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West Papuan refugees moved away from Blackwater camp

On 2 May, the Papua New Guinea authorities began to airlift West Papuan refugees out of Blackwater camp near Vanimo in an operation designed to empty the camp as fast as possible. The refugees were all transferred to Kiunga in Western Province for re-location to East Awin, the only area where re-location camps have been set up for refugees who have flooded into Papua New Guinea since February 1984.

The evacuation of Blackwater followed a preposterous claim by the Indonesians that the Blackwater refugees were responsible for an attack on a transmigration site in West Papua on 11 March (see separate item). The evacuation was carried out by a two-hundred-man squad of PNG policemen and PNG Defence Force troops, with police dogs. In a highly charged atmosphere, the refugees were told to register for re-location and had little option but to comply. Within the limits of its remit, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) could do little more than urge the PNG authorities not to use violence. By 15 May, about eight hundred refugees had been removed, leaving a group of ten who refused to move. It was not clear at the time of going to press what would happen to them.

143 refugees from Biak who left Blackwater camp some time ago and set themselves up nearby in Wara Stone were apparently not included at this stage of the evacuation.

PNG politician Warren Dutton, the Justice Minister in the first Paias Wingti government, has condemned the re-location of Blackwater refugees to East Awin, believing that it was taken under strong Indonesian pressure to remove active OPM supporters from an area close to Jayapura and the scene of intense OPM activity.

The evacuation took place despite representations last year by Blackwater refugees not to be moved to East Awin. In a declaration in March 1987, Blackwater camp refugees rejected the idea going to an inland site. They are coastal people who would find it difficult to integrate with inland people.

Crisis on PNG-Indonesian border

Following the 11 March attack on a transmigration site when five hostages were taken, OPM guerrillas took their hostages to OPM camps close to the border where they were trailed by Indonesian troops. On 3 and 4 April, the


troops raided the camps, one of which was one kilometre inside PNG territory. This led to a strong protest from Papua New Guinea's Foreign Minister, Akoka Doi who told the Indonesian ambassador that such an incursion in pursuit of the OPM was intolerable. The PNG Defence Department also announced that troops of the PNG Defence Force had succeeded in freeing three of the hostages while the other two appear to have been killed during the assault. [Post Courier, 14 and 22 April 1988]

According to several sources, Australian officials also became involved at the border. This could have happened under the terms of the Joint Declaration of Principles adopted by PNG and Australia earlier this year, formalising Australia's defence commitment to Papua New Guinea. It provides that in the case of external armed attack, the two governments shall consult on measures to be taken, jointly or separately, in relation to the attack. According to one source, Indonesian troops were withdrawn from PNG territory

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any case, there has never been any evidence that large-scale voluntary repatriation was feasible, given the strong feelings among refugees towards Indonesia.



Close ties between PNG and Indonesian armies

While this was happening at the international level, Papua New Guinea and Indonesia were engaged in bilateral negotiations for a friendship treaty which was concluded in October 1986. Although Indonesia failed to get Papua New Guinea to agree to joint border patrols and the right of 'hot pursuit' for Indonesian troops trying to track down OPM guerrillas on PNG territory, Murdani worked out a deal with Brigadier-General Anthony Huai, then commander of the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF), for co-ordinated action to control security in the border region, especially during the re-location of refugees.

Murdani's primary aim was to 'sanitise' the border region and ensure close collaboration between the Indonesian armed forces and the PNGDF in border operations against the OPM, including the exchange of military attaches as the channel for military intelligence about the border region. The details were worked out during talks between Murdani and Huai in Jayapura in May 1986, a week before the negotiations in Jakarta to finalise the draft of the Friendship Treaty. Clearly, Indonesia wanted to make sure that no camps remained anywhere near the border, providing sanctuary and support for the OPM. Moreover, following a visit to Jakarta in March 1986, Huai said PNG and Indonesia had reached an understanding to pursue the common objective of eliminating the OPM whom he described as "a bunch of terrorists" [Niugini Nius, 27 March 1986].

Blackwater camp has always been considered by Jakarta as the most dangerous camp because many political activists lived there, including deserters from the Indonesian army. The Indonesian army still smarts from the humiliating blow struck by the Blackwater refugees in October 1984 when Indonesian officials headed by Brigadier-General Soegiyono, then deputy-governor of Irian Jaya, had to beat a hasty retreat because angry refugees greeted them with a hail of missiles [see TAPOL Bulletin, No 66, November 1984]. According to refugees in Blackwater, Indonesian agents have since infiltrated the camp, placing the refugees' security in jeopardy.

because of the Australian intervention. The sequence of events also suggests that the evacuation of Blackwater camp was a condition of the Indonesian withdrawal.

In 1986, the Wingti Government intended to create three re-location sites, one in East Awin to accommodate non-politically active refugees in Western Province, one in Lumi, West Sepik Province to accommodate non-politically active refugees in West Sepik Province and one in Wabo, Gulf Province, strictly as a temporary camp for politically-active refugees until they are resettled elsewhere in PNG or overseas [Times of Papua New Guinea, 5-11 May 1988]. With East Awin the only area now available for refugees, there was nowhere else to send the Blackwater people.

The roots of the crisis

The roots of the crisis engulfing the refugees in Papua New Guinea go back several years. Initially, Port Moresby wanted to rid itself of the problem by repatriating the vast majority of refugees; a programme of forced repatriation began in 1985 when several groups were forced to return to Indonesia. World protest halted this policy and led to the collapse of the Somare government. The Wingti government which then took office decided to accede to the UN Convention on Refugees and involved the UNHCR in finding a solution. One aspect of the new policy was the re-location of refugees some distance from the border, along with political asylum for the more politically-active refugees in Papua New Guinea or overseas.

But re-location had strong opponents especially in Canberra where it was feared that providing long-term accommodation for West Papuans in Papua New Guinea would entice tens or even hundreds of thousands more to cross the border, a recognition of the dissatisfaction among West Papuans now living under Indonesian rule. So Australia withheld funds for re-location, insisting that the UNHCR should instead persuade Indonesia to allow an international agency to monitor the return of refugees. The assumption was that this would encourage refugees to go home voluntarily. However, Jakarta refused all efforts either by the UNHCR or the International Red Cross (ICRC) to establish a presence in West Papua. In

Murdani's associates in the PNGDF

The Murdani-Huai accord has never been made public but the close links between present and past PNGDF commanders and Murdani were exposed in 1987 when former PNGDF commander, Ted Diro, admitted that he had accepted \$139,400 from Murdani to finance his party's 1987 election campaign. The money was promised in March 1987 when Diro, then Foreign Minister, visited Jakarta to formalise the Friendship Treaty. Diro was forced to resign as Foreign Minister and became a minister without portfolio after coming under investigation for fraud. When the Murdani bribe became public, Diro resigned as minister but remains a force in PNG politics as leader of the People's Action Party, despite his highly compromising links with Murdani.

Soon after Diro's resignation, Huai was sacked as PNGDF commander for making unauthorised visits to Jakarta, for receiving gifts from Murdani and for leaking details to him about the draft Joint Declaration of Principles between PNG and Australia. Public disgrace has not meant the removal of the two Murdani associates from political life, nor has it meant a reversal of the undertakings Huai made to Murdani in May 1986. Soon

after Huai's dismissal, James Pokasui, the PNG Defence Minister, and Brigadier-General Rocky Lokinap, Huai's successor as PNGDF commander, visited Jakarta to reinforce ties between the two military establishments. Apart from the secret deal on border security, these ties include training facilities for senior PNGDF officers at the Indonesian army's staff and command school (Seskoad), training for lower ranks and the supply of military equipment to the PNGDF. ☆

Renewed fighting in West Papua

There are reports of renewed fighting in West Papua between the OPM and the Indonesian army. According to reports in the PNG press, heavy fighting was continuing in Sarmi sub-district, west of Jayapura, and in the highland sub-districts of Paniai and Nabire [*Post Courier*, 2 May]. OPM leader Mathias Wenda, regional commander in Jayapura, spoke of fighting in several places causing the deaths of more than 150 people.

The heightened level of activities has been accompanied by widespread arrests. According to information from inside West Papua which reached the refugees in Blackwater before they were evacuated, many people who were held for varying periods in the past twenty years have been re-arrested and subjected to interrogation and maltreatment. In the cities, the military prisons are over-crowded. The source mentions a number of kampungs where arrests have taken place: Depapre in Jayapura district, Dormena, Wambena and Tablasupa in Tanah Merah, as well as Ormu I and II, Jongsu I and II, Japase, Tablanusu, Kendate, Demoi, Kantomilena, Wanya and Bugisi, the precise locations of which are not clear.

There are also reports of more West Papuans fleeing across the border into Papua New Guinea. One group crossed over to Komovai, a village on the Fly River between Bosset and Obo [*Post Courier*, 11 April 1988]. Another group of twenty-two people crossed over on 23 April to Bewani, about 45 kms south-west of Vanimo. The adult males in this group are to be charged for illegal entry [*Times of Papua New Guinea*, 28 April - 4 May]. ☆

WEST PAPUAN REFUGEES



Refugees from Blackwater Camp who have now been transferred to East Awin.

Transmigration site attacked in West Papua

A group of about two hundred people, most of them armed with machetes, attacked the Arso IV transmigration site, south-east of Lake Sentani at around 3 pm on 11 March. The attack proceeded without any armed opposition as no guards were on duty at the time.

The Indonesian authorities were not alerted of the attack until four hours later, when helicopters were sent to take out the wounded. One source reports that following the attack, five local transmigrants ('transloks') were arrested; the casualties were also said to include local transmigrants [*Indonesia News Service*, No 94, 25 April 1988]. According to the PNG media, many West Papuan civil servants and politicians were arrested in Jayapura following the raid and heavy fighting was continuing in Sarmi sub-district, west of Jayapura, and Paniai and Nabire sub-districts in the highlands [*Post Courier*, 2 May 1988].

Reports of the attack have come from several sources. The first report which TAPOL received very soon after the attack, from a very reliable source, said that seventeen people were killed as the assailants went down the rows of houses hunting out transmigrants. The INS source reported twelve dead, with seventeen being treated in hospital and six missing and thought to have

been taken hostage.

Much later, when reports began to appear in the PNG and Australian press, the figures were vastly inflated. According to Australian Associated Press, at least two hundred people were killed. "According to OPM sources, 152 Indonesians - both civilians and soldiers - were killed during the attack... and another fifty troops wounded, some of whom died in hospital" [*The Age*, 2 May 1988].

OPM sources were quoted in the PNG press as saying that the attack followed "Indonesian retribution for an OPM attack on a work party on the Wutung-Jayapura road". They admitted that some of their fighters "went too far" in the ferocity of the attack [*Post Courier*, 2 May 1988]. A few days later, a statement was issued from Markas Besar, inside West Papua, (the headquarters of the OPM wing associated with Jacob Prai), on behalf of Mathias Wenda, the regional commander of Jayapura, taking responsibility for the attack. He said the attack had been planned by OPM leaders meeting on 7 March and that on 11 March, "OPM fighters attacked Arso and killed Indonesian men, women and children" [*The Times of PNG*, 5-11 May 1988].





Rumkorem disowns attack on transmigrants

Speaking for the National Liberation Army, the armed wing of the OPM whose headquarters is called Markas Victoria. Seth Rumkorem, the guerrilla leader who is now a refugee in Athens, told TAPOL that attacking civilian targets, especially innocent people, is not the habit of the NLA, which has never taken civilians, particularly innocent people, as hostage. The way in which the attack on Arso was carried indicates that it was not conducted by the NLA. Rumkorem believes the attack has all the hallmarks of an operation by Kopassus, the elite para-commando unit, and adds that he believes the same unit was behind a letter circulated late last year said to have been sent by the OPM to President Suharto. The letter, dated 13 June 1987, warned: "The deadline is the end of 1987. If by then, you have not granted us our independence, we shall obliterate all other ethnic groups now living on our soil, without exception."

According to information received by Eliezer Bonay, also of the NLA, who is now a refugee in Holland, the NLA launched a series of attacks in the Jayapura area in early March but these were directed at bridges and roads in Holtekan/Arso, Jayapura, Skouw and Batas.

PNG Catholic Commission criticises refugee policy

The PNG Catholic Commission for Justice, Peace and Development is very critical of the PNG government for failing in its obligations as a signatory of the UN Convention on Refugees. The Commission made a number of complaints about the treatment of West Papuan refugees, including not allowing them freedom of movement in and out of PNG.

The refugees are not being given decent housing or allowed access to public education, their certificates, diplomas and degrees are not recognised nor do they have opportunities for employment. For those with permissive residence and family ties in Papua New Guinea, the government should facilitate their naturalisation and assimilation into PNG society. The Commission accused the government of shirking its responsibilities by leaving things to the UN High Commission for Refugees. It also called on the government to take responsibility for finding countries willing to re-settle the West Papuan refugees [Niugini Nius, 22 February 1988].

UNHCR wants PNG to settle the refugees permanently

The UN High Commission for Refugees would like the PNG government to consider allowing West Papuan refugees to re-settle permanently in Papua New Guinea if they cannot return home or find third-country asylum, according to Akilajah Akiwumi, the UNHCR Liaison Officer in Port Moresby. Akiwumi made this statement shortly before leaving Papua New Guinea to take up a new assignment.

He said it was proving extremely difficult to find third-country asylum for West Papuan refugees. Two refugees were sent to Greece in 1982 and five were sent to Ghana in 1986, all of them OPM guerrilla leaders whom the PNG government refused to allow to remain in the country. These seven refugees are still waiting for a country that will accept them for resettlement.

Akiwumi also hoped that those refugees who have not completed degree courses would be allowed to complete their studies in Papua New Guinea, and people with professional training to resume their professions. So far, only one high-school teacher is teaching in Rabaul, while efforts for other refugees are still under way.

But Akiwumi also expressed gratitude to the government and people of PNG for allowing the refugees to stay and for showing them generosity in many respects [Times of Papua New Guinea, 25 February - 2 March 1988].

Two thousand refugees transferred to East Awin

By the middle of March this year, just over two thousand of the ten thousand West Papuan refugees now in Papua New Guinea, most of whom fled from West Papua in 1984, had been transferred to East Awin. Information about the new camps in East Awin has reached TAPOL from a refugee who was moved there from Telefomin last year. The most striking thing is the isolation and difficulty of access.

So far, eight camps have been set up in East Awin. Seven of the camps are named after the camps where the refugees were previously living, meaning that they come from the same regions in West Papua. The eighth camp is called Jameso, an acronym for Jayapura, Merauke and Sorong, because the inhabitants come from all parts of West Papua. Jameso has now become the centre of Iowara Refugee Camp, the base from which UN and PNG government officials operate.

The camps are widely dispersed in East Awin and are several hours journey from Kiunga, the nearest town and capital of North Fly Province. It is fifty kilometres by road from Iowara to Rimsait, a wharf. The river trip from Rimsait to Kiunga adds another one-and-a-half hours to the journey. During heavy rains, the road is impassable so the whole camp is completely cut off.

Contact with East Awin will continue to be difficult until an airstrip is built but this will not apparently be done until there are six thousand refugees in the area. ☆



Operation Clean-Out in Western Biak

by: John P. Rumbiak

In an effort to capture, dead or alive, the leader of the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, the Free Papua Movement) in Western Biak, Cendrawasih Bay, troops of the VIIIth/ Udayana Military Command have been flown in to West Papua. The Udayana Military Command includes the territory of East Timor, where military operations are also under way against armed resistance under Fretilin's leadership. [West Papua, or Irian Jaya as the Indonesians call it, is in the territory of the VIIth/Trikora Military Command.]

The Indonesian army has been trying for the past twenty-two years to crush OPM operations in West Biak under the leadership of Melkianus Awom, better known by his non-de-guerre, Konsup (Komandan Superiori). These efforts were recently stepped up with an operation code-named Operasi Sapu Rata or Operation Clean-Out. The previous operation code-named Operasi Sate or Operation Skewered-Meat was launched in 1986, but OPM activities have continued unabated in all parts of West Papua. The chief target in the latest operation is kampung-dwellers in the countryside suspected of supporting the guerrillas and supplying them with food. Their sago stands and gardens have been cut down and burnt. The objective is to deprive the guerrillas of food, forcing them to give up the struggle. But in a further move to force Melkianus to surrender, his wife and children have been arrested by the District Military Command in the town of Biak.

As a result of the latest operations, kampung dwellers are now facing severe food shortages because they depend almost entirely on their nearby sago stands and food gardens. They are also forbidden to hunt or gather food in the forest because they might make contact with the guerrillas. Under such systematic pressure and intimidation, and deprived of essential food supplies, many villagers have drifted into the town, moving in with relatives with jobs or a livelihood there.

There is nothing new about these operations. One such operation, called Operasi Pamungkas (the meaning of this term is not clear), which was launched in the early 1970s when Brigadier-General Acub Zainul was the military commander, is described in a history of the XVIIth/ Cendrawasih Military Command which was published in 1978. 1) This operation was concentrated in Bird's Head and North Biak which was the base-area for Melkianus Awom and his guerrillas. The Indonesian soldiers, equipped with modern weapons against a core of 167 guerrilla fighters with no more than fifteen firearms between them, inflicted many losses on the OPM. Among those shot dead during the operation were Captain Lodewijk Asaribab, Second-Lieutenant Laurens Awom, Sergeant-Major Ananian and several more whose names are not known. First-Lieutenant Yuliana Bonsapia, Second-Lieutenant Yacob Suspater and an OPM supplier in Biak town, Hendrik Tan, an ethnic Chinese, were among those captured during this operation.

The people living in the kampungs have always been the



Melkianus Awom in West Biak, in late 1987.

chief victims of these brutal operations, including the elderly, children and women. This is why it is so important for international human rights agencies to protect the people of West Papua from a repetition of the fate inflicted on the native people of America and Australia.

OPM leader Melkianus Awom

Melkianus Awom is the brother of Ferry Awom, the renowned founder and leader of the revolution of the people of West Papua and better known as Father of the OPM. Melkianus fought side by side with his brother and other leaders, Lodewijk Mandatjan and Barend Mandatjan, when the OPM first launched the armed struggle in Manokwari in 1965, in order to resist the presence of the Indonesian neo-colonial army on West Papuan soil. All these leaders were captured and killed.

Before continuing the armed struggle in Cendrawasih Bay region, Melkianus Awom and his comrade-in-arms Zacharias Kafiar undertook a dangerous and historic mission, travelling by sea to Papua New Guinea, stopping

1. *Catur Warsa - Empatbelas Tahun Kodam XVII Cendrawasih (1963-1977)*, (Fourteen years of the Regional Military Command XVII/Cendrawasih) 1978, page 36. In 1985, the XVIIth/Cendrawasih Command became the VIIIth/Trikora Military Command for Irian Jaya and Maluku.

on the way at Numfor and Biak islands and at Hollandia (now Jayapura). After arriving in Wutung, on the PNG side of the border, Melkianus and Zacharias handed over documents setting out the aims and ideals of the OPM

struggle to Australian government officials, to be passed on to the United Nations. After accomplishing their mission, the two men returned home and have been leading the OPM struggle in West and North Biak ever since. The struggle has continued for twenty-two years without any political or material help from abroad. ☆

“Indonesia planning early push into Papua New Guinea”

A Swiss pilot who worked for a Catholic missionary air service in West Papua for six months until he and his family made a spectacular escape to Australia, has told the press that he has documents to prove that the Indonesian military are planning to make a push into Papua New Guinea within six months.

The pilot, Theodor Frey, left Nabire in West Papua secretly with his wife and daughter abroad a Cessna 182 aircraft and arrived in Nhulunbuy, the northern-most tip of Australia. They had no flight plan and only two litres of fuel left when they landed without warning, after a five-hour flight. They left Nabire with enough fuel for only five hours flying, knowing that any head wind on the way could have lengthened the flight-time, meaning they would run out of fuel before reaching safety.

Frey said that Indonesian military forces in West Papua "were going into remote areas and setting up armored villages so they can move military forces into Papua New Guinea when they are ready. We think Australia should be worried and be closely watching what is going on". [Northern Territory News, 9 May 1988.]



Indonesian troops in West Papua, a threat to Papua New Guinea.

Flying for the military

When the family first arrived, they refused to speak to the press because they feared for the safety of friends still in Indonesia, though the pilot's wife, Martha, said that they had fled because they were afraid of the Indonesian armed forces. Theodor Frey was employed by a Dutch Catholic mission within the Associated Mission Air (AMA). AMA is owned by the Catholic Church and provides air services for isolated government posts and church communities; as such, it is not unusual for its aircraft to be used by the military [The Age, 29 April].

The family arrived in Australia without passports because it is AMA policy for passports of members of staff to be held at the company's office. The immediate cause of the sudden departure appears to have been that the pilot felt himself caught between two opposing forces, on the one hand the military who were harassing him, and on the other, local inhabitants who suspected him of working for the military.

After remaining for ten days in Gove, near the airstrip where they landed, the family moved to a secret address in Brisbane. It was from here that they spoke more freely to the press about their fears for Papua New Guinea. [Sunday Sun, 8 May, Sunday Territorian, 8 May and Northern Territory News, 9 May 1988.] ☆

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Japan seen as Indonesia's economic saviour

With the 1988 meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia due on 15-16 June, Suharto's new team of economic ministers have been busy trying to persuade key IGGI member-states and the World Bank to provide more economic aid this time round than last year's record commitment of \$3.15 billion.

Indonesia's official debt is now in excess of \$35 billion and almost forty per cent of foreign exchange earnings must be used to service the debt. (A much higher figure - \$43.2 billion - for the total foreign debt is often mentioned, which includes loans for special projects such as liquefied natural gas plant expansion in Aceh and East Kalimantan.) As Jakarta sees it, the heavy burden of this debt can only be alleviated with the help of Japan, which alone accounts for 32 per cent of the total. The size of Indonesia's debt repayment problem has been exacerbated by the stronger yen against the dollar, sharply inflating the dollar value of repayments to Japan. But an additional problem for Indonesia is the shaky position of state revenues which have taken a battering because of the fall in oil prices resulting in lower tax payments from the oil companies. As a result, 36.6 per cent of state receipts are now allocated to buy foreign currency to repay the country's overseas obligations. This has serious consequences for many development projects which are unable to proceed because rupiah needs are drying up.

Attention has therefore been focussed on persuading Japan to substantially increase its aid commitment to Indonesia in 1988/89, to grant all this aid not in project aid but in commodity aid which can be converted into rupiahs, and to give Indonesia concessions regarding the repayment of its outstanding debt.

Spiralling Japanese aid

Japanese aid to Indonesia granted within the IGGI doubled in two years, up from \$303.2 million in 1985 to \$473.6 million in 1986 and \$606.8 million in 1987. Japanese aid accounted for nearly twenty per cent of the total IGGI commitment in 1987, multilateral as well as bilateral. Japan's commitment was more than three times the next largest donor, the USA which pledged \$190 million [Kompas, 7 May 1988].

According to Japan's leading economic daily, *Nihon Keizai Shinbun* [3 March 1988], Indonesia has asked Japan to grant no less than \$770 million this year. Moreover, Indonesia wants all this to be committed in commodity aid and hence convertible into rupiahs. This has given rise to controversy in Japan, the paper says, because "until now, Japan has persistently taken the position that aid should enhance self-reliance".

Most people may find it difficult to understand how getting into debt on such a scale can be equated with striving towards self-reliance. It would be closer to the truth to say that the absence of any project aid is bad news for Japanese exporters who rely on overseas projects to provide them with markets.

The lengths to which the Suharto government has gone to plead its case with Tokyo have been widely publicised in Indonesia. Last December, during the meeting in Manila of ASEAN heads of government, Suharto made a personal plea to Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita for concessions in the terms of Indonesia's repayments to



An Indonesian sweat-shop. The Indonesian textile industry is gradually entering the world market.

Japan. In February, he sent Professor Widjojo Nitisastra on a mission to Tokyo to deliver a letter to Takeshita suggesting three options regarding the concessions (Widjojo's second visit to Tokyo in a year as Suharto messenger-boy). In March a high-level financial team also visited Tokyo to discuss the details of the proposed concessions.

So when Japanese Foreign Minister Sousuke Uno visited Jakarta in April, hopes ran high that he would, as Finance Minister J.B. Sumarlin put it, "bring us some good news". But after completing his round of meetings with ministers and having a session with Suharto, Uno spoke briefly at a press conference and offered nothing, much to the disappointment of one and all.

Indonesia's economic dependence on Japan should not be under-estimated. No-one believes for a moment that Japan will leave Indonesia in the lurch, but in addition to fighting opposition centred in the Ministry for International Trade and Industry, Takeshita's government fears that concessions to Indonesia, its largest debtor, will encourage other debtors to demand similar special treatment.

Japan's oil interests are also hoping to reap benefits from the recent appointment of Ginandjar Kartasasmita as oil minister, the first science graduate from a Japanese university to get a place in an Indonesian cabinet. Recently, Ginandjar invited Japan to become a major oil producer in Indonesia, spreading alarm among US contractors who have long dominated the Indonesian petroleum industry [UPI, 11 April 1988, reported in *Indonesia News Service*, No 96,2 May 1988].

US monopoly control of the petroleum industry was established after beating off a determined effort in the early 1970s by Japanese oil companies to gain a foothold in Indonesia when a tacit agreement was reached between Suharto and US and Japanese oil interests, according to

which Japan would confine itself to liquified natural gas production. [See Wayne Robinson, "Imperialism, Dependency and Peripheral Industrialisation: the Case of Japan in Indonesia" in *South-East Asia: Essays in the Political Economy of Structural Change*, ed: Higgott and Robison, 1985, page 208] Oil interests in Japan may now see a chance of using Indonesia's foreign exchange crisis and a Japanese-trained oil minister to change the face of the oil industry in Indonesia.

IGGI aid to increase sharply

According to leaks from the World Bank's Report for 1988, to be submitted to the coming IGGI meeting, the World Bank has recommended a total aid commitment of \$3.8 billion, 19 per cent higher than last year [Jakarta Post, 19 May 1988].

World Bank Vice-President, Attila Karaosmanoglu, announced during a visit to Jakarta in May that World Bank credit to Indonesia will increase from \$1.1 billion

last year to \$1.2 billion. Karaosmanoglu lavished praise on Indonesia's economic managers for the readjustments and deregulation introduced in the past few years.

The West German Minister for Economic Co-operation, Hans Klein also used the occasion of a visit to Indonesia to announce an increase in aid from \$72.9 million last year to \$100 billion this year. In addition, Germany has promised credit of \$100 million to support seven projects in Sumatra.

Many western leaders have praised Indonesia for refusing to consider proposals to re-schedule foreign debt repayments. They include Dutch Deputy Prime Minister, R.W. de Korte, who said in January, that "a request for postponement would cause the world no longer to have confidence in Indonesia". US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Gaston Sigur said during a visit, "We regard any steps to re-schedule debt as unrealistic". IMF Managing-Director, Michel Camdessus warned Indonesia that debt-re-scheduling could lead to "long-term problems of tightened credit and constricted capital outlays". [See *Indonesian News Service*, Nos 71, 73 and 74.] West Germany's Hans Klein also welcomed Indonesia's decision to concentrate on how to repay its debt rather than how to postpone it (*Kompas*, 4 May 1988). With such enthusiasm for Jakarta's economic management, this year's IGGI meeting is certain to exceed all expectations. ☆

EASTTIMOR

Timorese refugee on Indonesian operations in East Timor since 1975

Cristiano Costa lived with his parents in Baucau until the town was invaded by Indonesian troops two days after Dili was invaded. He fled to the mountains and spent the next three years in the bush. From 1979 till 1987 he lived in Indonesian-occupied Baucau, often in detention or in danger of arrest. In October 1987, he escaped from Indonesia while in Jakarta. After a short stay in Macau, he reached Lisbon in February and testified before the UN Human Rights Commission in March. This is the second part of an interview by TAPOL. The final part will appear in TAPOL Bulletin No. 88.

Can you speak about the arrival of Indonesian forces in Baucau in December 1975, after the invasion in Dili?

Before the invasion, it was Indonesia's intention to take control of the whole of East Timor in 72 hours, taking Dili on the first day, Baucau on the second, and Los Palos on the third. They thought that Fretilin forces were very weak and could easily be smashed, and that by controlling the three towns, with the border region already in their hands, Fretilin would be forced to surrender. But the resistance in Dili frustrated this strategy. The Indonesians only managed to control parts of Dili along the coast in the first two days.

But they had taken the airfield on Atauro Island which they used as the base from which to attack Baucau and Los Palos. On 9 December, Indonesian aircraft bombed the airfield at Baucau. Fretilin had no air power, but its troops held defence positions round the airfield.

On 10 December, the Indonesians used Kopasgat, the airborne commandos or rapid-deployment troops, who were parachuted in, as well as naval craft to land troops at Waigaka, east of Baucau, on the way to Los Palos, between Baucau and Lada. There was little resistance in Baucau, nothing like the resistance in Dili. Fretilin forces had withdrawn to Venilale, about 30 kms south.

disarray though there was some resistance round the airfield. But because of the ferocity of Indonesian forces in Baucau, many inhabitants fled to the hills.

What do you mean by ferocity?

The way the troops swooped down from the air, landed on the coast, and entered the town in their panzers, firing machine-guns and other weapons. It was terrifying and people fled, seeking protection with Fretilin.

The capture of Baucau

The invasion threw Fretilin forces in Baucau into



Were there arrests and shootings like in Dili?

Yes, but not on the scale of what happened in Dili where the resistance was much stronger. In Baucau, the resistance was much weaker, and as a result, fewer people were killed. A week after gaining control of Baucau airfield, the Indonesians began to advance towards Vikeke. They met with fierce resistance here and it was almost a month-and-a-half before they overpowered the resistance and took control of the town. But Los Palos was already in Indonesian hands; it was the second town to fall, about a week after the invasion in Dili.

A month or so after the Indonesian invasion, a delegation of some sort came, I think from the United Nations, early in 1976. By this time, I had fled to the bush but my family was still in Baucau, and they saw how the Indonesians hid their tanks from the UN visitor, even digging huge holes in which to hide their tanks.

But although Dili, Baucau and Los Palos had been



Traditional East Timorese village.

taken, the Indonesians were unable to destroy Fretilin, so they pursued a strategy of gaining control of all the district towns. During 1976, Indonesia aimed to control the towns and set up a government in Dili. In May, an assembly met in Dili and adopted a petition asking President Suharto to incorporate East Timor, so on 17 July 1976, East Timor was proclaimed as Indonesia's 27th province. Yet at that time, only 15 to 20 per cent of the population was under Indonesian control. The rest had fled to the interior with Fretilin which quickly reorganised itself and gave protection to the population.

This must have been a gigantic task for Fretilin with so many people coming from the towns.

Yes, many of the towns in Indonesian hands at the time were virtually empty of people. Fretilin set about reorganising itself, basing itself on the support of the population. It created shock brigades of people from different regions who were trained in the technique of warfare, former members of the Portuguese colonial army. Responding to Fretilin's strategy, the Indonesians began a new strategy to destroy the shock brigades. The new strategy started from the western border region in 1977. By this time, as the Indonesians knew, Fretilin was getting short of supplies.

Onslaught against the population

The new Indonesian operation was called Operasi Sapu Bersih or Operation Clean-Sweep. They began in the western sector and from there, they moved eastward to

the central sector. They used all means, air-raids, bombardment from the sea and land-based troops. Many guerrillas were killed or surrendered and thousands of people were killed or captured.

In the central sector, there was fierce resistance, so it took them two months to overcome Fretilin. The ones who got killed during the bombing raids were ordinary people, not guerrillas, many of whom managed to escape.

In the eastern sector, they encountered even fiercer resistance, but by concentrating all their forces here, Fretilin was forced to retreat, taking shelter in the Matabean mountains. But they weren't able to hold out because of the strength of Indonesia's forces. A huge number of people were killed during the attack on Matabean, perhaps as many as 20,000 people. Most died during the bombing raids or were killed by Indonesian troops.

Did you experience any of these bombing raids?

I first saw an air-raid in Vikeke, in the village of Bibileo. Then later in Aitana, near Lakluta, and the third time, in Natarbora. The Bibileo raid didn't kill anyone; as soon as we heard the planes approaching, we ran for cover. Not many people were killed during the Lakluta raids either, but many were killed in Natarbora. Indonesian positions in Natarbora had been attacked by Fretilin, causing many Indonesian casualties. So the Indonesian ground forces asked for air support. Three aircraft - I think they were Skyhawks - bombed the region, killing thousands of people. In particular, women, children and old people were killed, people who couldn't run for cover. They were killed in large numbers. All we could do was pray for God's protection. The planes came in low and sprayed the ground with bullets, with their machine-guns, killing many people.

When the raids began in the east, the people were still with Fretilin. They had fled south with Fretilin so there were many people in Natarbora. It was here that people began to come down from the mountains to areas controlled by the Indonesians.

Why did they come down?

The economic situation was becoming very bad indeed. Moreover, Fretilin forces were by this time dispersed in many directions because they had to seek protection from the air raids. So the population moved back into the towns which were controlled by the Indonesians. Here they were driven into concentration camps which later became known as the pemukiman, or resettlements.

The strategy used in that Indonesian offensive was very effective but even so, many Fretilin guerrillas survived. So in late 1978, the Indonesians launched a second operation in the eastern sector which was called Sapu Bersih Kedua, the Second Clean-Sweep Operation. This was after they had smashed Matabean. Fretilin forces were now widely dispersed, so it was easy for the Indonesians to concentrate their troops to go out in search of certain targets.

Fretilin leaders murdered

Then, they got information that there was to be a meeting between Nicolau Lobato, Antonino Carvarino and Vicente Reis, leading members of Fretilin's permanent committee. Indonesian troops managed to track down each of them and before they were able to meet and discuss the situation, they were all killed. Lobato was killed in Mindelu, near Kabalaki. Carvarino was apparently

captured near Fihukrin in the region of Same. Vicente Reis was shot in the leg but wasn't captured. I don't know what happened to him after that.

The elimination of these three guerrilla leaders caused widespread demoralisation among the forces of resistance and many surrendered. Among the first to surrender, in 1978, was Alarico Fernandes with the radio transmitter. Then many were captured or surrendered. I think as many as 10,000 resistance fighters fell into enemy hands.

Where were you at the time?

With a company in Baucau region, near Ostiko. About two hundred of us surrendered, leaving very few Fretilin forces in the region. I surrendered in Ostiko on 17 April 1979 and after being held there for a couple of days, I was sent to Venilale. After two weeks, I was sent to Baucau and re-joined my family. I wasn't in captivity but I had to report to the army once a week. My family had already returned five or six months earlier. When they fled to the mountains, the house was left empty and everything was looted by the Indonesians. Then the house was burnt down. So they lived in a hut. Some of their land had been taken by people who hadn't fled to the mountains. My parents are poor peasants.

How did things develop after Fretilin's virtual extermination?

The Indonesians made an almost complete sweep of Fretilin forces. There were reports that Xanana had been shot dead in Uatulari, south of the eastern sector.

The Fence-of-Legs Operation

Following the revival of Fretilin forces in 1980, the Indonesians decided to launch a new operation called Pagar Betis or Fence-of-Legs. The Indonesians used forty battalions and mobilised all men over the age of 17 who were strong enough to walk and go up mountains to take part, not just in the east but from the whole of East Timor.

How did the Indonesians recruit all these people?

They gave instructions to the village heads and the sub-district chiefs who told the population to join in. The 'fence' consisted of three lines. The front line consisted of Indonesian troops, then there was a line of people with more Indonesian troops, and behind them a third line consisting of Indonesian troops. The fence started in the extreme west of the country and went down south, then along the coast to the east, then up north and along the north coast to complete the circle. It was like a huge fence encircling the whole country which moved slowly forward, getting smaller and smaller. The operation took three months, from May to August 1981. It hemmed in Fretilin forces, concentrating them in Aitana.

Each day, we moved forward. The Indonesian plan was to push Fretilin forces back to Aitana. The huge fence reached Aitana region at the end of July. It was here that a ghastly massacre occurred. Many people still under Fretilin's protection were slaughtered in cold blood. They murdered everyone, from tiny babies to the elderly, unarmed people who were not involved in the fighting but were there simply because they had stayed with Fretilin and wanted to live freely in the mountains. There were reports that Xanana had been killed - a second time. The Indonesians believed it but it was a guerrilla ruse. They had taken his clothes and put them on the body of a dead guerrilla.

Did you take part in the fence of legs?

Yes, I was in a team of Timorese who had all fought previously in the bush. We were armed and used by the Indonesians to take part in the pagar betis. I was with the troops when they reached Aitana. But I did not go in with the front-line troops which attacked Fretilin forces surrounded in Aitana. We were behind. But when



East Timorese guerrillas on the move.

the attack was over and mopping-up operations were under way a week or two later, our team entered the area. It was a ghastly sight. There were a great many bodies, men, women, little children, strewn everywhere, unburied, along the river banks, on the mountain slopes. I would estimate that about ten thousand people had been killed in the operation. There were so many decomposing bodies that the stench was unbearable and we couldn't stay in the area. The Indonesian soldiers showed no mercy to anyone. Even tiny babies were slaughtered.

Didn't anyone get away?

Some people escaped from the encirclement but all those who were caught were massacred. They were not only from Aitana but from all over, people who had been swept along by the advancing troops. That's why so many people were there. And everyone was killed.

To be concluded.

Transmigration and defence

In a wide-ranging interview on his plans for the future of transmigration, the new Minister of Transmigration, Lieutenant-General Soegiarto said that by promoting economic development in the sparsely-populated border regions with the resettlement of transmigrants from Java, Indonesia's territorial defence will be reinforced. He listed "Indonesia's vast border regions where defence needs to be strengthened, such as the Mentawai, Nias and Simelue string of islands along the west coast of Sumatra, the Riau Islands near the South China Sea, the Sangir-Talaud Islands north of Sulawesi and the thousands of islands in the provinces of Maluku and Irian Jaya" [Kompas, 21 May 1988].

The Minister spoke of plans to enhance the role of private capital in the transmigration programme. This interview and other developments will be discussed in the next issue of TAPOL Bulletin.

Military operations in East Timor during 1987



Two major military operations were launched by the Indonesian army during 1986 and 1987, causing many civilian casualties among the Timorese.

Since the invasion in December 1975, the Indonesian armed forces have repeatedly launched small, medium or large-scale attacks, either against the Fretilin guerrillas or attacking innocent East Timorese in the countryside. In the words of Inacio Moura, who left East Timor last December after working for several years in the East Timor 'provincial' administration, entire villages have been decimated. "The exact number of those killed is difficult to know, but an estimate of that tragic number may be put at around 200,000 victims, given the huge proportion of the population who have disappeared." Moura estimates that the Indonesian armed forces have lost more than 15,000 troops killed in the fighting with the Timorese resistance:

The (Indonesian) soldiers are tired of so much war. They are there but thinking of their families. They die, or are mutilated, and afterwards live a miserable life. Many soldiers say: 'We come here to die while the generals in Jakarta are living at our expense.'

The military command structure in East Timor

At times when there are no large-scale operations under way, Indonesia's territorial army in East Timor consists of between 10,000 and 15,000 soldiers. During operations, divisions and battalions from all parts of the country are flown in. Virtually every military unit in Indonesia has had combat experience in East Timor.

According to a report from East Timor on the military

Indonesian red-berets of Kopassus, arriving at Baucau airport in July 1987, with the assignment to capture Falintil commander Xanana, dead or alive.

situation in November, women's military units were brought in to take over some of the territorial duties, such as population control.

The territorial command in East Timor is the Komando Resor Militer, or Military Resort Command, known as Korem 164/Wira Dharma, with its headquarters in Dili. The present commander is Infantry Colonel Machfud who took over from Colonel Yunus Yosfiah at the end of 1987.

In 1983, a special command was set up for East Timor, the Komando Operasi Keamanan East Timor, or Security Operations Command for East Timor, known as Kopskam Timtim. Kopskam Timtim is always under the command of the commander of the first division of Kostrad, the army's strategic reserve corps, the best trained and equipped corps in the Indonesian army. Unlike Korem 164/Wira Dharma which is under the Military Regional Command IX/Udayana based in Bali, Kopskam Timtim is under the armed forces commander-in-chief. The present Kopskam commander is Brigadier-General Mantiri. The previous commander, Brigadier-General Sugito later moved to the prestigious post of Jakarta military commander and is now commander of Kostrad.

The 1986-87 military operation

In June 1986, Indonesia launched an operation called Operasi Kikis, or Operation Extinction which lasted one year and was terminated in May 1987. In July 1987, a special operation was launched with the arrival of one thousand special red-beret troops, under the command of

Colonel Soenarto. The primary objective of this operation was to track down and eliminate the Fretilin



A red-beret (Kopassus) commander giving instructions to his men, out on operations in a mountainous part of Baucau region.

guerrilla leader, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao, who has led Falintil, the armed resistance in East Timor, since 1979. In December 1987, Colonel Soenarto and his troops were withdrawn, having failed to achieve their goal.

Operasi Kikis

In a document written by Xanana in May 1987, the Falintil commander made the following assessment of this operation:

Following guerrilla attacks, wherever they have taken place, the occupying forces always carry out reprisals of many kinds against the defenceless population. This is firstly in order to terrorise the people even further, secondly, to implant the idea that if there were no armed resistance the population would not be suffering the consequences, and thirdly, to impress upon the guerrillas that no Indonesian soldier will be killed without someone from among the Timorese population being killed as well.

In other words, Operation Extinction was a response and retaliation to mounting Fretilin actions all over



Indonesian troops using radio and binoculars to monitor a bombing raid on guerrilla positions near Lakluta, in March 1987.

the country. By inflicting harsh punishments and on-the-spot executions on innocent villagers, the army intended to set an example while at the same time spreading fear. The aim was to alienate the population from the guerrillas by blaming the latter for the sufferings and hardship caused by the Indonesian troops.

In addition, an overwhelming military presence was needed before and during the general elections in East Timor on 23 April 1987. In East Timor, a general election is nothing less than a military exercise, during which the entire population is herded into the polling booths.

As with previous operations, Operation Extinction involved troops brought in fresh from various regions. This time they included Zipur Battalion 9, a combat battalion consisting of special commandos and army engineers, Battalion 744 from Central Sulawesi, Battalion 527 from the Brawijaya East Java Division, Battalion 745 from North Sulawesi, Battalion 714 from South Sulawesi, along with other battalions that have not been identified. According to Fretilin, altogether thirty-six battalions were deployed in the operation, a total of about 27,000 additional troops.

There were reports of many clashes between the guerrillas and Indonesian troops. Skirmishes occurred almost everywhere, with the focus on the eastern sector.



In late 1986 when fresh troops were disembarked at Tacitolu and Areia Branca, west of Dili, the troops moved quickly south. The first clashes were reported in Zumalai, Bobonaro and Atsabe, all in the western sector. In the following months, the troops moved eastward where the guerrillas have many strongholds.

After the heavy bombing raids of the late 1970s, the guerrillas learned one important lesson - not to set up permanent bases as they are a sitting target for jet-fighters and bombers. Inacio Moura stated in various interviews with the Portuguese press that one need only go to Baucau to see the military base from which US-manufactured planes take off daily to bomb Fretilin positions and zones occupied by the resistance. After a raid, ground forces are sent into the bombed area but as soon as they leave, the guerrillas return to their former positions.

When the war zone moved east to the Los Palos region along the key road from Baucau to Vikeke, many Indonesian troops were ambushed. Refugees report that the Indonesians have virtually given up trying to control the road. People say that till 4 pm, the Indonesians rule, then Fretilin takes over.

Many documents have reached the Fretilin office in Lisbon reporting clashes during this period, and exposing the brutality of the Indonesian troops. One event in Iliomar, in the eastern sector, shortly before the elections, is typical:

Some time in late February or early March 1987, 87

troops of Zipur Battalion 9 entered Iliomar and forced the townspeople to gather in front of the military post. After threats of various kinds, seventeen Timorese, including Jaime da Costa and Martinho Hornai, were bayoneted to death.

Falintil guerrillas avoided direct confrontation with the enemy who deployed a far greater number of troops than Falintil. But the guerrillas launched counter-attacks whenever conditions were favourable. Nearing the end of Operation Extinction, in April and May, many Indonesian units were ambushed and hit by the guerrillas. On 12 May, guerrillas succeeded in shooting down an Indonesian helicopter in the Barike district.



Indonesian red-berets arriving during the night in Baucau airport, to participate in Colonel Soenarto's operation.

Details of confrontations in April-May 1987

3 April

Fighting in Los Palos. One Indonesian officer was killed.

17 April

Two dead and two wounded Indonesian soldiers transported to Dili.



This photo was taken in Luro region, near Los Palos, an area of 'unrest'. Indonesian soldiers appear to be inspecting rows of Timorese men. The purpose of the inspection is not clear. The accompanying note says that all travel in East Timor is strictly supervised and requires a travel permit (surat jalan). This may be a briefing before the men go to work in the fields.

21 and 22 April

Fighting on the north coast of Lautem, directly north of Los Palos. Three guerrillas were killed and their weapons captured on the first day. Nine Indonesian soldiers were killed and their weapons seized on the second day.



Indonesian forces patrolling in the Lacluta area, in March 1987.

23 April

On polling day, Falintil attacked Raimero village, in Same. Two soldiers were killed and one wounded; three weapons were seized. A similar attack in Hatudo failed. Six dead Indonesian soldiers arrived in Dili.

4 May

Armed encounter with Battalion 714 in Liaruka/Ossu. Four Indonesian soldiers were killed and their weapons seized. One guerrilla was killed.

10 May

Six dead Indonesian soldiers were brought into Dili from Betano on the south coast.

12 May


An army helicopter was shot down in Barike. According to some reports, it was hit and made a forced landing, then took off and was hit again and crashed.

17 May

A Falintil unit intercepted a bus in Los Palos.

* * *

Although Operation Extinction came to an end in May, there was a report that in August 1987, forty-six armoured cars with heavy artillery units manned by 7,200 soldiers arrived in East Timor. This was said to be in preparation for a plan to end armed resistance in East Timor by September 1988.



The search for Xanana Gusmao



A senior Indonesian officer giving instructions to men of a Kostrad battalion, in an army barracks in Baucau, in September 1987.

One thousand red-beret Kopassus troops were flown in to Baucau and Los Palos by Hercules aircraft on 11 and 12 July 1987, under the command of Colonel Soenarto. The sole assignment of the operation was to capture Falintil commander, Xanana Gusmao.

The Soenarto operation appears to have been a combined intelligence-commando operation, the intention being to lure the guerrilla leader into negotiations through a church intermediary and to capture Xanana during the talks. This never happened. Indeed Falintil intelligence was clearly forewarned of the plans, and sent information abroad very quickly about the operation. Later, Falintil sent out photographs of the troops arriving, some of which are reproduced on these pages, which only confirms that they have well-established lines of communication within enemy ranks, keeping them well informed of every Indonesian move.

The Soenarto troops were concentrated in the east where they hunted the elusive guerrilla leader. Soenarto sent out secret agents to mingle among the Timorese to hunt down Xanana. One source stated that some commandos had been given lessons in Portuguese to help them mix better among the Timorese.

In August, five of Soenarto's men were killed in Los Palos and twenty were seriously wounded in an ambush.



A combat-ready Kopassus unit, flown in to East Timor from Java, in July 1987.

The wounded were flown back to Jakarta. Those guerrillas who were captured were immediately interrogated for information of Xanana's whereabouts, but without success. On 16 and 17 October, a fresh batch of red-berets arrived in Baucau and military equipment was unloaded at Lautem harbour.

After failing in his mission, Colonel Soenarto returned to Jakarta on 12 December. Two weeks later, armed forces commander-in-chief, General Benny Murdani, stated that it would still take several years to put an end to armed resistance in East Timor. He estimated that there were about five hundred armed guerrillas in action. The report he received from Soenarto must have been very discouraging.

Source: *Nakroma*, Nos 1 and 2, published by Fretilin Information Office (GIF), Lisbon, and documents from East Timor, obtained from GIF and logged in various Memos published by *East Timor News*.



Newly-arrived Indonesian red-berets at Baucau airport, receiving army insignia from local territorial troops, in July 1987.

TAPOL Occasional Reports Series

No. 1 Exchange of Messages with Fretilin commander, Gusmao Xanana

With Lord Avebury, chair, Parliamentary Human Rights Group and Carmel Budiardjo, TAPOL Organising Secretary.

No. 2 Joint Statement by Union of Democratic Timorese and Fretilin, March 1986

No. 3 Reactions from Indonesia to Transmigration Campaign

Indonesian press clippings reacting to the campaign by Survival International and TAPOL.

No. 4 TAPOL Statement on East Timor to the UN Committee of 24, August 1986

No. 5 The 1987 Indonesian Election in East Timor
An analysis written by TAPOL.

No. 6 TAPOL Statement on East Timor to the UN Committee of 24, August 1987

No. 7 July 1987 Statement on the Joint Decision of the Chairman of the Supreme Court and Minister of Justice.
By Ikadin, the Indonesian Lawyers' Association.

No. 8 World Bank maintains support for Transmigration
Survival International and TAPOL write to World Bank, 22 January 1988.

Copies from TAPOL, 80 pence a copy, including postage.

New row with Australian journalists

Indonesian consular officials have started a new diplomatic row between Indonesia and Australia because a poster advertising a play about five Australian television journalists killed by Indonesian troops in East Timor in October 1975 was displayed when three Indonesian TVRI (television) journalists visited the Darwin Press Club in May.

After the journalists had been at the Club for some time without complaining, a consular official with them drew the attention of the Indonesian Consul in Darwin to the "offending" poster [*Sunday Territorian*, 8 May 1988]. The Consul then announced that the journalists would be leaving the building at once. They later cut short their visit to Australia to reinforce their protest.

The play, "Death at Balibo" is based on the tragic murders of the television journalists who were close to the border between East and West Timor in October 1975, to record Indonesian military activities in the area. The circumstances in which they were shot dead by Indonesian troops have never been investigated, nor did the Australian government seek an explanation of the atrocity, let alone protest. Indonesian officials reveal by their absurd response to the poster that they are extremely embarrassed by the Balibo murders.

programme in May of a film exposing the activities of Indonesian diplomatic missions in Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne and Darwin which spy on Indonesians living in Australia. In a blatant attempt at blackmail, Wen, a well-known former Opsus agent, said that applications by Australian journalists to enter Indonesia were in the pipe-line and the SBS report might "not be conducive to improving relations with the Australian media" [*The Weekend Australian*, 14-15 May 1988].

How long can the thaw last?

There is currently said to be a 'thaw' in Jakarta's blanket discrimination against Australian journalists working in Indonesia which has been in force since early 1986. (One major Australian newspaper, *The Australian*, has been prevented from sending anyone to Indonesia since 1982.)

Recently, it was announced that the Australian Associated Press has been given permission to place a journalist in Jakarta for one year, and five Australian journalists were allowed to enter Indonesia to cover the celebration of ANZAC Day in Ambon. They include Peter Hastings, long a close friend of the Suharto regime who nevertheless has been excluded from Indonesia for the past two years, and David Jenkins, Foreign Editor of *Sydney Morning Herald* whose article about the Suharto family fortunes, published in April 1986, so infuriated the Indonesian government. But with all these 'concessions', the journalists are expected to be on their best behaviour, as if permission to visit Indonesia is some kind of special favour.

As *The Weekend Australian* commented editorially in its 7-8 May issue:

Despite, or perhaps because of, all the efforts of Australian politicians to ingratiate themselves with the Indonesian Government, our northern neighbour continues to treat this country with contempt...

It has to be assumed that the restrictions on the Australian media and their representatives result from unfavourable reports or comments on events in Indonesia and, more particularly, criticism of Indonesia's violent annexation of East Timor and its denial of a genuine act of self-determination to the people of the former Portuguese colony....

It is a fact that five Australians were killed in East Timor in 1975. The Indonesian Government cannot make Australians forget what happened. ☆

DEATH AT BALIBO



Presented by the Timorese Association NI (Lafaek) and Darwin Theatre Group.

Aussie journo's killed, a country invaded, a cover up, a silence... until now.

Death at Balibo is a spectacle of theatre, laughter, tears, magic, song and drums.

Thurs May 12, Sat May 14, Wed 18-Sat 21 May, 25-28 May.

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DEATH AT BALIBO



Apresentado pela Associação Timorese do Northern Territory (Lafaek) e Darwin Theatre Group


Jornalistas Australianos mortos, uma nação invadida encoberto, um silêncio até agora

Death at Balibo é um espetáculo de teatro preenchido com alegria, lágrimas, magia, música e batuque

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


106305-1

From the Northern Territory News, 5 May 1988.

Foreign Minister Ali Alatas quickly condemned the poster "insult" as "regrettable" while a senior TVRI official called the display of the poster a "set-up". It was "serious and deliberately provocative" and an attempt by Australian journalists to "exploit the situation" [*Northern Territory News*, 7 May 1988]. Of course, none of these indignant Indonesians have the slightest interest in finding out what happened in Balibo nearly thirteen years ago, one of the most shameful examples in the history of journalism of a cover-up, in this case, an atrocity aimed at concealing the truth about Indonesian aggression in East Timor.

Less than two weeks later, another "incident" was looming on the horizon, with a protest by Tony Wen, the Indonesian Consul for Information (sic) in Sydney, against the planned screening on the SBS *Vox Populi*



Foreign affairs: New minister, old problems



Indonesia's new Foreign Minister Ali Alatas is the first career diplomat to be appointed to the post by Suharto. His appointment suggests that Suharto is dissatisfied with the state of Indonesia's foreign affairs and has turned this time to an experienced expert, a 'tough negotiator' as Alatas has been described in the press.

He worked his way up in the information division of the Department of Foreign Affairs (he was then known as Alex, not Ali), becoming spokesperson for the Department in the early 1960s. His first post after Suharto seized power was as political counsellor at the Indonesian embassy in Washington from 1966-70. He then held a succession of jobs as personal assistant, and from 1978 to 1982 was the personal assistant of Vice-President Adam Malik, Indonesia's longest-serving foreign minister. From 1983 till his appointment as minister this year, he was Indonesia's ambassador to the UN in New York.

One of his major tasks as ambassador was to cope with the question of East Timor, in particular the consultations with Portugal carried out under the terms of resolution 37/30 of the 1982 General Assembly. During his entire term in New York, no resolution was adopted by the General Assembly, a fact which former Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja described as a 'boon' for Indonesian diplomacy.

In one of his first statements as Foreign Minister, he admitted that East Timor was still a "nuisance" internationally. It has created "many misunderstandings and misconceptions, even among our allies, thus creating difficulties in our diplomatic work" [Tempo, 16 April 1988].

Diplomatic setback in Dusseldorf

Alatas had been in the job less than two months when he had his first major diplomatic setback. The cause as usual was East Timor and the setting was the meeting of foreign ministers of the EEC and ASEAN countries in Dusseldorf held on 3-4 May (see separate item).

Alatas is also trying to sabotage a strongly-worded resolution on East Timor to be voted on shortly by the European Parliament. He has instructed Indonesian embassies in Western Europe to lobby against it. A new tactic apparently initiated by him is to try and persuade people well-known for their criticism of Indonesia to go to East Timor on a guided tour, believing that the testimony of right-wing politicians and discredited journalists like Nuno Rocha has probably done more harm than good to Indonesia's propaganda efforts regarding East Timor.

Leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement

Alatas will also promote with renewed vigour Suharto's ambition to become president of the Non-Aligned Movement from 1989, reversing Mochtar's failure at the NAM meeting in Luanda in 1985. At the NAM summit conference in Harare in 1986, Indonesia sent a huge delegation to lobby delegates but to no avail.

It was at Harare that Indonesia made a formal bid to chair the Movement next time round. Its main rival is Nicaragua, the more likely candidate since it is now Latin America's turn, following India and Zimbabwe. Alatas now claims that Indonesia and Nicaragua have agreed to support each other's bids for the next two terms, though he did not say whether they had agreed on who should come first.

As part of Jakarta's attempt to win greater support from Third World countries and in particular to boost Indonesia's fortunes in NAM, the Foreign Ministry recently announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with Nicaragua and with Cyprus, the venue of this year's meeting of NAM foreign ministers which will decide on who will be the next NAM president. ☆

EEC countries adopt common stand on East Timor

The twelve EEC countries have agreed to adopt a common stand on East Timor. The decision was adopted at the meeting of EEC and ASEAN foreign ministers in Dusseldorf in May. It was the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Joao de Deus Pinheiro, who raised the question, proposing that all the countries present should adopt a common stand.

Indonesia's Ali Alatas threatened to walk out, but a crisis was averted by an agreement to limit the common stand to the EEC countries only. Even so, this was a serious blow for Indonesia, and will enhance Portugal's

and hence East Timor's position at the UN General Assembly this year.

At a press conference announcing the results of the meeting, the West German Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher made the following statement:

As you know, in the Progress Report of the UN Secretary-General of 8 September (1987), it is said that "the two countries (Portugal and Indonesia) agree to continue the substantive talks with a view to

achieving a comprehensive and internationally acceptable settlement".

What I can say here is that the Twelve take a favourable view of the existing contacts under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General. The Twelve will make their agreed position known in greater detail in the UN which is the appropriate forum to address these matters.

Commenting on the decision, Jose Ramos Horta, who has represented Fretilin at the UN since 1975, said this was a significant step forward. "Even though the statement is cautiously worded," he said, "it is significant because it is the first time the Twelve have issued a joint statement. It will bind them when a resolution comes before the UN General Assembly or later, before the UN Human Rights Commission. It could influence other countries, the Scandinavian countries, Francophone countries and countries in Latin America."

According to Horta, some ASEAN countries are getting tired of having to support Indonesia every time joint ASEAN and EEC events take place and the Portuguese raise East Timor. ASEAN countries have always supported Indonesia at the UN but some, such as Thailand which has had a close friendship with Portugal for many years, might now consider changing their position. ☆

EAST TIMOR



A West Papuan group performing during a Human Rights Seminar in Dusseldorf, when EEC-ASEAN foreign ministers were meeting there. East Timorese representative, Cristiano Costa is seated in the background.

HUMAN RIGHTS

The latent danger of the PKI

It has become a ritual for Indonesian generals to warn people of 'bahaya laten PKI', the 'latent danger of the PKI' (the banned Indonesian Communist Party), as an ever-present threat. Among the younger generation who did not experience the 1965/66 massacres and mass arrests, much of this talk goes in one ear and out of the other. For them, the PKI does not exist and, however much the generals may go on, there have never been any signs of a PKI revival. For young Indonesians interested in human rights, and social and environmental issues, the PKI spectre is just a part of history.

The anti-communist over-kill of retired generals like Sarwo Edhie and Amir Mahmud sometimes worries the more security-conscious generals who see it as being counter-productive, because it makes people more eager to learn about the 'forbidden fruit' of Marxism.

The latest 'bahaya laten' campaign has brought to light splits among the generals, each with their own analysis of the present political situation. A glance at the dispute gives some idea of the present political atmosphere in Jakarta.

General Sarwo Edhie Wibowo

Ten days after the inauguration of the new cabinet, retired General Sarwo Edhie Wibowo startled everyone by resigning from the DPR and MPR, the two legislative assemblies, and giving an interview to *Jayakarta*, a Jakarta daily, which was published under the sensational headline: "People smelling of PKI-Madiun should not occupy key posts". No names were mentioned but anyone who knows anything about Indonesian politics could tell that Sarwo Edhie was talking about the Vice-President,

General Sudharmono. It was in Madiun in 1948 that the army swooped down on the PKI and other leftwing organisations, blaming them for an alleged attempt to take over the government. At the time of Sudharmono's appointment, stories circulated about his early leftwing leanings, including membership of the PKI's youth organisation, Pesindo, one of the organisations clobbered in Madiun. Since 1965, thousands have lost their lives because of alleged 'Madiun involvement'.

Many staunch New Order supporters greeted the appointment of Sudharmono and some other cabinet members with dismay. Even when he entered the army's law academy in the 1950s, he was still known as a 'leftist'. Several of his proteges now in the cabinet have similar reputations. The new Attorney-General, Sukarton Marmosudjono, was a member of the leftist wing of PNI, the nationalist party, known as the PNI-Asu.

For a New Order hawk like Sarwo Edhie, this was more than he could stomach. As a young colonel in charge of the red-beret murder squads in 1965, he spearheaded the red drive in many PKI strongholds, slaughtering hundreds of thousands of communist sympathisers. Some say that even his own father fell victim to the butchering, while his son would not raise a finger to protect him. With such a background, the 'bahaya laten' ritual is dear to Sarwo Edhie's heart.

Although he helped install Suharto as president, Sarwo Edhie never became part of Suharto's inner core. He had none of the subtleties of 'intel' officers. Smashing heads was the only language this rather simple-minded officer could understand. After serving as ambassador for a while, he was recalled to run BP7, the indoctrination outfit responsible for compulsory Pancasila courses. But here too, he failed to employ the cunning skills in which Suharto has become so adept.

In Sarwo Edhie's opinion, a Pancasila human being is superior to anything on earth so the idea that communists or prostitutes could win a highly-treasured P4 certificate was obscene. Yet anyone can learn the stuff by rote, so our upright general was horrified to discover that former communists had passed with flying colours. Still worse, stories began to abound about prostitutes framing their certificates and displaying them on their walls. This led him to denounce the very idea that such people could be brainwashed. In so doing, he destroyed the concept of Pancasila education as a force to transform the whole population. Hence, it was decided that Sarwo Edhie should be found another job.

When he was appointed a member of the DPR and the MPR, it was thought that, as one of the crowd, he would have less chance to cause embarrassments. He has the reputation of being a pure warrior type, not interested in material wealth, an oddball among the generals, satisfied to live with his family in a humble house in the compound of the red-beret barracks. But he really set a precedent this time because no appointed member had ever resigned from the legislature before. Some thought he objected to being a back-bencher, below officers junior to him who were given positions of leadership in parliament. But the *Jayakarta* interview gives a better idea of the reason for his disenchantment.


But his version of 'bahaya laten' was really going too far. Here was someone using the ritual to attack leading members of government. So it fell to Admiral Sudomo, now Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs to come out with a rebuttal. He angrily denounced the insinuation that an '-ex-PKier' could have reached the top. But a few days later, *Jayakarta* was at it again. This time, retired General Nichlany, a former deputy-chief of Bakin, the intelligence coordination agency, complaining that "several key government posts are unstable (rawan)". He said that after two failed attempts at insurrection, the PKI was now trying to infiltrate the bureaucracy and occupy strategic positions. This interview was followed by four articles warning of the dangers of communism. Clearly, the paper was serving the interests of a group of disgruntled, retired generals.

The West Sumatra events

In the midst of all this kerfuffle came the sensational news that the chairman of Golkar in Payakumbuh had been dismissed because of "clear indications of PKI involvement", adding fuel to the Sarwo and Nichlany charges. Then, several newspapers reported that two ex-tapols in the same part of the country had applied for permission to set up a political party for ex-prisoners. It is hard to conceive that this was a serious proposal. Ex-tapols are under constant surveillance and are unlikely to come up with such a provocative idea. It is far more likely that the two ex-tapols - if indeed they really exist - had been put up to it by officials to create a stir about a 'PKI comeback'. The two events grabbed the headlines for days, renewing interest in the 'bahaya laten' scare.

Suhardiman's spider-web theory

Not to be left out, the next contributor to the debate



was retired General Suhardiman, chairman of Soksi, the yellow union set up in pre-1965 days to fight the leftwing union, Sobsi. He was a founding member of Golkar who, like Sarwo Edhie, helped bring Suharto to power but has always been kept out of his inner core. Until Sudharmono took over the leadership of Golkar in 1983, Suhardiman was one of its leading lights and played a key role in Golkar's parliamentary fraction. After Golkar was turned from a federation into a fully-fledged party with a vertical structure, Suhardiman's role was diminished. He was elbowed out and lost his seat in the legislature in the last elections.

According to Suhardiman who prefers to dabble in certainties, the PKI will re-emerge in 1995. Three concepts of the Suharto government, the 'bahaya laten' concept, the 'clean (political) environment' concept, and the concept of 'alertness' (kewaspadaan), have forced the PKI to switch their strategy and tactics. He says that communists judge things not in terms of winning or losing but of success or failure. When one strategy fails, another must be devised. In Indonesia today, the workers and peasants have become a 'floating mass' so they are no longer fertile ground for political action. Hence the communists have turned to the bureaucracy. It is a sophisticated game, played strictly according to the rules, and they could, he warns, be effective. He compares them to a spider, building its web slowly and carefully. Or, he says, look at a sweet potato. Above ground, it looks attractive but down below the roots are pushing in all directions.

This time round, the 'bahaya laten' warnings have been brushed aside by those in authority. Besides Sudomo,

General Murdani and several Golkar spokespeople have entered the fray. Murdani has insisted that "as far as I know, as Kopkamtib commander, no important positions in government are held by PKI or ex-PKI members". A Golkar spokesman, Marzuki Darusman urged the public not to exaggerate the dangers of communism for this could only make people restive. Colonel Nurhadi, head of the Information Division of Kopkamtib, gave public assurances that all people in high positions have passed a clearance test, while admitting that these tests are not infallible. But Sudomo went farther, saying that there must be an ulterior motive behind the scare-mongering, "to disrupt unity and create an atmosphere of uncertainty and fear".

Of course, the dispute brings no relief to the hundreds of thousands of alleged PKI sympathisers. After more than two decades of persecution, they are still treated like pariahs, as Mahbub Djunaedi reveals in his moving article published elsewhere in this issue. The latest 'bahaya laten' scare only draws attention to a new group of disgruntled officers, unhappy with a number of Suharto's appointments. But, however sound their New Order credentials may be, they hardly have the power to make any dents in the Suharto armoury. ☆

A fellow Indonesian

The following article, reproduced here in full, was written by Mahbub Djunaedi, a well-known columnist and member of the Muslim party, Nahdatul Ulama. It appeared in Kompas, on 8 May 1988.

He's now 64 years old. Back in 1965, he was a civil servant in quite a senior post and had been in the service for twenty-one years. At the time of the political events of that year, he went on working as usual, without anything happening.

Suddenly in March 1966 he was dishonorably dismissed as from 1 January 1966. He had received no advance warning that this would happen. He hadn't been suspended, nor screened, nor interrogated by anyone. The dismissal came like a bolt out of the blue.

the Kopkamtib executive officer in Central Java saying that he had been classified as B1. He didn't even understand what B1 classification meant. As before, he was not summoned or investigated by anyone. He began to wonder whether this decision had been taken simply because he had written those letters. Had things got worse for him because of the letters?

Feeling desperate and at a loss to know what to do, he decided to leave things to the Almighty and to accept whatever difficulties might befall him even though he



KARTU TANDA PENDUDUK
PEMERINTAH KABUPATEN DATI.II

Selama berlaku/tamatnya dalam jangka waktu 14 (empat belas) hari sejak berlakunya habis, penduduk yang bersangkutan diwajibkan mengajukan kembali permohonan untuk memperoleh Kartu Tanda Penduduk yang baru. Pelanggaran terhadap peraturan ini diancam dengan pidana kurungan/denda.

An example of an identity card which all Indonesians must carry. Note the ET sign on the right, identifying the holder as an ex-tapol or former political prisoner'.

Tanda tangan/Cap Jempol kiri pemegang kartu

Nomor K.T.P. : / / ET

Nama lengkap :

Jenis Kelamin : LAKI-LAKI Golongan darah :

Tempat/tgl lahir :

Kawin/Tidak kawin : KAWIN Agama : ISLAM

Pekerjaan : BURUH TANI

Alamat :

R.T. 03 : R.W. 01 01 JAN 1986

Kelurahan/Desa :

Kecamatan :

Berlaku hingga : 03 JUL 1988

PEMERINTAH KABUPATEN DATI.II
CAMAT

His head of department felt so sorry for him that he advised him to complain to the central authorities. So he sent letters, asking for his case to be considered. He wrote to the commander of Kopkamtib (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), to the leadership of Parliament, to V.B. da Costa, chairman of Parliament's Commission III and to Sabam Sirait, chairman of its Commission II. In his letters, he asked for an investigation to find out why he had been dismissed. Along with the letters, he sent statements from the local leaders of the PNI (the nationalist party) and the NU (the main Muslim party), testifying that he was clean.

From then on, things went well. He voted at the 1971 and 1977 general elections and no attempt was made to disqualify him. Superficially things seemed to be alright although he never received replies to any of his letters.

But then, in 1981, although he had heard nothing about any charges, he received a cruel shock, a letter from

had no idea what he had done wrong. Having already done everything possible, what else could he do but surrender to fate and bow to the inevitable? If the rock looming ahead was so colossal and his hands too weak to shift it, what else could he do but sit back and hope that God and those in power would take pity on him?

* * *

But then what happened? He was not going to be allowed to live in peace. The waters that had been stilled began to swirl around him again. Why? He read an item of news on page XI of Kompas, on 3 February this year. He was still to be haunted by anxiety. The newspaper reported that the West Java Education and Culture Office was conducting clearance tests for all elementary school teachers in the region. Everyone affected by the screening had to buy three copies of the screening book costing Rp. 1,250 each and twelve 3-by-4 passport photos. This was the second time tests were being

conducted; the first time was in 1972.

What was it for this time? To make sure that there was a "clean environment" in the world of education. And what did "clean environment" mean? It meant that no educators should have grandparents or parents-in-law who had been involved in OT (banned organisations). All educators must be as clean as an unblemished piece of white cloth. A screening team at the Education and Culture Office was collecting data on 190,000 teachers and 5,000 people on the administrative staff.

Why did he get so upset? Because he has five children who are all civil servants; one graduated from a teachers' training collage (IKIP) and teaches at an elementary school. He felt distraught because his children would be hit by this "clean environment" criterion, even though the oldest was only in the third

form of lower secondary school and the youngest was only four years old in 1965. How could a third-form youngster or a four-year-old child understand anything about ideology and politics? But if they were linked to their father who had been dismissed and classified as B1, there was every likelihood they would be swept away by the clean-up.

He had no idea what to do. He could only resign himself. He did not want his blameless children to be hit by the law for things beyond their control. Why had they been allowed to grow up if only to be cut down in the end?

What is the name of the fellow I have been talking about? His name isn't important. And anyway, he doesn't want anyone to mention it in public. It's enough if people know that there is a 64-year-old Indonesian who is suffering such a fate in a country that is based on the Pancasila. ☆

Mahbub Djunaidi

Pramoedya: "This is a bandit regime"

Indonesia's best-known writer and Nobel Prize candidate, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, recently told Dutch journalist, Hans Hoffmann, that he would never leave Indonesia because it would be much easier for his fellow-countrymen to terrorise him abroad than in Indonesia.

Asked whether he would be allowed to travel to the Netherlands, Pram said: "I probably would, but I would probably not be able to return. This regime is a bandit regime. They have murdered half a million people. They are prepared to do absolutely anything. I myself saw people in Buru being shot dead. Without trial. The regime is responsible for what happens here, but not abroad. The world press would write about it if anything happened to me. I have an international name."

He spoke at length about his arrest in 1965 and his fourteen years in detention without trial. Asked whether he was a communist, Pram said that he came from a left nationalist family. "Since my childhood days, my upbringing was left oriented."

"1965 was the break in my life. My life is divided into the period before 1965 and the period since 1965. That was when I was arrested but to this very day, I still don't know why. My house was seized. That happened on 13 October. I had about five thousand books and they were all burnt. I was taken to a prison in Jakarta.

"I was married and had eight children. My wife had to feed the children on her own. She had almost no money. On top of looking after the children, she had to buy food for me because the food in prison was so inadequate. I remained in prison for fourteen years and two months."

After spending some years in Jakarta, Pram was moved to the notorious prison island of Buru. For the first eight years he was not allowed to write, but he said that was not his worst problem.

A book about Buru to appear soon

"I come from a family of fighters, but now I was a pariah. I could no longer contribute to the national struggle. Why did the New Order of Suharto do this to me? I began to ponder about everything. And then to write, when I was again able to. My book about Buru will probably come out in March and it will first appear in the Netherlands. I will tell you why it took so long.



When I read *The Gulag Archipelago* by Solzhenitsin, it struck me that my book was a kind of copy of his. My story was very much like his, so I thought it better to wait. Now the time has come. I haven't change the manuscript one single jot."

Asked whether he had anything more to say, Pram replied: "I have much more to say. Too much. That's why I write. I am very grateful to the Dutch people for reading my books They have helped saved me from becoming an outcast. I am very grateful."

Pramoedya has written about twenty books but they are all banned in Indonesia, including the translations into Dutch. He lives from the royalties for his books that have been published overseas. In the past few years, fourteen translations have appeared: "Japanese, Chinese, Turkish, Swedish, Dutch, French, German, English, Czech, Bulgarian, Russian, Roumanian. Is that fourteen?"

Asked why his books were banned in Indonesia, he replied: "That is their problem, not mine. It is more difficult to write than to destroy. You can destroy things in five minutes, whereas literature makes people conscious."

A glimpse into Indonesia's torture chambers

A Muslim activist who must remain anonymous wrote an account of his experiences as a detainee in Jakarta after the army shot at a Muslim demonstration in Tanjung Priok in September 1984, killing dozens of people. The writer was one of many dozens of Muslims who were rounded up in the immediate aftermath of the Tanjung Priok massacre.

The following is an abridged translation of his account. The full report was published in March 1988 by Muslimedia, London, under the title: "Untold tale of ghastly torture in Indonesia."

As soon as we arrived at the North Jakarta military command detention centre in the middle of the night, our hands were tied up with rope and our faces were wrapped in thick, dark cloth, with the ends tied round the neck so that we could not see anything in front, to the left or right, or behind. We could hear friends in the same room being called away and taken to other rooms by the soldiers on guard.

Then we heard beatings and screams of pain; they were being beaten about the face, on the legs and in all parts of the body with clubs. The soldiers forbade us to say 'Allahu Akbar' (though of course we said the words even if they would have killed us for it). When we said 'Lailaha Illallah' or 'Allahu Akbar', they flew into a rage. They stood in front of us, kicking us in the face with their heavy boots, taunting us, and saying: "Here is your Allah". *Nauzubillahi min zalik*.

With our faces all swollen and bleeding, they pulled our clothes off, leaving us in our underpants. We could not resist as our hands and faces were bound up tight. As they were stripping us, they struck our heads with rifle butts, making us bleed. Then we were told to go to sleep on the floor, on our backs, with our faces bleeding and still wrapped up. Then they trampled on our faces, screaming: "You devils, you PKI [Indonesian Communist Party] curs". We were treated like animals for the whole night, from about 2 am till 6 am.

The next morning the soldiers on duty were replaced. We prayed that the new guards would treat us better as we could stand no more. But these were forlorn hopes.

The new batch of soldiers were under the command of

Captain Rencano, a Menadonese Christian from North Sulawesi. Soon after taking over, they yelled: "Hey, have you eaten?" At first we didn't want to reply but they kept yelling, striking us in the face with clubs. Our heads started bleeding again and several friends fainted. One friend, Surya bin M. Isa, was kicked in the mouth as the soldier yelled, "Here's my foot to eat instead of a plate of rice". The friend's mouth was cut open and began to bleed. When another friend said he had eaten, the soldier barked back: "You're lying", grabbed his head and banged it against the wall so hard that it started bleeding. The friend fainted.

By now it was 12 noon on Wednesday, 13 September. It was extremely hot in the sun because we were almost naked and we were hungry and thirsty. We all had splitting headaches and felt sick. Some friends became so desperate they thought of trying to escape but this would have been impossible because we were blindfolded with our hands tied behind our backs....

When the sun was at its highest, at about 1 pm, some forty of us were told to crawl sideways like frogs, in a sitting position, out to a concrete forecourt which was burning hot in the sun. We had to lie on the concrete with nothing covering our bodies. They kicked us and struck us with their rifle butts. We had to go to sleep out there, repeating the words, "Allahu Akbar". At first it felt as if there was a scorching iron on our backs. We tried to withstand this terrible agony. Some friends fainted. Many were screaming with pain, twisting their bodies left or right, like fish being roasted on a

Indonesia: Muslims on trial

Published by: TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

Since early 1985, more than 150 Muslims have been tried, convicted and sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment in Indonesia for giving public sermons critical of the government, conducting religious courses not approved by the authorities, or producing leaflets or journals that denounce government policy. Some were held responsible for bombing incidents that were never properly investigated.

The trials followed the army's crackdown on a demonstration of Muslims in September 1984. Dozens, possibly even hundreds, were killed when troops opened fire on the unarmed crowd. The trials took place at a time of deep disquiet in Indonesia about the military government's imposition of total ideological conformity, preventing organisations from proclaiming Islamic or other religious principles.

Indonesia: Muslims on trial analyses the trials, placing them in the context of the continuing conflict between Indonesia's Muslims and the military regime.

"The first genuine attempt in the West to focus on the oppression of Muslims in a state that is more than 90 per cent Muslim, by a regime committed to establishing Western norms and values. The conflict between the political culture of the Muslim masses and their rulers is brought out vividly in *Indonesia: Muslims on trial*. Although it focuses on events in Indonesia, this study will help one understand why Muslim nation states are inherently unstable and are invariably held together by oppression."

Dr. M. Ghayasuddin, Editor, Muslimedia

Indonesia: Muslims on trial



128 pp. £4.00 plus p & p.
ISBN 0 9506751 4 8

spit.

This went on for three days.

In the Lion's Den

Guntur, the headquarters of the military police (PM) in Rumpit Market, South Jakarta, is not far from Pondok As-syafi-iah. It has become known as the Lion's Den because criminals or political prisoners taken there face three alternatives: they go mad, become paralysed or die.

After three days of torture, we were transferred to this, the most feared place of all. We travelled in a covered military truck, blindfolded with our hands tied. When we arrived, our tormentors pushed us off the truck so that we fell to the ground, with our hands and eyes tightly bound. The troops welcomed us with blows and kicks. We were then forced to crawl about 150 metres to the rear. Some of us could not crawl fast enough so the troops got on our backs and beat us with canes and stingray fish-tails and gave us electric shocks. One friend was even stripped naked and given an electric shock on his penis. His whole body quivered with pain as he let out a piercing shriek. Many of us became paralysed by this treatment.

When we entered the rear of the building, we heard shrieks of pain coming from the cells. We heard some people sobbing quietly, as if trying to stifle their sobs. Sometimes the sobbing would stop then start up again. These were other friends who had arrived here earlier. What they had gone through was far worse than anything we had yet experienced.

We were put into a large room with a heavy door of iron bars. It was now about 5 pm on 16 September. After a while, the torturers called five of us. The men were asked whether they had had a bath. "Not yet," they replied, so the soldiers shouted back; "Okay, go and have a bath!" The friends did what they were told. We were relieved to hear this because we had not been able to wash for four days. We were itching all over and our bodies smelt dreadfully from sweat and dried-up blood.

But when the five friends returned, we were aware of a terrible stench. They had not had a bath at all but had been forced to immerse themselves in a stinking drain full of filth that had been stagnating for years. They took us out in groups of five, until everyone had been through the same terrible experience.

After magrib (evening prayers), the cloths wrapped round our faces were removed and we were given some food, a few spoonfuls of rice and some under-cooked salt-fish. But we ate ravenously because we had had nothing to eat or drink since early morning. But some friends were unable to eat because their throats had swollen from the all beating. A few hours later, we began to itch and spots appeared all over our bodies. None of us could sleep all night because of the itching. And because we scratched the spots, they turned into soars. This itching lasted for about a month and only improved after we were moved to Cimanggis Prison and were treated for the soars.

Two days after arriving at the Lion's Den, we again heard shrieks coming from a corner cell. A man was sobbing intermittently, sometimes loudly, sometimes softly, and sometimes his voice altogether disappeared. Later, after moving to Cimanggis, we discovered that he was a friend called Lilik, from Gang Warakas, Tanjung Priok, not more than twenty. He was crying because his hands had been tied behind his back for six days; the fingers of his right hand were bound so tight with a



piece of wire that the blood could not circulate. His hand had swollen up and was rotting away. When we met him in Cimanggis, only the bones of the fingers were left. The flesh had all rotted and fallen off, bit by bit. Later he had all the fingers of his right hand amputated. Lilik was suspected of being a supporter of Amir Biki [a Muslim leader who was shot dead on 12 September in Tanjung Priok].

Laksus, Jakarta Special Military Unit

Laksus, the headquarters of Jakarta military command intelligence, is located in Salemba Tengah, not far from Salemba Prison. It is often called Gua Hantu or 'Cave of Ghosts' because it is so terrifying.

Anyone being transferred here goes into a panic at the thought of what is about to happen. Many who arrive fit and well are carried out on a burial-stretcher. A recent example is Pak Jabir, an official of a mosque in Tanjung Priok, who was accused of being an accomplice of Ir. Sanoesi, a former minister of industry, in plans for an Islamic revolution in Indonesia and the overthrow of the dictator, President Suharto. Pressure was used to force him to confess that Ir. Sanoesi was the key figure in the movement. But Pak Jabir, a Buginese, a man of great faith, refused to confess. They pulled out his nails one by one. When this failed, these evil men stuck an iron rod down his throat. Pak Jabir died a martyr. His body was returned to his family in Tanjung Priok.

Other ghastly incidents occurred, such as the torture of Robi Pantau, a young Muslim accused of undermining the authority of President Suharto. He is now serving a fifteen-year sentence in Cipinang Prison. His hands and feet were tied when he was brought to Laksus. When the truck arrived, he was thrown on to the ground which was covered in grit. Because of the way he fell, he became deaf in one ear. Then there is Asnul Arifin, now serving a sixteen-year sentence in Cipinang. While in Laksus,



A shot taken during the session of the trial of Muslim activist, H.M. Fatwa. When he was presenting his defence plea, hearings went on late into the night.

table-legs were placed on his feet with four soldier-torturers sitting on the table. This almost broke his toes.

We had been transferred to the 'Cave of Ghosts' after four days in Guntur, from 16 to 20 September 1984. On the way, we surrendered ourselves to Allah. Even so, many friends came out in a cold sweat on the journey, thinking of what was about to happen. On arrival, we were greeted with blows by the soldier-guards. Our faces, already swollen and bloody from earlier treatment, became even more swollen; we looked like moldy black papayas covered with red blotches. We got the same treatment every time we were interrogated. Sometimes they used electric shock to make us confess. This was our treatment for two days. On 21 September, we were again transferred to Cimanggis Prison.

Cimanggis Military Prison


This military prison is the most modern prison in Indonesia, with loud-speakers and television cameras outside to control the movements of the prisoners. It is in Bogor district, about 25 kms from the Cililitan bus terminus. The prison is surrounded by seven perimeters, making it impossible for anyone to escape. The first is a barbed-wire fence, the second a series of posts for soldiers who are expert marksmen. The third is dominated by two sentry posts guarded by heavily-armed troops. The fourth is another barbed-wire fence along which runs an electrified cable. The fifth is a long iron fence with sharp spikes. The sixth is a heavy wooden gate in front of which there is a television camera which is visible from afar. The seventh is a heavy iron gate.

We were detained here for many months. While in this prison, we hardly ever saw the sun or heard any news. But we never forgot the name of Allah, and we prayed night and day except when we were absolutely exhausted. It was here that we learnt to cope with hunger. Each day we received only two spoonfuls of rice, one at 12 noon and one at 5 pm, just to keep us from dying. It is hard to describe the effects of starvation. Most days, our limbs and body would tremble because we were weak from hunger. Sometimes we fell into a daze, everything going black before our eyes, unable to see anything clearly, unable to stand up. At such times it was extremely difficult to pray because we could not kneel. Even to move the body was a huge effort. Many friends became paralysed and could not pray at all, except by blinking their eyes.

Still worse were the experiences of friends who had been shot during the Tanjung Priok affair. They were not given proper medical treatment. Yusran bin Jainari had a serious heart condition because one of the bullets that had penetrated his chest was still lodged in his body,

close to his heart. Maqsudi had been shot in the back and the bullet was still lodged near his kidney; he was not treated for a year. Yet even so, he was forced to appear at one of the regime's show-trials. He was later treated by Muslim doctors at the Islamic Hospital in Jakarta. They nursed him back to health though he did not fully recover. Another victim was Ismail bin Abdul Hamid who had been shot in the chest. The bullet had pierced through to his back. He had difficulty breathing because one lung had been pierced by the bullet. On one occasion, I thought he had passed away; he seemed not to breathe for a whole hour. Then, he began breathing again. Ismail was sentenced to a year in jail. After his release he was treated by doctors at the Islamic Hospital and has since recovered, though two of his ribs have been removed. The fourth was Amir bin Bunari whose arm was broken because of a bullet wound. For almost a month, he got no medical treatment, so the wound festered badly. He has since recovered though he will never be restored to full health.

Many dozens more suffered in this way. It is hard to imagine just how much they suffered. ☆



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US writers award for Pramoedya

The American Centre of PEN, the international writers' organisation, has given one of its highest honours, the Freedom to Write award, to the renowned Indonesian writer, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, all of whose books are banned in his own country. The award ceremony took place on 27 April but Pram was not able to be present. [Washington Post, 24 April 1988]

Needless to say, this outstanding award to an Indonesian writer was not so much as mentioned in the Indonesian press.

Muslim teenage girls sentenced

In mid April, just before the commencement of the holy month of Ramadhan, several district courts in Java passed severe sentences on a number of alleged Muslim activists.

More usroh trials

After several months when the trials of usroh activists seem to have faded away, and prosecutions of NII or Indonesian Islamic State people in Jakarta and Jemaah Islam people in Cirebon took centre-stage, the usroh spectre has emerged again, this time in the village of Kolekan Beku, Klaten sub-district in Central Java.

The usroh movement is an Islamic movement based on small, house gatherings, promoting piety and a return to basic Islamic values.

On 9 April, the Klaten district court sentenced thirteen teenage women to six-month sentences, with costs. The court judged that the thirteen young women were involved in a 'criminal' organisation known as usroh which aims to bring about the creation of a state based on the Qu'ran and Hadits. Most of the defendants were high school graduates or first-year students. This is the first time that women have been prosecuted in the wave of Muslim trials under way since 1984.

According to the public prosecutor's office, the girls were dealt with 'extremely leniently', having been tried under the Criminal Code and not the far harsher Anti-Subversion Law.

Three other persons, referred to only by their initials, AM, MYH and YFH, who are said to have given the girls training courses, are due to be tried later under the more serious charge of subversion.

The thirteen girls, Sriyanti, Tri Maonah, Nunung Retnoningsih, Rohayati, Suwanti, Sri Supati, Sri Hartati, Nurhidayati, Dwi Wasi, Murtilaksmningsari, Siti Muqomah, Nurhidayah Endang Niswati and Mela Pratiwi were found guilty of attending "illegal religious gatherings" (pengajian gelap) between 23 and 26 November 1987, in a house in the village of Kolekan Beku. During these meetings, the government, the judiciary and the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Ulamas' Council of Indonesia) were all slandered, which led the court to conclude that they were subversive.

More NII trials

The NII trials meanwhile continued in Jakarta, though at a slower pace, apparently because it was Ramadhan, the month of fasting.

Two parking attendants, Alimin and Iskandar (see TAPOL Bulletin, No 86), who were being tried in separate court-rooms in the South Jakarta District Court, received heavy sentences of eight and seven years respectively.

As members of a group allegedly responsible for fund-raising for the NII, the two were said to have carried out robberies. They also attended courses at which basic state tenets, such as the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, were criticised.

In the East Jakarta District Court, the trial of a roof-tile trader identified only as DAB, forty years old, continued. The prosecutor, Agoeng Masa, delivered his summing-up and demanded a sentence of fifteen years. The accused is alleged to have been a member, along with Syahroni (already sentenced to fifteen years), Safki Suarul Huda (serving a life sentence) and Aa (whose trial is soon to take place), of a Fa'i or fund-raising group to support the subversive NII movement. ★

[Sources: Jawa Pos 26 April, Kedaulatan Rakyat, 11 April and Jakarta Post, 18 April 1988.]

Another death sentence prisoner dies

Suwandi, the former secretary of the East Java Provincial Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party, who was sentenced to death in June 1973, has died in prison of a heart attack. He was 64 years old. Suwandi was arrested in July 1968, along with many other PKI leaders who had tried to create a clandestine PKI organisation in South Blitar, East Java. He spent almost twenty years in Pamekasan Prison, Madura.

According to reliable information, Suwandi suffered a heart attack late last year but recovered and was returned to Pamekasan Prison.

In April this year, he suffered a second heart attack and died on 23 April. He was buried in Surabaya on 24 April in a funeral attended by members of his family.



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