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
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British Campaign for the Defence

of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

TAPOL Bulletin No 43

January 1980

EDITORIAL

TORTURE AND THE SALE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT

"If it comes to the crunch and there is a row in the UN, we should keep our heads down and avoid siding against Indonesia."

Sir John Ford, British Ambassador in Jakarta, in a confidential letter to the Foreign Office, 21 July 1975.

On 3rd December 1980, Lord Strathcoma, a Minister at the Foreign Office told the House of Lords:

"We would not sell equipment which, in our judgement, could be used for internal repression, to a regime which is known to practise torture"

The next day, Lord Avebury, in a Lords debate on E. Timor, quoted this statement and condemned Britain's sale of Hawk aircraft to Indonesia:

"Of course it is said that we are selling only the trainer version but if the manufacturers claim it is so easy to convert, how could we prevent the Indonesians from doing it? . . . The Hawk aircraft can certainly be used for internal repression. It would be an ideal weapon to use against villages of E. Timor into which the Indonesian colonialists and aggressors have herded the population. By the simple modification in the field of adding pylons to the wings, bombs, rockets, napalm and so on could be deployed against the civilian population."

Lord Avebury referred to recent reports of torture published by TAPOL, mentioning specifically the gruesome account of torture employed against Acehnese political prisoners in late 1979 (see **TAPOL Bulletin**, 39, July 1980).

This present issue contains a chilling account of maltreatment and torture by A. M. Fatwa, in October 1980.

These instances of torture are known because the victims have been in a position to publicise them, but they are only a tiny part of the whole picture. The victims of torture in E. Timor and W. Irian have virtually no chance of bringing their experiences to world attention, though we are now learning a great deal about summary executions and disappearances in these two places.

" . . . keep our heads down and avoid siding against Indonesia". This is surely a most accurate description of British government policy, not only since 1975 but since 1965 when the Army took over in the wake of massacres and mass arrests, and all through the period of repression of students, Muslims and other government opponents. And at each new stage of repression, reports of torture have sooner or later emerged. Yet throughout, no British government, Labour or Tory, regardless of any proclaimed adherence to human rights principles, has been deflected from the course of providing aid, military as well as economic, and of supplying military equipment, in increasing amounts to the Indonesian government.

Now that a minister in the present government has made a fairly categorical statement refusing to sell repressive equipment to governments that employ torture, it is time to press the government to place an embargo on the sale of military equipment to Indonesia. We therefore urge TAPOL readers in the UK to write to the British government direct, or through their MPs, protesting against the sale of Hawks to Indonesia, and demanding that no further sales of equipment "which could be used for internal repression" should be permitted. Address your letters to:

Lord Carrington, Foreign Secretary, Foreign Office, London SW1 or write to your MP, **House of Commons, London SW1**.

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SERIOUS ANTI-CHINESE RIOTS OCCUR IN CENTRAL JAVA

Anti-Chinese riots swept through Central Java last November causing widespread material damage and creating an atmosphere of terror for the Chinese community. Numerous factories, houses and vehicles were destroyed, and commerce in several major towns and cities was brought to a standstill for days on end. Eight rioters are reported to have been shot dead by troops trying, in many cases with little effect, to quell the riots. There are reports too of physical attacks on Chinese. Several thousand youths were rounded up, and an undisclosed number are still being held.

The riots started in Solo, a town situated on the south coast of Central Java and renowned as one of the two main centres of Javanese culture. After four days of devastating attacks on Chinese-owned property, the riots shifted to Semarang, the provincial capital and headquarters of the Central Java Military Command. They proceeded for several days unabated in Semarang, spreading at the same time to other places in the province and across the border into East Java.

The riots were sparked off by a minor street accident on Wednesday 19th November when a cyclist, a student at the Solo sports teachers' college, collided with a pedestrian, a schoolboy of Chinese origin. When a row broke out between the two, another Chinese intervened, attacking the cyclist and inflicting a head injury on him. As passions rose, the two Chinese fled from the scene and took refuge in a nearby Chinese shop. The cyclist quickly reported the incident to his fellow students, who went in a group to the shop, demanding that the boys give themselves up. Predictably, the boys had already left and were nowhere to be found.

The next day the students made a second visit to the shop, somewhat illogically again demanding that the Chinese give themselves up. When they got no satisfaction, they started throwing stones at the shop and at other Chinese shops in the same street. The riots quickly spread to other parts of the town, and worsened after one of the rioters was shot dead by troops. The rioters consisted mainly of students and school pupils. They continued unabated for three days, coming to a climax on Sunday, 23rd November, when hundreds of youths, riding motor-bikes at high speed in compact groups, combed the town in what appeared to be a well-organised fashion, setting fire to offices, houses, factories and vehicles, and moving quickly from one target to the next with hardly any opposition from the authorities.

On Monday, as things quietened down in Solo, the gangs of motor-cyclists moved to Semarang, more than a hundred miles to the north. These "attack-group contingents", as they were called, joined forces with school-pupils in Semarang to continue the trail of destruction. The riots proceeded for several days in the provincial capital, causing even more damage than in Solo. At the same time, "attack-troop contingents" moved into other towns in the province, creating havoc everywhere. Towns known to have been

seriously affected include Kendal, Kudus, Pemalang, Pekalongan, Purwodadi, Pati, Jepara, Cepu and Rembang, as well as several towns in East Java, including Madiun, Ngawi and Jombang.

Curfews Ignored

The Army and the Police in Solo appear to have been taken completely by surprise by the intensity and scale of the riots. Little was done to prevent them from spreading, not only within the town, but to other towns many miles away. Curfews were imposed in Solo, Semarang and other towns, but were frequently violated with no apparent consequences for the violators. The behaviour of the troops, who fired on rioters on a number of occasions, causing many injuries and deaths, only whipped up emotions even further, with disastrous consequences not for the troops or the authorities but for the beleaguered and defenceless Chinese.

One indication of the lack of determination of the Army to protect the victims of these riots is the fact that, even though it was being said that there were not enough troops in Solo to cope, many troops and officers stationed there left the town on Saturday, 22nd November, at the height of the riots, to attend a military installation ceremony several miles away, an event which could easily have been postponed. It was not till Wednesday, 26th November, a full week after the trouble started, that the military commander of Central Java, Major-General Sukotjo, issued a statement promising "stern measures".

News Blackout

For the first few days, the only response to come from Admiral Sudomo, commander of the Army's security command, KOPKAMTIB, was to impose a complete news blackout. This decision is widely acknowledged to have made things far worse by creating a situation in which rumours spread rapidly. Sudomo's justification was that media reporting might encourage the rioters and cause the riots to spread. But this is precisely what did happen, despite the blackout. The people organising the riots clearly had no difficulty planning their strategy. They had their own system of communication whilst the general public were left to feed on unsubstantiated rumours.

Foreign news reporters in Jakarta were not permitted to visit the riot-stricken areas and obtained most of their information from phone-calls to Chinese in the cities affected. Some journalists who managed to take photographs of ravaged areas had their film or their cameras confiscated. The only national newspaper to question the blackout was *Merdeka* which stated editorially (28th November) that gagging the press only engendered confusion, especially "since it has become an open secret that discord and conflicts have arisen in the government and the social forces backing it". (Quoted by AFP, 28th November 1980). On 2nd December, the Indonesian Journalists Assoc-

iation issued a statement urging the government to provide an explanation "to prevent confusing reports being received by the community" (AFP, 2nd December).

Sudomo Urges Chinese Community to "Behave Properly"

As for the Chinese, the defenceless victims of these riots, they obtained little comfort from any of the official pronouncements. A statement from President Suharto, following an emergency Cabinet meeting on 24th November, pointed out that Chinese technical know-how was "still" needed "for the time being", a statement which must have made Chinese ponder seriously over their future prospects in Indonesia.

In a press statement issued on 8th December, Admiral Sudomo actually warned the Chinese of the need to "carry out introspection, display social solidarity, behave properly and at all times conform with their social environment". (Tempo, 13th December 1980)

★

No-one has yet offered a serious analysis of the political background to the riots though few doubt that they were well organised and, apart from the initial developments on the first Wednesday, far from being spontaneous. In his press statement, Sudomo claimed that the riots were aimed at "launching a revolution which would commence in Central Java by inciting anti-Chinese sentiments or racialism and utilising students and pupils as the main implementors". (Tempo, 13th December 1980). He gave no hint as to who he thought stood behind this "revolution", but as Tempo obliquely points out in the same issue, he clearly intends to use this conclusion as justification for intensifying the Army's grip on society. It is noteworthy that the "Sapujagat" operations (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 41/42, September-November 1980) do not yet extend to Central Java but have so far been confined to West Java and Sumatra.

The school population in many urban areas is riven with inter-school rivalries and gang "warfare". In Solo, gangs

referred to as *gali* (short for *gabungan anak-anak liar*, or wild-kid gangs) have become a feature of life, dominating the amusement arcades, roaming the streets and even operating protection rackets. Generally speaking, these *gali* are organised on strictly racial lines. In a society where no outlet for the expression of democratic opinion is permitted, gangs like these become the channel for social frustrations over worsening economic conditions, corruption and the ever-widening gap between rich and poor. The Chinese, a small percentage of whom engage in business activities, are quickly identified as being part of the elite and are thus an easy scapegoat for everyone. Their vulnerability has worsened in the past few years because some of the best-known business houses known to be collaborating with the generals, including Suharto and his wife, are Chinese. In fact, Mrs Suharto holds major investments in at least two of the factories vandalised in Solo, the Batik Kris enterprise and Solo Optical.

STOP PRESS

At the end of December, Sudomo announced that some of those arrested in connection with the riots could be released if "their *pesantran*" (Muslim religious school) would "provide written guarantees" (Tempo, 27th December 1980). He gave no further details.

Some independent observers are now suggesting that the government may be trying to place the blame for the riots on the Muslims, the major political challenge to the Army as the 1982 elections draw near. It was Interior Minister Amir Machmud who was alleging in September last that "G30S/PKI" or ex-tapol elements were planning a political comeback, and intended to infiltrate Muslim organisations. Sudomo's assertions about attempts to launch a "revolution" in Central Java by means of the riots may soon turn out to be an extension of this theory.

There are also strong indications that the riots are closely connected with the power struggle taking place among the generals surrounding Suharto.

MORE THREATS FOR FOREIGN MEDIA

Radio Australia

The Indonesian Government still hopes to persuade the Australian government to put an end to Indonesian language broadcasts by Radio Australia which are beamed nine hours a day and reach an audience of some 30 million Indonesians. Radio Australia's news gathering activities in Indonesia came to a halt early last year when its chief reporter, Warwick Butler, was refused renewal of his work permit and other staff replacements were refused visas.

When Australian Broadcasting Commission officials visited Jakarta in December 1980, hoping to re-open Radio Australia's office, they faced a demand from the Indonesian authorities that they should either stop the Indonesian-language broadcasts altogether or that the broadcasts should refrain from reporting anything about Indonesia.

Indonesia's latest grievance concerns Radio Australia's reports about the anti-Chinese riots at a time when a black-out on news of these events was in force throughout Indonesia. Radio Australia news therefore became the main if not only source of information for millions of Indonesian listeners.

Radio Finland

A half-hour programme in mid-October on Radio Finland about the political situation in Indonesia and the question of East Timor led to a formal complaint from the Indonesian Embassy in Helsinki. In a letter to the Finnish Foreign Ministry, the Embassy claimed that the programme "contained one-sided information, negative and unfair towards Indonesia" and represented "interference in the domestic policy of a friendly country".

The Embassy's assumption that Radio Finland is a "state-controlled institution" is quite false, and the complaint therefore fell on deaf ears.

MASS MURDERS IN BURU: DEATH LISTS RECEIVED

Eleven tapols were shot dead on a single day in 1972 at Unit V in the Buru penal labour camp, and three others who escaped were killed shortly afterwards. A year later, six tapols were shot dead over a period of four days at the Jiku Kecil special punishment camp for Buru detainees.

This information is contained in lists giving details of 319 tapols who were killed or died of various causes during their detention on Buru. Altogether 39 men are listed as having been killed by guards. Fifteen suicides are listed, several of which are directly linked with torture and maltreatment by guards. Twenty-six men died after an escape attempt from Unit II, and one man who gave himself up after this escape was later shot dead.

The set of lists was made available to TAPOL a few months ago. There are separate lists for each of the 21 regular units on Buru (Nos I to XVIII, and the R, S and T units) and for the Jiku Kecil special punishment camp which was later moved to 'Ancol', cynically named after the well-known recreation resort on the outskirts of Jakarta. The lists give detailed information about each man including his prison registration number, year of birth, date of death, marital status, religion, home address and cause of death. In several instances where men were killed by guards, the name of the soldier or soldiers responsible is also given.

The list for Unit V states that the eleven men shot dead on 6th October 1972 were killed by soldiers of Battalion 733 of the Pattimura (Maluku) Division who were in charge of guarding Units III, V and VI.

The 1973 killings at Jiku Kecil are also described in a recently-published book by the Australian journalist, Hamish McDonald. In *Suharto's Indonesia* (1980), he reports on a three-day visit to Buru in 1977 during which, he says, "No restrictions were placed on contact between prisoners and journalists". Of the killings in Jiku Kecil, he writes:

The staging camp of Jiku Kecil became a special punishment centre. The hardship appears to have reached a peak in the years 1972 and 1973, particularly towards the end of this period when the usual Moluccan guard battalion was replaced for a year by a unit from South Sulawesi, a strongly Muslim region. Late in 1972 a month-long security disturbance (see reference above to the shootings in Unit V, *Tapol Bulletin*) led to tightened control of the prisoners. Those suspected of organising disturbances were taken to Jiku Kecil. With great consistency, numerous prisoners alleged that guards carried out vicious beatings and torture. Often they were deprived of water and fed salted food so that they drank their own urine in desperate thirst. One man, Prawoto, who died of this treatment was officially reported as having hanged himself. In 1973 a group of prisoners from Jiku Kecil collecting timber angered their guard. He shot one man dead, then lined up the remaining five and shot them one by one in the chest with a pistol. Only one survived.

Footnoted clarifications attached to the list of deaths at Jiku Kecil largely corroborate McDonald's account. According to these footnotes,

Prawoto bin Martodimejo died on 1st October 1972 while under interrogation by Captain Adam, Intelligence Assistant Officer at Buru Camp.

Mustaji was tortured for eight consecutive days, and finally committed suicide.

Suwarno Ciptosupono was shot "after surrendering, with his hands up"

Gatot Widodo was shot dead on 16th November 1973, while in a nearby coconut garden. There were three bullet wounds in his body.

Suharjono, Alex, Nono and Abdulgani were shot dead on 18th November 1973 after being tortured for three days and two nights. They had been gathering timber in a nearby garden when they heard the shots that killed Gatot Widodo. They returned to Jiku Kecil, were subjected to prolonged torture, then shot dead. Another man, Juhendi, who was shot with them, survived.

Awang Rasawan was shot dead the next day. **Kadi** was hit by a bullet intended for Awang. He survived, but the bullet is still lodged in his collar bone.

The lists of deaths on Buru also reveal that 39 men died as the result of accidents: 20 by drowning, 11 from falls from trees or from being crushed by falling trees, 5 were struck by lightning and 3 died from attacks by wild animals. The major illnesses causing death appear to have been hepatitis (48) and tuberculosis (38). Three men in Unit I "died in their sleep" on three separate days in August, September and October 1976, while four men in Unit X are described as having been killed "by local inhabitants".

It is unlikely that the lists include all the deaths which occurred on Buru. For one thing, the last recorded deaths took place in July and August 1978 which is more than 15 months before the final batch of tapols left Buru.

JAKARTA'S POPULATION BEING FINGER-PRINTED

Everyone who lives in Jakarta, Indonesia's capital, is now being finger-printed by the Jakarta Police in collaboration with the municipal government. Announcing this on 12th September, 1980, the Armed Forces daily, *Angkatan Bersenjata* said this is being done for three reasons:

1. To establish everyone's identity, to identify corpses and safeguard their rights.
2. To ensure speedy service in completing identity-card formalities (all Indonesian citizens are required to possess identity-cards).
3. To provide a better means for the effective control of the population by the local authorities, and to help the Police to be able to apprehend criminal elements more speedily.

WEST IRIAN

Submission to Bertrand Russell Tribunal: INVOLUNTARY STERILISATION OF PAPUANS IN WEST IRIAN

Papuan men are being forcibly sterilised, in conflict with Papuan tradition, according to West Papuan representatives in a submission to the Bertrand Russell Tribunal which met in Rotterdam last November. The Tribunal which was held to hear complaints about the treatment of Indians in North and Latin America, agreed to accept complaints submitted by the *High Court of the Chamber of Representatives of West Papua* which has its headquarters in Delft, Holland, about the situation in West Papua, known in Indonesia as the province of West Irian.

According to the submission, sterilisation is part of a massive re-population programme for West Irian which will eventually result in the number of Indonesians far exceeding the number of Papuans in the province. There are already about 500,000 Indonesians there, most of whom have come there under the "transmigration" programme. This compares with a Papuan population which numbered one million before Indonesia's takeover of the province, and of these, according to the submission, about 150,000 are estimated to have been killed or to have disappeared since West Irian came under Indonesian control in 1963.

"Indonesians dominate the social life in the cities. There is no place left for Papuans. They feel like strangers in their own land . . . and are forced to retreat to the forests. The use of the word Papuan is forbidden."

The submission also complained of widespread job discrimination (the very problem raised by Vice-President Adam Malik, see separate item) and said this was particularly serious in Jayapura, the capital, and in Merauke, Fak-Fak, Kaimana, Sorong, Manokwari and Biak.

Marten Tabu Sentenced to 30 Years?

The West Papuan representatives also told the Tribunal that Marten Tabu, the OPM leader who surrendered to the Indonesian troops in April 1980, is shortly to be tried. (The *Far Eastern Economic Review* of 19th December 1980, quoting "reliable sources", reports that Tabu has already been tried, and was sentenced to 30 years) This was despite the fact that he was granted an amnesty by President Suharto soon after his surrender. Three other OPM leaders are also said to be awaiting trial: Jareth Wajoi, Abner May and Joel Worumi. The first two are known to have signed statements agreeing to collaborate with the Indonesians and to join the Indonesian Army, yet even so, they are now scheduled for trial.

The submission also gives the names of three Papuan political prisoners who have died as a result of maltreatment since the beginning of this year. They are Baldus Mofu (see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 39, May 1980), Michael Wajoi and Mathias Tata-Rawaji.

According to a report in the Dutch weekly, *De Groene Amsterdammer* in November 1980, Marten Tabu is being held in detention in Dok V, the headquarters of Brigadier-

General Santosa, the military commander of West Irian. The journal also reported that a unit of OPM guerrillas led by Marten Tabu's brother, Matias Tabu, attacked a group of Indonesian officials who were on a visit to the district of Mamberamo Hilir, 300 kilometres south of Jayapura. Six census-takers were killed in the encounter. The other members of the group which included military as well as civilian officials, are being held as hostages, and will only be released in exchange for the release of Marten Tabu.

OPM CHARGE IS "THE KISS OF DEATH", SAYS MP

Critical remarks made by Indonesia's Vice-President Adam Malik about the administration of West Irian, following a visit to the province in October 1980, drew a rueful response from a Papuan member of Indonesia's Parliament.

"If people in West Irian made such remarks," said Steef Patrick Nafuni who represents the PDI (National Party), "they would be accused of all manner of things, and they would be interrogated in connection with the Free Papua Movement (OPM)." (*Kompas*, 5th November 1980.) While welcoming Adam Malik's criticisms, Mr Nafuni said: "People in West Irian fear being branded as members of the OPM just as much as people in Java fear being branded as members of the PKI. The PKI charge means nothing to people there," he said, "but the OPM charge is 'the kiss of death'".

The MP's remark followed a report in *Kompas* (31st October 1980) that Vice-President Adam Malik told President Suharto, after his visit to West Irian, of a number of serious problems, in particular the very low wages paid to government officials and the serious lack of employment opportunities for "local people"*. An earlier item in *Kompas*, filed from Jayapura, the capital of West Irian, during the course of Adam Malik's visit, quoted him as warning officials there that far too little has been done to place "local people" in positions of responsibility within the administration. "Because we have failed to do this, we are encountering the problems we now face in security affairs," he said, warning that it was wrong to think that security can be solved by bringing in more troops. The problems there must be solved "sociologically and anthropologically". (*Kompas*, 23 October 1980)

In his statement, Mr Nafuni also said that he had frequently stressed that more "local people" should be given positions of authority, but his remarks has always "created difficulties" for his party colleagues in the province. He went on: "Some officials in West Irian even seem to think that if too many people originating from the region were to occupy important posts, a Papuan state could come into existence."

* As reported elsewhere on this page the word "Papuan" is proscribed. Papuans are therefore referred to as *anak daerah* or "local people"

1. From 15th October when the press reported that I would preach at the Idul Adha prayer-meeting in Kuningan Square, Setia Budi (South Jakarta), my home was watched night and day by *intel* [1] men, and I was often followed when I went out. Some *intel* men tried to enter the grounds of my home but this was difficult because Muslim youth had been keeping guard for some time. They had taken this initiative out of a sense of solidarity after hearing that my family and I were being terrorised and intimidated.

2. On 18th October, the chairman of the Idul Adha (Festival of Sacrifice) Prayer-Meeting Committee informed me that my sermon had been cancelled, under pressure from the authorities.

3. I decided therefore to attend the Idul Adha prayer-meeting on 19th October at Cut Mutiah Square, together with General Nasution whose sermon, which was to have been delivered there, had also been cancelled. When I left home I was followed by two *intel* vehicles and several motor-cycles. After prayers, I spoke to several *intel* officers from the Cut Mutiah army office, including Lieutenant-Colonel Simbolon. I asked him to stop surrounding my house and having me followed. I had, after all, complied with the ban against me as a preacher. He laughed and said: "It won't happen again." But when I drove off to General Nasution's house I was trailed by the same cars, plus others. They even parked quite conspicuously outside the General's home.

4. From there I went to Al-Bayinah Mosque in Setia Budi to see H. Nuri who had been detained by *Koramil* [2] after he had announced that I would preach at the Friday prayer-meeting at his Mosque. The *Koramil* commander was determined that neither Syafruddin Prawiranegara nor I should preach in his district, and someone had even overheard him say that he would "kill someone" rather than have his career ruined. I was also planning to visit H. Mawin, chairman of the committee that had invited me to preach, because I heard that he and his family were being terrorised by Army personnel.

5. Outside the Mosque, I met several mosque officials and congregants. Some of them, especially H. Nuri, who had just been released the night before, embraced me very warmly.

6. On the way home, just as I was about to call on H. Mawin, I was ordered to stop by some soldiers under the command of Captain Kaelani, Intel Assistant at the South Jakarta *Kodim*, a well-known man in the locality. When I refused to accompany them unless they could produce a warrant, they dragged me out. In the scuffle, my foot slipped on the kerb. Bystanders who spoke up on my behalf were warned that they would be arrested. When a friend tried to stay with me and came towards the *intel* car into which I was being hustled, someone ordered his arrest. I managed to push him away from the car. I was then driven away in the *intel* car. It was by then about 9.00am and many friends witnessed these events.

7. There were four *intel* officers in the car which careered around the Menteng District. The men threatened to go at

Dr. A. M. Fatwa, an outspoken Muslim critic of the Ina (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 40, July 1980, page 7) has spent months in detention in 1978 after the crackdown against Suharto's re-election as President in March 1978. In August he resumed mosque service (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 41/42, September 1978).

In October, the Army again prevented critics, including me, from attending the Festival of Sacrifice. Intelligence personnel spied on my movements and kept me under surveillance. He was arrested, and, together with some mosque officials, was taken to a military camp.

The following is a slightly abridged translation of Fatwa's account of the methods of terror used by the Army, it also shows how Fatwa was injured not by Army officers but by a street mob.

very high speed and prevent me from keeping the door closed. The car could overturn, they said, and we might all be killed. Captain Kaelani made contact through his walkie-talkie with the *Kodim* commander and the First Assistant (Intelligence) of Jakarta's *Laksusda* to inform them that he had secured "the goods", and to ask where he should now take me. "To Room 6", came the reply. We then drove to Setia Budi *Koramil*. Here the *Koramil* commander dragged me out of the car, badly damaging my shoes. In the *Koramil* office, I was thrown down onto a chair. The commander then began to beat me with his fists, striking me in the face, head, ears and jaws. He also kicked me in the head, the chest and the legs.

8. During a pause, the *Kodim* commander who was also in the room, ordered the arrest of members of the Al-Bayinah Mosque Committee. Soon afterwards, three of them appeared — H. Mawin, H. Ramli and another man whose name I don't know. They were shouted at and beaten for allowing me into their locality without reporting it to the authorities. H. Mawin was treated the worst. He was punched and kicked by the *Kodim* commander, and fell to the floor. Then Second Lieutenant Sukarman, the *Koramil* commander, started beating me again, this time with two other soldiers, though these two didn't beat hard. Lieutenant Sukarman told me to drink some tea from a bottle on his table. He tried to force the bottle into my mouth which only made me splutter and choke, so he threw the liquid at me, drenching my clothes. He grabbed the Bugis Bone cap I was wearing, threw it to the floor and trampled on it. He pulled off a scarf I had wrapped round my head to protect it. I responded to each of his blows by chanting, "Allahuakhbar!" though he told me not to. He said that he was a fanatic Muslim, and the *Kodim* commander, a lieutenant-colonel said: "I'm more fanatical than you. You only use religion to create trouble." He complained that he hadn't been able to sleep for five days and nights because of me.

9. After further consultations with the First Assistant of the *Laksusda*, H. Mawin and I were transferred to Satgas Intel in Banteng Sqaure. H. Ramli and his colleagues were allowed to return to the mosque.

10. At *Satgas* Intel, H. Mawin and I were dragged into the

RTS MAL-TREATMENT

Indonesian government and signatory of the Petition-of-Fifty frequently suffered persecution by the Army. He spent several years in prison for his Muslim criticisms of the 1977 general election and of the New Order. In this year, he was prevented from preaching at a Lebaran (November 1980, page 10).

A. M. Fatwa, from preaching in mosques during Idul Adha, was arrested, his prayer-meetings and kept people like Fatwa under close surveillance by officials, severely beaten up.

Fatwa's chilling account of his experiences. Besides revealing the tactics of the intelligence men contrived to create the impression that



A. M. Fatwa

office and thrown heavily against a wall. We both fell to the floor. Then we were dragged out to the back yard and beaten up. I saw H. Mawin bleeding after his mouth had been struck. The soldiers beating me were led by Captain Thomas, a *Satgas* intel officer, formerly commander of Senen *Koramil*. After a while, Captain Thomas ordered me to make a speech "to arouse people's passions" as I was "in the habit of doing", as he put it. I could not even open my mouth, as both my jaws had been so badly beaten. He started beating me again while another soldier pushed me backwards and forwards, kicking me from behind. Each time they beat me, I shouted "Allahuakhbar!" although Captain Thomas said it would not help, and could even make things worse. When the soldiers took a rest, I was ordered to stand upright and still. The beating only came to an end when another *intel* officer led me away to a different room, sat me down gently on a chair, brought me a drink and food (though I couldn't eat) and brought me a mat so that I could say my midday prayer. I don't know his name, but he was the person who saved me from further torture.

11. Then, Lieutenant-Colonel Kosman, Commander of *Satgas Intel*, turned up. When he saw my swollen face, he said: "This is the work of criminals. He's been beaten by a mob of people, hasn't he?" When the soldiers replied, "Yes", he said: "If that's the case, I don't want him here. Take him back to *Koramil*, or better still, to the police station".

12. Then, when H. Mawin and I were alone with Captain

Kaelani, he told us he was from a devout Muslim family in Palembang who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca for several generations back. I took this opportunity to tell him how surprised I was that he could treat his fellow human beings in this way, and I told him I hoped I was the last person he would beat up like this. His eyes began to moisten. I asked him why he was crying, and he said: "I know how you feel. I would feel like that too if my son or daughter were treated like this. Don't think I'm not afraid of *karma* [3]." When I asked him whether we would be beaten up again when we returned to the *Koramil* office, he replied: "I am in charge. I assure you I will not let anyone touch you again."

13. After preparations had been completed, we were driven in an Army vehicle to the police station. I said I wanted to sit in the back with H. Mawin but I had to sit in the front, in between the driver and Captain Kaelani with another guard sitting behind. When we reached Malang Canal Road, just in front of the Setia Budi administrative office and about four hundred metres from the police-station, there was a group of masked men standing in the road. When the car stopped, they pulled open the doors. The driver and Captain Kaelani quickly jumped out, and the men got in and started beating me up. Again I cried "Allahuakhbar!" each time I was beaten. They pulled me by the legs but I clung to the steering-wheel feeling sure it would be much worse if they managed to get me out of the car. They might even have thrown me into the canal.

14. Strangely, this assault stopped of its own accord, without any intervention by the authorities. I only heard Captain Kaelani say: "Okay, that's enough" whereupon the men disbanded and the car in which we were travelling proceeded down the road to the police-station. I felt that God had protected me, in response to my prayers.

15. At the police-station, Captain Kaelani showed me five men, saying "These are the men who beat you up. We didn't catch them all." Then I saw them being taken to a cell and was told to listen while they were struck, but the "cries of pain" didn't sound at all real. It was no surprise to hear later, from a reliable source, that the men "who had been arrested by the police were taken to the *Laksusda* office".

16. I then heard Captain Kaelani phone the *Kodim* commander and the First Assistant of *Laksusda* to report that a mob had attacked me and that I was badly injured. The captain left, and later returned with orders for me to be allowed home for treatment. He also said that criminal charges could be made through the police. H. Mawin who was not so badly injured as me went home, and I was taken by two policemen in a taxi to the Islamic Hospital, as I had requested.

17. On my first night at the hospital, numerous phone-calls were received from unknown persons threatening to kidnap me.

18. **Conclusion** It is quite untrue to say that I was beaten up by an unknown mob. The truth is that I was arrested by an officer of the Army, Captain Kaelani, *intel* officer of South

Continued on page 8, lower half.

SUSPENSIONS AND EXPULSIONS IN THE CAMPUSES

No fewer than 30 students have been expelled from state universities in various parts of Indonesia, under pressure from Daud Joesoef, the Minister for Education. A far greater number have been suspended from studies for periods of up to a year. Expulsion and suspension have thus become the current government tactic for forcing students to conform with its plan to depoliticise the campuses.

The expulsions and suspensions have led to lecture strikes in several universities. In December, students at the Bandung Institute of Technology went on a three-day strike in protest against the suspension of Yayat Nurhayat, chairman of the Student Council. The existence of the council itself is a defiant challenge to the government which has ordered, under its 'normalisation' programme, that all student councils should be disbanded and replaced by closely supervised faculty-student bodies.

At the University of Indonesia, Jakarta, a lecture strike also took place in November 1980, when Elbiner Tobing, a student of the Faculty of Social Sciences, was expelled, after being under a suspension order since 1979. His expulsion came after he led a student delegation to Parliament to protest against Army intrusions on the university's campus and in particular against the incident on 25th October when a number of students were injured.

Campus Meetings Prevented

October and November are months that abound in Indonesian history with commemorative days and have in the past few years become months of confrontation between the students and the Army. True to form, this happened again this year.

The first and most serious of the incidents occurred on 25th October when armed troops broke up a two-day seminar being held on the campus of the University of Indonesia to commemorate the 25th anniversary of UI's Student Council. In defiance of a prohibition by the Jakar-

ta Military Command, Chris Siner Key Timu, a signatory of the Petition-of-50 (see **Tapol Bulletin** No. 40) attended, and was about to deliver a speech when troops moved in to prevent this. The Army was also angered by the presence of General Nasution who had been invited as a special guest. According to one report, General Nasution was dragged out by troops; according to another he was requested by the Rector to join him in his office. (The incident was not directly reported in the press following a news blackout imposed by KOPKAMTIB.)

When students tried to hold back the troops and prevent them from entering the hall, they were beaten with rifle-butts. Fourteen were injured, one seriously.

Three days later, on 28th October, Youth Pledge Day, a poetry-reading on campus had to be cancelled when students who turned up for the event found the campus already occupied by troops. Care had been taken on this occasion not to invite "controversial" people, but this failed to save the meeting.

The third meeting enjoyed a better fate. This was the meeting held on campus on 10th November, Heroes Day, scheduled for late in the afternoon. Many students had been on campus since morning, and by the time the meeting was due to commence, the hall was filled to capacity with about 3,000 people. But the campus by this time was surrounded by troops, and the gates were locked well before the meeting was due to start. Large crowds of people who had turned up hoping to attend could not get it, but were able to follow the proceedings from loud-speakers. The meeting was addressed among others by Lukman Hakim and Hariman Siregar, both former chairmen of the UI Student Council and both of whom have been tried in the past few years. Buyung Nasution, the human rights lawyer, also spoke.

Sources: **Tempo**, 22nd November and 13th December; **Radio Nederland** Hilversum, 28th October; **Pelita**, 29th October; and **NRC-Hanselblad**, 12th November.

Continued from page 7.

Jakarta *Kodim*. The first round of beating up which also included torture was carried out by an officer, Second-Lieutenant Sukarman, member of the Setia Budi *Koramil* who was wearing his military uniform. This took place at the Setia Budi *Koramil* office, in the presence of the commander of the South Jakarta *Kodim*. The incident was also witnessed by members of the Al-Bayinah Mosque Committee. The second round of beating, which also included torture, occurred at the office of *Satgas Intel* of *Laksusda*, at No. 34 Banteng Square, with Captain Thomas, an officer on the staff of *Satgas Intel*, in charge. The third round, which included an assault as well as torture, took place inside an Army car at a time when I was still under guard and in the charge of Captain Kaelani and an Army sergeant. Although I don't know the identity of the people who made the assault, there is absolutely no reason to doubt that the incident was stage-managed and well organised beforehand.

19. May the Lord God Almighty grant his humble servant protection. Amen.

Jakarta, 22 October 1980

Footnotes

1. *intel*: a widely used term in Indonesian, both for the intelligence services as well as for the men who work for them.
2. **Glossary of military terms**
Koramil: The lowest-level military command.
Kodim: District military command, above *Koramil* and below *Kodim* which is the provincial-level command.
Laksusda: The provincial military commanders are also given special security powers, signified by the additional title of *Laksusda*.
Satgas: "Special Tasks" units set up by the Army at central and provincial command levels, in charge of intelligence operations against "subversion".
3. *karma*: the notion that good or bad deeds will inevitably earn their just rewards or punishments.

MORE EXECUTIONS REPORTED

Since June 1980 when Indonesian troops occupying East Timor came under renewed attack from guerrilla units operating on the outskirts of Dili, the capital, there has been a marked increase in the level of repression. Reports are now being received — mainly from Timorese who have reached Portugal in the last few months and from Indonesians or foreigners who have visited East Timor — that numerous arrests were made in the aftermath of the June raids.

An Amnesty International Urgent Action circular, issued on 14th November 1980, estimated the arrests at between 80 and 100, and said: "A number of East Timorese are known to have disappeared after having been captured or arrested . . . It is believed that some of them may have been executed." The circular calls for special action on behalf of David Ximenes, who served for a time in the Indonesian Army. He was arrested and disappeared in June.

Henry Kamm, in a dispatch from Jakarta (*New York Times*, 9th December 1980), puts the number of arrests since June at around 200, and states that "reliable Timorese sources reported that several hundred inhabitants of mountain areas around Dili, from where the insurgents are believed to have come, have been driven from their homes, either to camps around Dili or to banishment to the offshore island of Atauro. Their mountain shacks were reported to have been burnt."

In June, the guerrillas struck in three different places around Dili, taking occupying troops completely by surprise. The raids also proved that resistance to Indonesian occupation is widespread and is not confined to the eastern sector of the country, as was previously thought. Moreover, the raids and the subsequent reprisals appear to have stiffened resistance. Henry Kamm explained it thus:

Despite the reprisals, a foreigner reported that Fretilin struck again the following month, attacking a fuel dump between Dili and its airport . . . Catholic sources reported that Fretilin's brief resurgence in the city has deepened the visible animosity of Timorese to occupying soldiers and heightened Fretilin's residual popularity.

Three Catholics Executed

The *Timor Information Service* (November 1980), published

in Victoria, Australia, gives the following account received from an Indonesian visitor to Dili:

. . . Several nights after the (June) attack, three prominent Dili Catholics approached staff of the Junior Seminary at Lahane near Dare (one of the three places where raids took place, *TAPOL Bulletin*) seeking food and shelter. They told the Seminary head that during the attack they were forced by the guerrillas to carry captured arms and ammunition back to the bush. They returned to Dili, but being afraid of possible Indonesian reprisals, they hid in the bush on the outskirts of the capital. Hunger had forced them to try the Seminary for help.

Initially the three were told that the Seminary could not offer sanctuary because that might put the Seminary in trouble with the military as well. Later, however, the Seminary head contacted the Dili Bishop who wouldn't go to Lahane because of the curfew but he did agree to interview the three men the following morning. Following the interview, the Bishop and Seminary head made representations to the Indonesian military intelligence body in Dili, saying that they would vouch for the three men — that they were not involved by choice in the June incident.

According to our source, the three men were then taken by the Indonesian military and handed over to a *Hansip* (local militia) group which took them to Dare Seminary. There, on a games court, the three were executed. Their bodies were rolled down a nearby slope. As of early August, their bodies remained because people were afraid to retrieve them for burial.

Trabhalista Leader Executed

Timor Newsletter (December 1980), reporting on the content of letters received from East Timor by Timorese refugees in Lisbon, quoted one letter which described the execution of Arbao Martins, leader of the right-wing Trabhalista party who was being held in an Indonesian prison:

. . . before they took him to be killed he cried and wrote

Continued on page 11, lower half.



Dr. Runcie, the Archbishop of Canterbury, with Father Francisco Fernandes, refugee priest from East Timor, and Mr. Au Sei Ki, during their visit to London in July 1980. Dr. Runcie, Primate of the world Anglican Church, gave the East Timor visitors assurances of deep sympathy and concern for the tragic plight of the people of East Timor.

HOUSE OF LORDS DISCUSS EAST TIMOR

On 4th December 1980, the House of Lords debated East Timor on the initiative of Lord Avebury of the Liberal Party who also chairs the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Human Rights. The debate came two weeks after the *New Statesman* had been served a High Court injunction, on the request of the Australian government, preventing distribution of its 21st November issue which quoted extracts from the book, *Documents on Australia Defence and Foreign Policy 1968-75* by George Munster and Richard Walsh, a book which was the target of many injunctions in Australia as well.

The Australian government's injunction which Lord Avebury described as "a totally unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of our country", came too late to prevent normal distribution of the journal to the bookstalls and the mailing of several hundred copies to Australia, though several hundred copies still in the warehouse had to be withheld.

In his opening speech, Lord Avebury dealt at length with British government pronouncements since 1975 on East Timor and concluded that "at the same time as we were making all the right noises in public about self-determination, we knew of, and were conniving with, Indonesian aggression". He quoted a letter from Sir John Ford, the British Ambassador in Jakarta, dated 21st July 1975, which was sent to the Foreign Office with a report on East Timor by a senior British Embassy official who had just visited the country. The Ambassador wrote:

The people of Portuguese East Timor are in no condition to exercise the right of self-determination. . . The territory seems likely to become steadily more of a problem child, and the arguments in favour of its integration into Indonesia are all the stronger. . . Developments in Lisbon seem now to argue in favour of greater sympathy towards Indonesia should the Indonesian Government feel forced to take stronger action. Certainly, as seen from here, it is in Britain's interest that Indonesia should absorb the territory as soon and as unobtrusively as possible; and that if it comes to the crunch and there is a row in the UN, we should keep our heads down and avoid siding against the Indonesian Government.

A request by Lord Avebury that the government make public the report sent with the Ambassador's letter, as well as other documents relating to British policy on East Timor was rejected by the government on the grounds that such documents were bound by the "30-year rule" (prohibiting publication for 30 years).

Lord Avebury also raised the case of the murder of 5 television journalists killed in October 1975 – two of whom were British subjects – as an example of duplicity by the British government. A cable sent a few days after the killing by the Australian Ambassador to his government shows that Australia (and clearly Britain too) knew that

although it is not true, the formal position of the Indonesian government is still that there is no military intervention in East Timor. If the (Australian Foreign) Minister said or implied in public that the Indonesian government was lying, we would invite a hurt and angry reply."

The point at issue was the nature of the public response to the murders. The Indonesian version was that they were killed while sheltering in a house hit by mortar fire, yet, as Lord Avebury pointed out, eye witnesses have said that one of the journalists was machine-gunned to death as Indonesian troops entered the village where they were working, and that the other four were put up against a wall and shot.

In February 1976, a government minister gave the House of Commons Indonesia's version of the murders, said Lord Avebury, who went on:

The minister meant that he did not want to discover the truth because if it were to have been proved that our citizens had been cold-bloodedly murdered, there would have been enormous public opposition to the cynical policy of encouraging the Indonesians to annex East Timor.

Yet even despite this, the government minister who responded to Lord Avebury's statement in the House of Lords once again repeated Indonesia's version of the killings and claimed "that the circumstances of their deaths are still not clear"

Referring to Britain's sale of Hawk ground-attack aircraft to Indonesia, Lord Avebury said these were planes that could be used for internal repression. A British government spokesperson had recently said in the House of Lords that "equipment which, in our judgement, could be used for internal repression (would not be sold) to a regime which is known to practise torture". Why then were they being sold to Indonesia, he asked, which does indeed practise torture "on an enormous scale"?

Supporting Lord Avebury in the debate was the Labour lord, Lord Fenner Brockway who strongly attacked Indonesia's occupation of East Timor and pressed for a full investigation of present conditions in the country by the UN.

Speaking in support of Indonesia was the Conservative, Baroness Vickers who has served for many years as president of the Anglo-Indonesia Association. She claimed that since she had made a visit to East Timor recently, on the invitation of the Indonesian government, she was in a better position to judge the situation. She had, she said, met 24 people, including five Portuguese. Arabs and Chinese were also present. "They expressed themselves to be . . . happy with existing conditions." She made a point of stressing that there had been no officials present, though admitted that she did have an interpreter with her!

IN MEMORIAM

We regret to announce the death last September of Jack Woddis, a sponsor of TAPOL for several years. He was always an enthusiastic supporter of our work and frequently helped us with advice. At the time of his death, he was head of the International Department of the Communist Party of Great Britain.

BABIES DIE IN ACEHNESE PRISONS

A letter signed "Another Fanatic", written to the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (12th December 1980), challenges a report by the journal that Hasan di Tiro, the Acehese separatist leader, is dead. It declares that Jakarta has the habit of "killing its enemies several times", and goes on:

"Jakarta is also in the habit of imprisoning the wives and children of men who are in the jungle. Two babies died behind bars in Aceh after their mothers were arrested."

The correspondent asserts too that Aceh, in North Sumatra, like West Irian and East Timor, is in the process of being diluted by Javanese transmigrants in an attempt to stamp out support for the cause of Acehese liberation. "That is why all regular Garuda flights to Aceh have been cancelled and all aircraft used to carry transmigrants."

The letter also criticises the *Review* for stressing that almost all important positions in the province's administration are in Acehese hands, and asks: ". . . have you considered just how little power an Indonesian governor has? The moment he pleads for anything that Jakarta

Continued from page 9.

the name of his wife and children on the prison wall. After they shot him in the stomach he cried "Long live the Anti-Communist Movement [1] and the blood of the innocent citizens of Serramara [2] spilt for the future of Timor!"

The same letter, which was sent from Timor in March 1980, three months before the June raids on Dili, also said:

. . . the people who are still in the bush are now only in the eastern zone but I think they will not last much longer because there is daily bombing . . . Timor was previously known as the 'holy red and green island' but now it is an island of blood whose sons don't know their fathers.

Food Aid to East Timor to Stop

Henry Kamm's report in the *New York Times* is mainly concerned with the serious consequences for the Timorese of Indonesia's plans for a total cutoff of food aid and the phasing out of medical assistance. The two agencies allowed to operate, the International Committee of Red Cross and the Catholic Relief Services, were being required, he said, to wind up their activities in East Timor by the end of 1980. [The ICRC programme, extended in October 1980 for another six months, concentrates on medical assistance to people in fourteen areas, while the CRS has only been supplying food aid, largely funded by the US government,

Footnotes:

- 1) The Anti-Communist Revolutionary Movement was formed in late 1975 by the Trambahlista, UDT, Kota and pro-Indonesian Apodeti parties to fight Fretilin, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor.
- 2) A reference to Queen Maria Serramara of Lete-foho district to whom Martins presumably paid fiefdom.

doesn't like, he will be replaced. The real power is with the military commanders". It also points out that even though the electorate in Aceh gave majority support to the Muslim party, PPP, in the 1971 general elections, local government is still controlled by GOLKAR (the Army's electoral platform) and the military.

*

GENERAL YASIN TO STAND TRIAL

Retired General Yasin, the man who circulated a document early last year exposing the corrupt business practices used to set up a cattle-ranch owned in West Java by President Suharto, is to be tried on charges of slandering the Head of State. Announcing this, the Attorney-General, Lieut.-General Ali Said said that seven others have been interrogated so far in connection with this trial. They include the former governor of Jakarta, Lieut.-General Ali Sadikin and other retired senior members of the Armed Forces. The interrogation of witnesses is still proceeding. (AFP, 23rd October 1980)

not by the Catholic church, while distribution is wholly administered by the Indonesian Army (*editor, TAPOL*.)

Henry Kamm reports that although both agencies believe that East Timor remains greatly in need of help, the Indonesian government has declared the emergency over, and has made it quite clear that no food imports into East Timor will be permitted after 31st December 1980. (Indonesia itself is the world's largest importer of rice!) Kamm thinks there are two reasons for this decision: Indonesia's anger over the continued majority support in the UN for self-determination in East Timor, and the continuance of warfare in the country. (Extensive military operations were the reason why relief aid was delayed until late 1979 even though it was widely acknowledged in September 1978 that starvation and disease were ravaging the population.)

Kamm quoted an unnamed Timorese contact in Jakarta as urging that foreign aid groups try to keep a lasting presence in East Timor. "If the foreigners leave," he said, "it will be tragic for the Timorese people. First, they give assistance. And besides, when the foreigners are there, the military men are afraid. When they go away, warplanes will come back to Timor, and warships also."

The *Christian Science Monitor* (17th December 1980) reports that in October last year, ten US Senators wrote to the Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, about reports of continued fighting in East Timor, the jailing of large numbers of political prisoners and their concern about prison conditions there. They also raised the problem of families who have been separated during the conflict in East Timor and who have not been able to be reunited. Many thousands of Timorese desire to join their relatives now living abroad, the letter said, yet few have been allowed to leave.

BUYUNG NASUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

During a visit to Holland in December 1980 to attend a seminar on Human Rights and Development Co-operation organised by the Dutch aid agency, NOVIB, Mr. Buyung Nasution, Director of the Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta, gave an interview to De Waarheid, (18th December 1980). The following are some of the questions and answers.

On the 1982 General Elections

De Waarheid: Will the released prisoners be allowed to vote?

Nasution: In principle they should have that right, but a long struggle must still be waged. In my opinion, they must in the first place be able to live; that is to say, their economic and social rights must be restored. I believe they should also get back their political rights even though I oppose the Communist Party and its standpoint. But if we were to concentrate at the present time on political rights, this would only irritate the authorities.

De W.: But these rights are important, and having to abstain is itself a violation of human rights.

N.: Yes, of course, and the authorities must be made to understand that. They are afraid of the Communist Party. Democrats must allow their opponents democratic rights, but this will take time.

On Interior Minister Amir Machmud's call for "vigilance against ex-tapols" and Admiral Sudomo's appeal to society to "accept them back".

N.: Machmud's statement is very confusing. He referred in general to all ex-tapols and didn't make clear what exactly he meant. He was directing suspicions at everyone, from top to bottom. There is no unanimity in the government regarding treatment of the ex-tapols. The ex-tapols face many stresses as a result of prolonged detention. Statements such as Machmud's do not help them at all, and can only make them nervous and full of anxiety.

On Remaining A-category prisoners and prisoners under death sentence.

De W.: There are still some A-category prisoners awaiting trial, aren't there?

N.: I can't believe that. The issue is already finished. There is no more evidence, there are no more witnesses, and maybe even the documents don't exist any more. The big question for me is: how much longer can these people be expected to wait. If they are to be

tried, it should be done now. If not, they should be considered as being eligible for immediate release as a "magnanimous gesture". I have criticised those in the West who only speak about the communist prisoners, including Amnesty International. Why limit concerns to the communists? . . . There are at present many Muslim prisoners, and recently more Muslims have been arrested.

De W.: From the old Masjumi or Nahdlatul Ulama?

N.: From both. Suharto is also restricting the freedom of movement of Muslims and their organisations. And in the past few years, many students have been arrested, some of whom are still prisoners.

De W.: In a letter to the Indonesian Commission of the Dutch Communist Party, the Dutch Foreign Minister recently said that the Indonesian authorities had assured him that the people under death sentence would not in fact be executed.

N.: That's fine, but I think that the important thing is for those death sentences to be formally commuted. It would then no longer be an internal question for the Indonesian authorities.

On Press censorship.

De W.: Has there been any improvement in the past ten or fifteen years?

N.: A little. Some critical articles occasionally appear about social problems, especially when worker and peasant delegations visit Parliament or the authorities about their complaints. News items like this are allowed, but only by the grace of the government. There is actually no freedom of the press . . . Tight control is exerted over the supply of news. Newspapers are prohibited from publishing political statements or speeches by me. If I make a defence speech in court, this is sometimes reported, but not if I make a speech to students, for instance. There is still a black list, which also includes General Nasution, Ali Sadikin, Darsono and the poet Rendra. Recently, the signatories of the "petition-of-50" were added to the list.

HUMANIST INTERNATIONAL

We have been asked to announce that all those engaged in the promotion of peace, based on Humanist Thoughts and Principles should contact Humanist International, A/183/1, Ashok Vihar, Delhi, 110052.

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