SPORT, TRADITION AND FREEDOM

A Thesis
Presented for the
Master of Arts
Degree
Victoria University of Technology,
Victoria, Australia

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September, 1992
STA ARCHIVE
30001001256199
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Sport, tradition and freedom
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This acknowledgement will be unable to convey the depth of gratitude which I feel for the people who have inspired, guided and comforted me throughout the completion of this degree. It is to these people that I now express my sincerest thanks.

Many of my most desperate and troublesome moments in the preparation of this thesis were overcome through the contributions, advice and friendship of my principal supervisor, Dr. Terry Roberts, and my co-supervisor, Dr. Dennis Hemphill. Their patience and scholarly excellence contributed in a significant way to this thesis.

The hardships in writing this thesis could not have been overcome without the balancing effect of the warm and happy moments spent with my many friends in the postgraduate course and on the staff of Victoria University. A special debt is owed to Hayden Power who not only organized my teaching duties, but who was always available to chat. I can only hope that the St. Kilda Football Club realizes what a valuable resource they are missing out on and immediately appoints him as team coach.

As important as these people have been, it is to my family that this thesis is dedicated. It was my sisters and brothers-in-law who gave me their friendship, interest, support and encouragement without question or demand. And it was my dad, Alan, and my mum, Joan, who accepted my moods,
the state of chaos in their home, and my odd eating and sleeping hours, with humour, generosity, patience and love. This thesis, I give to them with love and gratitude.
ABSTRACT

"Sport, Tradition and Freedom" entails a philosophical examination of the relationship between traditions of rationality and understandings of freedom in sport. Chapter One introduces the ideas of freedom and virtue. Chapter Two involves a critical and historical exploration of the traditions of conservatism, liberalism and Marxism and the effects that these traditions have had on accounts of freedom in sport. Chapter Three examines the issue of freedom in sport from a social critical-formalist perspective, particularly addressing the influence that the process of commodification in advanced capitalism has had on sport. It also endeavours to suggest that the virtues, as explained by Alisdair MacIntyre, are important to the protection of formal freedom in sport, from the effects of advanced capitalism. Chapter Four examines the link between the modern liberal tradition and the virtue tradition. This link is made via the ideas of self-determination and authentic social unions which both traditions share. This chapter also investigates the influence that these various traditions have had on the framing and solution to issues in sport, using the drug issue as a paradigm case. The conclusion suggests that it may be profitable to explore the rationality of less dominant traditions in society when investigating sport.

Inquiry revealed that many traditions of understanding
in sport rely heavily on elements from political traditions in society. Freedom in sport has been linked to conservative notions of a craft, to liberal notions of play and the independent individual and to accounts of freedom which support the dominant capitalist institutions of society. The examination by social critical theorists of the freedom of authentic social practices and the location of this freedom in the formal rules of sport, provided an alternative to these previous explanations which had located freedom in either the attitude of the player or the economic institutions of society. On the formalist view of sport, freedom is located in the pursuit of gratuitous difficulty, which the rules of sport make possible. The protection of this freedom from social abrogation involves virtue, the formation of authentic social unions, and judgement in sporting participation. The concluding chapter suggested that the protection of formal freedom and the importance of judgement and "seeing without illusion" in sport is critical to issues such as feminism, professionalism and creativity in sport.
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Men reason to strengthen their own prejudices and not to disturb their adversary's convictions.

(Ashley Jukes)
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

A cursory reading of most introductory physical education texts will suggest a number of benefits that will occur as a result of participation in sport. These benefits include the promotion of health and physical fitness, the encouragement of qualities such as persistence, determination and self-discipline, the ability to follow rules and the enjoyable participation in a safe and wholesome activity. It has been stated that sport promotes national pride, unity and social integration for a society, as well as educating its members about the value of qualities such as tolerance, cooperation and competition (74: p32).

However, the practice of modern sport appears to be suffering from a number of disturbing maladies that suggests that sport may not be serving as beneficial a role in society as previously thought. Elite athletes are expected to continue to play whilst injured and risk further damage to their bodies. Some athletes use illegal tactics to gain an advantage over their opponents. Spectators at some sporting events choose to confront opposition supporters violently. Far from being safe or educational for the athlete, or unifying for society, elite sport may have become so competitive, regimented and serious that the moments of excitement and freedom available to players and spectators
are becoming dominated by a fear of defeat or failure. In order to understand the significance of the apparent debasement of sport, it is necessary to examine first the humanizing possibilities that sport has to offer its participants, and then to explain how these possibilities are affected by the current practice of sport.

Gruneau (34: p19) suggests that there have been two related areas of concern which have pervaded most of the sociological theory about society, and about sport. The first is the issue of human agency; that is, the extent to which individual humans are free to think and act in the ways they do. The major political theories of society all suggest the necessity for the protection of freedom in society. This freedom is described in various ways and is believed to be threatened by different obstacles. The advocates of each theory believe that their description of freedom is the most accurate or meaningful, and that the limits which are removed by the application of their ideas are the most restrictive. As a simplification, it may be suggested that conservatism offers the agent freedom from anarchy or revolution, two events that threaten the link between the agent and his or her community and role. Liberalism demands freedom from ignorance, poverty and excessive bureaucratic control in order to allow individuals the opportunity to pursue those goals in life which they believe to be important. Marxism suggests that it is necessary to free the individual from the alienating effects of rationalisation in the workplace. Each
of these ideas will be explained more completely in a later section of this thesis.

The second issue of importance in sociological theory, according to Gruneau (34: p19), is the identification and explanation of the rise and decline of specific socioeconomic structures and the cultural forms associated with them. A number of economic, social, cultural and political developments in Europe from the late seventeenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth century resulted in the establishment of our three major ideological traditions; democracy, socialism and nationalism (33: p20). The development of the modern industrial state resulted in a greater opportunity for geographic and social mobility than was previously available to individuals. Workers left the security of small, conservative, rural communities to sell their labour in larger industrial cities. The homogenous stable rural community was replaced by a heterogenous, mobile community which lived in larger industrial cities. Harmony in these cities required the practice of tolerance towards the various religions and diverse cultural practices of its members. The new cultural forms of modern religions, occupations and social relations arose in combination with the development of the modern state. The impact of this was felt in a number of ways. Karl W. Deutsch suggests:

Social mobilisation...denotes...a number of more specific processes of change, such as changes of residence, of occupation, of social setting, of face-to-face associates, of institutions, roles and ways of acting.... Singly, and even more in their
cumulative impact, these changes tend to influence and sometimes to transform political behaviour (cited by 33: p21).

How are these developments related to Gruneau's first issue of human agency? Liberal theorists suggest that the development of the modern state allows individuals a wider freedom to use their abilities creatively in society (17: pp38,39). Conservative ideas, which had been governing society long before the development of the modern state, were voiced in opposition to liberal views. The conservative theorists believe that the modern state destroys the agent's freedom by removing the links the agent has to community, religion and tradition (56: pp52,53). Marxism also suggests that the rise of the modern liberal state and the incidence of social mobility, and the development of new cultural forms of economic practice, religion and community, can be explained in terms of wider or narrower freedom for the individual.

MacCallum (58: p312) suggests that the controversies concerning freedom in society can be roughly divided into four related kinds. The first concerns the nature of freedom. The second and third involve the relationship between the attainment of freedom and the attainment of other social benefits such as technology or economic security, and the ranking of freedom amongst these benefits. The final problem involves the potential of an idea to attain freedom for the members of a community. Disputes concerning one kind of question are readily changed into disputes about the other.
issues. For example, political parties often dispute the nature and extent of freedom by referring to the presence or absence of other social benefits, such as safety, which are believed to be secured or denied by the parties' policies. MacCallum (58: p313) goes on to suggest that: "The resulting flexibility of the notion of freedom, and the resulting enhancement of the value of freedom, have suited the purposes of the polemicist."

This flexibility about the notion of freedom in modern liberal society should not be surprising considering the origins of the modern state. The evolution of the heterogenous modern state requires the practice of tolerance towards a variety of ideas and ways of life. A plurality of traditions can develop and persist, each with its own views on freedom and how it is best protected. According to Gamble:

Out of the Enlightenment and the revolutionary era at the end of the eighteenth century emerged the two central doctrines of the Western ideology - liberalism and socialism. They did not enjoy undivided sway, since they were challenged from the outset by conservative doctrines that were anchored in the traditional institutions, practices, and beliefs that still survived so strongly in many societies (30: p15).

These major traditions of thought persist in some form in modern society. The various traditions can be regarded as a series of attempts to understand and solve the problems of society. These traditions reveal a sense of the transient and relative nature of ideas. This transience means that notions of truth and certainty, in matters such as the
freedom of individuals, lose their fixed quality. The superiority of any one tradition is no longer a matter of faith. It is related to its ability to answer challenges to its revelatory statements. A tradition's explanation of society approaches the truth as it answers questions about the nature of practices in that society at that particular historical era. In Gamble's terms:

The Western ideology can be examined as a set of moral discourses and practices, concerned with the question of the good society and of right conduct, of social justice and the full development of human potential. But it is also a set of rational discourses and practices that are concerned with the question of truth and knowledge and with discovering the most effective and most efficient means for realising given ends (30: pp19,20).

Flexibility about the notion of freedom has also suited those who write about the value of sport in terms of its potential to enhance or restrict freedom. Some authors, including Huizinga (47) and Novak (75), suggest that play, as the basis of sport, appears to transcend the practical affairs of everyday life and give the athlete the opportunity to be free and creative. To them play gives the impression of being a spontaneous activity. Gruneau (34: p146) contends that the rules and traditions which define and regulate sporting practice are conservative by-products resulting from a staunchly defended, cultural heritage of past participants. Far from being a spontaneous and free activity, this view suggests that sport is a rule governed and restricted aspect of human agency. Elite sport may have become one of the least autonomous avenues of human agency, where the opportunities
for the athlete to display creativity and freedom in their play are subordinated to the requirements for military-like coordination, efficiency and productivity within the team.

The second issue involves the extent to which the practice of sport is affected by the rise and decline of specific socioeconomic structures, and how sport acts as a medium for human development and social change or maintenance. Huizinga (47) and Novak (75) argue that sport and play offer the human agent the opportunity to pursue perfection in their actions. In this sphere of life, all people are permitted an equal opportunity to seek this goal. In this respect, play and sport may offer the agent greater freedom than other cultural practices such as education or employment. Novak (75: p225) goes on to suggest that a playful attitude is necessary for creativity and social development in all aspects of life. However, critics of modern sport such as Brohm (8) and Rigauer (87) argue that participation in sport may blind people to their potential to act politically in the wider, unjust society. Through its logic and practice, sport reinforces the values of aggressive individualism, competition, productivity, subordination and rationalisation which are crucial to the maintenance of a capitalist society. Sport conditions the agent to support and accept the logic of a repressive society.

The second chapter of this thesis will examine the conservative, liberal and Marxist views of modern society. In addition, the various applications of these theories to sport
will be critically assessed. It will be suggested that each of the theories make significant contributions to the explanation of freedom in sport. It will be shown that the conservative ideas of freedom and virtue in sport become shrouded by the importance of efficiency and productivity in the liberal-capitalist tradition. The Marxist explanation of sport proposes one solution to the problems of the liberal tradition of sport. This alternative account of freedom in sport will also be critically examined.

It is the contention of the present thesis that the serious problems associated with the practice of sport, which were stated at the start of this chapter, arise from a misunderstanding or ignorance of the nature of freedom in sport. This is, in turn, caused by a confusion of the presence or absence of other social benefits derived from sport, such as fame or wealth, with the presence or absence of freedom. It is to be argued, in agreement with Morgan (70: p62) that freedom in sport is made possible by the formal rules of sport. These rules circumscribe the use of more efficient means in pursuing the goal of a sport and are accepted in order to make the activity possible. This allows athletes to be seriously free and creative in the pursuit of their goals, whilst acknowledging that there is a lack of external seriousness in their pursuits. Further, it is believed that the wide gulf that exists between the ideal benefits of sport and the actual practice of sport is the result of a diminution of the freedom available in sport by
the exaggeration of benefits such as prestige and wealth. This exaggeration can create a belief in the athlete that the sport practice is simply externally serious.

Can freedom in sport be protected from this exaggeration? Each of the major strands of social theory concerning sport offers a significant contribution to the understanding of the relationship between freedom and other benefits, both internal and external, in sport. The arguments put forward by conservative, liberal and Marxist writers which contribute towards this understanding will be described and criticised throughout this chapter. It will be argued that no one strand of thought adequately explains the practice of sport, the nature of freedom in sport and how this freedom is to be protected. The major reason for the inadequacy of each theory is that no theory about sport recognises the nature of its relationship to the rationality of the tradition of thought in which it resides. This relationship will affect how sport is described, what the aims of sport are and how problems in sport are characterised and solved.

An extension of that problem is that these three traditions, which remain with some power in modern thought, are firmly rooted in a historical era which occurred prior to the influence of advanced capitalism. According to Gamble:

Capitalism as a process of accumulation and rationalisation has created a world for which the moral discourse of the Western tradition is increasingly unsuited. Its images and utopias have been undermined but nothing has replaced them....
That capitalism should have transformed the world in such a way as to undermine the moral force of the ideologies that guided, assisted, and interpreted it, is one of the great facts and the great paradoxes of the modern world (30: p20).

It will be suggested that when this relationship between the modern historical situation and the various traditions of thought is acknowledged, the virtue tradition as offered by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book *After Virtue* (60), with some modifications taken from both the social critical and modern liberal traditions, offers the best explanation of how the freedom articulated by the formal rules of sport can be protected. The purpose of chapters three and four is to show that these three traditions share a number of similar ideas about freedom in sport. In Gamble's terms:

> The pluralism of modern Western thought,...is one of the most striking facts about it. At the same time the diversity should not be exaggerated. There are enough unifying assumptions in modern Western doctrines for the whole of them to appear from one angle as a single ideology... (30: pp12,13).

Chapter Three will explain one alternative to the problems of the earlier traditions, as offered by social critical theorists. The advances made by the social critical tradition over the Marxist tradition will be shown to provide a better explanation of freedom in sport. This freedom is captured by the formal rules, which protect the pursuit of the inconsequential goal of the game. It will be argued that the first stage of Macintyre's explanation of the virtues is important in the protection of this formal freedom of sport from social abrogation.
It is necessary first to explain some of the important aspects of MacIntyre's theory about social practices generally, and then to apply these ideas to the specific social practice of sport. MacIntyre defines a social practice as:

...any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of excellence... (60: p187).

To use education as an example of a social practice, the teacher hopes to approach excellence in the internal goals of knowledge of the subject matter and communication of this matter to students, as well as a variety of other goals. As the limit of each of these internal goals is extended, that is, as improved teaching methods are devised, the techniques which are new become available to all practitioners without harm to the inventor.

It is with the claim that social practices are a cooperative activity that it may be difficult to compare sport with other social practices. The idea of sport is to win; to achieve the gratuitous goal in sport before or more regularly than other competitors. Whilst winning can and should be viewed as an internal goal in sport, in that it reflects excellent performance, the goal is achieved at the expense of the other competitors. Opponents cannot share the internal goal of victory and must, by the nature of the practice, attempt to thwart each other's attempts to pursue
the internal goal of victory.

The balance between opponents competing for the scarce benefit of victory, and a breakdown of the relationship between opponents resulting in the alienating practices of cheating and violence, is a precarious one. The balance may be tilted towards the alienating breakdown of relationships when the freedom available in sport is subordinated to the pursuit of other benefits derived from sport; that is when sport is pursued as a pathway to some other good.

MacIntyre goes on to suggest that virtue is crucial to participation in any social practice because it focuses the attention of the practitioner on the pursuit of the internal goals. The virtues of honesty, justice and courage are critical to the maintenance of any practice, for reasons which will be explained later in the paper. Other virtues may be crucial to the preservation of certain practices only (60: p191). For example virtues such as patience and understanding may be vital to the social practices of education or counselling, but may not be critical in the practices of engineering or economics. This chapter will explore the possibility of there being a special virtue in sport, one that contributes to and protects the special features of the social practice of sport and enhances the opportunity for athletes to be free.

Yet, is it being too optimistic to suggest that the development of a special virtue will protect sport? Is it
possible that there is no position for virtue or the pursuit of internal goals in modern sport? The problem with modern elite sport may be that it has lost touch completely with the idea of virtuous practice, and that, in its current pattern, it is impossible to regain the idea of virtue in sport.

MacIntyre suggests that in the liberal individualist tradition of modern times, it is not possible for a community to have a shared understanding of the nature of virtue. The language of morals, which developed in times and contexts different to modernity, has withered away, so that previous moral standards have lost their depth and meaning. According to MacIntyre, the barbarians:

... are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they have already been governing us for quite some time. And it is our lack of consciousness of this that constitutes part of our predicament (60: p263).

MacIntyre (60: p263) goes on to suggest that the reason that there is no depth in the explanation of virtues in modern society is that there is no shared conception of the telos for human beings in modern society. For society to reinvigorate the idea of virtue, it will be necessary for a community to have some idea of a common good. Since modern liberal-capitalist society is not a community, but merely a group of individuals pursuing their own self-interests, it does not have an idea of a common good. MacIntyre believes that the only hope for the development of moral rationality, or a fuller understanding of the nature of virtue, lies in the development of local forms of community.
Jeffrey Stout (99: p271) contends that, while MacIntyre correctly describes liberal society as having no one shared conception of a telos for the human, it is possible that members of society possess a rich enough shared background of beliefs to suggest some common understanding about the nature of virtues and internal goals in practices. Stout goes on to say that liberal society is endowed with a wide variety of social practices, all of which contain a tradition of internal goods and virtues that can be passed on to new generations of practitioners. The greater the number and more varied the nature of social practices, the more coherent the language of virtue in society should become.

Can Stout's arguments be applied to the nature of sport in modern society? Whilst sport is practiced for a variety of reasons and with a number of different goals by the various athletes in society, there does appear to be grounds for believing that there is some shared conception of the good in sport. Children are taught from an early age about the tradition of appropriate behaviour in sport, much of which goes beyond the strict requirements of the rules. In addition, athletes who hope to acquire the qualities of excellence must submit themselves to the authority of experts, who pass on their knowledge about the pursuit of excellence.

The problem with modern sports, according to Stout (99: p284), is not that individuals have no shared conception of the good of sport, but that the internal goods in sport
are being affected by the seepage of goods which are important in other spheres of life. Lasch (53: p408) explains that the degradation of sport occurs when the traditional conventions of the game are overlooked. This occurs when the qualities of the game are appraised according to the goods important in the market-place; that is, the productivity, efficiency and marketability of parts of the game.

The major contention of this paper is that sport offers the athlete a possibility for freedom that must be defended against the intervention of goods from other spheres of life, those that interfere with or destroy that freedom. However the defence of this freedom will only be successful if the special features of the social practice of sport, that is, the splendid futility of its goals and the precarious balance between cooperation and competitiveness of its practitioners, are emphasised to the exclusion of these other intrusive goods. It is the purpose of this paper to explain the necessity for there being a special virtue of judgement which contributes to and protects the special features of sport, and enhances the opportunities for athletes to be free within the social practice.

The fourth chapter will explain the modern liberal alternative to the problems of the traditions discussed in Chapter Two. It will examine how modern liberalism is thought to be superior to the idealism that bolstered the early liberal tradition. However this chapter will also show that this new form of liberalism need not be in opposition to a
natural end ethics which describes a telos for the person. This union gives the virtues which may be used to advance freedom in the social practice of sport, the force of a tradition. The drug issue in sport will be used as a paradigm case to display the inadequacies of current explanations of, and solutions to, the issue. These inadequacies will be shown to be due to an incomplete use of various traditions in sport or to the use of traditions which no longer suit the current conditions of sport, resulting in problems of consistency. It will be suggested that solutions to any problem in sport require a consistent application of a tradition to all aspects of sport.

The final chapter will summarise the thesis and present further implications of these ideas to modern sport. It will be shown that these concepts can have significance in understanding issues such as feminism and sport, the media and sport and sportsmanship.
The film *Dead Poet's Society* (109) begins with a celebratory mass to mark the commencement of the school term. The boys of Wilton Academy, an American preparatory school, are asked to recount the four pillars of society, pillars which have stood for the 120 years of the school's existence. The group replies that the four pillars are tradition, honour, discipline and excellence.

The boys' teacher, John Keating, proceeds to teach his students the dangers of conformity. After one lesson about the difficulty of maintaining your own beliefs in the face of conformity, his philosophy of education is challenged by the headmaster of the school. The headmaster explains that the curriculum is set and proven, and should not be questioned. Tradition, discipline and preparing the boys for college are the only requirements of a teacher at Wilton.

Conservative theories of society place a high value on tradition. Tradition is more valuable than reason, because the tradition of any practice includes not only its conscious reasoning but the dispositions, habits, motivations and sympathies out of which the practice grows and develops. Conservatives desire change only when it is incremental and adapts to the existing order of society (56: p48). Edmund Burke argued that traditions in good order involved
"...wisdom without reflection" (59: p353).

It was an aspiration of the Enlightenment philosophers from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries to provide standards and methods of rational justification by which courses of action in every sphere of life could be judged. This desire arose in opposition to conservative ideas of tradition, and it was hoped that reason would replace authority and tradition as a measure of the quality of practices and actions (59: p6). In Richard Rorty's terms:

... liberal social thought has centered around social reform as made possible by objective knowledge of what human beings are like.... we must step outside our community long enough to examine it in the light of something which transcends it, namely, that which it has in common with every other actual and possible community. This tradition dreams of an ultimate community..., which will exhibit a solidarity which is not parochial because it is the expression of an ahistorical human nature (92: p4).

Both MacIntyre (59: p7) and Rorty (90: p258) argue that this rationalist justification of society by Enlightenment philosophers and the non-rational view of tradition by conservative philosophers blinds people to the rationality of tradition. MacIntyre (59: p7) suggests that what both projects fail to observe is how standards of rational justification are inextricably linked to the history of a culture. These standards of justification emerge from, and gain support by, the way that they overcome limitations and provide solutions to the problems of their predecessors within the same tradition. In each tradition, reason or intellectual enquiry is part of the explanation of the social
The rationality of any tradition begins in some form of historical contingency (59: p354). Rawls (83: p225) explains that the liberal tradition of political justice arose within the social and historical conditions of the Reformation and the Wars of Religion, and was affected by the growth in constitutional government and market economics. The principles of tolerance and fairness, which allow for a diversity of beliefs and a plurality of conceptions of the good, began as ideas of political expediency to stop religious and civil wars and to accelerate production (17: p40). The development of any tradition occurs when authoritative texts and leaders of the tradition are shown to be susceptible to incoherencies. The established set of beliefs may be revealed to be inadequate in dealing with new situations and new problems, or in meeting new communities and their traditions. Human beings readjust their positions and beliefs to meet the changing conditions of their life. Rational behaviour is behaviour that adapts to incoherencies in ways similar to other members of the community (91: p217).

The response to the inadequacies or ambiguities in a tradition will rely not only on the current stock of reasoning abilities within the tradition, but also on the inventiveness of the individuals inhabiting the tradition. The solution to incoherencies will result in a reformulation of the authoritative texts and ideas of the tradition. This reformulation will also expose the inadequacy of prior forms
of the tradition (59: p356). According to Rorty (90: p267), it is the post-enlightenment idea of the situated historical person which allows for moral progress to be viewed as a history of solutions to problems; "...of poetic achievement by 'radically situated' individuals and communities...", rather than a gradual demystifying of life through the process of an ahistorical human rationality.

Once this point of rationality is reached in a tradition, it will have had to institutionalise and regulate to some extent its methods of enquiry. Standard forms of argument and questioning will be developed. At each stage of the tradition's development, the beliefs and judgements will be justified in terms of their superiority over prior forms. The claims to truth of these beliefs and judgements will be less susceptible to question and objection than were these prior forms (59: p359). However at no stage can an ultimate claim to truth be made as no tradition can be entirely confident that its present beliefs and judgements will not be shown to be inadequate in the future (59: p361).

In an earlier paper, MacIntyre (61: p459) comments that at any stage in a tradition's history, it may reach a point where its methods of enquiry cease to make progress in the solution of problems. It may also be that these methods of enquiry reveal increasing numbers of incoherencies in the tradition that cannot be solved. The inherited modes of explanation offer rival possibilities of interpretation, and ambiguity can occur. Such a crisis occurred within the
enquiry by Enlightenment philosophers to construct a tradition-free individual. The history of this tradition has been one of continuously unresolved disputes such that disagreement upon the major issues of the dispute seems to be ineradicable (59: pp334,335).

The resolution of such an epistemological crisis occurs with the invention of a new set of beliefs and texts. The creation of new concepts must allow the adherents of the tradition to understand both how they could hold prior modes of explanation, and how they could have been misled by these prior beliefs. Secondly, the new scheme must reveal solutions to the problems which were unsolvable by prior forms of the tradition. Finally, the new form of the tradition must show some fundamental continuity with the beliefs and ideas of the prior forms (59: p362).

There is a need to explain one further point of MacIntyre's theory. Whilst concepts and ideas are aspects of the traditions of distinct societies, this does not mean that they cannot be applied outside of that society. Aristotle's views of justice and reason occurred in terms of the historical context of traditions, social order and conflict in which he resided and from which his ideas emerged. Yet these ideas may be reembodied in modern times if the features of the Aristotelian polis essential to those concepts explained by Aristotle, are also present in modern times (59: p391).
This chapter will briefly describe the traditions of conservatism, liberalism and Marxism. In each, the historical contingencies, the conflicts and the solutions to problems addressed by these traditions will be examined. The ideas and beliefs of each tradition will also be shown to have had a significant effect on the explanation of the social practice of sport in society. The essential conditions of sport and society, which contributed to these understandings, will also be explained. This is in order to display the potential or difficulty in re-embodying these traditions as explanations of modern sport and society. It should be noted that these descriptions are only generalized summaries of the past traditions, and not detailed analyses. Nonetheless, they remain important as they provide a context and introduction to subsequent arguments in the thesis.

There are two reasons for explaining these historical traditions of thought. Firstly, many of the historical conditions of society, and of sport, which led to the development of the belief structures of these traditions, remain important in modern times. It may be possible that these ideas can contribute to an increased understanding of modern society and sport, and the problems faced by each. Secondly, some of the possible solutions to problems in modern sport may be remnants of past traditions without the historical conditions or beliefs necessary to support these solutions. As a result, these solutions may not be rationally defensible within a modern tradition.
Political Traditions

1) CONSERVATISM

As cited by Minogue (103: p195), Lord Hugh Cecil observed that: "Before the Reformation it is impossible to distinguish conservatism in politics, not because there was none, but because there was nothing else." Conservatism refers to a society's attachment to long held traditions, beliefs and institutions and the doctrines that have been used to support and defend those attachments. It is a tradition that views radical social change with suspicion, and supports those ideas that have grown over a long period of time and negotiation (56: p48).

There were a number of historical contingencies that promoted the development of the conservative tradition. Prior to the Reformation, there existed a population of small communities in Europe. These communities were largely agricultural, and relied on a geographically and socially stable working-class population. An individual, through his/her subservient labour, could produce little more than what was required to maintain the family. Any extra income was quickly appropriated by the government and the church; this minimized the geographical mobility of the working class (93: p14).

Stability and civilisation relied on a tradition of long-established, powerful institutions. Political stability relied on the strength of the family, the Church and the
Moral stability rested upon a sense of duty and respect, strengthened by religious belief. Disraeli (cited in 110: p27) argued that: "The most powerful principle which governs man is the religious principle.... Man was made to adore and to obey." The power of the Roman Catholic Church as the dominant religious institution was critical in controlling and restricting the mobility and rebelliousness of the labour classes. The dominant values of respect for authority, tradition and property required to maintain an orderly and subservient working class, were passed on through the teachings of that Church (17: p40).

This concept of obedience was important in convincing the working classes to accept long working hours, poor pay and religious and state taxes. The Church emphasised the idea of duty. The aristocracy and the Church praised the "honest toil" of the labourer, and elevated the work they did to a form of nobility. Manual work was the professed ethical ideal. Belief in religion allowed the worker to endure hardship and poverty, yet remain confident in the knowledge that he/she will live in supreme happiness with God in the hereafter (93: p15).

The communities were governed by an established elite consisting of royalty, the aristocratic landowners and the clergy. The major duty of government was to maintain peace and order. Any attempt to go beyond these basic requirements was likely to create a disproportionate amount of disruption in society. Change, according to conservative theory, should
emanate from the slow and regulated negotiation within society, and not be imposed by a powerful government (103: p195).

What were the established set of beliefs which resulted from these historical conditions? Conservatives believe in the complexity of human affairs; hence they mistrust utopian ideas based on some postulated universal human nature. Edmund Burke, in Reflections, observed:

The nature of man is intricate, the objects of society are of the greatest possible complexity: and therefore no simple disposition or direction of power can be suitable either to man's nature or to the quality of his affairs....

We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that the stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages (cited by 110: p28).

As a result of this unpredictability, conservative theory holds that governing is a special skill developed through a long tradition of practice, and is not necessarily distributed equally among all members of society. The exclusive and uncontested control of the people by the ruling elite is defended and justified on the basis of past experience, natural propensity and a divine right of the government as the chosen rulers by God (100: p196).

The individual is viewed as being constituted by his/her various roles in society, roles which connect the individual in concrete relations to other members of the community. The important relational links resulting from the stability of the conservative community are: a link to
ancestry which establishes a person's sense of place as related to a succession of generations, a link to those in one's family, one's religion and one's society which creates a respect for others and for authority, and a link to a place which provides the person with a motivation to be involved in the success of the community (40: p230). According to Burke (in 110: p37): "A nation is not an idea only of local extent and individual momentary aggregation, but it is an idea of continuity which extends in time as well as in numbers and in space."

Conservative theorists place a high value on tradition in life. Conservatives regard tradition as a heritage of skill and attainment through which current achievements are judged and to which all people can aspire. For this reason, traditions are dynamic, fertile and adaptable. Change in society only occurs when the conventions governing society cease to be useful to that society (56: p50). Society is better off if it absorbs novelty in small amounts. These slow changes are dependent on a general atmosphere of trust among the citizens, a tradition of political legitimacy and a tacit agreement for fair play by the government (40: p235). In Burke's terms (cited by 110: p61): "All persons possessing any portion of power ought to be strongly and most awfully impressed with the idea that they act in trust..."

In addition, conservatives regard habit as important in stabilising the community. Through habituation, a person
performs complex tasks with greater ease and efficiency. For Burke (cited by 110: p29): "Prejudice renders a man's virtue his habit; and not a series of unconnected acts. Through just prejudice, his duty becomes part of his nature." It is through habit that individuals are believed to be rendered free. Freedom is experienced as a quality of the individual's actual existence such that, he/she was free in the performance of this or that activity. Habitual acts permit greater freedom as they allow the activity to be performed better. Habit was crucial to the stability and efficient functioning of relations in society. It was the habits of conservative society; its customs, institutions and beliefs, that embodied the results of historical experience in society's practices and allowed it to preserve those practices. Individuals are civilised by the traditions and habits of the state. Social discipline and obedience created what was good in the person and in society (56: p53).

The hostility of conservatives to the French Revolution was based on the Revolution's proposed destruction of the important relational links in society in favour of vague and utopian principles of individual freedom. Conservatives such as Burke contended that freedom was a concrete and historical thing residing in the constitutional laws of England which protected the individuals. These laws developed through a history of compromise and resolution within conservative communities (40: pp224,225). Rights existed for all Englishmen and were protected by the law.
They did not exist as individual natural rights but as part of the balance of the community. This balance was decided within the tradition of negotiation in conservatism and was to be maintained as long as it was suitable to the society (56: p51).

Revolutionary theory proposed a freedom which was abstract and unhistorical; a Freedom of Man which stripped individuals of their social roles and duties. Burke (cited by 110: p58) replied that: "Abstract liberty, like other mere abstractions, is not to be found. Liberty inheres in some sensible object..." The joy for individuals, which the revolution was said to achieve by some writers, was not possible. According to conservative beliefs, people apart from their roles experience emptiness, disgust and alienation as well as a deep hatred of their existence. This hatred could only reverberate into wider rebellion. People were not made free by the revolution; they were merely alone and angry (40: p227).

Conservative theorists also believe that the mobility in a society based on revolutionary ideas is self-destructive. Mobility of wealth, property, power or status which is rapid enough to endanger social habit and threaten identity by linking social position to talent, and not to tradition, is opposed by conservative ideas. When a person's social role is linked to their talent, and not to their ancestry, then the identity of the person is experienced as something haphazard. The person, with different talents,
experiences a different role. In this situation, one's role seems arbitrary and absurd (40: p235).

According to conservatives, people's nature, as enduringly sinful or morally frail, is the root cause of political and social problems. Through habit, tradition and stability, the person copes with a weak nature and dutifully fulfils the requirements of social roles. To suddenly and radically change the roles that a person occupies, without first educating that person in the traditions of this new role, will result in social problems brought about by the weakness of the individual's nature. For this reason, conservative theory favours tradition over radical reform (56: p53).

The Enlightenment's objection to conservative society was that the individual was trapped and corrupted by an unjust society (56: p49). Conservatism had become a fixed ideology that resisted any change and disregarded the society that it governed. As an inexact science, politics could only provide practical maxims which could contribute to the understanding and solution of problems in society. The moment that a principle is regarded as absolutely good and unchangeable is the moment of betrayal of the conservative belief in a dynamic tradition (103: p198).

This betrayal may be revealed in a number of ways. For example, the fixed principles may no longer solve the problems they were supposed to, or may create new problems. Changing historical conditions may reveal the principle to be
inadequate or unfair. According to many Enlightenment writers, conservative theories could not satisfy the changing conditions of European society in the seventeenth century. The next section will investigate the historical changes which took place in Europe and the attempts by liberals to develop a tradition which satisfied these changes.

2) LIBERALISM

The liberal ideas of freedom have come to be important only in the modern age which commenced with the Renaissance and the Reformation. The ideological ancestry of liberalism can be found in the works of Greek philosophers, in the Roman conceptions of law and in the Christian belief in the relationship between the person and God. The liberal agrees with the importance of values of self-knowledge and self-discipline, the impartial administration of law and the integrity of officials and the sincerity of belief. Yet the liberal ideas of freedom are not to be found in Ancient Greece or Rome, nor in Christian countries before the Reformation (17: p36). Liberalism occurred because of the coming together of these ideas with the social, economic and cultural conditions favourable to its advent.

Held (42: p12) suggests that several historical factors contributed to the origin of the liberal tradition and the transformation of medieval conservative politics. These factors involved struggles between monarchs and the landed gentry about the rightful division of authority,
working class rebellions against excessive state and religious taxes and social obligations, the development of trade and industry, the challenge to the universal claims of Catholicism and the division between the church and the state.

The industrial revolution of the seventeenth century created a modern state which was both highly centralised and largely populated. The development of new industries resulted in an increased opportunity for social and geographical mobility for members of the modern state. This mobility was compatible with the economic doctrine of laissez-faire capitalism. Individuals within the market economy became free to sell their labour as they desired (103: p458). All individuals were granted a wider freedom to use their abilities creatively and choose their position in society. People were no longer bound by conservative tenets of hierarchy and tradition.

The period of religious conflict following Luther strengthened the people's willingness to associate for the defence of their preferred religious beliefs. The toleration of diverse religious beliefs was found to be politically expedient in the prevention of civil or religious wars (17: p42).

The increased mobility of the population and the decline in traditional structures of society and uniformity of belief creates the need for an elaborate legal system in which the rights and obligations of the human being are
distinguished from rights and obligations of individuals filling particular social roles and occupations (17: p38). The earliest forms of liberalism in Europe and America required the government to form a fair and universal legislative system to resolve those conflicts which would become prevalent in public life guided by the free-market values of competition and individualism. It was the duty of government to protect the life, the liberty and the property of its subjects (103: p458).

The liberal ideas of freedom emerge with the attribution of the rights of the human against those in authority. Whilst certain legal restrictions are viewed as necessary, traditional liberalism suggests that there should be an area of personal freedom in which the individuals can develop their natural faculties. Liberal ideology calls for an area of absolute freedom from the laws and constraints of the state (17: p47).

The association of people to defend religious beliefs was admitted to be a justified area of personal choice and this freedom was to be protected by the liberal state. Gradually, liberalism extended that doctrine so that freedom of choice should be applied in all matters that affect an individual (42: p13). As early as 1670, Spinoza asserts man's right to reason freely about everything and suggests that any interference by the sovereign state with this right was a invasion of freedom. According to Locke, the business of government is to protect and promote the pursuit of
indirect interests, and not to force the individual to believe anything even if it is thought to be heretical (17: pp42, 43).

Eventually tolerance and freedom of speech came to be valued highly in the liberal tradition. Politics is concerned with the defence of the rights of individuals. This defence should leave people in a position to realise their capacities (42: p13). Liberals consider that if the minimal amount of freedom is violated, individuals will find themselves in too narrow an area to develop. Locke and Mill suggest that this area should be as wide as possible to allow a variety of interests and activities to be pursued. This minimal amount of personal freedom must be preserved so as to not degrade the individuals' nature nor deny their interests (6: p11).

The combination of the rights of freedom of belief and of the development of natural interests is thought to be critical to society. According to Mill, civilisation can not advance without these freedoms. The truth, without a free discussion of ideas, will not come to light. There will be no scope for spontaneity, originality, creativity, moral courage or mental energy without the free pursuit of interests. Society will be crushed by the burdens of custom, tradition and collective mediocrity. Liberty is endangered by the mere existence of authority. In Constant's words: "It is not the arm that is unjust, but the weapon that is too heavy..." (cited by 6: p49).
These outcomes are all derived from the liberal belief in the rights of the free individual against those in authority. These individuals, Hobbes contends, are profoundly self-interested, and conflicts of interest necessarily occur. Hobbes' famous belief about the state of nature being a "War of everyone against everyone" requires the creation of an all-powerful state to create laws and secure the safe and just conditions of social and political life (42: pp14,15). Although Hobbes' conclusions are illiberal, his beliefs about the rights of free and equal individuals are a starting point for liberalism.

John Locke suggests that Hobbes is wrong in arguing that people who do not fully trust each other will freely consent to placing their trust in an all-powerful state. Like Hobbes, Locke begins with the idea of individuals endowed with natural rights prior to the setting up of the state. However, both Locke and Mill, suggest a more positive view of human nature than Hobbes, where people's interests can occur in harmony (6: p8). According to Locke, the law of nature specifies basic principles of morality, including the necessity not to harm others. Humans are free and equal because their reason allows them to grasp and follow the law of nature. Adherence to this law ensures that the state of nature is not a state of war (42: p20).

Political activity, for both Locke and Mill, is necessary to the preservation of individual rights. Membership of the political community ensures the freedom of
individuals, but it also carries the responsibility of participation. The state exists to safeguard the interests of the individuals, who are ultimately the best judges of these interests (42: p22).

In opposition to these ideas, modern welfare liberalism developed throughout Europe during the nineteenth century. People gave up some personal freedom to the state to be freed from the misery of poverty and ignorance (103: p458). Welfare liberalism suggests that individuals gain a positive freedom to place themselves in society, and form ambitions which are attainable, whilst relinquishing some part of the control of their lives to the state. This surrender of some personal responsibility ensures that individuals can exercise their new freedoms.

Like Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau offers an account of the state of nature. Rousseau believed that humans are happy in the original state, but they are driven from this state by a variety of obstacles, including individual weaknesses and natural disasters. Human beings come to realise that the development of their full capacity for reason can occur only through social contract with a law-making and enforcing body. Rousseau's differed from Locke and Hobbes, in that he saw this contract as making self-government possible (42: p29).

Rousseau views human beings as essentially social beings. Ambitions and human skills only occur within the social framework. In his work Emile (1762) Rousseau describes an education that creates rational, social desires in the
individual. With these social needs, the individual recognises the importance of making claims on others, and of acknowledging the claims of others. Only as a social being will individuals understand and appreciate freedom as the full capacity for reason (17: p47). Knowledge frees the individual by eliminating irrational desires. Rousseau (cited by 6: p24) argued: "He is truly free, who desires what he can perform and does what he desires."

Kant believes that freedom is the control of, or resistance to, irrational desires. However, contrary to the beliefs of conservatives about the civilising effects of tradition and social habit, the individual is made free by pursuing autonomous aims and choosing to follow self-imposed moral laws. Desires which are unattainable, or infringe on the rights of others, are abandoned by the rational person. This decision is identified with freedom (6: pp20,21). The state's responsibility in this process is the education of the individual. However, once education has created the rational being, the obedience to self-imposed moral laws is part of a sphere of life with which the state is not concerned (17: p48). Kant suggests that liberty is identified with the perfectly rational society, where all individuals are given all the freedom that they desire. Individuals abandon their wild, lawless freedom of childhood and find it again in its mature, educated form in the rational state (6: p33). Obedience to this state relies on the self-imposition of moral laws. The recognition of the immorality of an act is
the absolute barrier to the imposition of one person’s will over another (6: p51).

Hegel expands on both Kant and Rousseau by explaining how the human is essentially social. The individual’s abilities to reason, to form purposes and to make plans are developed in a social situation through the process of the cultural inheritance of ideas, customs and traditions. To become rational, purposeful and moral are all part of the same course of development which is social. Freedom is a chance to develop capacities and pursue interests. In conceiving of freedom in this way, it is also necessary for the human to recognise the social rules of relationships (17: p48).

Hegel conceives of people as developing beings, as well as moral ones. The development of capacities occurs within the framework of the institutions and practices which they create. People’s beliefs and desires are affected by and effect the customs and conventions of the practice. Progress occurs as a reasoned solution to any contradiction between an individual’s desires and the conventions of the practice. This progress appears as a deepened understanding of the relationship between the individual, the practice and the social world. The growth in understanding about the world and the practice is considered to be a growth in freedom (17: p48).

The state is both an effect and a condition of the greater freedom of the individual. The more social rules
declared by the state, the greater the understanding of humans about rights and obligations and the better equipped humans become to satisfy their ideals and seek progress in their practices. The state is the social order in its most rational aspect. All desires and values of individuals are compatible in the rational state (6: p53).

Yet Hegel is also acknowledged for recognising how institutions can restrict freedom. People can be enslaved by an uncritical and asocial acceptance of institutions or beliefs. It is only through the alignment of the conventions of an institution with the current social situation that individuals are able to form suitable and rational purposes and ideals within the institution (6: p28).

The problems facing the tradition of liberalism based on Hegel's or Kant's claims of rationality have been recognised both within and from outside the tradition of liberalism. Liberals such as Mill and Humboldt fear the paternalism that is apparent in Hegel's adulation of the state. They believe that if the state provided too much for the individual, then the individual's autonomy and independence will be weakened. The ability to define one's own problems, or to recognise weaknesses in the state, will be reduced by this dependence. The individual who is freed from irrationality through education, may gain new restraints if the acceptance of this education is uncritical (17: pp49,50). The principles of self-realisation, self-improvement and autonomy, which are necessary for individual
freedom, cannot guarantee it.

Forms of liberalism based on the rationalist perspective of society offered by Hegel and Kant suffer from the problem of how this rational state is to be made explicit in practice whilst remaining true to the principles of liberalism. Clearly the irrational individual requires education. However, it is equally clear that the irrational person cannot be expected to always co-operate. Fichte (cited by 6: pp33,34) suggested compulsion is justified in education for future insight. Yet, it is the decision of some other person what future insight is valuable to the individual. This line of argument, stemming from the principles of welfare liberalism, results in a state of affairs which is clearly illiberal. The rationalist argument of an ideal liberal society leads from the ethical doctrine of autonomy and individual self-perfection to the authoritarian and intrusive state which decides what is best for the individual (6: p37). A major problem for the liberal state is in justifying its determination of the rational common good for society. According to MacIntyre:

Any conception of the human good to which, for example, it is the duty of government to educate the members of the community morally, so that they come to live out that conception of the good, may up to a point be held as a private theory by individuals or groups, but any serious attempt to embody it in public life will be proscribed. And this qualification of course entails that... its [liberal individualism's] toleration of rival conceptions of the good in the public arena is limited (59: p336, my insertion).

The solution by modern liberals to the problem of the
rationalist perspective of society, discussed in Chapter
Four, is to remove the idea of the nature of the individual
as a rational being.

Yet some of the beliefs of liberalism act as a
starting point for the tradition of Marxism. The ideas of
individualism, freedom of choice, politics as the arena of
the maintenance of private interests and the importance of
institutions and practices are all critical to the Marxist
tradition (42: p31). The next section of this essay
endeavours to show how Marx uses some of the beliefs of
liberalism, and adjusts them to address the problems which
liberal social theory faces in modern capitalist society.

3) MARXISM

The growth of the modern industrial state brought
about the development of an exchange society, that is, one
where goods are produced primarily for profit, and not to
satisfy human needs. When a society produces more than it
needs for survival, a point of surplus production is reached.
At this point, the product can be distributed unequally, as
the division of the excess product has no effect on the
survival of the species. This surplus commodity production
determines the nature of economic relations in the modern
society; it results in some people having a larger share of
what is produced than others (50: p15).

The private appropriation of the results of
production mean that people, instead of cooperating in the
social practice of production, must compete for larger shares of the product. Thus, competition and individualism occur in society as people fend for themselves. Along with private appropriation, capitalization, that is, the accumulation of productive capital, also occurs. Some people obtain the monetary power to buy other people's labour (66: p106). The unequal distribution of the profits of production creates a division in society between those people who privately own the means of production and those people who sell their capacity for work in order to survive (43: p41).

The more productive capital that is available in society, the more diversified the division of labour becomes and the more diversified industry becomes. The progressive development of more efficient means of production occurs as a result of the competitive production process in capitalist society. This development and rationalisation of techniques and tools results in greater forces of production in a society (66: p107).

Eventually, commodity production transforms all social relations so that the individual, whether labourer or capitalist, pursues individual interests. Advancement and achievement are related to individual performance (66: p112). Capitalists require this competition between individuals to maintain their strong position as owners of the products of industry. Collective action on the part of the workers can endanger the advantageous position of the capitalist (50: p16). Yet, it is this competition which dooms the capitalist
to impoverished relations with others. People, in a society, become linked by abstract exchange relations rather than concrete personal ones.

A general tendency exists in capitalist societies towards rationalisation and monopoly. Smaller industries are taken over by larger industries, so that a concentration and centralisation of capital occurs. The free market becomes progressively replaced by "...an oligopolistic and monopolistic production of standardized goods" (43: p41). The competitiveness of capitalist society means that fewer people come progressively to control a greater share of the means of production. Successful capitalists are "...forced to intensify the exploitation of the workers to remain competitive and profitable" (66: p110).

In order to fully understand Marx's opposition to liberal-capitalism, it is necessary to begin with his understanding of the nature of humans, and then observe how this is enhanced or corrupted in a liberal-capitalist society. According to Marx (63: p.609): "He that would criticise all human acts, movements, religions, etc. ... must first deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature as modified in each historical epoch."

Like all species, humans depends on their environment for survival. This environment satisfies all species needs for food, shelter and water. The thing which separates the human species from all other species, according to Marx, is its capacity to control and use the environment in creative
production. Human productivity extends beyond the requirement of the satisfaction of physical needs. Marx (64: p113) argued that, "...man... only truly produces in freedom" from necessity.

The essence of human nature is the ability humans have to devise and carry out a plan of creative use of the environment. It is through this productive work on the environment that individuals show that they are a species, superior to all others (7: p578). In Marx's terms (64: p113), "...it is just in his work upon the objective world...that man first really proves himself to be a species being." It is in art, architecture or any other cultural practice, that individuals show their humanity, not just in the functional requirements of the product, but when the human "...forms things in accordance with the laws of beauty" (64: p114).

This feature of human production also distinguishes people from other species in that the human species produces according to individual standards. When animals produce, their objects of production are made in accordance with the standards and the needs of the species. The person acknowledges the standards of every species and creates a personal standard. Humans realise their own individual projects through work, and satisfy the purposes that they invent or devise for their product (66: pp97,98). It is through this creativity that individuals develop a consciousness of their abilities and possibilities in society. Marx (63: p177) observes: "By this acting on the
external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature."

Marx also recognises that the human is a social being. The transformation of the primitive environment into a modern society requires the co-ordinated work of all humans together (66: p101). Without the assistance of other people, the range of possibilities for consciousness-raising work available to individuals is severely limited. At a societal level, praxis is the intelligent, material, social activity through which a society transforms its environment to satisfy its needs. Through this cooperative work, a base for future generations is created (66: p102).

This account of a generalized human nature may appear to be incompatible with Marx's claim that: "...all history is but the continuous transformation of human nature" (65: p160). According to this argument, human nature is subject to historical development in the same way that social structures are. How then is it possible for Marx to suggest a general model of humanity which transcends this concrete, historical form?

Marx's solution is that the differentiation and the manifestation of human nature are historical processes that will be complete when the ideal human condition is reached. Marx sees social relations as the critical determining factor in shaping human nature. Any imperfection in the nature of these social relations will necessarily result in imperfection in people who cannot reach their ultimate human
potential (7: p577). Thus, the human species, defined through its creative work on the environment, moves through a series of historical stages towards a set of ideal relations which allow greater opportunity for this work. This movement is still only partially realized in the current social configuration of liberal-capitalism (73: p492).

The aspiration of Marxism, like that of liberalism, is to provide the social conditions for all humans to develop their nature and express their diverse qualities. Both traditions acknowledge the need for respect between free and equal individuals. The two traditions differ in what they believe to be the ideal human nature. Liberalism is preoccupied with the creation of a world where individuals can achieve rationality. The Marxist tradition believes in the desirability of social goals and relations, as occur during the process of creative production (42: p164).

For Marx, the underlying and critical mode of social production that affects the manifestation of human nature, is economic. Any important changes in the cultural practices of a period, and in the development of the human nature, are ultimately the result of changes in the economic substructure (17: p148). The rest of society reflects the nature of economic relations in production. According to Marx (cited by 66: p110): "The mode of production... determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life."
At any stage of history the key to understanding a particular society is its predominant mode of production. This mode of production consists of the tools and techniques it uses, that is, its forces of production, and the relations of production through which a society applies the forces of production to nature (7: p579). Human nature is embodied, not in people as individuals, but in groups as organised by the mode of economic production (73: p493). In Marx's terms (cited by 73: p494), "...the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its actuality it is the ensemble of social relations."

Marx's opposition to the capitalist mode of production, which developed in harmony with the ideas of liberalism, is that this configuration of social relations failed to allow all people the opportunity for the exercise of their ergon, that is, free and creative work. The wage-labourer is prevented from those productive activities which specify the species as human. The agent is compelled by a need to survive, to produce in accordance with someone else's plans and standards (73: p488). Marx (64: p114) stated that: "In tearing away from man the object of production... estranged labour tears away his species life." The capitalists' private appropriations of the labour and the product have the effect of making impossible the activities of planning, personal standards and social production which elevate the human species above all animal species (73: p490).
Labour that is either concerned merely with survival, or where the creative process is debased, is alienated. Alienated labour reaches its worst form in industrial capitalism. In this form of organization, workers are tied to the machine in the performance of tasks that are only a small part of the production process. The wage-labourer is distanced from the object of production. The capitalist owns the worker's labour, the product, the raw materials and the production process. The capitalist claims the further right, by virtue of this ownership, to determine and control the entire labour process. In so doing, the worker's individual creativity and intellect is stifled (7: p578).

The capitalist mode of production determines, independently of the people's will, an uncooperative form of social relations. The resentment of the workers towards the capitalist increases in line with their exploitation, the number of compelled wage-labourers grows, and the outcome is a savagely divided society where a majority of people have practically no control over their working lives.

The resultant strain in relations which occurs when capital is controlled by a small number of people, and the ensuing dependence of the population's financial security on these owners, means that the state now faces a choice. It can endeavour to restrict the level of monopolization of industry, or it can give active support to the system of monopolies. Marx believes that the state is a reflection of the class relations in civil society. Rather than acting as
an institution which demonstrates the highest human qualities, as Hegelian liberals profess, the state in capitalist society supports exploitative and dehumanizing capitalist relations. In order to reinvigorate human relations, it is necessary to change the whole structure of the state (7: p578). Marx argued that this change will only occur when, "...the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of society" (cited by 7: p579).

Marx believes that capitalism is a necessary step towards the ideal state of human nature in a communist society. Nasser argues, in line with Marxist theory, that:

In the absence of those historical conditions which make it possible for man to exercise his ergon in the context of an egalitarian and communitarian social order, the values of equality, community and free exercise of one's powers are nothing more than empty ideals; ethics cannot (require) them because history does not (allow) them (73: p496).

Capitalism prepares the way for communism both by developing the forces of production and by creating the conditions of disenchantment within the majority of people. As a result, the workers acquire both the will and the ability to overthrow the existing system. The will is developed during the deprivation of the individuals' humanness. The ability occurs as a result of the numerical advantage of deprived humans in advanced capitalism (73: p494).

The inevitable collapse of capitalism will result in the downfall of all cultural forms, including the state, that protect and promote the capitalist mode of production. What
will be left is a new, humane and fully human order where
democratic values guide all forms of economic and social
practice (17: p148). In the words of Marx (cited by 7: p578):

In a higher phase of communist society; after the
enslaving subordination of the individual to the
division of labour..., has vanished; after labour has
become not only a means of life but life's prime
want; after the productive forces have also increased
with the all-round development of the individual, and
all the springs of cooperation flow more abundantly -
only then can... society inscribe on its banners:
From each according to his ability, to each according
to his needs!

One of Marx's revelatory observations is that many
institutions in modern society, such as the law of supply and
demand, are subjectively chosen historical solutions to
problems in society. These solutions become mistaken for
objective powers which then stand in the way of development
and freedom as situations change (6: p28). This observation
applies to both conservative and liberal explanations of
society. Both Marx and Engels explain that abstractions have
no real value unless they can be related to the historical
conditions of the time (15: p6).

The liberal determination to create a sovereign
democratic state where all individuals are free and equal is
radically compromised by the reality of the free market. The
Marxist tradition shows that the organisation of the economy
cannot be regarded as non-political, that the power relations
of the economy will have a distorting effect on the freedom
and equality of the state (42: p166). In Horkheimer's terms:

Production is not geared to the life of the whole community [to the common interest] while heeding also the claims of individuals: it is geared to the power-backed claims of individuals while being hardly concerned with the life of the community (cited by 43: p43).

The political task in Marxist politics is to set the individual free from the material conditions of capitalism, in order to permit the individual the opportunity to achieve the fullest human nature possible.

Yet the Marxist critique of the liberal tradition is also problematic. The weaknesses in Marx's theory have made it possible for a large variety of contradictory theories to spring from it (7: p582). The central failure of Marxism is its simple reduction of political power to economic power. This reduction excludes other issues from the area of political or state power. The ideas of Marxism cannot encompass the suggestions of racial or gender demands for power. The Marxist concept of the political is too narrow to explain non-economic demands for power (42: pp166,167).

A second major problem for Marxism is the historical capacity for liberal-capitalism to adapt and grow stronger. The class contradictions in advanced societies failed to escalate into revolution. The extension of the franchise to include workers, the development of the welfare state and the provision of pensions, public education and free hospitals drawn from the taxes of the rich and middle-class provided some sense of social solidarity in advanced capitalism. The
free market of liberalism became a fairer and stronger one
(56: pp58,59).

Held (42: p168) argues:

The central issue today is not the old alternative
between liberalism and Marxism, reformism or
revolution to abolish the state. Rather it is the
question of how to enact the 'double-sided' process
of creative reform by state action and innovation
from below though radical social initiatives.

The traditions of conservatism, enlightenment liberalism and
Marxist socialism may all have applications in areas of
modern society. It is important to recognise the historical
conditions which led to the development of these ideas. To
re-embbody these theories certain historical conditions must
be approximated in modern society. The following two chapters
of this thesis will show the critical input that these
traditions have had to the development of modern theories of
society, freedom and the nature of humans.

Before this is done, it is important to look at how
these traditions of thought influenced the explanation of the
social practice of sport throughout modern history. Once
again, it will be important to explain the historical
conditions of sport which affected both the beliefs about
freedom in sport and the crises in those beliefs.

**Sport and Tradition**

There is a sentiment which occasionally appears in
discussions concerning sport that suggests that sport would
benefit if it was kept separate from politics. In its most common form it occurs as the slogan, "sport and politics shouldn't mix." The sentiment has held a powerful position in societies throughout history. During the period of the Ancient Olympic Games, participating athletes were allowed to travel through their enemy's territory in safety. The Olympics were considered to overshadow the political problems of the warring nation-states of ancient Greece. In more recent times, the Australian Olympic Federation ignored the recommendation of the Australian Government to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Jim Webster (108: p116) commented:

However, by its bullying tactics this country came as close as it ever has to having its sporting pastimes controlled and determined by politicians. That it came even remotely near this was as disturbing to many Australians as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan itself.

According to this account, the celebration of international sport was not the correct arena to display a country's opposition to another country's political actions.

Whilst the sporting community has been determined to maintain its independence from politics, the political community has recognised the value of sport in supporting a country's ideology. The Chinese communist party used sport as a medium for readmission into the international community after the cultural revolution of 1966 to 1970. The slogan of "friendship first, competition second" was used by the Chinese as a diplomatic tool to gain better relationships with Western countries (5: p20). Hoberman (45: p1) suggests
that the demonstration of nationalistic fervour on the occasion of the West German victory in the 1954 soccer World Cup indicated a resurgence of national pride which had been suppressed by guilt since the war.

Hoberman (45: pl) goes on to suggest that these strikingly political effects of sport may interfere with a discussion of sport as an "...intrinsically political phenomenon." It is these vividly apparent powers of sport to unite a population which blind people to the more specific relationships between sport and the traditions of political or social belief. Sport has been used as an "...undifferentiated vehicle of self-assertion by the state..." (45: pl) regardless of the specific ideology which holds power in the community.

The ideology or tradition which dominates a country's belief system may infuse every sphere of life. This idea is not conspicuous in Australian or American sport because sport in these countries has no obvious ideological bias. However, in totalitarian cultures such as post-1949 China, practices such as sport readily register changes in beliefs (45: pp2,3). The change in the political ideology of the Communist Party in China from the secrecy of the Cultural Revolution to the years of openness of the 1970's was reflected in the practice of sport in that country.
The intrusion of political ideologies or traditions into Western understandings of sport may not yet be plainly evident. Jonathan Spence (cited by 45: p7) has argued:

It is difficult for us to ascribe "ideological" values to [popular] diversions. We shy away from such ascription as an unwholesome pasttime, as something smacking of cant or dogmatism, even though we are aware of how much time we spend simply looking at these mass entertainments, and how great an influence they seem to have on our children.... And though we acknowledge that we live in a bourgeois-capitalist society, we are not generally interested in discussing bourgeois-capitalist art, nor in giving much weight to the fact that such art may mislead or distort.

It is the purpose of this section to examine the relationship between descriptions of sport and the particular social traditions of conservatism, liberalism and Marxism. Each of the traditions will be discussed in terms of their different conceptions of the human nature and society, and the impact these can have on the organisation and understanding of sport practices.

1) THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SPORT

Codified sport emanated from the public school system in England during the nineteenth century. Whilst the public schools were originally set up to educate the needy and the poor, the number of fee-paying students came to outnumber the poor students during the eighteenth century. These paying students were the sons of the aristocracy and landed gentry, and were unwilling to accept discipline from masters who they
considered were their social inferiors. As a result, there was a great amount of tension and unruly behaviour in these schools (20: pp47-49).

During this period, the boys organised their own activities, which included the aristocratic pastimes of hunting and fishing as well as the village games of cricket and folk football. The masters were largely disapproving of these activities because of the brutality in the games. However, it gradually became apparent that these games reduced the number of discipline problems at the schools. Public schools became the leading supporters of sport in the community (12: p138).

The "old boys" of these schools from the aristocratic and landed gentry classes, who remained interested in sport, had both the time and the wealth to pursue their interest actively. The English Football Association was created in 1863 and the Rugby Football Union in 1871. The Jockey Club of Newmarket and the Amateur Athletic Club ensured the control of these sports remained in the hands of the ruling classes (12: p139). The game of cricket had been appropriated by the landed classes in the mid-eighteenth century and was controlled by the exclusive Marlyebone Cricket Club (39: p180).

There was little enthusiasm to share the benefits of sport with the labour class. Rules were enacted to discourage the working class from participation. The Amateur Athletic Club not only excluded professional athletes from
competition, but also excluded anyone who was "...a mechanic, artisan or labourer..." (cited by 12: pl39). The opposition to participation was partly rationalised by the belief that the working classes required mental stimulation in their leisure time to balance their physical labour. However, there was also a deeper sentiment that suggested that the idea that the poor should be included in the leisure pursuits of the rich was abominable. Such inclusion would ruin these games. This was displayed in the comment of one Duchess to the establishment of public holidays for the working class. She remarked: "What do the poor want with holidays? They ought to work" (93: pl7). The life of the labourer was thought to be focused solely on work.

The aristocracy continued to have a significant impact on sport even after the changes in power relations which occurred in the wider society during the industrial revolution. Kemp (51: p.180) suggests that this was most evident in England where the industrial revolution took place so slowly that many semi-feudal aspects of conservative, agrarian society lingered. Sport was a less central cultural phenomenon than either economics or politics, so changes in the practice and structure of sport did not occur at the same time as changes in the political and economic arrangement of society. In addition, sport was also being used by the public schools to introduce the sons of the emerging bourgeoisie and professional middle class to the polish and grace of the aristocratic class (12: p139).
The development of professionalism in sport that occurred during the late nineteenth century saw the upper classes formulate a stricter articulation of the principles of amateurism. These principles included fair play, the pursuit of the activity for its own sake, self-reliance and humility in victory. Pierre de Coubertin was inspired by these ideas to revive the Olympic Games. His vision was to breed a new generation of conservative rulers because of the "...incredibly displaced and dislocated aristocracy..." in modern society (104: p85).

Therefore, the historical conditions of sport at this time included the prevention of working-class participation, the use of sport as an educative tool in polish and grace for the aristocracy and wealthy and the preservation of sport for these classes. This ensured that the people playing sport had both the time and money to participate in sport for the sake of the game, and had the instruction in sport to participate fairly and with virtue. The quality, and not just the result of the play, was of importance to athletes in this period.

What were the beliefs about sport which supported and emanated from these conditions? The cricket career of Victor Trumper, who played in the early twentieth century, displayed the concern for the quality and craftsmanship of players under the tradition of conservative sport. Trumper's career was described in the following way:

Trumper, who was idolised in his time, would perhaps have been fortunate to have held a place in the Australian team of the Bradman era. His test batting
average of just under thirty-three was mediocre. The reason, no doubt, was in Trumper's attitude to the game. He was a stylist who batted with recklessness. His batting was dangerous and unmethodical, although held to be an object of beauty. Runs were not his main concern, and nor were they the manner by which he was judged (cited by 39: p183).

The attitude of Trumper was not only focused on the result of his efforts. Trumper appeared to be aware of the importance of the methods by which his runs were accumulated. And for Trumper, cricket allowed a wide range of possible methods of this accumulation.

Max Scheler, a German philosopher of the 1920s and 1930s, endeavours to show the importance of a variety of opportunities. He argues that the problem of explaining the social practices in society is confounded by considerations of utility in modern society. The idea of utility is supposed to have resulted in the production of tools and science, the origin of language and education and the development of religion and art (45: p38). Scheler suggests that any social practice under the constraints of utilitarian capitalism cannot account for the level of originality and creativity in these practices. He proposes the ideal of a vitalistic principle in all aspects of life which represents the pure expression of possibility (45: p39).

Bodily training in all its forms plays a critical role in allowing the person to discover the limits of his or her creative potential. The body and sport offer an emancipatory potential for the individual, containing a vital force which was more important than work. Its value cannot be
contained solely within its functions. The use of sport for utilitarian reasons strips the activity of its invigorating potential, and represents a debased form of sport which was utilitarian, rather than ludic, in character (45: p39).

Ortega (77: p379) agrees with Scheler that the first and original activity of any social practice is always spontaneous, free and overflowing. Each species builds up a stock of useful habits which are applied as the situation presents itself. The situation demands the selection from innumerable "useless" actions which living beings created out of exuberance. Utility merely employs and stabilizes those responses which have been created prior to the need, according to which satisfy the need in the most suitable and efficient way.

Scheler glorifies this vitalistic principle, which is present in all practices of life including sport, in his book Resentiment:

Most older civilisations had such techniques [for the intensification of vital forces]: the castes for the selection of the best and for the advancement of the physical, intellectual and moral hereditary values; the fixed, almost automatic systems for the distribution of cultural goods;... all these embody the same idea: that a dead mechanical technique stands below a vital technique.... Modern civilisation is alone in lacking such a vital technique - not only in practice: it has lost the pure idea!... The "estate" - a concept in which noble blood and tradition determine the unity of the group - is replaced by the mere "class" a group unified by property, certain external customs ruled by fashion and "culture". Bodily training... is nothing but "recreation" from work or the gathering of strength for renewed useful labour - it is never valuable in itself as a pure play of vital forces.... "True seriousness" pertains to business and work
alone, and all the rest is only "fun". Even modern "sports" are nothing but recreation from work, and by no means a manifestation of free vitality at whose service work should be (cited by 45: pp40,41, my insertion).

Ortega also believes in the value of sportive activity. He views sport as the primary, creative aspect of life. It is the most important, serious and noble pursuit in life. Although utilitarianism gives athletes the impetus to create, in the form of a goal, the first impulse in the vital process of sport still occurs in the spirit of playful exuberance and exploration of possibilities. Individual actions are the result of the choices made from a variety of creatively formulated possibilities, whilst the concrete goals of the sport are acknowledged and satisfied (77: p378). The athletes satisfy the functional requirements of the sport, whilst learning about their nature through the creative process.

The abundance of possibilities is the sign of a thriving practice according to this theory. In Ortega's words:

He who rests content with barely meeting necessity as it arises will be washed away. Life has triumphed on this planet because it has, instead of clinging to necessity, deluged it with overwhelming possibility, so that the failure of one may serve as the bridge to the victory of another (77: p379).

These beliefs, which arose during the amateur period of sport, were made possible by the position and security of athletes. These athletes were economically secure enough to practice sport with style, grace and creativity. However, the
vitalistic tradition can also be linked to many of the ideas of the conservative tradition of society. The idea of the nobility of pure sport where vital traditions and values are passed on from generation to generation via the relational links of the group is a conservative one. The apprenticeship system in English soccer, the university sides in cricket and the "old-boy" network in other sports all provided an education in the game which was more extensive than the skills of the game. It gave an appreciation of the tradition of the game; a tradition which required protection from the radical social change of the democratization of sport. Sport was considered vital and creative and an element of pure freedom, but these opportunities were only granted to the elites of the sporting community. The aristocratic class saw democracy as leading to mediocrity in all social practices.

Conservative sport, like conservative society in general, was ascriptive, and the working classes were excluded from the practice and control of sport. The working classes were trapped into labour and were denied the opportunity to be creative in the practice of sport. However, changing historical conditions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century created the requirement for sport to be made available to more of the population. Although conservative values were tenaciously protected in sport, the democratization of sport created changes in the practice of sport. The next section looks at both the changing conditions of sport and the changing belief system which resulted from
2) THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF SPORT

Although there was not a general move to offer sport to the masses during the conservative period of sport, it was obvious that some members of the ruling classes observed the value of sport as a counter to growing working class militancy. In the same way that British colonial governments expanded the franchise to "...graciously open the door when it is about to be broken down" (103: p196), sport was offered to the working classes as both a diversion from militancy and an example of the values of hard work, utility and thrift necessary to the preservation of a subservient working-class.

The late nineteenth century brought about the development of the professional athlete. In soccer, this caused the virtual abandonment of the sport by the conservative classes. The great majority of League clubs grew out of the concerns of working men to develop leisure relationships within their class. Sheffield United grew from the cutters of the Sheffield steel works, West Ham United from the Thames iron workers and Manchester United from the workers at the Lancashire and Yorkshire railyards. Soccer became a cheap, mass participatory sport for the working classes (102: pp137-139). In the game of rugby, the situation was alleviated by the separation of the game into League and Union, where Union remained a pure, amateur game. A similar distinction occurred between Gentlemen and Players in
cricket, where the amateur gentlemen enjoyed a superior social status in the game (12: p141).

Harriss (39: p180) claims that the division in cricket did not initially change the basic conservative and amateur values of the game. The social characteristics, which included the leisurely pace, the emphasis on the cerebral, the importance of harmony, aesthetics, social obligation and polite behaviour, all remained of vital importance in the practice of the game in the early twentieth century. Even professional cricketers conformed with these values. Jack Hobbs, the great English professional who played from 1905 to 1934, regarded the style of run scoring more important than the accumulation of runs. According to Wilfred Rhodes, one of Hobbs' regular partners, Hobbs could have scored thousands more runs but he regularly gave up his wicket to allow others a chance (cited by 39: p181).

The inter-war years brought about a change of consciousness on the cricket field, a change that Harris suggests reflected a change from the values of a conservative, agrarian society to a liberal, industrial society. The emphasis on style and aesthetics was replaced by a utilitarian concern for objectivity and run accumulation. The professional values of rationality, efficiency and success had become part of the game by the 1930s (39: pp182-186). Colin McCool, a member of Bradman's 1948 touring team
lamented this trend:

...the game has been dominated by a standard type of player completely lacking in brilliance and imagination. They all play their shots the same way, and you can tell as soon as one of their number takes his place at the crease how he will react to each type of delivery from the bowler (cited by 39: p185).

Bryson (9: p136) suggests that sport must always be understood within the historical conditions of the society in which it resides, and is therefore subject to constant change. The development of the industrial society made the key values of conservative sport, such as amateurism, tradition and style, anachronistic. Yet these values remained integral to sport. They were, in some cases, believed to be part of the essence of sport rather than the product of historically specific social conditions. Certain values in sport, such as subordination to the authority figure, remained important in sport, but only in so far as they could fit with the modern values of efficiency and success.

What were the ideas and beliefs which grew with these charges in the social practice of sport? In his book, Homo Ludens, Johan Huizinga suggests that the protection of the play decision from outside control and instrumental requirements is necessary for human society to develop. The great archetypal activities of human society, such as language, myth and ritual, out of which the practices of law, economics, science and logic develop, are all permeated with play (47: p4). To progress in science, art, politics or sport, the practitioner is concerned with similar problems,
restrictions and options to those that must be rationally solved in play. As the individual is separated from material life and submits to a nonpurposive order, he/she comes closer to achieving the perfectly creative human state and having an innovative effect on cultural practices (47: p211).

Schmitz (94: p35) argues that sport, in its origin and attitude, is an example of free, self-conscious, tested play. The object of sport resides within the play decision for the athlete. Sport is practised because of its immediacy, exhilaration, indeterminacy and rule-directed freedom. The human agent is required to act with reason and imagination within the freely accepted formal elements of sport. The decision to play, and the values of self-consciousness gained from play, are intensified through the performance, competition and victory of sport.

Novak suggests an even greater possibility for modern sport in that: "Sports lie in a different realm [to work] altogether, a freer realm, a realm of ends, a point to which time, compressed and self-contained and instantaneous, is transmuted into eternity" (75: p217, my insertion). The practice of sport offers the human being standards of excellence and formalized actions. It alerts individuals to the presence of powers greater than themselves. It also offers people the opportunity to seek and approach perfection. The free play of imagination and intelligence, in the solution to sporting obstacles, allows the athlete to struggle and to conquer (75: pp29-31). The athlete
participates, not to be productive, but for the sake of excellence. Excellent play in sport is a craft. There is no point to it, other than the excellence (75: p223). It is a fear of both Huizinga and Novak that the democratization of society will result in a decay of the playful cultural process. Creativity and progress are not the concerns of the socially mobile individual. Like Scheler and Ortega, Huizinga believes that the quality of play can not be measured by instrumental results, but is elevated by the virtue and the beauty of the process itself. This feeling can be destroyed by selfish individualism, overseriousness or rationalization (45: p152).

Novak (75: p223) fears the effects of rationalization and systematization on the cultural practice of sport in liberal-capitalist society. Sport is an area of life which is susceptible to the demands of efficiency, effectiveness and results. The democratization of sport can undermine the protective influence that the smaller, exclusive, conservative community of athletes was able to maintain over its practice. The pursuit of external ends in sport, such as wealth or prestige, which occurs with the professionalization of sport, means that creativity and freedom are reduced in the game. The illusion and internal meaning of the play world are destroyed by excessive seriousness.

The degradation of the creative and human aspects of sport occurs when sport is given an external purpose which is explicable without reference to the game. The regimentation
of sport in order to achieve results means that some part of the pure play quality of the game is lost (47: p197). As the play element becomes separated from the cultural practice, the human agent loses the creative attachment to the practice. Huizinga argues that in modern social life, sport is neither play nor earnest; neither creative nor productive. It loses its potential to offer a wide range of possibilities to the athlete because of the stifling effects of modern organization and logic. With the atrophy of the play element, the virtuous and vital qualities of sport are also lost (47: pp197-199). Novak agrees that modern, liberal society has become secular. Competitive individualism obliges people to become pragmatic, glib and superficial. The hunger for perfection, for form and for beauty is subsumed by the demands for practicality and advancement. Results in sport command precedence over the process (75: pp20,21).

This logic means that the athlete's actions are constrained within narrow options and that sport is no longer a vital practice. Starting from principles of democracy, fairness and rationality in play, the democratization of sport results in illiberal conclusions. The practice of sport suffers stagnation because its participants cannot express creativity and innovation in their play. The pressure of results stifles the individual's desire to be distinct and individual (47: p210). Schmitz (94: p36) suggests that: "Sport which issued from the play-decision, promising freedom and exhilaration, ends dismally in lessening the humanity of
players and spectators."

Novak continues by arguing that the democratization of sport in liberal society ensures its demise as a creative practice. The description of sport as a diversion fails to explain the individual's passion for sport; it removes the magic, mystification and illusion from sport. The meaning of sport is stored in tradition and the appreciation of this meaning is available only to those people who are educated in this tradition. Modern education does not teach people about the importance of myth, spirit, narrative or play. Individuals, educated in pragmatism, are not prepared to fully appreciate sport (75: pp23,24,26).

The similarities between these authors and the works of Scheler and Ortega cannot be denied. Both groups are suspicious of the influence of democratization on the practice of sport; both hope to protect sport by preserving its tradition of practice from the influence of external forces. Yet Huizinga argues that play offers any human being an area of freedom from the constraints and demands of everyday life. As a voluntary activity, the meaning, rules and practices of play are developed or accepted by the human agent freely in order to ensure the temporary order within which the individual can be creative (47: pp7-9). Schmitz agrees that play involves a freely taken decision to suspend the ordinary concerns of life and create a new order of significance. This decision opens up a world of possibilities for the individual, shrouded from the requirements of the
ordinary world. These possibilities give the human being the opportunity to develop and express individual and distinctive abilities. The play decision seeks to secure any individual's freedom and potential for creativity, and this helps to assure certain values for human consciousness and human existence (94: pp32-34).

Play occurs within the private sphere of life for the human agent. The individual seeks freedom, diversity and contemplation in this sphere of life. Novak suggests that there is little opportunity for human privacy and autonomy in the confusion of modern life. Play allows humans to display their reason, imagination and spirit in order to achieve goals which are personally significant (75: p216). Play offers the agent an area of concern, apart from the interests and necessity of the state, where individuals can discover and place themselves. As with religion, occupation and education, it is necessary to preserve this sanctuary from the control of the state. The individual's responsibility for this decision allows the free development of abilities which the individual values.

Play offers an absolute and peculiar order where goals are clearly defined and the methods of achievement are known. This allows individuals to develop an awareness of themselves. Players' courage, fairness and honesty are tested in play. The tension or uncertainty of results in play creates ethical questions which require resolution. Players discover themselves through this resolution process (47:
Any attempt to control this test by outside forces reduces the area within which the players can discover themselves.

There may be some relationship between the ideas of these writers and the early liberal tradition. In sport, as in society, the area of freedom available for the athlete must be made as wide as possible. Sport should occur in the private sphere of an individual's life where the person may test capacities and form relationships with other participants. Therefore, it is necessary to protect the activity from the influences of the public spheres of economics and politics. Both Locke and Mill believed that any private practice of society would not advance without a free participation in the practice.

So, there appears to be a paradox in liberal beliefs about sport. Writers, such as Huizinga and Schmitz, lament the passing of the play-element in sport and the shift to overseriousness. Other authors, such as Novak and Lasch (53: pp407,408) suggest that the problems in modern sport result from a lack of seriousness about the traditions of the game. Yet both groups of authors agree that the rationalization of modern sport causes an increased concern with the results of the game to the detriment of the tradition of play within sport. Schmitz suggests: "Heroism in sport often arises through the determination of a player to maintain the importance of the play-world even in the face of disturbances from the 'real' world" (94: p37). For Feezel, the play world
is one in which the athlete seriously pursues excellence of form and beauty whilst remaining within the conventional rules of the game, and freely agreeing to the standards of victory and defeat that these rules explain. The athlete seeks a mean disposition between a frivolous attitude towards the magic of the game and an obsessive concern for efficient results in the game (22: p11).

The sports-as-play theorists, in agreement with the liberal tradition, view sport as an area of private life where individuals can discover themselves if the conditions are conducive. Human potentialities are salvaged, promoted and developed in creative, sporting practices. The athletes place themselves in the sporting community. Abuses in modern sport are possible, and in some author's opinions (47;75) probable, but these abuses stem from extreme dispositions towards sport. These extremes are either an excessive external seriousness, resulting in a destruction of the vital play element, or a lack of concern for the traditions of the game which degrades the social practice of the sport. The playful appreciation of sport involves the acceptance and protection of its play element. In Novak's terms:

Distorted, the drive for perfection can propel an ugly and considerably less than perfect human development. True, straight and well targeted, it soars like an arrow towards the proper beauty of humanity. (75: p27)

In contrast to some of the ideas of the sport-as-play theorists, and aligned with the ideas of welfare liberalism, Allen Guttmann argues that the subordination of the play
Element in sport to instrumental reason and technocratic rationality does not reduce the individual's overall freedom. He acknowledges that the athlete's spontaneous creativity is limited, but it is the acceptance of these limits which extends the possibilities for the modern athlete. The athlete sacrifices some radical individual freedom, to coaches, dietitians, techniques, strategies and team owners, and this relieves the athlete of worries about money, food intake or strategy. This allows the athlete to concentrate on performance alone. Guttmann gives the example of Nadia Comaneci's performances in gymnastics. He writes:

Nadia Comaneci solo salto is made possible by two coaches, a choreographer, a physician, an assistant music master, and a masseur, not to mention an entire civilisation which imagined the sport of gymnastics and staged the international drama of the Olympic Games. But she alone performs. (37: p160)

The conditions of modern sport allow the individual athlete to achieve cooperatively what no athlete has achieved before. Solutions to the obstacles provided by the rules of sport require tuition, help and support by coaches, trainers and governing bodies. The athletes are freer in these conditions because they are able to choose from alternative solutions to problems and act upon those choices. Any loss in radical freedom is more than compensated for by the athlete's gain in opportunities to be creative in sport (37: p160)
Creative reason is useless to the athlete if the athlete is unable to achieve the results of this planning.
Guttmann (37: p161) suggests that while "...play is paradigmatically separate from modern sports..." it does not mean that the exclusion of one is necessitated by participation in the other. If the athlete seeks the individual freedom of play, the athlete can abandon the support staff and "...run as Roger Bannister did, barefoot, on firm dry sand, by the sea." If the athlete seeks to expand the opportunities available in sport, then it may be necessary to give up some individual freedom to a controlling body, such as a trainer or coach, so as to improve the capacity to perform. Guttmann's link to welfare liberalism occurs because the decision to relinquish some personal freedom is apparently one freely taken by the athlete in the same way that the decisions to be educated by the state and to live by moral laws are also freely taken.

Although they are opposed by their respective explanations of some aspects of sport, both groups of theorists agree that freedom in sport is related to both the attitude of the player and the social requirements of sport. Whether this freedom is enhanced by the instrumental rationality of the liberal-capitalist tradition, as argued by Guttmann, or decreased by the drive for efficiency and productivity, as suggested by the play theorists, it is the attitude of openness to the opportunities of the sport which protects the freedom of the player. This attitude of opportunism and creativity allows the athlete to participate
freely.

Both groups of theorists about sport have been criticized by Gruneau (34) as being at least partially attached to an abstract idealism about freedom, creativity, play and sport. The liberal belief system, which offered the freedom of participation in sport to all people, has also resulted in illiberal conclusions of reduced opportunities for freedom and creativity for individual athletes. The solution to these problems has been pursued within several different traditions of thought. The next section of the thesis will reveal the Marxist solution. In Chapter Three, the social critical or neo-marxist views of modern sport and freedom will be discussed. In Chapter Four, the modern liberal solution of sport will be put forward which will include part of Gruneau's critique of the idealist liberal view.

3) THE CAPITALIZATION OF SPORT

According to Jean-Marie Brohm (8: p5), the crises in elite sport is linked to the crises in the advanced capitalist state. The signs of the former crises are discernible by the fact that the idealist, romantic sentiments about sport are no longer universally held. People have begun to criticise both the practice and the institution of sport and seek solutions to the problems within sport. In Brohm's words: "...the decisive fact is that today the basic consensus has broken down" (8: p5).
During the 1972 Olympics the former UNESCO director of sport, René Maheu, delivered a speech lamenting the discrepancy between the official ideology and the world wide practice of sport. In this speech he stated:

It is impossible to deny that the development of spectator sport has turned attention away from the moral value for the individual toward its entertainment potential.... The success of spectator sport and the importance it has come to assume in everyday life are unfortunately too often exploited for purposes alien or even opposed to sport-commercialism, chauvinism and politics - which corrupt and deform it. If we want to save sport's soul, the time has come to react and react quickly (cited by 8: p8).

What are the historical conditions which prefaced this lament? The demand for improved performance in elite sport, during the period of advanced capitalism, creates a number of barriers to the freedom of the athlete. In professional sport as in any sphere of advanced capitalism the most capable competitor is able to negotiate the best exchange rate for the labour. Competition for achievement becomes the primary concern for the athlete. Scientific training and participation geared towards achievement entails the elimination of human unpredictability. To achieve this, the athlete’s lifestyle has to be subordinated to the methods of systematic training (87: pp21,22).

Hoberman (44: p321) suggests that this competition for the scarce rewards of victory contributes to the poisoning of relationships between athletes. The manipulation of athletes by secret technologies in order to achieve results can create a feeling of mistrust amongst the members
of the sporting community. He continues by suggesting that the use of manipulative sports psychology to create "mindless athletes" reveals a hostility towards any rational or critical participation in sport by athletes. Unquestioning obedience is the key to sporting determination, fearlessness and victory. This obedience is reinforced by the use of child-like disciplinary procedures for trivial transgressions in professional athletics; a method used to further separate the athlete from a critical appreciation of their program (44: pp324,325). As in the military, every player is required to be obedient to the plan of action decided by the team's "controllers", the coaches and trainers. During the pre-season training of the 1986 Indiana University basketball team, the coach, Bobby Knight, removed his star player and Olympic Gold Medallist, Steve Alford, from training twice. He also made Alford train in white which was the colour of the substitutes. Several times he abused Alford for mistakes. Alford was expected to accept all these punishments without question. It was Knight’s way of breaking him in (23: pp41,42). According to Brohm, the use of roll-calls, inspections, obedience, punishments, uniforms, and deference to superiors all suggest that sport's discipline is based on military discipline (8: p11).

What is demanded of the athlete in sport is the same as what is demanded of the worker in the advanced capitalistic production system. The athletes sell their labour and, in so doing, relinquish a portion of the control
over their practice. The athletes are required to obey the
instructions of coaches, trainers and owners, or be fired.

When Joachim Behle, West Germany's leading long-distance
skier, refused to adopt the new Siitonen technique of skiing,
his trainer was asked whether Behle should be allowed to
choose his preferred technique. The trainer replied that as a
paid athlete, Behle was "...expected to increase his
efficiency by learning new techniques" (44: p326). To
increase the performance of the athlete, many technological
improvements are used, even if those technologies could
endanger the health of the athlete. The athlete is
replaceable just like any other employee in industry (8:
p16).

In his discussion of the history of professional
baseball, Thomas Keil (50: pp19,20) shows the close
relationship between mechanisms used in advanced capitalism
and those used in baseball to ensure profitability. The
development of professional baseball into a viable economic
enterprise reflects the problems, conflicts and solutions
that occur in the transition from laissez-faire capitalism to
monopolistic production. The early baseball leagues of the
1870's consisted of a number of small-scale professional
teams that competed fiercely and expensively for both freely
mobile players and sporadic spectators. The formation of the
National League in 1876 resulted in several smaller producers
being taken over by larger franchises. This monopoly enabled
the owners to change the rules and practices of the game to
enhance its marketability and profitability. Sewart (95: p.175) suggests that the rule and schedule changes, such as double-headers and livelier baseballs, were the result of a desire to produce a more attractive spectacle in order to attract more spectators and more sponsors. Similar changes occurred in professional football, basketball and soccer in America.

Through contracts, reserve clauses and drafts, the players become servants to the owners of the teams. Their individual and collective bargaining power is reduced, as the competition between players for wages is regulated. The players are no more capable of resisting the dominant force of capital than workers in any other industry. According to Kiel (50: p20), the solutions to problems in baseball, which mimicked solutions in any other industry in advanced capitalism, provide a pattern for commercialisation which was repeated in many other sports. Stewart (98: pp5,6) suggests that the Victorian Football League is "...a highly regulated co-operative and in some ways even socialistic institution."

The League enforces rules concerning maximum wages, recruitment and transfers in order to eliminate economic competition between clubs and restrict the bargaining power of individual players. In these ways the League and the clubs maintain a monopoly of control over players and spectators, whilst sharing the proceeds of the game in a partially socialistic way through the equitable distribution of gate receipts amongst the member clubs.
According to Marx, labour under capitalism is treated like a commodity. It is bought and sold according to the market features of opportunity and constraint. But labour, unlike any other commodity, must be valued only in the act of production, and not by the product itself. What workers sell is their labour power; that is, their creative potential and energy (89: p41). Under advanced capitalism, commodities appear as impersonal, ready-made products. They are dehumanised objects. The conscious awareness of them, as produced by human capacities and social relations, is either absent or of secondary importance (89: p45).

In Brohm's terms, spectator sport is also sold as a commodity. Athletes are bought, sold and employed as commodities (8: p51). Under the control of advanced capitalism, this commodification of sport is related to its corruption and dehumanization. Traditional meanings and practices are replaced by puerile displays which exhibit an undisguised primacy of the profit motive. Sewart explains that this effort to attract large audiences to sport has interfered with the quality of play in a number of ways. The Los Angeles Olympic Committee organised the marathon race at the 1984 Olympics to commence as close as possible to prime-time television even though this was the hottest part of the day. In addition, competitors were required to run the last fifteen kilometres of the race through the smog of downtown Los Angeles. The situation was explained by the American
athlete, Steve Scott:

The Olympics are just a staging ground for someone's commercial interests. The games are no longer an event to bring the best athletes together... they're a TV extravaganza to sell McDonalds and Xerox (cited by 95: p175).

Whilst both liberal and Marxist theorists acknowledge these problems in sport, the Marxist view grounds these problems in the systems of the wider society. Gruneau suggests that liberal attempts to view sport as a separate social practice have the effect of masking the link between it and the general social practice of advanced capitalism. The metaphysical separation of sport, civil society and politics is especially suitable and compatible with the views of human agency in liberal pluralism which led to laissez-faire capitalism. Marxist studies of sport are more accomplished in showing the relationship between sport and the wider society (34: pp19,22).

Rigauer argues that the work-like behaviour in sports is historically conditioned by the influence of capitalist social formations. These techniques of productivity are so dominant in advanced capitalist societies that they come to impose their rules on all aspects of these societies, including sport (87: pp1,3). Brohm argues that sport ideologically reproduces the developments in capitalist societies in a concentrated form by displaying all the tendencies of that society, including rationalization, efficiency, specialization and alienation (8: pp69,70).
As sport adheres to the same rules and practices as advanced capitalism, Marxist theorists suggest that it would suffer from the same crises. The athlete is as prone to alienated work as the labourer. Adorno and Horkheimer (cited by 87: p9) observe that: "The oarsmen, who cannot speak to one another, are each of them yoked in the same rhythm as the modern worker in the factory." The pursuit of scarce rewards in sport causes a separation of athletes from their peers, from the product and from their creativity. The pressure that the goals in sport exert on the athlete determines that the athlete would relinquish some personal freedom. These goals, important in advanced capitalism, predetermine the behaviour of the athlete. Prescribed regimens of training, sleep, diet and sexual abstinence may be given to the athlete to ensure the successful completion of his goals (87: p22).

Rigauer (87: p32) suggests that sport is like any other form of labour. When the athlete loses or relinquishes control of the means of production, he/she becomes subservient to criteria established by others. The athlete's room for choice is reduced as the process of production is divided into specialized tasks, and the responsibilities for choices are given to other people. In Brohm's terms: "The manufacturing of champions is no longer a craft but an industry.... Most top-level athletes are reduced to the status of more or less voluntary guinea-pigs" (8: p18).
Gamble argues that one of the paradoxes of liberal society is that it helps to produce the economic practice of capitalism which is unsuited to the ideas of freedom and self-determination which are part of the liberal tradition. The development of advanced capitalism occurs because of the rejection of many of the ideas of the Western liberal tradition (30: p4). Similarly, the freedom of liberal sport, which creates its popularity, also creates its marketability. Contrary to Guttmann, this popularity results in the athlete being required to perform in a more constrained way.

Keil (50: p15) and Brohm (8: pp40, 41) both agree that sport plays an integral role in the functioning of advanced capitalist society. Sport is part of the ideological complex that maintains the structure of capitalism. Through the promotion of competition, achievement and productivity, the treatment of the athlete as a machine and the exploitation of the athlete's labour for capital accumulation by team owners, sport makes the ideas of division of labour, inequality, subordination and efficiency both apparent and credible to the members of society. The athlete is constrained to act in certain limited ways by the forces of productivity that inhere in the structure of sport and the logic of the achievement principle. Sport provides the athlete with information and experience concerning the efficacy of the ideologies and subjective states which are important in advanced capitalism. This ideological education through sport
undermines class consciousness and conflict. Rigauer (87: p100) suggests:

Concepts like drive, conscientiousness, recognition of authority and of the achievements of one's superiors, modesty and shyness, the good of the group, etc., encourage conformity to the existing system of action and control.... By integrating middle-class virtues within themselves, sports take on - unconsciously - schemes of behaviour derived from society in general - schemes marked with regressive consciousness. Sports are no separate realm of activity, but an agent of socialization.

This location of sport, as a constituted and constitutive practice in society, is crucial to the Marxist resolution of problems in sport. Once the principle of maximum productivity is accepted in sport, the consequences, such as an obsession with champions, rationalisation and alienation, necessarily follow.

In order to offer possibilities for freedom in sport, the satisfaction of individual needs must be the central purpose of sport. It must rid itself of its financial and ideological links to the state system. The changes necessary in sport must be part of changes in society, and cannot occur in the separation of sport from society (87: p105). According to Brohm (8: p61): "It is an illusion to think that...it will be enough... to rid sport of its accompanying 'abuses' and 'excesses' for it to become 'educative', humane and 'progressive'."

The beginning of this change, according to Kiel, occurs with the recognition that the needs that sport satisfy are historically important. The needs of achievement and
productivity in sport are not grounded in human nature, but emerge from the context of liberal capitalist practices. The appreciation of alternative possibilities in sport can only begin with this recognition (50: p23).

While the situation of sport as an historically determined activity has great explanatory value, especially in the examination of its commercial, technocratic and socialization aspects, Gruneau suggests that it is important not to push this line of argument too far. Marxism, according to Raymond Williams argues clearly for some sense of determination, but it cannot accept that human beings are simply the result of objective forces (cited by 35: p14).

Marxist critiques of sport are useful in correcting the romanticized view of sport held by liberal and conservative views by explaining sport as a socially conditioned practice. However, these critiques may be overly reductive and may not recognise the degree of autonomy that sport may have within advanced capitalism. The reduction of cultural practices to mere passive reflections of reality denies that sport is a contested and conflict-riddled area of human experience and relations (35: p25). It also denies the possibility of any positive role to sport. What is valuable in sport can transcend changing historical conditions and the determination of advanced capitalism (95: pl83).

The Marxist theories of sport cannot explain the possibility of real human alternatives to determined activity. These theories suggest that the participants in
sport are unreflective about their practice. The reduction of
sport to an instrumental product of the state or the
bourgeois class ignores the dynamic struggle between
individuals and groups which gives sport its constitutive
role in history. These struggles may have been influenced by
the ideological complex of capitalism, but their oppositional
character means that they cannot have been wholly determined
by this ideology (35: pp27,28).

William Morgan offers a more damning criticism of the
Marxist theory of sport. He suggests that this tradition
suffers from a fundamental malady which makes its legitimacy
as a critical body of thought questionable. The triumph of
the Marxist ideology over critical thought has the effect of
reducing all cultural practices to economic categories. The
potential autonomy of these practices is neglected by Marxist
theorists of sport (71: pp35,37).

The major problem of the Marxist body of writing,
according to Morgan, is that the presentation of sport and
its structural intrinsic properties as wholly determined
products of capitalism has the effect of diminishing sport’s
inherent futility, of reducing sport to the sameness which
the status quo requires to legitimate itself. It is these
formal elements of sport, which make sport different from
social reality. The claim is not, as the liberal and
conservative theorists have suggested, that sport should be
made separate from society. Morgan argues that sport is
separated by virtue of its intrinsic laws and values (71:
The crisis for the Marxist theory of sport is that, in ignoring this formal difference in sport, it also ignores the potential for an alternative view of freedom in sport. The following chapter will commence with a more thorough explanation of Morgan's critical interpretation of sport.

However, whilst the Marxist theories of sport have been criticized as being overly reductive and non-dialectical, they have also been acknowledged as being important in explaining the historical and social nature of sport. Their explanatory potential can be shown in a number of areas. Morgan suggests that, as the formal rules of sport are only concerned with the necessary and sufficient conditions required for a practice to qualify as a sport, the many other qualities of sport beyond these conditions are subject to considerable social influence, influence which the Marxist body of thought has tried to characterize. The tactics, techniques, bureaucracies, conventions, external purposes and economics of sport are all affected by society, to a greater or lesser degree (71: p47). Therefore, it would be a mistake to completely overlook the Marxist tradition in its explanation of sport.

**Conclusion**

The three traditions described in this chapter all suffer from difficulties in their explanation of the modern phenomenon of sport. Yet they also offer important
contributions about the origin, the purpose and the history of participation in sport, and these contributions should not be ignored. Their major weakness appears to be that all of their positions dealing with sport, do so from an external vantage point. The attitude of the player, the social freedom of the individual and the influence of the capitalist state are all external to the formal requirements of the game. Chapter Three will endeavour to provide an internal perspective from which to judge the nature of freedom in sport.

The contents of these traditions discussed in this chapter will be included in the explanation of modern accounts of sport in Chapters Three and Four of this thesis. Chapter Three will commence with an investigation of the social critical tradition and its effect on the understanding of freedom in sport. The chapter will continue with an explanation of how the formal freedom in sport, as explained by Morgan, can best be protected from social abrogation by the influence of capitalism. It will be argued that MacIntyre's view of social practices and virtue offer an important mechanism for this protection.

Chapter Four will investigate the modern liberal tradition of thought. It will suggest that this tradition is not in opposition to MacIntyre's virtue tradition, and that the modern liberal tradition has potential in protecting the emancipatory value in sport. This potential will require an acknowledgement of the influence of capitalism on sport.
In the film *Dead Poet's Society*, the teacher John Keating explains to his students the difference between various practices in society. He argues that occupations such as engineering, medicine and science, whilst being noble pursuits, necessarily constrain the practitioner to narrow methods of operation because of the need for efficient economic results. However, practices such as art, poetry and literature allow the human being unlimited freedom to express one’s creativity and expose one’s soul (109).

What Keating overlooks is the possibility that in advanced capitalist societies, all aspects of modern culture can become commodified. Marx explains the transformative power of capital in the following way:

All that is holy is profaned.... The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every activity hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe. It has transformed the doctor, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage labourers (cited by 95: p186).

The previous chapter endeavoured to show the influence of traditions of thought on descriptions of sport. In so doing it also attempted to display how faults or crises in these traditions were also present in the descriptions. At the conclusion of the previous chapter, it was suggested by Morgan that the Marxist critical theory of sport was
suffering "...from a malady so fundamental that its own legitimacy as a critical body of thought is open to question" (71: p33). The crisis which this description faces is that it shares an ideological view of sport with that of the dominant beliefs of advanced capitalism, of which it is supposed to be a critic. Therefore it is unable to present the practice of sport, or any cultural practice, as a critical alternative to advanced capitalism. The origin of the malady is that both strands of thought share the view that sport is pre-eminently a social practice and therefore must be linked to social reality (71: p36). This crisis is shared by both the vulgar Marxist view of Brohm and Rigauer, and the neo-Marxist hegemonic theory of Gruneau.

The orthodox Marxist view of sport argues that, as the mode of production in capitalist society determines the complexion of all cultural practices in that society, all categories of capitalist production have to reappear in each cultural practice, including sport. Sport cannot appear in ways which differ from the dominant norms and values of society. In Brohm's terms, sport "...always plays an integrating and never an oppositional role" (8: p178).

Sewart argues that this reductive account of sport is misleading, and does not correspond with Marx's assessment of the quality of classical art, as an example of a cultural practice. Marx stated:

The difficulty is in not in grasping the idea that Greek art and epos are bound up with certain forms of social development. It lies rather in understanding
why they still constitute for us a source of aesthetic enjoyment and in certain respects prevail as the standard and model beyond attainment (cited by 95: p183).

The aesthetic enjoyment of sport, or art, which has occurred through the stages of agrarian, capitalist and advanced capitalist society, cannot be accounted for by the Marxist reductive analysis of sport. Sewart argues that: "What is valuable does not merely appear and disappear with changing historical conditions" (95: p183).

The structural qualities of sport, which can explain much of its appeal as a challenging practice, are confused for historically determined ones by Marxist theorists. When Brohm argues for the destruction of all cultural forms which are determined by the capitalist ideology, he misunderstands the distinction between ontological features of sport and the social practice of sport. In so doing, he calls for the removal of one of the possible opposing forces to the logic of capitalism (71: p38).

The neo-Marxist hegemonic view of sport held by Gruneau, rids itself of the crude base-superstructure relationship between the economic mode of production and cultural activities. It views society as a social totality where material and cultural forces are assigned mutually constitutive roles in the formation of practices. Sport is embedded in the prevailing logic of social relations through the material production and reproduction of a society's tradition. The structure of sport, on this view, is
intimately connected to the structure of society. However, sport is never completely bound by the nature of social relations, as it can act as a forum for renegotiation between members of society. This sense of contested dominance allows sport to "express critical, oppositional social meanings" (70: p58).

According to Morgan, hegemonic theory suffers from a similar problem to Marxist theory. Its belief that sport is indissolubly connected to social totality, and its neglect of the co-option of the capitalist way of life by all members of society, means that hegemony theory underplays the effect of capital on the practice of sport. The struggle for the control of sport, is less a critical struggle between opposing classes, than an indication of the triumph of bourgeois-capitalist ideology. The ideology of competition, dominance, subordination and control by elites is as important in sport as it is in capitalist society. Sport can not oppose or criticise the effect of capital on cultural practices. The range of social meanings available in sport is restricted to those dominant meanings in society (70: p60).

The attempt by hegemony theory to unite sport and the material forces of social totality has the effect of making the practice of sport exclusively dependent on changes in the social forces at any particular time. Foucault explains this exercise as "...the sacralization of the social as the sole instance of the real" (71: p42). In so doing, it places an excessive emphasis on how sport is played, without
recognising the possibility for how sport can be played. It, like the vulgar Marxist view, also fails to acknowledge the aesthetic enjoyment of sport which transcends historical epochs.

The epistemological crisis facing these two strands of Marxist theory is that their descriptions and proposed reforms for the social problems faced by sport in advanced capitalist societies come from the same perspective as the use of sport under advanced capitalism. The changes advocated by these two theories will foreclose any possibility of presenting sport as an autonomous, alternative and critical view to advanced capitalism. In Morgan's terms:

...to invest sport with a purpose, or put otherwise, to diminish its inherent futility, is neither a novel nor a radical gesture, but the very way the status quo goes about producing the sameness it requires to legitimize itself (71: p40).

If the view proposed by orthodox Marxist and neo-Marxist hegemony theorists is adopted, then the possibility for autonomy for sport will be destroyed. The fate of sport becomes dependent on the social forces of marketability and productivity, which govern all other commodities in society.

Social critical theory has attempted to oppose the ideology which supports advanced capitalism by showing the autonomy of critical cultural practices, such as sport and art. This chapter will briefly explain the historical conditions and beliefs which affected the development of the social critical tradition, and then explain the use of these beliefs in an examination of sport. The chapter will go on to
establish a link between this and MacIntyre's (60) theory of social practices and virtues which was introduced in Chapter One. This link will be made via the explanation of a special virtue in sport which protects the nature of sport as inherent futility from the destructive social forces of advanced capitalism.

**Social Critical Theory**

The major advantage which social critical theorists hold over Marx is that they describe and discuss a society which is more subtle than the one which Marx envisaged in his theories. Advanced capitalist society endeavours to undermine class consciousness and conflict by reducing differences to sameness through the successful coordination of capital and labour. The desire of all individuals has become the success and profitability of the system. The collusion of labour and capital occurs through the increased standard of living granted to the working class (71: p34) Horkheimer suggests that the demise of liberal competitive capitalism and the rise of big organised industries has the effect of unifying society. In addition, a number of subtle apparatuses such as education and the mass media further serve to remove opposition within society. He argues:

...the leaders of industry, administration, propaganda, and the military have become identical with the state in that they lay down the plan of the national economy as the entrepreneur before them laid
down policy for his factory (cited by 43: p53).

According to critical theorists, the individual in advanced capitalist society is caught in a situation where the economy and the polity are increasingly interlocked. As a result, the critical opposition of the polity is reduced, as it cannot provide a basis to understand the intrusion of market features into more and more areas of life (43: p.77). Advanced capitalism displays an increasingly integrative trend in society.

This means that when the economic crises of capitalism, such as unemployment and inflation arise, the subjective conscious forces necessary to provoke criticism, and revolution are stagnant. Horkheimer explains the disruption in the labour class as:

There is today a gulf between those regularly employed and those working only by exception [occasional, part-time work] or rather those totally unemployed.... This does not mean that all goes well for those working... the misery of those working remains... but the type of active worker is no longer characteristic of those who are most in need of change.... Those who have a most immediate and urgent interest in revolution, the unemployed, do not possess... the capability for training and organisation, class consciousness and reliability of those who are habitually incorporated into the capitalist process (cited by 43: pp48,49).

The lives of the employed differ significantly from the unemployed. This creates a fragmentation in the labour movement. Adorno argues that, whilst during liberal capitalist society classes had a certain unity, in advanced capitalism this unity is destroyed (cited by 43: p71). Unemployment, inflation and alienation are considered to be
normal parts of an efficient and wealthier system. Opposition to this form of social reality in advanced capitalism is considered irrational or heretical (71: p34).

Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse all agree that capitalism provides a major impetus to the development of instrumental reason. John Alt argues:

the rationalisation of culture [in advanced capitalism] means that the ends of an activity are instrumentally specified, usually in terms of mastery or quantified success, while means became technically calculated (4: pp97,98, my insertion).

The free competition and individualism of early liberal capitalist markets gives way to the efficient commodity markets of advanced capitalism. Individual achievement is replaced by labour productivity. Marcuse believes that this technological rationality created a common framework of measurement for all occupations. The agent's performance is measured by standards which are external to him (cited by 43: p.67).

The extension of this rationality into all areas of life becomes a concern as a form of domination: means become ends and social rules become reified efficient directives (43: pp65,66). The history of advanced capitalism, influenced by the rising standard of living of the working class in an increasingly efficient society, is one of corporatisation and integration of all social life worlds which were once autonomous and controlled by the community. The liquidation of these critical life worlds or practices occurs, not by rejecting the values of the practice, but by incorporating or
losing these values in the social reality of capitalism. Horkheimer and Adorno state: "What is new is... that art renounces its autonomy and proudly takes its place among consumption goods" (46: p157).

Education, health, leisure, art and sport become organised by a 'new class' of corporate executives who are concerned with the profitability of these practices. By expropriating and discrediting the traditional internal expertise of community exemplars in these practices, this "new class" creates a demand for the professional administration of these practices. This phenomenon furthers the dominant ideology of economic growth and social control in advanced capitalism (4: p98). Marcuse explains this situation:

The private and public bureaucracy thus emerges in an apparently objective and impersonal ground.... For, the more the individual functions are divided, fixated and synchronized according to objective and impersonal patterns, the less reasonable it is for the individual to withdraw or withstand.... The rationality embodied in giant enterprises makes it appear as if men, in obeying them, obey the dictum of an objective rationality. The private bureaucracy fosters a delusive harmony between the special and common interest (cited by 43: p68).

As a result, critical opposition in society declines. The human agent, once a means of resistance, becomes merely one of "ductility and adjustment" (43: p69).

According to Sewart (95 p182), "...no social process is immune from the corrosive impact of commodification." The traditional, ritualistic meanings of any cultural practice can be distorted or lost when the productivity of the
practice becomes of primary concern. The commercialization of ballet heightens the demands for efficiency on dancers, leading to pressures to perform whilst injured or to conform to the company director's discipline. Eugene Loveland, president of the Board of the Houston Ballet explains:

I wanted to know what we were selling.... Because you can't succeed without money. I looked at this as I would at any new business.... What we needed was to develop a product (cited by 95: p183).

Horkheimer and Adorno refer to the rise in profitable and standardized artistic forms as the development of a "culture industry." These products of mass culture serve to enhance political control and legitimize the status quo as they set the context in which individual socialization takes place; "...the man with leisure has to accept what the culture manufacturers offer him" (46: pp123-124). Art, along with other cultural practises is coopted to reproduce the conditions of modern capitalism. As an industry, art acts to ensure its own viability. It acts to be popular, not critical. It aims at a passive, relaxed and uncritical audience and it produces little, if any, new shape to conventional forms. The culture industry functions to induce an uncritical obedience to the existing power order, it becomes an extension of the outside world (89: p114). Adorno argues:

The concepts of order which it hammers into human beings are always those of the status quo. They remain unquestioned, unanalyzed and undialectically presupposed...the categorical imperative of the culture industry no longer has anything in common with freedom....The power of the culture industry's
ideology is such that conformity has replaced consciousness (2: p17).

Horkheimer and Adorno argue that most art and music of the twentieth century is produced, not according to internal standards, but according to the functional requirements of commodity production. It is manufactured for its saleability and is produced with standard formulas of success and profitability. They suggest:

- Not only are the hit songs, stars and soap operas cyclically recurrent and rigid invariable types, but the specific content of the entertainment itself... only appears to change. The details are interchangeable (46: p125).

The form of this entertainment duplicates the existing images of reality. The culture industry stands for adjustment to the dominant social order of advanced capitalism. Sewart concludes that the transformation of these practices into profitable products, as occurs with the primacy of the commercial approach to sport or art, "...results in a debauchery of both artists and the art or athletes and athletics" (95: p183).

The transformation of these cultural practices into profitable mass entertainment means that they cease to be an indictment of the social reality of advanced capitalism. Their value and meaning becomes measured in terms of their economic profitability, which is an identical measure of the value of all other cultural practices. A profitable film is simply an example of a profitable product, and it is not judged by autonomous standards. Horkheimer and Adorno
explain: "...when art becomes commercial, it reduces the opportunity for liberation within it" (46: p121). This liberation involves the potential for the artists to recognise their uniqueness through their work.

Critical theorists are concerned with the demise of class consciousness in advanced capitalism. Adorno is especially opposed to those mechanisms in advanced capitalism which prevent people from "...coming to consciousness of themselves as subjects..." capable of spontaneity and creativity (cited by 43: p51). In order to display critical differences in society, critical theorists choose to stress the importance of non-productive cultural activities as autonomous and potentially critical spheres of human action. According to Held (43: p83), there is a general agreement amongst critical theorists that the emancipatory effects of these cultural practices are generated by the rejection of the dominant forms of order in society.

For Horkheimer and Adorno, the elements of art which permit this alternative perspective, are those features which generate "non-identity thinking." Art loses its critical potential when it tries to create for specific political or economic functions, whether these effects be the preservation or the destruction of the status quo. Art serves its true function in its functionlessness. It should compel rather than demand a change of attitude (cited by 43: pp82,83).

Art, and other critical cultural practices, are most compellingly critical when they are autonomous; that is, when
they negate the dominant empirical reality out of which they originate. Marcuse argues;

By becoming components of the aesthetic form, words, sounds, shapes and colours are insulated against their familiar, ordinary use and function; thus they are freed for a new existence (62: pp98,99).

Through its form art provides an arena for critical thinking by presenting images of life which contradict the existent. The most "genuine" forms of art are those which resist the pressures of commodification and the "rule of equivalence" of autonomous forms to identity thinking. These works preserve the freedom and criticism in their form, and demand from the viewer active participation. According to Adorno, "...social criticism flows from a work's form - not its content" (cited by 43: p83). Culture will only be challenged, and consciousness raised, when new ways of viewing the world are presented in art, and actively accepted by the audience (112: p89).

However, the attempt by people to gain both escape from tedium and from concentrated effort, through participation in the activities offered by the culture industry, is doomed to failure. The culture industry seeks to reinforce those images of life which currently exist, and sustain this industry. The form of the products, not only duplicates existing images of reality, but compels them. The use of standard formulas, of laughter soundtracks and the concentration on light entertainment demands non-critical participation by the audience. Adorno suggests that free-time
experiences in advanced capitalist society exist to sustain capacities for free labour. Novel experiences can only be gained through concerted effort (3: p32).

The form of art refers to its organization which allows it to restructure conventional patterns of meaning. Cultural practices are viewed as autonomous because of their formal structure, which identifies those internal elements, that transcend any social or economic teleological description. The capacity for the cultural practices of art, literature, poetry or sport to display differences between people, resides in their peculiar internal forms which resist organisation into an instrumental rationality. It is believed that if autonomous cultural experiences cannot completely shield the true nature of an agent’s activities and if they show the possibility of individuality in advanced capitalism, then individuals are able to grasp an authentic idea of their human nature and situation. If this idea does not correspond to their desires, then people can alter their situations, and affect the social reality. Society can be criticized for "what is" against "what could be" (71: p36). For Horkheimer, the urgent task is "...to protect, preserve, and where possible extend the limited and ephemeral freedom of the individual." In so doing the opportunity for the autonomy of the "wholly other", or the critical agent, will be preserved (cited by 43: p73).

According to critical theorists, the result of advanced capitalism is the incorporation of potentially
critical cultural practices into the dominant tradition. This incorporation occurs through the commodification of these practices, resulting in the development of an instrumental rationality towards participation in these practices. Success is regarded in terms of profitability and efficiency, and not in terms of the internal standards of originality, form and creativity. It is when these internal standards are secured that these autonomous cultural practices are granted the opportunity to criticize advanced capitalist society through the presentation of alternative forms of existence.

However, advanced capitalist society is incompatible with the progressive and alternative existences of affirmative society. Artistic criticism is continually threatened by the process of technological expansion and capital accumulation. The gap between art and reality, which is crucial in the presentation of alternative existences, is being closed off in ever more critical realms of artistic culture (43: p89). According to Horkheimer and Adorno:

The culture industry, integrated into capitalism, in turn integrates consumers from above. Its goal is the production of goods that are profitable and consumable. It operates to ensure its own reproduction (46: p159).

Therefore, there are two areas of investigation which follow. The first is to decide whether sport can present alternative existences in society; that is, can movement be freed as a critical form in sport. The second is to decide how this alternative form, if it exists, can be protected from the integrative trend of advanced capitalism.
Critical Theory and Sport

Critical theorists oppose capitalist ideology's tendency to change difference into sameness through its reduction of all cultural practices, including sport, to a commodified form. Through this opposition, critical theorists hope to show sport as an autonomous and potentially liberating area in society. Adorno's concern with advanced capitalist sport is that:

Bourgeoisie sport wants to differentiate itself strictly from play. Its bestial seriousness consists in the fact that instead of remaining faithful to the dream of freedom by getting away from purposiveness, the treatment of play as a duty puts it among useful purposes and thereby wipes out any trace of freedom in it (1: p296).

What are the historical conditions of sport which suggest the integration of sport into the ideology of advanced capitalism, and those that contribute to the development of the oppositional critical tradition? Many of the historical conditions of sport have been explained by the Marxist theories. Social criticism simply reforms the belief system of these theories to more adequately describe the problems in the practice of modern sport and the possible solutions.

According to Alt, the cultural crisis facing sport occurs with the rise of the spectacle in advanced capitalism. The form of the spectacle comes to shape and alter the game
to suit market and technical criteria, and in so doing, changes the traditional values and meaning associated with sport. The sporting spectacle becomes perceived and analyzed at the level of factual appearance, and not at the more intricate level of metaphorical or ritualized meaning. This appearance is dominated by action, sensationalism and entertainment, and the spectacle is increasingly shaped to display winning, violence, vengeance and masculine qualities. In the extreme, standards of excellence are repressed by commercial norms so that sport is reduced to its "...most banal and sensational elements" (4: p98). Sewart explains that in a number of sports, including baseball, gridiron and soccer, the application of marketing techniques improves the popularity of the game. Rather than improving the skill level of the game, team owners use cheerleaders, mascots, doubleheaders, live rock bands and video screens to sell the spectacle (95: pp178,179). The situation is explained by Jim Kaplan in an article on baseball. He laments:

Nolan Ryan of the Astros will shoot for the career strikeout record tomorrow, but the game at the Astrodome won't come close to selling out. "I bet we only get 20,000", said Houston reliever Dave Smith. "The fans here aren't very knowledgeable about baseball".... Smith unwittingly put his finger on one of the game's lingering problems. Baseball has expanded and probably will continue to expand to cities that have large, often indoor stadiums and are situated in attractive television markets. Most expansion cities also have poor baseball traditions and fans who are more likely to be taken with mascots and exploding scoreboards than good pickoff plays. In such fashion does baseball become richer - and poorer (49: pp67,68).
Sewart argues that critical theory is important in highlighting the extent to which modern commercialized sport loses its autonomy and traditional meaning. As sport attempts to broaden its market, practical standards of excellence tend to be de-emphasized. The modern fan seeks entertainment, not meaning. The value of sport is reduced to purely market criteria (95: p172).

Morgan endeavours to show that regardless of these market pressures, sport remains a "...gratuitous exercise of wit, skill and intelligence..." because of its intrinsic formal properties. It is these formal properties which identify the transhistorical internal goods of sport. Sport is not simply a social phenomenon, but a complex practice involving social and formal elements. What separates sport from other cultural practices are these formal elements, which define the peculiar logic of sport as the pursuit of gratuitous difficulty (70: p61). It is these formal features which free movements in sport from the dominant meanings in society and reveal alternative existences in sport.

The formal features of sport partition it from normal life by giving it a rational order which is incommensurate with normal life. The goals in sport are wholly arbitrary and inconsequential, and the skills in sport are equally futile. A graceful and expert golf swing loses its meaning outside the game of golf, yet in golf it presents an alternative meaning. In addition, the logic of sport, with restrictions on the most expedient methods of achieving these goals, is
also peculiar to normal life. No essential progress is possible in the realization of the sporting goal. Whether the goal is achieved more quickly or more proficiently, the goal remains the same at a simplified, non-sporting level of description (70: p62). The golfer still gets the ball in the hole whether he takes four or ten strokes, although at another 'sporting' level of description it is better to achieve the goal in as few strokes as possible. In sport, the achievement of a goal more quickly, will not necessarily mean that the athlete will go on to achieve the goal more times. What this means is that an expert performance does not produce better or more goals. It may only produce the same goal more efficiently or more aesthetically. The purpose of competition is to improve the means, and not the goal of the practice. The athlete does not look for a shorter route to get from the starting line to the finish. According to Morgan, such an attempt at essential progress in the realization of the sporting goal will destroy the splendid futility of the sport, as explained by the formal rules, and will therefore also destroy the sport (70: p62). In industry, the production of a quicker result, means that more goals, or products may be made. The product in industry is conceived of independently of the means of achieving it. Products are valued for what they are, or how popular they are, and not for how they are achieved or produced. Hence, the means of production are always expendable and are always under the threat of replacement.
It is the formal rules which make sport an independent aim or an autonomous activity. As with art, literature and poetry, sport is a self-sustaining aim governed by its own laws and values. These laws and values offer the individual opportunities for freedom which may or may not be undertaken in practice (71: p44). For example, there are easier ways to get a golf ball in a hole other than by hitting it with a golf club. However, by requiring the use of a club, the golfer is challenged to creatively use his skill and intelligence to achieve this end. This creativity is negated if the golfer ignores the rules and uses his hand to put the ball in the hole.

Any social conditions which militate against this formal freedom, such as commodification, are fatal to the autonomy of sport. The formal account of sport acknowledges that actual instances of games may not maximize the formal freedom for participants inherent in the sport's ideal form. Formalism "...reveals a tension between sport in its formal sense and sport as it is practiced in certain limiting social contexts" (71: p46). The formal freedom in sport may be abrogated by intrusive practices such as excessive coaching, manipulative psychology, violence and market interference which may either take the power of autonomous action away from the athlete or induce violations of the formal rules of sport. However, if the formal qualities of the game are granted precedence over the social elements, then the human
agent is guaranteed an opportunity for freedom in sport (71: p48).

This formalist tradition has advantages over all of the other traditions' ideas about sport which were discussed in Chapter Two. By grounding the idea of the "splendid futility" of sport within the formal logic of games, and not in the attitudes held by athletes, the opportunity for freedom is equally available to, and able to be equally destroyed by all people. Freedom resides in an acknowledgment of the peculiar logic and the superfluity of means and ends in sport. This idea may not be easily recognized in the modern society of advanced capitalism.

Raimond Gaita argues:

It makes sense for a craftsman to say that an entire age has lost the understanding of what it is to make furniture, meaning not that furniture-makers do not possess the relevant skills, but that the difference between the skilled carpenter and the craftsman doesn't matter to them or their craft (28: p87).

Whilst there are obviously functional requirements which any craftsperson must satisfy: that is, if a beautifully crafted table does not stand up it becomes simply ridiculous, it is not these functional criteria which determine the difference between craftspeople and furniture-makers. The craftsperson cares about the process of production, and will often submit themselves to less efficient means of production. A craftsperson would be horrified at the suggestion of using screws to secure joints, even though the use of screws would be functionally
expedient. The craftsperson would see this as a violation, both of the material and of their expertise. In the film Fame, one of the students explains that Mozart would be able to produce his symphonies on a single musical instrument now. When asked who would play these symphonies, the student replies that Mozart, by himself, would. The teacher suggests that this is not music but masturbation (78). In golf, the ban on the newly developed square-grooved golf clubs, which allow greater backspin to be imparted on the ball, can be viewed as an effort to preserve some of the differences in skills between golfers.

Craftspeople are involved in a limitless pursuit of self-exploration through their creativity within the functional requirements of their craft. To be a craftsperson requires a proper understanding of appearance and reality. What may appear, both functionally and aesthetically, as a craft, is not a craft if it fails to allow the person a deepened understanding of what they are capable of and who they are. This understanding is different to technical expertise. The wisdom gained in craftspersonship can be called upon apart from the craft (28: p87).

John Alt suggests that the increasing commercialization of sport, and the production of the sport's spectacle, reduces both the player's and the spectator's appreciation of sport as a craft. The spectacle fosters a participatory group of people who have lost a commonality of shared values, skills and standards. The members of this
group are concerned with the appearance of the spectacle. Separated from the traditional subculture of sport, which included an education in the craft of sport, these people are reintegrated at the level of social totality, merely passively enjoying the view. There is no critical engagement by either the players or the spectators (4: p98).

The advantage which the formalist theory of sport has over the explanations of sport in the previous chapter of this thesis, is that the idea of a sporting craft becomes available to any participant through an acknowledgment of the splendid futility of sport. Both "liberal" and "conservative" writers lamented the loss of this recognition when sport became democratized and capitalized. The formal theory of sport correctly locates this loss as the abrogation of formal freedom by social influences. The historical conditions apparent in the origins of sport, of a financially secure sporting community, did not create the attitudes of disinterestedness and a concern for the quality of the game, within that community. These attitudes are part of the formal requirements of the game. Bernard Suits refers to them as the lusory attitude (101: pp41,47). The security of wealth and the profusion of leisure-time allowed the sporting community to give the formal requirements of sport dominion over the social intrusions into sport. Democratization, professionalism, rationalization and commodification cannot destroy entirely the splendid futility of sport. Alt argues that the cults of winning, violence and action in the
spectacle can envelop and shape the practice of sport but can never completely eliminate the formal infrastructure of sport (4: p103).

A related advantage which the critical tradition has is that it does not require any metaphysical connection between sport and play. The Marxist tradition effectively demolished the idealist theory of a relationship between sport and play. It is the logic of sport, and not the play attitude, that reveals sport to be a gratuitous conquest of obstacles. As Morgan states:

It is not at all a question... of whether sport should or should not be "universalized" as an "abstract form". Rather we are dealing here with a factual question: namely, that sport is in fact an independent aim, an autonomous activity, a universal abstract form (71: p44).

The rules which determine the practice of sporting activities may have clear social and historical origins, and are fashioned out of historical experiences. However, the transformation of these experiences by the superimposition of the logic of sport means that the form of sport cannot be tied too closely to social reality. Sport lifts these social elements out of historical experience and endows them with a life and meaning of their own. The particular social forms of sports may become dated. However, the logic of sport, regardless of the historical conditions, never loses its position. This logic, which has informed sports throughout history, continues to appear in popular sports today. It is the more ostensible social influences in sport, such as
Finally, the formalist view of sport, like other traditions, acknowledges that actual instances of sport may not attain the potential freedom for participants. The formal rules of sport are concerned only with providing the necessary and sufficient conditions to qualify an activity as a sport; that is, providing the gratuitous difficulty in sport and the means of overcoming this difficulty. There is a whole scope for social influence in sport. Sport is not immune to these social forces and it may be used in ways which hinder an athlete's freedom.

However, the reforms offered by formalists to these social affects on sport are designed to protect the gratuitous logic of sport from outside interests which destroy this logic. The reforms do no attempt to strip sport of its internal free form, as Marxist theories have suggested in their argument for the destruction of all practices associated with capitalism. The social intrusions on the autonomy of sport encounter their own limit when the logic of the game is destroyed. The social limitations may shape sport but they cannot "...determine what sport is and what sport means at its most basic level" (70: p65). As Morgan concludes:

This constitutes its advance over the materialistic theories of the radical critics which were so steeped in their social milieu that they could not see beyond it. This also constitutes its advance over the idealistic drift of the earlier, and weaker bourgeois versions of formalism which were so steeped in the asocial, and the ahistorical that they glossed over
the social entanglements of sport.... [This theory can] make claims for the emancipatory potential of sport (in terms of its formal autonomy) without denying the very real social stricures which saddle cultural phenomenon like sport (71: p48, my insertion).

Adorno displays the positive hope of formalists by stating, "...human beings still constitute the limit of the reification of sameness... and human beings cannot be totally manipulated" (95: p187). The function of critical-formalist theory is to display the possibility for freedom and autonomy in sport by protecting the individual agent from social influences on his participation.

The next section of this thesis will show one possible mechanism for the protection of sport's logic. The ideas of Alisdair MacIntyre (60) about the nature of virtue and its effect in social practices will be linked to the formalist account of sports given by Morgan.

Social Practices and Virtues

The major purpose of Alisdair MacIntyre's book After Virtue (60) is to provide an account of the virtues which shows that modern society cannot reasonably do without them. The conception of the individual which flourished during the Enlightenment, of a person with sole responsibility for the development of his or her interests and a society which tolerates whichever route that development takes, providing it doesn't interfere with other people, means that moral
consensus was denied to a liberal democratic community. Pluralism is preferable to conformity in modern liberal society. In agreement with Marx, MacIntyre suggests that the separation of the moral from the theological, the legal and the aesthetic in the political doctrine of liberalism, means that there are no traditional social supports for moral thought in modern society. Moral disagreements cannot be rationally decided as MacIntyre suggested that they were differences in individual preference. According to MacIntyre, ",...we possess no rational way of weighing the claims of one against another" (60: p8). A commitment to autonomy and freedom ensures that moral decision making is personal and emotivist, and the state functions as a mechanism for resolution of conflicts between these decisions. Moral community degenerates into modes of manipulation and bureaucracy in practice (19: pp216,217).

MacIntyre believes that Marx's analysis and solution to the problems of liberalism suffers from a repeat of the same key notions which causes these problems. MacIntyre suggests that Marxism embraces the ethics of modernization and rationalization which lead to bureaucracy. The change from liberalism to Marxism "...may change the ownership but not the process of decision making..." which remained individual, rationalist and emotivist (19: p218).

The failure of contemporary moral philosophy is the result of the dearth of moral guidelines in which to ground policies and actions. Utilitarianism is seen as an
application of instrumentality to ethics after emotive value choices have been made. Rationalistic attempts to ground value choices in natural human rights, suffer in a historical exploration of subjectivity and the influence of traditions. The incommensurability of these moral principles suggests that moral positions are arbitrarily supported (21: p206). Bureaucracies manage the social system after irrational, individual choices are made (19: p219).

In this society, virtuous practices survive because of ad hoc individual applications, or by appeals to those irrational philosophical grounds with which they are incompatible, such as utilitarianism. In liberal societies, the concept of a virtue is emotivist, and becomes whatever a person chooses a virtue to be. MacIntyre opposes this notion of individualism which acts as the final source of authority in moral matters; either in teleological terms with utilitarianism or in transcendental formalist terms in Kantian morality (107: pp240,241).

Through a historical analysis of virtue in societies, MacIntyre hopes to reconstruct an Aristotelian tradition of virtue, so that virtuous practice is once again underwritten by a philosophical understanding of the meaning of moral choices (107: p237). In ancient societies, virtues were lived by a community rather than chosen by individuals. A virtue could not be entirely understood teleologically.

According to Stout, MacIntyre's rather pessimistic portrayal of pluralistic society, as too fragmented to
sustain rational discourse about morality, is flawed. Whilst there may not be perfect agreement about the moral good in liberal societies, there is a limited but significant background of agreement which allows for moral discourse in non-emotivist terms. The provisional agreement lies in the shared acknowledgment that any idea of the moral good should not be pushed too strongly resulting in intolerance and nonrational persuasion. A shared conception of morality lies in most noncontroversial matters. Disagreement and "MacIntyrian emotivism" occurs in complex problems where our different heritages show through (100: pp40,41). Yet the explication of the virtues gives a moral vocabulary with which to critique modern society and resolve controversies (99: p266).

MacIntyre suggests that to understand the virtues, it has always been necessary to have some prior account of certain features of social and moral life in terms of which they have been defined. Aristotle's account of the virtues was secondary to an understanding of the "good life for man" conceived of as the telos of human life (60: p186). MacIntyre's account of modern virtue receives its intelligibility from a prior account of social practices. Virtues are displayed in particular types of practices. The second stage of the development of a virtue tradition is the acknowledgment of the importance of virtues to the "good of a whole human life" and the third occurs as an account of virtue with the force of a moral tradition. Each later stage
builds on the accounts given in earlier stages. This section of the thesis will be concerned with the application of the first stage of MacIntyre's account to sport. The following chapter will use the second and third stages of this account to link formalism and communitarianism with the ideas of modern liberalism.

The first stage of MacIntyre's account suggests that virtues are important in the sustenance and growth of social practices. According to MacIntyre, a social practice is:

...any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended (60: p187).

Crucial to this definition is the importance of the difference between internal and external goods. Internal goods can only be experienced or comprehended within the specific practice being performed, and the extension of these goods benefits the community of practitioners. The attraction of these goods can only be specified in the terms of participation in the practice. External goods may be achieved by engaging in a number of different practices, and are usually achieved at the expense of other practitioners. These external goods can be valued without reference to the practice (60: pp188,189).

It is apparent that social practices have dynamic histories. Practices develop as the skills and capacities of
individuals, and the techniques and equipment of the practice, improve. The standards of excellence provide objective criteria for the evaluation of any performance, at anytime, within a practice (21: p208).

Teaching can be considered an example of a social practice. The internal goods that a teacher pursues may include knowledge of the subject matter, communication of this matter to students and motivation of the students. External goods which a teacher could gain and value include the position and status he/she gains in the community, money and leisure time. These external goods can be achieved in a number of practices and can be explained without reference to the practice of teaching. However, it is only within the practice of teaching that the internal goods are explained and extended. True exemplars of teaching extend those standards of excellence by which their practice is judged, and this development is apparent to their contemporaries and their successors.

To pursue the internal goods which are valued in a practice, agents must subordinate themselves to the standards of excellence and the rules of the practice which currently exist. This humble subordination allows the participant to learn the capacities required to participate in, and possibly extend, the practice. In engaging in a practice, the person enters a hierarchical community which shares expectations, internal goals and standards. To fully enter this community the individual requires virtue (21: p208).
According to MacIntyre, a virtue is:

...an acquired human quality, the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods (60: p191).

By placing the concept of virtue in the context of a social practice, MacIntyre maintains that the explanation of virtues at any historical time requires the prior account of critical features, or internal goods, of the social and moral life of the time. Just as the important virtues of Homeric society were identified in terms of the social roles of that period, the virtues of modern society are exposed during participation in, and extension of, important social practices of this period (60: p184).

To enter into a practice, individuals require courage to confront the risk of failure in their pursuit of valued internal goals. Participants also require humility and honesty in observing their own shortcomings and in seeking the education and training required to recognize and approach the standards of excellence of the practice. In addition, agents are required to justly recognize and respect those authorities who are knowledgeable in the practice. Agents must acknowledge the performance of others by granting them the esteem and the input they deserve, if they are to approach the standards of excellence of the practice (21: p208). MacIntyre suggests that these virtues of honesty, courage, justice and respect are central to the maintenance of, and participation in, any social practice. The display of
these virtues defines a person's relationships to other practitioners, and to the tradition of the social practice (60: p191). Other virtues such as persistence, patience and determination may be crucial to the preservation of relationships in certain practices only.

Practices cannot flourish in communities which do not value the virtues. Cooperation between practitioners, recognition of the authority of exemplars, respect for the rules and existing standards of excellence of the practice, and the acknowledgment and use of other people's achievements in the practice all require a courageous admission of one's limitations, and honest pursuit of internal goals, and a just recognition of other people's achievements and contributions (60: p193). This is not to say that externally successful practitioners may not be vicious. The vicious rely on the virtues of others for the practice to flourish and develop. They can gain the external goods available from the practice, but they are denied the experience of achieving internal goods. In the practice of education, development relies on the courageous pursuit of improved teaching methods. If every teacher refused to risk mistakes and taught in the same way as current standards dictate, then the practice of teaching would stagnate.

MacIntyre continues by contrasting practices with institutions. Institutions are characteristically and necessarily concerned with external goods, such as prestige and money. Institutions are the bearers of social practices.
For both to survive, the institution must accumulate the money and power to support the practice (60: p194). For example, the social practice of education is maintained by the institutions of schools, universities, state and federal government bodies and teacher's associations. Without the protection of some of these institutions, the social practice of education would change and could wither.

However, institutions, because of their acquisitive need for external goods, pose significant threats to the integrity of the social practice. There exists a tension whereby the institutional demand for external goods may corrupt the pursuit of internal goods by practitioners. The ability of a social practice to retain its integrity and creativeness, during a conflict of goals with the institution, relies on the virtue of its practitioners (60: pp194,195). Schools and universities necessarily require money in order to function in the social practice of education. To gain money, they must attempt to attract a steady flow of private or government support, through student intake. The desire of a school to maintain a high percentage of graduates, so as to be attractive to potential students, may result in the decision to force the poorer students to leave the school. In this example, the external goods of esteem and money interfere with the practice of education at the school. In order to oppose this interference, the virtues of justice, in acknowledging the right of all children to be educated, and of courage, in confronting the institution with
this right, would be necessary in extending the social practice of education at this institution. In MacIntyre’s terms, "...the cooperative care for common goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the institution" (60: p194). The possession of the virtues may, on some occasions, hinder the achievement of external goods for institutions and for individuals. It should be expected that if the possession of external goods becomes a priority in any practice, then the role of virtue in that practice would be reduced and possibly extinguished. In addition, the evaluation of standards of excellence would no longer be related to the internal goods of the practice (60: p196).

The Monty Python film, The Meaning of Life begins with a parody set in a modern hospital delivery rooms. On hearing that the medical administrator is approaching, the eminent doctors demand that all the equipment, including "the machine that goes ping", be brought out. The administrator is pleased to see this equipment, especially "the machine that goes ping." He proceeds to give a description of the complicated process of acquisition of this machine, which saved the hospital millions of dollars. To this, the doctors offer their applause (48). The parody signifies how the practice of medicine is controlled and extended by administrators and bureaucrats. Stout comments:

Without the experts, the technology would not exist or be put to use. Without some sort of bureaucracy, the people who need the technology would never get together with the people who operate it. All of this is true and worth remembering, but it is equally
evident that the social practice of medical care has been placed at grave risk by its own institutional setting and related social practices [e.g. economics], and this risk is something we need to understand systematically (99: p275, my insertion).

The Social Practice of Sport and Formalism

MacIntyre refers to sport in some of his examples about the elements of social practices, institutions and virtues. He shows the authority of exemplars in the game of baseball (60: p190) and the extension of practices in the batting of W.G. Grace (60: p191). Yet W. Miller Brown suggests that MacIntyre has neglected the formal aspects of practices that are evident in sports, as well as a variety of other practices. Practices are complex activities which are typically organised in terms of rules that make explicit both the purposes of the practice and the means available to the participant. The means, ends and internal goods are determined by the rules, which are partly constitutive of the practice (9: p72).

Thomas Morawetz (67) goes further by suggesting that sports are paradigm examples of practices. The constitutive rules of sport, that is, those rules that make the game possible, clearly define the ends, the means and the goods of sport. The end in the marathon is to cover the distance in as short a time as possible. Whether this is done well or badly, the end remains the same; that is, the passage of approximately forty-two kilometers. To suggest that the end
would be achieved more quickly if a marathon only lasted thirty kilometers, would be to change the sport. The rules allow players to have a "critical reflective attitude" towards their behaviour and the behaviour of others in the practice. Morawetz calls this critical attitude an "...internal perspective on the game." A person who does not know these rules will describe behaviours in different ways, which are not meaningful in sport. Striking out in baseball becomes missing or avoiding the ball or missile (67: pp210,211). Hence, sport shares with other critical cultural practices the ability to present forms, in terms of movements, which have alternative meanings to the descriptions of actions in advanced capitalism.

The constitutive rules define these peculiar dimensions of sport, and all the finite possibilities of the required goal are anticipated by the rules. In sports, a specific movement either achieves the goal or it doesn't, and the game continues as a series of these specific movements. In baseball, a batter is out after three strikes and an innings is over when both teams have three outs. The simplicity and unambiguity of the rules of sport, and the arbitrariness of the goals in sport, requires an internal perspective of the game for participation. To participate in a sport, by pursuing means which are impermissible under the constitutive rules, is to change the game.

The difference between cultural practices such as sport and art, and practices such as law and language, is
that in these latter practices, the rules regulate, but do not define, the logic and the means and ends. The rules, at best, give only a rough description of the practice. Communicative action between participants defines the logic of the practice. Changes in the rules and the goals of these practices occur from within the practice through participation by practitioners themselves. This difference between these other practices and sport can be explained by understanding these practices as tools. The point of language is communication, of law is moderation, and these goals are external to the rules and may be achieved to a variety of degrees. There is no finite limit to the achievement of the goal. Improvement in the completion of the goal occurs due to communicative action, and forces a change to the rules. Precedent-setting cases and legislative changes in law are examples of this action (67: pp213-215).

Morgan's formalist account of the practice of sport is in agreement with Morawetz. The formal rules of sport explain its gratuitous logic and its internal goods. However it is the history of the game with its traditions, narratives and conventions which provides the activity with its life and seriousness. The social manifestation of the sport gives its logic and internal goals meaning, and attracts novices to the game. Virtue in sport is important to oppose any communicative action of these participants which displaces the formal logic of sport by an exaggeration of the social meanings of sport, as occurs in the commodification of sport.
The social dimension of sport receives its orientation from the formal rules. An internal perspective of the game recognises the importance of both the tradition and the logic. The cultivation of sport requires a protection of this internal perspective, so that the unambiguous internal goals remain clearly defined. In Morgan's terms, "...having an internal perspective on the game is requisite to having a critical reflective attitude of it by which our behaviour and others can be effectively criticized" (69: p18). An external perspective will merely acknowledge the institutional results of sport; that is, its power, its economic impact and its entertainment value. This reduces the game to the sameness of advanced capitalism and ignores the intricacies and freedom of a distinctive social practice.

How is this internal perspective in sport endangered? Christopher Lasch argues: "The degradation of sport, then, consists not in its being taken too seriously, but in its trivialization. Games derive their power from the investment of seemingly trivial activity with serious intent" (53: p407). It is important to emphasize the "worthlessness" of the internal goods in sport, goods which cannot be explained and have no use value outside sport. Sport is to be celebrated as a serious attempt to achieve an absurd form of excellence (21: p207).

Yet this attempt is constantly threatened by the apparatuses of control, such as the media and the education system, which adopt an advanced capitalist view of the
external seriousness and marketability of sport. Feezel observes that sport is a fruitful area for dreams and illusions of importance (21: p210). Iris Murdoch argues that:

Our minds are continually active, fabricating an anxious, usually self-preoccupied, often falsifying veil which partially conceals the world.... anything which alters consciousness in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity and realism is to be connected with virtue (cited by 21: p209).

Virtue resides in experiences where reason pierces any falsity of appearance which is self-serving. Judgement occurs as an understanding of social practices, to perceive justly and honestly without sentimentality or self-absorption. According to Feezel: "One of the central barriers to building character in sport is the inability of people to perceive things truly" (21: p211).

The effects of sports journalism and commercialism have combined to create a feeling within the sport's community that sport is exceedingly important; that losses are tragedies, victories are triumphs and failures are life-threatening (21: p210). Roger Kahn (cited by 25: p8) observes that, "...the most fascinating and least reported aspect of American sports is the silent and enduring search for a rationale." Society invests a large amount of time, money, emotion and energy in sport. In order to rationalize this involvement, the sports media and profession exaggerate its importance. Sport is described in such hyperbolic terms so as to become more serious than ordinary life. It is these exaggerations in a society's vision of sport which endanger
its practice.

To perceive sport without illusion, in Murdoch's sense, is to see it as splendid futility. To understand why it is futile, the practice of sport must be contrasted with the larger context of life. This honesty was exemplified when:

At the 1988 Seoul Olympics, Australia's Grant Davies paddled across the finish line of the 1000 metre singles Kayak race to see the scoreboard flashing his name as the winner. His paraplegic father had promised Grant he would stand and applaud if he won a medal. Dick Davies pulled himself out of his wheelchair, clapped furiously for a few seconds and collapsed back into his chair. As Grant was going to the medal presentation, a Korean official explained there had been a timing error. Grant Davies had lost by the shortest official margin, five one-thousandths of a second. As Davies showed his medal to his proud family he said, "That's the way it goes. If that is my biggest disappointment in life, then I have no problems" (76: p10).

An education in the judgement required to perceive sport honestly involves the observation of authoritative examples which reveal the contrast of appearance and reality, such as the prior account of Grant Davies. Rush Rhees suggests that "the language of love" allows people to observe the contrast of real with sentimental or counterfeit love, and to learn the appropriate objects of love through this contrast. In order to gain clarity in observing this contrast, participants require a disciplined, honest and critical understanding of the language of love (28: p413).
Feezel suggests that this idea also applies to sport when he argues that:

We really appreciate and love baseball when we appreciate Ryne Sandberg's second base play or Will Clarke's swing, not just wins and losses. We love the tradition and enhance the moral possibilities of a given sport when we view such excellence as shared good.... Surely the most important sense of winning and competing courageously is to see winning as an internal good of significant yet trivial proportions (21: p212).

It is this appreciation which gives alternative meanings to movement in sport.

It is this honesty in the contrast and placement of sport within the larger framework of life which makes MacIntyre's second stage of the concept of a virtue important to a discussion of sports. Can the internal goods of sport be ordered against the goods of other practices to provide a unifying telos in an individual's life? This question will be the concern of the following chapter. However, before it can be addressed, it will be necessary to return to MacIntyre's original claim about the fragmentation of modern society, and apply this with respect to the practice of sport. Is sport too fragmented to suggest any consistent understanding which would allow a rational discussion and pursuit of virtue in it?

**Sport and Understanding Virtue**

Raimond Gaita believes that a person learns in moral matters by being moved, so that the individual sees depth or
meaning where they failed to see it before. A person's acts of love, courage, honesty or justice disclose to others that the objects of these virtuous acts are precious. The display of this action is authoritative. This authority relies on the display revealing to others the person's sincerity. To see without illusion cannot be disassociated from a disciplined observance of those examples of virtuous actions which move a person. Discipline and judgement require an education in understanding authentic examples of the virtues, and one's responses to those examples (28: pp125,126).

Jeffrey Stout suggests that the virtues which are required in medical care, are acquired through the imitation of role models who impress new participants in the practice. Whilst few doctors or nurses could explain these virtues in a philosophical sense, most could describe actions which display virtue and would have some sense of understanding about the importance of virtue. It is this shared, partial understanding of the virtues of medical care which suggests to Stout that the medical community does have a vocabulary of critical and rational discourse about the virtues. It is also these shared understandings, learned through authoritative examples, which allow an individual's behaviour to be lauded or criticized by peers. Ordered towards the internal goals of patient care, medical skill and respect, this language of medicine has its significance as a practical list of appropriate and inappropriate behaviours and as a vocabulary of criticism. The medical practice "...employs a nuanced and
supple language..." which, as a whole, is directed towards
the virtuous pursuit of the internal goods of medicine (99: pp269,270).

Is the picture the same as can be portrayed about the
social practice of sport? In trying to reveal virtuous
conduct in sport, it is important to observe authentic
effects of sporting conduct which move individuals. The
meaning of these examples is best conveyed in the language of
sport which conveys their particular and exciting goodness,
and not in the language of advanced capitalism which reduces
their meaning to external measures of success. The discipline
involved in this observation, is to separate the real
effects of virtue in sport from the hyperbolic and
artificial examples, often conveyed in the press. These
artificial examples include shaking hands after a violent
match or not revealing the truth at a tribunal hearing to
save an opponent from suspension.

The most obvious examples of virtue are those
motivated by altruism:

On Saturday, 11 March, 1956, John Landy performed an
action which moved Franz Stampfl to regard it as
"...the most gallant thing I have witnessed in a
lifetime of sport." Halfway through the third lap of
a mile race Ron Clarke fell and Landy had to hurdle
him. Fearing Clarke was hurt, Landy turned back.
Clarke signalled for Landy to run on and Landy began
to chase the world class field who were now seventy
yards ahead of him. Spurred on by a boisterous and
appreciative crowd, Landy passed the field on the
last turn and won by ten yards. It was estimated that
Landy’s action cost him the chance of recording the
first sub-four minute mile (111: pp9,10).
A second kind of sporting encounter which may move people is the type of respectful relationship shown between players who have engaged in a highly competitive rivalry over a period of time. The mutual honesty and respect of Chris Evert and Martina Navratilova exemplifies the bond that is available between athletes. Similarly, another example occurs when players or teams engage in competitive play such that their performances are extended by this competition. The British Open battle between Jack Nicklaus and Tom Watson where Nicklaus' 66 was beaten by Watson's 65 was an example where both players agreed that their performance was extended by the other player so that they played more skillfully. All these examples can move spectators and other participants to reflect on the quality of virtue in sport.

However, to paraphrase MacIntyre, are these virtuous acts merely ad hoc compassionate actions by individual athletes, or do they indicate some shared understanding of virtue in sport? MacIntyre argues that the truly virtuous person will act in a consistently virtuous way in a variety of situations. A virtue is a settled disposition of a person, and it will occur in situations which may preclude or harm the pursuit of external goods by the person (60: p205). According to MacIntyre, "...a person cannot be genuinely courageous or truthful, and be so only on occasion" (60: p198). This consistency in the practice of virtue overcomes the emotivism of moral choices in modern society which
MacIntyre opposes.

Feezel asks his reader to consider a coach who addressed his players in the following way:

Gentlemen, I know you've all had coaches who say things like "Winning is living." but I'm not one of them. I want you to look honestly at what you're doing. You're playing a rather silly game. Compared to other human endeavours it is relatively insignificant. Don't ever let your sport consume your life to the detriment of other great goods in life. Sport is wonderful because it offers you an opportunity to commit yourself to a highly enjoyable physical endeavour. In doing this, sport can dramatise great moments of the human condition. You ought to see it as art, not war (21: pp215,216).

Feezel concludes that such an address seems "outworldly."

Although the address is obviously an exaggeration, it does describe many of the elements of sport which a virtue-formalist account hopes to protect. It suggests the futility, the meaning, the freedom and the craftsmanship in sport. So why is it outworldly?

In some contexts it would not appear unusual. In children's sport, virtues are explained and learned through modelling of authoritative examples and through an instruction which normally acknowledges the importance of internal goods. Stout suggests that: "Our society, in short, is richly endowed with widely valued social practices and goes to remarkable lengths to initiate new generations into them." The more varied a person's participation in social practices, the more complete and diversified his understanding of virtue and vice should become (99: p271).
Sport is one of the major practices used by society to educate the young, and one of the first languages through which children learn to conceive of excellence and virtue and criticize inappropriate actions. This language is often applied to evaluate actions in other social practices. It may be easier to learn courage as a doctor if it is first experienced as a child in athletics. Stout suggests:

My daughter, Little League and Yankee fan that she is, aims to run, hit and field not simply by the rules but as her favourite Yankee does. She studies him with the dedication of someone who needs no convincing that the goods internal to baseball are worth pursuing or that imitating excellence is the only way to achieve them (99: p271).

Unfortunately, the question of virtuous practice in sport cannot be so confidently predicted in elite sport. At best it is equivocal whether there is enough of a shared appreciation of real virtue in sport to suggest that it can be rationally discussed. Murray Hedgecock described Jimmy Connors performance at the 1991 U.S. Open in the following way:

Everything Connors achieved in New York was to my mind utterly invalidated by the manner of achievement. The gross, vulgar, insensitive, graceless, selfish, self-aggrandising and unsporting style of Jimmy Connors was a scar on the 1991 US Open and I was depressed at how many people accepted it as an inevitable part of the man and his method (41: p38).

At worst, the situation is as MacIntyre describes society. The practice of sport, as the traditions discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis explained, is heading in the
wrong direction if sport is to act as a forum for criticism and freedom. The idea of virtue, instilled in childhood, may be ignored in the different context of adulthood. What is considered to be virtue, by modern society, may be context dependent as well as practice dependent. It may depend on the importance of the game, or the reward for winning. And this could never be considered a settled disposition in MacIntyre’s terms.

Whilst this is not an optimistic outlook for modern sport, a criticism which also describes MacIntyre’s outlook on society, both modern society and modern sport have the tools available for an immanent and transcendent critique of modern practices. The language and tradition of virtues gives a critical vocabulary with which to discuss social practices, and this language, which is apparent in a variety of social practices such as education and medicine, is available to be applied to the practice of sport. What is needed is enough authoritative examples which move people to instigate the application of this critical vocabulary to the common practice of elite sport.

Conclusion

This chapter has tried to show that freedom in sport can be preserved by acknowledging that the intrinsic formal qualities of sport partition it from normal life. The constitutive formal rules of sport define its peculiar logic
and arbitrary internal goals of sport. It is these features which provide the difference between sport and other social practices. In Morgan's terms, the tradition of formalism means that:

...the distinctly human features of sport can be conceptually demarcated off from its social features.... Sport is not commodity sport in virtue of what is necessary to make it sport....[The abstraction of sport] allows us to preserve the essential difference between sport as such and commodified sport (68: p82, my insertion).

Formalism corrects many of the problems of the traditions of sport which are discussed in Chapter Two. It does not require the metaphysical connections between sport and play and recognises the real social strictures on freedom which occur in modern sport. However, it also opposes the reductive link between sport and social totality which Marxist and hegemony theories propose, by observing the wedge between sport and real life which the rules of sport produce.

This freedom is to be protected by the practice of virtue in sport; especially the virtue of judgement. Judgement involves viewing sport as it really is, as the voluntary overcoming of gratuitous difficulty, and not as it is presented by many sections of modern society, such as the media and the sporting professions. Feezel argues that judgement is important in appreciating the position of sport in the larger scheme of things, whilst also recognizing and protecting the attractive internal goods of sport from overconcern with these larger issues (21: p218).
Yet, Feezel is not sure about the possibility for the development of judgement in modern sport. To the question, Does sport build character? he replies "it depends." The problem in modern sport is that, because of the conflation of social and formal aspects of sport by the profession and the media, vicious actions are often presented and lauded as effective, productive, courageous and virtuous. In other practices there is a reasonably clear demarcation between virtue and vice, which is commonly agreed upon. In sport, this area of agreement is obscure because of the forceful, growing but misconceived tradition which suggests that sport is externally serious, competitive and brutal, a tradition which sells the spectacle of sport (21: p219).

It is not clear that there is enough of a common agreement about the importance of virtue in sport to suggest that there is a basis for believing that virtue will become important in sport or in society. Stout states: "I may seem to have affirmed the health of pluralistic society and the richness of moral vocabularies at one moment while pointing out signs of rapidly advancing disease with the next" (99: p276). To oppose the "sameness" of advanced capitalism, it will be necessary to develop a tradition of virtue which has the force to produce a common belief in its importance. Stout suggests that we are not far from this. Although in many regards differences appear at the level of philosophical debate, it is more important to shift the debate to the level
of detail in social practices; to look at what makes each practice different and to preserve this difference. At this level, the communitarian MacIntyre, the social critics Horkheimer, Adorno and Habermas, and the modern liberal Rorty agree that it is important to preserve the essential character of social practices from the influence of external goods (99: pp276,277). In order to achieve this result, it will be best served by borrowing from all these theories, and from the traditions of Chapter Two, and then to apply this to the specific social practice of sport.

The following chapter will continue with the second and third stages of MacIntyre's creation of the tradition of virtue in society. It will use the idea of the telos for human beings as a link between formalism and a modern liberal view of society and of the practice of sport. The separation of sport from the influence of other social phenomenon occurs through the ordering of sport as one of life's practices. This can only occur in a life which has, at least, a provisional good which gives a life integrity.
As discussed in Chapter Two, liberalism arose in opposition to the conservative tradition as a desire to secure freedom and rights for all members of society. The Enlightenment belief in a universal human nature and dignity, was used as a justification for the provision of these rights. This belief was extended to suggest that all human beings shared a common essence which ensured that the rational pursuit of one's goals would be compatible with everyone else's rationally pursued goals.

It becomes apparent that the ideas of an a common human nature and the compatibility of all rational goals, creates more problems for the tradition of liberalism than it solves. Who is to decide between what is a rational goal and what is an irrational goal? How is the irrational individual to be educated? The ideas, beginning from the premises of freedom and autonomy in liberalism conclude with the authoritarian and non-liberal state which decides what it is rational to believe in. In Rorty's terms:

...the Enlightenment attempt to free oneself from tradition and history, to appeal to "Nature" and "Reason", was self-deceptive.... such an appeal [is] a misguided attempt to make philosophy do what theology failed to do (90: p262, my insertion).

In response to this crisis in liberalism, Marxism proposes that all human actions and relations are determined
by the nature of the economic production in a society. Marxist theory emphasizes the interdependence of the different spheres in society and especially the influence of economics on all these spheres. The rights and freedoms thought to be achieved in the modern state are myths, as the ideological influence of the capitalist state determines the practice of those rights and freedoms in social practices.

The Marxist solution to the problems of capitalist society is a social revolution which seizes control of all practices from the dominant capitalist class (106: p318). However, Marxism also proves to be faulty in explaining the actual practice of freedom and constraint in society, because it denies the individual the rationality and capacity to oppose the standards and norms of advanced capitalism.

As discussed in Chapter Three, social criticism, as a reformulation of the Marxist tradition, offers an alternative to these problems. It suggests that the individual's freedom and creativity can be achieved in the pursuit of critical autonomous cultural practices. These practices, through their formal rules and logic, allows the individual an area in which to be creative. This creativity is linked with the requirement for participants to act virtuously and pursue the internal goals in practices. This idea has strong implications with respect to sport, a paradigm example of a practice.

This chapter will investigate another liberal alternative. Contemporary liberals, according to Rorty, have
given up the metaphysical endeavours of the Enlightenment (90: p258). Instead, they have returned to the original historical conditions and premises of liberalism, and have resisted attempts to push these premises too far towards discoveries of an essential human nature and goal. This chapter will commence with an explanation of the tradition of modern liberalism. It will then return to the second and third stages of MacIntyre's explication of the virtues and endeavour to show that they are not necessarily in opposition to the beliefs held by modern liberals. The link between liberalism and virtue will have important implications with respect to the practice of modern sport.

Modern Liberalism

Michael Walzer argues that the origins of the liberal tradition can be viewed as a method of dividing the organic and integrated whole of conservative society into separate spheres. Liberal theorists and politicians form boundaries between the various institutions of society and each boundary separates different realms in society and creates new liberties for individuals. For example, the wall between church and state, which occurred with the recognition of the political expedience of the tolerance of a variety of religions in response to the Wars of Religion, creates a private sphere for individual conscience into which the state cannot intrude. Similar boundaries between the state and
other institutions result in academic, economic and market, employment and private freedoms for the individual (106: pp315-317).

According to Rawls, the historical conditions which resulted in the development of the tradition of liberalism also create conditions which profoundly affect the development of a practical and fair political conception of justice. In a society which is not an organic whole, and which permits individual liberties, differences in belief and opinion are likely to occur. Rawls argues that:

...in the history of any society during which certain fundamental questions give rise to sharp and divisive political controversy.... One task of political philosophy... is to focus on such questions and to examine whether some underlying basis of agreement can be uncovered and a mutually acceptable way of resolving these questions publicly established (83: p226).

Rawls uses the original premises of liberalism, and other commonly held ideas in modern society, to formulate a practical conception of justice in order to resolve conflicts of interest in a fair manner. In so doing, Rawls avoids the metaphysical claims about human nature which proved inadequate and led to contradictory conclusions in the original liberal tradition. The political conception of justice is worked out for the social, economic and political institutions of a modern constitutional democracy, and remains at the level of practical debate through the resolution of conflicts. It is not intended to be the application of a general moral conception to the practice of
these institutions. Such an application fails to allow for the plurality of conflicting beliefs and goals which occur in existing democratic societies (83: pp224, 225). For purposes of political theory, liberalism avoids more comprehensive questions about the nature of humanity, the identity of individuals, the motives of moral behaviour and the meaning of life (90: p261).

Rawls does not discredit these more general conceptions of human nature and society. He simply suggests that for the purposes of practical justice, it is better to tolerate the various beliefs within these comprehensive doctrines. The political conception of justice hopes to use the underlying intuitive ideas which each of these doctrines shares. The two factors which determine the nature of a political conception of justice are the pluralism of modern society and the rich common culture which consists in principles acceptable to all people. It is from this common culture that Rawls hopes to develop a theory of justice as fairness, which will be acceptable to all people (86: p7). These settled ideas are collected and organised into a coherent, but less comprehensive, conception of justice (83: p228). In Rorty's terms:

There is, in short, nothing wrong with the hopes of the Enlightenment, the hopes which created Western democracies. The value of the ideals of the Enlightenment is,... just the value of some institutions and practices which they have created.... I have sought to distinguish these institutions and practices from the philosophical justifications for them (92: p16).
The fundamental intuitive ideas, which the more comprehensive philosophical and religious doctrines in democratic society share, combine to suggest that society should be "...a fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons." Persons are conceived of as having two moral capacities: a sense of justice and a personal and rational conception of the good (83: p231). Modern political liberalism can be defined as:

...a theory of social justice which includes procedural elements for resolving conflicts between conceptions of the good, and conditions upon that resolution which requires that each individual be treated with equal respect and concern. The procedural element must be compatible with a wide range of theories of goodness and nonetheless express concern for the interests of all individuals (cited by 81: p154).

The failure of any general theory to provide a conception of the good which is rationally pursued by all members of society requires this development of a conception of justice which recognizes the validity of the various goods pursued by different people. The liberal view of society cannot accept a theory of the good which is prior to the conception of justice, and which would exclude some competing conceptions of the good (79: p805).

1) FREEDOM AND POLITICAL JUSTICE

Rawls' principle of justice as fairness sets limits to permissible ways of life. Claims made by citizens which contravene these limits have no weight in political decisions of justice. However this principle has no meaning unless it
is recognized that all human beings pursue goods, and the function of the conception of justice is not only to permit, but to sustain permissible ways of life. For Rawls, "...justice draws the limit, the good shows the point" (82: p252). The primacy of justice to beliefs about the good occurs because persons in a modern democratic society place liberty and free choice ahead of perfection. This primacy allows for both settled social habits and conventions, and for the opportunity for individuals to freely oppose and charge those habits (90: pp265, 266).

A person is someone who can be a fully cooperating member of society. The requirements of this membership are that individuals are free to use their moral powers, and that they recognize the equality of other members of society to use their respective moral powers as they wish. According to Rawls (83: p233):

A sense of justice is the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the public conception of justice which characterizes the fair terms of social cooperation. The capacity for a conception of the good is the capacity to form, to revise rationally to pursue a conception of one's rational advantage, or good. In the case of social cooperation, this good must not be understood narrowly, but rather as a conception of what is valuable in human life.... that is, ends we want to realize for their own sake, as well as attachments to other persons and loyalties to various groups, and associations.

This rational plan of life is understood as a general goal which orders the person's life and determines the allocation of various resources to that plan over an entire life. However, it must include the ends of tolerance and fairness
which all people share (82: p254).

2) FREEDOM AND SELF-DETERMINATION

The right to freedom emphasized in this conception should not be confused with a metaphysical claim about the nature of humanity. Once again, this idea of freedom as a human's ability to formulate one's own plans comes from basic intuitive ideas held by persons in society. People conceive of themselves as free if they are capable of reviewing and changing their own conceptions of the good, and these changes do not affect their public identity or rights as a person. Personhood is not related to any specific conception of the good, but to the ability of any person to hold and revise their own conception. This contrasts with the intuitive ideas held in conservative society where the strength of individuals' claims are, at least partially, related to their position in society (83: p241).

Kymlicka suggests that the ideas of freedom and self-determination stem from the belief in modern society that individuals rationally evaluate their conception of the good life with the knowledge that they could be wrong. Deliberation occurs both to the suitability of rational plans to achieve the goal, and to the value of the goal, and persons recognize that their current or past judgements could be mistaken. In Kymlicka's words: "This is the stuff of great novels - the crisis of faith" (52: p182). However, the acknowledgment that individuals may be wrong does not entail
that they will accept that their lives can be directed by others. An individual's life plan is only improved if it is revised "from the inside", according to beliefs about the value of certain goals held by that person (52: p183).

Liberty is needed in a modern democratic society so that individuals can discover what is valuable and reasonable to pursue in their own lives. From Mill to Rawls, freedom in liberal society is valued because it allows people to discover the good and to independently revise their personal conceptions of morality. Self-determination is not an end in liberalism, but is the only way that individuals can rationally pursue the good (52: pp185,187). However, whereas autonomy was a part of a comprehensive moral doctrine in the theories of Mill and Kant, for Rawls it arises from the basic intuitive ideas which lead to the political conception of justice (83: p247).

The political conception of justice provides all citizens with the opportunity to adequately develop and fully exercise their moral powers and to share in the means essential for the development of their conceptions of the good. Justice as fairness rejects the idea of comparing and perfecting well-being in matters of social policy. Nor does it try to assess the merit of the ends pursued by individuals, provided those ends are compatible with the principle of justice (82: p258).
3) FREEDOM, NEUTRALITY AND LEGITIMACY

Stout argues that Rawls' political conception of justice is valuable in defining what justice is about for members of society, that is, in explaining the basic intuitive ideas about persons, freedom, self-determination and equality which are held in society. However his theories about the methods of ensuring neutrality in modern liberalism have pushed this conception too far by avoiding all ideas of individual desert (100: p43). It will suffice to suggest that any bargaining advantages which inevitably arise in society should be eliminated from a political conception of justice (81: p154).

Michael Walzer (106: p321) explains this position in terms of the art of separation in democratic society. He suggests:

...society enjoys both freedom and equality when success in one institutional setting isn't convertible into success in another, that is, when the separations hold, when political power doesn't shape the church or religious zeal, the state, and so on.

At the level of individuals, the political conception of justice is neutral when all people have a right to hold their own beliefs about the good, provided they do not infringe on anyone else's rights. The social position that is held in society by individuals does not justify any expectation by those individuals that other people should accept their conceptions of the good.
This idea of neutral grounds is important to the liberal ideal of political legitimacy in democratic society. The ideal of legitimacy suggests that any reasonable person can accept the principles of justice which regulate the basic social and political institutions of society in a fair and equal manner. When the idea of conflicting conceptions of the good is added, it requires that the principles of justice are legitimate if they are acceptable to any reasonable person and certain concepts which can be recognized by all people as neutral between different moral views (16: p255).

Rorty suggests that the success of this accommodation of a variety of people's rational plans will accrue to give modern liberalism the authority of a tradition without the need for Kantian buttresses for morality. Reflective equilibrium becomes the only mechanism needed in discussing social policy. Rational behaviour is adaptive behaviour which coincides with the behaviour of other members of the community in similar circumstances. Justice as fairness allows rational behaviour where it does not contravene the rules of fairness (91: p217). Metaphysical claims become, "...at best relevant to private searches for perfection only" (90: p264). Rawls argues:

...what justifies a conception of justice is not it being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us (84: p519).
Individuals will accept the legitimacy of the political conception of justice if it fairly protects their basic interests of self-determination and the freedom to pursue their own goals, and it establishes fair procedures for resolving conflicts between non basic interests. From this idea, it would seem reasonable that any person has a civil right to pursue goals which do not interfere with other people’s basic rights. Alternatively, legislative neutrality only allows the state to interfere with any individual's plans when those plans interfere with another person’s basic interests. Also, legitimacy cannot be undermined by failures to satisfy non-basic interests if these failures are not unfair. State or institutional justice is only illegitimate in terms of neutrality if it advances one neutral conception of the good over another (16: p258). A society cannot maintain all comprehensive conceptions of the good. Some die out through lack of support. This attrition cannot be helped in any political conception of justice. This constraint does not answer the question as to whether such loss is to be lamented (82: pp265,266).

How should conflicts of non-basic interests be settled? Constitutional neutrality, such as the rule of the majority, is morally arbitrary because it ranks some non-basic interests as higher than others, those supported by a majority of people. De Marneffe suggests that it is better to
leave the mechanism of this resolution open. In his terms:

The point is that if the interests of two reasonable people conflict and neither can point to some neutral value as sufficient reason why he should get what he wants, then the only justification that both can accept for things going one way over another is that the framework of basic laws in which such conflicts are decided is itself justifiable to both of them. If the framework of basic laws can be justified..., then he has reason to accept those laws even when they do not secure for him everything he might want (16: p273).

Although this may seem to leave so much undecided, it may be the most practical conception of justice for which a modern democratic society can hope.

4) JUSTICE AND MODERN SOCIETY

Michael Walzer offers a less optimistic view of modern liberal society. He suggests that in modern society, "...our cities really are noisier and nastier than they once were" (105: p293). Humans are by nature social beings, before they are political or economic beings. Increasingly associational life has been neglected in social policy.

Walzer suggests that the good life of authentic solidarities can only be lived when these associations are freely chosen. This choice occurs in the realm of civil society. In advanced capitalism, civil society, and the virtues of civility, have not been protected. Modern societies have "...not thought enough about solidarity and trust or planned for their future" (105: p294).

However, Rawls suggests that his political conception of justice provides for the development of authentic social
relationships, or social unions, in the community. He believes that the social nature of humans is best displayed by the way they share final ends and value common institutions and practices as good in themselves (85: p523).

Rawls continues by explaining that the rational plans of individuals exceed their personal capacity to carry out these plans. Individuals require the assistance of others to engage in ways of life that they find satisfying. Yet this assistance cannot be fully explained instrumentally. The success and enjoyment of others is necessary to the individual's own good. In addition, people cannot carry out all the plans to which they are disposed. Thus, each person devotes attention to those plans which "...he wishes to encourage..." and shares in the achievements of others in those practices which were not pursued. In Rawls' terms:

Different persons with similar or complementary capacities may cooperate so to speak in realizing their common or matching nature. When men are secure in the enjoyment of their own powers, they are disposed to appreciate the perfections of others, especially when their several excellences have an agreed place in a form of life the aims of which all accept (85: p523).

This security of the individual is related to the political conception of justice, which protects the respect people receive for the plans of action and choices they make.

The "community of humankind" exists where members of society enjoy the excellences and individuality of each other in a variety of social practices, and they recognize the importance of this variety to the whole scheme of life of the
community. Under this scheme, all practices which adhere to the political conception of justice are equally valuable. The community also extends through time, with each generation contributing to the realization of shared final ends by members of an authentic social union.

Rawls recognises the importance of political virtues of civility and tolerance in the conception of justice as fairness. This conception necessarily affirms the superiority of these moral virtues above other virtues. However, Rawls also recognises that these virtues are presented as political values and they do not lead to a perfectionist state. They appear, in various ways, in the comprehensive doctrines of society to ensure the development of social unions (82: p263). The shared ends of political virtues calls on the cooperation of many people to achieve them. The goods realized are social ones, and are appreciated by members of a society as an achievement (82: p271).

Walzer continues by suggesting that the measure of this achievement is the exact character of the associational life in a community, and during this assessment the quality of the institutions and practices of society will also be measured. Civil society is the area of life where the stakes are lower, and influence and coercion is less likely to occur. The experience of civil society works against the intolerance of most religions and the exclusivity of most nations. Civil society becomes the area where free decisions to associate are made (105: p300).
According to Rawls, the shared ends of a social union are not simply a common desire to achieve the same result. Both teams in a sporting match hope to win. A social union involves "...an agreed scheme of conduct in which excellences and enjoyments of each are complementary to the good of all" (85: p526). The community combines to execute a plan of action which is acceptable to all. There are many types of activity in modern society which display the elements of social unions, ranging from families and friendships, to larger associations. Rawls comments: "A well-ordered society, and indeed modern societies, will presumably contain countless social unions of many different kinds" (85: p527). The freedom of the individual occurs as a self-determined choice to participate actively in some forms of social union, and to enjoy the accomplishments of other people in other social practices. The political conception of justice protects this freedom.

5) MODERN LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL CRITICISM

Liberalism has been successful in eliminating politics from civil society. However the Marxist tradition was the first to suggest that liberalism has not been successful in protecting the institutions of civil society from the effect of wealth, and that liberalism is a system of political justice which served this influence of wealth. In
Gamble's terms:

That capitalism should have transformed the world in such a way as to undermine the moral force of the ideologies that guided, assisted, and interpreted it, is one of the great facts and the great paradoxes of the modern world (30: p20).

Whilst Marxism suggests that the walls of liberalism should be broken down, Walzer suggests that the important need in a democratic society is to extend these walls and develop an area of protected space where economic interests such as rationalization, productivity and power are excluded. In Walzer's terms:

...institutions are responsive to their own internal logic even while they are also responsive to systematic determinations. The play of internal logic can only be repressed by tyrannical force, crossing the lines, ... established by the art of separation. Liberalism is best understood as an argument against that sort of repression (106: p319).

With the boundaries intact, the possibilities for self-determination, change, social criticism and freedom are enhanced, and the opportunity for comparison between institutions arises.

How close is this position to the ideas of social critical theorists about the necessity to preserve critical cultural practices from the influence of capitalism? Walzer goes on to suggest that in a liberal society, inequalities which exist in institutions and practices are neutral if they reflect a shared understanding about the internal logic of these institutions and practices. When success in one sphere influences the distribution of resources in another sphere, then this distribution is inequitable. The problem in modern
democratic society is that the tyranny of wealth overrides free exchange in a variety of ways. The integrity and freedom of institutions will not maintain itself; it is maintained by the protection of rules, mores and traditions (106: pp321,322). Jeffrey Stout suggests:

We are right to worry about a system in which the proliferation and distribution of external goods makes doctors and prospective doctors lose sight of the goods internal to medical care.... medical care in our society tends increasingly to be dominated by the modes of interaction and patterns of thought characteristic of the market.... With them [the marketplace and the bureaucracies], it tends to be overwhelmed by goods and rates alien to its own telos of caring for the sick (99: pp274,275, my insertion).

Historically, liberalism has viewed institutions as an intermediate point in the process of separation, with the freedom of the individual the end point. Yet this does not provide a realistic understanding of why individuals form relationships in civil society. Civil society is not just the correspondence of individuals pursuing similar goals. The individual does not create, or wholly shape the institutions they enter. They enter institutions and practices because their particular rules, customs and cooperative arrangements are attractive to individuals. Therefore, the art of separation is needed to preserve institutional integrity. Individuals are free if they are able to pursue the goals they desire. As these goals only occur within institutions, then freedom exists if these institutions are ruled by internal and not external forces (106: pp325,326).
This leads to a dilemma which Walzer and liberals like him share with MacIntyre, and that is how is it best to preserve the integrity of institutions and practices from the influence of the capitalist marketplace (100: p54). Walzer suggests that the art of separation is a popular art about what is important to the internal logic of institutions, and the focus on institutions socializes this process, rather than leaves it in the hands of lawyers and bureaucrats. Popular support establishes and protects the separations through the political process (106: p328).

A problem remains with the possibility of a social tradition of tolerance and compromise getting the lines of separation wrong. The political conception of justice allows individuals to fight democratically for these lines, and revisions are constantly made. Yet Walzer suggests that there is no reason to be confident about the sustained existence of the notions of civility, internal goals, trust and participation which are necessary to the integrity of modern practices and institutions. He concludes:

...in the modern world we need to recapture the density of associational life and relearn the activities and understandings that go with it.... We have to reconstruct that same density under new conditions of freedom and equality. It would appear to be an elementary requirement of social democracy that there exist a society of lively, engaged and effective men and women - where the honour of "action" belongs to the many and not the few (105: p304, author's italics).

And in a modern society which lacks a thorough knowledge of civility, and suffers from a growing list of problems such as
violence and poverty, civil involvement and authentic social
unions become necessary conditions rather than luxuries.

The following section will explore how the ideas of
MacIntyre about the virtue tradition can be integrated into
the political conception of justice and civility to achieve
reasoned participation in creating the boundaries of civil
society and in reinvigorating associational life in modern
society. This section will commence with MacIntyre’s
statement of the problem of modern liberalism. It will then
proceed to show how a reformulation of liberalism can make it
compatible with, and even enhance, the virtue tradition.

Liberalism and Virtue

MacIntyre suggests that the attempt to separate
modern life into a series of compartments has the effect of
making it impossible to conceive of the unity of a human
life. Each segment carries its own special standards and
norms of behaviour. Childhood and old age are separated from
the rest of human life. And as each separation is made, it
becomes easier to think of the life of an individual in terms
of its distinct parts rather than its unity (60: p204).

Without this unity, it is impossible to think of the
individual as having a telos which orders the conflicting
goods of the various segments of that person’s life. And,
without such ordering it is necessary to have a neutral
system of justice to determine conflicts which occur between
individuals. The reason for this need is that there are no rational criteria for weighing the relative claims of incommensurable goods. The commitment in liberalism is to there being no overriding good which can order subordinate claims. Rawls argues that such an attachment to an overriding good would seem irrational in a pluralist society (cited in 59: p337).

However, according to MacIntyre this commitment to shallow foundations in liberalism creates perpetual and unresolvable debates in modern society. When individuals or groups express their respective values, the only rational way to adjudicate between these values is to decide by means of philosophical enquiry which values approach the truth. This is impossible in liberal society, and debates at a practical level proceed. Rival standpoints necessarily assume the form of assertion and counter assertion (59: pp343,344).

The consequence of this situation is that the social and political background of modern society has degenerated from feelings of civility, authentic social unions and moral community to modes of bureaucratic manipulation and management in practice. Less and less significance has been given to finding a resolution to these conflicts in terms of the good for humanity and society, and greater emphasis is given to developing fair methods of tallying preferences and to the justification of these methods to members of society. The mark of liberalism is to refer its conflicts to the law
courts, and not to debate (59: p344). Modern society is one where:

The bureaucratic manager, the consuming aesthetic, the therapist, the protester and their numerous kindred occupy almost all the available culturally recognizable roles; the notions of the expertise of the few and the moral agency of everyone are the presuppositions of the dramas which those characters enact (60: p256,257).

According to Rasmussen, the political conception of justice, as having no normative bases for conflict resolution, causes practical and theoretical problems. It involves a contradiction between the doctrines and the goals of liberal theory. If there is no basis for determining and legitimating the value of various activities, what constitutes a violation of a person's liberty? Without a normative basis for determining the content of liberty, John Gray argues that liberalism becomes a meaningless ideal. Its rules and regulations are those that best fit, and not those that provide greatest liberty. (cited by 81: p153). In Clarke's terms, "...what passes for moral debate is merely jockeying for a position" (14: p429).

Christopher Lasch poses this problem in the practical terms which Walzer used to criticize modern society. He suggests that without a normative basis to the conception of justice, it becomes impossible to evaluate and criticize the goals of market exchange which impinge on a society's practices and institutions. He argues:

My objection to the liberal view of things can be simply summarized by saying that this is too narrow a conception of public interest. The public also has an
interest... in medicine or sports that are practiced with devotion, with primary attention to internal goods. This interest... demands a policy, a far more effective policy than anything that now exists, designed to limit the degree to which they are compromised and corrupted by the pursuit of external goods (54: p73).

Or, in the terms of social critical theorists, there is no basis for judging one end to be more worthy of pursuit than another, provided the pursuit of both ends satisfy the requirements of the political conception of justice. On this account, commodified practices are as validly pursued as any other practice. There can be no position in this account of liberalism which opposes the influence of advanced capitalism on practices.

1) LIBERALISM AND NATURAL END ETHICS

Is it possible for such a judgement to exist under a tradition of liberalism? Rasmussen looks to the possibility of using a "natural end ethics" to overcome the problem of indeterminacy in deciding between goods in modern liberal society. This ethics determines the difference between desire and right desire in terms of a person's telos which is the ultimate standard of value. Actions which promote the telos can be rationally valued above those which do not (81: p154).

This appears to be opposed to the doctrines of modern liberalism. Yet Des Jardins argues that modern liberalism can accommodate a natural end ethics if the following conditions
are not the case:

(a) there is one unequivocal interpretation of the human telos (b) the telos provides unequivocal guidance regarding human interests (c) no conflict occurs between those interests and (d) as a result of these factors, individual freedom of choice is not among the central human interests (cited by 81: p155).

If these conditions do not apply, then there is a necessity for a theory of justice based on the importance of protecting the individual's decisions about how to achieve their telos. This theory of justice would still include the ingredients of tolerance, pluralism and self-determination which are important to any liberal theory of justice.

A human or universal telos does not require that all people will act in the same way all the time. The actions of individual human beings will be related to the situation in the history of each person. Differences will occur where people actualize their unique potentials. Rawls agrees that, although the political virtues need to be universally held in a fair and equal society, what these virtues call for in the light of the various conceptions of the good will differ in terms of concrete actions. This in no way contradicts the idea of a telos. The human good is always and necessarily individualized (81: p156).

However it is these unique attributes and histories which Rawls tries to factor out of moral equations in terms of his "difference principle." Principles of justice which eliminate individual attributes cannot be grounded in a theory of the human telos. The principle of
universalizability, important in any just conception of justice, which occurs in a natural end ethics is warranted to the extent that one can, through an act of abstraction, conceive of human nature and truly predicate the nature of individual human beings. These features of human nature are always individualized in actual human beings. It is a mistake to treat these features in a way which removes this individuality. Thus, the principle of universalizability relates to the good in abstraction, not to how it exists in real life (81: p157).

Clarke continues by arguing that the "difference principle" contradicts one of the basic and common intuitive ideas of real society. In real life, desert is factored into justice. The notions of desert and justice are linked to a community with a common understanding of practices, institutions, internal goods and rewards. The liberal attempt to remove these historical concepts from consideration is motivated by an admirable but misguided desire to not offend opposing traditions (14: p428). Stout agrees that in a society's practices, the understanding of justice is wider than the liberal conception, which eschews considerations of merit. And in real society, this wider conception is more practical (99: p273).

One other impediment remains if there is to be an alignment between liberalism and a natural end ethics which aims at the truth. The pluralism of modern culture required Rawls to deny the "truth" of his political conception of
justice. To achieve a consensus of the various comprehensive conceptions in society, Rawls avoids the question of truth, as he did not believe that his theory is entitled to prevail over any other doctrine. For a plural society, consensus is more important than truth. Rawls argues that: "...social unity... is the most desirable conception of unity available to us; it is the limit of the practical best" (82: p269).

Joseph Raz argues that if Rawls pursues social unity in his political conception of justice, then he must recommend this good as worthwhile. To accept this theory of justice above any other is to suggest that this good is more important and worthwhile than any other good, and to accept that this theory of justice is the most valid, or reasonable, or true doctrine for this society. The achievement of consensus based stability and unity is the "truth" on which this theory relies. In Raz's terms, "...there can be no justice without truth" (86: p15).

Once epistemic abstinence is avoided, consensual unity and stability can be valued as one of a number of goods provided by the political conception of justice, to show that this doctrine is the most valid for modern society. In addition, Rawls suggests that his theory is advantageous for individuals by allowing them to adequately develop their moral capacities. It is also beneficial to the community by creating a socially realized good of a well-ordered society. The well-ordered society provides a number of areas for the development of authentic solidarities between its members.
In Rawls' estimation, all these benefits combine to show that this doctrine is the most valid for modern society. According to Raz, the doctrine is true because it represents a balance between freedom and equality which allows for a fair system of cooperation between people. The achievement of consensual unity is valuable because it allows for this system of cooperation. Since he wished to avoid the requirement that his doctrine was true, Rawls was forced to suggest the alternative, that a fair system of cooperation is valuable because it produces consensual unity (86: pp17,18).

In an attempt to avoid decisions about the truth of his theory, Rawls is committed to a theory which has shallow foundations in the basic intuitive ideas shared by a community. The desirability of the political conception of justice denies the primary justificatory force of any theory, which is its truth. While acceptability may be an important practical consideration, it cannot be the principle which makes the theory valid. This position presents an essentially complacent and assured view of the justice of society. Any political theory must realize the possibility that the society it addresses is unjust. In Raz's words, "...not every feasible doctrine is a valid one" (86: p18). Stout offers a similar criticism of Rorty's pragmatic view of truth. The attempt to reduce objectivity or truth to solidarity reduces the validity of the ideal to its popularity (99: p245). In both of these positions, radical and unpopular criticism of the popularly held but invalid beliefs and institutions,
would not be valued as moving towards truth. Such criticism would only be valuable if it reordered the world in a significant way for a significant number. This seems to contradict the premises of individual freedom of speech, and equality in conceptions of the good, which liberalism champions. It is the validity of the ideal, and not just its popularity which makes it desirable (86: p20).

2) JUSTICE, AUTONOMY AND TRUTH

A theory of justice can be autonomous in two ways, according to Raz (86: p22). It is strongly autonomous if its validity does not rely on non political considerations, as in Rawls' view of his political conception. It is weakly autonomous if its values fit in with and make sense of the variety of other goods embraced in an individual's comprehensive moral conception. If the political virtues and values are manifested in the constitutional structure of a society, so as to fit with other values, then that political theory is weakly autonomous. Raz suggests two objections to viewing any political theory as strongly autonomous. First, justification of any theory relies on how well that theory of political values can be integrated into comprehensive views of human well being. Secondly, the practical implications of any value, political or moral, depend on its relationship to, and conflict with, all other values in an individual's life. A strongly autonomous political conception does not allow for comparison and adjudication of its values with non political
values (86: pp22,23).

However, the truth of Rawls' theory means that it can avoid the need for shallow foundations, strong autonomy and the overriding value of a stable community. Its justification is its practical ability to resolve conflicts in values and to create the conditions for authentic social relationships, which makes it desirable as a political ideal. Those features remaining important in this reconstruction of Rawls' theory are: his political conception of justice has limited applicability in deciding issues and not determining the good for all people; the doctrine has a higher order interest in autonomy for preserving an individual's self-determination of the good and; it preserves the central role of an overlapping consensus as valuable, though not of overriding value, in society. The true liberal moral theory recognizes the value of all people establishing their own conceptions of the good, whether they be valid or invalid. It retains its objection to forcing people to change their comprehensive moral doctrines (86: p25).

3) MODERN LIBERALISM AS A TRADITION

MacIntyre contends that the values which the political conception of justice endorses are not neutral. They impose a particular conception of justice, of practical reason and of the good upon both critics and defenders of liberal society. This conception is an articulation of the historical conditions and the developing theories of modern
liberal society. The good of liberalism is the continued sustenance of the liberal social and political order. To suggest that liberalism is valuable for sustaining liberal society is not a compelling argument for its acceptance. Liberalism turns out to be one of a variety of traditions which have contestable conceptions of the good, justice and rationality, and its justification occurs in a comparison with these other traditions (59: p345).

So how is the liberal theory of justice to be evaluated against other traditions? MacIntyre suggests that there are no tradition-independent standards of rational justification. Each tradition, including modern liberalism, can be justified in its own terms, for it is out of the debates and historical contingencies of this tradition that ideas of justice and practical rationality arise. Justification always occurs from the standpoint of a specific tradition (59: pp350,351).

An initial problem in any debate about justice and practical rationality is to discover and construct some forum of debate for antagonistic traditions, which does not predetermine the outcome of the debate in terms of one tradition. What the problems are, how the terms of the debate are formulated and addressed, and how, if possible, they are resolved will vary not only with the historical, social and cultural situation of the person who is affected by these problems, but also with the history of belief and attitude of each particular person up to the point at which these
problems must be faced. In modern society, this person is confronted with a set of rival traditions, one of which is modern liberalism. The problems for that person are determined by the relationship between what is specific to each of the rival traditions and what is specific to the beliefs and history of the individual who confronts the problem. Therefore, the intellectual encounter cannot take place in any generalized way which addresses adherents of all rival traditions (59: pp392,393).

The denial of the rational justification of goals by the liberal tradition occurs because it ignores the fact that this rational justification always occurs within the framework of a tradition. Individuals never live behind "a veil of ignorance." Their decisions occur within, and are affected by, the tradition in which they reside. Naturally, the tradition in which they reside will prefer goals which sustain and satisfy that tradition, rather than some other view. This was the truism of Rawls' view of unity and stability. However, this Rawlsian justification does not mean that there are no neutral grounds for supporting any decision. The problem with moral debate in contemporary society is that it is unaware of its own limits, situation and incoherence. By being ahistorical and asocial, it is also arational and incapable of self-criticism (107: p240). As a result, the liberal tradition also makes it difficult to recognise the kind of rationality that traditions possess.
Clarke argues that MacIntyre's critique of liberalism is important because of its display of the link between tradition and change. A society whose members are unaware of other traditions changes slowly. It is only when conflict or communication between traditions occurs that change accelerates. He states:

Once we have realized how far traditions differ, it is difficult to retain an un-selfconscious devotion to our own. We must do so in the knowledge that we would have been as devoted to the alien values [of other traditions] were it not for historical accident (14: p432, my insertion).

Liberalism becomes one more tradition which attempts to solve problems, with contestable validity. An analogy to this situation is explained by Stephen Jay Gould in an interview with Clive James (31). He suggests that conscious types of bias in science, generally for professional esteem or money, tell us nothing about the nature of knowledge, but a great deal about the nature of society. It is the unconscious biases which are interesting in revealing more about knowledge; those biases which find things which are presupposed in the traditional beliefs of a society, but which further investigation proves to be incorrect. The American anthropologist of the nineteenth century, Morton, showed the racial hierarchy of the capacity of skills to be, from largest, whites, Indians and blacks. These studies were published, which showed a conscious belief in the truth of them, and, on further examination, revealed an unconscious bias of Morton's tradition.
Traditions begin in some form of historical contingency with beliefs, institutions and practices which a community share. Authority in a tradition is conferred upon certain ideas. This authority is tested and justified in terms of its ability to resolve problems. If significant problems are unable to be resolved by it, or accommodated within it, the tradition must develop, and this development relies on both the reasoning abilities and the inventiveness of its members. Members of a tradition compare and contrast the reformed tradition with its predecessors. The truth of the tradition lies in its intelligent thought which is more adequate in its dealings with the realities of the social world. Any tradition is vindicated by its ability to survive dialectical questioning. Beliefs and judgements are justified by their superiority over past forms in their ability to handle past problems, and each new form is less susceptible to dialectical questioning and objection, and members of the tradition are more confident of its truth, at least until new problems are perceived as significant. Justification is both dialectical and historical (59: pp354-360).

However no member of a tradition can ever be assured that the current beliefs and judgements of the tradition will never be shown to be inadequate. At any given stage, a tradition may cease to progress in terms of its ability to solve problems, or may come into conflict during communication with another tradition. If this new tradition produces better answers to the problems of a society, then it
must be acknowledged that it is rationally superior to prior traditions, in respect to the truth of its claims (59: pp364,365).

According to MacIntyre, the effect of modern liberalism has been that most people are unable to recognise their encounters with traditions. Instead they accept, usually unquestionably, the assumptions of the dominant liberal individualist forms of public life, but use a variety of other traditions in their private life of social practices. Such a person suffers from inconsistency and disunity in their moral principles and choices. Rationality requires that such a person learns to test each tradition dialectically, both by engaging in arguments within the tradition and through conflicts with other traditions. With at least a partial understanding of several traditions of thought, modern individuals are capable of comparison through conversation between traditions. This conversation will furnish the individual with a recognition of personal incoherences, and an acknowledgment of the best tradition to most adequately explain these problems. Individuals confirm or disprove over time their initial views of their relationship to a particular tradition of enquiry. This rationality combines both dialectical criticism with self-determination (59: pp397,398).

MacIntyre suggests that the confidence that members of a tradition have about the truth of that tradition is increased over time as the tradition survives challenges. The
idea of desert in justice which remains popularly held in modern society, exhibits an adherence to an older, Aristotelian tradition. The durability of this tradition, in its survival of conflicts with both conservative and liberal views of justice, suggests that there is some residual power in the virtue tradition in modern society. This view of justice remains important in many social practices in modern society (60: p252). The adherents of the Aristotelian tradition:

...have every reason at least so far to hold that the rationality of their tradition has been confirmed in its encounters with other traditions.... This conclusion will of course be unacceptable to all those who give allegiance to rival traditions of enquiry (59: p403).

4) THE VIRTUE TRADITION AND THE GOOD

The first stage of MacIntyre's reformulation of the virtue tradition emphasizes the importance of shared understandings of practices, roles and institutions in society. A tradition is a history of narratives unified by these understandings, and the rationality of moral practices is partly determined by the quality and durability of a community's tradition. The notion of desert in justice is only possible in a community which shares ideas of the good in practices, the good for human beings and the good for community, and where individuals identify their basic interests with those goods.
MacIntyre hopes to extend these principles by reinvigorating the notion of virtue to give it the force of a tradition. The virtuous practices which remain in liberal society survive on an ad hoc basis without the sustaining force of a tradition. It could be no other way in modern society as the tradition of the virtues is at variance with central features of the liberal conception of justice. The liberal conception systematically rejects the idea of the telos of humanity. In so doing, those virtues which produce the telos according to the virtue tradition, are not given any privileged esteem in modern society. In the absence of a telos, moral debate becomes the exchange of personal beliefs and the struggle to achieve individual ends using the partial remnants of the virtue tradition (14: p425). Individuals sacrifice their freedom and self-determination to the law courts and bureaucrats. MacIntyre suggests that this is a reductio ad absurdum of the basic intuitive ideas of freedom and personal responsibility which created liberalism (cited by 107: pp240,241).

The alternative to liberal society is to place the questions of justice and practical rationality into the larger framework of the quest for the good for humans. The human being looks to a conception of the good which will order the conflicts which occur in life. In MacIntyre’s terms:

It is looking for a conception of the good which will enable us to order other goods, for a conception of the good which will enable us to extend our
understanding of the purpose and content of the virtues, for a conception of the good which will enable us to understand the place of integrity and constancy in life that we initially define the kind of life which is a quest for the good (60: p219).

The absolute good may not yet be defined, but it is in the quest for the good that individuals achieve their telos, and further the tradition of the virtues. MacIntyre goes on to suggest:

...the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those that will enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for man is (60: p219).

The idea of a narrative is important in MacIntyre's quest. Individuals lead their lives as actors in stories. Any choice an individual makes tells part of the story about them, and their tradition. Each individual seeks both unity and truth in their stories. Truth occurs as the development of an understanding of the good in life which orders their conflicts and decisions. Unity occurs as a constancy in their actions which allows for the understanding of their story by others. A virtue will manifest itself in a person's life in a variety of situations and practices. This unity gives the person's life constancy or integrity, and is only comprehensible if that life has a telos which guides all the individual's actions (60: p205). Gaita explains that one of the reasons Socrates gave for not fleeing prison was that it would be a betrayal of his past. It would not only destroy the unity of his life, but it would contradict the truth of the virtues which directed his life. In this way, the past of
a unified narrative affects the future (28: p417).

This quest for truth is determined by the particular and determinate historical situation of the individual. All choices, all parts of the story, are affected by the person's community, that is, by one's membership, role and function in that community and how strongly he or she accepts or rejects the influence of his or her tradition. The individual's situation and membership of a community is his or her moral starting point. However, the person does not have to accept the moral limitations of this membership and can rebel against it (60: p221). One's telos can neither be wholly decided individually as believed by modern liberalism, nor can it be conditioned completely by society. It exists as a dialectical relationship between the individual and the tradition (19: pp219,220). A person's narrative is always affected by other members of the community. The story of one's life is always only part of the larger narrative of action of which he or she is not in complete control. At any given time, in the enacted narrative, there is no certainty as to what the future holds because of the interdependence of narratives. However, there is some goal at which individuals aim. So, at any point, unpredictability and teleology coexist in a person's life story (60: pp215,216).

5) VIRTUE AND SELF-DETERMINATION

Wartofsky suggests that MacIntyre is not opposed to individualism, but to the emotive individualism of modern
practical liberalism. Virtue becomes whatever a person wishes it to be in order to gain what they value (107: pp240,241).

Individualism within the virtue tradition occurs as the self-determined quest for an idea of the good which orders a person's life, acknowledges the contingencies of one's situation, and satisfactorily resolves any disputes. Certain modern liberals have also acknowledged the effect of tradition on self-determination. Kymlicka suggests that the purposes which are presupposed in the liberal account of the value of freedom could come from the acceptance of the authority of historical ends, or they could come from freely made personal decisions criticizing and changing the cultural matrix. We can either affirm or reject what is passed down to us (52: pp188,189). In Rawls' terms:

...in a well-ordered society... unity is the same for all; everyone's conception of the good as given by his rational plan is a subplan of the larger comprehensive plan that regulates the community as a social union of social unions. The many associations of varying sizes and aims being adjusted to one another by the public conception of justice, simplify decision [making] by offering definite ideals and forms of life that have been developed and tested by innumerable individuals, sometimes for generations (85: p.563, my insertion).

Rasmussen argues that a natural end ethics is compatible with the reformed Rawlsian liberalism if it is agreed that individuals can only achieve their natural end through their own agency, and that self-direction is a fundamental human interest worthy of legal protection. Self-direction is involved in any form of human flourishing and must be present in any activity which is said to contribute
to a human's natural end. It is his argument that:

...to hold that the human good is to perfect one's nature in accordance with the standards of human flourishing is also to hold that the human good is a life of self-directed activity. If I am not the author of the activity, that activity is not good or right for me even if it should nonetheless be true that if I were the author of that activity it would be good for me (81: p160).

The recognition of the importance of self-direction is crucial in addressing the social and political questions which Rawls poses. The protection of the individual's free choice must be a concern of the law. This is not disputed in the reformulation of Rawls' position by Raz. Nor is it disputed by MacIntyre when he argues that it is rationally justifiable to conceive of an individual life as a unity, so that we can specify each life as having "its good" and the virtues are important in enabling an individual to make personal choices about one kind of unity rather than another (60: p225).

6) VIRTUE AND COMMUNITY

Both Walzer and MacIntyre agree that more is required of society to preserve virtue. Society needs the construction of local forms of community, and the preservation of already existing forms, within which the virtues important in social practices can gain the force of a tradition. Clarke again emphasizes the practical importance of free choice to these
communities. He argues:

By his [MacIntyre's] own arguments, it could not be achieved by setting out to achieve it, as though he were offering advice to the omnicompetent social engineer. Such local forms of community as are constricted or imposed are unlikely to earn our loyalty.... The understanding of the social mechanisms that engender loyalty does not sit well with any such continued loyalty. The point is not a logical one (14: pp425,426, my insertion).

How will the virtue tradition be important in sustaining these forms of community, as well as social practices? To understand, it is necessary to explain other aspects of MacIntyre's notion of a virtue. To be counted as a virtue, a human quality must not only satisfy the requirement of being necessary to the achievement of goods internal to social practices. A virtue must also contribute to the development of an understanding of the good of an entire life. Finally, the goods which an individual pursues must be compatible with the ideas of a tradition which aims at the truth in terms of the good for humanity, justice and rationality. The unity of a person's life allows the person to discover how the quest to discover one's telos, and the telos for humanity, can best be pursued. These individual answers gain the force of a tradition when there is sufficient common ground between them. This common ground contributes to the sustenance of the community (60: p218).

The virtues enable the individual to overcome the dangers, harms, temptations and distractions which impinge on the individual's quest for the good. During this quest, the person learns both about himself and about the nature of the
good, through the successful conquest of these factors. The virtues enable individuals to understand "...what more and what else the good life for man is" (60: p219).

At the next level of MacIntyre's account, it is recognized that this quest for the good is always carried out within some tradition. This tradition is necessary to explain both the goods internal to practices and the goods of a unified life. The history of practices, and of the quest, is embedded in and made intelligible by the history of the tradition. The strength and progress of a tradition occurs through the exercise of the relevant virtues. Courage, honesty, justice, judgement and the intellectual virtues all help to sustain a tradition's quest for the truth. They allow future possibilities to be understood in terms of the past (60: pp222,223). If the virtue tradition can provide more cogent accounts of the weaknesses of rival traditions, then adherents are entitled to be confident about the truth of this theory. And, if this is the case, all other traditions must acknowledge the superiority of the virtue tradition (60: pp275-277).

Stephen Clarke presents a more optimistic view about the virtue tradition in modern society than MacIntyre. Individuals still live in historical communities, with ancestral and social loyalties. The shared values of a community are often expressed in acts of common and altruistic decency (14: p426). Pride in craftsmanship, fidelity, love of ancient things and respect for past
exemplars all remain important in a society's practices. Friendships endure, beyond commercial and military unions, because of shared views of the good. Moralists and scholars continue to search for, and promote, their truth of the good life in debate. Whilst these ideas may not be very well articulated in modern society, they remain important in its practice (17: pp430,439). In Clarke's terms:

The virtues that "all humankind" admires, the characters "we" reckon virtuous, are courage, loyalty, compassionate care, piety and honour, and intelligence. How these virtues are embodied in any particular time and place, how they are ranked amongst themselves, may be in dispute. But it is difficult for us to conceive of any human community which genuinely admires cowardice, treachery, irresponsibility, contempt or ignorance of what is sacred, dishonour and stupidity (17: p429).

7) VIRTUE AND SOCIAL CRITICISM

Clarke suggests that MacIntyre has offered a view which extends our understanding of the pursuit of the good. If people believe that there are no objective values or rules to be followed, then their choices arise because of transient desires and impulses. The second level of obedience is lived when individuals are moved by social etiquette. To live at this level is to possess a social, as well as a natural, self, but to be ignorant of reasons to live in alternative ways (17: p441).

The virtue tradition of MacIntyre hopes to achieve an ideal of virtue which can order natural impulses and question social ethics. In practical terms, it hopes to achieve a wide
enough rational consensus or tradition, which can oppose the seepage of the justice of capitalism into practices which are better suited by the virtue of justice. To achieve this, the virtue tradition must solve problems in practices, which other traditions cannot solve.

Jeffrey Stout is more optimistic about the possibilities in modern society than MacIntyre. He suggests:

> Our various moral languages... can actually be seen, from the vantage point of stereoscopic social criticism, as the languages of specific social practices and institutions. These languages have legitimate roles..., but they also cause severe systemic problems when the habits of thought they embody and modes of interaction they promote seep into spheres of life they can only threaten and destroy (99: pp284,285).

These various languages do not contribute to disunity in a community’s life. Moral discourse is not threatened by disagreement about the good in life. It is threatened by injustice and intolerance, and the destruction of any one of these traditions by the rationality of the marketplace and the bureaucracies (99: p287). The situation is parodied in an episode of the B.B.C. comedy Yes Prime Minister where the award for the most efficient hospital is given to a hospital which had no patients. When the Prime Minister questions this he is told that the institution was the most efficient, well-run and clean hospital in the district (57: pp196,197). In its own way, the television show displays the effect of an overriding concern for bureaucracy, with internal goals of efficiency and order, on the telos of caring for the sick in medical practice.
As with any tradition, the tradition of pluralism must be critical and developmental to survive. Criticism of the various languages is important. According to Stout:

It can burrow deep into its own culture's past in search of forgotten truths, learn enough about an alien culture to put our practices and institutions in fresh perspective, and imagine ways of life that have never been.... So if I am right, we lose nothing by confining ourselves to immanent criticism except the illusions and pretensions of philosophical transcendence (99: p282).

And, with any tradition, this criticism can become radical when tensions in social practices become severe; tensions between the internal goods of various practices, and between internal goods of a practice and external goods. In all these problems, resolution is guided by the provisional telos of the value of a diversity of social practices and virtues. In Habermas' terms, internal goods and virtues are not threatened by liberalism, but by the demise of criticism caused by, "...the rise to dominance of cognitive-instrumental aspects, which results in everything being driven into the realm of apparent irrationality" (cited by 99: p284).

Whilst it may appear that the second section of this chapter has attempted to completely refute the tradition of modern liberalism, this has not been the intention. Amy Guttmann argues that it is best to view MacIntyre's virtue tradition as supplementing, and not opposing, the tradition of liberalism, in the production of the best society possible (38: p320). Stout agrees that of the level of a society's
practices, rules, behaviours and institutions, there is probably little difference in the reforms suggested by modern liberals, such as Walzer, and those suggested by MacIntyre. The endeavour to label and separate these two factions reflects a failure to appreciate their similarities and the possibility for consensus (99: p277).

What MacIntyre has made apparent is the need to recognize the existence of many traditions in modern society, each with a view on the nature of humanity, justice and practical rationality. Justice as fairness has its own sphere of action in procedural protection of the individual's liberty. However, in spheres of life which have a common understanding of valued ends, the view of justice as related to desert may be important. Rather than exclusively promoting either the modern liberal view or the virtue tradition, it is more important to move to the level of detail and determine for each practice which view of justice is the most suitable. In so doing, limits are set to acceptable behaviour. These limits depend not only on the internal goods of a practice, but on the relationship of this practice's goods to the goods of other practices, and on the importance of all these goods to a given society over time. Practical wisdom determines these limits and must recognize the link between any practice and its tradition (99: pp273,274).

MacIntyre's view allows for this recognition of the validity of rival traditions, which permits criticism and improvement of one's own tradition. Whilst he favours the
virtue tradition, he also suggests that enquiry and criticism necessarily begins from the relationship between an individual and the intellectual and social past of a tradition. The development of this tradition occurs as the extension of the history of that enquiry into the present (59: p401). The liberal view of tolerance and self-determination permits a just recognition and respect for all traditions. Stephen Clarke argues:

...that all societies with anything like a rightful claim upon our allegiance must allow us scope to see beyond the norms they set for us.... Cashed in political terms this requirement is for liberty of conscience, and a recognition that the word may be announced to anyone.... Alongside that liberal requirement we should add, as Plato and Aristotle did (and St. Benedict) that those who can should be encouraged to detach themselves from merely temporal concerns. Decent societies have a place for those who will remind their fellows how time-bound, parochial and merely analogical their cherished notions are (14: p444).

This view combines the liberal requirements for tolerance and self-determination with MacIntyre's belief in the importance of virtue and the good, to produce a tradition which questions, resolves and flourishes.

The next section of this chapter will investigate the effect that tradition has upon moral dilemmas in the social practice of sport. It will limit itself to a discussion of the issue of drug use in sport and the various philosophical conceptions of this issue. This section will show how the debate about drug usage in sport is bound to the traditions discussed in Chapters Two, Three and Four of this paper.
The purpose of Chapter Two of this thesis was to show the relationship between various descriptions of sport and the traditions of conservatism, liberalism and Marxism. The characterisation and solution of problems in sport, depends largely on the ideas of the tradition which is used in each description of sport. For example the sport-as-play theorists, such as Novak (75) and Huizinga (47), lament the professionalisation of sport as an abomination of the amateur principles of disinterestedness and the pursuit of sport as a craft. The influence of the conservative tradition of thought can be seen in the vitality of the craft tradition. In contrast, Guttmann (37) argues that the influence of professionalism permits greater freedom in sport. Athletes are granted an expanded opportunity to concentrate on their practice. This sense of freedom is compatible with the tradition of welfare liberalism. Orthodox Marxist theorists (8;87) view professionalism as part of a progression towards efficiency and alienated labour in sport. Within this description, athletes unwittingly give up their freedom because of the influence of the doctrines of competitiveness and rationalization in capitalist society. The solutions offered by the three descriptions are; the exclusion of professional athletes from sport, the encouragement of professionalism in sport and the transcendence of alienated sport. The issue of professionalism in sport, and its effect
on sport's freedom, is framed in three different ways and resulted in three different solutions. Later in this chapter, a fourth solution coming from the Buddhist tradition, involving the exclusion of professionalism from sport will be presented.

This section of the chapter will look at the issue of drug usage in modern sport and show how the solutions offered by different philosophers are closely tied to various traditions of society. As explained by liberal theory, modern sport is part of modern plural society. As a result, the problem of drug usage can be framed and solved using fragments from a variety of different traditions which all retain some strength in modern society. These solutions have ranged from a attachment to pieces of the conservative tradition of sport, to a modern liberal perspective about the issue. Drug usage in sport is offered as a paradigm example of the approach taken to an issue in modern sport, and the method of approach taken in this paper could reveal the tradition-dependence of solutions to many of the problems in sport.

Robert Simon argues that the ban on performance enhancing drugs in sport is legitimized by an ideal of personhood which should be promoted in the practice of sport. Competition in sport should be viewed as a mutual quest for excellence between persons. Athletes challenge each other through the use of their respective human abilities, and each competitor is expected to bring out the best in their
opponents. Participants extend their knowledge of themselves through their reaction to the choices, acts and abilities of the other competitors (96: p11). When athletes use performance enhancing drugs, it is no longer their human capacities which determine the result of the competition. Simon states, "...the use of performance enhancing drugs restricts the area in which we can be respected as persons" (96: pl3). The outcome is determined by the body's efficiency in utilising the drug. The contest is determined by factors which are irrelevant to personhood, factors which have "...only a contingent and fortuitous relationship to athletic ability" (96: pl1). Fraleigh agrees that the use of drugs dehumanizes performances in sport (26: p.25). Athletes no longer respect and challenge each other. They view each other as competing bodies which have to be overcome (96: pl2).

This thesis will simply mention, and not discuss, several of the problems of this argument. The method of determining what factors are or are not relevant to personhood, the distinction between an athlete's performance and his or her body's efficiency, the possibility that performance-enhanced athletes provide a greater challenge to other competitors and the problem of observing differences between drug-enhanced sport and "normal" sport, are just a few of the contentious issues in Simon's theory.

It is important to recognise that Simon's solutions to these contentious issues rely heavily on an ideal of competition which was influenced by conservative and early
liberal traditions of thought. Sport is viewed, in this conception, as an opportunity for testing one's abilities against the performance of others. It combines the early liberal view of the rugged and competitive individual who was self-reliant with the conservative view of sport as a creative, playful craft.

However the strength and nobility of this ideal was related to a number of other beliefs and historical conditions which created an area of respect and community in sport. Athletes were expected to view sport as a craft. They acknowledged the splendid futility created by the logic of the practice, and were expected to participate in a disinterested way. It is difficult to support a view that holds that part of the conservative ideal of sport, that is the respect between athletes, will retain the strength of a tradition without the support of these other factors. Or, to paraphrase MacIntyre, Simon's view of sport retains only a part of this tradition of sport, and, as a result, cannot achieve the full exploratory force of the tradition. Hence, it lacks strength in facing questions concerning its consistency from adherents of opposing traditions. It cannot survive these questions because so many other aspects of sport do not adhere to this conservative tradition.

Lois Bryson adds:

...key values that are implicated in modern sport, arose in circumstances very different from those which operate today. Yet these concepts are often taken for granted, as aspects of the essential nature of sport... (12: p156).
The use of these noble ideals of personhood and self-exploration in descriptions of modern sport may interfere with the resolution of parts of the "...seamy side of sport." And, this interference means that the sports community should investigate the value of retaining these ideals in their watered-down form (12: p150). Roberts and Hemphill agree that it is necessary to sacrifice the sacrosanct view of the uncontaminated athlete important in the idea of pure sport, in discussions of issues in modern sport (88).

Perhaps one of the best descriptions of the problem of drug usage in sport is that offered by Roberts and Hemphill (88), because of its acknowledgement of the historical situatedness of the issue. They suggest that this occurrence is merely an extension of the capitalist tradition of efficiency and productivity into modern sports, which suggests that modern athletes use a variety of external aids to improve their performance. These aids include coaches, trainers, dieticians, intrusive psychology and training. Drugs occur as one of many external aids which are believed by some athletes to be necessary to success.

This view argues that athletes live their athletic lives in accordance with MacIntyre's view of liberal society. Athletes relinquish their personal control to other people to manage their lives. Athletes make decisions using a variety of incomplete traditions to best suit their goals. There is no consistency in their decision-making. The athlete who uses drugs is considered immoral through the application of the
conservative tradition, as seen in Simon's position. The one who uses technology is considered exemplary, because of the liberal-capitalist tradition. Roberts and Hemphill suggest that any solution to the drug problem will also result in changes to the understanding of a wide variety of aspects of sport (88: p9).

In a similar way to the amendment of the early liberal idealist claims by Rawls, Michael Lavin amends Simon's arguments by suggesting that, although the ideal of competitive sport may not be strong enough to justify a ban on performance enhancing drugs, it may suggest that a consensus of disapproval about these substances exists which is warrant enough to make their ban morally permissible. Lavin suggests that such a consensus of a core set of ideals exists in sport which favour the adoption of certain prohibitions rather than others in sport. These ideals covertly operate to secure the ban on performance enhancing drugs. Regulation can be viewed as a democratic attempt to maintain these ideals. In Lavin's terms: "The ideal rationalizes, without mandating, specific regulations or requirements" (55: p41).

However, Lavin does not suggest that a consensus of opinion will justify the ban. Beliefs must be rationally, and not democratically, justified. It would not be convincing if the majority of the consensus were ignorant about the actual effects of drug use or biased by emotive propaganda about drug use. Without an informed consensus, individuals could
view regulation as a "...capricious, imposition of values alien to them" (55: p41).

In Lavin's terms, a consensus about drug regulation requires the demonstration of three elements or necessary conditions. It should involve shared opinions held by different interest groups. The use of banned substances should evoke visceral dislike in terms of the effect of this use on the current competitive ideal of sport. Finally, the ban must respect history, as these regulations could not be authoritative if they ignored history. Actions in sport which have been widely supported over time become "natural." In the absence of these three conditions, disillusionment with regulation will occur. With disillusionment comes abuse (55: p41).

Once again, this discussion will merely state the contentious issues in this argument. It is a debatable empirical issue as to whether a consensus about banned substances exists in sport. The frequency of drug abuse by competitors, coaches, trainers and sports governing bodies seems to suggest doubt about both the pervasive opinion about regulation and the visceral dislike of banned substances. Additionally, it is difficult for coaches and athletes to openly criticize the ban on drugs because of the sanctions and stigma associated with drug use.

Lavin has provided a Rawlsian liberal view of drug regulation in sport. Without a rationally justifiable and universally held ideal of modern sport, the best that can be
done to legitimize the ban is to collect the beliefs held by various doctrines about sport, and search for an underlying agreement about sport which does not interfere with any of these views. This can be seen as a political conception of sport which justly acknowledges the different views of sport, whilst using the intuitive, and usually covertly held, ideas to secure the ban on drugs. Aside from the sanctity of longstanding practices, regardless of whether these practices are rational or irrational, there is no other basis for deciding about the truth of these various views about sport and drugs. As de Marneffe argues, institutional justice is unfair if it advances one neutral conception of the good over another (16: p258). Without a normative basis, individuals will not accept the legitimacy of a governing body advancing one conception of sport, which interferes with their non-basic interests, over another. And, as critics of Rawls' view of justice have argued, without a normative basis, the problem of justification becomes one of counting votes or forming a consensus.

Sewart offers a similar objection to democracy in sport when arguing about the effect of commodification on sport. He suggests:

...the sporting public is by and large totally ignorant of what it might be getting.... Unaware of what they might be tasting, it is hardly surprising that most of the public expresses a desire for what they get....

These tastes are often the only ones people have had any chance to develop. They are unconsciously acquired habits rather than autonomous choices (95: pp185,186).
The alternative to Lavin's and Simon's arguments is provided by Brown. He criticizes the ontological claims of Simon, about the nature of sport and personhood, by suggesting that historical elements and biases contributed to the ban on performance enhancing drugs. Brown suggests that a society draws the boundaries to actions in social practices. The ban on drugs is an:

...essentially conservative attitude toward the human condition which neglects to give sufficient weight to a primary human value: freedom. It opts for relative stability, predictability and control in human affairs, rather than for novelty, change, surprise and creativity. It presupposes a relative fixity in the human condition as opposed to an evolving transformation of what we are (11: p22).

The position suggested by Lavin, "...that long-standing practices become, as it were, natural," indicates this conservative attitude to sport.

Brown continues by suggesting that this conservative nature of sport theory may shroud the fact that there is no universally held ideal of modern sport, to which all athletes would rationally agree. As a result, in modern liberal society, there is no authorization to interfere with any belief held by individuals about sport provided they do not interfere with the participation of other competitors. In a free society these beliefs, including those about the permissibility of drugs, are tolerable and may be held by autonomous individuals (10: pp19,20).

Brown argues that there may be some function for sport in the conception of the good life for man. This
function may rely, not on the nature of sport, but in the way that individuals decide to play the game. Drugs may be banned if they interfere with this method of playing. However, in adopting this stance, of the superiority of one conception of the good life over all others, the critical importance of self-determination, autonomy and personal responsibility to an individual may be denied (10: p21).

The problem with Brown's argument is that the importance of self-determination in modern liberalism cannot be extended to include the inviolability of any free choice. Just because no authoritative ideal exists in sport, it does not mean that actions which obviously are not in the long term interests of human beings should be allowed. In Simon's terms:

...it may well be rational, in the name of autonomy itself, to deny individuals the right to autonomously engage in certain activities when autonomous engagement in these activities significantly reduces the extent to which we can function as autonomous beings at all (97: p31).

To justify this interference, it is necessary to develop an understanding of the telos of humanity and the part that sport contributes to the achievement of this telos. In addition, this conception of the individual and of sport must gain the force of a tradition, so that individuals can freely choose to adopt it, and make personal decisions about how to achieve it. Sewart argues:

While any mass cultural form is to some extent an expression of people's needs, it is potentially tyrannically collectivist to accept any, and all
forms of culture as expressions of equal worth, significance and value (95: p187).

A solution to the question of drugs in sport may lie in the reinvigoration of the critical ideal of competitive sport, as discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis, and an appreciation of the position of sport in the unity of a person's life guided by MacIntyre's quest for the good. The previous chapter showed that sport is played virtuously if its splendid futility and special logic is protected. If this is the case, then participation can develop an understanding about the creativity and ability of individuals.

In Brown's opinion, one of the advantages of participation in social practices is the development and extension of those human capacities which are dictated by the practice. Yet, Brown suggests that if only the first stage of MacIntyre's conception of the virtues is used then nothing would preclude athletes using drugs to achieve the internal goals of sport. He argues:

...the constraints of the practice, including the internalization of the virtues, are compatible with the use of performance enhancing drugs....The development of technical skills and extensions of human powers help transform and enrich "the capacities of the relevant goods and ends" (6:193) that practices embody (9: p77).

Or as stated in another paper by Brown, the formal freedom in sport is not endangered by the use of drugs. It exists, as it did in the conservative tradition and Greek society as the "...exaltation of participation in the game as an 'adventure in freedom' however I choose to develop it" (11: p22).
The restriction of the use of performance enhancing drugs may be justified by the idea of a prudential athletic life. The relationship between different stages of an individual's life can be used to prohibit the use of drugs in any one stage of that life. A prudential account of participation requires that individuals preserve their capacities to participate in sport throughout their life. Any activity which prematurely diminishes those capacities should be avoided (9: p80). It should be noted that this argument is the same as that which suggests that drugs should be banned because of short term harm to the user, and suffers from the same problems of consistency. However, in conjunction with the pursuit of internal goods, it can contribute to a broader conception of the good of an entire human life, and not just of a compartmentalized sporting career.

Part of this fuller understanding of the importance of sport to a complete human life must include Rawls' notion of social unions and MacIntyre's ideas of the relationship between practitioners. Lavin argues that participation in sport involves a voluntary decision to participate in a group activity. This social union decides upon and shares the the core ideals of the practice. Those people who do not share those ideals do not need to join the social union (55: p.41). Hoberman continues by expressing the idea that manipulative technologies, such as drugs, are poisoning the relationships between practitioners in the social union of sport. Individual performances which were once shared by all
participants as advancements of the internal goals of the practice are greeted with suspicion and mistrust, and are no longer enjoyed by the group (44: pp.321,322). This position extends the arguments of Simon and Lavin because it does not require the justification of the conservative ideal of sport. It views sport as an area of authentic social relationships, and any practice which destroys these relationships should be questioned. To the extent that these relationships are maintained, sports act as an area where people are engaged in a partially cooperative venture, acting towards each other with respect.

In other traditions, and at other times, the solutions to the problems of sport may have contributed to an individual's understanding of the nature of humanity and community. Enough of these past traditions may remain, or enough contact with other traditions may occur, to allow individuals to question their fragmented view of human life in modern society. Lavin's undisclosed consensus about drug regulation may be the conclusions which remain from a wider theory about the importance of sport to the telos of life. In MacIntyre's terms:

Even when marginalized by the dominant modern social, cultural and political order, such traditions have retained the allegiance of the members of a variety of types of community and enterprise, not all of whom are aware of whence their conceptions of justice and practical rationality derive (59: p391).

Feezel contends that sport does not permit any possibility for the development of those intellectual virtues
which contribute to an understanding of the nature of the good life for humans. Strategic skills may be developed, but judgement about the importance of unity in life is not a priority in sport. Uncertainty, scepticism, reflectiveness and critical ability are not described in any coach's list of character traits enhanced by participation in sport (21: p215).

That is not to suggest that individual athletes cannot approach sport with scepticism and reflectiveness about its position in their lives. Bill Rodgers, the American professional golfer who won several events including the British Open, but quit the tour at the age of 30 explains the problem and his solution:

When you get into those little worlds you cannot see out very easily.... The better you play the more insulated you become. You have a ring through your nose. You don't have to think. If you can find the first tee your right.

I look at everything so differently now. I realise how tied into it all I was. You can get so hardened, man, you really don't know what reality is (32: p44).

Rodgers explains one of the problems of viewing sport as a part of the unity of a person's life. Sport is partitioned off from the rest of a person's life and viewed as a separate, almost pristine, realm. What happens on the field is expected to stay there. Elite adult sport is separated from the sport of childhood and old age in individuals' lives. There is little hope for constancy in a person's narrative of sport, nor in their conception of the importance of sport in that life. Solutions to problems occur
in an ad hoc manner with little relationship, other than the constancy of the historical conditions of the individual, to solutions in other spheres of life and other eras of a person's life.

However, to suggest that there is no possibility for forming a view of athletic participation throughout life which contributes to constancy in life is to have either a complacent or resigned view about sport. This conception is not readily apparent, or promoted, in modern liberal society. Yet the case of Sidd Finch suggests the ideas of a prudential athletic life and the pursuit of the nature of humanity may be strong in the tradition of Buddhism in modern society. Finch is a trappist monk who had learned the art of the baseball pitch. His pitch was measured at 65 mph faster than the fastest ever recorded in professional baseball. He refused to change his unorthodox style because it prevented injury. His reply was, "...I undertake as a rule of training to refrain from injury to living things" (80: p71).

Yet Finch was not sure whether he would become a professional baseballer with the New York Mets. He wrote that there were "mental adjustments" to be made. According to one expert of Eastern traditions:

The biggest problem Finch has with baseball... is that nirvana which is the state all Buddhists wish to reach, means literally "the blowing out" - specifically, the purifying of oneself of greed, hatred and delusion. Baseball... is symbolised to a remarkable degree by those very three aspects.... So you can see why it is not easy for Finch to give himself up to a way of life so opposite to what he has been led to cherish (80: p72).
For Finch, baseball offered a contradiction to the narrative of his life so far. It did not contribute to the quest for truth, in its current form, in his tradition. All conventional inducements for Finch would not work. The struggle was an internal one.

Is it possible to revive the virtue tradition in modern sport? MacIntyre argues that insofar as the aspects of the Aristotelian polis essential to the practice of the virtues, can be reembodied in modern social practices, then it is possible that the virtue tradition may also be reembodied (59: p391). However, as with the conclusion of Chapter Three, it seems that modern society is moving further from, rather than closer to, virtue and a sense of the unity of a person's life.

Sport is one of many practices where the virtue of justice in terms of desert is still evident in modern society. The persistence of this part of the virtue tradition in modern liberal society, suggests that it may approach "the truth" in sport. Without some pursuit of truth, about the nature of humanity and the position of sport in achieving that nature, there is no moral justification to solutions to problems in modern sport. To complacently accept the current solutions sport offers is to produce a stagnant tradition, one which is unable to offer justification for its answers.
Chapter Three of this thesis is concerned with showing the importance of virtue in defending the splendid futility of sport. This logic preserves for athletes an area for creativity and freedom in sport. The chapter ends with two conclusions. The first is that there is some shared notion of virtues and internal goals in modern sport. The second conclusion suggests that modern society, and modern sport, is moving away from, rather than towards, virtue. The reason for this is that the idea of virtue is losing the governing force of a tradition in modern society.

This chapter has endeavoured to show the effect of traditions of belief on the explanation and solution of problems in modern society. A tradition affects a person's view of justice, rationality and the telos of humanity. It also determines how problems are framed, and the solutions which are pursued. Both the problems and the solutions must fit with the language and the beliefs of the person's tradition. These features of traditions are as evident in modern approaches to the solution of problems in sport, as in any other social practice.

Traditions meet and confront each other in their relative abilities to solve problems. The justification of a tradition exists as its ability to give solutions where other traditions cannot. So, traditions can be compared and contrasted.
Modern plural society offers fragments of a variety of traditions. Modern liberalism tries to accommodate this pluralism by suggesting rules of justice which eliminate the comparison of traditions. As a result, there can be no normative basis for the goals pursued by the adherents of various traditions. No set of goals, provided they do not contravene the requirements of the political conception of justice, are any better, or more true, than any other set of goals.

According to MacIntyre (59), the problem with this view is that different traditions pervade the various spheres of a person's life. To develop constancy in a person's life, to order the goals in that life in terms of importance, it is necessary to view that life as a whole governed by one tradition and pursuing the telos supported by that tradition. This, in no way, interferes with the modern liberal's requirement for self-determination, as the individual still chooses how to use and develop the beliefs of this tradition. Individuals do not invoke the beliefs of an assortment of traditions when it suits their goals. This gives unity to people's lives.

The goal of a person's life is to develop a tradition which satisfies the idea of the best achievable good of that life. Sport can contribute to this development. To suggest otherwise is to submit to the current form of both modern liberal society and modern sport. It is to show a lack of vision.
The reinvigoration of the virtue tradition, and the protection of authentic social unions, may hold a possible solution to many of the problems in modern society and modern sport. The virtuous pursuit of internal goals still allows individuals opportunity for free choice. The pursuit of external goods means that individual actions are being commanded by the demands outside of the social practice.

Virtue also protects the splendid futility of sport. This orders the importance of sport in an individual's life. When sport is viewed like this, it may achieve the importance granted to it by the conservative ideal. The freedom and creativity of sport may be more important to the telos of humans, because of its questioning nature, than the restriction and practicality of work. This prominence is related to the pursuit of internal, and not external, goals in sport. However, the virtue tradition must remain open to the possibility of mistake and maintain its quest for solution.

One problem remains for the virtue tradition, and it is particularly important in sport. How can the notion of a virtue be given the force of a tradition? Sport is one area of life where vicious actions are not always presented as vicious. The distortion of appearance and reality in sport, as discussed in Chapter Three, creates a language which shrouds the importance of tradition.

Marx Wartofsky takes this problem one step further, by asking how the virtue tradition died from the times of
Aristotle. If it is to be reinvigorated, MacIntyre's notion of tradition must not only show why it is superior to modern liberalism, but also show why modern liberalism came to be valued over it. Why did the newer and incomplete account of justice and human nature come to occupy modern lives over the virtue tradition? (107: p243) Or to pose the question in terms of sport, why did athletes lose sight of the splendid futility and creativity in sport, and choose to pursue efficiency and constraint?

To reinvigorate the virtue tradition in sport may be too radical a change for modern society to accomplish. However two of the purposes of this chapter have been to show that the virtue tradition does exist as part of some peripheral traditions in modern society, such as Buddhism, and that it is a weakness of modern belief to suggest that in the historical conditions in which individuals exist, change towards virtue is simply romantic thinking.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

Sport, Virtue And Tradition

On the third anniversary of the implementation of the Islamic fatwa on Salmon Rushdie for the publication of his novel, The Satanic Verses, Tom Stoppard, another author, addressed a meeting which was designed to maintain the opposition in Britain to the execution order. He said:

What this occasion is not, I hope, is the one thing it appears to be; a gathering of Western Liberals to deplore attitudes uncongenial to Western liberalism. That particular circularity won't roll anywhere, anymore.... The least ingratiating interpretation of this occasion would be that we are writers closing ranks for literature.... Literature, the freedom of expression... is categorically invalid in this argument.... The right to freedom of expression is not fundamental.... To a theist, free expression can never be fundamental. God never said let there be freedom of thought and word.... I won't dwell on the obvious fact that such extreme sanction [the execution of Rushdie] is as strange and as repugnant to us, as it was eminently reasonable to an Iranian diplomat who, three years ago, said, "why do you find this behaviour strange?" It is a question... one is obliged to answer. To think it is not worth answering is to be ignorant of our cultural history. The notion of tolerance as a human virtue, the concepts of liberty and pluralism as we venerate them today were as unintelligible to St. Augustine, as they were to his contemporary, Mohammed, and did not begin to find a place in our system of values for 1000 years after that (27: my insertion).

Stoppard went on to argue that the complacency which an individual or a nation holds about the truth or rightness of their beliefs is brought into doubt by opposition to those beliefs. And often, such opposition throws doubt on ideas
that a society believed "natural" and beyond argument and criticism. He quotes Isaiah Berlin who argued:

All of these [liberty, pluralism, tolerance] are elements in a great nation of Western thought and feeling that took place in the eighteenth century, the consequence of which appear in various counter revolutions all too obvious in every sphere of life (27, my insertion).

This position, which suggests that Western thought developed and progressed during the Enlightenment, a term of description given by Western society and not God, and that Muslim fundamentalist thought did not develop, must be proven and substantiated to Muslim sceptics before the execution order will be removed. How is it possible for Western society to show itself to be superior to Muslim society? Or, in Stoppard's terms:

How can I be certain that one of the counter-revolutions mentioned by Berlin will not overtake my children and leave their children in a very different culture, but in a similar state of complacency, of self-certainty (27).

This is not a problem with which Salmon Rushdie can deal. He is concerned with the preservation of his life. Yet, to argue for this preservation in terms of freedom of expression is to misunderstand the problem, according to Stoppard. The problem is that:

What we have here, famously, is the opposition of two sets of minds without the common terms of value that would enable even discourse, let alone resolution. On one side we hold up signs which say "irrational", "fanatical", "unenlightened", while on the other, "why do you find this behaviour strange?".... Any argument from fundamental rights of free expression is a non-starter. That is to look at the argument from the wrong end. We should not be busy standing up for the rights we have accorded ourselves.... We
should be busy questioning, examining the rights assumed by Iran, beginning with their assumption that Islamic law prevails over all other law in all other countries (27).

Stoppard believes that the entry of fundamental Islamic countries into the international world is a means of bringing into conversation and question those laws which threaten Rushdie's life.

Although the problems in sport are not of the same magnitude as the threats, bombings and deaths associated with the fatwa placed on Rushdie, it has been the purpose of this thesis to show how complacently modern society accepts its current tradition of sport, as the most enlightened understanding so far seen. Problems in sport are approached with the conviction that modern society's comprehension of sport is the most refined and developed in the history of sport. This may be due to the influence of the Western-capitalist idea that progress is measurable. As scores or times improve it is believed that the understanding of all aspects of sport also improves. Yet the question which has been addressed in this thesis is whether the adherence to this tradition has been advantageous in the understanding and protection of freedom in sport.

The introductory chapter of this thesis states that Richard Gruneau suggests that modern social theory, and modern sports sociology, are mainly concerned with two interrelated issues. The first is the issue of human agency. The second is the explanation of the rise and decline of
those specific institutions in society which affect the individual's freedom. Gruneau argues that an understanding of individual freedom in sport, as in any institution, requires that:

...we will have to be more sensitive to the dialectical relationships between social structures and human agency. In other words, it will be necessary to struggle to avoid one-sided considerations of players as voluntary agents acting in the absence of constraining structures and of structures which do not allow for the creative and transformative capacities of players.

This struggle will require that we be more specific about the nature of the limits and possibilities that can be associated with structured forms of human activity (36: pp83,84).

To gain this sensitivity, the discussion of sport and freedom must shift, from the positivistic temperament of most sociological studies and the idealistic treatment of most philosophical accounts of sport, to a critical inquiry which describes the mixture of freedom, constraint, seriousness, futility and unreality in sport (34: pp15-17).

According to Morgan, Gruneau sets a worthy goal, but then fails to pursue it, because he lacks a standard by which current practices may be judged. In suggesting that sport is produced in society to further the "...making and remaking of particular ways of life...", and that privileged methods of playing occur through cultural and institutional forces only, Gruneau denies that there is a basic nature to sport. The formal rules which govern sport are simply seen as essential elements in the social instantiation of sport. According to Gruneau's reading, "...sport cannot be separated in any
significant way from social reality" (68: p74). As a result, the legitimation of the practice of sport occurs as a historical task of assessing the freedom which occurs in changing cultural conditions which affect sport (68: p75). The assumption is that all that is worthwhile knowing about sport occurs in the social and historical context in which it is played (68: p79).

It is the question of freedom in sport which this thesis approached. With Gruneau, it approached the question as a historical task of assessing the practice of sport during different periods of history. However, it approached this task from a perspective which suggested that the development of a society's ideas about sport was related to the development of the different traditions in that society which govern its belief about justice, practical rationality, freedom and the nature of humanity. In MacIntyre's terms:

...theories of justice and practical rationality confront us as aspects of traditions, allegiance to which requires the living out of some more or less systematically embodied form of human life, each with its own specific modes of social relationship, each with its own canons of interpretation and explanation in respect of the behaviour of others, each with its own evaluative practices (59: p391).

The development of sport occurs through a changing set of historical conditions which results in an emerging set of problems. These problems are framed and solved in terms which are affected by the tradition in which the practice of sport resides. Chapter Four of this thesis shows the link between various solutions to the drug problem in sport and
the different traditions which affect these solutions.

However, it is argued in line with Morgan that, regardless of the influence of any tradition, there remains intact an ultimate standard for the practice of sport in any time; and that is, the preservation of its formal logic. This logic, which defines the pursuit of splendid futility as the goal in sport, creates the area for freedom for the athlete. It is this formal logic which must be protected if the athlete's freedom is to be preserved.

The explanation of sport's formal qualities allows critics to determine the difference between sport, and various debased forms of sport such as commodity sport or violent sport. In these debased forms, a society's tradition of rationality impinges upon the formal logic of sport. This imposition can only be asserted, and not established, in Gruneau's argument. To maintain this distinction, it is necessary to differentiate between those features of sport which transcend traditions, and those features which are determined by traditions (68: pp82,83).

A major contention of this thesis is that freedom in sport was best understood during the period of history governed by the conservative tradition, a period where the practice of sport was protected from the influence of other spheres of life by the imposition of the ascriptive amateur laws. Sport was viewed as a craft. Athletes recognized the splendid futility of the practice, but still approached it with a determination to extend the internal goals of the
practice. This recognition required an adequate sense of the position of sport in the overall life of man. Or, to use Murdoch's words, it required that sport be viewed without illusion.

Yet if society is bound by the liberal capitalist idea of progress, then it becomes insensitive to the possibility of the superiority of past, or other, traditions. Chapter Three of this thesis displays the social critical theorists appreciation of the mechanism of this insensitivity. In their opinions, advanced capitalism creates this insensitivity to differences between sport and art, and other social practices, by the process of commodification. This process determines that the results of sporting practice are evaluated in the terms of all other products.

Modern society complacently suggests the superiority of its view of sport, and ignores the criticism offered in alternative traditions. These alternatives not only include other traditions from contemporary society, such as Buddhism, but also traditions from past societies. What is not conceivable according to the liberal view is that past traditions may have known more about freedom in sport than present, enlightened societies. Jim Kaplan approaches this conception in his description of American professional baseball. He argues:

Scenes like this [of extreme joy in the practice of a game] don't occur very often these days. I don't want to romanticize the lot of old-time ballplayers, who had lousy salaries, poor medical care and virtually no rights, but they may have enjoyed the game more
than today's major-leaguers. Baseball was their reason for living, and they loved playing (49: p70, my insertion).

To achieve this free position again, it is not necessary to agree to the ascriptive historical conditions of conservative society which created this approach to sport. What is needed is the reinvigoration of the virtue tradition combined with some of the ideas of modern liberalism, including self-determination and the importance of authentic social unions in society. The virtues allow individuals to place sporting practice in an overall scheme of life without diminishing its internal importance. In order for this positioning to be meaningful in the individual's performance in sport, it must be determined personally. Only then, can individuals unite in social unions to grant the protection of the splendid futility of sport and the pursuit of internal goals in sport, the force of a tradition.

What are some of the implications of this view which need to be given greater consideration than is possible here? One possible implication was expressed by Martin Flanagan when commenting on women's tennis. He wrote:

I had seen the quarter-final between Gabriella Sabatini and Jennifer Capriati. That was a wonderful match; contrasting styles, fluctuating fortunes, one player in the ascendancy, then the other. I concluded my description of that match... with the words: "Those who say women's tennis isn't as good as men's tennis miss the point. Women's tennis is good on its own terms" (24: p2).

In moving away from a singular preoccupation with scores and times, and regarding the quality of the game as of
major importance, the comparison between men's and women's sport, and between different levels of sport becomes less of a concern. Each can be appreciated in terms of specific qualities, and compared in terms of those qualities which contribute to the athlete's freedom.

However, this is a dramatic step away from a tradition of belief about sport in society which suggests that measurements enable understanding in sport. This understanding is captured and criticized by Brown. He writes:

Consider a proposal by Paul Weiss (9:pp 12-14) who argues that athletic records may be regarded as "objective summaries" of what people have done, as "indications" of human capacities, and as a medium of comparison among people of different times and places....between me and Bill Rodgers; between both of us and Pheidippides....[In Brown's opinion] even granting the limitations of such records as a measure of human achievement, such a view reflects a normative view of human nature. What is in question here is a powerful moral vision which may be taken to guide our judgements about both the games we play and who may play at them together....it embodies, I believe, an essentially conservative attitude. (11: pp21,22, my insertion)

It is this essentially conservative attempt to treat sport as an area for comparison between ages, rather than an opportunity for human development and freedom, which Brown believes contributes to the ban on performance enhancing drugs, and contributed to the ban on professional athletes and labourers during the "conservative" period of sport.

It may also be this attitude which prevents the development of new and different sports, where the goals are not biased towards the capacities of one sex or the other. It is important to recognize the implications of a separation of
the tradition-independent formal logic of sport from tradition bound formal goals of sport. As suggested in Chapter Two of this thesis, the formal goals of sport arose from a social tradition which was biased towards masculine proficiencies of power and speed. With this in mind, the true feminist cause in sport may not be the development of equality in the sports currently practiced, but the development of equality in the opportunities to play sports with formal goals which suit the abilities of the female sex. The recognition of this point acts as a precursor to the formation of arguments for the promotion of sports which favour female proficiencies, or the acceptance of the quality of sports which do not favour those capacities which are important in the current tradition of sport. An individual in Western society may not understand the massive appeal of Sumo wrestling nor the qualities of synchronised swimming, but to dismiss the appeal or the qualities, is to be, in Stoppard's terms, complacently ignorant.

Secondly, when individuals view sport without illusion, and as splendid futility, they may find that many of their descriptions of athletes and of sports appear

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1 There may have been a number of other traditions of thought which affected the formal rules, and part of the logic, of sport. The Darwinian tradition of competition may have influenced the forms of sport which are practiced today. And, these sports may be losing some of their force in modern society in the face of individual adventure sports.
ridiculous. Flanagan suggests:

Because sport is habitually treated as a matter of life or death when it is not, it teeters on the edge of absurdity. Many of the characters I enjoy watching - cricketer David Boon, footballer Tony "Plugger" Lockett - are only a shade away from being comic (24: p2).

In Japan, 450 pound Sumo wrestlers are idolized. In America, 7 foot tall basketballers are the heroes of communities. In all sports, people are revered for doing basically futile things, very skilfully. When compared to heart surgeons or social workers, the description of an athlete's achievements may seem hyperbolic.

However, such comparison only occurs when sports are stripped of their specific logic, and made to appear as work. If, in the future, this comparison occurs, then this does not mean that individuals were misguided in their belief in sporting heroes. What was misguided was the transformation of sport into something it is not, that is, work. The tradition of thought and evaluation which occurs in the modern Western capitalist world has led people to this misconstrual of the importance of sport. Sport's importance lies in its formal freedom and internal goals, and these features of sport are beyond comparison with other practices in modern society. There is no common ground where comparisons can be made. Only when sport is made functional, as in its commodified form, is it able to be contrasted with other products. And it is in this comparison that sport can be viewed as exaggerated in importance or a waste of time.
This thesis concludes with a discussion of the problem of drug usage in sport, as an example of one of several aspects of modern sport which is believed to impinge on the formal freedom offered to athletes. Problems in sport should be acknowledged as being answerable in a number of traditions. Many of these answers are not satisfactory to members of society who occupy alternative traditions. If this is the case, then each tradition should endeavour to strengthen the rationality of its view to show the superiority of it. Individuals should search for a tradition which can answer criticism from any quarter. And, as an extension of Morgan (68: p88), this vantage point will lie outside the tradition of modern society's understanding of itself and sport, because it must move to this external position to recognize the criticisms of other traditions. Or, in Stoppards terms, to begin within our tradition of sport is to begin at the wrong place, for the current configuration of sport must necessarily live up to the standards of its own tradition. And, this is not a good place to begin the criticism and the reform of any practice.


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