Australian Cold Warrior:
The Anti-Communism of W. C. Wentworth

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This thesis is submitted in the fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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‘I, Lachlan Clohesy, declare that the PhD thesis titled ‘Australian Cold Warrior: The Anti-Communism of W. C. Wentworth’ is no more than 100,000 words in length including quotes and exclusive of tables, figures, appendices, bibliography, references and footnotes. This thesis contains no material that has been submitted previously, in whole or in part, for the award of any other academic degree or diploma. Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own work.’

Signature: _______________________                     Date:  30 June 2010
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Abbreviations

AACF  Australian Association for Cultural Freedom
AAEC  Australian Atomic Energy Commission
AAF  Aboriginal-Australian Fellowship
AAL  Aborigines Advancement League
AASW  Australian Association of Scientific Workers
ABC  Australian Broadcasting Corporation
ABN  Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations
ACEN  Assembly of Captive European Nations
AIAS  Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies
AIATSIS  Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies
AIF  Australian Imperial Forces
ALP  Australian Labor Party
ANSTO  Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation
APA  Aborigines’ Progressive Association
ASIO  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
ASIS  Australian Secret Intelligence Service
BBC  British Broadcasting Corporation
BMR  Bureau of Mineral Resources
BWR  Boiling water reactor
CANDU  Canada Deuterium Uranium (nuclear reactor)
CCF  Congress for Cultural Freedom
CEA  Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (France)
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency (United States)
CIS  Commonwealth Investigation Service
CLF  Commonwealth Literary Fund
CMF  Citizens’ Military Forces
CNCNSW  Captive Nations Council of New South Wales
CNWC  Captive Nations Week Committee
CPA  Communist Party of Australia
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
<td>Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPUSA</td>
<td>Communist Party of the United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIR</td>
<td>Council for Scientific and Industrial Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSM</td>
<td>Catholic Social Studies Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP</td>
<td>Democratic Labor Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELDO</td>
<td>European Launcher Development Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EYL</td>
<td>Eureka Youth League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>Foundation for Aboriginal Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation (United States)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCAA</td>
<td>Federal Council for Aboriginal Advancement (later FCAATSI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCAATSI</td>
<td>Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCDA</td>
<td>Federal Civil Defense Administration (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIA</td>
<td>Federated Ironworkers’ Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSTW</td>
<td>Federation of Scientific and Technical Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>H of R</td>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNO</td>
<td>Croatian National Resistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOP</td>
<td>Croatian Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRB</td>
<td>Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUAC</td>
<td>House Committee on Un-American Activities (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency (in Vienna, Austria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRD</td>
<td>Information Research Department (United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHR</td>
<td>Member of the House of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ML</td>
<td>Mitchell Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MW</td>
<td>Megawatt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAA</td>
<td>National Archives of Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAAA</td>
<td>National Aboriginal Affairs Association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NAWU  North Australian Workers’ Union
NLA  National Library of Australia
NPT  Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NTBT  Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
OAA  Office of Aboriginal Affairs
PKI  Partai Komunis Indonesia
PRO  Public Record Office (London)
PWR  Pressurised water reactor
QCAATSI  Queensland Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders
RAAF  Royal Australian Air Force
RCE  Royal Commission on Espionage
SAFA  Student Action for Aborigines
SEATO  Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
SGHWR  Steam generating, heavy water moderated, light water cooled reactor
STEP  Survival Through Emergency Preparedness (United States Program)
TAA  Trans-Australia Airlines
TVA  Tennessee Valley Authority (United States)
UAP  United Australia Party
UK  United Kingdom
UKAEA  United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (United Kingdom)
UN  United Nations
US  United States
USA  United States of America
USAEC  United States Atomic Energy Commission (United States)
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWF  Waterside Workers’ Federation
YSA  Yugoslav Settlers Association
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Abstract

This thesis is a case study of the Australian anti-Communist W. C. Wentworth. It will examine his anti-Communism and the various ways it manifested itself in his thoughts, policies and actions over his long political career. This study of Wentworth sheds light on the broader spectrum of anti-Communist politics in the Cold War period in Australia. Wentworth was an important figure in anti-Communist political circles from World War II until the end of his political career in 1977. He was involved with a broad range of extra-Parliamentary groups, including a propaganda organisation in the 1940s known as the Political Research Society, groups associated with the Captive Nations movement and the Australian Association for Cultural Freedom. He also served as the Liberal MHR for Mackellar from 1949 until 1977, becoming Minister in Charge of Aboriginal Affairs and Minister for Social Services under the Gorton and McMahon Governments. In addition, Wentworth was involved in numerous Committees, such as the Government Members Committee on Railway Standardisation, the Government Members Committee Against Communism, the Government Members Atomic Committee and the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs. This wide range of associations and interests makes Wentworth an ideal subject for a study of one of the leading exemplars of anti-Communism in Australia.

This will be done using a combination of sources, including *Hansard*; contemporary newspaper accounts; oral histories; archival sources; and Wentworth’s own publications.

Chapters one and two deal broadly with defence, with an emphasis on the atomic age. Chapter one covers the period up until 1956, and focuses on Wentworth’s early defence interests, uranium prospecting and mining and civil defence. Chapter two discusses the
period from 1956, the year in which Wentworth first proposed an Australian nuclear deterrent. It gives insight into Wentworth’s atomic ambitions for Australia, including the development of both atomic power stations and atomic weapons. Chapter three focuses on foreign affairs. It examines Wentworth’s views on the United Nations, his association with Eastern European émigrés of the extreme right, and Vietnam. Chapter four is a study of Wentworth’s views on security. This includes legislation Wentworth sought to introduce to create an Australian version of the United States’ House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) and examines Wentworth’s long relationship with the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). Finally, Chapter five deals with Wentworth’s work in Aboriginal affairs, arguing that Wentworth’s anti-Communism was a major factor behind the various policies he pursued.
**Introduction – W. C Wentworth: Australian Anti-Communist**

A man with a sense of catastrophe is returning soon to Australia. He is William Charles Wentworth, that unnerving mixture of prophet and demagogue, of private sleuth and original thinker, and of eccentric and near genius.¹

- journalist Alan Reid, March 1955

*The Outcasts of Foolgarah* by Frank Hardy has as its setting Australian society of the late sixties and early seventies, and uses satirical representations of thinly disguised characters to criticise Cold War politics.² The book ostensibly deals with a strike by garbage men, but lampoons various individuals from the Queen and Prime Minister to workers and trade union officials, including a Communist author with a striking resemblance to Hardy himself. The character D. C. (or ‘Crazy Darcy’) Meanswell is the Minister for ‘Social Welfare’, whose great grandfather is described as trying to organise a ‘kangaroo aristocracy’. Meanswell is apparently a strong debater ‘even if prone to do the lolly on the Red issue’ and ‘a bit inclined to look under the bed for Communists.’³ Meanswell studied at Oxford and earned an athletics Blue for running in the 880 yards. He invaded Foolgarah during the war just to prove that the Japanese could have done likewise. Meanswell also recognises an Aboriginal man from ‘Wattle Hill’ involved in

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¹ Alan Reid, ‘Red Baiter Returns a Changed Man’, *Argus*, 22 March 1955, p. 4.
the strike and fears Communist influence among Aborigines.\textsuperscript{4} As historians Drew Cottle and Angela Keys point out in their study of Douglas Darby (elements of whom are also incorporated in the D. C. Meanswell character), Foolgarah is based on the Sydney suburb of Warringah.\textsuperscript{5} It is also clear that D. C. Meanswell was primarily modelled on the Liberal MHR for Mackellar from 1949 to 1977, W. C. Wentworth.

W. C. Wentworth IV was one of Australia’s most outspoken anti-Communists during the Cold War period. He developed this anti-Communism during World War II and seemed driven by what Alan Reid called his ‘cataclysmic view of history’.\textsuperscript{6} Wentworth’s anti-Communism drove him to advocate wide-ranging measures to protect Australia from the perceived anti-Communist threat. This thesis will examine what impact this anti-Communism had on Wentworth’s thoughts, policies and actions during his career, focusing on key areas. Chapters one and two focus on defence and the atomic age. They will detail Wentworth’s fight to ensure a ‘proper’ defence program for Australia focusing mainly on his efforts to encourage uranium prospecting and mining to feed the ‘ arsenals of the Free World’; his emphasis on civil defence which led him to instigate a backbench revolt; his views on the role of Australian ‘conventional forces’; and his advocacy of atomic power and a nuclear deterrent. Chapter three will examine foreign affairs and will discuss Wentworth’s views on the United Nations and its one-time President, Dr. H. V. Evatt. It will deal with Wentworth’s views on the role of

\textsuperscript{4} Hardy, \textit{The Outcasts of Foolgarah}, pp. 150-1. Wentworth also won an athletics Blue at Oxford in the 880 yards. Ron Hurst and W. C. Wentworth, ‘Interview with William Charles Wentworth, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, Parliament’s Oral History Project, Canberra, 1984-7, p. 1:3. As we will see in Chapter I, Wentworth led an ‘invasion’ on Sydney to test defences, simulating Japanese guerilla methods. Chapter V will show Wentworth’s involvement with the striking Aboriginal workers from Wave Hill station at Wattie Creek, and his fears of Communist influence among Aborigines.


Australia’s conventional forces, as well as his engagement with émigré communities in Australia which led to his involvement in groups such as those associated with the Captive Nations movement. Chapter four is a wide-ranging study of Wentworth’s involvement with the security aspects of the Cold War. This chapter examines Wentworth’s involvement with groups such as the Political Research Society, a propaganda organisation of which Wentworth was the driving force. It illustrates the similarities between various pieces of legislation Wentworth sought to introduce and corresponding legislation overseas, particularly in the United States. This legislation aimed to set up an Australian equivalent to the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). The greater part of the chapter, however, deals with the highly irregular relationship between Wentworth and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), a relationship which lasted for over twenty years. Finally, Chapter five will examine Wentworth’s interest in Aboriginal Affairs, arguing that Wentworth’s anti-Communism was a major factor in Wentworth’s engagement in this area. It will examine key appointments to the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Wentworth’s views on the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders (FCAATSI). The chapter will discuss Wentworth’s attempts to wrest the initiative from left wing forces, as well as his abortive attempt to ‘expose’ Communist influence in the Aboriginal movement.

Whilst there is an extensive body of literature dealing with this period in Australia, there is, surprisingly, no biography nor even a significant study of Wentworth’s political career. Labour historian Andrew Moore claims that writing on the whole ‘extreme Right’ or anti-labour side of politics is fragmentary, and that left-wing politics
have always proved more attractive to labour historians in Australia.⁷ Literature on the Liberal Party largely ignores Wentworth, and he does not feature prominently in any of the plethora of political biographies from the period. The existing literature on Wentworth is indeed fragmentary, and rarely concentrates on Wentworth himself. To attempt to understand Wentworth and his anti-Communism, one must focus on the people, places and events with which Wentworth was involved. Only then can a picture of Wentworth begin to emerge.

Of the biographies and studies of the many people with which Wentworth was associated, Mungo MacCallum’s *Mungo: The Man Who Laughs* is a useful starting point for comprehending Wentworth. MacCallum is in a unique position to contribute, as he is both a Wentworth himself (his mother is Wentworth’s sister) and a former press gallery journalist in Canberra. His autobiography gives pertinent insight into the Wentworth family, their history and some idea of what it meant to be a Wentworth (including a seemingly hereditary penchant for political extremism).⁸ Wentworth’s university life and experiences can begin to be understood by reference to the biographies of his contemporaries at New College, Oxford, such as Dick Crossman and Douglas Jay, who were both to later become Labour Party MPs in Britain.⁹ Jay describes Wentworth as ‘an eccentric millionaire Australian athlete’.¹⁰ The biographies of the various Prime Ministers during Wentworth’s career, including those of Robert Menzies, Harold Holt

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⁸ MacCallum, *Mungo*.
¹⁰ Jay, *Change and Fortune*, p. 35.
and John Gorton, give varying degrees of insight into Wentworth’s actions.¹¹ Biographies and autobiographies of political figures such as Don Chipp, Jessie Street and Fred Daly are extremely useful in illuminating Wentworth’s early disputes with his future Liberal Party leader, Robert Menzies.¹² These disputes led, among other things, to Wentworth’s unsuccessful campaign as an independent for the ‘family seat’ of Wentworth in 1943 and more than likely contributed to Wentworth’s omission from the Ministry until 1968 – some nineteen years after he successfully entered Parliament as the MHR for Mackellar in 1949. Books drawn from contemporary notes, such as Paul Hasluck’s *The Chance of Politics* or Peter Howson’s *The Howson Diaries*, provide candid views on many politicians and issues of the era, including Wentworth.¹³ Other biographies and autobiographies that deal with Wentworth’s contemporaries such as Wilfrid Kent Hughes, Jim Killen, Richard Casey, Hubert Opperman and Percy Spender also shed light on various issues of the period.¹⁴ The three main biographies of Dr. H. V. Evatt, the focus of so much of Wentworth’s ire, illuminate many of Evatt’s actions regarding important issues of his time.¹⁵ Piecing together these varying accounts allows for different perspectives on the same incidents to emerge, providing a more detailed overall picture and a political milieu within which Wentworth can be placed.

When studying Wentworth’s anti-Communism, it is important to provide a context in which he operated. Buckingham explains that a Communist was originally considered to be someone who advocated a political system whereby all property is owned by the community, which shared in the means of production. Later, this term came to be associated more with the repression and expansionism of the Soviet Union. He also describes the local Communist Parties in countries around the world, claiming they were tied to Moscow. These parties were required, among other things, to accept the idea of a dictatorship of the proletariat; accept the decisions of the Communist International (Comintern); adopt a system of organisation based on ‘democratic centralism’; and identify themselves as the Communist Party of the country in which they were based. The Communist Party of Australia was one of these parties, gaining Comintern recognition after several years of infighting in 1922. Though it had its strongest roots in the trade union movement, its actions were by no means limited to this sphere of activity. Macintyre states that they worked towards many varied goals, including the abolition of sexual inequality, freedom for Aborigines and an end to the White Australia Policy. The CPA was briefly outlawed during World War II, with legality being restored as the West found themselves in an alliance with the Soviet Union. Following the restoration of legality, the party reached its highest membership. Though this numbered only 23,000 at its zenith, the CPA was far more influential than this

16 Peter H. Buckingham, America Sees Red; Anticommunism in America, 1870s to 1980s, Regina Books, Los Angeles, 1988, p. xii.
19 Ibid., p. 412.
number would suggest. The immediate post-war years were to be punctuated by strikes and lockouts on the waterfront, in transport, in the coalmines and throughout the metal industries. Many saw these troubles as being fomented by Communist officials with subversive intent. Though this does not tell the whole story of industrial unrest in the immediate post-war period, it does give insight into the perceptions of Communist influence among those who would oppose it.

Kovel argues that anti-Communism was a response to a genuine antagonism. He states that anti-Communism would never have existed had capitalist societies not had a socialist adversary, particularly one that had reached superpower status by the end of World War II. Haynes contends that anti-Communists have been defined by what they are against, rather than what they are for. He argues that anti-Communism has lacked a core of anti-Communist ideology, or an anti-Communist party to lead a movement. In America, anti-Communism moved from the margins of politics to the centre within five years of the end of the war. Arguably, the same occurred in Australia. Schlesinger illustrates the breadth of the anti-Communist sentiment. It came from both the left and the right; from within trade unions as well as major corporations; from politicians as well as religious leaders; and from individuals who varied from Senator Joseph McCarthy himself to liberals and socialists. Australian anti-Communism lacked none of the diversity found in other countries. As we shall see, opposition to Communism in

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21 Ibid., p. 50.
Australia came from many groups, including Catholics, Anglicans, Eastern European émigrés, Coalition politicians, the conservative establishment and ASIO. Wentworth would attempt to harness the potential of all of these groups in his wide-ranging battle against perceived Communist influence in Australia.

**Defence and the Atomic Age**

The issues of defence, civil defence, atomic power and atomic weapons are all inextricably entwined, and dominate the two opening chapters of this thesis. By far the most useful publications for evaluating Wentworth in this area are those of Wentworth himself. His books and pamphlets give his views on subjects ranging from the dangers of relying on Singapore as a defence against the Japanese prior to World War II to civil defence and evaluations of the international atomic scene.²⁶ Peter Stanley’s examination of the potential Japanese invasion of Australia during World War II includes an analysis of Wentworth’s *Demand for Defence*.²⁷ Jeffrey Grey’s survey of Australian military history is a useful narrative of Australian defence commitments for the period in question.²⁸ Phillip Deery and Jean Buckley-Moran have written on Wentworth’s attacks on the Australian Association of Scientific Workers (AASW), which were undoubtedly influenced by high profile espionage cases in the United States, Britain and Canada.²⁹

David Lowe has written on the political climate of the time, during which it was feared that World War III was possible or even likely. Wayne Reynolds has written extensively on Australian attempts to procure atomic weapons, focusing primarily on the Australian experience leading up to the Bermuda Conference of 1957, after which Britain’s working relationship with the United States was restored at the expense of the ‘Fourth Empire’. Jim Walsh and Jacques E. C. Hymans have also viewed Australia’s nuclear ambitions and their promotion by important figures, including those in the military, in the context of international non-proliferation studies. Alice Cawte’s study of Australia’s atomic ambitions remains one of the leading works in the field, whilst Richard Broinowski has also dealt with the subject. Ann Moyal has analysed the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC), as has AAEC insider Clarence Hardy. Brian Martin has focused on two of the leading atomic scientists and advocates of the period, Professors Philip Baxter and Ernest Titterton. Titterton’s own book, published in 1956, favourably quotes Wentworth’s publications and provides sharp insight into the


mind of one of Australia’s great atomic supporters. S. J. Angyal and J. O. Newton have written on Baxter and Titterton respectively, whilst Stewart Cockburn and David Ellyard’s work on Professor Mark Oliphant is likewise relevant. Roger Cross has also discussed atomic matters in this period, focusing on the adverse effects of British nuclear weapons testing in Australia. This thesis will use original research to locate Wentworth within the context of the atomic age. It will explore his obsession with uranium, atomic power and an Australian nuclear deterrent over a period of more than twenty years. These chapters will argue that Wentworth’s defence policies were based on an understanding of defence as ‘defence against Communism’. This understanding would lead him to become one of Australia’s most vociferous advocates of uranium mining, atomic power and atomic weapons. He would come closest to fulfilling these last two goals as part of the Ministry of his good friend and fellow nuclear advocate, John Gorton.

**Foreign Affairs**

Like defence matters, the most useful literature on Wentworth and foreign affairs is that authored by Wentworth himself. His publications detail his views in the immediate post-World War II climate and into the 1950s when the Cold War would become the context within which foreign affairs would be considered. Christopher Waters also provides

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valuable insight into the foreign affairs issues of the period, and his analysis of differing schools of thought is important. Waters’ examination of international liberalism and Cold War liberalism is significant in providing a framework within which Wentworth can be judged. ⁴⁰ The biographies of some of the various Ministers for External Affairs are also helpful in providing a wider context. ⁴¹

When investigating the Eastern European émigré organisations such as Captive Nations, Douglas Darby’s long term involvement provides a useful starting point. His unpublished autobiography is useful, as is the study by Cottle and Keys. ⁴² John Playford has written on what he calls the ‘extremist émigrés’, discussing Captive Nations and the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN). ⁴³ Like Playford, Mark Aarons has examined the extremist nature of émigrés involved in groups such as the ABN and Captive Nations Week Committee, highlighting specific instances where those involved have been accused of war crimes prior to their arrival in Australia. ⁴⁴ More contemporary works by K. D. Gott and M. Jurjevic are also useful when examining the organisations they

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condemn, which are the League of Rights and the Croatian Ustasha respectively. Frank Cain’s work on ASIO focuses largely on the Ustasha and is significant in any examination of the various Croatian groups in Australia during the period in question. Robert Manne’s work on the Petrov Affair remains unsurpassed, whilst John McLaren’s investigation of the Australian Association for Cultural Freedom is important for its discussion of Polish émigré, Richard Krygier. Wentworth is only mentioned briefly, if at all, in examinations of the politics of the Eastern European émigrés in Australia. Cottle and Keys, for example, claim that Darby was the only politician actively campaigning for the Captive Nations, using the rationale that the few biographies and autobiographies of other politicians do not discuss the Captive Nations movement. This thesis not only examines the politics of the Captive Nations movement, but those of other émigré groups such as the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations and the Croatian Ustasha. It will argue that Wentworth was not only a committed activist, but an important ‘Old’ Australian in New Australian politics. This chapter will argue that Wentworth’s view of foreign affairs was significantly affected by his anti-Communism. His anti-Communist views came to influence his position on the United Nations and overseas conflicts, such as those in Indonesia and Vietnam. This anti-Communism would also allow him to turn a blind eye to the past deeds of many of his associates, some of whom had been accused of war crimes in their native countries.

Legislation and Security

Any study involving the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation must, as a starting point, consider the work of both David McKnight and Frank Cain. Cain has focused to an extent on the reliability of Soviet defector Vladimir Petrov and criticised ASIO for pursuing Communists rather than the ‘real’ terrorists in groups like the Ustasha. McKnight, on the other hand, deals more with the interplay between ASIO and the Coalition Governments between 1949 and 1972. Both studies are of central importance in this study of Wentworth’s own relationship with ASIO, which uses archival research to extend the research of McKnight in particular. It will suggest that Wentworth provides a stark and more specific example of the types of partisan improprieties that McKnight has described in a broader sense.

John Warhurst’s thesis contains the best study of the Political Research Society thus far, though this thesis will attempt to go beyond the existing scholarship on this group. McLaren’s work, mentioned previously, links Krygier to this group and gives important background on arguably one of its most pivotal members. Peter Henderson’s article on Frank Browne not only examines Browne, but illustrates the diversity of opinion captured within the Society.

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52 McLaren, *Writing in Hope and Fear*.

Biography also illuminate the history of individual Society members. Andrew Moore is a leading historian of the extreme right and his work in several areas informs this chapter of the thesis. In particular, he has examined Major General Thomas Blamey’s ‘The Association’, the anti-Communist historian and author M. H. Ellis, and the attacks on the Commonwealth Literary Fund (CLF), of which Wentworth was the chief proponent. Ellis own’ book, described by McKnight as an ASIO ‘bible’, is also important. Deery has also written many relevant articles on topics such as William Thomas Dobson, former Secretary of the Department of External Affairs John Burton (with McLean), the Information Research Department (IRD) in Britain, and Wentworth’s overseas tour to learn about civil defence.


The studies of Ellen Schrecker are significant when studying McCarthyism. Her work is important when considering the aspects of the American experience Wentworth attempted to replicate in Australia. Whilst this thesis will not make a study of McCarthyism as a worldwide phenomenon, it will contrast the Australian experience with that of other countries. Thomas C. Reeves’ biography of McCarthy is also useful for this purpose. Walter Goodman has examined the House Committee on Un-American Activities, whilst Kenneth O’Reilly has investigated HUAC’s relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In addition, Jennifer Stonor Saunders has explored the covert propaganda initiatives pursued by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Reg Whitaker has made a vital contribution in his lengthy article comparing McCarthyism in Australia, the United States, Britain and Canada. Laurence W. Maher has examined what he terms ‘Downunder McCarthyism’, examining the legal aspects of this period in particular. All of these studies provide an international framework in which Wentworth’s advocacy, proposed legislation and support of Government measures of the time can be placed.

An examination of the attacks on the Commonwealth Literary Fund by Moore has already been mentioned and McLaren’s Writing in Hope and Fear also includes an

investigation of this assault. In addition to these two studies, Allan Ashbolt and Fiona Capp have made important contributions.\textsuperscript{65} Whilst this group of publications deals with the criticism of the CLF in broad terms, it is also covered in relation to specific individuals who were targeted. Jane Grant’s biography of Kylie Tennant and Ric Throssell’s biography of his mother, Katherine Susannah Prichard, are extremely useful is shedding further light onto these events.\textsuperscript{66} In addition to Manne’s study, Nicholas Whitlam and John Stubbs have also written on the Petrov Affair.\textsuperscript{67} Chapter four will argue that Wentworth attempted to set up an equivalent to HUAC in Australia, firstly in 1948 and then as a response to the eventual defeat of Menzies’ Communist Party Dissolution Bill in the High Court. Wentworth, who was aware of the effectiveness of intelligence on fighting Communist because of his association with the Political Research Society, would then embark on an improper relationship with ASIO which would last for over twenty years.

\textbf{Aboriginal Affairs}

There is voluminous information available on Aboriginal Affairs in Australia, though the impact of the Cold War and Communism is invariably overlooked. When Wentworth, Australia’s first Minister in Charge of Aboriginal Affairs, has been discussed, his anti-Communism has rarely been mentioned – let alone linked to his work with Aborigines.


\textsuperscript{67} Whitlam and Stubbs, \textit{Nest of Traitors: the Petrov Affair}. 
The scholarly work available, however, still provides an important backdrop to Wentworth’s own involvement.

In examining the period in question, biographies of those concerned with fighting for Aboriginal causes are useful for this study. These include the autobiographies of Joe McGinness, Faith Bandler and Jack Horner. Peter Read’s biography of Charles Perkins is significant, though it does not deal with Perkins’ own perspectives on Communism or the Cold War, an oversight that this thesis will attempt to address. Marilyn Lake’s biography of Bandler is also central to this thesis, as Bandler was herself central to the cause of Aboriginal advancement at this time. John Ramsland and Christopher Mooney’s collection of biographical pieces include those on Harry Penrith (also known as Burnum Burnum) and Reg Saunders, who both feature in this study. Lorna Lippman and Ann Curthoys have also published personal accounts. Frank Hardy, the Communist author who travelled to Wave Hill before the famous strike, published a book on the Aboriginal situation. Biographies of the leading politicians of this period are valuable, including those on Prime Ministers Menzies, Holt and Gorton.

In addition to these studies, there have been wider examinations of Aboriginal Affairs at this time. Sue Taffe’s book on the Federal Council for the Advancement of
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders is an important study of an organisation which Wentworth, as Minister, had to deal with and one within which he suspected Communist influence. Jennifer Clark’s work also examines Aboriginal advancement during the 1960s, the years which are most relevant to this study of Wentworth. Minoru Hokari’s examination of the Wave Hill strike using oral histories is meritorious. Bain Attwood and Andrew Markus have specifically analysed the 1967 referendum. These studies constitute a significant body of knowledge with regard to Aboriginal Affairs, particularly during the late 1960s. This thesis will add to this body of knowledge by examining the first Minister in Charge of Aboriginal Affairs, investigating the role of anti-Communism in Aboriginal Affairs, and examining the influence of anti-Communism on Wentworth specifically. It will argue that, though Wentworth had many notable achievements in the field of Aboriginal Affairs, his anti-Communism was a major influence on many policies and actions.

**Wentworth the Cold Warrior**

Through an examination of all of these areas, a picture of Wentworth emerges. Though it focuses on Wentworth, this thesis is a case study of an anti-Communist and his anti-Communism, rather than a political biography. It will examine the impact of anti-Communism on the various thoughts, actions and policies of Wentworth throughout his long political career. The lack of a biography or significant study of Wentworth so far

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76 Jennifer Clark, *Aborigines & Activism: Race, Aborigines & the Coming of the Sixties to Australia*, University of Western Australia Press, Perth, 2008.
constitutes an important gap in the historiography of the Cold War in Australia, as well as many of the areas in which Wentworth was involved. The omission of any detailed examination of Wentworth in existing works on defence, uranium, atomic power and weapons, Australian foreign policy during the Cold War, Australian McCarthyism, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation or Aboriginal Affairs limits the existing knowledge in these areas. This wide-ranging study will attempt to locate Wentworth within all of these various contexts, and will therefore make a distinctive contribution to understanding the phenomenon of Cold War anti-Communism in Australian history.
Chapter I – Defence, Survival and the Arsenals of the Free World

W. C. Wentworth was interested in Australia’s defence long before Australia’s defence interests had to consider the Soviet Union, Communism or atomic weapons in a Cold War context. His 1939 book, *Demand for Defence*, was concerned primarily with the threat of Japan. Indeed, Wentworth had even supported the stand of Communist wharf labourers at Port Kembla during the *Dalfram* dispute, in which Japan was to be the recipient of Australian pig-iron. The *Nation* claimed that the Port Kembla dispute was a turning point in Wentworth’s life, leading to his study of Communist tactics. His involvement with defence issues continued during clashes with Communists over a second European front in 1943, and a controversial ‘invasion’ of Sydney in the same year. With the almost simultaneous advent of both the atomic age and the Cold War, however, Wentworth’s defence interests came to be consumed by anti-Communism. Wentworth argued that Russia was stalling for time following World War II in order to develop the atomic bomb and he even seemed to advocate the threat of a pre-emptive nuclear war to implement international control of the bomb by force. In this period, which Wentworth referred to as Russia’s ‘soft shell’ period, Wentworth attacked the Australian Labor Party’s Dr. H. V. Evatt (External Affairs Minister and Attorney-General under Chifley, later ALP leader in Opposition), members of the Australian Association of Scientific Workers, and the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) on their attitudes to defence issues. At the same time, Wentworth was pressing hard for the development of

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2 ‘Return of a Native’, *Nation*, no. 238, 2 March 1968, pp. 10-3.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (hereafter CPD), House of Representatives (hereafter H of R), 23 March 1950, p. 1153.
Australia’s uranium resources. By 1954 Wentworth’s attitude had changed. The Soviet Union had detonated a hydrogen bomb and Wentworth believed they had reached the point of having ‘saturation stocks’ of atomic weapons.\(^5\) This led to an increased emphasis on civil defence, concentrating not on preventing Russia from gaining atomic weapons but instead on how Australia would survive if such weapons were used against it. Such was Wentworth’s enthusiasm for civil defence that he travelled the world at his own expense to learn about what was being done, and clashed with those inside his own party – most notably Sir Wilfred Kent Hughes and the Prime Minister Robert Menzies. This chapter will show that, as defence came to be understood by Wentworth as ‘defence against the Soviet Union’, his anti-Communism came to dominate his views on World War II; science and scientists; uranium mining and prospecting; transport; and civil defence.

**Early Defence Interests**

The *Dalfram* dispute occurred in 1938 when members of the Waterside Workers’ Federation (WWF) refused to load pig-iron bound for Japan. The WWF was apprehensive about the Government policy of selling pig-iron to a potentially hostile nation, and their fears proved to be prescient with the entry of Japan into World War II. The *Dalfram* dispute, named for the ship to be loaded, also marked the first of many clashes between then Attorney-General, Robert Menzies, and the labour movement. This incident would burden Menzies with the nickname ‘Pig-Iron Bob’ for the rest of his

political life.\textsuperscript{6} At this time Wentworth was a relatively young man, whose main political involvement had consisted of working for Bertram ‘Tubby’ Stevens’ State Government in New South Wales. Wentworth described his attitude to defence in 1937 as ‘obsessed’, and claimed that it was the New South Wales Treasury’s failure to accept his ideas in that year that caused him to leave their employ.\textsuperscript{7} Though his class, family connections and university experiences may have conditioned him to oppose Communism, he was certainly not an outspoken anti-Communist at this stage. When the Dalfram issue came to a head, Wentworth lent his support to the striking labourers.\textsuperscript{8} This began a feud with Menzies that was to last for the rest of Menzies’ political career, and arguably deny Wentworth ministerial office until after Menzies’ (and Holt’s) departure from federal politics. Perhaps more importantly when considering Wentworth’s anti-Communism, however, is the contention that this incident led Wentworth to begin a study of Communist tactics, as he objected to the way his name and opposition to the Japanese were used by Communists for their own purposes.\textsuperscript{9}

It was still with the Japanese in mind that Wentworth wrote \textit{Demand For Defence}.\textsuperscript{10} According to economist Colin Clark, this book was so unpopular and against the preconceptions of both political parties that Wentworth had to publish it himself.\textsuperscript{11} The book was prophetic in that Wentworth warned against the reliance of Australia on Singapore for defence in the event of a Japanese attack. Wentworth pointed out both how defenceless Australia was, and the benefits for Japan in attacking Australia in the event of

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\textsuperscript{8} Bruce Juddery, ‘Conservative Radical Gets Pragmatic’, \textit{The Canberra Times}, 22 May 1968, pp. 28-9. The Dalfram dispute is discussed in more detail in Chapter IV.

\textsuperscript{9} ‘Return of a Native’, \textit{Nation}, no. 238, 2 March 1968, pp. 10-3.

\textsuperscript{10} Wentworth, \textit{Demand for Defence}.

\end{flushright}
war. Stanley argues that Wentworth’s study was seen by staff officers of later generations as a ‘worst-case scenario’, which, as we shall see, was an important and common characteristic of Wentworth’s ideas on defence. The book had little reaction within Australia but, according to Wentworth, a copy translated into Japanese was picked up among Japanese documents by forces in New Guinea. The fulfilment of Wentworth’s dire predictions also had the effect of convincing Wentworth of his own aptitude in this field, as evidenced by the lengthy title of his 1943 election campaign literature – *Men who have proved right in the past will be the best leaders for the future*. Demand for Defence, and the fact that Wentworth had published it at his own cost, illustrated Wentworth’s obsession with defence at this time. Wentworth enlisted in the Militia, or Citizens’ Military Forces (CMF) as a Reserve in mid-1940. Defective vision prevented him serving in the Australian Imperial Forces (AIF) and he instead served in New South Wales. A measure of his imagination can be illustrated by looking at Wentworth’s submissions to the Army Inventions Directorate. In August 1941 he volunteered his ideas on a simple device for derailing trains. In early 1942 he made another suggestion, this time on a device which he believed would be useful for moving ditched tanks or armoured personnel carriers. Whilst neither invention was adopted, they both illustrate the inventiveness of Wentworth’s mind.

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15 W. C. Wentworth Defence Record, National Archives of Australia (hereafter NAA), B884, N73473.
17 Maj.-Gen. D. A. Clowes, Commanding 1st Division to Eastern Command Headquarters, NAA MP 76/1, 1343.
Though *Demand for Defence* dealt for the most part with Japan, Wentworth did give some insight on Soviet Russia when discussing possible allies for a then potential World War II. Conspicuously absent from his assessment of the Soviet Union, however, was his later antipathy towards Communism. Indeed, Wentworth believed the rebuff of Russia at the 1938 Munich Settlement – where he argued ‘we acquiesced in her exclusion from European deliberations, and conceded to Hitler our acceptance of his anti-Russian attitude’ – was a tragedy and that the democracies should stress to Russia that ‘we do not share in any attitude of hostility towards her’. He did, however, suggest that the Russians may believe it is in their interest to maintain conflict so that ‘in the final ruin, the seeds of Communism may be planted’. He cited China and Spain as examples where Russia had intervened, yet not enough to be decisive. Wentworth either did not consider anti-Communism important at this stage, or concealed it as he realised the value of Russia as a potential ally, as well as the danger of a potential Nazi-Soviet alliance. This attitude towards Communism contrasted dramatically with the fierce anti-Communism that was later to affect Wentworth’s defence policies.

A 1943 incident further illustrates Wentworth’s commitment to defence issues. By 1942 Wentworth had become a Captain in the 45th Battalion, protecting a section of the New South Wales coast. In 1943 Wentworth was given seventy men and charged with simulating an invasion of Sydney. He supposed he was meant to mount a

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18 Wentworth, *Demand for Defence*, p. 15.
19 Ibid., p. 167.
20 Ibid., p. 15.
21 Though many reports of this incident suggest that he was a Captain, his Army record appears to show that he was only a Temporary Captain, and that he had relinquished the rank on 25 September 1942. Another section of his record, however, states that he relinquished the rank on 3 June 1943. NAA B884, N73473. While most accounts refer to Wentworth as a Captain, Stanley’s account suggests Wentworth was actually a Lieutenant at the time. Stanley, *Invading Australia*, pp. 135-6.
conventional assault, but being unconventional by nature, Wentworth decided to carry out a guerrilla attack, reasoning ‘if we were the Japs we would have done it’. Wentworth’s group then proceeded to seize vehicles, explosives from a Council depot, a telephone exchange and even Bren gun carriers from the Battalion headquarters before making a token destruction of the Liverpool ordnance depot. According to one account, the group put all trains out for thirty-six hours. Another stated that, had the action been real, Wentworth would have been dead or the recipient of a Victoria Cross. Though the embarrassment caused to the defence establishment by the incident led to Wentworth’s departure from the Army, ostensibly on medical grounds, Wentworth later claimed it led to valuable changes in defence. Stanley contends that the incident illustrated that the Militia was far from ineffective. Nevertheless, the incident was used by Labor politicians such as Eddie Ward to attempt to embarrass Wentworth later in his political career. This episode exemplified the obsession of Wentworth in relation to defence, and his absolute belief in his own judgement. This zeal would become a distinguishing feature of Wentworth’s opposition to Communism.

**Wartime Opposition to Communism**

In August, later in 1943, Wentworth ran for Federal Parliament. He fell out with the United Australia Party (UAP) and instead ran as an Independent National Government candidate in the seat bearing his famous ancestor’s name. Wentworth was still passionate

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24 Fred Daly, *From Curtin to Kerr*, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1977, p. 91.
28 CPD, H of R, 26 October 1950, p. 1554.
about defence in this World War II climate, recalling that he stood on a defence platform and that at that time ‘defence obviously took precedence over everything else’.\textsuperscript{29} His campaign material claimed he was the ‘first advocate of an adequate Australian Defence Programme’.\textsuperscript{30} Whilst promoting a strong war effort, Wentworth’s campaign literature was also significant in that it attacked Communists in Australia. In fact, after espousing the benefits of a National Government approach to the war, Wentworth claimed that Labor’s refusal to join such a National Government was caused by ‘Communist intrigues’. In addition, Wentworth alleged that Communists were against national unity and ‘social amelioration’, as this would prevent class war. Whilst Wentworth did not explicitly link his anti-Communism to defence issues, it is clear that by August 1943 he had developed an antipathy towards Communists, declaring that ‘effective opposition to Communism’ was part of his policy.\textsuperscript{31} However, Wentworth’s attacks on members of his own party, the United Australia Party, show that his defence criticisms applied to all shades of the political spectrum. Not only did Wentworth stand against one of Menzies’ friends (and a future colleague) in sitting UAP member Eric Harrison, he had also given a statement to the \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} in April 1943, declaring:

\begin{quote}
Mr Menzies can neither call nor command as a leader… Under his leadership the party broke up, and yet he refuses to co-operate under the leadership of anybody else. Under these circumstances the greatest national service he can render the party and Australia would be to quit politics. Those of us who stand for a more vigorous policy developing
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{29} Hurst and Wentworth, ‘Interview with William Charles Wentworth, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, p. 9.1.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., pp. 5-31.
into National Government are anxious that Mr Menzies’ inevitable failures should not block the path of future progress.  

This was another important incident when reflecting on the relationship between Menzies and Wentworth. Former Liberal MP and Australian Democrats Leader, Don Chipp, for example, recalled that Menzies ‘never attempted to hide his revulsion at Wentworth when he [Wentworth] rose to speak in the Party room’.  

By August 1943 Wentworth’s views as an anti-Communist were firmly established, as evidenced by attacks on the politically left-leaning Labor candidate, Jessie Street, and a very public refusal to co-operate with her in a preference deal.  

Wentworth was, however, yet to clash directly with Communists on defence issues as he had done with those inside the UAP. The first such clash with the CPA came later that year, after both Wentworth and Street had been unsuccessful in defeating Harrison.

The issue of a second European front in the war was taken up by the CPA, which held a rally on 30 September 1943. Wentworth vehemently disagreed with the position of the CPA, which advocated the opening of a European second front from the West (such as that which eventually occurred following the Normandy landings). Wentworth and a friend, Brian Penton of the Daily Telegraph, attended the Communist rally. The Tribune accused Wentworth of trying to provoke an incident, claiming that Penton had his photographer there to capture it.  

The Sydney Morning Herald went into some detail,

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describing how Wentworth was pushed off the stage and struck in the face.³⁶ Wentworth was critical of Russia, recalling the Nazi-Soviet pact and comparing it to the peace between the Soviet Union and Japan at the time. He accused Russia of interning American pilots forced down after operations against Japan, suggesting instead that Russia should allow the United States to make use of available air bases against the Japanese.³⁷ On the issue of the second front, Wentworth argued that it should be opened from the Mediterranean rather than Western Europe. He considered the policy advocated by the CPA as being aimed at preserving Russia’s position following the war. He later claimed that he was on the same side as British Prime Minister Winston Churchill.³⁸ Gilbert, Churchill’s official biographer, explains that Churchill wanted to push from Sicily to Rome, and then capitalise on partisan anti-Nazi activity in Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece.³⁹ Following a challenge published in the Communist newspaper Tribune, Wentworth agreed to debate the CPA National President, Lance Sharkey, on the second front issue. The Tribune lauded the event as ‘a massacre, not a debate’,⁴⁰ whilst Wentworth claimed to be ‘infuriated’ that the Town Hall was packed in advance by Communist supporters and that his own supporters could not get in.⁴¹ The Sydney Morning Herald described the crowd as ‘hootling’ Wentworth whilst, after Sharkey spoke, they rose and ‘gave the clenched fist salute’.⁴² Wentworth maintained, more than forty years later, that the second front option from the Mediterranean would have been

³⁷ ‘Two Reasons for Ejection at Meeting’, Herald, 1 October 1943.
⁴⁰ ‘Massacre, Not Debate’, Tribune, 18 November 1943, p. 3.
⁴¹ Hurst and Wentworth, ‘Interview with William Charles Wentworth, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, p. 9:3.
the correct option, and blamed subversive elements within the United States for taking
advantage of a weakened President Roosevelt. Referring to it as a ‘disgraceful episode’,
Wentworth said that the consequences of failing to open the second front in this way
‘subjected all the captive nations of Europe to Russian domination’. By the end of
1943, as he began to look to the post-war world, it was clear that Wentworth’s ideas on
defence were deeply affected by an increasingly vehement anti-Communism. By the end
of 1945 the war against Fascism had been won, and opposing Communism became
Wentworth’s sole focus.

Scientists Under Suspicion

The advent of the atomic age was the catalyst for a dramatic increase in the significance
of science and scientists on the world stage. Whilst scientists had played an important
role during World War II, the atomic bomb was, in 1945, the ultimate weapon. The
hydrogen bomb, not yet developed but foreseen even by the end of 1945, was thought to
have the dangerous potential to ignite the atmosphere, engulfing the whole world in fire. The
defection and revelations of cipher clerk Igor Gouzenko from the Soviet Embassy in
Ottawa, revealed that the Soviet Union was engaged in espionage within the international
scientific community. The scientists arrested following Gouzenko’s defection to Canada
included Dr. Raymond Boyer, National Chairman of the Canadian Association of
Scientific Workers, and Dr. Alan Nunn May, an active member of the British

43 Hurst and Wentworth, ‘Interview with William Charles Wentworth, Former Member of the House of
44 Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-
Manwell and Cedric Pugh (eds.), Intellectual Suppression: Australian Case Histories, Analysis and
Association of Scientific Workers. The defence of those implicated in the Gouzenko affair by the Australian Association of Scientific Workers led the press and some politicians in Australia to accuse the AASW of being treasonous and infiltrated by Communists. One of those politicians was W. C. Wentworth.

The AASW was formed in July 1939 and had been important in areas such as manufacturing, overcoming wartime shortfalls of raw materials, and developing important anti-malarial drugs during the Second World War. Another organisation, the Federation of Scientific and Technical Workers (FSTW) was created as a trade union for scientists after the AASW decided against becoming a union itself. Despite the AASW’s World War II respectability, however, Wentworth had shown his antagonism towards the organisation by disrupting a 1944 Planning Conference. Following the Gouzenko arrests, Wentworth again saw fit to interject himself into the affairs of the scientific community.

The New South Wales branches of the AASW and the FSTW combined to organise a conference held from 12-14 April on ‘Atomic Power and the International Co-operation of Scientists’. The conference, attended by Wentworth, passed several resolutions including one viewing ‘with great concern the recent arrests of Dr. Nunn May in Great Britain and of Dr. Raymond Boyer and others in Canada’ seeing a ‘direct threat to freedom of scientific discussion’. The Sydney Morning Herald reported:

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46 Whitaker and Marcuse, *Cold War Canada*, p. 86.
48 Ibid., p. 12.
51 Ibid., p. 7.
Mr. Wentworth, opposing the motion, said that he was amazed that the conference, reputedly a meeting of loyal citizens, should carry a motion of protest against the arrest of men who were apparently Communist quislings.52

Another motion urged the ‘immediate removal of all restrictions on the publication of scientific information regardless of the application or potential application to military use’.53 This motion was again more than Wentworth could countenance. Opposing it, Wentworth spoke on the need to reform the United Nations (UN) before countries such as Russia, Spain and ‘similar’ countries found the way to construct the bomb. This reference to Spain was likely because of another resolution passed called for investigation of Nazi scientists working there on atomic energy. Wentworth went further in comparing the Nazis and Russia, arguing that the ‘present regime in Russia was directed against the British Empire just as much as Hitler’s regime had been’.54 Wentworth then launched into an extraordinary attack on the AASW itself, saying it ‘has the Communists with it just as much as they are with its sister traitor organisation in Canada and this conference is stiff with Communists’.55 Wentworth contended that the Associations of Scientific Workers overseas were hosts for ‘the activities of a treasonable Communistic nucleus’ and suggested that the Australian organisation was headed the same way. Wentworth himself attempted to move several resolutions which lapsed for want of a seconder.56

55 Ibid.
before a motion that Wentworth no longer be heard was carried. The *Daily Telegraph* featured Wentworth’s claims that the AASW was attempting to get the technique to construct bombs for Russia, and that it was a ‘fifth column’. Buckley-Moran quotes Wentworth’s argument that the policy of the Soviet Union was that even if three-quarters of the world’s population die, it would not matter as long as the remaining quarter was Communist. Wentworth later published what he claimed to be Lenin’s quote to this effect on the second page of his publication *Time and the Bomb*. Wentworth publicly criticised both the AASW and FSTW, alleging they had penetrated the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and that the organiser of this ‘treasonable conspiracy’ was Dr. R. E. B. Makinson, a lecturer in physics at Sydney University. His attack was taken up in Parliament by Country Party member, Joe Abbott, later a member of Wentworth’s Political Research Society. Abbott was joined in this offensive by his Party’s leader, Artie Fadden, and the Liberal Party’s Eric Harrison. Later, the right wing Labor member and former New South Wales Premier, Jack Lang, would also condemn the AASW.

Wentworth was elected to Federal Parliament late in 1949. In early 1950, the arrest and conviction of Dr. Klaus Fuchs in Great Britain as an atom spy once again brought the issue of scientists and Soviet espionage to a head. Despite the decision by the AASW to dissolve itself on 31 July 1949, Wentworth was still maintaining his opposition to the Association. Addressing the Prime Minister in the House of Representatives,

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57 ’Atom Secrecy Opposed’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 15 April 1946, p. 4.
60 The Political Research Society is discussed in Chapter IV.
Wentworth emphasised Dr. Fuchs’ involvement with the British Association of Scientific Workers. He also reminded the House of the Canadian scientists implicated in espionage in the Gouzenko affair, outlining their links with the Canadian Association of Scientific Workers. Wentworth accused the three organisations (British, Canadian and Australian) of forming a Soviet controlled network, ‘creating the climate of treason and furthering acts of treason’ and broadened his scope to attack the Australian Labor Party, who had apparently allowed the AASW to infiltrate the CSIR. Wentworth called on Menzies to ‘close the security loopholes left either through accident or design by the Chifley [ALP] Government’.

The AASW had gone, but Wentworth’s war against the perceived influence of Communists in the scientific community was far from over. In June 1952 Wentworth zeroed in on one of his 1946 targets, Dr. R. E. B. Makinson. Announcing that ‘I have no proof that Dr. Makinson is still a Communist, but no doubt that he is’, Wentworth repeated his earlier claims that Makinson had organised a ‘treasonable conspiracy’. Wentworth used Dr. Fuchs as an example of Soviet espionage, referring to him as ‘a living monument of the success of the Communist treason policy’ before referring to Makinson as an ‘embryo Dr. Fuchs’. Deery tells us that the Sydney Morning Herald refused to print a rebuttal Makinson took to their offices, whilst the Herald refused to publish a letter by Dymphna Cusack on behalf of the Australia-New Zealand Civil Liberties Society. Another supporter of Makinson, however, was Brian Fitzpatrick who

\[64\] CPD, H of R, 5-6 June 1952, pp. 1619-22.
published a small journal titled the *Australian News-Review*. Fitzpatrick offered to help Makinson.\(^{66}\) Firstly, Fitzpatrick attempted to ‘expose’ Wentworth’s ‘slander on science’, writing an article in which he dubbed Wentworth the ‘Mad Mullah of Mackellar’. He published an account of the 1946 AASW meeting authored by the Chairman of the concluding session, R. O. Chalmers, in which Chalmers belittled Wentworth, claiming he provoked ‘feelings of amusement or irritation in the audience’.\(^{67}\) Fitzpatrick also published the letter from Cusack the following month, in which Cusack hoped to indicate the ‘fantastic nature of the charges made, under privilege, by Mr. Wentworth’.\(^{68}\) Wentworth was prepared to waive this privilege, and offered to repeat anything he said about Makinson outside the House (thereby giving Makinson the opportunity to sue for libel).\(^{69}\) Makinson, however, did not. Makinson’s wife later argued that it was the attacks of Wentworth which stalled Makinson’s academic career, so much so that he had to wait twenty years to gain promotion.\(^{70}\)

Anti-Communism had pervaded Wentworth’s worldview so much that he considered being a Communist synonymous with being a traitor. To Wentworth, Communists in sensitive scientific positions posed an unacceptable security risk. Even having Communists associated with ‘loyal’ scientists posed a risk of espionage. ‘I cannot believe,’ Wentworth protested in Parliament, ‘when we have scientists like Dr. Makinson freely talking to eminent scientists who are quite loyal, that we shall be able to keep from Russia vital information which we wish to conceal’.\(^{71}\) This obsessive anti-Communism

\(^{66}\) Ibid., p. 4.
\(^{67}\) Fitzpatrick and Chalmers, ‘Mischief-Making Mr. Wentworth's Slander on Science’.
\(^{69}\) CPD, H of R, 5-6 June 1952, p. 1621.
\(^{71}\) CPD, H of R, 5-6 June 1952, pp. 1619-22.
was again to influence Wentworth with the visit of Professor P. M. S. Blackett to Australia. Wentworth had read Blackett’s book, *Military & Political Consequences of Atomic Energy*, published in 1948.\(^{72}\) This book alarmed Wentworth, as it proposed accepting Russian proposals for the abolition of the atomic bomb without inspections. Deery appears to suggest that it was Blackett’s advocacy of atomic disarmament which made him seem a security threat to Wentworth, yet Wentworth himself was an advocate of international disarmament. Wentworth’s view, however, was that this disarmament must be ‘subject to sanctions and enforced by an adequate international inspection force operating in Russia and throughout the world. Anything short of that will be useless and will inevitably lead to disaster’.\(^ {73}\) Wentworth’s ideas closely followed the United States’ Baruch Plan. This called for territorial inspections and immediate, certain penalties from the United Nations Security Council which were not subject to veto.\(^ {74}\) In October 1953 Wentworth would describe proposals similar to Blackett’s as ‘worse than useless’ but that was yet to come. In February 1953 Wentworth read of Blackett’s arrival in Australia in the press. Wentworth wrote to the Attorney-General (his usual conduit to the ASIO),\(^ {75}\) claiming that Blackett’s book had a ‘tremendous impact’ on Western planning and accusing it of being in line with Communist designs.

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\(^{73}\) CPD, H of R, 4 October 1950, p. 285.


\(^{75}\) This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV.
So far as I can see, Blackett is a top Communist agent and perhaps is the top Communist agent in Britain. If my appraisal of his book to which I have referred is correct, he has so far accomplished far more than any Fuchs and is a far more deadly person.\(^76\)

Wentworth requested information from ASIO on Blackett as a matter of urgency.\(^77\) ASIO, for its part, suggested that Blackett’s views were not acceptable to the British or American governments, and had certainly not had a tremendous impact on Western planning. Blackett’s file also noted that he was an independent thinker whose views were not acceptable to Communists either. Though Wentworth was informed that enquiries made were not able to support his view, they did forward to him a review of Blackett’s book in *The Economist* of 16 October 1948. This review was compatible with Wentworth’s position, suggesting that technical arguments and ‘never explicitly stated political assumptions’ led to conclusions ‘oddly reminiscent of editorials in the “Daily Worker”’. The review then attacked Blackett’s argument that ‘the Western nations ought to take risks in accepting the Russian proposals for abolition of bombs without thorough inspection’.\(^78\) Wentworth’s lack of hard evidence did not stop him attacking Blackett in Parliament in December 1953. Wentworth spoke on ‘Soviet agents operating in the highest policy-making sphere’ and compared Blackett to Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White (former top-level United States Government officials suspected of espionage). Wentworth concluded that, whilst he could not be certain that Blackett was a Soviet

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\(^{76}\) Wentworth to Spicer, 16 February 1953, NAA A432, 1953/2122.  
\(^{77}\) Ibid.  
\(^{78}\) Spry to Bailey (Solicitor-General), 17 February 1953, NAA A432, 1953/2122.
agent, Blackett’s words of advice were ‘of such a character that it could not have suited Soviet Russia better even if they had been 100 per cent traitorous’.  

Wentworth’s determination to seek out Communists within the scientific community illustrates both the increase in the significance of science in the early Cold War period and the increasingly obsessive zeal of Wentworth himself. For Wentworth, however, these actions were not likely to have seemed overly obsessive at all. Wentworth’s accusations against Makinson, Blackett and others have to be viewed in the context of that period, a period in which Dr. Alan Nunn May and Dr. Klaus Fuchs in particular had shown that Soviet espionage in scientific circles was not only attempted, but successful. Furthermore, it should be noted that Wentworth did not treat all scientists with suspicion. Professor Mark Oliphant, perhaps Australia’s top nuclear physicist, had often been seen as a security risk. He had denounced ‘American witch-hunting’ after the enquiry of the Personnel Security Board of the United States Atomic Energy Commission into the loyalty of his friend, Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer. Oliphant had also experienced difficulties obtaining a visa to attend a conference in the United States, with hints that security reasons were involved. Oliphant’s later appointment as Governor of South Australia (in 1971) was criticised at the time because of his affiliation with the ‘far, far left’.  

It was also Oliphant who had invited Blackett to Australia in 1953.  

It was Wentworth, however, that presented Oliphant’s case for a nuclear accelerator to Parliament in November 1954. In addition to providing members of Parliament with information on Oliphant’s proposal, Wentworth arranged a lecture for members by

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79 CPD, H of R, 2 & 3 December 1953, p. 872.
Oliphant. Wentworth earned support from both sides of the House, including praise from the ALP’s Dr. H. V. Evatt and Clyde Cameron.\textsuperscript{82}

**Uranium Prospecting and Mining**

Wentworth’s enthusiasm for the atomic age extended beyond rooting out treasonous elements in the scientific community. At the same time that Wentworth was attacking Makinson, Blackett and the AASW, he was also considering how Australia might contribute to the effort of the ‘Free World’ in what was becoming a nuclear arms race with the Communist bloc. On 28 May 1952, Wentworth told the House he was ‘not satisfied with the progress that has been made in the development of Australia’s uranium resources’.\textsuperscript{83} Outlining the importance of this development in a Cold War context, Wentworth stated:

As Mr. Churchill said some time ago, the atomic preponderance of the democracies safeguards them from Soviet aggression and is the greatest contributing factor towards the maintenance of peace. That preponderance is bottle-necked upon uranium supplies, which are of vital importance to us from not only an international standpoint but also a national standpoint.\textsuperscript{84}

Wentworth was far from a lone voice in advocating uranium exploration. Chifley’s Labor Government had initiated searches for uranium before the end of World War II, as well as financing State Governments to do the same. Menzies further strengthened

\textsuperscript{82} CPD, H of R, 10 November 1954, pp. 2847-51.
\textsuperscript{83} CPD, H of R, 28 May 1952, p. 953.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., p. 952.
uranium prospecting efforts upon taking office. Menzies established a Uranium Committee, consisting of himself, the Treasurer and Country Party leader Artie Fadden, the Minister for Supply, Howard Beale, the Minister for National Development, William Spooner and the Minister for External Affairs, Richard Casey. This committee agreed on generous incentives for uranium prospectors, with the hunt for uranium being likened to a gold rush.\textsuperscript{85} However, Wentworth approached the subject with a sort of fanatic fervour. It was clear from the outset that Wentworth’s anti-Communism was a driving force behind his advocacy of uranium development. Wentworth’s sense of impending doom at the hands of Soviet aggression led him to insist that this development was vital and the need for it urgent. Wentworth also discussed the economic aspects of uranium development, claiming ‘there is an unlimited world market for uranium at an excellent price’,\textsuperscript{86} though defence interests took a clear precedence.

Wentworth was excited by the find at Rum Jungle, sixty miles south of Darwin in the Northern Territory only a few years before. He reasoned that it was far too big a coincidence that uranium deposits only existed in the most accessible part of the Territory, one mile from a railway, a couple of miles from one of Australia’s largest airstrips and seven miles from the Dam which provided water for Darwin. Straining the coincidence even further was the fact that Rum Jungle was one of few freehold patches in the Northern Territory, and as such was one of the only parts subjected to proper examination. Wentworth was convinced that it was likely Australia contained vast resources of uranium.

\textsuperscript{86} CPD, H of R, 28 May 1952, pp. 952-3.
A pamphlet from the Commonwealth Bureau of Mineral Resources (BMR) was released in order to help prospectors identify uranium. The pamphlet stated: ‘It is a rather striking, though unexplained fact, that most productive uranium lodes and veins have been found in regions occupied by very old (pre-Cambrian) rocks’.  

Wentworth, fancying himself an amateur geologist, explained to Parliament that ‘Australia is one of the few places in the world where pre-Cambrian rocks appear on, or near, the surface’.  

Wentworth quoted the work of Professor Edgeworth David to illustrate how remarkable the occurrence of pre-Cambrian rock in Australia was, arguing that an intensive search for uranium was desirable. Wentworth went on to outline factors he believed hindered uranium development, including administrative imperfections, a lack of private enterprise due to the Government treating uranium mining as a monopoly, unsatisfactory prices offered for uranium, and a lack of resources including Geiger counters and scintillometers. Wentworth also advocated the purchase of helicopters for prospecting.

Ironically, given his concern for security, Wentworth also criticised what he called the ‘excessive and inordinate policy of concealment’ with regard to the secrecy surrounding uranium. Wentworth pointed out differences between Australian and United States policies in this regard, arguing that the secrecy in Australia discouraged uranium prospecting whilst denying prospectors information which would make them more efficient.  

He pointed out that the Commonwealth was not bound by any constitutional impediments and enjoyed unlimited Constitutional power in the Northern Territory, the site of the most promising uranium prospects. In view of this, Wentworth urged Parliament to ‘take such measures as lie within its power to remove the Communists from

87 Ibid., p. 953.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., p. 954.
the Northern Territory’, as he believed it was the ‘mainline policy of the Communists to prevent uranium production in Australia’. ⁹⁰ It seemed that Wentworth’s appeal for less secrecy did not extend to Communists. Wentworth’s concern about Communists compromising Australia’s search for uranium was again evident on 27 August 1952, when he accused the Communist Party of running a ‘uranium espionage network’. He quoted a *Tribune* article:

> Last week Wentworth W. C. had a long lobby discussion with Messrs. Frankovitch, Oster and Dodd – three of the Yank uranium experts out here…Incidentally, W. C. and German scientist, Schleicher, had some long discussions at Rum Jungle during the parliamentary recess.⁹¹

Wentworth informed the House that he had consulted members of the Press Gallery, such as noted journalist Alan Reid, who had informed him that the three Americans were not known in Canberra and would not have been recognised. This, and the fact that the three gentlemen meeting Wentworth had been noted especially, led Wentworth to the conclusion that Communists were engaging in espionage inside Parliament House itself. That Wentworth had, at Rum Jungle, met a Czechoslovakian named Slice (in pronunciation, presumably easily confused with a German named Schleicher) aroused his suspicion that this uranium espionage was going on not just in Canberra, but at Rum Jungle as well. Referring to the article’s author, Rex Chiplin, as a ‘full and complete traitor’, Wentworth again reminded the House that Parliament had unlimited power over

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⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 958. He would soon attempt to get legislation to this effect introduced. This is detailed in Chapter IV.
the territories (as the referendum ‘No’ vote on banning the Communist Party in 1951 only applied to States) and called for the Communist Party (and Communists) to be banned from both the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory.\textsuperscript{92}

Wentworth continued to advocate uranium prospecting, calling for the tax situation for prospectors to be clarified and for adequate supplies of Geiger counters and information booklets from the Bureau of Mineral Resources to assist individual prospectors. In September, Wentworth used the Estimates debate to argue that a proposed £45,000 for mineral prospecting was inadequate, suggesting millions of pounds were necessary.\textsuperscript{93} He later argued that the £250,000 vote for the BMR should be ‘at least ten times greater if we had a proper sense of proportion’.\textsuperscript{94} Wentworth pushed for a uranium policy along United States lines, suggesting that secrecy was necessary during the war but, with the revelation that the atomic bomb had been developed, secrecy in exploration was no longer required. He noted that the United States had enlisted the talents of industry, individual prospectors, educational institutions and government agencies. He argued that Australia had opportunities and responsibilities in this matter. The opportunities existed because of the vast uranium resources in Australia. Australian responsibilities, on the other hand, were predicated on the basis that ‘the defence of the free world depends on the quantity of uranium available to it’.\textsuperscript{95} Wentworth framed the uranium mining issue in terms of defence against Communist aggression. Speaking in March 1953 on the Atomic Energy Bill, Wentworth contended that only the Free World’s ‘atomic preponderance’ stood between Australia and a Soviet attack. Arguing that

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., pp. 168-9.
\textsuperscript{93} CPD, H of R, 3 September 1952, pp. 953-4.
\textsuperscript{94} CPD, H of R, 9 September 1952, p. 1110.
\textsuperscript{95} CPD, H of R, 3 September 1952, pp. 953-4.
uranium was necessary for any type of atomic weapon, Wentworth told the House that ‘our prime duty is, within the minimum time, to get the maximum amount of uranium into the arsenals of the free world.’

An insight into the wide scope of Wentworth’s desire for uranium can be seen in his attitudes to Antarctica. As early as 1951, Wentworth had discussed Antarctica’s mineral potentialities. At the same time, Wentworth even seemed to suggest that Antarctica may be suitable for the manufacture and testing of atomic weapons.

Perhaps, too, with the development of our atomic research, we shall need experimental or production areas, remote from population centres, where the various processes can be carried out without undue danger of radiological contamination. For that purpose, the Antarctic continent may well be ideal.

Whilst, in modern times when global warming is a major issue, and the idea of an Antarctic experimental area for atomic power or weapons beggars belief, in 1951 the Antarctic Treaty was still a distant ten years into the future. Responding to a question from Wentworth, External Affairs Minister, Richard Casey, acknowledged Antarctica’s potential for the discovery of uranium in March 1953:

The possibility of finding uranium in this region must be borne in mind because of the geographical similarity between parts of Australia’s Antarctic territory and those parts of southern Australia where uranium has been found.

96 CPD, H of R, 26 March 1953, pp. 1681-5.
97 CPD, H of R, 6 November 1951, p. 1570.
Wentworth explained to the House that the Australian sector of Antarctica consisted of pre-Cambrian rock, the type of rock in which the most productive uranium lodes had been found. Wentworth again emphasised the significance of Antarctica’s pre-Cambrian rock formation when discussing the *Australian Antarctic Territory Bill* in 1954 and maintained an interest in the continent for several years.99

In August 1953 Wentworth wrote to Howard Beale, the Minister for Supply, asking for the Department’s views on, among other things, the use of scintillometers and Geiger counters for aerial prospecting.100 Wentworth received notes from the BMR, detailing the feasibility of – and problems associated with – radiometric probes, airborne scintillometers and the use of helicopters for aerial prospecting. Wentworth met later that month with J. E. S. Stevens, the Chairman of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission, to discuss uranium development and his views on the work of the Commission. Stevens had experience in planning the British atomic weapons tests at the Monte Bello Islands in his former role as Secretary of the Department of Supply. Indeed, he had been ordered by Menzies to conceal information on British tests from his Minister, Howard Beale, who made a fool of himself on several occasions denying that the British were planning tests in Australia.101 Wentworth indicated that he believed the Commission’s plans for uranium mining and exploration were proceeding too slowly, and that a ‘whole fleet of planes’ should be doing reconnaissance work.102 He also indicated that helicopters should be involved; maps showing surveys should be published; and that uranium

100 Wentworth to Beale, 3 August 1953, NAA C945, G1953/278.
102 Stevens to Beale, 1 September 1953, NAA C945, G1953/278.
intelligence officers should be employed in capital cities to give advice to interested prospectors.\textsuperscript{103} Wentworth also advocated the development of Darwin’s ports, as he had done in the House earlier that year, though Stevens seemed dubious about the necessity of the belt conveyor facilities Wentworth was advocating. Stevens also disagreed with Wentworth’s theories on what Wentworth believed would be a fall in the future price of uranium (due to increases in breeding technologies), and urged him not to share this view publicly as it would deter private enterprise.\textsuperscript{104} Undaunted, Wentworth felt he was sufficiently expert on the subject of uranium prospecting to draft a seven point plan, which he sent to Beale and Senator William Spooner, the Minister for National Development, at the end of October. Spooner had set up the AAEC in November 1952. David Fairbairn, a later Minister for National Development, recalled:

Partly as a result, I think of pressure from Bill Wentworth, my predecessor, Bill Spooner, had set up the Australian Atomic Energy Commission. I took it over and found that this organisation had quite a small body but a very excellent body.\textsuperscript{105}

The Australian Government was also informed by the examples of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) and the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA), which had both been set up previously. Another reason for the establishment of the AAEC was Menzies’ desire to gain atomic cooperation with the Britain, who they hoped would influence the United States in turn.\textsuperscript{106} Despite these other

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{105} Mel Pratt and David Fairbairn, ‘Interview with David Fairbairn, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, Parliament’s Oral History Project, Canberra, 24 March 1976, p. 72.
\textsuperscript{106} Cawte, Atomic Australia, p. 46.
reasons, the fact that Fairbairn regards Wentworth as an influence, however small, in the AAEC’s development indicates Wentworth’s own involvement in and knowledge of atomic issues.

Wentworth’s contribution, titled ‘Notes on Uranium Prospecting’, urged an increase in aerial prospecting and suggested a three stage process for mapping and detailed prospecting.\textsuperscript{107} Fairbairn later recalled that he and Wentworth personally looked for uranium.

I even reached the stage myself, where, in conjunction with Bill Wentworth, we flew around Australia with a Geiger counter in my plane and we got reaction in one or two spots, but we didn’t find anything worthwhile.\textsuperscript{108}

Wentworth’s report, meanwhile, urged the publication of maps, taking for granted that international companies would be interested in developing Australia’s uranium deposits. Wentworth urged Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) involvement, contending:

The defence significance of finding uranium is likely to be greater than the defence significance of all other RAAF activities. Assistance to such prospecting should therefore be put on the footing of a \textit{War Operation} to be carried out as a matter of top priority.\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{107} Notes by Wentworth on uranium prospecting, 29 October 1953, NAA C945, G1953/278.
\textsuperscript{108} Pratt and Fairbairn, ‘Interview with David Fairbairn, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, p. 112.
\textsuperscript{109} Notes by Wentworth on uranium prospecting, 29 October 1953, NAA C945, G1953/278. Emphasis in original.
Wentworth urged that the RAAF set up a ‘helicopter wing’ to ‘fill a bad gap in present R.A.A.F. establishment.’ Wentworth’s seven point plan, like most of Wentworth’s plans, could never be called modest. He suggested immediate action in obtaining 50 airborne scintillometers and recorders and 100 hand-held scintillometers; fitting out 50 small RAAF planes with scintillometers and cameras, as well as the organisation of RAAF groups to fly through ‘potentially uraniferous’ areas; and increasing the number of equipped Dakota aeroplanes for mapping anomalies; setting up the helicopter wing in the RAAF with at least 50 small helicopters and some larger ones as well; the organisation of an RAAF photography and survey wing; increasing drilling facilities and the organisation of ‘ground follow-up parties’, to work in conjunction with helicopters. The scale of Wentworth’s proposals and the extent to which he would have the RAAF devoted to them reflected Wentworth’s attitudes on the significance of uranium prospecting and the importance of supplying uranium to the arsenals of the Free World as part of the worldwide conflict against Communism. Wentworth’s recommendations were examined by P. B. Nye, the Director of the Bureau of Mineral Resources. Nye’s appraisal highlighted the unrealistic scope of Wentworth’s plan. Minor difficulties included the fact that Dakotas were no longer produced but eagerly sought, and that the RAAF had a photography and survey group – and had just disbanded it. Nye budgeted the cost of Wentworth’s proposals at £4,700,000 (remembering that the combined budget for mineral prospecting and the Bureau was just under £300,000) and had not even included Geiger counters, bulldozers, drilling plants, vehicles, portable laboratories and operational costs. Nye commented that the number of aircraft was excessive, indicating that six aircraft (rather than fifty small aircraft, ten Dakotas, fifty small helicopters and
other large helicopters) would be a more realistic number. Nye also pointed out that only a small fraction of the professional staff necessary for Wentworth’s plan would be available and, in any case, Wentworth’s plan involving 120 aircraft (Nye assumed ten large helicopters), or sixty if the RAAF operated the helicopter wing, would far exceed the size of Trans Australia Airlines (TAA)\(^\text{110}\), which ran only forty aircraft.\(^\text{111}\)

Wentworth’s advocacy of the helicopter is interesting in itself. During the time in which Wentworth favoured purchasing helicopters, they were not considered to be reliable. The Minister for Air and Civil Aviation, Athol Townley, replied to a question from Wentworth on helicopters in August 1954:

> The helicopter, as I think everyone will agree, has an enormous potential, but at present the machine is still in the experimental stage. Australia has had a small number of helicopters for service evaluation, and experience of them has not been happy…We must appreciate the many limitations of the helicopter. It is a short-range machine, which cannot be flown in cloud. In bad weather it becomes very hazardous and consequently almost useless. The helicopter is very costly and its maintenance expense is almost prohibitive.\(^\text{112}\)

Cawte states that, when Spooner announced a renewed search in 1951, he had wanted to use one of only three helicopters Australia possessed.\(^\text{113}\) This further highlights the exorbitant nature of Wentworth’s proposals. Despite these limitations, Wentworth emphasised the importance of helicopters for uranium prospecting. In October 1953,

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\(^\text{110}\) TAA was Government owned, and one of two major domestic airline carriers in Australia in this period.
\(^\text{111}\) Nye to Stevens, 12 November 1953, NAA C945, G1953/278.
\(^\text{113}\) Cawte, *Atomic Australia*, p. 67.
when he released his seven point plan, he made the case for them several times, suggesting they would be useful for detecting submarines off the coastline\textsuperscript{114} and espousing their benefits as ambulance helicopters during the Korean War.\textsuperscript{115} Wentworth’s comments on the defence significance of uranium prospecting, and the heavy involvement of the ‘experimental’ helicopters in his plan, makes it plausible that these latter positions were advocated in order to acquire helicopters which could also be used for his prospecting plans. In one sense, Wentworth’s views on the helicopter show that he was ahead of his time. The helicopter would become a vital part of air forces around the world. In another sense, however, Wentworth’s advocacy of a largely untried, experimental technology to such an extent (Nye estimated the cost of helicopters alone in Wentworth’s plan to be £2,000,000) illustrated the urgency of Wentworth’s actions and the immediacy with which he viewed the Communist threat.

\textbf{Civil Defence}

It is unlikely to be a coincidence that Wentworth’s first publication on atomic weapons, a thirty-two page pamphlet titled \textit{Time and the Bomb: An analysis of the atomic situation}, was first published in the same month of 1953 that the Soviet Union tested its first hydrogen bomb. Much of this analysis reflected on the history of the atomic bomb, detailing Wentworth’s opinions on the Soviet Union’s strategy in acquiring the bomb and its manipulation of the United Nations (and subsequent reflections on the External Affairs Minister, Dr. H. V. Evatt).\textsuperscript{116} Wentworth detailed the facts of the atomic bomb, including an explanation of the difference between fission and fusion bombs, and the importance of

\textsuperscript{114} CPD, H of R, 1 October 1953, pp. 909-10.
\textsuperscript{115} CPD, H of R, 22 October 1953, p. 1666.
\textsuperscript{116} Wentworth’s views on Evatt and the United Nations are discussed in greater detail in Chapter III.
uranium. He canvassed possible means of delivery, including aerial bombing, rockets, guns (presumably artillery) and ‘sneak import’. The latter delivery system is important, in that it relied on what Wentworth called ‘an effective Fifth Column organisation’. *Time and the Bomb* declared that the atomic bomb put a ‘premium on treachery’. This in particular illustrated how Wentworth believed that defence and anti-Communism had become one and the same, in that he believed the quashing of the Communist ‘fifth column’ would remove a potential delivery system for atomic weapons. In the final chapter of *Time and the Bomb*, titled ‘Way Out?’, Wentworth advocated an international atomic agency as the sole possessor of atomic weapons, empowered to use sanctions including ‘war and atomic war’ against any nation refusing to submit to ‘full atomic control’.117 Whilst Wentworth’s foreign policy arguments (including the possibility of a preventative war against the Soviet Union) will be canvassed in greater detail later,118 it is important to note, in civil defence terms, that Wentworth dismissed the ideas of dispersing populations. He argued that no effective dispersal could be achieved in a short time and that bomb shelters were useless as there would likely be no warning of atomic attack. He saw no counter-measure for the atomic bomb, and no way of ensuring that they would not be delivered close enough to their targets so as to be effective.119

Indeed, it was not until the beginning of October 1953 that Wentworth began espousing the benefits of civil defence. Seeming to consider surviving, rather than preventing, an atomic attack for the first time, Wentworth made several observations. He suggested that national service be retained, as the training of the population would be desirable in circumstances where large population centres and possibly large parts of the

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118 See Chapter III.
military were destroyed. He pointed out that dock facilities would be unusable, and that
the Navy should look to developing systems which could operate without dockyards and
ports. Wentworth also advocated the dispersal of factories, a move away from his
previous assertion that there was not enough time for such a plan.

Wentworth sent a copy of *Time and the Bomb* to Sir Frederick Shedden, the
Secretary of the Department of Defence. Whilst Shedden sent a note to Wentworth on 8
October promising to let him know if he had any worthwhile comments after a series of
upcoming meetings, records show that Shedden had prepared a report on Wentworth’s
pamphlet three days earlier.\textsuperscript{120} Shedden’s report revealed his ‘grave doubt’ over some of
Wentworth’s assertions and suggestions, particularly with Wentworth’s plans to control
nuclear weapons internationally. Shedden also criticised the idea of a ‘saturation level’,
the term Wentworth used to describe the point at which one side has enough bombs to
destroy the other entirely, and after which the level of a country’s atomic stocks no longer
mattered. Wentworth argued that there was little point in having enough weapons to
destroy the other side twice, as once was enough. Shedden, on the other hand, believed
there was always an advantage in superior firepower.\textsuperscript{121} Although much of Shedden’s
appraisal falls mainly into the category of foreign policy, it is important to note the
divergence of views between Wentworth and Shedden in terms of their later public feud
over civil defence. Wentworth also sent a copy of *Time and the Bomb* to H. P. Breen, the
permanent head of the Department of Defence Production. Breen disagreed with
Wentworth on whether a world authority should be able to use atomic weapons, and

\textsuperscript{120} Shedden to Wentworth, 8 October 1953, NAA A5954, 1474/6.
\textsuperscript{121} Shedden to Philip McBride (Defence Minister), 5 October 1953, NAA A5954, 1474/6.
indeed whether such an authority was workable given the United Nations’ difficulties, but otherwise stated:

I congratulate you on a clear and understandable exposition of the atomic threat to humanity. Whether your suppositions of Soviet long-term policy are correct, I don’t know; but they well could be.¹²²

Like *Demand for Defence*, the threats detailed in *Time and the Bomb* could safely be described as a worst-case scenario.

*Survival is Part of Defence: How the will to live can help to avert atomic attack* was Wentworth’s next publication, a sixteen page pamphlet published in November 1954.¹²³ By this time Wentworth had accepted as factors in his policy planning that Russia had ‘saturation stocks’ of atomic weapons and that Australian policy must be designed to withstand – rather than prevent – atomic attack. Though this was not a new idea, and drew on old fears that ‘the bomber will always get through’ (as *Time and the Bomb* had also conceded), it was a shift in emphasis. The basic thesis of *Survival is Part of Defence* was that the Soviet Union was more likely to launch an atomic attack if it believed such an attack would deliver a ‘knock-out blow’. The greatest deterrent to atomic attack, according to Wentworth, lay in the capacity of the ‘Free World’ to not only survive the initial hostilities, but to retaliate against the aggressor.¹²⁴

It is likely that Wentworth’s ideas as expounded in *Survival is Part of Defence* had their origins in the policies of the combatants in World War II in relation to gas

¹²² Breen to Wentworth, 6 November 1953, NAA MP1038/2, DRAWER 3/8.
¹²³ Wentworth, *Survival Is Part of Defence*.
¹²⁴ Ibid.
warfare. In October 1953, the same month that he spoke on civil defence in the House for the first time, Wentworth wrote to Phillip McBride, the Minister for Defence. He asked for ‘the most considered advice available’ on ‘why gas was not used in the last war’.\(^{125}\) Informed by McBride that Germany and Italy had declared their intention to observe the Geneva Protocol (prohibiting the use of asphyxiating methods of warfare), Wentworth clarified his question, asking for the military rather than political factors in consideration of the fact that ‘Nazi Germany was not very scrupulous about the observance of agreements and was apparently perfectly willing to violate them when it suited her’.\(^{126}\) Wentworth was then given advice written by F. R. Sinclair, Secretary of the Department of the Army, which quoted extensively from American experts. Sinclair’s advice quoted United States Major General William N. Porter, former Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service, who wrote in March 1942:

> Whether or not gas warfare will be used depends solely on whether one side feels that the advantage to it would outweigh any disadvantages. Until now, neither side has felt so…Hitler understands well that mustard gas on British beaches would add materially to the precariousness of an invasion. On the other hand, should the Nazi Fuehrer believe that one gigantic overwhelming stroke with gas would win the war for him, he would undoubtedly use it.\(^{127}\)

An article written by Major General Alden H. Waitt, Porter’s successor as Chief, was also included. Waitt’s commentary, written in March 1946, speculated that the Germans did

\(^{125}\) Wentworth to McBride, 28 October 1953, NAA A816, 9/301/266.  
\(^{126}\) Wentworth to McBride, 14 December 1953, NAA A816, 9/301/266.  
\(^{127}\) McBride to Wentworth, 9 March 1954, NAA A816, 9/301/266.
not use gas because the Allies were better prepared for its use. He saw it as a ‘distinct American military achievement’ that the ‘gas war’ had been won before it started. In concluding his article, Waitt wrote:

I see a tremendous lesson for the American people in our gas victory. It further proves that preparedness pays, and that the nation which is well armed and ready for any emergency need not fear enemy attack. In this era of undeclared wars and potential wholesale destruction from blitz tactics, we must constantly be on our guard from unscrupulous foes. Here is a case where preparedness actually prevented the use of a weapon. Make no mistake; Germany would have used those tremendous stocks of gas if we had not been ready to overwhelm her with our own gas.128

Given the timing, and the emphasis of Survival is Part of Defence on civil defence and military preparedness – especially the retention of retaliatory capacity in the event of an attack – the similarity between Wentworth’s ideas on atomic warfare and those of Porter and Waitt on gas warfare suggests that Wentworth applied the ideas of the two Chemical Warfare Chiefs to atomic weapons.

It was not until 9 March 1954 that Wentworth received this information from the Defence Department. That Wentworth had consistently pursued civil defence before then reveals that, whilst the advice provided by McBride was influential in formulating Survival is Part of Defence, Wentworth’s ideas had already been taking shape. Wentworth consistently highlighted the Soviet threat throughout the latter half of 1953, concentrating on foreign policy remedies. Wentworth also wrote to Menzies in late

128 Article by Waitt, 9 March 1946, NAA A816, 9/301/266.
December 1953, enclosing a newspaper clipping and a two page report on the possibility of smuggling atomic bombs. This letter, among other things, lamented the freedom of movement Communists enjoyed in Australia, and reminded Menzies of Wentworth’s long record of arousing the public to the danger of the Communist threat, specifically mentioning the AASW meetings of 1946 and Dr. Makinson. Menzies forwarded the letter to McBride.\textsuperscript{129} A letter from Charles Spry, Director-General of ASIO, to Richard Casey, the Minister for External Affairs, reveals that Spry was also sent a copy of the newspaper clipping direct from Wentworth. Spry’s opinion was that if the CPA had atomic explosives they would be prepared to use them in an opportune time, but that he believed they were not capable of making detonating preparations in Australia.\textsuperscript{130} In fact, later correspondence between Shedden and Australia House in London on the potential smuggling of the bomb reveals that the Australian Government had no idea of the mechanism of the bomb, and therefore little idea of how to assess the practicability of a clandestine bomb being assembled.\textsuperscript{131} In August, Wentworth continued his push for helicopters, and repeated his call for emergency measures in the event that Australian ports were destroyed.\textsuperscript{132} By this stage the correspondence on gas warfare had been incorporated into Wentworth’s civil defence thinking. By 2 September 1954, Wentworth’s arguments to the House mirrored those later to appear in \textit{Survival is Part of Defence}. Wentworth stressed that Russia would be more likely to attack if it believed it could deliver a ‘knock-out blow’, and that the retention of retaliatory capacity in an attack

\textsuperscript{129} Menzies to McBride, 21 January 1954, NAA A5954, 1474/6.
\textsuperscript{130} Spry to Casey, March 1954, NAA A5954, 1474/6.
\textsuperscript{131} Shedden to Major-General E. L. Sheehan (Defence Representative at Australia House), 5 March 1954, NAA A5954, 1474/6.
was paramount.\textsuperscript{133} Whilst a retaliatory capacity was often alluded to, it seems clear that Wentworth was referring to the capacity of the Free World, rather than Australia specifically. He also identified areas where things could be done to aid the defensive effort, including decentralisation of defence services, ordnance, stores and headquarters; the taking of measures against submarines and bomb smuggling (including the removal of diplomatic immunity); organisation of rescue and emergency services; development of decentralised stores of food, vehicles, oil and other necessities; and reorganisation of transport (including, significantly, the standardisation of trunk railway gauges).\textsuperscript{134} Wentworth acknowledged that little decentralisation could occur within a year, as he had advocated in \textit{Time and the Bomb}. With the passing of more than a year since the Soviet Union had first tested the hydrogen bomb, however, Wentworth was more positive and argued ‘the fact that we cannot do everything at once is no excuse for not starting’.\textsuperscript{135} He continued to speak on civil defence over the coming weeks. On 8 September, he again challenged diplomatic immunity.\textsuperscript{136} The following day Wentworth proposed decentralising government departments around the periphery of Canberra.\textsuperscript{137} On 14 September, Wentworth spoke of the need to decentralise food stores and railway gauges – the standardisation of which, he argued, ‘stands on its own two feet as a commercial and economic proposition, but is also necessary as an emergency defence measure’.\textsuperscript{138} Because of the necessity of a ‘disciplined force that could maintain order’ after an atomic

\textsuperscript{133} CPD, 2 September 1954, p. 926.  
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., pp. 926-8.  
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{136} CPD, H of R, 8 September 1954, p. 1060.  
\textsuperscript{137} CPD, H of R, 9 September 1954, p. 1136.  
\textsuperscript{138} CPD, H of R, 14 September 1954, p. 1194.
attack, Wentworth again advocated the retention of national service. Wentworth realised that his proposals would have a high economic cost, but argued:

Yet what do we think of the man who, told by his doctor that he either has to enter a hospital for an operation or die, and refuses to go to hospital because he has to make a business trip, or because his wife is giving a party? Such excuses are ridiculous, but I mention them merely to illustrate how ridiculous would be the same kind of excuse used in relation to our defence needs... Before World War II, I was strongly criticised for suggesting that the allocation for Australia’s defence preparations should be increased to £150,000,000.

It is not an exaggeration to suggest that, by the time of Survival is Part of Defence’s publication in November 1954, Wentworth was completely obsessed with readying Australia for an attack from the Soviet Union. Concepts such as civil defence and decentralisation had long been a part of defence planning, but the impetus behind Wentworth’s own push for defence was clearly his perception of an external Communist military threat. To Wentworth, the issues of Communism and defence had become inextricably linked. He continued to press for civil defence during September and October. Wentworth requested that members of Parliament be briefed by the Chief of the Australian General Staff on his meeting with the Imperial General Staff on atomic weapons; that members of Parliament be briefed by the Director-General of Medical

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139 CPD, H of R, 15 September 1954, p. 1291.
140 Ibid., p. 1292.
Services in relation to the medical effects of atomic weapons;\textsuperscript{142} noted that the Government’s Constitutional power to deal with subversive elements may be extended by the signing of an international treaty agreeing to combat Communism;\textsuperscript{143} and outlined the value of strategic roads and petrol stores, whilst again advocating the standardisation of trunk railways.\textsuperscript{144}

Wentworth’s continued emphasis on the standardisation of railway gauges is an especially telling example of the effect of anti-Communism on his policies. Indeed, one of Wentworth’s greatest achievements during his political career was the standardisation of Australian railway gauges. Despite its economic benefits, it formed a large part of Wentworth’s civil defence framework to guard against Communist attack and thus underscores how anti-Communism played a large and perhaps even pivotal role in the railway’s development. Wentworth had written two articles on how standardisation could be achieved for less than £30 million in the \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} during May 1954.\textsuperscript{145} The primacy of defence is shown in Wentworth’s first article, in which he argued ‘Action is needed urgently, not only for defence reasons (for the new atomic weapons may well block up our ports and paralyse our coastal shipping) but also for economic reasons’.\textsuperscript{146} Despite frustration and opposition from Menzies, which Don Chipp later suggested may have been simply because the plan was Wentworth’s,\textsuperscript{147} Wentworth established a party committee, though it had no parliamentary standing. Wentworth recalled later that nobody knew it was not official, and that when they went to

\textsuperscript{142} CPD, H of R, 29 September 1954, p. 1692.
\textsuperscript{143} CPD, H of R, 4 November 1954, p. 2701.
\textsuperscript{144} CPD, H of R, 20 October 1954, p. 2179.
\textsuperscript{146} Wentworth, ‘£30 Million Scheme Would Partly Solve Rail-Gauge Problem’, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{147} Chipp and Larkin, \textit{Don Chipp: The Third Man}, p. 57.
the Commissioners in the various States, they were treated as if the committee did indeed have official standing.148 David Fairbairn, a friend of Wentworth’s and Liberal MHR for Farrer, served as the Committee’s Secretary.149 The various railway staffs gave Wentworth’s committee technical help and the committee then produced a report. Wentworth’s group faced opposition in their bid to get its report printed as a Parliamentary Paper, since the Liberal Party hierarchy objected to policy moved by a private member. Wentworth found an unlikely ally in the ALP’s Arthur Calwell, and the Paper was printed. Wentworth then recalled that after the publication of the Paper, the plan had to be implemented in stages, and they made an art of coinciding the approval of the stages for when Menzies was overseas and Artie Fadden was Acting Prime Minister.150 While many focused on the economic benefits of standardisation, Wentworth’s comments indicated that he viewed the standard rail gauge as an important and strategic civil defence measure in case of a Communist atomic attack. The proposed Albury-Melbourne line would link Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane on a standard gauge, whilst the proposed Broken Hill-Port Pirie link, as well as linking Sydney to Perth on a standard gauge, would provide access to the yellowcake producing Port Pirie uranium treatment plant which was to open in August 1955. It can be argued, therefore, that standard rail gauge railways in Australia were built not just on economic grounds, but because of the strategic defence benefits. Wentworth was not the first to link rail standardisation to defence, but his anti-Communism made this defence benefit a priority.

149 Pratt and Fairbairn, ‘Interview with David Fairbairn, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, p. 38.
Despite his influence in getting the project carried out, however, Menzies refused to invite Wentworth to the opening ceremony. Wentworth’s wife walked the platform with a large poster, reading ‘Where’s Wentworth?’.

Wentworth’s civil defence arguments earned the praise of some political opponents, (for example, Robert Joshua, then ALP member for the western Victorian seat of Ballarat, but later Democratic Labor Party (DLP) leader) and the derision of others (such as Gough Whitlam, ALP member for the Sydney seat of Werriwa and later Prime Minister, who referred to Wentworth as the ‘honourable member for McCarthy’, a disparaging reference to the United States Senator whose name became an ‘ism’). To Wentworth, though, it is likely that this period seemed analogous to his pre-war agitation. As he had then with regard to the threat of Japan, Wentworth believed he was taking the lead in arousing Australia to the danger of Communist aggression, and – as in 1943 – he believed that men who had been proved right in the past would be the best leaders for the future. Such a view regarding the imminence of a war with the Soviet Union was not isolated. Robert Menzies, for example, had in 1951 predicted war within three years.

The Korean War, in which Australia was involved, was another factor until 1953. The first Taiwan Straits Crisis in early 1955 would do nothing to allay fears. In the Cold War climate which existed in Australia, and indeed the world, at this time, Wentworth’s ‘impending sense of catastrophe’, as journalist Alan Reid put it, was not out of place.

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152 CPD, H of R, 4 November 1954, p. 2692.
Survival Is Part Of Defence

As we have seen, *Survival is Part of Defence* was the culmination of more than a year’s research on civil defence. It contended that Western countries must plan for Russia having ‘saturation stocks’ of atomic explosives and the means of delivering them. Like Wentworth’s other publications, it was apocalyptic in its assumptions. The three main objectives for the ‘Free World’ were articulated as the need to hold power of retaliation by atomic weapons, the need to ensure the power to survive and win in the event of mutual atomic attack, and the need to build up power in conventional warfare.\(^\text{155}\) As in *Time and the Bomb*, Wentworth canvassed the options for Russia in delivering atomic weapons (aerial bombing, rockets and smuggling – he had by this stage eliminated the gun). He stressed that the West could not make delivery impossible, though it should still make it difficult. Wentworth argued that the Free World must plan for the possibility that all of its cities may be destroyed and that their greatest deterrent to attack lay in retaliatory power. Planning for an atomic attack was important, Wentworth argued, as Russia was more likely to attack if it believed it could land a knock-out punch. The prospect of a long slugging match, on the other hand, would make Russia less likely to attack. Wentworth stated ‘the Kremlin’s moves may well depend upon its estimation of our capacity to withstand an atomic blow.’\(^\text{156}\)

Wentworth believed each nation would have its own unique problems, but identified nine general areas applicable to all. These were atomic smuggling; the ‘fighting forces’; protection against effects; measures of evacuation; rescue services; emergency administration; accumulation of stores; transport; and long-term


\(^{156}\) Ibid., p. 6.
decentralisation. In relation to atomic smuggling, Wentworth advocated appropriate customs procedures, keeping suspect planes and ships away from vulnerable areas, and the withdrawal of diplomatic immunity and the associated territorial immunity of embassies. He referred to Communists as enemy agents, and stated that they ‘must be treated with quite new rigour’.\textsuperscript{157} He said Communists should not be allowed to move freely in Australian cities, and highlighted the disparity between Russian control of anti-Communists and the free reign Communists enjoyed in Western nations.\textsuperscript{158}

In terms of fighting forces, Wentworth stressed the need for decentralisation of headquarters and supply dumps. The necessity of stores was based on the assumption that no new munitions were likely to be manufactured as factories would be destroyed. The decentralisation of stores was a short-term alternative to decentralising the factories and workers themselves. Air Forces and Navies would have to function without airports or shipping ports. Here, Wentworth also discussed individual Communists, advocating their removal from the armed services and particularly from those forces with access to atomic installations, which would be prime targets for sabotage.\textsuperscript{159}

Wentworth recommended radiation monitoring services, as well as the establishment of shallow shelters around the peripheries of major cities. Deep shelters were vulnerable to underground explosions, and access to them would likely take too long for them to be effective. Evacuation routes should be planned in advance, with the decentralisation of populations actively encouraged. Similarly, the decentralisation of hospitals and fire fighters was encouraged. Emergency administrations should be set up, so that civilian and military forces could work side by side. Wentworth emphasised the

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., p. 9.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., p. 10.
importance of training the military and police to control an atomic emergency, and advocated the establishment of ‘Citizens Organisations’. He warned that ‘enemy agents and subversives’ could operate effectively in this environment, and that the time to root them out was not after an atomic attack, but immediately.\textsuperscript{160} Wentworth highlighted the need to accumulate stores, pointing out (as he had with munitions) that there would likely be little production after an act of atomic aggression. Petrol was specifically mentioned, and the need for factories which were likely to survive to stockpile their raw materials and maintenance requirements was emphasised.\textsuperscript{161} Wentworth discussed road and rail transport, but was more concerned that sea transport was likely to be affected by an attack. Long term decentralisation, it was argued, could likely be achieved more through the siting of new factories with defence in mind, rather than a total relocation of existing facilities.\textsuperscript{162} As with railways, Wentworth was not the first to highlight the defence benefits of decentralisation. But, again as with railways, it was his anti-Communism which provided the impetus for his advocacy of greater defence measures. Though Wentworth later admitted that \textit{Survival is Part of Defence} did not attract much notice in Australia,\textsuperscript{163} it offers a clear insight into the wide range of areas influenced by his anti-Communism. As well as an overall push for decentralisation, it revealed that Wentworth was still in favour of aggressively combating Communism within Australia despite the disappointments of the High Court challenge to the Government’s attempt to ban the CPA in 1950, and the failed referendum bid in 1951. Indeed, Wentworth had proposed his own legislation in 1952, which would have, among other things, banned Communists

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., p. 12.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., p. 13.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., pp. 14-5.
\textsuperscript{163} Hurst and Wentworth, ‘Interview with William Charles Wentworth, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, pp. 11:11.
from the Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory.\(^{164}\) The pamphlet demonstrates that Wentworth’s ideas, such as those on the locating of new factories and transport facilities, were largely influenced by his anti-Communism and his perception of Australia’s vulnerability to Communist attack. Interestingly, despite its lack of attention in Australia, Wentworth later claimed that ‘the Chinese Coms’ published a Chinese version of *Survival is Part of Defence*. Wentworth claimed to possess one of the Chinese copies himself.\(^{165}\)

**Civil Defence World Tour**

Despite the apathetic response in Australia, Wentworth was not done with civil defence. In early January 1955, Wentworth set off on a tour of Europe and North America to learn more about the subject. Before he left, however, he wrote two articles for the *Sydney Morning Herald* which dealt specifically with civil defence, to be published while he was overseas. The first dealt with the dangers Australia faced,\(^{166}\) whilst the second examined how civil defence preparedness would help to protect Australia.\(^{167}\) On his return from overseas, the *Argus* summed up his trip:

> For weeks now Wentworth, by no means a rich man, has been travelling the world at his own expense, living in cheap digs in London, and existing in the U.S. on a slender dollar

\(^{164}\) This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV.

\(^{165}\) Hurst and Wentworth, ‘Interview with William Charles Wentworth, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, pp. 11:11.


budget. He has been ferreting and talking his way into places where security is skin-tight, trying to find out for himself the real atomic story.  

Wentworth first travelled to Britain. According to Deery, Wentworth wrote to Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister whose mindset Wentworth believed he shared, in order to secure a meeting.

My dear Winston,

I am wondering whether you would spare a moment to see me...As a member of the Australian Parliament who has been most interested in the atomic crisis as it has developed over the past years, I have come to Britain to find out what I can on both technical and policy aspects, and I have already been shown much...I am the more anxious to see you because I have felt critical in some degrees of past British and American policy, as having been altogether too weak and shifting.

Deery notes that Wentworth was told that Churchill could not see him. Wentworth claimed that he was instead sent up to Churchill’s technical advisor at Oxford. The man he was sent to see was F. A. Lindemann, better known as Lord Cherwell. Cherwell was born in Germany, and was in 1955 the head of Christ Church (a college) at Oxford. Menzies had been to England in 1953 and met Cherwell, who had later that year

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168 Alan Reid, ‘Red Baiter Returns a Changed Man’, Argus, 22 Mar 1955, p. 4.. 
170 Hurst and Wentworth, ‘Interview with William Charles Wentworth, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, p. 9:11. In the interview Wentworth is unsure of the year of the visit, but it is reasonable to assume that it was in this trip, given the supporting evidence. Wentworth says that it was ‘in ’52 or ’53 I suppose’, yet this would mean that Wentworth had met Cherwell before Menzies in June 1953, and the Australian Cabinet on 6 October 1953. It is much more likely, given that we know Wentworth was in Britain in early 1955 and that he claimed later to have met the head person in Britain on this occasion, that Wentworth was referring to his 1955 trip. 
171 Ibid.
visited Australia to discuss trading British technology for Australian uranium.\textsuperscript{172} Wentworth recalled later that he visited the Institute of Civil Defence and made some valuable contacts.\textsuperscript{173} Wentworth wrote again to Churchill, disagreeing with one of his Parliamentary speeches and arguing, ‘If Russia already has saturation stocks, time has already run out and an entirely different approach is called for’.\textsuperscript{174} Wentworth informed Churchill that he was going to see what he could find out in the United States.\textsuperscript{175} Wentworth arrived in the United States on 4 March. Casey had written a letter of introduction for Wentworth to Sir Percy Spender, the Australian Ambassador to the United States, though the two were already familiar with one another.\textsuperscript{176} Indeed, Spender had been the Liberal MHR for Warringah, adjacent to Wentworth’s own electorate of Mackellar, until taking the Ambassadorship in 1951.\textsuperscript{177} Wentworth advised Spender that he was interested in the atomic and anti-Communist situation, but that he also had side interests in helicopters, aluminium and railways. He asked Spender if he could arrange any lectures for him to give during his visit, as he wanted to earn some money to cover the cost of his trip. Wentworth referred to an article he had written for the \textit{Air Force Magazine}, printed in Washington and hoped to follow it up.\textsuperscript{178} Spender replied that he had Embassy staff working on the matters in which Wentworth expressed interest and looked forward to seeing him.\textsuperscript{179} Wentworth later recalled meeting the ‘head people’ in both the United States and Canada. He had travelled to Canada as he was interested in

\textsuperscript{172} Cawte, \textit{Atomic Australia}, pp. 54-8.\\textsuperscript{173} Hurst and Wentworth, ‘Interview with William Charles Wentworth, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, p. 11:12.\\textsuperscript{174} PRO PREM 11/817, Wentworth to Churchill, 2 February 1955 (Provided by Phillip Deery).\\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.\\textsuperscript{176} Casey to Spender, 30 December 1954, NAA A3093, 618/10/123. Spender to Wentworth, 12 January 1955, NAA A3093, 618/10/123.\\textsuperscript{177} Percy Spender, \textit{Politics and a Man}, Collins, Sydney, 1972, p. 302.\\textsuperscript{178} Wentworth to Spender, 5 January 1955, NAA A3093, 618/10/123.\\textsuperscript{179} Spender to Wentworth, 12 January 1955, NAA A3093, 618/10/123.
the Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor and met Dr. Wilfrid Bennett Lewis, the man centrally involved with its development, while he was there. Wentworth later said that it was during this visit that views on the domestic use of atomic power, discussed in the following chapter, began to materialise.\textsuperscript{180} This is particularly interesting, as it suggests that his earlier pressure to establish the AAEC may not have been on atomic power grounds. In fact, that his support for the AAEC occurred more than two years before could imply that it was concerned instead with atomic weapons. On 31 March 1955 Liberal MP Jo Gullett sent a telegram to Spender, informing him that Wentworth was needed in Canberra on 18 April. Wentworth was phoned in Ottawa and left San Francisco on 15 April.\textsuperscript{181} The Americans in particular must have been impressed by Wentworth. In March 1956 the Australian Embassy conveyed an enquiry from the Civil Defence Organisation\textsuperscript{182} in Washington as to whether Wentworth had prepared a report or made a speech to Parliament since his visit, requesting copies.\textsuperscript{183} They were sent a copy of \textit{Survival Is Part of Defence} as well as copies of Hansard containing Wentworth’s speeches in the House.\textsuperscript{184} In August 1956 the Federal Civil Defence Administration agreed to Wentworth’s request to give him (as an Australian Government representative) samples of radiological detection equipment, stating that they did not expect them to be returned by Australia. Wentworth received ten different items worth

\textsuperscript{180} Hurst and Wentworth, ‘Interview with William Charles Wentworth, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, p. 11:12.  
\textsuperscript{181} Gullet to Spender, 31 March 1955, NAA A3093, 618/10/123.  
\textsuperscript{182} G. Hartley (First Secretary of the Australian Embassy in the United States) to A. Tange (Secretary of External Affairs), 16 March 1956, NAA A3093, 618/10/123.  
\textsuperscript{183} O. L. Davis (External Affairs) to Australian Embassy in the United States, 9 April 1956, NAA A3093, 618/10/123.
approximately $US210 for test and comment.\textsuperscript{185} On his return to Australia, the \textit{Argus} claimed that Wentworth, who was described as ‘that unnerving mixture of prophet and demagogue, of private sleuth and original thinker, and of eccentric and near genius’ had come back a changed man.\textsuperscript{186} The article compared Wentworth’s mood as ‘similar to that of his pre-war years’ when he attacked the Lyons Government on defence. It said that Wentworth had already been critical of the Government, though it observed that politicians are prone to change their mind when pressure is applied from their leaders.

But from the way he [Wentworth] is talking he is prepared to go “the whole hog,” even to attacking the Menzies-Fadden Ministry, of which he is a nominal supporter.

It looks as though the Government will have at least a one-man rebellion on its hands when our modern Wentworth sees again Sydney Heads, through which the first Australian Wentworth sailed with Governor Phillip.\textsuperscript{187}

The \textit{Argus} had no way of knowing how prophetic this statement would prove to be.

\textbf{Uncivil Defence}

Emboldened by the knowledge gained during his recent excursion, Wentworth embarked upon a course in May 1955 that would potentially threaten the stability of both the Government and Menzies’ leadership. On 5 May Wentworth criticised the Government for its meagre allocation of £90,000 for civil defence. He pointed out that in Britain the figure was close to £85 million, whilst the USA spent £42 million (though Wentworth

\textsuperscript{185} Val Peterson (Federal Civil Defense Administration) to Wentworth, 22 August 1956, NAA A3093, 618/10/123. See also Inventory of items, 26 October 1956, NAA A3093, 618/10/123.
\textsuperscript{186} Alan Reid, ‘Red Baiter Returns a Changed Man’, \textit{Argus}, 22 March 1955, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid.
said this had since been stepped up). Quoting the British Field Marshal Montgomery, Wentworth argued that civil defence was a necessity and that without it the home front would quickly collapse in a potential war.\textsuperscript{188}

Wentworth’s answer was to introduce the \textit{Civil Defence Council Bill}, a private member’s Bill which sought to set up a joint State and Federal body consisting of twenty-six members, of which eighteen would come from the States. The stated functions of this Civil Defence Council were to protect Australia from enemy threats, and to ensure maximum survival as well as the existence of Government and society in the event of an attack.\textsuperscript{189} Despite Menzies’ apparent wish to see the Bill lapse, Wentworth found support from Standish Keon (who had recently split from the ALP and would become a DLP member) and C. W. J. Falkinder (Liberal MP) when the Government tried to postpone debate on it. Jo Gullett also spoke favourably of Wentworth’s measures.\textsuperscript{190} Calwell even commended Wentworth for his writings on the atomic question, though he felt he could not support the Bill in its current form.\textsuperscript{191} Sir Wilfrid Kent Hughes, the Minister for Civil Defence, praised Wentworth’s efforts overseas, yet also felt that the Government could not support it as it would cut across existing arrangements with the States. Kent Hughes also argued that sufficient measures were already in place.\textsuperscript{192} Despite the apparent lack of more widespread support, however, Wentworth was determined to press the issue.

Wentworth’s indication on 1 June that he wanted to move a second reading of the Bill caused a minor crisis within the Liberal Party, with news of Menzies calling a special...
party meeting on 2 June hitting the front page of the Sydney press.\footnote{\textit{Party Meeting Called by P.M.}, \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, 2 June 1955, p. 1.} Wentworth later recalled that he believed Menzies’ personal animosity towards him played a part in motivating Menzies’ actions. There was also an element of objecting to any initiative of private members (rather than Cabinet), an element which would later affect Menzies’ attitude toward railway standardisation. Wentworth said ‘He [Menzies] was concerned that no private Member should ever do anything. Particularly me.’\footnote{Hurst and Wentworth, ‘Interview with William Charles Wentworth, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, p. 12:2.} During the party meeting, Menzies threatened the resignation of his Government if the debate on Wentworth’s Bill were proceeded with. Menzies argued that he was given a commission by the Governor-General to form Government, and that if Wentworth’s Bill were proceeded with against the wishes of the Government, the Government would have lost control of the House, necessitating its resignation.\footnote{\textit{Dramatic Back-Bench Moves in Federal House}, \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, 3 June 1955, p. 1.} The \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} claimed that a group of Liberal backbenchers were determined to force a Cabinet reshuffle; it named nine and claimed that this ‘rebel’ group was supported by many more who were dissatisfied with the Cabinet’s performance. Among these rebels were Wentworth, Falkinder (who had supported the \textit{Civil Defence Council Bill}), David Fairbairn and Senator John Gorton.\footnote{Ibid.} Kent Hughes was among the Cabinet members they wanted replaced, as were J. Francis (Army and Navy), Paul Hasluck (Territories), Beale (Supply) and William McMahon (Social Services).\footnote{Ibid.} During the party room debate H. J. P. Bate, who was not one of the nine ‘rebels’ named in the media, declared that the Government’s record on civil defence was a good example of the need for a
Many claimed that the current turmoil of the Labor Party, from which Robert Joshua had announced the DLP’s split on 19 April, presented a golden opportunity for Menzies to address the preponderance of old hands in his Ministry.

Whilst the ‘rebel’ group was not considered to have the numbers to force a reshuffle, it did appear that Wentworth had garnered some sympathy and support. It is likely that this support may have been based more on the attitudes of backbenchers toward a Cabinet reshuffle than on Wentworth’s Bill in particular. However, this episode shows that Wentworth’s strong position on the need for protection against a Communist threat led him to push to such an extent that Menzies threatened resignation and the Liberal Party was divided. Perhaps emboldened by support in the party room, Wentworth was about to further damage what had already seemed an irreparable relationship with Menzies through his actions in the House. Wentworth raised the matter of the Bill once again in the House, again attacking Government inaction on civil defence. In a sensational airing of the contents of the party meeting, Wentworth told the House:

I proposed pressing this matter to the vote, but the Prime Minister made it plain to me that he would regard that as a vote of censure, necessitating the resignation of his Government. That would certainly have served no useful purpose. The incoming Government [Labor] would in no respect be better than the present one; indeed I believe that it would be far worse. If the Government has failed, as I suggest, it is on this front [civil defence] alone.

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198 Ibid.
201 CPD, H of R, 2 June 1955, p. 1360.
Menzies was furious. He adjourned the House early to have another party meeting. The Sydney Morning Herald’s front page reported Menzies as trenchantly criticising Wentworth for ‘attempting to revolt’ against the Government.\textsuperscript{202} Many of Wentworth’s colleagues believed he had gone too far, and Wentworth was reported as being upset when he emerged from a meeting in Menzies’ office that night. The Sydney Morning Herald’s editorial criticised both Menzies and Wentworth, criticising Wentworth’s methods but supporting his stand on civil defence.\textsuperscript{203} It is interesting to note that the Labor Party’s split was used by both sides on the issue of a Cabinet reshuffle. As discussed, those in favour said the Labor split made the timing for a potential change perfect. Menzies, on the other hand, pointed to Labor’s turmoil in arguing the need for party unity. Menzies’ biographer, A. W. Martin, has argued that, in the end, the incident confirmed Menzies’ ascendancy over the party.\textsuperscript{204} In any case, by 4 June the matter apparently was closed.\textsuperscript{205} Wentworth had again pushed Menzies, almost to the point of mutiny, because of his belief in the need to defend against Communist attack.

Wentworth did not lose the temerity to attack those within his own party following the events surrounding the Civil Defence Council Bill debates. In late September 1955, Wentworth condemned the Government over its budgetary allocation for civil defence. Wentworth had already criticised the fact that only £90,000 was allocated in the previous budget and was extremely critical that only £33,000 of this had even been spent. The increased amount for the following year was £234,000, an amount

\textsuperscript{203} ‘A Little War Over Civil Defence’, Sydney Morning Herald, 3 June 1955, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{204} Martin, Robert Menzies, pp. 304-5.
Wentworth labelled ‘an insult to the intelligence’ and announced that he would take the extraordinary step of not voting for it.\textsuperscript{206} Wentworth then launched an astonishing assault on Sir Frederick Shedden, the Chairman of the Defence Committee and Secretary of the Defence Department. Shedden, it will be remembered, disagreed with Wentworth’s policies years previously after the publication of \textit{Time and the Bomb}. Wentworth claimed Shedden ruled the Defence Committee, consisting of Shedden and the Chiefs of Staff of the three armed forces, with a ‘rod of iron’. Wentworth alleged that Shedden made sure that the Minister disapproved of decisions which Shedden himself disapproved, and claimed that Shedden had, for some time, been the ‘virtual strategic chief of the Australian armed services’.\textsuperscript{207} Wentworth continued:

> These are matters that...cannot be determined by a clerk [Shedden], however many schools that clerk may have attended in London for superficial indoctrination into the old doctrines that he has not, perhaps, entirely understood, but is now endeavouring to impose on the Australian defence system. There has been a very bad appreciation of the defence situation, and I am sure that it is related to the position that exists on the Defence Committee.\textsuperscript{208}

Horner, Shedden’s biographer, claims that Shedden’s authority over the Chiefs of Staff was an issue at the time. Others had suggested a Commander-in-Chief be appointed to head the Defence Committee, or that, at the very least, a serving officer should be Chairman. Opponents of Shedden felt that military advice should be given by military

\textsuperscript{206} CPD, H of R, 29 Sep 1955, pp. 1142-3.  
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid., p. 1144.  
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid.
men. Wentworth may have believed that such men would support his calls for a greater defence effort, though his attack could just as easily have been an expression of his dissatisfaction with the defence situation in general, and civil defence in particular. His critique then moved on to Kent Hughes, who was not in the House, suggesting that he ‘apparently does not consider that the matter is important enough to justify his presence here’. Wentworth accused Kent Hughes of seriously misleading Parliament by suggesting there was nothing to worry about and that everything possible was being done. Wentworth’s attack on Shedden, Kent Hughes and, by implication, McBride as the Defence Minister, was then prominently featured in the press. Wentworth attracted condemnation from the Country Party’s L. W. Hamilton for his comments, but was supported by the Liberal Party’s W. D. Bostock (who had earlier supported Wentworth over the Civil Defence Council Bill), and Labor’s Kim Beazley. In fact, Shedden felt compelled to write to Hamilton thanking him for his remarks in the House, and detailing his position as Chairman of the Defence Committee, claiming he was invited to be Chairman at the Chiefs of Staffs’ unanimous request and that the Committee’s suggestions were in no way biased when presented to the Minister. Once again Wentworth had jeopardised his relationship with the Liberal Party over the matter of civil defence, attacking a senior public servant in the process. It is not implausible to suggest that Wentworth harboured some bitterness that Shedden did not accept his views years earlier, as articulated in Time and the Bomb and this perceived slight may have played a

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211 Ibid.
small, contributing role to his assault on Shedden. This lack of support may have led Wentworth to believe that Shedden and he diverged over the civil defence issue. The attack on Kent Hughes can be seen in the context of both the Civil Defence Council Bill debates and the backbench desire for a Cabinet reshuffle. In any case, Wentworth’s advocacy of such a Cabinet reshuffle seems to have stemmed from an inability to get his defence views accepted. In this way Wentworth’s anti-Communism came to affect his views on Liberal Party organisation and led him repeatedly down a path of disagreement and even rebellion.

Conclusion
Wentworth’s opposition to Communism, at home and abroad, gradually became a more important and, eventually, dominant factor in Wentworth’s defence policies. It is clear that Wentworth always maintained an abiding interest in defence, harking back to his pre-war days and the publication of Demand for Defence. The lack of antipathy towards Communism in this publication and Wentworth’s support of striking Waterside Workers’ Federation wharfies shows that anti-Communism was not an important early factor in Wentworth’s decision making. The debates on the second European front and public feud over preferences with Jessie Street in the 1943 election illustrate, however, that as World War II drew to a close anti-Communism had become increasingly prominent in Wentworth’s defensive thinking.

Following the defeat of Fascism, the onset of the Cold War meant that, to Wentworth, defence came to be defined as ‘defence against Communism’. This attitude had begun to manifest itself during the war, but took on a new importance with the advent
of the atomic age. Wentworth, never doubting his own ability or convictions after accurately predicting the Japanese attacks of World War II, believed he was taking a lead in awakening Australia to the dangers of Communism. Interjecting himself into scientific circles, Wentworth attempted to ‘expose’ Communists in their midst. In doing so he was undoubtedly influenced by the cases of Nunn May and Fuchs, and determined to prevent the same happening in Australia. His anti-Communism was especially prevalent in his attacks on the Australian Association of Scientific Workers, and Dr. R. E. B. Makinson in particular. This anti-Communism manifested itself in Wentworth’s defence interests, as he was aiming to prevent the Soviet Union, by means of espionage, gaining the defence secrets of the ‘Free World’.

Wentworth’s efforts to expose Communists were not the only result of his anti-Communism. His anti-Communism was not solely concerned with individuals, but also with foreign Communist powers (the Soviet Union in particular). Wentworth’s views on Communism had led him to believe that Australia was in imminent danger of attack, and that it was vital to get supplies of uranium into the ‘arsenals of the free world’. In this way Wentworth’s anti-Communism greatly affected his views on uranium mining and prospecting. Wentworth came to advocate a multi-million dollar plan which would have seen the RAAF, as well as an aerial fleet larger than Trans Australia Airlines, solely committed to the exploitation of Australian uranium resources. In fact, Wentworth believed uranium prospecting should be considered the RAAF’s most important war operation. The significance of uranium mining and prospecting, given Wentworth’s Cold War outlook, led him to advocate the large scale purchase (at a cost of some £2,000,000) of an experimental and unproven technology – the helicopter. The Cold War importance
of uranium mining and the potential for atomic testing were key reasons Wentworth advocated the assertion of Australian claims to the Antarctic. The importance of the uranium industry to Wentworth was such that he advocated the banning of all Communists from the Northern Territory, where most of the uranium claims were located.

Obsessed with the threat of Communist attack, Wentworth advocated decentralisation of populations and factories, as well as stores of food and vital necessities. Concerned with how Australia would function following a Communist attack, Wentworth urged the development of transport lines, most notably the standardisation of trunk railway gauges. The perceived possibility of Communist attack was such that Wentworth believed it was reason enough to continue national service. Again, this time in a civil defence context, he advocated restricting individual Communists within Australia so as to neutralise the Soviet Union’s ‘fifth column’.

Wentworth was so concerned with defending Australia against Communists by this stage that he travelled the world at his own expense, visiting Lord Cherwell in Britain, Dr. Wilfred Bennett Lewis in Canada and numerous people in the United States to find out what was being done on a world scale. Wentworth’s frenzied actions indicate the level of importance he attached to defending against the Communist threat. He clashed with Robert Menzies, as he had done so often on defence throughout his career, to the extent that Menzies threatened the resignation of his Government. He was prominently involved with a ‘rebel’ group of backbenchers, calling for a Cabinet reshuffle following the shutting down of his Civil Defence Council Bill. He attacked Sir Wilfrid Kent Hughes on civil defence, as well as senior public servant Sir Frederick
Shedden, who had disagreed with his views on civil defence some years before. Wentworth’s anti-Communism and what he perceived as the Liberal Party’s failure to take the Communist threat seriously led him into direct conflict which very nearly pushed the party towards major divisions and even a potential split.

All of this evidence illustrates that Wentworth’s defence policies were predicated on his strong anti-Communist beliefs. Though initially separate, Wentworth’s ideas on defence were influenced by his anti-Communism to such an extent that eventually they became indistinguishable. Defence came to mean ‘defence against Communism’. Because of this need for defence against the real or perceived threat of Communism, Wentworth’s anti-Communism greatly influenced or was directly responsible for his treatment of scientists and the AASW; his policies on uranium mining and prospecting (including the use of helicopters and exploitation of Antarctica); policies for civil defence; building of the standard rail gauge; advocacy of national service; views on restricting individual Communists and clashes with Menzies and the parliamentary Liberal Party. In a very real sense, Wentworth may have even sacrificed his career progression because of his anti-Communism. Buckley-Moran tells us that the Cold War crusade served the careers of many politicians who denounced Communism.\footnote{Buckley-Moran, ‘Australian Scientists and the Cold War’, p. 11.} If anything, Wentworth’s story was the opposite. Wentworth was passed over for the Ministry, claiming later that, though he would have liked to become a Minister, he wasn’t prepared to sacrifice his stand.\footnote{Hurst and Wentworth, ‘Interview with William Charles Wentworth, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, p. 12:6.} It seemed that Wentworth’s obsession with Communism and perceived erratic behaviour would disqualify him from ever being part of the Menzies’ Ministry. Fairbairn recalled in 1976 that:
He [Menzies] knew that I was a close friend of Bill Wentworth and on one occasion he said to me that he had on occasions considered putting him in Cabinet but he felt certain that if he did, within about three weeks he would be asking for his resignation.\footnote{Pratt and Fairbairn, ‘Interview with David Fairbairn, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, p. 36.}

Fairbairn also added that Menzies undoubtedly admired Wentworth’s capacity, which suggests that Wentworth’s unpredictable attacks and behaviour or Menzies’ personal dislike of Wentworth were the most likely reasons he was excluded.\footnote{Ibid.} Indeed, by this stage, Wentworth’s standing within his Party began to decline. Before this, the then Minister for Territories, Paul Hasluck, claimed that Fairbairn was ‘misled by an illusion’ that Wentworth would one day be a leader of the Liberal Party and, indeed, Australia.\footnote{Paul Hasluck and Nicholas Hasluck (ed.), The Chance of Politics, Text Publishing, Melbourne, 1997, p. 182.} Hasluck claims that Wentworth even led a ‘Menzies Must Go’ campaign with the inference that Wentworth himself should be Prime Minister. Though Hasluck claims Wentworth had adherents at the beginning, he states that they dropped off as the idea of Wentworth as leader became ludicrous.\footnote{Ibid., p. 113.} Wentworth’s colleague and Liberal MHR for Corio, Hubert Opperman, reflected that the dogmatic immoderation which intimidated Wentworth’s opponents diminished his disciples.\footnote{Hubert Opperman, Pedals, Politics and People, Haldane, Sydney, 1977, p. 370.} Wentworth’s successor in the seat of Mackellar, Jim Carlton, felt that Wentworth may even have done damage to the anti-Communist cause through his ‘extreme exposition’, as it allowed anti-Communists to be
painted as fanatics. Hasluck claimed that Wentworth’s support in the Party room fluctuated. On some issues Wentworth would find himself isolated, yet months later he would have rallied quite a number to a cause. An account of the political scene by Whitington, published in 1956, argued that Wentworth’s colleagues questioned the balanced judgement of someone who can become so obsessed with his stand on fighting Communism that he lost awareness of other subjects. It was this stand on Communism which largely influenced his defence policies, and would come to define Wentworth’s career.

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221 Jim Carlton, Interview with author, 24 March 2009.
222 Hasluck and Hasluck (ed.), *The Chance of Politics*, pp. 113-4.
Chapter II – Nuclear Nation: Atomic power and weapons in Australian defence

By the mid 1950s the world had avoided Robert Menzies’ dire 1951 prediction of a World War within three years.\(^1\) The Korean War had ended in 1953 and it seemed less likely that the world would be plunged into nuclear war, though the Taiwan Straits Crises would remain an issue. Influenced by what journalist Alan Reid referred to as his ‘cataclysmic view of history’ and ‘impending sense of catastrophe’,\(^2\) W. C. Wentworth continued to speak out on defence matters. He persisted with his advocacy of greater civil defence measures, despite the damage his very public showdown with Menzies seemed to have done to his political prospects. He pushed for international disarmament, subject to effective international inspection. He even advocated an Australian nuclear weapons program, a prerequisite of which was an Australian nuclear industry which could be used to produce both electricity and atomic weapons. In circumstances reminiscent of his world tour to inform himself on civil defence in 1955, Wentworth travelled abroad again in 1960 and 1961 to learn about nuclear power stations and processes. He came back convinced that the attitude towards nuclear power in his native country was ‘altogether too cautious’.\(^3\) Wentworth chaired a Government Members Atomic Committee and consistently advocated investment in an Australian nuclear program. There were even rumours in Canberra that the price of Wentworth’s support for

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John Gorton’s bid for the Prime Ministership was a promise to pursue nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Wentworth also supported intervention in Southeast Asia both to combat Communism and to preserve Australia’s alliances with those that could potentially defend the nation, were it to come under attack. The mid-1960s were tense for Wentworth, who saw a rebalancing of regional power and new threats from Communist China which concerned even the Soviet Union. He was also conscious of the situation in Indonesia, and fearful of the possibility of a Communist country on Australia’s borders. As Vietnam went sour, Wentworth became more apprehensive, believing that the United States was now less likely to come to Australia’s aid and that a ‘Fortress Australia’ policy was needed. His anxiety was compounded by the election of Gough Whitlam’s Labor Government in 1972, a Government which Wentworth believed was ‘liquidating’ Australia’s defence and encouraging isolationist sentiment in America. This chapter will continue to show how Wentworth’s fear of Communism shaped his attitude to defence. It will highlight Wentworth’s pursuit of a nuclear deterrent and a nuclear power industry. It will show the reactions and thoughts of Wentworth on issues such as disarmament; the role of the Australian armed forces; events in Indonesia; the war in Vietnam; the Sino-Soviet split and Wentworth’s changing views the Australian relationships with Britain and the United States.

**Defence and Disarmament**

As discussed in the previous chapter, Wentworth spoke out in favour of international atomic weapons disarmament as early as 1953. Throughout 1955 Wentworth wanted the

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Government position on disarmament made clear. The difference between Wentworth’s advocacy and that of others such as Professor P. M. S. Blackett was that, whilst Blackett called for a voluntary disarmament, Wentworth believed that ‘a full and free system of inspection’ was an ‘indispensable preliminary’ to international disarmament.\footnote{Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (hereafter CPD), House of Representatives (hereafter H of R), 25 August 1955, p. 75.}

Wentworth argued that this proposal was put forward by the United States in 1946 and that the Soviet Union, despite supporting it in principle, thwarted it at every turn.\footnote{CPD, H of R, 8 September 1955, p. 486.} He was undoubtedly referring to the Baruch Plan of June 1946, which demanded that all nations allow full territorial inspection, with immediate and certain action to be taken against transgressors by the United Nations Security Council. In this, there was to be no right of veto for any country.\footnote{Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, *The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2008, p. 123.}

In 1955 the United States, this time joined by Britain, proposed a similar agreement on atomic disarmament. Taking into account the confusion generated by Communist propaganda on the subject, Wentworth suspected that the Soviet Union was again employing the same tactics nine years later.\footnote{CPD, H of R, 8 September 1955, p. 486.} He continued to push Menzies to debate the issue in Parliament into 1956.\footnote{CPD, H of R, 5 June 1956, pp. 2736-7.}

Whilst Wentworth wanted international atomic weapons disarmament, his view of the Russian attitude suggests that he never believed it a serious possibility. In light of this, he viewed with suspicion those who opposed atomic testing. In 1957 Wentworth received a delegation of women opposed to atomic testing and, when approached for comment afterward, suggested that those women were being used as a tool for the Communist Party.\footnote{Ron Hurst and W. C. Wentworth, ‘Interview with William Charles Wentworth, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, Parliament's Oral History Project, Canberra, 1984-7, p. 13:1.}

Recounting his
thoughts more than forty years later, Wentworth said that he believed that the Communists were trying ‘to get us [the Free World] to disarm sufficiently to enable them to attack’.

Given Wentworth’s suspicion of the Soviet Union’s intentions, it is not surprising that he continued to call for civil defence measures despite the controversy he had caused in 1955. Wentworth spoke out during the Estimates debate, declaring that he would be unable to support the proposed vote on civil defence as he believed it inadequate. In Wentworth’s eyes, Civil Defence should be the fourth arm of the defence forces alongside the Army, Navy and Air Force. By this stage Wentworth’s devotion to defence was damaging his career, with the *Sun-Herald* claiming in January 1956 that Wentworth’s stoush with Menzies the previous year had led to his being ‘passed over’ for the Ministry. Undeterred, Wentworth maintained the pressure on the Government to institute adequate civil defence measures. Wentworth was most likely encouraged by the Australian National University’s Professor Ernest Titterton, who quoted Wentworth’s *Survival is Part of Defence* approvingly in his 1956 book, *Facing the Atomic Future*. On 23 April 1956 Wentworth wrote to Allen Fairhall, the Minister for the Interior and Minister for Works, asking whether the Australian Government was preparing any ‘parallel exercise to the ‘Operation Alert’ drills in the United States. The American version of the exercise was conducted by the Federal Civil Defense Administration annually from 1954. The operation simulated an atomic attack, during which citizens in

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11 Ibid.
16 Wentworth to Fairhall, 26 April 1956, NAA A873, WHOLE SERIES. The Department of the Interior was responsible for the Civil Defence Directorate.
‘target areas’ were to take cover for fifteen minutes. Newspapers published reports of the fictitious attacks, civil defence officials tested their communications systems and readiness, whilst federal officials (including the President) were evacuated as air raid sirens sounded.\textsuperscript{17} Fairhall did not believe such an exercise was practicable as no civil defence organisation existed in Australia at that time.\textsuperscript{18} So interested was Wentworth with the civil defence effort in the United States, which he had inspected personally just over one year previously, that he regularly sent articles to the Minister for Defence, Philip McBride, from the FCDA \textit{Daily News Digest} on topics such as lightweight hydrogen bombs suitable for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and new Russian submarine launched missiles.\textsuperscript{19} In June 1956 Wentworth sent McBride a \textit{Digest} passage which promoted the United States’ new Survival Through Emergency Preparedness (STEP) program and urged more civil defence spending.\textsuperscript{20} In October 1956 Wentworth was suggesting that members of Parliament attend the civil defence school at Mount Macedon and arguing that the spending on civil defence should be increased. Indeed, Wentworth was present at the opening of the Mount Macedon school and had seen the courses being given to trainees.\textsuperscript{21} In the years that followed Wentworth wanted the effects of an atomic attack researched, with emphasis on factors such as radioactive fallout\textsuperscript{22} and the incendiary effects on bushland.\textsuperscript{23} However, it was not civil defence but another reason which makes 1956 a crucial year when examining Wentworth’s views on

\textsuperscript{18} Fairhall to Wentworth, 8 May 1956, NAA A873, WHOLE SERIES.
\textsuperscript{19} Wentworth to McBride, 16 May 1956, NAA A5954, 1474/1.
\textsuperscript{20} Wentworth to McBride, 27 June 1956, NAA A5954, 1474/1.
\textsuperscript{21} CPD, H of R, 10 October 1956, pp. 1327-9.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Wentworth to Fairhall, 3 January 1958, NAA A873, WHOLE SERIES.
defence. It was in this year that, for the first time, Wentworth suggested an alternate means of ensuring Australia’s security: the atomic bomb.

**Atomic Australia**

The United States Congress passed the McMahon Act in 1946, which restricted the sharing of atomic information with Britain if this information was to be shared with third countries, such as Australia and other British Dominions. The British response to the McMahon Act was to ‘go it alone’ and embark on its own atomic weapons program, involving the Dominions.\(^ {24}\) The Australian Prime Minister following World War II, J. B. Chifley, agreed to collaborate with Britain on missile testing at Woomera, in central Australia. Lowe contends that Chifley hoped Australia would eventually house British nuclear weapons and become a centre for industrial research.\(^ {25}\) In September 1950, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee approached Robert Menzies, who had succeeded Chifley as the Australian Prime Minister following his 1949 election victory. Attlee requested permission to consider the Monte Bello Islands as a nuclear test site. Menzies agreed at once. Though Menzies was undoubtedly an Anglophile, he was also acutely aware of the deteriorating international situation and the need for co-operation.\(^ {26}\)

The Americans were also building up their military forces, under the framework of National Security Council document 68. They US had by now acknowledged that they would need to lay the groundwork for permanent mobilisation of their military forces, and had not excluded the prospect that the Soviet Union would start a World War as early as

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Menzies’ biographer, A. W. Martin, contends that Menzies was influenced by contemporary Cold War fears, a sense of crisis and the gravity of his responsibility to ensure Australia’s safety. He was also well informed on atomic matters. Lowe explains that Menzies inherited Chifley’s advisory committee on atomic energy, chaired by Professor Mark Oliphant. In 1948 Oliphant had suggested that an atomic pile in Australia could produce both power and plutonium for weapons within five years. This Committee also consisted of the Chief Executive Officer of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, Dr. F. W. G. White; Professor Philip Baxter, the Professor of Chemical Engineering at the University of New South Wales and later Chairman of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission; H. P. Breen, Secretary of the Department of Supply and Development and later head of the Department of Defence Production; H. J. Goodes of the Treasury; Professor Leslie Martin, Professor of Physics at the University of Melbourne; and Dr. H. G. Raggatt of the Bureau of Mineral Resources. Menzies inspected the British Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell in June 1952, and the relationship between Britain and Australia would feature another milestone in October of that year when the British exploded an atomic bomb at the Monte Bello Islands off Western Australia. Australia had secured access to British reactor technology in 1954 in exchange for uranium and possibly plutonium at a future date. Australian scientists were also working in Britain to gain experience for potential future

roles in an Australian nuclear industry.\textsuperscript{32} Cawte argues that Menzies was not enthusiastic about the bomb, preferring instead to rely on Australia’s great and powerful friends – the cheaper option.\textsuperscript{33} Reynolds, however, argues that Menzies had supported the use of atomic weapons by the French in Vietnam. He also argues that Menzies – like Chifley – expected some benefit for Australia, namely atomic technology, in return for the British use of Australian testing sites.\textsuperscript{34} Menzies had even argued that atomic disarmament would impair Australia’s ability to defend Malaya, considered to be the area that, in an Australian forward defence plan, Australia would meet the Communist thrust southward in a global war. He also contended that Australia had ‘special armaments needs’ due to the dangers of Communist and Japanese aggression.\textsuperscript{35} External Affairs Minister Richard Casey also believed that defence in Southeast Asia against any significant aggression ‘cannot be achieved by the use of conventional weapons alone’.\textsuperscript{36}

Wentworth had long supported atomic research in Australia. Fairbairn claims that Wentworth was influential in the formation of the AAEC.\textsuperscript{37} He had also backed the efforts of Oliphant to gain funding for the Australian National University’s particle accelerator. Indeed, Wentworth had invited Oliphant to address members of Parliament in November 1954.\textsuperscript{38} By 1956 Wentworth’s attention was not confined to atomic power, but also included atomic weapons. In this he was not alone. According to Cawte,

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., pp. 119-20.
\textsuperscript{37} Mel Pratt and David Fairbairn, ‘Interview with David Fairbairn, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, Parliament’s Oral History Project, Canberra, 24 March 1976, p. 72.
\textsuperscript{38} CPD, H of R, 10 November 1954, pp. 2847-51.
Wentworth and Senator John Gorton were the most enthusiastic supporters of a nuclear deterrent, which was also favoured by Professor Philip Baxter, who by this time was head of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission.\(^{39}\) In February 1956 Wentworth asked Menzies in Parliament whether he would allow community representatives and some members of Parliament the opportunity to view British atomic weapons testing in the Monte Bello islands.\(^{40}\) Wentworth later revealed he had asked Menzies privately as well.\(^{41}\) Menzies replied on notice, suggesting that the nature of the Monte Bello tests made Wentworth’s suggestion impracticable, but that such problems should not be a factor in the Maralinga tests scheduled for later in the year.\(^{42}\) Wentworth did in fact attend an atomic bomb test at Maralinga, codenamed ‘Operation Buffalo’, sharing a room with Liberal MP Jim Killen and Labor’s Kim Beazley. Such was his fascination with atomic matters that Killen recalled that Wentworth stayed awake most of the night reading Titterton’s pro-nuclear \textit{Facing the Atomic Future}. Killen recalled that the tests, which began on 27 September, made a ‘significant impact’ on his mind.\(^{43}\) Undoubtedly, they made a significant impact on Wentworth as well, who in Parliament on 9 October 1956 asked:

\begin{quote}
We believe in world-wide, watertight atomic disarmament. We will do what we can to get it; but, pending getting it, what should we do? Until we get world-wide atomic
\end{quote}

\(^{40}\) CPD, H of R, 22 February 1956, p. 105.
\(^{42}\) CPD, H of R, 7 March 1956, pp. 608-9.
\(^{43}\) D. J. Killen, \textit{Inside Australian Politics}, Methuen Haynes, Sydney, 1985, p. 21. Killen says Wentworth was reading \textit{Facing the Atomic Age}, though he was most likely referring to Titterton’s book.
disarmament, is the only course open to us to become atomically armed ourselves? I do not try to answer the next question; I merely pose it.\textsuperscript{44}

Wentworth was not the only person discussing the bomb. Titterton’s \textit{Facing the Atomic Future}, published in 1956, also dealt with the question of atomic weapons. Titterton believed a renunciation of atomic weapons would be ‘morally wrong’ and was suspicious of the political motives of those vociferously opposed to the bomb.\textsuperscript{45} Titterton, a ballistics expert, was Australia’s representative at British atomic weapons testing since 1952, when the British had specifically asked for his assistance. Indeed Titterton, during his time working on the Manhattan Project, had pushed the button to detonate the world’s first atomic bomb.\textsuperscript{46} Titterton was also part of the Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee formed in May 1955, and would later become its head in March 1957. This latter appointment was debated as Titterton was seen as too ‘pro-atomic’. Such was the extent of Titterton’s nuclear advocacy that a briefing paper for Menzies questioned whether Titterton’s priority would be ensuring the safety of Australians or the technical success of the atomic testing.\textsuperscript{47} Wentworth was wary of a rapidly industrialising Asia, which he believed would be able to provide its forces with enough conventional arms to ‘make them, man for man, comparable with our forces’. He argued that Australia would need to rely on allies as the greater numbers of Asian countries would make Australia vulnerable. In what provided a glimpse of his later thinking on Vietnam, Wentworth argued that one of the major roles of Australian conventional forces could be to secure

\textsuperscript{44} CPD, H of R, 9 October 1956, p. 1273.
\textsuperscript{45} Titteron, \textit{Facing the Atomic Future}, pp. 329-39.
allies in any eventuality. Wentworth later specifically mentioned the concept of small, mobile forces ‘for the purpose of honouring our commitments to our allies in the South-East Asian theatre’. Nevertheless, Wentworth was sceptical as to whether any ally could be fully depended on in the atomic age. He had, after all, asked whether Australia should acquire its own atomic weapons, the use of which would be determined by the Australian Government. Wentworth believed that the nations of the world fell into two classes, the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ in terms of atomic armaments.

If Wentworth was not answering the question he posed in October 1956, he seemed to have made up his mind by 1957. Others in Government were of a similar mind. Cabinet’s Defence Committee believed that low yield atomic bombs would considerably increase the effectiveness of the Australian Defence Force, and had suggested an approach be made to the United Kingdom to obtain bombs in November 1956. Walsh claims 1956 is the beginning of what he calls the ‘attempted procurement phase’, a period during which Australia tried to obtain bombs from their allies. In April Wentworth spoke on atomic weapons, contending that ‘every country, to its own people, has the duty of ensuring survival by keeping in the [atomic weapons] van’. In May he revisited his argument on the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’, and again questioned whether allies could be relied upon. He argued that in a ‘fringe war’ allies may help, but that they could be deterred when called upon to defend against an aggressor ‘if that aggressor is the master of the thermo-nuclear weapon’ and that it would be safer for any nation to belong

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48 Ibid., pp. 1272-3.
49 CPD, H of R, 8 May 1957, p. 1156.
50 CPD, H of R, 9 October 1956, p. 1273.
51 Ibid.
53 CPD, H of R, 11 April 1957, p. 806.
to the ‘haves’. He criticised the defence policy of the Menzies Government, arguing that:

[The defence policy] does not advance our capacity to obtain nuclear weapons, which are both the deterrent and the only way to give effective striking power to a tactical force, which must always be small in numbers compared with its potential enemies.55

Wentworth even argued that the engagement of a small nation such as Australia in the atomic arms race may hasten international disarmament by bringing the issue to a head. He advocated the construction of an atomic pile such as the type at Calder Hall in Britain, which he said was a ‘dual-purpose plant which produces both power and nuclear explosive’. He also discussed delivery systems, such as bombers and air-to-ground missiles. Arguing that a nuclear program should be begun immediately, Wentworth said Australia should either obtain weapons from allies or construct them.

Let us ask our allies to put this power in our hands and let us devote, if necessary, a reasonable portion of our expenditure on defence towards getting the means of effective defence. That means bombs. It means also the means of delivering them. Both those things are now available overseas.56

Wentworth put the cost of building an atomic pile at up to £20,000,000 a year, which he argued was a small portion of the £190,000,000 defence budget. The urgency of

54 CPD, H of R, 8 May 1957, p. 1154.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., p. 1155.
Wentworth’s desire to spend such a significant sum on the immediate commencement of a nuclear program demonstrated his trepidation over what he saw as new threats emerging from an industrialised Asia, and China in particular. Wentworth continued to advance the case for nuclear power, informing the House on advances in technology in October 1957.\textsuperscript{57} Wentworth’s push for a nuclear industry in Australia was due to his interest in the potential for nuclear weapons production rather than power, an attitude made clear by his insistence on the ‘dual-purpose’ nature of potential nuclear power plants. In September 1957, Menzies had advised Parliament that Australia would not be pursuing nuclear weapons for the time being, citing the attitude of the United States as a reason. The 1957 Bermuda Conference restored the working relationship of the United States and the United Kingdom, though restrictions were placed on the sharing of information by Britain to Commonwealth countries like Australia (though Canada was involved in the US program). Britain’s agreement with the United States effectively ended atomic co-operation with its Dominions. Menzies announced that, for the time being, Australia had ruled out plans to produce nuclear weapons. This meant that, in advocating a nuclear industry with the intention of building an Australian bomb, Wentworth was now advocating a policy which did not have the support of Cabinet.\textsuperscript{58} Australia was, however, still seeking to procure a bomb from Britain. Menzies had asked British Air Chief Sir Dermot Boyle and Foreign Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, Lord Carrington, whether Britain could supply a bomb in March 1957. Their response suggested that the chances were slim. In August, Australian Air Marshall A. W. Scherger informally approached Boyle again. Walsh contends that Scherger was Australia’s most

\textsuperscript{57} CPD, H of R, 17 October 1957, pp. 1461-2.
\textsuperscript{58} Reynolds, ‘Rethinking the Joint Project’, p. 872-3.
enthusiastic advocate of the bomb, a contestable assertion given the advocacy of scientists such as Baxter and Titterton in particular. This time Boyle hinted that Australia may be able to purchase atomic weapons.59 By this stage Menzies, however, was less than enthusiastic. Menzies met the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, when Macmillan visited Australia in January 1958. Menzies did broach the subject of obtaining weapons with Macmillan, but seemed satisfied with Macmillan’s refusal on the grounds that the United States wished for no new nuclear powers. Macmillan was aware that the United States Congress was revising the McMahon Act and wished to wait until this process was complete. In February the Defence Committee decided that they would seek information on nuclear weapons, rather than the actual weapons themselves. In response to continual informal approaches by senior Australian military figures, Menzies in July 1958 banned any discussions with United Kingdom authorities without his express permission.60 That Scherger reported on discussions regarding the characteristics, costs, storage and maintenance requirements of tactical nuclear bombs for the Royal Air Force (RAF) indicates that this permission was forthcoming, and Menzies indeed retained an interest in keeping the nuclear option open.61 Walsh claims the drive for nuclear weapons had stalled by November 1959, quoting defence views that it was preferable to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons to those countries which already possessed a nuclear weapons capability.62 Notes on the Australian views at the United Nations General Assembly suggest that, by October 1959, Australia was willing to halt the spread of nuclear weapons but was careful not to limit the ability of countries with

60 Ibid.
nuclear weapons stationing them in other countries and retaining control. This left the
door open for Britain or the United States to station nuclear weapons in Australia.\textsuperscript{63}

By March 1958 Wentworth was emphasising nuclear power on economic, rather
than defence grounds, a strategy which had proved effective when advancing the cause of
the standard rail gauge. He compared the cost of nuclear power in a report given by the
Australian Atomic Energy Commission to the cost of electricity produced from coal. He
also prophesised a fall in the cost of nuclear power in the future, whilst he believed the
price of electricity from conventional sources was likely to increase. Whilst he
commended the nuclear power station at Lucas Heights, Wentworth was acutely aware
that it was only an experimental reactor, used primarily for atomic research. Wentworth
envisaged a nuclear industry in Australia which, he argued, would need four legs. The
first of these legs was a plant which was able to produce uranium as a metal from the
uranium oxide mined at Alligator River, Rum Jungle and other sites. Wentworth
described this process as uncomplicated and noted ‘there is nothing in any way secret
about it’. Indeed, Wentworth had seen such a plant in action on his trip to Britain several
years earlier. He estimated that this plant would cost roughly £3,000,000. The second
leg Wentworth advocated was a plant to produce uranium rods. Wentworth believed
these two plants could operate at a profit, as the price for yellowcake or uranium oxide
(which Australia exported) was £10,000 a ton whilst uranium rods fetched approximately
£25,000 a ton. Wentworth estimated the cost of the two plants together to be ‘an amount
certainly under £10,000,000 and probably considerably under that sum’.\textsuperscript{64} This idea had

\textsuperscript{63} Top Secret History of Australian Policy Towards the Acquisition of a Nuclear Weapons Capability, c.
\textsuperscript{64} CPD, H of R, 26 March 1958, pp. 689-91.
also been advocated by the AAEC and its Chairman, Professor Philip Baxter, who believed it was not good economic policy to sell uranium in its natural state.\(^\text{65}\)

Whilst the first two legs of Wentworth’s program dealt with nuclear fuel, the third leg of his plan involved building a nuclear reactor. He envisaged a 100 megawatt (MW) power station which would be able to provide electricity ‘at a cost not far removed from, and perhaps a little below, the average price of electricity generated from existing plants’. This nuclear power plant would give Australia benefits other than cheap electricity. Wentworth believed the benefit of training Australians in nuclear physics was of great importance. Whilst he praised Lucas Heights, he believed the country needed a fully functioning power reactor to complete the training of scientists involved. Another benefit discussed by Wentworth, the benefit which is likely to have appealed to him the most, was the ability to produce fissile material. Whilst Wentworth argued that enriched fuel such as plutonium, uranium 233 and uranium 235 would be necessary for fuelling the new and advanced types of reactors which would be available in the next decade, he declined to mention that these were also able to be used in the production of nuclear weapons. Wentworth put the cost of this 100 MW reactor at up to £17,000,000. A fourth leg of the program was also required: a plant for processing spent fuel, costing up to £7,000,000.\(^\text{66}\) Wentworth’s program to start a nuclear industry in Australia would have cost £34,000,000 on his own estimates. This was significantly higher than the £20,000,000 he had implored the Government to spend in October 1957, although this new figure included plants for the production of fuel for the reactor and for the treatment of spent fuel. Though he likely had atomic weapons in mind, Wentworth had not yet


incorporated the costs of producing weapons or delivery systems. The £34,000,000 would merely put Australia in a position to be able to embark on a weapons program if such a policy were pursued. In late 1958 Wentworth was attempting to win ministerial support for a nuclear power station in either the Snowy Mountains or the Mount Lofty Ranges near Adelaide. Included in the thirty page report he handed to one department were extensive notes on manufacturing military grade plutonium from a reactor.67

By September 1959 Wentworth again, although implicitly, called for the bomb by highlighting why Australia needed a nuclear deterrent. In Wentworth’s view, Australia had a more pressing need for civil defence than the United States, as he believed the lack of a retaliatory response (that is, an Australian atomic bomb) put Australia at greater risk of attack.68 In October he disagreed that Australia should follow the United States and Britain in concentrating on conventional forces, arguing that in both cases those countries had shored up their atomic defences first as a matter of top priority. Wentworth believed that the protection of a nuclear stalemate existed only between those nations with nuclear weapons. Furthermore, he was concerned that in this stalemate situation a country such as the United States may not be willing to use atomic weapons in Australia’s defence as they would then be open to reprisals. It was Wentworth’s opinion that Australian conventional forces would be so outnumbered that to give them extra funding would be a waste. He considered the only role of conventional forces as being one of support to allies, to make them indebted to Australia and to allow the Government to ‘make a more

67 Papers left by W. C. Wentworth for External Affairs Department, 17 October 1958, NAA A1838, 720/3. Departmental notes reveal that the External Affairs staffers were unsure if Wentworth had authored the report, or merely supported it. The notes suggest that Wentworth’s aim was to seek the External Affairs Minister’s support if he could convince the Ministers concerned with nuclear power to put a proposition to Cabinet.

68 CPD, H of R, 29 September 1959, p. 1481.
effective, sentimental appeal’ for allied assistance.\textsuperscript{69} In April 1960 he referred to nations under the ‘atomic umbrella’ being safe from attack in any limited or fringe war, but warned that those without a retaliatory response were now more vulnerable. He cautioned that it may not even be possible for the United States to aid Australia in a conventional sense, due to the Communist submarine fleet in the Pacific. Australian conventional forces, he argued, should be used to strengthen alliances if only to put doubt in the minds of the enemy as to whether there would be allied intervention. On atomic weapons, he contended:

I think the truth of what I am going to say is obvious: There is no defence against a non-conventional [atomic weapons] attack on Australia or any other country in the world, except the deterrent effect of the possibility of non-conventional counter-attacks in retaliation.\textsuperscript{70}

By late 1960, Wentworth had not only been convinced that international disarmament was no longer feasible, he had become an ardent supporter of an Australian nuclear industry and an Australian nuclear deterrent. With conventional forces only useful for strengthening alliances, and alliances no longer as reliable in the atomic age, Wentworth was determined that Australia’s security depended on ‘keeping in the van’.

\textsuperscript{69} CPD, H of R, 6 October 1959, p. 1817.  
\textsuperscript{70} CPD, H of R, 5 April 1960, pp. 905-6.
**Around the World**

Wentworth was a member of the Australian delegation to the United Nations in 1960.\(^{71}\) Even as he sat in New York, however, Wentworth’s mind was consumed by his obsession with the atomic age. From the Australian Mission he wrote to the Minister for National Development, Senator William Spooner, whose responsibilities included oversight of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission. Wentworth asked Spooner to provide him with ‘atomic contacts’ and informed Spooner that he would be in the United States, Great Britain and Europe during the next few months.\(^{72}\) Spooner’s reply suggested that Wentworth get in touch with AAEC Liaison Officers I. J. W. Bisset in Washington, D. C., and A. D. Thomas in London.\(^{73}\) Ever resourceful, Wentworth also sought contacts and technical advice from Professor Philip Baxter, the chemical engineer and Vice Chancellor of the University of New South Wales, who was also the chairman of the AAEC.\(^{74}\) Baxter was the driving force of the AAEC, though he only acted as a part-time Chairman because of his University commitments. Baxter saw himself, through the AAEC, as the sole source of policy proposals concerned with the development of nuclear power in Australia.\(^{75}\) He was also a proponent of an indigenous atomic weapons program. In early 1958 he had proposed a facility in Mount Isa to produce weapons grade plutonium. On this occasion he had been rebuffed as the Defence Committee was in favour of procuring atomic weapons from Britain, though the Defence Committee soon abandoned this policy as well.\(^{76}\) He had contacts in the United States, Canada and the

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\(^{72}\) Wentworth to Spooner, 27 September 1960, NAA A3211, 1960/6101.  
\(^{73}\) Spooner to Wentworth, circa October 1960, NAA A3211, 1960/6101.  
\(^{74}\) Wentworth to Baxter, 19 October 1960, NAA A3211, 1960/6101.  
\(^{76}\) Walsh, ‘Surprise Down Under’, pp. 4-5.
United Kingdom (he was born in Wales). The British authorities had accepted Australian scientists on secondment as full working members of the Harwell team on Baxter’s recommendation.\(^{77}\) He was also Australia’s representative on the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which Wentworth would also visit.\(^{78}\) Martin has referred to Baxter, along with Titterton, as the most vocal and longstanding advocates of nuclear power. He has argued that Baxter and Titterton’s written output on nuclear power is equal to that of all other advocates combined.\(^{79}\) Baxter informed Wentworth that, through Bisset and Thomas, he should be able to see anyone he wanted to within the American and British atomic programs and suggested people he might like to see in each country.\(^{80}\) In the company of Bisset, Wentworth subsequently visited the United States Atomic Energy Commission where he met with numerous contacts to discuss the economics of different types of atomic reactors. He met with the heads of various divisions, including the Division of Military Application, and received numerous reports. The notes prepared on the visit by Bisset indicate that Wentworth had made his own plans to visit Atomic Energy of Canada Limited at Ottawa, where he intended to revisit Dr. Wilfrid Bennett Lewis, the scientist instrumental in the development of the CANDU reactor.\(^{81}\) On the British leg of his tour Wentworth met with various members of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, primarily to discuss the economics of nuclear power.\(^{82}\) Among the topics Wentworth discussed were his ideas for small, nuclear powered cargo submarines, which Wentworth believed would be economically

\(^{80}\) Baxter to Wentworth, 24 October 1960, NAA A3211, 1960/6101.
\(^{81}\) Visit to USAEC by Mr. W. C. Wentworth - Report by Bisset, 9 December 1960, NAA A3211, 1960/6101.
\(^{82}\) Wentworth’s British Itinerary, circa 20 December 1960, NAA A3211, 1960/6101.
competitive with air freight for goods such as ‘out-of-season fruits, flowers, foodstuffs and costly manufactured items’.

Wentworth also inquired about the use of nuclear power for the distillation of sea water, a topic on which, unbeknownst to Wentworth, the AAEC and UKAEA had already been in consultation. Wentworth also met with the Central Electricity Generating Board and visited the Bradwell reactor. Later, he visited Vickers Nuclear Engineering Limited to discuss his submarine proposals, where he found interest from the Chief Executive, Rear Admiral Sir Edward Rebbeck, and the Deputy Chief Executive, Captain H. F. Atkins.

En route back to Australia, Wentworth found time to call on the French Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA) in Paris, where he met Dr. Bertrand Goldschmidt, before visiting the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. In a letter to Rebbeck following his return to Australia, Wentworth summed up his belief in atomic power in the following terms:

You will probably agree with me that the general lay approach to the problems of nuclear power is altogether too cautious. If our great-grandfathers had had the same attitude to steam, we would probably still be proscribing steam engines and their “dangerous pressure systems”.

The international negotiations between the United States, Soviet Union and Britain over the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT) in June 1961 forced Menzies to again consider acquiring nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union demanded listening posts in Australia as Australia had been a test site for nuclear weapons. When the United

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84 Ibid.
85 Wentworth to Thomas, 3 February 1961, NAA A3211, 1960/6101.
Kingdom approached him, Menzies replied by demanding either atomic weapons or the technology to build them from Britain. In the preceding years, despite an official policy against seeking weapons, Australia had been interested in delivery systems. They were interested in bombers, and were choosing between the British TSR-2 and the American F-111. Because of technical and financial problems, however, the TSR-2 was scrapped. In addition, Australia was also interested in missiles. The British Bloodhound missiles had been developed at Woomera, though the American Nike missiles were cheaper and already capable of carrying an atomic warhead. The Bloodhound Mark I and Mark II missiles were conventional weapons and the Mark III, the nuclear capable version, had not yet been developed. The Australian Government did, however, opt for the Bloodhound, though like the TSR-2, the Mark III would eventually be terminated by the British Treasury. With Menzies’ request for weapons in June 1961, it seemed Australia was once again pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. Following the Soviet Union’s resumption of atmospheric testing in September, however, negotiations on the NTBT broke down. As a result, with Soviet listening posts in Australia no longer being likely, Menzies put a stop to negotiations on an Australian nuclear capacity. In early 1962, despite reaffirming their right to possess atomic weapons, Australia told the United Nations that it did not plan to produce or acquire such weapons.\(^87\)

Wentworth spoke on Russian nuclear testing in September 1961, arguing that because the tests were conducted so soon after Russia’s announcement that they would resume nuclear testing, the tests must have been planned for some time.\(^88\) To Wentworth, this further exposed Russia’s duplicity in calling for atomic disarmament. Wentworth

\(^{88}\) CPD, H of R, 14 September 1961, p. 1205.
believed in disarmament if ‘both sides will come to the party’, but in its absence wanted to increase defence spending.\textsuperscript{89} In November, Wentworth, paying the expenses from his own pocket, sent 104 telegrams to every Federal member giving his views on disarmament.\textsuperscript{90} Speaking on nuclear testing in May 1962, Wentworth said ‘I am afraid it is necessary for us [the Free World] to continue our tests while Russia continues hers’. He went further than merely supporting the tests conducted by Australia’s allies, claiming:

\begin{quote}
The second point I want to make is that we in Australia, isolated as we are, may need nuclear weapons in certain circumstances for our own defence, provided – I make the proviso – that we do not have effective world disarmament.\textsuperscript{91}
\end{quote}

Wentworth’s statements to this point had indicated that he believed international disarmament impossible, so his proviso meant little. In fact, he had already been working behind the scenes to urge the Government to adopt atomic power, armed with the knowledge recently gleaned overseas. On 28 March 1962 he had written to J. O. Cramer, the Minister for the Army, outlining discussions between an Atomic Committee chaired by Wentworth and Sir William Cook of the UKAEA. Wentworth said that cost estimates he had given in 1958 for a nuclear reactor were in line with the current costs given by Cook. He argued for a nuclear reactor on economic grounds, but added ‘the immensely important developmental and defence aspects of possessing a nuclear reactor would be a

\begin{footnotes}
\item[91] CPD, H of R, 17 May 1962, p. 2461.
\end{footnotes}
nett [sic] bonus’. In a handwritten note to Cramer, Wentworth added ‘You will know the significance of this. I’ll hope to discuss it with you at your convenience.’ \(^92\) Cramer obtained advice from G. F. Cawsey, the Scientific Advisor to the Military Board, which, among other things, dealt with the implications of atomic power on the development of a nuclear weapons capability. Cawsey’s advice noted that the requirement of such a capability was doubtful, citing the Government’s policy that Australia would not use nuclear weapons nor ‘join the nuclear club’. He also considered the options should this policy change. The Defence Department believed the cheapest course of action would be to purchase nuclear weapons from either the United States or Britain, though it foresaw rigorous conditions which would be attached to the sale of such weapons. For this course of action, the existence or lack thereof of an Australian atomic reactor was not seen as influential one way or the other. An indigenous weapons program was estimated to involve an outlay of £50 million to £100 million, with warheads likely to be available within five years. The benefits of an atomic reactor in this program were reduced power charges and the ability to breed more fissile material, such as plutonium. Whilst reactors were normally bought overseas, the report suggested that the United States or Britain normally lease fuel on a returnable basis, meaning that Australia would need to build its own reactor if it intended to produce fissile elements for a bomb. It stated that, in this situation, costs would not be much different and that the reactors built might as well be breeder reactors rather than the more economic alternatives. Echoing Wentworth’s own four point plan of four years earlier, Cawsey’s advice recommended that some nuclear industry including fuel processing plants and plants for the extraction of disposal of waste were necessary. It concluded that the importance of an atomic reactor to defence was

\(^92\) Wentworth to Cramer, 28 March 1962, NAA MT1131/1, A29/1/125.
‘slight except possibly in weapons development’. Wentworth’s approaches to Cramer indicate his eagerness to push the atomic issue in Australia, but also allow an insight into the broader thinking of the Government on the issue at the time. The Government had abandoned the nuclear option. In any case, the preferred method of obtaining weapons if needed was by procuring them from allies. Wentworth, on the other hand, had become obsessed with the indigenous production of a bomb. It is clear that Wentworth’s lobbying went beyond his speeches to the House, and included work with the Atomic Committee and direct approaches to Ministers. Indeed, it was Wentworth who formed, chaired and was the driving force behind the Government Members Atomic Committee. 

An interesting incident in 1963 seemed to show that Australian military planners were indeed considering tactical nuclear weapons in their defence planning. ‘Operation Blowdown’ involved the explosion of a spherical mass of TNT designed to simulate the effects of a nuclear explosion on a tropical forest. It was a joint exercise with the United States and Britain, and was conducted on 18 July 1963. This shows that, whether the authorities were planning on acquiring weapons or not, they were certainly preparing for the possibility of their use in a tropical environment such as that which existed in countries to Australia’s near north.

**Looking to Asia**

Australia’s commitment to the war in Vietnam began in July 1962. This initial deployment was made up of only thirty advisors, a number which grew to eighty by June 1962.

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93 Cawsey to Department of the Army, 13 April 1962, NAA MT1131/1, A29/1/125
During this time Wentworth strongly criticised what he believed was a shortfall in Australian defence spending. In October 1962 he strongly considered voting against the Government’s defence proposals. In October 1964, Wentworth was in a position to make several observations about the changes in Australia’s regional defence situation. Four factors were identified by Wentworth as necessary to take into consideration. These were the emergence of new powers with conventional weapons in the region; the Communist thrust southward; his belief that the British Government had decided to do away with its nuclear deterrent; and the imminent emergence of China as a nuclear power. As we will see, Communism assumed a central role in all of these assessments.

The first two factors were closely related, and Wentworth had discussed them in Parliament the previous week. He described the situation of South East Asia and the Pacific as a whole as ‘deteriorating’ and South East Asia in particular as ‘precarious’. He believed that South East Asia was ‘not beyond salvage’, but that it was not a ‘safe situation’. Wentworth argued that the situation in Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia had to be reversed to ensure Australian security. He also saw worrying signs in Indonesia, which he said did not have a great industrial capacity, but was receiving large quantities of arms from Russia. Wentworth believed Indonesia was showing ‘disconcerting signs of going left and into the Communist camp’ and that if this happened ‘our situation in Australia becomes precarious indeed’. Only two years earlier, Wentworth had said that Indonesia was one country Australia need not worry about, as it was not Communist.

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Wentworth had even suggested that Australia ‘must do those things which help and strengthen the hands of the very real anti-Communist forces in Indonesia itself’.  

Wentworth’s view of the newly elected British Labour Government’s election pledges on disarmament was that they would ‘liquidate Britain’s nuclear deterrent’. Though this did not eventuate, Wentworth believed Australia would now only be protected against potential Communist aggressors by one nuclear umbrella, that of the United States. In view of this, Wentworth reiterated the role of conventional forces in securing the American-Australian alliance. Wentworth saw this alliance as being for conventional as well as atomic protection. He argued:

If we want American soldiers to fight a conventional war for the defence of our Australian frontier, we must be prepared to use Australian soldiers to help the United States to hold the more distant line which keeps conflict out of Australian territory.  

Rather than choosing between an Australian atomic deterrent and great and powerful friends, Wentworth believed that Australia should have both. The maintenance of conventional forces was not the only measure Wentworth supported for securing alliances. In 1963 he attacked the Labor Party over conditions it sought to impose on the US Naval Communication Station to be built in Western Australia. When it was suggested in March 1964 that the Government should look to places other than Britain and the United States to purchase defence equipment, Wentworth argued that this would...

be a slap in the face of Australia’s allies.\textsuperscript{103} The main effect of the 1964 British election on Wentworth was that he viewed the alliance with the United States with increased importance. This foreshadows the role Australia was later to have as the Vietnam War commitment grew larger. By November 1964, Wentworth was publicly supporting conscription to this end.\textsuperscript{104}

In March 1964 Wentworth had warned of ‘a new cloud on the horizon in the form of Communist China’. He argued that China was preparing nuclear weapons, though it may be five or six years before they had them. At this stage, Wentworth quoted a warning from Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, saying that ‘if the Chinese Communists obtained nuclear weapons they proposed a war which would destroy half humanity as well as most of the Chinese people’, citing the Sino-Soviet split as evidence of the truth of Khrushchev’s assertion.\textsuperscript{105} In October the Chinese conducted their first nuclear test. Wentworth suggested that they were not yet a nuclear power, but that they had ‘taken the first step along the road’.\textsuperscript{106} In Wentworth’s eyes, this first step was an ominous one. He sought to prevent China becoming a nuclear power altogether.

It would be folly and madness for the world to allow this madman, Mao, to obtain nuclear capacity. Communist China must be enucleated swiftly and in the name of peace. This is the most essential contribution to world disarmament. To fail in this moral duty is to fail humanity and to acquiesce in the murder of thousands of millions of people, Chinese and others alike. The flames of thermonuclear war can be put out now in Red China. It will not be long before they will be unextinguishable. In the name of peace, in the name of

\textsuperscript{103} CPD, H of R, 10 March 1964, p. 393.
\textsuperscript{104} CPD, H of R, 17 November 1964, pp. 3102-7.
\textsuperscript{105} CPD, H of R, 19 March 1964, p. 715. The Sino-Soviet split is discussed in more detail next chapter.
\textsuperscript{106} CPD, H of R, 29 October 1964, p. 2525.
disarmament, Sir, it is our moral duty to see that Red China – this aggressive power – does not obtain full thermonuclear capacity.\textsuperscript{107}

A further source of consternation for Wentworth was the fall of Khrushchev. He believed that this could be the prelude to a renewed Sino-Soviet alliance, an alliance which would worsen Australia’s security situation and strengthen Communist forces in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{108}

Wentworth continued throughout 1965 to urge the Government to take more action on defence. On the commitment to Vietnam, Wentworth argued in August 1965 that Australia was there for two reasons: duty to the Vietnamese people and duty to the Australian people. He spoke on the terror and fear that the Vietnamese were subjected to by the Viet Cong, accusing Ho Chi Minh of executing thousands and attacking claims by Labor’s Dr. J. F. Cairns that there had been no Communist aggression from the north of Vietnam. He said that if the United States and Australia were to abandon Vietnam, no Asian country would trust their word, and countries such as Thailand, Burma, Laos and Cambodia could be expected to feel that the US and Australia could not offer them protection. Abandoning Vietnam was, to Wentworth, akin to abandoning the whole of Asia. Believing both in forward defence and maintaining the alliance with the United States, Wentworth believed that it was absolutely necessary for Australia’s security that Australia remained in Vietnam.

The domino theory, unfortunately, has too much reality in it to be a comfortable theory. The Chinese thrust is southwards. If the United States were to lose interest in this area – I do not for one moment think it will do so in spite of the provocation to that end that is

\textsuperscript{107} CPD, H of R, 21 October 1964, pp. 2182-3.
\textsuperscript{108} CPD, H of R, 17 November 1964, pp. 3104-5.
being given by the Communists in Australia and those who echo Communist propaganda – Australia would be a Chinese province within ten years.¹⁰⁹

**Nuclear Power Is Essential**

The changes in the international situation led Menzies to reconsider an atomic bomb. The British decision to withdraw its forces from Asia, American disengagement from Vietnam and China’s entry in the nuclear club meant that Australia’s security position had deteriorated. This led Cabinet to re-examine the nuclear option, including a study on the costs involved with an indigenous weapons program carried out by the AAEC.¹¹⁰ It was perhaps the advent of these changes in Australia’s regional defence situation that led Wentworth to claim in October 1965 that ‘it is now essential that the Government go ahead with plans to construct a large nuclear power reactor in Australia’. He argued that the continuous improvement in power plants meant that even though a plant ordered now for completion in five or six years was not yet economically competitive, it was likely to become competitive in the future.¹¹¹ He considered himself well informed on the subject of nuclear power, in contrast to many of his Parliamentary colleagues. Moyal contends that David Fairbairn, Minister for National Development between 1964 and 1969, considered himself completely ignorant of the technical aspects of nuclear technology. She also argues that Fairbairn’s successor, Reg Swartz, did not possess any technical knowledge of nuclear matters.¹¹² On the other hand, Wentworth’s Parliamentary colleague, Killen, recalled:

The distinguished physicist Sir Mark Oliphant once observed that he spent a short time explaining a complicated nuclear problem to Wentworth. When he finished, not only did Wentworth understand it, but he then proceeded to argue it.\(^{113}\)

Wentworth recommended a reactor of 300 to 400 MW. Two suggested sites were ‘somewhere between Adelaide and Melbourne’, which would be economic and achieve full connection of the power grid between those two cities, and the Snowy Mountains, where it could be used in conjunction with the Snowy Mountains Scheme for things such as pump storage.\(^{114}\) Another advantage of a scheme in the Snowy Mountains was that it would be under the control of the Commonwealth, rather than the States. Wentworth had seen the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) power stations in the United States, and saw the potential for the Snowy Mountains Scheme to become Australia’s equivalent. Reynolds has argued that the scheme was, in fact, influenced by the TVA and established to enable Australia to pursue atomic power with an end result of atomic weapons in mind.\(^{115}\) Wentworth feared that countries that did not familiarise themselves with nuclear power would be ‘left behind in the industrial race’. He advocated the choice of nuclear power stations over new conventional plants, suggesting that nuclear power would also provide fringe benefits and had possible applications in desalination plants.\(^{116}\)

Wentworth did not mention atomic weapons in Parliament at this time, but he argued in

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\(^{114}\) Using the pump storage system, a reactor would work during both peak and off peak times. During peak times it would deliver power straight to the grid, and during off peak times it would pump water up for storage so that it could descend during peak times, augmenting the hydroelectric power supply.


June 1966 that, although a 300 MW station in the Snowy (seemingly Wentworth’s preferred choice of sites) would not make nuclear weapons, it would give Australia the capability and reduce the time to make them if a decision to do so was taken.\textsuperscript{117} A letter from Acting Minister for Defence, Alan Hulme, to Menzies shows that a South Australian reactor was indeeded being considered. This plant was also linked with weapons, as Hulme suggested that plans for the reactor be deferred until an assessment could be made of the ‘political, strategic, technological and economic aspects’ of nuclear weapons policy, as well as an examination which would include the possibility of manufacturing Australian weapons.\textsuperscript{118} By September, Wentworth was convinced that a nuclear reactor constructed in Cooma as part of the Snowy Mountains Scheme would produce power at a cheaper rate than the existing Scheme did, as well as providing the economic benefits, such as employment, normally associated with large scale construction projects.\textsuperscript{119} Later that month he again advocated the Snowy Mountains as a site, outlining the benefits of a reactor to pump storage and revealing that the Government Members Atomic Committee was investigating the costs involved.\textsuperscript{120}

The Government Members Atomic Committee was chaired by Wentworth, with Jim Killen as its Secretary. Killen recalls that the Committee was formed by Wentworth and consisted of ‘some half-dozen in membership’ who met ‘whenever there was occasion to do so’.\textsuperscript{121} Fairbairn stated that he was a member, and that the Committee

\textsuperscript{117} Wayne Reynolds, \textit{Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb}, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2000, p. 194.
\textsuperscript{119} CPD, H of R, 1 September 1966, p. 658.
\textsuperscript{120} CPD, H of R, 15 September 1966, pp. 955-6.
\textsuperscript{121} Killen, \textit{Inside Australian Politics}, p. 20.
‘used to have discussions regularly on atomic energy with some of the experts in the field’. When the Committee was formed is unclear, though it is probable that Wentworth founded the Committee some time after returning from his overseas tour of 1960 and 1961. The Committee was definitely in existence by 1962 as it met with Sir William Cook of the UKAEA. Broinowski has incorrectly referred to Wentworth on several occasions as a former chairman of the AAEC, a position in fact held by Baxter at this time (and only J. E. S. Stevens before him). Though Fairbairn claims that pressure from Wentworth led to the AAEC’s creation, it is likely that Broinowski was referring instead to Wentworth’s chairing of the Government Members Atomic Committee. Wentworth was the driving force behind the Atomic Committee, and much of the investigation of subjects, such as a reactor in the Snowy, was done by Wentworth himself.

On 23 September 1966 Wentworth wrote to Harold Holt, who had succeeded Menzies as Prime Minister in January that year. Wentworth claimed to have new material available on the economics of nuclear reactors, possibly as a result of the Atomic Committee’s investigation. Seeking a meeting with Holt, Wentworth’s eagerness to push for nuclear power can be seen in his offer to go to Canberra or Melbourne to meet Holt if required. Whether or not Wentworth met Holt is unclear, but following Holt’s famous commitment to go ‘All the way with LBJ’ into the Vietnam conflict in June, 1966, it is plausible to assume that nuclear power and weapons were not high on Holt’s defence.

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124 Wentworth to Holt, 23 September 1966, NAA M2684, 185.
agenda. Indeed, Holt had already rejected similar approaches on the same subject by the Minister for National Development, David Fairbairn, earlier that year. Fairbairn’s proposal stated:

Should world conditions in the future require Australian interest in a weapons program, all the knowledge and experience gained in the power program would be available for this purpose, and the time in which such a program could be realised would be greatly reduced.125

Following a negative response from the Prime Minister’s Department, Fairbairn withdrew his submission in mid-1966.126

In early 1967 Wentworth was speaking out in favour of the Vietnam War. In February he said of the North Vietnamese, ‘a normal person should not have an uncommitted outlook towards them – they are our enemies’. He argued that an Australian visiting Hanoi would be akin to an Australian visiting Berlin in 1933.127 In March The Herald described Wentworth as a ‘hawk’ on Vietnam and quoted his policy of bombing China’s ‘atom centres’ before China could get weapons. When asked what he would do if China rebuilt their factories, Wentworth replied ‘Bomb them again’.128 Wentworth believed that entering Vietnam was the right thing to do, though he also saw the political benefits from doing so. He wrote to Holt in May 1967, crediting the election win of November 1966 to the ‘Communist issues’ flaring up over Vietnam. By this time, however, Wentworth believed Vietnam was ‘going sour’. Whilst he believed that the

126 Ibid.
128 ‘Most abused’, Herald, 15 March 1967, p. 34.
Government’s chances of retaining power would be increased if another overseas conflict occurred before the November 1969 election, he thought it unwise to count on one happening.\textsuperscript{129} Urging action against Communists at home against the backdrop of the Vietnam War, Wentworth forwarded Holt a letter in September 1967 which advocated the publishing of a White Paper on Communist activities in Australia.\textsuperscript{130} However, Wentworth’s push for a nuclear Australia had stagnated under Holt. Holt had decided to withhold uranium in case Australia wanted to pursue atomic weapons, and commissioned a study on what it would take to manufacture an Australian nuclear weapon in May 1967.\textsuperscript{131} These actions, however, only served to keep the nuclear option open rather than pursue it. Hymans points to Holt’s rejection of Fairbairn’s nuclear reactor proposal and argues that Holt took no positive steps towards a nuclear capacity.\textsuperscript{132} It appears from departmental notes that Holt’s decision to investigate the possibility was a reaction to international calls for Australia to sign to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).\textsuperscript{133} Interestingly, speculation mounted in Britain as to whether they would transfer nuclear weapons to Australia. A question had been asked in the British Parliament by Lord Lambton, which suggested that a transfer of weapons to Australia was possible for several reasons, including the Australian acquisition of the F-111, the loss of the British nuclear storage capacity in Singapore, a British surplus of weapons following the disbanding of the V bombers, and Australia’s isolation following the British withdrawal east of the Suez. The Australians referred British enquiries to the UN statement of 1962,

\textsuperscript{129} Wentworth to Holt, 12 May 1967, NAA M2684, 135.
\textsuperscript{130} D. H. Paddon to Wentworth, 18 September 1967, forwarded to Holt on 3 October 1967, NAA M2684, 185.
\textsuperscript{131} Walsh, ‘Surprise Down Under’, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{133} Holt to Allen Fairhall (Minister for Defence), 4 May 1967, NAA A1209, 1965/6470.
stating Australia would not manufacture or procure weapons.\textsuperscript{134} This suggests that the Australian Government, under Holt, was not interested in a nuclear deterrent. However, Holt’s death in December 1967 would change the political climate in Australia, and allow Wentworth a measure of influence he had not yet possessed.

**The Gorton Years**

After a short intermission under the Prime Ministership of Country Party leader, John McEwen, the Liberal Party elected John Gorton to take over as party leader and hence Prime Minister. According to Reid, Wentworth had joined very early the camp pushing for Gorton as Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{135} Liberal member Peter Howson’s diaries tell us that Wentworth was leading the ‘Gorton machine’, and that it was considered ‘pretty effective’.\textsuperscript{136} Gorton recalled that Fairbairn was one of those seeking to get him elected as well.\textsuperscript{137} Howson and others believed that Wentworth had initiated plans to get Gorton elected even before Holt’s death.\textsuperscript{138} Indeed, Gorton was interviewed by the press during the leadership campaign at Wentworth’s retreat at Pittwater.\textsuperscript{139} The Gortons were the houseguests of the Wentworths over Christmas in 1967, though Wentworth claimed it was a date arranged long before Holt’s 19 December drowning.\textsuperscript{140} Wentworth wanted a greater say in National Development. Gorton, however, realised that he needed Fairbairn in this role. Fairbairn recalled:

\textsuperscript{134} Australian High Commission in London to Department of External Affairs, NAA A1838, TS680/10 PART 2, 13 December 1967.
\textsuperscript{135} Reid, *The Gorton Experiment*, p. 198.
\textsuperscript{136} Aitkin and Howson, *The Howson Diaries*, p. 278.
\textsuperscript{140} E. W. Tipping, ‘Chance At Last For Maverick Billy?’, *The Herald*, 13 January 1968, p. 2.
In fact, at one stage, he [Gorton] was talking about putting Wentworth into my Department of National Development. The proposal that he put forward was to have a Minister and an assistant Minister. I was to be the Minister and Wentworth was to be the assistant Minister. I said, that is absolutely hopeless. Under no circumstances would I ever operate in this way. Much as I liked Bill Wentworth, he would be impossible to control and I would just not contemplate it… I said, ‘Under no circumstances would I have him as my assistant Minister’, making undoubtedly off-the-cuff statements which would cause me a lot of trouble.\textsuperscript{141}

Hancock argues that Wentworth was instead rewarded for getting Gorton the leadership with roles as the Minister for Social Services and the Minister in Charge of Aboriginal Affairs.\textsuperscript{142} A contemporary newspaper article canvassed to links between Gorton and Wentworth, also noting that Wentworth was a close friend of Fairbairn.\textsuperscript{143} According to Liberal Senator Alister McMullin, the price of Wentworth’s support was something else entirely. McMullin claimed that Wentworth supported Gorton based on a promise to invest in nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{144}

Gorton had earlier supported a nuclear deterrent, and now had the backing of Wentworth and Fairbairn who, as Minister for National Development, was responsible for the AAEC.\textsuperscript{145} Indeed, Gorton had supported the idea of nuclear energy as early as

\textsuperscript{141} Pratt and Fairbairn, ‘Interview with David Fairbairn, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, pp. 97-8.
\textsuperscript{142} Hancock, \textit{John Gorton}, p. 160.
\textsuperscript{143} Tipping, ‘Chance At Last For Maverick Billy?’.
\textsuperscript{144} Aitkin and Howson, \textit{The Howson Diaries}, p. 386.
\textsuperscript{145} Cawte, \textit{Atomic Australia}, pp. 116-7.
1958.\textsuperscript{146} He shared Wentworth’s concerns about the reliability of the American nuclear umbrella, asking if the US would be willing to trade San Francisco for Sydney.\textsuperscript{147} Wentworth’s relationship with Gorton afforded him an influence in the Liberal Party unprecedented so far in his political career. By May 1968 Howson and the Minister for Immigration, Billy Snedden, were concerned that Gorton’s coterie of friends, dubbed the ‘cocktail Cabinet’ by Reid,\textsuperscript{148} were too influential – singling out Wentworth in particular.\textsuperscript{149} Wentworth had a close enough relationship with Gorton that he sent him ideas on a significant number of topics which he said Gorton could use for ‘a policy speech or the Governor-General’s speech when Parliament assembles’.\textsuperscript{150} His notes on nuclear power argued against signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and urged the establishment of nuclear power on a commercial scale ‘without delay’. He also urged that, regardless of whether the NPT was signed, Australia should maintain a ‘nuclear option exercisable at the shortest possible notice’.\textsuperscript{151} B. A. Santamaria, the founder of the National Civic Council and a guiding influence of the Democratic Labor Party, thought Gorton had been influenced by Wentworth’s preconceptions in choosing what he called a ‘Fortress Australia’ approach.\textsuperscript{152} Though the DLP had been publicly advocating a

\textsuperscript{146} Hancock, \textit{John Gorton}, p. 73.
\textsuperscript{147} Walsh, ‘Surprise Down Under’, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{148} Reid, \textit{The Gorton Experiment}, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{149} Aitkin and Howson, \textit{The Howson Diaries}, p. 428.
\textsuperscript{150} Wentworth enclosed brief notes under several headings. Areas covered were Parliamentary procedures, defence, nuclear power, Communists, transport, Aborigines, New Zealand, foreign aid, New Guinea and the territories, development and patents. Wentworth to Gorton, 26 January 1968, NAA M3787, 41. He later wrote ahead of a New South Wales speech with further ideas on water conservation, the development of Botany Bay, Sydney’s traffic, the Sydney-Melbourne railway, health, nuclear power, migration and Communists. Wentworth to Gorton, 31 January 1968, NAA M3787, 41. The wide range of subjects canvassed by Wentworth indicates influence over Gorton’s policies which extended well beyond Wentworth’s portfolios.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
nuclear deterrent, it still favoured forward defence. Wentworth still supported the war effort in Vietnam (and would continue to do so), but this was arguably because of factors such as opposition to Communism and a commitment to the United States than a desire for a forward defence plan. Santamaria believed that Wentworth thought that South East Asia was ‘gone’ and that India and Pakistan would probably follow, and that his attitude in turn affected Gorton. Horner states that the abandoning of a forward defence strategy was due to President Lyndon Johnson’s announcement of American de-escalation in Vietnam, and was later reinforced by President Richard Nixon’s 1969 announcement that the United States’ allies had to be able to defend themselves from major attack. By May 1968 Wentworth was sitting in on Cabinet subcommittees of which he was not a member, and at one stage barged into a Foreign Affairs and Defence Cabinet subcommittee uninvited to give his views on the NPT and Australia’s need for nuclear weapons. At this meeting he refused to leave, even after being asked to do so by Gorton. In early 1969, it appeared that the like-minded Gorton was eager to move in the direction Wentworth wanted – towards a nuclear Australia.

During the mid to late 1960s, orders around the world for nuclear reactors were at an all-time high. By 1969 it appeared that nuclear power would eventually take over from fossil fuels worldwide, and the AAEC had formed the view that nuclear power would be introduced into Australia in the coming decade. Baxter, the Chairman of the AAEC, believed that there were advantages in the Commonwealth establishing a ‘lead

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156 Howson, The Howson Diaries, p. 427.
station’ before State authorities would inevitably construct their own plants. The AAEC believed that, with the right location and reactor type, the plant would be competitive with fossil fuel plants. In March 1969 Fairbairn began talks with the States on a nuclear power plant, and by June 1969 Gorton was urging New South Wales to collaborate with the Commonwealth Government in a feasibility study. Gorton wanted the plant to be located within the ACT, or the Commonwealth Territory at Jervis Bay.\footnote{Clarence Hardy, \textit{Atomic Rise and Fall: the Australian Atomic Energy Commission, 1953-1987}, Glen Haven Publishing, Sydney, 1999, pp. 85-6.} In September, the feasibility study recommended a 500 MW station at Jervis Bay, on the New South Wales south coast. With the coming election in October 1969, the Jervis Bay nuclear power station became part of Gorton’s platform.\footnote{Cawte, \textit{Atomic Australia}, pp. 127-8.} Gorton had also made it clear before the election that he would not sign the NPT as he believed it could infringe on Australia’s right to peacefully pursue atomic energy.\footnote{Hancock, \textit{John Gorton}, pp. 234-6.} Wentworth was an enthusiastic campaigner for Gorton, and was even struck by a heckler in Brisbane as he attacked Labor’s defence policies at a public meeting.\footnote{‘Minister Punched at Election Rally’, \textit{Courier-Mail}, 23 October 1969, p. 1.} Asked later whether he had had input on Gorton’s policies, including the Jervis Bay power station, Wentworth replied ‘One would hope so!’\footnote{Hurst and Wentworth, ‘Interview with William Charles Wentworth, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, p. 16:16.}

For Wentworth the nuclear option was not one of just electricity, but also of weapons. Moyal argues that Wentworth’s involvement in a number of Government consultations and committees indicated that Gorton was considering pursuing a nuclear
deterrent. After Gorton was returned to power, Wentworth wrote to Malcolm Fraser, the Minister for Defence.

There are various reasons, which you may well appreciate, why we should have people who are thoroughly conversant with systems of missile construction and guidance. There may well be circumstances in which we could not purchase the whole apparatus from abroad, and we should therefore make certain that we have capable technicians, who can guide a program of production or adaption.

Wentworth’s letter then referred to the British missile testing at the Woomera rocket range in South Australia, and expressed a fear that Australian knowledge in this field may be reduced when the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO) program ceased. Fraser assured Wentworth that Australia had access to the ‘technical data and design details of all the weapons that have been tested at Woomera’. He pointed to Australian involvement in the development of the Malkara and Ikara missiles as evidence of Australian competence in this area. Fraser regretted that the ELDO operations were ceasing, as they not only created work for Australian engineers, but brought them into close contact with developing European technology. Wentworth’s interest in weapons delivery systems was not confined to rockets. In 1968 he had invited the former Minister for Air and former Naval pilot, Peter Howson, in for a drink to discuss the F-111 aeroplane. The F-111 was purchased by the Australian Government in 1963 on the

164 Ibid.
165 Fraser to Wentworth, 18 December 1969, NAA M62, 38.
understanding that it would be able to carry nuclear weapons. Reynolds has described the co-operation between the United States and Australia which led to the transaction, suggesting that there may have also been assurances that Australia would have access to atomic weapons in the future.\textsuperscript{167} However, it was the prospect of atomic weapons production that most excited Wentworth.

Wentworth was anxious that an Australian nuclear power plant would enable the development of nuclear weapons. He wrote to Fraser in December 1969, enclosing notes he had prepared which set out the reasons for a nuclear deterrent, as well as the importance of choosing the correct reactor for the purpose. Wentworth classed nuclear weapons as ‘strategic’, such as thermonuclear or fusion weapons (hydrogen bombs) which measured in the megatons, or ‘tactical’, which were fission (atomic) bombs with a yield of up to a few hundred kilotons. He believed an invasion of Australia would probably have the backing of a nuclear power, and hence both types of weapons were necessary. A program that pursued tactical weapons only was, in Wentworth’s words, ‘not worth pursuing’. In an international climate where the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was being discussed, Wentworth was sensitive to international concern. His answer to this concern was a proposal to pursue nuclear weapons in secret, using electricity production as a cover.

It must be recognised that any direct move towards nuclear weapons will forfeit the sympathy of U.S.A. and U.K., and that therefore everything we do must be capable of presentation as a normal move in peaceful atomic industry. In this way we can hope to get a “short-term nuclear option” without giving open offence, and then, at some future

\textsuperscript{167} Reynolds, \textit{Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb}, pp. 207-10.
date, if events require it, take up the option without giving this offence time to accumulate and provoke electoral pressures in U.S.A. and U.K.  

Hymans also acknowledges the strains that the Australian pursuit of nuclear weapons would have put on the US and British alliances. He argues that, whereas Menzies tried to avoid putting the British in particular in an uncomfortable position, Gorton decided that gaining the bomb was worth straining these ties with Australia’s allies.

Wentworth argued that, until recently, the separation of uranium 235 from natural uranium (i.e. the enriching of uranium) had involved large plant costs and it was assumed Australia would need to purchase enriched uranium overseas. Whilst the new method of using a centrifuge to separate uranium 235 was not yet practical, Wentworth believed it was ‘overwhelmingly probable that it will become practical in the next few years – i.e. well before fuel is required for the projected Australian reactor’. Because of this, and the fact that enriched uranium 235 was required for tactical weapons and as a trigger for strategic weapons, Wentworth said that the plant should be based on enriched fuel.

The decision that the Australian reactor should be based on natural uranium (unenriched) [uranium 238] would seem therefore to be wrong, since this precludes the establishment of an enriching plant under the cover of being part of a peaceful programme, and thus makes it impossible for us to get a short term option on thermonuclear weapons.

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168 Wentworth to Fraser, 8 December 1969, NAA M62, 38.
He argued that Australia should build a reactor which used slightly enriched uranium, and avoid agreements that restricted its right to use its own fuel. It would then be possible, if the centrifuge plant were proceeded with, to produce uranium 235 both as reactor fuel and potential fissile material for weapons. It would also be possible to run the reactor so as to produce weapons grade plutonium.\textsuperscript{171} Moyal argues that the reasoning behind the AAEC Chairman Baxter’s original preference, the natural uranium fuelled CANDU reactor, was that it had the benefit of producing up to fifty percent more plutonium than those reactors which used slightly enriched uranium.\textsuperscript{172} Wentworth, however, clearly favoured the reactors using slightly enriched uranium\textsuperscript{173} as Australia would then be able to argue that a uranium enrichment facility was part of a peaceful nuclear power program.\textsuperscript{174} Wentworth also suggested Australia build a heavy water plant; an isotopic separation plant for lithium; and a bomb fabrication and assembly plant. The bomb fabrication plant, according to Wentworth, could be studied prior to making a decision on a nuclear option so as to reduce the time taken to build it if the option were taken up.\textsuperscript{175} Interestingly, by October 1970 Baxter’s preference had changed from the CANDU reactor to the SGHWR reactor. Martin argues that Baxter also wanted an Australian uranium enrichment plant.\textsuperscript{176} Moyal contends that Baxter wanted a reactor fuelled by slightly enriched uranium that was also a good plutonium producer. His decision to back the SGHWR instead of the CANDU reactor hinged on this factor, as it was both

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{173} These included the British steam generating, heavy water moderated, light water cooled reactor (SGHWR), and the two American reactors, the boiling water reactor (BWR) and the pressurised water reactor (PWR). Ibid., p. 372.
\textsuperscript{174} Wentworth to Fraser, 8 December 1969, NAA M62, 38.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{176} Martin, \textit{Nuclear Knights}, p. 48.
expensive and difficult to produce plutonium with the BWR or PWR reactors.  

AAEC scientist Keith Alder, however, disputes this and claims that ‘No one in their right mind would try to make plutonium in that system’. This was, however, stated years afterwards. The AAEC’s Maurice Timbs stated that plutonium could be made in the SGHWR in a letter to Baxter and the contemporary thinking is more valuable in assessing the intentions of those concerned. Writing in 1975, Baxter himself said that it was the AAEC’s desire that any potential reactor should be a good plutonium producer, though he says it was not for military applications. Hymans argues that Baxter and Gorton realised they were a minority on the nuclear weapons questions, and instead tried to promote the economic benefits of nuclear power. Wentworth’s notes show clearly that he linked the development of atomic power with a nuclear deterrent. He could not say this openly, however, and presented his plans in the context of the peaceful pursuit of nuclear energy. His willingness to pursue the atomic option in such a duplicitous and clandestine manner illustrated his lack of faith in the reliability of the American alliance. By this time, the United States was pursuing a policy of Vietnamization in Vietnam, with the intention of training South Vietnamese troops and withdrawing American forces. The decline of morale among US forces and the emergence of strong public opinion in America against the war led Wentworth to have grave doubts that the United States would engage in an action to defend Australia, and thus reinforced his determination to create an independent Australian defence plan.

179 Ibid.
A very public falling out between Fraser and Gorton would lead to the end of the Jervis Bay project before it started. A dispute over defence led to Fraser’s resignation as a Minister and prompted a crisis within the Liberal Party. Gorton called for a vote of confidence in his Prime Ministership in the Party room, a vote which ended up deadlocked at 33 apiece. As chairman, Gorton held the casting vote and elected to fall on his sword, effectively resigning as Liberal Party leader and therefore Prime Minister. William McMahon succeeded Gorton on 10 March 1971.\textsuperscript{182} By June the project was deferred for twelve months, a deferral that eventually led to its abandonment. This followed a reassessment of the costs of the reactor, particularly as it compared with coal fired plants.\textsuperscript{183} This significant setback to Wentworth’s nuclear aspirations followed an earlier blow, when Gorton reluctantly bowed to pressure from McMahon, then Minister for Foreign Affairs,\textsuperscript{184} to sign the NPT.\textsuperscript{185} Encel and McKnight have contended that this represented a victory for McMahon over the ‘bomb lobby’, a lobby they claimed consisted of Baxter, a number of Liberal backbenchers and Ministers (presumably including Wentworth), and the DLP.\textsuperscript{186} There has also been speculation that Gorton’s signature was actually an attempt to preserve Australia’s nuclear option. Countries that signed the NPT before it came into force were not bound until the treaty was ratified. Countries which signed after the NPT was in force were bound from the time of signature. Thus, by signing before it came into force, Gorton kept Australia’s options open until ratification. The treaty would not be ratified until after Gough Whitlam’s ALP

\textsuperscript{182} Reid, \textit{The Gorton Experiment}, pp. 427-44.
\textsuperscript{183} Cawte, \textit{Atomic Australia}, pp. 131-2.
\textsuperscript{184} In 1970 the Department of External Affairs was renamed the Department of Foreign Affairs.
\textsuperscript{185} Hancock, \textit{John Gorton}, p. 254.
won Government in 1972.\textsuperscript{187} Other possible reasons for Gorton’s decision to sign were pressure from the US and the impact of late signatures from countries which had previously been opposed to signing, leaving Australia more and more isolated.\textsuperscript{188} Though Australia retained the technical expertise from Lucas Heights to manufacture a bomb and the F-111s as a delivery system, it seemed Australia would not be pursuing atomic weapons.\textsuperscript{189} Wentworth later claimed that the decision to defer Jervis Bay was made ‘very largely under pressure from the coal mining interests’, stating the decision was ‘a minor disaster’.\textsuperscript{190} Baxter also considered the decision ‘a tragedy for Australia’.\textsuperscript{191} The retirement of Baxter as Chairman of the AAEC on 15 April 1972 seemed to damage the atomic cause beyond repair.\textsuperscript{192}

Despite what seemed to be a lack of confidence in Australia’s allies, Wentworth continued to steadfastly support the United States in the hope of strengthening the alliance between the two countries. In February 1970 he wrote to Gorton after speaking to Guy Pauker of the influential RAND Corporation in Los Angeles. Pauker had suggested to Wentworth that Australia provide assistance to the Indonesian Army, which was engaging in ‘considerable activities for civilian construction’. The United States had already committed six million dollars in this area. Wentworth contended that assisting the ‘anti-communist forces in Indonesia’, in which he acknowledged the ‘vital part the

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., pp. 12-3.
\textsuperscript{190} Hurst and Wentworth, ‘Interview with William Charles Wentworth, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, p. 11:4.
\textsuperscript{192} Angyal, ‘Sir Philip Baxter 1905-1989’, p. 194.
Army plays’, would increase Australia’s security.\textsuperscript{193} In September he painted a grim picture of Australia’s defence situation, claiming ‘our old securities are no longer with us’ and that Australia was ‘nearly isolated in the Pacific’. He was particularly critical of Labor’s policies, which he alleged insulted Australia’s allies and were ‘almost deliberately designed to get Australia’s vital allies to desert it if any hour of need should arise’.\textsuperscript{194} In 1971 he strongly supported the joint Australian and American base at Pine Gap, condemning statements by Labor MPs which suggested that the base was ‘of a type that we should not have here’. Wentworth argued that, as the facility was designed to help detect a Soviet sneak attack, its deterrent value actually promoted peace rather than war.\textsuperscript{195} He addressed rallies in support of the Vietnam War, and believed that adolescents against it were the dupes of Communists.\textsuperscript{196}

Wentworth had lost influence in the Liberal Party with the resignation of Gorton and had seen the plans for atomic power in Australia scuttled. On the afternoon that McMahon replaced Gorton, Wentworth’s nephew, journalist Mungo MacCallum, visited Wentworth’s office. MacCallum recalled Wentworth staring at a map of the world, and when MacCallum suggested to the gloomy Wentworth that things could be worse, Wentworth replied ‘Yes, and they will be.’\textsuperscript{197} That McMahon’s reign would be less than two years was no consolation for Wentworth. On 2 December 1972 the Labor Party, led by Gough Whitlam, would sweep the Coalition from power for the first time since Menzies’ victory in 1949.

Labor Government

The election of a Labor Government was seen as disastrous by Wentworth. In March 1973 he bemoaned what he called ‘the gradual drift of Australia towards the Left since this Government has been in power’. He believed Australia was being taken ‘into the Communist orbit’. Wentworth went after Dr. J. F. Cairns, now Minister for Overseas Trade and Minister for Secondary Industry. He had earlier attacked Cairns’ denial of aggression from North Vietnam, and also accused Cairns of supporting Fidel Castro, who had seized power in Cuba in 1959. Now, he said that Cairns was ‘bringing the Vietnamese murderers – the Vietcong – into this House, and making their cause his own’. He accused the Government of double standards in relation to nuclear testing, and highlighted the contrasting attitudes of the Government to French tests and those of Communist China. He was outraged that Labor Ministers had previously appeared ‘under Vietcong flags and before the portrait of the infamous Ho Chi Minh’. He accused the Labor Government in August of the ‘liquidation of any effective defence capacity’ at a time when he believed Australia’s allies were ‘either reluctant or powerless or alienated’. Wentworth defended the AAEC, and accused the Whitlam Government of disbanding the National Radiation Advisory Committee which refused to go along with the ‘campaign of deception’ by Labor on the radiation effects of French testing. This committee had included both Baxter and Titterton. In considering a replacement for Baxter as AAEC Chairman, Wentworth claimed that the ‘whole of the Australian defence

and security position’ would rely on advice given by the new appointee.²⁰² Wentworth’s calls to reject the NPT fell on deaf ears. He quoted an article by Baxter in the House on the subject and said that the NPT was now a sham. In echoes of his earlier calls for international disarmament, Wentworth said he was in favour of the concept but only if it were watertight.²⁰³ In March 1974, despite his own concerns over the reliability of Australia’s alliances, he criticised the faith shown by the ALP in the United Nations rather than Australia’s traditional allies to protect the nation’s security. According to Wentworth, the Whitlam Government had encouraged isolationism in the United States and Britain to the detriment of Australia’s security position.²⁰⁴ Grey contends that relations between Australia and the United States were indeed patchy during the Whitlam years. He attributes this to the anti-Americanism of the left, due partly to the war in Vietnam. Another reason was the Americans’ fear that agreements concerning their bases in Australia would be jeopardised by the Labor Government.²⁰⁵ By the end of the year, a vexed Wentworth, warning of American isolationism and intelligence reports that forecasted imminent Communist aggression worldwide, demanded a ‘proper defence plan for Australia’.²⁰⁶

In 1975 Wentworth was prepared to concede that the Vietnam War was lost. He was not prepared, however, to allow criticisms of Australia’s involvement to go unanswered. Responding to a Labor MP, Wentworth argued:

He said that we have been defeated in Vietnam. So we have… The honourable member said that we involved ourselves in Vietnam for our own selfish interests. It is not a crime for an Australian government to think selfishly of the interests of Australia.207

And these interests, Wentworth believed, were worth the effort of fighting the war. Indeed, Wentworth optimistically saw advantages for Australia in the aftermath.

Although we have been defeated or our side has been defeated in Vietnam, it may be that the intervention has been to the advantage of Australia, and perhaps only to the advantage of Australia. Let me put something to the honourable member and let him think about it very carefully. At the time of that intervention Indonesia, the country which is to our north, was trembling between the communist and anti-communist causes. The anti-communist cause is now firmly established in Indonesia. I venture to think that if there had been no intervention in Vietnam the opposite would have been the case and Australia would now be confronting not far across the water – indeed insofar as New Guinea is concerned a country with almost a contiguous land border – a communist threat from a country of 150 million people. This is something which is of vital interest to the security of Australia.208

Wentworth believed that Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War was the right decision both because of a commitment to Australia’s allies, and because it was in Australia’s interest to fight Communism. Indeed, he had earlier suggested that the only

207 CPD, H of R, 13 May 1975, p. 2175.
208 Ibid., pp. 2175-6.
role of Australia’s conventional forces was to fight what Grey has termed ‘wars of diplomacy’.\textsuperscript{209} Speaking in the mid-1980s, Wentworth stated:

\begin{quote}
We all feel a bit ashamed of the Vietnam affair and I wonder whether it is shame for the correct reasons. I think we should be ashamed because we lost, not because we intervened… certainly, part of the propaganda of shame about Vietnam, which is going on now, is I think misplaced. The shame is that we lost.\textsuperscript{210}
\end{quote}

Factors also pressing in the public mind in 1975, however, were worsening economic conditions and the scandal known as the Loans Affair. After again admonishing Labor’s defence policy and arguing that the American withdrawal from Asia had dire consequences for Australia’s security, Wentworth was confident enough in the eventual demise of the Whitlam government that he allowed himself to look ahead to the days when the Coalition would again govern. Discussing what he perceived to be Labor’s attitude of hostility toward the presence of United States bases in Australia, Wentworth continued:

\begin{quote}
Well, it does not matter so much now because this Government has not got long to run. The damage that it is doing to the security of Australia will be remedied shortly by a change of government, and the United States and our other allies in the free world will know that once again Australia will have a government which represents the overwhelming majority of the Australian people on this issue, which will not twist and determine Australia’s foreign policy in the interests of the communist powers to the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{209} Grey, \textit{A Military History of Australia}, p. 220.
\textsuperscript{210} Hurst and Wentworth, ‘Interview with William Charles Wentworth, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, p. 16:4.
control of the left wing, that minority pro-communist control, which apparently is still so potent over the thinking of the government when it comes to foreign policy.\textsuperscript{211}

Wentworth continued to attack Labor on defence in the final months of the Whitlam government, which he called in late August a ‘caretaker government repudiated by the people’. He saw the potential for hotspots in Timor and Papua New Guinea and advocated a bipartisan approach to defence, something he said the Coalition would try to achieve ‘when we are in power’.\textsuperscript{212} He would be proved correct in his predictions of a change in government. The election of Malcolm Fraser in late 1975 was, for Wentworth, both an end to a Labor government whose defence policies he staunchly opposed and an opportunity to return to his earlier obsession, the pursuit of an atomic Australia.

**Atomic Advocacy**

The prospects of atomic power or weapons in Australia declined sharply during the McMahon and Whitlam administrations. During this period, Wentworth had also lost the influence he had enjoyed under the Gorton Government. Whitlam had ratified the NPT a month after he was elected. His government had joined with that of New Zealand to take France to the International Court of Justice in order to prevent atmospheric nuclear testing in the Pacific. Such a move had the potential to derail a joint feasibility study between the AAEC and the Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique on a uranium enrichment plant in Australia. The Minister for Minerals and Energy, Rex Connor, believed in exploiting uranium for Australia’s benefit. His plans included three uranium mining and

\textsuperscript{211} CPD, H of R, 21 August 1975, p. 457.
\textsuperscript{212} CPD, H of R, 28 August 1975, pp. 785-6.
milling plants as well as the enrichment plant, but the ensuing scandal of the Loans Affair, in which Connor was primarily implicated, meant that many of his ideas did not come into fruition.\textsuperscript{213} Strict environmental controls of uranium mining were also enacted. Labor instigated the Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry, known as the Fox Inquiry, a wide-ranging investigation of the impact of uranium mining in Australia.\textsuperscript{214}

With the advent of the Fraser government, Wentworth believed the time had come once again to push vigorously for atomic power. Within months of the Coalition taking power, Wentworth wrote to the new Prime Minister enclosing four pages of his own notes on uranium, outlining his belief that Australia could dominate the world market.\textsuperscript{215} He contended in Parliament that uranium ‘is as important to Australia as oil is to Arabia’.\textsuperscript{216} Wentworth submitted to the Fox Inquiry that it should wrap itself up and let the Government alone decide whether to mine uranium or not.\textsuperscript{217} In April 1976 he enclosed more notes for Fraser, this time on the Australian defence situation as it pertained to nuclear weapons. In echoes of his earlier views, Wentworth argued that the possession of nuclear weapons by an enemy may mean that Australia’s allies would not be willing to help, and that the only means of defence was the threat of an effective Australian nuclear deterrent. The final points of Wentworth’s brief report almost seemed to plead with Fraser to consider building the bomb.

\textsuperscript{213} Broinowski, \textit{Fact or Fission?}, pp. 106-125.
\textsuperscript{215} Wentworth to Fraser, 11 March 1976, NAA M1334, 22.
\textsuperscript{216} CPD, H of R, 31 March 1976, pp. 1179-1180.
\textsuperscript{217} Dalton, ‘The Fox Inquiry’, p. 146.
7. If we have nuclear weapons we can better protect ourselves against conventional attack, either by destroying approaching convoys or by taking out enemy bases on the Australian mainland.

8. If we have nuclear weapons we can protect ourselves against nuclear blackmail by threatening retaliation.

9. If we have nuclear weapons we shall probably never have to use them. If we do not have them, we may well wish desperately that we had acquired them before it was too late.  

In terms of nuclear power, Wentworth told Parliament that it was the ‘cheapest, safest and cleanest power available to mankind at the present moment’. He lambasted the anti-nuclear lobby, which he said was started by coal interests twenty years previously but had since been taken over by Communists. Wentworth claimed that the dangers of toxic waste had been blown out of proportion and that anti-nuclear groups such as Friends of the Earth, who were picketing outside Parliament House at the time, were in fact advocating the ‘maximum pollution in the environment’. By April 1977, Wentworth appeared to accept that there may be risks involved with nuclear power, but that they were risks worth taking.

Sure, there are great dangers in nuclear energy and its development, but there are even greater dangers in not developing nuclear energy. That is true both on a global scale and

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218 Wentworth to Fraser, 15 April 1976, NAA M1334, 22.
in regard to Australia’s own particular interests. It seems to me that we should be looking at both the world situation and the particular interests of Australia.\footnote{220 CPD, H of R, 21 April 1977, p. 1177.}

As late as September 1977, a month before Wentworth would resign from the Liberal Party and only a few months before he would eventually leave Parliament in December, Wentworth was still pushing the case for an atomic Australia. He again proclaimed nuclear energy the ‘safest and cleanest method of producing electric power yet devised by man’, before again claiming that the dangers of nuclear power had been blown out of proportion. Wentworth suggested that a nuclear plant would be one hundred times safer than any coal fired plant, before referring to the hazards of mining coal. Wentworth was even accused by Labor member Clyde Cameron of collaborating with Titterton and Baxter to script his speech for Parliament.\footnote{221 CPD, H of R, 7 September 1977, pp. 848-53.}

Despite being quoted in March 1975 as wanting to keep the nuclear weapons option open,\footnote{222 Broinowski, \textit{Fact or Fission?}, p. 127.} Fraser did little to move toward atomic energy. By the time he was in power, the international nuclear power industry had begun to stagnate. Nuclear power was also unpopular with the Australian electorate.\footnote{223 Ibid., pp. 127-133.} Wentworth had never regained the influence that he had in the Gorton government, and was not given a ministry by Fraser. He left Parliament at the age of 70 in 1977. His nephew, Mungo MacCallum, claimed that his ultimate ambition was to be Minister for National Development, an ambition that was never realised.\footnote{224 MacCallum, \textit{Mungo}, pp. 141-2.}
Conclusion

When it became clear to Wentworth that international disarmament with the appropriate level of inspection could not be achieved, an aim which Wentworth arguably believed impossible from a very early stage, he became obsessed with the idea of an Australian nuclear deterrent. The timing of the question he first posed to Parliament tells us much about this obsession, coming so soon after Wentworth witnessed an atomic explosion at Maralinga. Unfortunately for Wentworth, the policy of the Government was not in favour of procuring nuclear weapons. Wentworth tried, over the coming years, to advance his case for atomic power, believing that this would be the first step on a journey which could end in a nuclear armed Australia. He travelled the world, speaking to leading authorities in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna to learn more about reactors and nuclear energy. He formed an Atomic Committee, which pushed for atomic power within the Government, and also maintained links with scientists such as Professors Philip Baxter of the AAEC, Mark Oliphant and Ernest Titterton.

Wentworth’s fear was his driving factor. He feared that Australia would be abandoned to the Communists of Asia by both Britain and the United States. In this situation, Wentworth believed Australia stood no chance without a nuclear deterrent. Australia’s conventional forces, he argued, were only useful for maintaining alliances. Wentworth harboured great doubts about the will of Australia’s allies to assist if needed, but nevertheless supported the actions of Australian troops in the South East Asian theatre as he believed it would help Australia make a sentimental appeal to their allies if attacked. It is important to note that Wentworth’s fears did not apply to nations such as
Indonesia, whom he believed were anti-Communist and therefore deserving of Australia’s assistance.

Undoubtedly, Wentworth’s greatest chance of influencing Australian policy towards atomic power came when John Gorton assumed the Prime Ministership. Wentworth exerted a great deal of influence on Gorton, himself a supporter of atomic power, and was an enthusiastic supporter of the Gorton Government’s plans to build a nuclear power station at Jervis Bay. Meanwhile, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was being discussed internationally. Probably because of the possible international scrutiny, Wentworth was prepared to enter into a clandestine nuclear weapons program, and made it clear that he thought that an objective of the nuclear power program should be to provide fissile material for weapons. That Wentworth was willing to spend enormous sums of money and risk an international backlash confirms how desperate he was to protect Australia with a nuclear deterrent. To him, Australia’s conventional forces were no match for the vastly superior numbers of countries like China, and Australia’s allies could not be fully depended on because of possible threats of nuclear blackmail and the increasing isolationism of the United Kingdom and the United States. Atomic weapons were the only way Australia could protect itself from its Communist enemies, and Wentworth was willing to direct the Australian defensive effort to this end, regardless of the economic, political or diplomatic costs involved.
Chapter III – Evatt, Émigrés and External Enemies: Wentworth and Foreign Affairs

The advent of the Cold War signalled a dramatic shift in the state of world affairs. The changes in both the nature of Australia’s perceived enemies and the technology with which any future war would be fought drastically altered the international situation. In attempting to relay the enormity of these changes, Wentworth used this analogy:

No doubt, as the blacks [Aborigines] at Kurnell watched Captain Cook’s ship recede into the distance, they turned to their old tribal foreign policy without realizing that something had happened which rendered meaningless the terms they were using. Something like that has now happened, not only to Australia, but also to the world… New weapons, particularly atomic weapons, have changed the meaning of the old terms connected with foreign affairs.¹

Though the Soviet Union was allied with Australia and the other western allies in Europe, Wentworth’s anti-Communism had been developing before World War II had finished. When the war was over and the Cold War began to dictate world affairs, this anti-Communism dominated Wentworth’s views on a number of topics. As discussed in the preceding chapters, defence came to mean ‘defence against Communism’, and similarly the area of foreign affairs would come to be dominated by the international struggle between the Free World and Communism. His views of relations with the two main Communist powers, the Soviet Union and China, were frequently discussed in Parliament and elsewhere. The Soviet Union, he believed, had also manipulated the Labor Party’s

¹ CPD, H of R, 23 March 1950, pp. 1152-3.
Dr. H. V. Evatt. Wentworth sought to publicise specific instances of Communist brutality, particularly in Hungary, Tibet and Czechoslovakia. He also supported the Government of the Republic of China at Taipei. Wentworth frequently discussed the United Nations, believing that Russia had sabotaged that organisation. He advocated a world government, seeing it as a possible way of ensuring world peace. In addition to his views on external matters, however, Wentworth was a strong supporter of anti-Communist eastern European émigré organisations in Australia. He was active in the Captives Nations movement, frequently addressed the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations and maintained links with other organisations. Finally, his views on Southeast Asian foreign affairs provide a stark insight into Wentworth’s perspectives on the global struggle between Communism and the West.

**Post-war Soviet Foreign Policy**

In 1947 Wentworth published a sixteen page booklet titled *Labor, Socialism and Soviets.* Whilst the publication dealt primarily with the contemporary public debate on bank nationalisation, Wentworth’s views on the Soviet Union at this time are also revealed: ‘It is now clear that Russia under Stalin is a regime of misery, tyranny, terror and potential aggression – much as Germany was under Hitler.’ His release of *What’s Wrong With...*  

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2 The Republic of China is often referred to as Formosa or Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China is often referred to as mainland, Red or Communist China.
3 The United Nations is also referred to as the United Nations Organisation (UNO). For uniformity, the name United Nations (UN) will be used.
5 Ibid., p. 7.
Socialism, a booklet published by the Institute of Public Affairs (NSW), argued that the Soviet Union was ‘the chief threat to world peace’.  

To-day, when Socialist Russia is deliberately creating chaos in Europe to further her own aggressive ends, and is almost openly preparing for her attack on the West, and is only playing for time until she has the technical means for a successful attack, the real nature of Socialism is all too dreadfully illustrated.

Shortly after entering Parliament, Wentworth emphasised the ‘potential aggression’ of the Soviet Union as he publicly enunciated his views on Communism:

Communism is not merely an idea. Communism is a method. Communism has developed through simple Marxism which was an idea, through Leninism, which is primarily a method of applying that idea. Leninism has developed into Stalinism which teaches that the idea of world revolution taking place spontaneously in various countries must give way to the idea of Russia as the fortress of the world revolution, finally extending the revolution by force of arms.

This speech and the booklets which preceded it are important, not only in that they confirm Wentworth’s anti-Communism, but also because they reveal Wentworth’s interpretation of the Soviet Union’s intentions. Wentworth viewed anti-Communism and Australia’s defence as synonymous. This in turn influenced his views on foreign affairs.

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6 W. C. Wentworth, What’s Wrong With Socialism?, Institute of Public Affairs (NSW), Sydney, c. 1948, p. 22. Wentworth claimed that this book was also used by the Conservative Party in Britain in an election ‘towards the end of the ‘40s’. Wentworth to Fraser, 22 September 1976, NAA M1334, 22.

7 Ibid., p. 24. Emphasis in original.

8 CPD, H of R, 23 March 1950, p. 1153.
The above speech was made in 1950, though Wentworth was able to discern a change in policy from as early as 1946. It was in early 1946, Wentworth argued, that a new atomic policy ‘became the determinant of Soviet policy in all spheres’. The Soviet Union’s ‘pre-atomic’ plans included preserving the invulnerability of Russia as the ‘mighty fortress of world revolution’, a fortress which existed both because of her internal geography, and her new ring of satellite states. According to Wentworth, these plans also called for the development of Communist Parties in the democracies, striving for revolution and able to be assisted by Russia’s military. This was not an isolated view and was shared by, among others, the Minister for External Affairs, Percy Spender, who believed that the Soviet Union was employing ‘fifth column methods’ to ‘white-ant and weaken’ democratic countries.

Wentworth contends that the advent of the atomic bomb destroyed the basis of these plans. Without the bomb, Russia was vulnerable and any large scale intervention into Western European democracies became unthinkable. In the years following 1946, Wentworth suggested that Russia had a ‘soft-shell’ period in which it was comparatively weak whilst it developed nuclear weapons. During this period, Wentworth argued that Stalin employed a policy of deliberately sabotaging efforts to internationally control the bomb, so that the Soviet Union could eventually (after it developed the bomb itself) force the world towards Communism either by force or the threat of atomic war. The problem for Russia was how to avoid war during this ‘soft-shelled’ period whilst still being free of international control of the Soviet atomic weapons program. According to Wentworth, Stalin adopted a policy of ‘deliberate

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procrastination’. So broad in scope did Wentworth believe this policy to be, that he considered coal strikes, waterfront strikes, and ‘Russia’s adventures in Europe’ to be diversionary tactics designed to ‘keep our minds off the main objective’. He believed the democracies were ‘being sold the dummy’. In Wentworth’s mind, the fault for allowing the Soviet Union the time to develop atomic weapons lay at the feet of the United Nations, and its one time President of the General Assembly, Dr. H. V. Evatt.

Soviet Stalling Tactics

Wentworth believed that the leaders of the democracies took the correct view in December 1945 at a meeting of the United Nations: atomic control was central and ‘that, without such control, the world was likely to perish’. The Soviet Union proposed banning the atomic bomb without the need for policing such a ban. The counter-argument, that effective policing was necessary in Russia and elsewhere, was rejected after ‘some carefully rehearsed Soviet indecision’. In addition, no atomic proposals were to be free from Russian veto. Further distracting from the atomic issue were what Wentworth called ‘communist diversionary activities’, which included conflicts in Greece, China, Java and Germany. Wentworth believed that the catalyst for the 1948 Berlin blockade was the approach of the United States toward ‘real atomic strength for the first time’, which, Wentworth argued, the Soviet Union believed would lead to

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13 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
renewed calls for international atomic control.\textsuperscript{17} Wentworth then contended that the United Nations Atomic Commission ‘faded gently into insignificance’.\textsuperscript{18}

By March 1950, these Soviet stalling tactics had convinced Wentworth that the United Nations was ‘bereft of power’.\textsuperscript{19} Wentworth had realised that all decisions were subject to the Russian power of veto. In calling it the ‘ideal stalling mechanism’, Wentworth argued that the United Nations was not only a ‘useless organization’, but that it was ‘occupying ground that some other organization might stand upon’.\textsuperscript{20} Wentworth saw but one option that could lead to the United Nations becoming a workable organisation – the expulsion of Russia. In fact, when interviewed in pyjamas on his doorstep in December 1949, the morning after winning the seat of Mackellar, Wentworth stated that expelling Russia from the United Nations was one of his objectives (as well as repairing the damage done by Evatt).\textsuperscript{21} Wentworth argued to Parliament that under Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations, parties to a dispute must abstain from voting. Wentworth believed that a recommendation to expel Russia from the United Nations would therefore not be subject to the Russian veto. This was also a reason, Wentworth argued, not to recognise China’s Communist Government as legitimate, as then Russia would be potentially able to use China’s vote (China also had the power of veto) to avoid expulsion. Contemplating the consequences of such an action, Wentworth argued:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Ibid., pp. 23-4.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 24.
\item \textsuperscript{19} CPD, H of R, 23 March 1950, p. 1154.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{21} ‘New M.P.s Tell of Plans’, \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, 12 December 1949, p. 3.
\end{itemize}
I know that the solution that I propose would divide the world, but it would be better to divide the world cleanly now than to have our enemies working inside our own organization and rendering abortive every move that we make there. I know that the proposal involves the possibility of war, though I do not think that it would lead to war.\textsuperscript{22}

The idea of risking war was not new to Wentworth. In 1947 Wentworth adopted a motion that the Liberal Party should send a message to Winston Churchill, hoping that he would once again lead Britain. Wentworth agreed with Churchill’s foreign policy which urged the adoption of a tough stance against Russia, even if it involved being prepared to use force.\textsuperscript{23} Wentworth saw in the situation a parallel to the appeasement of Nazi Germany before World War II.

One regrets that epithets such as “war-mongers” should be bandied about this chamber. After all, the people who are raising that cry now were shouting “war-mongers” in 1936 and 1937 at those of us who were endeavouring then to stir up some kind of opposition to the growth of nazi-ism in Germany. Who were the real war-mongers? Were they the people who thought that Hitler should have been stopped in 1936 or 1937, when he could have been stopped without war, or, at the worst, with only a little war, or were they the people who counselled appeasement? The supporters of appeasement described themselves as the makers of peace, but they made war.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{22} CPD, H of R, 23 March 1950, p. 1155.
\textsuperscript{24} CPD, H of R, 4 October 1950, p. 281.
Thus, Wentworth’s anti-Communism and advocacy of force can, in part, be understood by reference to the Munich Settlement before World War II. Indeed, his was an attitude shared by Spender, who told Parliament in 1947:

> It seems to me that historically we have entered upon a second era of appeasement. This time, however, the power being appeased is not Germany, but Soviet Russia. Already we have progressed a long way along the road of appeasement, and my very real fear is that unless we retrace our steps the world will be engulfed in a disaster greater even than that which followed the first era of appeasement, namely 1933 to 1938; and millions upon millions of people will again be destroyed or enslaved.\(^\text{25}\)

Wentworth first attacked Evatt’s role in the United Nations in March 1950, arguing that Evatt maintained the UN as a ‘sham force’. Dr. H. V. Evatt was the former Minister for External Affairs in the Curtin and Chifley Labor Governments from 1941 until Menzies’ election in 1949. He had been the first President of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and President of the third session of the United Nations General Assembly.\(^\text{26}\) Wentworth argued that ‘in 1946, 1947 and 1948 the avoidance of future war would have been quite easy’.\(^\text{27}\) In October 1950 Wentworth quoted an Evatt speech of 1946, in which Evatt suggested that the Soviet Union’s policy was only ‘directed towards self-protection and security against future attack’.\(^\text{28}\) Wentworth suggested that the ‘unfortunate accident of history’ that had elevated Evatt to the UN Presidency had allowed that ‘misconception’

\(^{25}\) CPD, H of R, 19 September 1947, p. 123.
\(^{27}\) CPD, H of R, 23 March 1950, p. 1155.
\(^{28}\) CPD, H of R, 4 October 1950, p. 282. The Evatt speech can be found in CPD, H of R, 13 March 1946, pp. 204-5.
to be preached on the world stage. Wentworth described the years in which Evatt was
gaining power in the United Nations as ‘analogous to that of 1936 and 1937 in relation to
Hitler’, contending that during that vital time nothing was done. Wentworth believed that
in 1950, comparing the Soviet Union once again to Nazi Germany, the world was closer
to the position of 1938 or early 1939. He was unambiguous about whom he blamed for
the situation. ‘The right honourable member for Barton [Evatt], … I believe, is the only
Australian in history as yet who has been able to do damage upon a world scale.’
Wentworth did not believe Evatt was a Communist, but a ‘Soviet stooge’ who had not
adopted that role deliberately, but was being made use of ‘by adroit men working behind
the scenes’.

Wentworth was not the only critic of Evatt at the United Nations. Waters explains
that Evatt’s Presidency strained relations between the Australian and British
Governments, as the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin’s realist approach and desire
to deal with the Soviet Union from a position of strength contrasted with Evatt’s belief in
liberal internationalism and the international application of the rule of law as a substitute
for power politics. Indeed, Waters plausibly suggests that Evatt’s actions at the United
Nations influenced the decision of the United States to place an embargo on security
information being shared with Australia. The British in particular considered Evatt’s
policy to be one of appeasement, and derisively dubbed Evatt the ‘universal
conciliator’.

29 Ibid., p. 283.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 C. W. P. Waters, ‘Anglo-Australian Conflict over the Cold War: H. V. Evatt as President of the UN
1994, pp. 294-316.
Wentworth criticised the United Nations and continued to advocate Russia’s expulsion. A reply to a question he asked Spender, indicated that the Liberal Party’s policy was in contrast to Wentworth’s own. Wentworth framed a question to Spender implying Russia was biding its time to build up atomic bomb stocks, and referred to a statement by the US Republican, Senator William F. Knowland, who was in favour of Russian expulsion from the UN. Asked whether the Government would give this matter consideration, Spender replied that it was ‘the policy of this Government, and of all governments of the other free nations of the world, to seek to confine the conflict that is taking place in Korea,’ before adding ‘I do not share the view of Senator Knowland’. Lacking support, Wentworth did not raise the issue of Russian expulsion from the UN in Parliament again, though he detailed what he believed were Evatt’s failings in *Time and the Bomb* in 1953.

**Eastern European Émigrés**

Wentworth sought to further involve himself with external affairs in this period by becoming involved with the eastern European émigré communities in Australia. Wentworth already had useful links in this area. Douglas Darby, the Liberal member for Manly in the New South Wales Parliament since 1945, was active with these groups. Darby and Wentworth were friends, and Darby lent his support to Wentworth’s bid for the new seat of Mackellar. In 1953, the Joint Baltic Committee formed an organisation

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33 CPD, H of R, 6 December 1950, 3773-4.  
34 Wentworth, *Time and the Bomb: An Analysis of the Atomic Situation*.  
known as the United Council of Migrants from behind the Iron Curtain.\textsuperscript{37} Lia Looveer, an Estonian born woman, was the Secretary of both the Committee and the Council. An advisory council of ‘old’ Australians was appointed and included Wentworth, Darby, Col. J. M. Prentice, Eileen Furley and Arleen Lower.\textsuperscript{38} Wentworth had also been involved with Richard Krygier, a Polish émigré, in the Political Research Society, an anti-Communist propaganda organisation during the 1940s.\textsuperscript{39} Krygier was the Australian representative of the international Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) from 1952, and in 1954 founded its Australian affiliate, the Australian Association for Cultural Freedom (AACF). The CCF was supported by funds channelled from the American Central Intelligence Agency in order to combat Soviet cultural diplomacy.\textsuperscript{40} Indeed, Saunders states that the CCF was the centrepiece of the American covert propaganda effort during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{41} Krygier claimed that Wentworth, along with the National Civic Council’s B. A. Santamaria and anti-Communist trade union figure Laurie Short, were members of the AACF. McLaren contends, however, that whilst all three maintained close contact with Krygier, none were official members of his organisation.\textsuperscript{42} Wentworth also had contacts within the Russian Anti-Communist Centre. He wrote to External Affairs Minister Richard Casey concerning this organisation in January 1953. Wentworth offered Casey a preview of the group’s activities, which he claimed was given to him three months earlier ‘by a friend who is interested in it’.\textsuperscript{43} This link is

\textsuperscript{38} Darby, \textit{A Try For Manly}, ch. 26, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{39} The Political Research Society is dealt with in more detail in Chapter IV.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} Wentworth to Casey, 28 January 1953, NAA A6122, 166.
particularly important, as it helps to explain Wentworth’s actions during the Petrov Affair. Manne states that Wentworth learned of demonstrations to be held at Mascot airfield on the night Mrs. Petrov was to be spirited out of the country through his contacts with Sydney refugees.\textsuperscript{44} Wentworth was present at the demonstration and collected statutory declarations during the noisy protest from witnesses who could speak Russian. The witnesses claimed that Mrs. Petrov had cried out that she did not want to go. These people were introduced to Wentworth by Krygier, who was also present.\textsuperscript{45} The press, meanwhile, attributed the organising role in the demonstration to a Russian, N. P. Harkoff, who was head of the Russian Anti-Communist Centre – the same organisation Wentworth’s ‘friend’ had given him information on.\textsuperscript{46} By the time of the Petrov Affair, it is clear that Wentworth was involved in the politics of the Eastern European émigrés and had developed a substantial network of contacts among the refugee community.

**Attacking Labor**

The Petrov Affair, involving the defection of the Soviet Embassy’s Third Secretary, Vladimir Petrov and his wife Evdokia (both of whom were also Russian intelligence officers) to Australia, was the catalyst for a split in the Labor Party. Evatt turned on the anti-Communist Industrial Groups in the ALP, who were supported predominantly by Catholics and had the backing of B. A. Santamaria’s Catholic Social Studies Movement (CSSM, also known as the ‘Movement’). In explaining why the ALP had lost the 1954 election which followed Petrov’s defection, Evatt argued:

\textsuperscript{45} McLaren, *Writing in Hope and Fear*, p. 117.
\textsuperscript{46} ‘Anti-Red Chief: “I’ve Evidence”’, *Sun*, 22 April 1954, p. 5.
In the election, one factor told heavily against us – the attitude of a small minority of members, located particularly in the State of Victoria, which has, since 1949, become increasingly disloyal to the Labor Movement and the Labor leadership. Adopting methods which strikingly resemble both Communist and Fascist infiltration of larger groups, some of these groups have created an almost intolerable situation, calculated to deflect the Labor Movement from the pursuit of Labor objectives and ideals.  

Evatt brought the issue before the Federal Executive of the ALP, which called a special Conference of the Victorian branch of the party to elect a new executive. At the Federal Conference of the ALP in Hobart in March 1955, both the new and old executives attended. The old, anti-Communist executive was, however, locked out and its members expelled from the ALP. This split in the ALP led to the creation of the Australian Labor Party (Anti-Communist), which soon became the Democratic Labor Party. The series of events which led to the split were further evidence to Wentworth of Communist influence within the ALP. Speaking in an interview in the mid-1980s, Wentworth said he ‘always had a great deal of time for Santamaria’, praising him for being ‘engaged in the anti-Communist cause’ and because of his ‘genuine religious background’.  

Morgan describes the two as frequent correspondents. Indeed, Wentworth had cultivated links with Catholic anti-Communists when he had sought Catholic representation in the 

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Political Research Society a decade earlier.\textsuperscript{50} It is hardly surprising, then, that Wentworth attacked Evatt for purging the only section of the Labor Party which vehemently opposed Communism, a faction with which Wentworth had collaborated to fight the Communist menace. Wentworth criticised Evatt over a range of areas, including what he believed was Evatt’s ‘deliberate provocation’ of the Royal Commission on Espionage, his defence of Communists, and his acceptance of Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov’s denial of espionage.\textsuperscript{51} Wentworth saw only one explanation of Evatt’s behaviour.

He has not done this, the House will feel assured, in any spirit of honesty, because he, as a former justice of the High Court of Australia, must know that the things he is saying are incredible and that the course he is taking is ethically wrong. He has not done these things in the interests of his party. He has contrived to split and decimate his party and will shortly destroy it. No one would think that he is doing this in the interests of the Government. He has not done it in his own interests, because this has hurt him throughout. Why has he done it? I put the explanation to the House – the explanation that I think the House must accept: he has done it in the interests of Soviet Russia.\textsuperscript{52}

Wentworth believed Evatt was ‘under some kind of compulsion’ from Communists, who had applied what Wentworth called ‘the Burgess and MacLean technique’.\textsuperscript{53} Wentworth detailed Evatt’s political history, attempting to show that Evatt owed his rise through the


\textsuperscript{51} CPD, H of R, 26 October 1955, pp. 1932-4.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p. 1934.

\textsuperscript{53} Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean were members of the Cambridge Five, who worked as British intelligence officers and diplomats and spied for the Soviet Union.
ALP and into public office to Communist elements within the Labor Party. He claimed Evatt was exposed ‘now almost in the open as a Communist agent’. Later, he would refer to Evatt as the leader of the ‘pro-Communist wing of the Labor Party’ and accuse him of ‘swamping’ the anti-Communist faction, which Wentworth said had been ‘liquidated’. This sinister interpretation of Evatt’s actions during the Petrov Affair reveals Wentworth’s own capacity for sensing conspiracies, a capacity matched only by Evatt’s own. Wentworth’s elaborate portrayal of Evatt’s apparent long association with Communism, stretching back to the 1930s, shows that he believed that the Soviet Union was not only conducting espionage in Australia, but had a long term strategy of interference with domestic Australian politics with Evatt at its centre. This illuminates Wentworth’s thinking on Soviet foreign policy as it related to Australia. In addition, Wentworth’s attitude toward Evatt, the leader of the ALP, helps to explain Wentworth’s attitude to the Labor Party as a whole.

In February 1956 ALP Deputy Leader Arthur Calwell stated that Labor would refuse to serve on the Foreign Affairs Committee because of the ‘scandalous slanderous attacks’ made upon the ALP by members of the Coalition. Wentworth had been a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee since early 1952. Wentworth claimed not to have impugned the loyalty of the Labor Party, though he did impugn the loyalty of some individual Labor members. He pointed out to Calwell that he was not one whose loyalty he questioned. He believed Calwell, ‘due to his unexpected election to the deputy

\[54\] CPD, H of R, 26 October 1955, pp.1932-5.
\[55\] Ibid., pp. 1934-5.
\[56\] CPD, H of R, 29 February 1956, p. 388.
\[57\] CPD, H of R, 22 February 1956, p. 132.
leadership,’ felt obliged to ‘support the pro-Communist policies’ of Evatt ‘though he himself may disagree with them’. He attacked Calwell’s contradictory arguments, firstly that there could be no bipartisan foreign policy and secondly that the joint Foreign Affairs Committee should have more power. In fact, Wentworth believed that the ALP should only be represented on the Committee if it remained ‘an educational and not an executive committee’. He also suggested that the information given to the Committee by the responsible minister may not be as candid ‘if the committee included members of the Opposition who happened, individually, to be people whom the Government did not think were loyal’.

Labor MP Les Haylen stated that Wentworth, on the first day the Foreign Affairs Committee sat, accused Dr. John Burton, a former External Affairs officer, of treason and sought to use the Committee to have him investigated. Wentworth said he made no apology for the report on Burton, made in common with other members of the Committee, and accused Burton of having links with both the Communist Party and the Labor Party. Indeed, Wentworth believed Burton was one of the links between the two parties, and said that Burton had signed a report overseas which came very close to treason. Referring to a statement in which Calwell said he did not like Wentworth being on the Committee, he again made no apology for seeing foreign affairs in terms of ‘a conflict between the two systems of communism and freedom’. He accused Calwell of ‘cringing servility’ to Evatt, who was leading the ALP in the direction of Communism. Wentworth’s use of the Committee to investigate Burton shows that he felt that the Foreign Affairs Committee should be used as a tool to fight Communism.

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60 Ibid., p. 133.
61 Ibid., p. 135.
This is reinforced by his view that only those ‘loyal’ Labor MPs should serve on the Committee. His resistance to the Committee being an executive Committee whilst it partly consisted of ALP members illustrated Wentworth’s suspicions of the Communist influence within the Labor Party and, hence, Labor’s untrustworthiness.

**International Dangers**

The year 1956 was a turning point for both Wentworth and the Cold War. As canvassed in the previous chapter, this was the year in which Wentworth first suggested an Australian nuclear deterrent. In Russia, meanwhile, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) General Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev, was consolidating his position as leader. On 25 February, 1956, Khrushchev delivered a report titled *On the Personality Cult and its Consequences* to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU which denounced the regime of former General Secretary and Soviet Premier, Josef Stalin. In the Australian Parliament, Wentworth pointed out that the Soviet officials now denouncing Stalin were active supporters of Stalin’s regime, had never criticised the regime in the past, and ‘were active participants in the loathsome crimes of Stalinism which they now profess to denounce’. Wentworth took into account the history of Khrushchev and other Soviet officials and questioned the sincerity of the denunciation.⁶³ In May he pointed out that the Soviet Union had denounced the ‘murders, tortures and slave labour that characterized Stalinism’, but still maintained a close relationship with Communist China ‘whose leaders have indulged, and are still indulging, in similar practices’.⁶⁴

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Hungarian uprising which began on 23 October 1956 was to prove a test of the Soviet Union’s sincerity.

Wentworth was a consistent campaigner for Eastern European countries behind the Iron Curtain, including Hungary. In March 1956, Wentworth had urged the Australian Government to be more vocal in condemning the continuing Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe. In April he urged that Australia renounce extradition treaties with Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in order to remove the fear of immigrants to Australia ‘that forces behind the iron curtain will seize them and drag them back to death because they dared to oppose communism’. The Suez Canal Crisis, during which British, French and Israeli troops were in conflict with Egypt, occurred contemporaneously with the Hungarian uprising. Wentworth believed that events there only distracted from the ‘much more important events which were taking place in Budapest’. Indeed, Western embarrassment over Suez was seen to have resulted in their failure to respond to events in Budapest.

He addressed representatives of the Hungarian community outside Parliament House in Canberra. Along with Douglas Darby, he was at the airport to greet the first Hungarian refugees from the crisis. Later, he addressed a rally in the Sydney Domain where he shared a stage with, among others, Hungarian émigré, Laszlo Megay. Megay was the President of the

65 CPD, H of R, 13 March 1956, p. 735.
66 CPD, H of R, 12 April 1956, p. 1336.
Hungarists Association in Sydney, and also a member of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, the right wing anti-Communist group of émigrés.\textsuperscript{72} In 1953 he had been elected President of the Federal Council of Hungarian Organisations in Australia and was also the President of the Hungarian Liberation Movement in New South Wales.\textsuperscript{73} He would later join the Liberal Party and become influential in its Migrant Advisory Council.\textsuperscript{74} Wentworth argued that the Australian Government should put the view to the United Nations that:

\begin{quote}
No representative of a regime imposed upon Hungary by Russian force of arms is entitled to be accredited as the representative of Hungary in the United Nations, and that the Government of Hungary be recognized by the United Nations as the one which has appealed to the United Nations for protection against aggressive Russian designs and action in Hungary.\textsuperscript{75}
\end{quote}

Perhaps the most original of Wentworth’s ideas, however, was his suggestion just before Christmas in 1956 of a peaceful march into Hungary by a United Nations delegation. Wentworth believed this delegation should be led by the Pope and other world leaders. He later recounted that ‘the feeling would have been that you couldn’t shoot down that front line’. He believed that this march into Budapest could have ‘reversed the tide of world history’, though admitted that the potential of such an action would have been

\textsuperscript{73} Playford, \textit{The Truth Behind “Captive Nations Week” & The extremist émigrés – ABN (Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations) in Australia}, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{74} Aarons, \textit{War Criminals Welcome}, p. 318.
\textsuperscript{75} CPD, H of R, 8 November 1956, p. 2133.
Following the crushing of the Hungarian resistance, Wentworth continued to stand up for Hungarian refugees in Australia. In April 1957 he publicly attacked the Australian Engineering Union, which he said was Communist controlled, for refusing trade testing and registration of Hungarian engineers who had fled Budapest. In September 1957 Wentworth was still championing the cause of Hungary, lamenting that the West ‘made no physical intervention while the Hungarian people were trampled into blood and dust’. He believed that the Hungarian example could be a weapon against the Soviet Union in the Cold War, citing examples of how, in countries outside Russia, former Communists had become disillusioned following the events in Budapest.

In December 1957, Wentworth was attacking the ‘naïve view’ of Evatt, who he said believed ‘that all we have to do in order to solve international problems is to call a summit conference’. He argued that the United Nations was a ‘perpetual forum’ and was in effect a continual summit conference, but that the Russians had abused it for the purposes of delay and propaganda. Wentworth returned to the question of ALP representation on the Foreign Affairs Committee in February 1958. He again criticised Evatt when explaining why he did not think Labor representation was possible.

I believed that we could fashion in this Parliament a bi-partisan foreign policy. That was at a time when the then leader of the Labour [sic] party [Chifley] took a very different view of foreign affairs from that taken by the party’s present leader [Evatt]. Those were the days when the ascendancy of Communist influences in certain sections of the

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77 CPD, H of R, 4 April 1957, p. 594.
79 CPD, H of R, 5 December 1957, p. 2951.
Parliamentary Labour [sic] party was not so evident, and there was some hope that these
Communist influences would be driven back by the saner and more loyal elements inside
the party itself. 80

Wentworth went further, suggesting that if there were ALP representation, the House
should be able to prevent certain ALP members from being on the Committee due to their
‘pro-Russian affiliations’. He said that a failure to do so would remove the certainty that
vital information would not be leaked from the Committee. 81 In March, he argued that
the affiliation with the ALP of various Communist controlled trade unions made it
undesirable that the Committee include members of the Labor Party. Testimonies of
those who had found the ALP’s ‘pro-Communist policy so intolerable that, at
considerable personal loss to themselves, they found it necessary to separate themselves
from it’ (i.e. Democratic Labor Party members) further proved this point. 82

In March 1958 the Labor MP for the Western Melbourne seat of Lalor, Reg
Pollard, argued against the refusal of the Government to allow a Chinese Communist
leader and his interpreter visit Australia for a six week tour. To Wentworth, what Pollard
was advocating was ‘one-way traffic’. Wentworth contended that the nations of the West
were not free to go to Communist countries and spread anti-Communist propaganda, and
as such, Communists should be prevented from doing so in Australia. He referred to the
recent decision of the Communist Chinese Government to refuse permission to Lord
Michael Lindsay to enter China. 83

80 CPD, H of R, 27 February 1958, p. 78.
81 Ibid.
83 Ibid., pp. 830-1.
Lord Lindsay of Birker was a British Sinologist. He lectured in Beijing before World War II. In 1941 he married Hsiao Li, whose father was a military commander for Chinese warlord Yan Xishan. When the Japanese invaded China, Lindsay and Li fought alongside Communists as guerrillas against the occupation. Lindsay met with the Foreign Affairs Committee in 1952 prior to the Peking Peace Conference. Later that year, he forwarded to Wentworth a critical letter he had received from New Zealand Communist Rewi Alley, a member of the Chinese Communist Party, which praised Communist China and spoke in laudatory terms of the Peace Conference. The tone of Lindsay’s covering letter to Wentworth, in which he refers to one woman as having ‘fellow-traveller tendencies’ and wonders whether Alley will be allowed to receive his reply, indicates that Lindsay himself opposed Communism. In 1954 Lindsay was given a leave of absence from his post as Senior Fellow in International Relations at the Australian National University to be the translator for a British Labour Party delegation led by former British Prime Minister Clement Attlee during their visit to China. Wentworth believed Lindsay was now being excluded from China because he could speak Chinese, and because he had, through his wife’s family, people in China ‘who could give him the truth’. His ability to make contacts distinguished him from those whose visits China could stage manage, particularly those who could not speak Chinese themselves. His criticism of China was not limited to the Lindsay visit, however. In 1957 he compared the recent Chinese suppression of revolts in Tibet to the Soviet actions

84 Information on Hsiao Li and Lord Lindsay (then Michael Lindsay) can be found in Hsiao Li Lindsay, Bold Plum: with the Guerillas in China’s War against Japan, Lulu, Morrisville, North Carolina, 2007.
85 Lindsay to Wentworth, 2 September 1952, NAA A1838, 563/5/1.
86 ‘Lord Lindsay to be Interpreter for Mr. Attlee’s Party’, The Canberra Times, 10 July 1954, p. 2.
in Hungary during 1956. In September 1958 he opposed trade with China, fearing that an Australian economy reliant on exports to China would be vulnerable should China maliciously decide to cut off trade. In April 1959, following the escape of the Dalai Lama to India, Wentworth attacked Chinese claims that he had been abducted and quoted the Malayan Foreign Minister, who strongly criticised Chinese actions in Tibet. Wentworth continued to argue against trade with China in May 1959, demanding to know who sponsored a Chinese trade delegation to Australia. Wentworth argued that China had cut off trade arbitrarily with Japan in order to extract political concessions for Communists, and that only the fortitude of the Japanese prevented this. He feared that trade was opening the door for Chinese interference in Australian politics. His argument also addressed trade with Russia, quoting Khrushchev’s consideration that trade could be a political weapon. Wentworth said that trade with Communist countries was, in effect, arming the Communist fifth column.

In addition to condemning China, Wentworth was an ardent supporter of the Republic of China (Taiwan). In this he had allies within the Parliamentary Liberal Party. Hancock refers to Wentworth, along with Wilfrid Kent Hughes and John Gorton, as members of the ‘Formosa lobby’ which supported Taiwan’s independence from China. This support contrasted with the views of the External Affairs Minister, Richard Casey. Casey had become convinced in 1951 that the Communist regime was firmly entrenched in power on the mainland. He had met Chinese Premier Chou En-lai in Geneva in 1954.

90 CPD, H of R, 9 April 1959, p. 1128.
91 CPD, H of R, 6 May 1959, p. 1870.
Casey ignored American suggestions in 1955 that Australia should establish a diplomatic mission in Taipei, and declared that Australia was under no obligation to contribute to Taiwan’s defence when trouble began to flare with Communist China later that year. On this latter point, however, Casey was contradicted by Menzies.\textsuperscript{94} Wentworth recalled in a later interview that he was a supporter of Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo of the Kuomintang. He believed a push from Taiwan could be successful in retaking mainland China. Whilst he did not believe that this would take the form of an invasion, he thought that, should there be a revolution against the Communists on the mainland, ‘intervention from Taiwan could have been a decisive factor’.\textsuperscript{95} How far into the Cold War Wentworth held this view and how likely he believed a revolution to occur is not clear, though it does shed some light on his aim of spreading anti-Communist propaganda in Communist China. In September 1959 Wentworth was ‘amazed at the continued failure’ of the Australian Government to establish an embassy in Taipei. He argued:

Free China, which at present is located in Formosa, is one of the countries which should be the first concern of Australia in the establishment of diplomatic relations. This is a country which is thoroughly on our side. This is a country which is making tremendous efforts to maintain a defence force which is part of the shield keeping Australia safe, and no mean part of that shield.\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{95} Hurst and Wentworth, ‘Interview with William Charles Wentworth, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, p. 4:12.
\textsuperscript{96} CPD, H of R, 3 September 1959, pp. 939-40.
Wentworth also wanted the benefits of the Colombo Plan to be extended to Free China, and argued Australia should divert some of the resources given to other Asian allies to Taipei. 97

**United Nations**

Wentworth had been an ardent critic of the United Nations. He believed the Soviets had employed it as a device to stall for time to build an atomic bomb in the late 1940s. By 1956 he believed that Russia intended to control the UN, and that this explained the ‘new Russian intrigues in South America and South-East Asia, and throughout the Mohammedan world’. 98 The following year he argued that the United Nations was weaker than the League of Nations, the organisation it was set up to replace. However, Wentworth did not want the UN abolished. He believed it was necessary – though inadequate and in need of reform. The United Nations, Wentworth claimed, was set up for two reasons. Firstly, it was set up to police atomic weapons, which he said ‘uncontrolled, would spell humanity’s doom’. The second was to end ‘the impact of tyranny, the impact of its last assault on the free world’. Wentworth contended that the state of world affairs must end with either ‘the end of tyranny, or the end of freedom’. He argued that the assault on freedom was ‘a continuation of the assault of the nazi creed’, before claiming that Communism was older than Nazism and that the roots of Nazism lay in Communism. Nazism, Wentworth claimed, was merely ‘an aberration on the main stem’ of Communism. 99 Later that year, when arguing that the UN was an alternative to Evatt’s summit proposals, Wentworth suggested that the United Nations

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97 Ibid.
was able to provide everything a summit could, provided that parties go to the UN with goodwill and not use it to stall, delay and spread propaganda, as he argued the Russians had done.\textsuperscript{100}

Eventually, Wentworth’s frustration at Russia’s treatment of the United Nations led him to completely lose faith in the organisation. In June 1958, the Lebanese Government appealed to the UN for help. In the meantime, the United States had sent troops to Lebanon to protect the Government, pending the United Nations action. Wentworth recounted for the House how the only country against sending a UN force to Lebanon was the Soviet Union, which used its veto. The Soviet Union then proposed that Lebanon be left to its fate, a vote which two countries abstained from, whilst the eight others voted against the Soviet proposal. A Japanese proposal that the United Nations observer group be expanded to replace the Americans, who would be withdrawn, was favoured by ten of eleven nations, but again vetoed by the Soviet Union. Speaking in Parliament, Wentworth argued:

It is no use just going through the legal form of saying, “We will put this into the hands of the United Nations”, because if the United Nations is hamstrung by Russian veto and Russian intervention then simply to raise the catch cry, “Let the United Nations deal with it”, is to say, “Let nobody deal with it at all”.\textsuperscript{101}

Attacking criticisms of American intervention from Dr. Evatt, Wentworth claimed that Evatt omitted the main fact of the situation: the United States had tried to put the matter

\textsuperscript{100} CPD, H of R, 5 December 1957, p. 2951.
\textsuperscript{101} CPD, H of R, 7 August 1958, pp. 156-9.
in the hands of the United Nations but was thwarted by the Russian veto. By April 1960 Wentworth argued that the United Nations was no deterrent to any limited war due to the power of the veto, which he described as paralysing the organisation.

It is surprising, given Wentworth’s scepticism as to the ability of the United Nations to function properly, that Wentworth was selected as a member of the Australian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1960. Even while acknowledging his pride at his selection, Wentworth attacked the Russian use of the United Nations as a propaganda forum. Wentworth later recalled his visit to the United Nations, claiming he ‘misbehaved from the Australian point of view’ as he spoke up with undiplomatic candour against the Soviet Union in committee meetings and ‘had the distinction of having my remarks stricken from the record by the Chairman of one of those committees who was himself a Communist’. He spoke out against Stalin and was ‘most disgusted with the Americans’, who he felt did too little to stand up for themselves and criticise the Soviet Union. Wentworth recalled:

I not only had my remarks stricken from the record by the Communists, I had the Australians saying I mustn’t say this kind of thing. I had my officer behind tagging and trying to pull me down. But worse than that, the Americans asked me not to do it. I forget who was head of the American delegation. He is a man well known. He asked me to come and see him and not to do it. Now, it was very difficult to know what to do. I felt I had gone as far as I could. I went further than anybody else. Looking back on it I

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am sorry that I didn’t go a bit further and defy both the Australian authorities and the American authorities. I think I should have.\textsuperscript{105}

In the wake of such outbursts, it is perhaps not surprising that Wentworth was prevented by the Australian Government from appearing on American television. When Labor MP Eddie Ward asked Prime Minister Robert Menzies about this in May 1961, Menzies confirmed that a scheduled television appearance had been withdrawn. Menzies stated that Wentworth had been asked to appear on television and, after consulting the leader of the United Nations delegation, was advised not to.\textsuperscript{106} Wentworth denied seeking approval to appear,\textsuperscript{107} however, and believed his views had been censored.\textsuperscript{108} Whilst this prevented Wentworth appearing on television, it did not stop him sending a letter to the \textit{New York Times}, attacking what he called ‘Soviet Colonialism’.\textsuperscript{109}

Upon his return to Australia, Wentworth set out to further expose Russia’s tactics at the United Nations. He claimed that ‘Soviet officials and certain undercover Soviet associates’ were suggesting in New York that if the West did not pursue issues relating to Hungary or Tibet on the UN agenda, the Russians would cease their obstruction of the United Nations and allow it to function normally. Garfield Barwick, the Attorney-General, was also at the United Nations and recalled these tactics which he alleged were ‘disgraceful in a deliberative assembly’ and stated that the Australian delegation would

\textsuperscript{105} Hurst and Wentworth, ‘Interview with William Charles Wentworth, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, p. 13:12.
\textsuperscript{106} CPD, H of R, 17 & 18 May 1961, p. 2060.
\textsuperscript{107} Hurst and Wentworth, ‘Interview with William Charles Wentworth, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, p. 14:1.
support any moves to keep the issues of Hungary and Tibet under review. Wentworth believed that the Berlin Crisis of 1961 was carefully orchestrated by the Soviet Union to coincide with a resumption of nuclear weapons testing. In this instance, Wentworth believed the United Nations would once again become an arena where the Soviet Union could employ delaying tactics. Speaking on the death of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, Wentworth explained that any successor would have to be approved by the Soviet Union, who he accused of preventing the operation of the UN and attempting to make it a futile organisation. He said even one of the translators appointed to the UN had turned out to be operating as a Soviet espionage agent. Urging Parliament to rethink its attitude to the United Nations, Wentworth argued that the UN could not be an effective international organisation ‘because of defects in its constitution and composition’. He contended that the United Nations should be abolished as it occupied the ground a useful organisation would stand on. Believing that it was dangerous to rely on the UN, Wentworth claimed that ‘in its present ineffective form it stands as a bar to the survival of humanity’. Recalling his views on the subject more than twenty years later, Wentworth felt the world would have been different had the UN been abolished, and that something more effective would have taken its place. In the eyes of Wentworth, the United Nations was unable to perform the duties for which it was constituted: controlling atomic weapons and to fight the assault of tyranny against the world, a tyranny Wentworth identified exclusively with Communism.

110 CPD, H of R, 9 March 1961, pp.84-5.
One interesting area in which Communism affected Wentworth’s views was the entry of Britain into the European Economic Community (EEC). Wentworth fervently believed in the monarchy, with the Queen as head of state. He did not, however, oppose British membership of the EEC, a move which many saw as both detrimental to the Australian economy and downgrading the importance of the Commonwealth. Wentworth’s colleague, Jim Killen, for example, toured Britain in 1962 opposing the move into the Common Market with controversial League of Rights Director, Eric Butler. Wentworth, however, believed that the disruption caused in Australia could be met by appropriate adjustments. Wentworth recalled later:

But having regard to the international situation I thought that on balance, not for trade purposes but for other purposes, it would probably be advantageous for Britain to enter into it [the EEC] and as such in the long term interests of Australia. The degree of political insecurity in the European Economic Community would have been much greater if Britain had not entered into it... Overall it has been to the benefit of Australia. Not from the trade point of view, from the security point of view.

Britain’s attempt to join the EEC was unsuccessful in 1963, though Wentworth’s comments were made well after Britain eventually joined in 1973. The primacy of the world situation as it related to Communism as a consideration for his views is clear.

Another of Wentworth’s ideas was a world government. He had mentioned this as early as 1961, criticising the United Nations for being an impediment to this end.\textsuperscript{117} In 1964 he believed that world government, with a world police force, was necessary to prevent the emergence of a ‘disastrous multilateral nuclear situation’.\textsuperscript{118} Wentworth’s advocacy of world government is curious, as it shares many of the features Waters attributes to liberal internationalism. Aspects of this policy which Waters associates with liberal internationalism include beliefs in world governance, internationalised armed forces, international control of the arms trade and the application of the rule of law internationally.\textsuperscript{119} On the face of it, it would seem that Wentworth’s attitude to world government corresponded with many aspects of Evatt’s views. The difference seems to be that Wentworth never believed world government was ever a serious possibility, and treated it as a hypothetical and unattainable ideal. In contrast to liberal internationalists, Waters describes foreign policy realists as supporting power politics, alliance diplomacy and Australia’s alignment with the Western powers in the Cold War.\textsuperscript{120} An evaluation of Wentworth’s views since the publication of \textit{Demand for Defence} shows that Wentworth sits comfortably in this category. The realist position is embodied in what Waters terms Cold War liberalism. Cold War liberals believed that power was the primary determinant of international relations, and that Australia, as a small power, must become intertwined with its powerful Western allies. They thought that Australia must be of such use and value to its allies that they would defend it in case of attack. Waters also describes a total

\textsuperscript{117} CPD, H of R, 26 September 1964, p. 1309.
\textsuperscript{118} CPD, H of R, 19 March 1964, p. 713-4.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
opposition to Communism and support for democracy (though not at the expense of maintaining the anti-Communist front) as features of Cold War liberalism.\textsuperscript{121} Though his advocacy of world government seems an apparent contradiction, Wentworth was an ardent advocate of the Cold War liberal school of thought.

Recounting his views later, Wentworth stated that his ideas on world government were related to his views on the ineffectiveness of the United Nations. He felt that world government was necessary because of the ‘inherent instability in the proliferation of nuclear and other aggressive capability in the hands of small countries’.\textsuperscript{122} Wentworth’s belief in the necessity of a world government further underlines his belief that, due to Russian abuse, the United Nations was unworkable as a useful international organisation. Wentworth felt that peace should be imposed by force if necessary, calling the failure to prevent the Russian atomic bomb ‘moral cowardice’. Wentworth argued that China had to be stopped from gaining nuclear capacity, and quoted Khrushchev’s opinion that a nuclear armed China would provoke a war ‘which would destroy half humanity as well as most of the Chinese people’. He stated:

\begin{quote}
I am one of those who believe in disarmament and in world government, but I say that in order to achieve these things we must take a much firmer line in the future than we have taken in the past. It is no use running away again.\textsuperscript{123}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{123} CPD, H of R, 19 March 1964, p. 715.
Wentworth’s advocacy of the imposition of peace through the use of force against China (and earlier Russia) helps to explain the apparent contradiction between his calls for world government and his realist foreign policy approach. Instead of advocating a genuine world government, Wentworth’s calls were in actual fact an appeal for an alliance against the Communist powers. His advocacy of world government must be seen in terms of alliance building and power politics, rather than liberal internationalism. Indeed, Wentworth explicitly stated that force should be used against China, and Chinese atomic factories destroyed in a March 1965 speech republished in the émigré journal *News Digest – International.*

Wentworth recounted the 1957 views of Soviet theoretician Mikhail Suslov, who warned of Communist China’s aggressive intentions. He then gave an account of how the Soviet Union had split with China and withdrawn Soviet technicians, attempting to ‘trip up the great leap forward’. Wentworth was against resolving the issue within the United Nations, as Communist China was not a member and he argued that their admission would further paralyse the UN. He did, however, suggest that the United Nations be the organisation to destroy China’s nuclear capability. Though he had little faith in the organisation, he clearly hoped that it would undertake what he saw as its ‘plain duty’ under the United Nations Charter, fulfilling a role which he had envisaged for a world government with a world police force.

**Wentworth and the Extremist Émigrés**

Wentworth had remained active in the politics of ‘New Australians’, maintaining his links with organisations such as the United Council of Migrants from behind the Iron 

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Curtain and the Australian Association for Cultural Freedom. The Liberal Party had also founded a Migrant Advisory Council in 1957. This included Lia Looveer, Laszlo Megay and Romanian Constantin Untaru. Megay and Untaru were also prominent members of the international Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, which ASIO considered pro-Nazi and of the extreme right in a 1955 report to Menzies and the Cabinet. The ABN had campaigned internationally for the declaration of Captive Nations Week, which sought to highlight the plight of nations behind the Iron Curtain. Jaroslav Stetsko, a prominent Ukranian émigré and leader of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations internationally, had arrived in Australia during 1957 to start a local chapter of the ABN. In Australia, the ABN also campaigned for the recognition of Captive Nations Week. Wentworth was a supporter of these efforts, addressing six hundred people at an ABN rally demanding that Captive Nations Week be recognised in Australia in September 1963. This meeting commemorated the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations. Speaking after Untaru, Wentworth told the crowd gathered at Croatian House in Sydney that Communism was more of a threat than Nazism was in 1938 and 1939. He urged those present to expose Communism in Australia. Wentworth was already acquainted with the Captive Nations campaign internationally, receiving a presentation from the President of the Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN), V. Sidzikauskas, of the flags of that organisation’s nine

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127 Aarons, War Criminals Welcome, p. 314-5.
128 Ibid., 314-6.
member nations whilst at the United Nations in New York. The Nation later criticised Wentworth, arguing that Australia extended ACEN no diplomatic recognition and that he should not have taken cognisance of the group. In turn, émigré organisations including ACEN sent letters to the editor in support of Wentworth. A 1961 article described him as ‘a staunch friend of the Captive Nations of East Central Europe’ when reporting Wentworth’s views given on Meet the Press. Wentworth was even the subject of a Radio Moscow broadcast after meeting with an Estonian émigré wanted for extradition by the USSR. With the backing of the ABN, the Captive Nations Week Committee (CNWC) was established in Australia in 1965. Shortly after, Wentworth was proposed as a patron for the organisation, a position which he occupied in both the CNWC and the organisation which succeeded it, the Captive Nations Council of New South Wales (CNCNSW), until well after his political career. This later included a brief stint as Vice-President of the CNCNSW in 1973. Cottle and Keys argue that only Douglas Darby, who served as President of the CNWC and CNCNSW, was a committed Captive Nations activist. Their rationale is that the biographies of other politicians involved do not mention the Captive Nations movement. In Wentworth’s case, this can be explained by the lack of a biography rather than the lack of committed activism.

132 ‘Mr. Wentworth’s Road’, Nation, no. 240, 30 March 1968, p. 15.
135 Aarons, War Criminals Welcome, p. 332.
Wentworth maintained involvement with émigré organisations and publicly championed their cause for the remainder of his career.

A prominent aspect of Wentworth’s long running support of the Captive Nations was his defence of the Ustasha. The Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP) was an organisation headed by former members of the Ustasha, which had acted as a puppet Government for Nazi Germany in Croatia during World War II. It was led by Ante Pavelic, the wartime dictator of the Ustasha regime, until his death in 1959. The Australian Ustasha was split into the HOP led by Fabijan Lokokovic and the more extreme Croatian National Resistance (HNO) led by Srecko Rover. The Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (HRB) was a terrorist organisation also headed by Rover, and used the HNO as its political front. The HRB trained members in terrorism and weapon-handling. In 1963 members of the HRB travelled to Yugoslavia to conduct a sabotage raid, but were captured. Even the HOP, the more moderate faction, had a training camp near Wodonga on the Murray River. In Australia, the term Ustasha was often used to refer to any of these organisations, and also all of them collectively. The Ustasha were often defended by members of the Liberal Party. In 1963 Gorton argued that they should be allowed to express their views, whilst Senator William Spooner had referred to the Ustasha as patriots. Liberal member for Corio, Hubert Opperman, had commended the Ustasha from beneath of portrait of Pavelic. The DLP’s Senator Frank McManus was also a supporter, receiving a former Ustasha officer with Opperman at a

140 Aarons, *War Criminals Welcome*, p. 15.
function in 1966.\textsuperscript{142} If Wentworth was aware of the wartime records of some of the Ustasha members, and it is quite plausible he was, he did not seem to be bothered by it. Wentworth already had associates among Eastern European émigrés who had questionable pasts. In 1961, he took up the case of Ervin Viks, an Estonian who served as an officer in the Estonian Security Service during Nazi occupation. Wentworth claimed Viks was innocent of war crimes following an extradition request for him from the Soviet Union. The USSR accused Viks of participating in the mass slaughter of 12,000 at a camp in Tartu, before being involved with the execution of 2,499 civilians in the Tallinn-Harju prefecture. The Government did not extradite Viks, citing insufficient evidence of his alleged crimes.\textsuperscript{143} Laszlo Megay, the Hungarian émigré, had become President of the Australian branch of the ABN following Stetsko’s 1957 visit.\textsuperscript{144} Megay had been accused of placing 14,000 Jews into a makeshift ghetto whilst serving as Mayor of Ungvar, Hungary, during World War II. The accounts also accused him of beatings, robbery and rape.\textsuperscript{145} A Jewish Council dossier estimated that Megay had been involved in the deaths of as many as 18,000 Jews.\textsuperscript{146} Following Megay’s death in 1959, his successor as President of the Australian ABN was the Romanian émigré Constantin Untaru. Untaru denied being a member of the Romanian Iron Guard, which had taken part in mass killings of Jews during the war. He did, however, serve as treasurer to the Iron Guard National Government established in Romania in 1944.\textsuperscript{147} Wentworth had previously shared stages with both Megay and Untaru, and both had been senior members

\textsuperscript{142} M. Jurjevic, \textit{Ustasha under the Southern Cross}, M. Jurjevic, Melbourne, 1973, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{143} Aarons, \textit{War Criminals Welcome}, pp. 445-6.
\textsuperscript{144} Aarons, \textit{War Criminals Welcome}, p. 318.
\textsuperscript{145} Playford, \textit{The Truth Behind “Captive Nations Week” & The extremist émigrés – ABN (Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations) in Australia}, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{146} Aarons, \textit{War Criminals Welcome}, p. 318.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., pp. 328-9.
of the Liberal Party’s Migrant Advisory Committee. His willingness to overlook the suspected crimes and Fascist tendencies of the groups and individuals with which he associated is a smaller scale example of Wentworth’s Cold War liberalism. Waters argues that Cold War liberals supported democracy, though not at the expense of the anti-Communist front. If applied to Wentworth’s relationship with the émigrés, it can be seen that the anti-Communist front was more important to Wentworth than the undemocratic and even criminal tendencies or histories of his associates.

Wentworth was familiar with the tensions between Serbs and Croatians as he had informers in both communities. In 1960, Wentworth had passed information on to ASIO from Toni Kovacs, an émigré with ‘connections in the Yugoslav Consulate’. He also received an appraisal of Lyenko Urbancic, later to be influential in the ‘Uglies’ faction of the Liberal Party, in 1961. In 1963 J. Djurkovic, the President of the Anti-Communist Fund – Australia, sent Wentworth a letter with information on a suspected Communist and promises of ‘the names and addresses of the Communist nest in Melbourne and Adelaide’. Despite his informants on the subject Wentworth was unprepared for a television debate with Labor MP Dr. J. F. Cairns on 20 May 1964. Debating the activities of the Communist Party in Australia, Cairns challenged Wentworth’s claim that Government spokesmen had mentioned two extremist organisations in Australia with Communist links. Wentworth was able to pinpoint these quotations later on in Parliament, and challenged the veracity of Cairns’ own statements about the Yugoslav Settlers Association (YSA), an organisation Wentworth claimed were set up to attack the

148 Ibid., p. 330.
150 Wentworth to Barwick (Attorney-General), 28 January 1960, NAA A432, 1956/2196,.
152 Djurkovic to Wentworth, 5 June 1963, NAA A6119, 4067.
Ustasha. Cairns, in turn, accused Wentworth of trying to cover up his links with the Ustasha, which Cairns referred to as a Fascist organisation, and stated that Wentworth was photographed in front of the Ustasha flag underneath a picture of Ante Pavelic at a function six months earlier. After claiming that the Ustasha during World War II were responsible for the deaths of 750,000 Serbs, 65,000 Jews and 23,000 gypsies, Cairns argued:

I charge the honourable member for Mackellar with being willing to support genocide, if it goes under the flag of anti-communism, and I do not think a more serious charge could be made against anybody. The record of the honourable member for Mackellar in this country proves that to be true.153

Cairns stated that his only association with Yugoslav associations was with the Yugoslav Settlers Association, which he claimed in May 1964 was only established ‘a few weeks ago’. Wentworth argued in Parliament that the Association, which he said was associated with ‘Communist activities’, was at least nine months old and probably older if the preceding organisation, the Dalmatian Settlers Association, were considered. The YSA, Wentworth claimed, had addressed the Eureka Youth League, a Communist front. Basing his argument on the seemingly inconsequential comments from Cairns about the date of the formation, Wentworth argued that Cairns was deliberately misrepresenting his association with Communists. Cairns, in turn, argued that the YSA was only set up to expose the activities of the Ustasha in Australia. He claimed that the public campaign by the YSA had led to public inquiries by the Victorian and Commonwealth Governments.

which led to a cessation of violent acts by the Croatian Liberation Movement.\footnote{CPD, H of R, 19 August 1964, pp. 414-8.} This sort of exchange characterised the long running debate on the Ustasha between Wentworth and Cairns, with Wentworth defending the Ustasha and accusing its rival organisations of Communist association, and Cairns defending Yugoslav groups and criticising Wentworth for his links with what he believed to be Fascist groups.

In September 1964 Cairns turned his attention to the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, which he said was not only capable of violence, but already guilty of perpetrating violent acts. He accused the Menzies Government of being ‘prepared to shield and protect the most extreme Fascist type organisation that has ever existed in this country’. He outlined the links between the Ustasha organisations in Australia and the wartime regime and argued that they were training in Australia for terrorist activities in Australia and Yugoslavia. Cairns then referred to Government statements claiming that the Ustasha had never trained with the Australian Army, before producing photographs which he claimed showed Ustasha members in possession of an Australian tank (actually a personnel carrier) and conducting joint exercises with the Army. Wentworth’s response to Cairns’ accusations of collusion between the Ustasha and the Australian Government was predictable. Rather than address the points raised by Cairns, Wentworth compared Cairns’ behaviour to that of ‘a Communist propagandist’. He accused the Dalmatian Settlers Association and its successor, the Yugoslav Settlers Association, of being Communist fronts. He also claimed that Cairns, the patron of the YSA, had made statements in the House given to him by its President, Marjan Jurjevic, in order that Jurjevic could then republish Cairns’ statements free from any charge of libel. Still, Wentworth refused to acknowledge that the Ustasha was responsible for violence in
Australia. In his only reference to Ustasha violence, he went as far as to infer that it was Communist agent provocateurs among the Croatian organisations, rather than genuine Ustasha members, who were inciting violence.155 His remarks in the weeks afterwards ignored Ustasha violence altogether and concentrated on painting Jurjevic as having Communist affiliations.156 Ustasha violence was not the only aspect of the situation Wentworth overlooked. Wentworth’s willingness to overlook the wartime record of the Ustasha was undoubtedly due to its anti-Communist viewpoint. Of its alleged wartime crimes he stated only:

I believe that in the last war [World War II] in what is now Yugoslavia atrocities were committed on both sides. I think some of the things said against the Croatians are true. I think some of the things said against the Serbs are equally true. In the passions of war these things occur. We regret them. We condemn them. We hope they will not be resurrected in Australia.157

Not only was Wentworth willing to write off the crimes of the Ustasha regime as something that happens ‘in the passions of war’, but he downplayed their significance by suggesting that both sides were to blame. Indeed, Wentworth was willing to look past the wartime atrocities of anti-Communists as both Cairns had alleged, and his associations with members of the ABN had proved. When Baron Krupp, a convicted Nazi war criminal, entered Australia in 1958 Wentworth defended him. He argued that during the war Krupp was at least ‘acting as a citizen of his own country’, comparing him

unfavourably with the Australian Communist who ‘acts as an agent of a foreign power’.\textsuperscript{158} In contrast, his vehement condemnation of the Russian role in episodes such as the wartime Katyn Forest massacre in Poland and Soviet brutality in the Baltic states shows that his dismissal of such events as happening ‘in the passions of war’ did not apply to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{159} Wentworth’s attack on J. Paletskis, President of Lithuania and the leader of the Soviet delegation to the Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting in Canberra in April 1966, is a further example of this double standard.

It would not be normal, of course, to criticise the delegates from other countries who come here to attend the meetings. But there are limits and I think in the interests of decency something should be said about one of the delegates, the leader of the Soviet delegation, Mr. J. Paletskis. I have checked and have found that he is identical with the Mr. J. Paletskis who was appointed by the Soviet to be head of the puppet government in Lithuania in June 1940. He was president of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic in those days.\textsuperscript{160}

Wentworth accused Paletskis’ Government of being responsible for 65,000 forced deportations, and read accounts of mass torture and execution.\textsuperscript{161} Wentworth’s determination to highlight the war crimes of men like Paletskis was commendable, and was praised by the émigré groups through their organ, the \textit{News Digest – International}.\textsuperscript{162} However, Wentworth not only failed to criticise or condemn other wartime Governments

\textsuperscript{158} CPD, H of R, 12 March 1958, p. 262.
\textsuperscript{159} CPD, H of R, 16 March 1961, pp. 371-2.
\textsuperscript{160} CPD, H of R, 20 April 1966, p. 1023.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
such as the Hungarian Arrow Cross, the Romanian Iron Guard or the Croatian Ustasha, but worked with their members to fight Communism in Australia. This shows quite clearly that Wentworth’s view of World War II was shaped not by events which occurred then, but by the contemporary conflict between Communism and the Free World. Wentworth, like many others in the Liberal Party, turned a blind eye to the uncomfortable aspects of the Eastern European émigrés such as alleged wartime crimes and terrorism, as his eyes were always firmly fixed on the Communist menace.

Wentworth was predictably vociferous following the ‘return to Stalinism’ indicated by the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Wentworth argued that the invasion proved that the Soviet Union was duplicitous, treacherous and aggressive. Comparing the invasion to the events in Hungary during 1956, he recounted how Hungarian leader Imre Nagy was executed.

They will remember, too, how the Hungarian Premier, Mr. Nagy, went out on a Soviet safe conduct and was murdered by the Soviet Union in defiance of the safe conduct it gave him. Mr. Dubcek would know this. I wonder how he is feeling tonight.

Following an interjection of ‘If he is alive’, Wentworth responded ‘Yes, if he is not already dead’. Wentworth maintained his links with Eastern European émigrés, and spoke at a meeting to launch Captive Nations Week in 1969. He argued that there was no sign of repentance from Communists, citing the continuing Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. He addressed a meeting of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations in April 1970.

164 ‘No repentance’ by Communists’, Daily Telegraph, 14 July 1969, p. 11.
at a protest meeting timed to coincide with the United Nations’ declaration of Lenin as a ‘humanitarian’ on the one hundredth anniversary of his birth.\textsuperscript{165} In August of that year he lobbied for Government funding for his friend and Captive Nations Council of New South Wales President, Douglas Darby, to attend the meeting of the World Anti-Communist League in Tokyo, Japan.\textsuperscript{166} In 1973, Wentworth even served briefly as Vice-President of the CNCNSW, replacing outgoing Vice-President and New South Wales State politician, Jim Cameron.\textsuperscript{167} When Jurjevic published an exposé of the Ustasha in Australia in the same year, he wrote: ‘Mr W. Wentworth, Liberal MHR, is one of their strongest supporters and he turns up year after year in the pages of “Spremnost” as being present at their functions.’\textsuperscript{168} Jurjevic was also critical of Wentworth’s attendance at Captive Nations Week functions and described Wentworth as a ‘rabid red-hunter’.\textsuperscript{169} His association with the CNCNSW would continue long after his political career.\textsuperscript{170}

**Indonesia and Vietnam**

Wentworth’s views on Indonesia are of particular relevance to this study. In October 1962, Wentworth believed that Australia need not arm against Indonesia as there was no Communist threat.

\textsuperscript{166} Wentworth to Darby, 15 August 1970, Darby Family Papers, ML MSS 6164, Box 16.
\textsuperscript{167} Letter from Captive Nations Council of Queensland to Lia Looveer, 17 June 1973, ML, MSS 7171, Box 46.
\textsuperscript{168} Jurjevic, *Ustasha under the Southern Cross*, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., p. 44.
\textsuperscript{170} CNCNSW records still show Wentworth as a Patron in 1982. Annual General Meeting Minutes, 30 June 1982, ML MSS 7171, Box 1. In 1984 when Wentworth ran unsuccessfully for the Senate, he wrote to Lia Looveer to advertise in migrant newspapers espousing his opposition to Communism. Draft advertisement, 12 November 1984, ML MSS 7171, Box 14.
Indonesia is not yet at any rate – I hope she never will be – a Communist country. Indonesia itself, if it is not a Communist country, which we hope it will not be, may need us as an ally, to protect herself against the Communist thrust coming down from the north which gets to her before it gets to Australia. Do not let us forget also that in our plans we must do those things which help and strengthen the hands of the very real anti-Communist forces in Indonesia itself.\textsuperscript{171}

Two years later, in October 1964, Wentworth was warning of the Indonesian situation, telling Parliament that Indonesia ‘shows disconcerting signs of going left and into the Communist camp’.\textsuperscript{172} He worried that the fall of Khrushchev in the USSR could be the prelude to a new Sino-Soviet alliance, which would in turn strengthen to Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), the Communist Party of Indonesia.\textsuperscript{173} Wentworth would have also been aware of comments made by Indonesian Brigadier General Hartono shortly after this, in which he advocated an Indonesian atomic bomb. The Australian Defence Minister, Shane Paltridge, said that such a prospect could not be discounted despite a lack of evidence to support this possibility.\textsuperscript{174} A report on the possible uses of any potential Australian nuclear forces was written in September 1964, but revised in December, considered striking at targets in Indonesia, though the report suggests that Indonesia hosting Russian or Chinese nuclear installations was more likely than an Indonesian threat. This report spoke of the ‘Cuban’ role Indonesia may play, in reference to the

\textsuperscript{172} CPD, H of R, 21 October 1964, p. 2182.
\textsuperscript{173} CPD, H of R, 17 November 1964, pp. 3104-5.
attempted Soviet installation of nuclear weapons bases on that island.\textsuperscript{175} China had detonated a nuclear bomb in October 1964, and according to Cornejo, by January 1965 Sukarno had allied himself with China in what Cornejo terms a ‘Peking-Jakarta Axis’. Sukarno himself declared his intention for an Indonesian atomic bomb in July 1965, and the Americans feared that China may even detonate a bomb in Indonesia and allow the Indonesians to claim it as a successful Indonesian test.\textsuperscript{176} In August 1965 Wentworth referred to Sukarno, claiming he was ‘now the prisoner of the Communists’. He claimed Sukarno had found it futile to resist D. N. Aidit, a senior PKI leader.\textsuperscript{177} Any potential Communist threat from Indonesia, however, was averted following a failed coup on 1 October 1965. A group calling itself the September 30 Movement, consisting of dissident army officers and PKI members, abducted and murdered six generals, claiming they were doing it to save Sukarno and Indonesia from a coup. Major General Suharto would crush the coup attempt, and embark on a massacre of up to 500,000 Communists and suspected Communists. As shown in the previous chapter, Wentworth later advocated support for Suharto’s regime. In January 1968, Wentworth still feared repercussions in Indonesia due to ‘the very great changes which are likely in the power-balance in Asia’.\textsuperscript{178} In 1970 he stated that the Australian Government should support the ‘anti-Communist forces in Indonesia’, of which the Army played a ‘vital part’, in the interests of Australian security.\textsuperscript{179}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{175} Report on Nuclear Forces in Australia, September 1964 (revised December 1964), NAA A1209, 1965/6470.
\item \textsuperscript{176} Cornejo, ‘When Sukarno sought the bomb’, pp. 35-6.
\item \textsuperscript{177} CPD, H of R, 19 August 1965, p. 303.
\item \textsuperscript{178} Wentworth to Gorton, ‘Notes on Communists’, 31 January 1968, NAA M3787, 41.
\item \textsuperscript{179} Wentworth to Gorton, 13 February 1970, M62, 38.
\end{itemize}

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Predictably, Wentworth was a ‘hawk’ on Vietnam. Wentworth viewed Vietnam as part of the wider Communist effort. The Vietnam War coincided with Wentworth’s calls to prevent China from acquiring a nuclear capacity. In March 1965 he argued that a car bomb which had exploded outside the US Embassy in Saigon would have been nuclear if China had the ability to manufacture a bomb. Wentworth also believed that Ho Chi Minh was ‘Mao’s puppet’. He believed groups advocating peace and disarmament were Communist fronts which advocated surrender. He criticised opponents of the war such as Cairns, whom he accused of taking the Communist line. Wentworth thought it would be ‘unfair to name him as a Communist agent even though he does and says the same things as a Communist agent would do and say’. He attacked Cairns’ arguments that there was no aggression from North Vietnam. Wentworth believed Australia had a commitment to both the Vietnamese and Australian people to be in Vietnam, and subscribed to the ‘domino theory’, arguing that if Australia and the United States were to leave Vietnam then Thailand, Burma, Laos, Cambodia and eventually Australia would fall to Communism. In March 1966, Wentworth participated in a public debate at the Paddington Town Hall, a debate during which Wentworth claimed that a ‘Communist clique’ attempted to drown him out, with the ‘approving glances and sniggers’ of Cairns. Later that year he accused Labor MP Allan Fraser of taking the Communist line over his claims that a farm destroyed by Communists at Bien Cat was actually bombed by the United States. In March 1967

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180 'Most abused', _Herald_, 15 March 1967, p. 34.
183 Ibid., p. 224.
184 Ibid., pp. 303-6.
186 CPD, H of R, 29 & 30 September, p. 1511.
Wentworth attacked Labor MP Tom Uren for adopting what he saw as the Communist stance. Wentworth’s colleague, Liberal MP John Jess, claimed that Uren was known to have marched in front of North Vietnam and Viet Cong flags.\textsuperscript{187} Wentworth’s note to Holt in May 1967, in which he confided that he thought that politically the Vietnam issue was ‘going sour’, shows that until this time Wentworth had believed that Vietnam was a vote winning issue for the Liberal Party.\textsuperscript{188} Notwithstanding his appraisal of Vietnam’s declining popularity, Wentworth continued to support the Vietnam War publicly. In August 1967, Wentworth supported the Defence Force Protection Bill, which outlawed the provision of aid to the North Vietnamese National Liberation Front. He stated that the amount of aid given to the North Vietnamese was not the issue, but that this aid also gave moral support.\textsuperscript{189} In 1968, the year in which Australia committed a third battalion to Vietnam,\textsuperscript{190} Wentworth condemned propaganda which he felt made the public ‘almost think that we were the aggressors’. He contended that Australia was instead in Vietnam to save it from Communist aggression.\textsuperscript{191} April 1969 saw Wentworth accuse the ALP of being in an alliance with the CPA on Vietnam.\textsuperscript{192} As public sentiment turned even more sharply against the conflict, Wentworth continued his attacks on opponents of the war such as Cairns, whom he criticised for being Chairman of the Vietnam Moratorium Committee that included CPA member Laurie Carmichael.\textsuperscript{193} Wentworth also authored a pamphlet, titled \textit{The Communist Roots of the Moratorium}, in which he detailed the associations of ‘open’ Communists such as Carmichael and hinted that there were

\textsuperscript{187} CPD, H of R.
\textsuperscript{188} Wentworth to Holt, 12 May 1967, NAA M2684, 185.
\textsuperscript{189} CPD, H of R, 31 August 1967, pp. 694-7.
\textsuperscript{191} CPD, H of R, 22 August 1968, p. 521.
\textsuperscript{192} CPD, H of R, 23 April 1969, p. 1375.
\textsuperscript{193} CPD, H of R, 9 & 10 April 1970, p. 1004-5.
‘undercover’ Communists involved. In September 1970, Wentworth was embroiled in allegations that a doctored photograph was tabled in Parliament by Jess. The photograph, purporting to show recently elected ALP Leader Gough Whitlam speaking under a Viet Cong flag, was allegedly altered to give the impression that the flags were closer than the ‘at least 50 yards’ away which they in fact were. The apparently fraudulent photograph led Labor to bring a motion of no confidence in John Gorton’s Prime Ministership, a motion defeated along party lines. Clyde Cameron alleged that Wentworth, despite knowing the photograph to be false, went onto ABC television show This Day Tonight and stated that Whitlam spoke with the Viet Cong flag above his head.

Australian forces were largely withdrawn in late 1971, with Australian personnel withdrawn completely following the election of Whitlam’s Labor Government on 2 December 1972. Even after Australian involvement had ended, Wentworth continued to attack Labor members for their alleged Communist leanings. Assailing Cairns, Wentworth accused him of ‘cohabiting with the North Vietnamese, bringing the Vietnamese murderers – the Vietcong – into this House’. In the months before the Khmer Rouge took Phnom Penh in Cambodia, Wentworth accused the North Vietnamese of aggression there and alleged that Cairns was ‘covering up for his communist friends’. He would later attempt to discredit Cairns using the controversy surrounding his Principal Private Secretary, Junie Morosi. He recalled that he was not gunning for Morosi herself, but instead trying to discredit the left wing of the ALP, and Cairns in

196 Grey, A Military History of Australia, p. 244.
198 CPD, H of R, 18 February 1975, p. 360.
particular. Wentworth regarded Cairns as ‘the mouthpiece of the Communist factions inside Parliament’. 199

Wentworth accused Whitlam of dumping the South Vietnamese Government when Whitlam’s Government recognised the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, 200 and was later suspended from Parliament when he left his seat to offer Whitlam a jug of water to wash his hands of the Vietnamese issue. 201 As discussed in the previous chapter, Wentworth conceded by mid 1975 that Vietnam was lost. He did, however, see positives in committing to Vietnam in the first place, as he believed that the determination to be involved in Vietnam had emboldened the anti-Communism of Indonesian Generals. 202 Speaking years later, Wentworth did not regret Australia and the United States entering the war, but only regretted that they did not win. 203 This attitude illustrated Wentworth’s view of Vietnam, which he saw as one more important battleground between the forces of the Free World and Communism. It is also shown by his attitude to Indonesia, which is arguably similar, though he considers Indonesia to have been ‘won’ by the anti-Communist camp. When he spoke of atrocities perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge, Wentworth emphasised that the regime was Communist and wanted the events publicised ‘so that Australian communists who are associated with this foul movement may receive the detestation and execration which is their proper due’. 204 He was also wary of Communist influence within Fretilin, the resistance movement in

204 CPD, H of R, 8 December 1976, p. 3465.
Portugese East Timor.  East Timor would be occupied by Indonesia months later. He maintained his passionate support of the Republic of China in Taiwan and espoused that country’s anti-Communist credentials. His views of Southeast Asia over the long period of Australian involvement in Vietnam and afterward confirm that Wentworth’s view of foreign affairs was seen through the narrow prism of anti-Communism.

Conclusion

Wentworth’s declaration that he saw foreign affairs as ‘a conflict between the two systems of communism and freedom’ defined his outlook. An examination of Wentworth’s attitude to foreign affairs shows that Wentworth believed in the big picture, the global conflict. The United Nations was viewed through the lens of anti-Communism. The Soviet Union, for example, first sought to use the United Nations to stall to allow it time to manufacture atomic weapons. After this, the Soviet Union was dedicated to frustrating the UN before eventually attempting to control it through getting Asian, African and Middle Eastern countries on side. For his part, Wentworth wanted to expel Russia from the United Nations and believed it was the job of the UN to fight tyranny, a tyranny he equated exclusively with Communism. His association with the Eastern European émigrés, many of whom had dubious backgrounds, can be explained only by their common anti-Communism. To Wentworth, this anti-Communism was far more important than the wartime records of the anti-Communists themselves, as the struggle between Communism and freedom was far more significant. Whilst he championed the cause of the Captive Nations of Eastern Europe, he wanted to use their

207 CPD, H of R, 1 March 1956, p. 402
plight for propaganda purposes to show the evils of Communism worldwide. Significantly, he failed to condemn both individuals and regimes unless they were Communist, and even downplayed the significance of some of the crimes of those who later fought Communism. In Southeast Asia too, countries assumed less significance individually but were important in a global context. Despite Wentworth’s speeches on helping the Vietnamese people, for example, he saw Vietnam as worth fighting primarily because it led to Indonesia becoming anti-Communist. The Vietnam War, therefore, was not only important for Vietnam itself, but as part of the global struggle.

Wentworth’s realisation that the Vietnam War was ‘going sour’ allows an insight into Wentworth’s anti-Communism. That Wentworth continued to campaign on what he realised was an increasingly unpopular topic shows Wentworth’s passion, conviction and fervour. These traits were evident years earlier, when he incurred the wrath of both the Australian and United States delegations at the United Nations for attacking Communist delegates. Wentworth fought Communism without compromise, and without regard to popularity. A poignant example of this was Wentworth’s denunciation of Chairman Mao Zedong upon his death in 1976. Rising on a condolence motion moved by Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser and supported by Opposition Leader Gough Whitlam, Wentworth was the only person to speak out against Mao.208

Three men in this last half century have attained supreme power – Hitler, Stalin and Mao – and it is no accident that they had so much in common. Hitler failed and was unmasked

before he fell, so that no one praised him in his death. Many praised the dead Stalin before they realised the true nature of the monster. And most now praise Mao.  

Wentworth later claimed his vitriolic speech against Mao was the only written speech he ever read in Parliament. Refusing to associate himself with the tributes to Mao, Wentworth left the chamber exclaiming ‘Mr. Speaker, Mao was a murderer’. Though his was an isolated voice then, Wentworth’s stand has been commended in more recent times. This further indicates how the Cold War liberal Wentworth saw the world: as a conflict between Communism and freedom.

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212 Henderson, ‘A bow to Mao now so embarrassing’, p. 11.
Chapter IV – Ensuring Loyalty and Security: McCarthyism, Legislation and ASIO

The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation was a product of the Cold War, established by Prime Minister J. B. Chifley in 1949. In 1948 the United States had banned the exchange of intelligence with Australia, labelling it a poor security risk. Chifley was convinced by the British that a new security service was needed, and so ASIO was born.1 ASIO became, in a sense, the front line on which the Cold War in Australia would be fought. Given the Cold War climate, the focus of ASIO was to be on protecting Australia from the dangers of Communism and Communists.

ASIO’s establishment coincided with Wentworth’s election to Federal Parliament. By 1949, Wentworth had established himself as one of Australia’s most vocal anti-Communists. As canvassed in Chapter one, Wentworth’s wartime activities included attacking Communists during his campaign as a candidate in the 1943 election; publicly debating CPA National President Lance Sharkey on the second front issue; attacking the Soviet Union’s prosecution of the war; and hunting Communists within the AASW. Throughout the mid to late 1940s, Wentworth was also involved with an organisation known as the Political Research Society, which collected and published information on Communists. One important consequence of Wentworth’s association with the Society was that, by the time he first sat in Parliament in 1950, he had both an appreciation of the value of intelligence, and access to large amounts of anti-Communist intelligence. The extent of Wentworth’s anti-Communism can be revealed by an examination of his attitudes to the role of intelligence and the security service during the Cold War. This

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applies not only to ASIO, but to agencies Wentworth wished to be set up to fulfil a propaganda role, similar in scope to the domestic functions of the British Information Research Department. Wentworth exchanged information with ASIO on a wide variety of subjects, including Communist writers and scientists, the public service, Communist publications including the *Tribune*, the Petrov Affair, the Peace movement, Aboriginal affairs and right wing émigré groups, including the Ustasha. The role of intelligence and the security service in Wentworth’s political career is important as it allows insight into Wentworth’s views on the Communist Party, the methods which he believed should be adopted to combat Communism, and his views on the role of an intelligence service such as ASIO. This chapter will examine Wentworth’s anti-Communism in relation to the use of intelligence information against Communists, the role of ASIO, the methods he believed should be employed to fight Communism and the adaptation of these methods over time.

**Early Experience**

Wentworth’s active opposition to Communism began after the Port Kembla strike of wharf labourers in late 1938, during which Wentworth had supported the striking workers over their stand on the export of pig iron to the Japanese. The extent of Wentworth’s support later became a subject of contention, and this tension most likely led Wentworth to study Communist tactics.² More than a year before the wharf labourers refused to load pig iron bound for Japan onto the *Dalfram*, Wentworth had started a newspaper in the area named the *Illawarra Star*. It began as a bi-weekly, later becoming a daily in 1939 before eventually winding up. Wentworth had developed the town of Warrawong after

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² ‘Return of a Native’, *Nation*, no. 238, 2 March 1968, p. 10-3.
sub-dividing the Wentworth estate, and it was here that the newspaper was printed. At some stage Wentworth awarded a cup, known as the *Illawarra Star* Cup, to striking workers. The exact circumstances, and what the cup was actually awarded for, are unclear. James Cope, the Labor MP for Watson, told the House that the Cup was awarded to the best team in the May Day marching procession. He explained that Wentworth’s comments about the trade unions in his newspaper had led to a black ban on its purchase. This black ban, Cope alleged, had hurt Wentworth’s newspaper in the largely industrial Wollongong-Port Kembla area and Wentworth visited Ted Roach, the Communist secretary of the Waterside Workers’ Federation to have it removed. Cope detailed how Wentworth had apparently paid 10 guineas to the strike fund and awarded the Cup, which was coincidentally won by Roach’s WWF marching team. Wentworth strenuously denied Cope’s account of events, saying that the Cup was given by the newspaper to the Labor organised procession, though he conceded that it was an error of judgement as ‘the Communists were very close to the Labour [sic] Party even then.’ Wentworth proceeded to deny ever being to Roach’s house, just as he had denied meeting Roach when the Labor MP for Watson, Eddie Ward, had first raised the allegations during Wentworth’s first year in Parliament. Rupert Lockwood, the Communist journalist who authored ‘Document J’ which appeared as an exhibit before the Royal Commission on Espionage, quoted Roach’s account in his book on the strike: ‘W. C. Wentworth… began to visit the homes of trade union officials. I put the bite on him for a

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4 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (henceforth CPD), House of Representatives (henceforth H of R), 22 November 1957, p. 2617.
6 Ibid.
7 CPD, H of R, 26 October 1950, p. 1554.
donation to the Dalfram relief fund. He donated £10.'\(^8\) The debate over how far his support went led Wentworth, following the strike, to begin to study Communist methods.\(^9\)

Wentworth’s anti-Communism manifested itself publicly in 1943, the year in which he ran as an Independent for Federal Parliament in the seat of Wentworth. During the campaign, as we have seen, he publicly attacked the politically left-leaning Labor candidate, Jessie Street, refusing to cooperate in a preference deal and alleging that Labor’s refusal to commit to a National Government was due to Communist influence. After he failed to win the seat, Wentworth clashed publicly with Communists over the execution of the war effort. In 1945 Jack Cassidy, a Sydney barrister, became the founding chairman of the Political Research Society.\(^10\) Wentworth became the driving force of this organisation, whose purpose was to maintain reference books, periodicals and other material related to Communism.\(^11\) It was Wentworth who approached Father Paddy Ryan, an anti-Communist Catholic priest.\(^12\) Wentworth sought Catholic representation within the Society, and Ryan suggested Brian Doyle, Associate Editor of Catholic Weekly, who agreed to join.\(^13\) Maher has discussed Catholicism as an intensely

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\(^8\) Rupert Lockwood, War on the Waterfront, Southwood Press Pty Limited, Sydney, 1987, p. 127. Lockwood also claimed that the actual pig iron to be sent to Japan came from old blast furnaces on the Wentworth estate. This may have contributed to Wentworth’s interest in the strike, though it was likely not as significant a factor as his obsession with regard to potential Japanese aggression.


\(^12\) Father Ryan was an active anti-Communist who had sold forty-five thousand copies of a rebuttal to Dean Hewlett Johnson’s Socialist Sixth of the World and would later publicly debate Communist Party Central Committee member Edgar Ross on the topic ‘That Communism is in the best interests of the Australian people’. James Franklin, ‘Catholic Thought and Catholic Action: Dr Paddy Ryan MSC’, Journal of the Australian Catholic Historical Society, no. 17, 1996, pp. 44-55.

powerful source of anti-Communist agitation in both the United States and Australia.\(^{14}\) This episode shows that Wentworth was not only aware of this, but wanted to harness Catholic anti-Communism as part of a broadly representative group. Richard Krygier, the Polish émigré and founder of the Australian Association for Cultural Freedom, was part of this organisation as well.\(^{15}\) Also involved with this organisation was the journalist Frank Browne, author of *Things I Hear* (ridiculed as ‘Things I Smear’). Browne later became famous for being jailed with Ray Fitzpatrick after alleging that a Member of Parliament was involved in a corrupt immigration scheme. He was also the founder of the neo-Nazi Australian Party. Browne was employed from 1940 by the Industrial News Service, which was a subsidiary of the American advertising company J. Walter Thompson.\(^{16}\) Rupert Lockwood was later to accuse this firm, through its American ‘chief’ Lloyd Ring Coleman, of having links with both Browne and Wentworth, accusing both of receiving Americans funds for anti-Communist activities. Lockwood alleged that Wentworth had lost money on his *Illawarra Star* venture and that American sources had funded his organisation of Eastern European émigré groups.\(^{17}\) Henderson quotes one of Browne’s associates, Arthur Smith, who described Browne as having ‘everybody on record’. Similarly, Browne’s ASIO file described him as ‘one of the best politically informed men in Australia’.\(^{18}\) Francis Bland, the economist, advisor to Stevens’ NSW Government and later Liberal member for Warringah, was a member too, as were

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\(^{15}\) McLaren shows that Krygier joined a ‘research organisation doing anti-Communist Research specially on the Australian press’ which he claims was headed by Wentworth. It is probable that the organisation referred to is the Political Research Society. John McLaren, *Writing in Hope and Fear: Literature as Politics in Postwar Australia*, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1996, p. 80.


\(^{18}\) Henderson, ‘Frank Browne and the Neo-Nazis’, p. 73.
Country Party member for New England Joe Abbott, noted medical practitioner Dr. Adrian Mackey Johnson and importer John Charles Frederick Walton. We can safely assume that Wentworth’s association with these people and the activities involved with the Political Research Society contributed to Wentworth’s views on intelligence. Doyle recalled in a letter to Warhurst, ‘De facto, Bill Wentworth was the whole or most of “the action”’. Importantly, Wentworth had also united several disparate groups of anti-Communists within the Society. Groups represented included Catholics, Eastern European émigrés, the extreme right, Coalition parliamentarians and the conservative establishment. Whilst Wentworth himself also represented this last category, it is also likely that he saw himself as an Anglican representative. It was in this capacity that he would write to the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1953 about the ‘Red Dean’, Hewlett Johnson. He was also an Anglican representative on the Australian Council for the World Council of Churches in 1954, and hoped to have Church representatives briefed by the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs. This was, however, yet to come. Wentworth’s time in the Society’s Pitt Street offices in Sydney are likely to have both convinced him of the value of well-maintained databases of intelligence on Communists, and familiarised him with the collection and use of such sources.

This recognition was enhanced by Wentworth’s association with another anti-Communist organisation, the Institute of Public Affairs (NSW), that, in 1948, published Wentworth’s *What’s Wrong With Socialism?* The IPA was an influential supporter of

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22 ‘Notes and Comments’, *The Australian Church Record*, 29 April 1954, p. 4.
23 W. C. Wentworth, *What’s Wrong with Socialism?*, Institute of Public Affairs (NSW), Sydney, 1948.
the Liberal Party, and would later publish full page advertisements in the 1949 and 1951 elections attacking the ALP’s socialisation objective, which they attempted to identify with Communism.\footnote{Warhurst, ‘The Communist Bogey’, p. 243.} At one stage, one of the targets of Wentworth’s anti-Communism mentioned previously, Dr. R. E. B. Makinson, urged Labor MP Kim Beazley to question the Government on the Political Research Society and its links with both Wentworth and the IPA, though Beazley does not appear to have followed this up.\footnote{Makinson to Beazley, 10 March 1947, National Archives of Australia (henceforth NAA), A6119, 1218.} In 1947 The Express, a newspaper for Australian ex-servicemen and women, ran a sensational story on a secret organisation which had taken the place of the disbanded New Guard. This organisation, it was alleged, had its headquarters in Pitt St.\footnote{‘Secret Organisation: Under-Cover “Cells” Operating in N.S.W.’, The Express, vol. 1, no. 3, 2 August 1947, p. 1.} The Political Research Society was located at 74 Pitt St.\footnote{Address given in the Political Research Society’s Digest of Soviet Activities, no. 1, November 1945, in Records of the Institute of Public Affairs, 1943-1987, NLA MS 6590, Box 18.} Another organisation led by Major General Sir Thomas Blamey and known simply as ‘The Association’, has been described by Moore as an Australia-wide paramilitary organisation ready to put down a Communist rebellion. The Association had its offices at 84 Pitt St.\footnote{Andrew Moore, ‘Fascism Revived? The Association Stands Guard, 1947-52, Labour History, no. 74, May 1998, pp. 105-8.} Over the next several years, it would appear that the Commonwealth Investigation Service (CIS),\footnote{Ibid., p. 108.} which was located across the road at 117 Pitt St., confused the two often. The Express article itself seemed to describe both The Association and the Political Research Society. The description of the ‘semi-military’ nature of the group, which would ‘come into the open only in a “national emergency”’\footnote{‘Secret Organisation: Under-Cover “Cells” Operating in N.S.W.’, The Express, vol. 1, no. 3, 2 August 1947, p. 1.} applied to The Association and not the Political Research Society, who
were not only publicly visible, but published a regular *Digest of Soviet Activities* and had a public membership drive.  

On the other hand, the following descriptions may have applied to both Wentworth and Krygier:

One, a fourth generation Australian of independent means and well-established social background, had a distinguished military career. He is known throughout the movement as “the major”. The other, a bitterly fanatical anti-Semitic, is a well-known member of Sydney’s Polish community. He has been in this country several years.

W. C. Wentworth IV was clearly a fourth generation Australian at a time when not many were, and had both independent means and a well-established social background. Whether his military career was distinguished is debatable, and he certainly never achieved the rank of Major. Whilst Blamey, a Major General, did have a distinguished military career, his father was English – not Australian. Krygier, on the other hand, was a Polish émigré who had fled Europe during World War II. Rather than being anti-Semitic, however, Krygier was himself Jewish. The article seemed based more on rumour and innuendo than fact. There were those, however, who were suspiciously monitoring Wentworth’s activities at this time. CIS reports by R. F. B. Wake, later an ASIO officer and then an important advisor to Evatt during the Petrov Affair, suggested that Wentworth intended to eventually move in the direction of using arms to suppress

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Communist activities. A summary of anti-Communist activities suggested that the Political Research Society may have had as many as 400 members. A different report stated that one of Wake’s informants had been told by an ex-Army Captain, Gordon Roberts, that Wentworth had claimed that anti-Communist groups in Melbourne and Sydney had memberships of 75,000 and 50,000 respectively. Still another report suggested that Wentworth and Sir Henry Manning, KC were recruiting for a ‘possible New Guard formation’. Manning was a former Stevens Government Minister in New South Wales and, like Bland, this association seems to be his link to Wentworth. When interviewed years later, Wentworth claimed that it was likely that he and Manning were recruiting for the Political Research Society. Moore considers it conceivable that some of the CIS reports are erroneous, and suggests that they may have confused the propaganda organisation and the paramilitary auxiliary. Whilst this is likely, this confusion is suggestive of Wentworth’s anti-Communism. Though he was not likely to have been part of The Association, that the CIS believed he could have been illustrates the perception of Wentworth as an anti-Communist in this period.

Another event which sheds light on how Wentworth was perceived was the bizarre case of William Thomas ‘Diver’ Dobson. On 6 August 1949, William Dobson called police from a telephone box to report an attempt on his life. According to Dobson, he had been bashed and thrown overboard from the Manly ferry by Communists. Dobson

37 Report on Anti-Communism, 22 April 1948, NAA A9108, ROLL 13/7.
38 Report on Possible New Guard Formation, 1 October 1948, NAA A6122, 2 VOL 1.
40 Moore, ‘Fascism Revived?’, p. 110. Moore himself confuses the Political Research Society with the Institute of Public Affairs (NSW)’s Industrial and Economic Research Service. Though there are some links between Wentworth and the Institute of Public Affairs (NSW), it is far more likely that the propaganda organisation concerned is the Political Research Society.
was an official of the ALP Industrial Groups or ‘Groupers’, the predominantly Catholic anti-Communist organisations which sought to wrestle power from Communists in trade unions. Days earlier, in a seemingly similar incident, Laurie Short, a key Grouper in the Federated Ironworkers’ Association (FIA), was bashed after announcing he would challenge Communists in the FIA elections. However, that is where the similarities ended. The alleged attack on Dobson was revealed to be a fabrication within days, apparently a plot to discredit the CPA. Deery has shown in detail that the plot was hatched at a meeting of Groupers including Pat Cain, Arthur Hatfield and Frank McKay as well as Dobson himself. This episode would earn him notoriety and the nickname ‘Diver’ Dobson.\(^41\)

Wentworth’s name was dragged into the Dobson affair after the CPA obtained copies of what they claimed were Dobson’s ‘private notes’, which they then proceeded to publish in the *Tribune*. On 27 August 1949, the *Tribune* claimed that Wentworth had promised Dobson money in exchange for the information on which he had written a newspaper article attacking Communists in the Federated Clerks’ Union (FCU).\(^42\) After the matter was brought up in the New South Wales Parliament by Labor MLA Jim Chalmers, Wentworth penned a statutory declaration to the effect that he had not paid any money to Dobson.\(^43\) However the matter did not rest there. Labor’s Arthur Calwell, himself under pressure after admitting that Dobson had ‘fooled’ him and that he had made representations on Dobson’s behalf to have a telephone installed, sought to deflect attention from himself. In Parliament, he said that on the night in question,

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\(^43\) Statutory Declaration, 8 September 1949, NAA M1718, 1.
Dobson had come straight from Wentworth’s residence.\(^{44}\) Wentworth, not yet a member of Parliament himself, had no direct right of reply. Instead he contacted Liberal member Howard Beale, who told Parliament that Wentworth’s wife and children were at home continuously when the incident occurred and that Dobson did not go there at all. Wentworth himself was apparently in his electorate delivering firewood to poor people, as these events occurred during the 1949 coal strike.\(^{45}\) Deery contends that Wentworth’s frenzied actions during the Petrov Affair, discussed later, make it seem plausible that Wentworth did indeed play a role in the Dobson saga. He states that this view was also held by Laurie Aarons and a great many other Communists he had interviewed.\(^{46}\) However, the unpublished autobiography of Douglas Darby seems to support Beale’s version of events. Realising the need to find a fuel substitute, Darby decided he should take the initiative and obtain firewood. As he recounted:

My first contact was Bill Wentworth. He was enthusiastic to be on the job. He acquired aerial maps and gleefully located an area of Kurringai Chase with access from Booralie Road, north of Terrey Hills. There was a lot of old timber there. Bill Wentworth did the negotiations and permission was granted. Then we wanted a saw mill. He found one in Sussex Street, I located an old wood depot in Golf Parade, Manly and Alf Brown volunteered to take charge. Frank Skyring, then manager of the Bank of New South Wales, the first port of call for all those starting out on social service endeavours became our treasurer and we were in business. Bill provided his jeep but it hadn’t got the power we needed.

\(^{44}\) CPD, H of R, 21 September 1949, pp. 394-5.  
\(^{45}\) CPD, H of R, 21 September 1949, p. 454.  
\(^{46}\) Deery, ‘Labor, Communism and the Cold War’, p. 82.
We acquired a stock of second hand potato bags and we made a good start on Sunday, July? [Darby has put a question mark, unsure of the date.].

We would sell bags of wood at our depot on a come and get it basis at 4/- a bag, the lowest ruling price but we would not bother to collect from old age pensioners…

Finding that many people had no means of transport, we provided a delivery service.

If the strike had lasted another fortnight we would have broken even on the financial level. As it was it collapsed after three weeks and we were left with a lot of wood and the equipment now second hand to sell. Bill and I shared the deficit of £200 but he had put much more of his own money in odds and ends than I had. Of all the adventures that I’ve had the Manly Emergency Fuel Supplies has perhaps the most tender spot in my heart.47

Darby’s corroboration of Wentworth’s alibi, Calwell’s desperate need to deflect attention and the unlikelihood of a declared candidate in a coming election risking a false statutory declaration make a strong circumstantial case to suggest that Wentworth’s involvement was far less than implied. Wentworth had penned an article on the FCU and claimed he had guaranteed legal expenses to expose Communist malpractice in FCU ballots, a guarantee he pointed out was not given to Dobson personally.48

**An Australian Security Service**

ASIO was established in March 1949 within the Attorney-General’s Department, but with the Director-General having the right of direct access to the Prime Minister. The service, which was given its present name in August 1949, was to be concerned not with criminal law, but with protecting Australia against espionage, sabotage and subversion.


48 Statutory Declaration, 8 September 1949, NAA M1718, 1.
Chifley’s directive urged that ASIO’s work be ‘strictly limited to what is necessary for the purposes of this task’, and further stated:

> It is essential that the Security Service should be kept absolutely free from any political bias or influence, and nothing should be done that might lend colour to any suggestion that it is concerned with the interests of any particular section of the community, or with any matters other than the defence of the Commonwealth. You will impress on your staff that they have no connection whatever with any matters of a party political character and that they must be scrupulous to avoid any action which could be so construed.\(^4^9\)

In addition to these points, the directive forbade enquiries from Government departments unless the Director-General was satisfied that such an enquiry was in the public interest, and reiterated the convention that Ministers should not concern themselves with specific information, but only so much as to determine an issue.\(^5^0\)

Chifley’s defeat at the 1949 federal election to Robert Menzies was a crucial turning point in the history of ASIO. Menzies saw no need for a judge to head ASIO, and replaced Reed with Colonel Charles Spry of Military Intelligence. Menzies did, however, issue Spry with a Charter that differed only in minor details from Chifley’s directive, retaining all of the features previously mentioned.\(^5^1\) Whitaker has claimed that Spry’s appointment was important in both the history of ASIO and the Cold War in Australia as it effectively placed personnel from military intelligence with strong views on foreign


\(^{5^0}\) Ibid.

and defence policy in control of civilian security. Furthermore, according to Whitaker, the mentor of the state Special Branches was the Federal Bureau of Investigation.\textsuperscript{52} O’Reilly contends that the FBI set out to build an anti-Communist consensus, which it achieved by undermining liberals, radicals, Communists and others. One of the ways it realised this was by supporting apparently reliable right-wing anti-Communist groups, conservative journalists and other influential public figures.\textsuperscript{53} The FBI encouraged ASIO to target Labor supporters, as well as progressive bureaucrats and politicians. Whitaker contends that, under Spry, they did this along American witch-hunt lines.\textsuperscript{54}

The American experience provides a wider international context within which the Australian experience can be located. McCarthyism pre-dated the rise of the politician from which it derived its name. In fact, until his speech of 9 February 1950 in Wheeling, West Virginia, during which he sensationally claimed to have a list in his hand of 205 Communists within the State Department, Senator Joseph McCarthy remained largely unknown.\textsuperscript{55} In the United States, the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) had been targeted by the Government since its inception in 1919. The House Committee on Un-American Activities was created in 1938 to investigate Nazi and Communist propaganda. In its early days it was known as the Dies Committee after its chairman, Texas Democrat Martin Dies, and became the most powerful anti-Communist investigating committee after World War II.\textsuperscript{56} The Dies Committee pioneered the

\textsuperscript{52} Reg Whitaker, ‘Fighting the Cold War on the Home Front: America, Britain, Australia and Canada’, \textit{Socialist Register}, vol. 21, 1984, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{54} Whitaker, ‘Fighting the Cold War on the Home Front’, p. 47.
techniques of what later became known as McCarthyism, including the encouragement of extremist witness, ignoring rules of evidence, smearing political opponents, the abuse of privilege (i.e. taking advantage of immunity from suits of libel or slander) and making adroit use of the press.  

HUAC members were often covertly supported with information from the FBI. Indeed, Shrecker contends that, had the influence of the FBI been known in the 1950s, ‘McCarthyism’ would have been termed ‘Hooverism’ after FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover. However, HUAC was only one part of the apparatus of McCarthyism. The Alien Registration Act, known as the Smith Act, called for the registration and fingerprinting of aliens over fourteen and was used to deport subversives among them. It specifically defined it as a crime to teach and advocate the overthrow of the United States Government by force and violence. In 1945 HUAC was made Congress’s first permanent standing committee. The Republicans gained control of the Senate in 1946. This was followed in 1947 by the repressive anti-labour Taft-Hartley Act and the Loyalty-Security program, which was the basis for a purge of alleged left-wing civil servants. In 1948 HUAC called witness such as Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers, who implicated many New Deal civil servants in Communist espionage, including, most famously, Alger Hiss. Though the United States led the way in terms of McCarthyism, it was not a phenomenon exclusive to America. In Britain, the Government had lists of Communists drawn up in 1946 and in 1948 initiated their own

61 Ibid., p. 208.
(though less ruthless) Loyalty-Security program. In Australia, the Labor Government had ordered security checks on public servants with access to classified information in 1948, a practice which continued despite fears that these checks were recording adversely ‘sympathisers’ and those who discussed ‘foreign affairs’ or ‘left-wing ideologies’. With the election of Menzies, these checks were also carried out on those without access to classified information. In 1950, the United States would also introduce the Internal Security Act, known as the McCarran Act, which required Communist organisations to register. If the organisation failed to register, its officers were compelled to do so. The upsurge in anti-Communism in these countries following World War II can be largely explained by reference to events such as the 1945 defection of Igor Gouzenko in Canada and subsequent revelations of Soviet espionage in North America; the Greek civil war and subsequent proclamation of the Truman doctrine of containment; the 1948 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia; the Berlin blockade of the same year; the Communist takeover of China and the detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb in 1949.

The influence of the United States’ experience in particular led Wentworth to attempt to set up an Australian version of HUAC. It was in 1948, most likely influenced by the Loyalty-Security programs in the United States and, to a lesser extent, Britain, that Wentworth and his Political Research Society colleague and King’s Counsel, Jack Cassidy, drafted The Communist Treason Bill 1948. This Bill sought to exclude

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63 Whitaker, ‘Fighting the Cold War on the Home Front’, pp. 24-35.
64 Ibid., pp. 47-8.
Communists from the public service and registered bodies, which included newspapers, broadcasting stations and news organisations, as well as any other body declared by the Attorney-General. It also required Communists who had resigned or been dismissed to provide the Attorney-General with the full details of their past CPA membership. Former Communists were able to apply for a certificate, which stated their opposition to Communism, if they gave to the Attorney-General an undertaking to provide:

All information and documents which are in or which may come into his possession about Communists, Communist Parties and his membership of them, and the activities of the U.S.S.R., the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Comintern, the Cominform or their agents in or in connection with Australia or the British Commonwealth or any Ally of the British Commonwealth and about such related matters as the Minister [the Attorney-General] may require.  

The certificate also required applicants to give evidence on request to any Court, Commission, Inquiry or Committee. This foreshadowed another part of the Bill, which sought to constitute a Standing Committee of Inquiry into Communism, or – in other words – an Australian HUAC. This Committee was to consist of the Attorney-General and a member of both the House of Representatives and the Senate appointed by the Leader of the Opposition. Unless there was a unanimous vote to the contrary, the hearings of this Committee were to be open to the public and the press. It was also to have the power to compel witnesses to appear, and to have all the powers of a Royal Commission. Importantly, and in common with HUAC, Parliamentary privilege was

68 Ibid.
extended to the Standing Committee. The Bill did not ban the Communist Party. It did, however, impose rigorous conditions which forced the CPA and declared organisations to submit details of memberships, meeting minutes and finances. It also required the registration of individuals who had been members of the CPA at any time since 31 October 1939. The Bill prescribed sentences of up to three years prison for those who failed to comply or held positions in contravention of its provisions. Interestingly, this sentence could be suspended if the guilty party undertook to enter the USSR. The Bill was to be presented to the Federal Council of the Liberal Party and then to a special conference of Liberal leaders, but was never introduced.

As discussed, the election of Menzies was an important development in the Cold War for Australia. The 1949 federal election was also a crucial turning point in the political career of W. C. Wentworth. Part of Menzies’ Liberal Party, Wentworth won the newly established seat of Mackellar. With his experience in gathering and using intelligence on Communists before his election, it was only a matter of time before the new Member of Parliament became highly interested in the new Security Service.

The election which catapulted Wentworth into federal politics was in December 1949, and within six months Wentworth begun to take an active interest in ASIO. Whitaker contends that without information from J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI, McCarthy, HUAC and other ‘witch-hunters’ could not function. It seemed Wentworth wanted to use ASIO in the same way (though he also had access to other sources of intelligence). On 4 July 1950 Wentworth wrote to Menzies, the new Prime Minister, asking to

69 Ibid.
71 Whitaker, ‘Fighting the Cold War on the Home Front’, p. 28.
‘examine the Security Library and filing system in so far as it relates to publications’.  

Menzies opposed this. His reply to Wentworth reiterated the convention that Ministers not concern themselves with the Security Service and stated that such a course of action would undermine the new Director-General of Security, Colonel Spry.  

Wentworth was dissatisfied with this response. Whilst he acknowledged that security files should not be given to outsiders, he urged that an index of published material be made publicly available. Wentworth accused Chifley of neglecting this, as Chifley apparently had a vested interest in seeing that nothing was done to ‘expose’ the ‘guilty associations with the Communist Party’ of members of Chifley’s former Government. Arguing that propaganda was ‘Russia’s most effective weapon’ and could not be fought in secret, Wentworth stated that if making public information on Communism was not the province of ASIO, it should be the province of some other organisation. 

Doubtless Wentworth was influenced by his own experience with the Political Research Society, a group which undertook the types of activities Wentworth was now advocating. Now that Wentworth was in Government, he sought to bring these activities within the scope of some sort of Government agency. Wentworth, a member of the Library Committee in Parliament, even volunteered the Parliamentary Library to do the job. 

Menzies considered that Wentworth’s ideas in general had some merit and suggested to Bernard Tuck, the Deputy Director of ASIO, that he meet with Wentworth to discuss the matter. Spry also saw the merit in Wentworth’s ideas, but felt unable to take further action as he was busy

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72 G. J. Yeend (Attorney-General’s Official Secretary) to Wentworth, 18 July 1950, NAA A6122, 158.
73 Draft reply, Spry to Acting Prime Minister Arthur Fadden (for transmission to Wentworth), 28 July 1950, NAA A6122, 158.
74 Wentworth to Fadden, 28 August 1950, NAA A6122, 158.
75 Ibid.
76 R. B. Lansdown (Prime Minister’s Official Secretary) to B. G. Tuck (Deputy Director of ASIO), 24 October 1950, NAA A6122, 158.
reorganising ASIO. Spry wrote in November 1950 that such an analysis of public information was not possible at present, though he hoped to be able to by mid-1951 when a ‘comprehensive and efficient records system’ would be established.\footnote{Spry to Lansdown, 16 November 1950, NAA A6122, 158.} Still in his first year in Parliament and, if not impatient, at least anxious to get his ideas accepted, Wentworth wrote again expressing his dissatisfaction and suggested that, if Spry was not in a position to undertake the work he had suggested, some other person should immediately undertake it instead. Wentworth stated that ‘postponement of this essential work until the middle of 1951 should not, in my opinion be countenanced under any consideration’. He believed the work could be done by clerical staff through the Public Service Board, before offering his own expert assistance to the cause.

If approval can be given for this work to be done I would be quite ready to discuss details with an officer of the Prime Minister’s Department or with the Public Service Board… I would of course make myself available in relation to this matter at any time and place where I might be called upon.\footnote{Wentworth to Menzies, 13 December 1950, NAA A6122, 158.}

Spry did not require Wentworth’s help, however, and wrote on 5 January 1951 that he now hoped to have this indexing done before midyear. These early experiences highlight the role that Wentworth expected the new Security Service to play, and shed light on Wentworth’s confidence in his own ability to conduct publicity campaigns against Communism. Also clear is the transition of Wentworth from the private sector to
Parliament and his desire to see his pre-parliamentary anti-Communist activities and practices adopted by both Government and ASIO.

**Banning the Reds**

Menzies had been elected in 1949 on a platform of banning the Communist Party and, accordingly, his Government introduced the *Communist Party of Australia Dissolution Bill* on 27 April 1950. Howard has suggested that Wentworth believed the Bill to be harsh, and joined Government members Wilfrid Kent-Hughes and David Drummond in arguing that the proposed Act should be in place for only one year. In fact, Wentworth’s opinion was quite the contrary. He considered but ultimately disagreed with this type of proposal:

> It would not be unreasonable to ask the Government to add a clause providing that unless the period of operation of the legislation be extended by a vote of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, it shall expire on, say, the 31st December, 1952. Unfortunately, I have no reason for believing that the menace of foreign communism will have been removed by that date. While the menace of foreign communism, operating in Australia through a fifth column, continues, this or similar legislation must continue to operate.

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80 CPD, H of R, 16 May 1950, pp. 2631-5.
Indeed, Wentworth firmly supported the Government’s measure, hailing it as ‘long overdue’. More recently, Wentworth has even claimed that the Coalition’s commitment to banning the CPA was due to the influence of the Political Research Society, exercised through Country Party member Joe Abbott. Like Menzies, he felt that the Communist Party was like no other political party and argued that the ‘conspiratorial nature of the Communist party… makes it different from every other party in that it is, in fact a conspiracy and not a political party at all.’ Wentworth wanted further restrictions on Communists, and advocated a national register which all those who had been CPA members since a certain (unspecified) date would be compelled to sign.

In August Wentworth penned *The Truth About the Anti-Communist Bill*, a pamphlet supporting the Bill and attacking proposed Labor amendments. Among the amendments were proposals to put the onus of proof on the Crown to prove that people were Communist. Another Labor amendment required evidence to be presented to a Court that a person was a Communist before being ‘declared’, rather than to a Committee consisting of the Solicitor-General, Defence Secretary, Director-General of ASIO and two others appointed by the Governor-General. Wentworth’s pamphlet argued that any person who had been ‘declared’ was able to go into the witness box to have the declaration set aside, and in those circumstances the onus of proof would be on the Crown. Other provisions related to jury trials, damages and court costs, rights of appeal and choice of court. Wentworth argued that the proposals were designed only to assist

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81 Ibid.
82 Warhurst, ‘The Communist Bogey’, p. 180. Warhurst suggests that, despite these representations, it was political expediency which was the major factor in convincing Menzies to attempt to ban the CPA.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
Communists. He criticised Dr. H. V. Evatt over his past associations with Communists before declaring that Evatt appeared in Parliament ‘again virtually as counsel for the defence of the Communist party.’ Rebutting Evatt’s proposal that Communists should be able to apply for exemption from the Bill on the grounds that they were not dangerous, Wentworth contended that all Communists were potentially dangerous. Wentworth’s arguments on the Bill show that he not only supported it, but thought that it should go further. He viewed the banning of the Communist Party and their exposure as necessary and overdue. Wentworth’s views on the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of the Communist Party as a political party due to its alleged conspiratorial nature give a sharp insight into his views and help to explain his later actions.

**Ellis leads Wentworth up the Garden Path**

There is also evidence of Wentworth utilising right wing anti-Communist ‘intelligence’ during the debates of this period. In 1949 M. H. Ellis published a book, *The Garden Path: The Story of the Saturation of the Australian Labour Movement by Communism*, which he called a ‘running guide to the continuous connection and interlocking of the Communist Party and the Labour [sic] Party in Australia’. Ellis was an anti-Communist ideologue who maintained his own collection of left-wing literature. He had already published *The Red Road: The Story of the Capture of the Lang Party by Communists Instructed from Moscow* in 1932. Ellis’ assiduous research on Communism led some to believe that the information he gathered was supplied by Government intelligence.

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sources, though this was probably unlikely. It is plausible, however, that Ellis’ operation provided an example to Wentworth for organisations such as the Political Research Society. Moore claims that Wentworth even sent Ellis pamphlets for his collection. Such was the thorough nature of Ellis’ research on Communism that he was called as an expert witness during the Lowe Royal Commission dealing with Communism in Victoria in 1949. According to Moore, Wentworth supported the publication of *The Garden Path*, both politically and financially. It is clear, however, that Wentworth not only backed the book, but relied heavily upon it in much the same way as McKnight has asserted that ASIO used it as a ‘bible’. Attacking the Labor Party in Parliament on 19 October 1950, Wentworth responded to Labor MP Percy Clarey’s argument that, until the Great Depression, there was no Communist influence in the Australian Labour Movement.

Has he never heard of Jock Garden? Has he never heard of the Red Internationale of Labour Unions? Let me read to him the list of the office bearers in that Communist subsidiary before the depression. There was Comrade Clifford, of the Carpenters Union; J. A. Ferguson, of the Australian Railways Union, who is now federal president of the Australian Labour Party; R. J. Patterson, of the Printing Workers Industrial Union; A. Doyle, of the Boilermakers Union; P. G. Hannett, of the Electrical Trades Union who had

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90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
93 McKnight, *Australia's Spies and Their Secrets*, p. 28.
recently returned from Vladivostok and Moscow; Wilson, of the Seamen’s Union; Dodd, of White Bay power house, a well-known Communist; T. Docker, of the Carpenters Union, another well known member of the Communist Central Committee; W. Orr, another Communist who was Moscow delegate and later the organizer of war-time turmoil in the Australian coal trade in 1940; Mitchell of the Painters Union; Douglas, of Eveleigh Railways Workshops; Pettit, of the Tramways Union; E. Knight, of the Australian Workers Union, a well known professional Communist, and others.94

The source upon which Wentworth relied for this information was none other than *The Garden Path*. A comparison with the following excerpt from that publication is striking in its similarity.

The rejuvenated movement acquired an executive:

Comrades Clifford (Carpenters), J. A. Ferguson (A. R. U.), R. J. Patterson (P.W.I.U.), A. Doyle (Boilermakers), P. G. Hannett (Electrical Trades Union and recently home from Vladivostok and Moscow), Wilson (Seamen’s Union), Dodd (White Bay Power House, a well known Communist), T. Docker (Carpenters, another well-known member of the Communist Central Committee). W. Orr (Communist and Moscow delegate, later the organiser of wartime turmoil in the Australian coal trade in 1940), Mitchell (Painters), Douglas (Eveleigh Railway Workshops), Pettit (Tramways’ Union), E. Knight (A.W.U., P.I.B., a well known professional Communist), Strickland and Mackay (A.R.U.).95

94 CPD, H of R, 19 October 1950, p. 1141.  
95 Ellis, *The Garden Path*, p. 244.
This excerpt starkly illustrates the extent of Wentworth’s association with Ellis’ work. Earlier that year, Wentworth had created a furore after attempting to distribute copies of *The Garden Path* to other members in Parliament (including those who did not want them). In this situation the Speaker, A. G. Cameron (himself a close associate of Ellis), ruled that he could find nothing in the standing orders to prevent Wentworth doing this.\(^96\)

By examining Ellis in this way, it is possible to shed further light on the ways in which Wentworth believed information on Communism should be collected and disseminated. Ellis undoubtedly contributed to Wentworth’s thinking and therefore indirectly helped to influence and shape both the Political Research Society and Wentworth’s attitude with regard to Communism. For Wentworth’s part, his support for Ellis and his work was not limited to supporting the publication of his book, but went as far as distributing copies and reading excerpts (without revealing the source) in the House of Representatives.

Moore has revealed that, though Ellis was not likely to have been a ‘spy’, he was a security informant.\(^97\) Wentworth himself also contributed vast amounts of information to ASIO, as will be shown later in the chapter. One of the more bizarre allegations against Wentworth, no doubt inspired by suspicion over the sources of his information, was that he was an undercover member of the Communist Party. The Labor member of Watson, Daniel Curtin, claimed that Wentworth ‘was a member of the Port Kembla branch of the Communist party under the name “William Jacobs”, party number 78’.\(^98\) Other archival evidence suggests that this allegation may not be as unlikely as it seems at first glance. In October 1951 Wentworth wrote to Menzies concerning Communist influence in an organisation called the ‘World Movement for World Federal

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\(^96\) ‘M.H.R. “Allowed to Distribute Books in House”’ *Sun*, 5 May 1950, p. 5.
\(^98\) CPD, H of R, 8 October 1950, p. 192.
Government’. Wentworth told Menzies, ‘A number of non-Communists, including myself, are sleeping members in this society and I would be very glad of a confidential security report’.99 This shows clearly that Wentworth did act as an ‘undercover’ anti-Communist agent in organisations, and thus Curtin’s allegation, though difficult to verify, seems nonetheless possible.

**High Court Challenge and Referendum**

The *Communist Party Dissolution Act* was finally passed in October, but following a High Court Challenge by several trade unions (where Evatt acted as counsel for the Communist led Waterside Workers’ Federation) the Act was declared unconstitutional. This prompted Menzies to call an election, with the aim of gaining control of the hostile Senate in a bid to pass legislation to enable his anti-Communist agenda to be implemented by way of a referendum. In the lead up to the election Wentworth emphasised the links between Evatt and Communism. He accused Evatt of acting for Communists in both the courts and Parliament, delaying Government action against them until they could ‘smash our industrial machine’. Wentworth also attacked Clive Evatt, a New South Wales MLA and Dr. H. V. Evatt’s brother, accusing him of being ‘an almost open Communist’ and blaming him for the inaction of the New South Wales Government against Communists in the coal fields. Clyde Cameron, a Labor MP, goaded Wentworth, asking him which of the two Evatt brothers he liked more. Wentworth responded:

> I should find it easier to answer if I were asked which of the two brothers I dislike most.  
> I dislike most the honourable member for Barton [Dr. H. V. Evatt], because he is the

slyer, less open, and more able of the two... It will be interesting to see for how long the Labour [sic] party will tolerate being exploited in the Communist interests by the right honourable member for Barton, the Communist interests’ well-paid mouthpiece in the courts of this land.  

The significance of this diatribe lies not in Wentworth’s remarks in themselves, but in the events that followed. Evatt rose in the House the next day to respond, denying Wentworth’s charges and going further, claiming that his allegations were not because of an honest mistake and were instead ‘the outpouring of a distorted mind or a black or malevolent heart’. Wentworth seized on the question of honesty to make a personal explanation, assuring the House that he believed every word he said against Evatt. He pointed to Evatt’s ‘long association with Communists’ and adoption of Communist policies. In what was a significant first for Wentworth, he offered to read his statement aloud on the steps of Parliament House. Reading this statement outside Parliament would have the effect of waiving Parliamentary privilege, which would then remove protections against claims of libel, allowing Evatt to sue for defamation. Removing privilege in this way was an attempt to bolster the legitimacy of what Wentworth was stating, and it challenged Evatt to use the courts to prove Wentworth wrong. It was a powerful technique, but one which would leave Wentworth exposed, as we shall see later in the chapter.

100 CPD, H of R, 8 March 1951, p. 223.
102 CPD, H of R, 9 March 1951, pp. 280-1.
Powers to Deal with Communists and Communism

On 28 April 1951 Menzies’ Liberal-Country coalition was re-elected and the Government assumed control of both Houses. This allowed Menzies to pass legislation which would enable Constitutional reform by way of a referendum, to allow the Government to ban the Communist Party. Wentworth continued to support the ban, and also continued his attacks on Evatt in the House. He accused Evatt of being dishonest and deliberately misleading the House over the proposed Constitution Alteration (Powers to Deal with Communists and Communism) Bill (Wentworth decided aloud against using the term ‘deliberately lying’ as he believed it, correctly, to be unparliamentary). He seized on Evatt’s argument that the Crimes Act could be used instead, reading from one of Evatt’s judgements as a High Court jurist which had expressed grave doubts over the validity of the Crimes Act.\(^{103}\) The eventual defeat of the referendum in September 1951 meant that Wentworth had to pursue alternative means of combating Communism. Wentworth’s explanation of the referendum in 1954, disagreeing with the Speaker’s interpretation, reveals his frame of mind when considering the challenges that lay before himself and the Government in combating Communism after the referendum failure.

In a statement that you made from the Chair yesterday in answer to a question that I asked of you on Thursday of last week, you said something that I believe to be incorrect. You remarked that the people of Australia had decided – I cannot recall your exact words, but I quote your sense – by vote at a referendum that the Australian Communist party should continue to be a legal party. That observation was not in accordance with the facts. It is true that one of the provisions of the legislation that was rejected at that

\(^{103}\) CPD, H of R, 10 & 11 July 1951, pp. 1260-4.
referendum was designed to disband the Communist party, but it was merely one of a number of provisions. You, sir, may recall that the opposition to the proposed law that was the subject of the referendum turned upon entirely different issues. In point of fact the people of Australia voted, not that the Australian Communist party should continue to exist legally, but that it should not be banned in the manner in which it was intended to ban it under the provisions of the proposed law.  

Clearly, the defeat of the referendum did not lead Wentworth to question the idea of banning the Communist Party. Instead, he sought to find a ‘manner’ in which he could effectively combat Communists and Communism.

A Nest of Traitors

Watson has claimed that in the aftermath of the referendum, Wentworth circulated a private members’ Bill whose provisions far exceeded those of the Communist Party of Australia Dissolution Act.  

This claim is erroneous, as we shall see. The Bill to which Watson refers, A Bill For An Act Against Communism, was the product of a campaign by Wentworth against perceived Communist influence in the Commonwealth public service. This was how Wentworth attempted to change the ‘manner’ in which he would fight Communism. Believing now that a scalpel rather than a broadsword was required, Wentworth viewed the public service as one of many areas from which Communists could be surgically removed. Watson contends that Wentworth conceived his Bill in May 1952. However, Wentworth had already drafted legislation which would have dealt

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104 CPD, H of R, 11 August 1954, p. 207.
with Communists in 1948,\textsuperscript{106} and raised the issue of Communists in the public service again in 1951.\textsuperscript{107}

Wentworth discussed preventing the infiltration of Communists into the public service in November 1951. He rose to support the remarks of Labor (and later DLP) MP Stan Keon during the debate on the \textit{Public Service Bill (No 2)}. Keon advocated the insertion of a clause into the \textit{Public Service Bill} which would have precluded Communists from appointment to public service positions. Wentworth agreed and emphasised the dangers of Communist infiltration:

\begin{quote}
We know that members of the Communist Party are Russian agents. They are our enemies and they are working for our downfall. We also know that one of the most effective ways in which the Communist party can operate is for its agents to infiltrate government departments. The Communists have followed that procedure in other countries. Indeed, it has been the secret of their success in many countries. Is any honourable member so simple minded that he imagines the Communists are not engaging in a similar process in Australia? Of course they are; and the Government should take steps to remedy the position.\textsuperscript{108}
\end{quote}

Wentworth canvassed steps taken in other countries, such as Loyalty-Security programs requiring Government employees to make declarations that they have not been part of Communist organisations (a measure he would incorporate into his Bill). He also believed that measures were necessary to protect the innocent, as the only way to clear

\textsuperscript{106} Wentworth and Cassidy, \textit{The Communist Treason Bill 1948}.  
\textsuperscript{107} CPD, H of R, 21 November 1951, p. 2422.  
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
their names was to convict the guilty. Wentworth did, however, disagree with Keon on the method on implementation of such a policy. Believing that it was too important to be merely one part of the Bill being discussed, he foreshadowed separate legislation in terms similar to those he would later advocate.

I should be prepared to support by my vote in this House the introduction, after due and proper consideration, of a measure designed not only to prevent the recruitment of Communists for the Public Service but also to expel Communists already in the Service.\textsuperscript{109}

He again reiterated that many who voted against the referendum believed Communists should be dealt with in some other fashion. This episode shows that the renewal of Wentworth’s attacks on the public service lay in the aftermath of the referendum defeat, where Wentworth reconciled himself with the loss by believing the public had expressed their view that the manner (rather than the concept) of curtailing Communism was disagreeable.

When Wentworth began discussing the public service again in May 1952, it is likely that he already had legislation in mind and was using questions in Parliament to highlight the problems of the public service with regard to the Communist question. On 13 May, for example, Wentworth raised the matter of an employee of the Government owned Trans-Australia Airlines, who was refused entry to the United States because of security concerns. Wentworth hinted that the concern was that this unnamed man was a

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.

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former branch secretary of the Communist Party.\textsuperscript{110} The next day Wentworth named the man, Herbert William Maley, and detailed his Communist activities, giving specific dates of newspaper letters and advertisements he had signed as the secretary of the CPA’s Brighton branch. The absence of a reference to Maley in the extensive records of correspondence between Wentworth and ASIO suggests that the information most likely came from other sources. Wentworth, however, was not concerned with Maley specifically and cut to the thrust of his argument. He argued that legislation should be enacted to stop Communists being employed by the Government. He argued it was within the Government’s power and that the Government had been lax in this area, probably, he thought, as a result of the referendum defeat. His second point was that he could not be certain that Maley was the same Maley employed by the TAA, a purely hypothetical point as Wentworth left little doubt, and that the Government (presumably ASIO) should collect and publish information about Communists. He said that, unless Communists are exposed publicly, their secrecy gives them power to operate and that ‘our security service is failing in its prime job unless it does that’.\textsuperscript{111} Such a call echoed the early pleas Wentworth had made to ASIO to make information on Communists publicly available, as well as his calls for the spectacle of public hearings of his proposed Standing Committee in 1948. As we shall see, Wentworth then proceeded to ‘expose’ one of his public service targets in just this manner – Dr. John Burton.

Burton was the secretary of the External Affairs Department, appointed by Evatt who was the Minister at the time. Preceding this, Burton had been Evatt’s private secretary. He had resigned as Secretary of the department in mid-1950, after the change

\textsuperscript{110} CPD, H of R, 13 May 1952, pp. 229-20.  
\textsuperscript{111} CPD, H of R, 14 May 1952, pp. 348-50.
of Government, and resigned from the External Affairs Department altogether in 1951.\textsuperscript{112} Following this, Burton was active in the peace movement. He led a delegation to ‘Red China’, after an invitation was accepted in April 1952 to attend a conference to plan for a larger Peace Conference in late 1952.\textsuperscript{113} On 27 May 1952 Wentworth rose in the House to ask a question of Richard Casey, the External Affairs Minister. Casey himself was very influential in security circles, recommending Spry to head ASIO and being closely involved with the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS).\textsuperscript{114} Wentworth asked Casey whether a highly confidential treaty with the United States was drafted in early 1950 and subsequently leaked to the Communist Party. Wentworth questioned whether this treaty, published in the Communist newspaper \textit{Tribune} in November 1951, was only available to high level departmental staff, and whether the source of the leak had been discovered. Casey confirmed that there was a ‘very grievous leak’, coming from a ‘reasonably senior officer’ in one of the several departments involved. Casey then said he believed ‘the leak did not come from my department, or perhaps I should say from any officer of the Department of External Affairs who is now in the department’.\textsuperscript{115} Later that day, Wentworth seized on this part of Casey’s answer, clearly suspecting Burton as the source of the leak.

\begin{quote}
The Minister said he was certain that the leakage was not from his own department. Then he corrected himself, and said he was certain that it had not come from any officer who was at present in his department. That raises the possibility that the Minister was hinting
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{112} McKnight, \textit{Australia’s Spies and Their Secrets}, p. 52.
that the document had been handed over to the Communist newspaper by some officer who had recently left the Department of External Affairs. Can the Minister tell us the date of the draft to which he referred, and also the date upon which Dr. Burton ceased to be permanent head of the Department of External Affairs, with access to the document under discussion?\footnote{116 CPD, H of R, 27 May 1952, p. 870.}

Wentworth’s purpose was not only to cast suspicion on Burton, however. He also repeated his call for effective action to be taken to remove Communists from the public service, emphasising again that the Government owed it to those innocent of subversion to clear their names by exposing the guilty. Casey’s reply, in which he infamously referred to a ‘nest of traitors’ in the public service, no doubt strengthened Wentworth’s argument. Rather than being the point at which Wentworth conceived the idea for legislation, as Watson contends, this was merely the continuation of a campaign Wentworth had engaged in since 1948. It was a campaign he renewed in November 1951, when he had agreed with Keon on the \textit{Public Service Bill} and sought new methods to combat Communism in the aftermath of the referendum defeat. It is likely that the discrediting of Burton was incidental and that Wentworth’s main purpose for this attack was again to highlight the need for measures to combat Communism in the public service. To say that such damage to Burton’s reputation was incidental is not, however, to say that it was unintentional. Interestingly, Casey stated that he did not want the inference to be drawn that Burton was responsible.\footnote{117 Ibid., p. 871.} Moreover, Cain contends that the leak was from the Department of National Development rather than External Affairs, and
was actually initiated by ASIO in an attempt to demonstrate that Communist journalist Rex Chiplin had access to secret information from public servants.¹¹⁸

**Wentworth’s Anti-Communist Bill**

On 3 June 1952 Wentworth questioned Casey about the lack of security precautions in the External Affairs Department before Casey assumed control of it. Wentworth again suggested that further legislation was required.¹¹⁹ By 29 June Wentworth had circulated his draft Bill confidentially to other members of Parliament. On the covering letter, Wentworth pointed out that it was ‘essential that we take prompt legislative action against Communism’. Furthermore, he believed his draft Bill would not only destroy the CPA, but provide a pattern for other nations to adopt in combating Communism in their own countries. Wentworth explained that he had studied spy trials in Britain and North America and had been convinced that exposure was the way to fight Communism. The proposals in his Bill were designed ‘to strike at the real nerve of Communist strength’.¹²⁰

The Bill will be discussed in some detail as it has generally been ignored by historians.

*A Bill For An Act Against Communism* proposed a Committee of Review that would determine whether people were Communists. It had several features similar to the proposed Bill of 1948. This Committee was to consist of the Chief Justice of the High Court (who was to act as President of the Committee), the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, two members of the Senate (one from each side), and two members of the

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¹¹⁹ CPD, H of R, 3 Jun 1952, p. 1231.
¹²⁰ Covering letter circulated in Federal members’ Rooms, Canberra, by Wentworth, 29 June 1952, NAA M1505, 292.
House of Representatives (one from each side). This Committee had the power to inquire into ‘all matters related to the Communist Party, its membership, its operations, and its associations, and into all matters related to the foregoing’. It was also charged with collecting published material related to these areas and compiling an index, which was reminiscent of Wentworth’s earlier requests of ASIO. Whilst the June 1952 Bill contained provisions which would have banned Communists from the Territories (where the Commonwealth had unfettered legislative power), by March 1953 these provisions had been dropped.

The legislation relied on three ‘schedules’, which were a form of statutory declaration. Schedule “A” was for those who were not, and had never been, members of a Communist Party as defined in the Act (this definition was consistent with the definition of the Communist Party Dissolution Act). Schedule “B” was for those who were not Communists, but had been members of a Communist Party in the past. Section (c) of this schedule stated that the signatory had ‘genuinely and sincerely abjured such membership, and am now opposed to such Party, and intend to do all within my power to work against it and undo any harm which I may have done by belonging to it’. Schedule “C” was then to be completed by those who had completed Schedule “B”. This schedule, in effect, allowed the signatory to confess their prior sins and repent.

Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, I undertake:

(a) That I will truthfully answer to the best of my ability all questions in relation to the above which are put to me by the Minister or his officers.

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121 Draft Bill Circulated by Wentworth, 29 June 1952, NAA M1505, 292.
(b) That I will not wilfully give any false or misleading information to the Minister or his officers.

(c) That I will at all times to the best of my ability help the Minister and his officers to find out the truth about the operations of Communism, and the movements associated with Communism whether openly or secretly.

(d) That I will, when called upon, appear as a witness in any court in relation to any case under the Commonwealth Protection against Communism Act, or before the Committee of Review set up under that Act, and will give evidence on oath of all things within my knowledge in relation to the above matters.

This Act would have forced former Communists to give information on their former colleagues. Furthermore, the schedule stated that the signatory would do all in their power to reveal information in its opening paragraph, and the ‘help’ mentioned in section (c) was not defined. This could have been interpreted as having a broader meaning than truthfully answering questions, particularly when considering the stipulation ‘whether openly or secretly’, and could quite plausibly have led to former Communists being forced to go undercover or become double agents. The penalties for falsely signing these schedules, or failing to ‘carry out to the best of his ability any Undertaking given under this Act’ was a maximum of a £500 fine and imprisonment for five years, in addition to possible penalties for perjury.

In operation, the Act would have required all Government employees to sign either Schedule “A” or both Schedule “B” and “C”. A refusal would result in their dismissal and forfeiture of all money owing, including superannuation benefits and leave. The names and addresses of those refusing to sign the schedules were to be included on
an index, as were those who failed to carry out undertakings and those convicted of any
offence under the Act. The Committee of Review was to maintain the index and was able
to add names to it. In this way Wentworth would have had a register of Communists in
Australia.

Those named were given the opportunity of a hearing before the Committee to
clear their name (provided they had signed either Schedule “A” or Schedule “B” and
“C”). The person named had the choice of whether they wanted a public or private
hearing, and were to be presented with references to themselves which they would then
be able to rebut. The Minister was able to be represented, and given powers to call upon
the applicant to give evidence on oath and be cross examined. In this way the Minister
would be the equivalent to the prosecution in a court case. The Committee was also
given power to award damages and costs to the person named if their inclusion on the
index was found to be unsupported by evidence.  

Whilst some of the provisions of Wentworth’s Bill seemed harsh, it did not, as
Watson argued, go much further than the Communist Party Dissolution Act. Wentworth’s Bill did not even declare the Communist Party to be illegal. Though an
earlier version had banned Communists from the Territories, where the Commonwealth
had unfettered legislative power, these clauses were dropped in the final Bill. The Bill
merely provided that Communists would not be able to work for the Government
(including the Defence Force) and that those already employed were to be dismissed.
Menzies’ legislation made being a Communist an offence punishable by five years
imprisonment. It also provided for the seizure and dispersal of CPA assets by the

Government, and allowed for names of Communists to be published in the *Gazette*. People declared in this manner were unable to be employed by the Government, and were also barred from holding office in trade unions. In fact, the only provisions Wentworth included that could be construed as harsher than Menzies’ Act were the obligations on former Communists to comply with the Minister or the Minister’s agents. Wentworth did not attempt to outlaw the Communist Party, did not make being a Communist illegal, and did not preclude Communists from holding positions within trade unions. The inclusion of members of the Labor Party in the Committee of Review is also important, as it shows Wentworth, as in 1948, was eager that this would be a bipartisan measure.

The significance of this analysis of Wentworth’s Bill lies in the contention that it was not, as has been suggested, a more draconian attempt at banning Communism, but instead was a representation of Wentworth’s adaptation to the political circumstances following the defeat of the referendum on Menzies’ legislation. The Wentworth Bill of 1953, had it been adopted, allowed the Communist Party to remain in existence and applied only to Government employment. It was a further example of the surgical approach to combating Communism Wentworth believed was required after the defeat of the referendum.

Nevertheless, the political climate was not yet ripe for further legislation on Communism so soon after the referendum. The Press had got wind of Wentworth’s legislation by August 1952, though Wentworth would still advocate it well into 1953. On 31 August 1952 the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s editorial viewed new Official Secrets legislation with suspicion.124 Days later, the *Age* reported that Wentworth’s Bill was

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being circulated among members of Parliament. The *Sun* reported that the Bill was likely to be rejected on 10 September, with Cabinet hesitant to introduce new legislation with regard to Communism and believing it had ample power to deal with Communists in the public service. Brian Fitzpatrick’s *Australian News-Review* opposed Wentworth’s proposed new law. Fitzpatrick had attacked Wentworth only one month before over Wentworth’s condemnation of Dr. R. E. B. Makinson, a scientist Wentworth labelled an ‘embryo Fuchs’. Wentworth was reported as circulating a draft copy of the legislation in Parliament House in March 1953. Despite finding some support within the Liberal and Country Parties, Menzies said he would not introduce legislation that gave civil servants the option of losing their jobs or becoming ‘pimps’. Menzies believed that other methods, such as secret ballots in trade unions, were more effective in fighting Communism.

**Commonwealth Literary Fund**

Another specific area in which Wentworth sought to attack Communist influence was the Commonwealth Literary Fund. It was actually Keon, again, who first drew the attention of the House to ‘an obvious and consistent pattern in the granting of recent awards’. He was referring to Communists when he claimed ‘a certain group, and that group only, has benefited from the fund’. Keon gave several examples of writers who had received funds in this way, including Judah Waten, Vance Palmer, John Morrison, Dymphna Cusack

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125 ‘Legislation and Civil Liberty’, *Age*, 3 September 1952, p. 4.
126 ‘Private bill against Reds rejected’, *Sun*, 10 September 1952, p. 5.
127 Wentworth’s attacks on Communists within the scientific community, particularly the Australian Association of Scientific Workers, are dealt with in Chapter I.
and Eric Lambert. Lambert’s work was labelled propaganda.\textsuperscript{130} When Wentworth rose to speak shortly after Keon, he revealed that he had asked for and received a list of scholarship holders from the fund ‘some time ago’.\textsuperscript{131} He accused Cusack of having a long history of associating with Communist organisations (she later protested against Wentworth’s attacks on the CLF in Fitzpatrick’s \textit{Australian News-Review},\textsuperscript{132} and cast aspersions on Palmer and Florence Eldershaw. Wentworth explained that the CLF had accepted the ‘cheap pot-boiler’ written by Barnard Eldershaw (a pseudonym used by the writers Marjorie Barnard and Eldershaw) on the life of Governor Lachlan Macquarie over a ‘scholarly and definitive’ work on the same subject.\textsuperscript{133} The author of the other work was Wentworth’s associate, M. H. Ellis, and Wentworth implied that Ellis’ anti-Communism, when contrasted with Eldershaw’s continuous involvement with the CPA, was the reason Ellis’ work was overlooked for selection.\textsuperscript{134} Wentworth’s opposition was not necessarily against the works themselves, but the fact that the CLF grants provided ‘sustenance for Communist authors and propagandists’. He claimed that one third of the people on his list were either members of the CPA or had definite connections with Communist organisations. Wentworth stated that author Kylie Tennant had Communist connections, and though her book on travelling bees seemed apolitical, the grant she had been given to write it allowed her to continue with other Communist activities.\textsuperscript{135} This is where Wentworth’s argument came unstuck. As it turned out, Tennant (the author of a book on migratory apiarists, rather than travelling bees) was not only not a Communist

\textsuperscript{130} CPD, H of R, 28 August 1952, pp. 717-20.
\textsuperscript{131} CPD, H of R, 28 August 1952, pp. 726-8.
\textsuperscript{133} CPD, H of R, 28 Aug 1952, pp. 726-8.
\textsuperscript{135} CPD, H of R, 28 August 1952, pp. 726-8.
but was, in her words, ‘extremely unpopular’ with the CPA. During Wentworth’s speech he had referred to his ‘habit’ of not saying things in the House which he would not say outside, free of Parliamentary privilege. Tennant, in an open letter to the *Sydney Morning Herald*, invited him to do so, assuring him ‘that within 48 hours of his doing so he will receive a writ of libel from my solicitors’. Whilst she had been a member of the CPA for a short time in 1935, Tennant became disillusioned and left the party not long after she joined. She later published a novel, *Ride On Stranger*, which satirised the CPA and led to a successful suit for libel against her by Communist Jack Blake. In an embarrassing about-face, Wentworth was forced to apologise to Tennant. McLaren has suggested that this was due to Menzies’ intervention. Ashbolt, too, has discussed Menzies’ defence of Vance Palmer but has also shown that Menzies privately lacked confidence in the CLF Advisory Committee. Wentworth apologised to Tennant and attempted to waive Parliamentary privilege in order to allow Tennant to sue him. The Speaker of the House ruled that privilege could not be waived, so Wentworth repeated his statement outside the House. Tenant declined Wentworth’s invitation to sue him for libel, claiming she was ‘too busy’.

One author not too busy to sue Wentworth, however, was Katherine Susannah Pritchard. The editorial page of the 10 September 1952 edition of the *Sydney Morning Herald* featured a letter from Wentworth in response to a letter the previous day from T.
Inglis Moore, a member of the CLF’s advisory board. Inglis Moore had challenged Wentworth’s accusations that the CLF had supported Communist writers, claiming that ‘of the 30 books published since 1940 under the fund’s sponsorship, not a single author was a Communist’. 144 Wentworth’s reply singled out Prichard as an example that the fund had, in fact, sponsored Communists. Wentworth wrote: ‘Now, Katherine Susannah Prichard (alias Mrs. Thorssell) [sic] is not only a member of the Communist Party in its exact sense. She is also one of its leading operatives.’ Wentworth went on to claim that he was in the habit of repeating his statements made under Parliamentary privilege outside so as to allow those named to take action, and as yet, nobody had (Tennant’s threat was yet to come, but ultimately she did not take action either). 145 Prichard did decide to take action, as she received legal advice that to refer to her married name (Throssell, rather than Thorssell) as an ‘alias’ cast doubt on the validity of her marriage. 146 The Prichard incident allows the most thorough examination of Wentworth’s relationship with ASIO in this period. Capp has dealt specifically with the links between Wentworth and the security service, claiming that Wentworth received material from ASIO and disseminated it into the public arena. She hinted that Wentworth conspired with ASIO in his attacks on writers and argued that, whether or not evidence exists of this, Wentworth at the very least served ASIO’s purpose (i.e. exposing Communists). 147 Capp, however, overstated ASIO’s role in the attacks on the CLF. Rather than acting as the voice of security in Parliament, as Capp claimed, Wentworth

seemed to speak and then check his facts with ASIO afterwards. As Capp acknowledged, Wentworth received information from ASIO on Kylie Tennant only after Tennant had challenged him via the *Sydney Morning Herald*.\(^{148}\) Clearly, Wentworth did not have ASIO information on Tennant before making his claims. Indeed, the nature of his request to ASIO suggests he may not even have had specific information from his own sources. Tennant’s ASIO file shows that of the two relevant instances produced, ASIO was unable to provide particulars of one (her joining the CPA in 1935) and the other was a 1951 petition signed by more than one hundred writers relating to legal action being taken against *Power Without Glory* author Frank Hardy.\(^{149}\)

ASIO’s willingness to convey this information to Wentworth, however, raises serious doubts as to whether ASIO was apolitical in nature as specified by both Chifley’s directive and Menzies’ Charter. In the case of Prichard, Wentworth’s representations to ASIO for information again appear to have been after his initial attack, rather than part of some conspiracy between Wentworth and ASIO to publicly discredit Prichard. Whilst Wentworth’s initial remarks regarding Prichard had appeared in the 10 September *Sydney Morning Herald*, it was not until 18 November that Wentworth wrote to ASIO requesting information on her. Notably, in October Prichard had decided to sue Wentworth for libel. ASIO provided Wentworth with three pages of places and dates relating to Prichard’s Communist activities stretching back some thirty years. Spry’s reply to the Solicitor-General, however, highlighting that Wentworth was being sued by Prichard, indicated the beginning of ASIO’s unease at providing Wentworth with information.\(^{150}\) Another inconsistency in Capp’s argument remains. Capp claims that Wentworth would have

\(^{148}\) Ibid.

\(^{149}\) ASIO file on Kylie Tennant, 23 September 1952, NAA A6119, 283, p. 12.

\(^{150}\) Spry to Prof. K. Bailey (Solicitor-General), 18 December 1952, NAA A432 1953/2055.
used the information provided by ASIO to defend himself when sued. If the case dealt with allegations of Communism, this may have been true. The suit, however, dealt with aspersions cast on the validity of Prichard’s marriage by the phrase ‘alias Mrs. Thorsell [sic]’ used by Wentworth in his letter. Wentworth’s disclaimer, published in February 1956 after Prichard’s court action had failed, specifically pointed out that he did not question the validity of Prichard’s marriage, but maintained that she was a Communist. Her son, Ric Throssell, wrote in his biography of Prichard that she would have confirmed the authenticity of this statement.\(^{151}\) Though it would have been a personal abuse of the security service had Wentworth received information to defend himself against a libel suit, ASIO more than likely knew that the information it gave to Wentworth was to be used for political purposes. If so, this directly violated its own Charter. Though Spry may have had misgivings about the nature of the information ASIO furnished to Wentworth, it maintained a relationship with him which was to last over twenty years.

**Wentworth and ASIO**

As we have seen, Wentworth’s relationship with ASIO began in 1950 where he attempted to gain access to the ASIO file library and suggested ways in which he believed ASIO should operate. During 1951 Wentworth often sent information to ASIO in a similar manner to his associate M. H. Ellis, enclosing items such as a Communist Party souvenir programme from the opening of Marx House in Sydney with signatures of Communist leaders,\(^{152}\) or titbits of gossip, such as ‘I have been told by one of my constituents that


\(^{152}\) Spicer to Wentworth, 18 September 1951, NAA A432, 1952/1400.
Mr. Merton Cooke of Sunshine Street, Balgowlah, is a leading Communist.’\footnote{Wentworth to Spicer, 8 October 1951, NAA A432, 1952/1400.}

Wentworth had directed his previous correspondence on security matters to the Prime Minister, but from 1951 he began writing to the Attorney-General’s Department in a pattern that would last until the early 1970s. In this way, the Attorney-General’s Department effectively became Wentworth’s conduit to ASIO. The practice of Wentworth receiving information from ASIO had become a regular occurrence some time before he received information on Tennant and Prichard. On other occasions, he had successfully sought information on groups as diverse as the Australia-China Society and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.\footnote{Wentworth to Spicer, 19 March 1952, NAA A432, 1952/1400, p. 11; Wentworth to Spicer, 19 March 1952, NAA A432, 1952/1400, p. 9; Spry to Attorney-General’s Department, 3 June 1952, A432, 1952/1400.} He also supplied material. On one occasion, Wentworth was approached by a member of the Institute of Public Affairs, and used to relay information to ASIO.\footnote{Wentworth to Spicer, 30 June 1952, NAA A432, 1952/1400.} In another instance, Wentworth was sent information by an anonymous source to pass on to the security service.\footnote{‘Aussie’ to Wentworth, NAA A432, 1952/1400, passed on by Wentworth to Spicer, 21 September 1953, NAA A432, 1952/1400.} By March 1953, however, Wentworth’s numerous requests for intelligence had become a burden on the organisation. Spry wrote to Senator J. A. Spicer, the Attorney-General, about Wentworth’s requests for information.

I have recently given some thought to the numbers and types of letters received from Mr. Wentworth. As a result I have found that they amount to a fairly formidable number –
about 30 in the last twelve months – of which 12 contain specific requests for information on security matters.\textsuperscript{157}

Spry stated that the correspondence with Wentworth causing the most concern were those that requested security information on specific individuals. Spry felt that Wentworth’s requests were either personal or political, giving examples of the Prichard case and another instance where Wentworth had asked for information concerning a person associated with his wife in a charity. Spry pointed out that the only way he could justify giving Wentworth any information was that it was done to help protect the security of the Commonwealth. In perhaps the most telling insight into Spry’s views on Wentworth, he wrote:

\begin{quote}
I admit quite frankly that until the case of Katherine PRITCHARD [sic] mentioned above, I felt disposed to trust Mr. Wentworth’s discretion to some extent in these matters, but since that case I have felt more and more disturbed at the possibilities.\textsuperscript{158}
\end{quote}

Spry met with Spicer on 6 March to discuss the Wentworth situation. Spry’s notes on the meeting appear at odds with Capp’s analysis of Wentworth’s importance to ASIO. For example, Spry ‘did not always know what Mr. Wentworth had in mind in regard to the subsequent use of information which was given in good faith to him by the Attorney-General’.\textsuperscript{159} This is not the remark of someone who believed Wentworth was the voice of ASIO in public affairs. He also believed that Wentworth was ‘given to outrageous

\textsuperscript{157} Spry to Spicer, March 1953, NAA A6119, 500.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
conclusions on very small inferences’, such as one instance in which Wentworth had linked the theft of guns and ammunition to Communists supposedly arming themselves.\textsuperscript{160} Spry said Wentworth often failed to tell ASIO why he wanted the information, such as in the Prichard case, and was advised by Spicer that he would talk to Wentworth, telling him that Spry was not going to give him any more information unless there were ‘very good reasons’.\textsuperscript{161} Spry’s correspondence on this issue is significant in that it reveals several things. First, rather than acting in concert with Wentworth, ASIO was not always aware of how Wentworth was intending to use the information it supplied him. Second, ASIO was content to furnish Wentworth with information until March 1953, after which Spry became uneasy due largely to the Prichard affair. Spry was able to ignore this discomfort, as he still provided Wentworth with information even after he was aware Prichard had launched legal proceedings against Wentworth. Third, Wentworth’s attitude to security is also revealed. That he does not reveal the legal proceedings against him, that he sought information involving him on a political level, and that he requested such a large quantity of information shows that Wentworth believed he was entitled to security information and that he considered Communism a security rather than political matter, a view consistent with his earlier attitudes. Referring to Spry’s opinion of Wentworth’s requests, McKnight noted that Wentworth received information on at least two other occasions after 1953.\textsuperscript{162} As we shall see, this figure dramatically understates the extent to which Wentworth utilised the security service in the years ahead.

\textsuperscript{160} Wentworth to Spicer, 10 June 1952, NAA A432, 1952/1400.
\textsuperscript{161} Memorandum of meeting between Spry and Spicer, 11 March 1953, NAA A6119, 500.
\textsuperscript{162} McKnight, \textit{Australia’s Spies and Their Secrets}, p. 312.
For a brief period, it seems the correspondence between Wentworth and ASIO did seem to slow. By the end of 1953, however, Wentworth again began requesting information from ASIO. In December he received copies of the CPA’s Constitution and ASIO’s notes on the subject. In January 1954 he asked for and received material on the CPA’s twenty-fifth anniversary. By the time of the most important security event of the 1950s, it seems Spry was once again content to give Wentworth information.

The Petrov Affair

On 3 April 1954, the Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy and Soviet intelligence officer, Vladimir Petrov, defected to Australia. This represented the culmination of ASIO’s efforts to recruit Petrov over several years. The defection caused a sensation, with Menzies revealing the events to a stunned House whilst the Opposition leader, Evatt, was absent on the evening of 13 April. Because the next day was the last day of Parliament before the House adjourned for the 29 May election, and because the Menzies Government had trailed in the polls leading up to this announcement, many on the Labor side became convinced that this was an elaborate election stunt. Following Menzies’ win in that election, some went further (including Evatt) and suggested that the defection was part of an elaborate conspiracy concocted by Menzies, ASIO and the Liberal and Country Parties to rob Evatt of the Prime Ministership, but that was yet to come. Wentworth’s part in the Petrov Affair was primarily concerned not with Vladimir Petrov, but with his wife Evdokia. Petrov had not told anyone at the Embassy of his impending defection, including Mrs. Petrov. At the time of his defection, Petrov was due to return to Moscow,

163 Receipt for documents, 23 December 1953, NAA A432 1956/2196; Wentworth to Attorney-General’s Department, 4 January 1954, NAA A432 1956/2196.
and this trip still lay ahead for his wife. Wentworth penned a letter to the *Sydney Morning Herald* concerning this situation, titled ‘Mrs Petrov’s “Crime” In Eyes Of Soviet Law’ which suggested Mrs. Petrov had committed an offence under Soviet law by failing to detect Petrov’s impending defection. He argued that Mrs. Petrov may be liable to banishment to Siberia, if she was not first dealt with by other methods darkly hinted at. Furthermore, Wentworth contended, Mrs. Petrov’s family in Russia were likely to be used as hostages to ensure she returned.\(^\text{165}\) The following day, as her Soviet ‘couriers’ ferried Mrs. Petrov onto a plane bound for Moscow at Mascot airfield in Sydney, an angry mob of five hundred people attempted to prevent her departure. The *Sun* reported that Australians and New Australians alike shouted for Mrs. Petrov to stay.\(^\text{166}\) Among them was Wentworth, who was reported as having collected statutory declarations from Russian speaking witnesses claiming Mrs. Petrov wished to stay in Australia.\(^\text{167}\) Wentworth gave an account in 1974 of how he came to find himself at Mascot.

\begin{quote}
I did hear that there was going to be some kind of demonstration, as was reasonable. On that night, my wife and myself, had taken our young sons in to catch the Glen Innes mail… they were going to boarding school in Armidale. And I said, almost by chance, let’s go out to the Airport, and see what’s happening.\(^\text{168}\)
\end{quote}

In an interview for Parliament’s Oral History project, Wentworth gave a similar answer.


\(^{167}\) Frank Chamberlain, ‘States approached on judge for Royal Commission’, *Sun*, 21 April 1954, p. 5.

What happened was this. When Mrs. Petrov was being exported that night I had some knowledge there was going to be a demonstration. I had nothing to do with organising the demonstration at all. Barbara and myself went out to the railway station to see off our two sons who were going up after their holidays to the school at Armidale, going up by the Glen Innes Mail for the term, and after that had happened I said, ‘Well there is nothing to do tonight, let’s go out and see what’s happening’.  

This account varied with the report of the demonstration in the Communist Tribune. It branded Wentworth, and by extension the Menzies Government, responsible for the ‘mob violence’ at Mascot. Indeed, W. J. Brown alleged that Wentworth played a key organising role. The mainstream media attributed the organisation of the protest to a White Russian, N. P. Harkoff, head of the Russian Anti-Communist Centre. Manne has cited archival sources to suggest that Wentworth not only planned to go to the protest, but that he spoke with ASIO before he did so. Manne’s analysis shows that Wentworth unsuccessfully attempted to call both Spry and Menzies on the morning of 19 April, the same morning his letter on Mrs. Petrov was published in the Sydney Morning Herald. The ASIO files reveal that, through the Solicitor-General Professor Kenneth Bailey, Wentworth arranged for an ASIO agent to ring him before 8:30am on the morning of 19 April. When Wentworth finally did get to speak to an officer, the Assistant Regional Director of ASIO, he outlined his belief that it was essential to separate Mrs. Petrov from her guards. He suggested that Mrs. Petrov may even be drugged. Wentworth told the

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171 Nicholas Whitlam and John Stubbs, Nest of Traitors: the Petrov Affair, Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, 1974, p. 90.
ASIO officer that he had rung the same information through to Menzies earlier in the day, but was unsure if it had reached him. After being assured that the question of Mrs. Petrov was ‘being discussed at the highest possible levels in Canberra’, Wentworth apparently ‘became friendly and almost cheerful’, and let the ASIO officer know that he would be at the airport that night to see what went on.\textsuperscript{174} These archives indicate that Wentworth was disingenuous in suggesting that he made a last minute decision to go to the airfield. The conspicuous absence of any evidence of an organising role makes it unlikely that Wentworth had a hand in organising the demonstration. An associate of Wentworth’s, the Polish-born Richard Krygier, collected witness statements claiming that Mrs. Petrov was heard saying she did not want to go, and introduced the witnesses to Wentworth.\textsuperscript{175} Wentworth rang the Lodge, where Cabinet was having a farewell dinner, and spoke to Defence Minister Phillip McBride, convincing him that action was needed to stop Mrs. Petrov being forcibly taken back to Russia. According to Wentworth, only the intervention from the Lodge following his phone call stopped Mrs. Petrov being transported back to Moscow.\textsuperscript{176} The importance of the Petrov episode when studying Wentworth, however, lies in the close communication he had with ASIO immediately before Mrs. Petrov decided to stay in Australia. ASIO seemed to have reconsidered their view that Wentworth was unreliable, and obliged when Wentworth demanded to speak to Security. Indeed, when Wentworth expressed dissatisfaction and hung up after his initial conversation with an ASIO agent, he was contacted by the Assistant Regional Director


\textsuperscript{175} McLaren suggests that it was Krygier, rather than Wentworth, who collected statutory declarations. It is likely that Krygier gave these to Wentworth when introducing witnesses. McLaren, \textit{Writing in Hope and Fear}, p. 117.

\textsuperscript{176} Hurst and Wentworth, ‘Interview with W. C. Wentworth’, pp. 5:9-10.
within fifteen minutes.\textsuperscript{177} Significantly, the relationship between ASIO and Wentworth during the Petrov Affair proves that by April 1954 Spry’s confidence in Wentworth’s judgement seemed to have returned.

Wentworth’s close association with Krygier is intriguing. Krygier was born in Warsaw at the end of World War I, and had fled the country during World War II. He had been a leftist in his younger years, but by the age of thirty had seen Poland destroyed first by the Nazis, then by the Communists. The anti-Communist research organisation Krygier worked for when he arrived in Australia was Wentworth’s Political Research Society. Krygier later founded the Australian Association for Cultural Freedom, an anti-Communist organisation, after being the Australian representative of the international Congress for Cultural Freedom from 1952. The AACF, established in 1954, set out to destroy what Krygier perceived to be the Communist hegemony among public intellectuals. Krygier and the AACF founded \textit{Quadrant} in 1956, a journal designed to combat the influence of left-wing journals such as \textit{Meanjin} and \textit{Voice}. McLaren’s examination of the AACF suggests that, though Krygier represented to others that Wentworth was a member of the AACF committee, Wentworth’s membership was never formal. Krygier is was likely to have been one of Wentworth’s ‘contacts’ among New Australians.\textsuperscript{178}

\textbf{Continuing Relationship}

The relationship between Wentworth and ASIO appeared to flourish once again following the Petrov Affair. In the months following Mrs. Petrov’s defection, Wentworth

\textsuperscript{177} Cabin 12 records, A6122, 13, p. 148-50.
\textsuperscript{178} McLaren, \textit{Writing in Hope and Fear}, pp. 79-80.
successfully sought information on Communist printeries and bookshops, and organised meetings with ASIO officers for certain people who came to him with information on Communism.\textsuperscript{179} In fact one of these representations, from Ken Blaxland, seems to have led to Wentworth’s next assault on Communism. Blaxland wrote to Wentworth on 16 July 1954, telling of meetings of Communists in private homes. One of the names he singled out was that of Communist journalist, Rex Chiplin. Chiplin had already demonstrated his subversive credentials as far as Wentworth was concerned. He was the journalist who published the \textit{Tribune} article which provoked the scandal involving Dr. John Burton and the draft treaty leaked from the Department of National Development in 1952. He had also published an article on Wentworth’s meeting with foreign uranium experts, also in 1952, which caused Wentworth to suspect a Communist uranium espionage network and label Chiplin a ‘full and complete traitor’.\textsuperscript{180} Wentworth put Blaxland in touch with security, but the Chiplin seed had been planted in his mind, and he was determined to do something about it. On 5 August Wentworth asked the Speaker:

\begin{quote}
Are you, Mr. Speaker, aware that an enemy agent, masquerading as a journalist, has been working in this building and using the privileges of the press gallery? In conformity with the Standing Orders I cannot mention his name, but he has been well and unfavourably mentioned before a certain royal commission as an employee of a newspaper…\textsuperscript{181}
\end{quote}

At this point the Speaker cut Wentworth off and suggested he visit the Speaker’s room. The journalist was undeniably Chiplin, and the Royal Commission was the Royal

\textsuperscript{179} For example, Wentworth arranged for Mrs. R. L. Malone and Ken Blaxland to see ASIO, Wentworth to Spicer, 18 June 1954, A432 1952/1400 and Wentworth to Spicer, 5 August 1954, A432 1956/2196.

\textsuperscript{180} CPD, H of R, 27 August 1952, pp. 668-9.

\textsuperscript{181} CPD, H of R, 5 August 1954, p. 35.
Commission on Espionage (RCE) set up in the wake of Petrov’s defection. On 10 August Wentworth challenged the legitimacy of the *Tribune* when requesting the Postmaster-General, Larry Anthony, deregister the publication using certain sections of the *Crimes Act*. Though Wentworth was eventually content to let the *Tribune* issue subside, the incident provides an insight into the sorts of political censorship Wentworth thought were not only acceptable, but advisable in the Cold War climate.

Wentworth continued to seek and gain access to information on ASIO. He received information on, among other things, a former Evatt campaign organiser in the Barton electorate allegedly thrown out of the ALP because he was a Communist, and an ALP financier who guaranteed funds for the alleged Communist spymaster before the RCE, Wally Clayton. These requests clearly reflected on the Labor Party, but Spry seems to have overcome his earlier concerns that such enquiries were not necessarily helping to defend Australia. In the case of the campaign organiser, Wentworth was asking to verify facts he already had in his possession, again indicating that he maintained his own intelligence files or had access to other sources. He would have likely used these sources when he attacked Evatt in the House of Representatives on 26 October 1955, when Wentworth sought to capitalise on the implosion of the Labor Party following the infamous ‘Molotov’ letter. Wentworth gave a potted history of Evatt’s supposed association with Communism stretching back to 1930. He alleged that Evatt was:

182 CPD, H of R, 10 August 1954, p. 92.
184 Evatt had written to the Soviet Foreign Minister, V. M. Molotov, in order to support his allegations of an ASIO/Government conspiracy designed to win the 1954 election for the Menzies Government. This incident was significant in the split in the ALP, after which several ALP MPs including Keon formed the Democratic Labor Party (DLP). The Molotov letter is examined in Cain, *The Australian Security Intelligence Organization*, p. 188.
A man in some way under compulsion by the Australian Communist party, a man who has been forced even against his own interests, and the interests of his party, to do what the Communists wanted him to do because they had gradually, over the years, developed some hold upon him.\textsuperscript{185}

Wentworth would not indicate what he thought the Communists may have had over Evatt. Even in an interview twenty years later, he hinted that there was more to Evatt’s connections with Communists but that he would not go into detail.\textsuperscript{186} It is possible that Wentworth had become aware by 1955 of information he would reveal in an interview in the mid-1980s, but was unable to verify. In discussing Evatt, Wentworth claimed:

Now Evatt, I regard Evatt as not a Soviet agent in any way at all. He briefly belonged to the Communist Party but only for a few weeks, and that was up in Kings Cross. But he was blackmailed by the Communist Party… I regard him, not as deliberately evil, I don’t think he understood what he was doing, but he was manipulated and he was one of the main Soviet cat’s paws without being a Communist.

When pressed on the alleged hold Communists had over Evatt, he replied that Evatt was always afraid the CPA would expose his former membership, which in the heated atmosphere of the Cold War, could potentially have destroyed his career. Wentworth said he did not see the membership card, but had spoken to somebody who was with Evatt when he affixed it, and added that Evatt had resigned after only three weeks.\textsuperscript{187}

\textsuperscript{185} CPD, H of R, 26 October 1955, p. 1935.
\textsuperscript{187} Hurst and Wentworth, ‘Interview with W. C. Wentworth’, p. 8:10.
Wentworth’s allegation is significant, as it helps explain the intense anti-Communist animosity Wentworth had toward Evatt.\textsuperscript{188} The possibility of CPA manipulation in this manner has not been addressed by Evatt’s biographers.\textsuperscript{189} The unverifiable nature of Wentworth’s information makes the allegation difficult to prove or disprove. Given the time which had elapsed since Evatt’s death at the time of the interview, however, there seems to be little motive for Wentworth to make a false assertion. It also demonstrates that Wentworth knew more than he was to publicly allege, and that he had sources that had been, at least formerly, part of the Communist Party.

Wentworth’s stream of ASIO information continued uninterrupted until Spry once again felt obliged to raise the principle of giving out security information with Spicer’s successor as Attorney-General, Neil O’Sullivan.

Mr. Wentworth’s query raises a point of principle which I discussed with your predecessor, Senator Spicer and with which he agreed. The view which I expressed was that whilst it was my duty to inform Ministers and Government departments on security matters which concern them, I should not supply information to private Members about private individuals.\textsuperscript{190}

There is no explanation from Spry as to why he had ignored this principle over the preceding four years since his conversation with Spicer. Wentworth was certainly not a

\textsuperscript{188} Rupert Lockwood also suggested in Document J that part of Wentworth’s dislike for Evatt can be explained by Evatt’s unflattering depiction of Wentworth’s ancestors in Evatt’s book, \textit{Rum Rebellion}, NAA A6202, J, p. 36.


\textsuperscript{190} Spry to O’Sullivan, 17 October 1957, NAA A6119, 500.
Minister and had certainly received information on private individuals in numerous circumstances. O’Sullivan had raised his objections in April 1957, when Wentworth had asked for information on a Romanian woman. On that occasion O’Sullivan had let the Solicitor-General know that he was not disposed to sending letters containing private security information to Wentworth. As before, however, Spry’s opposition to Wentworth’s requests was be shortlived.

An Anti-Communist Machine

Though Wentworth had continued to receive information from ASIO, he had not (Evatt aside) made public attacks on Communists on the same scale as he had over the issues of the Commonwealth Literary Fund, the Association of Scientific Workers and the public service in the years following the Petrov Affair. Yet Wentworth had not abandoned his desire for an organisation to disseminate information on Communists and Communism. In July 1956, Wentworth saw a stark contrast in the efforts of the Government to promote the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the lack of action on Communism domestically. He wrote to the Minister for External Affairs, Richard Casey, expressing this view:

I agree on the importance of an organization [SEATO] to combat Communist subversion and am glad that this is being set up and will have a budget equivalent to a quarter of a million United States dollars.

It does, however, strike me that while we are doing this kind of thing abroad, we are allowing Communist propaganda almost free rein in Australia. Cannot something more

191 Note for Bailey, 12 April 1957, NAA A432, 1956/2196.
effective be done towards setting up an organization of this character in Australia to
guide public opinion along anti-Communist lines and to counteract obvious lines of
Communist propaganda.
I am sorry to say that I feel that in the last six years the Government has almost entirely
fallen down on this vital task.192

Casey forwarded this letter to Spry, who agreed with Wentworth’s view that Communist
propaganda had been allowed to go unchecked, describing as ‘somewhat illogical’ the
lack of domestic measures while regional initiatives such as SEATO were pursued.
However, Spry believed that this sort of counter-propaganda role should not fall to ASIO.

To be effective, propaganda against Communism must be factual and continuous. The
organisation effecting such should be non-political if the best results are to be obtained.
This rules out action by a Government organisation, or an organisation sponsored, or
known to be sponsored, by Government.193

The caveat in the last sentence, ‘or known to be sponsored’, suggests that Spry could
have meant that Government sponsorship of such an organisation could (or should) be
kept a secret. Such was the case, for example, with the CIA sponsorship of the Congress
for Cultural Freedom and the British experience with the Information Research
Department. In November 1954, Wentworth advocated a ‘proper machine for the
identification of Communist propaganda and its confrontation’.194 Wentworth stressed

192 Wentworth to Casey, 13 July 1956, NAA A6119, 500.
193 Spry to Casey, 25 July 1956, NAA A6119, 500.
the need to publicly identify Communists to lessen their influence, giving the example of
A. W. Sheppard, an individual whom Wentworth claimed was running a long line of
Communist propaganda.\textsuperscript{195} Wentworth had, in fact, written to ASIO with information on
Sheppard as far back as 1952.\textsuperscript{196} A letter from Sheppard had appeared in the \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} on 27 October which, to Wentworth, showed ‘the need for being able to
identify these people publicly’. He believed that a list should be available of all
published references to Communists not just to the press or parliamentarians, but to all
people. Wentworth was speaking in relation to the \textit{Australian Security Intelligence
Organization Bill}, which was being introduced to give ASIO a legislative footing, as it
had only existed under the authority of Chifley’s directive and Menzies’ Charter since its
inception.\textsuperscript{197} However, Wentworth eventually allowed the idea of an organised counter-
propaganda ‘machine’ to fight Communism to subside for several years.

**Peace Movement**

A scandal which erupted in 1959 illustrated how Wentworth believed information about
Communists could be used to fight subversion. It involved the Australian and New
Zealand Congress for International Co-operation and Disarmament (referred to below as
the Peace Congress) to be held in Melbourne. Wentworth, like most Cold Warriors, had
long been suspicious of Communist influence within the peace movement. He requested
information from ASIO in May 1955\textsuperscript{198} and in mid-1956 received material on the
Australian Assembly for Peace which included a nine page dossier of published

\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{196} Wentworth to Spicer, 16 December 1952, NAA A432, 1956/2196.
\textsuperscript{197} CPD, H of R, 31 October & 1 November 1956, p. 2047.
\textsuperscript{198} Wentworth to Spicer, 6 May 1955, NAA A432, 1952/1400.
references regarding the Communist connections of some twenty-six individuals associated with the peace movement.\(^{199}\)

The controversy began with an article published by the *Nation* on 24 October 1959. This article detailed the visit of Spry to Professor A. K. Stout, head of the Department of Moral Philosophy at Sydney University, a ‘well-known non-Communist’, and a sponsor of the upcoming Peace Congress. The article described how a member of ASIO had visited Stout, and then later in the day Spry had himself arrived, ‘attempting to persuade him [Stout] to withdraw his sponsorship’. The article attacked ASIO for pushing ‘the Liberal Party line’, calling the use of Spry for this purpose an insult to both the service and Australian citizens. The article also claimed Wentworth knew of the impending visit before it took place.\(^{200}\)

Menzies was keen to distance himself from the affair. When he was asked a question by Labor MP Frank Crean (himself associated with the Congress), Menzies gave his Attorney-General, Barwick, the task of answering. Barwick revealed that it was he who, upon hearing that Stout desired information on the Congress, had asked Spry to give facts on who was ‘behind’ the Congress. Spry was not sent to persuade Stout, Barwick claimed, but merely to put the facts before him. Upon learning of these facts, Stout withdrew his sponsorship of the Congress.\(^{201}\) Further questioning from Labor MP Les Haylen revealed the extent of Wentworth’s involvement. Haylen asked:

Since when has the Director-General of the Security Intelligence Organization been able to go from place to place preparing a white list in some cases and a black list in others,

\(^{199}\) O’Sullivan to Wentworth, July 1956, NAA A432, 1956/2196.
\(^{200}\) ‘For You Must Know Security’, *Nation*, no. 29, 1959, pp. 3-4.
\(^{201}\) CPD, H of R, 27 October 1959, pp. 2279-80.
followed by the honourable member for Mackellar (Mr. Wentworth) whom we now charge with subverting the security service to his own ends.\textsuperscript{202}

Haylen had been in touch with W. J. Latona, a constituent of Wentworth’s. Latona was also the joint secretary of the Peace Congress. Latona had called Wentworth to talk about the Congress, who had phoned back claiming the Congress was dominated by Communists and that he had proof. According to Haylen, Latona had asked to see the nature of the proof, and Wentworth had offered to send an ASIO agent to brief him. Apparently what followed was an exchange between Latona and Wentworth in which Latona criticised Wentworth’s use of ASIO, and said that instead he would see any information Wentworth himself had. Latona’s statutory declaration on the incident claimed ‘Wentworth said that he had seen information on private citizens, and reiterated that I should see a security officer’.\textsuperscript{203} Haylen’s criticism was scathing:

Things have reached a pretty pass when the members of the security service, which, as the Prime Minister has said, was established by a Labour government for a specific purpose, are allowed to become the police officers of a police state. This development has been encouraged by the activities of the honourable member for Mackellar. What a tragedy, and what a pity, to see a security officer being led to every little bung-hole by the honourable member for Mackellar, who dances like a ferret in front of a burrow and says, “There is one in there. Bring him out.” We object to this. We think it is bad for our

\textsuperscript{202} Ibid.. p. 2347.  
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid.. p. 2348.
society, bad for the honourable member for Mackellar, and, above all, bad for the security service.204

Wentworth then rose to give his version of events. He claimed that he had heard that Stout had doubts about the Communist affiliations of the Congress, and had indicated that if he had evidence that it was Communist inspired and controlled, he would withdraw his sponsorship. Upon hearing this, Wentworth contacted Barwick, who asked Wentworth to make sure that security information was what Stout wanted. Wentworth then rang Stout and arranged for Spry to visit. Wentworth defended his actions, saying that the actions of himself and Barwick were not ‘anything but commendable’. On Latona, Wentworth said:

Mr. Latona is the New South Wales organizing secretary of this congress. He lives in my electorate. He has frequently been in touch with me before in regard to matters of this character. He has assured me, and has given me his word, that he is not a Communist. As to that, I know nothing beyond what he himself has told me, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, I accept his word.205

In fact, Wentworth’s knowledge of Latona was not limited to Latona’s own word. In October 1958, Wentworth had written to the Attorney-General (then O’Sullivan) in the following terms:

I wonder if you could tell me in confidence whether anything is known of the activities of Mr. W. J. Latona, 29 Water Reserve Road, Balgowlah. Mr. Latona is mixed up with a

204 Ibid.
205 Ibid., p. 2349.
number of Peace movements and I would like to know for my own information if possible, whether he is sincere or whether he has any Communist connections. Let me emphasise that my own mind is at present open on this point.\textsuperscript{206}

Spry’s reply advised that Latona had been involved with the peace movement since 1950, that he had associated with Communists, but that he had not come to attention as being a member of the CPA. Spry added that Latona had been described as a socialist but claimed to be a ‘genuine pacifist with no sympathy for Communism’.\textsuperscript{207} Wentworth claimed that Latona was guilty of misconstruction in his version of events, but given Wentworth’s own misrepresentation of his knowledge on Latona, his denials of Latona’s claims that he was urged to meet security officers is unreliable. The significance of this episode lies in Wentworth’s apparent belief in the role ASIO should play. Not only was ASIO used to disseminate security information, it was directed by Wentworth to visit a specific person, Professor Stout. It is doubtful whether Spry could honestly have believed that the Peace Congress constituted a threat to Australia’s defence. It is even more doubtful that Spry would not have been aware of the political implications of being seen to be directed by a Government member, and a backbencher at that. Whilst Wentworth’s role may not have been a dramatic as that portrayed by Haylen, Haylen’s criticism was in substance valid.

\textsuperscript{206} Wentworth to Spry, 10 October 1958, NAA A432, 1956/2196.
\textsuperscript{207} Spry to Attorney-General’s Department, 27 October 1958, NAA A432, 1956/2196.
Government Members Committee Against Communism

A letter to Menzies from Wentworth, in 1960, revealed that Wentworth was among a group of Government House of Representatives members who were meeting to discuss opposition to Communism.\(^{208}\) This group had been referred to by the new Opposition leader, Arthur Calwell, as the ‘Wentworth Liberals’ as early as 1958.\(^{209}\) This group, which in fact consisted of both members of the House of Representatives and Senators, was not organised at this stage, and would become the Government Members Committee Against Communism (GMCAC) after the 1961 elections.\(^{210}\) They agreed on a statement which Wentworth sent to the Prime Minister. This statement accused the CPA of a continuous public relations campaign on behalf of Communism in which Communists used unwitting people and subverted the loyalty of others without even letting them know they were affected. It again urged the creation of an ‘anti-Communist machine’. The statement detailed how this machine would work.

An anti-Communist machine should have three aspects –

(a) An intelligence service, directed to collating information about Communist activities, analysing the current Communist line, and identifying individual Communists. This function differs from that at present performed by Security, especially since the information gathered includes much required for public use.

(b) A planning service, directed to devising the appropriate counter strategy. Such strategy may include policy lines, legislation, organisation, administration, liaison, and publicity.

\(^{208}\) Wentworth to Menzies, 17 March 1960, NAA A6119, 500.
\(^{209}\) ‘Mr. Calwell Forecasts Depression in a Year’, *Age*, 6 November 1958, p. 5.
Wentworth indicated that the group was unhappy with the state of affairs in relation to Communism, and that thus far representations to Ministers had come to nought. He asked for Menzies to appoint a small Cabinet sub-committee to deal with the matter, but this request, too, fell on deaf ears.

In 1962, the Federal Executive of the Liberal Party appointed a Committee to Examine Tactics Against Communism. The Federal Executive then directed this Committee to meet with the Government Members Committee Against Communism. Whilst the Liberal Party Committee seems to have been short-lived, the fact that it acknowledged Wentworth’s group is important. Wentworth stated that the GMCAC had met with Barwick on several occasions, and implored Menzies to meet with them. Whilst it is not clear whether Menzies did, the request gives us a list of members of Wentworth’s Committee. Besides Wentworth as Chairman, the Committee consisted of Senators G. H. Branson, N. E. Buttfield, G. C. Hannan, and A. E. D. Lillico, as well as Sir Wilfrid Kent Hughes, C. E. Barnes, Alex Buchanan, J. S. Cockle, Nigel Drury, Dudley Erwin, W. C. Haworth, John Jess, Jim Killen, P. E. Lucock and H. B. Turner. Membership, however, changed over time.

Wentworth remained determined to ensure that Communism was fought more openly. In 1963, for example, Wentworth asked for a list of Communists in his electorate. Spry seemed to be getting frustrated with Wentworth’s requests for information yet again, though not because of the privacy issue. He replied to Garfield...
Barwick, who was now Attorney-General, that the organising of information according to electoral boundaries would involve considerable work at the expense of other operations.\textsuperscript{213} Wentworth then requested information on all Communists in either New South Wales or Australia as a whole, volunteering to sort them by electorate himself so as to make the information available to members of Parliament.\textsuperscript{214} Not surprisingly, Spry balked at the idea of turning over this vast amount of information to Wentworth, claiming that his records were not designed to publicly list individuals and that to provide such information in any case would involve a prohibitive amount of work.\textsuperscript{215}

Wentworth continued to push ASIO for greater dissemination of information on Communism. Spry’s reply in August 1964 indicated that the problem was not with the principle involved, but rather the method.

This is a question which Mr. Wentworth has raised consistently over the years in relation to an exposure of Communist activities generally. Undeniably he has a valid point. The question is “how”? Any public exposure inevitably comes to the question of naming people. I have not the slightest doubt that the Communist Party of Australia and its supporters, plus other well intentioned, but misguided, liberals, would endeavour to test every case to the limit. This could and would result in the exposure of our sources. These are very difficult to obtain and indeed much more difficult than Mr. Wentworth realizes. In fact, if a number were exposed by this method, A.S.I.O. could finish by having none – that is other sources would withdraw fearing exposure, and replacements for them would not be forthcoming…

\textsuperscript{213} Spry to Barwick, 3 April 1963, NAA A6119, 500.
\textsuperscript{214} Wentworth to Barwick, 14 May 1963, NAA A6119, 500.
\textsuperscript{215} Spry to Barwick, 7 June 1963, NAA A6119, 500.
If Parliament should be used as a vehicle for such exposure, one certainly would have privilege from defamation suits, etc., but it would generate (skilfully exploited as it would be by the Communist Party of Australia) an atmosphere of McCarthyism.

Regretfully, I am unable to suggest any workable method, other than the “quiet” publicity which appears from time to time in some of our national journals plus occasional general answers in Parliament to specific questions.216

This was a view Spry reiterated in early 1965, when Wentworth again sought to press the issue. In fact, the Attorney-General at this time, Billy Snedden, wrote that Wentworth wanted to put pressure on him through his Committee to force more disclosures of information on Communists. A handwritten ASIO note by Peter Barbour, who was later to succeed Spry as Director-General, speculated:

It is reasonable to assume that Mr. Wentworth would want to develop the “Government Members Committee Against Communism” as a medium for the dissemination of public information on Communism. Material supplied to him by the AG [Attorney-General] must also be assumed to be channelled to the Committee.217

Indeed, Wentworth did seek to exert pressure through his Committee. In June 1965, Government members Wilfrid Kent Hughes, Alex Buchanan and Alan Hulme all wrote to Menzies either urging, or enclosing letters from constituents urging the publication of a White Paper on Communism.

216 Spry to Snedden, 12 August 1964, NAA A6119, 4068.
Once again Spry had concerns about giving information to Wentworth. In Spry’s eyes, Wentworth considered himself the best means of disseminating information. Spry’s opinion, however, was quite different:

Mr. Wentworth has given the impression that he provides a satisfactory outlet for this information. However, quite apart from the fact that his own information is often inaccurate and misleading, it is considered that the channels at present in use for the dissemination of information are more effective, more reliable and (from a source protection point of view) more easily controlled.218

Spry later suggested to Snedden that he draft a letter to Wentworth, requesting that he be more selective in his requests of ASIO. Spry believed Wentworth’s requests placed a significant extra burden on ASIO’s resources. In early July, 1965 he claimed Wentworth had already made twenty requests for security information from ASIO since the beginning of the year.219 This was in addition to fifty-nine requests for information in the previous two years.220 As indicated earlier, it has been suggested that, after 1953, Wentworth received information on two more occasions.221 Though Wentworth did not receive information for every request, archival sources show that in the two and a half years until July 1965 alone, he received many times more than that number. Wentworth’s response again highlighted the differing views of himself and Spry. Whilst Spry believed there was no workable method to disseminate public information,

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218 Notes for Director-General for discussion with the Attorney-General on 5th July 1965, NAA A6119, 4068.
219 Spry to Snedden, 9 July 1965, NAA A6119, 4068.
220 Notes for Director-General for discussion with the Attorney-General on 5th July 1965, NAA A6119, 4068.
221 McKnight, Australia’s Spies and Their Secrets, p. 312.
Wentworth believed that ‘ASIO’s work is wasted unless there is some means of making appropriate parts of it… available for publication’. Again Wentworth urged that there should be an anti-Communist machine ‘either attached to ASIO or working in some way parallel with it’ to use information on Communists in publications. Wentworth did not believe that his requests placed any strain on ASIO ‘if ASIO is in any way an efficient organisation’, and stated that because of the ‘questions of major principles are involved’ he was going to table the correspondence between himself and ASIO in front of the Prime Minister and the members of the Committee Against Communism. Wentworth met with an Assistant Director of ASIO (whose name has been expunged) in August 1965 ostensibly to amplify information on an applicant for naturalisation, but quickly subverted the meeting to his own ends. The ASIO officer recorded that ‘Mr. Wentworth then invited me to lunch during which he embarked on an unproductive fishing excursion’. Wentworth criticised the Prime Minister and Attorney-General, claiming he did not receive enough information. He also explored the idea of publishing intelligence material again and the topic of the White Paper, and unsuccessfully tried to establish personal contact with ASIO. In this latter approach he was rebuffed, with the officer reiterating that Wentworth dealing with the Attorney-General was the correct procedure.

Wentworth again turned to his Committee Against Communism to attempt to exert pressure. Spry was wary of this Committee, refusing Wentworth’s request for the group to have a briefing on Aboriginal Affairs in May 1965 as he did not wish to create a

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222 Wentworth to Snedden, 21 July 1965, NAA A6119, 4068.
223 ASIO Minute Paper of Assistant Director-General (Q)’s meeting with Wentworth, 31 August 1965, NAA A6119, 4068.
precedent of meeting with them. Wentworth penned a note which proposed, among other things, that ASIO should provide material for debate and check the information of members, that Government Ministers should be present during debates on Communism to show their support, and that the Government take further administrative steps against Communism. The list of those undersigned shows that Wentworth’s Government Members Committee Against Communism now had significant numbers. Besides Wentworth were his House of Representatives colleagues H. Bate, C. W. B. Maxwell, Alex Buchanan, Kevin Cairns, Nigel Drury, Dudley Erwin, W. C. Haworth, L. H. E. Irwin, John Jess, Sir Wilfrid Kent Hughes, Jim Killen, R. Lindsay, and P. E. Lucock, whilst those from the Senate were Senators G. Branson, T. C. Drake-Brockman, A. E. Lillico, K. A. Laught, E. W. Mattner, K. J. Morris and M. Scott. Though five had dropped out since 1962, including Senators Butfield and Hannan who had lost their seats (later to regain them), the Committee not only maintained its numbers but increased them. Warhurst has suggested that the group never consisted of more than half a dozen, but in 1965 it consisted of twenty-one members. ASIO thought the GMCAC’s letter raised similar problems to those encountered in Wentworth’s earlier requests, citing the need to adequately protect sources of information. Even the question of CPA membership was, in some cases, a closely guarded secret. Spry believed that this information in respect to trade union officials not publicly associated with the CPA was what Wentworth’s Committee was most interested in. Another problem involved those who would wish to challenge the accuracy of information given about them, accuracy which could not necessarily be verified without compromising sources. Spry was also

224 Spry to Snedden, 19 May 1965, NAA A6119, 4068.
225 Wentworth to Menzies, 27 October 1965, NAA A6119, 4068.
sensitive to be seen as sponsoring Government propaganda, which could invite allegations of McCarthyism. He wrote to Snedden in terms suggesting that the best practice was to treat the group’s request as it had treated those of Wentworth in the past.\textsuperscript{227} This meant that the information given was usually ‘publically available’, meaning that it could also be verified by referring to published sources such as the\textit{Tribune}. In this way, if the information was challenged then ASIO could point to the published reference rather than compromising its sources. The organisation frequently claimed the need to protect sources prevented them from ceding to Wentworth’s representations for a ‘machine’ to deal with Communism. Spry could see no workable method for disseminating information which would ensure ASIO’s sources were protected.

\textbf{Ministerial Responsibility}

Wentworth’s promotion to the Ministry under the Prime Ministership of John Gorton had important implications for his relationship with ASIO. The Ministerial responsibility of Social Services and Aboriginal Affairs gave him the authority to request briefings from ASIO, allowing him the direct access he had requested in 1965. Wentworth had long been interested in Aboriginal Affairs, and requested information on many prominent figures and the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders.\textsuperscript{228} In his previous meeting with an ASIO officer, Wentworth had spoken of the need to ‘wrest the initiative from the left wing forces’ within the Aboriginal

\textsuperscript{227} Spry to Snedden, 4 February 1966, NAA A6119, 4069.  
\textsuperscript{228} See Chapter V.
Wentworth met Peter Barbour, the Deputy Director-General (Operations), on 25 March 1968. He claimed the CPA was active in the Aboriginal movement and wanted information on the ‘Communists and sympathisers’ among those he dealt with as part of his portfolio.\(^{229}\) In May, Wentworth wrote directly to Barbour (rather than the Attorney-General) on FCAATSI’s Easter Conference, furnishing a report for ASIO’s records.\(^{230}\) Wentworth again had a meeting with Barbour on 14 May, during which he outlined his plans to ‘expose’ the Communist involvement in Aboriginal Affairs. He specifically asked Barbour for information which he could use in the House of Representatives.\(^{231}\) On 27 May Barbour again met Wentworth personally, furnishing him with material on several subjects associated with the Aboriginal movement.\(^{232}\) Wentworth did not, however, stop making written requests to the Attorney-General’s department for other information. Subjects raised by Wentworth included the Ustasha (about whom Wentworth was to have several stoushes with Jim Cairns), the peace movement and the use being made by ASIO of those who had publicly defected from the CPA.\(^{233}\) Wentworth also kept track of the various factions of the CPA, which had by now splintered into several groups: the Communist Party of Australia, the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist) and the Socialist Party of Australia.\(^{234}\) In 1970 Wentworth wrote to Gorton, suggesting that the Liberal Party continue to attack Labor. He suggested that ‘By far the most effective of these attacks upon Labour [sic] would be

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\(^{229}\) ASIO Minute Paper of Assistant Director-General (Q)’s meeting with Wentworth, 31 August 1965, NAA A6119, 4068.

\(^{230}\) ASIO Minute Paper of Barbour’s meeting with Wentworth, 28 March 1968, NAA A6119, 4070.

\(^{231}\) Wentworth to Barbour, 7 May 1968, NAA A6119, 4070.

\(^{232}\) ASIO Minute Paper of Barbour’s meeting with Wentworth, 16 May 1968, NAA A6119, 4070.

\(^{233}\) ASIO Minute Paper of Barbour’s meetings with Wentworth, P. Nixon (Minister for the Interior), Mr. Swift (of the Department of the Interior), and Barrie Dexter (Director, Office of Aboriginal Affairs), 29 May 1968, NAA A6119, 4070.

\(^{234}\) Wentworth to Tom Hughes (Attorney-General), 21 November 1969, NAA A6119, 4070.

\(^{235}\) Barbour to Attorney-General’s Department, 5 September 1972, NAA A6119, 4070.
the Communist question and its variants’. Wentworth informed Gorton that, as the Liberal Party had not set up its own organisation, the only two worthwhile sources of information in this regard were ASIO and DLP intelligence.\footnote{Wentworth to Gorton, Preparations for Debate, 2 January 1970, NAA M3787, 41.} This implies both that Wentworth had access to DLP intelligence himself, and that he continued to liaise with Catholic anti-Communist forces, as he had done since the Political Research Association days. The continued traffic of information from ASIO had continued even after Barbour’s ascension to the Director-General’s role in December 1969, though the meetings with Wentworth did not appear to continue into the 1970s. Indeed, it appears Barbour’s promotion signalled the beginning of the end of Wentworth’s relationship with ASIO. As Director-General, Barbour wrote to the Attorney-General along the same lines that Spry had when concerned about supplying information to Wentworth. Barbour had also begun to question whether Wentworth’s ministerial responsibility entitled him to information.

Mr. Wentworth’s requests have been referred to me through your Private Secretary and the Department. I am not clear whether they come with your approval. It seems to me to raise questions about the use of security service. There is a great deal of work involved in obtaining the information required by Mr. Wentworth and I am placed in somewhat of a dilemma not only as to whether it is a proper function of my Organisation but also because I have not been made aware of the purpose to which my replies are to be put. I assume, but perhaps incorrectly, that Mr. Wentworth does not require the information in his official capacity as Minister for Social Services. Perhaps I would be wrong in wondering whether the information is to be used for electioneering purposes. I would
Barbour also commented on the volume of Wentworth’s requests, commenting that ‘over the years Mr. Wentworth has been the only person consistently seeking such material from ASIO and to my recollection he has never disclosed the purpose of his requests’.

Barbour again discussed the matter with the Attorney-General, Ivor Greenwood, on 15 November 1972. In this meeting Greenwood seemed to approve of the earlier Wentworth plans for a separate agency to disclose publicly information on Communists, whether in the Attorney-General’s or Prime Minister’s department. Barbour outlined for Greenwood the activities of the Information Research Department in Great Britain. The IRD was a secret organisation, formed in Great Britain in the late 1940s, designed to counter Soviet propaganda and funded by the British secret service, MI6. The IRD seemed similar to the anti-Communist ‘machine’ Wentworth had long advocated, but which ASIO had long baulked at. In this instance, Barbour’s notes of his meeting with Greenwood reveal that Greenwood thought ‘consideration ought to be given to establishing some other body’ and that Greenwood would give it consideration after the coming election. It appeared that Wentworth’s requests had finally gained some support, with an Attorney-General interested in establishing a ‘machine’ and the Director-General of ASIO suggesting a form in which it may be done (the IRD). Unfortunately for Wentworth, the Government would lose the coming election, and therefore his idea was accepted some twenty years

237 Barbour to Ivor Greenwood (Attorney-General), 18 October 1972, NAA A6119, 4070.
238 Ibid.
239 Note for Record by Barbour of meeting with Greenwood, 16 November 1972, NAA A6119, 4070.
too late to be implemented. The contact between Wentworth and ASIO dried up at the end of 1972. This could be because Wentworth did not consider that he would receive information through Lionel Murphy, the incoming Labor Attorney-General who later raided ASIO. It is also likely that the personal contact Wentworth had briefly enjoyed with ASIO (and Barbour in particular) evaporated with his ministerial responsibility.

Nevertheless, Wentworth continued to agitate for security information following the fall of the Whitlam Government. As late as 1977, in what was to be his final year in Parliament, he gave notice that he would introduce a motion which moved:

That this House and the nation are entitled to better information about subversive communist activities in the community so that people may know who their real enemies are and may be enabled to take measures to protect themselves from them.  

Wentworth informed Parliament that he was tendering his formal resignation to the Liberal Party in Parliament on 11 October 1977. He attacked the economics policies of the Treasurer, Phillip Lynch, labelling them ‘salvation through stagnation’. These policies, Wentworth argued, would pave the way for Communism.

Indeed, unless this doctrine is rejected, the socialists will win, not just electorally – though in all conscience that is important enough – but by moulding public opinion with the acceptance of their basic idea. Lenin predicted that socialism and communism would be made acceptable by the failure of free enterprise to present a workable alternative. I

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would not willingly, by my silence, play even the smallest part in making that Leninist prophecy come true, either here in Australia or on the larger world scene.\textsuperscript{242}

He continued to sit as an Independent in the dying days of the Parliament, which went to an election on 10 December 1977. With this election Wentworth’s career ended, but not before moving once more, on 25 October, for a Select Committee into Communist Activities which he vainly hoped would survive his career.\textsuperscript{243}

**Conclusion**

The examination of the role of intelligence and security in Wentworth’s anti-Communism reveals that Wentworth consistently favoured the public ‘exposure’ of Communists. He believed that the power of Communists lay in their secrecy, and that the best way to combat them was to expose their Communist connections to the wider public. His early experience with the Political Research Society allowed him to appreciate the value of collecting intelligence, and the propaganda value of disseminating this intelligence publicly. The disparate groups of anti-Communists he united within the Society included Catholics, Anglicans, Eastern European émigrés, the extreme right, Coalition parliamentarians and the conservative establishment. Whilst Wentworth was certainly an Anglican, the lack of religious rhetoric and his minimal activity in the Anglican community (when compared to other areas) would appear to discount Anglicanism as a major factor in his anti-Communism. Wentworth made valuable contacts during this period, such as M. H. Ellis, whose techniques Wentworth largely adopted, and Richard

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{242} CPD, H of R, 11 October 1977, pp. 1820-1.
\item\textsuperscript{243} CPD, H of R, 25 October 1977, p. 2305.
\end{itemize}
Krygier who fought Communist influence in ways similar to those Wentworth advocated through the establishment of the AACF and the publication of *Quadrant*. He maintained links with the various groups of anti-Communists throughout his career.

Wentworth also drafted legislation which would have replicated McCarthyism in Australia, providing a Standing Committee similar to HUAC in the United States. The comparison with McCarthy is an important one. Maher has argued that there was an absence in Australia of someone resembling McCarthy, and as such anti-Communism was not the realm of the demagogue as much as it was in the United States.\(^{244}\) Wentworth was both willing and able to act in this role, and it is possible that if legislation such as his own, or Menzies’ for that matter, were enacted that Wentworth could potentially have been the demagogue Maher refers to. Wentworth’s opinion, given years later, was that he did produce ‘McCarthyism Wentworth style’. He even defended McCarthyism, explaining in 1986:

> McCarthy undoubtedly committed a great many excesses. He was clumsy and did things which were not always to his credit. I think many of the things said against him are true. But on the whole he was right, not wrong, and the way in which McCarthyism has been developed as an epithet… is part of the very well orchestrated campaign of Soviet propaganda. The ‘Reds under the beds’ is a Communist phrase… Everybody shudders back at McCarthyism now, and very rightly there are some things which are very wrong about McCarthy, but on the main point McCarthy was right. And the fact that we forget the main point and concentrate always now on the bad angles is the result of a very

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clever, well financed, major Communist campaign running all over the world. The use of McCarthyism in that way is the biggest triumph of Soviet propaganda.245

After his election to Parliament, Wentworth possessed a public forum for disseminating information he collected. His anti-Communism also showed that it could adapt itself to the circumstances of the day. Wentworth tempered his anti-Communism following the decision of the High Court to strike down the *Communist Party of Australia Dissolution Act* and the subsequent referendum defeat. Believing that the Australian public had not rejected anti-Communism, but only the method in which it was applied, Wentworth set about targeting specific areas in which he felt he could combat Communist subversion, including the prominent examples of the Commonwealth Literary Fund and the Commonwealth public service.

Whitaker argues that J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI fed McCarthy, HUAC and other ‘witch-hunters’ information without which they would have been unable to operate.246 The relationship between ASIO and Wentworth was arguably similar. Wentworth consistently asked for and obtained information from ASIO, even when it appeared Spry had doubts about whether Wentworth should receive such information. In 1953 and 1957 Spry had cause to meet with the Attorney-General regarding Wentworth. In 1965 Spry again raised doubts over Wentworth’s use of security information and Barbour’s attitude toward the end of 1972 showed that he shared the concerns of his predecessor. The main point of conflict between ASIO and Wentworth seems to have been the continual argument, raised in varying ways over the years, between Wentworth’s preference for

246 Whitaker, ‘Fighting the Cold War on the Home Front’, p. 28.
‘exposure’ of Communists and ASIO’s reluctance to disseminate information due to fear of exposing their sources and a willingness to avoid allegations of Government interference. Wentworth formed the Government Members Committee Against Communism because he believed nothing substantial was being done. He also felt that he could use this Committee both as a medium to disseminate information and as a force for exerting pressure on the Government with the aims of gaining greater publication of information and eventually creating an anti-Communist ‘machine’.

Despite Wentworth’s ongoing conflict with ASIO, his relationship was at times improper and, at other times, seemed as if ASIO and Wentworth assisted each other. Whilst ASIO action against Communists can be seen as political, McKnight has recently pointed out that the furnishing of security information on Communism was a partisan issue; revelations of Communism bolstered the Liberal-Country coalition at the expense of the Labor Party.247 Barbour himself seemed aware that the material he was giving to Wentworth was being used for electioneering purposes. In Wentworth’s mind, however, Communism was always a security rather than political issue and the political side of his anti-Communism was almost incidental. Aside from possible political bias or influence, which in itself would be a violation of ASIO’s Charter, the convention exists that Ministers do not concern themselves with security information. McKnight quotes Justice Hope, who headed the Royal Commission into ASIO during the 1970s:

I have found evidence of cases where MPs have written to Attorneys General seeking information from the minister as to ASIO’s knowledge about a person. It is in my view

improper for an MP to ask such questions for remission to ASIO, improper for a minister to transmit them to ASIO in the expectation of a reply and improper for the Director General to communicate information on persons by way of reply to the MP’s inquiries.\textsuperscript{248}

This statement suggests that Hope considered the dissemination of knowledge on private citizens to be undesirable because of the principle involved. Interestingly, Spry and Barbour were more concerned that sources may be exposed. This exhibited a level of concern for their sources that was curiously absent from those whose information they were putting into Wentworth’s hands. This is especially poignant as ASIO often did not know the purpose of Wentworth’s requests, though it was clear his intentions towards those he sought information on were usually hostile.

An examination of the relationship also reveals a disturbing level of collusion between ASIO and Wentworth, who was for the most part of his career a backbencher. He sought information on Katherine Susannah Prichard when she threatened to sue him for defamation. He had an unusually close relationship with ASIO during the Petrov Affair. Later he was able to arrange for sponsors of the Melbourne Peace Congress to meet with Spry, in what can only be described as political interference. He was also able to offer this opportunity to Latona, a secretary of the Congress. Wentworth is likely to have maintained his own information as well, and used ASIO to verify his own facts. Indeed, on one occasion he implored the Attorney-General to arrange a meeting between himself and an ASIO officer so as to avoid ‘two separate intelligence organisations’.\textsuperscript{249}

In another instance, ASIO suggested questions Wentworth might ask publicly about a

\textsuperscript{248} Ibid., p. 710.
\textsuperscript{249} Wentworth to Snedden, 7 December 1964, NAA A6119, 4068.
visiting South African Communist. In one two and a half year period, he was able to make seventy-nine requests for security information. Barbour stated that Wentworth was the only person consistently requesting security information, suggesting that the relationship between ASIO and Wentworth was significantly closer than the usual relationship between ASIO and Government MPs.

Wentworth’s use of security and intelligence provides considerable insight into his anti-Communism. Wentworth believed that the Communist Party was a conspiracy, and therefore should not be treated as a normal political party. Because of this, Wentworth was not hesitant in using security sources in his battle against Communism. He was a consistent campaigner for an anti-Communist machine to expose Communists, though his ideas were not accepted by ASIO or the Government. Because his primary method of fighting Communism was through public exposure, Wentworth’s anti-Communism relied on security and intelligence information. He gained this information from techniques learned before his election to Parliament, and by maintaining links with other anti-Communist groups such as Catholics and Eastern European émigrés, and by establishing and maintaining a close working relationship with ASIO which continued unabated despite ASIO’s occasional moral discomfort. In Wentworth’s crusade to prevent Australia becoming a totalitarian state, he advocated aspects of that which he was trying to prevent, including the censorship of Communist publications, the interference of an intelligence organisation in political affairs, the reporting of security information on private citizens, employment restrictions according to political beliefs and a Government sponsored propaganda machine. The length of time over which Wentworth collected intelligence, the fact that for most of this time he was a backbencher, the vast amounts of

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250 Spry to Snedden, 4 November 1964, NAA A6119, 4068.
security information he was given, the uses to which he put the information and the fact that he was the only Government MP consistently seeking information, all point to Wentworth’s relationship with ASIO being perhaps the most egregious example of sustained impropriety between a Federal parliamentarian and ASIO since ASIO’s inception.
Chapter V – Reds Amongst Blacks: Wentworth and Aboriginal Affairs

The welfare of Australia’s Aborigines was an area in which W. C. Wentworth took a keen personal interest. It was an area that had not traditionally attracted votes,¹ which led to the perception that those politicians who were active in the field of Aboriginal Affairs such as Wentworth, Gordon Bryant and Kim Beazley, were primarily motivated by altruism and a sense of justice. Wentworth played an extremely significant role in the foundation of the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS), and was instrumental in the campaign for a referendum to give the Commonwealth power to legislate for Aborigines and count them in the census. He was rewarded by being appointed the first Minister in Charge of Aboriginal Affairs under John Gorton’s Prime Ministership, a portfolio which contemporaries such as Don Chipp believed he administered ‘with great distinction and compassion’.²

Wentworth’s involvement in Aboriginal Affairs was not, however, based purely on altruism or justice. There was another reason for Wentworth’s work with Aborigines – a reason which, as we have seen, was a constant motif throughout his political career. Though not immediately apparent, a close analysis shows that anti-Communism had a profound influence on Wentworth’s decisions and policies. This anti-Communism manifested itself in various ways: a stream of requests to ASIO for security information on leading Aboriginal rights figures; a refusal to acknowledge the only prominent national Aboriginal organisation³ as representative of Aboriginal opinion; key

³ A National Tribal Council was eventually established after the Easter Conference of FCAATSI in 1970. Sue Taffe, *Black and White Together: FCAATSI: The Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines*
appointments of Aborigines to the Office of Aboriginal Affairs (OAA); and calculated policies to seize the initiative from his (left wing) political opponents on issues such as the Gurindji strike claim. On land rights, too, Aboriginal interests were secondary to his other passions, such as uranium mining. This chapter will show that Wentworth viewed Aboriginal Affairs within a Cold War paradigm, allowing anti-Communism to guide his decisions and policies. Significantly, such an examination of Wentworth in this context has not previously been done. Many works on Aboriginal Affairs by historians such as Taffe, Lake, Curthoys, Attwood and Markey that refer to Wentworth fail to point out his anti-Communism. This is also true of autobiographical works by activists such as Joe McGinness, Faith Bandler and Jack Horner. Read consciously separates the two in his biography of Charles Perkins. In fact only Clark, who refers in passing to Wentworth’s consideration of the radical left, makes mention of Wentworth’s antipathy to Communism at all. The closest any writer has come to linking Wentworth’s anti-Communism and his work in Aboriginal Affairs is Frank Hardy’s *The Outcasts of Foolgarah*, the satirical novel in which a character based on Wentworth recognises a striking Aborigine from a strike up north and fears Communist influence in the

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7 Jennifer Clark, *Aborigines & Activism: Race, Aborigines & the Coming of the Sixties to Australia*, University of Western Australia Press, Perth, 2008, p. 235.
Aboriginal movement. This examination of Wentworth’s policies is therefore unique in both its approach and analysis.

Campaigner for Aborigines

Wentworth’s initial interest in Aboriginal affairs came from personal experience. It was certainly not an interest shared by many members of Parliament. Menzies’ biographer, for example, states that Menzies’ own lack of caring or understanding about Aborigines symbolised the prevailing attitude of his time. It was aroused during the frequent trips Wentworth made, with his wife Barbara, to holiday in outback Australia. When reflecting on his career in Aboriginal Affairs, Wentworth felt that his awareness of Aboriginal problems began in the 1950s, perhaps even earlier. It was a concern that began ‘by chance’, and which became apparent in two areas. The first was the welfare of Aborigines. Wentworth recalled that he felt Aborigines had had a ‘pretty raw deal in the past’ and needed help. He believed they should receive preferential help, not ‘to redress the wrongs of the past or anything like that’, but to bring their present situation up to ‘something reasonable and acceptable’. The second area had a more sociological perspective. Wentworth concluded that Aboriginal society needed to be studied and recorded. Wentworth viewed himself as an amateur sociologist or anthropologist, and through these lenses he viewed the Aboriginal people as a hunter-gatherer society. He believed that Australia was the only place in the world where a hunter-gatherer society could still be studied, and that Australia had a ‘duty to the world’ and ‘responsibility to

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humanity’ to record the nature of Aboriginal society. Indeed, Barrie Dexter, Director of the Office of Aboriginal Affairs while Wentworth was Minister in Charge, recalled that Wentworth told the BBC program *Man Alive* in 1968 that Aborigines should be studied quickly because soon there would be no Aborigines left. Wentworth considered the problems of societies around the world to be problems of authority and subordination, and believed that a study of the mechanisms of these aspects of society among Aboriginals would provide a better understanding of the nature of authority and subordination in systems such as those which existed in Australia, Britain or Russia.

The Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies (AIAS) was founded as a research organisation largely at Wentworth’s insistence. Recounting the circumstances of its founding, Kim Beazley, the Labor MP for the Western Australian seat of Fremantle, told the House that AIAS was set up as an interim organisation in 1962, largely because of the representations of Wentworth. Dexter claims that Wentworth’s effort might not have been as crucial as suggested, but believes it was important in the Parliamentary sphere.

A Dexter has suggested, Wentworth did indeed believe that time was of the essence. In a pamphlet on the need for an AIAS, he stated: ‘Within ten years there will be nothing but a fraction of a fraction left. It must be recorded now, or it will go unrecorded forever.’ On the adoption of the 1964 Bill to set up AIAS as a permanent organisation, Peter Howson, then Liberal member for Fawkner, stated:

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11 Ibid.
14 This Institute later changed its name to the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies.
I rise merely to pay a tribute to the great work of the honourable member for Mackellar (Mr. Wentworth) in this matter. I feel that it should be said in this House at this time that the nation in years to come will owe a tremendous debt to the work that he has done in this field during the past three years. This evening both sides of the House have paid tribute to one man.\textsuperscript{18}

Beazley was similarly appreciative of Wentworth’s efforts, suggesting in 1966 that Wentworth had:

a quite unique and vital distinction in the politics of Australia in this respect, because in his persistent work which led to the establishment of the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies he extracted from the Government of the Commonwealth the first gesture of a basic respect for the Aboriginal people in 50 or 60 years.\textsuperscript{19}

Wentworth and Beazley became the two Parliamentary Representatives on the Council of the AIAS. Wentworth considered the establishment of AIAS the greatest achievement of his long political career,\textsuperscript{20} and the Institute holds a biennial Wentworth Lecture in his honour.\textsuperscript{21} AIAS was, however, set up only as a research institution. Dexter has been critical of Wentworth, in that Wentworth believed the Institute should record everything known about the Aborigines before they or their culture disappeared, rather than fostering a continuation of their culture and survival as a race.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{18} CPD, H of R, 20 May 1964, p. 2170.
\textsuperscript{19} CPD, H of R, 10 March 1966, p. 127.
\textsuperscript{22} Barrie Dexter, Letter to author, 27 April 2008.
Wentworth’s passion for improving Aboriginal welfare can be seen in his advocacy for the referendum campaign on their behalf. In 1959 the Joint Committee of Constitution Review had recommended the repeal of section 127 of the Constitution, which was responsible for the exclusion of Aborigines from the census. The Labor Party had also adopted the removal of section 127 as official policy, as well as an amendment to section 51, which prevented the Commonwealth making laws with respect to Aborigines. In 1962, Beazley initiated debate on a referendum on section 51, and in 1964 Arthur Calwell attempted to introduce legislation for a referendum on both sections 51 and 127. Menzies finally announced, in November 1965, that a referendum would be held only to repeal section 127.\textsuperscript{23}

Wentworth had supported a referendum as early as May 1965. In a debate on Appropriation Bills, he suggested the referendum be approached as a non-party subject as, if it were otherwise, it would be difficult to gain popular approval. He called section 127 ‘archaic’ and proposed its removal, saying it had ‘no place in our Constitution.’ Wentworth also canvassed the prospect of removing section 51 (xxvi.). The preamble to section 51 read: ‘The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to –’. A list of powers then followed. Sub-section (xxvi.) read: ‘The people of any race, other than the Aboriginal race in any State, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws’. Wentworth, however, dismissed the idea of removing this sub-section, despite believing that there should not be racial discrimination in Australia and that ‘perhaps it would be out of place to maintain in our Constitution the power to make laws on the basis

\textsuperscript{23} An amendment to section 24 was also announced, though this related to the number of Senators relative to the number of members of the House of Representatives, not Aboriginal Affairs. Attwood and Markus, \textit{The 1967 Referendum}, p. 35.
of race’. His opposition to its removal in its entirety was based on his belief that a situation would then exist in which, rather than removing the power to make laws on the basis of race, the power would just be transferred to the States. Instead, Wentworth proposed a new sub-section for section 51. It read:

Neither the Commonwealth nor any State shall make or maintain any law which, by reason of racial origin, either

(a) Denies Australian citizenship to any person born in Australia

(b) Denies or impairs the right of any Australian citizen to be enrolled for or to vote at any election for any Parliament or for any body created under the law of the Commonwealth or a State

(c) Places any Australian citizen under any restraint or disability.

This sub-section, Wentworth proposed, could replace sub-section (xxvi.). Wentworth also saw the possible need to make laws for the benefit of Aborigines and suggested that another amendment could be placed in an appropriate position in section 51, or that States could refer their powers to make these laws to the Government, which they were entitled to do under sub-section (xxxvii.). After Menzies introduced the Constitution Alteration (Repeal of Section 127) Bill in November 1965, Wentworth argued that the Bill did not go far enough, again suggesting amendments to give the Commonwealth power to make laws for the benefit of Aborigines and seeking to eliminate discrimination against any particular race. Realising his amendments would be outside the scope of the Bill and its very narrow and specific title, Wentworth signalled his intention to propose a

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second Bill to ask further questions in the referendum in order to cover his amendments. Wentworth’s *Constitution Alteration (Aborigines) Bill* was debated in March 1966; however, the final referendum proposal – the similarly named *Constitution Alteration (Aboriginals) Bill* – was not debated until March the following year. Wentworth considered the new Bill to have ‘at least three-quarters, and probably more than three-quarters, of the substance that we were seeking for the Aboriginal people’ and as such he supported it.  

Following the disappearance of Harold Holt and the ascension of John Gorton to the Prime Ministership, Wentworth was appointed Australia’s first Minister in Charge of Aboriginal Affairs in an office within the Prime Minister’s Department.

**Red Menace in Black Movement**

Some of the major factors motivating Wentworth’s activism on behalf of Aborigines were the sympathy he felt after encountering Aborigines whilst travelling around Australia; a sense of white responsibility for Aborigines and the feeling that they had got a ‘raw deal’ in the past; and his pretensions of being an amateur sociologist. *The Canberra Times* published an article on Wentworth in 1968, after his appointment to the Ministry, and attempted to explain Wentworth’s interest in Aborigines:

> A friend suggests that he turned to the Aborigines in the late fifties, reconciled to never achieving office and seeking an interest to occupy his time. “He made a very natural transition from the scientific side to his interest in social problems”, the friend adds. “Now he wants to head off things he sees coming in the Aboriginal world”.

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Sekuless also notes that in December 1956, public support for Aboriginal causes from politicians such as Wentworth, Beazley or Gordon Bryant, the Labor member for Wills, was yet to come. Clark argues that, other than Wentworth, Beazley and Bryant, few Parliamentarians had any personal or abiding concern for Aborigines. In his memoirs, Beazley adds Paul Hasluck’s name to this list. By the 1960s, however, Wentworth began to become active in Aboriginal Affairs. Despite any feelings Wentworth may have had about his future ministerial prospects, he was concerned with one problem in particular which he saw among Aborigines. As early as 1952, Wentworth had alluded to the potential for Communist manipulation of the Aboriginal movement. Speaking on what he saw as a Communist scheme opposing uranium mining, Wentworth claimed:

The scheme… is cunning because, like most Communist schemes, it is designed to use the pressure of people who are not Communists, and to direct the efforts of those people to use for Communist purposes, without allowing them to know why they are being used… The aborigines are to be used.

By the 1960s Wentworth was convinced that this was occurring and wished ‘to head off things he sees coming’. In October 1962 he wrote to the Attorney-General, Sir Garfield Barwick, to request information on the Federal Council for Aboriginal Advancement

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29 Clark, *Aborigines & Activism*, pp. 30-1.
(FCAA, later known as FCAATSI). FCAATSI was a federation of organisations from all over Australia concerned with Aboriginal Affairs, and in the Federal Council they comprised Australia’s only national Aboriginal rights body. Wentworth asked for material which ‘could be regarded as being for publication.’ Wentworth had been writing to the various Attorney-Generals for more than ten years, as discussed in the previous chapter, and this had become standard practice when Wentworth wished to gain security information from ASIO.

ASIO has a longstanding interest in the Aboriginal movement. Taffe argues that ASIO believed FCAATSI to be under the control of a Communist faction which sought to use Aborigines to further their own campaign for Communism in Australia. McKnight has shown that ASIO believed that the CPA was trying to encourage trade unionism among Aborigines in order to weaken wealthy pastoralists. ASIO also believed that those organisations which sought to assist Aborigines were ‘fronts’. McKnight also argues that an ASIO paper was the basis for a Bulletin article attacking Communist influence in the Aboriginal movement following the 1965 Freedom Ride which sought to expose inequality in country New South Wales. The full extent of ASIO’s penetration of the Aboriginal movement, however, has yet to be revealed. Cain’s work on ASIO, for example, fails to mention Aborigines at all. In order to better illustrate ASIO’s activities, the following is a partial attempt to fill this historiographical gap.

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32 This organisation was later known as the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders (FCAATSI). Subsequent references will use this name.
33 Wentworth to Barwick (Attorney-General), 9 October 1962, NAA A6119, 500.
34 Taffe, Black and White Together, p. 71.
36 Ibid., p. 186-7.
ASIO relied on informants who passed information from the various organisations with which they were involved. These sources were often of Aboriginal descent themselves. One report, for example, describes an ASIO officer picking up an informer and debriefing him for two hours as he handed over documents and information relating to the Victorian Aboriginal Special Operations Organisation. The informant (whose name is blacked out) also gives intimate details of the internal politics of the Victorian based Aborigines Advancement League (AAL). There is persuasive evidence to suggest that the informant was Aboriginal activist Harry Penrith (later known as Burnum Burnum).  

Penrith is most remembered for his successful campaign to remove the remains of Truganini from the Hobart Museum for reburial in the late 1960s, and placing an Aboriginal flag on the white cliffs of Dover during Australian bicentenary celebrations on Australia Day in 1988. Charles Perkins, the leader of the Freedom Ride and Manager of the Sydney based Foundation for Aboriginal Affairs (FAA), claimed that he was approached by an ASIO officer who asked for assistance in identifying Aborigines in photographs and also sought information on those identified. David Anderson, a part-Aborigine and one time Vice President of the AAL, revealed to his Mildura church congregation that he had been under secondment to ASIO and ‘had become a Communist or Leftist to collect information’. His revelations suggest that he was employed by ASIO,

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38 Report of meeting on Aboriginal Activities, NAA A6119, 3662, 10 November 1969. The report refers to the informant as being part of a three man ‘all Aboriginal delegation… consisting of Stewart MURRAY, Robert Louis MAZA and himself’. This delegation was elected to give a report to the AAL on 17 September 1969 asking the white members of the executive to resign. A press release from the AAL reveals that the three man delegation at this meeting consisted of Murray, Maza and Harry Penrith. Aboriginal Advancement League, Winds of Change, 8 October 1969, Retrieved 13 October 2009 from http://www.reasoninrevolt.net.au/bib/PR0000589.htm.


rather than merely volunteering information.\textsuperscript{41} The ASIO reports concerning Aboriginal activist and poet Kath Walker (later known as Oodgeroo Noonuccal), Secretary of the Queensland Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders (QCAATSI), were particularly intimate. They reveal that Walker was suspicious of the motives of Stan Davey, the white General Secretary of FCAATSI, and decided to test his morals in 1962 by giving him ‘to understand that she would go with him if he wanted company, but at no time did he indicate that he was remotely interested’.\textsuperscript{42} Walker subsequently supported Davey. A later report by an ASIO agent within QCAATSI said that relations had thawed between Walker and Faith Bandler, a long time activist and Davey’s successor, because Walker was ‘more than friendly’ with Bandler’s brother.\textsuperscript{43} These incidents serve to illustrate the extent of ASIO’s penetration of the Aboriginal movement in its hunt for ‘reds’. This infiltration of the Aboriginal movement has not been thoroughly examined by historians of either the Aboriginal movement or ASIO.

Wentworth asked for information on FCAATSI in 1962. As well as providing some unclassified material on office bearers, organisations affiliated with FCAATSI and published references of CPA membership or support, the reply from Spry included a frank assessment which is useful in demonstrating ASIO’s attitude to the Aboriginal movement at the time. It stated:

\begin{quote}
Within the Federal Council for Aboriginal Advancement a Communist Party of Australia fraction now operates and the President of the Council, Joseph Daniel McGinness, has attended a fraction meeting. On the executive and staff of the Federal Council and its
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{41} ‘Local church gathering told: “I was spy for Federal Govt.”’, \textit{Sunraysia Daily}, 20 October 1969, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{43} Report on the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, 1 February 1968, NAA A6119, 3661.
thirty-one affiliated organisations I have reports that fifty-three persons are or have been members of the Communist Party of Australia. Of these, three are now known publicly to be anti-Communist, sixteen have been named publicly as Communists, eight have some public reference to being supporters of the Communist Party of Australia and the rest are known as Communists through secret and delicate reports.\textsuperscript{44}

FCAATSI had been founded in 1958 and since that time had been campaigning for Aboriginal equality in living standards, citizenship, wages and education, amongst other things.\textsuperscript{45} As indicated earlier, Wentworth had suspected Communist infiltration of the Aboriginal movement before 1962, but this appears to be the first time he requested information from ASIO on any Aboriginal rights organisation. Spry’s information confirmed for Wentworth the presence of Communists in the movement. It does not appear, however, that Wentworth used the information to attack members of the FCAATSI publicly – as was his style a decade earlier. Wentworth later conceived the idea that he would have to take the initiative on Aboriginal affairs in order to prevent the Communists from gaining any further ascendancy in this area, and it appears that he began to form this opinion as early as 1962. By this stage the AIAS was an interim organisation, but Wentworth and Beazley had made clear from the outset that AIAS was a research institution, with no role for welfare itself (excepting of course that the research would produce information which would better inform welfare policy). This was important, as it meant that Wentworth’s approach to Aboriginal welfare issues can be

\textsuperscript{44} Wentworth to Barwick, 9 October 1962, NAA A6119, 500.
\textsuperscript{45} Taffe, \textit{Black and white together}, pp. 12-3.
seen as distinct from his work with the AIAS, which indulged Wentworth’s sociological and anthropological pretensions.  

On 10 May 1965, Wentworth wrote to Barwick’s successor as Attorney-General, Billy Snedden. This time Wentworth wanted an ASIO briefing for the Government Members Committee Against Communism. Spry was, however, wary of creating a precedent by meeting with Wentworth’s Committee and was mindful of the potential for adverse publicity were such a meeting made public. Instead, Spry referred Wentworth to an ASIO paper released in October 1964. Wentworth was grateful for the ‘secret memorandum’ he received via Snedden, and suggested that the ASIO paper be circulated among his Cabinet colleagues. He also suggested a revised version be published. Spry cautioned against these actions, as it was the responsibility of the Minister for Territories rather than Wentworth. Whilst of the opinion that the document was valuable, Wentworth had two objections. The first was that it did not take sufficient account of the international situation, stating ‘the Communists are using the Aboriginal issue abroad as a means of inflaming African and Asian hatred against Australia.’ He suggested that the ultimate objective of this resentment would be to open Australia to armed attack. He was perhaps mindful of the remarks of Soviet Union leader Nikita Khrushchev at the United Nations in late 1960, when Khrushchev referred to the way ‘the Aboriginal population of Australia was exterminated.’ Wentworth’s second objection was that the document did not contain a list of current organisations and main office bearers, with

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47 Wentworth to Snedden, 10 May 1965, NAA A6119, 4068.  
48 Spry to Snedden, 19 May 1965, NAA A6119, 4068.  
49 Wentworth to Snedden, 1 June 1965, NAA A6119, 4068.  
50 Spry to Snedden, 30 June 1965, NAA A6119, 4068.  
51 Wentworth to Snedden, 1 June 1965, NAA A6119, 4068.  
52 CPD, H of R, 8 & 9 December 1960, pp. 3870-1.
indications as to who among them were Communist Party members or sympathisers, which would presumably have been similar in nature to the list he received in 1962.\textsuperscript{53} The day after Wentworth wrote this reply to Snedden, he penned another letter asking for information ‘regarding Communist activities among aboriginal organisations, particularly in New South Wales’.\textsuperscript{54} Due to some confusion with ASIO, Wentworth did not receive a reply to his enquiry until 16 September 1965.\textsuperscript{55} By this time, however, Wentworth had seen ASIO’s Assistant Director-General regarding a separate subject.\textsuperscript{56} During this meeting Wentworth discussed Aborigines, stating that he was personally interested and wished ‘to expose Communist activity in this area.’ In an indication that his anti-Communism was a motivating factor with regard to his Aboriginal agenda, the ASIO report stated:

He [Wentworth] said he is also attempting to move the Government to act strongly to increase the welfare of the Aboriginal people in order to wrest the initiative from the left wing forces.\textsuperscript{57}

Spry gave information to Snedden for Wentworth relating to the ‘Freedom Ride’ organised by Student Action for Aborigines (SAFA), of whom Brian Aarons (son of the

\textsuperscript{53} Wentworth to Snedden, 1 June 1965, NAA A6119, 4068.
\textsuperscript{54} Wentworth to Snedden, 2 June 1965, NAA A6119, 4068.
\textsuperscript{55} Wentworth had wanted the information before a meeting with the Aboriginal author of an anti-Communist magazine article, former boxer George Bracken. ASIO eventually replied to Wentworth with information on Bracken. Wentworth was then obliged to write back and explain that he did not want information on Bracken, but on Communist activities so he could be made aware of them before his meeting with Bracken. Wentworth explained what he wanted in Wentworth to Snedden, 18 August 1965, NAA A6119, 4068. Spry’s reply to Snedden with information is in Spry to Snedden, 16 September 1965, NAA A6119, 4068.
\textsuperscript{56} To ‘amplify information on Stavko Semiga, an applicant for naturalisation’. ASIO Minute Paper, 31 August 1965, NAA A6119, 4068.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
General-Secretary of the CPA, Laurie Aarons) and Ann Curthoys (daughter of prominent then-CPA members Geoff and Barbara Curthoys) were active participants. Curthoys’ memoir of the Freedom Ride recalled the influence of the Communist Party’s position on Aborigines on her own thinking at the time. Charles Perkins and Jim Spigelman, wary of perceptions of Communist influence, publicly announced that they would not allow Communists to stack the tour and that they had discouraged Eureka Youth League (EYL, considered a Communist front) members from attending. Curthoys recollects that SAFA publicity played down the fact that up to a quarter of Freedom Riders had connections to the Sydney University Labour Club, the EYL or the CPA.58 Spry’s information for Wentworth also included notes on the use made by Communist Party of the visiting ‘well known communist anthropologist’, Professor Frederick Rose.59

After several years of work in the area by Wentworth, the referendum on Sections 51 and 127 of the Constitution finally took place in May 1967. The result was a resounding approval of the alterations submitted. By August, however, little progress had been made in terms of Aboriginal affairs. The Prime Minister, Harold Holt, was under pressure to preserve the existing state of Aboriginal affairs, following a vote by the Aboriginal Welfare Conference of State and Commonwealth Ministers.60 The Government’s inaction prompted Aboriginal figure Charles Perkins to complain to Wentworth.61 Perkins had been a leader in the SAFA Freedom Rides, and had also been a well known figure in FCAATSI. Perkins was, however, an anti-Communist. With the Reverend Ted Noffs, he was the driving force behind the Sydney based Foundation for

58 Curthoys, Freedom Ride, pp. 64-5.
59 Spry to Snedden, 16 September 1965, NAA A6119, 4068.
61 Read, Charles Perkins, p. 140.
Aboriginal Affairs. This Foundation was hailed in the Bulletin in February and March of 1965 as being the only Aboriginal rights organisation to steer clear of Communist influence.\(^{62}\) By the end of 1966, Perkins attacked the Aborigines’ Progressive Association (APA) founders Helen Hambly and Ray Peckham at the FCAATSI annual conference, claiming they were known Communists who brought discredit on legitimate workers for Aboriginal advancement.\(^{63}\) Perkins thereafter regularly criticised what he perceived as the Communist domination of both the FCAATSI and the Aboriginal-Australian Fellowship (AAF).\(^{64}\) In early 1967 Perkins resigned as Vice-President of FCAATSI, saying that the organisation no longer represented Aboriginal opinion.\(^{65}\) By October 1967 he was publicly debating Faith Bandler over Communists in FCAATSI. The ASIO report of the debate states that Perkins had realised that ‘the Communists had a fairly firm hold on the Organisation including its Executive’. The same report quoted Kath Walker’s opinion that Communists had penetrated Aboriginal Advancement groups, with Walker saying she had been around too long ‘to be fooled by sweet talking Communists’ and would remain in FCAATSI ‘to fight the Comrades from within’. Perkins, however, would try to support a new group which could ‘give the Aboriginal a better voice’.\(^{66}\)

Arguably, this history of anti-Communism significantly influenced Wentworth’s opinion of Perkins. When Perkins complained of a lack of progress to Wentworth in August 1967, Wentworth forwarded Perkins’ complaint to Holt with the additional note,

\(^{62}\) Lake, Faith, pp. 96-7.
\(^{63}\) Ibid., pp. 97-8.
\(^{64}\) Ibid., p. 98.
\(^{65}\) Horner, Seeking Racial Justice, p. 126.
\(^{66}\) Report on Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, 1 November 1967, NAA A6119, 3661.
‘Charles Perkins, who writes the enclosed, is not a bad man, but may get into bad hands.’ Soon after, Wentworth was asked by Holt for suggestions regarding the new Director of Aboriginal Affairs within the Prime Minister’s Department. Wentworth advised Holt to set up an ‘Aboriginal Advisory Panel’, and recommended Perkins as the convenor. Perkins, Pastor Doug Nicholls and Maude Tongarie attempted to form a National Aboriginal Affairs Association (NAAA) to rival FCAATSI, exclusively for Aborigines and excluding white activists such as Jack Horner and politicians such as Labor MP Gordon Bryant. As well as better representing Aborigines, Perkins hoped to counter the Communist influence apparent in FCAATSI. Perkins, Nicholls and Tongarie sent a summary of the NAAA meeting of 20 October to Wentworth. Following the summary, a handwritten addendum by Perkins stated:

We are making this stand because we feel it is vital to Aboriginal affairs all over Australia. There are 3 members of the Communist Party alone on the National Executive of FCAA. I write to you in confidence but you may rest assure [sic] we will fight these people.

Faith Bandler, who had replaced Perkins as FCAATSI Vice-President, wrote to Nicholls urging that discontent be channelled through FCAATSI. During their October 1967 debate on the ABC television program, People, Bandler defended FCAATSI by saying that the Executive contained only three Communists and two ex-Communists. ASIO suspected that Bandler herself and Kath Walker were the ex-Communists, whilst Dr.

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67 Read, Charles Perkins, p. 140.
68 Wentworth to Holt, 3 October 1967, NAA M2684, 135.
70 Lake, Faith, p. 124.
Barry Christopher, Shirley Andrews and John Baker were the Communists referred to.\textsuperscript{71} Following Bandler’s letter, Nicholls relented and as a result the attempt to form the NAAA was short-lived, though a closed ‘Aboriginal session’ was held at the FCAATSI Annual Conference the following year.\textsuperscript{72} At that conference in 1968, held over Easter, Perkins again lashed out at Communist influence. Perkins experienced some resentment over his attempt to split FCAATSI. Stan Davey, a white former General Secretary of FCAATSI, also experienced some resentment. Barrie Dexter, Director of the Office of Aboriginal Affairs, believed this was because he had attempted to split the Communist elements of FCAATSI from the ‘genuine’ elements.\textsuperscript{73} Davey had been asked to resign in mid-1967, ostensibly because FCAATSI could not afford to pay him after spending large amounts of money on the referendum campaign.\textsuperscript{74} Attempts by Davey to limit Communist influence in FCAATSI had, however, annoyed members of the executive. Kath Walker, a supporter of Davey, publicly criticised what many viewed as Davey’s sacking.\textsuperscript{75}

As we have seen, Wentworth was appointed Minister for Social Services and Minister in Charge of Aboriginal Affairs after the new Prime Minister, Gorton, reshuffled his Cabinet on 28 February 1968. Within his first month in these new roles, Wentworth had called a meeting with the Deputy Director-General of ASIO, Peter Barbour, to be briefed on Communists within the Aboriginal movement. In the past ASIO had been reluctant to meet Wentworth and information had gone through the Attorney-General’s Department. Wentworth’s new status as a Minister gave him more access to ASIO than

\textsuperscript{71} Spry to Bowen (Attorney-General), 13 November 1967, NAA A6119, 4069.
\textsuperscript{72} Lake, \textit{Faith}, p. 124.
\textsuperscript{73} Dexter to Wentworth, 18 April 1968, NAA A2354, 1968/26.
\textsuperscript{74} Horner, \textit{Seeking Racial Justice}, p. 126.
\textsuperscript{75} Taffe, \textit{Black and White Together}, pp. 239-40.
he had previously enjoyed, and he was determined to take advantage. In the interview with Barbour, Wentworth indicated that he felt the Communist Party was playing a significant part in influencing Aboriginal affairs and that he desired information on Communists and sympathisers in the movement. Wentworth asked for information on specific identities including, among others, Professor Rose, Aboriginal union organiser Dexter Daniels, Wave Hill Welfare Officer Bill Jeffrey, Frank Hardy, Ray Peckham and Faith Bandler. He also received a paper on CPA interest in Aboriginal Affairs. By mid-April Wentworth had feedback from staff of the Office of Aboriginal Affairs on the Easter Conference of FCAATSI, which he had addressed. These reports included Perkins’ outbursts against Communist influence, as well as a list of ‘Non-Aboriginals with an undue (and harmful?) influence’. Barrie Dexter added to these notes in a further report for Wentworth, referring to the conference as ‘stacked’. Dexter described the opportunities for Aboriginal expression as ‘very limited or non-existent’ and continued:

> There may at present be no scope for us to work with the F.C.A.A.T.S.I. as a useful Aboriginal organisation. On the other hand we obviously cannot ignore it. We must just, as you have so aptly put it, get out ahead of them and stay there.  

What is clear from Dexter’s report is that Wentworth maintains his belief, stated in the ASIO meeting of 1965, that Aboriginal welfare policy should aim to ‘wrest the initiative

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from the left wing forces’. Wentworth, writing to fellow MHR, Alan Jarman, on 26 July 1968, confirms this after Jarman had written to him expressing the concerns of a Liberal Party branch member about FCAATSI.

It is difficult for me to answer this specifically because of the confidential nature of the information, but between ourselves I could say that the Federal Council for Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders has a very substantial measurement of Communist involvement in its top levels, although this is emphatically not a statement which could be made about the total number of members.

A reply by Dexter regarding the FCAATSI in September of the same year also denigrated FCAATSI because of Communist involvement, stating it ‘pretends to be a council of all Aboriginal organizations’ and was ‘not representative to any great extent.’ Dexter cited several localised Aboriginal groups as being far more representative of Aboriginal viewpoints, including Perkins’ New South Wales based FAA (earlier praised for being free of Communists). He then detailed the split that occurred, mentioning that Perkins and Davey denounced the Communists after leaving the executive. Dexter considered that their leaving may have only afforded the Communists in FCAATSI an opportunity to gain a stronger hold over the organisation.

The following year Dexter reconsidered FCAATSI’s position. He began a letter to Wentworth, in this way:

79 ASIO Minute Paper, 31 August 1965, NAA A6119, 4068.
The activities of FCAATSI have I know been a source of some concern to you. The Council\textsuperscript{82} has similarly been concerned at the possibility that influences inimical to the true interests of Aborigines might be at work amongst them.\textsuperscript{83}

The letter then explained that after attending the 1969 Easter Conference, he considered that Communist influence was ‘very much reduced.’ At the same time, Aboriginal participation ‘increased dramatically.’ Dexter also praised the influence of conservative views in FCAATSI, aided, in his view, by grants from the OAA for delegates from Queensland, the Northern Territory and Western Australia to attend the conference. Further boosting Dexter’s confidence in FCAATSI was the election of one of the OAA’s Liaison Officers, Phillip Roberts, as Vice-President.\textsuperscript{84} What these reports show is that Wentworth and his Office considered working with Aboriginal groups, and FCAATSI in particular, based largely on the level of Communist influence within the organisation. Wentworth sought and received security information from ASIO on Communists within FCAATSI and other organisations, and this information influenced his decision making with regard to dealing with these organisations. It is quite plausible that anti-Communism also affected the appointment of Liaison Officers and a Research Officer to the OAA. Roberts, one of the Liaison Officers, had told an ASIO agent one year earlier at the 1968 FCAATSI Easter Conference:

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\textsuperscript{82} The Council mentioned is the Council for Aboriginal Affairs (CAA). This was set up by Holt on 2 November 1967 and consisted of Dr. H. C. ‘Nugget’ Coombs, Professor W. E. H. Stanner and Barrie Dexter. Frame, \textit{The Life and Death of Harold Holt}, p. 215. Hancock argues that Holt intended to confine the role of the Council to co-ordinating State activities, whilst Gorton believed the Commonwealth should take a greater role. Ian Hancock, \textit{John Gorton: He Did It His Way}, Hodder, Sydney, 2002, p. 181. Dexter, also Director of the Office of Aboriginal Affairs responsible to Wentworth, believes Wentworth wanted the Council to disappear. He claims Wentworth tried to detach him from Coombs and Stanner and this had an adverse affect on Aborigines. Barrie Dexter, letter to author, 20 April 2008.
\textsuperscript{83} Dexter to Wentworth, 5 June 1969, NAA A 2354, 1968/26.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
We in the Northern Territory are not encouraging Communists to take a leading part in any of our activity. We know there are some who want to use us to further the C.P.A. We are not as silly as they think. We will use them but they will not use us.  

In addition to appointing Roberts in early 1969, Wentworth appointed Reg Saunders, who was an Aboriginal veteran of World War II and the Korean War, and had also been President of the local branch of the Returned Services League. Saunders’ appointment as a Liaison Officer was questioned in Parliament after a critical letter from several Aboriginals was published in the *Sydney Morning Herald*. The letter criticised the appointment on the grounds that Saunders was not active in the struggle for Aboriginal advancement leading up to the referendum, and that his prominence was for reasons other than Aboriginal advancement. The letter was signed by Ken Brindle on behalf of other activists, including Faith Bandler and Dulcie Flower. ASIO’s report of an interview with Wentworth reveals that Wentworth was shown ASIO files, but it does not divulge the subjects of the files Wentworth read. However, an ASIO report written for Wentworth on 30 April 1970 is more specific. It detailed that Bandler had been a CPA member until 1963, Brindle had attended a CPA fraction meeting in August 1965 and Flowers had been a CPA member since at least 1962. It is not unreasonable to assume that Wentworth was aware of these security profiles in March 1969. Wentworth’s response to the criticism of Saunders’ appointment in Parliament supports this assertion:

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86 CPD, H of R, 5 March 1969, p. 393.
88 Barbour (Director-General of ASIO) to Acting Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department, 30 April 1970, NAA A6119, 4070.
It is regrettable that the letter was published, particularly since several of the signatories were themselves unsuccessful applicants for the post of liaison officer… When I looked at the list of signatories to that letter I thought that several of them might well have thought that when Mr. Saunders fought for Australia and the United Nations in the Korean War he was fighting for the wrong side because he was fighting against Communists.  

This reply shows both that Wentworth was aware of the political leanings of those who had signed the letter, and also that he knew who had applied for the positions. The OAA also appointed an individual as a Research Officer whom Wentworth knew already had an impressive record of anti-Communism – Charles Perkins. FAA activist Ken Colbung describes Wentworth as a ‘great friend’ of Perkins, fondly recalling how the Wentworths often invited himself and Perkins to their house. Dexter states that these appointments were ultimately his responsibility, rather than Wentworth’s. He also claims that considerations of Communism did not determine the appointments and that subsequent experience shows that he picked the best people for the job. Given the contemporary correspondence between Dexter and Wentworth on Communism, however, it is plausible to assume that the prevailing Cold War climate did influence the appointments whether or not Dexter was conscious of its effect. Wentworth’s Parliamentary reply suggests that he was at least aware of the identities and political leanings of several of the unsuccessful

89 CPD, H of R, 5 Mar 1969, p. 393.
91 Barrie Dexter, letter to author, 20 April 2008.
applicants. Whilst Wentworth may not have made the appointments directly, he was undoubtedly satisfied with the choices made.

The Gurindji Strike

On 23 August 1966, two hundred Aboriginal stockmen walked off the Wave Hill cattle station. They were striking over wages and conditions. Though Frank Hardy was in the Northern Territory at the time and offered advice to strike organisers, the strike was a spontaneous movement rather than a Communist inspired one. It was led largely by the North Australian Workers’ Union (NAWU) Aboriginal former organiser Dexter Daniels and Gurindji tribal elder, Vincent Lingiari.92 Kimber notes that Daniels is credited with convincing Lingiari to walk off the Wave Hill settlement.93 Recently, the former Pastoral Manager of Vestey’s (the pastoral lessee), Peter Morris, attempted to paint the strike as Communist influenced, and suggested that Daniels was influenced by both Hardy and Northern Territory Communist Brian Manning.94 Another assessment, based largely on the oral history of the Gurindji, is that the Gurindji had planned to fight for land rights well before Daniels or Hardy met them, and well before the initial strike over wages and conditions.95 Hardy’s account states that it was due mainly to the insistence of tribal leader, Pincher Manguari, that the dispute widened to become one involving the complex issue of land rights for the Gurindji people.96

96 Hardy, *The Unlucky Australians*, pp. 68-74.
In April 1967 the Gurindji, who had been camped at the Wave Hill Welfare Settlement, moved their camp to Wattie Creek, which was near several sacred Gurindji sites and had a permanent source of water. In May the Gurindji presented a petition, framed by Hardy, to the Governor-General for 500 square miles of land. The petition referred to the land as being ‘tribal lands’, and claimed they were ‘dispossessed in time past.’

This proposal was rejected on the advice of C. E. Barnes, Minister for Territories.

Utilising his newfound access to ASIO, Wentworth sought security advice on Hardy, Daniels and the Welfare Officer at Wave Hill who had been supporting the strike, Bill Jeffrey. This was prior to a tour of Aboriginal settlements which led The Australian to proclaim ‘A willy-willy called Wentworth is sweeping through the Northern Territory.’ Wentworth visited several Aboriginal settlements, including Hermannsburg and missions in Groote Eylandt, but the ‘master-stroke’ of his tour was the visit to the Wave Hill station. This visit occurred despite advice from Northern Territory officials, and gave the Gurindji strikers the official recognition of the Federal Government. Wentworth was quoted as saying ‘I intend to find out for myself what is happening’ and ‘sat in the dust with Gurindji tribe elders and heard their case for a land lease.’ The Canberra Times reported that Wentworth ‘has apparently discarded, as an

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97 Taffe, Black and White Together, pp. 199-200.
101 Ibid.
important influence anyway, the notion that the strike of Aboriginal stockmen on the station was fomented by Communist agitators.'

Wentworth recommended excising eight square miles at Wattie Creek from the 6158 square mile Vestey’s lease to allow the Gurindji to have a ‘place they can call their own,’ also arguing that it would be a ‘social experiment’ to encourage self-reliance. What becomes clear, however, is that Wentworth had not discounted Communism as an influence on his policy for the Gurindji. After his proposals met opposition in Cabinet, Wentworth argued that any hesitation in formulating an Aboriginal policy would have national and international repercussions, and that he had spotted the ‘Reds’ in the movement and was determined to thwart them. One of Wentworth’s chief opponents in this regard was Peter Nixon, the Minister for the Interior, who had responsibility for the Northern Territory. Among Nixon’s reasons for opposing the Wentworth plan was that the Aboriginal claim was ‘communist inspired’ – ironic considering Wentworth’s long history as a Cold Warrior. After a meeting in early July, when Wentworth had presented his proposals to Cabinet and continued to persist after they were deemed unacceptable, the Treasurer, Billy McMahon, had felt the need to tell Wentworth, ‘Look, you’re more trouble to Australia at the moment than all the communism you imagine you’re fighting!’

Wentworth had confided in Barbour during another meeting with the ASIO Deputy Director-General on 14 May that he wanted the Gurindji proposal approved by

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104 Hancock, John Gorton, p. 181.
105 Ibid., p. 183.
106 Ibid., p. 182.
the Government quickly. Wentworth was mindful of the Government’s decision to prevent Professor Rose visiting Groote Eylandt, and suspected that the Rose case would be taken up by the Opposition in Parliament. Should the Gurindji proposal be approved before an answer to a potential Rose question was required, Wentworth intended to expand the answer to such a question to encompass Communist involvement in Aboriginal Affairs. For this purpose, Barbour gave Wentworth two papers, one a summary of information pertaining to members of the 1968 executive of FCAATSI, and the other a paper on CPA interest in land rights for Aborigines.\textsuperscript{108} Wentworth asked for a second set of papers, concerning the three subjects (FCAATSI; CPA and land rights; and Professor Rose) but containing information Wentworth could use publicly, in what was another indicator that Wentworth planned to ‘expose’ the Communists in the Aboriginal movement.\textsuperscript{109}

This again illustrates that Wentworth was actively working behind the scenes, preparing a case against the Communists which he could present in Parliament. Two things seem to have stopped Wentworth going down this path. The first was that the failure of the Government to approve the proposal excising land for the Gurindji.\textsuperscript{110} The second was a series of meetings Barbour held on 27 May 1968. The first of these was at 9:30am with Nixon, whom Barbour reports in an ASIO Minute Paper as being unconvinced that the Government could adopt similar proposals to those advocated by the CPA without the CPA claiming credit. Barbour discussed with Nixon the insufficient nature of the evidence with regard to substantiating an attack on Communist involvement in Aboriginal Affairs, and Nixon agreed. Barbour and Nixon also discussed the potential

\textsuperscript{108} ASIO Minute Paper on CPA Interest in Aboriginal Affairs, 16 May 1968, NAA A6119, 4070.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid. See also Spry to Bowen (Attorney-General), 17 May 1968, NAA A6119, 4070.
\textsuperscript{110} Howson and Aitken, \textit{The Howson Diaries}, pp. 430-3.
for the Government to be open to accusations of smearing Aboriginal claims because of Communist manipulation.\textsuperscript{111} After meeting a Mr. Swift (Deputy Secretary of the Department of Interior in charge of Northern Territory affairs) at 11am, Barbour then met Barrie Dexter at 11:45am. Barbour set out to convince Dexter that Wentworth had not explained how he could prevent the CPA taking credit for his policy on the Gurindji, and also that the Government’s credibility might be threatened if Wentworth made attacks on the CPA which could not be substantiated with publishable information. Barbour told Dexter of Nixon’s earlier remarks, stating that this would play into the hands of the Communists, a proposition with which Dexter agreed.\textsuperscript{112} At 2:45pm, Barbour began the final meeting in a now busy day with Wentworth himself. Barbour may have been relieved when Wentworth informed him that he would be unable to proceed with an attack on Communists in the Aboriginal movement for want of a decision on the Gurindji claim. Barbour then went on to emphasise the lack of availability of publishable information. Wentworth, according to Barbour’s report, was of the view that not enough notice was being taken of the international significance of the Gurindji case, and expressed a desire that ASIO intelligence be used more often in the future than it had been previously.\textsuperscript{113} It appears that Wentworth was on the verge of launching a public attack on Communists within the Aboriginal rights movement, but a convergence of events – including the lack of a Government decision on the Gurindji and Barbour’s representations that there was insufficient publishable evidence, stopped him. Wentworth’s eventual answer to the inevitable Opposition questions was scathing with regard to Rose, accusing him of having a ‘particularly bad record of treachery and of

\textsuperscript{111} ASIO Minute Paper on Communist Interest in Aboriginal Affairs, 29 May 1968, NAA A6119, 4070.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
prostituting his position as an anthropologist for the gains of the Communist Party’.\textsuperscript{114} Whilst this was a strident attack on Rose, it stopped well short of Wentworth’s planned exposé of Communist influence within the Aboriginal movement.

It is likely that Wentworth genuinely believed that the Gurindji strike commenced spontaneously, despite the involvement of Frank Hardy. However, when replying to Alan Jarman’s inquiry in late July, Wentworth wrote:

\begin{quote}
The Communists have been extensively involved at Wave Hill. So far as I can understand the trouble started without direct Communist intervention but as soon as they found out that it had started and that a genuine grievence [sic] was involved, they jumped on the band waggon [sic] and have endeavoured to exploit it ever since.\textsuperscript{115}
\end{quote}

This reply illustrates Wentworth’s belief that the Communists began manipulating the strike, once it had started, and were particularly active participants. Wentworth continued to ask for information on Communist involvement in the Aboriginal movement and received it as late as 1970. In an interview conducted in the mid 1980s, Wentworth recalled that by October 1970 he had not only believed that Communists were attempting to use Aboriginal advancement groups, but that they had succeeded to a great extent.\textsuperscript{116} Clark suggests that Wentworth’s land rights submissions to Cabinet in May 1971 were designed to checkmate the radical left and allow the Government to retain initiative on Aboriginal policy.\textsuperscript{117} Wentworth continued to advocate Aboriginal land rights even after

\textsuperscript{114} CPD, H of R, 4 June 1960, p. 1887.  
\textsuperscript{116} Hurst and Wentworth, ‘Interview with William Charles Wentworth, Former Member of the House of Representatives’, p. 16:7.  
\textsuperscript{117} Clark, \textit{Aborigines & Activism}, p. 235.
he lost responsibility for Aboriginal Affairs when William McMahon became Prime Minister. However, even this advocacy illustrates Wentworth’s priorities. Despite advocating land rights in the Northern Territory, he added that ‘it will be almost impossible and a crime against Australia to hold back development on some parts of Alligator River.’\textsuperscript{118} He sought to preserve the Crown reservation at Narbalek, which was, of course, the uranium mine situated within the Alligator River uranium field.\textsuperscript{119} This instance shows once more that, though a passionate supporter of Aboriginal advancement, Wentworth’s Cold War priorities took precedence in his thinking.

\textbf{Another Front}

What is clear, then, from Wentworth’s activities concerning Aborigines is that his policies were significantly influenced by his anti-Communism. With regard to FCAATSI, which was at that time the only national Aboriginal organisation, Wentworth (and by extension his Department head, Dexter) refused to recognise that FCAATSI was representative of Aboriginal opinion so long as there was a substantial Communist influence. Dexter’s differences of opinion between the 1968 and 1969 Easter Conferences of FCAATSI clearly show that, while Aboriginal representation was also a factor, the political leanings of the Council were a major concern. Dexter’s 1969 report considered Communist influence reduced and reported favourably on the increase of conservative views. This suggests that Wentworth’s concerns about Communism were at least influential, if not overriding, in considering the basis on which the Office of Aboriginal Affairs could work with the most prominent Aboriginal advancement

\textsuperscript{118} CPD, H of R, 17 November 1976, p. 2804.  
\textsuperscript{119} CPD, H of R, 1 December 1976, p. 3066.
organisation in Australia. It is also arguable that several appointments of Aboriginal Liaison and Research Officers, including Reg Saunders who had acquitted himself with distinction fighting Communists in Korea, and Charles Perkins who had attacked Communist influence within the movement, were made with a clear eye to their perceived ideological leanings.

The example of the Gurindji strike shows that Wentworth was very much concerned with outmanoeuvring the Communists, and framed his policy initiatives on that basis. Before he went to sit with the Gurindji, Wentworth had made use of ASIO to receive security profiles of activists such as Bill Jeffrey and Dexter Daniels. His meetings with Barbour show an urgency to rush through a proposal for the Gurindji so that Wentworth might wrest the initiative from the Communists, after which he could then go on the offensive in Parliament by highlighting Communist interference. Without the backing of the Government on a Gurindji deal, Wentworth could not attack the Communists in the Aboriginal advancement movement as he was unable to best their promises by providing anything for the Aborigines himself. Wentworth also showed himself to be concerned with international perception of the Aborigines’ plight, perhaps fearing it could provide propaganda incentives to Communists as it had for Khrushchev in 1960.

It would be unfair to allege that Wentworth only became concerned with the Aborigines when they became another front in the Cold War politics of Australia. Wentworth and his wife travelled the outback extensively and encountered many Aborigines, and Wentworth clearly developed sympathy for them. It was as a sociologist or anthropologist, rather than as a Cold Warrior, that Wentworth had advocated the
AIAS. However, evaluations of Wentworth’s legacy invariably focus separately on Wentworth’s anti-Communism and his work in Aboriginal Affairs, failing to see the complex relationship between the two.\textsuperscript{120} Instead, from the mid 1960s Wentworth always considered policy within the framework of the Cold War, and it was an ever present and, at times, dominant influence on his decisions with regard to Aborigines. Wentworth’s comment that he wanted to ‘wrest the initiative from the left wing forces’ in 1965 can be applied to his advocacy of the referendum campaign and his treatment of the Gurindji people. Equally revealing is Dexter’s paraphrasing of Wentworth, suggesting Wentworth wanted to ‘get out ahead of them [Communists] and stay there.’\textsuperscript{121} Wentworth also simultaneously screened the Aboriginal movement for Communists and assisted groups based largely on political (i.e. Communist or non-Communist) affiliation.

Despite Wentworth’s considerable record of achievement regarding Aboriginal affairs, the evidence supports the conclusion that his policies were affected by his anti-Communist beliefs. Wentworth viewed Aboriginal affairs as another venue for his long running battle against Communism. He sought to use progressive policies to seize initiative and popular support at the expense of ‘left wing forces’; he utilised Australia’s security apparatus to keep dossiers on individuals and organisations with whom he was dealing; and on at least one occasion he came close to publicly exposing ‘subversive’ elements in the Aboriginal affairs movement on the floor of Parliament. It is plausible, even probable, that appointments of Liaison and Research Officers to the Office of


\textsuperscript{121} Dexter to Wentworth, 18 April 1968, NAA 2354, 1968/26.
Aboriginal Affairs were influenced by the prevailing Cold War climate, as were Wentworth’s attitudes towards working with the peak Aboriginal body of the time, FCAATSI. Though he doubtless had strong affection and sympathy for the Aborigines, it is clear that Wentworth viewed Aboriginal affairs as yet another area of conflict in the war against the real and perceived dangers of Communism.
Conclusion: Australian Cold Warrior

The anti-Communism of W. C. Wentworth was initially shaped by his wartime experiences. In 1943, as a result of what he believed was a misuse of his name by Communists over his support for a waterfront strike, he began to study ‘Communist tactics’. From this point onwards, particularly as Wentworth’s anti-Communism became intertwined with his obsession with Australia’s defence, it came to define him politically. With characteristic zeal, Wentworth fought Communism and sought to expose it wherever he found it. Frequently throughout his career, Wentworth’s anti-Communism manifested itself in his thoughts, policies and actions. Resourceful and indefatigable, Wentworth built extensive networks of contacts; formed and championed extra-Parliamentary groups; founded Government Committees and became one of Australia’s most outspoken anti-Communists. Wentworth’s links with anti-Communists of many different shades included Catholics, Anglicans, Eastern European émigrés, Coalition politicians, the conservative establishment and ASIO. These associations allow a glimpse into the broad spectrum of anti-Communist groups in Australia during the Cold War. Wentworth’s anti-Communism affected his thoughts, policies and actions in the various areas in which he took an interest, including defence; atomic power; atomic weapons; foreign policy; legislation against Communism; the role and operations of ASIO; and Aboriginal Affairs. Though Wentworth made contributions in many of these areas, it is clear that these efforts were overwhelmingly influenced and motivated by Wentworth’s passionate anti-Communism.
The Origins of Anti-Communism

At first glance, Wentworth’s pursuit of Communists may seem erratic. To many, it appeared that Wentworth was a stereotypical Cold Warrior, able to see ‘reds under the bed’ wherever he looked. After all, what relation could Communist subversion among scientists, for example, have to do with Communist subversion among Aborigines? Yet Wentworth’s efforts in the areas discussed in the preceding chapters, though they often seemed to run parallel, were actually interrelated. To understand why, one must look at the origins of Wentworth’s anti-Communism.

The Dalfram strike over pig-iron exports to Japan is valuable to this examination of Wentworth, not just because it led him to study Communist tactics, but because it sheds light on another of Wentworth’s obsessions, an obsession which predated Wentworth’s anti-Communism by several years. It was an obsession with Australia’s defence. Demand for Defence warned of the threat of Japan to Australia, a threat that was realised in World War II. Wentworth had even warned of the reliance on Singapore in Australia’s defence. He left the New South Wales Treasury as they would not accept his ideas and by 1940 was a member of the CMF, the Australian Militia. In 1943, Wentworth led an attack on Sydney based on the guerrilla-style tactics used by the Japanese. Though this led to important changes in Australian defence, it was embarrassing for the Army and Wentworth was discharged, ostensibly because of poor eyesight. However, this did not dampen Wentworth’s enthusiasm for defence issues. Wentworth supported the Dalfram strike, debated Communists on the Second Front in Europe and contested a Federal election for the seat of Wentworth in this year. His election policy called for a National Government in wartime and claimed he was the ‘first
advocate of an adequate Australian Defence Programme’. Though Wentworth clashed with Communists on defence issues, it was the defence issues rather than anti-Communism which seemed more important to Wentworth. Wentworth criticised the Soviet Union over issues such as their interning downed US pilots; their refusal to declare war on Japan; their refusal to allow the United States to use its territory for air bases against Japan; and what he saw as a Second Front policy designed primarily to maintain the Soviet position following World War II. All of these issues had defence significance in the wartime climate. When World War II ended, Wentworth did not lose his passion for Australia’s defence. Indeed, Wentworth’s actions for the remainder of his career can be attributed to the primacy of defence in his thinking.

World War II was replaced by the Cold War, a war of undeclared enemies, ideology, espionage, propaganda and subversion. What became clear to Wentworth, perhaps even earlier than most, were the battle lines that would be drawn for this new type of conflict. He was also aware of many of the methods of the new confrontation. Gouzenko’s defection in Canada had shown Wentworth that the Soviet Union had deployed espionage agents, subverted foreign targets and stole intelligence. His own experiences over issues such as the Second Front had given him a glimpse of local Communist propaganda techniques, including their use of the *Tribune* newspaper, stacking crowds at debates and winning public opinion to ideas which he believed were in the interests of the Soviet Union. He was also aware of Communist infiltration into trade unions. To Wentworth, who believed that the aim of Communism was eventually to conquer the world, these were all measures designed to weaken the ‘Free World’. The

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weakened democracies, in Wentworth’s view, would then be ripe for a Communist takeover. The Cold War was, in essence, the prelude to what Wentworth believed would be World War III. Until that time propaganda, subversion, espionage and the establishment of ‘fifth columns’ were the weapons which the Soviet Union (and later China) used. Wentworth himself, reflecting on his career, stated that he did not regard threats as internal or external, but ‘parts of a whole’. To Wentworth, fighting Communists anywhere was to fight them everywhere. Every Communist action, no matter how seemingly inconsequential, was part of the overarching scheme of international Communism to dominate the world. As defence came to mean ‘defence against Communism’, Wentworth was ready to defend Australia against these new threats. Defence and anti-Communism became inextricably entwined. In this way, the origins of Wentworth’s anti-Communism lay in his obsession with defence.

The Political Research Society can be seen as ahead of its time. Established in 1945, it collected intelligence on Communists long before ASIO was established in 1949. It also carried out propaganda roles well before the British Information Research Department was formed in 1948. Though preceded by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and other interim arrangements, the Central Intelligence Agency was not established until 1947 and the centrepiece of its main international propaganda operations, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, was not founded until 1950. In the Political Research Society, Wentworth also united disparate groups of anti-Communists, including Liberal and Country Party politicians, Catholics, Anglicans, Eastern European émigrés and the conservative establishment. The operations of the Political Research

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Society represented the change in tactics required in the Cold War as distinct from a hot war. The Society was the embodiment of Wentworth’s personal adaptation to new circumstances. As ASIO came into being, Wentworth began a relationship with the new security service that would last for over twenty years and give him information with which he would fight perceived Communist subversion. Viewing secrecy as a Communist strength, Wentworth attempted to expose subversion using intelligence in areas such as science, the public service and the Commonwealth Literary Fund. The CLF example is significant, as Wentworth believed the Fund was giving sustenance to Communist authors who were valuable to the propaganda apparatus of Australian Communism. Scientists, on the other hand, posed an explicit espionage risk as they had access to technological information which could aid Soviet defence preparations and lead to advances in Soviet weaponry. Wentworth also believed that the Communist Party, which he regarded as a Soviet ‘fifth column’ could be agents for espionage and even the ‘sneak import’ of an atomic bomb. Wentworth’s attempts at legislation to combat Communism specifically addressed the threats of Soviet espionage, particularly with regard to Australian uranium and the public service. He regarded the Communist strategy to weaken the democracies as wide-ranging and pervasive. Given his preoccupation with defence, Wentworth’s responses could constitute nothing less.

**Defence and an Atomic Australia**

Wentworth’s policies for Australia’s defence were overwhelmingly dictated by his anti-Communism. His wide-ranging plans for uranium prospecting were predicated on the basis of two adversarial camps internationally: the Communists and the Free World. He
believed that only the ‘atomic preponderance’ of the Free World protected it from Russian attack. Wentworth told Parliament in no uncertain terms that it was of crucial importance to ‘the survival of free men everywhere’ that Australia quickly supply uranium to feed ‘the arsenals of the free world’. That Wentworth believed that uranium prospecting operations should be on a ‘war footing’ illustrated the urgency with which he viewed the world situation. His was not a unique fear in Australia at the time. Prime Minister Menzies had, after all, warned Australia to prepare for war within three years in 1951. Even so, Wentworth’s plans for uranium prospecting were extraordinarily exorbitant. The Director of the Bureau of Mineral Resources, P. B. Nye, suggested that six aircraft were adequate where Wentworth had advocated over one hundred. This highlighted Wentworth’s perception of the immediacy of the Communist threat of the early 1950s.

Soon Wentworth’s attention turned to civil defence, again as a response to a perceived external Communist threat. His publications *Time and the Bomb* and *Survival is Part of Defence* also advocated wide-ranging measures. They preceded an international visit to Britain and the United States, where Wentworth met key people in the atomic industry, as well as forming links with the United States’ Federal Civil Defense Administration. Wentworth’s anti-Communism fuelled his overzealous approach to civil defence, an approach which led him to publicly attack the Secretary of the Department of Defence, Sir Fredrick Shedden. Later, it would inspire Wentworth to lead a backbench revolt against Menzies. Though many backbenchers were more concerned with forcing a Cabinet reshuffle than Wentworth’s civil defence agenda, the

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3 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (hereafter CPD), House of Representatives (hereafter H of R), 26 March 1953, p. 1682.
incident showed how far Wentworth was willing to go in order to protect Australia from a perceived Communist threat. His public conflict with Menzies damaged the Liberal Party and almost certainly hindered Wentworth’s own political career.

According to the later Minister for National Development, David Fairbairn, Wentworth had been influential in the decision to establish the Australian Atomic Energy Commission in 1952. Wentworth claimed to have formed views on the domestic uses of atomic power during his overseas civil defence tour of 1955, so it is even possible that his support for the AAEC was based instead on an interest in atomic weapons. Indeed, Wentworth’s later advocacy of atomic power stemmed from his desire, first stated publicly in 1956, that Australia pursue a nuclear deterrent. This call followed Wentworth’s presence at the detonation of a British atomic bomb at Maralinga. Again, this was a response to a perceived Communist threat, a threat which – to Wentworth – remained constant. Wentworth chaired a Government Members Atomic Committee and maintained connections with leading scientists, including Professors Mark Oliphant, Philip Baxter and Ernest Titterton. He later travelled the world to study nuclear power, visiting Austria, France, Britain, the United States and Canada. Wentworth’s drive for a nuclear deterrent was fuelled by a fear that Australia would be left alone by its allies to the Communist hordes, after which Australia would be overwhelmed by the vast numbers of Communist conventional forces. Indeed, he believed that the only purpose of Australia’s conventional forces lay in maintaining alliances to protect Australia from Communist enemies. Rumours in Canberra suggested that Wentworth’s support of John Gorton as Prime Minister hinged on Gorton’s promise to pursue nuclear weapons. Wentworth was undoubtedly influential during Gorton’s term as Prime Minister. He had
been an early ally of Gorton in the Party room. Gorton and Fairbairn (Minister for National Development under Gorton) had been part of the backbench revolt stemming from Wentworth’s civil defence controversy. Wentworth was credited with leading the ‘Gorton machine’ to have Gorton elected, and Gorton considered creating an Assistant Minister of National Development position specifically for Wentworth, with significant atomic implications as that Ministry oversaw the AAEC. Following the announcement of American de-escalation in Vietnam, Wentworth was perceived as influencing Gorton towards a ‘Fortress Australia’ approach to defence. It is also likely that Wentworth was influential in the decision to construct an atomic power reactor at Jervis Bay. Wentworth opposed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and believed so fervently in the need for atomic protection against Communist threats that he suggested a clandestine weapons program. Even after Gorton’s fall and the abandonment of Jervis Bay, Wentworth did not lose hope for an Australian atomic deterrent. Following Gough Whitlam’s Labor Government, which Wentworth accused of liquidating Australia’s defence, Wentworth pleaded with the new Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, to consider building an Australian bomb. This plea fell on deaf ears. Despite what appears to be a significant contribution to the advancement of Australian nuclear ambitions in this period, Wentworth has not been examined in this context. This study rectifies this oversight and places Wentworth within the wider milieu of Australian atomic aspirations.

It is clear that by the end of World War II Wentworth’s anti-Communism was the major influence on his defence policies. Defence became ‘defence against Communism’. Wentworth’s calls for uranium prospecting, civil defence, atomic power and atomic weapons were all predicated on an external Communist threat.
Foreign Affairs

Internationally, Wentworth’s outlook was again dominated by his ‘two camps’ outlook. He told Parliament that he saw foreign affairs as ‘a conflict between the two systems of communism and freedom’. He fitted the description of what Waters termed a ‘Cold War liberal’, as he possessed a realist foreign policy outlook with beliefs in alliance diplomacy, power politics and maintaining Australia’s alignment with the Western powers during the Cold War. The contrasting position, liberal internationalism, involves beliefs in world governance, international rule of law, internationalised armed force and internationalised control of arms. Whilst Wentworth did advocate a world government, these calls can be seen as attempts at alliance building rather than sharing characteristics of liberal internationalism. When he supported the UN taking action internationally, it was often against Communist nations. He advocated the expulsion of Russia from the UN in 1949; indeed, it was part of his stated election policy. In this instance, Wentworth would have used the UN to form an international alliance against the Soviet Union, rather than involving it in world government. Similarly, he opposed the recognition of Communist China by the United Nations and called for the UN to disarm her. At other times he called for the abolition of the United Nations, citing abuse and obstruction by Communist representatives within the organisation.

According to Waters, maintaining the anti-Communist front was more important to Cold War liberals than supporting democracy. No clearer example of this can be found in Wentworth’s career than his support of the extremist Eastern European émigrés. Wentworth support for organisations such as the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations and the Captive Nations Week Committee brought him into contact with many anti-Communists.

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4 CPD, H of R, 1 March 1956, p. 402
accused of war crimes in their native countries, including those who had participated in the pro-Fascist Hungarian Arrow Cross, the Romanian Iron Guard and the Croatian Ustasha governments. He was also a supporter of the Suharto government, which had massacred as many as half a million Communists in the mid 1960s. On one occasion, he even defended a former Nazi war criminal, claiming that he had at least served his country patriotically, unlike those he believed were Communist traitors in Australia. His long-running defence of the Ustasha in Parliament against the attacks led primarily by Dr. J. F. Cairns was contemporaneous with Ustasha terrorist attacks against supporters of Tito’s Communist government in Australian and Yugoslav territory. This defence of an organisation which was committing violent attacks, but was nonetheless an important sector of the Eastern European anti-Communist émigré community, epitomised Wentworth’s prioritising of the international anti-Communist front above all else. Wentworth apparently saw no contradiction in defending these émigrés and ignoring their crimes, whilst at the same time attacking atrocities committed by Communist governments. There have been studies of the relationships between certain émigrés and right wing Parliamentarians and political parties. This study, however, is the only one that addresses the relationship between Wentworth and émigré groups.

Wentworth’s views on Indonesia and Vietnam illustrate his perception of the Cold War globally. The primacy of the defence importance of Vietnam is underscored by Wentworth’s continued advocacy of the Vietnam War even after he acknowledged that it was ‘going sour’ with voters in Australia. It was important in Australia’s forward defence planning, as well as the maintenance of the alliance with the United States. Wentworth’s attacks on opponents of the Vietnam War, such as Cairns, even after he was
aware of its declining popularity show that he placed his anti-Communism above political expediency. In Indonesia, Wentworth supported the anti-Communist forces and suggested that the Australian government do likewise. In the early 1960s, Wentworth believed that Indonesia was not a threat as it was not Communist. However, as Sukarno began to be seduced by Peking, Wentworth urged support for anti-Communists in Indonesia and referred to Sukarno as a ‘prisoner’ of Communism. He supported the Government of Suharto, which took power after the massacre of up to 500,000 Communists and suspected Communists. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s he urged Australian Government support of the regime. His view that the war in Vietnam was worth fighting because it had influenced events in Indonesia, which he considered had been ‘won’ by the Free World, illustrates that, to Wentworth, the importance of both countries lay in their significance to the international Cold War.

**Legislation and Security**

Because Wentworth believed that secrecy was a significant asset of Communists, he sought to expose them publicly wherever he could. The early efforts of the Political Research Society were directed to this end. Wentworth’s early legislation, drafted before he even entered Parliament, would have set up an Australian equivalent to HUAC, complete with its public trials open to the press. He was also a supporter of the *Communist Party of Australia Dissolution Act*, introduced by the Menzies Government to ban the Communist Party, and the ‘Yes’ vote on the subsequent referendum which asked the Australian public whether it should be enacted. The failure of the referendum was not, to Wentworth, a vote that the Communist Party should remain legal, but instead a
vote that it should not be banned in the manner prescribed by the Act. In response, Wentworth sought other ‘manners’ in which to fight Communism. He sought to introduce legislation in 1952 which would have banned Communists from the Northern Territory, Australian Capital Territory, public service and defence forces. His 1953 legislation was a watered down version of this, after it had initially failed to gain support in the party room. The 1952 and 1953 legislative proposals were rejected by Menzies, who refused to introduce legislation which, in his eyes, gave public servants the option of losing their jobs or becoming ‘pimps’. Whilst there have been studies of Menzies’ legislation, there has been none of Wentworth’s. This study is therefore significant in that it explores some of the potential alternatives to the Communist Party of Australia Dissolution Bill, both before and after its introduction, and addresses the potential for an Australian version of HUAC.

Wentworth’s attitude to the role of ASIO shows the primacy of anti-Communism in Wentworth’s view. He believed it should function in a capacity such as the Political Research Society had, not only collecting intelligence but also disseminating it. In addition, Wentworth requested and received information from ASIO which he used in his attacks on perceived instances of Communist subversion. Just as McCarthy’s witch-hunt in the United States was often based on FBI intelligence, so did ASIO’s intelligence frequently form the basis of Wentworth’s red-baiting. This relationship between ASIO and Wentworth lasted for over twenty years, despite doubts by ASIO’s Director-General, Charles Spry. No episode more vividly demonstrates the role Wentworth believed ASIO should play in domestic politics than the controversy surrounding the 1959 Peace Congress, which Wentworth believed was Communist inspired. Wentworth orchestrated
a visit to Sydney University academic Professor A. K. Stout, one of the Congress sponsors, by Spry. Stout subsequently withdrew his support for the Congress, whilst Wentworth was accused of subverting the security service to his own anti-Communist ends. Wentworth continued to ask for information from ASIO, and his continuous requests began to put a strain in the organisation. He constantly campaigned for greater public disclosure of information, and formed the Government Members Committee Against Communism. This group advocated the establishment of an organisation along the lines of Britain’s IRD, and may have even been willing to take on that role itself. Wentworth’s elevation to the Ministry increased his access to ASIO officers and information, and he often used his new position to pursue topics well outside his areas of ministerial responsibility. Wentworth’s relationship with ASIO was an example of what Justice Hope, the Royal Commissioner on Intelligence and Security, would later conclude was improper. Hope reported that it was improper of an MP to request information on a person, improper for the Attorney-General to submit that request to ASIO, and improper for ASIO to respond with the information requested. Propriety, however, was not Wentworth’s concern. To Wentworth, the fight against Communism assumed the highest priority. In this fight, he not only abused the resources of ASIO, but continually accused the security service of insufficiently fighting the Communist menace. Existing works on ASIO – especially by McKnight – have dealt with impropriety. This case study of Wentworth’s links with ASIO, however, constitutes a systematic examination of the depth of the relationship between ASIO and an anti-Communist politician.

Wentworth’s views on domestic security were overwhelmingly dictated by his anti-Communism. Wentworth’s anti-Communism expressed itself to the extent where
civil liberties were potentially threatened, whilst many careers and reputations actually were. Several studies have been made of McCarthyism in Australia, yet there has been little appreciation of Wentworth’s contribution to this phenomenon. Whilst Wentworth, of course, never assumed the role of McCarthy in the United States, this is arguably due to factors outside his own control. His legislation, though not introduced, showed that he was willing to replicate the procedural apparatus of McCarthyism in Australia and thought that, like the FBI in the United States, ASIO should provide the intelligence necessary to make this possible. Although McCarthyism did not reach the levels of hysteria in Australia which it ascended to in America, Wentworth did contribute to the climate of hostility towards those involved with left leaning politics and went some way towards creating an atmosphere of ‘McCarthyism Wentworth style’.  

Aboriginal Affairs

The influence of Wentworth’s anti-Communism on Aboriginal Affairs was not as apparent as in other areas. Undoubtedly, anti-Communism was not the sole factor motivating Wentworth’s work for Aboriginal causes. He had personal contact with many Aboriginal people and believed Aboriginal culture should be documented and preserved for sociological and anthropological reasons. It is for these reasons, rather than anti-Communism, that Wentworth became instrumental in the founding of the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, which survives today as the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies and holds a biennial Wentworth Lecture in his honour. Nevertheless, anti-Communism was not only a significant influence on Wentworth’s experience with Aboriginal Affairs, but also an important reason for his

involvement at all. The relationship between Wentworth’s anti-Communism and Aboriginal Affairs has been ignored by historians. This study evaluates Wentworth’s contribution to Aboriginal Affairs with a view to the influence of his anti-Communism, and as such addresses this historiographical oversight.

Wentworth appreciated the possibility of Communist manipulation of Aborigines as early as 1952. By the 1960s he was writing to ASIO, asking for evaluations of Communist influence within Aboriginal organisations. He was concerned with the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in particular. His fears were confirmed when ASIO replied that they believed FCAATSI to be under the control of a Communist faction. Wentworth retained a suspicious attitude towards those involved with Aboriginal Affairs, including individuals involved with the Freedom Rides. He was wary of Communists using Aboriginal issues. He believed this was not only to advance their own domestic policies, but to turn world opinion against Australia, particularly among African and Asian nations. In a 1965 meeting with ASIO, Wentworth canvassed the need to ‘wrest the initiative from the left wing forces’ active in Aboriginal Affairs. He felt Communist activity among Aborigines should be exposed and attempted to move the Government to increase Aboriginal welfare. The motivation behind Wentworth’s advocacy of referendum proposals, leading up to the successful referendum of 1967, can also be seen in this light.

After becoming Australia’s first Minister in Charge of Aboriginal Affairs, Wentworth’s anti-Communism continued to affect his decisions. The most obvious example of this was his reluctance to deal with FCAATSI, which at the time was the only prominent national organisation advocating Aboriginal rights, due to its apparent
Communist influence. He also supported Charles Perkins, who had a history of anti-Communism and urged Prime Minister Harold Holt to appoint Perkins to head an Aboriginal Advisory Panel. As Minister in Charge, Wentworth also intended to present to Parliament a wide ranging exposé of Communist involvement in Aboriginal Affairs. He wanted the Government to act on the claims of the Gurindji people at Wattie Creek before mounting this exposé, which suggests that ‘wresting the initiative’ was a significant factor in his advocacy of their cause. Though ASIO believed there was insufficient evidence for such an attack on Communists within the movement, it was only the lack of action by the Government on the Gurindji claim that prevented Wentworth from airing his allegations. Even after his Ministerial involvement with Aboriginal Affairs, Wentworth advocated the cause of uranium mining over Aboriginal claims, illustrating once again that the defence issues of the Cold War took priority in his thinking.

The Influence of Anti-Communism

In the areas studied, it is apparent that anti-Communism was not only a factor, but the driving force behind Wentworth throughout his political career. Just as Wentworth saw reds under every bed, so too was anti-Communism found lurking just beneath the surface of the vast majority of Wentworth’s activities. Wentworth believed that the Cold War tactics of Communism were varied, far reaching, pervasive and wide in scope. Wentworth’s anti-Communism therefore assumed these characteristics to adequately respond to the Communist threat. Wentworth saw no distinction between the external and internal menace of Communism. He believed it to be part of the one greater, multi-
faceted plan and his anti-Communism can, in a sense, be seen as a mirror image of this perception.

Like Wentworth’s anti-Communism, this study is wide-ranging. It reveals contributions made by Wentworth in the various areas in which he took an interest. These include roles in influencing the formation of organisations such as the AAEC and AIATSIS. He played a pivotal role in advocating exploitation of Australia’s uranium deposits. Wentworth was also instrumental in bringing about standard gauge railway links. His links to Eastern European communities allowed him to play a role in the Petrov Affair, possibly contributing to the defection of Mrs. Petrov in particular. He had a measure of influence over the policies of John Gorton, including the change in Australian defence policy to what was termed ‘Fortress Australia’, and the proposal for a nuclear reactor at Jervis Bay. Wentworth was a driving force behind the 1967 referendum which gave the Commonwealth power to legislate for Aborigines. Wentworth also had some less laudable contributions. He played a role in creating a climate of oppression and suspicion through his attacks on various groups, such as scientists, authors and public servants. His abuse of ASIO was grossly inappropriate, and he influenced that organisation to intervene improperly in instances such as the 1959 Peace Congress. He was often a force for disharmony within the Liberal Party. His excessive zeal in pursuing Communists may have even damaged the anti-Communist cause, allowing views such as his to be labelled extremist and open to charges of McCarthyism. His successor in the seat of Mackellar, Jim Carlton, commented:

The sad thing about it is that the legitimate concerns that people had and needed to have about Communism and the genuine threat that was there, which was massive, were better
pursued by less extreme exposition… They [anti-Communists] could be made to look loony.⁶

The constant theme in Wentworth’s thoughts, policies and actions is clear. Wentworth was driven by anti-Communism and this became the prevailing influence on his political career. It is his role as an exemplar of this counter-ideology which makes Wentworth worthy of study. Even when Wentworth has made lasting contributions in other areas, anti-Communism has been a dominant factor in the motivation behind them. Faced with what he perceived to be a wide ranging and pervasive threat, Wentworth responded with an equally wide ranging and pervasive policy of anti-Communism. It was this anti-Communism, and the excessive zeal with which it was expounded, which defined Wentworth as an Australian Cold Warrior.

⁶ Jim Carlton, Interview with author, 24 March 2009.
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