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## The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

TAPOL Bulletin No. 121

February 1994

### Xanana speaks from his cell

*From his cell in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta, the East Timorese resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, has called on the resistance to "proceed on our march to victory". In a taped message, Xanana repeated his rallying call when still in the bush: "We resist in order to win".*

#### Many documents smuggled out

Xanana's message to the *National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM)* and *FALINTIL*, the National Army for the Liberation of East Timor, was recorded in prison on 7 December, the "18th anniversary of the cowardly invasion of our beloved country". The tape reached the outside world together with a number of letters. Publication of some of these letters in the Portuguese press infuriated the Indonesian authorities. They accused him of "damaging Indonesia's good name internationally", withdrew his rights to have family and ICRC visits and declared that any remission to which he is entitled would be withheld.

He highlighted the turning points in the struggle and described 1993 as "a difficult year, a year of emotions, of speculation, of real trauma, moral, psychic and political. But in spite of everything, the sacred flag of liberation continues to fly from the peak of Ramelau and Matabian, of Kablake and Tanamam".

He derided the army's claim that there is no-one left to conduct the struggle. The colonialists, he said, have a paternalistic attitude towards the people they colonise. "Whatever we do is wrong and they tell us: 'We are here to teach you what you do not know.'"

On the military situation he said: "... there have been many (Indonesian) commanders in Dili and hundreds of battalion and company commanders that have operated in the jungle. But from 1979 until now, there have been only 50 guerrilla fighters, according to the propaganda of Benny Moerdani. Moerdani wrote a book and confessed to being not guilty of what has happened in East Timor since the invasion. This gives out a sense of defeat, a clear sensation of the expression of shame. I recognised that the military is defeated on the ground but I did not say that FALINTIL is defeated.... While we recognise our military incapacity,

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### Student on trial for insulting Suharto

**Nuku Soleiman**, 29 years old, chair of *Yayasan Pijar* (Pijar Foundation), which has recently emerged as one of the core groups organising protest actions, went on trial in Jakarta on 15 January. He is accused of producing and distributing a sticker which "insults the good name of the head of state". Under Article 134 of the Criminal Code, he faces a sentence of up to six years. This is not his first brush with authority. He was arrested in 1989 for participating in protests when electricity prices were hiked.

Nuku was taken into custody on 25 November 1993, at the office of the Foundation, soon after security forces arrested five people at a demonstration calling for an end to the state lottery. [See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 120, December 1993] They were held for distributing stickers to people in the crowd. The sticker carried a slogan based on the initials of the lottery, SDSB: *Suharto Dalang Segala Bencana!* meaning, "Suharto, mastermind of all calamities". The sticker listed among the calamities, the killing of four land protesters in Madura last July, the killing of four members of the Haur Koneng Muslim sect in West Java earlier in 1993, the Tanjung Priok massacre in September 1984, the

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Lampung massacre in February 1989, the thousands of killings in Aceh since 1989 and the Dili massacre in November 1991.

## Huge crowds attend first hearing

As troops ringed the court-house, hundreds of supporters came to the Central Jakarta district court to attend the opening of the trial. Most had to follow the proceedings through loudspeakers outside. Abdul Hakim Garusa Nusantara, head of the team of defence lawyers, protested at the large number of security personnel and anti-riot troops surrounding the court-house.



*A dapper Nuku entering the courtroom.*

*Tempo, 22 January 1994*

The indictment accused Nuku Soleiman of defamation of the head of state, in collusion with another Foundation member, Ardiyanto, who is "still at large". When asked by the presiding judge whether he understood the indictment, Nuku said, No. "I hope the judge can tell the prosecutor to convey the indictment in clear Indonesian language, not in the language of power." Nuku was not in a mood to make any concessions to court protocol and turned up dressed in a T-shirt, faded blue jeans and thongs. [*Jakarta Post*, 17.I.1994]

A row broke out when the judge said that, to save time, he would only allow one defence statement at the next stage of the proceedings, either from the defendant or from his lawyers. Against strong opposition from the defence team, the judge finally agreed to allow two statements. Speaking in his own defence at the second hearing, Nuku said: "It's strange for a political statement to become a criminal case." With political opinion coming from the mouths of citizens every day, there won't be enough prosecutors to go round, he argued.

His defence team said their client's constitutional right to free expression was violated by charging him with insulting the president. Article 134 was introduced in 1916 to protect Dutch colonial rule and is in violation of the constitution and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

## "A life of activism"

Here are some remarks from an interview of Nuku in Salemba Prison, Jakarta:

\* "Why should criticizing the President be called an 'insult'? In a presidential system of government such as we have in Indonesia, it is right for the president to take responsibility for everything that happens."

\* "We are trying to make the political situation here healthier. No fact-finding commission was ever set up to investigate the number of victims of the Tanjung Priok massacre. Political activities should not lead to charges in court except for things like assassinations or other acts of violence. In my case, all it's about is a sticker."

\* "I'm not prepared to say whether I had anything to do with the sticker. This has to be proven in court."

\* "I regret nothing. I have decided to dedicate myself to working for NGO activism. I will continue the struggle."

\* "I manage to read newspapers and books, behind the backs of the authorities. As for food, I have asked my friends to bring food. I refuse to drink the water they supply and boil everything myself. The prison officials treat me well." [*Tempo*, 15 January 1994].

## Profile of Yayasan Pijar

*Yayasan Pijar*, or the Pijar Foundation, has recently emerged as one of the key organisations involved in pro-democracy activism in Indonesia. The organisation was set up in September 1989 by twenty student activists from Jakarta, Bandung and Yogyakarta, several of whom had already been in and out of prison.

Anyone entering the premises of Pijar is greeted by a banner which reads: "If you're the hesitant type, you'd better go home." The name *Pijar*, which means 'glowing' or 'red-hot', stands for *Pusat Informasi dan Jaringan Aksi Reformasi*, the 'Information Centre and Network for Reform Actions', a rather modest-sounding name for a group that has been associated with a swathe of actions and demonstrations over the past few years. Some people have even started calling it the 'demo bureau'.

It has members and contacts in many places, particularly

on university campuses, but hasn't revealed the size of its membership. It relies entirely on the membership for funding, in contrast with other NGOs, most of whom survive thanks largely to grants from foreign funding agencies. Being financially independent and relying on money contributed by the members is one of the Foundation's principles. For demonstrations, activists are expected to produce their own banners with minimal help and cash from the organisation.

The acting chair, Rachland S. Nashidik, who is in charge following the arrest of Nuku Soleiman, strongly denies that it is being steered by 'third parties', a charge levelled by the authorities to discredit activists by alleging that they are 'used' by others for ulterior motives.

Pijar's links with opposition groups like the Petition-of-Fifty and the Legal Aid Institutes in the YLBHI are well

known. It is closely associated with the legal aid group, Ampera, in West Java, which assisted people defending their land rights in Cijayanti, Bogor some months ago. An Ampera lawyer, Dedi Ekabrata, is now in custody, because of his role in this dispute.

Another of its activists, Bambang Beathor Soeryadi, spent four-and-a-half years in prison for spreading hatred against the government. Yet another is Bonar Tigor Naipospos, who is serving an eight-year sentence in Yogyakarta.

### Train crash victim

One of Pijar's leading activists, Hasbi bin Achmad Lallo, was killed in a train crash last November in Citayam, Bogor (West Java). He and other activists were on their way to Bogor to prepare for a demonstration protesting against the

arrest of a number of people for allegedly inciting peasants in Rancamaya who were resisting plans to drive them off their land. The train crash itself led to further protests demanding the resignation of the Minister of Transport who was held responsible for the neglect that led to that disaster in which 20 people died and a hundred others were injured.

"Our aim," says Rachland, "is to struggle for democracy and human rights." It is run by an executive council of 25 members and produces two publications, *Kabar dari Pijar* (News from Pijar) and *Neraca Pembangunan* (Development Balance Sheet) which circulate on campuses and among the NGOs. [*Tempo*, 15 January, 1994].

## Criminalising demonstrations

*More than two dozen activists have been arrested for taking part in demonstrations. The army is pressing for a new law that would limit the right to protest. Many people are going on trial simply for having participated in demonstrations.*

The right to demonstrate is now a major political issue following the arrest in Jakarta of 21 people – mostly students – during a demonstration outside parliament on 14 December, and the arrest of 22 people during a demonstration on 4 January 1994.

### Troops attack demonstrators

The demonstration on 14 December called on the legislative assemblies, the MPR-DPR, to convene an extraordinary session to dismiss Suharto as President and bring him



*Police brutality at demo on 4 January 1994*

before a court to answer for numerous human rights violations that have occurred since he seized power. They blamed Suharto in particular for the Tanjung Priok massacre in September 1984, the Lampung massacre in February 1989, the mass killings in Aceh since 1989, the recent deaths in Madura and West Java, and the Dili massacre in November 1991.

While representatives were inside negotiating for a meeting with the chair of the MPR-DPR, the demonstrators settled down in the lobby and started enacting drama performances and singing songs, without interference from the security forces. Then suddenly, without warning, fifty anti-riot troops entered the lobby, formed a barricade and moved forward, attacking the demonstrators with rubber batons and truncheons. Although most people fled, many were injured as troops rained blows right and left. Twenty-one demonstrators were driven away in trucks and are now in police custody, awaiting trial. Among those dragged off were two women, including Yeni Damayanti, a student at the National University, Jakarta. She had just been released by the police after being held in connection with an earlier demonstration.

The 4 January demonstration outside the parliament building was held to protest against the detention and trial of their 21 colleagues on 14 December, along with Nuku Soleiman, leader of *Yayasan Pijar*, who has gone on trial in connection with stickers that were distributed during an earlier demonstration in Jakarta (see separate item). On this occasion, 22 people were arrested and taken to various police commands in Jakarta.

### Nationwide protest campaign

The 14 December arrests provoked anger in many campuses across the country. There were protest demonstrations in Yogyakarta, Bandung, Semarang, Malang and Surabaya in Java, Mataram in Lombok and Denpasar in Bali. The styles were varied and very resourceful.

In Surabaya, demonstrations were held on three consecutive days, each one larger than on the previous day. Those participating sang songs and recited poems critical of the regime. In Bandung, students focused their actions on the local legislative assembly (DPRD), calling on legislators to defend the right of people to meet members of parliament. In one of their actions, they entered the DPRD building where they immediately unfurled a banner calling for an end to the army's security approach.

Protest was also expressed through a petition launched by *Yayasan Pijar* which quickly won the support of a thousand signatories in more than a dozen cities throughout the country. "As Indonesian citizens, we are aware that expressing opinions is the right of every citizen," it said. The petition also said that the arrest of people who were trying to inform members of parliament of their views runs counter to the spirit of democracy and human rights. The English-language daily, *Jakarta Post* called the support for the petition 'unprecedented'. It asked in an editorial: "Is this a beginning of an expanded alliance of the disenchanted?" [*Jakarta Post*, 15.I.1994]

Collecting signatures for a petition is a new tactic for mobilising public opinion in Indonesia. This first attempt won support from many groups, including the Petition-of-50, dozens of lawyers, intellectuals, artists and some politicians who are in leading positions in the two government-endorsed political parties, the PDI and the PPP.

### New anti-demonstration law?

The army is clearly worried about its inability to handle demonstrations and deal with the current upsurge of activism without provoking yet more opposition. President Suharto and other government officials have warned against the danger of 'liberalism' which they seek to portray as the new cloak being used by communists.

To grapple with the present upsurge which some people are comparing to the student unrest in the 1970s, the army is now pushing for the introduction of a law that would impose restrictions on the right to demonstrate, making it obligatory for a police permit to be obtained. Human rights activists argue that such a law would be a setback for democratic freedoms. Everyone knows that obtaining permits for seminars and other gatherings is a lengthy and difficult process, frequently ending in refusal. It would be

virtually impossible to obtain permits for demonstrations which the authorities would invariably brand as political. Most demonstrations take place spontaneously, at short notice. "One argument for introducing such a law is that demonstrations disrupt the public order. But demonstrations by students or workers never do this. The fact is that demonstrations annoy the government for political reasons," wrote Mokhtar Pakpahan, leader of the independent trade union, SBSI. [*Forum Keadilan*, 20.I.1994]

### The charges

Press reports quote the police as saying that all the 21 people arrested at the 14 December demonstration will be tried on charges of 'insulting the President'. Contacts in Jakarta believe that the public prosecutor may decide not to press such a charge, as this would give all the defendants the opportunity, in their defence pleas, to highlight their own charges against Suharto. A team of 49 lawyers from the LBH and the Bar Association (Ikadin) has been set up to defend the 21. No date has yet been set for the trials.

As for the 22 arrested on 4 January, the authorities turned to a law that has not been used for many years. Six of them were charged under Article 510 of the Criminal Code. the other 14 were released. Article 510 criminalises people for involvement in any public event, without police permission, that causes a public disturbance. The maximum penalty is two weeks in prison or a fine. The six who were charged were sentenced to two days or a fine of Rp. 10,000.

Several lawyers from the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) have raised strong objections to the charge. Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara said: "If the authorities start using Article 510, peasants and workers will no longer be able to register their complaints with parliament. They will be punishable under this law, meaning that such activities are being criminalised." [*Kompas*, 7.I.1994]

According to LBH director, Adnan Buyung Nasution, this article was part of Dutch colonial law enacted to prevent Indonesians from expressing their aspirations collectively.

## Thirteen PNG villagers killed

*Reports of the killing of villagers on both sides of the PNG-Indonesian border last October have alarmed human rights activists in both countries. They also suggest that Indonesian military activity along the border is quite intense, despite lack of hard information about the situation.*

There has been widespread anger in Papua New Guinea at the killing on 29 October 1993 of 13 villagers in the PNG village of Yapsei by Indonesian crack troops (*Kop-assus*). The armed intrusion into PNG territory occurred after troops carried out sweeps against the armed resistance, OPM, in Wiwirok and Batom sub-districts in West Papua. According to an OPM spokesperson in Port Moresby, 121 people, including many women and children, were killed during these sweeps. [*Times of PNG*, 2.XII.1993] There has been no confirmation of this large-scale massacre from other sources although revelations by J.C. Princen (see below), who gives far lower casualty figures, may be relating to the same incident.

The thirteen deaths in Yapsie have been confirmed by in PNG and all the victims named. Individual and Community Rights Advocacy Forum (ICRAF), chair, Powes Parkop, confirmed the deaths after an investigation. He has enough evidence to prove that the thirteen dead and eight injured were PNG citizens. The killings occurred in

tiny hamlets used for gardening and hunting.

The PNG and Indonesian governments have denied the intrusions and killings, but several politicians have called on Indonesia to accept responsibility and pay compensation or face demands for its recently-opened consulate in Vanimo to be closed down.

### Princen's charge

Meanwhile, J.C. Princen, chair of the human rights organisation, LPHAM, says that he has evidence, including photos, of the killing on 13 October of thirteen villagers on the West Papuan side of the border. His sources say the soldiers were hunting for an OPM fighter, entered a house where they thought he had taken refuge and killed the occupants. Among the dead is a child whose head was crushed with a stone.

Princen has written to armed forces commander, General Faisal Tanjung and the National Human Rights Commission calling for an investigation. [*AP*, 17.I.1994]

# GSP and Indonesian labour practices

*The visit of US Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen to Jakarta pushed the issue of labour practices to the forefront again. On 15 February, a decision is expected from the Clinton Administration on whether to continue or suspend Indonesia's trade benefits under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) which depends on whether Jakarta improves its labour record. As the date for the decision approaches, the signs are that the trade benefits will not be withdrawn.*

1994 started with a busy schedule in Washington-Jakarta relations. In January a team of US congressmen led by Richard Gephardt, a Democrat leader in the US House of Representatives, arrived in Jakarta. Five days later a group of US Senators arrived in Jakarta, led by Senator J. Bennett Johnston. Both visits preceded Lloyd Bentsen's visit to Suharto on 16 January. From the press, it was clear that the GSP issue was high on the agenda. The GSP system grants tariff cuts and quota increases to developing countries to encourage their exports. Indonesia's shoe and textile industry has been greatly boosted by the GSP system with duty free status for US\$650 million in Indonesian exports.



The US Treasury Secretary was the first senior Clinton administration official to visit Jakarta. After his meeting with President Suharto and Finance Minister Marie Muhammad, Bentsen said he had called on the Indonesian government to improve human rights, including its treatment of workers, if it hopes for an extension of US trade privileges. US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor voiced similar concerns on the lack of labour rights in Indonesia [see TAPOL Bulletin no. 117 and 119] and threatened last August to withdraw the GSP privileges. Bentsen was promised a report by the Indonesian government on improved labour conditions.

## New broom?

Although Jakarta-Washington relations have been relatively smooth, in the last few years East Timor and human rights, including the GSP issue, have rocked the boat. The new Indonesian ambassador in Washington, Arifin Siregar, was chosen by Suharto to improve relations. A former banker and trade minister, Arifin Siregar is expected to strengthen ties with US business and is more personable than his predecessors, who were mostly three-star generals. Siregar

admits that the East Timor issue is still haunting US-Indonesia relations and adds that they now face the Feingold amendment (on linking arms sales to human rights). He is worried about Indonesia's bad image in the US press which sees Indonesia as a *gross violator* (original in English) of human rights. But he is not very optimistic: ".....I'm very cautious because I don't know yet what the results of the GSP affair will be. In my opinion, this is a determining factor. Hopefully it can be resolved in a good way. But this doesn't mean that everything will go smoothly. The fact is that the issue of East Timor will continue to haunt us". [Tempo, 8 January 1994].

## Frantic home-work

At first, the GSP threat was disregarded by Jakarta and seen as a misunderstanding between the two countries, but in the last few months Jakarta has comprehended the seriousness of the matter, working very hard to improve things. Three major criticisms have occupied the minds of the authorities: freedom of association, military intervention in labour disputes, and low wages. The government-backed union SPSI has been the target of international criticism. As the only recognised union, it does nothing to protect workers' interests and often functions as a government or corporate tool to control the workers.

Responding to the critics, SPSI was changed from a unitary union into a federation with 13 sectoral trade unions. While on paper this might impress some people, it is only cosmetic. Many SPSI officials are retired military, Golkar bureaucrats or even entrepreneurs. Mochtar Pakpahan, chair of the non-recognised SBSI union, said the SPSI reorganisation would do nothing to improve workers' welfare. "It's like putting on a new shirt while the face is still ugly" [Jakarta Post, 31-12-1993]. Indonesia is still far removed from the fundamental right of freedom of association. The history of labour in many countries teaches that the workers are bound to organise in independent unions, with or without permission. Appalling labour conditions will only hasten this.

## The minimum wage

Another response to the critics has been to raise minimum wages. From 1 January, the minimum wage for Jakarta and surrounding areas was raised to Rp 3,800 (US\$1.80) a day, up from Rp 2,600 (US\$1.23). While the new rate is far too low to meet workers' minimum needs, many employers have said they will not to pay the increase.

The new year started with a wave of strikes. Thousands of workers in Jakarta and Tangerang staged protests to demand the new rate. In the last few years, different non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have made the workers' plight their major area of concern. Research on workers' condi-

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tions has improved greatly and provides a sound basis for assisting the workers in their fight for better conditions.

In a recent seminar on workers' rights the wage issue was the main topic. In a study of a Korean-owned shoe factory in Tangerang it was revealed that top management salaries were 150 to 220 times the wages of the lowest paid operators. Another survey in Jember, a major tobacco-growing region in East Java, compared wages in 1978 and 1993. In 1978, the rate was Rp 225 an hour, equivalent to 8 kgs of rice, while the wage in October 1993 rose tenfold to Rp 2,250, enough to buy 4.5 kgs of rice.

The average woman worker in Indonesia needs to work much more to buy the same goods than workers in neighbouring countries. Adnan Buyung Nasution, Indonesia's best-known human rights lawyer said: "What can a worker buy with such a small sum (or) survive in urban areas?" [*Jakarta Post* 31-12-1994]. Indonesian officials acknowledge that the minimum wage covers only about 78% of a worker's minimum physical requirement.

### Military involvement

Military involvement in labour affairs is structural and has been the main obstacle to the emergence of independent unions. When in January newspapers carried banner headlines reading: "Indonesia bans army action in labour disputes", it was as if an earthquake had struck.

The energetic Manpower Minister announced the lifting of three decrees of 1986 and 1988 that were the target of Washington's criticism. They allow military intervention in labour disputes and have blocked the rise of new labour unions. The new decree also said companies could no longer call on the security forces if a labour dispute

threatens to become violent.

Indonesian human rights organisations reacted with cynicism. In August last year they demanded a judicial review of all the decrees which curb labour rights. In his first reaction Mochtar Pakpahan, *SBSI* chair, said the new decree contains many loopholes, including unclear mechanisms for settling labour disputes, and does not apply to state enterprises and non-commercial institutions. The *YLBHI* or Legal Aid Foundation was even more sceptical. It believes that the step has been taken merely to meet GSP requirements, while *Bakorstanas*, the military security body, is still free to step into any political situation, including labour strikes. The tragic death of labour activist Marsinah is taken as an example of *Bakorstanas* meddling. The latest strikes demanding payment of the new minimum wage have also been handled by the military. *YLBHI* spokesperson Hendardi argues that ministerial decrees are subordinate to the unbridled powers of *Bakorstanas*.

### Strikes at Nike

The new year also saw the start of a series of mass strikes in Jakarta and its industrial suburbs. On 18 January, about 12,000 workers in Tangerang, west of Jakarta, staged a strike. In the last decade Tangerang has become a boom city of manufacturing. It displays all the ugly features of rapid development - factories sprawling in all directions, shabby housing complexes hastily erected everywhere and dreadful pollution. Tangerang is also the location of the leisure shoe company Nike which produces 1 to 1.2 million pair of shoes a month in Indonesia. Two sister companies of Nike, *PT Hasi* and *PT NASA* (*Nagasakti Paramashoes Industry*) produce 12-15% of Nike's global output. This time *PT NASA* was hit when the entire work force of 8,000 workers downed tools. The company has 10 assembly lines and produces half a million Nike shoes a month.

## ECONOMICS

### Tightening the belt

*Economics is hardly an exact science and forecasts about 1994 vary greatly. Some economists predict another year of robust economic expansion for Indonesia while others paint a more gloomy picture. Suharto's New Year budget speech reflected a bare-bones budget, suggesting some lean years ahead.*

Despite Indonesia's respectable macro-economic growth of 6.5% in 1993, the near future doesn't look as bright as it seems. The boom years of the eighties have come to a halt and the world recession is also biting deep into the Indonesian economy. Bad bank debts and the collapse of several prominent conglomerates are typical results of the casino economy of the Reagan/Thatcher era.

Other major stumbling blocks are: the sluggish world market prices of oil and gas, the foreign debt service repayments, falling foreign investments and the huge unemployment figures. All give sleepless nights for the top Indonesian technocrats.

Suharto's 1994/1995 draft budget reflects austerity and implies a contraction of economic activities, not least because more than 40% of the recurrent routine spending will go for foreign debt service payments. The president is urging government officials to improve their budget discipline and efficiency. The almost mythical figure of 30% is frequently used by senior officials to indicate rampant corruption, leaks and inefficiency by the huge bureaucracy. The new budget anticipates much higher state



8,000 workers at *PT Nasa*, the Nike shoe factory, went on strike for three days in January.

revenue from taxes (VAT and income-tax), a logical step with the number of the affluent people growing.

### Oil and gas prices

The budget still uses the oil price of US\$ 16 a barrel, while the spot price in January plummeted to US\$13. This will create a gap of almost US\$1 billion in revenue which can only be filled by more tax-earnings and an increase in exports by the non-oil sector. Oil and gas now account for only 21.5% of domestic income.

The government is determined to keep economic growth between 6 and 7% and by the year 2000 the government target is US\$1000 for average income per annum. In comparison, neighbouring Malaysia has reached a per capita income of US\$ 3000.

At present, Suharto's goal is threatened by several factors, in particular falling investments and the growing rate of unemployment.

### Sluggish foreign investments

The global recession and in particular near-zero growth in Japan has led to stagnation in the whole region, including Indonesia. Foreign investments in Indonesia in 1993 fell by 21.3% in comparison with the year before. In 1992 US\$ 10.3 billion was invested and in 1993 foreign investments stood at US\$ 8 billion. Singapore has overtaken Japan as the biggest investor by putting US\$1.33 billion into the Indonesian economy, while Japan in the second place invested US\$ million with South Korea in third place with US\$660 million. Economists argue that the drop in foreign investments is the result of a sluggish global economy but also of greener pastures for foreign investments in countries like China, India and Vietnam.

### Bad bank debts

The new Governor of *Bank Indonesia*, Sudradjat Djiwandono, recently announced tougher measures for the domestic banking industry. According to his figures bad and

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doubtful debts account for 15.2% of total bank credits of 169 trillion (US\$ 85 billion), up from 7.4% in 1988. Bad debts total 3.3% of total credits, says the Central Bank. The economist Kwik Kian Gie puts the figure much higher; his estimate is as high as 8%. Many businesses can't handle their debts anymore. Figures mentioned in financial circles suggest that between 40 and 50% of state bank loans and 20 to 25% of private loans are uncollectable in the short term. Sudradjat Djiwandono said that in an effort to improve bad debt recovery through the legal system, the *Bank Indonesia* had intensive discussions with the justice department, the attorney-general and other institutions.

### Unemployment figures

Indonesia, with the fourth largest population in the world, has a frightening population situation. By the year 2000, the island of Java will be inhabited by 120 million people, while every year 3 million people enter the labour market. Abdul Latief, the Manpower Minister, stunned the public when he announced that unemployment is as high as 38%; last year, the official was a ludicrous 2 to 3%. It later emerged that the minister's figure includes the under-employed. However close his figure is to the real situation, the statement helped to focus attention on this serious matter.

It is estimated that about 29 million people are without full-time jobs, the first public acknowledgement of this grave issue. The absence of any social security net forces people to seek a living in the informal sector and to function in the margins of the economy. Official figures reveal that efforts to create new jobs are not enough to absorb the new entrants to the labour market. Unless the Indonesian government introduces drastic policy changes, the unemployment situation could become a time bomb.

## UK-INDONESIA RELATIONS

# The cosy Jakarta-London relations

*While the international community is now moving towards adopting human rights conduct as a criterion for aid, London is moving in the opposite direction, providing aid as a way to win arms deals. The World Development Movement calls UK aid 'a sweetener' for landing lucrative arms deals. The examples of Malaysia, Jordan, Oman and Indonesia are cited. Indonesia, never part of the British Empire, has seen its aid from the UK rise by 196% since 1980, as the arms trade has mounted.*

The coming and going of British and Indonesian ministers between Jakarta and London is an example of the cosy relations [see also *Tapol* Bulletin no. 118, August 1993]. Kenneth Clarke, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer paid a five-day visit to Indonesia early this year to offer financial services, ie. privatisation expertise, and explore the possibilities of more British investments in Indonesia.

In his address to Indonesian policy makers and businessmen, Clarke said: "Indonesia's public enterprises sector remains large but we are watching with great interest the steps you are taking to speed up privatisation by setting up holding companies to coordinate the process". While the Japanese flow of banking credits to Indonesia has grown

sluggish, Clarke is looking for openings for British banks and said British financiers can help Jakarta obtain offshore capital loans at acceptable costs, as well as provide management know-how for the embryonic Indonesian stock exchange.

### Oleh-oleh dari London

In December, when Britain's Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshall visited Jakarta, it was revealed that the Indonesian air force has been given the green light to open negotiations with British Aerospace (BAe) to purchase another 16 Hawk aircraft. A few months earlier BAe managed to clinch a 500 million sterling deal from *AURI* for 24 Hawk trainers and

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ground-attack fighters. The new deal involves Hawk 200 Series single-seat fighters with fittings for Maverick air-to-ground missiles.

On 25 November, Minister Rudy Habibie paid one of his many visits to BAe in London when he signed a number of agreements with the ailing flagship of British industry. The agreements came to light when Habibie reported to a parliamentary commission. Habibie, Indonesia's high-tech czar, has plans to develop a cheap people's car which is energy-saving. While the design and body will be Indonesian, they will be fitted with Rover 1.1 litre K-series engines. Rover is part of the BAe empire.



*Picket-line at the Stevenage BAe factory, April 1993*

After the Taiwan BAe deal fell through, it became almost inevitable that IPTN (the Indonesian aerospace industry) and BAe would close ranks. The 25 November preliminary agreement points in that direction. IPTN is planning to launch its 70-seater N-250 turboprop plane in 1995. BAe has promised not only to help to promote the N-250, but also to assist in acquiring a European certificate for the plane. Discussions about a possible joint venture between the IPTN N-250 and the BAe Jetstream turboprop were also on the agenda. *Oleh-oleh* (souvenirs) from London is certainly what Habibie took home to Jakarta.

### UK, Indonesia's gateway to Europe

UK Trade Minister Richard Needham, a frequent visitor to Indonesia, took a 20-strong trade delegation last December.

He offered the UK as Indonesia's gateway to European markets. The UK's total investment in Indonesia, including oil projects, totals two billion dollars, making it the largest European investor in the past two years. Speaking to a business lunch organised by *Warta Ekonomi* he made a pledge to double trade with Indonesia within two or three years. Needham and Habibie signed a MOU on the cooperative establishment of an engine laboratory for thermodynamics, engines and propulsion systems. During his visit

Richard Needham also explored the possibilities of British projects in the development of infrastructural works like airports, harbours and public transport systems like subways.

### Shopping for arms in Europe

Clinton's commitment to human rights, although largely rhetorical, has caused irritation in Jakarta. In particular, military circles are deeply offended and missions to European countries like Britain, France and Germany have been sent to explore arms deals. Defence Minister General Edi Sudradjat said last September that Indonesia would buy defence equipment from Europe, if US arms sales are linked to human rights, particularly in East Timor. The Indonesian army is looking to Europe for light armour, artillery equipment and armoured personnel carriers.

In recession-ridden countries like the UK, arms exports are becoming the foundation for jobs and prosperity. The scandals surrounding the sale of arms to Iraq, now under investigation by the Scott inquiry, and the huge row that has broken out about the UK's funding of Malaysia's Pergau dam project which was, unlawfully, linked to British arms sales, has only reinforced the impression that this is how John Major's government operates these days.

### Peace activists sued

Chris Cole and Milan Rai, two peace activists, are being sued for damages in the British High Court by British Aerospace (BAe). Rai and Cole are each being sued in relation to a specific action. Cole entered BAe's factory in Stevenage while Rai scrawled a slogan, 'No Hawks to Indonesia' on the wall of BAe's head office in London. Cole's action allegedly caused £90,000 damage, while Rai's is said to have cost BAe £850.

BAe knows very well that it cannot get such sums from these two men. Their intention may be to persuade the court to issue injunctions preventing them from entering the company's premises, under the threat of being arrested for contempt of court.

Both the activists have said they will continue their activities and will not be intimidated by BAe.

*Continued from p. 20*

There are many sides to this book. Rich in description of exotic landscapes by a master of English prose, it is punctuated by outbursts against the realities of Suharto's Indonesia with its brutal attempt to remould people to a standardised pattern. There is plenty of wit in its comment on the agents of this State-led social engineering. As with so many of Lewis's books, this is a vivid snap-shot of people and environments under pressure to change, succumbing and resisting with dignity.

Many who may want to read it will be put off by the price of this hard-back edition. But be assured; the paperback version can't be too far off.

*Carmel Budiardjo*

# Nepotism, Indonesian style

*Having a famous father (or mother) can be useful for one's career anywhere, but in Asia nepotism has become the fashion. Sons, daughters or wives are taking over as rulers and political leaders from their deceased fathers/husbands. As Asian societies modernise, family-favouritism has become rampant. The "Asian disease" has now hit Jakarta. "Tutut for President" has become a hot political potato.*

The emergence of Tutut Suharto and Megawati Sukarno at the pinnacle of the political elite was in many ways to be expected. The lack of genuine democratic structures in Indonesia, which applies to many other Asian countries, helps pave the way for family dynasties.

## Megawati and the PDI

Megawati, the late president's oldest daughter, has been in politics for quite some time and was reelected to parliament last year. Her parliamentary colleagues consider her a quiet, low-profile or even lazy MP. She is mild-mannered, modest in her dress, and not a high-flyer in politics. This changed in late 1993 when for the umpteenth time a crisis engulfed the PDI (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*). Overnight Megawati became the darling of the press and the hottest issue in town when she was chosen to lead the party.



The PDI, a loose, forced alliance of nationalist and Christian parties, although popular among the urban youth, has never played (has not been allowed to play) an important role. Its role is purely cosmetic. The 1987 elections saw a flirtation between the PDI leadership and senior generals in the armed forces (ABRI). This carried over to the 1992 elections though the alliance was never formal. Suryadi, the PDI chairman for 1988-1993 is a close associate of General Benny Murdani's. The deadlock at its congress in 1988 was 'resolved' by top-level army intervention and Suryadi was appointed with ABRI's blessing.

The Suharto-Murdani conflict intensified and in 1993, Suharto removed Murdani from the cabinet. This signalled the end of Suryadi's career as a politician but he managed, by controlling the party bureaucracy, to be 'democratically' re-elected at the PDI congress in mid-1993. But in Jakarta, Suharto and his cronies annulled the decision. This left PDI bereft of a chairman and the government convened a special congress in December 1993 in Surabaya. Home Minister, ret'd Lt. General Yogie Memet had the job of

installing a government loyalist.

## Rekayasa or arus bawah?

Government *rekayasa* (social engineering) seemed to be working. PDI provincial branch delegates were handpicked by the authorities to ensure the election of Budi Hardjono, an obscure politician.

But unexpectedly, Megawati emerged as candidate for the chair and her election soon became unstoppable. Branches overwhelmingly gave her their support and the government scheme fell to pieces. Yogie Memet and local bureaucrats tried to arm-twist the PDI branches, but in vain. Most delegates had promised to support Budi but in Surabaya, switched their support to Megawati.

Some political analysts, in their enthusiasm, started talking about the victory of *arus bawah* (grass-roots or people's power). The regime's efforts to out-manoeuvre Megawati had crumbled.

The special Surabaya congress cost the government Rp 900 million but gave Megawati a convincing victory. The results were again annulled. Not to be outdone, Yogie Memet convened yet another PDI meeting in Jakarta. It was now clear that Mega's position was unassailable and gradually government stalwarts changed positions, supporting her as chair.

The powerful Minister, Habibie gave her his backing as did the Suharto kids, Tutut and Bambang Suharto. So within days *Bina Graha* gave Mega the green light. Yogie Memet, who had had the thankless task of preventing Mega's nomination, grudgingly accepted defeat. His meeting with Megawati became front page news, with everyone full of smiles

To argue that this happened because of *arus bawah* is to give too much credit to this interesting political event. But it is unprecedented for Megawati and the PDI rank-and-file to have disregarded government pressure and *rekayasa*. It does not mean that *rekayasa* did not occur. According to former Vice-President Sudharmono, the PDI congress in Medan chose Suryadi but when he failed to get government blessing, Mega became the rallying point, a clear example of *rekayasa*.

## The role of BAIS

In the eighties, friction emerged between Murdani and Suharto over *Golkar*, the ruling party which had become Suharto's vehicle. As things worsened, Murdani backed the PDI as a way to nibble at *Golkar's* monopoly. Suryadi was a Benny man; after being ousted from the chair, he backed Megawati in Surabaya.

Officially Benny Murdani holds no positions and rejected an ambassadorial post. In Suharto's Indonesia, people out of office are usually toothless but Benny Murdani is an

exception. As an intelligence operator he still influences many intelligence officers in pivotal positions in ABRI and the administration.

It was Murdani who founded *BAIS*, *Badan Intelijens Strategis*, the Strategic Intelligence Body, which he headed for many years. Even after he stopped being Defence Minister, *BAIS* remained virtually intact. The *BAIS* Megawati operation was initiated by Murdani himself, who called ABRI HQ urging that they back Sukarno's daughter. The task was carried out mainly by Major-General Hendropriyono, a former *BAIS* deputy chief, and his successor in *BAIS*, Major-General Agum Gumelar. Political circles say Megawati promised the military that she would not to promote Sukarnoism. Sukarnoism means different things to different people but in the sixties it meant the inclusion of communists in the national front. She also told them the PDI would back the ABRI candidate, should Suharto step down in 1998.

After three costly PDI conferences, Megawati Sukarno was finally installed. An odd combination of *arus bawah* and *rekayasa*.

## Mbak Tutut, a household name.

While Mbak Mega's political ambitions are modest, Mbak Tutut (Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, to give her her full name) has higher ambitions. Previously known for her social work, chairing an array of foundations, Tutut has recently become a successful businesswoman. Her flagship company *PT Citra Lamtoro Gung* has diversified into practically all fields of business: from tradecraft to road-building, from import-export to banking, more than 30 companies.

But now, Tutut has become a big name in domestic politics. She was appointed vice-chair of *Golkar*, the government party and is also a member of parliament. She attends a dazzling array of events: social gatherings, signing multi-million contracts, meeting in parliament. Megawati's victory threatened Tutut's high profile so she visited the grave of President Sukarno, and invited Megawati to visit her, which became the event of the day.

## Tutut, surrogate foreign minister

The only gap in Tutut's activities is foreign affairs so she has been working hard to fill it. She unexpectedly appeared in London to meet the participants at the 'reconciliation' talks between Timorese. In January she became chair of the Indonesia-Portugal Friendship Association. East Timor continues to haunt every Indonesian diplomat and by involving herself in the issue, Tutut has guaranteed herself frequent media attention. It is now being said that she may attend the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in February.

## The succession

The rift between Suharto and large sections of *ABRI* has brought the succession issue to the fore. There are two likely candidates, ret'd General Try Sutrisno, now Vice-President, and Minister Habibie who enjoys support from large sections of the business community, the bureaucracy and Muslims. Although both are close to Suharto, the ageing president has never given any hint about a likely successor. Still worse, he has shown his dissatisfaction with Try Sutrisno. While Try lacks brains and subtlety, Habibie is charming and charismatic. As the most powerful person



*A gushing Tutut Suharto (right) summoned a demure Megawati Sukarno for a photo opportunity.*

(after Suharto, of course), he has made coalitions with many groups, even including Suharto's critics. Not necessarily all Habibie's moves have the blessing of the palace.

As with any dictator reaching the end of his reign, the most worrying factor is, how to step down gracefully while protecting his wealth and personal safety. If he doesn't feel safe with either man, his eldest daughter Tutut, could be the best choice.

## STOP PRESS

A major shake-up has taken place in the top echelons of *ABRI*, the Indonesian armed forces. While at the time of writing, the reshuffle is not complete, some important trends can be noted. *BAIS*, the major intelligence agency, is being totally overhauled. Set up as a monitoring agency, *BAIS* became extremely powerful. With the removal of General Benny Murdani, the founding father of *BAIS*, from government, it was expected that Suharto would reorganise the intelligence agency which has always been seen as Murdani's network. The new unit will be called *BIA* (*Badan Intelijens ABRI*, *ABRI* Intelligence Board) and will be reduced in size, with 5 instead of 8 directorates.

*BAIS* was formerly under the *ABRI* Commander-in-Chief and had a direct line of command to *Kopassus*, the notorious red berets. *BAIS* has been deeply involved in 'trouble spots' like East Timor, Aceh and West Papua and the handling of land conflicts. The Megawati operation, described above, was a typical *BAIS* operation. *Bina Graha* (Suharto's office) now argues that the upsurge of protest (students, workers and peasants) signals the failure of this intelligence agency.

Details of the new structure of *BIA* are unavailable but it is certain that it will not have the operational clout of its predecessor and its line of command will be lower down in the armed forces hierarchy. And what is also certain is that the era of de-Benny (Murdani)-isation has begun.



## Human rights briefs

### GOLPUT activists appeal against verdict

About 2,000 students from different cities went to Semarang district court to hear the verdict against Luwarso and Poltak Ike Wibowo who were tried for calling for an election boycott in 1992. At stake is campus freedom in general. The students rallied in front of the court building, singing, yelling slogans and reading poetry. The security forces were present in full force; even *Arhanud*, air force crack troops, were deployed.

Judge Suwarso sentenced the two to four months which created quite some anger among the demonstrators. The defence team which included Adnan Buyung Nasution has decided to appeal. Puspoadjji, chair of the *LBH* Semarang office said: "What the defendants did was quite normal within a campus environment". He was referring to a satirical art event organised by the students in May 1992 at the Diponegoro University campus.

### Universitas Indonesia under fire

Leading human rights activist and lawyer, Adnan Buyung Nasution, was not allowed to address a seminar at *Universitas Indonesia*, the state university in Jakarta on the orders of the university authorities. Buyung was to have taken part in a seminar on *Scholars and Human Rights* but the organisers were informed the night before that his appearance had been cancelled by the authorities.

This was the second time in as many weeks that UI had silenced people known to have the courage to speak up against the situation in Indonesia. The previous target of UI's denial of freedom of speech was the noted poet and playwright, W.S. Rendra.

The Legal Aid Institute, of which Buyung is director, bitterly criticised the university not only for trampling on freedom of speech but also for bringing itself into disrepute as a centre of learning. "The ban at UI has indirectly made the academic functions of higher learning institutes impotent," said the Institute. [*Jakarta Post*, 14.XII.1993]

### How (not to) get a permit

No seminar, discussion or symposium can take place in Indonesia without a police permit, while the process for getting the permit is time-consuming, tortuous and often unsuccessful.

The procedure requires organisers of such events to apply first to the police, then go to the directorate for social-political affairs (a division of the interior ministry or local government administration usually under military direction), the social affairs office and the army's stability agency, *Bakorstanas(da)* and thereafter back to the police. At each stage, forms have to be filled in and 'inducements' given to the officials. All this can take up to a month; in many cases, the permit is issued only an hour or two before the event is due to begin, or is refused. By this time, everything has been set in place, participants have been invited (sometimes having travelled long distances), food and drink ordered and other costs defrayed.

All this hassle, so often to no avail, means that activities of this nature have become too risky to undertake, which is

a serious setback for political and academic debate. [See Mulya Lubis, "Our society has tooth-ache", in *Forum Keadilan* 23.XII.1993]

### Buyung turns down meeting with Dutch MPs

Adnan Buyung Nasution refused to attend a meeting with a group of Dutch MPs headed by the Speaker, saying the meeting would be of no value in improving human rights. He also rejected the meeting because it would have been in private (he used the word *clandestine*) with very few people attending. Activists from other NGOs should also have been invited, Buyung insisted.

Buyung said that initially he was invited by the Dutch ambassador to have lunch with the MPs in Hotel Indonesia together with Marzuki Darusman, deputy-chair of the National Human Rights Commission, Mochtar Pakpahan, of the independent trade union SBSI, and T. Mulya Lubis, Director of the Centre for the Study of Human Rights.

Buyung regretted that the Dutch parliamentarians had wanted a clandestine meeting with NGO activists. Such matters should be discussed out in the open, he said.

[*Media Indonesia*, 14.I.1994]

The Dutch MPs visit has also been criticised by human rights groups in the Netherlands. It was a very high profile mission composed of the leaders of all the main party groups in parliament. The itinerary was set by the Indonesian parliament and only one hour was allowed for contact with human rights organisations. Previous Dutch parliamentary visits have invariably given a high profile to human rights concerns. East Timor was not on the agenda at all.

The mission was sent in preparation for a visit to Indonesia of Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers and Foreign Minister Pieter Kooijmans. This will later be followed by a state visit by the Dutch Queen.

*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13.I.1994.



NEWS ITEM: BURMESE STRONGMAN KHIN NYUNT WANTS TO COPY WHAT HE CONSIDERS INDONESIA'S MILITARY-DOMINATED POLITICAL SYSTEM.

### ET/OT markings to be scrapped?

Armed forces commander-in-chief General Faisal Tanjung told a parliamentary commission recently that the government may soon abandon the policy of marking the identity cards of former political prisoners alleged to have been

members of the PKI as well as those of their relatives, with 'ET' (for 'ex-tapol') or 'OT' (for *organisasi terlarang*, or banned organisation). The policy is based on an Interior Ministry regulation of 1981 saying that such markings are needed for purposes of control; relatives can apply to have the marking removed provided they can prove their loyalty to Pancasila and the Indonesian state and government.

The difficulties created by these markings are widely-known. The widow of a former PKI politbureau member said recently that even to pay a visit to her family in Solo, she had to apply for a permit. When she wants to move house, she needs the approval of the security agency, Bakorstanas, which involves her in lengthy formalities. Joebar Ajoeb, the former secretary-general of the leftwing cultural organisation, LEKRA, which was banned in 1965, is still required to report at least monthly to the local army command.

An official of the Interior Minister would not say whether the 1981 policy was about to be abandoned. "We're studying it," he said. [*Forum Keadilan*, 6.I.1994]

## The never-ending story of HKBP

For the state and army to intervene in an internal religious conflict is asking for trouble. The conflict in the Toba Batak church, *HKBP*, the largest Protestant congregation in Indonesia, has gone from bad to worse. The authorities' use of gangster methods has only infuriated the followers of Reverend Nababan who was forced to resign as *HKBP* leader. They have been physically attacked by hired thugs. Sabam Siburian, a Medan lawyer, was attacked by four men and struck in the forehead and arm with a machete, barely surviving the attack. A similar atrocity happened to Raya Butar Butar who was knifed and beaten with wooden bars. During an attack on the home of T.M.R. Simbolon, considerable damage was done to his house.

The government-backed *HKBP* wing led by Rev. Simanjuntak is using *Pemuda Pancasila*, a notorious youth organisation to gain an edge over the Nababan group. This youth group, with branches in all the major cities, lives from extortion and other Mafia-like practices. It enjoys the protection of the local military or, worse, often works hand in hand with them. Although Simanjuntak has the backing of the authorities, the vast majority of *HKBP* congregants (including the ministers) support Nababan. Most church buildings and land are in the hands of Nababan followers.

Now the Simanjuntak wing is using violence to seize control over these properties. But Nababan followers have not stood idle. More than 2,000 people attacked the *HKBP* foundation office in Medan and went on the rampage. The building along with documents and files were destroyed. A dormitory at the adjacent Nommensen University was also destroyed. The Dean, previously on Nababan's side had just been replaced by Rev. Simanjuntak so a clash occurred between the security forces and the Nababan congregation.

## Reviewing Sanusi's case

Haji Mohammad Sanusi, 73 years old, is the victim of one of the most tragic cases in Indonesian legal history. A former Cabinet minister and MP, he was a leading member of the *Petisi 50* dissident group and a vocal critic of government. As a key defendant, he became the fall guy in the Muslim trials of the early eighties.

He was tried twice. In 1985, he got 19 years for alleged

involvement with an explosion at a bank. In 1986 he got 20 years for plotting to topple the government and an alleged assassination attempt against the president. These charges were pivotal in giving substance to regime accusations about the terrorist activities of Muslim defendants and proving that there had been a grand scheme to plot against the state. But the evidence against Sanusi was flimsy to say the least.

In May 1993, the Supreme Court annulled the second sentence on the grounds that the defendant was serving a similar maximum sentence for another offence. In November, his lawyer Muhammad Dault asked for another judicial review. The lawyer now argues that Sanusi's trial was political and present circumstances today are different than they were then. Key witnesses against him have now retracted their testimonies. Rachmat Basuki, recently released, who was given 17 years, now admits that his incriminating testimony was given under duress and torture.

The Sanusi trial was arguably the most draconian political trial of the era. Justice demands that he should be released immediately. [*Forum Keadilan*, 6.I.1994]

## Lawyer condemns abuses in West Papua

The human rights situation is far worse in Irian Jaya (West Papua) than in Java. People there are easily accused of being 'separatists' and detained without trial, said Bambang Widjanto who recently won the 1993 Robert Kennedy Award for his activities in defence of the indigenous people of the region. The indigenous people are terrified of local military officers who use threats of OPM involvement to obtain bribes from them.

He told a gathering of activists meeting to celebrate his award that greater attention should be paid to Irian Jaya. He said that military checkpoints were located everywhere outside the provincial capital and spoke in particular about the damaging impact of Freeport mining activities. [*Jakarta Post*, 16.XII.1994].

## Dayaks against logging company

Two Bentian Dayak tribal leaders went to Jakarta to demand an end to the logging of their land [see also *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 120, December 1993]. Two NGOs in Jakarta, LBH and WALHI, are assisting L.B. Dingit and Nyeloy Adi, village-head of Jelmu Sibak in East Kalimantan, in their lobbying with government officials.

The logging company, *PT Hutan Mahligai* is a subsidiary of the powerful *Kalimanis Group*; it has a 161,000 acre timber estate and has already demolished large sections of the Bentian ancestral forest, destroying precious plots of land, trees, rattan and plants. *Kalimanis*, owned by Bob Hasan, has close ties with the Suharto family. Company spokesperson Djokosoebroto insisted that they have paid compensation to the tribe. The Bentian people are pleading for an end of the logging and are determined to fight for their land, says Dingit: "Death would be better than dishonour". The Bentian leaders met Environment Minister Sarwono and Transmigration Minister Siswono. It is uncertain whether the meetings will halt the land-clearing activities of the loggers.

Continued from p. 1

Jakarta has to recognise its political incapacity on the ground of complex political struggle."

He made an attack on those who participated in "what the enemy pretends to call reconciliation, this secret meeting which will be held in the UK.... It is a pity that some Timorese abroad are only able to play the games of the enemy. Those who are abroad do not know the character of the enemy, they do not know what we know about the enemy." His message ended with the words:

*I wish to appeal and urge all leaders of the clandestine front to enjoy many successes in the struggle of our people in 1994.*

### The truth about his trial

In a letter to the Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists, Xanana explained at some length how he was prevented from appointing lawyers of the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) and forced to use a lawyer named Sudjono who was introduced to him by Major-General Hendropriyono, who was then an intelligence officer in BAIS. Hendropriyono is now military commander of Jakarta. The lawyer remained in close contact with the army at every stage of his trial. Xanana also insists that it was never his intention to ask for clemency from Suharto. "It went against my principles to ask for a reduction of sentence as I did not accept any sentence," he wrote.

The letter concludes with an appeal to the ICJ and all international bodies connected with international law to launch a protest and campaign for annulment of his trial process. He also asked for intervention in his case of a Portuguese lawyer who should be assisted by LBH lawyers, in order to facilitate communication.

### Response by the LBH

Xanana also wrote to the LBH explaining how he had been prevented from making contact before the trial. He has now broken completely with Sudjono and asked the LBH to provide him with a lawyer "in view of my status as a convicted person, as regards the Indonesian legal aspects" and to ensure that the lawyer would visit him periodically.

The contents of Xanana's letter to the LBH were made public in a statement on 17 January in which the LBH announced that it has appointed three lawyers "to meet him and find out what precisely happened to him and what he now wants". The lawyers are: Adnan Buyung Nasution, Frans Winarta and Luhut Pangaribuan.

On 20 January, they asked the Director of Prisons at the Justice Ministry, Baharuddin Lopa, to allow them to meet their client. It was Lopa who took the decision earlier this month to withdraw Xanana's visiting rights, violating his rights under Indonesian law and according to internationally-accepted principles. Lopa, a professor of law, was recently named Secretary of the official Human Rights Commission set up last year by presidential decree.

Another of Xanana's moves was to write to President Suharto. He said he had accepted full responsibility for everything done by the resistance up to the time of his capture on 20 November 1992. Referring to East Timorese now in prison for having carried out activities under his command and in connection with his own capture, he said it was "logical and legally plausible" for them to be released unconditionally "in exchange for an even heavier sentence against myself".

Xanana also appealed to Suharto for "a greater willingness

## EAST TIMOR

for dialogue regarding the case of East Timor".

### Sleep deprivation

In a letter to the Portuguese solidarity movement written in Cipinang Prison in November, Xanana reveals that when he was in captivity in Denpasar, where he was taken the day after he was captured, he was subjected to prolonged sleep deprivation.

It is now clear that this was how army intelligence tried to break his spirit but he decided upon his strategy of waiting for the right moment to defeat the enemy. He said:

*"(When) I was in the military police prison in Denpasar, four or five guards were posted in front of my cell. They did not stop making a noise..., looking at me, watching my every move. I was handcuffed. But they did not want me to be able to think. I was unable to sleep for three consecutive days and nights, twenty-four hours a day.*

*"...I was exhausted, totally exhausted. Fatigue weighed me down. I would pick up food just to settle my stomach. I smoked. It was all planned. At around midnight, they would start calling out, 'Have you rested?' I felt like spitting in their faces.*

*"I studied their questions, their aims. I studied what it was they wanted. I cried a lot. I cried in order to act. I knew that it was temporarily a way for me to be able to defeat the enemy, to unmask him at a later stage. But it was hard for me to do, extremely hard. I decided not to row against the stream, not because I was afraid of being touched - I knew I would not be. I was too 'important' for them. I was too valuable a piece for them. I had to be treated with kindness, as their compatriots usually are.*

*"At night, whenever I was able to think for a few moments and while they were laughing with satisfaction, believing they had achieved victory, I would recapitulate the steps, summarising every point."*

Now at last, his apparent acceptance of integration before the television cameras can be placed in context. His mental powers and spirit to resist remained intact during this harsh psychological torture which he turned to his own advantage.

Continued from p. 15

Tutut's special role on East Timor suggests that Suharto needs his own framework to resolve the question of East Timor which continues to dog his attempts to shape a more prominent role for Indonesia and for himself on the international arena. In East Timor itself, Tutut's forays into 'social' good-works have won her no friends. Nor is the international community likely to be impressed by all these characters now parading as pioneers for new relations between Timorese and between Indonesia and Portugal.

# Diplomatic offensives on East Timor

*Two diplomatic offensives on East Timor are underway, a UN move to launch a new initiative which involves direct consultations with East Timorese opinion, and an Indonesian move to split the East Timorese resistance movement abroad.*

Jakarta is working hard to undermine UN and Portuguese efforts to find a solution. Since talks between Portugal and Indonesia resumed under UN auspices in 1993, it is clear that the UN now stands firmly by the principle of General Assembly resolution 1514 of 1960 which requires a solution that is acceptable to the people of the territory by means of a referendum or other form of assessing the people's views.

## UN consults the East Timorese

In January 1994, two senior UN officials from office of the Secretary-General in New York, Director of Political Affairs Francesco Vendrell and Tamrat Samuel, visited Lisbon, Jakarta and East Timor. Their primary purpose was to formulate a new initiative in time for the next round of talks between the two sides in May 1994, in Geneva.

High on their agenda was consultations with the East Timorese, meaning that for the first time, the UN Secretary-General's mandate from General Assembly resolution 37/30 of 1982 to consult 'with all parties directly concerned' is being implemented.

In Jakarta, the UN team visited the East Timorese resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, in prison. "I am satisfied with my visit because he (Gusmao) talked with me freely," said Vendrell. Details of the discussion were not divulged. The envoys also had talks with Indonesian human rights activists, Princen, Adnan Buyung Nasution and Hendaridi. They all told Vendrell that they consider East Timor's right to self-determination to be integral to the human rights situation. They agreed that progress on human rights and on Xanana's case was essential before a referendum could take place. [*Radio Netherlands*, 24.I.1994]

As for government circles, their attitude towards the UN mission was decidedly cool and the media took the hint. Although the visit of an obscure, pro-Indonesian retired Portuguese general a few days earlier had been headline news, the press all but ignored this high-powered UN team.

The UN envoys also visited East Timor and held discussions with East Timorese contacts including Bishop Belo. No details are available although Foreign Minister Ali Alatas used the occasion to publicly denounce Bishop Belo for openly advocating a referendum.

## Jakarta-sponsored 'reconciliation talks'

Hoping no doubt to take the wind out of the UN's sails, Jakarta last year initiated moves to encourage 'anti-integration' East Timorese to enter into reconciliation talks with 'pro-integration' East Timorese. After several false starts, the talks eventually took place in December 1993 at a secret location outside London. Heading the team from Indonesia was Lopes da Cruz, Suharto's special ambassador for East Timor affairs, while the team of 'anti-integration' Timorese was headed by Abilio Araujo, former chief of Fretilin's external delegation who was expelled from Fretilin in mid-1993 because he had become involved in this

Indonesian initiative which is totally rejected by Fretilin.

Hardly any journalists were given access to the venue. Those who did gain access confirmed that the location was surrounded by Indonesian security officers. Effendi Arizal, political counsellor at the Indonesian embassy in London, was clearly in charge. Indonesian diplomats from Spain and France were also present. As Abilio Araujo was being interviewed by a BBC reporter, his every word was monitored by Indonesian officials who videoed and taped



*Demo in Seattle during the APEC Summit Conference.*

the encounter, to make sure he said nothing about self-determination. (Several weeks later, Indonesia's Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs, Susilo Sudarman said Araujo was welcome to 'come back to Indonesia' for a visit, provided he did not say anything that would question East Timor's status.

Nothing has been revealed about the substance of the London talks. A main plank of Indonesia's strategy is to split the East Timorese community abroad and win over high-level figures well-known in the past for their opposition to Indonesia's occupation of East Timor. Their major 'catch' is Abilio Araujo but his willingness to enter into Jakarta's embrace has only increased his isolation from the East Timor community abroad.

## Tutut's Timor role

It was the unexpected appearance in London of 'Mbak Tutut', Suharto's oldest daughter, who held discussions with Abilio Araujo, which signalled the importance which Suharto himself attaches to this diplomatic initiative.

Tutut has for some time shown a special interest in East Timor. It was her foundation, *Yayasan Tiara*, which in 1992 enticed young East Timorese to go Java, promising them specialist training and well-paid jobs in Batam industrial

complex. They got nothing of the kind and have been living in penury, as unskilled, poorly-paid labourers in various factories, unable even to raise enough cash to return home to East Timor. Tutut's business interests in East Timor, especially in land ownership along the north coast for a tourist project, are well known.

From the 'social' and the commercial, Tutut is now playing a political role. Besides negotiating with Jakarta's new Timorese collaborators like Abilio Araujo, she has become president of the newly-formed Indonesia-Portugal Friendship Association, the counterpart of a Portugal-Indonesia Friendship Association in Lisbon which is trying to undermine the almost unanimous support in Portugal for

## EAST TIMOR

East Timor. Chairing the association in Lisbon is a retired general, Carlos Galvao de Melo, who broke from the army group that overthrew the fascist Caetano regime in 1974 because of his extreme right-wing views. In Jakarta in January, most newspapers hailed him as the man who 'led' the junta. In Dili, he went out of his way to pour scorn on East Timor's opposition to integration. Bishop Belo refused to meet him and referred to him contemptuously as 'Indonesia's ambassador to Portugal'.

*Continued on p. 13*

## Seven Timorese leave for Portugal

*Seven East Timorese students who sought asylum at the Swedish and Finnish embassies in Jakarta in June have at last been allowed to leave Indonesia. For the first time, Timorese asylum-seekers have got their way.*

The seven men, Mateus Brito Ximenes, Jose Manuel da Oliveira Sousa, Oscar Golcalves, Clementino Fario, Ventura Valentim, Profirio da Costa Oliveira and Florencio Anunciacao Fernandes (see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No. 118, August 1993) left Jakarta under the protection of the International Committee of the Red Cross on 30 December and arrived in Lisbon on New Year's Eve to the enthusiastic welcome of the Timorese community.

Ever since they were thrown out of the two embassies just days after entering them, four of them have lived under the protection of Indonesian human rights activist, Haji J.C. Princen. The three who had to leave the Finnish embassy spent their first month or so in the home of Lopes da Cruz, special ambassador for East Timor affairs, then left to stay on church premises, also under Princen's protection.

### Bitter memories

In a meeting with Foreign Minister Durau Barroso in Lisbon, the three initially held at Lopes da Cruz' home said that 'Chico' Lopes had interrogated them as if he were an intelligence agent, wanting to know who was 'behind' the 12 November 1991 demonstration in Dili, Xanana Gusmao or the Bishop of Dili.

They later harshly criticised the Finnish embassy in particular. Contrary to their belief that Finland was a country that respected human rights, the embassy turned out to be a place "in which the Indonesian military had complete freedom of action, coming and going as they pleased".

At a press conference, Portugal did not escape criticism, for having done nothing until the Santa Cruz massacre, broadcast on TV. "It was only after Santa Cruz," said Valentim Ventura, "that Portugal and the rest of the world opened their eyes to the Timor issue. The sad part is that for the past 17 years, there have been worse massacres but nobody said anything at all".

At a meeting in the presidential palace, Portuguese President, Mario Soares, promised he would call on the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali to redouble his efforts to discover the whereabouts of the hundreds of young East Timorese who have been missing since the 1991 massacre.



*The seven Timorese. Photo taken in Jakarta, before seeking asylum in the two embassies.*

The government has promised to help them with their studies. The Foreign Minister said that although Jakarta's decision to allow them to leave was a positive sign, "it should not be forgotten that the heart of the Timor problem has still to be solved". [*Publico*, 1.I.1994]

### EAST TIMOR : the basic facts

15 page booklet available in Portuguese, French, German, Spanish and English.  
available from CDPM, Rua Pinheiro Chagas 77-2Esq, 1000 Lisbon, Portugal.

## Dealing with the Timorese resistance

*The claim that only a few remnants of the East Timorese resistance are left is a recurring theme. Major-General Theo Syafei, whose military command oversees East Timor, says there are no more than 90 members. The resistance is now portrayed as small gangs of criminals, murdering and looting villagers. While these stories are the usual Indonesian rhetoric, some new elements have emerged.*

Major-General Theo Syafei has promised to withdraw all combat troops, replacing them with territorial troops. As explained in *TAPOL Bulletin*, [No. 120, December 1993], the switch from combat troops to territorial troops is in anticipation of the growth of the resistance in the urban areas. A new factor has now been added, the deployment of Mobile Police Brigade (*Brimob*) units in East Timor.

### The emergence of the Police

In most countries the police is separate from the armed forces but in Indonesia, *POLRI* is an integral part of *ABRI*. For years it has been left to the military to enforce law and order, but now serious efforts have been made to increase the role of *POLRI*. In the present upsurge of demonstrations in many of Indonesia's big cities, it is increasingly the police, or more precisely, *Brimob*, the Police special forces, who confront and arrest demonstrators. The military plays a back-up role and only steps in if *Brimob* cannot handle the situation.

The same scheme is now being applied in East Timor. While *Falintil* guerrillas will still be hunted down by army crack-troops, the clandestine front in the urban areas will be handled by *Brimob*. This special force has been given training to deal with crisis situations. Well equipped with truncheons and riot shields, *Brimob* is geared towards handling large crowds in demonstrations and mass rallies. Police officers have had anti-riot training in Germany, the UK and Australia.

Since 1991, demonstrators in Dili have experienced the heavy-handed methods of the police, but the appearance of *Brimob* units in the streets of Dili and Baucau will only heighten the tension in East Timor.

### Changing the name of the game

The resistance in East Timor is still called '*GPK/Fretilin*' by the authorities, which totally misrepresents the Timorese resistance. In a New Year statement to the press, Police Major-General Amrin Syarofi, Police Chief of the Nusa Tenggara islands, including East Timor, enumerated the so-called 'crimes' of the resistance, calling them murders, robberies and assaults. Peering through the mist of confusion created by his categories, it is clear that the level of armed conflict is far greater than the army will admit. In 1993, says the police chief, there were 79 'robberies', 12 'murders' and 3 attacks causing injuries as compared with 21 'robberies' and 15 'murders' in 1992. He also listed 'anti-integrasi' acts to 'undermine (*merongrong*) the Indonesian state': 15 incidents in 1993 including 8 cases of illegal pamphleteering, 3 cases of unfurling illegal banners, 3 of pulling down the Indonesian flag and one case of raising the flag of an independent East Timor. In 1992 there were

4 cases of illegal pamphleteering and 8 illegal meetings.

Two things should be noted. This report was made by the Police Chief not, as in the past, the military commander. Second, the use of such words as 'criminal' shows a shift in terminology. The resistance is now to be portrayed as 'bandits'. In the words of Amrin Syarofi, talk of the '*GPK/Fretilin*' killing and robbing people can be beneficial for Indonesia's standing on the international arena. [*Suara Karya*, 3.I.1994]

Typical of this new word-play is a report filed by AP on 24 January. It reports the killing of two 'villagers' one of whom, Mariano Alves, "led a local spear platoon against the pro-independence fighters". Alves was clearly under arms and this could only have been a Timorese fighting alongside Indonesian troops in an armed encounter with the resistance. The police chief's 1994 figures will list this as a 'murder'.

The police chief expressed confidence that the deployment of *Brimob* units in East Timor would improve security. *Brimob* operations will be known as *Operasi Kamtibmas* (*Keamanan dan Penertiban Masyarakat*), security and order operation. It is not known how many companies of *Brimob* will be despatched.

## STOP PRESS

### Theo Syafei replaced

Major-General Theo Syafei has been replaced as commander of the Udayana Regional Military Command based in Denpasar, Bali. The new commander is Brigadier-General Adang Ruchiatna, currently commander of the first division of *KOSTRAD*, the strategic reserve command. He is likely to come from *KOPASSUS*, the crack troops.

For the past two years, Theo Syafei has been in control of military operations in East Timor, first as commander of *KOLAKOPS* in Dili, then as commander of the Udayana Command where he was far more directly associated with the situation in East Timor than his predecessors in this post.

Syafei's replacement less than a year after taking over the regional military command suggests that the move is not routine but may signal a change in the regime's policy towards security and military operations in East Timor. It is too early to speculate further on the significance of Syafei's removal.



## Timorese prisoners appeal to the ICJ

Six of the eight East Timorese who were convicted under the anti-subversion law in 1992 for participating in the peaceful demonstration in Dili on 12 November 1991 and given very harsh sentences, wrote to the Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists on 28 September 1993, asking for help to invalidate their trials and sentences. The six signatories are: **Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha** (serving life), **Francisco Miranda Branco** (15 years), **Saturnino da Costa Belo** (9 years, raised to 10 or 12 on appeal), **Filomeno da Silva Ferreira** (5 years, 8 months), **Juvencio de Jesus Martins** (6 year, 10 months) and **Jacinto das Neves R. Alves** (10 years).



*Drawing by a Timorese prisoner in Cipinang prison.*

During the first month after their arrest, they wrote, they were subjected to prolonged and intensive interrogation by army intelligence from 7am daily often till 3am the next day; they were ill-treated and under severe psychological pressure. During this period, the security forces needed to select which of the Timorese under arrest would be scapegoated by being put on trial. In the second period, which lasted about two months, questioning was in the hands of the attorney-general's office and BAIS (Strategic Intelligence) in sessions sometimes lasting 12 hours a day.

The prisoners described how the authorities tried to prevent LBH lawyers from handling their cases. Also, they were told that if they did as they were told and pleaded guilty, they would get lighter sentences. None of them responded to this cheap enticement. Although the trial sessions were allegedly open, many civilians and even relatives of the defendants were prevented from attending.

Among the witnesses who testified against them – the victims – were army officers who were responsible for the massacre.

### Defendants' testimony ignored

Court verdicts and sentences ignored the juridical status of East Timor as a non-self-governing territory under

international law, as well as the defendants' testimonies. False information about the demonstrators possessing arms was accepted although no evidence was produced.

After being sentenced, the convicted men were denied their rights, under Indonesian law, to be assisted in lodging appeals against the verdicts; on the contrary, they were kept in total isolation in dark cells. The appeal courts also ignored statements submitted by their lawyers. (In all cases, their sentences were upheld on appeal, except for Saturnino, whose sentence was increased.)

### How the ICJ can help

- \* It should press the Indonesian government to allow an investigation of the trials by a group of international jurists and seek the assistance of the International Platform of Jurists for East Timor for them to lodge appeals with an impartial court.
- \* Help to provide an exact definition of East Timor's status under international law.
- \* Attend all future trials held in East Timor.
- \* Have those responsible for the slaughter of 200,000 East Timorese people since the Indonesian occupation brought to justice before the International Court in The Hague.

### Timorese escapes to Darwin

A 38-year old East Timorese who spent time in detention in 1993 managed to escape from East Timor after bribing his way onto an Indonesian naval vessel and arrived in Darwin on 23 December.

Vicente Floriano Dias Ximenes, who applied for refugee status immediately after arriving in Australia, said he had been tortured while in custody. His escape was quite sensational. He crossed the border to West Timor in a car, disguised in an Indonesian army uniform, then bribed his way onto a naval ship and eventually flew to Darwin by way of Singapore.

Foreign Minister Ali Alatas called his escape "a ridiculous story. We don't even know this guy." [*West Australian*, 22.1.1994] Unfortunately for Mr Alatas however, Vicente's name appears on a list published in April 1993 by Asia Watch; the list was provided by the Indonesian forces. Vicente is described there as director of a company called CV Colega Timor [see *Asia Watch*, April 1993, Vol. 5, No. 8].

Vicente brought with him a document signed by Col. M. Simbolon alleging that he had provided reports about East Timor to people living in Australia. "If at any time it becomes apparent that (he) is still involved in the clandestine..., he will be sentenced," the document says.

His application for refugee status is now under consideration.

# Torture in Aceh

*Reports about human rights abuses in Aceh are scarce but recently, Acehnese refugees (or survivors) in neighbouring countries gave accounts of bestial treatment by KOPASSUS, the Indonesian crack troops. Aceh remains one of the most inaccessible areas in the Indonesian archipelago. Only on rare occasions do reports appear that make it clear that the situation is still tense.*

One occasion was the appointment of the new sub-district military commander of East Aceh on 23 December 1993. In his message district military commander, Colonel Sridono stressed the strategic importance of East Aceh; it remains a region with a high level of disturbance (*kerawanan cukup tinggi*) and in the past was the base for the GPK (*Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan, Security Disruptor Gang*), the usual name given to the Free Aceh Movement. Sridono stressed the territorial mission of the military, which means tight social control of the population. He spoke of its economic importance, its elaborate agricultural plots, forestry-industrial plantations and oil fields. The Sridono speech is the latest indication that East Aceh is still in turmoil.

## The survivors in Malaysia

Many thousands of Acehnese fled to neighbouring Malaysia in the early nineties. The exact number is difficult to estimate, as the majority have assimilated among the locals; many Malaysians have blood relations with Acehnese or are from the country. While a few hundred refugees are being held in awful conditions by the Malaysian authorities, there are groups of Free Aceh Movement cadres who travel in and out of Malaysia. It is virtually impossible to investigate the situation in Aceh, but the Acehnese in Malaysia are living examples of the brutality of the Indonesian troops. Three detailed accounts by Acehnese who escaped from Indonesian captivity have reached the outside world.

## Torture and killings

Reports from a range of human rights organisations and individuals agree on some basic facts: extrajudicial killings, disappearances and torture of those in captivity are normal practice. The three accounts confirm these facts.

The first is from Nasruddin Ismael, 22, a farmer from Peureulak, arrested on 8 March 1991 by *Kopassus*, the red beret commandos, while working at a Plantation in Alue Nireh. His only 'crime' was that he was the nephew of Razali Hamid, a local leader of the Free Aceh Movement. Nasruddin was taken to the *Kopassus* interrogation centre and beaten unconscious with truncheons. He was taken by truck to the notorious Tualang Cut prison together with other prisoners. On the way, two prisoners were strangled and their bodies dumped in public in the streets of Sungoe Raja village. Another prisoner was clubbed to death and his body thrown in the river. By the end of the journey, another four prisoners had died of torture and their bodies were thrown in Kuala Simpang River. In the 7 days and nights of his detention, Nasruddin was moved from the Peureulak detention camp to Tualang Cut prison several times. In this brief period he experienced terrible treatment and witnessed the suffering of other prisoners.

His stubborn refusal to deny his family kinship with the

local freedom fighter probably saved his life. At one point, after a heavy interrogation session when his ribs were broken, he was taken to Lhok Nihong, a densely forested area. While the soldiers were relaxing, he made his escape and went underground. It took him months to recover.

## The Lamuello prison

Ibrahim bin Yacob endured four months' imprisonment in Lamuello prison. He was an active member of the Free Aceh Movement; his cover was eventually blown in a series of mass arrests and interrogations. He was arrested by a platoon of *Kopassus* soldiers led by Captain Rubiono in the town of Beureunan on 22 May 1993 and thrown into a pool of human excrement during interrogation. He was then beaten with truncheons and given electric shocks. The food was dreadful, no visitor or lawyer was allowed. Only after strong international pressure was the ICRC allowed to visit several prisons, including Lamuello. Ibrahim bin Yacob names 13 prisoners who were with him there. Eight of them are probably still in detention: Dr. Syamsuddin, Hamid, Angkasah, Abdu'lah, Mahmud, Umar Tong Weng, Ibrahim and Muhammad Lambot. The other five, Banta Sulaiman, Iljas, Jafar, Zulkarnaini and Zubaili, were moved to Rantjong Prison, the most notorious prison in Aceh. Usually people who are moved to Rantjong Prison 'disappear'. Ibrahim managed to escape. His report includes a drawing of Lamuello prison, showing the sites of mass graves.

## Lhok Nga Prison

Said Mustafa Usab bin Said Usman, 32, from the sub-district of Meulaboh, was detained from 7 August 1990 till 16 August 1991. The first days were atrocious, the torture temporarily paralysed him. For 17 days he was beaten, given electric shocks, burned and thrown in cold water in the middle of the night. On 26 August 1990 he was moved to Lhok Nga Prison and the torture continued on three occasions up to October 1990.

He gives the names of many fellow prisoners. Lhok Nga prison is used for tried prisoners and one of the few visited by the ICRC. Said Mustafa describes the ICRC visit on 11 June 1991 as the happiest day during his captivity. The authorities said only 10 of the detainees were political prisoners and the rest common criminals, but after the ICRC visit, conditions improved a bit. Said includes two pages of names of prisoners, tried and untried, and some who were murdered.

After his release the Indonesian military intelligence still hunting for him, so he decided to flee to Malaysia.

# West Papuan refugees express their concerns

*West Papuans at the East Awin refugee camp have written to TAPOL in response to a UNHCR document accusing us of giving a 'very false picture' of conditions in the camp. The UNHCR has not answered or even acknowledged TAPOL's two letters sent to the agency more than two months ago.*

The UNHCR criticisms of reports published in earlier *Bulletins* were never sent to TAPOL. The document was reproduced in the September 1993 issue of *West Papua Courier*. [See *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 120, December 1993]

Writing on behalf of WPYSA, the organisation of West Papuans at the camp, Julius Ireeuw, said the UNHCR has failed to resolve the status problem of the refugees. So far they have only been accepted as *prima facie* refugees which does not allow them to move freely out the East Awin camp. Their determination as refugees entitled to permissive residence would require screening by the UNHCR but this has not been done although the West Papuans fled across to PNG ten years ago, in February 1984. Nor has the agency acted to obtain third-country resettlement for them.

The world agency has been responsible for the voluntary repatriation of refugees. One condition for repatriation was that the International Red Cross (ICRC) would monitor the returnees, but now the ICRC has closed its office in West Papua and church and missionary organisations which also monitor the returnees have been told by the Indonesian government that all foreign missionaries will have to leave by July 1994. This means that there will no longer be any independent agencies present to protect the returnees, said Ireeuw. All efforts by the refugees to be resettled in Australia have failed, despite support for this aim from the Refugee Council of Australia.

Ireeuw said the UNHCR which is now planning to withdraw its support for the camp may regard the problem of West Papuan refugees as insignificant, compared to refugee problems elsewhere in the world. But "even though we amount to just a few thousand people, we are entitled to protection and the solution to our dilemma in accordance with the UN Convention and Protocol on Refugees". It was this sense of frustration that sparked the demonstration at the camp in January 1993 when the UNHCR flag was pulled down and a West Papuan flag unfurled in its place. He denied the UNHCR contention that those involved in the action had surrendered to the police.

## Voiceless

With regard to physical conditions at the camp, Ireeuw referred us to a series of articles in *Times of PNG* last December. Seeing their problems in the global context, he wrote:

*"Refugees are a tangible human symbol of problems afflicting contemporary society: persecution, war, civil conflict and intolerance. (We suffer) feeling of loss, alienation and displacement and are often referred to as 'the uprooted', 'the unwanted' or 'the homeless'. But if there is one thing common to the disparate groups called refugees, it is that they are effectively voiceless. This is not to suggest that they are inevitably passive or incapable of express their aspirations. Far from it. But they are disenfranchised, ... and rarely have direct access to the people who are taking far-reaching decisions about their lives."*

The refugees invited TAPOL to visit the camp "to assist us in gaining a better understanding of the situation here".

## PNG journalists highlight problems

The refugees were able to describe their problems to PNG *Times* journalists who visited East Awin camp last year.

"Our shelter is made of plastics, tree stumps, barks of trees, sago leaves, reeds. There is no proper medical care and very limited drugs. Many have died as a result.

"The UNHCR (has) sponsored primary education since 1988 and the schools are run by Montfort Catholic Mission (Canada)... But the fact is that primary education at East Awin is not recognised so the children cannot enrol in high schools throughout PNG to further their education.

"Life in the camp is hard. We have to survive by producing our own food. the soil is not fertile enough for intensification so we have to chop the trees all the time for new gardens. Gardening for highlanders is easier but coastal people, used to fishing and sago, find it hard. Sometimes they collect sago but this produces conflicts with local people.

"Fighting has occurred because refugees trespass and cut sago palms.... In one case, the hut made by refugees in the bush for hunting was burnt down and food items taken away."

There are one hundred widows and fifty orphans among the refugees for whom the work of building huts and creating gardens is particularly difficult.

One refugee hit on the idea of building a canoe for transport back and forth to Kiunga. A tree was felled with the permission of the locals and it took three months to make the canoe. But the chances of making more canoes have disappeared because local people will no longer allow them to fell any trees.

They are not allow to go more than one kilometre from the camp boundary into local land. When refugees ventured further than this in the dry season to garden and hunt, their relations with local people grew tense.

## "Give us permissive residence!"

John Wakum speaking for the refugees, said the government and the UNHCR should create projects to help them become self-reliant. But above all, The government must consider giving the refugees permissive residence. "We request them to look into our current *prima facie* status and grant us permissive status." [*Times of PNG*, 2.I.1994]

In TAPOL's opinion, these demands are justified. The fate of these people cannot be allowed to drag on unresolved. The statement is evidently the result of hesitancy by the PNG government, anxious not to upset its powerful neighbour. Surely it is for the UNHCR to seek a solution and not turn a blind eye to the fate of these refugees, as seems to be their policy at present.

**Norman Lewis, *An Empire of the East, Travels in Indonesia*. Jonathan Cape, London, 236 pp. Hardback, price: £16.99.**

Visit any major bookshop anywhere in the UK and you will be hard put to find any books about Indonesia. Even on the specialist shelves, there is little to be found. So the appearance of a book by this country's best known and best loved travel writer, sporting such an uncompromising title, is bound to draw attention to a country still so little understood. Add to this the fact that he chose to travel in the three regions which, as he writes, have "withstood the standardising processes of the Indonesian government" – Aceh, East Timor and West Papua – and there is reason to hope that perceptions of Jakarta and its imperialist ambitions are likely to take a significant leap forward. Moreover, the enthusiastic reviews that have appeared in the major newspapers will assure the book a wide audience.

The author is certainly a seasoned traveller (now well into his eighties) and makes light of the most arduous situations. He shies away from the comforts of the tourist trail and makes a point of visiting places still largely off the beaten track. He is a keen observer of how people who are still largely untouched by the 'civilising' influences of missionaries and government administrators attempt against great odds to preserve their identities.

Although he does not set out to argue in favour of a particular cause, Norman Lewis is not a neutral spectator. Indeed, he was instrumental in helping to bring *Survival International* into being, following a journey through Brazil after which he published an essay entitled *Genocide* in a major Sunday paper, causing a great stir.

## Aceh

During his travels in Aceh with his son and a friend, accompanied by a reluctant Acehnese 'guide', the reader is frequently reminded of the overwhelming presence of an army bent on crushing a revolt though there are few encounters with people who can provide an insight into what it means to live in such a state of terror. His anger is directed in particular at the wanton destruction of forests, which is happening even faster in Indonesia than in Brazil. He laments the dereliction caused by a transmigration site that he happens upon. For one logger he met "who had just turned a half-million acres of a forest in Aceh into cement sacks", the future was bright: "From now on, it's golf courses. This is going to be the paradise of Japanese golfers."

## East Timor

In East Timor, travelling now with his daughter, Lewis struck up a friendship with Salesian nuns who run an orphanage in Venilale. With their help, the travellers moved around with ease and enjoyed the hospitality of Catholic clergy and nuns. On a trip to Lospalos, they travelled for miles through barren stretches which are now known as 'dead earth' "because all those who had filled it were dead and gone and human activity had come to an end".

He is unstinting in his praise of the Catholic clergy and sisters who have sided with the people of East Timor. They are to be admired like the clergy he has learnt to admire in Bolivia and Brazil, working in isolation among the dispossessed, though in East Timor, he points out, the magnitude and complexity of the problems they face are

much greater. He was especially moved by a ceremony to instal local chieftains, on which Bishop Belo conferred his blessings, celebrated in traditional style. It was during this ceremony, as dancers whipped themselves into a brief frenzy, that a man approached him, spoke furtively, then disappeared in the crowd: "They've been inside for years and when you come out, you go to extremes. When they took me to Atauro prison, they put me in a coffin for four months. It's dark. You hear nothing. You see nothing and it just fits your body.... Four years in Atauro, then another four in Cai-Laco. It leaves its mark. You're never the same again."

## West Papua

Lewis's travels in West Papua had an altogether different flavour about them. The missionaries he meets here could hardly have been more different, seeking souls and imposing their rituals with little sympathy for local traditions. These are the men who bring trinkets as enticements, and cajole their 'flock' into building and maintaining airstrips, creating advanced bases for church and government penetration.

He introduces the reader to many fascinating people. One is a local government teacher who has made the leap from Dani culture to Pancasila 'morality' but quickly strips himself naked and dons a penis gourd to join in a tribal war, knowing full well that such activities are strictly prohibited. He meets up with the Dani tribe where Wyn Sargent, the US photo-anthropologist, lived and worked until she was hounded out for speaking out against atrocities. They still spoke fondly of her as a sadly missed friend. Everywhere tribal people were being enticed into destroying their traditional habitat and move into 'healthy houses' built to strict government specifications, which are not only very unhealthy but part of a strategy to drag people away from their traditions. But many of these houses stand empty or are decked up to appear as if they are lived in, a quiet form of resistance to the intrusion of a foreign and unwanted power.

*Continued on p. 8*

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