



VICTORIA UNIVERSITY
MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA

Tapol bulletin no, 64, July 1984


This is the Published version of the following publication

UNSPECIFIED (1984) Tapol bulletin no, 64, July 1984. Tapol bulletin (64). pp. 1-16. ISSN 1356-1154

The publisher's official version can be found at

Note that access to this version may require subscription.

Downloaded from VU Research Repository <https://vuir.vu.edu.au/26284/>



British Campaign for the Defence

of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

TAPOL Bulletin No. 64

July 1984

New Societies Law threatens future of many NGOs

A new law on social organisations, the Societies Law (*Undang-Undang Organisasi Kemasyarakatan*), which is now before the Indonesian Parliament, will have the effect of bringing every single organisation in the country under the direct control of the government and of compelling them all to give unreserved support to government policies. The draft law is one of five bills tabled by the government in June, for adoption by Parliament at its next session which starts in August. With all members of Parliament either hand-picked by the President or screened by the Interior Minister before their names could enter the electoral lists, there is no doubt whatever that the bills will be unanimously adopted.

The Societies Law will standardise and regulate a vast array of organisations which have come to be referred to broadly as “non-government organisations” (NGOs). All will be required to adopt Pancasila, the state dogma of five principles, as their sole basis and principle (*azas tunggal*).

In the past decade or so, many NGOs have come into existence as an expression of frustration and dissatisfaction with the political party system which has been totally domesticated to conform with the demands of the military rulers. The parties consist of GOLKAR, the government party controlled by the military, plus the PPP (Muslim) and the PDI (Nationalist and Christian) both of which are heavily infiltrated by the military and do not deviate any more from government policies.

Broadly speaking, the Societies Law will regulate four types of organisations:

–So-called “mass” organisations of workers, peasants, fishermen, women and the like. In fact, in all these sectors, single organisations now exist which comply with the military requirement for harmony and consensus and have no mass basis at all. They are nothing more than “empty houses” or “shop fronts” which have no relevance to the pressing needs of Indonesian people working (or not working) in various sectors of the economy. These organisations have nothing to fear from the new legislation; indeed, they epitomise the end result intended for the other NGOs.

–Religious organisations connected with the Protestant and Catholic churches, with Islam, and with the other two state-recognised religions, Hinduism and Buddhism. These are organisations which enjoy large followings.

–Professional organisations of lawyers, doctors, scientists and so on, some of which have until now been relatively free from


government intervention.

–A number of small NGOs set up to campaign on issues like environmental pollution, consumer protection, the promotion of intermediate technology, legal aid and human rights. These organisations have tried to use the little space still available, in some cases to very good effect.

Azas Tunggal

The compulsory adoption of Pancasila as the sole basis (*azas tunggal*) for every organisation is presenting religious organisations with a severe dilemma. At its conference last year, the Muslim students organisation, HMI refused to accept the “sole-ideology” requirement despite strong pressure from the Minister of Youth Affairs who attended the meeting. At the time, the HMI argued that it would not accept *azas tunggal* as the Societies Law had not yet been enacted, and the government was prepared to let the matter rest for the time being.

Leaders of both Protestant and Catholic churches have



From the banned defence plea of Sukmadji Indro Tjahjono, *Indonesia Under the Jackboot* (1979)

spoken of their anxiety over possible implications of the new Law, in separate interviews with **Sinar Harapan** (18 June 1984). The interviews suggest that the Catholics are more upset about the law than the Protestants. The General Secretary of the Indonesian Council of Churches (DGI), Dr S.A.E. Nababan, said that the Church is the creation of God, not of people, and cannot be regulated by temporal power. Mgr Leo Soekoto, the Secretary of the Indonesian Bishops Conference (MAWI), said that church bodies have Christianity as the basis for every facet of their activity. "Where must we now put our religion? Will it not mean replacing our religious beliefs with the Pancasila?" The government often claims that it does not want to replace religion by the Pancasila, but what we want, said Mgr Soekoto, is a firm guarantee in the Law itself that religion will be allowed to inspire all church organisational and community activity, as well as participation in national and state affairs. He wanted to know whether MAWI would now fall under the terms of the new law. MAWI is part of the Church structure regulated by the Vatican. Its members—the Bishops—are appointed by the Pope. The many Catholic orders are similarly part of international establishments and they, like charismatic organisations, exist solely to serve religious purposes. If such organisations are not explicitly excluded from the Law, they could find themselves being subject to government control (under **Article 12**) and could even be disbanded by the government (**Article 15**), said Mgr Soekoto.

Strict adherence to government policy

Other NGOs which by and large have no particular ideological tendency are not so troubled by the *azas tunggal* requirement; many probably already pay lip-service to Pancasila in their statutes. What troubles them is that they will now be subject to direct government control and intervention. The leadership of an NGO can be "frozen" (*dibekukan*) by the government if it "engages in activities that disturb security and the public order, accepts funds from abroad without government consent, or provides assistance to foreign groups in ways harmful to national and state interests". (**Article 13**). Any organisation that persists in such anti-government pursuits after its leadership has been "frozen" will be dissolved by the government (**Article 14**). An organisation can in any case be banned without going through the rigmarole of "freezing" the leadership.

As a means of making government intervention and control far more effective, the law requires that all organisations operating in the same area of activity must come together within a single organisation. This is precisely the tactic already used so effectively with trade unions, the peasant organisations, and indeed with the political parties that were all forced to merge in the early 1970s. The journalists' organisation, PWI, the only one of its kind, has been under tight military control for many years. Now, lawyers' organisations are under pressure to create a "single vehicle", with the Minister of Justice playing the leading role. The move is clearly designed to eliminate the role of the Bar Association (*Peradin*) which has so far preserved its independence from the government. As part of the process, splinter lawyers' organisations came into being which have now been able to insist on a say in the merger process, in other words, doing the government's bidding and making the merger appear to have grass-roots support.

Financial control

Besides arming the government with powers to ban organisations, the new Law makes it obligatory for all foreign financial assistance to obtain government approval. This method of control is certain to be used to prevent organisations from engaging in any activities not to the government's liking. Most NGOs are not large membership organisations; they are institutes or campaigning committees which assume responsibility for activities that are often varied and costly. A prime example is the Legal Aid Institutes which, among other things provide free legal aid or defence, and also run training or

advisory schemes to increase people's awareness of their legal rights and the ways to uphold these rights without necessarily going to court. Funding from abroad, through private channels has become important, but the new law will prevent funds from going to any organisation engaged in activities that do not meet with the government's approval.

NGOs will also be required to confine themselves to a one-dimensional approach with the government being the arbiter in determining whether such narrow constrictions are breached. Government control will be exerted through the Minister directly concerned with the area of operations of the NGO in question. Government control will thus be not simply a question of registration and de-registration; it will involve direct and continuous supervision over all NGOs.


With control over so many aspects of life already so tight, Indonesia's military rulers appear to have opted for a rather gradual approach in their latest move to eliminate all remaining independent organisational activity. The Societies Law will give existing organisations a transitional period of two years to bring themselves into line with the provisions of the law. By 1986, Indonesia's model of total conformity and the annihilation of the last remaining centres of criticism, will be in place.

The other bills

The four other bills tabled in the single packet of legislation prepared by the government involve the general elections, the political parties, Parliament and the "People's Assembly" (MPR) and a referendum requirement for any constitutional amendment. These bills represent little more than a tidying up of existing legislation which already safeguards the regime against any challenge to its rule. The new law on the political parties will only introduce the requirement that parties bring themselves into line with the *azas tunggal* principle. Both PPP and PDI have in fact already done so. The new law on Parliament and the MPR increases the number of seats in these two rubber-stamp bodies to 500 and a thousand respectively and provides for 100 and 200 presidentially-appointed representatives from the Armed Forces instead of the 75 and 150 seats they now hold. The referendum bill is simply a device to make any amendment to the Constitution even less likely than it now is.

Internal exile law

The five bills before Parliament do not include the internal exile law, the draft of which was leaked last year (see **TAPOL Bulletin No. 61**, January 1984). The Armed Forces have apparently decided to keep this particularly repressive piece of legislation for the next round of parliamentary business, after the *azas tunggal* principle has been established by law. The internal exile legislation will grant extra-judicial powers to the president to order people into exile for up to ten years, without any recourse to the courts, if he regards them as detrimental to state interests. Internal exile was widely practised against tens of thousands of political prisoners held without charge or trial for alleged "communist sympathies" in the 1960s and 1970s. The new law will make literally anyone subject to such arbitrary exile.



From *Indonesia Under the Jackboot* (1979)

The killing of Arnold Ap and Eddy Mofu

Arnold Ap, curator of the Anthropological Museum in Jayapura and leader of the Mambesak West Papuan Arts Group, was killed by Indonesian security forces at the end of April (see **TAPOL Bulletin** 63, May 1984). His funeral, though screened by Indonesian intelligence, was attended by over one thousand people, evidence of his extraordinary popularity and the great respect for a person who sought to preserve Papuan culture in the face of Indonesia's destructive policies.

It has now become clear that from the time of his arrest up to his death, Arnold was the victim of a long catalogue of legal abuses. Virtually every aspect of his detention was in violation of the Indonesian procedural code (KUHAP), and his death has received no official explanation from the Indonesian Government, although the circumstances surrounding it give grounds to believe he was deliberately killed by the Indonesian Armed Forces.

Arnold Ap was arrested on 30 November 1983 (see **TAPOL Bulletin** 61, January 1984), and detained by KOPASSANDHA (para-commandos) at its Panorama Detention Centre in Jayapura. He was not charged with any offence, his family were not told of his whereabouts, and he had been arrested by the military, all of which contravened the procedural code. His case attracted the attention of the Legal Aid Institute (LBH), which protested about the legal irregularities, and the newspaper **Sinar Harapan** also reported details of his arrest. The Government reacted by severely reprimanding the paper, a veiled threat of complete closure, while KOPASSANDHA intensified its interrogation of Arnold in an attempt to discover who was informing the press about his case. The publicity may have had some positive effect, however, because on 20 January 1984, Arnold and four other KOPASSANDHA detainees were transferred to the Irian Jaya Police Command, under the jurisdiction of the provincial Chief of Police. Then, on 25 February, their case was put into the hands of the Public Prosecutor's Office. This should have meant that Arnold's case would go before the court, or that he would be released within 50 days, according to the procedural code. Neither of these things happened.

Arnold remained in police custody until his death. There have been different accounts of what happened to him and his four companions between the time they were last seen in prison and the discovery of Arnold's body. The most improbable explanation comes from Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, who protested angrily over letters of concern over Arnold Ap's death by a number of Australian academics who normally support Jakarta's line. Mochtar said Arnold had been killed in a shoot-out at sea (**Sydney Morning Herald**, 11 June), and claimed his information came from the highly unlikely source of the Australian Ambassador in Jakarta. According to Mochtar, the five men had escaped from prison with the help of a guard. But Alex Mebri, the only one of the five who escaped and reached PNG, says they were all taken out of prison in a military vehicle, from which he was able to jump while being taken to what he assumed later to have been their place of execution. It is not yet certain exactly what happened, but on 23 April Eddy Mofu's body was found, bruised and disfigured, washed up on a beach near Jayapura. On 26 April, Arnold's body was discovered at the Aryoko Hospital in Jayapura by a Papuan employee there. His body was also bruised, and there were three bullet wounds in the stomach. The other two men, Johannes Romainum and Augustinus Runtuboi, were recaptured (it now appears that Romainum was not killed, as reported in **TAPOL Bulletin** 63). Romainum is being held in police custody, and the military have paraded Runtuboi around in front of students at Cendrawasih University to give their version of the killings.

Arnold's wife and family did not attend his funeral, as they


were among the first people to flee to Papua New Guinea. He did not manage to get the legal aid he needed in Jayapura, because of the flight of local lawyers to PNG. The whole tragic episode of Arnold's imprisonment and death has made one point clear to West Papuans—that the Indonesian military dispenses with all humanitarian and legal standards as a matter of routine, whether it be to eliminate OPM sympathisers, or to silence someone who, more than anyone else, personified Papuan cultural and national aspirations. This can only harden the attitude of Papuans towards increasingly repressive rule by Indonesia.

LBH calls for independent enquiry

The Legal Aid Institute has called on the government to set up an enquiry into the death of Arnold Ap, and to end "the conspiracy of silence". LBH Director, T. Mulya Lubis, visited Jayapura in June when he heard from several sources that Ap was killed while he was in the hands of the security forces. The commission of enquiry should include "people from outside like lawyers and reporters, so the independent nature of the committee could be maintained". (**Sydney Morning Herald**, 30 June 1984)

Yap Thiam Hien, Vice-Chairman of the LBH, who accompanied Lubis on his trip, spoke of a climate of fear in Jayapura, "fear of being arrested, tortured and killed", which had driven thousands into neighbouring Papua New Guinea (**The Age**, 6 July 1984)

Mr Yap, who is also a member of the Indonesian Council of Churches, said it is a matter for regret that both Protestant and Catholic churches in the territory have kept silent about the situation there. (**Kompas**, 29 June 1984)



ARNOLD AP

Many border villages deserted

Thousands more refugees have fled to Papua New Guinea because of continued Indonesian army operations in villages in West Papua. International aid agencies have become concerned over the welfare of refugees who have arrived in remote parts of PNG along the border, many of whom may be receiving little or no assistance. There are reports that some refugees have been forced to go back into West Papua because food and shelter are not available for them at the small mission stations on the PNG side of the border.

The number of West Papuan refugees in PNG has continued to increase since they first started arriving in February, and there are now over 10,000 camped all along the 700km border. It has also been suggested by the UN High Commission for Refugees that there may be more refugees in the forests who have not yet been accounted for. The greatest number have arrived in PNG since April, when the total began to rise dramatically; most of these are located just south of the central mountain range. In this district, around the mission station of Komopkin, there are over 6,000 refugees, far more than any mission station could possibly support. The Indonesian press admits that over 7,000 people¹ left their villages in the area of West Papua immediately adjacent to Komopkin. This means that the fate of about 1,000 people is still unknown. There have been other disturbing reports, from the UNHCR, from mission sources in PNG and from the OPM, of numbers of bodies, presumed to be refugees, being found near the border, although these have yet to be confirmed.

The refugees present the PNG Government with a humanitarian problem of major proportions. But PNG is still under pressure from Indonesia to treat the problem as an internal matter between the two countries. Consequently, the UNHCR has not been permitted to visit areas of PNG which have received the majority of refugees (the UN agency is only allowed a presence in Vanimo, on the north coast) and there has been no assessment of the conditions in which most are having to live. The UNHCR has not been able to get aid to these remote parts of the border, and although the missions are now requesting assistance through their parent organisations, this may be too late to help many of the refugees.

Refugees returning, claim military officials


The first reports of refugees returning to West Papua came in the Indonesian press, which for the first time is reporting developments in West Papua almost every day. There is no independent confirmation of these reports. The papers have been covering a series of publicity campaigns by the Indonesian authorities which are trying to create the impression that there are no serious problems in West Papua. The campaign has been notable for the prominent role of the military commander of the region, General Sembiring, and the Deputy-Governor, General Sugiyono. Both men are East Timor veterans with experience of population control. Sugiyono has made several well reported visits to areas from which refugees have fled, and his statements have been quite open about the numbers of people involved in the mass exodus. *Sinar Harapan* (29 June), reporting Sugiyono's visit to the areas of Merauke province adjacent to Komopkin, said that in Waropka District, out of a population of 6,094, 4,350 people had fled, and nine villages out of fourteen were deserted; 456 people were said to have returned. In the sub-district of Mindiptanah, 3,290 people had fled, out of a total population of 8,506, and 1,846 had apparently returned.² Other observers who have visited the area recently confirm that large numbers of villages are completely deserted.

Sugiyono has made much of the plans to relocate people in this area to new, controlled population centres with amenities such as markets, co-operatives and schools. This is ostensibly because many of the deserted villages were destroyed, for which

the authorities blame the OPM although evidence suggests it was the work of the Indonesian Armed Forces. But the publicity is doubtless meant to give the impression that returning refugees will be well treated, so that attempts to accord West Papuans in PNG refugee status and give them the choice not to return will be weakened. Such widespread destruction of villages with immediate plans for replacing them with new population centres may also be evidence of attempts by the military to relocate people strategically, in order to deny support to the OPM and tighten control in the border area. This part of Merauke province will not be ready for transmigration sites for some years, so the forced absorption of local people into Javanese transmigrant communities is not yet possible there. It is worth noting that these developments are comparable with the strategic hamlet programme in East Timor during the late 1970s, which aimed to deprive Fretilin of its popular support base.

1 See footnote (2)

2 On 19 July, *Sinar Harapan* reported another trip to these areas, this time by the Governor, Izaak Hindom. This report said that 5,032 people had deserted Mindiptanah villages, and 4,358 had fled from Waropka villages for a total of nearly 9,400. This report said nothing about any villagers returning from PNG, only that "efforts to find and return these lost villagers" were under way.



Indonesian journalist gets a taste of Papuan anger

An Indonesian journalist who visited Blackwater camp near Vanimo recently got a taste of the deep hatred for Indonesia felt by Papuan refugees in Papua New Guinea. The journalist, Susanto Pudjomartono of *Tempo*, describes in his detailed report of the visit how he encountered hostility as soon as the word got round that an Indonesian was in the camp. His escort, an official of the PNG Department of Foreign Affairs, tried to persuade the refugees to talk to Susanto.

Soon we were surrounded by dozens of people, some of them shaking with fury. "We don't want any Indonesians here," said one. "Indonesia is criminal. Throw him out."

... The atmosphere became very tense as the crowd grew in size. "Cut his throat," said one, to which others responded, "Indonesians are cruel. They have murdered 150,000 Irianese in the past 20 years." Another clutched his hair with one hand and pointed the other at me, saying, "Anyone without curly hair isn't welcome here."

Susanto then explains how the PNG escort tried to persuade the crowd, by now several hundred people, to step back, but the argument continued. As some pressed forward, others tried to calm them down. Eventually, things quietened down and two of

the crowd of some 300 people, which included quite a lot of women and children, stepped forward. One introduced himself as Tom who used to teach at Cendrawasih University, and said he had been a regular reader of *Tempo*.

He said I could only take a look at the camp, but first they wanted to display some banners and posters. They were all written in English and appealed to the UN to intervene and resolve the question of Irian Jaya.

After making a brief tour of the camp, Susanto and his escort arrived back near the road where their car was parked. Suddenly the escort shouted:

"Run, quick. Things are getting dangerous." From the direction of the barracks, a long line of people were marching, bearing the OPM flag. There were some men running in front, wearing army fatigues like Indonesian uniforms, and they were shouting.

We took to our heels and fled. I tried to take a few shots with my camera. By the time I reached the car, I was covered in sweat. The engine had been started up already, but some people in the crowd were running in front of the car. We heard the police shout to the crowd to step back, and one of the policemen fired a warning shot. Even before the car doors had closed, the vehicle moved away very fast. I heard my escort take a deep breath and say, "That was a near thing." We travelled at high speed all the way back, covering 25 kms in just ten minutes.

Tempo, 9 June 1984



A photo taken by Susanto Pudjomartono in Blackwater Camp. (*Tempo*, 9 June 1984)

MPs call for UNHCR control over refugees

Sixty Members of Parliament have supported a call in the House of Commons for the UNHCR to be allowed a direct role in handling the problem of refugees from West Papua now in Papua New Guinea. Four of the six sponsors of the Motion are from the Conservative Party and the other two are Labour. Altogether 39 of the signatories are from the Labour Party, 15 are from the Conservative Party and 6 from the Liberal Party. The Motion, which will continue to collect signatures up to the end of the present session in early August, reads as follows:

That this House, gravely concerned that the Government of Papua New Guinea intends to return immediately 8,000 refugees who have fled to Papua New Guinea from the Indonesian Province of Irian Jaya and whose lives are in danger if they go back without the involvement of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, calls on Her Majesty's Government as a member of the Commonwealth to press the Governments of Papua New Guinea and Indonesia not to send back any refugees without involving the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and to permit the United

Nations High Commission for Refugees to screen refugees so that their exact status may be ascertained.

Sponsors: Jerry Hayes, Alfred Dubs, Peter Bottomley, Dave Nellist, Robin Squire and Cyril D. Townsend.

Signatories: Austin Mitchell, Paddy Ashdown, Greg Knight, D.N. Campbell-Savours, Ernie Ross, William McKelvey, David Knox, James Tinn, Roland Boyes, Robin Corbett, Frank Cook, Ernie Roberts, Clare Short, Robert Parry, Dennis Canavan, Laurie Pavitt, Ivan Lawrence, Richard Caborn, Dr Norman A. Goodman, Sir Bernard Braine, Russell Johnston, Sydney Bidwell, Simon Hughes, Tom Clarke, Sean Hughes, Eric Deakin, Dr John Marek, Allan Rogers, Tony Lloyd, Bill Michie, Harry Cohen, Joan Maynard, Michael Meadowcroft, Gerald Bermingham, David Atkinson, Piers Merchant, David Alton, Harry Greenway, Alex Carlile, John Fraser, Dr Jeremy Bray, Robert Litherland, Reg Freeson, Bowen Wells, George Park, Tony Banks, Norman Buchan, Patrick Ground, Charles Irving, Bob McTaggart, Chris Smith, Andrew Hunter, Mark Fisher and Ron Brown.

Seth Rumkorem[★] speaks at the UN

For the first time ever, a representative of the West Papua independence movement, OPM, has addressed a UN body, drawing attention to the human rights violations in his country, and condemning the fact that his people have been denied the right to self-determination. Speaking in August to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Seth Rumkorem, leader of the OPM who is now living in exile in Europe, drew attention to the role the UN played in 1962 in allowing Indonesia to occupy and rule West Papua in defiance of all accepted principles of decolonisation and self-determination, and urged the UN to take up its responsibility now to help find a peaceful solution to West Papua's tragic situation.

Seth Rumkorem's appearance before the Working Group was sponsored by the London-based Anti-Slavery Society which itself made a submission on the situation in West Papua for the second year running.

The OPM leader noted the most important events in West Papua's recent history dating back to the time of the Indonesian Declaration of Independence on 17 August 1945. Within hours of the declaration, he said, Markus Kaisieppo, representing West Papuan leaders at the time, notified the Dutch administration in West New Guinea that the West Papuan people would not become a part of the new Indonesian republic. Seth spoke at length about the brutal consequences of the 1962 New York Agreement which, with the concurrence of the US government, handed West Papua over to Indonesia, with no guarantees for the survival of the West Papuan people.

He told the Working Group that the OPM was carrying out an investigation of the number of people who had been killed, massacred or who had disappeared since the time of the Indonesian takeover in 1963. The sum total from these investigations came to nearly 110,000 so far, though he stressed that there was often a time lag between incidents resulting in loss of life and information about the number of people involved, which means that the actual figure is much higher. The figures

given were related to the military operations undertaken by the Indonesian Armed Forces since the mid 1960s. These operations are as follows:

Operasi Tumpas (Operation 'Crush') which took place under the command of General Kartidjo and General Bintoro (1964-68).

Operasi Sadar (Operation 'Awareness') under the command of General Sarwo Edhie (1969).

Operasi Wibawa (Operation 'Authority') also known as the 'open-handed policy' under the command of General Acub Zainul (1970-74).

Operasi Kikis (Operation 'Chipping-Away') under the command of General Imam Munandar (1977).

Operasi Galang (Operation 'Support'), also known as the 'smiling policy', under the command of General Santoso (1981).

Operasi Sapu Bersih (Operation 'Clean-Sweep') under the command of General Santoso and, after his death, General Sembiring, the present military commander (1981-84)

Speaking about the most recent disappearances, the OPM estimates that about 5,000 people fled from West Papua in February 1984, but only 316 are known to have reached their destination in Papua New Guinea; the rest are feared to have disappeared.

Anti-Slavery Society's submission

The Anti-Slavery Society's submission declared that "the United Nations has a duty — if it is not to stand accused of hypocrisy — to attempt to put right that grave wrong committed against the West Papuan people in 1969". Stressing that the West Papuan people were fighting a war of liberation "to achieve their independence from a colonial power", the Society asked the Working Group to communicate to the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities that the legitimate aspirations of the people of West Papua to self-determination are being met with brutal repression.

★ Seth Rumkorem was prevented from leaving Greece at the last moment, so his statement was read out by Adolf Tombo.

Recently Papuans in the Indonesian army were required to take a loyalty oath to Indonesia by crawling through the legs of General Meliana Sembiring, commander of the Irian Jaya Military Command. The general is holding a bow and arrow, the weapon used by the OPM, in his hands. (*Sinar Harapan*, 25 May 1984)



Two more violations of PNG border

The problems facing Papua New Guinea over the flood of refugees from West Papua and the Indonesian military operations there have kept up tension between the two countries. Indonesia has persisted in making unreasonable and contradictory demands on PNG, and has violated PNG's territory on at least two occasions. The PNG Government appeared at first to take a strong stand against Indonesia's attitude to the border problem, but since talks between the two countries' Foreign Ministers in April, PNG has instead tried to comply with most of Indonesia's demands. This has meant risking domestic opposition from a strongly anti-Indonesian public in PNG, and resisting international pressure to allow the UNHCR to supervise the West Papuan refugees. The PNG Government has attempted to keep publicity about the border area to a minimum, but events there have often frustrated its efforts, and show clearly the intractable dilemma now facing PNG over its relations with Indonesia.

At his meeting in April with Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, PNG Foreign Minister Rabbie Namaliu got no explanation for the violation of PNG airspace by two Indonesian aircraft in March, but Mochtar pressed Namaliu to give an assurance that OPM guerrillas would not be allowed to operate from PNG territory.

Dispute over Australian television documentary

This was later to lead to a major clash between the PNG Government and the Australian Broadcasting Commission, after an ABC journalist interviewed OPM leader James Nyaro, allegedly on the PNG side of the border. ABC were not the first to interview Nyaro on the border; other Australian, PNG and Fijian journalists had already done so. But the ABC interview came directly after Namaliu's assurance to Indonesia, and PNG insisted that it should not be screened on ABC's "Four Corners" programme, as planned, to which the ABC management agreed. The interview was screened, however, after an uproar by Australian journalists forced ABC to reverse its decision. The PNG Government responded by banning ABC journalists from working in PNG.

Indonesia has made no secret of its role in the row between the PNG Government and ABC, which has damaged relations between Australia and PNG. Indonesia openly applauded PNG's decision, and the *Times of Indonesia* said it was "in the spirit of friendly and co-operative relations". *Kompas* followed by suggesting that the ban was "meant for Indonesia's consumption" (*Age*, 30 May). But if PNG thought this would ease the pressure from Indonesia on the border, it was mistaken. In the middle of May, Indonesia conducted massive military "exercises", about which, contrary to an assurance already given by Mochtar, PNG was not given prior warning. PNG was angered by this particular display of insensitivity since an assurance that PNG would be informed about such exercises was the only concession made by Indonesia during the April talks.



PNG Foreign Minister Rabbie Namaliu, and General Benny Murdani. (*Sinar Harapan*, 11 July 1984)

"... We're still at odds over recent border crossings". Namaliu (*Financial Review* 13.7.84)



Children at the Blackwater Camp. (From Susanto Pudjomartono's report, *Tempo*, 9 June 1984)

PNG gardens destroyed in second incursion

A more recent incident is likely to cause a further deterioration in relations between PNG and Indonesia, although Mochtar still calmly insists that relations are fine. On June 21, 53 Indonesian troops entered the village of Sowampa, inside PNG at the northern end of the border. They burned down ten huts, then proceeded to destroy gardens and plantations around the village. PNG authorities have collected substantial evidence to show that this attack was without doubt the work of the Indonesian army, yet Indonesia has denied responsibility, as it has before, and has gone so far as to counter PNG's formal protest with an accusation that a group of PNG citizens had gone into West Papua and killed an Indonesian. Behind the series of allegations and counter-allegations is a very clear build-up of pressure by Indonesia on PNG. Indonesia continues to drive refugees over into PNG, but refuses to co-operate in attempts to solve the problem, while at the same time insisting that the refugees must come back without the involvement of the UN High Commission for Refugees.

Quite clearly, the PNG Government cannot hope to deal with this situation in a way which will satisfy Indonesia, let alone public opinion in PNG. Many observers there and in other countries regard the border violations as a serious warning by Indonesia, while the presence of refugees in PNG and the activities of the OPM on the border may at any time be used by Indonesia as a grievance to justify further military actions.

"The Philippines will never be the same again . . ." and the *Southeast Asia Chronicle* explains why.

"The Philippines After Aquino, After Marcos?" (*Southeast Asia Chronicle* Issue No. 92), a probing analysis of the forces contending for control of the Philippines' future examines elite and leftist opposition, explores the economic crisis, and relates details of the mystery surrounding Benigno Aquino's murder.



Also available:

"U.S. Military Bases in the Philippines" (Issue No. 89)

"The Philippines in the 80s—From Normalization to Polarization" (Issue No. 83)

"400-Year War—Moro Struggle in the Philippines" (Issue No. 82)

Single copies \$2.50; 10 or more \$1.50 each plus postage.

Order from: Southeast Asia Resource Center, Dept. T
P.O. Box 4000D, Berkeley, CA 94709 Write for free catalog.

Self-determination for East Timor dropped from ALP programme

The Australian Labour Party conference held in July this year failed to adopt a resolution reinforcing its policy of support for self-determination for East Timor. The policy adopted in 1982 called for a halt to Australian military aid to Indonesia until it withdraws its occupation troops from East Timor and pledged Australia to support an act of self-determination. The 1984 resolution which was lost by 43 votes to 55 would have also called on the Australian Government to reverse the previous government's decision to recognise Indonesia's illegal occupation of East Timor.

However, feeling on the issue of East Timor ran so high at the conference that the counter-resolution tabled by the faction of Prime Minister Bill Hayden, who has striven so hard for a policy of accommodation towards Indonesia, had to be drastically amended to ensure its passage. The amended resolution declared:

The ALP indicates grave concern at reports of renewed fighting in East Timor and about the threats to human life and safety there, and calls on the Indonesian Government to give free access to humanitarian relief teams, to international organisations such as the Red Cross, Amnesty and the Commission of Jurists, to allow an independent international mission to enter the territory to make an independent and impartial report on conditions.

On the crucial issue of the right of the East Timor people to decide their own future, however, the resolution went no further than to criticise Indonesia for incorporating East Timor without an internationally-supervised act of self-determination. It called on the Australian Government to support "international initiatives, including the efforts of the UN Secretary-General, that have the aim of achieving a settlement of the East Timor problem". (*Financial Review*, 12 July 1984)

The political framework in which the resolution is cast is revealed by its emphasis on the need to work for better relations with Indonesia, and by a claim made by Mr Hayden during the debate on the resolution when he asserted that "if we want to do the best we can by the people of East Timor, then we must have an association with Indonesia which is credible (and) influential". (*The Age*, 12 July 1984)

Within hours of the adoption of the ALP resolution, Bill Hayden was on his way to Jakarta to attend a "dialogue" with Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN countries, profoundly relieved

that he was taking with him a policy that Indonesian senior officials had already said they could "live with". General Benny Murdani, Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces was less generous however. He bluntly told the Australian Foreign Minister that attempts by anyone to send a mission to investigate human rights in East Timor would be regarded as an act of interference in Indonesia's internal affairs. (*Sinar Harapan*, 14 July 1984)

Threats, counter-threats and on-off-on ambassadorial visit

During the weeks preceding the ALP conference, East Timor and Australia's shaky relations with Indonesia were hardly ever off the front pages of the Australian press. Strenuous efforts by the Foreign Minister, sometimes supported and sometimes confounded by Jakarta, were made to ensure that the ALP conference would abandon its support for the principle of self-determination for East Timor.

Canberra had hoped that a visit to East Timor by its ambassador in Jakarta, planned for late May, would help ensure defeat for the self-determination resolution. But just a few days before the visit was to have taken place, it was announced in Jakarta that permission for the trip had been withdrawn. A variety of reasons were given for this change; some Indonesian newspapers reported that this was a reprisal against Australia for having given permission to Jose Ramos Horta, Fretilin's representative to the UN, to make a six-week speaking tour of Australia in preparation for the ALP conference. Others claim that the visit could not proceed because of "transportation difficulties" or because Indonesia could not vouch for the safety of the ambassador in East Timor.

In fact, the decision to cancel the visit was taken at a time when Indonesian military operations in East Timor were again being stepped up (see separate item). That this was the real reason is proven by the fact that it was not only the ambassador's visit that was cancelled. A visit by an International Red Cross team that was to have taken place at the same time was also stopped. But the decision to cancel the ambassador's visit also served the purpose of showing the Australian Government that Jakarta could be "tough", and would use all forms of pressure to assert its will on the government of Bob Hawke and the Australian Labour Party.

Editorial

East Timor injustice

While visiting Indonesia this week, Secretary of State George Shultz has a chance to demonstrate US evenhandedness in opposing unjust colonial wars. Everyone knows where Washington stands on Afghanistan and Cambodia, nations occupied by Communist neighbors. But Indonesia's occupation of East Timor has been passed over by three US administrations with shamefully vague murmurs of the kind Americans scorn in United Nations declarations.

Indonesia has triply offended. It invaded East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, in 1975. A year later it annexed the territory. And under its administration since then, more than 100,000 Timorese, a sixth of the mostly Catholic population, are believed to have died from famine, disease

and fighting. The extent of the calamity can only be estimated because Jakarta has impeded relief measures and closed the island to foreign observers.

Americans have only gradually become aware of Indonesia's assault on this poor and primitive territory. The pretext is combating Communism. The invasion began a day after President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Jakarta. Though they did not condone the attack, they failed to condemn it.

Mr. Shultz has been reminded of this persisting neglect by the bipartisan plea of 22 senators and 123 representatives. They urge him to press Indonesia to give relief organizations and other monitors unrestricted access to East Timor. Last Saturday their appeal was reinforced by an

unusual admonition from Pope John Paul II.

In accepting the credentials of an Indonesian ambassador, a general, the Pope broke with custom by speaking out on behalf of the East Timorese. He "earnestly recommended" respect for their human rights and said it was his "ardent wish" that relief organizations gain access to the many in need.

East Timor has as much right to self-determination as Cambodia and Afghanistan. At the minimum, its people should be rescued from starvation and brutal persecution. Saying that may not sway Indonesia's military rulers. But they need to hear it, and high-placed Americans need to say it.

New York Times, 11 July 1984

While the Australian media was still expressing anger over the cancellation and predicting that Hayden was now "sunk on Timor", Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja warned that Indonesia might take steps to downgrade its relations with Australia. According to the **Sydney Morning Herald** Foreign Editor, Peter Hastings (29 June 1984), Mochtar implied that an anti-Indonesian resolution on East Timor could lead to a "major break" in relations between the two countries, though he denied that Indonesia might withdraw its ambassador from Canberra. Fretilin's UN representative, Jose Ramos Horta described this as "an arrogant bluff, a smart political strategy for the ALP conference" (**The Age**, 30 June) and referred to the Australian ambassador's projected visit as a "farce, a big joke and irrelevant because the idea of the whole trip is to present a rosy picture".

Bill Hayden however persisted in seeing the cancellation as a severe blow to his chances of pushing through with his policy of accommodation, and pleaded desperately with Mochtar to allow the visit to go ahead (**SMH**, 27 June). In the end, Jakarta announced that the visit was "on" again, and it took place just a few days before the ALP conference opened. By this time, the impact was minimal, and in any case, the ambassador was to complain at the conclusion of his trip that it had been "too narrow". It turned out to be a feeble gesture indeed, for the ambassador was not permitted to do more than visit the prison island of Atauro, go briefly by helicopter to Manatuto, 66 kms east of Dili, hold a meeting with East Timor's puppet governor, Mario Carrascalao, and pay a visit to a bridge built with funds from Australia. This was virtually nothing by comparison with what the Australian parliamentary mission had been allowed to see last July, just before the 1983 offensive was launched.

Postscript: "Timor Gap" negotiations can now proceed

Shortly after Bill Hayden's visit to Jakarta, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja announced that negotiations between Indonesia and Australia over exploitation of petroleum resources in the "Timor Gap" can now be resumed. (See "The 'Timor Gap': Oil and Trouble", in **TAPOL Bulletin** No 63, May 1984.) Since the ALP has now agreed not to question any more East Timor's "integration" into Indonesia, the Indonesian Government is willing, he said, to continue negotiations with Australia. (**Sinar Harapan**, 18 July, 1984) On several occasions earlier this year, Mochtar declared that Indonesia was in "no hurry" to resume negotiations on the "Timor Gap", and insisted that Australia's position on the question was "untenable".

Indonesian military offensive resumed

The Indonesian offensive launched last August which ground to a halt in the face of stiff opposition from Fretilin (see **TAPOL**

Bulletin No. 62, March 1984) and because of the rainy season from November to March, was resumed some time in May. The first report of these renewed operations came in an AFP report from Jakarta (**The Australian**, 28 May 1984) stating that 15,000 Indonesian troops were engaged in operations involving helicopters, aircraft and armoured cars. The report spoke of "fierce fighting, numerous arrests, (and) search operations . . ."

Two days later, Pat Walsh, speaking for the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) said that the real reason for the cancellation of the Australian Ambassadors's visit to East Timor was the resumption of military operations. Information in the past week, he said, indicated that Indonesian troops were "poised for a final assault". (**The Age**, 30 May.) As on previous occasions, ACFOA's information was based on its sources within the church in East Timor and Indonesia.

Reporting from Lisbon, Jill Jolliffe was able, a month later, to produce eye-witness testimony from East Timorese refugees who left the country early in June. They described the recent flight of many East Timorese civilians to mountain areas, reminiscent of the departure of Timorese to the mountains in 1975, at the time of the first Indonesian invasion of East Timor. These flights were taking place, said the refugees, possibly because people wanted to join Fretilin forces, though many were certainly impelled by fear of the current Indonesian operations, or by a desire to avoid conscription, because all males between the ages of 15 and 50 were again being forced to march ahead of Indonesian troops, to provide them with a human shield. (**The Age**, 29 June)

The newly-arrived refugees spoke of an engagement between Fretilin and Indonesian troops at Be-Moz on the outskirts of Dili on 3 June, of fighting in the region of Same on the central south coast two weeks earlier, and of an attack on 8 May in the Viqueque region farther to the east in which more than a hundred houses had been burnt down. The refugees

said there was constant military movement in Dili and that early this year, an encampment of three battalions had been established at Coconut Beach north-west of Dili . . . Surveillance aircraft, in groups of three, were over-flying Dili daily and helicopters brought wounded to Dili military hospital daily. They said there was one hospital flight a week from Dili to Indonesia for the seriously wounded (and that) funerals of Indonesian soldiers in the "war heroes" section of the Dili cemetery were a regular occurrence.

The refugees also confirmed that the Catholic Church in East Timor was facing great difficulty. The Bishop of Dili, Mgr Carlos Philippe X. Belo, who sent a letter earlier this year to his predecessor bitterly complaining about grave human rights abuses in East Timor since the start of the 1983 offensive (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 63, May 1984), was taken to Bali for an inquiry by the Indonesian authorities, the refugees said. They spoke about his efforts to restrain Indonesian activities against Timorese civilians.

Pope speaks out on East Timor

The Pope used the opportunity of his first meeting with a new Indonesian ambassador to declare publicly that the Roman Catholic Church is concerned about the situation in East Timor. He also said that the church is anxious that individual rights be respected in Irian Jaya (West Papua):

After accepting the credentials of ambassador Hardiman Sastrapoespita, the Pope said:

Regarding the situation in East Timor, you know with what attention the Holy See views this very delicate problem. The Holy See continues to follow the situation with preoccupation and with the hope that particular consideration will be given in every circumstance to the ethnic, religious and cultural identity of the people.



Indonesian troops get ready for a killing. From East Timor, early 1984.

The killing that became an embarrassment

When police-officer Jarot Taftoyani went out one night in July last year to catch an alleged drugs-pusher, he clearly regarded his operation as being part of the anti-crime wave launched several months earlier by the Jogjakarta army garrison. Unlike the army killers however, as things turned out, he would pay the ultimate penalty for his deed, in the interests of a cover-up by the authorities.

Armed with a scimitar (*celurit*), the weapon used by many of the death-squads who by that time had killed hundreds of alleged criminals on the streets of Jogjakarta, police-officer Jarot followed up a tip-off from a prostitute. He caught the suspect as he was coming out of a brothel. He hacked him down, then called for an ambulance to take the victim to hospital, but the man was dead within hours. The victim turns out to have been a student at Gaja Mada University who was in fact carrying out an investigation into night-life in Jogjakarta.

Although Jarot had been acting under orders, he was not commended for his successful operation. On the contrary, he was placed under arrest, the only known instance in which an officer participating in the officially-sponsored campaign of murdering alleged criminals found himself behind bars. Within two months, he had been dismissed from the force and was told that he would be tried for murder before a military court.

By the end of 1983, Jarot was feeling increasingly resentful of his situation, so in January this year, he managed to draw public attention to his case by sending a request to the Legal Aid Institute in Jogjakarta for legal assistance to back up his demand for an early trial. (*Sinar Harapan*, 10 January 1984). The LBH announced that it had accepted his case. Representations had been made to the authorities to treat the case in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code which had already been violated in a number of ways, not least because the time limit on holding a suspect without trial had long since expired.

Nothing happened however, and in March Jarot took another

move to publicise his plight by escaping from prison and going into hiding. (*Kompas*, 23 March 1984.) A week later, he turned up at the office of the Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta. "I was carrying out orders," he told the LBH's Director, T. Mulya Lubis, "but I fully accept responsibility for what I did. If it was wrong, I am prepared to be punished." But he complained bitterly of being held in detention without trial, of having been dismissed from the force even before a verdict had been passed, and of the fact that his family was now left without any income or support.

Acting on Jarot's instructions, the LBH immediately made contact with Police Force headquarters in Jakarta. Upon receiving assurances from a senior officer that Jarot would be given full legal protection and would be brought to trial very soon, the LBH Director handed Jarot back to the police. Jarot himself seems to have been satisfied with these arrangements, for he declared soon afterwards in an interview (*Sinar Harapan Minggu*, 8 April 1984) that he had escaped from prison not in order to evade responsibility but to back his demand for proper treatment. He was a policeman with long experience, he said, and if he had wanted to disappear altogether, he could very well have done so.

A couple of weeks later, it appeared that Jarot had made his point with good effect for his trial did indeed commence. However, all was not well for, despite the fact that he had already been dismissed from the force, he was tried by a military court. Moreover, a few days before the trial commenced, the Jogjakarta LBH received a note from him saying that he no longer wanted them to defend him and was prepared to leave his case in the hands of a military lawyer. Even though the note was hand-written, the LBH found it difficult to understand the reason for his change of heart, since he had gone to such lengths to make contact with the Institute and obtain their help. Unusual too was the fact that the trial was completed in a matter of days,

East Timor

Team of top-ranking generals visit East Timor

On 2 July, General Benny Murdani made yet another visit to East Timor, this time in the company of nearly a dozen high-ranking officers from all the armed forces. The team included Lieutenant-General Gunawan Wibisono, Chief-of-Staff for Social and Political Affairs, Commander of the Fleet, Vice-Admiral R. Kasenda, the Assistant for Intelligence of the General Chief-of-Staff, the Assistant for Operations, the Assistant for Territorial Affairs and the Assistant for Security and Order of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the three Assistants for Operations of the Army, Navy and Air Force Chiefs-of-Staff, and other senior officers from the Armed Forces headquarters; no fewer than ten generals in the Indonesian Armed Forces. Such a senior team of officers can only be explained by the importance which General Murdani currently attaches to the military operations now under way in his desperate attempt to put an end to continued resistance to Indonesian rule in East Timor.

123 Members of Congress write to George Schultz

A group of no fewer than 123 members of the US Congress, including members of the House of Representatives from both parties, sent an appeal to US Secretary of State George Schultz to make East Timor an

important part of his agenda during a visit to Jakarta in the first half of July.

Mr Schultz who was visiting Jakarta to attend a dialogue with foreign ministers of the ASEAN countries was told in the letter that it was of crucial importance "that the plight of the people of East Timor be accorded serious attention" in his meetings with the Indonesian leadership. The letter pointed out that the people of East Timor "are living under a military regime imposed by force, in violation of international law". It dwelt at great length on the letter from the Bishop of Dili released earlier this year (see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 63, May 1984) which drew attention to human rights violations and to persecution of the Catholic church. It complained that further details of atrocities and conditions generally in East Timor are virtually impossible to obtain because the Indonesian regime continues to seal off the country from independent journalists and international church and human rights groups.

The members of Congress reminded Mr Schultz of Section 914 of the Foreign Aid Authorisation Bill, passed by the House of Representatives earlier this year, expressing the "sense of Congress" that President Reagan should take appropriate measures to encourage the Indonesians to allow increased access to East Timor for journalists, relief agencies and human rights organisations.

Besides calling on the Secretary of State to raise the issue of the church's right to exist in East Timor free of persecution and harassment, the letter urged him to use his visit "to begin a dialogue with the Indonesians on constructive initiatives that could lead to an equitable settlement of the conflict in East Timor". (*The Age*, 11 July 1984)

whereas court proceedings for serious cases often drag out for weeks, if not months.

Within ten days, Jarot had been found guilty of murder and sentenced to 4½ years imprisonment. Jarot accepted the verdict and announced that he would not make an appeal. On the other hand, the prosecutor who had called for a sentence of 6 years announced that he was not satisfied and would appeal against the sentence.

But nine days later, Jarot was found dead in his cell. The authorities claimed that he hanged himself, but press reports of the discovery are disinclined to accept this version. Jarot's father, himself a police officer of many years standing, strongly rejects the claim and has declared that the marks round the dead man's neck were the marks of strangulation, not of hanging. (*Sinar Harapan*, 17 May 1984). Nor did he, or anyone else for that matter, want to accept that the "suicide" note said to have been found pinned to Jarot's body was indeed written by him.

The Jarot case has been widely reported in some Indonesian

newspapers ever since his first move in January to seek the help of the LBH in Jogjakarta. Nowhere is it stated explicitly in any of the reports that the murder he committed last July was part of the officially-sponsored death-squad campaign, yet everything Jarot himself is reported to have said clearly reveals that this is what he thought. The LBH Director made it known after Jarot had been found dead that the policeman had told him he had killed 40 "suspected criminals" before killing the student which led to his own arrest (*Sunday Sun*, Melbourne, 17 June 1984).

An open trial in a civil court would have given him the opportunity to argue precisely that in his own defence. The LBH in Jakarta has now made a call for a public enquiry by a team of people from the Armed Forces, the Police Force, the medical profession, the LBH, and a journalist. (*Minggu Merdeka*, 27 May 1984.) Such an enquiry is unlikely to take place, but the tragic death of police-officer Jarot shows the lengths to which the regime is prepared to go to cover up its own involvement with the death-squad killings.



Sugianto speaks to lawyers at the Legal Aid Institute of the Islamic University in Jogjakarta. (*Tempo*, 26 May 1984)



Jarot on trial (*Tempo*, 26 May 1984)

Fugitive from the death-squads

Fugitive from the death-squads

On 16 November last year, Sugianto, a third-form secondary school pupil in the town of Kertosono, near Jombang, set out on a motorbike with his father, Ichsan to visit the army commander (Koramil) of Perak, in the province of East Java. Ichsan was carrying a large sum of money, and was making his fourth visit to the newly-appointed Koramil officer, to pay yet another instalment of "protection money". Several months earlier, Ichsan, the son of a rich local farmer, had been told that he was on the hit list of the death-squads.

A man known many years ago in the locality as a petty criminal, Ichsan had long since abandoned crime, taken off his black-magic protective amulet, and settled down to a life of farming. But in 1983, when the death-squads launched their so-called "anti-crime" campaign, Ichsan found himself the victim of persistent harassment by local police officers. The first time the police came demanding cash was in mid 1983. In return for an assurance that he would not be killed, Ichsan handed over

Rp 5 million, and within weeks, two more payments of Rp 2.5 million and Rp 2 million had been made. "I lost count of how many times they came to the house," says Sugianto, "but altogether he paid them a total of Rp 30 million." To keep up these payments, Ichsan sold off his land, as well as other possessions like gold and a couple of motorbikes.

Then the Koramil officer got into the racket, and demanded regular payments of Rp 100,000. But as Ichsan and his son were on their way to the Koramil office that fateful 16 November, they were set upon by two police officers and robbed of all the cash Ichsan had with him. That finished, father and son proceeded on their way to the Koramil office but within minutes of arriving, the policemen who had just accosted them turned up. They were called into the Koramil office by the army officer; the three men grabbed Ichsan, threw him to the ground and shot him in the chest. As he lay dying, Ichsan shouted to his son to flee for his life. Although the police had by then tied Sugianto's hands behind his back,


he managed to pull them free, and fled from the scene of his father's murder, with shots cracking behind him.

Sugianto managed to hide in a nearby sugar plantation, then later returned home briefly to tell his family of the tragedy that had befallen his father. He then left home and went into hiding. For several months he lived as a fugitive in East Java, then in Samarinda, East Kalimantan, but eventually decided to seek protection from a Legal Aid Institute. He did this in Jogjakarta, at the Legal Aid Institute of the Islamic University, where he told the story of his father's death. The Institute decided to launch an immediate investigation. The Koramil officer, they discovered, was still at his post but evaded all attempts to make inquiries about the incident. As for the policemen who had robbed Ichsan then later participated in his murder, all they would say was "We're just low-ranking officers. Ask our superiors."

According to *Tempo* (26 May, 1984) which gives a full account of the incident, the Jogjakarta Legal Aid Institute is determined to pursue its enquiries. Approaches to the chief of police of East Java have produced nothing. According to *Kompas* (25 May) the Institute has taken the case to the Chief of Police in Jakarta.

Meanwhile, Sugianto continues to live the life of a fugitive from the death-squads.

Residents near Halim airport driven from their land



In the latter part of 1983, the commander of Halim Perdanakusumah airport, which is situated on the outskirts of Jakarta, issued instructions to a special military unit to demolish the houses of many families living in the region of Cipinang Baru Trikora III which lies in the vicinity of the airport. Halim is the international civilian air terminal for the capital and is also used for military purposes. There are altogether 2,037 families living in the region, a total of more than 10,000 people. They have been trying to defend their land rights since the time of the Japanese occupation.

It was in April 1945, just four months before the collapse of the Japanese Army, that the inhabitants were ordered to vacate their homes and land because the area was needed for aerial war operations. The people had no option but to comply and were given removal expenses to cover the cost of setting up home elsewhere. No compensation for the land was paid however because it was made clear at the time that they were only being asked to move for the duration of the war. After the end of the Japanese occupation, the inhabitants moved back and have been living there ever since.

Starting in 1968 however, the people were threatened with expulsion by the Armed Forces (ABRI) who insisted that the land was their property because it had been acquired by the state at the time of the Japanese occupation. The inhabitants, on the other hand, insist that this is not so and that they will not relinquish the land until they have been paid due recompense. Their case has been supported by a number of declarations and testimonies. One comes from a man named Isro Djajakusumah who was an official of the local administration at the time of the Japanese occupation and who was himself involved in paying removal costs to the inhabitants. In 1965, the Department for Agrarian Affairs confirmed that the land had been taken over by force by the Japanese authorities and that this had meant no change whatever in the land rights of the owners of the land. Then in 1973, the Governor of Jakarta, Ali Sadikin wrote a letter to the Department of

Defence and Security complaining that the Air Force had appropriated 511 plots of land in the region for which no compensation had been paid.

For a period of several years from the late 1970s, the inhabitants of Cipinang Baru Trikora III were left in peace, but in 1983 the Air Force renewed its efforts to gain control of the land, still insisting that the people living there had no right to compensation. It was then that orders were first issued for troops to move in and destroy some of the houses. Tractors and bulldozers were used by armed troops; people were man-handled and taken into custody, and dogs were set against people who had come out to protest. In an attempt to defend their homes, women and children threw stones and clumps of earth at the troops. The families whose homes had been demolished still refused to move and set up hovels and make-shift tents for shelter.

Following the illegal demolition, a group of people went to Parliament to draw attention to their plight, and to press for the payment of compensation. Said one young schoolgirl among the demonstrators: "Our home hasn't yet been demolished but it could happen any day. We live in constant fear of this." Another woman, a mother with a three-year old child, said: "We bought our land there in 1978 and paid Rp 3,000 per square metre for it. This was money we obtained from selling our home and land in Wonogiri." But she also explained that since living in her new home, she had never been able to obtain an identity card. Indeed, for many

years, none of the inhabitants have been issued with identity cards.

With increasing militancy on the part of the inhabitants over their unjust treatment, General Benny Murdani, Commander-in-Chief of ABRI, declared in September last year that all the land in the vicinity of the Halim airport is the property of ABRI. He also said: "It is in the interest of security of both military and civilian aviation for the entire area to be cleared. If anyone attempts to prevent this happening, KOPKAMTIB (the army's special security command) will take the strongest measures."

Since then, the struggle to resist the takeover of the land has not subsided however. The inhabitants decided to put their case in the hands of the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) in Jakarta. In February this year, the day before further demolition of property was to take place, the LBH wrote to the local *lurah* (village administrative head) demanding that all further demolition should not be allowed to proceed until a court verdict on the dispute has been taken. The LBH at the same time submitted a formal complaint to the district court against the military commander of Halim airport, insisting that no further clearances should take place until the court has adopted a decision on the land rights of the people in question.

(Based on an article in *Indonesia Feiten en Meningen*, the publication of the Dutch Indonesia Committee, Volume 10, No 2, June/July 1984.)

New!

TAPOL
Slide-show

On:

- ★★ **repression and militarisation in Indonesia**
- ★★ **East Timor**
- ★★ **West Papua**

■

72 slides, colour and black-and-white

Price: £12.50 plus postage:
60p UK, Europe and surface
2.50 airmail

Available for hire.
Please write for details.

Send your order, with cash, to
TAPOL, 8a Treport Street,
London SW18.

Compulsion being used in Indonesia's family planning programme

Various forms of compulsion are being used by Indonesia's Family Planning Programme administrators to force women to practise birth control. Although the programme has been in progress for more than a decade, it has failed to have any impact on the rate of population increase which still stands at 2.3%. The Five-Year Plan which commenced in April this year has set a target of reducing this rate of increase to 2% by 1989. (*Sinar Harapan*, 16 July 1984) In addition to imposing illegal sanctions on women to force them to practise birth control, Indonesia's family planners have launched an intensive campaign to persuade them to use the coil (IUD) rather than the pill because women have shown resistance to the programme by simply not taking the pill.

In a cover story entitled "The Successes and Excesses of Family Planning", *Tempo* (14 July 1984) reported that, in their determination to achieve targets set by the provincial and national planners, local officials have resorted to compulsion to keep up the number of "acceptors". The journal gives details of several methods. For example, primary school teachers in Jepara district, East Java, were told three months ago that their salaries will no longer be paid if they cannot produce a certificate of participation in the programme; failure to participate will also damage their chances of promotion to higher salary grades. In Pati District, villagers have complained that they are being penalised for non-participation in the government-sponsored programme even though they practise traditional methods of contraception. In the case of one couple where the husband is a civil servant, the wife has now been forced to accept a coil (IUD) although they have been successfully practising traditional methods for more than four years; if not, the husband would have been denied his salary.

In some villages in the Pati District, village councils have adopted a decision that women who become pregnant before their previous child reaches the age of four will have to pay a fine of Rp 25,000 (the equivalent of about \$25), a heavy sanction for any villager. Women who already have three children will be fined this amount for getting pregnant at all. The system is also being used to penalise unmarried women who become pregnant, for they will be required to pay a fine of no less than Rp 100,000 with the threat of three months in prison if they fail to pay up. Women in several villages are quoted as saying they are repeatedly being harassed with the threat of fines if they do not participate in the official birth control programme.

In another part of the country, in the village of Kampung Kertoraharja in West

Java, *Tempo* refers to a woman who is determined to practise traditional methods of birth control but has been forced in addition to take the pill. "If I don't," she said, "I will be denied various facilities such as getting treatment at the local clinic or obtaining credit for food-growing."

Asked about these abuses, Haryono Suyono, chief of the National Coordination Body for Family Planning said: "We have to deal with 20,000 people a day so some people are bound to get trodden on in the process."

"Coil-safari" in West Java

Efforts to persuade women to accept the coil were greatly speeded up late last year when Haryono Suyono made a "coil-safari" (*safari-spiraal*) through West Java late last year in the company of the Governor of the province. Meetings were held in many villages which all women of child-bearing age were expected to attend, and where they were under strong pressure to have the coil inserted on the spot. Inevitably, the "success rate" of such

meetings was extremely high. The chairman of the Family Planning Board in the Sukabumi District, West Java has recently been quoted as saying that all participants of the birth control programme in his district will be using the coil by the end of 1984.

Meanwhile, the following letter was published in the letters' column of *Sinar Harapan* on 23 March 1984:

According to instructions issued by the Bupati (District Chief) of Pandeglang (East Java), government employees were told to go to the District office to pick up their March salary and to take with them their family planning certificates.

I was greatly disappointed because, after making the long journey to fetch my salary, I was not paid because my family planning certificate was turned down. I was informed that certificates for acceptors using the pill are no longer valid according to an instruction from the Bupati, and the cashier was not allowed to give any concessions.

I have been enrolled with the family planning programme for one year and my youngest child is 2 years old. As far as I know, the pill is an acceptable method of birth control under the government's family planning programme. So why is the pill not acceptable for the Bupati of Pandeglang? I would like an explanation for such methods being used by administration officials. Government employees are being victimised for the sake of the family planning programme.

(Name and address known to the editors)



Haryono Suyono, chief of the Family Planning programme, with women in South Sulawesi



Suharto makes a state occasion of it (Both photos from *Tempo*, 14 July 1984)

Black cargo of the military regime

Indonesia is already well-known as an exporter of natural resources and agricultural products, but in the past few years, new exports have been added to the country's balance of trade. One of these new exports is labour.

According to Minister of Labour, Admiral Sudomo, the foreign currency earned from the export of labour amounted to US\$23.7 million in the first six months of 1983.¹ Sudomo has also said that the export of labour has good long term prospects,² and that the target for the Fourth Five-Year Plan which commenced in April this year is for a total export of 300,000 people which will add altogether \$1.8 billion to the country's foreign exchange earnings.³ This figure could well be greatly exceeded because Abdul Malik M. Aliun, Vice-Chairman of the Indonesian Manpower Suppliers Association has said that 100,000 workers are to be exported this year, of whom roughly one half will probably be women.⁴

The Indonesian military government has set up a special agency within the Department of Labour known as AKAN (*Antar-Kerja Antar Negara*, the Inter-State Labour Agency), to exploit this new source of foreign exchange as effectively as possible. The two most senior officials of the Labour Department are both top-ranking military men, Admiral Sudomo who, till March 1983, was Commander of the Army's top security command, KOPKAMTIB, and General Sutopo Yuwono, formerly chief of the state's intelligence coordination agency, BAKIN, who is now Secretary-General of the Department. Admiral Sudomo says that the purpose of AKAN is to supervise the export of labour,⁵ and there are in addition a number of private companies which handle the registration and technical arrangements of people applying to work abroad. These private companies are, according to reliable sources, owned by people occupying top positions in the government apparatus or who have close links with senior officials.

Anyone wishing to register for employment overseas is required to pay a registration fee which varies from Rp. 300,000 to Rp. 400,000 (approximately \$300 to \$400).⁶ A couple of years ago, the World Bank raised Indonesia's classification from a "low income" to a "middle income" country, but it would be a mistake to think that there has been any fundamental improvement in the standard of living of the vast majority of Indonesians. For the average Indonesian industrial worker who is not likely to earn more than Rp 20,000 a month in major cities like Jakarta, Surabaya or Medan, let

alone the millions of unemployed, it is hardly possible to scrape together a sum of money like that. Most workers would need to borrow extensively or sell off everything they have, and only hope to make enough to pay this back later on. In some cases, money paid for registration is misappropriated by the handling company and there is no compensation for people who suffer such a loss.

Many people are attracted by the chance of finding jobs abroad not only because of the higher salary but also because of the lack of job opportunities at home.⁷ Those who go abroad are generally between the ages of 19 and 30, though women now being sent in growing numbers to Saudi Arabia are between 23 and 40 years old. They have all completed primary or lower secondary education, and there are some too who have graduated from upper secondary school. Almost all are employed as unskilled labour in the

construction industry, road-building, as plantation workers, gardeners, masseuses and house-servants. Before leaving, they are required to attend a short orientation course, and for those being sent to countries in the Middle East, they are expected to learn at least 500 Arabic words before departing. Most of the people being sent to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are women who will be employed as servants, and they, like all the other exported workers, must undergo political indoctrination in the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The government obviously believes that women who go abroad as servants should be able to uphold the good name and reputation of Indonesia as a state based on the Pancasila.

In Sabah, East Malaysia, there are now 120,000 Indonesian contract labourers, 80% of whom work in the plantation sector, and throughout Malaysia there are probably as many as half a million

International recognition for the publishers of Pramoedya Ananta Toer's banned novels

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

UNION INTERNATIONALE DES ÉDITEURS
INTERNATIONALE VERLEGER-UNION
INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION



Secrétaire général
J. A. Koutchoumow
Avenue de Miramon 3
1206 Genève
Téléphone 463918
Télex: Inpubliss

Mr Josoeef Ishak,
Hasta Mitra,
JALAN PLN 36,
PAN CORAN,
JAKARTA,
SELATA,
INDONESIA

3 May 1984

Dear Mr Ishak,


I have pleasure in informing you that, at the XXIInd Congress of the International Publishers Association held in Mexico City 11-16 March 1984, the one thousand participating publishers unanimously commended your company, Hasta Mitra, for its persistent struggle in the cause of freedom to publish and its resilience against political pressure to limit access to culture, education and free expression.

Publishers all over the world wish to express their admiration and solidarity for the action your company has taken, which illustrates what publishers are striving for.

We are sending you by separate mail a brochure entitled Freedom to Publish 1984, which is a report on obstacles to freedom in publishing prepared by Index on Censorship in London for the International Publishers Association's XXIInd Congress in Mexico.

IPA sends you best wishes for your future publishing activities.

Yours sincerely,


J. A. Koutchoumow
Secretary General

Indonesian workers already. Recently Ashar Ahmat, the lawyer who heads the legal aid team of the trade union organisation, FBSI, expressed serious concern over the lack of legal protection for contract workers in Malaysia.⁸ He gave the example of Indonesians employed by the Serawak Palm Oil Company whose contract provides for a daily wage of M\$8, excluding overtime. The contract stipulates that the workers are to be provided with accommodation free of charge but upon arrival they discover that they have to pay M\$10 a month for electricity plus M\$70 a month for food, and on top of that, they have to supply their own work tools⁹

Maltreatment of women workers in Saudi Arabia

About 10,000 of the roughly 50,000 Indonesians now working in Saudi Arabia are women, almost all of whom are employed as house-servants. More Indonesian women are working there than in any other foreign country. In many cases, the women are married, and with grown-up children. Some have explained that they decided very reluctantly to take advantage of this opportunity because they were finding it impossible to pay school-fees to keep their children at school.¹⁰

Companies which handle the export of labour advertise the attractions of working in Saudi Arabia by speaking of the high wages paid for very light work and also stress that taking a job in that country provides the person with a better chance of making the pilgrimage to Mecca.¹¹ The latter point is bound to attract a lot of people in a country where nearly 90% of the population are either orthodox or "statistical" Muslims. The idea of taking a job abroad is made even more appealing by the great publicity now being given to the venture, with frequent photographs appearing in the press showing the Minister of Labour giving the women a warm send-off at specially organised ceremonies. The Indonesian ambassador to Saudi Arabia said in a press conference at the Department of Labour late last year that plans are now under way to open massage parlours with Indonesian labour in Saudi Arabia.¹²

The large-scale dispatch of women to Saudi Arabia has recently been at the centre of public protest in Indonesia. A spokesperson for the Indonesian National Women's Movement (*Perwarnas*) described it as "covert trading in women".¹³ Sudomo's reply was that Indonesia is a "democratic country" where people can say what they like but he was satisfied that these women are well protected by their contracts, and they are also under the watchful eye of the Indonesian embassy in Jeddah.¹⁴ Yet, for his part, the Indonesian ambassador in Jeddah has been quoted as saying that the embassy could not get involved in conflicts between Indonesian employees and their employers.¹⁵

The condition of many women now working as house-servants in Saudi Arabia

was brought to public attention recently by Harun Lukman, chairman of the foreign affairs section of the Muslim association, Muhammadiyah. He has received information indicating that 80% of the women now working in Saudi Arabia are being badly treated,¹⁶ in response to which Labour Minister Sudomo complained that such an allegation is damaging the good relations between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia.

Harun Lukman also said that the women were being required to work all hours of the day and night, and many are being passed on from one employer to another. In many cases, they have to work from six in the morning till two the next morning. It is not a simple matter for women to report incidents to the police, as they are not familiar enough with Arabic. Many are employed in places which are hundreds of miles away from the Indonesian embassy. They are often denied permission by their employers to go out, and in any case, it is highly unusual for women to be seen walking on the streets alone. If they ask to be allowed to return home, they can be required to pay their employer huge sums in compensation.¹⁷ In not a few instances, women house-servants have been raped by their employers, and some have become pregnant. For those who return home disillusioned and perhaps even pregnant, there is of course no reception

committee from the Labour Department waiting for them at the airport.

The conditions experienced by Indonesian workers in foreign countries are hardly any different from working conditions in Indonesia. They are all part and parcel of the social, political and economic system in Indonesia. But there is something particularly pernicious about a government devoting so much energy and attention to pushing up foreign exchange earnings from a form of trade which involves hundreds of thousands of people who are desperate to find jobs anywhere in the world.

Hendrik Amahorseja

- 1 *Kompas*, 24 February 1984
- 2 *Berita Yudha*, 21 November 1983
- 3 *Merdeka*, 14 January 1984
- 4 *Tempo*, 2 June 1984
- 5 *Merdeka*, 24 July 1983
- 6 *Kompas*, 6 January 1984
- 7 *Pelita*, 30 January 1984
- 8 *Topik*, 2 August 1983
- 9 *Suara Karya*, 3 May 1984
- 10 *Kompas*, 17 May 1984
- 11 *Kompas*, 12 May 1984
- 12 *Berita Yudha*, 21 November 1983
- 13 *Minggu Merdeka*, 29 January 1984
- 14 *Minggu Merdeka*, 29 January 1984
- 15 *Merdeka*, 18 November 1983
- 16 *Tempo*, 2 June 1984
- 17 *Kompas*, 9 May and 12 May 1984



Women ready for departure to Saudi Arabia, with the Labour Minister, Admiral Sudomo. (*Tempo*, 2 June 1984)

**West Papua:
The
Obliteration
of a People**

Price: £2.50 plus
postage 40 pence,
or £2 air

Available from TAPOL

**INDONESIA
Law, Propaganda
and Terror**

Price: £5.95 plus
postage 50 pence,
£3 air

Julie Southwood
Patrick Flanagan

IGGI allots \$2.46 billion to Indonesia

The Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia met on 5-6 June in The Hague, and approved aid commitments to Indonesia for the coming fiscal year of \$2.46 billion, an increase of around eleven per cent over what was pledged in 1983. This is regarded as a seal of approval by the donor countries for Jakarta's revised economic plans for dealing with the recession and reduced oil prices. Indonesia is proving itself ready to implement strict austerity measures to maintain international confidence in Indonesia's economic stability. Already Mrs Thatcher has singled out Indonesia, together with South Korea, as a country worthy of applause for its willingness to control expenditure, chiefly by slashing subsidies and re-phasing economic projects worth US\$ 14 billion.

Human rights were not raised during IGGI deliberations this year despite pressure from non-government organisations. This pressure which was particularly heavy in Holland, also came from the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group which compiled a 20-page dossier cataloguing violations in East Timor and West Papua as well as the extra-judicial killings by the Indonesian army's death-squads. The dossier was sent to all IGGI governments and called upon them to discuss these matters before making aid commitments.

Far from heeding these requests, the IGGI member countries concentrated on congratulating the Indonesian regime for its "decisive and timely measures" to help the economy. Needless to say, the great majority of Indonesian people are affected by the austerity measures, and not by the foreign capital based economic growth rate.

In spite of the praise, however, there were undercurrents of concern over future economic trends. It is generally considered desirable to use Indonesian products and services in the projects funded by IGGI finance, although some of the donor countries prefer to encourage the use of their own products and services. But in open international tenders, Indonesian companies are rarely competitive or suitable for IGGI projects, so that IGGI funded "development" does not help build an efficient domestic economic infrastructure, the measure of true development. Moreover, the Indonesian State Secretariat has tried to insist on positive discrimination for Indonesian companies, with the result that many projects have been seriously delayed.

The World Bank, of which Indonesia is the second largest client, is also concerned that many planned government projects are not designed to absorb Indonesia's vast pool of surplus labour, increasing by nearly two million each year. There is also concern over Indonesia's rising national debt, which is approaching a dangerously high level in relation to export earnings. But by the standards of most debt-ridden Third World countries, Indonesia is obviously satisfying the IGGI governments with its economic performance, at a time when the balance-sheet mentality dominates international economic thinking. The victims of death squads, in East Timor and West Papua, do not appear on balance sheets.

(From *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 19 April, 17 May, 21 June)



"Make the sack stronger to prevent any more leaks . . ."

Sinar Harapan, 12 June 1984

Mrs Thatcher to visit Indonesia in September

It has been announced that Mrs Thatcher will visit Indonesia in September as part of a trip to South East Asia which will also take her to Singapore and Malaysia.

At the beginning of July, a senior official of the British Foreign Office, Sir Crispin Tickell, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, paid a visit to Indonesia to discuss the results of the Economic Summit held in London in June. The visit took place as the result of a submission to the Summit by Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, acting as current chairman of ASEAN. The submission apparently raised matters connected with international trade relations and the possibility of a new round of negotiations by GATT to replace the "Tokyo Round" held several years ago.

Subscription rates

Annual rates (six issues):

	UK, Europe and overseas/surface	Overseas/airmail
Individuals	£ 7.50	£10.00
Institutions	£12.00	£14.00

TAPOL's GIRO account no: 56 781 4009

Overseas subscribers should please add £1.50 on cheques that are not drawn on a London bank, to cover bank charges.

Australian subscribers

Rates for Australian subscribers:

	Seamail	Airmail
Individuals	A\$14.00	A\$19.00
Institutions	A\$22.00	A\$26.00

Australian subscribers may pay, at these rates, to:

Siauw Tiong Djin,
19, Rosella Avenue,
South Clayton, Victoria 3169

Subscriptions and correspondence to: TAPOL, 8a Treport Street, London SW18 2BP Telephone: (01) 874 3262.