MAKING SOLIDARITY EFFECTIVE

NORTHERN VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS POLICY ADVOCACY AND THE PROMOTION OF PEACE IN ANGOLA AND EAST TIMOR

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Making Solidarity Effective

Northern voluntary organisations, policy advocacy and the promotion of peace in Angola and East Timor

CIIR discussion paper

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Abbreviations

AAM        Anti-Apartheid Movement (UK)
ACORD     Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development
ACP        African Caribbean and Pacific (countries)
ACTSA     Action for Southern Africa (UK)
ADRA     Action East Timor
AWEPA   Association of European Parliamentarians for [Southern] Africa
BCET      British Coalition for East Timor
CCET      Christian Consultation on East Timor
CICA     Council of Christian Churches of Angola
CIIR      Catholic Institute for International Relations
CNRM     National Council of Maubere Resistance
CPDM  Committee for the Rights of the Maubere People
EMS      Eduardo Mondlane Foundation (Netherlands)
ETAN     East Timor Action Network
ETISC     East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign
FNLA     National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FONGA   Forum of Non-Governmental Organisations of Angola
FRELIMO  Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
FRETILIN Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor
ICRC     International Committee of the Red Cross
IPJET     International Platform of Jurists for East Timor
IZA     Institute for Southern Africa (Netherlands)
KZA     Holland Committee for Southern Africa
MAC     Mozambique Angola Committee (UK)
MP     Member of Parliament
MPLA     Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NGO     Non-governmental organisation
NVO     Northern voluntary organisation
UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNCHR     United Nations Commission for Human Rights
UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
SADC Southern African Development Community
SJA     Syndicate of Angolan Journalists
TAPOL     Indonesia Human Rights Campaign
UAJ     Angolan Union of Journalists
UNDP     United Nations Development Programme
WCC     World Council of Churches
WoA     Washington Office on Africa
Introduction

Whether we think of the social movement which helped end the US intervention in Indochina in the 1970s, the international network of non-governmental agencies, churches and solidarity organisations that accompanied the peace processes in Central America from the 1980s until today, or the global network of organisations known as the ‘anti-apartheid movement’ which assisted the transition from apartheid to majority rule in South Africa, it seems that Northern voluntary organisations have been crucial to promoting peace in many armed conflicts throughout the developing world during recent decades. The contributions of these organisations to the search for peace have attracted increasing attention from governments and inter-governmental organisations, the media, scholars and from voluntary organisations themselves, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Yet there are few systematic analyses of efforts by Northern voluntary organisations, and particularly of their advocacy work, in this domain. What have these organisations accomplished? How should their advocacy work be assessed? How do we explain the different impacts of Northern voluntary organisations’ advocacy in conflict situations? How could their advocacy work be more effective in these contexts?

This paper is CIIR’s attempt to provide initial answers to these questions. The debate touches us directly since we are involved, through advocacy and development work, in many conflict situations. The two cases studied in this paper, East Timor and Angola, are central to CIIR’s mission: we have been committed to the search for self-determination, peace and justice in East Timor for over a decade, and we are developing a programme on Angola to supplement our longstanding involvement in other parts of Africa. We have been engaged in similar work in Latin America and the Caribbean for some time. Nonetheless, we have tried to be as objective as possible in our analysis, with a view to promoting learning and better practice in CIIR and among other voluntary organisations involved in advocacy for peace. The paper has four basic goals. First, we aim to promote greater clarity on concepts such as ‘policy advocacy’. Second, we wish to advance the debate on how advocacy by Northern voluntary organisations should be assessed. Third, using the scheme presented in this paper, we propose to assess the impact of Northern voluntary organisations’ advocacy work in support of the search for peace in Angola and East Timor. Fourth, we aim to identify, on the basis of those cases, strategic lessons that can be applied in those and other struggles, as well as methodological lessons for the future study of comparable campaigns. Before examining the involvement of Northern voluntary organisations in Angola and East Timor, we will clarify key concepts used in the paper and set out a framework for assessing advocacy effectiveness in each case. The focus of this paper on Northern voluntary organisations complements other papers CIIR is working on, which deal with the role of Southern civil organisations in peace processes.
This is a first approximation rather than a definitive analysis and if this paper is more open-ended than some of our publications, it is because we are inviting constructive debate on a topic that lends itself to creative yet practical dialogue.

Definitions

Any attempt to define terms like 'Northern voluntary organisations', 'policy advocacy' or 'the promotion of peace' is inevitably fraught with difficulties. These concepts mean different things to different people; their meanings are bound up with distinct, sometimes contradictory, moral discourses and political projects. Some non-governmental organisations have begun to use these concepts without having carried out much research or reflection on the implications of the new terminology. Still, in recent years there has been some convergence around definitions; it may be helpful to review these for the sake of clarity.

Many people use the term 'non-governmental organisations' (NGOs) to describe the variety of entities that are juridically separate from states but provide complementary or alternative services in areas ranging from humanitarian assistance to victims of war to lobbying for women's rights. Although this category is firmly established in the language and accreditation procedures of the United Nations, it does not do justice to organisations such as churches, unions and solidarity groups which are distinct from NGOs. Some people refer to all of these entities as 'solidarity groups', a label which might correspond to the identities of many activists worldwide, but perhaps not to the self-perceptions of professionals in large development NGOs, the churches or trade unions. Clearly, we need a concept that encompasses more than just the world of NGOs and solidarity groups, while also doing justice to the self-conceptions of distinct entities.

We could employ the notions of 'transnational promotional groups' or 'non-state organisations' favoured by certain liberal theorists. These concepts accurately reflect the increasing importance of organisations other than governments and inter-governmental organisations in international affairs, to which analysts such as Peter Willetts have usefully drawn our attention. Yet the notion of 'transnational promotional groups' never entered common usage (perhaps because it was too close to the term 'transnational corporations') while the notion of 'non-state entities' sets out what the churches and NGOs are not, but does not help us identify what they actually are. Laura Macdonald has offered the term 'global civil society' as an alternative. Her term implicitly projects to the global level the definition of 'civil society' used by Gordon White — that is, 'an intermediate associational realm between the state and family populated by organisations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy from the state and are formed voluntarily by members of society'. This concept encompasses the array of Northern civil society entities active in Southern conflicts and peace processes, defines them in terms of what they stand for (civil society as opposed to the state) and opens the door to studying the political differences between these entities, tensions between Northern and Southern NGOs, and their complex relations with business organisations.

The last point is crucial, for it links with the view of Jenny Pearce that, despite its limitations, the concept of civil society can be re-appropriated to facilitate the study of politics. However, Macdonald's concept of 'global civil society' rests on the problematic assumption that most such organisations are global in scope, which may hold for Amnesty International but not for the many organisations one would want to study under this rubric but which only work in, or on, one or a few countries. More fundamentally, it does
not help us distinguish between the NGOs, churches and solidarity organisations which are driven by a common commitment to justice and peace, and business organisations whose activities are rooted in the profit motive.

The term 'voluntary organisations' is coming into common usage in Britain and the United States of America; it may provide an alternative to these problematic concepts. Indeed, it refers to those entities formed on a voluntary, non-profit basis, dedicated to the provision of services or the construction of social alternatives, in the domestic and international spheres. It includes NGOs as well as solidarity organisations and also the churches, at least in their extra-pastoral activities; it also includes trade unions. Adding the qualifier 'Northern' to this rubric can help us distinguish between organisations based primarily in the North from those rooted in Southern societies, without assuming, rather presumptuously, that Northern organisations are global or international while our Southern counterparts are merely national or local. We will therefore employ the concept 'Northern voluntary organisations' (NVOs) to denote the array of Northern NGOs, church, labour, solidarity and other voluntary organisations which are involved in different conflict and peace processes. This paper does not pay much attention to the role of Northern business organisations, but it does leave the door open to examining relations between such entities and voluntary organisations.

The concept of 'policy advocacy' seems less controversial. Jenkins defines it as 'any attempt to influence the decisions of any institutional elite on behalf of a collective interest'. As such, the term could encompass attempts to affect the policies and practices of governments, inter-governmental organisations, business corporations and the mass media; it could include actions ranging from analysing policy documents and sharing analyses with decision-makers, liaising with politicians to shape laws or resolutions, working with the mass media or even engaging in high-profile public protests. Some practitioners use the term more restrictively to denote only policy analysis and direct contact with decision-makers, as opposed to public campaigning or media work. Others suggest that there is a difference between 'advocacy' and 'lobbying', whereby the latter means selling a pre-packaged answer while the former means engaging decision-makers in an open dialogue on solutions; in this sense, 'lobbying' is what the 'special interests' do, while 'advocacy' is what the organisations working for the 'common good' do. These are interesting distinctions but they can only be taken on board selectively. In particular, if the distinction between advocacy and lobbying is stripped of its normative content, it may be a useful tool for understanding the differences between working directly with decision-makers (by lobbying them) and trying to influence decision-makers indirectly (through the media, for example), both of which are potential techniques in a campaign to advocate policy change. Bearing this caveat in mind, we will use the broader definition of policy advocacy favoured by Jenkins because it facilitates a study of the range of activities that could be used to influence the policies and practices of governmental, inter-governmental or private sector elites, and does not presume that voluntary organisations are purer than arms dealers or other 'special interests' in their use of these techniques.

It may also be useful to define what we mean by the 'promotion of peace'. Some NGOs and scholars use the term 'peacebuilding' to indicate any activity undertaken with the purpose of preventing, alleviating or resolving armed conflict. Although this usage corresponds to a widespread belief that peace requires transformation and therefore must be built over time, it does not make sufficient use of distinctions developed by UN agencies and now used widely in official and academic circles, between:

- emergency assistance to victims of war;
• peacemaking — the use of good offices to help warring parties reach peace agreements;
• peace-keeping and verification (of elections, of respect for human rights, and so on)
and other techniques used to monitor compliance with agreements and foster mutual
confidence;
• peace-building, which includes the promotion of institutional and socio-economic
measures, at the local or national level, to address the underlying causes of conflict; and
• preventive diplomacy or conflict prevention.6

The literature on conflict resolution has tended to focus on the activities of governmental
and inter-governmental organisations in these domains, but we know that Northern
voluntary organisations have also been active across this spectrum; as such, it seems
unnecessary to limit ourselves to the concept of peacebuilding when trying to study their
contributions to peace. We will therefore use the broader term ‘peace promotion’ to denote
the range of contributions which Northern voluntary organisations can make to the search
for peace in Southern societies.

Assessing advocacy effectiveness

The literature

Human rights, environmental, peace and other voluntary organisations have engaged in
advocacy efforts for decades, but it was not until the 1980s that many development NGOs
took this challenge on board and that a literature analysing their efforts began to take
shape. Contributors to this body of analysis have noted that, whereas the debate in the
1980s was about whether development NGOs should take on advocacy work (as opposed
to concentrating on project work), in the 1990s the debate shifted to what NGOs should do
to be effective advocates. Yet surprisingly few of the contributions to this literature
explicitly set out the criteria against which to evaluate impact. Even the judgments of
respected analysts such as Clark, Edwards and Hulme, Korten and Smillie rest on unclear
standards of assessment.7

One exception is the work of Jane Covey, which suggests that the impact of
development NGOs’ advocacy work should be measured against two criteria: policy and
civil society outcomes. Policy outcome is the degree to which NGOs’ policy objectives are
achieved; civil society outcome is the degree to which NGOs strengthen the capacity:
of other civil organisations to follow up on a campaign in the long run. Covey represents this
scheme by placing policy outcome on a horizontal axis and civil society outcome on a
vertical axis. The resulting figure enables her to compare the outcome of different
advocacy initiatives on each dimension; it also enables her to illustrate the trade-offs
between policy advocacy and civil society capacity-building, deriving from the different
rhythms of each activity. Covey argues that it is theoretically possible to achieve positive
impact on both dimensions.8

This scheme offers a starting point for assessing the advocacy work of Northern
voluntary organisations. Covey’s framework opens the door to exploring the tension
between ‘speaking for’ Southern partners and strengthening their own ability to defend
their interests. Yet it does not distinguish between Northern and Southern outcomes as
clearly as it could; by not specifying the criteria she uses to assess impacts on each
dimension, Covey also misses opportunities to sharpen her method for assessing and
comparing advocacy efforts. Is it possible to retain Covey’s two-dimensional framework
while distinguishing more clearly between Northern and Southern outcomes and teasing out indicators for each dimension in order to facilitate assessment and comparison?

The broader literature on the effectiveness of NGOs' advocacy work suggests a number of indicators which could help us develop this framework. First, it is worth recalling the argument by some analysts that development NGOs are unlikely to become effective advocates: Dolan, for example, suggests that development NGOs are too dependent on funding from official sources or from conservative individuals, too ideologically different and overly concerned about their market shares to build the alliances required to influence policy. Edwards and Hulme argue that, in addition, development NGOs have difficulties forging agreements on priority issues and advocacy strategies, and often fail to understand complex official decision-making processes. Smillie suggests that development NGOs have increased their capacity to criticise policies, but have not been successful at formulating alternatives.9

Others suggest that despite these constraints, NGOs and other voluntary organisations can under certain conditions influence the policies of more powerful entities. According to Willetts, voluntary organisations are more likely to influence policy when their demands converge with other pressures, including demands by states, inter-governmental organisations and businesses, even if the motives behind those complementary pressures are different. Clark emphasises the importance of acting strategically, that is, of identifying realistic policy objectives, and carefully planning the actions that will be required to increase bargaining power (by accumulating resources like detailed policy knowledge, funding, allies and credibility) and intervening with sufficient resources at key moments in the decision-making process in order to bring about significant changes in policy and practice. Clark, Covey, Jenkins and Sogge argue that building coalitions which combine adequate funding, technical expertise and lobbying skills with the capacity to mobilise public pressure, and agreeing to clear divisions of labour on that basis, are crucial to achieving bargaining power.10 Covey emphasises the need to balance expertise and speed with the imperative of building broad coalitions in which grassroots organisations are subjects and not simply instruments of NGOs' strategies.

In line with his argument about the need for multiple pressures, Willetts suggests that in order to achieve influence coalitions should reach beyond the voluntary sector by including sympathetic interlocutors within governmental, inter-governmental and business entities. The notion of building coalitions reaching into elite institutions has been echoed by peace researchers such as Kumar Rupesinghe, in their argument that forging peace often requires the construction of alliances that transcend the usual class, national and institutional boundaries.11

The critique of a 'selling approach to advocacy' cited earlier suggests that such multi-sectoral coalitions are more likely to be built on the basis of genuine dialogue (between subjects who, despite their different interests, may be able to combine their forces to change policies and practices on which they disagree) rather than on the basis of the inflexible promotion of a given 'line'. This idea of dialogue also converges with the view that taking sides with particular parties to armed conflicts might impede one's capacity to promote reconciliation, at the local level or at the level of entire societies.12 Yet we should not accept these ideas uncritically; indeed, we should ask how we can reconcile a dialogical approach with the moral imperative of condemning historic injustices such as human rights violations. It is also worth asking ourselves how we should assess when dialogue is producing constructive changes and when it is merely a cover for co-option by more powerful entities.
Our approach

Many different assessment frameworks could be constructed on the basis of these considerations. The framework we originally devised included five indicators to which we assigned nominal values that could be accumulated to produce composite scores for given campaigns, with regards to impact in the North and in the South. In the light of responses at from European NVOs and Southern partners at a seminar held in London, on 27 March 1997, we reworked the approach into the following model.13

First, we distinguish between impact in the North and in the South, on the grounds that while it is important to assess the effect of NVO advocacy on Northern institutions, it is also important to ascertain what effect NVOs' advocacy has had on the situation in the South.

Second, we distinguish between three types of impact in both the North and South: capacity-building, declaratory policy and implementation. Capacity-building impact is the extent to which NVOs and their Southern partners have accumulated the funding, infrastructure, policy information, contacts and allies they need to carry out effective advocacy, and the extent to which they have translated these resources into realistic policy objectives, careful planning, sensible divisions of labour, appropriately-timed interventions in decision-making processes, and into dialogue with elites without compromising their own values. Rather than assuming that NVOs are inherently incapable of building up these capabilities, we use this indicator to evaluate the extent to which different NVOs have developed in this regard.

Declaratory policy impact is the degree to which advocacy has produced a change in the rhetoric or legislative outputs of decision-makers (which could include governments, international organisations and transnational corporations).

Implementation impact is the extent to which these measures have been translated into new administrative procedures or broader practices, particularly by Northern or Southern elite institutions.

This enables us, for example, to distinguish between the increasing sophistication of NVOs' analyses and lobbying, the shifts this might generate in public statements by Northern governments and the changes this might produce in the behaviour of military personnel in particular Southern countries, without assuming that advances in one area necessarily lead to progress in another. Indeed, distinguishing between these types of impact should help us detect when declaratory policy changes are used to mask the absence of change on the ground. They also serve to highlight our belief that the ultimate test of NVO advocacy work is its effect on the situation, at the field level, in the South.

We assumed that the same sets of indicators can be used to assess Northern and Southern outcomes. With regards to Northern outcomes, for example, one could look at whether NVOs have accumulated key information about Northern governments' decision-making processes towards particular conflicts (capacity-building impact); whether this has led Northern governments to issue statements committing themselves to the search for peace in a particular conflict (declaratory policy impact); whether this has led to changes in secondary legislation or administrative procedures, such as the restriction on weapons exports to one or both sides to the conflict (implementation impact). With regards to Southern outcomes, we could look at whether NVOs' efforts have helped Southern partners accumulate the skills required to advocate on related issues (capacity-building impact); whether this has led to significant changes in the rhetoric of Southern decision-makers (declaratory policy impact); whether this has been followed up
with administrative changes in the country in question (implementation impact).

Finally, we distinguished between three levels of impact for each indicator: ‘low’ where there was little discernable impact; ‘moderate’ where there had been some impact, and ‘high’ where there had been considerable impact.

For example, with regards to the implementation impact of a hypothetical campaign on respect for human rights in a particular Southern country, if the government of the country in question had not taken any significant steps in response to the campaign, we would code it as ‘low impact’; if the government had closed down a detention centre where torture was widespread without releasing its prisoners or discontinuing the practice of torture in other facilities, we would code it as ‘moderate impact’; if the government had closed the centre, released all arbitrarily detained prisoners and instituted effective new procedures to prevent torture, we would code this ‘high impact’ in our scheme.

One final caveat seems in order: discerning advocacy impact is complicated by the tendency, as highlighted by Willetts, for policy influence to flow from numerous sources. We therefore decided to attempt to apply the hard test of whether outcome X would have happened if campaign Y had not been carried out, to ensure a degree of rigour in our assessments. Of course, this does not eliminate the subjective element that will always be present in coding voluntary organisations' performance on particular indicators or in other aspects of the evaluation process, as will be seen when we apply this scheme to the examples of NVOs' advocacy work vis-a-vis Angola and East Timor.

**Outline**

Although our evaluation scheme evolved during the course of the project and the assessments in each case study initially followed slightly different formats, these have been adapted to conform to the scheme set out in this Introduction. The last section of this paper compares the assessments of each case, highlights differences and commonalities, and draws out practical and methodological lessons.

These case studies are not offered as a representative sample. They were selected on the basis of CIIR's commitment to working on these particular situations and in the hope that they might shed light on wider issues. We invite readers to approach the cases in the same spirit, and to accompany us in thinking about how our work, in the collective sense, could be more effective under such circumstances.

**Notes to the Introduction**


13. The framework we originally put forward rested on five sets of indicators: capacity-building impact; execution impact; declaratory impact; legislative and administrative impact; and implementation impact. We assumed that the same sets of indicators can be used to assess Northern and Southern outcomes.

   We hoped that by assigning nominal values to each set of indicators and making scores cumulative, we could generate a quantitative assessment scheme to help us sharpen our analysis.

   We chose to allow values of 0, 0.5 and 1 for each set. The resulting framework was graphically presented as follows:

   Northern outcomes

   5
   4
   3
   2
   1

   Southern outcomes

   0 1 2 3 4 5

   Some of the participants in the March 1997 seminar welcomed the elaboration of this assessment framework on the grounds that it represented a step ahead of the frameworks implicit in most of the literature and of Covey’s groundbreaking approach. Yet on balance participants felt that a numerical approach could mask the subjective elements which remained in the coding process — that is, in assigning values of 0, 0.5 or 1 to the performance of particular advocacy efforts on specific sets of indicators. When we tried to apply this scheme to a case study we also found working with five sets of indicators cumbersome.

   On that basis, we reworked the framework into the simplified model set out in the Introduction as used in the text. Still, it is worth noting that one cost of abandoning nominal values is that scores cannot be cumulated across indicators. As a result, the only way to express the overall impact of a campaign is to describe or illustrate its effects by indicators and summarise these in narrative form.
CASE STUDY 1
International civil society, advocacy and the search for peace in Angola

Kathryn O’Neill

Introduction

More than two years after the signing of the Lusaka protocol in November 1994, the Angolan peace process is far from concluded. When the Bicesse Accords were signed in May 1991, providing for the demobilisation of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) troops and subsequent multiparty elections scheduled for September 1992, the role of civil organisations in sustaining the peace and democratisation process was barely acknowledged. More recently, with the hindsight offered by the failure of Bicesse, there is great interest within Angola and internationally as to how civil organisations can ensure that peace does not elude Angola’s people a second time around.

Various studies have focused on the failures of the international community and the United Nations in the series of negotiations and agreements for peace in Angola (Gbadolite 1989, Bicesse 1991, Abidjan 1993, Lusaka 1994). This paper considers how key actors within ‘international civil society’ have supported the peace process through their advocacy work in their national, regional and international contexts. Section 2 summarises the background to the conflict, while Section 3 maps out the main advocacy initiatives undertaken in Europe and North America. Section 4 provides a preliminary evaluation of the impact of these initiatives, and assesses how far international efforts have supported local initiatives for democratisation and peace promotion.

The development of local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and pressure groups is at an early stage in Angola. Thirty years of war, combining the legacy of colonial rule with the post-independence one-party state, have hampered the development of civil groups, although there is some tradition of independent organisation, as seen in the musseques (shanty suburbs) of Luanda in the post-independence period. The churches are among the few institutions to have remained constant in people’s lives throughout decades of war. In the early 1900s Protestant and independent African churches or sects gained strength and voiced opposition to colonial policies. However, the churches did not escape repression during the post-independence one-party state era, and church-state relations are still problematic. Unfortunately, many churches were drawn into the conflict, with some leaders remaining in UNITA areas while others are in government areas. The Catholic church is by far the largest, followed by Protestant churches, the most significant of which are members of the Council of Christian Churches of Angola (CICA) or the Alliance of Evangelicals of Angola (AEA).

The emergence of formal NGOs was greatly encouraged by the Law on Associations approved by the ruling MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) in 1991,
to ‘stimulate the creation of new socio-professional associations, cultural, civic and other non-governmental organisations which compete for citizens’ democratic participation’. Hundreds of associations and NGOs were formed but, given the humanitarian crisis that unfolded after the renewal of the war in 1993, they were oriented towards emergency aid rather than development or advocacy.

The strength of civil groups depends on their context — and the Angolan context is one in which most people’s energies are devoted to ensuring their own individual and family survival. This factor alone means tomorrow’s leaders may never realise their potential, and leadership is critical if civil institutions are to be effective. Peace might simply not be possible without a minimum of economic security. This links to another key factor. A recent report notes that ‘civil society develops best in a political environment that tolerates pluralism and competition’. Freedom of movement, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly are prerequisites for strong civil groups — but these are far from a reality in Angola, and would require considerable commitment to democratic principles by the government and UNITA, which looks doubtful in the short term.

Background to the conflict

Angola in the 1990s was commonly referred to as a ‘complex emergency’, but this reflected in part poor analysis or understanding of the nature and roots of the conflict. This can be categorised broadly into four phases:

1. The armed liberation struggle began in 1961, waged by three separate nationalist movements — the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), MPLA and UNITA. Each had its power base in a specific region, shaped by rural/urban, class, racial, religious, linguistic and ethnic divisions, but there were also significant political and ideological differences. The MPLA’s manifesto was based on socialist and nationalist principles, emphasising national unity across ethnic and racial divisions. Its leadership was dominated by an urban, educated mestico (mixed race) elite, whereas its main support came from unskilled workers and public sector employees in urban areas. The FNLA, under the autocratic leadership of Holden Roberto, adopted a regionalist form of nationalism, rooted in the powerful historic Kongo kingdom encompassing Northern Angola. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi began his political life with the FNLA in exile, but split to form his own movement in 1966. UNITA’s political and ideological identity has been fluid, changing according to available alliances.

Each movement also commanded a degree of external backing. The MPLA received military support from the USSR, whereas the FNLA had support from Zaire and the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). UNITA was supported by the Portuguese armed forces (until 1974), among others.

The Alvor all-party independence conference of January 1975 hosted by the outgoing colonial power, Portugal, resulted in an agreement signed by the FNLA, MPLA and UNITA for a coalition government to run until 11 November, the date set for independence. But the agreement quickly collapsed, and in February 1975 the FNLA, supported by Zairean troops, mounted an offensive against the MPLA, with covert backing from the CIA. The MPLA accepted support from Cuba in the form of military advisers and weapons. In August, South African troops invaded Southern Angola from occupied Namibia to support UNITA’s push on Luanda. They were repelled two months later by MPLA forces and Cuban troops who arrived after the South African invasion. The
battle for control of the capital, Luanda, was won by the MPLA. Independence was declared in November 1975, and two years later Angola declared itself a Marxist-Leninist one-party state.

2. The post-independence period (1975-91) was characterised by a guerrilla war waged by UNITA, with military support from South Africa, the United States and Zaire, within the Cold War context. South Africa’s policy of regional destabilisation and military aggression had devastating consequences for Angola, with repeated incursions by South African troops into Southern Angola to support UNITA offensives.

The US policy of ‘constructive engagement’ linked negotiations for Namibia’s independence to the withdrawal of approximately 60,000 Cuban troops from Angola. Agreement on the Cuban withdrawal, and the pull-out of 4,000 South African troops trapped in Southern Angola after the pivotal battle for Cuito Cuanavale ending in March 1988, was finally reached at New York in December 1988. The first United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) arrived in Angola the following month to oversee the Cuban withdrawal. The United States and the Soviet Union, the two superpowers, had begun the process of disengaging from the conflict, but the task of resolving matters between the MPLA and UNITA remained. A series of protracted negotiations began, the United States having taken over from South Africa as UNITA’s main backer in an attempt to put pressure on the Angolan government to make a deal. A final agreement was reached in May 1991 with the Bicesse Peace Accords, which set the terms for demobilisation of UNITA troops and Angola’s first ever multiparty elections, in September 1992. UNAVEM II was authorised to monitor both sides’ compliance with the accords, but it lacked a sufficient mandate and resources. From May 1991 there was a tentative peace in Angola, and the elections went ahead in September 1992 in a highly volatile atmosphere.

The failure of Bicesse was largely attributed to some international governments’ lack of commitment (political and financial) to the process. Some of the main actors involved, the United States, the United Kingdom and others, confident as they were of a UNITA electoral victory, ignored warnings from NGOs and civil groups that key aspects of the accord had not been implemented. The parliamentary elections were won by the MPLA; in the presidential elections the UNITA leader Savimbi narrowly lost with 40.07 per cent of votes, compared with 49.57 per cent for MPLA leader Jose Eduardo dos Santos, thereby forcing a second round. The elections were deemed ‘free and fair’ by the United Nations.

3. November 1992 — November 1994: UNITA rejected the election results and restarted the war, bringing the bloodiest fighting ever. The war took a different turn, with large battles for control of provincial capitals. Negotiations began after intense international pressure, principally from Portugal, Russia and the United States (the three co-signatories to Bicesse), but agreement on a ceasefire and other matters was only reached in November 1994 with the Lusaka Protocol. The design and execution of the Lusaka agreement was considered a significant improvement on the Bicesse accords. UNAVEM III, the largest and most expensive UN peacekeeping force in the world to date (costing an estimated US$1 million a day), was authorised by the UN Security Council on 8 February 1995. There was to be a phased deployment, dependent on the continued commitment of both parties to the process.

4. Predatory phase — 1993 to date: the deepening political and socio-economic crisis has led to a situation in which both the government and UNITA appear to lack legitimacy; Angolan citizens have little faith in representative democracy, given their experience. As
one recent report states, 'the lack of a sense of accountability on the part of both the government and UNITA constitutes a serious obstacle to reconciliation'.

Implementation of the Lusaka Protocol has been slow and uneven, and as late as December 1996 the UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros Ghali was critical of UNITA for continued delays, especially in demobilising its troops, and its failure to fulfil its commitments under the Lusaka Accords, including the formation of a national unity government, allowing freedom of movement and the extension of government administration throughout the country. A Government of National Unity and Reconciliation was to be in place by July 1996, but a revised target date of 25 January 1997 had to be set. UNITA had demobilised approximately 69,000 troops by 7 December 1996. There are no confirmed figures of its total fighting force, but it has been suggested that UNITA still has 26,000 fully equipped troops in the country. Of those presented at quartering camps, more than 15,000 had deserted, and 7,000 were under the age of 18. UNITA handed over 30,180 personal weapons and 4,857 crew-served weapons to UNAVEM, but Boutros Ghali warned that the quality of weapons and ammunition surrendered was low. It appeared that UNITA was withholding its major weapons and elite troops.

The government disbanded its rapid reaction police force, and began collecting weapons from civilians in August 1996. A unified national army of 90,000 is to be formed as soon as the 26,300-strong UNITA contingent is identified suitable for the purpose. The task of reintegrating demobilised soldiers and their families, as well as the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced people, remains.

Savimbi’s ‘special status’, his future political role, is still to be resolved. Savimbi has called for recognition of his ‘special status’, but what he wants is unclear — titles such as ‘Head of Opposition’ and ‘Special Adviser to the President’ have been mentioned. UNITA’s Congress in August 1996 rejected the government’s offer of a vice-presidency for Savimbi. UN Security Council Resolution 1087 of 11 December 1996 called on both parties to agree on this crucial factor, and for Savimbi to travel to Luanda at the earliest possible opportunity to ‘enhance confidence in the irreversibility of the peace process’. His refusal to do so is seen as showing little commitment to peace. UNAVEM III’s mandate was due to end on 28 February 1997, and the international community made it clear that it was not willing to continue to fund the operation beyond that date.

For ordinary Angolans life continues to be a daily struggle. Most survive through buying and selling on the parallel market. During the war hundreds of thousands of people left their rural homes and fled to Luanda or other coastal cities, putting great strain on already inadequate social infrastructure such as health, education and sanitation. Those who remained in rural areas often suffered from successive raids by government, UNITA troops, or unidentified bandits. Although raids have abated since disarmament began, low-level violence continues and could increase with the UN withdrawal. Annual inflation is estimated at 3,000 per cent, and basic salaries for public sector employees such as teachers are pitiful, the equivalent of US$20 a month. The government still does not have complete administrative control throughout the country.
**International advocacy initiatives and programmes**

This section details some of the advocacy initiatives undertaken by international NGOs, churches, solidarity networks and others on Angola from the 1980s to date. The study focuses on the efforts of British and other national groups, but also covers North American and European networks. First, it is necessary to put these actions in context.

**The challenge of advocacy work on Angola**

Advocacy work around the peace process in Angola has been extremely difficult, requiring sustained effort over long periods for seemingly insignificant results. The reasons for this include:

- Africa, let alone Angola, is low on the political, economic and public agenda in Europe and North America, except at times of humanitarian crisis. Within the Southern African region, South Africa remains the dominant political and economic force, and the focus of much of the West’s interest.

- The economic power base of both the Angolan government and UNITA, with control of oil and diamonds respectively, means they are less susceptible to international pressure. The sheer scale of the monetary resources they command means they do not have to bow to pressure (UNITA has an estimated income of US$500 million annually from diamonds). UNITA’s control of the diamond trade and access to commercial routes through Zaire,* based on a firm alliance with Zaire’s President Mobutu, has never been seriously threatened by the prospect of vigorously-imposed sanctions. This factor must have figured in Savimbi’s procrastinations at the various negotiating stages.

- For lobbying to be effective, those being lobbied have to have some actual or potential leverage over the key protagonists. Lobbying may have only limited impact where one of the protagonists is ‘non-government’ and an autocracy — as in the case of UNITA. In a similar vein, the political situation in Zaire made it unlikely that there could be an organised and efficient sanctions-monitoring operation — certainly until the overthrow of Mobutu in May 1997.

- The dearth of Angolan NGOs until the early 1990s restricted the extent to which international groups could identify partner organisations on whose behalf they could advocate.

- UNITA was better than the MPLA at selling itself abroad and developing alliances beyond traditional ones. In the 1980s UNITA contracted a US public relations firm which successfully promoted its image in the United States as a movement of ‘freedom fighters’ against a communist regime. This was an extremely successful campaign — one analyst stating that ‘in most Washington contexts, UNITA’s version of events went unchallenged’. This allowed successive US administrations to withhold official recognition of the Angolan government. The MPLA was less shrewd, relying on support from the socialist bloc, and closing itself off from other potential allies in the West.

- The ‘message’ about Angola in the mid 1990s was not as straightforward as it had been a decade earlier. While UNITA bears responsibility for restarting the war in 1992, which some international governments allowed through their political inaction. The MPLA

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* Now the Democratic Republic of Congo, under the victorious Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire, led by Laurent Kabila.
government has also failed in key responsibilities. Different interpretations of who bears responsibility for what have been a constraint in some advocacy work. In the UK, for instance, at one end of the spectrum, the British government’s attitude of ‘even-handedness’ attributed equal responsibility for the 1993 humanitarian crisis to the MPLA and UNITA; at the other end, solidarity activists were convinced the MPLA was beyond criticism (everything was ‘down to the war’). This tension was never really resolved.

For peace and democracy to become a reality, international criticism of both the government and UNITA may be appropriate. The problem lies in communicating complex messages effectively.

• In the 1980s and early 1990s, communication between Northern voluntary organisations (NVOs) and possible Angolan counterparts was problematic. First-hand, reliable and up-to-date information — so vital to credible advocacy work — was scarce. The war, the threat of repression, and even linguistic constraints limited what was possible. Travel to or from Angola, or beyond Luanda, was also infrequent. This had begun to change by the mid 1990s, with some positive results. Communications infrastructure within Angola’s 18 provinces is still weak; vital information often does not reach grassroots level — with the result that few people, particularly in rural areas, are aware of, for example, the terms of the Lusaka Protocol, or the human rights agreements which their government has signed up to. NVOs are providing important assistance to address some of these problems (see Section 4, page **).

Despite these constraints, advocacy work was carried out in the 1980s and 1990s by knowledge-based groups (solidarity activists) in the United States and Europe. Considerable effort went into counteracting the UNITA lobby. Solidarity networks were active in the public realm in the 1980s, while international NGOs began to work in Angola from the late 1980s and stepped up their support as the humanitarian crisis unfolded in 1993.

**Range of lobbying activities/methodologies**

Most international organisations adopted one or more of the following advocacy tools:
- Provision of information to decision-makers
- Compiling briefings for parliamentary questions/debates
- Joint delegations and/or letters to the government ministry concerned with external or foreign affairs
- Parliamentary lobbies
- Meetings with officials of decision-making bodies — EU, member states’ officials, parliamentarians
- Arranging meetings with representatives of Angolan partner organisations
- Public education and information
- Production of leaflets/booklets
- Encouraging press and television coverage
- Writing joint letters to the press
- Solidarity conferences and academic seminars
- Sharing of information through inter-agency meetings
- Visits to Angola to obtain information and establish contacts
- Policy and monitoring work
- Drawing up policy papers
• Proposing lobbying actions to agencies and individual supporters, to take up with their parliamentary representatives
• Monitoring progress of peace negotiations and implementation of peace accords
• Proposing resolutions for adoption to influence policy of various organisations.

UK-based organisations

The British government has a limited interest in Angola. But as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and a member of the European Union (EU), it is in a position of influence. Solidarity networks, aid and development organisations and church groups in the UK were active in lobbying work on Angola, either individually or in joint fora.

Solidarity work — the Mozambique Angola Committee (MAC)

Solidarity work in the 1980s was undertaken by MAC, a small membership-based organisation which evolved from the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau (pre-1975). MAC has a membership of about 100 individuals, mostly people who had been cooperantes — skilled volunteers, mostly from Europe, who went to work for the newly independent socialist governments in Mozambique or Angola.

MAC’s stated aims are: to keep the interests of Angola and Mozambique in the public view; to act as a resource for anyone seeking information on Angola or Mozambique; and to support the development and rebuilding programmes of the Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) and MPLA governments. In Britain, MAC tended to be dominated by the left wing of the Labour Party and the Communist Party.

The ‘inroad’ for advocacy work on Angola in the 1980s was South Africa’s policy of regional destabilisation. Ironically, the victory associated with the dramatic and positive change in South Africa’s political situation has made advocacy and public education work on both Angola and Mozambique more difficult. The British government and British civil groups have much closer links with South Africa and Zimbabwe than with lusophone Angola and Mozambique. Consequently, diminishing public interest in South Africa in recent years has led to a corresponding diminution in public interest in Angola.

As a small organisation, MAC’s main strategy for campaigning on Angola was to link into larger related organisations, principally the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) and its successor organisation, Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA). This strategy was used to good effect with the Angola Emergency Campaign (AEC), set up in November 1992 as an urgent response to the deteriorating situation on the ground.

The AEC was convened jointly by MAC and the AAM, ‘to support peace and democracy in Angola’, through putting pressure on Britain, the European Community (EC), and the international community, especially the UN, to secure key objectives. The AEC called for an end to South African support for UNITA (covert and overt), sanctions against UNITA, and increased aid to the Angolan government. One of AEC’s first actions in December 1992 was a petition to the British foreign secretary (and then president of the European Council of Ministers), Douglas Hurd, calling for concerted action by the EC on Angola.

AEC’s programme of action for 1993 included:
• stepping up pressure on the British government to act, by encouraging organisa­tions to send joint or individual delegations to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO); encouraging individuals and organisations to send letters to the FCO and to their member of parliament (MP); and generally getting Angola onto parliament’s agenda
• campaigning for the newly-incumbent US (Clinton) administration to establish
diplomatic relations with the democratically-elected Angolan government
• stepping up pressure to isolate UNITA within the international community to force it
to comply with the Bicesse peace accords and abide by the election results
• stepping up information and public education work on Angola.

Alongside its public education work, AEC concentrated on parliamentary lobbying,
through written briefings for supportive MPs to raise questions or debates; and through
letters to the press and foreign office. Two memoranda were presented to the British
overseas development minister, Lynda Chalker, in January and September 1993. The first
presented the case for US recognition of the Angolan government, and a package of
sanctions against UNITA (both of which were eventually enacted although not necessarily
as a direct result of the AEC campaign); the second criticised the international community
for doing ‘too little, too late’ in response to UNITA’s intransigence.

MAC considers it had some small impact on the British government over a period of
time, particularly through increased contact under the AEC umbrella. The AEC’s initial
strength was as a coalition of groups and individuals. But frustrations arose over its
partisan nature. Although the group was united in challenging the ‘even-handed’
approach taken by the British government, there was concern that only abuses by UNITA
were being acknowledged and acted on by the AEC. Some aid agencies and church groups
found it increasingly difficult to support the position taken by MAC through the AEC.
There was frustration that MAC’s analysis of the rapidly changing situation failed to take
into account voices other than the MPLA’s, and to recognise that the MPLA’s stance in
1995 was very different from what it had been 20 years earlier.

The British AAM became ACTSA in October 1994, in line with the changing political
situation in Southern Africa. ACTSA’s aims and objectives are based around information,
campaigning for peace, democracy and development, and promoting solidarity, including
on Angola and Mozambique. ACTSA works closely with the European network on
Southern Africa to lobby the EU on the Angolan peace process. It regards the EU/Southern
Africa relationship as the key one around which its future work will revolve.

As one of the convenor organisations of the AEC, ACTSA participated in the meetings
with the British foreign office from 1992 to 1994, but felt there was not the political will to
take up at senior level issues such as sanctions, and continued South African support for
UNITA. ACTSA began to direct more effort into engaging its members (individuals,
organisations, trades unions, etc) on specific actions, such as letter-writing. Its campaign
materials for 1996 included a postcard to be sent to the UK overseas development minister
calling for increased backing for the UN peace process; and greater pressure on UNITA to
fulfil its commitments by enforcing the arms and fuel embargo, and restricting the sale of
illegally-mined diamonds by UNITA on the international market. ACTSA received direct
feedback from the FCO that the message had been received, but there is little evidence it
was acted on.

ACTSA has established its credibility in a short time. It has provided a much-needed
source of reliable and up-to-date information on the peace process, through the Angola
Peace Monitor (APM), published fortnightly since April 1995. The aim of APM was to
inform and sustain international support vital to the success of the peace process, and to
serve as an early warning mechanism should things slide towards breakdown again. APM
is targeted at decision-makers: the UN Security Council and Department of Humanitarian
Affairs, the EU, members of the European Parliament, key foreign ministries, the Troika
observer states to the Lusaka Protocol (the United States, Russia and Portugal), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), international agencies and Angolan organisations.

The director of ACTSA visited Angola in March 1996. This coincided with a visit by the Washington Office on Africa (WoA) representative, William Minter, an author and expert on Angola and Mozambique. Discussions resulted in a joint policy framework. The contact also facilitated greater sharing of information between the North American and British/European networks. WoA and ACTSA have instant access (via electronic communications facilities) to decision-makers in the above fora, although it is difficult to say how far this information is utilised. However, the mere fact that reliable and up-to-date information on developments in Angola is scarce means that WoA information is more likely to be consulted.

Aid agencies

The main UK agencies working in Angola have tried to coordinate their advocacy work. A series of inter-agency meetings took place from 1991 to 1994, providing a relatively informal forum for discussing operational programme and advocacy issues. Those represented were the Agency for Cooperation and Research on Development (ACORD), the Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (CAFOD), Christian Aid, the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), One World Action, Oxfam, Save the Children Fund UK (SCF), and for specific agenda items (non-development, or non-orthodox NGO work) MAC. While some agencies were engaged in operational emergency work (Oxfam and SCF), others tried to work through partner organisations (ACORD, CAFOD, Christian Aid and One World Action) and focus on development projects rather than emergency aid. Some agencies were investigating ways of expanding their programmes to respond to the growing crisis. Most agencies shared a similar perspective (basically anti-UNITA and cautiously pro-MPLA as the legitimate government) and some worked with the same Angolan partner organisations; some had more of a public profile, but almost all had been involved in public education and advocacy work on Angola and the Southern African region for some years. It is fair to say that one or two agencies (SCF in particular) had better access than others to officials in the British government, both in the embassy in Luanda and in London. What they said as an individual agency may have been more influential than what the group of agencies said together. Some operational agencies, particularly Oxfam, bruised by its experience with the Charity Commission over its Frontline Africa campaign, had to prioritise issues such as staff safety and non-suspension of programmes over its advocacy work. Angola was presented by the media as predominantly a humanitarian emergency rather than a political one. This encouraged a response from the British and other governments based on humanitarian need rather than political action.

These inter-agency meetings were useful for sharing information, providing first-hand accounts of developments from recent staff visits, and coordinating specific advocacy actions. The group arranged for delegations to the FCO, as well as specific meetings with the Overseas Development Administration on aid matters. The group also sent joint letters to the FCO and to the press in 1992 and 1993. Letters are sometimes considered ineffective, but the British government has stated that points raised by the agencies in letters and in meetings were taken on board in UN Security Council resolutions.14

A representative from MAC was invited to some of the inter-agency meetings. However, there was tension on one occasion when some of the agencies felt unable to
discuss issues openly and in confidence, given MAC’s proximity to the Angolan embassy in London. MAC was not invited to subsequent meetings unless there was a specific reason, while agencies continued to attend meetings of the AEC. The inter-agency group became more concerned with operational programme issues and less enthusiastic about advocacy after 1993, with no end to the war in sight and little sign of interest on the part of the British government. The group had the impression that the work it had done had brought few tangible results.

Most of the agencies undertook some public education work. There was little material available on Angola during the 1980s, but more effort was made in the early 1990s to provide information through publications and videos, some for a general audience, others targeted at decision-makers. Angola rarely featured on British television, except at the height of the humanitarian crisis in 1993, when it was presented as the location of the world’s worst war, with 1,000 people dying each day. New angles or stories were hard to find, but when they did arise (the landmines campaign, for instance) they had to be taken up with maximum effort to capitalise on the opportunity. Non-operational agencies found it difficult to organise successful media visits, because of logistical problems on the ground.

Church-related agencies and networks
Various church networks within the UK, Europe and North America have been active on Angola, based on their links with the Protestant or Catholic churches in Angola. The three main church-related agencies in the UK, (CAFOD, Christian Aid and Tear Fund) participated in a sub-group formed by the Church Conference on Mission (CCOM) of the Council of Churches of Britain and Ireland (CCBI). The group first met in December 1993 and then infrequently, and was mainly an information-sharing network. Some church agencies funded UK-based advocacy work, such as CIIR’s Southern Africa development education programme, and more recently ACTSA’s Angola Peace Monitor.

Human rights lobby
Both Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch/Africa (HRW) have undertaken lobbying and advocacy work on Angola. They have an advantage in that they are ‘single-issue’ organisations, highly-respected, with a clear focus, and completely independent. Whereas solidarity groups and other organisations may have to adapt their public message according to rapidly developing political situations, the message at the heart of AI’s work (human rights) retains its essence. AI and HRW have made recommendations to both the Angolan government and UNITA, as well as key international governments (the United States, Portugal, Russia) concerned with the peace process. Both AI and HRW claim to have achieved at least some successes in their advocacy work.

Since May 1992 AI has published five reports relating to the human rights situation in Angola, each with targeted recommendations. Although some have been ignored — for example, calls for independent inquiries into atrocities such as a mass grave discovered in Soyo in July 1996 — other appeals appear to have been heeded. One example is AI’s lobbying of the special representative to the UN secretary-general for UNAVEM III to include a Human Rights Unit. This was granted under UN Security Council Resolution 976 of February 1995, although in the first year of its operation it was largely ineffective. Another example was the introduction by the Angolan government of some constitutional amendments in 1992 that may have been influenced by an AI memorandum.

AI’s range of activities (urgent actions, memoranda, reports, lobbying individual
governments, missions to country) provides a balance between public and private action. Overall, AI has found that private lobbying can make a difference in individual cases, but public actions and information are vital if lobbying is to be effective.

HRW (Arms Project) has produced three reports on Angola which have kept the issue of the arms trade on the international community’s agenda. Specific recommendations were addressed to the Angolan government, UNITA, the United Nations, the Observer Troika, and South Africa and Zaire, but in the main they have not resulted in action. HRW’s most recent report did, for the first time, prompt a written statement from the Angolan government.

International groups and governments have begun to support human rights work, acknowledging that, as an integral part of the peace and democratisation process, Angolans need to know their rights and how to protect them.

To conclude, British NVOs seem to have put considerable effort into lobbying work, but with few tangible results on the promotion of peace. They have, however, worked hard to keep open channels of communication with the British government.

Dutch-based agencies and organisations

Dutch agencies have been involved in advocacy work on Angola for many years, having had stronger links with lusophone Africa than some other European countries.

Institute for Southern Africa (IZA)
The Institute for Southern Africa (IZA) was formed by the merger in 1997 of the Eduardo Mondlane Foundation (EMS) and the Committee for Southern Africa (see below).

The Eduardo Mondlane Foundation (EMS) was set up in 1969 as a solidarity movement, mobilising political support and sending development workers to lusophone Africa. It maintained its advocacy role while also funding development projects. EMS’s main activities were lobbying the Dutch government, informing the public and raising funds for programmes, as well as sending volunteers (professionals) to work with NGOs or local government institutions, mainly in Mozambique. Its campaigning was carried out through actions similar to those of British agencies — meetings with government officials, letter-writing, educational conferences. EMS recognised that it had an advantage in that its government’s attitude to the Angolan situation was relatively progressive. One of its most effective lobbying strategies was face-to-face contacts with the Dutch foreign ministry. These meetings were informal but effective. Another advantage enjoyed by EMS was that some of its volunteers later took up positions within the Dutch government, so were sympathetic to the views and work of NGOs and their networks.

EMS worked closely with other agencies such as NOVIB, the Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation (ICCO), HIVOS (a Dutch humanist NGO) and Bilance (ex-Cebemo), which have generally held a unified position in public policy and advocacy work. EMS also organised a series of international conferences with key speakers from Angola to stimulate and inform international advocacy work. The 1996 conference, ‘Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Civil Society in Angola’, produced a statement to the European Union, which was to be followed up with the Dutch government when it assumed the EU presidency from January to June 1997. Until its merger with the Committee for Southern Africa, EMS had held meetings with Dutch and European parliamentarians and sent a letter to the Dutch foreign affairs ministry presenting the conference conclusions and remarks. These called on the Dutch government and the EU to be ready to take action to prevent the collapse of the peace process, if necessary.
Committee for Southern Africa (KZA))
The Committee for Southern Africa (KZA), formerly the Angola Committee, was set up in 1961 at the start of the Angolan anti-colonial liberation struggle. It continued to be active but broadened its focus to the Southern African region. KZA and EMS merged to become the Institute for Southern Africa (IZA) in January 1997. One aim is to do more work at European level. A computerised information and documentation centre is planned to provide a sound basis for future lobbying and research work.

Office for Policy Development (BBO)
This is a joint lobbying organisation of the Protestant church agencies in the Netherlands, set up in 1992 and based in the Hague, with direct access to the national parliament and the Dutch foreign affairs ministry. It has done some work on Angola, but mainly relating to aid allocations rather than the peace process.

Reasons for success
Compared with other national groups, Dutch NVOs seem to have been reasonably successful in their lobbying activities.

The reasons for this are, first, that the Dutch government has been more involved and concerned with the peace process in Angola than, for instance, the British government, so Dutch groups' lobbying has sought only for additions or amendments to policy rather than drastic policy change.

Second, the solidarity groups set up in the Netherlands in the 1960s have successfully adapted and responded to changed circumstances, such as the decreasing enthusiasm for the MPLA government. Their closer contacts and information sources in Angola have enabled them to do this, as well as to communicate changed contexts to other European groups through their conferences. The newly-formed IZA's planned computerised documentation centre shows the importance it attaches to reliable and up-to-date information as a basis for effective lobbying work.

EMS's evolution from purely solidarity work to funding development projects enabled it to build new partnerships and expertise and maintain first-hand knowledge of the complex social and political situation. As such, it seemed to have a stronger partnership with Dutch development NGOs than the British solidarity movement (ie MAC and ACTSA) has with British NGOs.

Third, in general, Dutch solidarity groups and NGOs managed to maintain a broad consensus in their lobbying work and present a united front in discussions with their government. This was not the experience of, for instance, the British and Canadian groups, where differences of analysis hindered united lobbying positions at critical times.

European organisations and networks
There has been some cooperation at European level in advocacy work: some specific initiatives, past and present, are mentioned below.

European Campaign Against South African Aggression in Mozambique and Angola (ECASAAMA)
ECASAAMA was set up in the late 1980s, combining the efforts of several national solidarity groups. It was successful as an information sharing network, and held a major conference in 1988. Its membership was particularly strong in Germany, Portugal, the Netherlands, the UK and Ireland. Although it carried out public education and campaigning work, there was limited scope for it to undertake European-level lobbying,
as the EC at the time did not prioritise coordination on foreign policy issues. (The EC’s aid programme in Angola in the 1980s was largely humanitarian).

**European Parliamentarians for (Southern) Africa (AWEPA)**
Formerly AWEPAA (Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid), AWEPA has actively supported the peace process in Angola from the 1980s, commissioning research, books and pamphlets (the most recent, in June 1996, focuses on the challenge for civil society), and sending delegations to Angola (one in 1989, and a team of election monitors in 1992). Other activities are planned within the framework of peace promotion: a programme of civic education workshops funded by the EU with ADRA, an Angolan NGO; translation of the Lusaka Protocol into African languages; sending human rights officers to work with the UNAVEM unit; and drawing up a cooperation agreement with the National Assembly of Angola for a series of international exchanges to discuss other African countries’ experience of fostering national reconciliation. Angolan parliamentarians will also visit EU member states as part of the programme.

**EC Liaison Committee**
The EC Liaison Committee of Development NGOs established a Southern Africa Group (SAG) in 1993 which acted in an advisory capacity. SAG had decided to focus on support for the peace process in Angola as one of five priority areas. One of its main tasks was to provide information to members of the Liaison Committee to stimulate and inform policy and lobbying. SAG produced some policy papers for distribution to national platforms, the European Parliament, and ACP-EC Joint Assemblies. These prompted some members into action. A paper was submitted jointly with the Liaison Group of Anti-Apartheid Movements to the September 1994 EU/Southern Africa Ministerial Conference in Berlin, the first meeting of its kind. The paper called on the European Union ‘to undertake a major diplomatic initiative on Angola to secure the adoption of comprehensive measures to isolate UNITA by the UN Security Council’.20

But the Liaison Committee/SAG faced two main constraints: it was an advisory body and members were under no obligation to take action on positions; and the committee had only limited capacity, with six active members from designated organisations meeting quarterly. Members had variable capacity and enthusiasm for advocacy work between meetings.

**European Network for Information and Action on Southern Africa**
Formerly the Liaison Group of Anti-Apartheid Movements in the EU, the European Network was established in April 1995, with some national groupings more active on Angola than others. A number of conferences were planned by members in 1997 to help raise the profile of Angola in different contexts (for example, EU relations with Southern Africa).

**Impact at EU level**
The EU (then as the EC) made a number of statements around the September 1992 elections in Angola but these were not followed up by action. More recently, though, the Union has demonstrated more positive interest in Angola. There was a surprising response to the UNDP-facilitated presentation of the Angolan government’s Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation Programme at the Brussels Round Table in September 1995 hosted by the European Commission. The European Union pledged US$127 million towards the programme, and one week later adopted its first Common
Position on Angola. This set out five key objectives, promising to 'assist the Government of Angola in the aim of strengthening democracy and the rule of law; assist UNAVEM III by taking part in the reinforcement of its human rights monitoring component proposed by the UN Secretary-General; and participate in initiatives undertaken by Angola and the international community aimed at national reconciliation and rehabilitation'.

This statement seems in line with what many NVOs had been asking for in relation to peace promotion. However, it is difficult to say with any certainty whether the statement was influenced by direct lobbying: none of the groups studied here had been calling explicitly for the European Union to adopt a common position. Rather, the impetus seems to have come from the successful Round Table and from President Dos Santos and Savimbi in one of their few face-to-face meetings. That the major protagonists were involved actually contributes to confidence about the entire process.

North American-based agencies and organisations

Canadian agencies and networks

Although the Canadian government was never an important actor in Angola, in marked contrast to the United States, it recognised the Angolan government (in 1977).

A number of coalition groups were formed in Canada at various stages. These focused on public education and advocacy work: the Angola Task Force, which subsequently became Program Angola (1988-93); the Angola Development Coalition (from 1993 to date); and Alternatives (formerly Centre pour Information et Documentation pour Mozambique et Afrique du Sud, CIDMAA). The first umbrella grouping was the Inter-Agency Working Group on Southern Africa (IAWGSA) which functioned from the mid to late 1970s until 1988. Program Angola was established from 1988 in the context of new funding possibilities, but with advocacy as a key element of its work. Objectives were to inform the Canadian public about Angola; to influence Canadian government policy on Angola; and to promote and encourage peace; to inform and help member organisations mobilise their constituencies to support peace in Angola.

There are currently three Canadian groups actively working on Angola: Development Workshop (with an office in Luanda), which is a key contact for Canadian NGOs and an enabler of Angolan NGOs, providing technical and organisational support and training; Alternatives, which now funds projects but has a history of education and advocacy work; and the United Church of Canada, which is a partner to some church denominations and NGOs, particularly in the central highlands region.

There is a church-based coalition, the Inter-Church Coalition for Africa (ICCAF) which covers Anglican, Catholic, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Mennonite and other churches. ICCAF's main goals are advocacy and education. In December 1995 ICCAF put recommendations to the Canadian government calling for specific actions to support the continued implementation of the peace process. Since 1991 ICCAF has lobbied the Canadian government extensively to support the UN involvement in the Angolan peace process, contribute to the peacekeeping force, and to sustain UN mandates when they were in danger of slipping.

In the opinion of some of those involved in Canadian lobbying, one of ICCAF's most effective lobbying tactics from 1992 was a programme of exchange visits and seminars with Angolan partner organisations, including sending election monitors. These events provided a forum for discussion around issues such as peace and social development, but also gave the opportunity for Angolan representatives to brief the Canadian government.
However, there was a problem in maintaining a broad consensus on advocacy work within the coalitions (Program Angola, for example), given the range of analytical and ideological strands of its members. Overall, their advocacy work seems to have had few concrete effects, but they worked hard to keep Angola on the Canadian government's agenda.

**US-based agencies and networks**

South Africa was the main political and economic focus in the Southern African region for the United States. A multiracial democratic government in South Africa, it was thought, would pave the way for peace and prosperity in Angola and the region. Since Angola's independence the United States has had a major impact, from playing out its proxy war with the Soviet Union in Angola and other developing countries, and now as the one remaining world superpower, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and one of the three observer countries to the Lusaka Protocol. Its actions have at times seemed incongruous with its business interests, for example, withholding diplomatic recognition of the Angolan government while being the largest importer of Angola's oil, to funding UNITA rebels to attack those oil installations which were guarded by Cuban troops. After 1975, US policy focused on securing the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, linked to negotiations for Namibia's independence. From the mid-1980s, under President Ronald Reagan, the United States provided covert and overt military support to UNITA, taking over from South Africa as UNITA's main backer, and shifting its supply route to the north of Angola from the Kamina airbase in Zaire. This meant that when South Africa agreed to Namibian independence as part of the New York agreement in 1988, the curtailment of UNITA's supply routes from the south in Namibia did not significantly reduce UNITA's military capacity.

In May 1993 the administration of President Bill Clinton recognised the Angolan government, and lifted its arms embargo shortly after. A marked shift in attitudes is evident: relations with the Angolan government have warmed, whereas patience with Savimbi has worn thin — he is no longer viewed as a freedom fighter, rather an 'exasperating troublemaker'. This shift was reflected in increased diplomatic activity in late 1995 and early 1996. On a visit to Angola in December 1995 assistant secretary of state George Moose made it clear to both sides that US patience was running out. President Dos Santos visited Washington later that month and responded by announcing concessions to take the stalled process forward. In October 1996 Warren Christopher was the first US secretary of state to visit Angola. Savimbi did not travel to Luanda to meet with him. The reasons for the US shift in policy may in part be connected with the new US ambassador in Luanda, who has been more energetically involved, in contrast with earlier periods, and a more active Angolan ambassador in Washington.

There is a history of links between the US and European anti-apartheid movements dating from the 1960s. Initially this was based on sharing information and perspectives on the anti-colonial struggle. From the 1980s to date the WoA has played the key role in lobbying and advocacy work. Early efforts focused on counteracting the image of UNITA as a movement of 'freedom fighters'. In the mid-1990s WoA continued cooperating with other groups and in some instances developed new links; for example, its collaboration with the British group, ACTSA, culminated in a joint position paper in early 1996.

WoA has established credibility based on its research and analysis. Its own assessment of its lobbying impact is that it has made a limited but positive contribution through
formulating perspectives seen in the broader debate. WoA notes that, since 1992, many private aid agencies have set up with funding from the US government development agency, USAID, to work in Angola, and they have access to senior government officials, although much of what is said is not in the realm of public debate, making it difficult for others such as WoA to respond. WoA seems to share European groups' frustration that it has not been possible to achieve a great deal through advocacy work around the peace process in Angola.

Although there has been a gradual shift in US policy since 1992, NVOs do not claim the credit for this. Rather, it seems to have resulted from a convergence of factors — from domestic political changes (Democrat Bill Clinton's electoral victory in November 1992); to the end of the Cold War, and the MPLA's ideological transformation from the 'enemy' it had been so important for UNITA to fight; and from US diplomats losing patience with UNITA; to indirect pressure resulting from policy changes by other governments making moves to build stronger bilateral links with Angola.

Although greater pressure seems to have been exerted recently, however, the United States failed to put pressure on UNITA when it could have had maximum impact — for instance, immediately after the Angolan election results were announced. Conversely, the US government has demonstrated that a combination of the 'carrot and the stick' approach can work. One report from early 1996 notes that 'frenetic US diplomatic efforts contributed towards reversing the Angolan government decision to postpone [the Lusaka meeting with Savimbi in May 1995]. The US threat not to fund the UN operation [...] and curtail assistance unless the meeting happened, was effective'.

**Angolan initiatives**

The ability of international organisations and networks to do effective advocacy work is in part a function of the capacity of Angolan partners. Until recently most international organisations looked to one Angolan NGO as the progressive and articulate voice of civil society — Action for Rural Development and the Environment (ADRA). This put great pressure on ADRA to respond to the varying agendas (financial and other) of potential new international partners.

But to what or whom do we refer when we talk of civil society in Angola? Recent studies have detailed some initiatives by churches, NGOs and the media, and set out strategies to inform international support for future programmes. Civil society is formed by NGOs, churches; trades unions (some independents are emerging, led by SINPROF, a teachers' union); women and youth organisations (ex-party linked); regional and professional associations; the media; and business interests. It is mostly NGOs and churches which are involved in civic education and conflict resolution work. They have the advantage of being able to combine international experience with local knowledge and cultures.

As this study is partly concerned with how NVOs have supported their Angolan partners' efforts in peace promotion or lobbying, some specific examples of different types of support (funding, sharing of skills or expertise, sharing of contacts, facilitation) are presented below.

**Non-governmental organisations**

Some agencies fund projects which could be categorised as support for civil society. AWEPA (see earlier) has linked up with ADRA to organise workshops on civic education, and promote local knowledge about the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. Amnesty International is providing some support to the Angolan Human Rights Association, and
has helped with distribution of information about human rights. The Forum of Angolan NGOs (FONGA) is implementing a conflict-resolution programme utilising experience of South African and Mozambican organisations in mediation and peacebuilding. FONGA and the churches are involved with the Conflict Management Group (linked with the Norwegian Refugee Council) funded by USAID, undergoing training in conflict-resolution techniques at grassroots level. Other support is broadly concerned with strengthening Angolan NGOs' organisational and communications capacity, such as Christian Aid's funding of the Development Workshop Angonet project, to link some Angolan NGOs to the Internet, to maximise opportunities for contact and sharing of information. Significantly, some of the more established Angolan NGOs (principally but not exclusively ADRA) are now in a position to provide support to emerging NGOs. Still others make a contribution at community level; for example, ACORD trains schoolteachers in its project areas in civic education, focusing on key clauses of the constitution, concepts of rights, citizenship, and so on.

In the search for peace and reconciliation there have also been some unique Angolan-led ventures. In February 1995 the Angolan Women's Ecumenical Commission organised a three-day meeting in Johannesburg to discuss women's role in the national peace and reconciliation process. There were women from the government, UNITA and other political parties, as well as representatives from international agencies, churches and the United Nations. The meeting provided an opportunity for discussion and debate. Follow-up included a declaration addressed to President Dos Santos and to Savimbi, as well as requests for meetings with the two leaders to present women's views. Members of the commission have since been trying to establish a national forum through legal processes.

Churches

The strength of the churches in Angola — as non-state institutions with their own history — is in part also their weakness. The development of different Protestant missionary traditions in different regions of the country, and the alliance between the colonial power and the Catholic church, produced divisions which are only now being worked through. Regional identities and political allegiances made it impossible for church leaders to be credible mediators.

The Protestant churches have recently engaged in efforts to reconcile their differences and take up their role in the national peace and reconciliation process. The Council of Christian Churches of Angola (CICA) and the Alliance of Evangelicals of Angola (AEA) began to explore possible joint actions on peace, and issued a joint statement in January 1994, as an 'encouragement from the churches to the negotiators in the peace process'. Cooperation continued, and culminated in September 1995 with a unique event in church history. The Meeting of Angolan Christian Church Leaders (EDICA) brought together more than 350 members from CICA and AEA from the provinces, along with with international representation. The three-day event culminated in an appeal to the government and UNITA to speed up implementation of the Lusaka accords, and also called on church leaders to set an example by remaining non-partisan. Specific recommendations were agreed, but follow-up has proved difficult. UNITA delegates were not allowed to attend the meeting. Meanwhile, both CICA and AEA are continuing with their individual programmes for promoting peace and reconciliation, with radio and television programmes, bible studies and other activities. Although these are encouraging signs, there is still a long way to go.

International church partner agencies have tried to assist in promoting local
reconciliation, providing funding and facilitation where possible, but their main preoccupation around 1992-93 was to meet basic needs in the emergency situation. Tension between Northern church funding agencies and their church partners in Angola was always evident, hinging on the pull between the churches as agents of social development and as providers of spiritual and pastoral guidance. Some church leaders were wary of adopting Northern agencies’ agendas and felt frustrated that the ‘partnership’ was one-sided. There was also a feeling on the part of some Protestant churches that their international partners had done too little too late.

The World Council of Churches (WCC) established an Angola Working Group which met in 1991 and 1993, and urged ecumenical partners and churches abroad to ‘put Angola on their agenda for public information and advocacy’. Meanwhile, the WCC engaged in quiet diplomacy between Geneva and Luanda and, within Angola, between the government and UNITA, having a senior Angolan ex-church leader on its staff. Various initiatives were undertaken by the WCC, some jointly with the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) or with regional groupings, including pastoral delegations to Angola (two in 1994), and an emergency meeting in Geneva in May 1995. Attempts to meet with church leaders in UNITA areas, or for them to attend these meetings, mostly failed. The World Council of Churches wanted to support a joint working group on peace between the Protestant churches and the Catholic Bishops’ Conference, but this group has not materialised.

In the field of development and emergency aid, British and European agencies (both Catholic and Protestant) put considerable effort into improving their response to the Angolan crisis by pooling resources through consortia operations: the Protestant-based Church Action in Angola was formally established in April 1994, but a proposed Catholic grouping did not materialise.

Has advocacy had an impact?

Most of the organisations with which this study is concerned agree that it is difficult to measure and evaluate the impact of their lobbying work, or even to set concrete objectives. ‘How can we know any slight change of position was down to us?’ is a typical response. Yet those organisations also give the impression that their advocacy work has had little direct impact on developments in the Angolan peace process. Overall, it seems a great deal of work was done for only a small tipping of the scales. Given the context, this hardly seems surprising.

However, there have been identifiable successes. One of the most important was the strong message conveyed by international groups that peace cannot be obtained ‘on the cheap’, and that investing adequate resources in peacekeeping interventions may save funds in the long run. Although too late for Angolans who suffered or died when the war restarted in 1992, the message that mistakes made with UNAVEM II should not be repeated – in Angola or elsewhere – was heeded, so that the peacekeeping operation in Mozambique and UNAVEM III in Angola were given adequate mandates and resources. But the message had to be put repeatedly to be heard. UNAVEM III began to withdraw in March 1997, a process to be completed by August 1997. A UN observer mission, UNOMA, will stay to monitor the situation, and the work of the Human Rights Unit is set to continue, if not expand.

To assess what impact international civil groups’ lobbying has had, we look at what was being called for in specific areas, and whether policy changes were effected.
Sanctions

The question of sanctions against UNITA, and their timing, was critical. International organisations and networks had, since November 1992, been urging their governments, the European Union, and the United Nations to impose sanctions against UNITA, to give a clear message that sabotage of the internationally-monitored electoral process with violence was unacceptable. It was only one year later, in September 1993, that the UN Security Council (in Resolution 864.93) imposed an oil and arms embargo against UNITA, threatening additional sanctions after 10 days unless a ceasefire was agreed. The Security Council had adopted resolutions six months previously in March, and again in July 1993, condemning UNITA and threatening sanctions if it would not come to the negotiating table. British and other agencies had pressed hard for sanctions, and it is interesting to note that Lynda Chalker, UK minister for overseas aid, stated that the UK ‘took a leading part in drafting 864 [which] imposed sanctions against UNITA [...] UNITA responded on 6 October by agreeing to the negotiations now taking place in Lusaka’. A ceasefire was only agreed one year later, in November 1994. UN threats of second-phase sanctions had therefore been seen to be empty.

The Security Council must bear responsibility for not imposing sanctions against UNITA much sooner. Savimbi knew that without resources to implement and monitor the embargo effectively, it was largely symbolic. Sanctions would probably have brought a ceasefire sooner, saving many lives and bringing the process forward. No plausible reasons have been given for the delay in taking punitive measures against UNITA.

US recognition of the Angolan government

The US administration at last recognised the Angolan government in May 1993, although the election results were announced in October 1992. Recognition was slow but predictable, given UN endorsement of the September 1992 elections as free and fair. However, recognition was not given when it would have had a significant impact on UNITA. Although recognition paved the way for an improved relationship between the United States and Angola, it has reduced US leverage over Savimbi.

Recognition had an impact at a different level, being closely followed by lifting of the US embargo on selling weapons to the Angolan government. This contributed to the MPLA's military advances in 1993 and 1994, helping bring Savimbi to the negotiating table. The UK had lifted its embargo in August 1993.

US and UK groups had been calling for recognition of the Angolan government for many years: the AEC had included this as an objective in its 1993 campaign. But there is little evidence to suggest that policy change was influenced by their lobbying on this issue.

Major diplomatic initiatives

NGOs repeatedly called for major diplomatic activities at various stages of the peace process and evidence shows that these diplomatic efforts intensified, particularly in late 1995 and early 1996. But again there is no evidence to suggest that these moves were a direct result of pressure from civil groups. The peace process was in danger of collapse following military manoeuvres by government forces in Soyo, Zaire province. An Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report from 1996 states that 'as a result of the intense international pressure on the two parties, there has been some progress towards defusing the tension and kick-starting the stalled peace process'.

There has been one significant regional initiative, in the newly-created SADC Organ on
Politics, Defence and Security. This body expressed ‘deep regret’ over Savimbi’s failure to attend a summit held in Luanda in October 1996. It called for an early high-level meeting between the government and UNITA, and appealed to UNITA to fulfil its commitments within the agreed deadlines.

The prevailing situation in Angola is the remaining major obstacle to total regional stability [...] which is seriously hindering the joint development programmes of the region, and in this context [the summit] urged UNITA to commit itself to peace and democracy in Angola so as to contribute effectively to the establishment of a new era of peace and co-operation in Southern Africa.27

The summit agreed to send five ministers to the Security Council in New York to present the regional position on the peace process, as renewal of the UNAVEM mandate was being considered. The summit requested that the Security Council ‘take into consideration the latest actions by UNITA and adopt measures, within the framework of resolution 864/93, which shall oblige UNITA to fully and urgently respect the deadlines established by the Security Council’.28

Human rights

Post-Bicesse in 1991, the human rights lobby succeeded in placing the issue high on the agenda, and getting resources committed to promotion of human rights through a separate unit within UNAVEM. The Human Rights Watch report of February 1996 was denounced by the Angolan government. Clearly, the message was received, although it was not acted on. The HRW report also may have had some impact in adding weight to existing demands on US intelligence services to release more information about arms flows to UNITA. But lobbying did not lead to a reduction in arms sales; instead, suppliers became more wary of detection and probably sought alternative delivery routes.

Some specific human rights measures have been implemented. For instance, the Angolan government formally abolished the death penalty in August 1992, shortly after the publication of Amnesty International’s report urging abolition. Amnesty considers it has been successful in providing information and materials to Angolan organisations on what their government has signed up to by way of international agreements on protection of human rights. There is also evidence that these materials have reached outlying areas. The UN Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council of October 1996 states that the number of reported cases of human rights violations has increased, which ‘may be due to heightened awareness of the population following a nationwide program of workshops and seminars’. So this may be viewed as a positive impact. The UNAVEM Human Rights Unit has also worked closely with the government on a plan of action to reform the judicial system, a crucial element.

Observations from the Angola case study

1. There is room for different but complementary lobbying strategies, for action at various levels, in both the public and private realms. There are many examples of this — Amnesty International’s call to supporters to take action over individual cases while following up broader issues at more senior level; ACTSA’s public education work with members, and analytical information work through the Angola Peace Monitor; EMS’s educational/campaigning conferences combined with meetings for Angolan speakers with Dutch government officials for briefings.

2. A minimum level of public awareness and readiness to act is a prerequisite. Proactive
work can be valuable in this regard, especially where much needs to be done even to ‘put Angola on the map’. Civil groups have to take advantage of every opportunity to raise Angola’s profile in the media — for example, British troops taking part in the UNAVEM III logistics contingent, or groups using Angola as an example in national and international campaigns against landmines. The recent visit of Diana, Princes of Wales to Angola with the Red Cross received high media coverage.

3. Public or private lobbying carries most weight where an organisation has a reputation for being credible and non-partisan. Solidarity groups are in a weaker position than some issue-based organisations in this respect, as their commitment is to a political group rather than to a principle such as protection of human rights, which applies to all those in power, whether in government or rebel areas. An organisation’s credibility can be seriously undermined if information it presents is highly selective.

4. Lobbying and campaigning should be focused, aiming for small but achievable objectives or concessions. Expectations of what can be achieved should be realistic. In some of the more difficult contexts, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, successful advocacy work may be limited to getting a commitment from key actors to ‘keep watch’ on a certain matter, not letting it slip off the political agenda altogether.

5. Joint efforts are likely to have a greater impact than individual actions (for instance, the British AEC campaign probably had a greater impact than MAC or ACTSA would have done individually). However, the increasingly competitive environment in which national and international NGOs are working can be an obstacle to collaborative broadly-based lobbying efforts, as can differences of interpretation that hinder common positions.

6. The scarcity of partner organisations, difficulty of communication, and even linguistic constraints were significant obstacles to effective advocacy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Many Northern groups were simply out of touch with what was happening in Angola, or had insufficient resources to begin to respond adequately.

   Northern groups have made efforts to improve information sources and linkages — between themselves and Angolan partners, and between Europe and North America. For example, IZA’s planned documentation centre in the Netherlands, ACTSA’s Angola Peace Monitor circulated in Europe and North America as well as Angola; Christian Aid-funded Angonet project to establish e-mail facilities for some Angolan NGOs and churches. These efforts should be continued.

7. Effective lobbying and advocacy requires time and resources. NGO desk officers, appointed for their development and programme skills, may not be the most appropriate staff to undertake lobbying, or may need advice and support from different sections of their organisation.

8. Some policy changes seem to occur in response to multiple pressures rather than lobbying from one or other group. In this case it is difficult to suggest that there is a right time or a wrong time to lobby, although sometimes timing is essential where key meetings or decisions are due to be taken. These timetables are usually known in advance.

9. Some things are beyond the power of civil groups to influence — for example, changes in national diplomatic postings which may have a more or less positive bearing on events. However, this underlines the importance of ongoing work to keep channels open and promote opportunities for discussion and exchange of views around key issues.

10. The regional factor has changed drastically over the past decade — from South African incursions into Southern Angola in 1986 in support of UNITA, to the South African president, Nelson Mandela, leading a gathering of SADC ministers in Luanda in October
Putting pressure on Savimbi and the UN to act appropriately. South Africa has the potential to have a positive influence on the success of the peace process in Angola.

**Recommendations for future strategies on Angola**

Some ongoing activities, although difficult to prove as having had any direct impact, seem worth continuing. These would include regular meetings with government officials, closer contact with Angolan partner organisations for two-way information, and sharing of resources. Others seem less useful, such as joint letters to the media, or governments.

Northern groups, in each national or regional context, should bear the following in mind when planning their advocacy work for the next phase:

1. **Southern Africa region**: Voluntary organisations in Europe and North America should facilitate greater contact between existing partners in Southern Africa with experience of lobbying at different levels (for community services, with civic associations, with employers, and so on) and Angolan counterpart groups. Leadership training should be prioritised along with exchange programmes to increase exposure and allow Angolans to develop more contacts with similar-interest groups and institutions. English language training should be considered a priority for strategic individuals or groups where this is a serious obstacle to progress.

2. **European-level work**: International voluntary organisations need to be able to respond quickly to the changing European arena. Before 1993 coordination of EU member states’ policies was loose. But, as coordination becomes evident (the October 1995 EU Common Position on Angola), there is greater potential for coordinated advocacy work at EU level.

3. **Angolan organisations’ capacity for lobbying**: It is difficult to make specific suggestions, as this should be the subject of discussion between groups working in partnership. However, there are some useful examples which could be replicated – for instance, Christian Aid facilitated a process for one of its partner NGOs in Mozambique, whereby practical expertise was shared working on the government’s Land Law consultation; the NGO gained experience of the lobbying process through a practical and critical issue, thus increasing the chance of its voice being listened to in future. Similar strategies could be considered for Angolan NGOs, where appropriate.

4. **Long-term commitment**: International organisations serious about supporting Angolan counterparts must take a long-term view; rebuilding local and national institutions, and developing a culture of people’s rights in the current context, is likely to be a slow process. Angolan organisations should determine where it is most appropriate for them to develop their own lobbying capacity without being overwhelmed by the cultural definitions or styles of their Northern counterparts.

5. **Communications**: International organisations should keep communication channels open – with each other, with their governments, opposition parties, and with the public – so that quick action can be taken where necessary. Although developments in
international communications infrastructure (e-mail) should make contact between Northern civil society groups and their Angolan partners easier, there is no substitute for exposure visits and face-to-face discussions. Visits from Angolan representatives to Northern partners and meetings with government representatives has proved to be an effective method of keeping Angola on the agenda, and should be continued.

6. Freedom of movement: Much local-level reconciliation work will be possible only when there is guaranteed freedom of movement. Re-establishing economic linkages would be an important incentive. The international community should continue to push for this. If free circulation of people and goods, a requirement of the Lusaka Protocol, becomes a reality, people could begin to rebuild their livelihoods through small-scale production and trade. Agricultural rehabilitation is the key factor but is greatly hindered by the presence of an estimated 10 million landmines throughout the country, as well as a lack of basic resources (seeds, tools and fertiliser), which were among the assets stripped from the people throughout the war.
Notes to Case Study 1

1. The Lusaka Protocol is a peace agreement relating to the establishment of national reconciliation in Angola; a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities; completion of a unified national army and national police force; and completion of the electoral process from September 1992.


3. Recent studies have given a greater insight into civil society in Angola. Challenges to Civil Initiatives Amidst Angola’s Precarious Peace, a report for AWEPA prepared by David Sogge, June 1996; US Institute of Peace (see note 5). A Canadian-funded research project with fieldwork by ADRA, Development Workshop and Save the Children Fund (UK) was under way in late 1996.


6. A ‘complex emergency’ is defined by the UN as a major humanitarian crisis, multi-causal in nature.


10. Alioune Blondin Beye, the UN secretary-general’s special representative to Angola, was required to draw up a mediation document as late as September 1996 calling on UNITA to fulfil key responsibilities by 20 November, or risk the imposition of second-phase sanctions as outlined in Resolution 864 of September 1993.


16. UN Humanitarian Coordination Unit, Luanda.


28. Ibid.

CASE STUDY 2

East Timor: Keeping the issue alive, working with the Timorese and beginning to shift policy

Arnold Kohen and Stephen Baranyi

It would be unjust to forget [...] the various non-governmental organisations, humanitarian groups, church related groups and individuals who have worked hard, in silence and without much publicity, so that the Timorese can receive assistance and that the Timorese issue would not be buried under the dust of oblivion.

Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo, Oslo, 10 December 1996

Without the generous solidarity movement we would be even poorer and alone.

José Ramos Horta, Oslo, 10 December 1996

The 1996 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo and José Ramos Horta has focused the world’s attention on the tragedy in the former Portuguese colony of East Timor. In making the award, the Norwegian Nobel Committee made it clear it was doing so in part to prevent East Timor from becoming a forgotten issue, which had been the case for much of the previous 21 years.

The Committee's actions have greatly increased public awareness of the East Timor problem. Yet while the Nobel peace prize is a great boost to the cause of justice and peace in East Timor, ‘it is no magic wand’ in the words of Geir Lundestad, permanent secretary of the Nobel Committee in Oslo. Indeed, along with this new awareness comes a greater responsibility to ensure that opportunities for constructive activity are effectively utilised by the range of governmental, inter-governmental and voluntary institutions involved.

This section focuses on one set of institutions involved in the East Timor issue, namely the Northern voluntary organisations (NVOs) — the solidarity, church and non-governmental organisations whose contributions were acknowledged by the Nobel laureates. After an introduction to the context in which NVOs have been active, we document their activities in three periods: the 1970s, the decade of solidarity and humanitarian responses; the 1980s, a decade of capacity-building and declaratory impact (see Introduction); and the 1990s when, particularly since the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991, increased capacity has been translated into policy impact at some levels. The threads tying together our account are an assessment of the impact of NVOs’ advocacy work during these periods and a bid to identify strategic lessons for the work of NVOs in the future.

Before reviewing the backdrop to NVOs’ efforts, it is important to note that this is an initial study of a complex case; further research, particularly on contributions by Australian, Japanese and Portuguese voluntary organisations, is required.*

* We are grateful for the assistance provided by Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL and John Taylor of South Bank University in the UK. We bear responsibility for any errors that remain.
Background

The Indonesian Armed Forces invaded East Timor, until then a Portuguese colony for more than 400 years, in December 1975. They have occupied the territory since that time in defiance of repeated United Nations (UN) resolutions. Indeed, the invasion itself was the culmination of 15 months of painstaking effort by Indonesia operatives in 1974-75 to ensure that the United Nations would not play a role in determining East Timor’s future. As Indonesian decision-makers apparently knew then, and surely know now, it is unlikely that the people of East Timor would freely choose to be part of Indonesia, thus a 21-year campaign of obfuscation has accompanied the invasion and occupation, during which as much as one-third of the original population of fewer than 700,000 people is estimated to have perished from the effects of the Indonesian assault.3

Indonesia was able to act with virtual impunity in the 1970s and has been able to continue doing so because of the acquiescence, as well as the support, of many Asian and Western states. Few governments backed their condemnation of the invasion with concrete measures to press Indonesia to withdraw its occupation forces and engage in serious peace negotiations. Indeed, the United Kingdom and the United States sold arms to Indonesia, Australia officially recognised Indonesia’s claims to sovereignty over the territory, and Japan soon became Indonesia’s largest aid and trade partner. Against this backdrop, resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly and Security Council in 1975 and 1976 were largely ignored by Jakarta. Resolutions passed in subsequent years by the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly fared no better, as the Indonesian military pursued its effort to destroy any opposition.4

The Indonesian state has used a combination of strategies in its attempt to crush the Timorese resistance. Militarily, it has deployed about 20,000 troops on the island, used carpet-bombing and search-and-destroy tactics to isolate and capture the guerrillas, honeycombed society with intelligence operatives and committed grave human rights violations against the civilian population. Politically, it has deployed vast resources to persuade the East Timorese, the Indonesians and the international community that Jakarta’s rule is beneficial and that resistance is futile.

Yet opposition has persisted: after being laid waste in the late 1970s, the resistance reorganised itself into a military front, a clandestine front and an external diplomatic front of the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) in the 1980s. According to Taylor, this ‘resistance by the East Timorese people to the Indonesian occupation for such a long period of time is, ultimately, the most important factor in keeping the issue alive internationally into the 1990s’.5 Opposition has been possible because the roots of East Timorese nationalism are deep, dating back centuries; and the stamina of the resistance to the Indonesian assault over the past 21 years is a measure of the strength of local feeling.

The tenacity of military and political resistance by the Timorese people also helped keep the door open for UN involvement. In 1982, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for ‘consultations with all parties directly concerned, with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem’. This resolution has been the basis of subsequent UN diplomatic activity on East Timor.

Yet, with the exception of progress on issues of family reunification for people seeking to leave East Timor, there were few gains from the bilateral talks between the governments of Indonesia and Portugal at the United Nations before the 12 November 1991 massacre at the Santa Cruz cemetery, in the Timorese capital Dili, brought unprecedented international attention to the issue. Since then, various inter-governmental bodies and
governments have expressed their concern with human rights violations in East Timor. Several Western governments suspended their aid to Indonesia after the massacre, and the US Congress has imposed restrictions on the sale of arms and military training to Indonesia. The UN has also stepped up its peacemaking efforts by sponsoring eight rounds of ministerial talks between the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Portugal, and two rounds of the All-inclusive Intra-East Timor Dialogue (AIETD).

These expressions of concern by the international community have led to slight shifts of policy by Jakarta, such as allowing inquiries into the Santa Cruz massacre and participating in the ministerial talks under UN auspices. Yet critics argue that these shifts have been cosmetic and that the fundamental thrust of Indonesian policy, the integration of East Timor into the Republic of Indonesia, has not changed.

What roles have Northern solidarity organisations, churches and non-governmental organisations played in keeping the East Timor issue alive against the odds? Have their activities strengthened the capacity of the Timorese to counter Indonesia’s strategies and press for effective international peacemaking? What impacts have their efforts had on the responses of the international community, and ultimately on the policies of the Indonesian government on the ground?

The 1970s: Solidarity and humanitarian responses

One cannot understand how East Timorese view the outside world without looking at developments between 1975 and late 1979, when the vast majority of the casualties were sustained from war, related famine and disease. A reflection by the East Timorese Catholic church in 1981 stated that they did not understand 'why the Indonesian Church and the universal Roman Church have up till now not stated openly and officially their solidarity with the Church, people and religious of East Timor. Perhaps this has been the heaviest blow for us [...] We felt stunned by this silence which seemed to allow us to die deserted'.

Although this spoke about only parts of the Church, the statement applies to many religious organisations during and immediately following the occupation.

In contrast, secular solidarity groups established themselves in Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Holland, Portugal and the United States. The British Committee for an Independent East Timor, Timor Informations in France and the Timor Information Service in Australia held public meetings, carried out public protests and maintained a flow of information about what was happening on the island. Many such groups were inspired by the struggle led by the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN); later, many were motivated by revulsion at the Indonesian occupation. Some of these groups maintained contact with exiled East Timorese diplomatic representatives such as José Ramos Horta and Abilio Araujo.

Yet these activities had little impact in the international community or on the ground. For example, despite protests in Australia, the government in Canberra denied reports about the extra-judicial execution of Western journalists at Balibo, in East Timor, before the invasion, and refused to carry out an inquiry into the killings. Meanwhile, the US government voted in favour of the resolutions by the UN Security Council condemning the invasion in 1975 and 1976, but US diplomats effectively blocked the implementation of those resolutions; under President Carter, Washington dramatically increased military assistance and arms sales to Indonesia. For its part, the government of Indonesia even
increased the scope of its 'encirclement and annihilation' operations in 1977-78. One result of these expanded counter-insurgency activities was that Timorese exiles and solidarity groups lost contact with the internal resistance in 1978, making it difficult, logistically and in terms of morale, to coordinate international solidarity efforts.

Another consequence of the Indonesian military's counter-insurgency campaign was that established non-governmental organisations such as Amnesty International (AI) and the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign (TAPOL) expanded their coverage of human rights violations in East Timor. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) increased its pressure for emergency relief assistance to victims of the famine which had been generated by Indonesian counter-insurgency operations. New organisations such as the Humanitarian Project in the United States emerged to press on the same issue.

In 1979-80 a small group of exiled East Timorese clergy and refugees began working with NVOs in Australia, Portugal, the United States and the United Kingdom to alert the press, the public, legislators and governments to the tragedy unfolding in East Timor. In the United States, two exiled East Timorese priests made an unprecedented testimony before the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly; secular NVOs also formed links over the East Timor issue with the Catholic Relief Services and the US Catholic Bishops Conference. A visit by Timorese clergy to Britain in 1980 provided an opportunity for co-operation between US organisations and the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR). There seems to have been little contact with Asian NVOs that might have been sympathetic to the East Timorese cause during this period.

This collaboration helped form the basis for future relations between secular and church organisations, as well as between organisations working in solidarity with East Timor in different parts of the world. It also led to reports and photographs of starving children in the media, editorials in major US newspapers as well as hearings in the US Congress. In turn, media coverage generated pressure on the Indonesian government to allow emergency relief aid to reach many thousands of East Timorese threatened with death by starvation. Some relief experts believe that without such actions, aimed at the media and at parliamentary institutions in particular, the death toll in East Timor might have been tens of thousands higher.

Nonetheless, such early activities seem to have been inadequate in the face of the magnitude of the atrocities taking place in East Timor. There was little funding available for NVOs working on East Timor, there was almost no domestic public base and there were very few elite allies. Decision-makers were engaged in dialogue where possible, but there were few sympathetic interlocutors in the inter-governmental world: even more so than today, Indonesia loomed large, with its strategic location, political and economic importance and status as a Cold War ally. Moreover, there was little coordination of NVO activity across the church-secular divide, across borders or across continents. Yet during the 1970s, some foundations for future advocacy work and for greater coordination with the Timorese were established.
The involvement of Northern churches increased from late 1981, after Bishop Carlos Belo's predecessor, Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes, began to speak out against Indonesian atrocities. Lopes, a native of East Timor, had assumed his position in 1977 after the Portuguese bishop resigned over the human rights situation. For more than three years Monsignor Lopes tried to work quietly with Indonesian military authorities, to little avail. In late 1981, in letters to friends in Australia, he denounced a massacre that had taken place at the Rock of St Anthony near the town of Lacluta. His words appeared in the international press, embarrassing the Indonesian regime, which pressured the Papal Nuncio in Jakarta for Lopes's removal. In May 1983, Lopes was asked to submit his resignation to Rome. Belo took his place, and Lopes left for exile in Lisbon.

In the years that followed Lopes travelled to Britain, Ireland, the United States, Canada, Japan and Germany. He published articles in prominent newspapers and journals, including the New York Times, with the assistance of Northern NVOs. He also gave moving testimonies before UN bodies in Geneva and New York, spreading awareness about the situation in East Timor in official, church and secular circles. Even though there could have been greater room for involvement by Lopes in the activities of NVOs working on East Timor during this period, the impact he had was substantial.

Indeed, the international work of Mgr Lopes had the effect of increasing the interest of Northern church organisations in the case of East Timor. Certain Northern church organisations in the 1980s contacted and began to forge a relationship with Bishop Belo. The Christian Consultation on East Timor (CCET), founded in 1985 by the Netherlands Justice and Peace Commission together with CIIR and secular advisors, became a venue for collective work, with meetings held on an average of once every 18 months over the ensuing 10 years. The CCET served as a forum for discussion of issues about and action on East Timor, with a special emphasis on church involvement, both Catholic and Protestant. Through the good offices of CCET participants, letters were sent to Bishop Belo by national bishops' conferences in Europe, the United States and elsewhere. As a result of these contacts, CCET participants developed a deeper understanding of the people and the Catholic church in East Timor. This knowledge was transmitted to elite allies, although the domestic public base in the North remained limited, as did the funding for such work.

Despite the increased contact between the Timorese clergy and church organisations worldwide, there was little movement on East Timor in the United Nations. After 1982 the UN General Assembly ceased to be an arena for action on East Timor and the secretary-general lowered his involvement, although the UN Decolonisation Committee continued to hold annual hearings on the issue. UN-sponsored bilateral talks between the governments of Indonesia and Portugal also continued, to no avail. Against this backdrop, Bishop Belo wrote to the then UN secretary-general Perez de Cuellar in 1989 asking him to sponsor a referendum on East Timor's future, but he received no reply from the office of the secretary-general for five years despite NVO pressure on the matter.

East Timor also dropped off the agenda of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, though the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities reintroduced it on the Commission's agenda in 1989; Taylor suggests that Northern voluntary organisations can be credited for returning East Timor to the UNCHR agenda. It is also during this period that NVOs began to work closely with Timorese exiles such as José Ramos Horta in the human rights mechanisms of the UN system; some
analysts even suggest NVOs could not have achieved the modest impact they did in the 1980s had it not been for their cooperation with the Timorese exiles. 12

Indeed, NVOs continued working with Timorese exiles during the 1980s, although this was not widely known in East Timor because almost no one from the island was able to travel to the outside world and return home. Until 1989, few representatives of church or non-governmental organisations were able to travel to East Timor, since foreigners were not allowed to visit the island without permission from the Indonesian authorities. Another factor that undermined communication was the deepening of splits among Timorese leaders abroad. In this context, Australian organisations were crucial to ensuring a flow of information from East Timor to the outside world. Activists' energies were also renewed by the creation of new organisations such as the East Timor Alert Network in Canada and the Committee for the Rights of the Maubere People (CPDM) in Portugal; organisations such as the UK Campaign Against Arms Trade and the Canada-Asia Working Group also took up the issue of East Timor.

In the absence of progress in the United Nations, the focus of some organisations' lobbying efforts shifted to the national level. Partly in response to this advocacy work by NVOs, some governments spoke out against ongoing human rights abuses. In 1984, for example, the US secretary of state George Shultz raised the issue of East Timor during a visit to Jakarta. 13 The following year, the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, did the same thing. 14 Yet it was also during the 1980s that the governments of Britain and the United States substantially expanded their development and military cooperation with the government of Indonesia, despite senior officials' expressions of concern over human rights violations. 15

One area in which NVOs appear to have had some impact is the treatment of political prisoners. With the support of NVOs, German parliamentarians visited a prison on Atauro island, on the north coast of East Timor, in early 1985. The media coverage they received in March 1985 prompted protests from Western governments; in turn, this seems to have moved the government of Indonesia to close down Atauro prison. Some prisoners were released, but many were simply moved to other detention centres where their conditions were harder to document and expose. 16

It was also during the 1980s that the government of Portugal took on a more proactive diplomatic role on East Timor. It would be a mistake to exaggerate this shift in policy, yet once he became president, Mario Soares gave new impetus to Portugal's condemnations of the Indonesian occupation and even the more cautious Portuguese foreign ministry sponsored the first European Community 'Common Position' on East Timor in 1988. It is partly on the basis of this position that Portugal pressed Indonesia to accept a visit by Portuguese parliamentarians to the territory; this visit was scheduled for November 1991 (see below). According to some analysts, such increased activism was due at least in part to growing public pressure, within Portugal, for action on East Timor. 17

In the early 1990s, Taylor summed up the work of NVOs at the time. With support for East Timor limited in the inter-governmental community, he observed, much of the work of 'keeping the issue alive' had fallen to NGOs, church institutions, support groups and individuals trying to coordinate actions undertaken in their respective countries. The impact of this work, from Taylor's perspective, had been decidedly mixed:

Within the international human rights network, various NGOs have succeeded in keeping East Timor on the agenda of bodies such as the UN Human Rights Commission. In terms of pressure on the Indonesian regime, this has produced regular diplomatic embarrassment, and much time and money has been spent by
Indonesia in containing criticisms internationally [...] Yet international pressure of this kind, although successful on its own terms, is limited in scope. It can never constitute a serious threat nor provide any basis for sanctioning Indonesia in any serious way.18

Yet, in addition to keeping the issue alive, NVOs also built up new capabilities for coordinated action. Perhaps the most significant area of resource accumulation was the building of working relationships between the church inside East Timor and church-affiliated organisations in Australia, Europe and North America. Another important step was the deepening of relations between the churches and secular organisations.

Some NVOs also had an impact on the policies of their governments, although their impact was more apparent at the declaratory level (for example, in the UN Commission on Human Rights) than at the level of policy implementation (on arms sales, for example). The same applies to the policies of the Jakarta regime, which modified some of its practices in response to international pressure while pursuing its fundamental goal of integrating East Timor into the Republic. Yet the attainment of this goal would be immensely complicated by the tragic events of 12 November 1991.

**The 1990s: Expanding the base and increasing impact**

The Santa Cruz massacre is known worldwide because when Indonesian soldiers launched an attack on demonstrators, killing more than 250 on the spot and wounding hundreds more, their actions were documented by western reporters, including British journalist and film-maker Max Stahl. Within days, excerpts of Stahl’s footage had shocked millions around the world, including churchgoers across the political spectrum. In early 1992 Stahl’s clips were re-broadcast with other material in Yorkshire Television’s documentary *Cold Blood*.

This initial coverage led to a spate of increased visits by Western journalists to East Timor; as a result, media coverage became more well-informed. In 1994, John Pilger’s film *Death of a Nation* was broadcast in the UK and picked up by stations in other countries. Never before had visual evidence of this kind from East Timor reached viewers across the globe. Public and elite perceptions of East Timor and Indonesia were profoundly altered.

Before looking at the full consequences of this media coverage, it is important to recall that Stahl, Nairn, Goodman and other journalists would probably not have become interested in East Timor, nor would they have had access to the range of sources required for their investigative journalism, without the media work which organisations such as Amnesty International, TAPOL and the Humanitarian Project had carried out for many years. Moreover, they would probably not have gone to East Timor in November 1991 had they and the Timorese resistance not expected a delegation of Portuguese parliamentarians to visit the territory at the time; although this idea was initiated by Portuguese MPs and government officials, they were, in part at least, responding to pressure by the Portuguese public for a more active approach to East Timor.

**Media coverage and NVO activities**

The most immediate effect of the media coverage of the Santa Cruz massacre was a storm of official protests which the government of Indonesia received from around the world. The governments of Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands suspended their government-
to-government aid to Indonesia. Even the British government felt obliged to postpone the sale of naval vessels which had been planned for some time.

A second effect of the 1991 events was to galvanise a much larger public constituency into action on East Timor. In the United States, individuals who had been active on other peace issues set up the East Timor Action Network (ETAN), an association of solidarity groups across the United States. The British Coalition for East Timor (BCET) was established in the United Kingdom. The International Platform of Jurists for East Timor (IPJET) was created in November 1991. Large human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch issued numerous reports on the situation in East Timor. In Japan, NVOs formed the Free East Timor Coalition while parliamentarians created the Diet Members Forum on East Timor.

Perhaps the most innovative development has been the emergence of solidarity activity in South East Asia. Indeed, voluntary organisations in the region came together to organise the first Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor (APCET) in the Philippines in 1994, with support from NVOs. A second APCET conference was organised in Kuala Lumpur in November 1996 but it was brutally disrupted by Malaysian authorities, under pressure from Jakarta. Both conferences attracted considerable media coverage because of official attempts to prevent them taking place. In Indonesia, a range of human rights NGOs, social movements and opposition parties have begun to express concerns about the situation in East Timor and even collaborate directly with the Timorese. Many of these Northern and Southern organisations use electronic mail services to facilitate information exchange among activists worldwide.

Advocacy impact on the UN system

Working closely with parliamentarians, voluntary organisations also had an impact in the UN system. At the initiative of NVOs, a letter addressed to the then UN secretary-general Boutros Ghali was circulated in the Japanese Diet and the US Congress in 1992, gaining the signatures of about 300 members. Similar letters followed from members of the European Parliament. With support from other NVOs, Parliamentarians for East Timor (PET) lobbied the UN secretary-general’s office for renewed UN peacemaking efforts and for the involvement of Timorese leaders in peace talks. These pressures converged with the steps taken by the diplomatic front of the CNRM as well as with efforts by the government of Portugal. In September 1992 Boutros Ghali convened new Ministerial Talks on East Timor; three years later he convened the first All-inclusive Intra-East Timor Dialogue (AIETD), but neither of these fora led to major agreements. In February 1997 Kofi Annan, the new secretary-general of the UN appointed Jamsheed Marker as his Personal Representative for East Timor; Marker has engaged in wide-ranging consultations with stakeholders to identify ways of reviving the peace talks, but it is too early to judge whether these new efforts will bear fruit.

Activity also increased at the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, where a strong resolution sponsored by the European Community was passed in March 1993, with support of the United States for the first time, spurred by NVOs’ advocacy work. The Commission has become a forum where Timorese exiles interact with Northern voluntary organisations, learn about the United Nations system and receive training in international advocacy; the International Service for Human Rights has been important in providing training for Timorese leaders.

However, the combined efforts of NVOs and Timorese exiles have led to only modest
changes. Indeed, the government of Indonesia has accepted three statements by the chair of UNCHR since 1993 and on that basis it has accepted visits by the Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial Executions (in 1994) and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (in 1995). As a result of effective advocacy by the Timorese and by NVOs (as well as the intransigence of the Indonesian government), the Commission again passed a strongly worded resolution on East Timor in April 1997, at the urging of the European Union in particular. Yet the government of Indonesia has steadfastly refused to accept visits by human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International, consistently opposed on-site UN human rights monitoring in East Timor and has not taken steps to improve the situation on the ground, despite its commitments in that regard.21

The United States and Canada

Advocacy work by these organisations has had considerable impact in some countries. In the United States, despite tensions between some established voluntary organisations and the newly-formed ETAN, their combined pressures seem to have led to Congress cutting off access by the Indonesian Armed Forces to the International Military and Education Training programme in September 1992. Two years later, after incidents of harassment of the East Timorese Catholic church by Indonesian security forces, long-running campaigns to ban the export of US military equipment that could be used in East Timor yielded fruit when Congress voted to stop the licensing of small arms exports to Indonesia. In July 1996, in response to pressure from Congress, the Clinton Administration announced the expansion of its arms export restrictions to cover the sale of armoured personnel carriers.

Allan Nairn has argued that these policy shifts ‘were built on grassroots pressure transmitted through Congress in the face of Bush and Clinton administration resistance’.22 Still, he and others acknowledge that US arms sales to Indonesia have continued, sometimes surreptitiously, partly owing to effective counter-lobbying by the government of Indonesia in partnership with certain US transnational corporations.

In Canada, advocacy by NVOs such as East Timor Alert Network, the Canada-Asia Working Group and Parliamentarians for East Timor also appears to have produced modest policy shifts. The government acquiesced to NVO pressure in freezing bilateral development assistance to East Timor after the Santa Cruz massacre, only restoring aid through non-governmental channels several years later. Canada co-sponsored the resolutions by the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1993 and 1997, partly in response to NVO lobbying. Still, Ottawa has not declared its support for self-determination and continues to grant licences to export weapons components to Indonesia, despite NVO campaigns on these issues.23

The European Union

In the UK, an important member state of the European Union (EU), the network of organisations working on East Timor and Indonesia grew in numbers and in sophistication during the 1990s. Non-violent direct actions in protest at the sale of Hawk fighter-trainer jets to Indonesia significantly increased media and public awareness of the implications of UK arms sales, especially after the acquittal on criminal charges of the ‘Ploughshares Four’ in June 1996 — four activists who disarmed a British Aerospace (BAe) military aircraft bound for Indonesia. Yet during the 1990s the British government expanded its official development assistance programme to Indonesia (including some projects covering East Timor) and increased the granting of licences to export weapons
systems to the Indonesian Armed Forces, despite intense activity and pressure from NVOs and opposition MPs. As one prominent British human rights activist concedes: 'To talk about policy impact on this government is quite difficult.' Still, years of campaigning by British NVOs may well yield dividends under the new government formed after the election on 1 May 1997.

Despite the persistence of controversial policies in member states such as France, Holland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, the EU agreed to a new Common Position on East Timor in June 1996. Critics suggest that the Common Position could constrain EU activism on issues such as arms sales, but others argue that its provisions for the active promotion of human rights, support for UN peacemaking and the development of a programme of assistance to East Timor do offer opportunities for constructive EU action.

The EU Common Position was the result of an initiative by the government of Portugal; no trace of any significant pressure by NVOs can be found on this score, although some voluntary organisations did join Lisbon's protests when the release of the CP was delayed by the British and Dutch governments. During the Irish presidency of the EU in late 1996, certain Irish NVOs took advantage of the Common Position to push for more proactive EU action on East Timor. Their efforts were reinforced by British voluntary organisations, although there was considerable variation in the policy recommendations put forward by different NVOs.

In Ireland, this work has been led by the East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign (ETISC), a small organisation that developed mutually beneficial relations with larger NVOs, the media and academics in Ireland and elsewhere. ETISC has recently been strengthened by the arrival of young Timorese exiles who escaped Indonesia in the early 1990s. The Campaign is credited with having transformed East Timor into a significant foreign policy issue in Ireland since the Santa Cruz massacre. It has clearly managed to press the government of Ireland into taking a more vocal stance on East Timor. Yet independent analysts suggest that this did not have a significant impact on the actual practice of the EU during the Irish presidency.

Building on the efforts of Irish organisations, the Christian Consultation on East Timor (CCET) coordinated efforts by its European members to press the EU to take a principled approach in the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1997, and to develop a sound package for development assistance to East Timor, on the basis of the Common Position. This work has been carried out in consultation with Timorese leaders and secular NVOs to ensure that information exchange and capacity-building take place. The positive results of this advocacy work at the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1997 are promising. Still, it will be important to monitor whether the Common Position prompts European voluntary organisations to improve coordination among themselves and define their own common position, and whether this has an impact on EU policy over the longer term.

**Australia and Japan**

National advocacy efforts have not produced particularly impressive policy changes outside the United States. Despite the public furore over the Santa Cruz massacre, the Australian government continued to honour the Timor Gap Treaty signed with Jakarta in 1988, and even stepped up military cooperation with Indonesia. In Japan, notwithstanding pressure from the Free East Timor Coalition and the Diet Members Forum on East Timor, the government has actually increased official development assistance to Indonesia in the 1990s. Although Tokyo has expressed its concerns about human rights violations in East
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Timor in certain forums, Japan abstained in the East Timor vote at the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1997; still, some activists suggest that Tokyo might actually have backed a 'no action' motion against this resolution had it not been for pressure from certain Japanese voluntary organisations.26

**Impact in East Timor**

What impact have NVOs' efforts had in East Timor in the 1990s? Some observers argue that the government of Indonesia accepted investigations into the Santa Cruz massacre because of the international concern generated in part by NVO efforts. However, they admit that Jakarta used the inquiries to legitimise the light sentences given to junior military personnel and defuse international criticism, that those ultimately responsible for these and other grave human rights violations remain unpunished, and that the institutional conditions which allowed the massacre remain unchanged.27

Another indicator of impact is the treatment of Xanana Gusmão, the leader of the Timorese resistance, when he was arrested by Indonesian security forces in November 1992. Benedict Anderson has argued that it was politically impossible for the Indonesian military to kill him, as they had done his predecessor, Nicolau Lobato. Whereas Lobato's death was met with virtual silence, despite his corpse being displayed on Indonesian television around New Year's Day in 1979, appeals for proper treatment for Gusmão were made throughout the world, including from the Portuguese president Mario Soares and on the editorial page of the Washington Post. As a result, the Indonesian government decided to try Xanana summarily and detain him indefinitely rather than kill him.28

A change in political atmosphere is also indicated by the fact that although some East Timorese are still arbitrarily detained, tortured and executed by Indonesian forces, rounding up large numbers of Timorese and executing them is no longer the easy option it once was. As one Indonesian military officer put it in 1995: 'We could kill all these young demonstrators, but the international press and public opinion won't allow us to do it.' In addition, US diplomatic pressure led to a peaceful end to the occupation of the US embassy compound in Jakarta by young Timorese in late 1994, during President Clinton's visit to Jakarta for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit.

**International arena**

Coming back to the international arena, where this account began, the award of the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize to two East Timorese leaders was the culmination of years of cooperation between East Timorese leaders and Northern voluntary organisations, working with politicians from Scandinavia, Portugal, the United States and Japan. Although it is also too early to tell what the policy impact of this initiative might be, there is no doubt that the award helped revive media interest in East Timor, renew the morale of activists worldwide, and even give impetus to new peacemaking initiatives by the UN and by other third parties.

Whether this new momentum is translated into decisive change in the international arena and on the ground depends partly on whether NVOs and their partners can seize the opening provided by the Nobel Committee. In turn, this depends on whether NVOs learn from their experiences to date, and apply these lessons, with their partners, in the future.
Assessing outcomes

Thus far, human rights and peace activists and East Timor solidarity groups have played a key role in making East Timor an issue of public discussion and in bringing about the small but significant changes in the policies of a variety of Western countries [...]

But despite the increased attention and criticism of Jakarta's occupation over the last few years, the West continues to supply Jakarta with billions of dollars in economic assistance and military aid. Grassroots activists must challenge these funding sources. We must also pressure national governments to actively support the United Nations negotiations on East Timor between Indonesia and Portugal, and to push for the participation of the Timorese resistance and the Catholic Church, with the goal of holding a plebiscite on self-determination in the territory.29

The narrative which forms the core of this case study appears to confirm this frank assessment of NVOs' efforts on East Timor, recently penned by Matthew Jardine, a prominent US activist. The assessment scheme presented in our Introduction can be applied to this narrative and used to test the accuracy of Jardine's intuitive evaluation.

Jardine's assessment focuses on the impact of NVOs' efforts on Northern governments' policies. Using our assessment scheme to examine the same aspect yields interesting results. Indeed, the narrative suggests that NVOs' activities may have had moderate impact on declarations by certain governments and on resolutions by the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the mid 1970s, but this had low implementation impact because most governments (and the United Nations) did not back their words with strong actions. With regards to the 1980s, it suggests that NVOs had even less impact because international condemnation of the Indonesian occupation decreased, and most governments actually increased their economic and military cooperation with Jakarta. Nonetheless, NVOs' impact improved in the 1990s: NVOs have had a high degree of impact on the declarations of many governments and international organisations since the Santa Cruz massacre, although the absence of consistent follow-up on these declarations by most governments suggests that implementation impact has been moderate at best.

Our case study and assessment scheme also enable us to distinguish more clearly between the impact of NVOs' advocacy on different governments and international organisations. For example, in the 1990s we should distinguish between the moderate impact achieved in the United States (where arms sales to Indonesia have been curtailed but not terminated) compared to the United Kingdom, where despite an impressive array of NVO advocacy efforts over many years, the government has not applied any significant restrictions on the sale of arms to Indonesia to date.

In addition, the scheme helps us distinguish between the fairly high degree of impact that advocacy by NVOs (and others, especially the Timorese resistance) has had in the UN Commission on Human Rights and the dismal implementation record of UNCHR resolutions and statements. As such, the scheme reminds us about what remains to be achieved in different jurisdictions.

Indeed, our framework also reminds us that the ultimate test of advocacy impact is change on the ground, in East Timor. The narrative suggests that NVO advocacy had little declaratory or implementation impact on the ground in the 1970s since the government of Indonesia did not modify its public posture or the brutality of its practices during this
period. In the 1980s, one could say that NVO pressures had moderate declaratory impact since they led the government of Indonesia to modify its public posture by closing Atauro prison and opening East Timor to foreigners, for example; but implementation impact remained low given that these moves had little impact on Indonesia’s basic policy of forced integration. As for the 1990s, despite NVO advocacy and its (uneven) impact on Northern governments’ policies, the government of Indonesia has still not modified its basic approach: consequently, implementation impact remains low (arbitrary detentions and torture still occur systematically in East Timor, for example), as does declaratory impact, as shown by Indonesia’s intransigent response to pressures from certain members of the UN Commission on Human Rights in early 1997.

By distinguishing between declaratory and implementation impact in the North, and different types of impact on the ground, our account yields a view of the strengths and weakness of NVOs’ advocacy that is slightly more nuanced than Jardine’s assessment. Yet the scheme and the narrative also highlight what has been accomplished in the domain of capacity-building.

Indeed, our account shows that NVOs started with very little advocacy capacity on East Timor in the 1970s, and that much of their work was carried out in isolation from the resistance by the Timorese; the capacity-building impact of NVOs during the 1970s seems high if measured against their starting point in 1975, but it was quite low compared to the resources required to affect policy in the North and on the ground. This changed somewhat in the 1980s as the network of NVOs active on East Timor grew, as their advocacy work became more professional and as they began to work more closely with Timorese partners; still, one would be hard pressed to rate NVOs’ capacity-building impact as more than moderate in either the North or the South during this period. By the 1990s, one could say that the capacity-building impact of NVOs’ advocacy had become quite high, with the vast growth of organisations working on East Timor worldwide and the increasing coordination of activities among themselves and with Timorese partners.

Although our assessment scheme does not help us distinguish between the high degree of capacity-building impact attained in the 1990s and the resources required to shift policy decisively, the narrative does suggest some lessons relevant to this challenge. As such, it provides ideas about how one could move towards the policy-influencing objectives usefully flagged by Matthew Jardine. It is with these lessons that we end our analysis.

Strategic lessons

What practical lessons can we draw from this case study which might help NVOs improve their advocacy work on East Timor? First, it is clear that NVOs should nurture community awareness of, and support for, the struggle for peace in East Timor. The significant increase in NVOs’ ability to influence the policies of certain governments and of the UN, after the media had covered the Santa Cruz massacre, underscores the need to combine the lobbying of elites with media work and with the mobilisation of people at the grassroots level. Even in countries such as the UK, where little policy impact has been achieved to date, the growing public awareness of East Timor which NVOs have carefully nurtured could translate into policy impact with a change of government in Whitehall; without this considerable public concern, there would be little resonance to pressures by NVOs for policy change.

Second, it is clear that informing public opinion (keeping the issue alive) and continuing
to harass decision-makers (maintaining the pressure) is not enough. In order to contribute to policy change, NVOs must focus on achievable policy goals. Attaining the requisite policy focus presupposes the development of detailed knowledge of governmental and inter-governmental decision-making processes, and the cultivation of working relationships with parliamentarians and officials. This presupposes that adequate funding is available for policy monitoring and influencing work. Yet effective advocacy also requires an ability to negotiate common approaches with voluntary organisations that may differ in interests and tactical perspectives; without such common approaches, NVO efforts will continue to be dispersed and policy impact will be correspondingly limited.

Third, achieving advocacy impact requires a clear division of labour and effective coordination across institutional boundaries. During the 1980s, some NVOs learned to work across the church-secular divide; others learned to build on the distinct competencies of grassroots networks, development NGOs and policy institutes. This collaboration, based on the distinctive competencies of different organisations, must be reinforced.

Moreover, although some NVOs have learned to coordinate advocacy work across borders, this coordination still tends to be ad hoc. Many NVOs have learned that their work can be enriched through collaboration with Timorese exiles, Timorese organisations on the ground, and with NVOs in South East Asia, despite the frustrations that all transnational coordination efforts entail. Yet much more needs to be done, by Northern voluntary organisations and by the Timorese themselves, to accompany each other more effectively in the pursuit of common objectives.

Finally, it is worth asking ourselves whether these improvements in NVO performance will have much of an impact if we continue to work mainly with one side to the conflict, or whether peace might be facilitated through dialogue with various sectors of Indonesian society. If the conflict in East Timor will be solved only when a critical mass of influential Indonesians comes to believe that self-determination is as acceptable for the Timorese as it is for Indonesians, then perhaps NVOs should complement their international advocacy work with efforts to nurture the kind of ‘peace coalition’ needed to bring such shift about. This could be linked to support for democratisation in Indonesia, since democratisation could possibly (although not necessarily) open the door to shifts in Jakarta’s East Timor policy. The changes under way in Indonesia and the growing awareness about East Timor in South East Asia might offer opportunities in this regard. Before we dismiss these ideas out of hand, it might be worth recalling the words of Constancio Pinto:

Our hope for self-determination lies on three, interrelated fronts: the intensification of resistance activities within East Timor; increased activity on the diplomatic front and by solidarity movements; and political and economic change within Indonesia.
Notes to Case Study 2

1. Interview by Arnold Kohen, 5 December 1996.
5. Taylor, op cit. page x.
15. Taylor, op cit, p175.
17. A Barbedo de Magalhaes, East Timor: Occupation and genocide, Lisbon: Oporto University, 1992, p67; and Taylor, op cit, p179.
18. Taylor, op cit, p187, emphasis added; see also p180.
27. Interview with Carmel Budiardjo, 4 March 1997.
30. Pinto and Jardine, op cit, p239. See also Pat Walsh, op cit, p15 for a similar strategic conclusion about the importance of supporting dialogue for change in Indonesia.
In 1996 the Nobel Peace Prize Committee and Diana, Princess of Wales drew international attention to, respectively, the struggle for self-determination in East Timor and the continuing threat posed by landmines in Angola. Both issues had received media attention before, but the actions of such high profile personalities and institutions highlighted the need for solutions to longstanding tragedies. Neither the Nobel Committee nor Princess Diana, however, would have had such impact without the years of work, mostly behind the scenes, by Northern voluntary organisations (NVOs).

This paper has gone beyond the kind of events that briefly capture media attention to examine what non-governmental organisations, churches, solidarity groups and other Northern voluntary organisations have done to draw attention to, and support, struggles for peace and justice in Angola and East Timor. We end by comparing the results of our analysis in each case, and by drawing out the strategic and methodological lessons.

Comparing the cases

Each case study includes an assessment of the impact of NVOs' advocacy work on their country, based on the evaluative framework set out in our Introduction. This framework also helps us represent the assessments in graphic form in order to compare the two cases.

Four graphs are presented below (pages 50-51). Each illustrates the low, moderate or high impact on three indicators of NVO advocacy efforts in the North and in the South. The indicators are capacity-building impact, declaratory impact and implementation impact. The meaning of these categories and the procedures used to code performance are explained in the Introduction.

Figures I and II illustrate changes in NVO performance over time. Three patterns stand out from these two graphs. First, in both cases there has been a steady increase in the capacity-building impact of NVO activity. This progress has been especially pronounced in the work on East Timor, where Northern advocacy has become more broadly-based, professional and linked to the increasingly sophisticated work of Timorese partners. On Angola, progress has been more moderate and recent because the Angolan state only allowed the formation of local NGOs in 1991, those that formed were oriented mostly towards emergency aid rather than advocacy, and because NGOs are concentrated in government-controlled areas. Moreover, some NVOs developed an understanding with the Angolan government, given the nature of UNITA's backers and the lack of independent Angolan organisations. This has implications for NGO autonomy and representativeness, both of which are critical for advocacy.

Second, these graphs show that although there has also been progress on declaratory impact, it has been quite uneven. For Angola, in the 1990s there has been a modest impact on the declaratory commitments of the government, of UNITA and of Northern
institutions. On East Timor, NVO advocacy had a moderate declaratory impact on the ground and in the North during the 1980s; but despite continued moderate impact on Northern institutions' declarations the government of Indonesia has back-tracked, as illustrated by Jakarta's wholesale rejection of the resolutions adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1993 and 1997.

The most striking pattern, however, is that when it comes to implementation impact, NVO activity has had very little effect on the situation on the ground, both in Angola and East Timor. Declaratory impact may even serve to mask a lack of implementation impact, especially for governments (and possibly for some NVOs) which can claim that they have taken 'appropriate action' even if their action has made little difference on the ground.

Our assessment framework also enables a comparison of NVO impact in different campaigns. Figures III and IV illustrate the effect of NVO activity on two issues; the attempt to get the US government to grant diplomatic recognition to the Angolan government, and the attempt to get resolutions on East Timor taken up by the UN Commission on Human Rights. We selected these examples because of the range of impacts that NVO campaigns can have.

Again, three patterns stand out. First, there is a striking contrast between the virtual lack of capacity-building impact in the Angola campaign, and the steady increase in NVO impact on their own and on Timorese partners' capacity to conduct effective advocacy, at least in the context of the UNCHR. Second, both campaigns have enjoyed increases in their declaratory impact in the North, but this has not been matched by declaratory impact in the South. Third, not surprisingly, both campaigns have failed to have significant impact in terms of the implementation of resolutions and other declaratory outputs, although the campaign on East Timor has fared slightly better.

The lack of impact on the ground can be attributed, in both cases, to external constraints over which NVOs may have little influence. Such constraints would include the absence of enforcement mechanisms for UNCHR resolutions, the pervasiveness of anti-communism as a dominant ideology in the United States or the ability of different entities (for example, the government of Indonesia and UNITA) to resist international pressure. Yet these graphs and the assessments on which they are based raise the question of whether NVO advocacy is the best mechanism for achieving implementation impact under such circumstances. We will return to this issue in the next section.

Strategic lessons

At the end of each case study, the authors highlight ways in which advocacy on those particular countries could be improved. In this section we look at common lessons that can be drawn from these cases about how NVOs can influence Northern and Southern elite institutions and build lasting peace. We offer these as guidelines that could be tested and refined on the basis of other experiences.

A first general lesson is that few organisations can afford to 'go it alone' on advocacy. Indeed, the most effective campaigns tend to be those carried out by formal or informal networks of organisations which have different strengths, including specialised policy analysis and advocacy, public awareness raising, and the ability to liaise with Southern partners to ensure that their message is linked to the interests of people on the ground.

A second general lesson is that, within this collaborative approach, linking to public campaigns is extremely important. Effective lobbying of governmental decision-makers needs a degree of public sympathy. In turn, the most powerful way of raising public
Figure I. Impact of NVO activity on East Timor, 1970s - 1990s

Figure II. Impact of NVO activity on Angola, 1970s - 1990s
Figure III. Impact of NVO activity at UNCHR over East Timor, 1970s - 1990s

Northern outcomes
- high
- moderate
- low

Southern outcomes
- low
- moderate
- high

Type of impact
- Capacity building
- Declaratory
- Implementational

Figure IV. Impact of NVO activity on US Government recognition of Luanda, 1970s - 1990s

Northern outcomes
- high
- moderate
- low

Southern outcomes
- low
- moderate
- high

Type of impact
- Capacity building
- Declaratory
- Implementational
consciousness seems to be through the mass media, as shown by the impact of media coverage of the Santa Cruz massacre, or that of Diana, Princess of Wales’s visit to Angola.

A third lesson is that raising public awareness is not enough; information has to be translated into influence through considered lobbying of decision-makers. Lobbying is made more effective by working out achievable goals (clearly distinguishing between short-term objectives which should be attainable and long-term goals which should be more ambitious) and the use of reliable information for continuing dialogue with decision-makers. It also requires resources, including adequate funding. Both cases suggest that there is tremendous potential for greater collaboration among NVOs, particularly for work directed at the institutions of the European Union; NVOs have difficulty in influencing policy without joining forces across borders.

A fourth lesson is the importance of partnerships for advocacy work with Southern organisations. Both cases point to the potential of partnerships with regional networks in the South. Developing such working relations is difficult, both logistically and politically. Communications are complicated by the uneven spread of information technology as well as by cultural and political differences. Consulting Southern partners takes time. Strong partnerships with organisations representing historically-marginalised sectors of civil society can undermine impartiality, especially in situations of armed conflict. Yet for NVOs, there is no substitute for working systematically with representative Southern organisations to achieve the aim of ‘speaking together’, as opposed to ‘on behalf of’, those subjects. Helping to build up such abilities and self-confidence is an integral part of creating and sustaining partnerships across the North-South divide.

NVOs have great difficulties making an impact at the level of implementation, namely in terms of achieving lasting changes in the practices of Northern and Southern elite institutions. This reflects the huge imbalances of power on the one hand between NVOs and their traditional Southern partners, and on the other between Northern and Southern elite institutions. But this does not lead us to conclude that NVOs should give up trying to achieve influence on the ground; rather, it reinforces our suggestions that in order to achieve influence NVOs will have to combine their forces, work out achievable objectives and, in the search for justice and peace, continue to talk to those with more power. We do recognise, however, that the analyses in this paper could be interpreted as an indictment of NVO advocacy, leading to a possible conclusion that NVOs should channel their scarce resources elsewhere.

The final lesson is the importance of assessing NVOs’ advocacy work. Most NVOs — at least those working on East Timor and Angola — do little systematic evaluation of the results of their advocacy. Evaluation can be useful in identifying gaps, such as that relating to the impact in implementing policy. Yet our study also shows how difficult it is to gather the data required for evaluation and then apply a common analytical framework to very different and complex cases.

Methodological lessons

This paper began by providing a set of definitions for terms thought central to the exercise. The term ‘Northern voluntary organisations’ has proved to be useful for analysing the activities of NGOs, churches and solidarity organisations based in the North; one could add to this a fourth type of NVO, peace groups such as Campaign Against Arms Trade in the UK. The term ‘advocacy’ has also been useful for looking at the relations between elite lobbying and public campaigning. We have not used the term ‘peace promotion’
systematically throughout, because our focus widened from advocacy alone to looking at a range of issues relevant to the countries analysed, notably human rights, development assistance, diplomatic recognition, and arms sales. Nevertheless, we hope that these definitions will prove as useful as the explanations of the other concepts.

Our assessment framework for evaluating the impact of NVO advocacy on Angola and East Timor allowed us to organise a wide variety of data on each case and to use common criteria to analyse that information. Our framework contributes, we hope, to the literature on assessing advocacy by voluntary organisations, for instance, in going a step beyond Jane Covey’s scheme. By applying this framework to two different cases, some insight has been gained into the strengths and weaknesses of different NVOs’ work. Large gaps have been identified, particularly in relation to implementation impact, or influence on the concrete actions of governments, international organisations and other elite institutions in the North and especially in the South.

Yet the difficulties with this framework and the way we have applied it should not be glossed over. The criteria against which we assessed NVOs’ work were set by CIIR, not by other NVOs, after the fact and not before advocacy work was undertaken. Retrospective evaluation based on criteria that were not set beforehand can be faulted for unfairness. Some NVOs are trying to remedy this problem by setting clear objectives before launching campaigns and assessing their impact against those objectives afterwards. The spread of such practices among NVOs and the sharing of information with independent evaluators could enhance the prospects for rigorous assessment, learning and better practice in the voluntary sector.

This brings us to the weakest aspect of the assessment exercise, namely the data on which it is based. In many cases our assessment rested on a hunch about whether or not NVOs had been responsible for policy change. In a few instances this linkage was clear; in some it was a possible interpretation; in others it was very unclear, as acknowledged in the text. Progress in the assessment of NVO advocacy depends on gathering more information about advocacy activities, policy changes and their context. Without this it will continue to be very difficult to apply rigorously the ‘hard test’ mentioned in the Introduction, namely whether or not policy outcome X would have happened if advocacy campaign Y had not been carried out.

A final methodological lesson from this exercise is that before undertaking comparative studies about cases on which little research has been published, it might be best to carry out research case by case in order to build up information for a subsequent comparative assessment. We have also concluded that evaluation would improve if it was conducted as part of a strategic dialogue with other NVOs and with Southern partners. CIIR will seek to apply this lesson to the study of a Latin American case during 1997.

In the meantime, we hope that this preliminary assessment of NVOs’ advocacy for peace in Angola and East Timor will promote constructive debate about improving Northern voluntary organisations’ efforts to produce lasting impact on the ground.
Key texts and suggested further reading

NGOs, Advocacy and Peace Promotion


Pearce, Jenny, ‘Civil society: Trick or treat?’, *CIIR News*, November/December 1996.


Angola

Key texts


**Further reading on Angola**

Amnesty International, London


**East Timor**


The Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) works to overcome poverty and injustice in the Third World. Founded in 1940, it is an independent charity which works with people of any religious belief or none. CIIR's International Policy Department carries out research, analysis, advocacy and development education on democracy, human rights, peace processes and international economic justice in Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and Southern Africa.

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MAKING SOLIDARITY EFFECTIVE
NORTHERN VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS
POLICY ADVOCACY AND THE PROMOTION
OF PEACE IN ANGOLA AND EAST TIMOR

From the anti-apartheid movement to Central American human rights campaigns, Northern non-governmental agencies, churches and solidarity groups have often been credited with a key role in the search for peaceful resolution of conflicts, especially in the developing world.

But what impact do voluntary organisations really have? What have their behind-the-scenes lobbying, public information and letter-writing campaigns accomplished? And how could this work be assessed and improved?

This DISCUSSION paper opens up the debate. It describes in detail the various efforts of a range of Northern-based voluntary organisations to promote peace in two different conflicts — in East Timor and Angola — and offers an assessment of their advocacy campaigns.

Drawing strategic lessons for organisations working on Angola and East Timor, the paper proposes an analytical framework that might be used to assess advocacy work in other conflict situations.

The paper argues the need for rigorous assessment, and provides a basis for constructive debate about how advocacy might be made to produce lasting impact on the ground.