

# Dili massacre Praise for academic's stand lies exposed

EXCLUSIVE

Report by  
**ANDRE  
MALAN**



## I'm no traitor: academic

THE man whose research into Indonesia's conduct in East Timor is likely to increase international pressure on the Jakarta Government declared yesterday he was no traitor.

Dr George Aditjondro, whose academic qualifications span environmental science and anthropology, is a lecturer at the Satya Wacana University in Salatiga, Central Java.

He is well known in Indonesia and overseas as one of the increasingly vocal post-World War II generation of intellectuals.

He received his PhD from Cornell University in the United States, and in 1986 he was presented an award by President Suharto for being the Indonesian environmentalist of the year.

Coincidentally, Dr Aditjondro left

Indonesia yesterday on a short visit to Ethiopia.

He said he did not expect any problems re-entering the country, but anticipated that the authorities would accuse him of being a traitor and try to damage his credibility.

"But I am not a traitor, and my credibility is already established," he said.

Dr Aditjondro's academic papers, purportedly on East Timor's ecology and culture, are certain to anger the Indonesian Government.

But he says it is the duty of democratic elements in Indonesia to lift the veil of secrecy from East Timor.

"I don't want the rest of the world to think that everybody in Indonesia accepts what has happened there," he said.



Dr Aditjondro

● A culture of violence intimidation had been fostered territory, with thousands Indonesian troops guilty of Timorese women sexually people being encouraged to each another.

● Some Indonesians have desecrated Roman Catholic religious symbols.

● Some Indonesian Government programs have drastically reduced the cultural diversity architectural styles of the Maubere people.

● East Timor is suffering ecological problems because occupation.

Dr Aditjondro says he has evidence to support allegations in a recent television documentary that between 30 and 200 people were murdered by troops hospital staff after the Dili massacre.

His outspokenness is likely to cause anger in Indonesia, where he is involved in a campaign to raise awareness concern about East

Timor. He would also embarrass Australia, which has adopted a soft-line approach to human rights in the region, and has even encouraged Indonesia to do the same.

His reports, pages 10-11; Editorial, page 12

### Tragedy



population 1986

Australia has been too easily persuaded by Indonesian and Malaysian views that in developing countries human rights should take a back seat to stable nations.

A LEADING Indonesian intellectual says he has confirmed that 271 East Timorese were killed in the 1991 Dili massacre and that another 200 went missing after the incident.

Two academic papers released to *The West Australian* this week by Dr George Aditjondro confirm many of the world's worst fears about what has really happened in East Timor since the 1975 Indonesian invasion.

Dr Aditjondro, who has researched East Timor for more than 20 years, says companies set up by Indonesian military officers who mounted the invasion have monopolised almost the entire economy.

He says one of these companies has close links with the Indonesian partners involved in the new casino in the Australian territory of Christmas Island.

Dr Aditjondro's findings support the worst case estimates that 60,000

**EAST TIMOR**

An Indonesian intellectual asks out

**George J. Aditjondro**

Veil on human rights abuses in East Timor

*The West Australian*  
PERTH SATURDAY MARCH 12 1994

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# EAST TIMOR

**An Indonesian intellectual speaks out**

by

**George J. Aditjondro**

*Edited by: Herb Feith, Emma Baulch, Pat Walsh*



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# INTRODUCTION

Herb Feith

Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University

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For Indonesian intellectuals the problem of East Timor has long been in the too hard basket. Even intellectuals who are sceptical of government accounts of what has been happening there have been reluctant to acknowledge what outside observers have persistently noted, that many East Timorese see themselves as living under a colonial military occupation.

In the period since the Dili massacre of 12 November 1991 this situation has begun to change. Indonesian intellectuals associated with human rights organizations have come to pay greater attention to East Timor and their sympathies have become engaged in a new way.

Many of them have become aware that human rights violations there are in some respects different from human rights violations elsewhere. Many now know more about the Indonesian invasion of 1975, of the trauma of war and famine of the next four years, and of the way in which memories of that terrible period continue to shape East Timorese perceptions of Indonesia.

George Aditjondro, the author of this collection, is one of a small group of intellectuals who have become active sympathizers of the East Timorese cause in this recent period.

On the basis of a great deal of scholarly work, he has developed a full-scale critique of the Indonesian role in East Timor. And he has taken great personal risks in putting this forward. In March-April 1994 he was at the centre of a media furore.

## **Who is George Aditjondro ?**

George Junus Aditjondro has been a well-known figure in Indonesian public life since the 1970s.

Born in Pekalongan, Central Java, in 1946, he studied engineering, then moved on to journalism and especially environmental journalism. In the 1970s he was active in several environmental organizations as well as Environment Editor for Indonesia's largest weekly news magazine, *Tempo*. His *Tempo* responsibilities also included Melanesian affairs.

Between 1982 and 1987 Aditjondro worked in Jayapura, the capital of Irian Jaya, where he played a key role in the formation of the Lembaga Pengembangan Masyarakat Desa Irian Jaya (LPMD Irja) or Irian Jaya Rural Community Development Foundation. With local colleagues he engaged in an intensive program of research and investigative reporting on a variety of environmental, economic and social problems in Irian Jaya. Many publications resulted from that program.

In the same period he was involved in networking and organization building in other parts of East Indonesia. When the International Non-Governmental Forum on Indonesia (INGI) was formed in 1985 he became an active member of its executive body.

The high quality of his contributions to Indonesia's environmental welfare was recognized in 1986 when President Soeharto presented him with Indonesia's highest decoration for environmental work, the Kalpataru.

A great deal of Aditjondro's work in the 1980s was scholarly. He studied a range of social science subjects at Cornell University in 1981-82 and again in 1987-89 and 1991-92. In 1989-90 he began to teach in the the Postgraduate Program in Development Studies at Satya Wacana Christian University in Salatiga, Central Java.

In 1992 he was awarded a Cornell Ph.D. in Education, with a thesis on media coverage of the conflict over construction of the Kedong Ombo dam in Central Java.

## **Aditjondro and East Timor**

George Aditjondro's interest in East Timor goes back to 1974. He visited the territory in May of that year as a *Tempo* correspondent. He was one of the first three Indonesian journalists to enter it after Lisbon's Carnation Revolution, the anti-fascist coup of April 25, which led to a quick emergence of party politics in Portugal's remote Eastern colony.

Later in 1974 he was part of a group of young Indonesian Catholics who sought to formulate a democratic and non-military policy on East Timor. A document they prepared for the Indonesian Bishops' Council is included as an appendix to this collection.

Between 1975 and 1991 Aditjondro kept an active interest in East Timorese developments and interviewed East Timorese leaders of all political persuasions, both inside and outside Indonesia. But East Timor was not a central part of his concerns again until after the Dili massacre of 12 November 1991.

### **Responding to the Dili Massacre**

The shooting of large numbers of mourner-demonstrators at Dili's Santa Cruz cemetery led Aditjondro to a new confrontation with East Timorese nationalism and the moral challenges it presents to Indonesian intellectuals.

Being at Cornell University at the time of the massacre, he was able to read a great variety of material on East Timor in its library, including Portuguese material and material in Indonesian which is otherwise difficult to obtain.

Since that time he has emerged as a leading figure in opposition to the Indonesian occupation of East Timor.

He began by publishing "Apa yang dilupakan *Tempo* tentang Timor Timur" (The history of East Timor which *Tempo* overlooked) in the February 1992 issue of *Warta Kita*, an Indonesian student journal in the US. This is the first of the papers reproduced in this collection. In this he took this nationally prestigious news magazine to task for the way it had backgrounded its reports on the Dili massacre. Reminding readers of his own role on *Tempo*'s staff in the crucial years of 1974-5, he accused the magazine of reproducing official distortions of the circumstances surrounding the December 1975 invasion.

In September 1992 he returned to Salatiga and to lecturing in the Postgraduate Program in Development Studies at Satya Wacana University. His special responsibilities there are for research methodology, environment and social movements.

On 2 December he presented a paper to the Satya Wacana Development Studies Program on "Prospek pembangunan di Timor Timur: Perlunya pemikiran secara mendasar" (Prospects for development in East Timor: the need for fundamental rethinking). This was followed by "Prospek pembangunan di Timor Timur sesudah penangkapan Xanana Gusmao" (Prospects for development in East Timor after the capture of Xanana Gusmao), which was published by the Diponegoro University student publication *Hayam Wuruk* after Satya Wacana's own journal, *Kritis*, had refused to publish it.

In June-July 1993 Aditjondro made a further trip to East Timor, followed by a trip to Portugal to attend the Fifth Symposium on East Timor held at the University of Oporto at the end of July.

The second and third papers in this collection were presented at Satya Wacana after these two trips. The first of these, whose English title is "From Memo to Tutuala: some environmental problems in East Timor" was given on 6

August 1993 before the Environmental Task Force of the University's Social Development Institute. The second, "In the shadow of Mount Ramelau: Some sketches of East Timorese cultures" was given in English in a form slightly longer than presented here to the first Contemporary Indonesia Program held at Satya Wacana (for overseas students) in January-February 1994.

### **The Furore of March-April 1994**

Dr Aditjondro's radically heterodox ideas about East Timor have influenced the thinking of human rights activists and students for some time. But they attracted the attention of Indonesia's mainstream media only in March 1994.

That happened as a result of a three-page article in *The West Australian* of 12 March. Andre Malan, from the staff of this Perth daily, had studied at Satya Wacana earlier. He now summarized Aditjondro's papers on the environmental and cultural situation in East Timor (the second and third pieces of the present collection) in a front-page story titled "Dili massacre lies exposed".

The article began as follows: "A leading Indonesian intellectual says he has confirmed that 271 East Timorese were killed in the 1991 Dili massacre and that another 200 went missing after the incident. Two academic papers released to *The West Australian* this week by Dr George Aditjondro confirm many of the world's worst fears about what has really happened in East Timor since the 1975 Indonesian invasion."

Sabam Siagian, the Indonesian ambassador in Canberra, was the first Indonesian official to respond to this presentation of Aditjondro's ideas. He made light of them, saying that Aditjondro had recognized expertise on environmental problems in Irian Jaya but not on East Timor, and suggesting that he must have succumbed to the journalist's temptation to chase front-page headlines.

In the following days various other Indonesian officials responded to Aditjondro's claims. A spokesperson for the Department of Foreign Affairs declared that Aditjondro had no credentials for his statements on East Timor. Major-General Soeyono, the military commander of Central Java, described his comments as misleading. He said he had seen service in East Timor both before and after its integration into Indonesia, so knew a lot about its problems. He also referred to 'national traitors' who import liberal ideas that could endanger national unity.

Among the other government figures who included treachery among their charges against Aditjondro was the President's daughter Tutut, who had recently become more actively involved in Timor issues. Chosen as chairperson of an Indonesia-Portugal Friendship Association formed in Jakarta in January, she was acting as the high-profile sponsor of a trip to Indonesia and East Timor by

24 East Timorese from Portugal.

The Democratic Party parliamentarian Markus Wauran asked the government to seek Interpol's help to bring Aditjondro back to Indonesia to be arrested. Defence Minister Edi Sudrajat declared that he was sure that what Aditjondro had written was completely untrue, adding: "He has defiled the Indonesian nation before the world. Of course we are offended". He went on to say it would be best if the press did not report material like this. "Let him be a hero in the eyes of no-one but his wife and children".

During much of this furore Aditjondro was in Addis Ababa at a global NGO conference organized by the International Council of Voluntary Agencies. His wife was summoned by the Rector of Satya Wacana and told that he had been harming the Christian university's reputation, at a time when things were already very difficult for Indonesia's Christian minority.

In Singapore on his return from Ethiopia, Aditjondro was interviewed at length for the Australian ABC television program *Lateline*. The program went to air in Australia on 22 March and was beamed to Indonesia by Australian Television International the following evening. The transcribed text is included as an appendix to this collection.

So sharp was the tone of the attacks on Aditjondro by Indonesian government figures that many wondered whether he would be prevented from re-entering Indonesia or arrested at the airport. Those were the fears of some of the journalists, NGO activists and friends who went out to Soekarno-Hatta airport to meet him. However he got through that barrier safely, gave a news conference at the Legal Aid Institute the following morning, and returned to Salatiga that evening.

About three hours after his arrival at home, at 1 a.m. on the morning of 24 April, two large stones were thrown at Aditjondro's house, breaking a window and damaging a door. The men on a motorbike who threw them drove off before they were identified. This stoning was reported in several Indonesian papers as well as outside. After it a group of Aditjondro's students kept an all-night vigil on the house for some days.

In the following weeks there was speculation that Aditjondro would be dismissed from his university post, with precedents being cited of other private universities which had succumbed to pressure to dismiss staff members who had taken a public position in defiance of the government.

Complicating Dr Aditjondro's relations with the Satya Wacana University administration is the fact that he has long been sharply critical of various of its projects in East Timor. Some of these are government research projects initiated under the Five Year Development Plan of Central Java's Regional Planning Council. Others are community service projects, including a training centre

linked to oil exploration in the Timor Gap area.

On the other hand there has been a good deal of support for Aditjondro in the Indonesian dailies and weeklies. In the mainstream media there have been very few expressions of sympathy for his ideas on East Timor, indeed very few expositions of them. But there has been widespread praise for Aditjondro's integrity as a scholar and for his contributions as an environmentalist, and support for his right to speak freely.



The April issue of the respected monthly *Forum Keadilan* was especially supportive. And the 7 April issue of the weekly news magazine *Editor* carried a piece on "Terror for Critics", in which attempts to intimidate Aditjondro were linked with similar actions against his Satya Wacana colleague Arief Budiman, the prominent lawyer Buyung Nasution and the well-known Muslim writer Emha Ainun Najib.

There have also been numerous overseas expressions of support for Aditjondro. On 8 April, 35 Indonesia specialists from 11 Australian universities released an open letter they had sent to the Rector. They wrote that "pressure to forbid Dr Aditjondro from continuing his work at Satya Wacana, if successful, would do irreparable harm both to the University's name and to the constructive role of academia in Indonesian public life."

With the papers presented here, Dr Aditjondro has given Indonesian discussion of East Timor a new dimension.

Comparing the Indonesian adventure in East Timor with the American one in Vietnam, he has stressed the importance of how Indonesian intellectuals have allowed themselves to become victims of censorship and media manipulation on the issue of East Timor. He is presenting Indonesia's democratic movement with a tough new challenge.

# East Timor



## THE HISTORY OF EAST TIMOR THAT *TEMPO* OVERLOOKED

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In its first Feature Report about East Timor after the catastrophe of 12 November, 1991, the weekly magazine *Tempo* began its analysis as follows: "On 31 May, 1976, the people of East Timor declared their right to become part of Indonesia." Journalistically speaking, this declaration may be correct, but in scholarly terms the opening lines of *Tempo's* Feature Report contain three weaknesses.

The first is that *Tempo* failed to clarify that those who "declared their right to become part of Indonesia" consisted of only 28 people who congregated in the former Dili sports hall. These people called themselves the "People's Representative Council of the Region of East Timor". However, how and when these 28 people were chosen to "represent" the 650,000 people of East Timor was not made clear.

The report in *Tempo* of 12 June, 1976 (p. 19) on the integration petition outlined the difficulties the press encountered in covering the event as follows: "Journalists were not permitted to leave the sports hall. As soon as they moved to descend the stairs, they were admonished by an official in civilian clothing. It was the same when they tried to question members of the committee who were gathered outside the meeting place. The same official politely requested that they go back into the sports hall". What then is our basis for the belief that the petition of these 28 people truly represented all, or at least a majority, of the people of East Timor?

The second weakness is that *Tempo's* Feature Report presented East Timor's history as if it only began when a small section of that country's popula-

tion issued their petition to become part of the Republic of Indonesia - without a referendum. This gives the impression that the transition period from 8 May, 1974 (when the Governor of Portuguese Timor announced the freedom of the people to form political parties) until 31 May 1976 was a period of calm, without flare-ups, and without meaningful expressions of their political aspirations by the East Timorese. This assumption is clearly wrong.

But what explanation does *Tempo* give for this very important two-year period? Of all that was recorded, not everything was written up. Items not covered by *Tempo* in its recent Feature Report include the late Foreign Minister Adam Malik's letter to Ramos Horta on 17 June, 1974, which supported the right of the East Timorese to independence; the proclamation of independence by the Democratic Republic of East Timor on 28 November, 1975; and the pro-integration proclamation made two days later. Silence on this information, provided over the two years, constitutes the third weakness of the Feature Report in *Tempo* of 23 November last year.

Then still a journalist on *Tempo*, I assisted in the writing of three Feature Reports on the process of decolonisation in East Timor (15 June 1974; 6 Sept. 1975; 20 Sept. 1975). My interviews with various community leaders of East Timor who came to Jakarta, such as Jose Manuel Ramos Horta (Fretilin) and Guilherme Maria Goncalves (Apodeti), were published in *Tempo*. Besides that, during my free time I often spoke informally at the Kartika Chandra Hotel in Jakarta with Mario Viegas Carrascalao of UDT, and with Jose Goncalves, a non-party man who was Minister of Economic Affairs in the Democratic Republic of East Timor, and later a member of the Advisory Council in the Interim Government of East Timor. Carrascalao and his family stayed for a long time at that hotel. Later he worked at the office of the Indonesian Permanent Representative at the U.N. in New York, then in Dili as the Governor of East Timor, a post he still holds (until Sept. 1992 - ed.).

As an individual who has followed closely the developments in East Timor, I have a sense of obligation to *Tempo* readers who are not familiar with East Timor's pre-integration history, which this magazine did purport to cover. To repay this debt, I will present some important points from *Tempo*'s coverage from the period 8 May, 1974 to 31 May, 1976.

Firstly, the political party that wanted to integrate with Indonesia from the outset, AITI (Indonesia-Timor Integration Association), which later changed its name to Apodeti (Popular Association of Democratic Timor), initially wanted to integrate in stages. As Jose Fernando Osorio Soares, 35, the Secretary General of AITI, told *Tempo*, this party wanted to foster a greater feeling of closeness to Indonesia amongst the Timorese people. They planned to do this firstly through the teaching of the Indonesian national language. Soares' view was supported by

a young pastor from the Fatima Seminary, Jose Antonio da Costa, 33, a Doctor of Theology from the Gregorian University in Rome.

Da Costa proposed that rather than having to travel long distances to Macao or Lisbon to study philosophy, prospective pastors should be able to study in Flores. For this reason he proposed to his Bishop that they should invite a pastor from Indonesia soon who could teach the Indonesian language to prospective pastors in East Timor. This young pastor was of the opinion that it was impossible to achieve integration in the space of one or two years. What was important for him was that the peoples from the two regions of the island should be left alone to become acquainted with each other on the basis of freedom. As well as suggesting the opening of the border between the Portuguese and Indonesian territories, he also recommended that freer trade relations be established (*Tempo*, 15 June 1974: 10-12).

Secondly, spiritual leaders in East Timor had already begun to enter the political arena from the time of the Proclamation of Political Freedom on 8 May, 1974, so this eventuality was not new. Various native Pastors were in attendance at the meeting to create the AITI Party (Apodeti's predecessor) at the Akaid hotel. Although they did not engage directly in political campaigning, "spiritual leaders had the task of educating the people to obey the norms as required, also in political life", said Pastor Antonio da Costa (*Tempo*, 15 June 1974: 12). One year later, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in Portuguese Timor conveyed their formal support for Apodeti through an announcement by the Bishop of Dili, along with the Bishops of Kupang and Atambua in Indonesian Timor, which gave support to idea of the integration of East Timor with Indonesia. (*Tempo*, 6 Sept. 1975: 9,12)

The involvement of elements of the Catholic church in the political arena since the beginning of the process of decolonisation has evidently been largely forgotten. *Editor* magazine, whose reporters are mostly ex-*Tempo*, did not touch on this fact in their Feature Report on "The Church and Politics in East Timor". It told its readers little more than that an elderly Pastor from Paroki Balide, Eduardo Barito, 74, who was strongly pro-integration, "helped Indonesia at the UN in 1978 to solve the problem of East Timor". (*Editor* 30 Nov. 1991: 15) Closing its eyes to the earlier attitude of the East Timorese Catholic church hierarchy, which 16 years ago was enthusiastically pro-integration, *Editor* did not investigate why it is that these spiritual leaders are now often accused of supporting anti-integration groups. *Tempo's* Feature Report of 23 November, 1991 (p 26) repeated the news about the letter to the Secretary-General of the UN by the Bishop of Dili, Mgr. Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, in which he recommended a referendum for East Timor. (*Tempo*, 27 May, 1989) But it did not explain that the last Portuguese Bishop in East Timor, Dom Jose Joaquim

Ribeiro, had supported integration in 1975.

Remembering my interview with a young pastor in the Seminary at Dare, 20 kilometres south of Dili, I asked myself what was the real role of Antonio da Costa in the formation of Apodeti. Why is his name not in the list of Apodeti founders, in either the pro or anti-integration literature? Is this what was meant when the church was said to be "not directly involved in political campaigning"? After the integration of East Timor, which happened faster than Antonio da Costa expected, where did this pastor go? In a country as small as East Timor, a Doctor of Theology from the Gregorian University in Rome cannot simply disappear. The fact is that when the Interim Government of East Timor (PSTT) was formed, there were only two pastors in it, Pastor Apolinario, the head of the Department of Spiritual Matters, and Pastor Jose Antonio, S.H., the head of the Department of Education and Culture.

Thirdly, the social teachings of the Catholic Church coloured the thinking of Fretilin leaders as well as Apodeti leaders. This is evident from *Tempo's* interview with the Fretilin leader, Ramos-Horta in Jakarta in June 1975:

"Question: Are you a Communist or Marxist or a Socialist like Mario Soares?"

Answer: I would ask you to separate me personally from Fretilin. Because of the name "Revolutionary Front", people easily accuse us of being "Communists". The fact is that as a "Front" we have assembled people from many different ideological positions who have the same goal: to free Timor Dilly. So Fretilin itself has no particular ideology. But as an independence movement, we must be radical. I myself am a Catholic. I don't subscribe to any particular ideology because I don't want to believe in an ideology that has emerged from the West. But I have a philosophy, which I call Mauberism. The Maubere in the Timorese language are the little people, the poor people. So Mauberism is a philosophy which concerns itself with how the poor people in society can become literate and free from poverty and other social injustices.

Question: Isn't that the same as the Catholic Church's social teachings?"

Answer: Indeed my philosophy fits with Christian principles. But I am reluctant to use the Christian label because the Catholic church in East Timor still has to free itself from its alienation in our community, the Maubere community."

The social teachings of the Catholic Church had influenced not only Ramos-Horta, but other Fretilin leaders as well. The Fretilin Chairman, Francisco Xavier do Amaral, 39, is a graduate of the Seminary in Macao, as is his brother-in-law, the leader of Apodeti, Osorio Soares. (*Tempo*, 15 June 1974, p.10)

Fourthly, let us examine the position of the Democratic Union of Timor

(UDT) which initially wanted to remain under the Portuguese flag but in the end was ready to integrate with Indonesia. Its Chairman, F.X.Lopes da Cruz, sent a petition to President Suharto requesting aid for weapons and ammunition. This 17-paragraph petition from the UDT recommended the territory's integration with the Republic of Indonesia on the following conditions: Ex Portuguese Timor would become the 27th province with full autonomy. The people would be free to use the Portuguese language while they are being taught the Indonesian language. They would be governed by a Governor of East Timor. After three years an act of free choice would be held in which the people could choose either to become independent or to continue as part of Indonesia.

The Indonesian Government's reply was given through the Regent of Belu, Markus Diduk, on 19 September, 1975. The Regent said that President Suharto agreed with UDT's petition. (*Tempo*, 11 Oct. 1975:12) From this it is clear that the "window" to independence was left ajar by the party which had previously wanted to remain under the Portuguese flag. The tendency to identify anti-integration sentiments solely with Fretilin gives too much credit to Fretilin.

A fifth aspect which *Tempo* overlooked was that the rapid economic development in East Timor in the last phase of Portuguese rule was a cause of concern to the Government of East Nusa Tenggara (NTT). In June 1974, I had the opportunity to interview the Governors responsible for the eastern and western parts of the island, Colonel Fernando Alves Aldeia in Dili, and Brigadier General El Tari in Kupang. Addressing the participants of a seminar on animal husbandry in Kupang which I attended, El Tari appealed to the central government to channel funds to the land transport subsector of NTT. He said that did not need to be done all at once and evenly distributed throughout the province. Rather it should be done in steps from east to west.

Why did El Tari give such high priority to the development of roads in West Timor? The problem was that the Governor of NTT, who had twice visited neighboring Portuguese Timor, was concerned when he heard of Lisbon's plan to spend 500 million escudos (about Rp. 7.5 trillion) on 400 kilometers of asphalt roads and the construction of five airports. According to the plan, the road was going to begin in Dili and go to small towns near the Indonesian border, as a part of Portuguese Timor's fourth five-year plan (1974 - 1978).

Aldeia, then in his second term as Governor had established working relations with his colleagues in Kupang in the areas of culture, trade, and freer border crossings. (*Tempo*, 15 June, 1974: p.11) People who frequently went back and forth between Kupang and Dili were aware that Dili, with a population only half that of Kupang's, already had its own Mayor, whereas Kupang did not yet have Kotamadya status. Dili appeared to be cleaner and neater compared to Kupang. (*Tempo*, 13 July, 1974: p. 18) So it is not surprising that Dili was more

attractive to foreign tourists than Kupang.

The NTT Governor's appeal, which was concerned about the lag in West Timor's development compared to that of East Timor, was underlined by *Tempo* at that time. "It is easy to see who would be embarrassed if people in the border area saw that roads in independent Indonesia were worse than the main roads in the neighbouring country which was still a colony". (29 June, 1974: p.42). A year later, El Tari's appeal was answered when the Army Construction Engineers of the Udayana Military District suddenly built 100 kilometers of main road from Kefamenanu to the border, using the labour of Timorese refugees (*Tempo*, 6 Sept.1975: p. 11, 20 Sept. 1975: p. 9). This explanation is necessary to correct the Feature Report in *Tempo*, 23 November, 1991 (p.27) which only stated that: "For the 450 years that Portugal has been there you could say that they have done nothing. By the end of 1975 or the time of integration there were only 12 kilometres of asphalt roads in all of East Timor, and they were in the capital city of Dili."

Sixthly and finally, *Tempo* overlooked the non-budgetary spending in the name of East Timor refugees, which led to a lot of concern in various circles in Jakarta. At least, it concerned *Tempo* editors. The millions of *rupiah* which were channelled every day to Kupang and Atambua in the second semester of 1975 were taken from the non-budgetary purse of various government departments in Jakarta, without accountability to the Parliament. *Tempo* wrote on 25 October, 1975 (p.7): "This flow of money to Timor can disturb the stability of the national monetary system, if there is no formal institution to observe and supervise the flow of money to the NTT border, so that financial discipline can be guarded, so that spending in the name of 'Timor refugees' does not end up as profits for speculators in basic needs and medicines."

This concern about a disturbance to the discipline of national finance was not without foundation, because the estimates of the number of refugees varied widely. General Widodo said that the number of refugees could increase to 3,000. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja as acting Foreign Minister said there were 15,000. That figure subsequently grew to 40,000 according to *Sinar Harapan*, or 50,000 according to *Suara Karya*. (*Tempo*, 20 Sept 1975: p. 8) Estimates of funds needed were evidently calculated on the basis of estimates of numbers of refugees expected to arrive as well as of refugees already there. Did *Tempo* ever investigate what percentage of spending per Timorese refugee really found its way to the refugees, and what percentage fell into the hands of speculators? In other words, did *Tempo* ever examine who became rich from the suffering of the refugees in Timor?

It is also worth examining the views of *Tempo* readers on the developments in East Timor during this period. In going through the bundles of *Tempo*

in the Southeast Asia collection of the Olin Library of Cornell University, I came across only three letters from readers on this topic.

The first of these (17 August, 1974), written by J.K Wiriasuganda, Banjarmasin, included the following: "I am very interested in *Tempo's* article of 15 June, 1974 about Portuguese Timor. What a pity you didn't report the attitude of Indonesia's representatives there towards this problem. Let us hope that willingness to integrate with the Republic of Indonesia is already a determined will of the community in this province."

A second letter was from Harun Al Rasid in Australia on 29 March, 1975. He said: "Indonesia, which initially had a passive attitude despite the fact that the Constitution calls for the elimination of colonialism from the face of the earth, has woken up from its sleep and started to pay attention to the problem of this colonial land.... The problem now is: what is our attitude? In my opinion, there are two approaches we could take. The first is that we must at all costs take over Portuguese Timor if a change in its status represents a 'threat' to the safety of our land and could become a 'thorn in our flesh'. The second says it is up to the people of Portuguese Timor themselves: Will they join the Republic of Indonesia or establish their own State, with the condition that there must not be any pressure placed on them in the referendum which is to be held? I don't know if there is any data which can be believed concerning the threat and the pressuring mentioned. However, to have a political attitude which is both moral and honest one needs to be accountable not only to the people of Indonesia but also to other countries, and also to God Almighty as a principle of the *Pancasila*."

A third letter was written by Honorarius da Lopez, from East Jakarta (where he stayed at the Universitas Indonesia student dormitory in Rawamangun) on 11 Oct. 1975 . He said: "Some of us have recently been provoked emotionally to play 'let us just invade'. Indeed, there are reasons for an 'invasion'. Fretilin, the party which is de facto in power, does not have the support of the people - and is Communist. Concerning popular support, it is clearly too early for us to be sure. The Dutch colonial government always used to say that the Republic of Indonesia was only Yogya and Bukittinggi. So, in order to determine who has popular support in Portuguese Timor there needs to be a referendum there. To be sure that it is not considered partisan, it would be best if it were conducted by the UN without any Government interfering. On whether Fretilin is communist, we should not follow in the footsteps of the Dutch government which said Indonesians struggling for independence were 'communist extremists'. I personally am anti-communist, but I am of the opinion that fighting communism cannot be accomplished by labeling a group and crushing it with violence. Attacking communism can only be done through efforts to eradicate the poison of communism from ourselves. These efforts can be in the form of strengthening our faith

in God, acknowledging human rights and freedoms, developing democracy and challenging dictatorship and opposing the emergence of a new class that speaks in the name of the people but oppresses them. Let us not be anti-communist in name and just like the communists in our actions and attitudes. I hope that 'Independence is the crown of every nation' remains our guide."

These three letters adequately represent the spectrum of opinion amongst the elite of Indonesia concerning developments in East Timor, before integration. The first letter represents the most 'popular' opinion, which wants to see East Timor integrate quickly with its 'older brother', Indonesia. The second letter represents the more moderate voices. The third letter is the most radical. Representing a minority at the time (and perhaps today too), it argues for a referendum to be held by the UN to honor the right of the people of East Timor to independence.

Leaving aside the content of the letters, it is rather strange that only three letters from readers concerning East Timor emerged during this time. This was possibly because the decolonisation process in Portuguese Timor was far away from the concerns of the majority of *Tempo* readers. It may also be that many *Tempo* readers were afraid to comment on a topic which was already considered to be sensitive. Or it could be that many readers' letters about East Timor were withheld by the editorial staff of *Tempo* as part of an effort of self censorship, for the sake of the safety of the ship and its crew.

This then is a quick note about one important phase of the history of East Timor that was evidently overlooked by *Tempo*. I hope this brief note can help us to understand the crisis in the country at the foot of the Ramelau ranges.

*Ithaca, 10 February, 1992*

# FROM MEMO TO TUTUALA: A KALEIDOSCOPE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN EAST TIMOR

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In response to a request from the chair of the Special Unit on Environment of the Satya Wacana Christian University, I will share the environmental problems which I investigated during a visit to East Timor from 28 June to 9 July 1993. First of all, taking into account their degree of importance, the time I spent on field work, and the limitations on my own time and resources, this paper will only discuss the environmental problems that I investigated while I was in East Timor.(1)

My second point is that, as I understand it, 'environmental problems' are not restricted to matters relating to biological and non-human natural resources but also encompass the disruption to sustainable living for the indigenous East Timorese.

Thirdly, as befits an investigator and scientist, I will not confine my reflections on the environmental problems in the Island of Timor to my field observations while I was there but will complement this with a study of the literature about the island that I have collected here in Indonesia, in East Timor (2), in the U.S. during my periods of study there (1981-82, 1987-1989, 1991-1992) and in Lisbon, Portugal when I attended the Fifth Symposium on East Timor held by Oporto University from 22-29 July 1993.

In my opinion, there are five main environmental problems 'plaguing' the land of Loro Sae. First, the environmental impact of the war that has been waged for the past 18 years to crush the liberation struggle there. Second, the impact of large tracts of land owned by old and new absentee owners/controllers of land. Third, the impact of the official transmigration programme and the flood of spontaneous migration from Indonesia following the era of the open war. Fourth, the impact of the programme of guided villages and the construction of houses by territorial battalions in East Timor. Fifth, the potential impact of the planned

exploration and exploitation of oil and natural gas in the Timor Gap. In this paper, I will examine briefly these five environment problems.

### **The war**

As we all know, the official version which has been (must be) disseminated by the Indonesian mass media since October 1975 is that only civilian Indonesian volunteers were asked to help anti-communist groups in East Timor to liberate the Portuguese colony from domination by Fretilin, which was portrayed as an extreme communist group supported by elements in the Portuguese colonial army. The true facts have fortunately now begun to emerge for the Indonesian public. The weekly journal *Tempo* in its edition of 5 December 1992 published a documentary photograph on page 28 with the following caption: "ABRI troops landing in East Timor (1975)". (3)

The January 1993 issue of *Angkasa* published a report illustrated with colour photographs on pages 39 - 42 describing how Indonesia purchased 16 OV-10 Bronco counter-insurgency aircraft from the U.S. to destroy the Fretilin liberation movement (1976 to 1979). According to the journal, these aircraft are capable of carrying a variety of weapons, including napalm, which suggests that reports that have appeared in the media and have been made by foreign observers about the use of napalm bombs in East Timor [see Taylor, 1991:204] may well be true.

Two sources whom I interviewed in East Timor, told me, without my even asking them, about a type of bomb that generated enough heat to melt the windows and glassware in the convent and that burned human flesh. If this is so, it is likely that herbicides used as defoliants such as Agent Orange which was used in Vietnam [Weisberg 1970; Galstone, 1971; Wilcox, 1989] were also used in East Timor, as foreign commentators have surmised [*Human Rights*, 1977: 63; Taylor, 1991:851.] This was also confirmed by a participant at the Symposium recently held by Oporto University in Estoril.

During my recent visit to East Timor, I encountered a "silent witness" of the ferocity of the war in December 1975, the former complex of Our Lady Fatima Seminary (Nossa Senhora de Fatima) which was almost totally destroyed by bombardment from sea and land on 13 December 1975. The destruction of that seminary was reported in 1979 by an Indonesian Jesuit, Alex Dirdja, in *Inter-Nos*, the house journal of his Order.

The environmental impact of the war can be divided into direct and indirect consequences. The direct impact is the human casualties, on the Indonesian side, and to a far greater extent, on the side of the East Timorese people. From December 1975 to August 1976, five hundred Indonesian soldiers were killed and 2,000 were seriously wounded. The number of casualties on the East Timorese side is far in excess of this.

According to the American political scientist R. William Liddle, sixty thousand men, women and children, or about ten per cent of the population of East Timor, were killed in the fighting or as a result of war-related deprivations during the first two months of this terrible war. [1992:22]

The death toll among the East Timorese quickly escalated during the succeeding years. During the first three years of the war, the population in the territory fell from 688,771 in 1974 to 329,271 in October 1978. What happened to the shortfall of 359,500 people? About 4,000 people went into exile in Portugal and Australia in 1975-1976. A large number of people were forced to flee or went voluntarily into the forests or went up into the mountains with Fretilin, as a result of which they could not be included in the army's census.

**TABLE 1**

**Coffee Exports from East Timor 1973-1988**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Amount exported</b>
<b>1973</b>	<b>5584</b>
<b>1978</b>	<b>1329</b>
<b>1979</b>	<b>2510</b>
<b>1980</b>	<b>5597</b>
<b>1981</b>	<b>3547</b>
<b>1982</b>	<b>2968</b>
<b>1983</b>	<b>4600</b>
<b>1984</b>	<b>2995</b>
<b>1985</b>	<b>3195</b>
<b>1988</b>	<b>6000</b>

*Source: Soesastro, 1991:224*

But quite apart from the problems plaguing the census, anecdotal accounts point to an exceedingly high death toll. According to Alex Dirdja, an Indonesian Jesuit priest who was in East Timor in the month of March 1979, the Maubisse

village in the district of Ainaro, which had a population of 9,607 in 1976, had lost 5,021 inhabitants. The priest sometimes had to bury four people in a single day .[1979:23]

Another direct consequence was the fall in rice production, in the number of cattle, in coffee output and other natural resources. The overall output of agricultural crops fell from 42,100 tons in 1973 to 12,600 tons in 1976. The rice output alone fell during the same period from 25,200 tons to 8,000 tons. [Soesastro, 1991:210] After three years of open warfare, the number of cattle in East Timor fell dramatically. [see Table 2, ramelau piece) The output and export of coffee, which was East Timor's leading crop, also fell drastically. [see Table 1] (4)

There have been many indirect consequences of the war in East Timor. The most important of all is the fostering of a culture of violence in the territory. This culture of violence, which reached its zenith with the massacre of 271 young people at the Santa Cruz cemetery, Dili on 12 November 1991, is closely connected to the "intel culture" in East Timor. What is meant here is the emergence of an appalling habit among East Timorese of spying on their compatriots, trying to solve the conflicts between them by making - often false - reports about the activities of their rivals to the security forces in East Timor. [Neonbasu, 1992:36,38] (5)

This culture of violence, or, perhaps more correctly, this culture of intimidation, has given birth to a new vocabulary in East Timor. Informants who are native East Timorese are nicknamed *bufo* (from the days of PIDE, the Portuguese secret police) or *Mau'hu* (a new term that has come into being during Indonesian rule). As a way of intimidating people who oppose the government, a number of new expressions have been created which are strongly associated with the methods of execution and torture employed during the first five years of war in East Timor. They include *mandi laut* (bathing in the sea) in Dili, (*jalan-jalan ke Jakarta Baru* (taking a trip to New Jakarta); *piknik ke Bullino* (going on a picnic to Bullino) in Ainaro and *menghinap di Hotel Flamboyan* (staying the night in the Hotel Flamboyan) in Baucau.

Besides the linguistic dimension, there is also a gender dimension to the culture of violence which unfortunately has not been taken up by activists who defend the rights of women in Indonesia. As with armies of occupation everywhere, sexual harassment of native women by thousands of Indonesian soldiers has been unavoidable. In the course of my observations, I have noted two kinds of reactions from the local population to the sexual pressures from soldiers who are stationed there. Some simply resign themselves to becoming the "kept women" of the armed men who are bivouacked in their *kampungs*. Without intending to insinuate, I call this the "Viqueque model", named after the place

where this kind of response has been reported.

However, in some places, the local women are rigorously protected by their traditional community. Any soldier who is attracted to a woman must first go through a traditional ceremony (for instance, paying a dowry that is fixed by the prospective in-law family) and then go through a marriage ceremony in church before being allowed to live with the woman he wants. Any soldier who refuses to undergo these customs and the church ceremony is reported to his superior officer in Dili, some of whom have been willing to discipline their subordinates who play around with women. This happens particularly in the eastern sector (district of Lautem) and the central-eastern sector (Manatuto and Baucau) where the Falintil guerrilla forces (6) are still a force to be reckoned with by ABRI (the Indonesian military).(7) This response, which I call the "Lospalos model" because I heard about it on my way from Lospalos to Tutuala, has occasionally been able to prevent the soldiers there from using local women for their sexual satisfaction.(8)

It is very important to underline the culture of violence in East Timor. I say this because some Indonesian intellectuals - among them members of the academic staff at Satya Wacana Christian University - actually believe that it will be easy to resolve conflicts over the exploitation of natural resources in East Timor simply by applying the provisions of the Law on Administration, the Law on the Environment and other Indonesian civic and military rules and regulations.

Another indirect consequence of the war in East Timor is the plunder of various natural resources, particular the livestock, by troops who are able to take advantage of the unsupervised transport network run by the civilian administration. The extremely severe livestock crisis felt during the first few years after "integration" had a number of negative effects. In the first place, bearing in mind the fact that livestock, especially bullocks and cows, are used to till the land according to the *renca* system which can also be found in West Timor, the yield from ricefields also fell. There are only a few places where it is possible for peasants to start tilling their land again. These are places where they are able to hire a tractor cheaply from a local non-governmental organisation such as the Etadep Foundation in the Loes River Valley on the boundary between the districts of Liquica, Ermera and Bobonaro and the Fatumaca College in the district of Baucau.

On the other hand, security disturbances in the Loes Valley have forced the peasants to change their past practice of letting their livestock graze freely in the valley bed. Now they have to keep what livestock they still have in cowsheds near their *kampung* on the mountain slopes. This has meant that they have had to cut down a part of the forest to clear grazing plots for each family's livestock.

This new method has led to serious erosion in the hills around the Loes Valley.[Metzner and Rumawas, 1991:16-17]

Another indirect consequence which is very obvious in countries that have lost large numbers of their menfolk because of war is that the burdens borne by the women have greatly increased. In East Timor they have had to take over as head of the household and make a livelihood to cater for the family's basic needs, as well as taking on additional jobs, along with their children, for productive purposes outside the home. [Nysliweg 1988:10-12, 52-53] School children in East Timor are often to be seen tarmacing roads [Seran, 1989], something that is rarely seen in Indonesia.

In recent years, teenagers have had their schooling cut short (with the help of the Tiara Foundation) to go off and work in factories in Indonesia. Some of these youngsters are employed by PT Kanindotex, near Salatiga. Their being taken there has little to do with improving their educational prospects and job opportunities and a lot to do with crushing the freedom aspirations which are so deep-rooted among the young people in East Timor.

Another indirect consequence and one that is most conspicuous in East Timor is discrimination in the construction of the infrastructure, particularly roads, bridges and harbours in favour of regions where armed conflict is still taking place, for instance in the eastern sectors of Baucau and Lautem. In the relatively peaceful regions such as Ermera and Maliana and from the Maliana border region to Suai, the condition of the roads is deplorable and there are hardly any bridges for crossing the rivers.

Finally, there are the consequences that have to be borne by people outside East Timor, in Indonesia and abroad. In Indonesia, communities that live in the vicinity of army barracks which accommodate troops that have just returned from East Timor must share in bearing the stress suffered by members of the armed forces. For instance, there often needs to be a speed-limit for traffic in the vicinity of these barracks. The broader community must also subsidise the war in East Timor bearing the costs of the "Seroja" orphanages that care for children of soldiers killed in East Timor. [See, for instance, *Sinar Harapan*, 16 June, 1985] The funds needed by the armed forces to cover the costs of the war in East Timor have reduced the share of the state budget allocated to education and health [See Kuntjoro-Jakti and Simatupang 1990].

In Australia and Portugal, people now have to look after the 5,000 refugees from East Timor. This has had consequences in the provision of separate settlements in these countries.

These are, in brief, the primary, secondary and tertiary consequences of the war that has raged for the past 18 years in East Timor, at first in the form of open warfare, and more recently in what has become known as "low intensity

conflict". At a time when environmental scientists have begun to pay special attention to the ecological consequences of war or ecocide in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, it is high time for Indonesian academics to investigate the ecocide that is happening in our own "backyard", East Timor.

## Land

A further environmental problem which is more limited in scale and its implications is the ownership of large tracts of land by just a handful of people. As so often happens in agrarian societies, a very lopsided pattern of land ownership leads to a situation where the majority work as agricultural labourers or become small-scale peasants. This "forces" the majority of poor peasants to scratch out a living on mountain slopes where no-one claims ownership and results in erosion. So, how has this condition, inherited from the days of Portuguese colonialism, fared during the era of the Indonesian occupation?

We first need to understand the structure of land ownership in East Timor during the Portuguese colonial era when vast tracts of land were in the hands of four main groups. First there was the *mestico* group (from the mixed marriages between Portuguese and local inhabitants), the descendants of political activists who were exiled to Portugal's easternmost colony. One example is the *fazenda* (large plantation) owned by the Carrascalao family in the border region between Liquica and Ermera. These *deportados* were given large tracts of land to dilute their radicalism so that they would not instigate local rebellions against Portugal.

The second group of large land-owners was a number of kings or *liurai* who had served the Portuguese well. One example is the King of Atsabe, Guilherme Maria Goncalves, one of the first chairmen of the pro-integration political party, Apodeti. Besides these private land-owners there were the state companies such as SAPT (Sociedade Agricola Patria e Trabalho) which controlled thousands of hectares of land in East Timor [Guterres, 1991:56] Most of the land controlled by the Portuguese state companies were coffee plantations in the western sector (Liquica and Ermera (9)) and some coconut plantations in the east (Baucau and Lautem).

But probably the largest land-owning institution in East Timor was the Catholic Church. The lands on which the parish churches stood and the monasteries, some with their own boarding-schools (*collegios*), were surrounded by large tracts of ricefields and plantations to feed the communities in the parishes and the *collegios*. During the Portuguese era, the ricefields owned by the *collegio* in Maliana were tilled by the students as part of their skills training and discipline.

The pattern of land ownership at the end of the Portuguese era was so lopsided that it is not surprising that the leaders of the UDT - most of whom were the offspring of *deportados*, but there were also six *liurai* - and of the

Apodeti, were very afraid when Fretilin was victorious in the elections of village heads that were held in the interior of the country in the second half of 1974. Fretilin had campaigned on a political platform that stressed the need for land reform [see Taylor, 1991:33] which meant re-distributing the large land holdings that were in private hands as well as those in the hands of the Portuguese state companies. Fretilin had even said that surplus land owned by the Catholic Church would be distributed to the landless peasants. This is why the leadership of the Catholic Church in Dili was initially anti-Fretilin.

It should be explained that this lopsided pattern of land ownership existed primarily in the western part of East Timor inhabited by clans of the Kaladi tribe who were the first to be pacified by the colonial troops, the priests and then the political exiles from Portugal. The lower slopes of Mount Ramelau were also very suitable for the coffee plantations owned by the *mesticos*, the *liurai* and SAPT. Farther to the east, where the population was mainly from the Firaku group of ethnic communities, Portuguese influence was far weaker. The land there is less fertile than in the west and was mostly owned by clans, with far fewer *fazenda* than in the west.

After 'integration', there were few basic changes in the system of large plantations. The large pro-Indonesian land-owners who had not fled abroad were able to keep hold of their *fazendas* and those *fazendas* that had been abandoned by their owners fell into the hands of a small group of East Timorese and Indonesians working for the new power holders in Dili. The plantation formerly owned by SAPT was taken over by a private company, PT Salazar Coffee Plantations, which is run by a group of businessmen who enjoyed the backing of the new rulers in Dili. In addition, there was a new group of landowners not in the coffee business such as for instance the sandalwood oil-refining company, PT Scent Indonesia, which has been granted concessions in all the sandalwood forests throughout East Timor. PT Marmer Timor Timur (East Timor Marble Co.) was granted the monopoly over all marble quarrying in East Timor.

Some land re-distribution did occur in a few villages here and there where land had previously been owned by one or two *mestico* families. This was carried out by the Village Development Institute of Satya Wacana Christian University in Vatuvou village, sub-district Maubara, district of Liquica, with the help of the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional) of the province East Timor. But on the whole, absentee landownership by large-scale companies, in contravention of the provisions and the spirit of the Land Reform Acts No. 5/1960 and No 56/1962, has grown enormously under the Indonesian government. So, we can anticipate that environment issues to do with land will intensify, along with civil and criminal cases arising from land conflicts.

Moreover, PT Salazar Coffee Plantations which monopolises the coffee

business, PT Scent Indonesia which monopolises the sandalwood-oil business and PT Marmer Timor Timur which monopolises marble quarrying, are all part of the PT Batara Indra Group which monopolises almost the entire economy of East Timor. This holding company grew out of PT Denok Hernandes International which was set up by the three officers who commanded Operation Seroja (the name of the operation mounted to invade and conquer East Timor, Tr.) - Benny Murdani, Dading Kalbuadi and Sahala Rajagukguk - with the help of a small clique of businessmen of Chinese origin, to finance military operations in East Timor by monopolising the purchase and export of coffee from East Timor. [Taylor, 1991:125-127]

And now, a subsidiary of PT Batara Indra Group, PT Watu Besi Raya, has been able to grab hold of the lion's share of civil engineering projects in East Timor. The same group of companies also set up a sugar plantation and sugar mill in the district of Lautem and built a new harbour in Kom, also in Lautem, though the company has fallen on bad times since the chief patron of PT Batara Indra Group, Benny Murdani, was pensioned off by Suharto. Before that happened, the Batara Indra Group had expanded beyond the borders of East Timor with the construction of a tourism project, including a casino, in Christmas Island, an Australian territory in the Indian Ocean.

Besides violating various articles of the Land Reform Laws, the subsidiaries of the PT Batara Indra Group also appear to be able to ignore the provisions of the Law on the Environment, in particular the Presidential Decree on Environmental Impact Assessment.(10) How then will it be possible to protect the sustainability of the sandalwood forests the products of which are virtually monopolised by PT Scent Indonesia? How will it be possible to minimise the effects of quarrying marble which is monopolised by PT Marmer Timor Timur? How should one anticipate the ecological consequences of the sugar plantations and sugar mills and Kom Harbour which have been built by those companies in Lautem ? And what about the ecological consequences of the new bypass that is being built by the same company in Manatuto?

### **Transmigration**

While large-scale land ownership has been gathering speed in East Timor, small landholdings have been shifting out of the hands of native peasants. Fortunately, this is happening in one or two districts only, because transmigration projects are still on a restricted scale in East Timor, centred in the districts of Maliana and Kovalima. There are also a few transmigration sites in the districts of Baucau and Viqueque, set up on the initiative of the Indonesian Communion of Churches and the East Java Christian Church. [Taylor, 1991:124] But for the moment, let us concentrate our attention on Maliana and Kovalima.

The transmigration sites in these two districts have several features that distinguish them from transmigration projects in Irian Jaya which several years ago attracted considerable international reaction. [See Aditjondro, 1986] Unlike the transmigration projects in Irian Jaya or in Kalimantan, the transmigration locations in Kovalima and Maliana have not been “carved” with a great deal of effort out of what was formerly primary forest, secondary forest, savanna or marshlands. On the contrary, these transmigration locations in Bobonaro and Kovalima were “pulled out of a hat” from ricefields that were formerly owned by local inhabitants. In one location in Bobonaro which includes the village of Memo, the ricefields were “acquired” from the local owners without a single cent being paid in compensation, according to the local peasants whom I interviewed. With not the slightest effort, the Balinese transmigrants - who are officially referred to in East Timor as “model farmers” - were very quickly able to reproduce their ricefields, drainage systems and temples, while at the same time widening the gap between their level of prosperity, culture and religion and those of the local inhabitants.

There is another aspect of transmigration in East Timor that distinguishes it from transmigration in Irian Jaya. The transmigration sites in Merauke and Jayapura have not attracted much of a flow of migrants from Papua New Guinea; but the transmigration projects in Bobonaro and Kovalima, which have so quickly turned into economic growth areas, have become a great draw for spontaneous migrants from West Timor, particularly from the district of Belu. Almost every hour on my journey from Maliana, the capital of the district of Bobonaro, to Suai, the capital of Kovalima, I came across buses and trucks full of passengers from Atambua, capital of Belu district. Since they are able to speak Tetun, which is their mother tongue, and adhere to the same religion as the majority of the people of East Timor, the migrants from Belu will soon intensify the struggle for land in the border region of East Timor, part of which is already controlled by transmigrants from Bali and East Java. (11)

So, where are the peasants of the Tetun, Kemak and Bunak communities, the original inhabitants of the border region of East Timor, supposed to go? There is less and less land available at the foot of Mount Ramelau because the upper slopes have been taken over by the coffee plantations and other business activities of Buginese and Makassarese traders who dominate the markets along a north-south axis running from Dili to Same.

### **Resettlement**

As for the lowland peasants living along the coast of Kovalima, they face a new challenge from economic activities connected with the exploration and exploitation of oil and natural gas in the Timor Gap - which I will discuss below. But

first, there is another environment problem which needs our attention, namely the re-settlement of inhabitants in the guided villages and the style of housing built by the territorial battalions in East Timor.

The style of traditional housing in Lospalos which, since Portuguese times up to the Indonesian era, has been regarded as "representative" of the region as a whole is in fact one of seven types of traditional architecture in East Timor. According to Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes [1987:16-17], these seven styles are: (1) the Bobonaro style, (2) the Maubisse style, (3) the Baucau style, (4) the Lautem style, (5) the Viqueque style, (6) the Suai style, and (7) the Oecussi style. These seven styles represent three quite distinct ecosystems or topographies. The first two, Bobonaro and Maubisse represent settlements in the mountainous regions. The next two, Baucau and Lautem, represent settlements in the upper plateaux, while the last three - Viqueque, Suai and Oecussi - represent settlements in the lowlands.

These seven traditional architectural styles are each the result of interaction over hundreds of years between the native inhabitants and their environment. The materials used for construction, the configuration of the *kampung*s and the specifics of the architecture of each building in the *kampung*s fitted into their system of beliefs, their social structure and the ecosystem in which they tilled the soil, hunted or secured their livelihoods in different fashions, as Cinatti and his co-authors described in detail in their 1987 study. It is therefore no coincidence that a region that is "only" 18,898 square kilometres (including the Oecussi enclave and Atauro Island and Jaco Island) should have produced such a stunning variety of traditional architecture, with Lospalos architecture displaying such exquisite carvings - on a par with the *tongkonan* of South Sulawesi, and the architecture of Baucau and Lautem which has a striking similarity to the *silimo* found in the Baliem Valley. [See Aditjondro, 1989:12]

Today, East Timor's traditional architecture has been slowly ravaged by the removal of populations from the interior of the country to the guided villages that are spread across a number of areas. These guided villages are the "inheritance" of resettlement programmes for the inhabitants who left the mountains and the Fretilin and Falintil guerrillas who surrendered or were captured in the late 1970s. This flood of people left the mountains in response to the intensive bombardment in 1976-79 by the OV-10 Broncos of AURI (Indonesian air force). This bombing campaign was very effective because the planes were able to fly as low as 100 - 200 metres, unloading the napalm bombs that so terrified the guerrillas. [*Angkasa* January 1993, 41-42]

Not only do the guided villages fail to use the traditional local architecture, they also have no surrounding plots of land to provide for the needs of a population that suddenly exploded in size. This is the reason for the extraordinary-

ily high death toll in those guided villages, which has been compared with the tragedy in Biafra. [Taylor, 1991:92:99]

After resettling the people who had come down from the mountains, the 'aid' provided for constructing houses for the population continued to flow. This was an integral part of the aid from the territorial battalions which was speeded up during the time Brigadier-General Rudolf Warouw was commander of *Kolakops*. This programme also failed to heed the cultural requirements of the native inhabitants which had produced a blending with a variety of ecosystems and topographies. Like the uniforms worn by the soldiers who built them, these houses built for the East Timorese were exactly alike. This had nothing whatsoever to do with encouraging independent initiatives by the people and everything to do with building as many houses as possible in the shortest possible time. Most important of all, all the houses were built along the main roads so as to make it easier for the security forces to keep an eye on the population. This surveillance aspect was clearly far more important than making sure that the inhabitants would be able to go to their gardens and areas of forest. (12) In many places the only useful thing the infantry battalions did under their programme of "territorial guidance" was providing water. Many of the houses they built remain unused.

Our fifth and final environmental problem, which is as yet still a potential problem, has to do with the drilling and distribution of oil and natural gas from the Timor Gap. Offshore drilling was begun last December by the US oil company USX Marathon Oil, a company with capital from Australia, Indonesia, Britain, Brazil, and Egypt. Ten other companies are ready to follow in Marathon's footsteps, Royal Dutch Shell (Dutch/British), Chevron (US), BHP Petroleum (Australia), Woodside Petroleum (Australia) and its subsidiary, Santos Ltd, Nippon Oil (Japan), Philips Petroleum (US), Sagas Co (Australia), Petroz NL (Australia), Enterprise Oil PLC (Britain) and Western Mining Co (Australia). These eleven companies stand ready to sink 45 exploration oil-wells in a seismic area that extends across 52,100 square kilometres. (*Publico*, 12 December 1991; *Cahaya Siang*, 3 October 1992; *Kompas*, 6 November 1992)

Various groups have reacted quite differently to the current "Timor Gap fever". Portugal, which is still recognised by the UN as the administering power in East Timor, has taken Australia to the World Court in The Hague. [Nairn, 1991] In Australia, Jose Ramos-Horta, on behalf of the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) has taken the Australian government to the Australian High Court. Meanwhile business circles in Australia and Kupang (Indonesia) are fighting hard for their respective regions and companies to become supply bases for the drilling of oil and natural gas. Of an evening, the flashing lights of the oil platforms docked in Tenau harbour are clearly visible from the town of Kupang. During the day, there is a mad scramble to buy up the land of people

living in the Bobol district, near Tenau harbour, because the provincial government of Nusa Tenggara Timur is actively promoting the bid for Bolok to become the supply base for oil-drilling in the Timor Gap, as well as to build an industrial complex covering 1,600 hectares. [*Pos Kupang*, 3 June 1993]

Things are still quiet in Suai, the capital of the district of Kovalima in East Timor. But government circles and the East Timorese evidently share the expectation that there will be an oil boom from the Timor Gap. Three new bridges over the dried-up rivers leading into Suai seem to be standing ready for a new influx of heavy equipment. (Or could they be there for transmigrants?) One indigenous priest I interviewed expressed the fear that offshore oil-drilling would include drilling along the south coast of East Timor which also has rich oil reserves. "When people here dig wells for water they often find oil," he said. He is afraid that the indigenous people who have gradually been losing their land to transmigrants and spontaneous migrants will now lose even more of it because of its value for oil-drilling.

It could be that the southern coast of East Timor will not be drilled for oil, even though oil-wells dug during the Portuguese era are still visible in Suai Loro. But, as in West Timor, various economic activities to back up oil and natural gas drilling can be expected to emerge in these southern coastal districts. Some people have already suggested that Suai be given a share in exploration activities for the Timor Gap by taking advantage of Holbelis airfield, which is large enough for Transall C-160 and Hercules C-130 planes to land, as a stepping-stone to Darwin in Australia. (Wibowo, 1993)

So measures should be taken to anticipate the impact of exploration for oil and natural gas in the Timor Gap on the coastal environment in south East Timor so that local inhabitants are not again provoked into rebelling. For as long as they continue to be regarded as Indonesian citizens they should have a veto on all economic activities that could conceivably be harmful or disruptive to their interests, in conformity with the provisions of Point 20 of the 1926 Law on Disturbances. (Salindeho, 1989:43-47)

Oil and natural gas exploration off the south coast of East Timor may also have harmful consequences for fishermen and others involved in maritime activities. In East as well as West Timor, the sea off the south coast is unattractive to fisherpeople. It is known as "the man's sea" (Mar de Homem) because of the huge waves that lash the shore, as compared to the Ombai Strait in the north which is known as the "the woman's sea" (Mar de Mulher). But even so, there is always the danger of tanker accidents occurring or oil spills from tankers that sail through the Timor Sea, events that are routine in the Straits of Malacca. Environmental activists in East Timor as well as in West Timor should be anticipating these possibilities.

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1. East Timor was hidden behind a veil of secrecy by the Indonesian government from the beginning of December 1975 until December 1988, when a more "open" approach to politics was initiated. However to this day there are a number of things which cannot be photographed even by Indonesian nationals. This is a sure sign of the different status accorded to East Timor, compared with other regions claimed as provinces of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. For that reason I am of the opinion that democratic elements in Indonesia should make extra efforts to lift this veil of secrecy.

2. I see seven reasons for regarding "East Timor" as a political entity not included in the political identity of "Indonesia". First, Indonesia's historical claim is to the former colonial territories of the Dutch East Indies. Second, what is known as the "Balibo Declaration" for integration with Indonesia was drafted by only five East Timorese politicians in a hotel in Bali under pressure from special military intelligence units (Opsus), to be handed over to the late Foreign Affairs Minister Adam Malik in Atambua (East Indonesia) as a reaction to the declaration of independence made by the Democratic Republic of East Timor in the presence of the people of East Timor in Dili, on 29 November 1975. Third, the decision taken by the People's Representative Council of East Timor which requested integration with Indonesia was attended by only 7 of the 35 *liurai* (traditional chiefs) of East Timor. Fourth, international law does not recognise East Timor as being a part of the Republic of Indonesia. Fifth, it is the constitutional duty of every citizen of the Republic of Indonesia to uphold the right of self-determination of all peoples (first article in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution). Sixth, the independence movement in East Timor has not yet been eradicated, moreover it is continuously being regenerated. Seventh, a referendum based on international principles has yet to be held in East Timor, in which the desire of the majority of the East Timorese to integrate with Indonesia could be confirmed.

3. As someone who wrote and edited reports about East Timor for *Tempo* magazine, I am able to point to an error contained in the caption of this photograph, which according to the credit was taken by one of *Tempo's* own staff. In fact that photograph, taken by former *Tempo* journalist Sjahrir Wahab, shows Indonesian troops landing in Atapupu in West Timor (Indonesia), in advance of the invasion of East Timor. All the troops which were landed by LST ships had their insignia indicating rank and unit removed, to create the impression that they were civilian volunteers landed to help the anti-communist front in East Timor. Both the invasion of Dili on 7 December 1975 and the previous attacks on towns bordering West Timor, such as Balibo, Maliana and Bobonaro, were off-limits to all Indonesian journalists, including those of *Tempo*. It is therefore not possible that *Tempo* could have possessed a photograph of the landing taken by one of its own journalists.

4. The decline of coffee production in East Timor cannot be attributed simply to the destruction of the coffee plantations by the ravages of war. A number of other factors must be taken into consideration. Firstly labour for the plantations became increasingly scarce, partly because of limitations imposed on the movement of coffee pickers who had previously been free to travel from region to region according to harvest needs. Secondly, price controls were imposed by the new authorities in East Timor. Moreover there was a period when the International Coffee Organization (ICO), which sets export quotas for its member nations, did not officially recognise East Timor as a part of Indonesia, with the result that this particular region was not allocated an export quota. (Soesastro, 1991:210-212, 223-227)

5. The most recent example of these false reports is that of the many people who have been forced to take a "blood oath" (*sumpah darah*) as a sign of the disbandment of clandestine organisations in the regencies of Ainaro and Aileu, whose members included junior high school students and civil servants, some of them cadres of Golkar and the National Indonesian Youth Commission, KNPI. An

older example is that of the torture and later imprisonment of a government employee, Dominggus S., who was held in several prisons in East Timor, Bali and finally Cipinang prison in Jakarta for 11 years after he had been involved with the defence of a number of families which were to be forcibly moved from their homes in Dili.

6. The Indonesian mass media still often mistakenly call the guerrilla movement Fretilin. In fact, on the initiative of Xanana Gusmao, the East Timor Liberation Force or Falintil (Forca Armada de Liberacao Timor Leste), was released in 1986 from being under the Fretilin hierarchy and changed from being the paramilitary force of a particular political party to being a unit of the national armed forces, directly under the highest command of the CNRM (Conselho Nacional de Resistencia Maubere), or the National Council of Maubere Resistance, whose members include all East Timorese who struggle for the independence of East Timor.

7. On Wednesday 17 March 1993 persons identified by the Armed Forces Information Centre as GPK (Security Disturbers Movement) remnants shot dead two members of the Students' Regiment (Menwa) and two members of the armed forces near the town of Lospalos. (Kompas, 19 March 1993) What was not reported by the Indonesian press was that two days later, six members of the armed forces were shot dead in the same area. According to my sources in Lospalos, there were many such occurrences during the first half of 1993.

8. According to Frantz Fanon, the satisfaction of sexual needs by soldiers of an occupying force with the women of the region they occupy does not meet biological needs alone. It also represents an attempt by the soldiers to reinforce their self-confidence, undermined as that is by the opposition to their presence which they face from the local populace. It also represents an act of vengeance for not succeeding in breaking the resistance of the local men. (See Fanon, 1967)

9. Coffee plantations were first established in Ermera by SAPT in 1899. (Taylor, 1991)

10. Foreign loan projects for East Timor are also free from the obligation to carry out proper environmental impact assessments. One example is the project to eradicate malaria via the wide-spread spraying of DDT, which was financed by loans from US-AID at the beginning of the 1980s, even though an environmental impact assessment was a compulsory element of US-AID procedure.

11. In the village of Casabau (subdistrict of Tilomar, regency of Kovalima), it was reported four years ago that 500 hectares of land belonging to indigenous East Timorese was grabbed by Javanese transmigrants in the region of Salele. (Fakta, 1 May 1989:54) According to what I was told by an informant, that group of transmigrants at first declared themselves Catholic, but after having settled in Salele they returned to being Muslims.

12. In several places, for example in the regencies of Lautem and Baucau, residents have to report to the local military post before they go to their gardens or to the forest, and then again on their return. In addition there are often changes in the location of villages, bringing them closer to main roads. Such security interventions sometimes have beneficial environmental effects, for instance decreasing the logging of yellow sandalwood for the wood carving for which Lospalos is famous. On the other hand they are often environmentally detrimental, for example by lessening the frequency of the weeding of gardens, which results in increased growth of alang-alang grass or imperata.

## IN THE SHADOW OF MOUNT RAMELAU: SOME SKETCHES OF EAST TIMORESE CULTURES

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**T**wo radically opposite misconceptions colour the literature about East Timor. In authors who sympathize with the independence struggle of the Maubere people there is a strong tendency to underline the uniqueness of the East Timorese cultures, which are claimed to be completely different from Indonesian cultures, of which Javanese culture is often taken to be most representative. For instance the most prominent leader of the Maubere resistance, Jose Alexandre Gusmao (Kay Rala Xanana), said in his defence speech in Dili (in May 1992 ed.) that only during the stone age were there similarities between the cultures of the East Timorese people and some of the peoples of the East Nusa Tenggara province of Indonesia.

On the other hand, pro-integration anthropologists and other social scientists who have studied East Timorese cultures tend to underestimate the resilience and adaptiveness of East Timorese cultures towards the various waves of domination with which they have had to cope. This underestimation is seen for instance in discussion of the role of Tetun (or Tetum), the lingua franca of East Timor, and of the role of the Catholic Church in this stillborn nation. Underestimating the vitality of East Timorese cultures goes hand in hand with a historical portrayal that the entire island was once united by one powerful kingdom, the kingdom of Belu, with its seat in West Timor, from where it spread the Tetun

language all over the island. (See for instance, Lopian and Abdurachman, 1980: 12-14, and Neonbasu, 1992: 20)

Budhisantoso, one of Indonesia's most prominent anthropologists, claims that Tetun has not been an effective vehicle for spreading the Christian religion in East Timor. (1980: 7, footnote No. 8) That is certainly a groundless claim. During the Portuguese era Tetun was not used as a major language for Catholic religious purposes, although a Tetun catechism had already been produced and the main prayers were being said in Tetun by some Catholics in the rural interior. But with the onset of the Indonesian occupation, when Portuguese was forbidden and the East Timorese Catholic church was not keen to adopt the Indonesian language as its major liturgical language, Tetun was adopted instead.(1) As a result of that policy membership of the Catholic church in East Timor grew dramatically, from only 27.8% of the population in 1973 to 81.4% in 1989. (Neonbasu, 1992: 76)

Both the misconception that the East Timorese cultures are completely distinct from Indonesian cultures and the misconception that the East Timorese cultures are just sub-cultures of Indonesia-based cultures are based in ignorance of history. Not all German-speaking peoples are happily united in one nation. Instead, they are spread over various nation states, namely Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Similarly not all the Malay-speaking peoples live in Malaysia. They are spread over Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand. And if we were to include all the peoples in the world who speak a Malayo-Polynesian - or Austronesian - language, this cultural realm would cover many more independent as well as still-born nation states.

Why then should one deny the fact that there are various strong cultural similarities between the East and the West Timorese, some of whom speak the same Tetun language, originate from the same Belu or Tetun ethnolinguistic group and profess the same Catholic faith? I certainly do not see that as requiring that they should be merged into one nation state, if the peoples of those two parts of the island do not wish that.

Avoiding the fallacy of exaggerating the "distinctiveness" of East Timorese cultures as well as the other one of overestimating the similarities between East Timorese cultures and other Indonesian cultures leaves us with room to comprehend the East Timorese cultures in a more positive way. It leaves us with two keys to analyze them and relate them to the struggle that is still going on in the territory. These are the ecological and the historical settings of East Timor. The ecological setting influenced and still influences the synchronic changes, while the historical setting influenced and still influences the diachronic ones.

According to the Portuguese architect, Ruy Cinatti, East Timor - includ-

ing the enclave of Oecussi - consists of three major ecosystems or biomes. These are first the mountains, second the hills and plateaux, and third the plains. (Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987: 56-57) Obviously, those three different biomes are not evenly distributed all over the island. The western and central part of East Timor is much more mountainous than the eastern part, which is covered more by hills, plateaux and plains. Plains also cover more of the southern than the northern coast of the territory, which is covered more by tidal swamps abundant with mangrove forests. This ecological division has influenced the population distribution of the island, which in turn has affected the concentration of the indigenous population and consequently Portuguese colonization and land-use patterns.

The western and central part of the territory, where the Ramelau mountain range is located has the highest population density in the territory (up to 40 persons per square kilometre in 1950) and became an ideal place to introduce coffee. And with coffee two major plantation systems were developed. One was the system of large plantations controlled directly by state-owned companies, such as the 9,000 hectares coffee plantation in Fatubessi, Ermera, which was owned directly by SAPT (Sociedade Agricola Patria e Trabalho) and has now been taken over by an Indonesian company, PT Salazar Coffee Plantations.

The second major plantation system is that of the *fazendas* (2), which were owned by individual families through whom the Portuguese colonial administration ruled East Timor. These were families of *liurai* (3) or chieftains who supported the colonial power and of Portuguese radicals who were deported to East Timor. By awarding them those land favors, the Portuguese colonial administration "bribed" the *deportados* into supporting Portuguese rule in the territory. The *mesticos* who were the offspring of those *deportados* became a second layer in the Portuguese colonial administration, together with the families of the faithful *liurais* and of officials from the African territories (4) who were posted in East Timor.(5) (Aditjondro, 1993a, 9-10) They also enjoyed greater educational opportunities, not only in the territory but also in other Portuguese colonies such as Macao, as well as in Portugal and other European countries. (6)

The eastern part of the territory, with its abundant hills, plateaux and plains, and a much lower population density (under 10 persons per square kilometre in 1950, with the exception of Baucau, which already had up to 40 persons per square kilometre), was less attractive to the Portuguese rulers. With the exception of Viqueque, the population of the eastern part of the territory had not been under the influence of the Tetun-speaking Belu kingdom (which contradicts the myth that the Belu kingdom once united the whole island of Timor). And the people of this region were also more resistant to the Portuguese rulers and their Catholic faith. The first Christians among the people of Tutuala, the

eastern-most settlement in East Timor, were baptized by Salesian missionaries as recently as 31 January 1948. (Vasconcelos, 1992) In contrast, the first baptism among the Bunaq people — whose homeland covers the western part of East Timor and West Timor — took place on 19 July 1875. (Bele, 1992 36)

## Differences

These ‘east-west’ differences among the Maubere people are often summed up under two popular names — and stereotypes that go with those names — “Firaco” for the Easterners and “Caladi” (7) for the Westerners. The Caladis are stereotyped as being more “civilized” and hence more diplomatic than the Firacos, who are considered to be more “barbarian” and to prefer to fight rather than negotiate.

This stereotype is still alive. One instance of it is that some former leaders of the independence movement who were Caladis — such as Francisco Xavier do Amaral — were too eager to surrender and negotiate with the Indonesian forces, whereas Firacos such as Kay Rala Xanana have shown a much stronger fighting spirit. Among the pro-integration leaders, the present governor, Jose Abilio Osorio Soares, who can be categorized as a Firaco (since he hails from Manatuto, which is also Xanana’s home district), also showed a tough fighting spirit in trying to insist that all future district heads (*bupati*) in East Timor should be native, civilian East Timorese. For months he has consistently resisted the wish of the Udayana army regional commander, Brigadier General Theo Syafei, to put military men from outside East Timor into strategic *bupati* posts like Viqueque. (8)

As with any stereotype, the Firaco-Caladi characterization of the East Timorese is full of exceptions. Guilherme Goncalves, a Caladi from Ermera who was the second Indonesian-appointed governor of East Timor, was also a man of strong fighting spirit, showing that in his criticisms of the coffee monopoly supported by Indonesian army officers. He used a New Year’s Eve party in 1980-81 in the governor’s residence to denounce atrocities which had been carried out against the Timorese people in the previous year. As a result he was kicked out of the governor’s residence after only two years in power, and in the following year his tenure was reduced from five to four years, on the pretext that he spoke bad Indonesian. He subsequently left East Timor and went into the microbus business in Jakarta. But his firm has been in trouble with the Jakarta special territory government. (*Fakta*, 1 June 1993, 78-79)(9)

Conversely the Firaco fighter Kay Rala Xanana has also shown sophisticated diplomatic skills, as for instance when in 1988 he managed to reorganize the scattered resistance units into the umbrella organization CNRM (10), after dropping the more leftist stance of Fretilin and appealing for a multi-party

system. The more conservative pro-independence party, UDT (11) was included in the CNRM coalition, together with FALINTIL, the former Fretilin army, which had been transformed into a national army after Xanana returned his Fretilin membership card.

After making all those organizational changes, based on the resolutions of the first and second national conferences of Fretilin in the interior in 1981 and 1984, and endorsed by the formation of the UDT-Fretilin National Convergence in Portugal in 1986, Xanana showed further negotiating skills in dealing with “outsiders”. He negotiated with the acting Bishop of Dili, Mgr. Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo (12) to obtain the support of the church for the independence struggle. And he even negotiated a cease fire with the Indonesian army commander of East Timor, Col. Purwanto (in March 1983, ed.). Unfortunately, that cease fire was soon annulled by the then chief of the Indonesian armed forces, General Benny Murdani.

Mgr. Belo himself, who hails from Baucau, is another Firaco who has shown very sophisticated diplomatic skills. He has continuously maintained a relatively independent stance for his diocese, in the face of Indonesian government and church authorities who have persistently urged him to publicly declare his support for integration.

This Firaco-Caladi characterization of the resistance’s leadership is certainly no more than a partial explanation of the resilience of the guerilla war in the eastern tip, or *ponta leste*. A second factor is the terrain with its savannas and hills, culminating in the Matebian mountain from where “mouse trails” allow the *guerrilheiros* to slip into the three bordering districts of Lautem, Baucau, and Viqueque. A third is the tacit support of *colegios*(13) which silently took care of the wives, widows, children and orphans of the *guerrilheiros*.

## Setting

But let us come back to East Timor’s historical and environmental setting. East Timor is located at the crossroads of all the major Asia-Pacific migrations of pre-historic times. As observed by Mendes Correia, pre-historic migrations have imprinted the genes of four races on the indigenous population of East Timor. These are (1) the Melanesoid race; (2) the Vedo-Australoid race; (3) the Proto-Malay race; and (4) the youngest race in this region, namely the Deutero-Malay race (Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987: 26).

Before the Indonesian invasion, the distribution of those racial genes was as follows: 7.5% Melanesoids; 13% Vedo-Australoids; 19.3% Deutero-Malays; and 60% Proto-Malays. This explains why one can see such a high diversity of physical types among the East Timorese peoples, ranging from the shorter, darker skinned and more Papuan-looking highlanders from the western interior,

to the taller, fairer-skinned and Polynesian-looking lowlanders of the eastern part of the territory. This also explains the similarity between the Lospalos architectural style and the Torajan and Batak architectural styles, since the people who built those beautifully decorated houses in Lospalos were predominantly of Proto-Malay stock like their Torajan and Batak brothers and sisters.

Some of the migration routes of the ancestors of the East Timorese ancestors have been described in the popular legends of the East Timorese, which trace their origin to Malacca, Makassar (now, Ujungpandang) in South Sulawesi, and the island of Ceram in the Moluccas. One of the most popular myths is about the origin of the island from a crocodile, who was a wanderer from Makassar, South Sulawesi. This myth, which has inspired many decorative patterns in East Timor, is shared with the Atoni of West Timor (Cinatti, 1987:154-155; Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987:13).

In more recent times African blood began to circulate among the East Timorese people. During the last stage of Portuguese colonialism East Timor's position in the Portuguese empire became that of an "overseas province", with the same status as the African colonies. So there was rotation of civil servants and military personnel, with East Timorese serving in Africa and Africans serving in East Timor. Prior to that European blood had begun to circulate in East Timorese veins, due to the voluntary as well as compulsory settlement of Portuguese in the territory. Arab migrants from what is currently the United Yemen Republic as well as Chinese migrants had also settled in the territory, attracted by the lucrative sandalwood trade.

In the late Portuguese period the Portuguese language was spoken only among the assimilated elites in the towns of Dili and Baucau. The majority of the indigenous East Timorese people still spoke their vernacular languages, indeed they did so until about a decade ago. The various early waves of migration did not merely leave their imprints in the genes of the population. They also interacted with the geographical isolation of the various ecosystems of East Timor to create more than thirty vernacular languages, some of which can be divided into several dialects.

As can be seen from the map and the list, the nine largest vernacular languages, in terms of numbers of speakers, are Tetun, Mambai, Makasai, Kemak (or Ema), Bunak, Tokodede, Galoli Dagada (Fataluku), and Vaiqueno. Considering also the smaller vernaculars, it is clear that East Timor is characterized by a much greater linguistic diversity than West Timor, where the main languages are Atoni (similar to Vaiqueno), Belu (similar to Tetun), Marae and Kemak (similar to the Bunak and Kernak languages in Bobonaro, East Timor), Helon (only on the island of Semau), and Rote (the language of Rote migrants on West Timor) (see Suparlan, 1971: 204). Of those six major West Timorese

languages (14), four overlap with the thirty languages of the East Timorese.

East Timor's greater linguistic diversity can also be found in smaller parts of the territory. For instance the island of Atauro, north of Dili Bay, which has been treated as a "prison island" by both Portuguese and Indonesian rulers, shows a quite high linguistic diversity. The indigenous inhabitants of that island, who amounted only to 5,180 people in 1915, speak three different languages. The Makili and Makdadi peoples who inhabit the southern part of the island speak the Ressusuk and Raklang'u languages, while the Beloi and Bikeli peoples speak the Rahessusuk language. It is still unclear whether those three languages should be treated as independent languages or as creoles, since most of their vocabulary is derived from (or similar to) Malay, Tetun, Mambai, Galole and Cairui words (Duarte, 1984: 1511, 15,19-20; Vasconcelos, 1992). Another area in East Timor with high linguistic diversity is Laga in Baucau district, where the people speak Nai-damo, Na Ine, Sahani and Waima'a. (Vasconcelos, 1992, *Funcacao Oriente*, 1989: 167)

### **Indonesian occupation**

These sketches of East Timorese cultures would be incomplete without a discussion of the cultural impact of the present Indonesian occupation. Let us begin by examining which group has had the highest death toll. Table 3 suggests that it was among the unassimilated peoples, the so called *gentios* or pagans that the most drastic population reduction occurred. (Dirdja, 1979: 22-23). While allowing for the difficulties of carrying out a proper census in a war zone, it remains safe to say that it was these unassimilated East Timorese, living mostly in the valleys of the Ramelau range in the interior of the western part of the territory whose livelihood was most drastically affected.

But it was not only in the western part of the island or among non-Christian highlanders that the death toll was high. The final sacrifice was made also by thousands of indigenous people in the eastern point area (*ponta leste*) who fled with the guerrillas to Mount Matebian. Faithful to its name, "the abode of death", Matebian was the silent witness to many raids by Indonesian counter-insurgency aircraft. Their bombs forced the surviving guerrilla fighters and villagers down into the lowlands of Baucau and into the resettlement camps in Laga. Many died in those camps. Many others died in overcrowded barracks on Atauro island. (15) Others were executed by being thrown into Dili Bay or off the cliffs at Hatu Bulico in the district of Ainaro or off the notorious Celicai river bank, which the local people came to call the "second hell" (*segundo inferno*).

Now that the "open war" has ended (and turned into a long-lasting guerrilla war), many highlanders and other villagers who were previously forced

**TABLE 1****Member Companies of PT Batara Indra Group (BIG)**

<b>PT Denok Hernandes</b>	Coffee trade, oldest BIG member, this company arrived with the Indonesian troops in 1975.
<b>PT Salazar Coffee Plantations</b>	Took over SAPT coffee plantations in Ermera.
<b>PT Palayaran Neediak</b>	Sea freight company.
<b>PT Batara Indra</b>	Initially established to manage the tourist and recreation activities of this group, it turned into BIG's holding company, which also imported various kinds of consumer goods to East Timor, from Indonesian cooking oil, sugar, wheat and cement to Portuguese wines. The shipment of its merchandise to and from East Timor was mainly handled by PT Neediak.
<b>Toko Marina</b>	Dili's main department store located in Colmera.
<b>PT Scent Indonesia</b>	Produces sandalwood oil, a basic material for perfumes, in its factory in Dili. It exports this commodity by air from Jakarta for US\$150 per kg in 50kg drums. This factory, the only one of its kind in East Timor, represents the largest industrial investment in East Timor so far. It employs 42 workers and produces 465 tons of sandalwood annually.
<b>PT Marmer Alam Timor Timur</b>	Produces marble in Manatuto. In 1993, it was officially still a "project" and not yet declared to be a commercial operation since the marble produced was not yet profitable. Its quality was considered to be lower than marble from Tulungagung in East Java, and the transportation cost to Java was obviously much higher compared to marble from Java and Lampung in Southern Sumatera. The East Timorese marble produced by this company is shipped by PT Pelayaran Neediak and to 2 sister companies of BIG in Surabaya.

<b>PT Kerta Timrindo</b>	Set up in 1991 as a side project of BIG's sandalwood and marble production units. It deals in marble handicrafts and sandalwood statues. In 1993 most of the craftspersons working in this factory near Comoro airport were people who had been recruited from Java.
<b>Hotel Mahkota</b>	East Timor's largest and most modern hotel, located in the centre of Dili next to the old SAPT building. A three-storey building with 92 rooms.
<b>New Resende Inn</b>	22-room hotel in Dili.
<b>Bioskop Seroja</b>	The only cinema in Dili, located at the former sporting stadium, where the 'integration' farce took place on May 31, 1976.
<b>PT Watu Besi Raya</b>	Contractor for most of the major civil engineering projects in East Timor including roads, bridges, and the unfinished harbour of Com in Lautem.
<b>PT Gunung Kijang</b>	Contractor for minor civil engineering projects.
<b>PT Guntur Madutama Sejahtera</b>	Started a sugar plantation and built a sugar mill in Lautem. The product was to be exported from the unfinished harbour of Com.
<b>PT Konindo Timur</b>	Not clear what is its line of production

*Sources : Timor Timur dalam Angka 1990; Muller, 1991; Tiara, September 12, 1993; Kompas, September 5, 1993; Jawa Pos, September 9, 1993; Suara Pembaruan, May 17, 1993.*

to live in settlement camps in the lowlands have been allowed to return to their villages on the mountains, hills and plains. Back home, however, life has not returned to normal. Coffee, the main cash crop of the highlanders, has been monopolized the production of sandalwood oil. Both companies, as well as PT Salazar Coffee Plantations which has taken over the SAPT plantations in Liquica and Ermera, belong to a holding company, PT Batara Indra Group.

As we can see from Table 1 the production of four major commodities - coffee, sandalwood, marble, and sugar — have practically or nearly been monopolized by this conglomerate. So is the trend in the production of handicrafts

from marble and the sandalwood wasted from the sandalwood oil production. And according to one of my sources, some of the marble ashtrays sold on the roadside in Manatuto were made by East Javanese migrants. This could severely limit the areas for the small farmers and craftsmen. Sandalwood and marble are actually strategic commodities for the indigenous rural people, because one does not need sophisticated technology to carve miniature Lospalos houses or rosaries from sandalwood, or ash trays from marble. Unfortunately, there are indications that the supply of sandalwood might have been drastically reduced. Meanwhile, Batara Indra personnel in charge of the sandalwood and marble businesses could not tell me whether with the total estimated marble available in East Timor, they would be able to maintain their level of production. If the monopolization of East Timor's strategic commodities continues along these lines, practically every Maubere or Bibere will have to become an employee of the Batara Indra Group, if he or she does not have a job with the government, the churches or other non-profit non-governmental organizations. So, besides losing their political independence, the Maubere have also been slowly losing more and more of their economic independence.

Indonesian government programs have also drastically reduced the cultural diversity of the Maubere people. The *Operasi Teritorial (Opster)* battalions have been building standard, nuclear family houses along the main roads everywhere, disregarding the various traditional architectural styles discussed earlier. This has had economic as well as cultural effects, since living in standard rows of houses along the main roads took people farther and farther away from their swidden farms, their hunting grounds, and their customary forests. For subsistence trips further away from the Opster-built houses, people have been required to report to local military posts, both before leaving on their trips and after returning from them.

There have indeed been some attempts by the Indonesian government to maintain the traditional architectural styles of the East Timorese. Those attempts, however, have been more of a symbolic and touristic nature. The only architectural style that has been promoted so far is the Lospalos style. And that has been promoted only in certain places, such as in Madame Soeharto's Miniature Beautiful Indonesia Park (*Taman Mini Indonesia Indah*) and in the village of Rasa in Lautem, where forty-four families are on display to be admired by the passing tourists (see Muller, 1991: 269-271).

The Indonesian occupation has not changed the Rasa village very much, for Rasa was already a show piece of excellent Lospalos craftsmanship in the Portuguese period. The major difference is that during those times Rasa was not the only showpiece of Lautem architecture. When the Portuguese architect Ruy Cinatti made his famous study of traditional East Timorese architecture, eight

other villages shared that honour, namely Vero, Tchailoro, Loro, Poros, Muapitine, Pehe-Pito, Ira-Ara, and Vailana (see Cinatti de Almeida and Mendes, 1987:120-155).

Another government program which has affected the livelihood of many lowland farmers in the western border area of East Timor, is the sponsored migration of Balinese and Javanese farmers to the Bobonaro and Covalima districts. Those hardworking and land-hungry farmers from Java and Bali were welcomed with land ready to be tilled which only needed some dikes and irrigation water, which the government was very willing to provide. In East Timor, in contrast to the transmigration areas carved out of the tropical rainforests or savanna forests in Kalimantan and Irian Jaya, paddy fields (*sawah*) were a well-established tradition in many parts of East Timor. What is distinctive about the East Timorese paddy fields is that the farmers rotate irrigated rice with grass, so that besides harvesting their rice they can also “harvest” their Timorese cattle on those rice-fields during the dry season. During the dry season, the cattle and the buffaloes are used to trample the mud in the rice fields, instead of the buffalo-drawn plows used in Java and Bali. (17).

Unfortunately, the pacification war of 1975-1980 killed most of the East Timorese cattle and buffaloes (see Table 2), so that many rice-fields were left idle. Thousands of hectares of such “underutilized” rice fields were awarded by the Indonesian government to Balinese and Javanese “transmigrants”, without any compensation being granted to the original land-owners, under the pretext of teaching the East Timorese better farming techniques. Only in East Timor are “transmigrants” officially called “model farmers (*petani teladan*).

### **Cultural changes**

When one moves from the material changes that have occurred in East Timor to the non-material or “ideological” changes, two radical changes stand out, the dramatic growth of Catholicism and the increasing popularity of Tetun.

As noted above, the number of professing Roman Catholics rose from only 27.8% in 1973 to 81.4% in 1989 (Neonbasu, 1992: 76). Six factors have contributed to this rapid change. First of these is the religious policy of the Indonesian government which requires every citizen to adopt one of the five officially recognized religions (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hindu and Buddhism). Catholicism seemed the most attractive choice, since the other recognized religions were mostly religions of the newcomers and non-East Timorese.

Secondly, the Catholic church in East Timor has taken a progressive stand, especially under the leadership of Monsenhores Martinho Lopes and Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, standing up for the universal human rights of the East Timorese, including their right to self-determination.

**TABLE 2**  
**Animal Population in East Timor from 1976 to 1987**

Type of Animal	Total Number of Heads			
	1979	1980	1985	1987
<b>Cattle</b>	<b>70200</b>	<b>30700</b>	<b>49800</b>	<b>53593</b>
<b>Buffalo</b>	<b>90600</b>	<b>24600</b>	<b>35200</b>	<b>36548</b>
<b>Horses</b>	<b>95400</b>	<b>15500</b>	<b>23400</b>	<b>23890</b>
<b>Goats</b>	<b>18820</b>	<b>26400</b>	<b>73900</b>	<b>79053</b>
<b>Sheep</b>	<b>27700</b>	<b>11200</b>	<b>27500</b>	<b>28309</b>
<b>Pigs</b>	<b>12190</b>	<b>64000</b>	<b>19040</b>	<b>20406</b>
<b>Poultry</b>	<b>72450</b>	<b>21880</b>	<b>41790</b>	<b>45320</b>
<b>Duck</b>	<b>31500</b>	<b>18100</b>	<b>29400</b>	<b>30408</b>

*Source: Aditjondro, 1993b:41*

Thirdly, participation in the numerous activities of the Catholic church has been the only way to associate freely and publicly in large numbers. The Indonesian authorities could not easily forbid this due to their *Pancasila* principles.

Fourthly, the iconography of the Catholic church, such as the crucifixes, Virgin Mary statues and grottos, and *via dolorosa* structures came to serve as substitutes for many indigenous forms of ancestor worship which became difficult to carry out in the territory, since they might be labeled Fretilin gatherings.

A fifth contributory factor was the influx of Catholics from the predominantly Catholic regions of East Nusa Tenggara, especially the Tetun-speaking Belunese from West Timor, who could easily travel by land to East Timor.

Finally, the church's growth was assisted by the adoption of Tetun as the liturgical language to replace Portuguese, which has been abolished from public use in East Timor by the Indonesian government.

**TABLE 3****Growth of Various Religious Groups in East Timor  
from 1974 to 1990**

<b>Religion</b>	<b>Total number of followers</b>	
	<b>1974</b>	<b>1990</b>
<b>Catholics</b>	<b>220314</b>	<b>676402</b>
<b>Protestants</b>	<b>2550</b>	<b>20660</b>
<b>Confucians</b>	<b>5660</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>Moslems</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>27334</b>
<b>Genios (Pagans)</b>	<b>460112</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>Hindus</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>3961</b>
<b>Buddhism</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>841</b>
<b>Others</b>	<b>18607</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>668771</b>	<b>747557</b>

*Source: Dirdja, 1979:22-3; Bappeda Tk I, 1992:128*

In spite of its position as an absolute and relative religious majority in the territory, the Catholic church has to face several problems at the same time. First, she has to be able to bring together both East Timorese and Indonesian Catholics residing in East Timor who support integration with Indonesia as well as East Timorese who are still striving for an independent Timor Leste Republic. Second, with the increasing number of Indonesian Catholics, both lay and religious, residing temporarily or permanently in East Timor, different traditions

of Catholicism have confronted each other. Third, for the first time in its history (19) the East Timorese Catholic church has to face a dynamic religious pluralism, with the number of non-Catholics continuously on the rise (see Table 3), due to the influx of outsiders as well as to the conversion of Catholics to other religions. Fourth, as the largest non-political force of the Maubere people, the Catholic church has often had to confront the Indonesian authorities, especially the security forces.

While the first two of these problems - the political and theological-liturgical diversity among the Catholics - have been relatively easy to cope with, the last two problems have been much more of a headache to the Catholic church in East Timor. Many East Timorese Catholics, lay as well as religious, see them as two sides of the same coin. The rapid growth of non-Catholic religions -some enjoyed a fantastic growth (Neonbasu, 1992: 44) - was seen as an indicator of the Indonesian domination over their homeland.

The emerging antipathy of Catholics against non-Catholics, however, is an unhealthy attitude. Even in an independent East Timor religious freedom - including the freedom to convert from one religion to another - would be a universal human right which that independent East Timorese nation-state should respect. I do believe, however, that the resistance towards religious pluralism (20) actually hides a deeper feeling of insecurity among the indigenous East Timorese in the wake of the continuous influx of outsiders. In that sense, Catholicism serves as an expression of their collective cultural identity.

It is for that reason that many East Timorese have shown dissatisfaction with the influx of fellow Catholics from the neighboring Indonesian province of East Nusa Tenggara, remembering that those 'fellow Catholics' were instrumental in delivering them into the hands of the Indonesian generals in 1975.(21) Those fellow Catholics, especially Tetun-speaking Belunese from West Timor, have been arriving daily by buses from Atambua (22) and buying the land of the East Timorese in the border districts of Bobonaro and Covalima, just like the successful Javanese and Balinese immigrants. Hence, in the case of a referendum, those Tetun-speaking West Timorese could tilt the balance in favor of continuing the forced integration with Indonesia, so some of my East Timorese sources feared.

At the time of my 1993 visit immigrants from South Sulawesi and other parts of Indonesia were also arriving in Dili every week in the three new Indonesian passenger ships, KM Kelimutu, KM Tatamailau, and KM Dobonsoro.(23) They had already become a decisive economic force in East Timor, with Buginese shops already lining the main road from Dili to Same across the Mambai highlands, selling all kinds of daily needs, from food and textiles to gasoline.

In some instances inter-religious tensions have been aggravated by the local Indonesian authorities. For instance in Hatu Bullico, Hatu Udo, and Ainaro, local policemen forced some children to convert to Protestantism. Those who refused were accused of being *kepala dua* (literally double headed, a code word for Fretilin sympathisers). In Suai, a member of the *Hansip* or paramilitary force, was intimidated against returning from Islam to his original religion, Catholicism, by accusations that he was a Fretilin member. He had to "rehabilitate" his name by bribing the local authorities with gold.

In addition to Catholics being intimidated by non-Catholics, attacks on non-Catholics have also taken place. I was told in 1993 of an episode when high school student activists in the clandestine movement removed the loudspeaker from the Indonesian-built mosque in Kampung Alor, Dili, at night and buried it nearby. In Lospalos, Lautem, two *Menhwa* or student regiment members from Java, who had declared publicly that they wanted to spread the Islamic religion all over the territory, were shot dead, together with two Muslim Indonesian soldiers on March 17, 1993, near a military post outside the town. (Aditjondro, 1993a: 6).

### **Church and State**

This brings us to the fourth problem, namely the continuous confrontation between the Catholic church and the Indonesian state, an area where the theology - and endurance - of the church leaders are constantly tested.

To claim their stake over the entire territory, the church leaders have boosted the construction of Catholic symbols - crucifixes, Virgin Mary statues and grottos and *via dolorosas* - on as many hills and mountains as possible. For instance, an Italian marble statue of Jesus Christ was erected on the top of Mount Matebian in a religious procession led by the acting Bishop of Dili, Mgr. Belo, during the annual Virgin Mary celebration on October 13, 1993.

The Indonesian security forces have confronted this symbolic challenge of the church through both overt and covert means. The overt means have included the construction of *integrasi* monuments in as many towns and villages as possible. One such monument was under construction in the capital of Ainaro district in July 1993. The covert means included an attack on the Motael church, the oldest church in Dili, as well as the destruction of Virgin Mary statues in Dili and Bobonaro. In many of the latter incidents (destruction of Virgin Mary statues), the security apparatus produced interrogation reports which stated that these vandalistic and sacrilegious acts were done by parish activists carrying out the orders of their parish priests - stories which most sane people in East Timor disbelieved, including the provincial prosecutor, a Muslim who had been educated at Catholic schools.

Family planning has been one persistent issue between the Catholic church

**TABLE 4****New Acceptors and Contraceptive Techniques applied at Family Planning Clinics in East Timor in 1990/1**

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Number of new acceptors</b>	<b>Technique used</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>5105</b>	<b>Injectables</b>	<b>65.52</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>1127</b>	<b>Pills</b>	<b>14.46</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>698</b>	<b>IUD</b>	<b>8.95</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>637</b>	<b>Implant</b>	<b>8.17</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>Condoms</b>	<b>1.88</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>MOW/P</b>	<b>0.98</b>
<b>TOTAL of 7,791 new acceptors</b>			

*Source: Timor Timur Dalam Angka, 1990:108*

and the Indonesian state in East Timor. Based on the *Humanae Vitae* encyclical, the acting Bishop has strongly opposed the Indonesian government's "family planning" (24) program, prohibiting all artificial contraceptives and allowing only natural methods. In this field, Mgr. Belo received unanimous support even from pro-Indonesian East Timorese leaders, including former governor Mario Carrascalao who criticised the use of injectable contraceptives with secondary school girls (see de Magalhaes, 1990: 58). With the latest trend in Indonesia's family planning program in East Timor, to use injectables which can prevent pregnancy for up to six months, and implants which can prevent pregnancy for years (see Table 4), this area of conflict between the Indonesian state and the East Timorese Catholic church may continue in the coming years.

As in the case of the resistance against religious pluralism, what was at issue here was not simply blind fidelity to a Papal encyclical. Nor was it mainly a matter of protecting the right of the women of East Timor to make their own reproductive choices. What was at stake was protecting a “patriotic duty” of East Timorese women to bear as many babies as possible, to make up for the tremendous losses of life during the Indonesian occupation, in order that the East Timorese could survive as a people.

This question of the survival of the East Timorese in their own homeland became more urgent as a result of the increasing influx of Indonesian immigrants. And it became especially urgent after the massacre at Santa Cruz, where 271 young people died, 250 were missing, and 382 were wounded (Peace is Possible, 1992).

However there has been little discussion of how the burden of child-bearing and child-rearing might be shared more equally between the genders. In traditional East Timorese society, child-bearing and child-rearing activities concerned the women more than the men, in addition to food-preparation and cloth-weaving (see Fundacao Oriental, 1989). While agreeing that opposing a genocidal policy is certainly a political virtue, one should also think about who has to bear the personal consequences of such a political strategy.

One other important cultural change has been the popularisation of the Tetun language. In the post-Portuguese time, this was initiated by the radical independence movement, Fretilin, in 1974, and continued in the bush until the 1976-1979 aerial bombing put an end to the widespread guerrilla movement. Then, in the early 1980s, Tetun received a boost due to its adoption as the main liturgical language. And eventually, in 1990 the Indonesian government adopted a policy of teaching Tetun in all elementary schools in East Timor to win the hearts and souls of the East Timorese. (Suprihanto, 1992:11). As a result Tetun may become not only a real *lingua franca* but an official second language after *Bahasa Indonesia* in East Timor, just like the function of Javanese as an unofficial first language among Javanese-speaking Indonesians. What then will happen to the linguistic diversity of East Timor discussed above? Is the popularisation of Tetun, which is also the language of a part of the West Timorese people a cultural strategy to make the integration of East Timor into Indonesia less painful?

While many vernacular languages are on the brink of extinction due to the popularisation of Tetun, the Portuguese language has been rising from the grave in which the Indonesian authorities tried to bury it. Portuguese, in former times the language of oppression, has been transformed into the language of resistance. Abolished from the public and private schools, Portuguese is currently widely used in the clandestine communication networks between resistance leaders and

militants in East Timor and abroad.

Let me end by expressing the hope that the result of all these changes will not be a reduction of the great cultural diversity with which the East Timorese people have been blessed by the Almighty, through nature, through history, and through their own ingenuity and endurance.

*Completed in the shadow of Mount Merbabu, Friday, 14 January 1994*

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## Footnotes

1. Prior to the decision of the Diocese of Dili to adopt Tetun as their major liturgical language a similar step had already been taken by the radical pro-independence party Fretilin, not only in their party platform but also in their actual program, their Paulo Freire style literacy program among the hill tribes.
2. A *fazenda* consists of a combination of a large single-crop plantation, small family farms of plantation workers and the large house lot of the *fazenda* owner. The relationship between the *fazenda* owner and his workers is not a business-like employer-employee relationship but more of a patron-client one. The Carrascalao family owned a *fazenda* of about 500 hectares in the border area between Liquica and Ermera. Mario Viegas Carrascalao, the oldest son of a Portuguese *deportado*, eventually became the third of the Indonesian-appointed governors of East Timor.
3. The *liurai* of Atsabe. Guilherme Maria Goncalves, who became the second governor of East Timor after the Indonesian occupation, is a large *fazenda* owner in Ermera. A *liurai*, the Tetun word for king, is the head of several *sucos*, smaller tribes, each of which consists of several *kouas* or clans.
4. When I first visited East Timor in 1974 I met a Mozambiquean *administrador*, or head of a *concelho* or district.
5. Some of the outstanding leaders of the Anti-Communist Revolutionary Movement (MRAC or *Movimento Revolucionaria de Anti-Comunista*), the coalition of four parties which “invited” Indonesia to invade to kick out the “communist” Fretilin from Dili, came from the families of *deportados* and *liurais* who had strongly supported Portuguese rule and were large *fazenda* owners. I have in mind mainly the Carrascalao and Goncalves families.
6. Mario Carrascalao received his agricultural degree in Portugal. Jose Goncalves, the oldest son of Guilherme Goncalves, received his economics degree in Belgium.
7. The term Caladi probably comes from the Portuguese *caladola*, meaning silent or quiet.
8. See the debate, which has been continuously reported in the Indonesian dailies *Jawa Pos* and *Surya* between September and December 1993.
9. This shows how little respect the Indonesian authorities have for one of the signatories of the “Balibo declaration” which was actually signed in a hotel in Bali.

10. *Conselho Nacional de Resistencia Maubere*, National Council of the Maubere Resistance.
11. *Uniao Democratica Timorese*, Democratic Union of Timor. This party, which was the first to be established in the territory after the Carnation Revolution in Lisbon, brought together most of the bureaucrats and large landowners, who initially favored a long-term association with Portugal leading gradually towards full independence. After their aborted coup of August 11, 1975, when they were kicked out of Dili by the pro-Fretilin armed forces, they joined hands with the pro-integration party Apodeti and two Apodeti offshoots, Kota and Trabalhista, to form an anti-communist coalition which invited Indonesia's intervention.
12. After the withdrawal of the Diocese of Dili from the Portuguese conference, the Pope himself has taken the role of Bishop of Dili. Mgr. Belo is administering the diocese on his behalf.
13. A *colegio* is a Catholic centre consisting of a parish church, a convent for the priests, brothers or nuns, a boarding school for boys or girls, and a large tract of farm land which is rented to local farmers as well as farmed by the students themselves to support that educational institution.
14. However the Rotinese pride themselves on speaking 18 different "languages" originating from the 18 small kingdoms on their island. (See Fox, 1977: 80-81.)
15. The Jakarta weekly magazine *Tempo* has estimated that about 5000 were jailed on Atauro in 1982-83, a number almost as large as that of the island's indigenous inhabitants (27 August 1988: 22). According to another source 387 Atauro inmates died over two and a half years as a result of bad prison conditions. After protests from the International Committee of the Red Cross the surviving inmates were resettled in several "prison villages" on the mainland of East Timor.
16. The local parish at Bulico has erected a large cross to commemorate the many Fretilin suspects who were thrown into the sea after being "invited for a trip to Jakarta" by helicopter. Ironically this action was taken with the support of the local military unit. Timorese people passing by stop there briefly to pray.
17. I have read that ploughs were introduced to Western Indonesia from China. In Eastern Indonesia, including the Central Sulawesi highlands, which also has an old tradition of wet rice farming, there are many places where the soil is prepared by letting buffalos trample the mud.
18. I am using the term "transmigrant" in inverted commas because according to international law they are immigrants who have moved from one state to another, rather than transmigrants moving from one island to another within one state.
19. During the Portuguese period the Catholic church enjoyed a near-monopoly of religious propagation in the territory based on a 1940 Concordat between the Holy See and Portugal.
20. In spite of the official Portuguese policy favoring Catholicism, a degree of religious pluralism existed prior to the Indonesian occupation. Duarte mentions in his study of Atauro that the 5180 inhabitants of that island included about 1000 Catholics and 2000 Protestants, the rest believing in natural or cosmic religions (1984: 15). The last Portuguese religious census noted the existence there of 2550 people professing to be Protestants. According to Mar'i Alkatiri, a member of the Overseas Delegation of Fretilin (DEF, *Delegacao Externa do Fretilin*), there were about 500 Muslims in Dili, many of whom regularly came to recite the Holy Qur'an in his father's house. Alkatiri's party accepted religious pluralism. Seven of the 60 members of its Central Committee were Muslims. (Of these Mar'i himself has left the country, Hamish Baswedan, Salim and Ali have died in the guerrilla

war, and three others are still working in the underground movement.) In addition members of the Chinese population of Dili were free to profess and practise Confucian belief.

21. Among the outstanding NTT Catholics who were instrumental in the Indonesian takeover of East Timor were the late Louis Taolin, a son of the last king of Insana in Kefamenanu in West Timor who dealt with East Timorese arriving in West Timor and with “partisans” from West Timor; Frans Seda, a well-known Indonesian politician and diplomat who hails from Flores; and Ben Mang Reng Say, another political and diplomatic figure who became ambassador to Portugal. These last two dealt with Portuguese government officials and generals to lobby them to favor the Indonesian takeover.

22. While Indonesian statistics are available for the number of travellers entering and leaving East Timor by sea and air, I was unable to obtain data about the number of bus passengers entering the territory from West Timor.

23. The effects of the opening up of the territory in 1988 can be seen from Indonesian statistics of sea travellers. In 1987 there was a net outflow of people travelling by sea. In 1989 there was a net outflow of 1995, with most of the new arrivals coming from South Sulawesi.

24. I believe that the term “family planning program” is incorrect. It should be renamed a “female fertility control program” for this is the dominant element. Look at how many new techniques to control women’s fertility are developed and introduced, compared to techniques to control men’s fertility.

## PORTUGUESE TIMOR, COMMUNISM AND OURSELVES

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*The following is a translation of a statement submitted to the Indonesian Bishops' Council (MAWI, Majelis Waligereja Indonesia) of the Catholic Church by the Movement of Younger Generation Catholics of Jakarta (Gerakan Angkatan Muda Katolik Ibukota) on 10 November 1974. George Aditjondro was one of its authors.*

1. Why has Portuguese Timor become an issue for us?

a. Because it is the colonial territory closest to the Republic of Indonesia and one currently struggling to achieve independence, and because whatever happens there could affect and be affected by Indonesia, especially via the province of East Nusa Tenggara (Nusa Tenggara Timur, NTT)

b. Because whatever happens there is connected to the Catholic church, especially to the Holy See (Vatican) which since 1940 has been linked with Portugal by a Concordat granting the church a monopoly of religious propagation in regions colonized by Portugal, as long as the political affairs of Portugal are not affected.

2. Portugal was the first colonizing force to come to this region - for commercial interests, to spread religion and to impose political domination - and it will be the last to leave it. It will leave Portuguese Timor, now that the 15th April

Revolution in Lisbon has overthrown the Caetano regime.

3. Political liberalization in Portuguese Timor has now given birth to four political parties, each fighting to realize their respective political aspirations. The four political forces are:

- a. The Timor Democratic Union (UDT), which wishes to remain under the Portuguese flag for an unspecified period. It comprises senior officials, and is subsidised by Portugal.
- b. Fretilin, which is fighting for the independence of East Timor after a transitional period of autonomous status when preparations for independence will be made. Its members are young intellectuals, university students and workers. It receives subsidies from Portugal and from private groups in Australia.
- c. Apodeti, which aims to integrate Portuguese Timor with the Republic of Indonesia (RI) with the status of a separate province. Its members comprise teachers, junior public servants and ethnic Timorese priests. It does not receive a subsidy from Portugal but has the support of Indonesia.
- d. Partai Buruh or the Labor Party, a group which left the UDT to be able to compete against Fretilin. It is in fact an arm of the UDT.

4. What is the position of the Indonesian government and parliament (People's Representative Council) in relation to developments in this area East of East Nusa Tenggara ?

- a. Officially, senior officials of the RI (Republic of Indonesia) stress that Indonesia supports Portugal's political decolonization, although Indonesia itself has no territorial ambitions toward Portuguese Timor. However if Portuguese Timor chooses to join its "brother with strong shoulders" (a term of Adam Malik's), then the RI has no objection, as the RI constitution permits it. However, how this will occur technically, and what the consequences will be for East Nusa Tenggara have not yet been openly discussed, either in cabinet meetings or in parliament.
- b. The deputy chairman of the parliament, Jaelani Naro, has expressed the hope that Portuguese Timor would simply join RI, since they are the same people and have the same history and also for the sake of Indonesia's own security. For an independent Portuguese Timor could easily fall under the influence of a

foreign nation which could launch subversive attacks into Indonesia from there. Conversely, another member of parliament, from Naro's own fraction, expressed his hope that Portuguese Timor would remind us to pay more attention to the development of East Nusa Tenggara, as a region which directly borders Portuguese Timor.

c. In a de facto sense, the Republic of Indonesia has already granted both direct and indirect support to Apodeti (see 3.c. above), one of the parties campaigning there. This has been done in three ways:

1. Material and moral support has been given by influencing the formation of public opinion in Jakarta. This has already prompted a reaction in the form of a demonstration by Apodeti's opponents in Dili, Portuguese Timor.

2. Radio Republic Indonesia (RII) broadcasting from Kupang in the local language Tettum has resulted in the Governor of Portuguese Timor sending a protest note to the government of Indonesia via the Indonesian consulate in Dili, Portuguese Timor.

3. Civilian volunteers, mostly Catholic university students and ex-students from Indonesian Timor, have been sent to master the Tettum language. Possibly as a result of this, a number of Indonesian nationals, including four nuns, who wanted to visit members of their families in Portuguese Timor, have been turned away by Portuguese Timor immigration police at the border.

5. What is our position on the issue of Portuguese Timor?

a. We can understand the concern of the government and members of parliament about the possible threat of communism which could spread to Indonesia through an independent Portuguese Timor. However, communism is not the only possible threat to Indonesia from Portuguese Timor. An independent Portuguese Timor could also give the US (or any other super-power) the opportunity to establish a base for troops there and to launch subversive actions against Indonesia.

b. On the other hand, we are concerned that the political offensive currently being waged by Indonesia in Portuguese Timor could rapidly escalate into a military offensive because of increasing political conflict there. In our view, any such military offensive would need to meet three conditions, namely:

1. Is it rational?

2. Is it the most effective instrument?
3. Does it have national support?

The possible escalation of the matter to the level of military offensive (military warfare) has not yet been an item of open general debate in the parliament as a forum representing the opinions of the people. So there is room for doubt about whether convinced national support exists for giving military as well as material and moral support to Apodeti as the best way out of the political confusion in Portuguese Timor.

c. In our opinion, Indonesia's fear of the Portuguese Timor threat is groundless. On the contrary it can be asked if there is not a greater possibility that Indonesia, as a large country in this region, could play a decisive role on whether an independent state emerges in what is now Portuguese Timor. If people think that the independence of Portuguese Timor would represent a threat to the existence of the Republic of Indonesia, then it is obvious that something is not right in our Republic. Geographically and economically it means that East Nusa Tenggara, as a region of RI closest to the border of Portuguese Timor, is not able to defend itself. Which in turn could weaken our entire national defence. If it is indeed true that East Nusa Tenggara is one of the poorest regions in Indonesia, it should be treated in a much more positive and constructive way to strengthen the resilience of the border region. More of the national income needs to be allotted to East Nusa Tenggara to develop self-sufficiency, so that it can become "a strong arm of a strong Indonesia" in accordance with the Unitary State and Archipelago Concept as laid down in the Basic Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN) (Chapter I, A, sections 1 to 3).

d. Granted that East Nusa Tenggara is an area where the majority of people are Christians, is it true that its Christians are so lacking in the faith needed to stand up to possible Communist ideological infiltration from Portuguese Timor that the area needs to be made part of our territory at all costs? If that is indeed the case, is it not time for the Catholic church there to engage in self-examination and, together with other Christian churches, the Islamic community and other religious groups, make an effort to revise those aspects of Church life which are caught up with their own world and indifferent to problems arising from the backwardness of our society ?

6. With regard to Communism, let us take the opportunity to quote the Work Guidelines of the Catholic Community in Indonesia (PKUKI) drawn up by the 1970 session of MAWI, the Indonesian Bishops' Council, particularly item

number 35. Communism cannot possibly be prevented by the use of force or by religious compulsion. Communists and those tempted by communism can only be made aware by clear actions based on social equality and humanitarianism. It is the obligation of all people - most importantly leaders - to ensure that there is popular participation in development. It is also clear that the task for religion in this regard is to show humanity the way to serve God in society, by creating a role for all people in life and helping them to develop fully in this world. When deficiencies and hypocrisy are rampant and the cause of social justice is not being addressed by Religion, then Religion is not being effective, and Communism finds fertile ground.

7. Of the 600,000 strong population of Portuguese Timor, only 25% (150,000) have embraced Catholicism. The remainder are of an animist faith. This is an indication that the standing of the Catholic church there (and indeed its mother church in Portugal) is nothing to be proud of, especially when one considers that the church has for centuries had a monopoly of religious propagation and that it has had Portuguese subsidies. As well, the silence of the Church in the midst of the current political crisis afflicting the Portuguese colony is an indication that the Catholic Church there has failed to become “a bearer of salvation for the nations”, that it has rather acted as an extension of Portuguese colonial power exploiting the poverty, ignorance and backwardness of the people of the faraway island. So, in accordance with the declaration of the Second Vatican Council concerning Religious Freedom (*Libertate Religiosa*), we suggest that the 1940 Concordat giving the Catholic church a monopoly of religious propagation in Portuguese colonies be immediately and unilaterally revoked by the Vatican, rather than remaining buried alive in the Vatican archives.

8. Given such oppressive social conditions, it would not be surprising if Communist ideology, with its dogmatic social prescriptions, which are materialistic but simple, draw an immediate response from factory workers and farm labourers in this region. Even so, is it necessary that they should suffer the same fate as other nations which have experienced the iron-fisted cruelty of Communism, with its totalitarian theories of class conflict and its machiavellian approach justifying the use of any means whatsoever? Do they really need to reject the pearls of the Church’s Social Teaching, which have been handed down by the Popes and by the Second Vatican Council as an answer to the problems of a world which is the church’s landlord and hunting ground? We refuse to accept that they should. Therefore we ask the Bishops in this MAWI session to play a more active role in approaching people of our faith over there, at the same time offering cooperative assistance to the Church and to all people of goodwill there. Not only by way of

“explicit communication” but above all by “implicit communication” as was instructed in the MAWI Council of 1970 (PKUKI, No. 56 to No. 58).

These are the main points of our thinking for the respected leaders of the religious community in the MAWI Council this year. We hope they will be accepted.

Ad Maiorem Dei Gloriam!

**TRANSCRIPT OF AN INTERVIEW  
ON EAST TIMOR  
WITH GEORGE ADITJONDRO**

*ABCTV Lateline*  
Tuesday 22 March 1994

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Reporters: Kerry O'BRIEN  
Margot O'NEILL

Speakers: Sabam SIAGIAN - Indonesian Ambassador to Australia  
Senator Gareth EVANS - Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Pat WALSH - Human Rights Director, Australian  
Council for Overseas Aid.  
Prof. Jamie MACKIE - researcher, Department of  
Political and Social Change, Australian  
National University  
Dr George ADITJONDRO - Lecturer in Research  
Methodology, Environment and Social  
Movements, Satya Wacana Christian  
University, Central Java.  
Paul KEATING, MP - Prime Minister

KERRY O'BRIEN: For nearly 20 years, there's been a constant trickle of horror stories emerging from East Timor, allegations of torture, executions and massacres carried out by the Indonesian forces there. Now, for the first time, a leading Indonesian academic has spoken out on behalf of the East Timorese.

GEORGE ADITJONDRO: If they're happy with integration, why does there have to be - according to Indonesian claims - eight battalions of Indonesian troops there? If they're happy with integration why does there have to be so many intelligence agents in Dili? If they're happy with integration, why can't the Timorese visit the graves of their relatives in Santa Cruz?

KERRY O'BRIEN: In the past, the Indonesians have played these claims down. This time, the accusations come from one of their own. Dissenting report - that's our story tonight.

It's 19 years since Indonesia invaded East Timor and annexed the former Portuguese colony as its 27th province. But the United Nations still doesn't recognise Indonesia's claim to East Timor and each year, through its Human Rights Commission, the UN expresses concern about reports of widespread human rights abuses there, particularly after the Dili massacre in 1991. The Indonesian Government has admitted to making mistakes in East Timor and has undertaken to reduce the role of the military. But it claims that allegations of other massacres, widespread torture and executions are the concoction of pro-independence guerrillas and foreign sympathisers. The majority of East Timorese, Jakarta says, accept Indonesian rule.

But now, a leading Indonesian academic has spoken out against his own government's actions in East Timor. Dr George Aditjondro first visited East Timor in 1974 and went back for ten days last year after the Dili massacre. He's now published two research papers adding the weight of a respected Indonesian to allegations of human rights abuses, economic dispossession and disaffection for Jakarta.

We'll be talking to him in just a moment, but first, Margot O'Neill's background report which contains scenes that may disturb some viewers.

MARGOT O'NEILL: For nearly 20 years, the allegations have persisted - massacres of hundreds of villagers, torture, starvation. In the five years after the invasion - it's now widely believed - that one third of East Timor's population died. But the bloodshed only seemed real to the international community when it was finally captured on film during the Dili massacre in 1991.

For nearly 20 years, East Timor has been a largely silent tragedy. Every now and then allegations grab headlines like the new John Pilger film *Death of a Nation*,

screening in Sydney and Melbourne. It gives alleged eyewitness accounts of a second massacre of 200 wounded survivors from Dili.

EXTRACT from *Death of a Nation*:

JOSE: After they stopped shooting, those who had survived - the ones who could have been saved because they were only wounded in the legs or arms - they were stabbed with bayonets.

MARGOT O'NEILL: The Indonesian Government which is yet to account for more than 200 people the United Nations says went missing in the wake of the massacre, denounce the claims. The Australian Government, which has been urging the United States to soften its increasingly tough stand on human rights in Indonesia, has played the allegations down.

EXTRACT: (20 February 1994)

GARETH EVANS: We haven't seen any evidence at all to justify anything like the events that are now reported to have occurred by Mr Pilger and his colleague.

MARGOT O'NEILL: Now, a new voice has emerged on East Timor. A leading Indonesian intellectual, Dr George Aditjondro, who once received an environmental award from President Suharto, has published research highly critical of Indonesian policies in East Timor. Dr Aditjondro claims that there's a culture of violence and intimidation in East Timor; that the military forced some locals to drink bizarre blood oaths to prove their loyalty to Jakarta; that napalm and defoliants like Agent Orange have been used; that there's widespread sexual abuse of women by soldiers; and that the true death toll of the Dili massacre is more than 270 compared to the 50 claimed by the Indonesian Government.

Jakarta responded quickly, describing Aditjondro's work as valueless and claiming he's not an expert on East Timor.

EXTRACT (17 March 1994)

SABAM SIAGIAN: I have my doubts about that paper. I know George. He's very good in environmental studies of Irian Jaya, but to venture into East Timor, I think - I have my doubts.

MARGOT O'NEILL: But Jakarta can't dismiss Dr Aditjondro lightly. Even

though his claims aren't new, the publication is an embarrassing blow because of his public standing both inside Indonesia and abroad.

JAMIE MACKIE: He's been an active figure in the NGOs - non-governmental organisations - for a long time, and he's very well known; I think pretty highly regarded. I couldn't lightly dismiss him.

PAT WALSH: The fact is, as an Indonesian academic of considerable standing, he is revealing to an Indonesian public aspects of the issue that have been kept hidden from them for many years, so I think the lifting of the veil of secrecy, the exposing of the real facts of the issue is incredibly important. Because until Indonesians know why the Timorese are unhappy and begin to exert some pressure on their government from within, there's not going to be any momentum there, at least, to change policy, and that's what's needed.

MARGOT O'NEILL: But while one of his university colleagues has supported his research, a member of the Indonesian Parliament has called for Dr Aditjondro's arrest when he returns to Jakarta tonight. Indonesian experts believe it will be an important test of President Suharto's commitment to greater political openness in Indonesia.

JAMIE MACKIE: Things have loosened up quite a lot and freedom of expression over the last year has been far greater than we've seen for a long time, so that I think if they were to take a tough line on him, now, they'd be going back on a recent trend of policy.

MARGOT O'NEILL: The Australian Government is reacting cautiously, saying it's still looking into Dr Aditjondro's claims. Canberra says it has to juggle a delicate balance between pressing for more human rights in East Timor and promoting better relations with Indonesia which is, according to Prime Minister Paul Keating, our most important bilateral relationship.

EXTRACT (16 March 1994)

PAUL KEATING:...that is, the emergence of the New Order government of President Suharto and the stability and prosperity which his government has brought to the sprawling archipelago to our North, was the single, most beneficial strategic development to have affected Australia and its region in the past 30 years.

KERRY O'BRIEN: Whether or not the allegations about East Timor are true, Jamie Mackie says Australia can't afford to rock the regional boat.

JAMIE MACKIE:... leave aside the issue, which is a complex one, of whether it is a third of the population or some other proportion, but its certainly been a high one and its certainly been a tragic and disastrous story. But I think if we were to put East Timor at the top of the agenda and say: 'This is what determines our policy towards the region', we're going to pay a very, very high price. I think we'd be antagonising countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and, by extension, the rest of ASEAN on issues that matter much - perhaps I shouldn't say much more, but matter a greater deal, at the moment, like APEC. And with Indonesia chairing the APEC summit later this year, I don't think this is a sensible time to say: 'Let's go out on a limb and pick a fight with Indonesia.'

MARGOT O'NEILL: Is there ever a sensible time?

JAMIE MACKIE: Probably not, no.

MARGOT O'NEILL: But while the Indonesian military continues to dominate life in East Timor, there's a growing recognition, even in Indonesia, that its policies of integration are failing.

PAT WALSH: There's no doubt the situation in East Timor is at an impasse. The Indonesian military is trapped between the fact that the carrot and stick policy of repression and development over many years has clearly not worked; and on the other hand it's faced by a pretty tough-minded, single-minded group of younger generation who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of Indonesia's administration who are determined to push their aspirations for independence and self-determination.

MARGOT O'NEILL: With voices like Dr Aditjondro and his colleagues now emerging in Indonesia, the fate of the people of East Timor is more likely than ever to remain on the international agenda.

KERRY O'BRIEN: That report from Margot O'Neill.

Dr George Aditjondro was a journalist when he first went to East Timor in the 1970s, and also covered other domestic issues for Indonesia's largest weekly news magazine, Tempo. He's also an internationally recognised environmentalist and in 1987 was awarded Indonesia's equivalent of the Order of Australia by

President Suharto for his outstanding work establishing environmental groups throughout Indonesia. For five years, he lived in Irian Jaya working on environmental and cultural issues. He obtained his Ph.D. from Cornell University in the United States in 1992, and currently lectures in research methodology, the environment and social movements at Satya Wacana University in Central Java.

We've attempted, by every means available, to contact the Indonesian Ambassador to Australia who is in Jakarta at the moment, but have had no response. We've also tried other political advocates of the Indonesian position without success. We also invited Australia's Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, to give an Australian Government perspective to the Aditjondro allegations, but he was also unavailable.

I recorded this interview with Dr Aditjondro by satellite to Singapore, yesterday.

KERRY O'BRIEN: George Aditjondro, before we go more to the substance of your claims, the Indonesian government has already attacked your credibility. It says your work is not based on facts and that you can't claim any expertise and credibility can you muster?

GEORGE ADITJONDRO: I have already been observing what's been going on in East Timor since 1974, first as a journalist with *Tempo* magazine, and I was one of the first three Indonesian journalists to enter the territory after the Carnation Revolution. Then, while I was still working with *Tempo*, I kept editing the reports on East Timor and kept my liaison, my contacts with the pro-integration Timorese who were living in Jakarta or who were visiting Jakarta. The *Tempo* magazine can be an evidence of what I've written about on East Timor and whom I have interviewed.

Then, during three occasions studying in the states in '81-'82 and '87-'89, '91-'92 I kept my contacts with the pro-independence Timorese, and while studying at Cornell University I also did my library research. I studied the Congress documents, the Congress hearings about East Timor in '76 concerning the use of American weapons, and the Congress hearings in 1978-9 in relation to the famine in East Timor.

And then, after the Dili incident, after the 12 November massacre in Dili, I started to put more concerted effort to know more about what's going on in the territory by doing more library research on East Timor - I mean, in the Cornell University library system - including using all kinds of documents including

Indonesian parliamentary records, Indonesian popular media, and so, simply not just basically the pro-independence or the pro-Fretilin material.

Finally, after having not been able to visit the territory for 19 years, in July last year I visited the territory for 10 days, travelling from the western-most village of Memo to the eastern most village of Tutuala. Two weeks later, I went to Portugal to attend a conference on East Timor and I collected all the baseline material I could get on East Timor relating to anthropology, to the agriculture, to the ecosystems, to the architecture of East Timor in Portuguese. So based on that, I think I can...

KERRY O'BRIEN: Claim some expertise.

GEORGE ADITJONDRO:...some expertise, yes.

KERRY O'BRIEN: The Indonesian government says that most East Timorese, today, are happy with their integration with Indonesia. On what basis would you disagree with that?

GEORGE ADITJONDRO: If they're happy with integration, why does there have to be - according to Indonesian claims - eight battalions of Indonesian troops there? If they're happy with integration, why does there have to be so many intelligence agents in Dili? If they're happy with integration, why does the Indonesian government have to spend so much effort to counter the pro-independence propaganda abroad?

KERRY O'BRIEN: You paint a devastating picture of the effects of the war and its aftermath on the environment and the people. Briefly, how would you summarise the economic and social conditions in East Timor today?

GEORGE ADITJONDRO: Briefly, I will say that East Timor is an Indonesian colony. There is a lot of development going on in East Timor, but it is not development dictated or led by the East Timorese people themselves. Just recently, there still has been a fairly strong opposition against the appointment of Indonesian military man as the district head ... of Viqueque. And if you talk about development in East Timor in the sense of the Indonesian government has pumped in so much money - they say 900 billion rupiah - into East Timor, we should also discount the subsidy paid by the Timorese, first by their lives - especially after one third of the population has died in the course of all these years - and also financially, in terms of the subsidies they have had to pay by

getting underrated coffee price and also by all the other monopolies run by Indonesians in East Timor.

KERRY O'BRIEN: So to what extent do East Timorese have input into the economy? To what extent do the East Timorese have any control of the economy or actually get any financial benefit from the economy?

GEORGE ADITJONDRO: The Timorese who have got some benefits from the economy are those who are living near the major transportation routes, the major asphalt roads, and the major asphalt roads are those roads which are needed for security purposes to transport the troops as well as for the transmigrants.

It's very obvious in Timor that areas where there are no guerrilla activities and where there are no transmigrants have very bad infrastructure until now.

KERRY O'BRIEN: You also say that there are instances under the transmigration programs where East Timorese land is being taken over by, say, Javanese or Balinese, without any compensation payments. How widespread is that and is there any justification?

GEORGE ADITJONDRO: In general, the Indonesian government does not recognise customary land as being something which is owned by people, by clans, and they only pay some compensation for the crops which grow on that land. That is not only a practice in East Timor but is also a practice in Indonesia as well - say, for instance, in New Guinea, in West New Guinea, in Kalimantan, in Sulawesi - simply where land is called adat land, customary land, the Indonesian government doesn't think they need to pay compensation for the land. They only pay compensation for the crops.

KERRY O'BRIEN: You mentioned, a moment ago, that about one third of the total population of East Timor had died as a result of the war. How easy is it to prove that figure?

GEORGE ADITJONDRO: When I say one-third, I mean about 200,000. It is a quite safe figure because in some places more than one-third of the population have disappeared. Most of them have died and some of them have fled abroad living as refugees in Portugal and in Australia. So I'm not only talking about figures or claims by the independence movement but also by people who are not necessarily pro-independence, but are pro-integration.

KERRY O'BRIEN: On the Dili massacre itself, the Indonesians once again flatly reject the figure of 271 dead that you quote. Now those aren't even your figures, are they? They are not your own figures, so how do you know that they're accurate?

GEORGE ADITJONDRO: I'm supporting that claim because the figures of 271 victims of the Dili massacre is compiled through intensive and hardworking compilation methods done by the Timorese in East Timor as well as the Timorese living abroad in Portugal. They worked hard to compile those data. They did a lot of cross-checking so that the same name wouldn't appear in two or three different categories; they looked into their village of origin or their district of origin; they looked into their professions. And what is the most important thing is they have the list of names of the 271 people who died, and then the two other categories; those who were wounded and those who are missing.

In contrast to that, all the Indonesian claims have not even been able to put a list of names, have not been able to put faces to the figures - say, for instance, even the Indonesian initial claim of 19 victims. Who are those 19 people? Who are those 19 people who are buried in a collective grave in the Hera cemetery in East Timor? So even these simple, small figures cannot be substantiated by the list of names, while this group in Portugal called Peace is Possible in Portugal, which is supported by the research done by Amnesty and also by Timorese health workers and clergy in East Timor, is much more convincing to me, as a researcher and as a lecturer in research methodology.

KERRY O'BRIEN: Tell me this, do you feel that most Indonesians are in ignorance of the real facts of East Timor?

GEORGE ADITJONDRO: Yes. That is the major difference between the American adventure in Vietnam and the Indonesian adventure in East Timor. The American adventure in Vietnam could be widely covered by the American media and, based on that knowledge, the American intelligentsia. American intellectuals could organise sit-ins, teach-ins on campuses. So you can say that the American intervention in Vietnam was not only stopped by the resistance movement in Vietnam itself but also by the young people and the intellectuals in America.

But in the case of East Timor, it started in late '75 with the killings of four Australian journalists, and after that, Indonesian journalists were also not able to cover the invasion in December '75. Indonesian journalists were also only allowed to visit places much later, maybe in very controlled manners, to serve

the Indonesian propaganda. So that's why most Indonesians do not have a clear picture of what is going on in East Timor, and therefore they have had to rely too much only on the official sources. And my attempt is an attempt to break this, to break through this veil of secrecy.

KERRY O'BRIEN: It's highly unusual for someone like yourself to be so openly critical of the government. Is there any risk in that?

GEORGE ADITJONDRO: Yes. The risk is quite clear in my home town, in my home province, because just last week the military commander of Central Java already stated in the Indonesian media that measures could be taken to George Junus Aditjondro if what he has stated in the Australian media is true. Indirectly, pressure could be built upon me through my university, like what they did to other Indonesian intellectuals who joined a petition of 50 in 1980. A friend of mine, at the time, was sacked from his position at the Catholic University of Atma Jaya, Chris Siner Key Timu, because he signed that petition.

So certain pressures could be built on the Satya Wacana Christian University, to the leadership of the university, to expel me from the university. So that's why I need the support also from our partner churches in Australia like the Uniting Church, as well as from the Indonesian churches, whether.... about what I'm saying whether that is really according to our Christian principles or not. And also, the Indonesian democratic movement should make their judgement about what I've stated in those papers.

Is it really like the Department of Foreign Affairs said - valueless, not based on facts and so on and so on? Or is it something which we have to reflect seriously on. And I think what I'm doing is also what say, for instance, people in America have been doing about assessing the impact of the war in Indo-China. It is also what the Muslim world is doing about assessing the impact of the Gulf war in Iraq as well as in Kuwait and the Gulf, or what people do in assessing the impact of the war in Bosnia.

So I think, as an Indonesian citizen, my primary responsibility is to think about and to talk about what we have exerted on other peoples and not only be concerned about what's happening far away from Indonesia, in the Middle East or in the Balkans.

KERRY O'BRIEN: Do you accept that there is a reality, now, that Indonesia will not and almost cannot withdraw from East Timor, that East Timor is now,

irrevocably, a part of Indonesia?

GEORGE ADITJONDRO: That reality might not last forever. It has taken the Palestinians more than 40 years to struggle for at least now recognition of certain parts of their homeland, of the former Palestine - the Gaza Strip and the West Bank - to be their territory. It took 40 years for the Baltic republics to regain their independence from Moscow, from the Russians.

KERRY O'BRIEN: But what we are now seeing in the fighting within what was Yugoslavia is precisely the kind of thing that the Indonesian Government says it has to fear in Indonesia, that there are so many disparate cultures there that they have to pursue the policies they are in the way they are to retain one country.

GEORGE ADITJONDRO: Yes. But the question of Indonesia and the question of East Timor are two separate things. East Timor was never part of the Indonesia which was proclaimed on 17 August '45. The Indonesia which was proclaimed at that time was the former Dutch East Indies.

Now concerning Indonesia, I think the only way to keep Indonesia intact is if all the cultures in Indonesia can develop themselves on the same level, on the same platform, and not let certain cultures dominate other cultures, that the centre can dominate the peripheries. Maybe Indonesia, in the future, should move more towards a federalistic pattern and not such a strong centralistic, unitarian state like it is now. If that can be accepted, then I am optimistic about the future of Indonesia. But if our unity is only a unity based on fear and based on exploitation, then Indonesia will face a serious danger of disintegration regardless of whether East Timor existed or not.

KERRY O'BRIEN: George Aditjondro, thanks very much for talking with us.

I should say, again, that we invited the Indonesian Government to respond to those allegations and I should say that the invitation remains open.

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