The "G30S/PKI" symbol is the major obstacle to democracy

On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the seizure of power by General Suharto, TAPOL invited a former political prisoner in Indonesia to contribute a piece for publication. The following is a translation of his article.

Here in Indonesia, people are still misled by symbols, primarily the G30S/PKI symbol.1 Facts about Untung having carried out a military operation on 30 September 1965, about volunteers from the Perhaka Rakjat [People’s Youth] and Gerwani [Indonesian Women’s Movement] being given military training, are regarded as the absolute truth, the whole and complete truth. The reality is that these facts are only part of the truth, not the whole truth, and there is no way for the whole truth to be disclosed here at home as long as people are transfixed by symbols that have been mystified by the military regime, helped along by others.

It is a matter of life and death for the Suharto military regime which now rules the country to prevent their lies surrounding these symbols from being exposed for what they are. People like D.N. Aidit (PKI Chairman), Njoto (PKI Deputy Chairman), Saksirman and Anwar Sanusi (both Central Committee members) were all instantly silenced for no other reason than to prevent the lies about the G30S/PKI from being exposed. Insofar as any PKI leaders were tried in the courts, the primary concern was that the person in question would not be in a position to analyse the event in its entirety, would not be able to deal comprehensively with the circumstances that led to the occurrence of the G30S/PKI. The trials also served the purpose of giving the impression that the law still functions in Indonesia.

The tragedy of the PKI’s silence

It is indeed tragic that in all these 20 years, the PKI has not been able to present its own account of the charges made against it, apart from a short statement circulated by Njoto at Bogor Palace in October 1965, the defence pleas of a few PKI leaders who were tried in court which were mostly defensive in nature and dealt with practical details, and the short statement issued by the Central Committee of the PKI in October 1965, the brief message of which was that "the G30S was an internal affair of the Army". To the knowledge of this writer, neither the PKI Central Committee nor anyone mandated to speak on its behalf, nor anyone who could in an emergency speak for it, has issued a single document capable of smashing the symbol of the G30S/PKI.

How does one explain the fact that Munir was sentenced to death and executed whilst Rewang was not sentenced to death and is apparently about to be released even though he was the principal figure in the South Biler affair? This has nothing to do with questions of law. The reasons are purely political. Munir was regarded as being a potential danger, someone who might have been able to destroy that symbol, given the time and opportunity. Munir had the respect of his comrades. Rewang’s record during interrogation and during his detention was not considered as anything serious by the men in power. They saw him as a man without leadership qualities, as a communist they had no reason to fear. Without knowing the reasons for such intelligence analysis, the execution of Munir comes as a ‘complete surprise’ while Rewang’s ‘release’ is incomprehensible. But one thing is clear: It all centres on the symbol of the G30S/PKI.

It is understandable that it has been difficult for the PKI to expose the lies surrounding the G30S/PKI because of its own reluctance to publicise internal party affairs, to admit that the party’s strategic defeat was the result of a poverty of theory, making it impossible for anyone to produce a satisfactory explanation. It may well be that the Untung movement would never have happened or would not have been the fiasco it was if the PKI’s strategy had been correct.

That Army generals succeeded in creating the G30S/PKI is not unconnected with the pre-conditions that had been brought about by the PKI itself. Unless people have the courage to be completely open about their own disorders, it will be difficult to destroy the lies surrounding the G30S/PKI symbol. Once this has been done, the next question people will ask is, "How was it possible for the PKI with its three millions members, with more than a hundred of its best cadres in the Central Committee, to have been so easily and rapidly wiped off the political map of Indonesia? How could the PKI have been swept away in a political and military adventure, bringing about its own destruction?" If people try to expose the lies of the G30S/PKI symbol without having the courage to analyse the internal facts about the PKI itself, the results will be the same. The facts will be partial and incomplete.

All democrats will benefit from demystification of the G30S/PKI symbol

There is a desperate need to know the absolute truth about the G30S/PKI both here in Indonesia and elsewhere in the world, because the G30S/PKI symbol has been a calamity not only for communists but for the millions of

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1) G30S stands for the 30 September (1965) Movement; PKI stands for Indonesian Communist Party.
Indonesians who lost their lives in the wake of the military seizure of power. It has also victimised Muslims, nationalists; in short, all Indonesian democrats are threatened by that symbol, they can all be pounced on by Kopkomtib (the Army's security command) and face the likelihood of being punished by the same laws of subversion.

The occasion of the 20th anniversary of the G30S/PKI is therefore the appropriate moment to draw attention once again to some basic facts so as to refresh our memories, and to prove that not all of us have been taken in by the symbol of the G30S/PKI.

**Deception and fabrication**

The name Lieutenant-Colonel Untung gave to his movement was the 30 September Movement. It was the military junta that later added the stroke and the initials, 'PKI'. President Sukarno himself called it the 1 October Movement, but this was not a name to the liking of the military junta because the 1 October Movement was in fact the start of their military coup d'etat, and it would not have been appropriate to add the initials PKI to such a name. For it was on 1 October that the military launched their military operation to seize state power from President Sukarno. Who can deny this?

Even though 20 years have already passed, the G30S/PKI is still foisted on the community for the most absurd reasons. Forest fires are blamed on G30S/PKI remnants, or fires that destroy high-rise buildings, or floods. When workers take action or peasants defend their land against expropriation, the G30S/PKI is held responsible. Even pickpockets and chicken-thieves are linked to the G30S/PKI.

Someone who is only 20 years old needs a G30S/PKI clearance certificate to get a job or enrol at a university. Even if a person was detained more than ten years ago, as an ex-tapol (political prisoner) he or she is issued with an identity card bearing the initials ET for ex-tapol. By marking their cards in this way, the men in power restrict openings for ex-tapol to get work. They are forbidden from working as journalists or writers or teachers or preachers. People who are running a business must also have their identity cards stamped with the ET sign to make sure that no-one will want to work for them. On the other hand, ETs still shoulder a number of burdens: reporting once a month, providing passport photos twice a year, taking part in indoctrination courses once a month. This not only means extra financial burdens, it is also the cause of a great deal of psychological stress.

Not satisfied with these violations of basic human rights, the Suharto military regime recently executed Munir, Rustamo, Gatot and Djoko even though they had already served sentences of 17 years. Thus, they were punished twice over, 17 years in prison plus the death sentence, which is the most inhuman thing of all to do. Why does the Suharto military regime think and act in such an irrational way? This cannot be understood unless we take account of the influence of symbols in Indonesian society. Just see how Indonesian society is led astray in a jungle of symbols. Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, Pancasila Democracy, the Sanctity of Pancasila, National Stability, and all the rest of it, whereas the myths surrounding these symbols and the reality of their practice are poles apart. It's the symbols that people are told to believe, not the things that happen in real life. The G30S/PKI symbol is the holiest symbol of all for the Suharto military regime. Indeed, how else could it be for this is the symbol which gave birth to military power in Indonesia. This is the symbol that made Suharto President of Indonesia. The G30S/PKI is the bastion of all the other symbols. The G30S/PKI symbol is the greatest achievement of the military junta under the leadership of Suharto.

This symbol didn't just fall out of the sky. It came about by means of treachery against the state and mass murder. It brought Suharto to the summit of state power. This is why it needs to be constantly replenished, which includes sacrificing the lives of Munir and our other comrades, all for the sake of preserving the magic of the G30S/PKI symbol. But it's not only communist lives that keep it thriving: others too, including Muslims and patriotic nationalists like Sawito, H.R. Dharsono and others must be sacrificed to preserve the fierce image of the G30S/PKI symbol.

True, a great deal has already been written by scholars in Europe, Australia and America who have tried to make an honest assessment of the G30S/PKI, and have critically analysed the problem, but virtually nothing is known about such work here in Indonesia. Language presents a barrier, of course, but more than this, it is has not proved powerful enough to counter the systematic, all-embracing propaganda churned out by the government, with the result that the G30S/PKI symbol still misleads people to the advantage of the military regime.

**Whose coup was it?**

The events of 1 October led to the overthrow of President Sukarno. But whose coup was it? On that day, Sukarno was with the forces of Untung, Latief and Heru at Halim Perdanakusumah Airbase. He was free to make contact with anyone he wanted and was provided with an escort to go home to his palace in Bogor. But later on, after his presidential powers were seized by Suharto, he was placed under house arrest and even rudely interrogated by a man named Durbawel.

Who, then, overthrew Sukarno? Who undermined his authority and made it impossible for him to run government affairs and find a political solution, to put a stop to the spilling of the blood of millions of innocent people? Who were the assassins of the people?
Who carried out a coup d'etat, the G30S/PKI or the military junta? Who betrayed the state by making secret contact with Malaysia, Untung or Ali Murtopo and Benny Murdani?

The patriotic forces of the people will not be able to restore democracy in Indonesia as long as the G30S/PKI symbol still clouds their vision, as long as we regard the symbols created by the regime as sacrosanct. The Suharto military regime can only be thrust aside if the democratic forces can shake off the influence of these disruptive and misleading symbols. Not yesterday, or today, but tomorrow for sure, just as surely as the sun rises in the east, truth and justice will prevail.

Mira, 30 September, 1985, Jakarta

D.N. Aidit, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party, in Army custody, only hours before he was shot dead on 22 November 1965. Aidit was captured on that day by an Army unit under the command of Colonel Yosir Hadibroto, acting under the orders of Suharto to capture him and shoot him dead. His murderer's account of the capture and execution was reported in the Indonesian press in October 1980. (See TAPOL Bulletin, No 41/42, September-November, 1980 for a full translation.)

Aidit's assassin is now governor of the province of Lampung.

Three more long-term political prisoners executed

Three more long-term communist political prisoners were executed at the beginning of July in Panekasan on the island of Madura, north of East Java. They are Gatot Lestario (Sutarljo), Djoko Untung and Rustomo, all of whom were arrested in late 1968 or early 1969. All were tried more than seven years after their arrest and had spent 17 years in prison by the time of their executions.

The executions were carried out in secret. The first reports reached the outside world early in August. Only after widespread protest had been expressed, especially in Holland, did the authorities in Jakarta finally admit, on 30 August, that the executions had taken place. Secrecy also surrounded the conditions under which the executions took place. According to independent reports, close relatives were given a last chance to meet the condemned men the night before the executions. This did not include the wives of Gatot Lestario and Djoko Untung, both of whom are themselves in prison. TAPOL understands that Gatot met his elderly mother but none of his children prior to his death.

The three men's bodies were thrown into holes after execution, and were not properly buried until a month later.

More executions could follow

Confirming the executions, Justice Minister, Ismail Saleh claimed they had been in accord with 'due process of law'. 'Whoever has gone through the existing process of law... and at the end, his request for a pardon is turned down, must have his sentence carried out.' (Jakarta Post, 31 August) This means that more executions could soon follow.

According to AFP in Jakarta (28 August), another communist prisoner, trade unionist Ruslan Wijayaastara, whose clemency plea has been rejected, is soon to be executed, and Sukatmo, former leader of the communist youth organisation, Pemuda Rakyat (People's Youth) "who has refused to ask for a pardon, could also be shot this year". Both men were arrested in late 1968, after the Army's crackdown on a group of communists who tried to re-organise themselves in South Blitar, East Java, together with the three men executed in July and Mohammad Munir, who was executed in May.

The "full process of Indonesian law"

Indonesia's military rulers are trying to disarm international protest against the execution of political prisoners - communist as well as Muslim - by claiming that the victims have enjoyed 'due process of the law'. The same argument is used by western governments as justification for their refusal to take positive action to halt the executions. At a time when the regime is going ahead with a new wave of trials, it is useful to examine procedures used for political trials.

On 27 August, Lord Avebury, chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group wrote to the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, about the "clandestine execution of three more political prisoners in Indonesia" which he described as "an act... of extreme and quite gratuitous cruelty". Surely, he went on, "there comes a point at which our concern has to be marked by some practical initiative, going beyond ritual incantations of disapproval".

Replying in an undated letter, Sir Geoffrey Howe argued that "the three men were tried and had their sentences upheld according to the full process of Indonesian law". Such a claim reveals a gross disregard for the violations of established legal procedures to which all tried political prisoners are subjected. In fact, the trials currently under way serve to renew concern over the travesties of justice perpetrated in the Indonesian law courts.

In the following, we examine the trial of Gatot Lestario and Djoko Untung. (A third defendant, Basuki, died while the trial was in progress under circumstances that have never been revealed.)
Arrest and pre-trial detention

Both men were arrested by military officers acting on instructions of KOPKAMTIB, the Army's unconstitutional Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, a body that is not answerable to Parliament nor to any other legal authority. This arm of repression was created in October 1965, ostensibly for a "transitional period" to deal with "temporary disorders" but has remained in existence ever since.

Their trial in Blitar was held seven years after their arrest, infringing the stipulations of the criminal procedural code then in force imposing limits on the period of detention without trial. Indefinite, long-term detention was given spurious legitimation by KOPKAMTIB Decree No 5, 1969 which empowered the Attorney-General to hold 'suspects' indefinitely without any trial or pending trial. Here is an example of an illegal body giving unlawful powers to the regime's law-enforcement officers. These 'special powers' were granted for use in cases of 'subversion', ie, for political cases.

The charges

Gatot and Djoko were accused of subversive activities prior to and after 30 September 1965, in particular of attempting to revive the PKI in South Blitar after it had been banned. These charges raise two fundamental issues, the illegality of the 1963 Anti-Subversion Law and the illegality of General Suharto's 1966 edict banning the Communist Party (PKI).

Defence lawyers acting for defendants in numerous subversion trials since 1965 have argued that the Anti-Subversion Law which was first enacted as a Presidential Decree by Sukarno in May 1963 is unconstitutional. Although it was introduced as an 'emergency measure' which suspended the basic democratic rights safeguarded in the Indonesian Constitution, it was formalised as a law in 1969 with its anti-democratic contents fully intact.

Unlike other laws which require that criminal acts must be proven, the Anti-Subversion Law allows the maximum penalty of death to be passed on a person who "has engaged in an action with the purpose of, or clearly with the purpose which is known to him, or can be expected to be known to him" that fall under a list of vaguely-defined subversive acts like "deviating from the ideology of the Pancasila or the State", "disseminating feelings of hostility... causing splits, conflict, chaos or disturbances among the population", and so on.

Defence lawyers have appealed to judges to use their interpretative discretion to reject the Anti-Subversion Law as unconstitutional, knowing full well that judges are not in a position to do so because they are in the employ of the Executive, bound by its policies and therefore not able to act as independent agents.

Although Gatot and Djoko Untung were initially charged under several articles of the Criminal Code in addition to the Anti-Subversion Law, these 'subsidiary charges' were dropped because the prosecutor argued that the 'primary charges' based on the Anti-Subversion Law had proved sufficient to bring a verdict of death.

The decree banning the PKI was issued on 12 March 1966 as a 'presidential decree' signed by General Suharto, not Sukarno who was still the president. This 'presidential' decree was later given the status of a decree of the Consultative Assembly (MPRS), a body composed of presidential appointees. The MPRS inherited from Sukarno was drastically purged of Sukarno appointees who were replaced with Suharto appointees. This was a case of an illegal decree being legitimised by an illegally-constituted law-making Assembly.

The judges

Indonesian judges are appointed by the President and are not impartial. As civil servants, they must belong to KORPRI, the Corps of Public Servants. The decree setting up KORPRI specifies that its guiding principles are to maintain political stability and reinforce the allegiance of its members to the State and the government. This fact alone negates the whole idea of a fair trial.

The chances of judges exercising any independence in the cases of people on trial for 'involvement in the 30 September 1965/PKI Movement' were particularly remote. There have been no known acquittals and sentences passed down have been extraordinarily harsh. The Suharto regime rests its claim to legitimacy on its insistence that the PKI was responsible for the May 1963/PKI Movement and therefore communist defendants could expect no sympathy, let alone impartiality from their judges.

The Defence

Although some of the defendants now on trial have been able to obtain the services of lawyers of their own choice, this was not the case with Gatot and Djoko Untung. They tried unsuccessfully to contact three well-known, Independent lawyers, Yop Thiam Hien, Buyung Nasution and Aryanto. They rejected the court-appointed lawyers and were therefore forced to handle their own defence.

**Indonesian political prisoners under sentence of death**

This list includes all long-term political prisoners arrested for alleged involvement in the 1965 events who, according to TAPOL's records, are under sentence of death. In some cases, the most recent entries go back several years. It also includes Muslim prisoners arrested and tried in the past few years. (Corrections from readers would be welcome.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age/Year</th>
<th>Arrested/Year</th>
<th>Sentenced/Year</th>
<th>Prison</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Abdullah Alihamy</td>
<td>60/1967</td>
<td>March 1975</td>
<td>Padang</td>
<td>Secretary, CDB Riau</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Asep Suryaman</td>
<td>61/1971</td>
<td>August 1975</td>
<td>Cipinang</td>
<td>PKI 'Special Bureau' and post-1965 CDB, Central Java</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Azhar bin Mohammad Safar</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sept. 1982</td>
<td>Medan?</td>
<td>PKI 'Special Bureau'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Boiman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cipinang</td>
<td>Army, Cakrabirawa</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Bono (Mulyono or Waluyo)</td>
<td>59/1967</td>
<td>Sept. 1968</td>
<td>Medan?</td>
<td>Army sergeant, Cakrabirawa</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Anatasius Buang</td>
<td>45/1965</td>
<td>Nov. 1969</td>
<td>Cipinang</td>
<td>Army, Cakrabirawa</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Bungkus</td>
<td>58/1965</td>
<td>July 1971</td>
<td>Cipinang</td>
<td>Army sergeant, Cakrabirawa</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Amar Hanafiah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Banjarmasin</td>
<td>Secretary, South Kalimantan CDB</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Hargiyono</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Cipinang</td>
<td>Army, Cakrabirawa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Iskandar Subekti</td>
<td>64/1968</td>
<td>Dec. 1972</td>
<td>Cipinang</td>
<td>Army, Cakrabirawa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Kamaruzaman</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Member 'lmran's group' (Muslim)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Maman Kuswayadi</td>
<td></td>
<td>April 1983</td>
<td></td>
<td>Member 'lmran's group' (Muslim)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Wismar Marpaung</td>
<td></td>
<td>1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18. Moederisman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cipinang</td>
<td>Army officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Suradjo</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>April 1971</td>
<td>Cipinang</td>
<td>Army, Cakrabirawa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Bambang Siswoyo</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>May 1985</td>
<td>Cipinang</td>
<td>Army, Cakrabirawa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Sukardjo</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>March 1969</td>
<td>Cipinang</td>
<td>Army, Cakrabirawa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Sukman</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>May 1976</td>
<td>Pamekasan</td>
<td>Member CDB, East Java</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Sukatno ****</td>
<td>56/1968</td>
<td>March 1971</td>
<td>Cipinang</td>
<td>Secretary-General, Pemuda Rakyat (People's Youth)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Sulaiman</td>
<td>56/1965</td>
<td>Nov. 1969</td>
<td>Cipinang</td>
<td>Army, Cakrabirawa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Sumbodo *</td>
<td></td>
<td>Feb. 1970</td>
<td>Pamekasan</td>
<td>Army lieutenant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Supono</td>
<td>64/1969</td>
<td>March 1972</td>
<td>Cipinang</td>
<td>PKI 'Special Bureau'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Sutandi 1)</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Oct. 1973</td>
<td>Pamekasan</td>
<td>Central Committee, PKI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Suryanto</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>June 1973</td>
<td>Pamekasan</td>
<td>Army, Cakrabirawa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Giriyadi Wignyosuhary</td>
<td>58/1965</td>
<td>Oct. 1968</td>
<td>Cipinang</td>
<td>Army sergeant, Cakrabirawa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Amin Zain *</td>
<td></td>
<td>March 1975</td>
<td>Padang</td>
<td>Peasant leader and journalist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Two Suradis (both Army captains) were listed in 1980. One named Suradi Prawitodiharjo died in Cipinang prison in 1982. The other one, also held in Cipinang, was sentenced to life imprisonment but his sentence was raised to death on appeal.

2) Abdullah Umar's death sentence was imposed by the High Court on appeal by the prosecutor against a life sentence imposed by the District Court. The prosecution had asked the District Court for a death sentence.

* Death sentence may have been commuted.
** May already have been executed.
*** Clemency plea against death sentence has been rejected.
**** Sukatno lost his appeal at the Supreme Court and, according to AFP, has refused to ask for clemency.

**Glossary**

CDB = PKI provincial committee.
Cakrabirawa = Palace Guards Regiment
SOBSI = All Indonesia Trade Union Federation

TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, September 1985
Members of the Court, Presiding Chairman and Prosecutor, A dozen Kalisosoksi will not prevent the banners of Democracy, National Independence and Social Justice from being unfurled.

On this day, I am going to present my defence. The case being tried here is a political case which has now entered its eleventh year, and involves events that happened ten years ago known as the G30S2 Affair, as well as events that happened seven years ago known as the South Blitar Affair.

I have no illusions whatsoever about this trial. I know that regardless of what may have been raised so far in court, it will in the end comply with and proceed according to the wishes and intentions of those in power, the victors. This court which has been given the task of trying me cannot do other than take sides with and defend those in power. I understand this perfectly well. Yes, the trials of the so-called G30S cases that have been conducted up to now are show-trials which are designed for political consumption by those in power. The verdicts have already been fixed by the men in power.

All my comrades have spoken in their trials about the sufferings of the tapols because of the inhuman way they are treated, the violations of human rights committed by the authorities. Many political prisoners were picked up on nothing more than guesswork and forced to say that they were members or sympathisers of the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, the Indonesian Communist Party). This means they were arrested only because of political differences with the the men now in power.

I can hardly do less than accuse the government for its barbarous treatment of the tapols. The men in power are perpetrating genocide - surreptitious, slow-but-sure mass murder. Whether deliberately or not, they are quietly acting, in violation of the UN Charter, to exterminate a group of people in society whose views, beliefs and ways of thinking differ from those of in power. From this platform, I appeal to all people and organisations to do everything in their power to compel the Indonesian government to end practices that are totally at variance with basic human rights and with every humanitarian principle.

In October and November 1965, massacres took their toll of hundreds of thousands of innocent lives. A state committee set up on the instructions of President Sukarno gave a figure of 300,000, while Antara news agency reported a figure of 500,000 in October 1966. Then in 1969, a campaign of terror and slaughter was unleashed by state security forces against people in Purwodadi and Grobogan and yet more lives were lost.

The law of snakasi has been used to arrest thousands upon thousands of people because of 'indications' that they are members of the People's Youth (PRI), the Indonesian Peasants' Union (BTT), the League for People's Culture (Lekra) and other organisations; some have been forced to say they were members or sympathisers of the PKI. In virtually every case, the arrests were made without a warrant and the people have been held indefinitely. The detainees have remained in detention for years on end in conditions that fail to comply with minimum health needs: sleeping on a single mat, crammed to overflowing into cells far in excess of capacity - a cell for 25 persons accommodating a hundred, ten people crammed into a one-person cell, and up to this very day, in 1975, cells of two or three metres intended for one person being used for five.

What was the G30S?

My comrades have told the court that the PKI did not wage a rebellion or coup, that the dissolution of the PKI is illegal, and that the South Blitar Affair was an inevitable consequence of the fact that communists and other democrats were placed outside the law, becoming people who could be murdered at will, without sanction. US Imperialism and the CIA made many attempts to overthrow President Sukarno and destroy the PKI.... But Sukarno was too self-confident, too sure of his ability to unify all groups in Indonesia, and failed to realise that there were many sycophants and hypocrites among his supporters, that the contradiction between the developing nations and the imperialist countries is a basic world contradiction which is antagonistic.... In 'Tovip', his 17 August speech in 1965, less than two months before the 1 October 1965 affair, he described the tense situation at the time as follows:

"And now they are also saying that Indonesia will collapse in October. Yes, indeed, the enemy's cunning attempts at subversion are continuing... And they are already predicting that in a month's time, some time during that month, Sukarno will fall, there will be no more Sukarno. I have written proof of this."

Because of grave internal weaknesses, the PKI which clearly supported the policies of the Sukarno Government did not take the appropriate steps to surmount the serious situation. On the contrary, some PKI leaders, totally disregarding organisational procedures, became involved in an act of military adventurism that was not based on the consciousness and conviction of the masses of the people.

(Some) right-wing generals then combined forces in a body called the Council of Generals which planned a coup against the lawful Indonesian government under President Sukarno. The Council of Generals was not an issue created by the PKI. It was a reality, and quite logically so, considering the political situation at the time. If it were possible to bring D.N. Aidit before the court to testify as a witness, he would certainly be able to explain the process of events leading up to the Council of Generals' coup conspiracy. If the judiciary in Indonesia were independent and impartial, should the courts not also investigate the right-wing generals who
were members of the Council of Generals in order to bring everything out into the open?

The Council of Generals' plan of action against President Sukarno provoked a response among younger Army officers who were intent upon thwarting the coup. As a political party which supported President Sukarno, the PKI defended the lawful government. Events moved fast. US imperialism and the CIA used splitting tactics, they had plenty of experience in destroying patriotic and democratic forces in many countries and worked to aggravate domestic tensions.

The younger officers were very worried about President Sukarno's safety; they became agitated not only in their hearts but also in their heads at a time when they should have remained cool-headed. Things got out of control when they took action to thwart the Council's plan for a coup on 5 October 1965. All their pent-up anger finally broke loose in an action that became known as the 1 October Movement (Gerakan 1 October, or Gestok, subsequently called the 30 September Movement or Gerakan 30 September, G30S) under Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, a battalion commander of the presidential guards, the Cabaranja Regiment.

Many people ask whether it is true that the PKI planned the G30S. The question has arisen because some PKI leaders, including D.N. Aidit, chairman of the PKI Central Committee, were involved in it. People therefore believe that the PKI must have been behind it. The PKI as a party has never had the chance to explain publicly the true facts of the case. On the other hand, the New Order whipped up a campaign asserting that the PKI was the organiser of the G30S.

Investigations will show that the PKI never had the slightest intention of overthrowing the Sukarno government. On the contrary, it defended that government. The PKI never planned any coup, and coups are not the way of the people... or of Marxism-Leninism.

People ask, but what are the facts about the PKI? Anyone who seriously and carefully studies the affair will see, from an investigation of all the PKI documents ratified by PKI congresses, that the G30S along with the decrees issued by its Revolutionary Council was an act of military adventurism, it was not the way to establish People's Democracy as defined by the PKI Congress. Therefore, as an organisation, the PKI was not involved in the G30S. Only a few individuals in the PKI leadership were involved in the G30S. The mass arrest of cadres, members and sympathisers of the PKI on the pretext of involvement in the G30S was a major project sponsored by US imperialism and the CIA, inspired by the idea of exterminating the communists and all democratic and patriotic forces.

Whose coup was it?

Who in actual fact carried out a coup d'état? President Sukarno was quick to take action to regain control of the crisis. At 11 am on 1 October 1965, he instructed the Naval Chief-of-Staff, Vice-Admiral E. Martadinanta to order General Suharto, commander of KOSTRAD (the Army Strategic Reserve Command) to report to the President/Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. At the same time, President Sukarno appointed General Pramoto Reksosumudra as ad interim commander of the Army and General Suharto was charged with the task of restoring order. On the same day, the Information Department of the Army HQ announced that for the time being, the leadership of the Army was in the hands of General Suharto. This announcement was signed by General Suharto himself. Never before in the life of the Army have there been two formal decisions taken simultaneously about the leadership. The President's adjutant, Colonel Bambang Widjanarko was ordered to instruct General Umar Wirahadikusuma, commander of the Jakarta Military Command, who was already at KOSTRAD, to report to the President. General Suharto told Colonel Bambang Widjanarko that General Umar could not report to the President.

Acts of insubordination were committed over and over again. General A.H. Nasution (Armed Forces Chief of Staff) was by this time together with the others at KOSTRAD. The order issued by the President/Commander-in-Chief for a cease-fire was obeyed by the G30S but not by KOSTRAD. These generals began to reveal their disloyalty to the President by refusing to obey his orders. Using the G30S as the pretext, they began to show that they were prepared to go against the President's orders, and this was to have far-reaching consequences.

Suharto, still a lieutenant-general in 1965, and commander of KOSTRAD, the Army Strategic Command, with Colonel Sarwo Edhi, commander of the para-commandos, the RPKAD, who spear-headed the massacres in 1965-66. The RPKAD were the main troops under Suharto's command when he seized power.

While a cabinet meeting was in progress [on 11 March 1966], the Palace was surrounded by troops not wearing any insignia who subsequently turned out to be para-commandos (RPKAD). The President and Dr Subandrio flew to safety in a helicopter and took refuge in Bogor. In The Smiling General (page 46), O.E. Roeder writes that, acting on the orders of General Suharto, a delegation consisting of Generals Basuki Rachmat, A. Jusuf and Amir Machmud, left Jakarta at 14.00 hours to see the President in Bogor, and told him of the need to create a calm and stable atmosphere for the government and for the continuation of the revolution. This could only be achieved by transferring power from the President to General Suharto. Going against the advice of his two closest advisers, Dr Subandrio and Chaerul Saleh, the President finally handed over powers and signed a document later known as an 'Instruction' or 'Order' (Surat Perintah), transferring executive powers to General Suharto.
The 11 March 1966 Order

The president signed the 11 March Order not of his own free will but because he was forced to do so under armed threat. General Suharto assumed the reins of state power by means of the 11 March Order.

I now come to the question of the use of the Supersemar (acronym for the 11 March Order) to outlaw the PKI. The authority that was used to outlaw the PKI was the Supersemar. Yet, laws were already in force specifically regulating the political parties, Presidential Decrees 7/1959 and 13/1960, not the Supersemar. I repeat, not the Supersemar. Supersemar is neither a law nor a piece of legislation, it is an order. The MPRS decree endorsing the Supersemar was unconstitutional, it was an infringement of the 1945 Constitution.

Perhaps, it may be argued, it was a law based on emergency conditions. This is not possible either because (a) the emergency conditions were brought on by those who used force to demand the Order; at the very least, there was blatant collaboration between those who surrounded the Palace and those who demanded the Supersemar. And (b) the emergency conditions were therefore nothing more than a pretext. There was no emergency except that used as a pretext by those who forced the President to issue the Supersemar, which was the 'starting point' of an act of rebellion. The most convincing proof is that the President was removed from power; he was interrogated, his ministers were arrested, members of the MPRS and the DPR (Parliament) were arrested, and arrests have continued to the present day. Is this not a coup?

Thus not only should the actions taken on the basis of the Supersemar be revoked, including the MPRS decision to endorse the Supersemar, the dissolution of the PKI and the creation of KOPKAMITIB (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), but legal action should be taken against the person in charge of implementing the Supersemar for he is guilty of committing criminal offences.

The 1965-66 massacres

I now want to speak about brutality and sadism. The civilized world was shocked by the horrendous sadism of the crimes that were sponsored by the fascist military regime. Things occurred that no-one could ever imagined would happen in Indonesia, a country whose people are regarded in the West as 'the most genteel people in the world'. While it is not good to look back, we should learn from history. To speak truthfully, I am very reluctant to speak about those ghastly events, but I do so because ten years on, the country's rulers still justify the terror, savagery and slaughter as being worthwhile as long as the objective of exterminating the PKI and overthrowing Sukarno was achieved. They have shown not the slightest sense of moral responsibility to investigate the massacres, or at the very least to call to account those who were in positions of authority at the time. Nor have they done anything to prevent a repetition of what happened.

These sadistic crimes have never been condemned, let alone charged by the people now in power. With the protection of the security forces who would never have acted in the way they did without the approval of their anti-communist superiors, groups which supported the right-wing Army generals ran wild everywhere. Spurred on by stories of eyes being gouged out and of obscene practices said to have taken place at Halim Airbase, of genitals being slashed, of bodies being thrown into the River Brantas, dozens of bodies were tied together and used as a raft. There was a bridge near Dabat (7) where many people were slaughtered. The many marks of dried-up human blood going down the bridge near Dabat is a telling reminder of how many people had been slaughtered there. The number of dried-up human blood going down the side of the bridge was a telling reminder of how many people had been slaughtered there.

Some people were subjected to a slow death; their limbs were chopped off one by one. Others were forced to jump down into trenches, called 'Luweng'. In one prison, victims were forced to jump off a high platform head first. In one prison, victims were forced to jump off a high platform head first. In one prison, victims were forced to jump off a high platform head first. It was a miracle for anyone to have survived this ordeal. The many marks of dried-up human blood going down the bridge near Dabat is a telling reminder of how many people had been slaughtered there.

The acts of extermination cannot be described as excesses, as an outburst by the people who were already well-organized, planned and premeditated. This is evident from the fact that everywhere, in all parts of the country, the massacres were targeted not only against ordinary people but also against local PKI leaders down to the village level. Those targeted included leaders of the mass organisations, members of district assemblies (DPRD) and of district executive organs, district heads, journalists, businessmen, lawyers and intellectuals.
'Indikasi' has been used to arrest at random anyone considered undesirable. Sadistic methods are then used during interrogation, including severe beatings, electrical torture, isolation, and a diet that brings on paralysis. Detainees' relatives who know nothing at all about the affair are subjected to pressure and intimidation, and threats of blackmail, ill-treated to destroy their morale, so as to inflict psychological pressure on the unfortunate tapol. Such treatment is meted out not only to men but to women as well, who often suffer the added indignity of being raped.

Having perpetrated such methods in the name of the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, the rulers have created the myth of 'new style PKI members' who are accused of 'giving guidance' and on the basis of 'Indikasi'. To this very day, after almost eleven years, all this intolerable treatment of the tapols is still continuing.

The trials

The trials being conducted are clearly pursuing a 'projected target', aimed at proving that the abortive G30S was planned and supported by the PKI with the help of democratic mass organisations and civilian and military officials said to have been 'under PKI guidance'. The people to be tried and the sequence in which the trials are held is arranged in such a way as to confirm the New Order's own construction of events. As many people as possible have been accused of playing a leading role, and each of them is expected to testify against others.

On numerous occasions, my comrades have told court hearings in Jakarta and elsewhere about detainees who have died as a result of being tortured during interrogation and of the inhuman treatment of prisoners in the detention camps. One tapol had no alternative but to confess to anything because he could not stand the sadistic torture to which he was subjected. The maltreatment of women is particularly sadistic. In some places, these poor women are stripped naked and put on a platform during interrogations conducted at night, with a bright petrol lamp shining on them. Some women have been dragged around markets naked. Some have had their vaginas burned or electrified, or have had bottles pushed up them. Some tapols have been dragged behind trucks. Some have become so desperate, going in and out of prison as victims of blackmail, that they have committed suicide.

In the eyes of the fascist militarists, no violation of the law in involved because the victims are seen as obstacles to their policies who have been successfully crushed and paralysed, and at such low cost. When the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia) raised certain objections about granting more credit against others.

I demand that the person responsible for this regime be tried for the crime of genocide. I call upon the entire Indonesian patriots and democrats of whatever group, however they are, to make best use of the opportunities available and break through the encirclement.

The military regime accused

This court of the Indonesian military regime may regard me as the accused, but in the court of history, with the entire people acting as witnesses. I stand here as the accuser for all the crimes against humanity already committed, now being committed or still to be committed by the present regime against the Indonesian people, against members of the PKI and the mass organisations, against the so-called 'remnants', in short, against all Indonesian patriots and democrats of whatever group, wherever they are.

I demand that all the political prisoners should be released and that all the torture perpetrated against the prisoners should stop immediately. As I have already said, the vast majority of those who are still languishing in prisons, in places of detentions, in exile camps, are being held
because their politics are different from those of the
regime now in power.
I firmly believe that the Indonesian people are the
mighty creators of history. Truth and justice will surely
win. The present dark ages are only temporary. Unite,
Indonesian people, in the common struggle for democracy,
national independence and social justice.
Blitar, 26 December 1975

Harassment of ex-prisoners

“Restoring voting rights” is the
excuse for new controls

Following the announcement (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 70, July 1985) that 1.7 million former political prisoners held for alleged involvement in the 1965 events are being re-registered to determine whether they will be allowed to vote in elections, a Presidential Decision has now been issued setting down the procedures to be used. The new arrangements will subject these men and women to yet more supervision and harassment, reinforcing their status as second-class citizens without civil rights.

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All people designated as having been 'involved in the G30S/PKI affair' who will be subject to these procedures are classified into three categories. (These same categories were used when they were political prisoners.)

A-Category are those who were "clearly directly involved in the G30S/PKI".

B-Category are those who were "clearly indirectly involved in the G30S/PKI".

C-Category are those regarding whom "there are indications, or it can reasonably be assumed, that they were directly or indirectly involved in the G30S/PKI".

Categories A and B can be considered for restoration of their right to vote provided they completed their sentences or terms of detention - appropriated validated by the competent authorities - at least one year before voters are required to register. (Category A meant that the person detained was to be tried, though not all of them were; Category B meant they could not be tried for lack of 'evidence' but were nevertheless detained indefinitely. Tens of thousands of those classified as C were also detained for many years despite official pronouncements that they were not to be detained indefinitely.)

Dual or treble control at every stage

For the purposes of deciding who may vote, the village or kampung head ( lurah) together with the territorial army officer at that level (babinsa) must compile a list of all persons in their area, giving recommendations for each individual. These lists must be sent to the provincial governor through the intermediary officials for further investigation. Each of the intermediary local government officials (camab or sub-district head, bupati or district head and mayor in the case of urban areas) together with the military commanding officer and police chief at each level will attach their own recommendations to all the names on the lists before passing them on. The names will then be sent to the Minister of the Interior, with a report on each individual accompanied by the results of all these investigations and bearing the signature of the provincial governor and the appropriate military commanding officer in his capacity as KOPKAMTIB executive officer (Laksus Pangkamkamtibda). To assist these officials in taking their decisions, Level-I Consideration Teams will be set up in each province, while a Central Consideration Team will be set up to assist the Interior Minister and the KOPKAMTIB Commander-in-Chief in making their final determination.

The investigations will be carried out, "person by person, selectively and meticulously, based on security considerations". The criteria are that the person in question "has shown loyalty and obedience to the nation, state and government of Indonesia based on the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila, has not disseminated the teachings of Communism/Communism/Leninism in any form or shape, has not engaged in any activity disrupting security or political stability, has complied with all regulations issued by KOPKAMTIB regarding government policy to maintain stability, security and order, and has obeyed all the laws in force".

This vicious new regulation which shows the regime's determination to go on hounding leftwing suspects twenty years after their organisations were banned was frequently made in the anti-PKI propaganda of the time.

Political prisoners at a 'release' ceremony in 1979.

1) Kalisomok is the prison in Surabaya where Gatot was held up to the time of his trial.
2) G30S, Gerakan 30 September or 30 September Movement of 1965.
3) MPRS, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara, the provisional People's Consultative Assembly or upper house. DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, the People's Representative Assembly, or lower house.
4) dug (graves). 'hole' is implied, referring to the well at Lubang Buaya or Crocodiles' Hole situated at Halim Airbase, where the murdered generals' bodies were found. The association between 'holes' and 'graves' supposedly dug by PKI members was frequently made in the anti-PKI propaganda of the time.
New anti-communist hysteria unleashed

The Military regime has unleashed a new campaign of anti-communist hysteria, warning in well-publicised statements that the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) was never 'totally uprooted', that many of its members 'evaded arrest' with the result that the party must continue to be regarded as a 'latent danger'.

The hysteria provides the regime with justification for the mass re-registration of former political prisoners reported in TAPOL Bulletin No. 70, July 1985. It also serves as a warning to many people at a time when there are signs of growing social unrest in various parts of the country.

Central and East Java appear to have been singled out for special attention, with claims being made by the military commander of Central Java and senior civil administrators (most of whom are military men) that 'ex-PKI members' have started a "closed-mouth" (tutup mulut) movement, whatever that means. The movement is said to be getting help from abroad and is alleged to have been responsible for persuading the European Parliament to adopt a resolution protesting against the execution of Mohammad Munir in May this year.

Central Java is said to be particularly 'threatened' because official sources claim that there are 200,000 (according to one newspaper), or 290,000 (according to another) former PKI topolos in the province. The Governor claimed that most of these people are concentrated in the districts of Boyolali and Purwodadi. Several sub-districts, including Grobogan, Demak, Kudus, Pati Rembang, Jepara and Blora are mentioned as being in need of special vigilance, because 'PKI remnants' allegedly use cultural activities, crime and other forms of violence to advance their political aims. Such remarks suggest that people in these areas are giving expression to their discontent in a variety of ways.

General Surano, Minister-Coordinator for Social and Political Affairs gave his stamp of approval to the hysteria with a statement in Semarang that "many PKI cadres have evaded arrest" and others who were abroad have "slipped back" illegally, using "cunning camouflage" to hide their identity. (Kedaulatan Rakyat, Semarang, 8 August)

"So, how many have you arrested?" he was asked. "I haven't been able to count and can't give details but rest assured, arrests have been made." He claimed that the current alleged PKI actions first began to felt in Central Java, a PKI stronghold in pre-1965 days. The best way to grapple with this 'latent danger', he said, is to re-register all ex-PKI members/former prisoners. "There are so many of them that if we don't collect concrete data about their lives, they can pose a real threat."

Checking on people's relatives

News has reached TAPOL about a questionnaire government employees in East Java are required to fill in, giving details about the past political affiliations of their parents, parents-in-law, uncles and aunts and other relatives. Three lecturers at the Teachers' Academy in Malang were dismissed when it was revealed that their fathers had been members of one or other of the mass organisations banned in 1965.

TAPOL Bulletin, No 68, March 1985, page 24 records the case of a man who was declared ineligible to stand for re-election as village head when it was discovered that his (deceased) brother-in-law was a member of the outlawed teachers union, PGRN-NV.

Corroborating this latest twist in Indonesian witch-hunting, Surabayy Pos (5 August) reports that intensive 'screening' of regional government employees has been under way, on the instructions of the Governor of East Java. Several university graduates occupying various positions were dismissed, reports Kompas, when it was discovered that their fathers had been murdered in 1965 in the anti-G30S/PKI wave of mass killings when hundreds of thousands were slaughtered for alleged 'PKI involvement'. Such is the 'justice' meted out to the children of men and women murdered in the anti-communist massacres of the late 1960s. In civilised countries, such people would be eligible for compensation, not liable to dismissal.

The same paper also reports that a senior official of the Lumajang district administration was recently dismissed for alleged G30S/PKI Involvement back in pre-1965 days.

Grobogan villagers flee from village head

For a different view of conditions in Grobogan, one of the sub-districts on the regime's list of 'PKI trouble-spots', Kompas (19 August) reports that 30 peasants and their families have fled from a village in the sub-district because of constant intimidation by the village head, identified as 'Swf'.

They tell stories of being beaten up, kicked and even given electric shocks by the official for the slightest of reasons. He also attempted to rape a woman in the village but was only prevented from doing so by the intervention of her husband.

Other families have also left the village in despair at the behaviour of the village head who has been in charge there since 1979. Many who could not afford to move to other villages decided to accept transmigration rather than continue to be terrorised by him.

It appears that the trouble with 'Swf' is that he uses terror to force 'development' activities on the villagers. A more senior, district official confirmed that Kompas that 'Swf' imposes harsh discipline in his village. But it's not as bad as they make out, just occasional beatings," he said. Under 'Swf', the village has an excellent development record. There was no initiative before he took control so his vigorous programme came as a shock to the villagers, many of whom couldn't stand it and decided to leave. It's just a case of difficulties that normally arise between father and children (sic) and shouldn't be exaggerated."

What the official didn't say was that the regime has a history of violence in Grobogan district which, together with neighbouring Purwodadi, was a region where many thousands of alleged communists were slaughtered in 1969, when the campaign of massacres that climaxcd in 1965/66, when the campaign of massacres that climaxcd in 1965/66, when the campaign of massacres that climaxcd in 1965/66, when the campaign of massacres that climaxcd in 1965/66, when the campaign of massacres that climaxcd in 1965/66, when the campaign of massacres that climaxcd in 1965/66, when the campaign of massacres that climaxcd in 1965/66, when the campaign of massacres that climaxcd in 1965/66, when the campaign of massacres that climaxcd in 1965/66, when the campaign of massacres that climaxcd in 1965/66, when the campaign of massacres that climaxcd in 1965/66, when the campaign of massacres that climaxcd in 1965/66, when the campaign of massacres that climaxcd in 1965/66, when the campaign of massacres that climaxcd in 1965/66, when the campaign of massacres that climaxcd in 1965/66, when the campaign of massacres that climaxcd in 1965/66, when the campaign of massacres that climaxcd in 1965/66, when the campaign of massacres that climaxcd in 1965/66, when the campaign of massacres that climaxcd in 1965/66.
Following the official confirmation that three more long-term political prisoners were executed in East Java at the beginning of July, the European Parliament adopted two more resolutions of condemnation on 12 September. (Two resolutions were adopted in June. See TAPOL Bulletin No. 70, July 1985) One calls into question the whole range of EEC economic relations with Indonesia in the light of the executions. The texts are as follows:

The European Parliament,
A. dismayed by the executions of the political prisoners Ruslan Widjajasastra, Gatot Lestario, Djoko Untung and Rustomo, 1)
B. whereas, in its resolution of 10 June 1985, it had already expressed its horror at the execution on 15 May 1985 of Mohammad Hutri, the trade unionist and former member of parliament after sixteen years in prison,
1. Condemns such death sentences and executions on the basis of universal human rights and rejects them as political murders;
2. Calls on the Commission to provide the European Parliament as quickly as possible with precise information on economic relations with Indonesia;
3. Calls on the Commission to submit proposals for a critical reappraisal of these relations in the light of this unacceptable violation of human rights in Indonesia;
4. Calls on the Council of Ministers to urge the governments of the Member States to review their development relations with Indonesia critically, in particular within the CEE, in view of this violation of human rights;
5. Calls on the Council of Ministers to ask the Government of Indonesia for a full explanation of the reasons for these executions, for clarification on the position of government opponents still held in prison under sentence of death and the Indonesian Government’s intention to grant them an amnesty and to release them;
6. Calls on the Council of Ministers to make the subsequent restoration of economic relations specifically dependent on these releases;
7. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the governments and Parliaments of the Member States and the President of Indonesia.

The European Parliament,
A. recalling its resolution of 12 June 1985, in which it urged the Indonesian Government to do everything in its power to prevent the death sentence on four trade union leaders being carried out,
B. having learnt that at least three of these trade unionists have been executed by the military regime in Indonesia,
C. whereas these executions are contrary to the undertakings given by the Indonesian representatives at the EEC-ASEAN parliamentary meeting during the July part-session,
D. whereas seventeen other people condemned to death for their trade union activities are threatened with execution under the same circumstances,
1. Is outraged at the executions that have already taken place;
2. Expresses its solidarity with all democrats and all victims of human rights violations in Indonesia, irrespective of their political beliefs, race or social group;
3. Calls on the Foreign Ministers of the ten Member States of the European Community meeting in political cooperation to bring every possible pressure to bear on the Indonesian Government to prevent these executions;
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Indonesian Government, the Commission, the Council and the Foreign Ministers of the Member States.

1) Ruslan Widjajasastra was not executed in July

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**Powerful City of London mission visits Indonesia**

Sir Alan Trottl, the Lord Mayor of London, headed a mission of leading city bankers, insurance directors and merchants on a visit to Indonesia in August. The mission included the deputy chairman of the Standard and Chartered Bank, the chairman of Paterson-Zochonis, Mr. For East advisor to Williams and Glyns Bank, the chairman of the S.E. Asia Advisory Group of the British Overseas Trade Board, and the secretary of the S.E. Section Committee of the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The mission’s visit was arranged when J.B. Habibie, Indonesia’s Minister for Research and Technology, visited London in June. The present Lord Mayor appears to have considerable business interests of his own in Indonesia as he regularly visits the country. Prior to his visit as Lord Mayor, he had already visited Indonesia three times.

The Lord Mayor and the British ambassador with Suharto
**“Freeing ourselves from fear”**

Syafruddin Prawiranegara, a former Finance Minister, is chairman of Korpz Mubaligh Indonesia, the Indonesian Lay-Preachers Corps, many of whose board members are now on trial or under arrest. He has been a member of the disdissent Petition-of-50 Group since its inception in 1980. The following extract is from a sermon he gave on Isul Fitri in June this year. He was later interrogated by the Jakarta Military Command, whose commander then announced that this “extremist” sermon might result in his being brought to trial. Syafruddin has in any case been mentioned as a likely defendant in the “Petition-of-50” trials that commenced in August with the trial of Lieutenant-General (retired) H.R. Dhasono.

Allahu akbar, Allahu akbar, Allahu akbar!

Whilst not forgetting the debts and fines we must still pay, we can look back with joy because we have completed the task of cleansing our spirits well. But if we look ahead, I don’t know how many of us still feel happy. If we look outside - which is a better way of putting it than saying ahead - Indonesia’s world appears to be clouded in a black fog or mist. We can therefore only see the situation and events nearer at hand with some clarity. We cannot see the situation and events that are farther away, and all we can do is make guesses.

Up to now, we have been paying less attention to the world outside us. During the month of Ramadhan, we have been busy straightening ourselves up and cleansing ourselves, listening to Ramadhan lectures and so on. Istd Fitri marks not only the conclusion of the Ramadhan fast but also the beginning of life and normal pursuits. It marks the “struggle for life” (original, Eng.) which for believers must be fought in accordance with the law. But also the beginning of life and normal pursuits, it marks the “struggle for life” (original, Eng.) which for believers must be fought in accordance with the laws of Allah swt. Finally, Allah Himself explained to us:

> Whosoever does good will experience his/her own merit
> Whosoever commits crime will bear his/her own punishment.

Guidelines for preaching in Indonesia

A set of guidelines for preachers was published by Syafruddin Prawiranegara, Chairman of the Korpz Mubaligh Indonesia, in April this year. It is aimed at advising KMI members on how to convey their religious message and keeping with the basic Islamic outlook of preserving the link between its religious message and its social message, despite the risks this involves at the present time.

Preachers are required to advise their congregations on all matters pertaining to their social conditions while avoiding direct accusations against persons responsible for the difficulties faced, unless under exceptional circumstances. When differences of opinion arise with anyone (including those in power), as for example over the government’s insistence on Pancasila as the sole principle, Syafruddin stresses that it is their duty to make their views clear and name those with whom they disagree. The guidelines also deal with attitudes towards criminal elements, and condemns attempts to fight crime by means of violence, an obvious reference to the activities of the Army’s death-squads. Crime can only be dealt with by tackling the social diseases of poverty and unemployment. Preachers not only need to understand Islamic teachings. They also need to understand worldly affairs. “Our younger members should prepare themselves for a more significant role than the kiyai and ulama, most of whom only know about religious affairs.”

Syafruddin Prawiranegara

TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, September 1985

13
On trial for "subversive" lecturing

One clear target of the many trials now under way in Jakarta is the Kopps Hukubah Indonesia (KMI), the organisation of Muslim lay-preachers (mubaligh) whose chairman, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara is himself likely to be tried soon. Many other members of the KMI central board are under arrest or on trial, including Mawardi Noor, Deputy General Chairman, A.M. Fatwa and Haji Salim Kadar, Second and Third Chairman, and board members Abdul Gadiz Djaelani and Tony Ardhi.

Haji Salim Kadar and Yayan Hendrayaya

The first of the KMI preachers to come for trial were Haji Salim Kadar (50), arrested on 18 September 1984, and Yayan Hendrayana (35), former secretary-general of the KMI Jakarta branch and assistant lecturer at the Islamic Dakwah (missionary) College, PDTI, who has been under arrest since 1 October 1984. Both are accused of having 'directly incited' the Tanjung Priok incident on 12 September last year with their 'inflammatory speeches'. Their trials commenced on 20 July and are taking place concurrently, with a largely similar list of witnesses being called by the prosecutor. Both men were also summoned to testify at each other's trials.

A number of the witnesses are members of the security forces who were assigned to spy on the two men from 30 June till 10 September 1984, that is, for several months before the Tanjung Priok massacre. (Suara Karya, 17 July) They go out of their way to suggest that both men were very popular indeed and addressed huge crowds. Thus, for instance, Suara Karya (9 July), the GOLKAR daily, in a lengthy 'leak' in advance of the trial, quotes one source as saying that Salim addressed a gathering of 10,000 on 18 August, another of 25,000 on 29 August, another of 30,000 on 1 September and yet another shortly afterwards of 40,000. One witness even told the court later on that the meeting addressed by Salim and Yayan at Tanjung Priok on 12 September was attended by 50,000 people (Kompas, 13 August), contradicting General Benny Mardani's own official account which claimed that 1,500 were present. One can only assume that the figures are deliberately inflated to emphasise the danger these men represent with their apparently enormous pull on huge crowds of people.

Moreover, if the security forces were aware for so long before the demonstration in Tanjung Priok that these 'inflammatory' lectures were being given, why were no arrests made until after the Tanjung Priok massacre? This paradox reinforces the impression that Army intelligence was involved in a frame-up calculated to incite a major incident so as to charge Muslim critics with acts of terror while at the same time inflicting heavy casualties as a warning to the Muslim community as a whole. In the meanwhile, intelligence agents, spying on preachers, were building up dossiers against the 'extremist lecturers'.

As for the contents of Salim Kadar's and Yayan Hendrayana's lectures, neither men deny charges that they spoke out frequently against the Pancasila as the sole- ideology (though not necessarily against the Pancasila itself), that they were critical of the birth control programme, of official moves to prevent Muslim schoolgirls wearing head-scarves at school, of government-sponsored Pancasila indoctrination courses (P4) and of the general elections.

Both men are also accused of distributing the pamphlet, Tegakkan Moralitas Islam Sekalipun Langit Akan Roboh (Uphold Islamic Morality even if the Skies Collapse) and of signing a pledge of the Jakarta Muslim community rejecting Pancasila as the sole principle and rejecting the Societies Law.

Prosecutor demands 'life' for Yayan

On 12 September, the prosecutor demanded a life sentence for Yayan for "subverting the government and the state ideology". Another charge was that he "accused General Mursidi of master-minding the so-called 'mysterious killings' and accused the President of corruption."

Haji Mawardi Noor

Haji Mawardi Noor (67), a former parliamentarian for the Masjumi party (banned under Sukarno and not allowed to re-establish itself under Suharto) and Deputy General Chairman of the KMI, was charged with subversion on 16 September. He is accused of spreading hostility and splits in a series of 14 lectures he is said to have delivered from late 1983 up to 7 September 1984, in mosques as well as other public places in Jakarta. His lectures which "condemned the Pancasila-as-the-sole-principle policy, rejected Pancasila indoctrination courses (P4), rejected school-lessons in Pancasila Morality Education, and rejected the present Indonesian government" were seen as an attempt "to undermine the lawful government."

Asked whether he understood the indictment, the accused wanted to know what the prosecution meant by 'undermine'. A heated discussion ensued with the defence insisting that the term would have to be defined before the indictment could be properly assessed. The prosecutor refused however to explain his meaning, saying that this would mean entering into the substance of the case.

In their demurrer (eksepsi), the defence also asked why allegedly subversive lectures delivered by the accused had been closely monitored for over nine months, yet the security forces had not arrested him until after the Tanjung Priok incident.

The accused rejected prosecution allegations that he favours an Islamic state. To reject Pancasila-as-the-sole-principle does not mean rejecting the Pancasila but
More severe sentences in East Java
Court verdicts against Muslim political prisoners in East Java who are accused of involvement in a so-called 'Jihad' (Holy War) Command are now coming thick and fast. In TAPOL Bulletin No 70, July 1985, we reported five sentences that had been passed by a court in Bojonegoro. (See that issue also for an assessment of the regime's claims about the 'Jihad' Command.)

The nine men on trial in Jember, East Java were all found guilty and sentenced in late June and July, as follows: Karto, 15 years; Saiful alias Mustafa, 11 years; Semaq Effendi, 13 years; Sunarso alias Hasan, 14 years; Abduusukr, alias Amnawachi, 12 years; Anwar, 4 years; Sohar, 14 years; Asdin alias Muharianto, 12 years and Porta alias Salim 13 years. All were found guilty of subversion for activities in 1979 and 1980, and to have deviated from the Pancasila ideology. According to Suara Karya (18 July), they are all small farmers with little education and not fluent in Indonesian.

In Probolinggo, the following sentences have been passed: Dr. Ahmad Hamaji, 10 years; Urhn a Salim 8; Hendra, 14 years; Latif, 8 years; Supan al Supandi, 8 years; Moksum, 8 years; Porta All, 11 years; Suwadad, 9 years; Masudh, 9 years; and Moch. Suroyono, 14 years. All the accused have been in detention since 26 November, 1982.

12 years for disputing Mordani's version of Tanjung Priok
In Surabaya, Ali Masrum (24), a teacher at a religious school (madrasah) has been given a 12-year sentence for organising lectures by lecturers from Jakarta on Islamic values, distributing a leaflet entitled, "Chronology of Attacks on the Muslim Community in Tanjung Priok" and circulating cassettes of lectures delivered by Amir Biki (who was shot dead during the 12 September 1984 Tanjung Priok massacre) and Syarifin Maluko just prior to the Tanjung Priok demonstration. These activities were considered by the court as being aimed at undermining government authority and overthrowing the lawful Indonesian government.

Ali Masrum is a well-known broadcaster on private radio in East Java, and his popularity drew large crowds to his trial.

The defence team protested against the Court for holding one of the hearings in secret, in order to listen to the cassettes containing the two offending lectures. Answering the defence complaint that this was in violation of the procedural code, the Court declared that this had been done for security reasons. It was the Court's opinion that "Amir Biki's lecture contained an attack on the legal Indonesian government and it was not fitting for it to be heard by the public." (Merdeka, 9 September)

The case against A.M. Fatwa

Andi Happehafat Hang Fatwa, a well-known Muslim preacher and political activist, used the occasion of his trial which opened in Jakarta in August to explain his views on a range of political, social and religious matters. In a 90-page document which he read to a packed court-room and to a large, supportive crowd following the proceedings outside, he also gave details of the acts of terror perpetrated against him since the late 1970s and the maltreatment he has suffered since his arrest - in his own words, "my abduction" - on 19 September last year. The following is a short summary with extracts from this very important document:

Abduction and maltreatment in custody
Fatwa was abducted by troops of the Jakarta Military Command while he was undergoing interrogation at a Jakarta police station about his Idul Fitri sermon in 1980.

In their abduction, the troops violated many procedural regulations. They dragged him from the police station and prevented his lawyer, who had been attending the police interrogations, from accompanying him to the Jakarta police station about his Idul Fitri sermon in 1980.

Fatwa's speech in court

I said my night prayers. 'Just as I was dozing off, the door was kicked open and I was ordered out, in my underwear and with my bare feet, bare.

The last page from A.M. Fatwa's speech in court

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to have my head shaven in the yard... as they kicked, punched and poured abuse on me. When I fought the pain by to have my head shaven in the yard... as they kicked, punched and poured abuse on me. When I fought the pain by

Fatwa was then driven blindfolded to Cimanggis by troops who added to his torment by making him think that he was about to be bumped off like a victim of the death-squads. In Cimanggis, there were a large number of young men who were victims of the Tanjung Priok affair. Many were severely wounded, with bullet wounds in their thighs and stomachs. Some had had a foot or leg (kaki) amputated. In Cimanggis military detention centre, the civilian detainees incarcerated there for the first seven months after the Tanjung Priok incident suffered the following restrictions:

- No writing implements were allowed.
- No books were allowed except for the Ku’ran and even this was not allowed in for the first two months.
- Detainees’ cell were repeatedly searched purely to inflict mental terror, as no ‘prohibited goods’ could possibly have got in because of the many searches.
- Sport was not allowed at all at first. In the final month, a 15-minute sports break was permitted but this only happened when “a good guard” was on duty.
- Friday communal prayers were prohibited. It was not till he was moved to Salemba Prison, seven months later, that Fatwa could participate in Friday prayers.
- Medical treatment was appalling, not so much because of the lack of facilities but rather because of attitudes, behaviour and (lack of) health protection. One young Priok victim was not allowed to remove a bandage from a serious wound for two days by which time it was already putrid. Another victim who had no fewer than 39 wounds as a result of being beaten, was left without treatment for a month, though many of his wounds were discharging puss all the time. A third man whose body became half paralysed was left screaming with pain for two days in his cell before a doctor was allowed to examine him and order him to hospital. A fourth was left screaming with terror in his cell for an hour when a snake entered.

Fatwa, who spent a period of time in detention during the Sukarno regime, makes the point that conditions under which political prisoners were held then were vastly better than under Suharto, despite his claims that Indonesia is now living in an “era of law”.

**Concocting the case against him**

When Fatwa was abducted from the police station on 19 September, no arrest warrant was produced in violation of legal requirements. Nor was a detention order produced for two weeks, until 3 October. Fatwa explains that his interrogators who were from the Public Prosecutors’ Office (Kejaksaan), not from the Army, told him frankly that they were “having problems” making an anti-subversion case “only on the basis of my sermons”. But as

**The charges**

That he attended “illegal” meetings, one at the home of Marine Lieutenant-General (retired) Ali Sadikin on 15 September 1985 where a White Paper on the Tanjung Priok incident was discussed, and one at his own home three days later where plans to carry out bombing attacks and wage a campaign of “mental terror” were allegedly discussed.

That he signed the White Paper which, with others, he circulated to mosques throughout the capital.

That he delivered a number of “inflammatory” lectures accusing the government of being anti-Islam because of its campaign to force all social organisations to accept the Pancasila as their sole ideology (azos tunggal).

That he conspired with others to bring about the downfall of the “lawful” government. These others who are to appear as witnesses in his trial and who are soon to be tried, according to the prosecutor in his charge sheet against Fatwa, include Lieutenant-General (ret’d) Hartono Dharsono, former commandant of the Siliwangi Division and former Secretary-General of ASEAN (his trial opened in September); Air Vice-Marshall (ret’d) Soeyono Sukirno, former ambassador to Australia; Lt-Gen. Ali Sadikin, former commandant of the Marine Corps and governor of Jakarta; Police General (ret’d) Hoegeng Santoso, former Chief of Police; Sjahruddin Prawiranegara, a leading Muslim politician and head of the 1948-49 Emergency Government of the Indonesian Republic in Sumatra; Slamet, former ambassador to Australia; Li-Gen. Ali Sadikin, former commandant of the Marine Corps and governor of Jakarta; Police General (ret’d) Hoegeng Santoso, former Chief of Police; Sjahruddin Prawiranegara, a leading Muslim politician and head of the 1948-49 Emergency Government of the Indonesian Republic in Sumatra; Slamet Bratanata, politician and Mines and Energy Minister in Suharto’s first post-coup government; H.M. Sanusi, a leader of Muhammiadiyah and Minister for Small Industries in Suharto’s first post-coup government; Anwar Haryono, former parliamentarian; and Erlangga, a student.

Fatwa is being charged are under the 1963 Anti-Subversion Decree which carries a maximum penalty of death as well as several articles of the Criminal Code.

**Fatwa leaving court after the first hearing**

the days passed, the military came up with the idea of making the White Paper the main charge, satisfied that this was adequate grounds for a charge-sheet invoking the Anti-Subversion Decree. Once the case against him had been concocted, a detention order was issued, asserting that he had been arrested and was being held under this Decree.

The process of case-creation was further clarified when Fatwa met another detainee, Tasrif Tuasikal (recently tried for involvement in the BCA bombing incidents last October and given a life sentence) after he was moved to Salemba Prison. “Tuasikal suddenly began to beg my forgiveness without me understanding why... He had been forced to make a confession about me, to acknowledge a receipt for US$2,000 received from me to purchase bombs. ... I was absolutely amazed and at the same time furious to hear about this vicious slander but he tried to calm me, showing me bayonet injuries in his chest, and telling me how he had been tortured night and day with his hands and feet bound.”

**Harassment and terror, the lot of a Muslim preacher**

Fatwa provides an account of his own experience of harassment since the mid-1970s. The Jakarta military
authorities first started picking him out for attention in 1976 because of his activities as the person in charge of the religious programme of the Municipality, under Ali Sadikin. The governor ignored several demands for his dismissal but his position became more vulnerable after Ali Sadikin was replaced as governor in 1977. In 1978, he was arrested and held for nine months without charge for allegedly opposing kebotinan (Javanese mysticism), and lost all his posts in various non-official bodies.

Not long after his release from prison, he was sacked as a civil servant by Interior Minister, General Amir Machmud because of a sermon he gave on Idul Fitri and re-arrested, though held this time for only two weeks, perhaps because of critical press reporting at the time. He never stopped preaching however, and after he signed the Petition of Fifty in 1980, the physical and mental terror intensified. He made various attempts to initiate legal proceedings against senior government officials for slanderous remarks about him.

All efforts to set himself up in business failed because licences were refused, while his preaching continued to be harassed. When an invitation to preach at an Idul Fitri gathering in 1980 was withdrawn under Army pressure and another preacher was "dropped" in his stead, troops started firing when disturbances broke out among the congregation. He was held for Interrogation for several days and ultimately released, again because of the public outcry. On his way to visit relatives of those who had been arrested because of their efforts to have him preach, Fatwa was abducted by the Army and severely beaten. (His account of what happened was published in TAPOL Bulletin, No. 43, January 1981.)

In 1982, he initiated legal proceedings against the soldiers responsible for the incident and against Admiral Sudomo, the then head of KOPKAMTIB, as their superior. His team of lawyers was in turn subjected to terror and Intimidation and eventually abandoned the case while protesting strongly because their professional freedom as lawyers had been placed in jeopardy. (See TAPOL Bulletin, No. 55, January 1983.)

Three retired generals, Aziz Saleh, Ali Sadikin and Hartono Dharsono took over his legal defence because they felt they would not be likely to be terrorised. The case proceeded but was lost. ("It would have been inconceivable for KOPKAMTIB to be found guilty," says Fatwa.) They appealed to the High Court which declared it was unable to hear the case because the documents were not considered adequate and returned it to the lower court. "It is still therefore open to me," says Fatwa, "to pursue the matter." The indefatigable Fatwa also declared that he had initiated proceedings against General Amir Machmud for unfair dismissal from the civil service in 1979.

In October 1982, an attempt was made on his life when thugs slashed his throat while he was driving in Jakarta. He lists the many occasions when sermons he was scheduled to deliver were banned by the military ("not cancelled by mosque officials, as the indictment claims").

Fatwa's political position

The last 30 pages of his statement are given over to a exposition of his own political views. He has never opposed Pancasila, he says. On the contrary, he regards it as a crucial platform, giving all creeds and opinions a rightful place in the Republic. He believes that the Muslim community, comprising the vast majority of the population, needs to have an assured place in society, not forced to conform to Pancasila as the sole ideology.

He has never supported calls for an Islamic state but stresses that Islam does not allow for a false separation between politics and state affairs. He says, "Far more moderate sermons" were subjected to constant harassment. Without saying so, he appears to suspect that the security forces allowed tensions to grow, leading ultimately to the crackdown on 12 September and the subsequent onslaught against Muslim opposition, of which his own trial is an important part.

New bill on the lawcourts

Lawyers are very critical of a draft bill on the law courts which has been submitted to the DPR (the lower legislative assembly) by the government because it will reinforce Executive control over the Judiciary. The bill places judges under two authorities, the Minister of Justice and the Supreme Court, giving the former pre-eminence. The Justice minister will exercise "guidance" (pembinaan) over the organisation, administration and powers of the lawcourts, while the Supreme Court will be in charge of "technical guidance". The new law confirms that judges are "government officials" (pegawai negeri) and therefore bound by government policy. On top of that, it gives the judges who preside over the district appellate courts (pengadilan tinggi) the power to exercise supervision over lawyers wishing to practise in all courts of law.

Lawyers attending a seminar of Peradin, the Bar Association, were outspoken in their rejection of the bill which they believe will put an end to what freedoms they still have. Harjono Tjiltposobono, chairman of Peradin, criticised the downgrading of the Supreme Court which should safeguard the independence of the judiciary. (The present structure of the Court which is chaired by General Ali Said has in fact already put an end to such independence.)

The status of judges as government officials has long been an issue with lawyers who defend political cases. With such a status, which also means that judges must join KORPRI, the government-sponsored civil servants' association whose members may not deviate from government policy and ideology, it is not possible for defendants to expect a fair trial.

Lawyers in East Java were the first to experience the effects of supervision of their profession by the law courts. When a Surabaya High Court judge announced earlier this year that lawyers working in the province must obtain a licence from his court in order to continue with their practice. He also decreed that these licences are renewable every two years. (See TAPOL Bulletin, No 68, March 1985, page 6.) Although lawyers protested strongly against this encroachment of their independence, the draft bill means that the East Java precedent in now to apply nationwide.

Judges' criticisms squashed

In fact, misgivings about the projected bill were first voiced several months ago by the judges association, Ikahi which argued in a statement that members of their profession would find it difficult to resist (government) interference in their determination of verdicts if they continue to be civil servants. The organisation was quickly forced to retract when General Ali Said publicly denounced their statement as being "absurd" and a "rehash" of earlier complaints. (Tempo, 8 June)

(Source: Kompas, 2 Septembers and Tempo, 7 September)

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Islamic educational course on trial

A series of trials have been under way since June and July in Malang and Surabaya, East Java in which the accused are all facing subversion charges because they have attended or are involved in a Muslim educational network called Lembaga Pendidikan Pondok Pesantren Kilat (LP3K). Roughly translated, this means Lightening-Course Pesantren Educational Institute, pesantren being the name of Islamic religious boarding-schools.

Accusations made against the defendants in the indictments suggest that the LP3K was first launched in 1982 in Bandung and has since established branches in many cities throughout Java, attracting a large number of participants. The trials under way are attended by large crowds of people, mostly young men and women who make no secret of their support for the men on trial. Most of the women wear head-scarves. The court-rooms are reported to be under heavy guard, with metal-detectors and other surveillance devices helping to create an atmosphere of tension.

From the names of people, presumably also under arrest, being mentioned in the current trials, the Malang and Surabaya trials are likely to be followed by others in Bandung and possibly also Jakarta.

The trials appear to be aimed at establishing a link between this educational network and a series of bombings in East and Central Java - the attack on a seminary in Malang on Christmas Eve last year, the explosions which seriously damaged nine stupas at the Borobudur Buddhist monument in Central Java on 21 January this year and an explosion on a bus near Banyuwangi, East Java on 16 March which killed seven passengers and injured many others.

The prosecution also appears to be bent on proving that the men guiding and directing the LP3K were using it as a training ground for cadres committed to the creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia. The men named in this connection are Mursalim Dohlan, a Muslim preacher from Jakarta, who is now under arrest and whose trial could come as the climax to the regime's campaign against the LP3K, and Ir. M. Sanusi, formerly a leading member of the Muslim social organisation, Muhammadiyah and now member of the Petition-of-50 group who was tried and sentenced to 19 years in May for allegedly funding the bomb explosions which damaged the offices of Bank Central Asia last October. (See TAPOL Bulletin, 69, May 1985, p. 9-10)

The defendants

The men on trial for subversion in Malang are Andi Sukisno (21), a student at the Malang Institute of Education (IKIP), Murdjoko (26) who works for the Brawijaya State University in Malang, Faisal Fochri (21), a student at the polytechnic attached to Brawijaya University in Malang and Sugeng Budiono (20) a student of statistics at the Open University. Others who are due for trial according to the public affairs office of the Malang District Court are Ir. 'FW', recently graduated from Malang University, Mach. Achwan, chairman of the Malang branch of the LP3K and 'AKAH' (37) who is described as the person caught in connection with the bus explosion:

On trial in Surabaya are Simpuang Abdul Malik a preacher and chairman of the Surabaya branch of LP3K and Andri Harto, a student at Universitas Muhammadiyah Surabaya and chairman of the Al-Falaq Mosque Youth also in Surabaya, who had taken an LP3K course in Malang and was then put in charge of spiritual affairs for the LP3K network in Surabaya. The Andri Harto trial is also referred to as an 'illegal leaflets subversion' trial because the accused allegedly distributed leaflets disputing General Murdani's account of what happened in Tanjung Priok last September, but primarily the hearings appear to deal with LP3K's educational activities.

Press reports are typically brief and reveal little about the case being put by the defence. The Galler Jarko daily, Suara Karya devotes more attention than other papers to these trials, charged apparently to help the regime build up an image of a dangerous, Muslim-inspired conspiracy threatening Indonesia's 'Pancasila democracy'. (Our access to Suara Karya reporting is based on Indonesia Reports logging of the Indonesian press.)

Defence witnesses not produced

An example of the severe constraints faced by the defence is their failure to secure the presence of the more senior figures in the LP3K movement in the witness box. It is the duty of the prosecution to produce witnesses, but witnesses called by the defence, including Mursalim Dohlan, were not produced. At a hearing of the Murjoko trial on 19 August, the prosecution presented the Investigation Reports (BAP) of four 'witnesses' including Mursalim Dohlan, claiming that they could not be present in person. (Sinor Horapon, 20 August) All were identified only by their initials, implying that they are all under arrest and awaiting trial. Despite the defendant's rejection of this testimony from men most of whom he said he did not even know, the judges decided to accept these Investigation Reports as formal evidence.

Retired general on trial

The trial of Lieutenant (retired) H.R Dharsono, formerly commander of the Siliwangi Division, has opened in Jakarta. In his indictment, the prosecutor mentioned nine members of the Petition-of-50 group as well, implying that they are also to be tried. They are: Major-General (ret'd) Azis Saleh, former Minister of Health; Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Ali Sadikin, former Governor of Jakarta; Major-General (ret'd) Suyitno Sukirno, a former ambassador; former Chief of Police, Hoegeng I. Santos; Syafuddin Prawiranegara; former ministers Buchanuddin Harahap, Slamet Brotonata and H.M. Sanusi (serving a 19-year sentence); Anwar Haryono, a lawyer.

A full report of Dharsono's trial and other related trials will appear in the next Bulletin.
Another Muslim paper banned

Al-lkhwan, an Islamic newspaper published in Jogjakarta, has been banned by order of the Attorney-General. The ban dated 28 May was not made public until 2 July. The announcement was made together with an announcement that dated 28 May was not made public until 2 July. The paper's editor, Irfan Suryahardjo (24) is under arrest with the Rector, a group of students tried to meet the attention to be paid to the needs of Risoloh which was banned in Jogjakarta, with more than 30 witnesses due to be called by the prosecution, of whom at least ten are professors and lecturers at Gaja Mada University, Jogjakarta who were named as advisors and sponsors of the publication.

Al-lkhwan (The Brotherhood) is the successor to Ar-Risalah which was banned in October 1983. The Attorney-General announced that the paper was being banned along with all other material produced by Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Masjid (Mosque Youth Communications Body) in Sleman, Jogjakarta. According to press reports, Al-lkhwan was printed monthly with a minimum run of 10,000 copies, circulating in Jakarta, Bandung, Jogjakarta, Solo and Surabaya.

'Suara Mujahadin' is launched

The enforced demise of Al-lkhwan does not appear to be the end of the matter. A new publication, Suara Mujahadin, with a format and style close to that of the banned paper, came out with its first edition in May 1985. Published by the Department of Information of Jama'ah Mujahadin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahadin Community), the first edition - a copy of which has been obtained by TAPOL - is a 12-page tabloid with articles attacking the 'kejawen' (Javanese mystics) philosophy being promoted by the Suharto military regime, a stinging condemnation of the government's family planning programme, a brief critical analysis of the current re-organisation of the Armed Forces and a lengthy report of interviews with two Muslim activists who managed to go into hiding while appeals regarding their cases were still under consideration.

Bandung students protest at suspensions

Thirty-five students at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) have been suspended indefinitely for taking part in activities involving inhabitants in kampungs around the ITB campus. They had planned to hold a cultural evening and discussions about current affairs. These activities were prepared as part of a 'study orientation' programme for new students, but ITB authorities refused to allow this on the grounds that all 'university initiation programmes' (perploncoan) are illegal, on as well off campus. (Kompas, 31 August)

Following repeated efforts to raise their grievances with the Rector, a group of students tried to meet the Minister of Education, Faud Hassan during a visit to Bandung but failed because they had "not used the proper procedures". The next day, many students demonstrated with banners and posters but were ordered to disband.

Workers dismissed for defending their rights

The Minister of Labour, Admiral (retd) Sudomo has dismissed nearly 800 workers who were employed by the United Can Company, accusing them of 'anarchic' behaviour. Making public his decision, he acknowledged that this was the first time in the history of the Labour Department for a minister to order dismissals. The decision had been taken, he said, "to prevent the spread of anarchy which could influence workers in all parts of the country." (Tempo, 31 August)

Prior to his appointment as Minister of Labour in March 1983, Sudomo was commander of the military regime's security agency, KOPKAMTIB (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), and he frequently alludes to his preference from strong-arm tactics and his KOPKAMTIB past in his dealings with the workers. Since his appointment, the militarisation of the Department has been stepped up. The Secretary-General is General Sutopo Yuwono, an intelligence officer who headed BAKIN, the intelligence organisation, for many years.

A labour dispute has been raging at the United Can Company, a joint Indonesian-Japanese enterprise located in Tangerang, West Java, since late last year. The workers, who are organised in the Union of Metal and Ceramic Workers - a member of the FBSI which is the only trade union federation allowed to exist - submitted a demand in December last year for the employers to bring their system for calculating overtime payments into line with a ministerial decision issued in 1984. When the company failed to do this and threatened to take action against the workers, 800 workers held a protest meeting and called for the dismissal of the personnel officer.

This led to the dismissal of eleven workers which in turn led to a second demonstration calling for the reinstatement of the dismissed men. During the course of this demonstration the police continued to call the men to line up, some management staff were unable to gain access to their cars, which led to a charge, widely reported in the press, that the workers had held 19 management personnel hostage. The workers vehemently deny this and say that this distortion of events is largely responsible for their shabby treatment ever since.

The eleven dismissed men were then interrogated by the local military command, and their dismissal was later upheld by the central arbitration board (P4P), whereupon the workers held their third demonstration, again calling for the reinstatement of the men. This was the 'anarchic behaviour' which resulted in Sudomo's dismissal order.

LBH protest

Abdul Hakim G. Nusantara, Director of the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute, has issued a statement condemning the minister's decision as a violation of the country's labour laws and a contradiction of Sudomo's own declaration less than a year ago that companies should avoid dismissing their workers, however hard the economic recession might hit them. Abdul Hakim also warned that those who have been victimised in this way are perfectly within their rights to sue the minister.

Human rights violations

A report of 7 August issued by the ITB Student Defence Committee which has just been received by TAPOL, criticises the huge funding and corruption surrounding the recent Indonesian Film Festival in Bandung. It calls for a more socially-oriented film industry and for more attention to be paid to the needs of the urban poor.
East Timor remains an international issue

Although the UN General Assembly has again decided this year not to discuss a resolution on East Timor following a report by the Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar that bilateral consultations between Portugal and Indonesia are still in progress, the issue of self-determination for East Timor has been more heatedly debated in the past few months than for many years.

Diplomatic row between Australia and Portugal

Bob Hawke, the Australian Prime Minister raised a storm of protest at home and abroad with a shameless remark on Indonesian television on 16 August and later reiterated in Parliament that Australia "recognises the sovereign authority of Indonesia over East Timor" and regards the East Timorese as "citizens of Indonesia".

While the Indonesian press welcomed Hawke's statement, with the Jakarta Post (22 August) cynically hoping that the whole affair could now be "buried in the dustbin of history", many groups in Australia voiced their anger. As Peter Robertson of the Australian Friends of East Timor put it, "Australia is risking condemnation and disgrace from her Pacific neighbours and many Third World countries. (Sunday Independent, 25 August)

The Australian Labour government did not however reckon with the strong protest that greeted Hawke's statements in Lisbon. Two protest notes were sent to Canberra, one from President Eanes and one from the Portuguese government. Jill Jolliffe, writing in The Age, (4 September) described this as "the strongest and most dramatic stand Lisbon has taken since the Indonesian invasion". The Australian ambassador in Lisbon was given a stiff reprimand by the Foreign Ministry and the Portuguese ambassador in Canberra was recalled "for consultations", a severe step to take in diplomatic relations.

Hawke's statement at first appeared to be little more than a reiteration of the Australian Liberal government's January 1978 de jure recognition of Indonesia's 'Integrasi' of East Timor. It was however the first categorical statement by the Labour government and moreover was apparently needed in order to clear the way for all-out exploration and exploitation by Australia-based capital of the rich oil deposits lying between Australia's northern reaches and the south coast of Timor. In the first week of September, the Australian Bond Corporation announced new investments of $233 million to open up 32 wells in four new areas located in the 'Timor Gap'.

On 19 September, the Portuguese government again protested to Canberra, this time about plans for joint Indonesian-Australian exploration of oil resources in the Timor Sea, part of the territory "over which Portugal is the internationally-recognised administering power". The note condemns Australia's "clear disrespect for internal laws" at a time when East Timor is still listed by the UN as a non-self-governing territory whose people have not been able to exercise the right of self-determination.

Hawke's shameless gesture may also have been prompted by his need to 'ease' relations with Jakarta at a time when they have been 'clouded' by such issues as the five Papuan refugees now residing in Thursday Island, and the recently-established radio link with Fretilin forces which continues to operate despite a ban imposed by the Australian government.

Indonesia's official reaction was somewhat less than jubilant for Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja was quick to point out that Canberra has not gone far enough because it has not yet positively acknowledged that an 'act of self-determination' occurred in Dili on 31 May 1976, legitimising 'integrasi'.

UN 'consultations' leading nowhere

Portugal's new firmness on East Timor should be seen in the context of the 'consultations' which have reportedly been taking place under UN auspices following the General Assembly 1982 resolution which instructed the Secretary-General to initiate consultations between the parties "directly concerned". (Oddly enough, the East Timor people have never been included under this definition.)

Early in September, Mochtar commented on the consultations and reiterated that self-determination was not to be discussed and that consultations with Portugal would only touch on peripheral matters. Thus, Portugal has been made well aware that not even a face-saving formula is possible, enabling it to appear to be fulfilling its constitutional obligation to bring about a process of de-colonisation through an act of self-determination in East Timor.

Although East Timor has never become an election issue in Portugal, President Eanes who will be quitting the presidency following elections in a few months time has always attached importance to Portugal's obligations and has often reprimanded the Socialist government for its negligence.

Jaime Gama: "Self-determination is the core of the question"

There is reason to believe that Jaime Gama, Portugal's Foreign Minister, has moved closer to the President's position, recognising that a statement has been reached with Indonesia at the UN. Jaime Gama took the unusual step of urging the former Portuguese colonies in Africa to support East Timor at the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers conference in Luanda at the beginning of September and went to the Angolan capital to attend the...
conference himself. Speaking at the UN General Assembly on 23 September, he stressed, in relation to Portugal’s bilateral talks with Indonesia, that self-determination for East Timor "is the core of the question". He also said that respect for human rights in East Timor is still far from meeting our expectations". (AP, 23 September)

Another sign of shifting attitudes among Socialist Party politicians who hope to win both the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections came with a statement by Minister of State, Antonio Almeida Santos, the party’s candidate for prime minister. In an interview on 31 August in Faro, he said: "Portugal has a moral obligation which it cannot decline and it will continue to be faithful to this and work within the bounds of possibility so that self-determination for the people of East Timor can be achieved." (Jakarta Post, 2 September)

Prime Minister Soares’ meeting with Mgr Belo, Apostolic Administrator of Dili (see separate item) may have also contributed to reversing his earlier feeble attitude towards East Timor. Portugal makes formal contact with Fretilin

On 24 September, the Portuguese Foreign Minister held a formal meeting in New York with Fretilin’s representative to the UN, Jose Ramos Horta. This is the first time such formal contact has been made and could mark a new departure in the negotiations currently taking place between Portugal and Indonesia under UN auspices regarding the future of East Timor, which have until now excluded East Timorese participation.

East Timor ruins Indonesia’s bid to host 1986 Non-Aligned Summit

An even more damaging dent in Indonesia’s battered image was inflicted at the September conference of foreign ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Luanda, the capital of a country that has consistently supported East Timor against Indonesia. The first blow came when, for the first time in the history of the Non-Aligned Movement, a Fretilin delegation was invited to attend the opening session along with other liberation movements, resulting in a furious row with the Indonesian delegation. The draft political declaration circulated in advance of the meeting by the Angolan government as the host, included a three-paragraph statement on East Timor calling among other things for East Timorese participation in the UN consultations.

On his departure for Luanda, flanked by a huge delegation of senior officials, Foreign Minister Mochtar declared that "the main task of the Indonesian delegation this time is to eliminate the East Timor question from the draft declaration". (Kompas, 30 August) But Mochtar had another ‘main task’ which was to push through a decision that Indonesia would host next year’s Non-Aligned Summit and chair the movement till 1989. The controversy over East Timor proved to be the stumbling-block to this ambition.

Indonesia has made no secret of its desire to host the 1986 Non-Aligned Movement conference. The idea was first mooted by the Malaysian Prime Minister during a visit to Jakarta last year, and as the Luanda meeting drew near, the idea was more and more enthusiastically promoted by Foreign Department spokesmen.

A few weeks before the meeting, Mochtar announced at his weekly press conference that "Indonesia is prepared to host the 1986 summit conference of the Non-Aligned Movement if requested at next month’s meeting". (Jakarta Post, 12 August) A few weeks later however, he was forced to admit that this was unlikely to happen as one criterion is that the host government is not in conflict with another member of the bloc. Even so, he could not abandon the idea because Suharto himself was determined to become the Movement’s chairman (maybe he thinks he isn’t likely to get another chance) and, as every government minister in Indonesia knows, Suharto’s wishes are paramount. This was to have been the crowning glory of Indonesia’s recent posturing as a ‘major world power’. Indeed, it was recently acknowledged that the elaborate gathering held to mark the 30th anniversary of the Bandung Conference last April was intended primarily as a ‘dress rehearsal’ for the 1986 Non-Aligned Summit. On his arrival at Luanda airport, Mochtar again announced that Indonesia was seeking the chairmanship, and while the conference was in progress, back home in Jakarta, General Amir Machmud, chairman of Indonesia’s legislative assembly, announced after an audience with Suharto that Indonesia “should agree (sic) to host an upcoming Non-Bloc summit conference” (Kompas, 6 September)

Unfortunately for Suharto however, things were not going Mochtar’s way in Luanda. East Timor proved to be the most hotly debated issue in Luanda, more controversial even than the debate over the Iran-Iraq conflict. "Fretilin," writes Jill Joliffe (Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 September) “was principally supported by the five Portuguese-speaking African countries, Vietnam, Laos and Vanuatu. What they lacked in numbers they made up for in commitment: the fight to keep the reference (in the draft declaration) resulted in the most heated debate of the conference.”

Indonesia lobbied hard and argued primarily on formal grounds, that East Timor had been deleted from the 1983 Political Declaration at the Non-Bloc Summit in Delhi and could not be restored. What Portuguese-speaking African countries, Vietnam, Laos and Vanuatu sought, Indonesia mustered a majority, but this did not result in the issue being dropped. Policy decisions by the Non-Aligned Movement can only be taken by consensus, with the result that the three-paragraph reference was kept in the Political Declaration with a note that consensus was not reached. And Zimbabwe was chosen as next year’s host.

East Timor’s cherished ambition to host the 1986 summit conference was shattered by an issue it has tried for so long to consign to “the dustbin of history”. And to ram home the defeat, it has now been announced (Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 September) that the question of East Timor has been included on the agenda of the 1986 summit.

Fretilin’s message to the Luanda conference

A message to the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers conference which was held in Luanda, from Xanana, chairman of the Revolution Council of National Resistance was transmitted by radio to Darwin on 1 September, in time for delivery at the conference which opened on 4 September.

After welcoming the Non-Aligned Movement’s principles of non-violence and stressing the need for dialogue to resolve conflicts, Xanana gave a brief history of East Timor’s 10-year struggle against Indonesian aggression.

Turning to the present situation, he says:

The vile and barbarous aggressor continues to massacre and torture the population with impunity, persecuting and threatening (people) with death, searching houses and people, prohibiting travel and demanding travel passes and controlling even the smallest concentration camps, with lower rank troops in each camp and higher rank troops in each village. Even so, the population is forced to provide security at night for the cowardly occupants. Each day, everyone – from the elderly to the children – is forced to do so, with threats of reprisals for each
Frelilin attack. Such reprisals occurred in Iliomar last January when over 40 civilians were shot by the occupiers, and last May in Viqueque where the enemy position inside the camp killed over 50 civilians with mortars and grenades concentrated near a building.

This is the constant threat hanging over the East Timorese population, the real face of military control by the occupation forces. The herded population, unable to survive without crops, tries to escape the vigilance and control of the enemy in order to scavenge for food in the bush, facing the risk of being caught by patrols and massacred on suspicion of being in contact with Frelilin.

On the misuse of relief aid from abroad, he says:
The resources of UNESCO are being used to serve Indonesian policy. The women whose husbands were massacred by the Indonesians and who agree not to work for the resistance and to spy for the Indonesians are the ones who receive the food, tins of condensed milk and rotten corn.

The liberation movement is very bitter about the favourable reports produced by government delegations that have visited East Timor under Indonesian auspices:
Several governments who use the rhetoric of human rights are in fact accomplices in the crimes committed in East Timor. Indonesia has spread false propaganda, claiming absolute control of East Timor, seeking thereby to guarantee total impunity for its policy of genocide and occupation carried out in our homeland. Several delegations manipulated by Jakarta have given false testimony about the real situation in East Timor. Tanks and assault vehicles are hidden outside the towns, war materials are stored (away) and the occupation troops wear civilian clothes while a few privileged Timorese are made to perform for puppets to impress the visitors. Prisoners are transferred to other locations and strong security placed around the towns. The population is threatened and told not to speak, and security prevents them approaching the visitors. These are different aspects of a farce repeatedly used by the murderous occupiers of our homeland. In fact, when foreign visitors ask (questions) about massacres, they are asking the torturers and the puppet governor.

Frelilin is particularly angry about the Australian government's stand, warning that Hawke's statement of 16 August will encourage Jakarta to intensify military operations against the population. This political and diplomatic support will encourage the military to commit even more atrocities against a defenceless population:

Recently, the Australian government pronounced an irresponsible and unscrupulous policy, recognising the military control and brutal repression of our people as supposed Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, with the intention of facilitating negotiations with Jakarta about deposits of oil and natural gas in our southern sea. We totally repudiate the idea that humanitarian concern motivates the Australian government in this dirty political manoeuvre to cover up economic interests. In the concrete case of the Timor Gap, the rights of the East Timorese people have been usurped in this operation.

The message makes a strong appeal to the Non-Aligned Movement to condemn Indonesian aggression and makes the following proposals:
1) To allow entry of independent observers to study the real situation in East Timor.
2) To allow entry of humanitarian organisations to give direct assistance to the needy population with clothing and medicine.
3) To consider the proposals for a solution put forward by Frelilin.

The message in conclusion recalls the original spirit of the Non-Aligned Movement, putting emphasis on its anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle:
Due to the character of the Non-Aligned Movement, the just struggle of this small and defenceless Haubere people is an integral part of the liberation struggles of peoples of the Third World against imperialism and colonialism and against the expansionist ambitions of the big nations who wish to subjugate by force small and frail peoples. We are confident that you will give due consideration to the sufferings of the oppressed people of East Timor who for ten years have resisted Indonesia's genocidal war of occupation.

Catholic Church's concern for East Timor grows

The low-profile visit of Mgr Carlos Ximenes Belo, Apostolic Administrator of Dili, to the Vatican in June this year led to speculations that he may be seeking asylum abroad. Only since his return have the facts about the activities of the leader of the East Timor Church while abroad become public:

Mgr Belo's efforts to seek a just solution for East Timor were revealed in an interview with Jacques Guillou, AFP correspondent in Jakarta, just before returning to Dili. He told AFP he had gone abroad "to try to launch new negotiations between Frelilin and Indonesia". When he met the Pope on 5 July, the Pope told him "to work for the Church, to fight the suffering of the people and to seek for a right solution for peace in Timor." He quoted the Pope as saying: "Now, Timor represents the most difficult problem in the world."

It is very difficult to know the real facts "because there is no free information in Timor". Regarding recent visits of journalists and diplomats to East Timor, he said that their reports were of little significance. "Even if these people are independent, they cannot say the truth because they are too closely guarded to see the truth." He only wished visitors could see more than the Indonesian military wanted them to see, that "they will be able to go into the villages and discuss freely with the population and not always with the governor, the military chief and the bishop (ie. himself)."

He also explained how carefully he had to manoeuvre. It had taken him 7 months to obtain clearance from the military to go abroad. This was why he kept a low profile while abroad: "I didn't want to speak with journalists in Rome because I know I could have difficulties getting back to Dili."

/AFP report, 8 August telefax from Hongkong

Mgr Belo meets Portuguese leaders

Mgr Belo also made a brief, unannounced visit to Lisbon while there sought appointments with President Eanes and Prime Minister Soares. Fearing that he was being followed by Indonesian secret agents, he met the Prime Minister and the President's personal aide at the Vatican's diplomatic mission where he had sought diplomatic protection.

He informed them of the serious situation and the continued flight of refugee bishops (Indonesian) graves regularly filling up in Dili cemetery. He himself had officiated at a series of burials of Indonesian Catholic officers. When asked by Prime Minister Soares about the communist nature of Frelilin, Mgr Belo who is known to be sympathetic towards Frelilin, dismissed the claim as nonsensical. He said they were pure nationalists.

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Continued opposite
PNG ready to give homes to refugees?

At last, the West Papuan refugee problem in Papua New Guinea appears to be moving towards a constructive solution. In a press statement on 17 September, Prime Minister Michael Somare said his government would sympathetically consider resettlement in PNG for those refugees not willing to return home, while continuing discussions with Jakarta on the repatriation of those wishing to return. Reuters reports him as adding that he would not allow OPM activities on PNG territory, saying: "For those who feel they want to make Papua New Guinea not a haven for illegal activities but who want to make PNG their country, of course this would be considered on their merits." (Jakarta Post, 17 September) It remains to be seen whether this will modify Somare's shift towards a more welcoming policy towards the refugees.

Although Prime Minister Somare's statement seems like a move in the right direction, the enormous difficulties still lying ahead should not be underestimated. PNG is currently facing an economic crisis and a budgetary deficit of major proportions. (PNG Times, 8 September) Its main source of revenue, mineral exports, has fallen dramatically because of low prices on the world market. The country's dependence on Australia is far from healthy. Most analysts stress that Australia is propping up the PNG economy with $300 million annually in aid but the balance of trade between the two countries is almost four to one in Australia's favour, producing huge profits for the latter's economy, which means that the propping up goes the other way round, a classical neo-colonial relationship.

As far as PNG's relations with Indonesia is concerned, Australia has shown a total lack of policy on the border issue. Recently, the influential Australian Financial Review commented that it was about time Australia formulated a clear policy on the PNG-Indonesian border region. There is "an increasingly glaring weakness in Australian foreign policy", the paper wrote, adding that Foreign Minister Bill Hayden has "created a real paradox in his pursuit of a sensible contemporary Australian regional foreign policy by pursuing a strong line on Vietnam, yet keeping totally aloof in policy terms from the Irian Jaya-PNG refugee problem". (Quoted in Pacific Islands Monthly, September 1985)

Australia's 'velvet glove' policy towards the generals' regime and its invisibility on the refugees raises serious doubts whether Canberra will be willing to support Somare's intentions to give the 11,000 refugees a new home.

More refugees cross the border

In the meantime, Indonesian military operations in the interior of West Papua have caused yet more villagers to flee towards the border. The BBC reported on 2 September that some 500 had arrived at Yapsiei in PNG's West Sepik province where they have built themselves temporary camps.

The Bishop of Vanimo, Father John Etheridge, who is closely connected with the welfare of refugees recently warned that prolonged camp life is causing tensions. "From what I can see, there is quite a bit of frustration building up in the camps. There is bound to be tension when people are stuck in one little spot and they don't know whether they are going to be allowed to stay or forced back to Irian Jaya." (The Australian, 4 September)

Background to the military operations in Panjait

In TAPOL Bulletin No. 70, July 1985, we reported the heavy loss of life in villages in the Papuan highlands as a result of Indonesian military operations. A report dated 26 July from Markas Victoria, headquarters of the OPM, provides some background information. It states that early in April this year, a serious clash occurred between Indonesian troops and OPM guerrillas during which the Indonesians lost 30 dead, three seriously injured and seven slightly injured.

In retaliation, a large reinforcement of troops was dispatched to the area to carry out operations against the defenceless inhabitants of various villages. During the course of one month, from 4 June till 6 July, 517 villagers were killed. The new military commander of the province, Major General Hasudungan Simanjuntak, has declared the whole region to be "rawan" (disturbed).
A long-awaited move towards unification between the two wings of the OPM has now taken place with the signing in Port Vila, the capital of Vanuatu, of a declaration on 11 July between the two OPM leaders in exile, Seth Runkorem and Jacob Prai. After nine years of discord and acrimony, they formally declared a truce and undertook to work together.

Last November, the first moves towards unification occurred with an agreement (a copy of which was only recently received) signed between the two wings inside West Papua, with M. Prawar representing Markus Victoria, the Runkorem headquarters, and Fisor Jarisetow representing Markus Perka, the Prai headquarters.

The Port Vila declaration contains a pledge to safeguard the "survival right of the Melanesian race in West Papuan. Both leaders admit that due to their disagreements, many casualties had fallen and the Indonesian military had been the ones to benefit. If disunity continues, they said, the result will be "the obliteration of the Melanesian race in West Papua". Various plans were mentioned, and it is envisaged that a new name will be agreed upon for the reunified national liberation movement. Agreement was reached on a division of responsibilities, with Jacob Prai taking charge of the political side of the movement and Seth Runkorem in charge of military activities. At a future meeting the date of which is not yet fixed, and new structure and constitution will be discussed.

Resettling 'isolated' communities encounters resistance

A brief news item in Kompas (27 August) quotes A. Sukanto, the district chief of Fakfak in Irian Jaya (West Papua) as complaining that the programme to resettle 'isolated' communities in government-designated villages is not going according to plan. While claiming that the programme is "in response to the wishes of the people", he contrasts himself with adding that "there still are people who want to remain in their places of origin".

The trouble with refusal to comply with the programme, says Sukanto, is that it hinders the work of officials in charge of "giving guidance" because they cannot reach the remote places where 'isolated people' live.

In a cautiously critical article, Kobar dari Kampung, the publication of the Irian Jaya Community Development Foundation (3-4/Vol. I, 1985) says three government departments are involved in the programme: the Interior Ministry whose aim is to "improve the security situation"; the Forestry Department which wants to develop the physical area but not the indigenous people; and the Social Affairs Ministry whose aim is to "improve the ideological, economic and socio-cultural welfare of those people and to improve the security situation".

Timika, a Fakfak district targeted for resettlement of 'isolated people' is a region of much social discontent, writes KKB. It agrees on the need to help indigenous people, but the plan to turn Timika into a transmigration site for 40,000 people "may develop the physical area but not the indigenous people".
The reorganisation of the Indonesian armed forces

Part III

The Navy and the Air Force

Four years after Suharto seized power, the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) underwent a major re-organisation which was carried out from October 1969 to April 1970. The primary objective of the Army leaders then was to destroy the independence of the Navy and Air Force chiefs by abolishing their authority over military operations, thus removing any threat to the Army’s control of state power.

The prevailing view in Army circles was: "The integration of the Armed Forces will prevent the occurrence of situations that arise in Latin America where a seizure of power is always accompanied by activities on the part of one of the armed forces or of individuals within the Armed Forces." (Indonesia Magazine, No. 1, 5 December 1969, page 83) Integration meant the total subordination of the other three forces, the Police, the Air Force and the Navy to the Army High Command. The 1969 re-organisation firmly established the Army’s organisational ascendacy and supremacy over the other three forces.

While the Police Force has now up to a point been decoupled from the Army (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 70, July 1985), the power relationship established in 1969 has not been disturbed by the present re-organisation.

The Navy (ALRI)

The Navy is being trimmed down in numbers even more drastically than the Army. It has been squeezed into two commands, losing its territorial character. It has now been re-organised into what is essentially an operation-oriented structure. The two commands are the Eastern Fleet (Armada Kawasan Timur or Armatim) and the Western Fleet (Armada Kawasan Barat or Armabar). Naval personnel are to be reduced and the number of flag officers will be cut from 70 to 46. The Navy’s Chief-of-Staff, Admiral M. Romly says that rigorous procedures will be used to select top-ranking officers and between 3,000 and 4,000 naval officers will be pensioned off. Unlike the Army, he asserts, there are no ‘generational problems’ in the Navy; he is the only remaining ‘1945-generation’ officer in the force.

The two Fleets will operate from five major bases known as Lontanal (Pangkalan Utama or Prime Bases) located in Tanjung Pinang (Riau), Teluk Ratal (Lampung, South Sumatra) which is still to be built, Surabaya (East Jawa), Bitung (North Sulawesi) and Ambon (Maluku). The relative strengths of the two Fleets is as yet difficult to assess. Eastern Fleet operations will cover a vast area with numerous islands and seas where foreign vessels (surface and submarine) have free passage, with illegal Japanese and Taiwanese trawlers operating with impunity.

It is acknowledged internationally that four of the sixteen strategically most important straits in the world (in terms of their use for international sea traffic) are located within the Indonesian archipelago: the Malacca Strait, the Lombok Strait, the Ombai Strait and the Weta Strait. Major disturbances in any of these straits could sever the connection between the Pacific Ocean and the Asian mainland. According to Admiral Romly, the locations for the five Lontanal have been chosen with these geographic and strategic considerations in mind.

The Tanjung Pinang Base will take charge of an operational area stretching from the Malacca Strait to the Natuna Islands, safeguarding the country from ‘threats from the north’ from the South China Sea. The

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Mochtar, the racist

The following extracts are from an interview of Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, by Peter Hastings, published in the Sydney Morning Herald on 16 August 1980:

The best thing Indonesia has done for its Melanesian people in Irian Jaya is to get them off "the habit of drinking beer", Indonesia’s Foreign Minister tells me.

He is relaxed in an armchair in his Pejambon office... The Foreign Minister is at the top of his engaging form...

...He maintains that because Melanesians have been weaned from beer in Irian Jaya, "Jayapura is a safer place than Port Moresby... you can’t mix primitive people with alcohol. It’s a recipe for disaster everywhere whether it’s American Indians or Australian Aborigines, or whoever. You bring them into contact with alcohol and you destroy them."

On the subject of the PNG border, he says, "I have done well. I have handled the PNG thing right!" This is a reference to the Indonesian policy of not bringing pressure to bear on Port Moresby over the border crossings. "A lot have come back to Irian Jaya, about 2,000 (sic). The ones who stay in PNG do so because they don’t have to work. We don’t want people who don’t want to work."

...But suppose the camps become "bases" from which OPM supervisors can move across the border into Irian Jaya, ferment trouble and move back into their PNG sanctuary? "The problem is for the PNG," he insists. "We want Irianese who are able and willing to work because we want them to become full-time citizens of Indonesia and to pay their way like everyone else."

...But what were his thoughts on the Irianese on Thursday Island who had been denied refugee status in Australia? "The biggest problem of these Irianese or Papuans or whatever you call them is that they have different cultural values. If they can manage it, they want to go through life doing nothing at all. We don’t need people like that."
Two more books by the Indonesian writer and former political prisoner, Pramoedya Ananta Toer were published in Jakarta on 23 September. The two books are Jejak Langkah, the third part of his tetralogy, and Sang Pemula (The One Who Began), a biography of the first nationalist journalist, Tirto Adhi Soerjo, the man on whom the principal character in the tetralogy is based. We are pleased to be able to publish a review of one of the books written by Basuki Resobowo, a close colleague of the author's, who is now living in political exile in Holland.

Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Jejak Langkah (Footsteps), Huata Mira, Jakarta and Manus Amici, Amsterdam, 1985

Jeqak Langkah is the third part of the novel Pramoedya wrote while in detention on Buru Island, was in detention for 14 years, deprived of his freedom and living in acute hardship. In order to write, he had to steal time from the forced physical labour, political prisoners were required to do every day. He had no space for documentation, yet he managed to write four books. I am full of admiration for his outstanding achievement.

The first two parts of his tetralogy have already been published, This Earth of Mankind (1980) and Child of all Nations (1981). Both were treated enthusiastically by the Indonesian public and were startlingly successful, not only as novels, but commercially as well. Abroad, too, the books were acclaimed. The successes of this Leftist writer of Lekra (the People's League for Culture), was held as a PKI political prisoner, shocked the authorities of the Dutch military regime. The two books were banned and all copies were confiscated and copies were burnt by the authorities. There were many protests abroad, and in Indonesia a resistance movement was tightened, many people expressed their anger at the brutal way the authorities treated Pramoedya's books. Now we all wait to see what the US will do about it.

The decision to ban Pras's books is quite incomprehensible. These novels show how hard it is to understand the history and times under colonialism, all of which is very important for people born after Indonesian independence. The present generation is incapable of reflecting on the growth of the Indonesian nation and state. Knowledge of Indonesia is confined to a schematic view of history consisting of a chain of events that occurred in the feudal era, the colonial era, during the Japanese occupation and after independence. Pras's books provide a different perspective altogether and should be compulsory reading for anyone aspiring to be a well-educated Indonesian.

Jeqak Langkah continues the story begun in the first two parts of the tetralogy. This is a hard life for Indonesians during the colonial era when they enjoyed no legal rights, and the only laws for Europeans and oriental foreigners. For native Indonesians there was only custom law, which protected the interests of the aristocracy (priyayi) while ordinary people had nothing but the duty to serve their superiors. Such was the fate of Nyai Ontosoroh, the young village girl, who was sold to a plantation owner, and of Minke who was not permitted to marry a girl of Dutch colonial stock. He chose the women he marries, the Chinese women, Mei, and later a Malay girl, for his independence from tradition. Minke also mixes freely with colonial government officials despite his father's misgivings, whose traditionalist background teaches him otherwise.

Minke becomes involved in social, economic and political affairs, and we come to know how he has to choose between political freedom and his family. The way he chooses the women he marries, first a Chinese women, Mei, and later a Malay girl, Minke's story involves a struggle for workers' rights and better wages. Gradually a conflict unfolds between the two books: A struggle for ideological upbringing, the religion of Islam, and his material circumstances, which create a deep bond between Minke and Mei.

Then comes the realisation that the struggle to free human beings from exploitation and oppression must mean forging international links with the countries of the neighbouring countries like China, Indo-China, Malya and the Philippines. These are the things that create the deep bond between Minke and Mei.

I cannot end without saying how proud I feel, as a member of Lekra, that my Lekra colleague Pras should have become the first Indonesian writer to produce a tetralogy of this calibre, a four-part masterpiece. The first three are novels and the fourth, entitled The Glasshouse, is a satire.

And finally, would like to ask Wiratmo Sukitno, the man who initiated the Cultural Manifesto, and his like: what have you all got to fear from a new form of culture enjoying 20 years of protection under the Sukarto military regime, freed from the shackles which you discussed Lekra of placing on your creative activity? To this day, I have seen nothing spectacularly produced by any of you in literature, painting, music, drama, dance or film. The sad thing is that the State of the Nation, which provides fertile soil for artistic creativity. On the contrary, it has thrown a man who you discuss Lekra of placing on your creative activity? To this day, I have seen nothing spectacularly produced by any of you in the USA and western Europe.

Basuki Resobowo

1) The Cultural Manifesto (Manikebu) was a proclamation issued by anti-Lekra artists in 1964.

Book review

It goes on to tell the story of this young Indonesian freeing himself from the yoke of traditional ties and colonial oppression. An example of his book on this is the way he chooses the women he marries, first a Chinese women, Mei, and later a Malay girl, Minke. He also mixes freely with colonial government officials despite his father's misgivings, whose traditionalist background teaches him otherwise.

Minke also becomes involved in social, economic and political affairs, and we see how he has to choose between political freedom and his family. The way he chooses the women he marries, first a Chinese women, Mei, and later a Malay girl, Minke's story involves a struggle for workers' rights and better wages. Gradually a conflict unfolds between the two books: the ideological upbringing, the religion of Islam, and his material circumstances, which create the deep bond between Minke and Mei.

Then comes the realisation that the struggle to free human beings from exploitation and oppression must mean forging international links with the countries of the neighbouring countries like China, Indo-China, Malya and the Philippines. These are the things that create the deep bond between Minke and Mei.

I cannot end without saying how proud I feel, as a member of Lekra, that my Lekra colleague Pras should have become the first Indonesian writer to produce a tetralogy of this calibre, a four-part masterpiece. The first three are novels and the fourth, entitled The Glasshouse, is a satire.

And finally, would like to ask Wiratmo Sukitno, the man who initiated the Cultural Manifesto, and his like: what have you all got to fear from a new form of culture enjoying 20 years of protection under the Sukarto military regime, freed from the shackles which you discussed Lekra of placing on your creative activity? To this day, I have seen nothing spectacularly produced by any of you in literature, painting, music, dance, drama or film. The sad thing is that the State of the Nation, which provides fertile soil for artistic creativity. On the contrary, it has thrown a man who you discuss Lekra of placing on your creative activity? To this day, I have seen nothing spectacularly produced by any of you in the USA and western Europe.

Basuki Resobowo
Red-beret clique takes charge

C.I. Santosa, a counter-insurgency expert, now heads transmigration bureaucracy.

On 31 July, Major-General Chalimi Imam Santosa, one of Indonesia’s leading generals, was appointed Secretary-General of the Department of Transmigration. His predecessor was also a general, indicating the importance the regime attaches to this job.

C.I. Santosa is of the so-called ‘bridging generation’, the graduates of the P3-AD, the provisional military academy set up in Bandung in 1950. Among his classmates who graduated in 1952 are General Benny Mursiadi, now Commander of the Armed Forces, Major-General Soedewo, now commander of the Strategic Reserve Command, KOSTRAD, Major-General Dadang Kabuadi, the ‘butcher’ of East Timor who is now Logistics Assistant of the Armed Forces, (Aslog ABRI), Major-General Soetoyo, now Intelligence Assistant of ABRI (Asintel ABRI) and Major-General Gunawan Wibisono who until his death in June this year was Social and Political Assistant of ABRI (Assospol ABRI). This P3-AD clique has now become the most influential group of generals within the Indonesian Army and ABRI as a whole.

C.I. Santosa together with his whole class of 1952 entered the red-beret paracommade corps which was known at the time as the RPKAD, later named Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus or Special Troops Command). In mid-1965 he became commander of the RPKAD First Battalion, taking over from Benny Mursiadi who had been sent on an Intelligence assignment, and was promoted to the rank of major.

During the 1 October 1965 events, he played a vital role in General Suharto’s military operations to assume control of Jakarta by commanding the RPKAD unit which retook the headquarters of the Indonesian Radio (FRU) assisted by Second-Lieutenant Sintong Panjaitan, the man recently appointed as commander of Kopassus. On 2 October, Major Santosa was assigned by Suharto to take over the Halim air-base which was under the control of ‘rebels’ troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Untung.

For the next few months, C.I. Santosa, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Sarwo Edhie, the notorious RPKAD chief (now the regime’s ideological supreme as head of the indoctrination board, P7), was involved in the army-led operations in Central Java which spearheaded the massacres in PKI and BTK (peasant union) strongholds. Blood-stained by these killings, he returned to Jakarta early in 1966 to become involved in the destabilisation operations of RPKAD, using the students to disrupt political and economic life in the capital which brought about the downfall of President Sukarno and the assumption of full power by General Suharto.

C.I. Santosa remained with the RPKAD for many years, commanding its newly-formed Group IV in 1967. In the early 1970s, he spent several years abroad, leading the Indonesian contingent attached to the UN Peace Keeping Force in the Middle East. After his return, he took on his first territorial assignment as Chief-of-Staff of the South Kalimantan Military Command, Kodam XV/Lambung Mangkurat and remained there till 1978 when he was appointed Kodam XVIII/Cenderawasih commander, in charge of counter-insurgency in turbulent West Papua.

In 1982, he was appointed to the top military ‘karyawan’ post as Karyawan Assistant of ABRI (Askari ABRI), in charge of military appointments in social and political affairs, and a year later he became head of ABRI’s Karyawan Guidance Body (Bobinark), which maintains control over all military men assigned to non-military posts.

C.I. Santosa’s latest appointment to one of the most important ‘karyawan’ postings is part of a number of recent appointments of people with a red-beret background, all of them men who make up Mursiadi’s inner circle. In the words of Indonesia Reports (No. 10, August 1985, page 61), “Santoso’s appointment is a further sign of Mursiadi’s increasing role in the transmigration programme, particularly in Irian Jaya where Santosa ran all counter-insurgency operations against the OPM. The appointment also signals President Suharto’s full-speed ahead instructions to Martono (Minister of Transmigration, TAPOL) on transmigration. Santosa’s last appointment afforded him intimate knowledge of where military officers were assigned to civilian positions in the government bureaucracy, thereby likely facilitating somewhat more inter-departmental cooperation and coordination in the transmigration effort.”

Brigadier-General Sintong Panjaitan, the newly-appointed commander of Kopassus, the paracommandos corps, has already had a long career of action and violence.

Born in Tarutung, North Sumatra on 4 September 1941, he went to Java in 1959 after finishing high school and became a cadet at the Military Academy in Magelang. After graduating in 1963, he joined the RPKAD, the predecessor of Kopassus, and won a reputation as a soldier of ‘valour’, always ready for combat.

On 1 October 1965, Panjaitan, then a second lieutenant, was in the detachment assigned to retake the radio (FRU) building which had been occupied by ‘rebels’ troops under Untung’s command. Soon afterwards, he went to Central Java with RPKAD troops on their murderous mission to exterminate whole villages of alleged communists or sympathisers. His next great ‘mission of valour’ was in East Timor when RPKAD troops were sent on numerous missions in an attempt to browbeat the population and reinforce Indonesia’s occupation.

He became a ‘public hero’ in 1981 when, already a lieutenant-colonel, he stormed a hijacked Garuda plane at Bangkok airport with orders from Benny Mursiadi to capture and kill the hijackers. All but one were killed in the attack, and the surviving hijacker was later killed as well. This feat earned him the ‘Bintang Sakti’ (sacred star) and promotion to the rank of colonel.

Prior to his present appointment, Sintong Panjaitan was commander of Pusada Linud in Batuajer, responsible for training Kopassus troops in Intelligence work and airborne activities.

He replaces Brigadier-General Wismoyo Arismunandar, former Kopassus commander, who was suddenly removed after incurring the displeasure of Mrs Tien Suharto, a close relative by marriage. Panjaitan starkly reflects the murderous image of Kopassus troops.

Sintong Panjaitan
Teluk Ratai Base in South Sumatra will be developed into a model naval base and is due to start functioning by the end of this century. Its main operational function will be protecting the Sunda Straits as the gateway to the Indian Ocean. A special team of engineers has been recruited to design this base, making it the most advanced naval base in the region.

Teluk Ratai has been chosen to replace the Surabaya Naval Base which is at present the Navy's main base. Surabaya, one of Indonesia's busiest commercial harbours and a centre for heavy sea traffic, is no longer considered suitable for naval operations, in particular for secret ship movements. Teluk Ratai, a relatively isolated and quiet area, offers a far more favourable alternative.

The Blutung Base in Menado, North Sulawesi is to become a 'forward base' protecting the frontiers in times of conflict along the line connecting the Malacca Strait, the Sulawesi Sea and the Sulu Sea. While no-one one mentions the country regarded by Indonesian military strategists as the likely 'threat', it is not difficult to conclude that they have a post-Marcos Philippines in mind.

Ambon is the headquarters of the fifth naval base, controlling the rich waters of the Moluccas with special emphasis on the Banda Sea, richer than any other sea in the world for its variety of fish. A major 20-year expansion programme has been launched to build the Navy along the lines envisaged. New orders for naval vessels have already been placed, two mine-sweepers from Holland, additional Type-209 submarines from West Germany and a series of PSK Mk-5-class patrol boats some of which are on order from South Korea, the remainder are to be built locally at the Surabaya shipyard, PT PAL.

The Air Force

The Air Force has also been rationalised into two operational commands, Operational Command I (Koopsau I) based in Jakarta and Operational Command II (Koopsau II) based in Ujung Pandang. Under the new structure, all air bases or Lanud (Pangkalan Udara) will assume the same responsibilities and will be equipped with the same number of jet fighter squadrons.

According to Air Chief-of-Staff, Air Marshall Sukardi, two factors have determined the choice of air-base locations - protecting the vital, strategic industrial centres and protecting the so-called rawan (security-prone) regions. The emphasis for the air-bases in the Western Koopsau I will be on attack squadrons while the Eastern Koopsau II will rely more on patrol squadrons for reconnaissance. This indicates that the military strategists regard the Asian mainland, primarily Vietnam and China, as the danger areas rather than countries on the periphery of their eastern waters, the Philippines and Australia.

Pakon Air Base will occupy a vital position situated at the crossroads between the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea. A new forward base called Ranai Air Base is being developed on the Natuna Islands, with another one on Weh Island, the most western tip of the Indonesian archipelago.

The main jet fighter currently being used by the Air Force is still the A-4 Skyhawk but ABRI chiefs are anxiously looking for a far more advanced aircraft like the F16, the F20 or the Mirage 2000. In the east, the Air Force will rely more on the slower Bronco OV10 and the Boeing 737-200, equipped with side-looking radar, to keep a lookout over the vast seas around Sulawesi, the Moluccas and the Lesser Sunda Islands.

Air Force personnel will also be cut in number, with special emphasis on the Air Force Special Command which was formerly known as Kopasat (Quick Reaction Forces Command), now to be called Paskhasau (Pasukan Khusus TNI-AU or Special Air Forcee Troops).

Centralised control

Operationally, the Navy and the Air Force will be firmly under the control of the ABRI commander, General Benny Mursi. The chiefs-of-staff of these two forces are non-vocal, colourless professionals by contrast with the Army chief-of-staff, General Rudini, and other senior Army commanders who often project a very public image. As far as these two forces are concerned, the emphasis is on the purchase of modern equipment and advanced technology. In the words of one naval officer, whereas in the Army, the focus is on manpower and the weapons needed to arm them (orang yang dipersenjatai), for the Navy and the Air Force, it is the hardware and weapons systems that count and the personnel needed to man them (senjata yang diwaki). Both forces will inevitably become technologically top-heavy.

Some non-military ABRI-watchers have expressed doubts about the ability of these two forces to cope with the advanced systems now under consideration for their use. The maintenance, operational and coordination requirements for these 'new toys' are formidable but if the ABRI leadership have their way and western arms exporters succeed in winning the orders they want, this is where much of Indonesia's diminishing stock of foreign currency will be spent.

Next issue: Part VI. Purchasing weapons for ABRI.

Stop Press

A fire almost completely gutted the studios of the Nusantara III network of Radio Republic Indonesia (RRI) in Banjarmasin, the capital of South Kalimantan, on 27 September. This follows a huge fire which completely destroyed RRI's central studios in Jakarta two months ago, on 20 July. (See TAPOL Bulletin No 70, July 1985)

Despite calls from various circles including people in the Army's political party, GOLKAR, the government has offered no explanation for the causes of the Jakarta RRI fire. The latest incident reinforces the impression that dissident groups may be directing their efforts at one of the regime's most powerful means of propaganda.

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