



VICTORIA UNIVERSITY
MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA

Tapol bulletin no, 117, June 1993

This is the Published version of the following publication

UNSPECIFIED (1993) *Tapol bulletin no, 117, June 1993*. *Tapol bulletin* (117). pp. 1-24. ISSN 1356-1154

The publisher's official version can be found at

Note that access to this version may require subscription.

Downloaded from VU Research Repository <https://vuir.vu.edu.au/26075/>

Xanana condemns Indonesia

In his statement to the Dili court, Xanana Gusmao, leader of the East Timorese resistance whose trial started on 1 February, delivered a stinging indictment of Indonesia and its backers, acting in the finest accusatory tradition of political defence in the courtroom. The court, clearly under instructions from the military, stopped him from delivering the statement after he had read only two pages.

The court handed down a life sentence at the end of a trial which Amnesty International, Asia Watch, the International Commission of Jurists and many others have condemned as blatantly unfair.

His statement, hand-written in prison and completed on 27 March this year, was smuggled abroad, reaching the outside world in time for publication as soon as the verdict was announced.

He explained how he had pretended to collaborate with his captors in their attempts to use him, in order to be able to speak at the end of the trial,

free from coercion of any kind. I have always insisted in all my conversations including the one I had with the Indonesian ambassador to the UN, Mr Nugroho, that, under the circumstances in which my earlier statements were made, no credibility can be given to them.

It is now clear that everything Xanana said following his arrest was aimed at keeping up the appearance of collaboration so that he could speak publicly in what he thought would be an open forum.

He reveals that his captors were ready to acquit him, had he collaborated with them in the trial.

On 22 November last year in Denpasar, I signed a document in which I affirmed that, according to international law, I continue to be, like all Timorese, a Portuguese citizen and in my own conscience I am a citizen of East Timor.

I reject the competence of any Indonesian court to try me, and particularly the jurisdiction of this court which has been implanted by force of arms and crimes committed against my homeland, East Timor.

As for Sudjono, the lawyer who became his defence counsel, Xanana described how he had been prevented from making contact with the Legal Aid Institute. A letter he had written to them accepting their offer to defend him was intercepted and he was forced to write another reply, refusing their offer.

The heavy hand of the military

Xanana devoted much of his statement to laying bare the degree of army control in East Timor, in particular BAIS, the intelligence agency, and KOPASSUS, the red-beret elite troops. Stressing the contrast between his experiences in the bush, always among his own people, and his experience now in captivity, he said:

I feel like a foreigner in my own land. In prison at Polwil [the police command] I am surrounded by Indonesians; officers from BAIS and Kopassus are my warders. Here in court, I see only Indonesians, mostly men from BAIS and KOPASSUS... some of them the very men who have handled my case throughout my imprisonment. The Timorese, my

East Timor

Courtroom gag that will reverberate	p. 4
UN envoy visits Timor again	p. 5
Two East Timor strategies clash	p. 7
Prisoners forcibly removed from Timor	p. 9
Mau Huno arrested	p. 21

Military: ABRI'S new faces

p. 10

Social issues	
Golfmania	p. 12
Women against Kartini Day	p. 18

Human rights: briefs

'Asian concept' under attack	p. 23
------------------------------	-------

West Papua

ICRC closes office in West Papua	p. 18
A people forgotten	p. 19

Ach: Forced repatriation from Malaysia

p. 17

UK-RI: UK sells itself cheap

p. 20

Labour: Growing international pressure

p. 22

EAST TIMOR

compatriots, are out on the street under strict surveillance.

In Polwil where they try to flatter me with special attention, the inscriptions written on the prison walls by the prisoners, my companions, remind me constantly of the sufferings of many of my compatriots, victims of torture, and remind me constantly of the unforgettable 12 November 1991. What did the peaceful demonstration of 12 November want? To remind Jakarta and the world of the need for dialogue, to remind Jakarta and the world that there is something profoundly wrong in East Timor.

In the dock of international opinion

Rejecting the farce of being tried for crimes against the Indonesian state and the illegal possession of firearms, Xanana said:

The ones who should be standing before an international court are:

- the Indonesian government for crimes committed in the past 17 years in East Timor;
- the US administration which gave the green light to the invasion on 7 December 1975 and have since given military aid and political support for Indonesia's genocide in East Timor;
- the governments of Australia and western Europe for their policy of complicity towards Indonesia;
- and finally, the Portuguese government for its grave irresponsibility in the decolonisation of East Timor.

The UN recognises as legitimate all forms of opposition to the colonial presence in any part of the world where people are fighting for liberation. My struggle and the resistance of my people and of Falintil [the armed forces of the East Timorese resistance movement] should be placed in this context, and stand above Indonesian law.

He had bitter words for the Indonesians with whom he has been in contact since his capture, of his disgust with a West Papuan officer who spoke to him enthusiastically about 'the great Indonesian family', of the Sumatran interpreter who had nothing but praise for his 'Javanese brothers', and of officers from Sulawesi who tried to impress him with their talk about 'Indonesian values'.

The concept of realpolitik has acquired a new dimension for me. Political realism is political subservience, the denial of the individual conscience, the death of the conscience of a people.

Every Indonesian bound by the policy of their own nation and their understanding of East Timor is a reproduction of how their government sees it unless they can open their ears to their own consciences and commit themselves to the principles of justice, freedom and the rule of law.


He had been lectured a great deal about the backwardness of Portuguese colonialism "as if I had not experienced it myself". His captors tried to impress him with statistics about development in East Timor but, he asked, "can colonialism be quantified as good or bad"?

Indonesia's claim soaked in blood

Xanana accused his accusers in court of going to far in their claim that Frettilin "had dared to impose its will on people of East Timor".

Until this moment, the UN does not recognise Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, which was imposed by force, by violence and the systematic violation of the most fundamental human rights.

The court mentioned 17 December 1975 as the day on which a provisional government and local assembly were



Xanana in court

formed. But since all the Indonesians have forgotten, I must remind them here of that tragic day, 7 December in that same year, the day of the cowardly and shameful Indonesian invasion [when] Indonesian troops indiscriminately massacred the defenceless population of Dili, killing thousands, including elderly people, women and children and also including an Australian journalist.

While the Balibo statement [of 30 November 1975] was signed with the blood of Australian journalists who were murdered by Indonesian troops during the attack on Balibo, the so-called Indonesian provisional government was formed over the corpses of the Timorese massacred from 7-17 of that same December.

How can a government that was established to the accompaniment of the sound of sea and land shelling of a defenceless population and the sound of advancing tanks and cannons claim to have any juridical standing?

Timorese witnesses as victims

Xanana also spoke about the pressures on Timorese who were forced to testify at his trial, all of whom had been inhibited from speaking the truth. All had been forced to say that they had surrendered "of their own free will". He accused the security forces of treating them inhumanely - "See how thin they are!" - and asked: "Were those responsible for the (Santa Cruz) murders ever brought to trial to answer for their crimes? What is the worth of a law which

shuts its eyes to the ghastly crime of 12 November 1991? Which moral values, which patterns of justice do the Indonesians uphold when they proclaim the criminals as heroes and condemn the victims?"

He recalled the valour of the witness, Saturnino da Costa Belo, who shouted "Viva Timor Leste" in court, describing him as an example of the heroism of the East Timorese people. "The farce of the hastily drafted medical certificate certifying that he was ill should make all you gentlemen here blush with shame, because you know very well that the problem rests on your shoulders."

Everything connected with my trial is in the hands of BAIS and Kopassus whose officers fill this room, watching everything and everybody. Jakarta should be ashamed of its criminal behaviour in East Timor and should have recognised long ago that it has lost in East Timor. The Indonesian generals should be made to realise that they have been defeated in East Timor. The moment has come for Jakarta to recognise its political defeat on the ground.

He went on:

Here today, as commander of Falintil, the glorious armed forces of national liberation of East Timor, I acknowledge military defeat on the ground. I am not ashamed to say so. On the contrary, I am proud that a small guerrilla army has been able to resist a large nation like Indonesia, a regional power which invaded us like cowards and want to dominate us by the law of terror and crime, violence, persecution, prison, torture and murder.

Appeals to the world community

Xanana concluded his unread defence with appeals addressed to many who hold the power to force the military regime to change its policy in East Timor:

* *I appeal to the new generation of Indonesians to understand that the people of East Timor attach more value to freedom, justice and peace than to the development which is carried out here with help from Australia, the US, and European countries which have close economic relations with Jakarta.*

* *I appeal to the people of Indonesia to understand that according to universal principles and international law, East Timor is a non-autonomous territory in accordance with the norms that govern decolonisation. I appeal to the Indonesian people to understand that East Timor is not a threat to Indonesia or a threat to its security. The story they tell you, that East Timor is communist, is old hat. We don't want to dismember Indonesia. The fact is that East Timor was never part of Indonesia.*

* *I appeal to the international community to understand that it is time to show that the New World Order requires acts that will bring to an end the situation inherited from the past*

* *I appeal to the European Community to be true to its own resolutions and all the resolutions adopted regarding East Timor.*

* *I appeal to the friends of East Timor, parliamentarians in Europe, America, Japan and Australia, to go on pressing their governments to stop applying double standards to similar cases where systematic violations of UN resolutions occur, as in the case of Indonesia's behaviour regarding East Timor.*

* *I appeal to President Bill Clinton to reconsider the*

EAST TIMOR

problem of East Timor and to press Jakarta to accept dialogue with the Portuguese and the Timorese in the search for an internationally-acceptable solution.


* *I appeal to the Portuguese Government never to abandon its responsibility towards East Timor.*

* *I appeal to the UN Secretary-General to ensure that the solution he seeks for East Timor is based on universal principles and international law.*

* *Finally, I appeal to the government of Indonesia to change its attitude and to realise that the moment has come to understand the essence of the struggle in East Timor.*

After saying to the UN Secretary-General that he is ready "to participate in the negotiating process at any time or in any place", he ends his statement with the following words:

As a political prisoner in the hands of the occupiers of my country, it is of no consequence to me if they pass a death sentence here today. They have killed more than one third of the defenceless population of East Timor. They are killing my people and I am worth no more than the heroic struggle of my people who, because they are a small and weak people, have always been subjected to foreign rule.



Price: £10.95 (paperback edition)

Order from:

UK: Zed Books Ltd, 57 Caledonian Road, London N1 9BU

USA: 165 First Ave, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey 17716

Australia: Pluto Press, PO box 199 Leichhardt, NSW 2040

Courtroom gag that will reverberate for years

In February, on the second day of his trial, with many foreign journalists present, Xanana Gusmao asked them "to stick with this trial up to the end". At the session on 17 May, his intentions became clear. Xanana had prepared a defence statement condemning Indonesia's unlawful occupation of his country. The resistance leader whom the regime had described as 'repentant', a 'convert to integration', had chosen the right moment to reveal his true political stand.

The hearing on 5 May was to have been devoted to hearing the defence plea by his lawyer, Sudjono, who thought that Xanana would not be speaking in his own defence. But as Sudjono rose to read his 67-page defence statement, Xanana interrupted him to say that he no longer wanted Sudjono to represent him and would now be making a statement of his own. He also said that he was not an Indonesian citizen, contradicting claims about what he said on the first day of the trial, and that the court has no jurisdiction to try him.



Xanana Gusmao being taken into the Dili court-house.

The judge would not allow him to read his statement and asked him to hand it over but he refused to do so. Since it was a hand-written statement in Portuguese, the judge said that it could only be presented in Indonesian. The trial was adjourned to give Xanana the opportunity to have his statement translated into Indonesian. In fact, according to the law, the responsibility for accurate interpretation facilities rests with the court, not with the defendant.

Sudjono meanwhile managed to persuade Xanana to withdraw the cancellation of his power of attorney. This had come as an acute embarrassment to Sudjono who probably warned him that it could jeopardise the continuation of the trial which, under law, requires the present of defence counsel. Xanana can quite understandably have decided that the most important thing for him at that moment was that the trial should continue; the status of Sudjono had become irrelevant.

International observers kept out

The hearing which followed, on 12 May, was even more of a shambles. Three diplomats and a UN representative were prevented from boarding a plane in Bali the night before so as to reach Dili in time to attend the trial the next morning. With boarding passes in hand, Tamrat Samuel from the UN Secretary-General's office, and an interpreter, together with

diplomats from the US, Japan and the UK (representing the European Community) and a Japanese TV reporter, were told the plane was "overbooked". They returned to Jakarta immediately to lodge protests with the Foreign Ministry.

Embarrassed by this contradiction of assurances given by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas that the trial was 'open' and observers were free to attend, the Ministry chartered a plane to take the group to Dili. However, they arrived too late to attend the hearing.

The court heard Sudjono's defence, but when Xanana produced his own statement, in Portuguese, the judge ruled that the statement would be entered into the trial records but would not be read out. This was hotly contested by Sudjono who threatened to complain to the Supreme Court. The hearing adjourned on that discordant note and was resumed the following day. Now the judge conceded that Xanana could read his statement if he so wished but since the 28-page document had not yet been translated in full, the hearing was adjourned till Monday 17 May. But Xanana was warned to confine his statement to "the charges and legal issues".

Xanana gagged

When Xanana rose to speak on 17 May, the courtroom was packed. Several diplomats were present but the UN representative had again been prevented from boarding a plane in Bali. Seats in the front rows usually reserved for the foreign observers were all occupied when they arrived so they had to sit in a nearby corridor. Normally anyone sitting in this part of the court-house could follow the proceedings through a loud-speaker, but on this day it had been switched off so they heard nothing.

The most conspicuous men in court were Major-General Theo Syafei and other senior officials, no doubt knowing what would happen and making sure nothing would go wrong. The judges and the prosecutors had copies of the Indonesian text and were ready to pounce.

As Xanana read the first two pages, the prosecutor protested several times. When he reached page three, the judge ordered him to stop, claiming that the defence was 'irrelevant'. As soon as they realised what had happened, the diplomats protested to the judge.

Theo Syafei made no secret of his pleasure. "*This is a court-room, not a political platform for a street-seller,*" he said. [Tempo, 20.V.1993] Here was one of the country's most senior officers speaking, a man well on his way to a top position in the regime.

Army strategy in disarray

Xanana's stand had thrown the army's strategy into confusion. The army, having told the world Xanana was repentant and would now side with Indonesia on East

Timor, was now exposed as flagrant liars who, as CNRM representative overseas, Jose Ramos-Horta, had "come to believe their own propaganda". As he says in his defence, Xanana had decided to use his court appearance to convey his true stand to the world. It was a wise decision. Held incommunicado for so many months, he knew that anything he did from his prison cell would be manipulated by his captors.

The regime could only respond by silencing him in court, an unprecedented event in the history of political trials in Indonesia. However unfair they are, "never in living memory", according to Asia Watch, had a court prevented a defendant from reading out his own defence. As an Australian academic has said: "*Judge Godang's ruling is not only out of line with Indonesian practice but also with articles 52 and 153 of the Indonesian Code of Criminal Procedure.*" [These grant the defendant "the right to speak freely to the investigators and the judge" and stipulate that the "head judge must ensure that nothing occurs... which obstruct either the defendant or witnesses from speaking freely".

Blaming the UN

But things did not rest there. Before the hearing on 17 May, the press reported remarks by Sudjono claiming that Xanana had been "influenced" to change his stand by the UN envoy, Amos Wako, who had had a private meeting with Xanana in April. [See separate item.] Sudjono, it seems, could not forgive Xanana for publicly humiliating him by withdrawing his power of attorney. Sudjono alleged that the UN envoy had "whispered" messages to Xanana. Xanana, he said, attached particular importance to the fact that UN representative, Tamrat Samuel was attending his trial. Certainly, the presence of a UN envoy at the trial must have been of great importance to Xanana.

The allegation about "Wako interference" was taken up by Major-General Theo Syafei who has never concealed his

EAST TIMOR

opposition to UN involvement in East Timor. This explains the moves in Bali, Syafei's headquarters, to prevent Samuel, twice, from reaching Dili to attend the trial.

Syafei's campaign to discredit the UN has come as a huge embarrassment to Ali Alatas who a few weeks earlier had promised UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in Rome that he would take 'confidence-building measures'. While promising to 'investigate allegations' about what was discussed between Wako and Xanana, Alatas warned government officials [ie, Syafei] to be more careful about making allegations against the UN. [UPI, 18.V.1993]

What Wako said to Xanana is confidential but the encounter must have been hugely significant to Xanana as a sign of continuing UN concern. But his decision to use the court-room to make his position known was taken long before this meeting. His statement in court was completed on 27 March, well before he met Wako.

The courtroom gag has only reinforced the momentum created by Xanana's bold move. Xanana Gusmao, symbol of the East Timorese resistance, will become the focus of an international campaign which will make Suharto, Ali Alatas and Theo Syafei rue the day troops were set on his trail and he was taken into custody.

Sudjono's appeal, a myth

Following the life sentence handed down by the court on 21 May, the lawyer Sudjono announced that he will lodge an appeal. He even said that because appeal courts are slow to pass verdicts, he will go straight to President Suharto to ask for clemency.

Were he to do such a thing, this would not be with Xanana's consent, as is evident from his statement that he will not contest any sentence by the court.

UN envoy visits East Timor again

The UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali sent his special envoy, Amos Wako, to East Timor in April for a second time, to check the implementation of recommendations following his first visit last year. The first Wako report has not been made public and it appears that the Secretary-General has no intention of making his second report public either.

The UN Human Rights Commission called for the publication of the Wako report in its resolution adopted in March this year. Everything suggests that the report was highly critical of Indonesia, a view confirmed by the Jakarta weekly, *Tempo* on 17 April 1993.

The second Wako visit took place just before the UN-sponsored talks between Indonesia and Portugal in Rome. The Wako the visit was widely reported in the Indonesian press.

The Santa Cruz casualties

The top priority for Wako was to check on whether any progress had been made to ascertain the number of casualties of the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991, what had happened to the bodies of those slaughtered and whether any of the 'missing' had been found. The position of the army remains basically the same as a year ago, a deliberate distortion of the true extent of the tragedy.

[After investigations in East Timor last year by the

clandestine movement and a thorough check of all the data supplied, *Peace is Possible in East Timor* in Lisbon has confirmed that 273 people died, 255 disappeared and 376 were wounded.]

At the time of Wako's 1992 visit, Indonesia's official figure still stood at 'about 50 dead'. Then in July, a new official figure emerged, that 'only 19 deaths' could be confirmed. All the victims had been buried in the Hera cemetery in Dili where there are now 18 graves; the 19th contained the body of Kamal Bamadhaj, the Malaysian, which has been removed by his family. The government now claimed that 115 East Timorese were 'missing' of whom 18 had died and 31 had 'returned home', leaving 66 'unaccounted for'.

At a meeting in Jakarta with the armed forces commander-in-chief General Edi Sudradjat, the general now said that 32 had 'returned home' (one more than previously) and that four more were known to have died, bringing the total death toll to 23, including Kamal. Officially, the figures are

EAST TIMOR

now that 22 East Timorese died, 32 have returned home and 61 are 'still missing'. Wako was told that since the other 'missing people' had probably fled into the bush, there was nothing the authorities could do about them. In General Edi's own words:

"Every time we ask the people who have returned, they say that their friends are still hiding in the bush. It's really difficult. How to find them. I told Wako, if you want to find them, go and look for them in the bush. It's difficult for us to find them even though we are still determined to go on looking." [Jawa Pos, 10 April 1993]

Wako did nothing to hide his dissatisfaction with these explanations.

Many people in East Timor know exactly where the mass graves are and where mass burials took place in the days



Amos Wako (left) talking to the Indonesian appointed governor Abilio Soares (right).

following the massacre. The full horror of the Santa Cruz death-toll will never come to light until these mass graves are inspected by independent observers. But Wako saw none of this and was once again shown the 18 token graves at Hera cemetery. The military authorities have never identified these 18 victims and to this day, no bereaved families have been notified of any deaths.

Meeting the captives

Wako was able to meet several political prisoners, including the three resistance leaders now in captivity, Xanana Gusmao, Mau Huno and Mau Hudo. He also met Saturnino da Costa Belo, the young convicted prisoner who shouted pro-independence slogans when he was in court to testify in the trial of Xanana Gusmao. Since that act of defiance, the authorities have pronounced him 'insane' and he has been incommunicado in a dark cell in Balide Prison, Dili.

Wako also met Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha, Francisco Miranda Branco (both serving long sentences), Agusto Periera in whose home Xanana Gusmao was captured last November, Xanana Gusmao's sister Armandina and her husband Gilman dos Santos, Felismena dos Santos Conceicao and Amaro de Araujo who are serving sentences for smuggling 'secret documents' abroad. While revealing nothing of what he heard, Wako said that he had sought assurances there would be no recriminations after he left.

It is for the International Red Cross (ICRC) to check on the condition of prisoners after an international inspection of this kind. A few weeks after the Wako visit, the ICRC

President made public his dissatisfaction with access in East Timor. [See separate item.]

Whilst Wako was full of praise for the facilities he had been accorded, this does not mean he was satisfied with what he heard. As for the widespread fear, and facts about the number of people imprisoned, tortured and killed, Wako's information was probably confined to his one-and-a-half hour confidential meeting with Bishop Belo. Bishop Belo later met a US journalist and gave him a grim account of the reality in East Timor today [see box].

The Wako visit is no substitute for thorough-going inspections demanded by the UN Human Rights Commission which called for investigations by the UN's special rapporteurs on torture and extra-judicial killings and its working groups on arbitrary detentions and disappearances.

Belo speaks out on the massacre

Bishop Belo, head of the East Timor Catholic Church, told a western journalist recently that the people of East Timor "are living in fear. We lack the freedom to speak, to walk where we want, to have different opinions." Political prisoners are tortured by Indonesian troops "just like two plus two equals four".

On the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991, he said he had "very reliable information" that several people were executed hours after they were captured alive at the Santa Cruz graveyard on 12 November 1991. The prisoners along with several dead bodies were transported from the cemetery to a government building in Dili. Some hours later, the building was sealed and the prisoners were killed "with big stones, iron bars and injections of a special substance that killed them". These are grave accusations coming from a man who is not known to exaggerate things.

Refusing to divulge the source of his information, he said he was "absolutely sure it is true".

The Bishop also met UN envoy Amos Wako at around the time he gave this interview to Philip Shonan of the *New York Times*.

He said he went to the cemetery within hours of the massacre and saw a Timorese teacher who had been injured, lying alongside four or five other men. "I never saw any of them again. Since I knew the teacher, I went to look for him, to the hospital, the mortuary. I could not find him. His family says he is still missing."

Commenting on the criminal charges brought against some officers, he said: "Some of the people have changed but the behaviour is still the same."

"We know that in the prisons here in Dili, all the political prisoners are tortured." They are often tied up and dunked in tubs of water until they nearly drown, are burnt with cigarettes and are subjected to mock executions."

"An intelligence officer told a prisoner, 'We only need your land. We don't need people like you Timorese.'"

Though not directly threatened by the military, his parishioners had told him of rumours that he would be "ambushed". He often gets anonymous phonecalls late at night with the message: "You are a pig. You are an animal." [New York Times, 24.IV.1993]

Two East Timor strategies clash

The announcement that the special military command, Kolakops, has been disbanded in East Timor does not alter the basic military presence there. The situation is still controlled by Major-General Theo Syafei, now promoted to commander of the Udayana military command based in Bali.

In April, Theo Syafei, who has ruled East Timor with an iron fist since January 1992, was appointed commander of the Udayana/IXth military command based in Denpasar, Bali, which covers several provinces in Eastern Indonesia, as well as East Timor. He was promoted to major-general, after appointing Colonel Soentoro, chief of intelligence in Bali, as commander of the sub-regional military command, Korem Wira Dharma/164, which is in direct charge of the entire region of East Timor. Although a *korem* is the 'normal' military structure for second level military commands, Soentoro's command is now being referred to something special, or '*korem plus*'.

Having secured these appointments, Syafei was ready to announce the disbandment of *Kolakops*, the special military command set up in early 1989 to take charge of operations in East Timor. As Udayana commander, Syafei has already shown that he will assert his control over East Timor much more directly than previous Udayana commanders. This new construction rendered *Kolakops* redundant but does nothing to reduce the level of militarisation in East Timor.

Troop reductions

Much of the international criticism about East Timor centres on the large number of troops present in the country. Syafei now claims that battalions brought in from outside are being reduced in number, from the present ten down to between 6 and 8 in 1994 and down to zero in 1995. "From then on, there will only be territorial troops. There will be no combat troops." [Tempo, 10.IV.1993] Or: "I hope that by 1995, the only troops remaining there will be organic Udayana units." [Editor, 10.IV.1993]. This leaves unanswered the question of how many troops will actually remain.

The fact is that the villages and towns of East Timor are saturated with troops whose territorial duties include strict supervision of the population and an attempt to impose alien social structures and an alien system of values on the East Timorese population. [See TAPOL Bulletin, No. 116, April 1993.] In any case, territorial troops are adequately trained and equipped to engage in combat, so the very idea that the level of military presence in East Timor is being changed into something less oppressive in pure fantasy.

Military versus diplomatic solutions

There are now two quite distinct strategies within the Indonesian regime on how to handle East Timor.

At the start of his sixth term, President Suharto cannot afford to ignore the impact of what he does on the international arena. While not wanting to bow to international pressure and stubbornly insisting on his 'right' to attend the forthcoming G7 meeting in Tokyo as chair of the Non-Aligned Movement, Suharto has chosen to adopt a conciliatory and non-confrontative posture with regard to East Timor. This suggests that he and Foreign Minister Ali



On the left, Colonel Soentoro, the new Dili commander and Major-General Theo Syafei, military commander of Udayana.

Alatas have resigned themselves to the fact that they are not likely to win a vote on the question at the General Assembly for the next year or two at least.

The decision to participate in UN-supervised talks with Portugal means that they acknowledge that East Timor is unfinished business, still a matter for the international community, however much they proclaim that Indonesia's annexation is lawful.

At the UN-sponsored talks between the Indonesian and Portuguese foreign ministers in Rome on 21 April, no progress was made on the substantive issue of self-determination. Only two decisions were announced by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, that the foreign ministers would meet again in New York on 17 September and that the two sides would take "confidence-building measures". Secrecy surrounds the nature of these measures.

Syafei's strategy

Syafei on the other hand has shown his contempt for diplomacy and conciliation. For him, East Timor is finished business and the international community has no right to interfere. This explains why he refused to meet the UN envoy, Amos Wako, during his recent visit to East Timor and Bali.

A few weeks later, he used the occasion of a visit to Indonesia of Cornelio Sommaruga, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to announce that there was no further need for the ICRC to maintain an office in Dili, now that *Kolakops* had been disbanded.

EAST TIMOR

Sommaruga had come to complain about limited access to political prisoners in East Timor. Given the agency's usual reluctance to criticise host governments publicly, these remarks mean that it has been having very serious problems indeed.

In Jakarta, Suharto and Alatas were quick to contradict Syafei, agreeing to allow the Dili office to remain open. After expressing concern at the lack of continuity of access to political prisoners following a visit to Dili, Sommaruga said he had been told things would improve. It is the military on the ground, however, who will decide what happens in practice.

Sabotaging trial observation

The Bali-based military command was certainly responsible for another challenge to Jakarta's conciliatory line, when four foreign observers, including a special representative from the UN Secretary-General's office, were prevented from boarding a plane in Denpasar on 11 May to attend the Xanana trial on 12 May. [See separate item] Since then has come Syafei's allegation that Wako 'incited' Xanana Gusmao to adopt a non-conciliatory position at his trial.

Although these could all be described as serious challenges to Jakarta, even acts of insubordination, the delicate balance between Suharto on the one hand and the armed forces on the other means that Suharto will find it difficult to sack Syafei and bring down the wrath of the armed

forces on his head.

Another problem for Suharto is that he needs tough commanders like Syafei to keep control of 'troublesome' regions like East Timor and Aceh.

Syafei's interest in East Timor goes back to the days when as a cadet, he went in with the invading troops in 1975. He has served for most of his military career in East Timor and is now becoming even more closely associated with the territory than the man who commanded the invasion, General Benny Murdani. East Timor is now *his* 'baby' and he appears determined to stay in command until the international community can be excluded from all further 'interference'.

In such circumstances, more clashes of will between the diplomacy and military strategists are bound to occur.



East Timor solidarity groups meet

Twenty-six East Timor solidarity groups from Europe, North America and Japan met in Amsterdam from 19 - 21 February 1993 to discuss campaigning in the coming period.

Five East Timorese representing all the resistance groups were also present: Abilio Araujo (external delegation of FRETILIN), José Ramos-Horta (representative of CNRM, the National Council of Maubere Resistance), Constancio Pinto (Clandestine Front, CNRM), Jose Amorim Dias (CNRM representative for Europe) and Zacarias da Costa (UDT, Portugal).

In a statement, the meeting noted that in the last few months, the level of repression inside East Timor had increased markedly. In the wake of the 20 November 1992 arrest of resistance leader Xanana Gusmao, the occupying Indonesian military forces rounded up scores of other East Timorese. They have intensified the terror to its worst level in a decade. Nevertheless, the solidarity groups were encouraged by the determination of the East Timorese people to fight for self-determination in extremely difficult circumstances. As they have since the Indonesian invasion of 1975, and during the killings of one-third of their population, the East Timorese people continue to struggle. The groups present were inspired by this commitment and rededicated themselves to support the people of East Timor.

The international solidarity movement would continue to lobby national parliaments, the European Parliament and international institutions, and launch campaigns in order to direct the attention of the international community to the East Timor issue.

The meeting expressed the hope that the proposed talks between Portugal and Indonesia under the auspices of the

UN Secretary General in April in Rome would make progress favourable to the East Timorese people. It emphasized the importance of the participation of representatives from the East Timor resistance in further negotiations on the future of the territory.

Support Manila Conference on East Timor

The groups present also decided to support and take an active part in the Asian East Timor Solidarity Conference to be held in Manila from 11 - 14 November 1993, welcoming it as an important event which aims to strengthen support for East Timor throughout Asia.



At the Amsterdam conference: from left to right: Constancio Pinto, Bernd H., Zacarias da Costa and Michio Takahashi.

Timorese prisoners forcibly removed from homeland

Thirteen East Timorese political prisoners serving sentences up to life have been sent away from East Timor to prisons in various parts of Indonesia. The transfers occurred on 8 April 1993, the day after the UN Secretary-General's special envoy, Amos Wako, completed his three-day visit to East Timor.

Wako had met several of the prisoners, not knowing of course that they were about to be transferred from East Timor. Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, it is unlawful for the forces of occupation to forcibly remove inhabitants from a territory under military occupation. The transfers also mean they will lose regular contact with their families.

Two prisoners, **Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha** (serving life) and **Francisco Miranda Branco** (serving fifteen years) were moved to Cipinang Prison, Jakarta.


Four prisoners, **Jacinto Neves Raimundo Alves** (ten years), **Saturnino da Costa Belo** (ten years), **Juvencio de Jesus Marins** (six years and eight months) and **Filomeno Pereira** (five years and eight months) were transferred to Mataram in Nusatenggara Barat.

Seven prisoners, **Carlos dos Santos Lemos** (eight years), **Bonifacio Magno** (seven years), **Bobby Xavier** (three years), **Aleixo Gama** (two years and eight months), **Joao dos Santos** (two years and three months), **Jaco da Silva** (two years) and **Bonifacio Barreto** (one year and eight months) were transferred to Kupang in West Timor.

News of the transfer came in a statement in Dili on 12 May by the wives and mothers of the prisoners. They call on the international community to devote special attention to this problem and ask the International Platform of Jurists for East Timor to press for the annulment of the convictions of their loved ones and the (forthcoming) conviction of Xanana Gusmao, head of the National Council of Maubere Resistance, Xanana Gusmao.

Kupang lies at the western tip of West Timor, nearly four hundred kms from Dili. Mataram is the capital of Lombok, the island immediately to the east of Bali, nearly a thousand kms from Dili. They both lie within the territory controlled by the Udayana military command under Major-General Theo Syafei. Cipinang, in Jakarta, twice as far from Dili as Mataram, has been the dumping ground for East Timorese prisoners since 1984.

Their forcible removal signals a determination by Syafei to scatter these likely symbols of resistance. It probably relates also to his intentions about where to locate Xanana Gusmao. It is rather unlikely that he will be kept in Dili. If, as seems likely, the intention is to isolate him completely, Syafei may transfer him to an isolated spot somewhere in the Nusatenggara string of islands under his control, thus preventing everyone, including the ICRC, from having access.



ICRC in East Timor, Aceh and West Papua

In an interview with *Forum Keadilan*, ICRC President Cornelio Sommaruga set out his concerns in Indonesia:

Q: Why have you closed your delegation in Irian Jaya [West Papua]?

A: We feel there's no reason for us to have one there. This does not mean we won't continue to conduct activities there. Although we don't need a delegation, we continue to follow developments there.

Q: What is your assessment of the humanitarian situation in East Timor from 1976 to the present? Have things changed?

A: From the beginning, there were vast humanitarian problems in East Timor and to this very day there still are many problems. This is why we need a delegation there and want to go on carrying out our mission there.

Q: Apart from East Timor, where else do you feel an ICRC delegation is needed?

A: First of all, we need one in Jakarta where we have our regional delegation. We also need to have our officials in Aceh.

Q: Why Aceh? What is the criterion for setting up a delegation?

A: When there are many humanitarian problems in a region, that's where we need to set up a delegation. In other regions, we don't see a host of humanitarian problems involving our special mission.

Q: What was the condition of the prisoners you met?

A: I can't say anything about that. I can only talk to the Indonesian Government about that. [Whereupon, the ICRC made his apologies and left.]

Responding to the ICRC President's complaint that "we are not satisfied because we haven't been given access to all prisoners in East Timor", *Forum Keadilan* quoted Foreign Minister Ali Alatas as saying there were "no obstacles in principle" to the ICRC performing its mission. But he acknowledged that ICRC delegates are not able to visit all places of detention. "These visits require permits from certain institutions and there are other factors as well," he said, refraining from going further into the matter. [*Forum Keadilan*, 27.V.1993]

ABRI's new faces

A big reshuffle has taken place in the Indonesian armed forces. Because ABRI still plays a paramount role in society, it is important to take a close look at the new faces and new trends.

It is important to note that succession within ABRI ranks has now been completed. All posts at the top are now filled by AMN (Military Academy) graduates. The post of minister of defence, until recently held by General Benny Murdani, has also been handed on to General Edi Sudradjat, a 1960 graduate of AMN. Lt.General Faisal Tandjung, the new ABRI commander-in-chief, is from AMN class '61, and Lt. General Wismoyo Arismunandar, the new army chief-of-staff is from class '63.

Major trends

It is striking that the *generasi akademi*, as this batch of officers is called, have a number of common features which distinguish the top brass from lower-ranking officers. Most have served in East Timor, have served as adjutants to President Suharto, are from the elite red-beret *Kopassus* troops or are from the army intelligence outfit *BAIS* (*Badan Intelijen Strategis*). The ones who have made it to the top mostly have at least two of these features. The three top ranking generals: Sudradjat, Feisal Tandjung and Wismoyo, have all done combat duties in East Timor, and all are members of *Kopassus*. Lt.General Wismoyo went one better by marrying Tien Suharto's younger sister. Wismoyo became intimate with the First Family when he served as a member of the Presidential Security Guard in 1966.

The Suharto channel

While East Timor experience, the red-beret connection and intelligence are the qualifications laid down by General Benny Murdani (himself an embodiment of all three), it has become increasingly important to have had close personal relations with Suharto as well. The president is officially still *Pangti (Panglima Tertinggi)*, the Supreme Commander which gives him the authority to appoint the top brass at *Cilangkap* (the armed forces HQ). In the last few years presidential appointees have increasingly been based on loyalty rather than military merit.

Lt. General Wismoyo is not the only officer who was catapulted to the top for this reason; many others achieved high posts simply by having served Suharto as his adjutant. Vice-President Try Sutrisno was Suharto's adjutant from 1974 to 1978, Police General Kunarto (former police chief) is another example, Vice Marshall Siboen (former Air Force chief-of-staff) was once Suharto's personal pilot, Major-General Surjadi Sudirdja (the present governor of Jakarta), is a former adjutant, Major-General Kentot Harseno (former military commander of Jakarta), is another, as are both Major-General Suryadi (current military commander of Central Java) and Rear-Admiral Tanto Kuswanto (the current Navy Chief of Staff).

Some military analysts argue that only the most meritorious officers can become presidential adjutants but it is also true that the growing rift between Suharto and the *Cilangkap* top brass has forced the president to handpick loyalists for some of the key ABRI positions.

The Benny channels

General Benny Murdani served General Suharto for many years and was catapulted to become ABRI commander-in-chief in 1983 by him. He had all the qualifications Suharto wanted. Major Benny had parachuted with the red berets in the dense jungle of Dutch New Guinea in 1963. He started his long intelligence career in 1964 in Bangkok, disguised as a Garuda Indonesian Airways official. In 1975, he was given the task of planning the Indonesian invasion in East Timor, code named *Operasi Seroja*. When General Murdani became C-in-C, the three 'merits' were used as criteria to promote officers. Despite Benny's removal from the cabinet, his network within the armed forces is still considerable, in particular through *BAIS*, the military intelligence, and the *KOPASSUS* red-beret troops. Members of this special unit have trained both as special battle commandos and intelligence operatives.

The esprit de corps in *KOPASSUS* is very high and it is no accident that all the three highest-placed generals, Edi Sudradjat, Faisal Tandjung and Wismoyo Arismunandar, are from *KOPASSUS* and took part in *Operasi Seroja*, the bloody invasion of East Timor in 1975. The red berets are specially deployed to crush "internal" rebellions and their operations always leave a trail of deaths, blood and torture.



Red-beret stalwarts, from left to right: Red Beret Commander Brig. General Tarub, Lt. General Wismoyo Arismunandar and General Edi Sudradjat.

East Timor war experience will become increasingly important as a political issue. The Indonesian invasion was, according to the official version, the work of 'Indonesian volunteers'. The present batch of officers want to revise this version and put the historical record straight. They want to be able to take credit for the venture and not go down in history as "volunteers" in a hidden war.

Some new faces

The new ABRI Commander-in-Chief, Lt.General Faisal Tandjung, was very much in the picture last year when he chaired the Special Military Council set up after the Dili massacre in November 1991. He had the ungratifying job of sacking several officers who became the scapegoats for the massacre. Unlike most front-runners in ABRI, he is not Javanese but from Tarutung, North Sumatra; he graduated from *AMN* in 1961.

His military experience is wide-ranging, and includes territorial functions, combat duties and teaching. Tandjung has been involved in many operations to crush uprisings. In 1963 he was involved in the campaign against the *RMS* (the South Moluccan rebels) in Seram, in 1965 he joined the witch-hunt against the *PKI*, the communist party, in 1969 he was a commander in *Operasi Wibawa OPM*, an operation against the *OPM*, the West Papuan guerillas. In 1975 he fought with *Operasi Seroja* in East Timor. Before becoming ABRI commander, he was chief of general staff of *ABRI*, on paper the second man in the armed forces.

For a brief period General Edi Sudradjat held three posts: minister of defence, *ABRI* commander-in-chief and army chief-of-staff. This bottle-neck was the result of the rift between the president and *Cilangkap*. It took almost three months to work out a compromise and Faisal Tandjung emerged as ABRI commander.

President Suharto is using him as a buffer between the Habibie group and *ABRI*. Habibie is backed by *ICMI*, a powerful group of Muslim intellectuals which has become a real threat to *ABRI*'s key positions in the cabinet, parliament and the bureaucracy. Lt.General Faisal Tandjung is known to be close to Habibie, going back to the early seventies when they both studied in Germany.

The new chiefs-of staff

Lt.General Wismoyo Arismunandar, 53, the new army chief-of-staff, secured his career when he married Datiet Siti Hardjanti in 1968. He met her when serving as an officer of the Presidential Security Guard and often had to stay in Suharto's private quarters. As a red beret commando, his hobbies are karate, boxing, judo, parachute-jumping and shooting. He has served in many army positions, is of average intelligence and has never marked up any outstanding achievements. But being married to the First Lady's younger sister makes all the difference. He is obviously the most serious candidate to replace Faisal Tandjung when the time comes.

Rear Admiral Tanto Kuswanto, 51, the new navy chief-of-staff, was Suharto's adjutant from 1983 till 1987. He was commander of the Eastern Fleet based in Surabaya. He will have the task of boosting the navy's role. The acquisition of 39 (East) German naval vessels will need a complete overhaul of the Indonesian navy. Three new naval bases will be built and Indonesia's maritime role in the South Pacific is bound to expand.

Air Vice Marshall Rilo Pambudi, a fighter pilot himself, graduated from the ABRI Academy in 1965 and is the youngest of the chiefs-of-staff. Pambudi served as defence

MILITARY

attache in Kuala Lumpur in the eighties and became director of air force operations and training in 1990. He was already the second in command and is expected to continue the strategy of his predecessor, Vice-Marshall Siboen, in modernising the air force with more US F16s and British Hawks.

Major General Banurusman, the new police chief, is 52 and has been chief of several police precincts, most recently in Jakarta.



The new chiefs-of-staff, from left to right: Navy Chief Rear Admiral Tanto Koeswanto, Army Chief Lt. General Wismoyo, Air Force Chief Rear Marshall Rilo Pambudi and Police Chief Maj. General Banurusman.

New territorial commanders


Many changes happened in April and May:

The *Bukit Barisan* Military Command in North Sumatra is now in the hands of Major General Albertus Pranowo, an *AMN* '63 graduate who had ranger training in the US. He served as a presidential guard in 1985 and became its commander two years later. Pranowo now has to deal with the troublespot, Aceh, and with volatile issues like the *HKBP* (the Batak Church) and growing dissatisfaction among transmigrants.

Major General Hendro Pryono, now in charge of the prestigious Jakarta Military Command, is *AMN* class '67, the youngest of the nine regional commanders. He is the darling of the ruling elite. President Suharto took him to Mecca on his pilgrimage and the *ABRI* is very impressed by Hendro Pryono's achievements. Trained as an intelligence officer, he was in charge of intelligence during the blood-bath of Tanjung Priok in 1984. A few years later when he served as territorial commander in Lampung, another bloodbath occurred, the *GPK Warsidi* case. Later, Hendro Pryono became Director A of *BAIS*, the military intelligence outfit dealing with cases like East Timor and Aceh.

Another intelligence officer who has emerged at the second-level of army regional commands is Colonel Soentoro, the new military commander of *KOREM 164 Wira Dharma*, the East Timor military command.

When the international community gets round to setting up a war-crimes tribunal for Indonesia, there will be plenty of men eligible to go into the dock.



Golfmania

It is supposed to be a sport and maybe it is in different parts of the world. But in Indonesia and neighbouring countries, golf is the meeting place for the happy few and a quick-yield investment. But new golf links are causing serious social conflicts and ecological havoc. It is no accident that worldwide protest against the frenzied proliferation of golf courses is gathering momentum.

Building new golf courses is a worldwide phenomenon and Indonesian real estate tycoons have joined this frenzy. According to BKPM, the State Coordinating Body for Investments, 12 new golf links will be finished by the end of 1993. Another 30 applications are under consideration. On the island of Bintan alone, ten new golf links are being prepared. The 68 already operating earn huge profits, creating queues of land and real estate developers who seek permission to join the ranks of golf link developers.



Playing golf is a relatively new phenomenon in Indonesia; only in the last two decades has it become the favourite pastime of the upper crust. Practically the entire top layer of Indonesian society – the president and his ministers, bankers and chief executives (CEOs), top civil servants and military officers – all have one thing in common: hitting a little ball on the green.

The happy few

In a developing country like Indonesia with a per capita GNP of US\$ 600, golf means status. Timber tycoon Bob Hasan, a close buddy of the president, explains that golf is an effective way of lobbying or doing business. "While relaxing, playing golf, everything becomes easier to discuss", and Bob speaks from experience. Laksamana Sukardi, a successful banker, is more coy. Playing golf has become a must because many informal business meetings

take place at the golf course. "It would look funny if I myself can't play golf". The necessity of appearing on the golf course is expressed by holders of multiple Transferable Membership Certificates (TMCs). The fanatics may possess up to twelve TMCs, but top executives like Adiputra Tahir (chair of HIPMI, Association of Young Entrepreneurs) gets by with just six. Agus Sasmito, a paint factory owner proudly holds eight, while one nine-TMC holder who prefers anonymity admits, "For me, playing golf is part of doing business".

While many golf links are in the environs of Jakarta and Bandung, golf courses in Bali and Riau are fast becoming favourite spots. It is nothing unusual for Jakarta's happy few to charter a flight to these islands to hit the little white ball.

Talking business on the golf link is the custom too for ASEAN leaders, and Suharto, a Javanese traditionalist, has swung a club or two with Goh Chok Tong, the Sultan of Brunei or world leaders like Ronald Reagan and Helmut Kohl.

The chair of the prestigious Indonesian Golf Association, ret'd Admiral Sudomo, is often on the front pages in golfing gear. And the military's top brass – General Try Sutrisno, General Edi Sudradjat, Lt.Gen Harsudiono Hartas or the new Chief of Staff Lt.Gen Wismoyo Arismunandar – all share the same enthusiasm.

Huge costs and profits

The cost of a TMC card varies. The *Pondok Indah* golf link, arguably one of the world's most attractive courses, charges Rp150 million (US\$ 75,000) while the prestigious *Gunung Geulis Country Club* charges Rp100 million for its 36 holes. Many new golf courses are also real estate projects like the controversial *Pantai Indah Kapuk (PIK)* (membership Rp135 million), *Bumi Serpong Damai* (twin membership with PIK), *Damai Indah Golf* (Rp135 million), *Emerald One* (Rp80 million) or *Palm Hills* and *Modern* with a TMC fee of Rp75 million. On top of this, members pay monthly allowances, caddy fees and tips, not to mention the expensive food and drinks. And since Indonesia's happy few and a growing number of expatriates are willing to pay such phenomenal sums, golf-link development has become one of the most attractive investments.

Real estate tycoon Ciputra already owns four golf courses: *Padang Golf Jaya Ancol*, favourite of General Try Sutrisno and Lt.Gen Wismoyo Arismunandar, *Pondok Indah*, frequented by ex-Vice President Sudharmono and several ministers; *Bumi Serpong Damai*, favoured by 15 cabinet ministers and captains of industry and *Pantai Indah Kapuk* another favourite of cabinet ministers and bankers. Ciputra is now planning seven more golf links in Surabaya, Tanggerang and Batam island. While real estate projects normally

have a long break-even point, a golf course investment can break even overnight. *Bumi Serpong Damai (BSD)* is a spectacular example: Ciputra was raking in the profits before it had even started.

Designed by Jack Nicklaus who received a US\$ 1.2 million fee, *BSD* attracted more than 1,200 members. From the TMC fees alone, Ciputra received Rp162 billion, against an initial investment of Rp100 billion. *BSD* is situated on the outskirts of Tangerang, a leading industrial centre. While tens of thousands of low-waged workers have to live in squalor, the 72 holes of *BSD* stretch out over 75 ha of lush green pastures.

Jack Nicklaus was also hired for another US\$ 1.5 million to design the north course of *Emerald One*, owned by the Soeryadjaya family whose *Astra* empire recently collapsed. The south course was designed by golfer Arnold Palmer for the same pittance as Jack Nicklaus. Greg Norman, another golf celebrity, was hired for a mere US\$850 000 to design the *Tering Bay* course on Batam, a few miles from Singapore which is part of a larger complex with a four star 500-room hotel and a range of bungalows available to the Singapore jet set. Other projects like *Royal Jakarta* and *Krakatoa Beach Resort* are based on the same concept: a four-star hotel with a dazzling array of sports facilities including a golf link. The target is obvious: next to the local happy few it is the Asian super rich who are expected to come in droves. Business executives from Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Hongkong and Singapore should be keen, for the combination of investing and playing golf is the main trend in business circles today. A full-page ad in a Jakarta newspaper says: "We offer the most profitable investment, an attractive business opportunity, prestige, five star luxury facilities..". Within two months the TMCs, varying in price from Rp45 million to Rp75 million, were sold out. One layer in society seems unaffected by the global economic recession.

A TMC is not simply a membership card: it is like a share; since it can be sold on the market, its price fluctuates. But with land so scarce, even for the golf developers, the value of a TMC is bound to go up. Just how much is demonstrated by TMCs for *Pondok Indah*: fifteen years ago they were worth only Rp5 million; now they fetch 30 times that amount. Evidently golf links are lucrative not only for the developers. As the boom continues, those with the capital to spare invest in multiple TMCs. While out on the green with a few business relations, their membership is accumulating some wealth.

Travel agencies too have jumped on the golf bandwagon and include golf package tours in their holiday programmes. *Sheraton* has been doing this since 1991. *Royal Jakarta* will provide a special Gary Player golf school for beginners and advanced players.

Land evictions


While the big spenders continue to improve their handicap, the darker side of the golf boom has meant land eviction for local people. One of the latest incidents was on 14 April 1993, when 800 people from four villages - Kertamaya, Bojongkerta, Genteng and Rancamaya - in the subdistrict of Ciawi, West Java demonstrated against plans to transform their agricultural plots into a golf course plus luxury real estate. Armed with banners and posters, they symbolically replanted parts of the threatened site with young saplings. Military and police forces arrested 14 villagers. The villagers claim that the 257ha site is ancestral land and should continue to be used as productive agricultural land.

SOCIAL ISSUES

The land developer PT SBM had never approached the local people. On 26 April some 40 evicted farmers and environmentalists protested outside Parliament and handed in a petition demanding an immediate halt to the construction of golf links in land-scarce Java.

The *Ciawi* case is not an isolated incident. Most golf sites are situated in Java, one of the most densely populated areas in the world. Somebody with 2ha in Java is seen as a big landlord. Developers of golf links like to think big and need hundreds of hectares, inevitably clashing with the local people who have been tilling the land for generations.

In 1989 one conflict hit the headlines because of the determination of the peasants to fight for their land and the support they received from student and environmental groups. The *Cimacan* case in West Java involved two hundred families, forced to accept meagre compensation for their valuable land. Resistance grew, but so too did pressure from the local authorities. Ret'd Admiral Sudomo as chair of the Indonesian Golf Association and until very recently Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, suggested that the golf course would create many new jobs and the farmers could be retrained as golf caddies. For many months the conflict was heated. The spokesperson of the *Cimacan* peasants was branded a communist instigator.



Reeducating peasants as caddies

The peasants kept their defiance by demonstrating over and over again and received growing sympathy from the general public. Eventually, the *Cimacan* golf project grew so unpopular that it was shelved, hopefully for ever. The success of the *Cimacan* peasants is a good example for other local communities threatened by the golf mania.

Other protests have emerged: the people in *Tapos* village in Tangerang subdistrict are opposing the building of a golf course and plans for a 100ha course in South Jakarta may be revoked by the city government because of protests.

SOCIAL ISSUES

Environmental hazard

The Global Anti-Golf Movement was launched at a three day conference in Penang, Malaysia from 26 to 28 April 1993 and attended by delegates from Hawaii, Hongkong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. One thing examined was the environmental impact of the noble art of golf. In the conference statement, golf courses are described as:

"another form of monoculture, where exotic soil and grass, chemical fertilisers, pesticides, fungicides and weedicides, as well as machinery, are all imported to substitute natural ecosystems. These landscaped foreign systems create stress on local water supplies and soil, at the same time as being highly vulnerable to disease and pest attacks. Just as the Green Revolution is collapsing in country after country, the Golf Green is also fraught with ecological problems."

The environmental impacts include water depletion, toxic contamination of soil, underground water, surface water and the air. This in turn leads to health problems for local communities, populations downstream and even golfers, caddies and chemical sprayers in golf courses.

The Pantai Indah Kapuk (PIK) golf course appears to be the prime example of environmental degradation. It is situated in the protected Muara Angke mangrove forest in North Jakarta, close to the international Sukarno-Hatta airport. City councillor Zarkasy Marzuki blames the golf course for the critical condition of the mangrove area, the water shortage and dozens of trees on the verge of dying. *"The management of the project should be (held) responsible for the damage because the forest always had enough water in the past before the project started,"* said Zarkasy. The Muara Angke mangrove forest, about 50 ha, is the only protected forest in the city.



The new Anti-Golf Movement demonstrating in front of the Ministry for Youth and Sport.

The PIK land developers, a consortium of 15 companies founded by real estate tycoon Ciputra, is planning a mega project of 10,000 mansions, a luxury hotel, a Rp60 billion golf course, shopping centres, water sports and other recreation facilities. Luxury villas will be built along artificial lagoons accessible by boat to the owners only. The PIK project has been repeatedly criticised because of its social, political and ecological impact, but the project

nonetheless got the go-ahead. Emil Salim, then Environment Minister, voiced his doubts about the project. Rumour has it that his criticism accelerated his downfall as minister. SKEPHI (Indonesian Forest Conservation Network) spokesperson, Indro Cahyono, says the PIK project will disturb the water system and create floods elsewhere in North Jakarta, not least in villages along the newly-built toll highway to the airport. There are no signs that the authorities will stop the project, for tycoon Ciputra has friends in high places.

Movement against golf

In conjunction with a "World No-Golf Day" on 29 April, a Movement against Golf Course Development was set up in Jakarta. At a demonstration outside parliament, the new movement explained that thousands of hectares of productive land could disappear within five years if new golf courses continue to be constructed at the current rate. High ranking officials reacted in the most cynical way: the newly appointed Minister of Youth Affairs and Sports, Hayono, said on television that the building of golf courses is a sign of the growing prosperity of the population and wanted everyone to be encouraged to play golf. Ret'd

David against Goliath

Pan Made Rampung, an elderly Balinese farmer is fighting a lonely battle against three giants: PT Narendra Interpasifik Indonesia (NII), PT Bali Tourism Development Centre (BTDC) and the local government of Bali. Rampung owns a 6.5 ha plot of land in Nusa Dua and it is his misfortune that the region has been destined to serve tourism of the *kantung tebal* (fat wallet) category. While places like Kuta Beach have become back-packers paradise, Nusa Dua is intentionally designed for the privileged, the ones who want to avoid mass tourism. Joop Ave, the new Minister of Tourism, supervised the project himself. The Nusa Dua project, run by NII, a 370 ha megaproject, consists of a five star hotel, luxury bungalows, swimming pool, other sports facilities and last but not least a 140 ha golf course.

Rampung's plot is very strategic, right in the middle of the golf course. He inherited this land from his family who in turn received this plot from the king of Kuta. In February 1990 Rampung found out, while paying his tax, that the land was confiscated by BTDC, the body promoting tourism. Rampung's 6.5 ha is now worth a fortune, Rp32 billion (US\$ 16 million) but the local Bali government didn't recognise Rampung's complete land certificates. He went to the district court to demand a guaranteed confiscation of the land. Much to everyone's surprise, Rampung won the case. In turn NII went on appeal but late February the court again decided in favour of the single fighter. Rampung is now willing to compromise, he is willing to sell the land for half the price (which will still make him a multi millionaire) but he will stick to the principle that the plot was privately owned and not state owned.

Admiral Sudomo denied golf is an elitist and exclusive game since "anybody can play golf".

There was public consternation at remarks of these officials especially as they came at the same time as an official report which revealed that 27 million Indonesians still live below the poverty line. The Anti-Golf Movement organised a protest outside the sports ministry, ridiculing the minister's remark and demanded a moratorium on all golf course development.

Ministers at loggerheads

The issue of poverty and the contrasting affluence of the golfers has suddenly become a major controversy in Indonesia. The Anti-Golf Movement is getting support from unexpected places. Hayono Isman's predecessor and present Minister for Housing, Akbar Tandjung agrees with tighter controls on golf course projects, and opposes them where developed on poor people's property bought at unreasonable prices. *"It's a matter of principle that no one should be displaced simply to make way for a golf course".*

After several DPR members had lined up behind the

SOCIAL ISSUES

protesters, President Suharto's secretary in charge of development control, Solichin GP, suddenly joined the chorus and spoke out against the construction of the *Cisarua* golf course. This placed him at odds with the recently-appointed Interior Minister, ret'd General Yogie Memet. Suddenly an issue has emerged to put some of the most senior officers and officials as loggerheads with each other. This is Indonesia's very own Golf War.

Sources:

Matra: Febr. 1993; *Prospek*: 22 Febr. 1992, 4 April 1992, 2 May 1992; *Tempo*: 7 Nov. 1992, 27 March 1993; *Warta Ekonomi* 6 & 13 April 1992; *Suara Karya* 15 April 1993; *Jakarta Post*: 22 April 1993, 29 April 1993, 5 May 1993, 13 May 1993; 14 May 1993, 15 May 1993, 17 May 1993, 18 May 1993; *Business Times* 29 March 1993; *Statement of the Global Anti-Golf Movement*, April 1993.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Human Rights briefs

198 arrested in North Sumatra

198 people, including 43 women and 13 children, are in detention as Binjai prison following protest at the arrest of two local transmigrants as they were on their way to a nearby town to sell palm oil. During a clash with security forces outside a police station in which several hundred people were involved, the protesters were struck with rifle butts; six people were seriously injured and two are thought to have died.

The incident came following a dispute involving several hundred families who had been resettled at the Sei Lapan palm oil plantation project 45 kms east of Medan as local transmigrants. An agreement was signed last December guaranteeing that 412 families would each receive 1.5 hectares of land to which they were entitled, but nothing has been done to implement this. Unable to resolve their demands, the transmigrants decided to take some of the produce to market so as to alleviate a food shortage. The two men who did this were arrested and accused of theft.

After failing to secure the release of the two men, a large crowd wrecked the police station where they were being held. In revenge, troops from the Bukit Barisan military command went to the site and arrested many of the inhabitants. The village has since been sealed off and the villagers prevented from moving in and out. An activist from the forestry NGO, SKEPHI, Indro Tjahjono, said the people are gripped by fear and hunger.

The Legal Aid Institute (LBH) in Jakarta has issued an Urgent Action calling for the withdrawal of the troops from the site, free access to people who want to assist the people there, the immediate release of all the children and elderly people now in custody at Binjai prison and implementation of the December agreement. [Source: LBH Urgent Action, 10 May 1993 and *Jakarta Post*, 22.IV.1993]

End militarism on campus

More than five hundred students at the Teachers' Training (IKIP) college in Rawamangun, Jakarta, staged a one-day protest against militarism on university campuses. The

protest was triggered by an incident when an IKIP student was beaten and tortured by a member of *Menwa*, the Student Regiment.

The protest was organised by an Anti-Violence Student Solidarity Committee on the campus and involved the singing of songs and poetry recitations. There were many banners with strongly-worded slogans: "Free our campus from militarism!", "We oppose force and tyranny!" and "Rawamangun is a sad campus!"

There are student regiments on all campuses throughout the country; they are seen by the body of students as "simply the student arm of the military". One student told the press that "powerful military influence has produced a climate of fear on our campus and makes students afraid of expressing their ideas". [*Indonesian Observer*, 22.IV.1993]

Chatibul Umam, the student who led the protest, said: "Campuses should be freed from conditions that create fear, and stifle the students." He spoke of pressures, intimidation and even violence by certain groups.

A deputy rector came out to try to pacify the students. There was a heated debate after the students read out their demands. [*Merdeka*, 22.II.1993]

Rector in trouble for democracy meeting

The rector of the Darul Ulum University in Jombang, East Java could face charges following a meeting on campus which was addressed by the well-known human rights lawyer, Adnan Buyung Nasution. Buyung has been giving talks at a number of universities recently, highlighting the lack of democracy in Indonesia today.

The Darul Ulum University meeting took place on 13 April but the security forces started threatening action against the rector more than a week later. The local police chief said a permit had been applied for, but only a few hours before the meeting was due to commence. "They should have given seven days' notice," he said. The local military chief accused the university of staging an illegal event and said it must take the consequences. The police official, who said a charge was likely for holding a meeting

HUMAN RIGHTS

without a permit under Article 510 or 511 of the Criminal Code, insisted that action would be taken "not just because Buyung was present but because procedural rules had been violated". [Jawa Pos, 24.IV.1993]

Speaking at another meeting at the Muhammadiyah University in Yogyakarta, Buyung Nasution condemned the state of political freedoms in Indonesia. Press freedom had suffered a setback in 1982 with the regulation giving the executive powers to withdraw publishing permits (SIUPP) from newspapers and periodicals. By contrast with conditions in the 1950s, political parties today were purely "ornamental" and parliament (DPR) had taken no independent initiatives. [Suara Merdeka, 22.IV.1993]

Land-for-the-people calendar trial

Two men are to go on trial for selling copies of a 1991 calendar which caricatured Suharto, his wife and many leaders of the regime as exploiters of the people. The poster-size calendar was endorsed by nine non-governmental organisations and sold like hot cakes on several campuses in Central Java and around the country.

Bun Tomi (28) and Matheus (28), who were both connected with the Geni agency which distributed the calendar, were arrested in March 1991 and warned that they would be charged. Although they have long since been freed, the Salatiga police chief has now announced that the case documents have been passed on to the public prosecutor to prepare the charges.

Human rights lawyers who will defend the accused say there are no grounds to charge people connected with the agency which handled distribution and sales. If anyone has to be charged, it should be the publishers of the calendar. It is a mystery why the case has suddenly become an issue again, more than two years after the authorities banned the calendar.

If the trial does go ahead, the defendants are likely to be charged under the Criminal Code, Articles 137, 156 and 157 for insulting the government. [Jawa Pos, 28.IV.1993. See also TAPOL Bulletin No. 104 and 105, April and June 1991.]

The caricaturist who created the calendar artwork, Yayak, was hunted down by the police at the time but escaped and is now living in Germany. He plans to hold an exhibition of his work shortly. Some of his caricatures have been made available to TAPOL and have been used in our latest issues.

Book-banning goes on

The latest crop of book bans announced by the Attorney-General concentrates mainly on Islamic religious tracts which the authorities consider to be "misleading" and liable to "incite public unrest". Two are books published in Malaysia and written by Ashaari Muhammad who is described as a "fundamentalist Muslim". One of the books is said to be "against the Koran" and could cause people "to waver in their religious conviction". Another two Muslim tracts to get the chop are published in Surabaya.

The fifth ban falls on a collection of leaflets entitled, "The Working Programme of Christianisation in Indonesia" and the March/April 1992 issue of *El Shaddai* published by the Yayasan Penyebar Kasih [Foundation for the Spread of Love]. [Jakarta Post, 16.IV.1993]

Press licencing system won't change

The Indonesian press has been warned that the government will not relinquish its powers to ban newspapers through the cancellation of a publisher's SIUPP (licence to publish).

Harmoko, who retained his post as Minister of Information in Suharto's new cabinet, told a seminar held on International Press Freedom Day (!): "If the media is used for improper goals or to abuse the essence of the nation, it will have to answer to the government." Defending the government's powers to revoke licences, he denied that this was a threat to press freedom.

Harmoko, a shameless defender of press bans who has already served two five-year terms as information minister, was one of the few ministers to keep his job in Suharto's sixth cabinet. He told the seminar: "If (a member of the media) does not want to abide by the regulations, it should not do business here. Go abroad."

Ahmad Fuad Afdhal, the corporate secretary of Bimantara Citra which publishes the monthly, *Swa*, said the licencing system is a serious threat to the existence of periodicals. Responding to a suggestion that publishers should insure their licences, he asked, "which insurance company is willing to take such an unpredictable risk?" [Jakarta Post, 4.V.1993]

Democracy camp attacked

On 11 January 1993, 250 people from several cities set up a camp with tents, outside the leadership meeting of the Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI) at Kopo on the outskirts of Bogor, calling on the meeting to stand by an earlier party commitment to nominate an alternative candidate to General Suharto at the forthcoming presidential election in March. The Camp was organised by the People's Democracy Alliance, *Aldera*.

The PDI leaders had gone back on their words and were accused by many groups of having deliberately deceived people into thinking they were seriously considering putting forward another candidate. The Democracy Camp was the culmination of a campaign lasting several months which had sought to challenge the practice of always having a single candidate and to insist that Suharto's presidency had lasted for far too long. The campaign had been widely reported in the foreign press; an issue of the Singapore-based *Straits Times* was banned from circulation in Indonesia because it published a photograph and report of a demonstration in November last year.

As people at the Camp which was located about a hundred metres from the meeting place prepared for action, party officials called in the riot police. As several hundred campers began to march forward peacefully, carrying banners calling on the PDI not to nominate Suharto and hoping to present a petition to the meeting, the riot police set on them with their truncheons, beating many of the marchers. At least two people were seriously injured. The riot police also tore into the camp and destroyed all the tents. [Suara Rakyat, 1.II.1993]



Forced repatriation of Acehnese from Malaysia

Since the beginning of this year, many Acehnese have been secretly refouled from Malaysia, where they had fled to take refuge from Indonesian repression in their homeland. Malaysia was evidently no refuge. Aceh will be far worse, according to a report received by TAPOL.

Since January, new waves of arrests have hit Acehnese refugees in Malaysia. The refugees have been kept incomunicado before being handed over to the Indonesian regime and refouled to Aceh, Sumatra, illegally and secretly. Given the nature of these operations, there is no guarantee of the safety of the Acehnese on their return. Moreover, they may face torture and summary executions. What follows is based on accounts of what happened to those arrested, given by the few who were lucky enough to escape.

11 'workers'

February 18 1993, 1am: Malaysian police came to arrest 11 Acehnese refugees at their dwelling near Port Klang. The Acehnese did not resist arrest, but Martunis bin Yunus lost the sight in his left eye when assaulted by a policeman, Abdul Fatah bin Muis. Another officer stole 100 Malaysian Ringgit from Sulaiman bin Suman.

The other 9 arrested: Zarkasji bin Husen, Darmansjah bin Yunus, Jusuf bin Ishak, Dasfur bin ..., Muhamad Diah bin Badai, Musriadi bin Sulaiman, Muhamad Mahdi, Usman bin Iljas, Fadil bin Saiful. All 11 have identity cards from the Aceh/Sumatra National Liberation Front, showing them to be political refugees. In the past, these cards have protected their holders from arrest, in keeping with an understanding between the Malaysian authorities and the UNHCR. Yet these 11 were arrested on the pretext of 'having no identification papers', and thus being illegal migrant workers (economic refugees). The 11 have been earning their living as labourers in the Port Klang area.

During their subsequent interrogation, the Malaysian authorities asked them the same political questions as the Indonesian embassy staff, indicating full collaboration between the two parties. Addressing the Muslim detainees in the most insulting terms - 'rebel pigs and dogs' - Malaysian officials questioned them about the activities of the Aceh Liberation Movement both in Malaysia and in Aceh.

16 March 1993: all 11 were refouled by sea and handed over to the Indonesian navy on the high seas in the middle of the Malacca Straits. Two of the refugees manage to jump overboard and escape, and were later picked up by a passing fishing boat. The fate of the remaining 9 is not known. As has happened in the past, they may undergo barbaric torture during interrogation, and be made to 'disappear'.

Three activists

April 7 1993: three Acehnese refugees, Muhamed bin Pawang, Abdurrahman bin Ibrahim and Hamid bin Harun, were identified by local authorities and arrested by Malaysian police in the town of Jerteh, state of Trengganu. They were charged as 'illegal immigrants' (Indonesian migrant workers). All 3 are on Indonesia's 'wanted' list for

having been activists of the Aceh Liberation Movement (GAM). The Indonesian Ambassador to Malaysia took part in their interrogation.

One of the three, Muhamed bin Pawang, has a history of his own. A well-known activist in Aceh, he narrowly escaped Indonesian troops who had come to his home to arrest him two years ago. Instead, the Javanese soldiers took revenge by killing his wife, brother, mother and father, and burning their houses. Muhamed fled to Malaysia for refuge. Last September, he was interviewed by a Swedish journalist whose article 'The Dirty War in Sumatra' - carrying his picture - has been much publicised. [See TAPOL's Occasional Report no.20.) Since then, the Indonesian intelligence service has been on the look out for him in Malaysia. On April 7, they thought they had him.

But on April 19, the three activists were taken to a detention centre where they were prepared for refoulement on April 22. Knowing his hopeless fate at the hands of the Indonesians, Muhamed leapt from the police car as it sped through a forested area. He escaped, but his two colleagues' lives remain in serious danger.

Two youths

April 20 1993: Alyub and Kamaruddin were working in Bahau district, Seremban, in Malaysia's state of Negri Sembilan. They were arrested and taken to Linggong prison, Seremban. As of 11 May, they have not been heard of.

These recent arrests and refoulements follow a pattern of treatment which Acehnese refugees have been receiving from Malaysia. Their status as political refugees means nothing in a country which is not a signatory to the 1958 UN Convention on Refugees. Being labelled as illegal migrant workers has become the norm. By this method, Malaysia has tried to evade its obligation in international law not to return people forcibly to a country where they have reasonable grounds to fear for their safety. Moreover, Malaysia has again been unashamedly working hand-in-glove with the very regime the returnees have good reason to fear.

Government to be sued

The Indonesian Environmental Forum Walhi will sue the Ministry of Industry and two giant fertilizer companies - one of them state-owned - if the government does not investigate reported gas leaks in Lhokseumawe, Aceh. Walhi has sent two letters to the ministry urging it to take action following four ammonia and nitrate leaks from fertilizer factories between 1988 and 1991. Hundreds of villagers suffered breathing problems, vomiting, headaches and fainting. The government bureaucracy has been accused of negligence and collusion with industry.

Women speak out against Kartini Day

Indonesian women's groups have for the first time condemned the ritualistic celebration of Kartini Day and Mother's Day. Scoffing at the mockery of Kartini Day celebrations, Myra Diarsi of the *Kalyanamitra Women's Centre* said it had "turned into a day for showing off". It was not Kartini's ideals and values that were emphasised but only what she represents to Javanese femininity.

Kartini Day marks the birth on 21 April 1879 of R.A. Kartini, who took a stand in early life against feudal restraints on women, set up a school to educate girls and carried out lengthy correspondence with Dutch writers. She died at an early age after the birth of her first child.

Refuting claims of some sociologists that Kartini did nothing to boost women's emancipation, she said: "In her social, economic and political context, she was a feminist."

Myra Diarsi also attacked the way *Hari Ibu* (Mothers' Day) on 22 December has usurped the commemoration of the first women's congress in 1928, at which the role of women in the nationalist movement was discussed, not their role as mothers.

The other women's group to speak out was *Yayasan Perempuan Mardika*, whose representative said that twice a year, "we talk excessively about women but for the rest of the year, the lot of women is virtually ignored". Edriana said that although Indonesian women have equal opportunities in education and in many jobs, they are still viewed as submissive, passive and content with a small wage. In fact, only 0.2 percent of working women hold white-collar jobs. Most work in factories or on the land.

Speaking for *Solidaritas Perempuan*, Tati Krisnawati said that the overwhelmingly patriarchal focus of Indonesian society offset many gains in education and equal opportunities. "A woman's membership in the largest women's

organisation in the country, Dharma Wanita, is tied to her husband's position. There is still sexual division in the workplace and discrimination before the law. Officially, the husband is 'head of the family' while the wife is 'mother of the family'. The law also condones marital rape; a wife has no legal recourse to reject her husband's advances, she said. [Jakarta Post, 21.IV.1993]

Indonesia's 'comfort women'

A team of Japanese lawyers visited Indonesia in April to collect the personal experiences of women who were exploited by the Japanese Imperial Army as sex-slaves or so-called 'comfort women' during the Pacific War. The evidence is being collected for a symposium to be held in Japan in October this year.

The investigation was facilitated by the Legal Aid Institute, the Jakarta Lawyers' Club and the fortnightly journal, *Forum Keadilan*.

After interviewing a number of women who had been abused during the Japanese occupation, Akira Murayama said his team accepted the evidence they had heard as correct but knew that it would be far from easy to persuade the Japanese government to accept this evidence and recognise the need to compensate the women. The government claims that if has already paid reparations to the countries that were occupied during the Pacific War and personal compensation cannot be considered. [Forum Keadilan, 13.V.1993]

WEST PAPUA

ICRC closes office in West Papua

At a border committee meeting in Wewak at the end of April, Indonesia and PNG agreed on the repatriation of 159 Papuans living in East Awin refugee camp to their home village of Sota, West Papua. The 159 were some of a larger number who fled over the border in January 1992 after clashes between the OPM resistance and Indonesian soldiers in Sota. 124 more are reported to be settled at camps at Kiuiu and Weam, while many more are said to be unregistered, in the border area jungle.

PNG agreed to the repatriation plan after Indonesia had reported the willingness of hundreds of border-crossers staying in East Awin - who have never been given recognition as refugees - to return home.

Previously there had been reports that the refugees in PNG fear for their safety should they return over the border to their villages. But these fears, according to FX Suryanto, head of border affairs for the Indonesian administration in West Papua, were the result of a misinformation campaign. 'Irresponsible elements', he said, had been changing the contents of letters from families in Irian Jaya before they

were delivered.

But, said Suryanto, two border-crossers originally from Mamberamo-Hulu, Jayapura district, had been allowed to visit their home village as part of a research team, along with PNG officials. There they met with relatives and earlier returnees. While no indication of their perceptions has been given publicly, it was on the basis of these that the two governments apparently agreed the repatriation plans.

The safety of those repatriated to West Papua is theoretically monitored by the International Red Cross. But no sooner had Suryanto publicised the plans, the Committee's president Cornelius Sommaruga announced that it would be closing its office in Jayapura [see separate item] Ironically, he pointed out in the same statement that the Committee has a mandate from 178 countries, including Indonesia than to see to it that the victims of conflicts and instability in any country are protected. How feasible it will be for the ICRC to fulfill this mandate for the returnees remains to be seen.

A people forgotten

At the end of last year Robert Suchanek from Germany visited East Awin, the refugee camp for 4,000 West Papuan refugees. The West Papua Courier, in the Netherlands, published sections of his report last month. It is first report to provide a glimpse into the conditions under which these refugees are now living. Here is a summary of the problems the refugees in East Awin face, based on his report:

Camp location

The camp lies in the heart of a rain forest, the nearest town, East Awin, is 70 kms away. The East Awin complex consists of a number of refugee camps several kilometres apart.

Transport

The camp can only be reached by motorised canoe (a 2-hour trip) and a land journey 3-hours long. Since 1 January 1993, the refugees have not been allowed to use UNHCR transport facilities free of charge. The local villagers no longer allow a truck which was a gift from the Dutch funding agency CEBEMO to be used.

River transport by motorised canoe is urgently needed. During heavy rainfalls, even the toughest land vehicles cannot travel on the roads.

Housing

The absence of sago trees means there is a lack of natural building material. The two local saw mills are closed down so no sawn timber can be produced.

Food production

The soil is rather infertile; very few crops can grow. The villagers refuse to allow the refugees to hunt in the area. The lack of fish and meat has caused a serious vitamin and protein deficiency among the refugees.

Health conditions

The poor diet is resulting in a high incidence of ill-health among the refugees. About seventy per cent have malaria, while many others suffer from diarrhoea. About five per cent suffer from tuberculosis and seven per cent are leprosy patients.

In the camp complex with a population of about 4,000 refugees, there is not a single doctor. Since mid 1992 there has not even been a para-medical worker at the camp capable of diagnosing those who are sick, with the use of clinical facilities.

Livelihood

The only place where anyone can earn an income is in the town but the West Papuans are not allowed to take paid jobs there. The possibility for selling garden crops in the towns is very limited but with transport costs so high, now that the UNHCR vehicles cannot be used without charge, almost all the proceeds are used to cover transport costs.

The only job opportunities near the camp were at the sawmill, a gift from New Zealand, but that has ceased to function. The sawmill is in a state of disrepair with no means available to repair the machinery.

Many urban and coastal Papuans are not used to heavy



West Papuan children demonstrating

agricultural labour.

Education

In some of the camps primary school education is available but no secondary school education is available anywhere.

Conclusions

It is clear that the refugees in PNG lack everything and their lives are under constant threat because of the meagre and insufficient diet and the prevalence of many diseases.

The worst thing of all is that they lack any prospects:

- * no chance for a normal life in PNG
- * no possibility to return to their homeland, West Papua, except under the terms of repatriation offered by the Indonesian authorities;
- * no prospects for a better future;
- * almost nobody cares about their fate.

In short: A Forgotten People.

Coming next issue...

Constraints on time and space have made this article all too brief. This important and rare report on conditions in East Awin will be covered more extensively in TAPOL Bulletin 118.

UK sells itself cheap

When two top British officials head for Jakarta within six weeks of each other, their purpose is not to press Indonesia on human rights. When Douglas Hurd went, it may have seemed like business as usual: promoting trade with a prosperous-if-rather-naughty ally. But when Malcolm Rifkind followed, the attention being given Indonesia, at a time when it is debating the idea of another 100 Hawks, does not seem accidental.

When the British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd visited Indonesia in April, he wasn't unaware of the sensitivity of his visit. But he maintained his government's line on not linking aid to human rights conditions, saying that to insist on such a link would not be a "sensible and fruitful thing to do," adding that neither Britain nor other western countries are entitled to press a western version of human rights on other countries.



A 'Hawaiian' welcome for Douglas Hurd.

Yet he did express Britain's 'continuing concerns' regarding the situation in the former Portuguese colony of East Timor. In particular he mentioned the contrasting sentences for the army personnel and the civilians tried for being involved in what Hurd, like the Indonesian government, calls the Dili 'incident'.

But evidently his main concern was Britain's significant trade with Indonesia, which increased to by 58% to £312m last year. "I do not think there is any other substantial market" which has increased as much, said Hurd. Or where so much is at stake.

So while his mentions of human rights were cautious, Hurd's visit guaranteed more trade for Britain in the guise of aid for Indonesia. He signed a concessional loan to Indonesia worth £65 million to fund a 66 megawatt gas and steam power station in Kalimantan. The station must, under the terms of the agreement, be built by a British company. Britain is thus assured a place in Indonesia's Sector of the 90's, for which \$30 billion of investment is planned. Against such a prospect, human rights concerns take a definite second priority.

Rifkind and IPTN

Although the UK has no special security arrangements with Indonesia, the Secretary of State for Defence, Malcolm Rifkind, apparently felt it necessary to make a two-day visit to Jakarta in mid-May, at a time when a deal for the

export of one hundred British Aerospace Hawks has become a matter of controversy within the Indonesian regime. Although he was quoted as speaking about Indonesia's geopolitical role, saying it "has been making a very important contribution in coping with regional problems and using its experience and interest in stability for the benefit of the region as a whole", his visit evidently had a different agenda.

The Minister refused to comment on negotiations about the possible export of 100 British Hawks, but at the same time heaped praise on IPTN, the state-owned Nusantara Aerospace Industry, for developing cooperation with some British companies. The Indonesian Ministry of Defence was more frank. It revealed that Rifkind had offered cooperation in the use of British-made sophisticated military equipment which has been the sticking point in IPTN's demands of British Aerospace.

Other aircraft manufacturers, notably from the US and Russia, have been making attractive offers to Indonesia and it is more than likely that BAe is getting worried about the prospects of this major deal.

The economic interests which lie behind Britain's relationship with Indonesia, in terms of investment, trade, arms and aid, are explained in a new detailed TAPOL Backgrounder, price £1.

Report on Siberut's vanishing forest, people and culture

By SKEPHI (The NGO Network for Forest Conservation in Indonesia)

This attractively presented, readable booklet discusses all the issues facing Siberut (a unique island off the West coast of Sumatra). It argues that the plans for Siberut are misconceived and that the uniqueness of Siberut, its traditional people, rainforest and wildlife, will be lost forever if present policies and activities continue. The report presents Siberut as a positive asset to Indonesia and the world and seeks to provide alternatives to the destruction of the island.

Published November 1992. 78 pages. Price: not known.

Available: SKEPHI, Jl. Pulo Asem Raya No. 23, Rawamangun, Jakarta 13220. Indonesia. Tel/fax: 62-21-4711388.

Mau Huno arrested

The arrest of Mau Huno, Xanana Gusmao's second in command, on 3 April this year, was again used by the army of occupation to claim that resistance to its rule in East Timor is now at an end. Nothing could be further from the truth. There is nothing to suggest that Mau Huno will be tried. Given the events at Xanana's trial, the army may prefer to back away from such an option.

Mau Huno, the guerrilla leader who has fought alongside Xanana Gusmao throughout the war with Indonesia, was arrested by an platoon of Indonesian troops. The army claims he was captured alone in a house near Ainaro in the centre of East Timor. Other reports say he was arrested following a fierce battle, with casualties on both sides.

Mau Huno took command of the armed wing of the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) immediately after Xanana's arrest on 20 November. He was also head of Fretilin. His arrest came two months after the governor, Abilio Soares, claimed that he would surrender within two months.

Fabricating Xanana's words

Looking back on recent events right up to last week's exposure by Xanana Gusmao in his defence statement, Mau Huno was well prepared for what might happen to his close colleague after his arrest. The following excerpts are from an interview of Mau Huno, transmitted to Lisbon and published by *Publico* and *O Independente* on 16 April 1993:

Explaining why the resistance had decided to freeze Xanana's functions as commander and leader of the movement when he was arrested, Mau Huno said that as a prisoner of war in the hands of Try Sutrisno's hard line, Jakarta was liable to take advantage of this fact, forcing him to fabricate a statement in favour of annexation. "That is what happened.... It was in this scenario of total breach of internationally accepted rules and procedures that Xanana's mysterious statements appeared which, happily, no-one was taken in by."

Mau Huno made a powerful plea to the international community and to the UN in particular, "to urge Jakarta to give ground, reinforcing the position adopted by Portugal's President Mario Soares".

Asked to comment on the claim by governor Abilio Osorio Soares that he, Mau Huno, would surrender in two months, he said: "Given my awareness of being Timorese as well as a freedom fighter, I would feel humiliated if I were ever to sink to the depths of an amnesty." He went on:

Abilio Osorio rubber his hands with glee when Xanana was captured and imprisoned. Other evidence reveals a different story. In spite of the perks, many Indonesian soldiers shouted for joy, saying, 'it's time to go home' while Timorese soldiers [in the Indonesian army] expressed shock at the capture of their 'big boss' and Timorese police refused to hand over their weapons to those whom they call 'the foreigners'. This (shows) that the Timorese soul cannot be bought by privileges and the occupier faces a potentially dangerous situation if he does not loosen his grip.

Asked whether Xanana had been captured as he was about



Mau Huno

to leave for New York for the talks there on 17 December, Mau Huno said that "even though he was not there in person, his presence was felt in the 17 December negotiations in that the proposal for talks without pre-conditions ... came from Xanana. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali for his part invoked both Xanana's name and that of Mgr Ximenes Belo, the prelate having been the architect of the idea for a referendum in East Timor."

New faces on the scene

Asked what he expected of the Rome talks on 21 April, talked about new faces appearing, like Rev. Paul Moore, the new White House chief, Bill Clinton, nobel prize winners in South Africa and Northern Ireland, and others of a variety of religions in Africa and Japan.

I am not discarding the possibility of Jakarta maintaining extreme positions. But the root of the issue is that the Timorese resistance, on its different fronts, will continue to defy Jakarta's rigid positions, showing willingness to search for a peaceful solution to the problem of East Timor.

Asked his views on the option of autonomy for East Timor, Mau Huno said the resistance demands the involvement of its representatives in the UN-sponsored talks. "This way, all the options would be put on the negotiating table. Second, the people of East Timor would have the last word. I categorically reject any option fabricated abroad which does not have the stamp of approval of Timorese representatives, of the CNRM, Fretilin, the UDT and other organisations and individuals of long standing and prestige in Timorese society."

Growing international pressure to protect workers

Analysts say the Indonesian economy is becoming one of the world's fastest-growing economies. But whilst 'made-in-Indonesia' products may have found a niche in the shops of Tokyo, New York, Berlin, London and Amsterdam, such a transformation has done nothing for workers' conditions.

The Indonesian economy has become an increasingly integral part of the global free market system. The same brand-name shops of Oxford Street or Kalverstraat can be found inside the glossy shopping malls of Jakarta. The same global manufacturing companies have poured investment capital into the Indonesian economy. Cheap labour, or as economists euphemistically say, 'comparative advantage', has encouraged many foreign companies to pour into Indonesia. The search for cheap labour, a sanctuary from free trade unions, disregard for safety and environmental codes, have resulted in huge foreign and domestic investments.

On the brighter side, Indonesia can no longer hide behind a bamboo curtain. International scrutiny is mounting. In June last year, Asia Watch and the International Labour Rights Education and Research Fund (ILRERF) filed petitions to the US Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate Indonesian labour practices. The two NGOs' concerns were based on internationally recognised principles like freedom of association, the right to organise and collective bargaining, the ban on forced labour, restrictions on child labour and unacceptable conditions of work. The focus of the petition was to challenge the application of GSP, the *Generalised System of Preferences* to Indonesia. The petition was quickly accepted for consideration.

In the meantime the new Clinton administration – and in particular the new USTR chief Mickey Kantor – seems prepared to take a much harder line against Jakarta. A tougher attitude was already apparent in the State Department country reports of 1991 and 1992, where lack of workers rights was monitored in detail.

Generalised System of Preferences

The GSP system is a tariff benefit system which allows some third world countries to export products to the US without (or with reduced) tariffs and duties. Indonesian textiles, for example, enjoying millions of dollars worth of tax exemptions, have flooded onto the US market. In April a GSP subcommittee considered the Indonesian case and almost unanimously agreed to place Indonesia in the "pending" category. At the end of May, the case will go to a higher level trade policy review group. Well-informed circles say that the Labour Department and Mickey Kantor himself are in favour of immediately suspending Indonesia's GSP privileges. The list of organisations that are demanding GSP sanctions is growing: the East Timor Action Network has urged its network to campaign for a cut-off of GSP trade benefits to Indonesia.

Pressure from ILO


The 1993 World Labour Report of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) also did not mince words. In particular it criticised the Indonesian government for allowing only one union, the All-Indonesia Workers Union (SPSI), which lacks all the qualifications of a free trade union. The ILO report laments the fact that "the SPSI's inability to redress

some of the workers' grievances, particularly on the implementation of the minimum wage, has provoked rebellious industrial action in some districts".

Herman van der Laan, the ILO Jakarta branch director, pointed out that the Indonesian government has signed ten ILO basic conventions and has ratified the convention on collective bargaining but in practice, it contradicts the basic conventions on freedom of association, the right to organise and collective bargaining.

The new minister

Cosmas Batubara, who till April served as Minister for Manpower, was ditched and replaced by the *Sarinah Jaya* Department Store owner Abdul Latief. It seems clear that President Suharto sacked Cosmas because he was too lenient towards the workers; he was also blamed for failing to contain mounting international pressure on the labour issue.



kondisi kerja = working conditions, buruh = worker.

The new minister is unlikely to improve conditions for workers rights. In an interview, he spoke of his determination to revive and strengthen the *tripartite* system, which requires a group composed of a government representative, a workers' delegate and the company to resolve disputes between workers and management. This corporatist model has invariably resulted in gagging workers protest. Strikes were almost always prohibited and the *SPSI* as the 'trade union' component almost always sided with the management.

Minister Abdul Latief is close to the First Family, in particular Ibu Tien Suharto, an important business partner of his. This is probably the most important reason why he was given the job.

Workers' actions

Despite the lack of free trade unions and despite the immense difficulties they face, workers' actions have become a daily event in industrial areas. The wave of strikes in the last months of 1992 [see *Tapol Bulletin* no. 114, December 1992] has been surpassed by strikes in the first quarter of 1993. Foreign investors have started threatening to move to China or Vietnam. It is the Department of Manpower who must develop strategies to end the strike wave. Instead of developing a humane social strategy of decent wages and labour conditions, the Manpower Department has issued a decree allowing the bosses to dismiss workers who "take leave without permission" for one or two days.

This decree, known as *Surat Menaker no B.62/M/BW-1/1993*, has been sharply criticised by a number of Indonesian NGOs who deal with workers issues. *FSB (Forum Solidaritas untuk Buruh, Workers Solidarity Forum)* a platform of eleven NGOs, called on Parliament to question the manpower minister about the decree. The decree, says *FSB*, has already been applied by the management in three textile factories which have sacked striking workers.

Strikes are spreading to all sectors of industry: textiles and garments, shoe manufacturers, shipping, packaging industry, bank employees, car assembling, rubber factory, cigarettes (Rothman and Pall Mall, and Dunhill), electronics, household products and public transport workers. While most of the strikes continue to be concentrated in the *Jabotabek*

LABOUR CONFLICTS

industrial belt around Jakarta, major strikes are now hitting East Java. In the first four months of 1993 alone, 53 strikes took place in East Java.

The role of the military

Calling strikes for better wages and labour conditions has been a resounding success in many cases, encouraging workers in other factories to step up pressure on the management. It is no coincidence that there is now a heavy presence of troops in industrial areas like Tangerang harbour. When strikes break out, special units of military are despatched to arrest the leaders and intimidate the others into going back to work. It is a public secret that local police and military officers receive handsome pay-outs to 'protect' factories from potential strikes.

It is said that cheap labour is the fuel which is stoking Indonesia's export drive and the army is the lubricator. The army is in fact the main obstacle to the exercise of workers' rights. The mafia-like extortionist methods the military use are costing the company bosses millions of rupiahs, which they reimburse by keeping down the workers' wages.

Workers have formulated their main demands: decent wages, freedom to organise and no interference by the military. The demands reflect the main problems faced by workers in Indonesia today.

HUMAN RIGHTS

'Asian concept' of human rights under attack

As the UN World Conference on Human Rights looms, the issue has become a big issue in Indonesia. Asian governments say they favour a 'different standard of rights' more attuned to the 'culturally distinct' people of Asia. But Asian NGOs at a UN regional human rights meeting did not agree.

The UN World Conference on Human Rights to be held in Vienna from 14 - 25 June, 1993 has forced the issue onto the political agenda in many countries, not least in countries like Indonesia which find themselves at the sharp edge of world condemnation for human rights violations.

In March this year, the Asian and Pacific governments convened their regional preparatory meeting for Vienna. Much to everyone's surprise 110 NGOs turned up to press issues on the governments and to have their own alternative conference. Confounding the efforts of Asian governments like China, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia which have been promoting an 'Asian concept' of human rights in which political and civil rights take second place to 'economic development', this diverse group of activists, most of whom had never met before, "hammered out a consensus declaration that refuted or contested every major premise of the 'Asian concept' of human rights. They effectively exposed the governments' line for what it is: a pretext of largely authoritarian governments to justify their unchecked power in the name of meeting economic and social needs." [Sidney Jones, director of Asia Watch, *International Herald Tribune*, 21.IV.1993]

Only two NGOs from Indonesia were present, both of them women's groups, who contributed to the pressure on

governments to include the rights of women and the rights of the child in their final statement. After being subjected to intimidation and harassment from Indonesian officials, the women decided to return home early. A representative of the *Front Demokrasi Indonesia* based in western Europe was also present.

Several East Timor activists were there, including José Ramos-Horta of the CNRM, who succeeded in making East Timor, along with Burma, one of the major topics taken up by the NGOs. The English-language Thai press gave Horta and East Timor a great deal of coverage.

The issue of East Timor got even more attention in the Thai press because of the decision of the official meeting to exclude the Japan-based International Federation for East Timor from attending, even though it has consultative status with the UN Public Information Department at the UN Secretariat in New York. IFET participation had the backing of the UN Human Rights Centre in Geneva and the Japanese government but in face of a threat by the Indonesian delegation to boycott the meeting if IFET was given accreditation, the organisation was kept out.

No to 'individualistic' rights

Indonesia's S. Wiryono, head of the Department for Politi-

HUMAN RIGHTS

cal Affairs at the Foreign Ministry, criticised the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for disregarding "society, State and nation" and for failing to see the human being both as an individual and a member of society. "We don't adhere to the individualistic view on human rights..." [That is to say, torture, extra-judicial killings, detention are of no significance!] A person's existence "can only become meaningful when he functions in a social environment".

But, there is no question of choosing between individual rights and collective rights, nor indeed of choosing between civil and political rights and social and economic rights. Defending peasants against the expropriation of their lands means protecting both individual and collective rights; defending workers' struggles for better wages involves both civil/political and economic rights. They are *indivisible*.



Picket line in front of the Indonesian Embassy after the announcement of Xanana's life sentence on 21 May.

For regimes like Indonesia, talk of promoting collective rights is a deliberate trick to conceal their persistent violation of both individual and collective rights. The ancestral land rights of indigenous groups, the rights of communities to be free from pollution and environmental catastrophes are violated every day. If collective rights are so important, what about the rights of free association and assembly which have ceased to exist in Indonesia? The only 'collective' right the regime is interested in is the right of 'society' and the State, in order to perpetuate the 'security approach'. Under this strategy, anything goes.

Understandably for a country that had just been condemned for its human rights record in East Timor by the UN Human Rights Commission, Wiryono also argued that the time had come "for international human rights forums to replace their counter-productive confrontational and condemnatory approach with one that is positive and constructive". Another plank of his attack was directed at NGOs - which provide much of the documentation to the UN human rights agencies - for 'politicising' human rights.

The *Bangkok Declaration* adopted by the governments seeks to protect human rights violators by for example emphasizing "respect for national sovereignty ... and non-interference in the internal affairs of States" and reiterating that all countries "have the right to determine their political systems". Another tactic for avoiding international involvement is the rejection "of any attempt to use human rights as

a conditionality for extending development assistance".

World Conference prospects

Less than a month before the UN World Conference, major aspects of the meeting were still unresolved. The final preparatory meeting in April had to be extended for a week because different groups of countries were locked in battle over the draft Final Declaration. Another conflict focused on the possibility for NGO involvement in the drafting process. The battle lines were drawn mainly between Third World countries which, to varying degrees, are trying to curb UN actions on human rights violations, and western countries which profess a greater commitment to the issue, regardless of whether they themselves are violators in their own backyards. The countries most actively involved on the Third World side of the dispute included Burma, China, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Cuba and Colombia.

At one point during the meeting, NGOs there were so infuriated by obstacles being put in their way that they threatened an all-out boycott of the Vienna Conference.

A proposal by Amnesty International for a UN Commissioner on Human Rights to be created has won some official support, notably from the Clinton administration. But with fierce arguments still raging, the Conference may have a hard time safeguarding the mechanisms that have already been working to some effect for the last twenty-five years, let alone improve on these mechanisms, which was the original intention.

Suharto to set up human rights commission

In an attempt to dupe the world into thinking that Indonesia is genuinely committed to human rights observance, a national human rights commission will be created by presidential decree. The announcement was due before the World Conference opened in Vienna.

Leading Indonesian human rights advocates, Mulya Lubis, Adnan Buyung Nasution and Haji J.C. Princen, have joined forces to criticise this commission. Since its terms of reference and membership will be fixed by Suharto, one of the world's most renowned mass murderers, this sham is not likely to convince any but the most gullible flatterers of the military regime.

Subscriptions

Annual rates (six issues)	UK	Europe & overseas (air only)
Individuals	£14.00	£14.00
Institutions	£20.00	£20.00
Girocheques and Eurocheques are welcome. TAPOL's Giro Account No: 56 781 4009.		

Please, no US, Australian or Canadian personal cheques to London.

Australian subscribers may pay in A\$ to:

TAPOL (Australia)
PO Box 121, Clifton Hill, Vic. 3068
Rate for individuals: A\$ 35

Dutch subscribers may pay in Dfl to:

S.L.Liem
Binnenkadijk 267, 1018 ZG Amsterdam
Postgiro 4637291
Rate for individuals: Dfl 40

Kindly state that the payment is for TAPOL.

All other subscriptions and all correspondence to:

TAPOL,
111 Northwood Road, Thornton Heath,
Surrey CR7 8HW, UK Phone: (081) 771-2904
Fax: (081) 653-0322