The Entrepreneurial Bureaucrat

A Study of Policy Entrepreneurship in the Formation of a National Strategy to Create an Asia-Literate Australia

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Declarations

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree of diploma in any university; and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the tex

Christopher James Mackenzie
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Abstract

This study investigates how individual policy actors can influence policy making and become catalysts of change. Its main proposition is that actors who heavily influence policy making and become agents for change are necessarily involved in specific activities and demonstrate particular characteristics. The study employs the concept of 'policy entrepreneurship' to analyse an episode of policy making which occurred in Australia between 1992 and 1994. The study concludes that in performing certain functions policy entrepreneurs help to affect change, but in doing so are at once constrained and enabled by contextual forces. Based on the findings of the analysis a theoretical framework of policy entrepreneurship is developed which augments existing conceptions of policy entrepreneurship.

The case studied is the 'National Asian Languages and Studies in Australian Schools Strategy' (NALSAS). The NALSAS Strategy was an initiative of the Queensland government which aims to promote and advance the teaching of Asian languages and studies in Australian schools. The NALSAS Strategy policy process was driven from the former Office of the Cabinet in Queensland. The then Director General of that Office, Mr Kevin Rudd, was the key protagonist and driver of the initiative. This study examines the policy process, particularly the characteristics demonstrated by Kevin Rudd and the activities in which he was involved, from the perspective of policy entrepreneurship.

The initial stages of the study canvas the literature on policy entrepreneurship, all of which originates from the US. It then proceeds to look in detail at the professional background of the individual at the center of the study, Kevin Rudd, and his position in the Queensland government of the then Premier, Wayne Goss. A key policy institution in the policy process, the Council of Australian Governments is also examined, especially its origins, achievements and operation. Important background information regarding the development of Asian languages and studies in Australian schools is presented which prepares the ground for a detailed reconstruction of the NALSAS Strategy policy process, using mainly interview data. This process is then analysed from the perspective of the literature on policy entrepreneurs. It concludes with the development of my own theoretical framework of policy entrepreneurship.
Abbreviations

AACALP  Australian Advisory Council on Australia's Language Policy
AACLAME  Australian Advisory Council on Languages and Multicultural Education
AEC  Australian Education Council
AEF  Asia Education Foundation
AFMLTA  Australian Federation of Modern Language Teachers Association
ALLC  Australian Language and Literacy Council
ALLP  Australian Language and Literacy Policy
ALP  Australian Labor Party
ANTA  Australian National Training Authority
APEC  Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASAA  Asia Studies Association of Australia
ASC  Asian Studies Council
ASEAN  Association of South East Asian Nations
ASLLP  Australian Second Language Learning Program
ASP  Asian Studies Program
COAG  Council of Australian Governments
DEET  Department of Education, Employment and Training
DFAT  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DPM&C  Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
EAAU  East Asia Analytical Unit
LACU  Language and Cultures Unit
LOTE  Languages Other Than English
MCEETYA  Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs
MOVEET  Ministerial Council on Vocational Education, Employment and Training
NALSAS  National Asian Languages/Studies in Australian Schools
NLLIA  National Language and Literacy Institute of Australia
NPL  National Policy on Languages
PMO  Prime Minister's Office
SPC  Special Premiers Conference
TAFE  Tertiary and Further Education
US  United States
Introduction

Policy Entrepreneurship and the NALSAS Strategy

The teaching of Asian languages and studies in Australian education can be traced back to 1866, when the first university appointment in Oriental Studies was made. The first teaching of an Asian language at secondary level commenced soon after the end of World War I. However, substantial government intervention only occurred in March 1969 when the Commonwealth government established an Advisory Committee to prepare a report on the Teaching of Asian Languages and Cultures in Australia (Auchmuty, 1970). In its report Professor J.J. Auchmuty, the chair, and his fellow committee members, lamented the state of Asian studies in Australian education. The Committee concluded that the availability of Asian languages in secondary schools was insufficient (1970: 90) and that Asia was inadequately considered in the social sciences curricula at the secondary level (1970: 89). Thus, the Committee recommended a significant increase in the teaching of Asian studies in schools and higher education institutions (1970: 97).

The Auchmuty Report is noteworthy for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it was the first significant government survey of the state of Asian studies in Australia. From its findings it recommended that governments consider new ways to include Asian studies in schools' curricula and other educational institutions. Second, it is striking for its emphasis on education as a means of responding to, and facilitating, 'Australia's growing relationship with Asia', an important dimension of all subsequent government decisions to support Asian studies in education. Third, the Auchmuty Report is notable because it considered the barriers to the advancement of Asian studies and foreshadowed many which have limited and continue to limit further expansion of such studies. It was extraordinarily prescient in the latter respect. These barriers have included an absence of adequate teaching and curriculum materials, insufficient numbers of suitably qualified language teachers, and thus, teacher training and professional development courses and in-

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1 Henceforth, the term 'Asian studies' will also be used in reference to 'Asian languages and studies'.

2 Henceforth referred to as the 'Auchmuty Report'.
country experience opportunities. Finally, so as to overcome these problems and expand the teaching of Asian studies, the Auchmuty Committee recommended a cooperative approach. The Report suggested that 'there would be considerable economy in common approaches... a cooperative effort by the parties concerned in the several states and in the Commonwealth' (1970: 100-101).

A number of government and non-government initiatives since the Auchmuty Report, as well as the Asian Studies Coordinating Committee set up in response to the Report, have attempted to alleviate the problems listed by Auchmuty and to advance Asian studies in Australia. From the mid-1970s the Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA) led this quest and was eventually successful in achieving one if its main objectives in 1986, the establishment of a Commonwealth government agency charged with promoting and coordinating the teaching of Asian studies, the Asian Studies Council (ASC). One of the influences that worked in favour of Asian studies and the ASC during the 1980s, and which was largely responsible for the latter's establishment, was Australia's burgeoning commercial and trading relationship with East Asia. Notwithstanding attempts by both Labor and conservative governments since the 1950s to strengthen ties with East Asia, it was during the late 1980s and early 1990s that Australia's 'engagement' with Asia began to accelerate. The idea of 'engagement' became a key plank of Australian foreign and trade policy and a powerful driving force behind government initiatives, particularly at the Commonwealth level, focusing on, and funding, Asian studies. Engagement with Asia was initially pushed by Prime Minister Hawke (1983-91) in the 1980s and then with even greater zeal by his successor, Paul Keating (1991-96), in the early-mid 1990s.

There is much to be said for a link between ideas and social and political change. There is little doubt, for example, that Rousseau's concepts of freedom and democracy were necessary in creating the ideological conditions for the French Revolution. Nor could one dispute that neo-liberalism (Macewan, 1999) has profoundly influenced government policy making in Western democracies since the early 1980s. Nonetheless, ideas do not and can not of themselves secure change. Assumptions such as these can not account for the process by which a general set of ideas is transformed into actual change,

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3 In this study the term 'Asia' will be used interchangeably with the such other terms as 'Asia-Pacific' and 'East Asia' to refer to the countries of Southeast and Northeast Asia and Indochina.
or proposals for change. The case of change in Asian studies policy which is the focus of this study is no exception. Engagement with Asia was a powerful force behind the NALSAS Strategy. However, although the idea of engagement was a necessary condition for the NALSAS Strategy, it alone is insufficient. The aim of this study is to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the policy process and to identify other forces which contributed to its development and implementation.

The main proposition of this study is that the NALSAS Strategy is not the result of some inexorable linear movement. Rather, the NALSAS Strategy is the consequence of one particular individual policy actor whom I have termed a 'policy entrepreneur'. The concept of 'policy entrepreneurship', as expounded by American political scientists Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones (1993), John Kingdon (1995), Michael Mintrom (2000) and others, is employed to describe and explain the actions, behaviour and achievements of dynamic and effective policy actors. Policy entrepreneurs display certain characteristics and possess skills which enable them to become catalysts of policy change. These often include, but are not limited to, creativity in developing solutions and connecting them to problems; alertness to political opportunities; a high level of argumentative and persuasive skill in order to build consensus for policy proposals; and, the ability to define issues so as to appeal to decision makers. Along with other actions and characteristics, policy entrepreneurs are significant agents of change.

The individual policy actor, or policy entrepreneur, in this study is Kevin Rudd, then Director General of the Office of the Cabinet in Queensland (1991-1994). Rudd was the main force behind the Queensland government's attempt to ameliorate some of the problems which continued to plague the teaching of Asian studies in order to create an 'Asia-literate' Australia. The NALSAS Strategy is the most recent attempt by governments to respond to the issues and problems observed by Auchmuty some twenty years ago. Its origins can be traced to the December 1992 meeting of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), when heads of government discussed the relevance of teaching Asian studies in schools to maximise Australia's economic performance in the

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4 The term 'Asia-literate' was coined by the ASC in its report entitled A National Strategy for the Study of Asia in Australia (1988). It refers to increasing the number of Australians with knowledge of Asian languages and developing not just an awareness and appreciation of Australia's close proximity to Asia but producing, mainly through the education system, individuals with varying degrees of knowledge of the cultural, political, economic and social systems Asia.
region. Agreeing that the expansion of Asian studies was 'a matter of national importance' and one which required 'urgent and high-level attention at a national level', a high level working group was created to write a report outlining a comprehensive school-based program to significantly increase the teaching of Asian studies in schools (COAG, 1992). In February 1994 COAG endorsed the Report and established an intergovernmental taskforce to implement the programs it recommended.

While the development of Asian studies in Australian education and the NALSAS Strategy itself are interesting phenomena in their own right, in this project they are used mainly as case study material. This is not to suggest, however, that those who have actively participated in the development of Asian studies in Australia and other interested parties, such as teachers and students, would not find the research and its conclusions of interest. Rather, it is to propose that the main target audience is policy analysts. To be sure, the NALSAS Strategy policy process offers a fertile body of evidence on which to study the policy making process and the roles which can be played by policy entrepreneurs when promoting policy change.

Given the conceptual orientation of this assignment the central aim is to determine if and how Kevin Rudd exhibited the actions and characteristics of policy entrepreneurs as discerned by existing theories of policy entrepreneurship and, if so, whether the actions of Rudd alone are sufficient to explain the change in Asian studies policy represented by the NALSAS Strategy. Thus, it is to determine whether, and to what degree, factors other than the individual's entrepreneurial characteristics impacted on the policy process. The study's main proposition is that Rudd heavily influenced the policy process and became an agent for change by applying certain skills to the task and by participating in certain activities, but in doing so was both constrained and enabled by a number of contextual forces. In more abstract terms, the claim is made that policy entrepreneurs are catalysts of policy change, but that in producing change they do so under circumstances which mediate their actions in numerous ways. Hence, policy is shaped not only by individuals but also by the context in which they operate.

5 Richard Simeon (1976: 551) has suggested that rather than explain the policy process, many case studies focus too much on the policy itself. 'The focus of many case studies 'has been on the details of the policy itself, rather than on using the policy to generalize about politics'. 
Using the observations and theories developed by others as guiding aids this study seeks to neither confirm, refute or supplant existing theories of policy entrepreneurship. In carrying out this enterprise the aim is to take into account what others have discovered but also to suggest modifications in accordance with the findings of the study. To this end the study endeavours to develop a theoretical framework of policy entrepreneurship, and thereby extend existing theories. Hence, this study attempts to do more than simply describe an event or merely make a contribution to historical erudition. And, although it is a historical reconstruction of events, it is much more than an account of 'who did what when'. It attempts to devise some generalisable propositions about the nature of policy making and to provide scholars and practitioners with a better understanding of policy making processes in Australia.

Context of the Study

There were a number developments which influenced the study's conception and formed the background to it and the NALSAS Strategy. Microeconomic and public sector reform, the restructuring of Australia's intergovernmental machinery, Australia's engagement with Asia and the teaching of Asian Studies in schools were mutually reinforcing developments which affected public policy in the 1980s and 1990s in very significant ways. Indeed, this was a truly tumultuous period in Australian politics and society.

Microeconomic, Public Sector and Intergovernmental Reform in Australia

When the NALSAS Strategy policy process was taking place a fourth successive Labor government was embarking upon a new range of microeconomic reforms (1993-1996). During the 1980s and 1990s Australian governments had sought to open the economy and society to the rest of the world. Although Australia had been trading internationally for many years, the rate of integration during this period was particularly frenetic and driven by a sense of urgency (Maddock, 1993:98). Perhaps the classic articulation of this sense of urgency, if not desperation, was demonstrated in May 1986 when the Treasurer of the Labor government, Paul Keating, claimed that Australia faced the possibility of becoming a 'banana republic'. Kelly (1994) argues that from 1986 onwards both political parties recognised the gravity of Australia's economic malaise and, as a consequence, policy was
driven by this 'sense of economic crisis':

Both saw the economic solution as lying in a new market-oriented direction which involved the destruction of the old order and the fashioning of a new Australian ideology to improve economic performance and to fit the new competitive realities of the 1980s and beyond (Kelly, 1994: 197).

In order to meet these problems head-on the Hawke-Keating government embarked on an unprecedented program of restructuring and internationalisation of the Australian economy (Hawke, 1991, 1996; Keating, 1991). The two key and closely related planks in Labor's strategy to resurrect the Australian economy and strengthen it against the inexorable forces of globalisation were to embark on a major programme of microeconomic reform (Forsyth, 1992) and seek greater integration with the prosperous, rapid growth countries of East Asia (Keating, 1996, 2000; Cotton and Ravenhill, 1997). These measures were underpinned by a broad-ranging policy of deregulation, a rigid faith in the philosophy of competition and the principles of neo-classical economic theory or, as it became known in Australia, 'economic rationalism' (Pusey, 1991; Carroll and Manne, 1992; Bell, 1997).

Floating the Australian dollar and abolishing controls over the flow of capital in and out of Australia were the first of the major microeconomic reforms carried out by the Hawke-Keating government (Ackland and Harper, 1992). This 'paved the way' for a whole raft of reforms (Capling et al, 1998: 56), including the deregulation of the banking sector in 1985, the reduction in tariff and non-tariff protection for industry and agriculture (Albon and Falvey 1992), the corporatisation or privatisation of numerous government owned enterprises and the winding back of centralised wage fixing systems to be replaced by enterprise-based bargaining (Borland et al, 1992).

Labor's microeconomic program continued when Paul Keating became Prime Minister in December 1991. After the initial program of reforms undertaken by the Hawke government in the late 1980s, Keating turned to sectors of the economy which had been left largely untouched (Hughes, 1998: 89). In areas such as telecommunications and aviation, significant reforms were carried out, but in those where the Commonwealth government was unable to act unilaterally, such as railways, roads, ports, gas, water and electricity supply, the environment and vocational education and training, progress was yet
to occur on a national scale. To enlist the cooperation and support of state/territory governments and to provide a forum in which the relevant reforms could be negotiated and carried out, the Hawke governments sought to restructure Australia's intergovernmental machinery.

In the middle of 1990 Bob Hawke (1990) launched his New Federalism initiative. In a speech delivered in July and entitled 'Towards a Closer Partnership', Hawke emphasised the importance of national cooperation for the achievement of microeconomic reform. He invited state premiers to a two-day conference held in Brisbane in October. The agenda included national regulatory reform, the improvement of the performance of government business enterprises, duplication of effort in the delivery of health and welfare services and the issue of tied and untied grants to the states. Hawke was supported in his effort by the New South Wales Premier, Nick Greiner (Greiner, 1990), an enthusiastic advocate of microeconomic reform, and the South Australian leader, John Bannon (Bannon, 1987), who also believed in reforming intergovernmental relations in Australia. Late in 1991, after Keating successfully challenged Hawke for the leadership, the Special Premiers Conference (SPC) was reconvened under the COAG name. Since then COAG has achieved a number of reforms, including the establishment of a national electricity market, the Australian National Training Authority, the National Food Authority, National Road Transport Commission and the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment. While SPC and COAG managed to ameliorate some of the more counterproductive features of Commonwealth-State relations, it never extricated adversarialism and conflict. Relations between the Commonwealth and the states were often acrimonious and, consequently, in many areas progress did not flow as many would have wished. However, in Chapter Two it will be shown that the cooperative approach did bear fruit (See Carroll and Painter, 1995).

Just as successive Commonwealth Labor governments had embarked on the restructuring of the Australian economy, the role and function of government itself underwent similar transformations. Not least to allow significant administrative reforms to take place, public sector restructuring was also aimed at achieving greater efficiency in the operation of executive government and greater central control of government policymaking (Painter, 1987). Ever since the early 1980s Western democracies world-wide were

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6 For convenience the 'states/territories' will herewith be termed the 'states'.
embarking on public sector reform, mainly in response to government overload, fiscal stringencies and political ideology (Meltcalfe and Richards, 1990).

In Australia, as elsewhere, these reforms were characterised mainly by the introduction of management techniques and principles imported from the private sector (Considine, 1988). As a key component of these changes, central agencies were strengthened to facilitate better coordination of the activities of government, their powers of oversight were enhanced and their capacity to actually make policy increased (Painter, 1987; Halligan and Power, 1992). Heading these central agencies were powerful, politically appointed bureaucrats, or senior officials. These officials, whose futures were tied inextricably to the fortunes of their political masters, were deeply implicated in both politics and administration: they combined technical knowledge with expertise in political strategy.

Engagement with Asia and the Significance of Asian Studies

The efficiency drive of microeconomic reform and New Federalism, as well as the desire for greater government control over the public service were all, in one way or another, intended to help internationalise the Australian economy and give Australian export industries the edge to operate efficiently in an intensely competitive global economy. Labor governments since 1983 had actively promoted the export of value-added goods and the sale of high-value service exports such as engineering, education, health, financial and software services (Emy, 1993: 15; Harris, 1992). Simultaneously, governments and business searched for lucrative markets in which to sell Australian exports and they looked no further than the region in which Australia was located, a region in which rapid

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7 Since the late 1970s and early 1980s a debate about the virtues of these reforms has taken place. While many attacked the managerialist reforms on the grounds that they centralised power in public services around Australia and placed economic concerns before those of a social nature (Considine, 1988; Yeatman, 1990), others regarded them as reforms necessary to reduce the size of government, use scarce resources more efficiently and to strengthen the democratic decision making power of ministers (Paterson, 1988; Keating, 1990). Throughout this study the terms “corporate management”, “managerial” and “managerialist” carry the same meaning. The author does not use the terms perjoritively or with great favour; they are simply terms employed to denote the public sector reforms described above.

8 Henceforth, the terms “bureaucrat” and “senior official” shall be used interchangeably. The term bureaucrat has inherited an unfortunate legacy since, for many, it implies red-tape, incompetence and inefficiency. In this study it is not used in a perjorative sense. It is a reference to any employee of the public service, either state or Commonwealth.
technological and economic progress represented one of the most significant changes in the international environment (Garnaut, 1989; Barrat, 1995).

With the end of the Cold War and, to a certain extent, Australia’s concomitant fear of communism in Asia, political leaders turned their attention to matters economic and ‘tilted’ Australia towards the region in which it was located. Goldsworthy (1997:27) argues that East Asia was suddenly perceived by many as an economic saviour. It was a huge and ever-expanding marketplace, a potential destination for Australian exports. Though the foundations for this shift in trade and foreign policy were laid by Hawke, they were pursued by Keating with particular vigor after he assumed the leadership in 1991 (Cotton and Ravenhill, 1997). This is not to suggest that Hawke and Keating ‘discovered’ Asia, for numerous Labor leaders and others before them forged significant ties with the countries of the region. For instance, Evatt in the 1940s for strategic and defence purposes; McEwan in the 1950s in order to expand Australia’s trade (particularly with Japan); the Menzies government, especially his External Affairs minister, Percy Spender, and the Colombo Plan; and, Gough Whitlam in the 1970s and his internationalisation program and recognition of China and others Communist Asian states (see Millar, 1978; Andrews, 1985; Meaney, 1999). It is to argue that engagement with Asia became almost a discrete national policy. The promotion of economic engagement with Asia, economic restructuring and the creation of a more competitive economy are closely interlinked. The nexus is clearly borne out by Goldsworthy:

>a globalising market logic drove Australia’s efforts to integrate itself more fully into Asian affairs, just as it drove Australia’s attempts to achieve microeconomic reform and macroeconomic liberalisation at home; indeed, these were aspects of the same general process (Goldsworthy, 1997: 18).

As far as policy makers were concerned economic engagement with Asia could only take place if the economic policy settings in Australia were calibrated accordingly. However, many argued that prosecuting microeconomic reform in Australia to be more competitive in East Asia constituted only part of the competition equation. To fully maximise their economic potential, many asserted, small to medium size Australian companies doing business in East Asia should be equipped with appropriate linguistic and cultural skills. In
short, proficiency in Asian languages and cultures was necessary to complement economic reforms in Australia. Thus, closely aligned with Australia's engagement with Asia was a push to increase the teaching of Asian studies in schools. Asian Studies was regarded an important means of facilitating Australia's "tilt" towards Asia and Australia's integration with Asian economies (ASC, 1988; Garnaut, 1989; Rudd, 1994; 1995).

In conclusion, it can be seen that microeconomic reform, including reform of federal arrangements, was necessary to internationalise the Australian economy and make it globally competitive, particularly in East Asia. Public sector reform was part of this same push for greater efficiency, in the sense that public services around the country would become more responsive to the edicts of executive government. The teaching of Asian studies in schools was regarded as a particularly useful means of helping to facilitate engagement with Asia and, hence, the NALSAS Strategy was developed and implemented for precisely this purpose.

**Significance of the Study**

This study is theoretically significant, first and foremost, because it applies exclusively American theoretical assumptions to find meaning in, and to understand, an episode of policy change in Australia. Neither as part of a general discussion nor with specific intent has an Australian scholar or practitioner sought to analyse policy making and policy change by recourse to the concept of policy entrepreneurship. Since the Australian policy analysis literature is devoid of engagement with the concept of policy entrepreneurship, conducting a study about policy innovation and change using policy entrepreneurship as an explanatory tool represents an opportunity to conduct truly original research. This study is an important one for it introduces a new means of examining the role of individual policy actors in Australian policy processes, and in this sense is rather unique.

At a practical level this study is important because it provides an insight to policy change during a period for which there is still great scope for further investigation. In short, the setting chosen is sufficiently unique that the study advances knowledge in the field. While there is an abundance of literature examining the program of economic restructuring pursued by successive Labor governments throughout the 1980s and first half of the 1990s, there are still gaps in our knowledge of the intergovernmental policy-
making reforms of the period. This is not to suggest that Hawke's 'New Federalism' and its consequences for policy has escaped scrutiny, for a number of Australian political scientists have focused attention on these issues. For instance, Weller (1996) wrote a report on COAG which was commissioned by the DPM&C and, though very insightful in terms of the actual policy process, did not carry out a detailed analysis of any specific COAG policy exercises. A volume of essays on microeconomic reform and New Federalism was edited by Painter and Carroll (1995) and articles have been written by Edwards and Henderson (1995) and Wiltshire (1992). Recently Keating and Wanna (2000) have also appraised this period of intergovernmental reform.

Despite the work described above, detailed and methodologically rigorous studies remain scarce. The only comprehensive study of Hawke's New Federalism, particularly the SPC and COAG process, has been conducted by Painter (1998). Painter's work examines in great detail several of the major policy reforms carried out through COAG and is of an extremely high quality. A doctoral thesis comparing Canadian and Australian reforms of this period was also written by Brown (1999). Brown's study also succeeds in providing greater depth of knowledge about this particular period of reform.

Moreover, this project is significant because it explores the relationship between the SPC and COAG and the restructuring of the Queensland government in the early 1990s. Several authoritative analyses of state government reforms are available (Painter, 1987; Halligan and Power, 1992), but few have conducted their examinations from the standpoint of intergovernmental relations. Apart from Davis (1995,1998), Wiltshire (1992) and Painter (1998) there is very little other than passing comments about the relationship between New Federalism and state government reform. This study shows that central agency coordination in Queensland was enormously important in interactions between itself and the Commonwealth, and that state public service reform was partly prompted by the Hawke/Keating New Federalism exercise.

This study's findings may also be of value to practitioners. Although it is an 'analysis of' policy rather than an 'analysis for' policy, my intention is to expose the fundamental connection between the two approaches. For undertaking a policy study with descriptive and explanatory intent (analysis of policy) will invariably contribute to the other (analysis for policy) by helping the policy analyst appreciate the complexities of, and obstacles to, more prescriptive undertakings (Parsons, 1995: xvi).
Research Methodology

The Case Study

There are many ways of carrying out qualitative research including, ethnographic research, action research, participant-observation or case study research. This study employs a traditional single 'case study' approach. Orum, Feagin and Sjoberg (1991: 2) define a case study as 'an in-depth, multifaceted investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single social phenomenon. The study is conducted in great detail and often relies on the use of several sources of data'. The authors argue that a common feature of case studies is their holistic approach: they allow the researcher to investigate political phenomena, such as organisational decision making, in great detail and in its 'most complete form'. Political scientists, for instance, can trace a sequence of complex sets of decisions over time and, in this way, bring a temporal dimension to their research. Case studies also allow researchers to identify 'specific characteristics or specific configurations of characteristics' in certain social or political conditions. Compared to quantitative techniques such as experiments, where a phenomenon is consciously dissociated from its context so as to consider only a few variables, case studies take into account contextual conditions. Since accounting for context is important for qualitative researchers this is an important benefit. And, since context and phenomena are not always distinguishable in real life settings, a range of other 'technical characteristics', including evidence gathering and data analysis strategies, need to be pursued (Yin, 1989: 13). Another virtue of case studies is their ability to enable theory building and generalisation.

Case studies are often the preferred approach in policy analysis. There are two main types of policy analysis. First, there is what Gordon et al (1977) call 'analysis of policy', which seeks to improve our understanding of policy and, second, 'analysis for policy', which is aimed at increasing the quality of policy (See also Parsons, 1995: 54-56). Building on the work of Gordon et al (1977), and later Hogwood and Gunn (1984: 26-29),

9 Qualitative research 'consists of a set of interpretive material practices that make the world visible... they turn the world into a series of representations... At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them' (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: 3).
Hill (1997: 2-3) identifies seven different types of policy analysis; the 'analysis of policy' approach includes, studies of policy content, studies of policy process, studies of policy outputs and evaluation studies, the latter of which constitutes the borderline between analysis of policy and analysis for policy. Analysis for policy includes information for policy-making, process advocacy and policy advocacy.

This study falls squarely in the analysis of policy category because it is a study of the policy process. Studies of the policy process examine the stages through which a policy making exercise passes and assesses the impact of different factors which influence that process. According to Hill (1997: 4), process studies are often concerned either with single issues or with particular areas of policy. They may also focus on policy processes within organisations or on factors which influence the policy process in towns and communities. With regard to the case study approach in the policy sciences, and in line with the discussion above, the Canadian political scientist, Richard Simeon (1974: 551), has argued that case studies 'can provide a sense of the rich nuance, detail, and complexity of the real world of policy-making'. Furthermore, the findings of policy process case studies can be transferred from one setting to another, that is, to be 'applied and tested later in other studies'.

For the reasons listed above, the purposes of the present research are best served by the case study approach. This approach is particularly amenable given the complexity of the NALSAS Strategy policy process and the various factors which influenced the actions of those involved and the final outcome of the exercise itself. This case study also produces results which can be generalised to other settings. In the Conclusion it will be shown how the finding of the research may be employed to investigate other episodes of policy making from the perspective of policy entrepreneurship.

**Interview Data and Documentary Evidence**

The bulk of the evidence concerning the actions and impact of the NALSAS Strategy policy entrepreneur was collected in 1997 and 1999, although some collection continued into 2000 and 2001. The primary means of collection was the 'semistructured' interview. By choosing the semistructured approach to interviewing rather than the 'free-range', or
'unstructured' interview, the researcher could achieve clearly defined objectives in terms of the information sought while maintaining some flexibility in wording and the order of presentation of the questions (Robson, 1993: 227). The semistructured interview also enabled the researcher to seek the opinions and attitudes of respondents towards events and to probe these in great detail when opportunities presented themselves and when it appeared important to do so (Yin, 1989: 84; see also Gillham, 2000 and Leedy, 1993).

Eighteen persons in total participated in the study. However, there were twenty-two semi-structured interviews conducted, since four of the key participants, including the policy entrepreneur, were interviewed twice. All of them, except for six (which were conducted by telephone), were face-to-face verbal interchanges. Though some interviews were uncharacteristically short, twenty minutes, and others particularly lengthy, ninety minutes, the majority averaged forty-five to sixty minutes.

A range of issues were covered in the interviews. Many of the early interviews asked very broad questions designed to establish the background to the initiative and to identify the key policy actors. As the study progressed and the researcher became more familiar with the narrative of events which occurred the questions became more specific. For instance, to the Queensland participants were put the following types of questions: Why did the state pursue a far-reaching second language program with an emphasis on Asian languages? Which persons were responsible and why did they want to take the Queensland policy to a national level? From which part of the Queensland bureaucracy did the national initiative emerge? What were the benefits associated with driving the initiative from the Office of the Cabinet? What were the advantages of pursing the NALSAS Strategy through COAG rather than the relevant ministerial council? What were the main problems confronting Rudd and his colleagues when seeking the support of relevant stakeholders?

Questions put to the Commonwealth interviewees from DEET and DPM&C were different; they were designed largely to ascertain the relevant department's reaction to Rudd's national Asian studies proposal. They included, for example, determining DEET's initial reaction to the Queensland proposal for a national Asian languages program? Did DEET oppose the initiative? On what grounds was it opposed? Did DEET resist Queensland's Asian languages initiative on the grounds that it was going to be a great financial burden to the Commonwealth? Was the nexus between linguistic
competence and trade performance disputed by DPM&CC? By what means did Queensland, and especially Kevin Rudd and Premier Goss, finally procure the funding commitment it was seeking?

For a study of this nature it could be argued that eighteen participants is insufficient to gain a comprehensive and balanced knowledge of the events which led to the NALSAS Strategy. However, it is the researcher's view that this number is adequate, for it should be noted that in the context of other intergovernmental initiatives undertaken by COAG during the period, the NALSAS Strategy exercise was carried out on a much smaller scale. It was a modest reform compared to others including, competition policy, the creation of the national electricity grid, national water and gas reforms, a major agreement on the environment, roads and transport policy, the establishment of the Australian National Training Authority (ANTA) and various other initiatives associated with the Commonwealth's microeconomic reform agenda. Associated with these initiatives were a great number of persons from the Commonwealth, states, industry, trade unions and environmental groups. The NALSAS Strategy initiative, by contrast, was much smaller and, hence, demanded less time, resources and personnel. There was simply only a small number of persons who participated in the exercise.

In many respects this made selecting the research participants a less onerous task. In short, those whose involvement in the policy process was intimate were the key participants in the study. Those indirectly involved but who were well enough positioned to be aware of the process provided secondary, yet vital, insights to the course of events which led to the NALSAS Strategy. The research participants selection process was aided by the fact that Rudd was the Chair of the intergovernmental working group which prepared the report and designed the Strategy. He was, of course, one of the first participants to be interviewed. It was he who also pointed out some of those with whom he worked during the passage of the Strategy. Preceding this interview, however, were discussions and pilot-like interviews with a number of persons in Canberra who were kind enough to identify relevant policy actors at the Commonwealth level. Initial contact with Brian Head who, during the period in question was located in the Office of the Cabinet in Queensland, was also useful in terms of locating specific individuals. Furthermore, the Report itself listed all members of the Working Group which prepared the Report. This became an effective means of tracing the key players at both state and Commonwealth level.
Of those from Queensland who were involved in preparing the Report and attended Working Group meetings, two were located in the Office of the Cabinet and one in the Education Department. Both Kevin Rudd, his colleague in the Office of the Cabinet, Tim Spencer, and the Education Department official, Allan Langdon, were interviewed as part of the study. The researcher adopted the view that, since Spencer, Rudd and Langdon (the latter two being interviewed twice) were central to the policy process, their accounts and contributions were sufficient to gain an accurate insight to the events under investigation. Of course their views were supported by other secondary actors. The Queensland Premier during the period, Wayne Goss, was interviewed since he argued the case for endorsement and funding of the Strategy with other heads of government. His input was particularly useful. There were also other persons from the Queensland government who, while not participating directly in the preparation of the Report or in the policy process, made extremely useful contributions to the research. They included Frank Peach, Deputy Director General of the Department of Education in Queensland, Brian Head from the Office of the Cabinet and Ministers for Education, Paul Braddy and Pat Comben. Due to their positions in the hierarchy of the Queensland bureaucracy and close proximity to key decision makers, particularly Head and Braddy, they made valuable secondary contributions to the research. One notable absence from the list of interviewees was Roger Scott, Director General of the Department of Education. For reasons of availability it was not possible for him to be interviewed. Nonetheless, his absence was compensated for by an interview with Frank Peach, the Deputy Director General at the time.

While the Queensland respondents were justifiably proud of their achievement and eager to take part in the study, those representing the Commonwealth were more reluctant. Although Commonwealth research participants included former and current officials from the Department of Education, Employment and Training (DEET), the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPM&C), members of government advisory bodies and a prime ministerial advisor, there were a number of persons who could not, or would not, take part. For example, while Anna Kamarul and Naomi Kronenberg from DEET were willing participants who contributed much to the research, one Deputy Secretary from the same department opposed to the Asian studies proposal and was unwilling to participate. It should be noted too, that he was living abroad at the time the research took place. Similarly, Alan Stretton from DPM&C, claimed he could
not recall the relevant events. However, the Secretary of DPM&C, Michael Keating, did take part and provided the researcher with useful insights, despite being unwilling to divulge information about precisely what his Department finally advised the Prime Minister regarding Rudd’s Asian studies proposal. Keating’s colleague, Alan Henderson, Secretary of the Commonwealth-State relations Secretariat also participated and, while his response to the interview questions were adequate, on occasions he claimed not to be able to recall certain details or was not prepared to speak frankly about certain issues. From the point of view of the researcher the most unfortunate aspect of the interview process was the absence of DPM&C official Katrina Edwards from the list of interviewees. Edwards, who was perhaps most closely associated with the NALSAS Strategy exercise when it became an issue for DPM&C, was approached for an interview but declined to participate, arguing that it would be improper for her to make public statements about the NALSAS Strategy policy process. We can speculate that the problems encountered by the researcher may have been due to Commonwealth officials being unwilling to discuss a policy exercise over which they lost control and that, as far as they were concerned, concluded most unsatisfactorily.

Despite the absence of Katrina Edwards and the reluctant but useful contributions made by Keating and Henderson the researcher was still able to obtain knowledge of the policy process, especially when corroborated with frank and forthright interviews with Anna Kamarul and Rodney Cavalier who, at the time, was Chair of the Australian Language and Literacy Council (ALLC). Combined with an equally fruitful interview with the Prime Minister’s social policy advisor, Mary-Anne O’Loughlin, and the interviews conducted with the Queensland participants, enough information was collected on which to accurately reconstruct the sequence of events which led to the NALSAS Strategy and the role of Kevin Rudd in them.

Once they were located, interviews with the key actors were organised. This entailed a written letter outlining the research focus and a request that recipients make themselves available for an interview. The letter was almost always followed by a telephone call and/or email to confirm it had been received and, more often than not, to prompt the potential interviewee into action. Often it was necessary to make a number of telephone calls to potential respondents before an interview could be arranged. Indeed, securing interviews was one of the greatest challenges in carrying out the research. The main reason for this was that the high-level bureaucrats and politicians who were the
primary players were extraordinarily busy and 'pressed for time'. Requests for interviews were, in many respects, requests for time. It appeared that in the schema of their priorities the researcher's request for an interview was relegated to the bottom of the list.

Interview appointment times were established by telephone or email and a set of proposed interview questions was forwarded to the respondent well before the interview date. To conduct the interviews it was necessary to travel to Canberra in November 1997 and in November 1999, and Brisbane in July 1999. The interviews were usually conducted in the office of the participants and all interviews were recorded. Upon completion of the interview, respondents were required to sign a 'Consent to Participate in Research' form, a requirement of the University Ethics Approval Committee which, in this case, was necessary to guarantee respondent anonymity and data confidentiality. Upon return to Melbourne, or very soon thereafter, the interviews were transcribed. As noted above, some respondents were interviewed twice or contacted again by letter or email to collect further information or to seek clarification of an issue raised in the initial interview.

Where possible documentary information was also used to supplement interview data. As Yin (1989: 81) argues, documents are useful for corroborating and augmenting data from other sources. Hence, a number of reports, speeches, newspaper articles and various secondary documents were used to support the interview data. For example, in the last three decades numerous reports have lamented the state of Asian studies in Australia and made recommendations to improve the situation; speeches made by Paul Keating during the early 1990s were employed to support Rudd's belief that the Prime Minister was eager to pursue further engagement with Asia; articles in the Brisbane newspaper, the Courier Mail, proved invaluable for tracing developments in the Queensland LOTE Initiative and for building a professional profile of Rudd, both when he was Goss's Principal Policy Advisor and as Director General of the Office of the Cabinet. Beneficial for these purposes too, was the Queensland Parliament Hansard.

However, this study is not heavily reliant on documentary sources. Being mainly a bureaucrats reform, the NALSAS Strategy was not widely reported nor was there a great deal of documentation to which the researcher could gain access. Correspondence and memos, briefing and position papers were either not available to the researcher or, in the case of the Queensland government, the relevant files unable be located. Moreover, intergovernmental policy making is often carried out behind closed doors and agreements
Data Analysis

Once collected the data were analysed by carrying out three main procedures. The first step was to focus and transform the data which emerged from the interviews, that is, to reduce the data to its dominant themes so as to draw some testable conclusions. Another term commonly used to describe the task of arranging findings thematically is 'patterning' (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 246; Robson, 1993: 185-86). Patterning means creating categories, the sorting of data according to themes, or dominant patterns. In this study patterns were identified according to the actions, characteristics and skills commonly attributed to policy entrepreneurs and matched with those of the policy entrepreneur in the present study.

In this study the process of patterning followed three main stages: (i) the first group of interviews were transcribed by the researcher. This task was undertaken almost directly after the interviews were conducted (ii) a preliminary reading of the transcripts followed so as to tentatively identify the themes emerging from the interviews (iii) the remaining interviews were conducted and transcribed, the dominant themes identified and then matched with those detected in the previous series of interviews. Once the data were arranged according to themes, it was possible to build what Mile and Huberman have labelled a 'logical chain of evidence'. Constructing an 'evidence chain' meant identifying the emerging relationships between the themes, such as the relationship between the skills of the policy entrepreneur and his context (independent variables) on the one hand, and the relationship between the policy entrepreneur and the NALSAS Strategy (dependent variable), on the other. Basing the analysis on the set of theoretical propositions which underpin other studies of policy entrepreneurship proved a useful means of guiding this process (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 260-62).

Discerning the relationships between the different thematic patterns allowed the process of theory building to begin, and thereby to determine how and why the NALSAS Strategy came to fruition. To ensure the credibility (internal validity) of the findings the interview data were triangulated. Establishing credibility by triangulation means that one
needs to identify causal relationships. It is to show that certain conditions lead to other conditions. As Robson (1993: 383) points out, triangulation refers to the use of multiple sources of data to validate information. It is a way of cross-validating sources of evidence, a 'means of testing one source of information against other sources' so as to, on the one hand, verify assumptions about the phenomenon under scrutiny or, on the other, refute those assumptions. Triangulating information sources 'improves the quality of data and in consequence the accuracy of findings'.

In the present case, for example, the responses of Commonwealth officials were matched with those of participants from Queensland to accurately establish the sequence of events which led to the NALSAS Strategy. By following the same procedure, it was possible to compare the responses of the Commonwealth participants with those of their Commonwealth colleagues to determine either continuity or discrepancy in their respective account of events. Naturally, this was also the case with those representing Queensland. In terms of identifying the key aspects and nuances of the debates which took place during the policy process, this method was also valuable. After extensive triangulation this approach allowed me to identify the actions and skills which characterised the policy entrepreneur involved in the policy process and various other factors which influenced the policy process.

This study also validates conclusions by triangulating 'sources' (Denzin, 1978). Interview respondents were carefully chosen in accordance with their stake and position in the policy process. Since in this study the Queensland and Commonwealth participants represented opposing sides it was necessary to ensure the voices of both were heard. To further strengthen the evidence and, hence, the findings of the study, participants were selected on the basis of their proximity to the policy process. In this study the evidence provided by participants close to the process can be regarded as 'stronger data'. This was particularly the case with the information imparted by those from Queensland, especially the most central players. The strength of the evidence is also demonstrated by repeated contact with these players. Although some of the evidence provided by Queensland participants was second-hand and hence, can be classified as 'weaker data' they were, nonetheless, senior and close enough to the process to be reliable sources (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 267-69).

The participants in the research representing the Commonwealth were also close enough
to the policy process to be reliable sources of information. However, as explained previously, the data gathered at this level was not as 'strong' as that gathered at the state level and should therefore be classified as 'weaker data'. Nonetheless, the research participants representing Commonwealth agencies were able to provide sufficient information on which to draw conclusions, especially when it was corroborated with documentation and the evidence of the Queensland participants.

Summary of Methodology

In summary this is a qualitative study which adopts a single case study approach. This was a conscious decision, made in light of the complexity of the phenomenon under study. Case studies are frequently used by political scientists, particularly when attempting to identify the determinants of policy and the factors which influence the policy process. Two main instruments were used to collect data: semi-structured interviews and various types of documentary evidence, although the former constitutes the main source. As noted earlier, the bulk of the interviews were conducted between November 1997 and November 1999. They were carried out in both Brisbane and Canberra.

The interview data and documentation were analysed according to dominant patterns and themes. This process was guided by existing theories of policy entrepreneurship and the characteristics they attribute to policy entrepreneurs. Great care was taken to select a balanced and representative group of participants. Participants were chosen in relation to their proximity to the policy process and in terms of whom they represented.

Preview of the Organisation of the Study

This study is organised in the following way. Chapter One provides an overview of the literature on policy entrepreneurship. Spanning 1972-2000, a number of the key texts and articles are discussed in order to discern the main theoretical perspectives. Three categories of theory and scholarship are identified: (i) general consideration of policy entrepreneurs (ii) the role of policy entrepreneurs in theoretical frameworks of the policy process (iii) fully fledged theories of policy entrepreneurship. The chapter concludes by constructing an inventory of the general skills and characteristics of the policy
entrepreneur on the basis of the existing theoretical perspectives and unveils the researchers own theoretical framework of policy entrepreneurship. Chapter Two then outlines a professional profile of the policy entrepreneur who is the focus of the current study. It also examines the context and location in which the policy entrepreneur operated, including the Queensland Office of the Cabinet, COAG and its associated network of committees and working groups.

Chapter Three provides crucial background information to the NALSAS Strategy case study which is presented in Chapter Four. Chapter Three is a chronological overview of the development of Asian studies policy in Australian schools. It is largely empirical but is, at the same time, careful to place emphasis on a number of specific issues which loom large in the case study. The case study presented in Chapter Four endeavours to piece together the process which influenced, and resulted in, the NALSAS Strategy. In this chapter, which is divided into two parts, the bulk of the primary evidence is presented. The first examines the origins of the NALSAS Strategy, establishes the key players and the presence of the entrepreneur in the policy process. It looks at how Kevin Rudd and his colleagues in the Queensland government set about placing their proposal for a national Asian studies policy on the agenda of key decision makers at the Commonwealth level and in the other states. The second part of the chapter continues by discussing the Report which Rudd prepared as Chair of the COAG Working Group on Asian Languages and Cultures. It then looks at criticisms of the Report and resistance to its recommendations by the Commonwealth during preparation. Finally, this part of the chapter looks at how Rudd and his colleagues responded to these criticisms and overcame resistance to secure a significant Commonwealth funding commitment.

Chapter Five analyses and interprets the primary data collected and presented in the case study. The analysis of the data is designed to establish whether, and to what degree, Rudd demonstrated the skills and characteristics of a policy entrepreneur, as well as to discern other factors which may have influenced the policy process, and thereby the NALSAS Strategy. Based on the analysis, this chapter exposes drawbacks in some of the existing theories of policy entrepreneurship discussed in Chapter One and shows how the findings of the analysis may strengthen their explanatory power. In the Conclusion, a theoretical framework of policy entrepreneurship is developed on the basis of the findings of Chapter Five. Other conclusions drawn from the findings are discussed, as well as how the framework may be employed to explain policy change in other areas of Australian
policy making. Finally, the Conclusion determines whether the NALSAS Strategy can be classified as a genuine innovation and considers the impact of the Strategy on Asian studies in Australia.
Chapter One: Entrepreneurship in Policy Making: Theoretical Perspectives

Introduction

Numerous factors influence policy making, including the social, economic and political environment in which policy is made, institutions, interest groups and political parties. Individuals constitute just one of numerous influences on the policy process. Although many researchers have studied the effect of lobby groups, parties and institutions on policy making, few have examined the role of individuals in policy making as an exclusive focus.

The explicit study of individuals in the policy process has been carried out by only a few scholars who have produced a correspondingly small body of literature. Borrowing from the economic and private sector usage of the term, these scholars have employed the concept of the policy entrepreneur to denote individual agency in policy making. The degree to which writers have endeavoured to apply the specific economic properties of the term to the public environment in which policy is formed has varied. Nonetheless, the distinguishing qualities normally attributed to private sector entrepreneurs are usually there in one form or another. Policy entrepreneurship has been studied mainly in the broad discipline of the policy sciences, or the field of public policy analysis. Building on some groundbreaking studies and the publication of seminal texts which appeared in the 1960s and 1970s, the policy entrepreneur began to emerge as an important player in the policy process.

It has also been studied by academic scholars of public administration, especially in the context of widespread public sector reforms undertaken by governments in modern western democracies since the 1970s (Metcalfe and Richards, 1990; Weimar and Vining, 1992; Wanna, O'Faircheallaigh and Weller, 1992). By contrast to policy entrepreneurship, which emphasises the activities and behavioural characteristics of particular individuals
and groups in their pursuit of policy change, 'public entrepreneurship' \textsuperscript{10} must be thought of in terms of developing an entrepreneurial culture, or spirit, in public sector agencies and departments, the creation of a 'group desire in organisations to change, adapt, innovate and entertain risk' (Forster \textit{et al}, 1996: 11). Given its focus on organisational culture and public sector reform, the work on public entrepreneurship is only marginally relevant to the current undertaking.\textsuperscript{11}

Some political scientists have recognised the importance of policy entrepreneurs in the development of public policy. Early research focused on entrepreneurship as a form of political skill (Bardach, 1972) and a number of works on policy agenda-setting which followed considered entrepreneurs crucial agents of change in policy processes (Eyestone, 1978; Kingdon, 1984; Riker, 1980, 1986; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Mintrom, 2000). Authors have also considered the notion of policy entrepreneurship and the importance of entrepreneurs identifying issues and pushing them onto the agendas of key decision-makers (Weissert, 1991). To gain a better understanding of policy entrepreneurs scholars have studied congressional staffs (Price, 1971; Walker, 1977), Congress (Uslaner, 1978), non-politicians (Doig and Hargrove, 1987; Roberts and King, 1996), policy making at the national level in the United States (US) (Wilson, 1980; Polsby, 1984; Kingdon, 1995) and in state legislatures (Bardach, 1972; Mintrom and Vergari, 1998; Mintrom, 2000). Other scholarship on policy innovation and diffusion has also demonstrated that entrepreneurs are crucial to the diffusion of policy innovations across different jurisdictions (Walker 1977, 1981; Polsby, 1984). There are also a number of influential studies amongst this

\textsuperscript{10} Public entrepreneurship refers to changes in the way the public sector functions. It is about more than modifying processes, 'the new demands to be entrepreneurial suggest a complete reconceptualisation of the method of operation and of outputs and outcomes in public activities' (Forster \textit{et al}, 1996: 2). Public entrepreneurship implies public sector agencies developing innovative means of delivering public services, that is, 'reinvigorating' the provision of public sector goods and promoting 'new activism', the transformation of the character of the state itself (1996: 8). External pressures such as economic and social fragmentation, including the growth of information technology, increases in leisure-based service societies and post-industrialism, have brought about the destruction of rigid bureaucratic hierarchies and prompted the devolution of public services, more flexible delivery systems and greater ad hoc decision-making (see Sturgess, 1994). As a result, entirely new demands are placed on the shoulders of public servants, or managers, in terms of their management expectations and development of new business-type decision-making skills (See also Drucker, 1985; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Wanta, Forster and Graham, 1996; Coaldrake, 1996; Sadler 2000).

\textsuperscript{11} Although there are commonalities between the two different forms of entrepreneurship, and therefore scope for further investigation, this is not acknowledged in either body of literature. Indeed, there is not a single instance of cross referencing or acknowledgement of work undertaken in one area by the other.
literature which, while never engaging with the idea of a policy entrepreneur, implicitly acknowledge the possibilities for entrepreneurial activity (Walker, 1969; Grey, 1973; Berry and Berry, 1990, 1992).

In these accounts the policy entrepreneur is variously described as a consensus-builder and as an 'issue generator' and 'issue broker'; one portrayed as 'alert' to the opening of 'policy windows', that is, congenial political circumstances which offer policy entrepreneurs opportunities to push policy ideas. The policy entrepreneur is also skilled in the art of argument and persuasion, and manipulates how problems and policy issues are defined so as to mould new 'policy images' and exploit the many 'policy venues' present, particularly in federal systems of government. Policy entrepreneurs are 'catalysts' and 'change agents', 'innovators' and 'ideas' people who pursue their goals through 'entrepreneurial design'. By writing the Report in which the NALSAS Strategy was developed and using it to persuade heads of government to provide the necessary funding, Kevin Rudd displayed almost all of the traits of a policy entrepreneur. As this study evolves it will be shown how he employed his entrepreneurial skills to become a catalyst for change in the policy field of education, particularly in the area of Asian studies in schools.

This chapter examines the different ways policy entrepreneurship is defined and understood. The objective is to distinguish the main activities and characteristics of the policy entrepreneur, with the aim of identifying major commonalities and differences. Three separate categories of scholarship are identified. Instead of presenting a complete inventory of the available scholarship on the subject, these categories comprise only the central texts. Nor are they presented in terms of cumulative improvements on each other, though they do represent ascending stages of theoretical development and, hence, could represent advances. Apart from one exception, the categories flow in chronological order: (i) this category considers the scholarly writing of Robert Eyestone (1978) and Jack Walker (1981). These are two of the very earliest forays into the topic; the activities of the policy entrepreneur are considered in a range of sociopolitical settings. These are non-research based accounts but they serve as an adequate introduction nonetheless (ii) in this category the policy entrepreneur is viewed as one of numerous variables in fully-integrated theories, or frameworks, of the policy making process. They allow us to comprehend the actions of
policy entrepreneurs alongside other factors which influence policy making. As the study unfolds, it will become clear that the theoretical frameworks developed by John Kingdon [1984] (1995) and Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones (1993) are enormously instructive for understanding the NALSAS Strategy policy process (iii) this category investigates a number of full-blown theories of policy entrepreneurship. In these theories the policy entrepreneurs are cast as powerful agents of change in their own rights. Considered is the work of Eugene Bardach (1972), Mark Schneider, Paul Teski with Michael Mintrom (1995), Nancy Roberts and Paula King (1996) and Michael Mintrom (2000).

This chapter also relates the theoretical literature to what the study does and finds. The rationale behind this is to illuminate the chapter and its theoretical considerations relevance to the study. Moreover, it lays the ground work for the formulation of the authors own theoretical framework of policy entrepreneurship. Even though the framework is discussed in detail in the Conclusion, that is, after the findings of the study have been established it is necessary, nonetheless, to introduce the framework at this point. For reasons of establishing the relevance of the literature to the study and to prepare readers with some knowledge of what to expect as the study unfolds, it is important to unveil the theoretical framework at the end of this chapter.

**Policy Entrepreneurs**

In the 1960s a number of authoritative publications appeared that focused on the exercise and distribution of power in the US (Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1963). Others during the same period, including Lasswell (1958), Lindblom (1965, 1968), and some even earlier, Simon (1945), became the pioneers of the variously known disciplines of the policy sciences, policy studies and policy analysis. In the 1970s a number of seminal works in policy analysis were published in North America (Simeon, 1976; Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972; Heclo, 1974; Wildavsky, 1979). These texts formed a foundation for the policy-making literature that followed in the 1980s and 1990s in the US, the United Kingdom to a certain extent, and Canada and Australia. Insightful and eloquently written, these foundational

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12 Bardach's contribution was published much earlier than the others in this category. However, since these categorisations are not organised chronologically and that Bardach does indeed develop a theory of 'political' entrepreneurship, his work deserves a place in the third category.
works were meticulously researched and, as a result, provided scholars and practitioners with a detailed insight to how public policy was developed and implemented. The value of these works remains undisputed. Nevertheless, none of them engaged expressly with the role of the individual policy actor in the policy-making process nor, of course, the notion of the policy entrepreneur.

One of the first to consider policy entrepreneurs was Robert Eyestone (1978). In *From Social Issues to Public Policy*, Eyestone’s engagement with the phenomenon is part of a broader endeavour to investigate how public issues are cut loose from the kaleidoscopic milieu of politics to become more clearly defined as a problem for which government may be able to provide a solution and, finally, its entrance into the policy process.

Eyestone’s work is set within the policy agenda-setting literature. For Eyestone, (1978: 79) the agenda is that set of issues on which the public currently believes action must be taken... an aggregate of the individual views of everyone in society. Public issues usually emerge from deliberate effort by those who want a government response. Facilitating the process of transition from issue generation to government response and, finally, issue resolution are usually a number of critical actors that Eyestone calls 'issue entrepreneurs'. Issue entrepreneurs are not found in any one specific location; 'there is no single best place to observe and describe them' (1978: 89). They may include actors inside and outside government, such as bureaucrats, appointed executives and elected politicians on the one hand, and lobbyists, interest groups or sometimes individual citizens on the other. Issue entrepreneurs perform two related and vital functions; they are 'issue generators' and 'issue brokers'.

Issue generators influence the agenda by bringing the issue under consideration to the attention of as many people as possible. For instance, those with an interest in having an issue placed on the government agenda may publicise the drawbacks associated with a particular government policy. They may even influence the agenda by attempting to expose a government scandal (1978: 89-91). On the inside government officials may influence the issue agenda by reconsidering issues previously relegated to non-status. In this case, Eyestone argues, timing is crucial. The issue may be more sympathetically received at some times rather than others. He states: 'Receptiveness at the right time may be critical for the subsequent progress of an issue towards and onto the government agenda' (1978: 91-93).
Issue brokerage usually needs entrepreneurs both inside and outside government circles. Activists and issue generators on the outside usually have contacts inside government. Eyestone calls these reliable and effective actors who hold official government positions 'inside-dopesters'. Particularly in policy areas with a long history of government involvement, inside-dopesters who individuals who hold formal positions in government work closely together with their counterparts on the outside. Inside-dopesters:

must know the details of the policy making apparatus. They must be prepared to bring together the needed staff assistance to carry out research on a crash basis, draft and redraft legislative proposals, coordinate informational and lobbying campaigns within government circles, and, where necessary, lobby direct with higher executive authority (1978: 94).

When the issue has been consigned to the realms of government, outside groups have the task of preparing themselves for unexpected outcomes at the official level. They must be ready to run a grass-roots campaign at short notice if required, be prepared for developments in the legislative and executive domains by ensuring the channels of communication with government people are open, and be able to maintain motivation and confidence levels of the group members. Eyestone concludes that 'the nature of issue resolution reflects the nature of political interests'. When issues become more technical and the positions of conflicting interest harden, increased levels of negotiation are required. He explains that: 'For this work, skilled entrepreneurs are much in demand' (1978: 96).

Kevin Rudd, the policy entrepreneur at the center of this study, was located squarely within government. By bringing his claim to the attention of others in government, in this case the Premier and his political master, Wayne Goss, as well as heads of government from the other states and the Commonwealth, he became an issue generator. As the study unfolds it will also become clear that his timing in placing the proposal for a national Asian studies strategy on the agenda was crucial. Furthermore, it will be shown how Rudd became much more than an issue generator, that indeed he was the main driver behind the proposal and without whose participation the Strategy would not have come to fruition. Rudd also played an important issue brokerage role which was aided by his knowledge of intergovernmental policy making processes and his location in
the Queensland state bureaucracy.

The next significant work following Eyestone was a paper by Jack Walker (1981). Walker examines how knowledge is diffused by and through policy communities and the impact of these processes on the setting of the policy agenda. The origins of policy proposals, agenda-building and the diffusion of knowledge by communities of policy experts are at the core of the later study, and it is in the midst of these processes that Walker situates the policy entrepreneur. This is not, however, Walker's first foray into the study of policy innovation, diffusion and the role of individuals in these processes. In the late 1960s he published the findings of ground-breaking research into policy innovation diffusion among the American States (Walker, 1969). The study was concerned with measuring the speed at which states accepted new ideas and why they adopted them. In the mid 1970s, he wrote a paper about how policy entrepreneurs use research data to persuade decision-makers to adopt particular policy responses (Walker, 1974). Several years later he researched agenda setting in the US Senate and based on his findings identified a number of factors which determined the agenda. Activist Senators, or political entrepreneurs, he suggested, played crucial roles in selecting problems for Senate attention and seeking recognition by persuading others of the importance of their chosen problem (Walker, 1977). Walker's later work, although similar because it considers the diffusion of policy ideas and the role of political entrepreneurs, is broader in scope and designed with slightly different intent (Walker 1981).

Walker (1981) argues that new policies emerge from within communities of policy experts. From within and between these communities located in the public sector, innovations, or 'new ideas and techniques', are diffused to other jurisdictions and adopted by them. These communities include agency heads and officials, academics and consultants employed by research institutions and professional consultancies, publishers and editors of influential journals and magazines, representatives of commercial organisations, elected officials and interest groups (1981: 79). According to Walker these communities frequently exchange information and it is from within them that opinions are formed, consensus built and the early stages of policy-making between experts takes place.

Walker argues that policy entrepreneurs are required to coordinate participating interests and use bodies of research as tools of persuasion and as a way of matching problems and solutions. Policy-makers are consistently confronted by constraints, including the
conflicting objectives and goals of public institutions, professional communities, and the ambitions of other policy entrepreneurs. Organisations and individuals in the public sector often modify their positions on particular issues in accordance with political conditions and the natural shifts which take place within and across coalitions of competing interests. Walker argues that these constraints to rational policy making, as well as limits imposed by the ideological disposition and values of society, distort the knowledge base on which policy is made and the way research knowledge and policy ideas are used (1981: 91). He argues that the task of ensuring that the use of research knowledge in policy making is maximised and of negotiating a course through the apparent disorder of the policy-making environment falls to the policy entrepreneur. Walker explains:

Policy innovation in such a loosely coupled system usually requires, as a necessary condition, the intervention of a skillful political entrepreneur. New departures in policy cannot be forced upon completely unreceptive agencies, but if a body of research emerges providing clear justification for the use of a given solution, and if an easily understood indicator is available showing that problems exist with which established agencies are unable to cope, an opportunity exists to break traditional patterns with a dramatic proposal for change. The energy supplied by the policy entrepreneur who makes such proposals and engineers their acceptance is an essential ingredient in the process of social learning (his emphasis) The circumstances must be ripe for change before knowledge can be translated into concrete policy, but the crucial matching of problems and solutions is almost always the result of the drive and imagination of a gifted leader.

In order to trigger policy change, Walker's entrepreneur uses research-based knowledge to identify policy deficiencies and provide justifications for solutions. A body of research is used to 'engineer' the 'acceptance' of agencies whose support is necessary to have the innovation adopted.

In terms of the current study Kevin Rudd effectively used existing research data as well as the findings of his own research to justify his pursuit of the NALSAS Strategy, both for arguing that there was indeed a nexus between linguistic and cultural skills and one's capacity to conduct business in East Asia and, hence, the maximisation of Australia's economic performance in the region. and for arguing that there was indeed a nexus
between linguistic and cultural skills. Various reports uncovered and produced by Rudd and his team, particularly 'Asian Languages and Australia's Economic Future', were also used to identify problems with the teaching of Asian studies in Australia and to persuade policy makers of the need for change.

**Placing the Entrepreneur in a Theoretical Framework**

Since the publication of the works discussed above, the concept of the policy entrepreneur has been significantly advanced by the research of John Kingdon (1995) and Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones (1993). These works are particularly important because they place the policy entrepreneur in a comprehensive theoretical framework of the policy process. This allows us to juxtapose the activity of policy entrepreneurs with other factors which influence the policy process. In Kingdon's, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, policy entrepreneurs are accorded the crucial role of identifying problems to which they attach solutions that are then pushed by the entrepreneur at vital moments in the political cycle. The book has become a seminal text in the agenda-setting literature. *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*, by Baumgartner and Jones (1993), is equally noteworthy for its contribution to the same body of literature. According to the authors, policy-making in America is a largely incremental process, which is sometimes 'punctuated' by short periods of radical policy change. Policy entrepreneurs are not attributed with the same vitality as the entrepreneurs of Kingdon but, nonetheless, can be pivotal figures when crafting policy images and choosing policy forums in which to push their initiatives.

The theoretical frameworks designed by Kingdon (1995) and Baumgartner and Jones (1993) are two of several that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s in the US. They quickly replaced the out-dated and faltering "stages heuristic" approach to understanding policy making, which divided the complex policy process into discrete stages. Sabatier (1999) nominates Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework, and Baumgartner and Jones' Punctuated-Equilibrium Framework as 'more promising' models since they overcome many of deficiencies of the stages heuristic approach. Since it was published before the work of Baumgartner and Jones, we will deal with Kingdon's Multiple Streams approach first.

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13 The book was originally published in 1984.
Kingdon's Multiple Streams approach to explaining public policy pre-decision processes is based heavily on the 'garbage can' model designed by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972). Kingdon's approach follows the essential logic of the model, but the logic is modified in some significant ways (Kingdon, 1995: 84). It identifies three distinct process streams in federal government agenda setting: (i) a problem stream consisting of how problems come to be recognised and defined by policy actors (ii) a policy stream involving those who generate policy proposals and the means by which an alternative is selected (iii) and a politics stream composed of factors such as national mood, the current administration, elections and the turnover of policy participants. These streams operate largely independent of each other, except when a 'window of opportunity' opens which allows policy entrepreneurs to join the three streams. If the policy entrepreneur is successful, significant policy change results.

The 'window of opportunity', or 'policy window', Kingdon (1995: 165) explains, is an 'opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems.' 'Policy windows' present themselves and stay open for only a short period of time and, when they do, policy entrepreneurs must be ready to take advantage of this temporary moment or risk having to wait for another opportunity. It is at this point that the three streams converge and are coupled by the policy entrepreneur. Policy entrepreneurs expose, or publicise the policy problem, accompanied by a solution proposal and then proceed to harness their political forces to achieve an outcome. The policy entrepreneur must be prepared to move and have developed ideas, expertise and proposals well in advance of the window opening, so that when a new government takes office, policy entrepreneurs must attempt to make their ideas part of the government's

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14 The 'garbage can' theory suggests that decision making is an unstable process driven by events, people and the demands of other problems. It implies that issues, problems and solutions are messy, untidy sorts of things, whose identification by decision makers will depend on the time it was detected and the availability of cans to put them in. Since it is a behavioural model of decision making, it is not as rational as some traditional economic and organisational theories. The garbage can theory is neatly summed up in a subsequent paper by March and Olsen (1976): 'Suppose we view a choice activity as a garbage can into which various problems and solutions are dumped by participants. The mix of garbage in a single can depends on partly the labels attached to the alternative cans; but it also depends on what garbage is being produced at the moment, on the mix of cans available, and the speed with which garbage is collected and removed from the scene' (March and Olsen, 1976: 26).

15 See Zahariadis (1995; 1999) for overview and critique of the approach.
agenda. They must:

hook solutions to problems, proposals to political momentum and political events to policy problems. If a policy entrepreneur is attaching a proposal to a change in the political stream, for example, a problem is also found for which the proposal is a solution, thus linking problem, policy and politics (1995: 182).

Kingdon labels policy communities (groups of specialists in a given policy area), the policy entrepreneurs within and the policy alternatives and proposals generated by them as 'policy primeval soups'. Ideas and vague conceptions of future policy activity as well as more concrete modes of action 'float' around, confront and may combine with each other; some ideas are taken up while others wither and die. Often ideas make the legislative process but are returned for amendment and then floated again. This is a view of policy making characterised more by chaos than as one which follows a step-by-step, rational and coherent pattern of initiation through to implementation (See Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993: 10-11; Hawker, Smith and Weller, 1979; and on the stages approach to the policy process, see Deleon, 1999; Sabatier, 1999). Kingdon's policy process is intermittent and erratic, and it is the task of the policy entrepreneur to make sense of the disorder.

Kingdon does a number of things quite well. He provides us with an insight to the personality of policy entrepreneurs by alluding to the presence of characteristics which are also hallmarks of their private sector counterparts. Kingdon explains that:

their defining characteristic, much as in the case of a business entrepreneur, is their willingness to invest their resources - time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money - in the hope of a future return. That return might come to them in the form of policies of which they approve, satisfaction from participation, or even personal aggrandizement in the form of job security or career promotion (1995:179)

Policy entrepreneurs are ready to shoulder the burden of risk in the pursuit of policy objectives and, rather than be motivated by financial returns, are driven by other, non-monetary forms of entrepreneurial profit.

Kingdon also infuses the entrepreneurial policy actor with substance by attaching
to him or her a range of qualities which fall into three main categories: (i) the participant
has some claim to a hearing. The policy entrepreneur operates amongst many individuals
who want to be heard, but only those who have 'a claim' to a hearing are actually heard.
This claim can come from three main sources: expertise; an ability to speak for others (a
leader); or an authoritative decision-making position (ii) the person is known for
connections or negotiating skills. This could be someone who combines sound policy
skills with political acumen (iii) the person must be persistent. Entrepreneurs, Kingdon
argues, must be willing to spend vast amounts of time and energy writing discussion
papers, talking to strategically important people, attending meetings in order to promote
an idea. Each quality on its own is not enough to ensure success but, when all three are
combined, the policy entrepreneur becomes an effective agent for change (1995: 180-81).

Kingdon's important contribution is also demonstrated by his discussion of the
forces that prompt policy entrepreneurs to advocate policies. First and foremost is that
participants perceive a problem and set out to propose solutions. They may also seek to
advocate a particular solution because of personal interest - to enhance their own career
prospects or to broaden the jurisdiction of an agency or department. This sort of
incentive is of a direct and personal nature. Secondly, proposals are advocated to advance
one's own values or ideological predisposition of an area of public policy. Thirdly,
Kingdon identifies what he calls 'policy groupies'. Some participants simply enjoy the
game of politics and being close to the centers of power (1995: 122-23).

Although this analysis of the NALSAS Strategy policy is not carried out exclusively
from the perspective of Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework, Kingdon's insights are,
nevertheless, very useful. For instance, as the study unfolds it will be shown how Rudd
detected a policy window (a change in the political stream), attached a solution to a
problem and sought to persuade decision makers of the worth and viability of his
proposal. Precisely how this was achieved is set out in the following chapters. However,
to ensure that the theoretical perspectives under review in this chapter remain relevant to
the study it is worth considering briefly how the policy window, problems and solutions
manifested themselves in terms of the NALSAS Strategy.

In this study the problem stream is represented by a range of weaknesses (most of
which are long-standing) in the overall delivery of Asian studies education in Australian
schools. These include, but are not limited to, a shortage of suitably qualified Asian
languages and studies teachers; an inadequate supply of high quality teaching and learning materials; and the absence of appropriate intergovernmental mechanisms to coordinate the teaching of such studies on a national scale (Chapter Two discusses these issues in detail). Representing the solution stream is the NALSAS Strategy itself, a comprehensive package of measures designed to alleviate the problems listed above. The politics stream in this study is understood to be present in Paul Keating’s ascendancy to the prime ministership after successfully challenging Bob Hawke for the position in December 1991. For Rudd and Wayne Goss, Keating’s presence and his zeal for pursuing Australia’s closer engagement with Asia was regarded as a policy window, that is, as an opportunity to push the proposal for a national Asian studies strategy. Even though Bob Hawke demonstrated a penchant for strengthening Australia’s relations with East Asia when he was Prime Minister it is argued that Keating pursued this objective with even greater commitment. There are reasons why this was thought to be an opportune moment to push for the national strategy but these are canvassed in future chapters.

It should be noted too, that Rudd demonstrated a number of other characteristics Kingdon attributes to policy entrepreneurs, including his willingness to invest his time, energy and reputation in return for a policy in which he deeply believed. While the research established quite clearly that he held a personal interest in this area of public policy, it does not conclude that he pursued the Strategy to advance his career or to gain satisfaction from being involved in the policy process. Moreover, the qualities Kingdon ascribes to the policy entrepreneur, such as having a claim to a hearing, connections, negotiating skills and persistence are all characteristics demonstrated by Rudd in pursuit of the NALSAS Strategy and will be addressed in detail later in the study.

Another useful approach to analysing the NALSAS Strategy and the role of Kevin Rudd has been developed in *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. In this book Baumgartner and Jones (1993; see also 1991; and Baumgartner, Jones and True, 1999) developed what they call the Punctuated-Equilibrium Framework. This framework argues that policy making in the US is characterised by extended periods of incremental change punctuated by brief periods of major policy change. This happens when opponents manage to develop new policy images and exploit the numerous policy venues characteristic of federal systems of government. Policy entrepreneurs are important policy actors from this perspective of policy making because they help to develop policy images and select appropriate policy venues.
In the world of politics and policy, groups and individuals are fundamentally concerned with establishing and maintaining a policy monopoly (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 6). A policy monopoly is the domination, or control, of 'political understandings concerning the policy of interest'. Policy monopolies have two key characteristics: first, they have an explicit institutional structure which limits access to the policy process; second, the institution is supported by a powerful set of ideas. These ideas are often associated with core political values such as progress, equality, independence, nationalism and so on. A policy monopoly is created when one group can convince others that its activities and goals serve these purposes, or will effectively deal with particular social and economic problems. The objective of the policy maker is 'to convince others that their policy, program, or industry represents the solution to one of these long-standing policy problems' (1993: 7).

As the interpretation or understanding of a problem changes new monopolies are created and old ones are swept away. This leads the authors to consider the links between change in the understanding of policy issues and the associated changes in policy processes and policy outcomes and, finally, their effect on institutional structures. They are interested in what happens after new ideas become broadly accepted (1993: 10-11). Recognising that bias is inherent in all political institutions, Baumgartner and Jones argue that change of institutional structures occurs when they are challenged and bias is re-mobilised to represent different interests and values. The mobilisation of bias captures the preferences of the previously apathetic; it alters the existing distribution of preferences. 16 Noting that institutional change is difficult to achieve in the US, the authors nonetheless assert that, when such change does transpire, it often leads to lasting changes in policy.

16 Baumgartner and Jones (1993) were heavily influenced by the work of E.E. Schattschneider (1960), one of the first to argue that the power of government is the power to manage conflict before it begins. He suggested that public policy is really an activity in which issues are included and excluded and bias is mobilised to ensure that conflict is managed and contained. Schattschneider contended that 'All forms of political organisation have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organisation is the mobilisation of bias' (1960: 71-3). Hence, the definition of issues is a vital form of political power. For Schattschneider, power-holders (winners) want to contain the scope of conflict while the powerless (losers) desire expansion. Cobb and Elder [1972] (1983) built on the work of Schattschneider. They were concerned with the analysis of limited participation and how the masses can influence the policy agenda. Their focus is on the way in which conflict is managed and expanded.
According to the authors, while institutions provide long periods of stability in American politics, they are often linked by short bursts of policy activity and change. This happens when institutional structures are challenged and bias is mobilised. Hence, 'the American political system lurches from one point of apparent equilibrium to another, as policymakers establish new institutions to support the policies they favour or alter existing ones to give themselves greater advantage' (1993: 12).

Policy entrepreneurs are at the frontline of the process whereby equilibrium is punctuated by short periods of significant policy change. Chief among the entrepreneur's functions is the redefinition of issues. According to Baumgartner and Jones, 'issue definition' is the driving force in both stability and instability, primarily because issue definition has the potential for mobilising the previously disinterested' (1993: 16). How a policy is defined, understood and discussed is its 'policy image' (1993: 25). They argue that problems need to be defined in ways that appeal to groups and individuals who may have been previously apathetic. Specialists, or policy entrepreneurs, are important in this process, since they are able to define the policy in a simplified fashion that is favourable to non-specialists. Baumgartner and Jones point out that:

Where images are at the centre of the analytical framework, as they are for us, one must address the efforts of policy entrepreneurs in attempting to alter the people's understandings of the issues with which they deal (1993: 42).

For Baumgartner and Jones, issue definition is decisive in politics; they place it at the heart of the political battle and put policy entrepreneurs on the front line. Also central to the punctuated equilibrium model are policy venues; those institutions or groups in the political system charged with the authority to make decisions regarding policy issues (1993: 31). Just as some policy problems are directly attached to certain policy images while others are contested, some policies are unquestionably the responsibility of one institution, while others must deal with the ambitions of actors in a number of jurisdictions. Some policy images may be accepted in one venue but not in another. Hence, 'images are linked with venues'. Baumgartner and Jones point out that the US federal system is particularly amenable to policy entrepreneurs because it provides them with a number of policy venues within which to craft and sell policy images. These institutions may include Congress and state legislatures, executive branches, the courts, local government, legislative policy committees and so forth. Since different institutions develop different
images of an issue, the policy entrepreneur must choose the institution whose image of the policy is most sympathetic to his own. Federalism, as the authors explain, creates 'opportunities for strategically minded policy entrepreneurs to shop for the most favourable locus for their policies' (1993: 25).

This study does not adopt the Punctuated-Equilibrium Framework as an analytical tool. However, some of its key elements, particularly the creation of policy images and selection of policy venues, activities for which policy entrepreneurs are responsible, are easily detectable in the NALSAS Strategy policy process and, consequently, play an important role in this study. Although Chapter Five covers these matters in detail it is worth noting that Rudd crafted an image of his proposal to which heads of government were sympathetic. Instead of articulating the teaching of Asian studies in terms of servicing multiculturalism or on purely educational grounds he chose to craft the proposal in terms of its potential to enhance Australia's business and trade performance in the region. He also carefully chose a policy venue highly receptive to the way in which the proposal was imaged. COAG was concerned with intergovernmental matters economic by nature; heads of government were prepared to countenance the proposal given its economic intent. It will be revealed in Chapter Five, however, that other factors also influenced Rudd's decision to use the COAG policy venue.

**Theories of Policy Entrepreneurship**

The studies of policy entrepreneurs which fall into this category are devoted to formulating explicit theories of policy entrepreneurship. The studies we have already considered are concerned with either the entrepreneur as a free-floating agent or with examining entrepreneurship within broader theories of the policy process. Even though the latter category was particularly useful in delineating entrepreneurial activity from other forces acting on policy making, the policy entrepreneur is understood as one constituent among others, albeit an important one, which influences the policy process. The category of works now under scrutiny is committed solely to the entrepreneur; they develop full-blown theories of policy entrepreneurship. Many of the characteristics and activities of policy entrepreneurs identified by the authors covered here are, like those canvassed in the previous category, extremely relevant to the current study of Kevin Rudd and the NALSAS Strategy.
In his book entitled *The Skill Factor in Politics*, Bardach (1972) attempts to develop a theory of political skill by studying Californian mental health politics in the mid-1960s. Bardach investigates five controversies in mental health politics by field observation, interviews, documentary analysis and a mail questionnaire. He describes political skill as 'a quality of political action. The action is political problem solving and the qualities of skill are efficiency, inventiveness, and creativity, the relevant criteria of quality, of course, on the type of problem' (1972: 5). Such skills are used by entrepreneurs 'trying to accumulate enough support for a proposal', an idea or initiative regarding an area of policy (1972: 9). For Bardach, elected government officials, or politicians, as well as staffers, advisors and departmental policy analysts can all be defined as entrepreneurs (1972: 15).

The entrepreneur's primary purpose is: 'Obtaining consensus from a set of sufficiently weighty interests to win a major victory is the entrepreneur's basic objective' (1972: 183). By consensus, Bardach means the entrepreneur must gain 'independent assent to the same proposal'. The major hurdle the entrepreneur faces when seeking this objective is to minimise the extent to which the new proposal disrupts the existing 'complex ecology of organisational programs and individual practices' (1972: 184). Since some consequences can never be entirely avoided, the entrepreneur must determine the costs and benefits of the potential organisation and program disruption, evaluating the level of support that can be garnered for the proposal, as well as gauge opposition to it. The key aim for the entrepreneur is to design a proposal that improves and invigorates, rather than upsets the array of existing programs and procedures (1972: 183-90).

In attempting to gain consensus for a proposal, the entrepreneur must resolve four main political problems. The first is to identify the configuration of interests that will provide the highest level of support (1972: 183-215). In addition to creating a proposal, the entrepreneur needs to determine the views of those who might pledge their support, as well as how weighty their views are among the relevant players. The entrepreneur must make decisions about which interests to target. Based on the findings of his case-studies, Bardach concludes that there are five main categories, or sources, of political 'weightiness': (i) in all democracies numbers are important: the more broadly supported a proposal, the more weighty it will be (ii) the more intensely the proponent of an idea feels about an issue the more seriously it is respected (iii) technical competence, or expertise and experience, is usually believed to furnish the entrepreneurs and allies with special insight to a problem;
(iv) the gravity of a problem and the importance attached to its resolution (functional indispensability) (v) there is what Bardach calls 'prerogative, the legal and customary right to be consulted on certain policy matters' (1972: 11).

The second fundamental problem is to persuade those sympathetic, well-placed and weighty interests and actors and to enlist them as active protagonists for the proposal. In short, the entrepreneur is faced with the problem of organising a coalition of backers, whose combined political resources will win the proposal sufficient support (1972: 215-31). In order to build a coalition the political entrepreneur needs to have certain political resources. Bardach identifies what he calls 'production' resources, following the famous 'factors of production'; land, labour and capital in manufacturing: (i) 'analytical' resources include insightful reports containing data and statistics, supported by the views of experts, analysts and advisers, which mark out the scope of a problem (ii) 'marketing' resources, the means by which the entrepreneur publicises the problem and the associated proposal to what Bardach calls the 'attentive public', or those individuals, groups and organisations which may be mobilised as potential allies or opponents. These include resources such as money, public speakers, access to an efficient and effective communication system and personal access to large groups of individuals (iii) 'managerial' resources are whatever assists an entrepreneur to make more rational decisions about how best to acquire and utilise analytical and marketing resources. This may include information gathered through strategically located contacts, office space in which to work, telephones, an outgoing personality and knowledge of policy processes (1972: 215).

The third main political task of the entrepreneur is to defend the proposal from attack by those opposed to it (1972: 231-41). This involves elements of gamesmanship, including the sabotage of the Opposition's support, and superior manoeuvres and timing. In addition to identifying and exploiting one's opportunities, the entrepreneur must also deal with coalitions of opponents seeking to block the proposal. Opposition coalitions can do this by undermining each other's weightiness and resources and by manoeuvring to set the arena and scheduling parameters of the contest advantageously for their own side.

The ability to carry-out the tasks of the entrepreneur for the duration of the exercise, is the final political problem confronting the entrepreneur (Bardach, 1972: 241-
Though dependent upon managerial and organisational elements, the entrepreneur also needs to master certain strategic doctrine and learn cognitive skills to deal with the 'dynamic features of a political contest'.

Many of Bardach's observations prove instructive for understanding the role played by Rudd in the NALSAS Strategy policy process. For instance, it was pointed out in the previous category of literature that policy entrepreneurs seek policy venues sympathetic to particular policy images. Bardach's research, however, demonstrates that in searching for support for a proposal policy entrepreneurs need to identify and forge agreement from a 'set of sufficiently weighty interests'. In the current study Rudd sought the assent of Australian heads of government rather than the relevant intergovernmental ministerial council in order to have the NALSAS Strategy endorsed, funded and implemented. COAG consisted of heads of government, a membership rather more powerful than the line department ministers who comprised the ministerial council. This finding and its implications for the current study and our understanding of policy entrepreneurship will be dealt with in more depth in Chapter Five.

There are three remaining aspects of Bardach's contribution which are relevant to the current study. First, Bardach's claim that entrepreneurs use certain 'analytical' resources to build support for their proposals can be observed in Rudd's employment of both Commonwealth commissioned research data as well as his own. Like Walker (1981), whose work was reviewed in the first category of literature, entrepreneurs use reports and research to buttress their arguments for change. Second, Bardach holds that a range of interpersonal contacts are also a prerequisite for successful entrepreneurial activity and, third, that entrepreneurs participate in strategic action designed to outmanoeuvre their opponents. As the study progresses it will be shown precisely how Rudd exploited his network of contacts and outwitted those who opposed his proposal.

In Transforming Public Policy: Dynamics of Policy Entrepreneurship and Innovation, Roberts and King (1996) show how entrepreneurship and innovation interact 'to produce radical policy change'. The research endeavours to discover how policy transformation occurs. Resting at the center of the study is the question 'What breaks the stability of the old policy order and permits a quantitatively different policy to take its place?' (1996: 3). Roberts and King develop a theory of policy entrepreneurship and innovation by researching the rise of
'school choice' onto the legislative agenda of the state of Minnesota in the US in 1987. From formal interviews, participant observation, questionnaires, three psycho-metric tests given to the policy entrepreneurs and archival research, Roberts and King argue that individuals are largely responsible for introducing radical innovations. As the authors explain, events do not by themselves trigger radical social change. Rather, radical change and policy innovations occur when an individual 'defines the situation, interprets the crisis, constructs an explanation of what it means, and describes how to deal with it'. This function is performed by the policy entrepreneur who:

focuses attention on an idea as a solution to a policy problem and insists that people attend to it. Pushing the idea forward both by design and by deft use of chance opportunities, she builds momentum. If she is successful in attracting enough support and resources to counter the resistance of those opposed to change, the idea ultimately becomes part of accepted practice. Although outside forces may present the occasion, it is the policy entrepreneur who seizes the opportunity and responds to them (1996: 223).

Policy entrepreneurs are regarded as catalysts of change. They are change agents who, rather than responding to crisis, endeavour to create the perception that in the absence of significant policy change potentially disruptive conditions will develop (1996: 223). There are a number of distinguishing features of policy entrepreneurship, according to Roberts and King. First, policy innovations are made possible by 'entrepreneurial design'. They explain that: 'As a concept, design entails deliberate, purposive planning'. While sensitive to other factors that influence the process of change, the study shows that individuals do have an impact if their efforts are carefully applied. Design is concerned with delineating policy problems and identifying appropriate solutions so as to influence policy outcomes. Policy entrepreneurs engage in this planning process by determining 'the nature of a problem and its causes, the range of possible solutions, and the strategy most likely to achieve a desired outcome given the available resources' (1996: 3). Policy innovation and policy entrepreneurship appears to be a very rational process.

17 Cross-district public school choice, or 'open enrollment' seeks to give families the opportunity to choose the school to which they send their children. According to Roberts and King (1996: 21): 'The aim was to give parents and students the option of finding a school district that met their needs better than the one where they lived'. Allowing students to move around and freely select between school districts was expected to create a market for educational services. To retain students, school districts would need to compete with each other.
The second distinguishing feature of the study is its emphasis on the concept of innovation. Following Polsby (1984): 'Policy change in government, radical or incremental, is treated as policy innovation'. They also refer to Joseph Schumpeter's economic theory of innovation, that is, of combining new factors of production so as to generate new combinations. Hence, Roberts and King define policy entrepreneurs as 'individuals who introduce, translate and implement an innovative idea into public practice... We know that in general terms that individuals who carry out innovations are entrepreneurs and that the function of the entrepreneur is innovation' (1996: 1). Their study also delineates stages in the 'innovative process'. There are four stages: (i) creation (the development of an innovative idea) (ii) design (the idea is transformed into concrete form) (iii) implementation (the innovation is put into practice) (iv) institutionalisation (becomes accepted practice). However, the more radical an innovation the greater the likelihood of overlap between the stages (1996: 8-10).

The third main feature of their work is the sophisticated means by which 'public entrepreneurs' are comprehended: (i) how they are differentiated from other policy actors in the innovation process (ii) the classification of various types of public entrepreneurs and (iii) recognition of various skills and characteristics attached to the entrepreneur. In regards to how public entrepreneurs are distinguished from other policy actors they identify (i) system maintainers (those who maintain the status quo) (ii) policy intellectuals (those who generate policy ideas) (iii) policy advocates (those who contribute to the idea process but also to the design stage) (iv) the failed entrepreneur (those who generate an idea, transform it into a proposal but fail to have the innovation implemented) (v) policy champions (involved in both design and implementation) who hold positions as either legislators, governors or senior administrators (vi) policy administrators (whose role is confined to the implementation of the legislation). To qualify as a public entrepreneur one is required to generate an idea, translate it to a concrete policy proposal and have it implemented.

The authors identify four types of public entrepreneur: (i) policy entrepreneurs (those who participate in the innovation process, but do so from outside formal positions in government) (ii) bureaucratic entrepreneurs (those who work in government but do not hold leadership positions) (iii) executive entrepreneurs (those appointed to positions of leadership)
and (iv) political entrepreneurs (those elected to office). Roberts and King claim that developing a typology of the public entrepreneur allows the researcher to trace the movement of entrepreneurs over time (1996:17).

All of the individuals studied by Roberts and King are 'policy entrepreneurs'. They included the head of a public affairs think tank, the head of a business lobby and policy development group, the president of a non-profit organisation, a policy analyst, an author who worked as an education consultant and a professor in public policy who was also an elected public official. Five of the six came from outside government. The sixth was both a political and a policy entrepreneur because he was a politician as well as an academic. Policy entrepreneurs are, in a sense, marginal players because they do not hold formal positions in government.

Combined with their own observations, the self-report data and the reports of others, they discovered a reasonably consistent identity emerging for the policy entrepreneurs. They were: individualistic, intuitive, innovative, analytical and adept critical thinkers and problem solvers. They appear to be change agents, alert to possibilities and opportunities to pursue their visions for change and often show potential for leadership in doing so. Policy entrepreneurs can be confrontational when necessary, but also skillful at managing conflict. Roberts and King demonstrate that policy entrepreneurs show no need for recognition of their work and are comfortable seeking radical change which may not be popular.

The fourth distinguishing characteristic of their work is its emphasis on the collective nature of entrepreneurship. They argue, as a result of their research findings, that 'public entrepreneurship can be an individual or group phenomenon'. As policy matters become more complex, constituencies more diverse and discerning, the authors believe the entrepreneurial process becomes a cooperative one and more team-oriented (1996: 181). Although they recognise the importance of the individual in the innovation process, Roberts and King argue that individuals who work with others in pursuit of a common purpose can achieve a greater impact than individuals operating on their own (1996: 162). Successful innovation results from the involvement of numerous individuals in various junctures of the innovative process. They suggest that the 'collective talents' of policy intellectuals, policy champions, and policy administrators may all need to be involved to help ensure the success of a particular policy innovation.
In this study Roberts and King's characterisation of the policy entrepreneur as an agent for change is used frequently to describe the role of Kevin Rudd in the NALSAS Strategy policy process. He was indeed a catalyst of change in the area of Asian studies, particularly in terms of increasing funding levels and by developing a national approach to the delivery of Asian studies. Furthermore, according to Roberts and King and the types of activities which they argue define policy entrepreneurs, Rudd was entrepreneurial in the way he planned the NALSAS policy exercise; he identified a set of problems, carefully designed a package of solutions as well as a strategy to win the necessary support of other senior officials and heads of government. Compared to Kingdon, for whom entrepreneurial activity is characterised more by chance and fleeting opportunities, Roberts and King see policy entrepreneurship as a more rational and planned enterprise.

It will also become clear as the study unfolds that the authors' application of the term innovation to describe policy change is also relevant to the NALSAS exercise, as is their four-way classification of public entrepreneurs. It is worth noting in regards to the latter that the policy entrepreneurs studied by Roberts and King were located outside of government and functioned in a team-like fashion. Given that Rudd was located squarely within the apparatus of the Queensland government and that he more or less operated independently, he is labeled an 'executive entrepreneur' and understood not to have participated in the policy process at a collective level like entrepreneurs studied by Roberts and King. Despite these divergences, there is much about the work of Roberts and King which was helpful in gaining a better understanding of Rudd's role in the policy process.

In Public Entrepreneurs: Agents for Change in American Government, Schneider, Teski and Mintrom (1995; and see Schneider and Teski, 1992) develop a theory of the public entrepreneur. Like Roberts and King (1996), they argue that, while most social scientific theory focuses on change occurring in an incremental fashion, change can be radical and sudden. These changes can occur as a result of the actions of 'actors who can perceive opportunities for major change and create the incentives and forces to affect such change' (Schneider et al, 1995: 1). Leaders often emerge to bring about such changes and it is the view of the authors that such leaders are the public sector equivalent of private sector entrepreneurs - 'individuals who create dynamic change in markets'. By placing the public entrepreneur at the centre of the policy process Schneider et al develop an endogenous theory of change.
The authors identify two types of 'public entrepreneur': political entrepreneurs - individuals who seek elective office to pursue their vision of change; and bureaucratic entrepreneurs - city managers or high level managers in public bureaucracies in command of established agencies (1995: 41-61 and 147-69 respectively). Focusing their research on the entrepreneur at the local government level, Schneider et al argue that local governments operate in a quasi-competitive market place called 'the local market for public goods'. Public entrepreneurs play important roles by affecting the competitive climate in metropolitan areas. Given the importance of local taxes in the provision of services, local governments compete against each other to make their community more attractive to businesses and households. Innovations established in one local government can then be diffused to other communities. Schneider et al argue that public entrepreneurs are critical actors in both the process of promoting innovations and their diffusion (1995: 10).

A distinguishing characteristic of this study is its detailed exploration of the linkages between public concepts of entrepreneurship and private sector and economic theories of entrepreneurship. Schneider et al see entrepreneurs at the public sector level as equivalent to those entrepreneurs more commonly associated with the private sector in the sense that they both carry out similar functions and share certain characteristics (1995: 42). They go to great lengths to align the public with the private by examining the latter in significant detail, as well as considering the work of some of the great exponents of economic entrepreneurship, including Joseph Schumpeter, Israel Kirzner and Mark Casson. Although they discover many similarities, they develop an argument that shows how public sector entrepreneurs face problems and perform functions that are quite different to their private sector counterparts (1995: 17-41).

Schneider et al proceed from the view that entrepreneurs perform three main functions:

First and foremost, entrepreneurs discover unfulfilled needs and select appropriate prescriptions for how these needs may be met - that is, they are alert to opportunities. Second, as they seize these opportunities, entrepreneurs bear the reputational, emotional and, frequently, the financial risk involved in pursuing a course of action with uncertain consequences. Finally, in pursuing these actions, entrepreneurs must assemble and coordinate teams or networks of individuals and
organizations that have the talents and resources necessary to undertake change (1995: 42).

The discovery of opportunities and unfulfilled needs, according to the authors, is not the most demanding task that confronts the entrepreneur; there are others. Rather, it is the prescription of solutions to problems which 'often requires exceptional insight'. To be sure, entrepreneurs 'must be able to recognize the contextual nature of those needs and establish feasible approaches to them' (1995: 42). For Schneider et al, an individual is acting entrepreneurially when he identifies, and then defines, or frames an issue to which is attached a solution that appeals to the public. The authors also distinguish a number of other features: (i) policy entrepreneurs are risk-bearers. In accordance with economic conceptions of entrepreneurship, Schneider et al argue that public entrepreneurs are defined by 'their willingness to engage in risky behaviour... entrepreneurs must bear the reputational and emotional risks involved in pursuing a course of action with uncertain consequences' (1995: 50). Accompanying these types of risks is also an element of financial risk. Both elected and non-elected officials face risks if their proposals fail (ii) entrepreneurs must also be adept organisers of human, physical, and financial resources in order to meet the demands of policy making (1995: 51-56) (iii) as a solution to bureaucratic and organisational barriers, the authors assert that entrepreneurs take advantage of networks. Networks operate not by formal administrative means 'but through individuals engaged in reciprocal, mutually supportive actions'. A high level of trust is necessary if networks are to operate efficiently and reliably. A network of trusted contacts is essential for the pursuit of the entrepreneur's goals. Hence, entrepreneurs need to be skilled at networking (1995: 58-59).

To clearly classify entrepreneurship, the authors opt to place entrepreneurial action in discovering opportunities and framing issues along a continuum (1995: 43-59). On the far right side of the continuum is innovation, which includes the employment of heresthetical strategies employed by entrepreneurs to produce the most radical change. Heresthetic strategies, as defined by the American political scientist, William Riker, and

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18 Heresthetic is a term coined by Riker (1986) to refer to a political strategy. In his book *The Art of Political Manipulation*, Riker explains 'the novice heresthetician must by practice know how to go about managing and manipulating and manoeuvring to get the decisions he or she wants... the heresthetician uses language to manipulate other people... in each case, the art involves the use of language to accomplish some purpose: to arrive at truth, to communicate, to persuade and to manipulate' (1986: x).
adapted by Schneider et al, are used by entrepreneurs to 'add a new dimension to a policy debate to achieve a preferred outcome' (1995: 44-46). In the middle of the continuum is leadership, which includes dimensions of rhetoric and management. These elements of entrepreneurship lead to less radical change; they are less than innovative. Compared to the use of heresthetics, by which the entrepreneur creates a new means of rhetorical strategies, the rhetorician changes the preferences of individuals through persuasion. Rhetorical skills combined with a capacity to manage are important, given that so much policy and political activity occurs in large organisations such as state bureaucracies (1995: 46-48). Finally, on the far left of the continuum there is arbitrage, which entails the adaptation of innovations across different policy and jurisdictional spheres. These are less radical and risky policy ideas. Entrepreneurs are involved in arbitrage, 'recognising that gains can be made by linking streams of previously separate market activities'. They adapt innovations in one area to needs in another (1995: 48-50).

This study of the NALSAS Strategy makes no attempt to probe the links between private sector and public entrepreneurship. What it does undertake, however, is an analysis of Rudd and his proposal for a national Asian studies strategy using a number of other assumptions drawn by Schneider et al. These include, following Kingdon, an alertness not only to the identification of problems but to designing strategies aimed at solving the problems they identify. Like Kingdon and Roberts and King in particular, the authors class the problem/solution dichotomy as an elementary facet of entrepreneurship. Furthermore, although Schneider et al deem the organisation and coordination of resources a particularly important function of entrepreneurs, it is their emphasis on networks and the exploitation of one's contacts which is most relevant to this study. This will be demonstrated in due course. Finally, the authors innovation continuum is also useful in this study. However, rather than locating it at one particular point along the continuum this study concludes that the NALSAS Strategy constitutes both an innovation, leadership by rhetoric as well as arbitrage.

In his book Policy Entrepreneurs and School Choice, Michael Mintrom (2000) presents a theory of policy entrepreneurship and undertakes to empirically test that theory. Following Roberts and King (1996), he uses the rise of school choice19 across the American States as...
his case study and as a policy area to test his theory. In essence, Mintrom wants to provide us with a better understanding of policy entrepreneurs and their role in the policy process. He argues that such an understanding will also help to explain how policy change occurs, not only in the area of school choice, but in other areas too.

Like Schneider et al (with whom Mintrom was a contributor), Mintrom (2000) suggests that studying the behaviour and characteristics of entrepreneurs in the private sector, or marketplace, can provide useful insights to the activities of policy entrepreneurs in the policy process. Just as private sector entrepreneurs are alert to opportunities and use their imagination and creative ability to introduce innovative products to the market, so do policy entrepreneurs when attempting to sell their policy ideas. Notwithstanding some of the distinctions between markets and politics, Mintrom argues that the metaphor of the entrepreneur can advance our understanding of the processes which facilitate policy change and innovation (2000: 4-13).

In trying to establish how policy innovation takes place and takes hold, Mintrom reviews the work of a number of contributors to the topic, including Baumgartner and Jones (1993), Kingdon (1995) and others. He concludes that they have sought to develop frameworks and theories of the policy process which have left room for the actions of certain individuals with the determination and creative energy to 'stimulate or redirect debate about policy issues'. This 'special class' of actors, Mintrom observes, have been called policy entrepreneurs. Like Kingdon, Mintrom sees policy entrepreneurs emerging from both inside and outside government (2000: 60).

Mintrom makes a concerted effort to distinguish policy entrepreneurs from other policy actors, and he does this by characterizing the policy entrepreneur, first and foremost, as a producer of innovation: 'Innovations represent changes that are deliberately designed to lead or force people to break out of particular routine behaviours and come to new understandings of their environment' (2000: 114). He makes two additional points. First, innovations may be introduced in one movement or they may be introduced incrementally; second, the introduction of an innovation may not necessarily be the work of a policy entrepreneur.
What makes Mintrom's work somewhat unique is its conscious endeavour to examine the policy entrepreneur in context. For Mintrom, the 'policy milieu' in which every policy entrepreneur is located can both assist and inhibit the activity of policy entrepreneurs. Considering both individual and contextual factors in the policy process is necessary to avoid concluding, perhaps erroneously, that one individual is more adept than another. In order to explain differences between the performance of individuals one must be cognisant of variations in the context, for some variations may assist the individual in his or her efforts while constraining him or her in another (2000: 115). When he speaks of context Mintrom refers to the preferences of citizens and interest groups and the existence and/or magnitude of public sector management reforms. Following Baumgartner and Jones (1993) he also refers to the availability and access to policy venues, such as local and state legislatures. Mintrom argues that institutions, current policies and the existence of other groups help, but do not determine, the 'shape of opportunities and the actions open to policy entrepreneurs...' (2000: 123). He describes his mission as follows:

I want to make the claim - and make it as plausibly as possible-that policy entrepreneurs can and do make significant contributions to the creation of policy change. One way to make such a claim is to admit that other factors matter as well, and to then assess the contributions of policy entrepreneurs, taking into account the most important of those other factors (2000: 159).

Mintrom is careful to emphasise the quantitative nature of his research, arguing that it is the next logical step to take from the qualitative studies which preceded. Most of the data concerning the existence and behaviour of school choice policy entrepreneurs was collected by a mail survey of education experts in forty-eight states. Mintrom learnt that policy entrepreneurs were prominent in placing school choice on the legislative agenda and getting it adopted, but that their effectiveness was heavily influenced by other factors, including whether it was a state legislature election year, opposition of teachers' unions and the proportion of neighbouring states where school choice was considered in the legislature (2000: 183-204).

Mintrom not only establishes that the presence and activity of policy entrepreneurs plays an important part in getting issues on the agenda and in causing policy change, but he also identifies the specific activities, characteristics and skills of policy entrepreneurs as they seek change. To this end he designates 'six keys to policy entrepreneurship': policy
entrepreneurs must be creative and insightful; socially perceptive; able to mix in a variety of social and political settings; be able to argue persuasively; be a strategic team builder; and be prepared to lead by example (2000: 267-275). Mintrom concludes by examining the intersections between his theory of policy entrepreneurship and other theories of policy making and policy change. Rather than arguing that his theory should displace any of the others, such as those of Kingdon (1995), Baumgartner and Jones (1993), Sabatier's Advocacy Coalition or Lindblom (1968), Mintrom believes that all should be seen as mutually reinforcing.

In relation to this study Mintrom's work is particularly important, mainly because he stresses the importance of examining entrepreneurs in their contexts. The policy milieu to which he refers, especially access to policy venues and the extent of public management reform, were both crucial contextual factors which assisted Rudd to achieve his objectives. Discovering that the context was extremely important in the case of the NALSAS Strategy and that Mintrom is really the only scholar to have placed considerable emphasis on contextual factors, has meant that it is one of the most significant findings of the study. Mintrom's work is also pertinent because, like many of his peers, he reinforces the view that policy entrepreneurs are innovators and can be located both inside and outside government. Moreover, he breaks down the attributes of policy entrepreneurs into six discrete categories, many of which match the skills and activities displayed by Kevin Rudd.

Conclusion

The works of the authors described in this chapter have made important contributions to the study of policy entrepreneurship. This overview of their contributions tells us a great deal about the activities of policy entrepreneurs, their behaviour, identity, characteristics and skills. It also indicates how the literature relates to the current study. However, what we need to do is assemble what we now know about policy entrepreneurship so that the fundamental precepts, commonalities and differences can be easily discerned. In short, the information needs to be distilled. It is also appropriate at this point to unveil, or at least draw a general outline based on the research findings, the authors own theoretical framework of policy entrepreneurship. The framework will be introduced here but set out in detail in the Conclusion. But first it is necessary to make a few summarial remarks about the literature
This chapter has divided the literature devoted to policy entrepreneurship into three sections. The first section considered some of the earliest contributions to the topic and, according to the authors on which it focused, established that idea generation is a key activity of the policy entrepreneur. Ideas are policy solutions developed as policy proposals in response to policy problems. Policy entrepreneurs are fundamentally concerned with having matters placed on the agenda of decision-makers and others with the capacity to legislate or make legally binding decisions. In order that a policy proposal reach the policy agenda, the policy entrepreneur must engage in consensus-building and argue his case persuasively. Persuasion is a vital skill that all entrepreneurs must possess and an activity in which they are required to engage. Policy entrepreneurs also help to broker agreements with decision makers when necessary.

The work of the authors in the second section largely reinforces the observations made by those in the first. Policy entrepreneurs attach solutions to problems, participate in brokerage, or bargaining, and engage in argumentation to persuade decision makers to support their proposals for change. In a number of ways Baumgartner and Jones and Kingdon significantly augment the earlier works of Eyestone and Walker and, thus, advance the contribution of their predecessors. Alertness to opportunity, the importance of access to personal and professional networks, the ability to craft policy images to which policy venues are receptive, as well as manage and coordinate relevant players are all new and interesting accretions to the body of existing knowledge. Furthermore, observing the activities and behaviour of the policy entrepreneur in a theoretical framework of the policy process advances our understanding of the nature and role of entrepreneurship in the policy process by viewing the behaviour of the policy entrepreneur in a broad context, alongside, and in comparison with other factors which influence the emergence of policy ideas and policy change.

Like those which preceded, the authors covered in the third section make valuable contributions to the literature on policy entrepreneurship. The authors covered in this section reinforce, to varying degrees, almost all of the characteristics of, and activities assigned to, policy entrepreneurs by previous research efforts. In some regards their work is superior to their predecessors because they develop comprehensive theories of policy entrepreneurship. By doing so the authors consider the role of the policy entrepreneur in policy making in great detail and with a keen eye for nuance. They demonstrate with great clarity and detail who are policy entrepreneurs and how they operate.
According to the accounts discussed in this chapter policy entrepreneurs are significant policy actors. They are, indeed, powerful agents of policy change. Regardless of whether policy entrepreneurs are observed outside of a guiding theory or framework or, indeed, if they are examined in the context of a broad framework of the policy process or in terms of a comprehensive theory of the phenomenon itself, policy entrepreneurs are regarded as factors which influence policy outcomes. The behavioural characteristics they demonstrate and the activities in which they participate to influence change are clearly distilled in the following inventory:

- **Innovation and creativity** - the ability to identify problems, reconceptualise activities, enrich purpose and promote alternatives (Bardach 1972; Eyestone, 1978; Walker 1981; Kingdon, 1995; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Schneider et al, 1995; Roberts and King, 1996; Mintrom, 2000).

- **Argumentation and persuasion** (Bardach, 1972; Eyestone, 1978; Walker, 1981; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Schneider et al, 1995; Kingdon, 1995; Roberts and King, 1996; Mintrom, 2000).

- **Strategic Sense** - the capacity to create appealing 'policy images', identify favourable 'policy venues' (Bardach, 1972; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995; Schneider et al, 1995; Roberts and King, 1996; Mintrom, 2000;)

- **Networks** - to be active in establishing and maintaining networks of contacts in order to learn from the experiences of others and as a means of building support for their proposals (Bardach, 1972; Walker, 1981; Kingdon, 1995; Schneider et al, 1995; Mintrom, 2000;)

- **Alertness to opportunities** - the ability to perceive and exploit opportunities within an environment (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995; Schneider et al, 1995; Mintrom, 2000).

- **Bargaining** - to be prepared to make deals and offer trade-offs when argumentation and persuasion fail (Bardach, 1972; Eyestone, 1978; Kingdon, 1995).
This inventory of characteristics and activities is important for it will provide the basis of the analysis and interpretation of the case study presented in Chapter Five. In the Conclusion as well this inventory will be crucial, for it is at this final stage that the findings of the case study analysis are arranged to construct a new theoretical framework of policy entrepreneurship. However, so as to lay the groundwork for the study and since it is a central element the framework deserves to be unveiled here.

The most significant finding of this study and, hence, resting at the heart of the researchers own theoretical framework, is that policy entrepreneurs interact with the contexts in which they operate to accomplish innovations and induce change. The study establishes that Rudd played the role of a policy entrepreneur and, in doing so, exhibited a range of entrepreneurial skills. With varying degree he engaged in all of the entrepreneurial activities listed in the inventory displayed above. He was creative and innovative about how he attached a solution to a range of problems associated with the teaching of Asian studies in Australia; he persuasively argued that there were indeed problems which needed to be confronted and skillfully argued his case for change; he was alert to the opportunity posed by Keating's desire for engagement with Asia and demonstrated strategic sense by crafting an economic 'policy image' and choosing a 'policy venue' not only because economic policy was its main concern but since it was composed of a powerful membership; the policy entrepreneur, Kevin Rudd, and Premier Goss, also engaged in considerable bargaining with the Prime Minister and a number of his senior advisors to finally guarantee funding for the NALSAS Strategy and, in doing so, exploited his network of political and bureaucratic networks; Rudd also exhibited the qualities of a policy entrepreneur by performing various strategic manoeuvres designed to outwit various opponents to his proposal, particularly a number of Commonwealth DEET and DPM&C senior officials.

Rudd did indeed fulfill many of the criteria of a policy entrepreneur. Concurring with those identified in the inventory above and, hence, the findings of previous research efforts, these behavioural characteristics and skills constitute the heart of the framework developed here. However, the findings of the study also suggest that the context in which policy entrepreneurs function affects their capacity to become successful catalysts of change. Analysis and interpretation of the NALSAS Strategy policy process shows that Rudd's efforts to garner support for the strategy and procure funding for its
implementation were influenced by a number of contextual factors. These were forces mainly of an institutional nature, such as Rudd's position of power as Director General of the Office of the Cabinet in the Queensland government. This position not only placed him in close proximity to Premier Goss but also to his counterparts in the other states and the Commonwealth through, in this case, the intergovernmental forum COAG. Apart from his position, the institutions of the Office of the Cabinet and COAG themselves constituted powerful contextual forces which worked in Rudd's favour. These contextual factors are also manifest in the broader institution of federalism in Australia, especially its unique financial arrangements and the division of powers. The study shows that when pursuing change Rudd was assisted by the very fact that it was a state government rather than the Commonwealth making the proposal. If, hypothetically speaking, the Commonwealth was the driving force behind the NALSAS Strategy it would have been difficult for it to eradicate the inevitable suspicion accompanying such a proposal given the states' constitutional responsibility for education.

Mintrom's (2000) work on policy entrepreneurship is the only contribution which seriously considers both the individual and contextual factors that influence policy outcomes. In this way his work is particularly insightful. Mintrom argues that, while the policy entrepreneur's actions are not affected in a 'deterministic fashion' they do, nonetheless, shape the opportunities and strategies open to them. Like Mintrom, this study discovers an interplay between Rudd's personal entrepreneurial skill and activities and the environment in which he operated. Thus, situated at the heart of the framework developed here is the interplay between individual and contextual factors. Moreover, the policy entrepreneur is seen as a 'strategic policy actor'; one who thinks carefully about how his or her context may provide opportunities to procure change.

Having introduced the framework of policy entrepreneurship developed on the basis of the findings of the study, the aim now is to describe the setting in which the policy entrepreneur was located. It is to establish the backdrop to the process through which his proposal for a national Asian studies strategy was pushed.
Chapter Two: The Entrepreneur: Location and Context

Introduction

Policy entrepreneurs are often, though not exclusively, located in formal government positions; they can be found both within and beyond the confines of government. The policy entrepreneur who is the focus of this study, however, is located squarely within government. He was a non-elected official, a bureaucrat or, an 'executive entrepreneur', one who is appointed to a position of government leadership (Roberts and King, 1996: 15). Much evidence suggests that effective entrepreneurs are often political appointees. Kingdon's (1995) research on policy making in the US demonstrates that apart from the President himself, those appointed by the President to powerful leadership positions, including cabinet secretaries and under-secretaries, heads of departments and bureaus, administrations and other government agencies, were the most powerful policy actors in the American political system (1995: 27-30). Other research has also shown the political appointee and the senior civil servant to be particularly influential in the process of policy-making and the shape of policy-making outcomes (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman, 1981; Rourke, 1984; Peters, 1995; Weller, 2001).

The policy entrepreneur in this study can be understood in similar terms, that is, as a political appointee in the North American sense where, as required under the presidential system of government, the President sources senior personnel from outside of government who are politically sympathetic with the President's official agenda (Peters, 1995). Kevin Rudd was appointed Director General of the Office of the Cabinet in Queensland by Premier Wayne Goss in December 1991. As Director General, Rudd was responsible for the close coordination of policy initiatives and the provision of advice to the Premier on all submissions to Cabinet. The appointment should not be understood as a feature of formal Australian constitutional procedure, but as part of a trend in Australian government to place politically aligned bureaucrats in senior central agency positions (Laffin and Painter, 1995).
Thus, it is the first task of this chapter to introduce the policy entrepreneur at the heart of this study. It sketches a brief personal profile of Kevin Rudd, his background, the role he played in the 1989 Queensland State Election and the circumstances surrounding his rise to the top of the Queensland Public Service, for it was from this position that he pursued his vision for a national Asian studies strategy. It also discusses the position held by Rudd in the Queensland government and how this enabled him to pursue a national policy agenda. It is argued in Chapter Five and the Conclusion that his position in the Queensland public service facilitated his work as a policy entrepreneur.

The second aim of this chapter is to describe and analyse the institutional contexts in which Rudd the policy entrepreneur operated; the Queensland Office of the Cabinet, the institution in which Rudd was located and from where he prosecuted his national Asian studies policy exercise; and COAG, the institution through which he pushed and negotiated his proposal for the national strategy with other senior officials and heads of government. The Office of the Cabinet was established by the Goss government for the purpose of coordinating policy formulation across the whole-of-government at both the state and intergovernmental level. Here it is considered in terms of the government’s public service reform agenda and similar changes taking place in New South Wales. COAG was established as part of Bob Hawke’s New Federalism initiative launched in the early 1990s. It was intended to improve Commonwealth-State collaboration. Briefly examined in this chapter is COAG’s origins, purpose and achievements, as well as the Senior Officials Standing Committee which prepared agenda papers, coordinated the activities of COAG and provided Rudd with access to other significant state and Commonwealth officials. Kevin Rudd represented the Queensland government on this committee and also chaired the Working Group established by heads of government to prepare the Report, *Asian Languages and Australia’s Economic Future*, or the ‘Rudd Report’, which formed both the intellectual and technical foundation of Rudd’s proposal for the NALSAS Strategy. Both the Senior Officials Standing Committee and the Working Group will be discussed.

This chapter provides background information relevant to Chapter Four, in which the NALSAS Strategy policy process is reconstructed in detail, and Chapter Five, where the policy process, the activities of Rudd and the entrepreneurial characteristics he displays are interpreted and analysed.
Kevin Rudd: A Professional Profile

Kevin Rudd's rise to the top of the Queensland state bureaucracy was rapid. Indeed, his appointment as Director General of the Office of the Cabinet in February 1991 has been described by a reporter from the *Courier Mail* as 'one of the most meteorical rises in the history of the (Queensland) public service' (Morley, 1994: 34). Rudd grew up on a Eumundi dairy farm on the Sunshine Coast, Queensland, and was dux of Nambour High School in 1974. After completing a Bachelor of Arts with Honours in Asian Studies at the Australian National University in 1980, Rudd commenced a career with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) as a trainee diplomat in 1981. His first post was to the Australian Embassy in Stockholm where he was appointed Third Secretary. Armed with a firm grasp of Chinese (Mandarin), Rudd was sent to the Australian Embassy in Beijing in 1984 as Second, and later, First Secretary. His jobs included analysis of politbureau politics, China's economic reform program, arms control and human rights (Livingstone, 1991a: 15). On returning to Australia Rudd was placed in the Department's policy planning branch and staffing policy section where, as Jamie Walker (1995: 112) states in his political biography of Wayne Goss, his work 'was highly regarded'. However, in June 1988 Rudd sought leave of absence from the DFAT to become private secretary to Wayne Goss, then Queensland Opposition leader.

In Opposition, Goss was eager to inject new blood into the party machine. In order to achieve this objective he replaced the loyal Labor Party stalwart, and private secretary to a long line of Opposition leaders, Malcolm McMillan, with 'someone more attuned to his own thinking' (Walker, 1995: 111). To the astonishment of many, Goss advertised nationally for the position. It is worth quoting the colourful picture Walker paints of Rudd:

Of the 100 or more applications, Goss received one from a high-flying young diplomat named Kevin Rudd. At first glance, Goss had been impressed by his credentials. Rudd held a Masters Degree from the Australia National University and could speak fluent Mandarin ... Goss was even more impressed when they met in Canberra. It was two hours before he looked at his watch. Like Goss, Rudd resented that his home state had become a national joke under Joh. He said he would like the opportunity to do something about it (1995: 111).
Rudd arrived in Brisbane on 30 June and immediately identified Labor's lack of credibility with business as a major impediment. He displayed the 'flair and diligence' with which he would become renowned by organising meetings between Goss and the chief executive officers of Queensland's top 40 companies. Rudd and Wayne Swan, the Assistant Secretary of the state Labor Party and the election campaign director, and Goss himself made 'a formidable team':

the troika of Goss, the hard-driving team leader, Swan the political strategist, and Rudd, the can-do bureaucrat, would propel the ALP into government in Queensland, then dominate the new administration. Together, they provided the three elements that Labor required to win: leadership, policy coordination and campaign coordination (1995: 115)

Convinced that Labor had to offer the people of Queensland a sound alternative to the Nationals, Goss 'looked to Rudd for much of the policy substance' (1995: 115). After Goss and the Labor Party came to power in December 1989 with an overwhelming majority (Coaldrake, 1990), Rudd became Goss's Principal Policy Advisor. Political scientist Ross Fitzgerald, cited by the Sunday Mail, believes Rudd was 'absolutely pivotal' in the Labor Party's 1989 State Election victory and has described him as 'a true intellectual, a very intelligent and smart tactician' (Fitzgerald, cited by Gillespie, 1991).

In February 1991 Rudd was appointed Director General of the newly created Office of the Cabinet. The creation of the Office of the Cabinet, one of three central agencies, was a major element in the government's objective to carry-out wide-ranging reforms of the public service and the means of coordinating policy development and implementation across the public sector (Head, 1993). In his capacity as Director General of the Office and as Goss's 'closest confidant', Rudd assumed the leadership of Queensland's intergovernmental relations. He managed a number of intergovernmental projects which honed his policy and negotiating skills, helped to form contact networks and sharpened his knowledge of the federal bureaucracy and the intergovernmental policy process. Of the many policy exercises in which he became involved, the majority were conducted under the aegis of SPC and later COAG. It was through COAG, and from his position as Director General, that Rudd pursued his vision for a national Asian studies strategy. The Office of the Cabinet was crucial in the NALSAS Strategy policy process
and so it is to this institution that we now turn our attention.20

The Queensland Office of the Cabinet

Between the late 1970s and early-mid 1990s significant administrative change has occurred in Australian state governments (Warhurst, 1983; Painter, 1987; Halligan and Wettenhall, 1990; Halligan and Power, 1992). Managerialism is the term now widely used to describe these changes; the main conceptual force behind the reforms. Commentators, mainly academics, have also used the terms 'corporate management' or 'new public management' to describe the enhanced role of business-type management practices in the public service (Davis, 1997).

Administrative reform and the movement towards greater central coordination at the state level was a response to an economically volatile historical juncture, growing fiscal stringency's on governments and the increasing interconnectedness of policy issues. The reforms were designed to enable governments to cope better with the growing complexity of policy making and administration in the modern capitalist state (Painter, 1987). Not only have these reforms sought to achieve more efficient allocation of resources via the application of corporate management processes and techniques, but they have also aimed to enhance central control of government policy-making (Painter, 1997; Wanna et al, 1992; and Halligan and Power, 1992). By restructuring state administrative machinery to achieve greater coordination, ministers could ensure that political strategies, policy aims and the public sector operated in accordance with the government's overall policy objectives.

Occurring alongside these reforms was also the growth of powerful central agency

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20 Rudd is currently the Federal Member for the Queensland seat of Griffith. In October 1994 he won pre-selection to run for the seat. In the middle of that month he stood down as Director General of the Office of the Cabinet to contest the pre-selection. Rudd justified his decision to pursue a career in federal politics to a reporter for the Courier Mail: 'my view is that there are a range of policy interests, including Australia's future challenges in Asia, future directions in national economic policy, employment policy and education and training, which I may be better able to pursue through elected office rather than my current public-service position' (Maher, 1994: 5). Rudd subsequently failed in his bid for the federal parliament at the National Election in March 1996. During this period he was a senior China consultant for KPMG. He successfully contested the seat at the 1998 Federal Election and made his maiden speech to the parliament on November 11. He is Chair of the Labor Party's Economic, Trade and National Security Policy Committee and writes regularly in the daily newspapers.
officials, and the transformation of the relationship between central agency heads and their ministers. Though senior public service officials, especially permanent heads, have always played a policy development role in one form or another, their acute politicisation is only a recent phenomenon. According to Kellow (1990: 69), the passing of the Public Service Amendment (First Division Officers) Act 1977 opened the way for political appointees, whose tenure is tied to that of their ministers.

This most fundamental of changes in the relationship between ministers and their permanent heads occurred in the 1980s, especially at the Commonwealth level (Campbell and Halligan, 1992), and later during the same decade and the 1990s at the state level. Allegedly as a result of recognition on both sides of politics that permanent heads could not be apolitical and neutral, and in order that governments be able to achieve their objectives, it was better for ministers to have permanent heads with whom they could work relatively harmoniously. Ministerial advisors, Halligan (1988: 48) observes, appear to have become 'political extensions of their ministers' (See also Walter, 1986; Scott 1996). Similarly, public policy and administration scholar John Uhr (1987: 22-23), points out 'It is now widely regarded as desirable to strive for an injection of political leadership in the higher levels of the bureaucracy'. Laffin (1997: 50) sums up:

   Thus the pattern that has emerged at the top is of a head or chief executive whom the minister has effectively (if not formally) selected. The fate of the head is now closely tied up with the minister's political fortunes, as the old convention of permanency or transferability of commitment has passed.

Appointing politically sympathetic chief executive bureaucrats enhances what Laffin calls 'groupthink effects'; a minister-bureaucrat relationship in which both share a common world view. When departmental heads are positioned on the basis of their political empathy, the minister is not only provided with a focal point of contact with the government as a whole and given greater control over policy development, but is also able to screen out information which may be at odds with the government's policy aspirations. In sum, by attaching the fate of departmental heads, particularly central agencies, to the minister's political fortunes, state government leaders are given enhanced control over policy outcomes.

There were three main states where these changes were pursued with great zeal.
In every case, and by varying degrees, change was prompted by major inquiries into the public service; the Bland Inquiry in Victoria (1974-75) during the first term of the Hamer government; the machinery of Government Review (1974) and the Wilenski Inquiry (1977-81) in New South Wales; and the Corbett Inquiry (1975) in South Australia, initiated by two exceptionally influential and effective premiers, Neville Wran and Don Dunstan respectively.21 Following these reports, there was a reduction in the number of departments in South Australia, and by 1979 decisions had been taken to introduce program budgeting procedures. In Victoria several 'super ministries' were established to enhance the government's coordinative ability (See also Low and Power, 1984) and there was a shift in New South Wales towards increasing central capability for policy evaluation and budgetary procedures. There is a broadly held perception that in addition to the stimuli for change provided by these inquiries, the other crucial driving force for change in these states, particularly New South Wales and South Australia, was the presence of powerful, reform-minded premiers (Painter, 1982). Corporate planning and program budgeting and other business-management approaches were also experimented with by the Cain Labor government in Victoria in the 1980s (Considine and Costar, 1992).

When the Greiner Liberal government came to power in New South Wales in 1988, its 'approach to administrative change was comprehensive, systematic and speedy'. Greiner's reforms confirmed 'the supremacy of the political executive', but placed greater emphasis on financial efficiency with the corporate managerialist framework than was the case under Wran (Halligan and Power, 1992: 119; and see Davis, 1997; Painter, 1997). According to Laffin and Painter (1995), an important characteristic of the Greiner government was a strong emphasis on cabinet, and the loyalty of ministers to cabinet rather than their departments. To ensure the centralised running of government, Greiner formalised cabinet procedures by integrating the budgetary cycle with annual ministerial reviews and convened regular meetings between himself, ministers, and departmental heads, and separate meetings with central agency heads. An important decision was to establish a Cabinet Office, separating the cabinet section and secretariat from the Premier's Office. The Premiers' Department was charged with monitoring policy implementation and performing managerial functions across the whole-of government, while the new Cabinet Office focused on policy development and servicing cabinet. The

Cabinet Office became a key instrument for intra-governmental reform (Laffin, 1995: 74-8).

Greiner appointed Gary Sturgess as Director General of the new Cabinet Office (1995: 74). Sturgess was one of the triumvirate of influential advisory staff that Greiner acquired to run the 1988 election campaign and who prepared the Opposition for government. This move has been characterised as 'unorthodox', according to Laffin and Painter (1995: 6). Sturgess became Greiner's principal advisor. Along with the head of Treasury, Percy Allan, and Dick Humphry as head of the Premier's Department, Sturgess played a key role in the reform process by generating ideas and maintaining the reform effort. Laffin (1995: 79) explains that Sturgess 'emerged as a superbureaucrat', playing a central role in a number of major government initiatives. But Sturgess's and Humphry's close relationship with Greiner became controversial over time, and they 'increasingly found themselves in the firing line between ministers and the Premier'. Some ministers felt that Sturgess was 'overbearing' and exercised too much influence over the Premier which caused 'enormous resentment' (1995: 80).

The Goss Labor government also embarked on a significant process of reform after it came to power in Queensland in 1989 (Coaldrake, Davis and Shand, 1992; Walker, 1995). These reforms were foreshadowed by Goss in his 1989 pre-election statement on managing the public sector Making Government Work. There had not been a change of government in Queensland for more than thirty years and, as a consequence, little reform of the executive structure or procedures of government. This was particularly significant given the revolutionary administrative and executive level change that had been taking place in other states from the late 1970s (Coaldrake et al, 1992: 5). However, some progress towards the modifying the executive procedures of government had taken place under the short-lived leadership of National Party Premier, Mike Ahern (Davis, 1995: 66).

After winning the election, Goss and his advisors proceeded to restructure the machinery of government. Among a number of reforms, Premier Goss sought to improve the coordination of government policy development across all departments of the public sector by modifying the cabinet process and strengthening the role of the central agencies. The government was 'particularly worried about coordination, and

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22 In addition to the more general reasons for public sector reform, there were several
established its new mechanisms with care', argues Davis (1995: 26; and see Finger, 1992; Johnston, 1992). Goss created three separate coordination domains; one each for discharging the political (the Premier's Office), policy (the Office of the Cabinet) and administrative (Public Sector Management Commission) functions. In strengthening the role of these central agencies, Davis explains, Goss 'sought a standard decision-making process so that Cabinet could exercise a political and policy judgement on all issues before the government' (Davis, 1995: 26). The Cabinet Handbook, which was inherited in draft form from the previous government of Mike Ahern, established rules and routines which aimed for consistency across government. The rules contained in the Cabinet Handbook ensured 'uniformity in process'.

Of the new central agencies established by the Goss government, a particularly significant one was the establishment of the Office of the Cabinet in 1991 (Rudd, 1991; Head, 1993; Finger, 1992). The new, stand-alone office was created from the old Policy Coordination Division and retained many of its staff and carried on most of its activities. The existing Cabinet Secretariat was also rolled into the new office. It was situated in the Premier's portfolio but remained separate from his Department (Head, 1993). These reforms were almost identical to those taking place in New South Wales under Premier Nick Greiner. Indeed, it was after discussions with Greiner and the Director General of his Cabinet Office, Gary Sturgess, that Goss became convinced that it was necessary to establish his own office in Queensland (Davis 1995, 75). Brian Head, former Director of the Policy Coordination Division and Cabinet Secretary in the first Goss government, describes the establishment of the Office of the Cabinet as the beginning in Queensland of 'a systematic approach to policy coordination across all areas of government' (Head, 1993: 163). Davis (1995: 64) described the Office of the Cabinet as 'the bureaucratic expression of executive authority, the tie which bound together policy work across the state'.

Kevin Rudd, then the Premier's Principal Policy Advisor, and a member of the group of three who drove and coordinated the election campaign in 1989, was appointed

circumstantially specific forces which fostered change in Queensland. Halligan and Power (1992: 162) argue that a new premier, the Fitzgerald Inquiry into police malpractice and the election of a government that was committed to reform and to implementing the recommendation of the Fitzgerald inquiry, were all powerful motivating factors (See also Prasser, Wear and Nethercote (eds) (1990).
as the first Director General of the Office of the Cabinet in February 1991 (Walker, 1995). The Office commenced operation in July. Its main task, according to Rudd (1991: 67), was 'to serve Cabinet through its minister - the Premier'. To carry out this task, the Office of the Cabinet performed 'the dual functions of managing the procedural dimensions of the cabinet process as well as performing a policy coordination function across the whole of government'. The Office of the Cabinet and, thus, its Director General, wielded great power and influence in the Queensland government, mainly because it was a central coordinating agency and enjoyed close proximity to the most significant political actors and vital elements of government. All cabinet business and documentation were subject to the careful and often critical oversight of the Office of the Cabinet (Davis, 1995: 80; Tait, 1992). Consequently, the creation of the Office of the Cabinet caused some tension within government and the public sector was the subject of attacks by the Opposition and attracted some criticism from academics (1995: 81-83).

Departments saw much of the Office of the Cabinet's activity as intruding in their policy sphere (Scott, 1996). Some complained that they were not privy to important briefing notes prepared for the Premier, that there was a lack of specialised expertise in the Cabinet Office and that the roles and responsibilities of and between the Office of the Cabinet, the Premier's Office and the Department of Premier, Economic and Trade Development were not sufficiently distinguished. Moreover, departments registered dissatisfaction with the individual style of some Office officials whom were deemed to be overstepping the authority vested in them. Davis makes the point that dissonance is a constant feature of managing government given that central agencies are concerned with ensuring policy coherence across the whole-of-government while departments are narrowly focused on the interests of their constituencies (1995: 81-82).

Goss and Rudd were also openly criticised by the Opposition. Many believed that the un-elected Rudd and Wayne Swan, the Assistant Secretary of the Queensland branch of the Australian Labor Party, and an important player in the 1989 election campaign team, had 'far too much influence with Goss and state government policy'. They were frequently lambasted in parliament by the National Liberal Opposition parties, by public servants, political commentators and disaffected Labor supporters (Gillespie, 1991: 21). The Liberal Party leader, in particular, expressed his dissatisfaction at Rudd's appointment to formulate Aboriginal landrights policy soon after his appointment to the Director Generalship early in 1991. In the parliament Denver Beanland described Rudd as 'the de
facto Premier' of Queensland and claimed that 'a select group of unelected Goss advisors' were driving government policy decisions (Koch, 1991: 6). In an analysis of the Goss government's first term, Paul Reynolds argued that the government was characterised by 'tight control, from the top, of all its operations' (Reynolds, 1992: 6).

The appointments of Rudd, and Gary Sturgess in New South Wales, to chief executive positions in state government central agencies, clearly reflect the growing trend towards the politicisation of central agency and departmental heads as identified by Uhr (1987), Halligan and Power (1992) and Laffin (1997). Rudd's was a particularly partisan appointment given his very close affiliation with the Australian Labor Party in Queensland and the nature of his role in Goss's campaign for government. These appointments have blurred the traditional distinction between bureaucratic impartiality and the political executive. Indeed, Wiltshire has described the appointment of Rudd as in the tradition of the 'W ashminster' system, 'where senior advisors come and go with the politicians they serve' (cited by Charlton, 1992: 32). Rudd became one of a new cadre of state central agency heads who emerged as a result of this revolution in public administration.

The restructuring of the machinery of government in Queensland after Wayne Goss came to power was also necessary to conduct and coordinate its intergovernmental relations (Davis, 1998). When former Prime Minister Bob Hawke proposed the reform of Commonwealth-State relations in 1990, which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, through a series of heads of government meetings, new demands were suddenly placed on state governments to provide coherent whole-of-government responses to a wide range of intergovernmental reforms. Just as Goss had emphasised the need for uniformity of process, and the coordination of the political, policy and administrative domains of internal government activity, it soon became apparent that similar coordination was required in terms of the state's intergovernmental affairs, especially in the New Federalism environment. The need for coordination, routines and processes became a necessity in the context of the SPC and COAG process in the first half of the 1990s. Davis (1998: 147-48) argues that:

if a state is to speak with one voice and to secure the best outcomes from a New Federalism, it needs sophisticated internal coordination mechanisms to ensure considered policy positions across the entire federal agenda.
Galligan (1995: 209) echoes the view of Davis, arguing that the managerialist grounds on which governments across Australia were basing their public service reforms flowed on to the restructuring of the intergovernmental machinery of the federation. Indeed, Painter (1998: 66) holds that the existence of elaborate central coordination machinery developed during the 1990s and the previous decade at state and Commonwealth level was 'an essential precondition' for the level of cooperation needed to establish and carry out many of the reforms undertaken by the Council.

Many of the reform issues dealt with by COAG, such as a national competition policy and a national electricity distribution grid, were highly complex. According to Davis (1998: 149), the existing mechanisms in states proved inadequate for dealing efficiently and proficiently with the number and pace of reforms, so 'states that did not upgrade their intergovernmental machinery found themselves at a disadvantage in swiftly flowing negotiations'. Indeed, states had to alter the way they made decisions. To impact upon the national agenda through the SPC and COAG process 'state governments had to rethink their own governance arrangements' (1998: 150).

The Office of the Cabinet, located at the centre of government and responsible for servicing cabinet and performing oversight of line department submissions to cabinet, was at the forefront of all Queensland government interactions with the Commonwealth and other state governments (Head, 1993: 169). The Cabinet Handbook was again an important tool for imposing coherence on the conduct of government business, this time at the intergovernmental level, and ensuring that all matters with intergovernmental implications were subject to consideration by the executive. The role of the Office of the Cabinet, then, was central:

As well as providing a detailed coordinated brief for each COAG meeting, officials from the Office of the Cabinet represented Queensland in COAG and MCC working parties. Thus, the same officials who briefed the Premier on intergovernmental matters put the case for the state in detailed negotiations. Such tight control allowed the state to push a consistent agenda (Davis, 1998: 157).

There were many major policy reforms carried-out during this period and the Office of the Cabinet, and Rudd in particular, was the central point of negotiation with other state governments and the Commonwealth. Amongst other policy exercises, Davis (1998: 157)
singles out one as a case in point, Rudd's chairmanship of the Asian Languages and Cultures Working Group (this will be considered in more detail in Chapter Four).

The Queensland state government, particularly the Office of the Cabinet, constituted one level of Rudd's, or the policy entrepreneur's, working environment. As Director General of this agency, Rudd was at the centre of the government machinery and in very close proximity to the most powerful government actor, the Premier, Wayne Goss. Moreover, it meant that Rudd operated beyond the limits of state boundaries; not only was he a key policy actor in Queensland, but also in negotiating Queensland's interests with the Commonwealth government and the other states. Thus, a second context in which he operated was at the intergovernmental level, and so it is to this realm that we now turn our attention.

The Council of Australian Governments

In 1990 Bob Hawke announced his New Federalism initiative by calling for a 'Closer Partnership' with the states to improve the efficiency of intergovernmental relations in Australia and to facilitate his government's broader agenda for microeconomic reform (Hawke, 1990). Hawke sought the cooperation of the states to reform areas which lay outside the constitutional jurisdiction of the Commonwealth government, including electricity, gas and water, road and rail transport, the environment and numerous others (Carroll and Painter, 1995: 3). It was also aimed at ameliorating some of the problems associated with the annual Premiers Conferences in which the Commonwealth was dominant and where, to the detriment of other matters, the focus was primarily on financial issues (Edwards and Henderson, 1995: 22). Through a series of SPC's, Hawke sought a means of minimising the 'conflict' which had always plagued Commonwealth-State relations and, instead, build a spirit of 'cooperation' (Hawke, 1990). Successive Australian Commonwealth governments have attempted to reform the intergovernmental machinery of the federation (See Whitlam 1971; Fraser 1975; Peachment and Reid, 1977). Prime Ministers Gough Whitlam and Malcolm Fraser, Bob Hawke and Paul Keating all sought to modify the system under various forms of New Federalism. But the New Federalism envisioned by Hawke, and then Keating, posits Galligan (1995: 203), 'was a more ambitious attempt' at improving Commonwealth-State relations.
Hawke confirmed the aspirations of the Commonwealth regarding microeconomic reform when he announced that: 'The goals are to improve our national efficiency and international competitiveness, and to improve the delivery and the quality of the services governments provided' (Hawke, 1990). 'Improvement' of the 'delivery' and 'quality' of government services, Hawke proposed, would require 'a closer partnership between our three levels of government: commonwealth, state and local'. In this venture, Hawke received considerable support from the Premier of New South Wales, Nick Greiner, who was a well-known advocate for microeconomic and intergovernmental reform (Painter, 1998: 36-7; Galligan, 1995: 204-05; Laffin and Painter, 1995).

The first SPC was announced in July 1990 and scheduled for October. This conference 'was hailed by all leaders as an outstanding success' and indicated 'a new cooperative spirit and willingness to engage in constructive dialogue' (Galligan, 1995:206; and see Parkin and Marshall, 1993: 31; Painter, 1998). Heads of government agreed to a major review of financial relations, including a commitment to: reducing tied grants and the duplication of services; investigating the feasibility of a national electricity grid; and the desirability of an intergovernmental agreement on the environment. Various working groups composed of officials were also formed and requested to report to the Council at successive meetings (Painter, 1998: 39).

The second SPC scheduled for the following May was postponed until July due to state elections in New South Wales. This meeting was also fruitful, for considerable advances were made in regard to agreements on several areas of microeconomic reform. The major achievements were: signing of agreements on the establishment of a National Road Transport Commission, and the untying of $350 million in Commonwealth road grants; the creation of a National Grid Management Council to monitor the integration of electricity supply and distribution into a single interstate market; the establishment of a National Rail Corporation; and the formation of a working party to consider the implications of a national competition policy (Painter, 1998: 39-40).

The meeting scheduled for November 1991 never took place. The states cancelled the conference when they realised that Hawke had decided not to meet several states' demands, which included 'untying' a number of special purpose grants and returning some income taxing power to the states (Painter, 1998: 41). Hawke's refusal to place fiscal reform on the agenda of the SPC can be explained by his precarious hold on the prime
ministership as a result of ex-Treasurer Keating's ambition for the leadership. With the support of numerous senior ministers, Keating was opposed to the Commonwealth relinquishing control over national fiscal outcomes given its role in macroeconomic management. After an unsuccessful attempt to displace Hawke in May 1991, Keating challenged again in December, and this time he was successful (Galligan, 1995: 208).

Keating's successful takeover momentarily destabilised the New Federalism of Hawke's SPCs. Given Keating's vehement rejection of state requests for fiscal concessions and his opposition to Hawke on this point (Keating, 1991), many believed the significant advances so far achieved in reforming Commonwealth-State relations could be endangered. But the notable achievements of the previous eighteen months, for both the states and the Commonwealth, were sufficient enough to assure the continuation of the cooperative process. Early in 1992 the states revealed their eagerness to maintain the current processes by proposing a Council of Federation. Apart from the success of Hawke's SPCs, the states believed that a continuation of the processes in train would be the most effective means of advancing their own interests when confronted by an overbearing Commonwealth. Keating responded by calling a heads of government meeting in May 1992 where it was agreed the SPC process should continue and be re-named COAG (Carroll and Painter, 1995: 9).

When it met in December 199223 few major initiatives were taken. A decision to cut the number of ministerial councils was taken in principle and a National Forest Policy was signed by all states apart from Tasmania. At the June 1993 meeting of COAG, microeconomic reform was discussed and an intergovernmental working group was created to prepare an agenda of new policy initiatives. The issue of Commonwealth-State roles and responsibilities was revisited and a working group established to report to the next meeting. The High Court Mabo ruling on Aboriginal land rights overshadowed the June meeting. By the next COAG meeting in February 1994, Wayne Goss and Marshall Perron from the Northern Territory were the only remaining original SPC group of

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23 According to Painter 'Federal-State politics entered a more adversarial phase during 1992. With the passage of time new figures had appeared on the scene and a more abrasive partisan climate had developed. In February 1992, Liberal Ray Groom replaced Michael Field in Tasmania. In the middle of the year, Nick Greiner was replaced by John Fahey as Liberal Premier of New South Wales; in September John Bannon was swept from office by the State Bank collapse and replaced by Labor colleague Lyn Arnold; and in October, the Liberals under Jeff Kennett won the Victorian State Election. Most of the original premiers in the new federal partnership in 1990 had left the scene (Painter, 1998: 45).
leaders, and Goss was the only Labor leader (1998: 49)

For the Commonwealth, competition policy was the most significant matter on its agenda for reform, along with making further progress on the national electricity grid, free and fair trade in natural gas and in water resources policy (COAG, 1994). Competition policy was a particularly controversial reform from a states' perspective since such reforms could only be carried out at great political and financial cost to themselves. Nonetheless, the states formed a common position on accepting the Commonwealth's principles for a national competition policy in return for monetary compensation.

The August 1994 COAG meeting in Darwin is well known for descending into an acrimonious debate about financial matters. Although it did reach in-principle agreement to the adoption of a national approach to competition policy (Scales, 1996: 70), heads of government refused to endorse the policy package in August (Churchman, 1996: 98). The only other issue to be discussed was electricity reform, particularly a comprehensive program to advance progress on the national electricity grid (COAG, 1994). When it met in April 1995, heads of government signed major national competition policy agreements. Further progress was also made on the matter of roles and responsibilities in housing, health and welfare services and the controversial area of Commonwealth treaty-making powers (COAG, 1995).

In judging the achievements of COAG Michael Keating and John Wanna (2000), in the most recent analysis, argue that most progress made by the SPC and COAG was in the area of microeconomic reform, particularly the implementation of competition policy and related microeconomic reforms, such as electricity, gas, water, road and rail transport (Keating and Wanna, 2000: 139-40). Progress towards achieving a clearer distinction between the respective roles and responsibilities of the Commonwealth and the states has, by contrast, 'been more uneven and marked by fits and starts as the prospects of agreement have advance or retreated for different services' (2000: 141-46). In respect to the states main area of concern, a reduction in the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI), whereby the states rely on Commonwealth fiscal transfers to deliver many of their services, little progress was achieved. As far as the states were concerned this was a
significant failure.²⁴

Both observers and participants in the SPC and COAG initiative argue that it was reasonably successful in achieving its main objectives. There are a number of reasons why this was the case, but only four of these will be discussed here. First, New Federalism was a collaborative exercise.²⁵ Keating and Wanna (2000: 139) conclude 'that the deliberate attempt at collaborative federalism orchestrated by government leaders did produce better and more timely policy responses than the sterile standoff that had previously characterised too much of federal-state relations'. They argue that the SPC and COAG 'focus on governments' shared interests, rather than insistence on protecting their separate interests, enabled them to activate a reform program in response to the common pressures they all face'. The New Federalism exercise was an effective forum for Commonwealth and state governments to coordinate their activities and reach consensus on a range of intergovernmental issues. Painter (1998: 124) labelled the New Federalism initiative an exercise in 'collaborative federalism', implying:

governments entering a range of commitments for joint, coordinated action, binding each other in various ways to avoid defection, and institutionalising mechanisms for subsequent implementation of jointly agreed policy.

This is in contrast to 'arms-length cooperation' where (1998: 122-23):

governments not only keep their distance and disagree when it suits them, but also keep their distance when they agree to the need for coordination. That is, the parties agree to cooperate by independent rather than joint action.

²⁴ However, it appears that many, if not all, of the states' aims in terms of fiscal reform have now been achieved, albeit through little effort of their own, by the Commonwealth's introduction of a goods and services tax, the revenue from which will be handed over to the states (Keating and Wanna, 2000: 146).

²⁵ There is broad agreement, however, that it served the interests of the Commonwealth better than it did the states. Painter (1998: 59) argues that 'Looking back on the achievements of the SPCs and COAG up to 1997, it is clear that the Commonwealth's priorities and objectives were the dominant element', for instance, competition policy. Keating and Wanna (2000: 139) make a similar judgement. They observe that 'the Commonwealth demonstrated how it could use its powers of persuasion, bribery and (implicit) threats to achieve adherence to its agendas from one meeting to the next-dealing only with topics it wanted to discuss and avoiding issues it did not want raised. Certainly compromises were accepted, but the Commonwealth's main agendas were preserved' (2000: 149).
Collaborative federalism as manifested in COAG was also aided by the Council's whole-of-government approach to executing reform, the second reason for its success. Although interaction between governments in Australia has always been the preserve of the executive arms of government (Sharman, 1991), the COAG represents a 'tighter system of executive control' (Galligan, 1995: 209). Fletcher and Walsh (1992: 602) have described it as 'largely managerialist and executive in procedure'. COAG redefines the executive by confining a significant proportion of policy development and decision-making to the central agencies of governments (Hendy, 1996: 112). Consequently, during this period, central agencies gained greater control over the intergovernmental activities of functional agencies and deprived ministers of some of their discretionary power; authority shifted from ministers to heads of government and, though falling short of completely usurping the influence of line departments, certainly diminished their autonomy.

Weller (1996) has also reported that the Council's whole-of-government approach to policy reform and development was significant. In a review of the SPC and COAG policy reform process commissioned by the Commonwealth, Weller concluded that the whole-of-government approach was crucial for COAG's policy making successes. He remarks that: 'Central agencies were able to take the lead' and were 'either brokers between departments, facilitators, or the direct source of policy ideas' (1996: 103). Above all, the whole-of-government approach provided central agencies with 'political clout' and weight 'where line departments may not have had the interest or access'. Weller (1996: 104) maintains that 'without the whole-of-government view, and the direct interests of heads of government, it was widely believed that nothing would happen'.

A third crucial factor in the successes of COAG, was the genuine commitment of its participants. Several state premiers, including Nick Greiner, Wayne Goss and John Bannon, showed 'genuine intellectual commitment and enthusiasm' for the general thrust of the New Federalism initiative. They were also supported by 'the intellectual enthusiasm and personal energy' of senior officials and advisors, mainly the chief executives of state and Commonwealth central agencies (Painter, 1998: 64; Weller, 1996). The heads of Cabinet Offices, or first ministers' departments, were 'key actors' in establishing the new machinery and maintaining the momentum necessary to achieve satisfactory outcomes and validate the worthwhileness of the new venture. They headed the various working groups and standing committees that emerged out of the new institution. Preparing Council
meeting agendas, attending to policy particularities and negotiating the finer detail of policy agreements, these officials came to play an integral part in the operation of the Council (Painter, 1998: 64; and see Hede, 1993).

According to Painter (1998: 64-65), leaders and officials worked closely with each other. In some cases 'the personae of political leaders and their closest advisors were sometimes hard to separate'. Greiner and Sturgess matched each others enthusiasm for federal reform and, 'Standing at Wayne Goss's shoulder and echoing his commitment to the venture was his chief advisor, Kevin Rudd'. The kind of relationship between heads of government and their key advisors alluded to here has been described by Wiltshire (1992: 177) as 'a new and interesting phenomenon in Australian politics... a new breed of officials serving each political leader':

These have been individuals working closely with the Prime Minister and premiers as head of the political chief's department or Cabinet Office... The New Federalism hatched them into a broader environment than they had known hitherto, one in each government, and they have continued to steer the process and coordinate their team members. Whereas the conferences of political leaders became known as HOGS (Heads of Government), they became immortalized as PIGLETS working to and for the HOGS.

Wiltshire's caricature is a clever one, for it captures the dual role of central agency heads in the first half of the 1990s; their function at state and intergovernmental level. These concur with the two levels of context in which Rudd operated as a policy entrepreneur, and around which this chapter is structured. Moreover, the sort of relationship between first ministers and their advisors described here matches the one which characterised Goss and Rudd during the NALSAS negotiations.

The final reason for the successes of the SPC and COAG was the establishment of an array of standing committees and working groups (Edwards and Henderson, 1995: 25-26; Painter, 1998: 67-69). The Senior Officials Steering Committee was the central committee amongst a network of other smaller committees and working groups. It was established by Hawke in 1990 and was composed of a chairperson, the Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, with the states represented by heads of Cabinet Offices or first ministers' departments. The steering committee met regularly
prior to Council meetings to prepare the agenda papers and reports to be considered by heads of government and to generally coordinate and advance the work of the council (Edwards and Henderson, 1995: 25; Weller, 1996: 108-109). After consultation with heads of government the steering committee sought to reach agreement on the need for action, and ensured that recommendations and courses of action were in place. If it managed to do this successfully the item was placed on the agenda for consideration by the Council (Weller, 1996: 97). According to Painter (1998, 68), the steering committee was also responsible for monitoring the work of other committees or working groups and intervened when necessary to 'overcome log-jams'.

A plethora of smaller committees and working groups were established to undertake detailed work on specific agenda items and decisions taken by heads of government. In 1995, there were four standing committees on treaties, microeconomic reform, regulatory reform and ecologically sustainable development; and working groups established for specific purposes including, gas, electricity and water reform, the legal profession, health and community services, and the centenary of the federation (Edwards and Henderson, 1995: 26; Painter, 1998: 68). There appears to be broad agreement too, that what provided the committee machinery with a high level of effectiveness was very close and regular interaction between the Senior Officials Committee, performing its coordinative function, on the one hand, and the political power of heads of government, on the other (Painter, 1998: 69; Weller, 1996: 108).

Kevin Rudd represented the Queensland government on the Senior Officials Steering Committee at the very first SPC in 1991 and continued to do so during the COAG phase until he resigned from the position of Director General of the Office of the Cabinet at the end of 1994. It was from this strategic position that Rudd sought the support of the Commonwealth and states for the NALSAS Strategy. As a member of this committee, Rudd was at the forefront of Queensland's negotiations with other jurisdictions on a range of matters; the establishment of the Australian National Training Authority (ANTA), the National Electricity Grid, the regulation and supervision of non-bank financial institutions, and gas and water reform. It was this committee that appointed him to chair the Asian Languages and Cultures Working Group in 1993 and charge it with preparing the Report entitled *Asian Languages and Australia's Economic Future*. In this context, Rudd worked closely with line department and central agency officials from the other states and the Commonwealth to hammer out the shape of the report and
the finer detail of the strategy it proposed.  

**Conclusion**

This chapter has provided a description and analysis of certain aspects of reform of the Queensland public service and Australia's intergovernmental machinery and demonstrated Kevin Rudd's relationship and close proximity to these events. In short, it considered two main institutional contexts in which the policy entrepreneur operated and his location within them. It introduced Kevin Rudd, the policy entrepreneur at the centre of this study, by sketching a brief professional profile and a background to his rise to the most powerful position in the Queensland Public Service, Director General of the Office of the Cabinet. Rudd's position on the Senior Officials Standing Committee and chairmanship of COAG's National Asian Languages and Cultures Working Group was also considered in this context. As a result, it is hoped that the stage is now set for Chapter Four, in which Rudd's role in having the NALSAS Strategy endorsed and funded by heads of government is described in detail and, for Chapter Five, where the policy process through which the Strategy was driven is analysed and interpreted. However, first it is necessary to establish the policy context in which the NALSAS Strategy was developed by detailing the historical development of Asian studies policy in Australia.

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26 In the context of the operation of the Council, Working Parties are small collaborative intergovernmental mechanisms whose task it is to implement the decisions of the heads of government. Working Parties are created by the Council as 'an acceptable policy process to balance the interests of all participants' (Weller 1996: 100). Headed by either state officials or independent chairs, ran through central agencies and usually with support from line agencies, the working parties represent a collaborative forum in which consensus on issues can be reached. Weller explains that working parties represent 'perceived agreeable solutions' to the federal nature of political arrangements by allowing the participation of all the relevant states.
Chapter Three: The Development of Asian Studies in Australian Schools

Introduction

The NALSAS Strategy, which Rudd would pursue from his position in the Queensland Office of the Cabinet and through COAG, was not formed in a vacuum. It was an event in a long sequence of policy making in the area of Asian studies and the creation of an Asia-literate Australia which extends back to the late 1960s. As Considine (1994: 22) has so aptly remarked, 'new policy decisions are never written on a clean sheet of paper. Informing every policy episode is a particular history, a given time and a unique place'. This chapter endeavours to provide an account of this history, and thereby place the NALSAS Strategy in its historico/policy context. It purports neither to be a general nor comprehensive overview of language education policy in Australia. To the contrary, its objective is to examine the development of government policy, particularly at the Commonwealth level, regarding the teaching of Asian studies in Australian schools.

The chapter follows a chronological approach in order to give the reader a sense of the long and frustrating story of purposive human effort which has characterised the making of Asian studies policy in Australia. There is, however, a thematic element to the chapter, which is intended to draw one's attention to some of the touchstone issues in the history of Asian studies. In one way or another, these have manifested themselves as problems for policy actors, professional movements and government agencies which have had to be overcome. They include: (i) a general set of problems, such as insufficient teaching and curriculum materials, an inadequate supply of suitably qualified teachers and a low number of students studying Asian language in schools (ii) the failure of governments to adequately support and fund Asian studies in schools (iii) the absence, until recently, of a nationally coordinated strategy to overcome the problems listed above and to expand the teaching of Asian studies (iv) the struggle over resources between advocates of Asian studies and community languages. Whereas proponents of the latter posit the importance of cultural maintenance on the grounds of multiculturalism, advocates of the former point to the significance of Australia's close proximity to Asia and
the nation's broader economic interests. Indeed, the economic arguments have proven powerful rationale for prioritising Asian languages and attracting government attention. These issues are enormously significant in terms of the development of Asian studies in Australian education and there was a strong current of each coursing through the NALSAS Strategy policy process.

This chapter is chronologically assembled and designed to draw the reader's attention to the issues described above. As a pre-history to the NALSAS Strategy, it will set the scene for the following chapter which describes the policy process through which the Strategy passed prior to implementation, and Chapter Five which determines the degree to which Kevin Rudd demonstrated the key attributes of a policy entrepreneur in this process.

*Making Education Policy in Australia*

In the Australian federation state governments have direct responsibility for the delivery of education for all their residents. Consequently, the generation of initiatives of national significance and nation wide collaboration by way of Commonwealth catalytic activities is difficult to prosecute. Federalism posits a constitutional division of powers between a central government and number of regional political entities so that each retains some degree of political, social and economic autonomy (Elazar, 1987; Riker, 1993). In being federal, the Australian Constitution disperses and fragments political power by setting up two distinct tiers of government and allocates powers to each (Greenwood, 1976; Crisp, 1983; Galligan, 1989). Although many dispute the democratic credentials of Australian federalism, few deny that it inhibits concerted national collaborative activity.

The division of powers in Australia are laid out in Section 51 of the Australian Constitution. Section 51 allocates specific legislative powers to the Commonwealth government in the areas of what Sharman (1997: 44) calls the 'high politics of economic management, international trade and defence'. The Commonwealth is also responsible for customs, foreign affairs, citizenship, currency and immigration. State governments retain residual powers not explicitly transferred to the Commonwealth, such as the delivery of health, policing, housing and urban transport services. The states also have exclusive legislative responsibility for schooling. Although responsibility for tertiary education was assumed by the Commonwealth in 1974 (Barcan, 1990; Marshall, 1991), the states
continue to exercise formal control over pre-school, primary and secondary education (Martin, 1996: 1; Borgeest, 1994). State governments have not only the constitutional responsibility for school education, they also shoulder the main financial burden of administering their own systems of primary and secondary education (Curriculum Corporation/AEC, 1994: 1).

The immediate implication of the division of powers for schooling is that there are multiple schooling policies. Consequently, national policies in schooling are extremely difficult to form and implement. In total there are eight distinct school education policies across the nation and another at the Commonwealth level. The division of powers is an inevitable but particularly frustrating structural feature of the Australian political system (Davis et al, 1993: 67) and the problem of bureaucracy is substantial. If one takes into account the Tertiary and Further Education (TAFE) sector and the smaller bureaucracies in each higher education institution, the difficulties associated with achieving coordinated national policies become almost insurmountable. As Ramsey (1991: 35) remarks, 'There is nothing like bureaucracy to inhibit change'. The Australian Language and Literacy Policy (ALLP) (DEETb, 1991: 29) alluded to the same problems in regard to languages policy when it stated that 'differences in state and territory strategies may inhibit the emergence of a consistent national approach to language and literacy programs'.

Although the states own and operate schools, employ teachers and administer education services and, therefore, remain the custodians of government schools the Commonwealth, by virtue of the Constitution and its fiscal dominance, plays an important strategic and policy role in education. Since the states rely heavily on Commonwealth funding to meet their responsibilities, the Commonwealth is able to influence areas of state education policy (Lingard and Porter, 1997: 2). Thus, in schooling responsibilities are shared; governments do not operate autonomously or in isolation of one another. Although Commonwealth involvement in schooling may serve as a catalyst for national cooperation, its advances are almost always perceived as intrusions and met with suspicion and mistrust by the states. The states are extremely protective of their jurisdictions. Hence, achievement of national policies and coordination is difficult in such a complex and competitive environment. According to Ramsey (1991: 35), school education is a 'football of federation'. Although at this point in history such dynamism and flexibility may actually be an asset to teaching and learning he ponders, it is, nonetheless, 'very difficult to achieve sensible national policies'.
The Teaching of Asian Languages in Australia

Apart from some focus on Asia in the university sector following the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905, Asian studies in Australian tertiary institutions remained marginal and piecemeal until 1969. In schools during the 1950s and 1960s, there were very few students studying an Asian language; European languages were dominant, particularly French. A survey conducted in 1964 showed that of a total of 23,381 Matriculation students studying languages: 17,455 were learning French; 3,924 German; with 2,513 taking Latin. Much smaller enrolments were in Italian with 560 and Chinese with 425, and a number of other languages with only minute enrolments, including Dutch, Russian, Hebrew, Greek, Spanish and Japanese (Ozolins, 1993: 86).

An important force operating in favour of Asian languages during this period, though it only became significant in the 1980s, was the perception of some in the Department of External Affairs that it was seriously deficient in terms of staff qualified in Asian languages. Some, including Alan Watt, Ambassador to the USSR and Japan during the 1940s and 1950s, argued that diplomats with Asian language skills would be a huge benefit to Australia's international relations. Ozolins (1993: 66) reports that this particular matter was raised in the Commonwealth parliament in 1959 and 1960 and taken up in the press. 27

Questioning in parliament about the linguistic capacity of Australian diplomats became a common occurrence, particularly after the initial flurry of interest in 1959-1960. Pushed by both Liberal, but mainly ALP members of parliament, External Affairs Ministers Barwick and Hasluck gradually announced measures for a few diplomats to undertake some language study. At this time also, those with pro-Asian views started to attack the dominance of French in the curriculum based on its perceived irrelevance to the

27 One of the problems advocates of Asian languages faced was not only lack of support from a non-committal foreign language teaching profession but one which, for some at least, did not believe in the value of teaching Asian languages. Van Abbe (1960), for instance, argued that European languages were superior in terms of educational worth, provided greater intellectual rigour than Asian languages and, given the difficulty and time consuming nature of learning Asian languages, would reward students with proficiency and the satisfaction of being able to practically apply their new skills (Ozolins 1993: 64).
current needs of Australia, and many of the arguments were now being couched in terms of the need for broader reform of the Australian education system (1993: 102).

In addition to the push to equip Australian diplomats with Asian language skills, the spectre of Asian communism thrusting towards Australia was another factor which drew attention to the teaching of Asian languages in education. Muller (1996) and Mahony (1991) write that this prospect of invasion was precipitated by political events reverberating through the entire region, such as the revolution in Indonesia, Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia and the Vietnam War, all events in which Australia had become inextricably involved. There was also increasing realisation that Australia's trade with European countries, our traditional trading partners, was rapidly shifting towards Asia, especially Japan. Australia's economic future, it was acknowledged, would increasingly rest in Asia.

There were also other forces which prompted governments to focus more intently on Languages Other Than English (LOTE) during the 1960s and 1970s. In particular, was the perception of the foreign language teaching profession that it was in a state of crisis. As Ozolins (1993: 87) comments, many believed that the profession was 'confronting serious attrition if not extinction' as a result of a serious decline in enrolments in schools. A combination of factors was responsible for the decline in students studying a second language, including: (i) a recommendation of the controversial Wyndham Report in New South Wales (1958) that all foreign language subjects become non-mandatory (1993: 141) (ii) the decision by many universities that students need not have studied a second language to matriculation for entrance to certain university courses (see Auchmuty 1970: 27) and (iii) opposition of grass-roots educationalist movements in Victoria and New South Wales to the expansion of foreign language teaching (1993: 90-92).

These events, combined with the concerns about the number of diplomatic personnel who possessed no Asian language qualifications, prompted the Gorton government to commission an inquiry into the state of the teaching of Asian languages and cultures in Australian education. In March 1969, with the approval of the State Ministers for Education, the Minister for Education and Science, Malcolm Fraser, created the Advisory Committee on the Teaching of Asian Languages and Cultures. The Advisory Committee was asked to investigate the current state of Asian studies and languages in Australian education institutions and to identify factors which impeded the advancement of such
The Auchmuty Report

Chaired by J. J. Auchmuty, an historian and Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the University of Newcastle, the Committee presented its report to the Commonwealth government in September 1970, the first substantial inquiry into Asian studies and languages in Australian education. The Teaching of Asian Languages and Cultures in Australia clearly recognised the need to equip Australians with an understanding and knowledge of Asia and Asian languages in view of Australia's close economic and political relations with the region (Auchmuty, 1970: 20). Apart from stating a rationale for Asian studies, the Committee recommended the expansion of Asian languages and studies in Australian schools and universities, and also canvassed issues which have remained central to all subsequent reviews and reports.

The Committee found that in 1969 only 108 out of the total number of secondary schools in Australia were teaching one or more Asian languages, and of these only six taught two such languages. The languages taught were either Indonesian and Chinese or Indonesian and Japanese (1970: 23-24). Although the questionnaire was only directed to secondary schools, the Committee discovered that, apart from some experimental teaching in South Australia, it knew 'of only a few isolated cases of Asian languages at the primary level' (1970: 35). With regard to languages the Report stated that 'Asian languages are not sufficiently widely available at secondary level' (1970: 90). It commented at length on the disparity and imbalance between the study of European (mainly French) and Asian languages, observing that the former was vastly dominant in Australian education. The Committee argued that a 'parity of esteem' with European languages was necessary if Asian languages were to be successfully included in schools curricula. Although it did not argue for the substitution of Asian for European languages in schools, the Committee recommended that students should be 'given the opportunity to learn Asian as well as European languages' (1970: 27 and 91).

In terms of studies of Asia, the Committee reported that at the primary and secondary levels of schooling there is 'inadequate treatment of Asia, as an obligatory element, in social studies and other courses at secondary level'. Although significant areas
of Asian studies exists in some secondary schools, the Committee established that: 'There does not appear to be any systematic coverage of Asia in any of the core areas of study taken by all students' (1970: 89). The availability of teaching materials and the inadequacy of texts at both school and tertiary level was regarded by the Committee as 'the largest single deficiency in the teaching situation' (1970: 94). Furthermore, the Report cautioned that the availability of teachers qualified to work in the areas of Asian languages and cultures, though sufficient for the current number of students taking such courses, would 'not be adequate to support any great expansion in the teaching of Asian languages' (1970: 95). The Report stated clearly and adamantly that universities and other educational institutions would need to consider training courses in Asian languages (1970: 95).

One of the committee's main conclusions was that dealing with these problems would require a cooperative approach between the states and the Commonwealth. It noted that there would be 'considerable economy' in a common approach to the development of curriculum materials, course design and teacher preparation. Auchmuty advised that: The expansion in the teaching of Asian languages and cultures can best be met through cooperative effort by the parties concerned in the several states and in the Commonwealth (1970: 101).

In 1972 the Commonwealth government responded to the Auchmuty Report by creating the national Asian Studies Coordinating Committee, located in the Commonwealth Department of Education. The Commonwealth outlaid $1.5 million dollars for various programs to be conducted through the Committee. Muller (1996: 51) explains that the Asian Studies Coordinating Committee assisted in the development of Japanese and Indonesian language programs and materials and was partly responsible for providing the impetus for students in most states and territories to start considering Asian languages rather than the traditional European languages. Many of the teaching materials developed at the time were also of a high quality and included audio-visual resources and teaching aids which challenged students' pre-conceptions of Asia. Studies of Asia increased their prominence in Social Studies, History, Geography, Economics and confronted Eurocentric images of the region and exposed to students, many for the first time, new perspectives on Asian cultures (Mahony, 1991: 15).

Kamada (1994:3) is less sanguine about the Committee's contribution to the development of Asian studies. While acknowledging that the work of the committee made a
contribution to Asian studies education in Australia, according to Kamada neither the Auchmuty Report nor the Asian Studies Coordinating Committee succeeded in sparking widespread growth in Asian studies. Kamada (1994:3) concludes that:

The committee exerted limited influence on the pace and extent of Asian studies development. The committee did not bring about policy changes in Asian studies education at the state or territory level or broaden the bases of Asian studies. Neither did they effect coordination among Commonwealth, state and territory governments. The decisions of the Asian Studies Coordinating Committee to grant funds to particular projects constituted an ad hoc response to applications forwarded to the committee. Lack of a clear set of objectives for the promotion of Asian studies was the major reason for the committee's limited influence.

Kamada (1994: 4) nevertheless concedes, that the Asian Studies Coordinating Committee was not charged with developing strategies or investigating the best and most appropriate means of advancing Asian studies. It was simply to administer funds for teaching and curriculum materials, travel grants and teacher education.

Despite the Report having a positive impact on education, Muller (1996: 52) argues that the expansion of Asian studies in the 1970s remained limited in scope. Asian studies in any form were not mandated; policy documents placed no emphasis on promoting Asia-focused education, nor were curriculum materials produced which considered aspects of Asian societies or cultures. According to Muller (1996: 52) 'the profile of Asia in the social sciences curriculum was lifted, but it remained piecemeal, non-mandatory and varied from one state to another...'. Asian languages, it appears, also languished during this period. The sampling approach to introducing languages, where two or three languages were sampled by first year secondary students, meant that students achieved a very low level of competence which, in most cases, offered very little educational value (1996: 52). Japanese, and the progressive introduction of other Asian languages, coincided with a serious reduction in the number of secondary school students choosing to study a second language. Finally, although Auchmuty and his colleagues advocated greater cooperation between the state and Commonwealth education authorities, the Asian Studies Coordinating Committee failed to achieve a common approach.
The 1980s was a decade of great change. After winning the federal election in 1983 the new Hawke Labor government set about the task of radical economic reform. Mainly in response to the demands of the international market-place, the government made two fundamental decisions; these were the floating of the Australia dollar and the deregulation of the financial system. These reforms were succeeded by further legislation to rapidly phase-out industry protection, privatise a number of large government enterprises and deregulate the centralised wage-fixing system (Kelly, 1994: 1-2).

Notwithstanding the efforts of past Australian leaders, Prime Minister Bob Hawke and his successor, Paul Keating, looked north towards the rapid-growth economies of Southeast and Northeast Asia to revitalise the Australian economy. Japan was Australia's principal trading partner and Australia's terms of trade with other Asian countries, including South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Malaysia were improving (Evans and Grant, 1994, and Cotton and Ravenhill, 1997). Several reports commissioned by the Commonwealth government during the late 1980s and early 1990s highlighted the benefits for Australia of tighter economic and political integration with the region. In the context of Australia's 'engagement' with Asia, the study of Asian languages and studies in education received a significant boost, albeit economically driven.

At the forefront of the movement to increase the study of Asia and Asian languages towards the end of the 1970s and early 1980s was the Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA). Australian Asianists, including Anthony Reid, John Legge and Arthur Basham, floated the idea of a national organisation in the early 1970s, but it was not until May 1976 that the ASAA was formally established. Legge's (1995: 83) account of the formation of the Association describes the process as 'long and drawn out'. The original intention for the association was for a broad membership but academics quickly came to dominate both the general membership and representation of the executive. In a history of the ASAA, King (1997: 4) explains the Association has succeeded in a number of areas, such as a journal published tri-quarterly, a biennial conference and various seminars and a number of publications series. King argues, as a result, that the ASAA has 'successfully fostered the academic enterprise'. In terms of utility for its membership she concludes that the ASSA 'has attempted to be different things for different people: for one group an academic forum, for another a political pressure group'. According to King
one issue the ASAA has struggled to resolve is the degree to which it should promote the teaching of Asian languages and studies in schools and higher education. Indeed, after the establishment of the ASC in 1986, an exercise in political lobbying in which the ASAA's role was crucial, the ASAA lost interest in teachers. Nonetheless, prior to the creation of the ASC, and indeed as a direct result of its establishment, the ASAA tirelessly lobbied governments to direct more attention and resources towards Asian studies in schools and universities.

The year of 1976 was a significant one for the ASAA because it was the beginning of a concerted effort by the body to focus serious attention on Asian studies in Australia. At its General Meeting in May 1976, ASAA members passed a resolution to consider the future of Asian studies and commissioned the Report, *The Teaching of Asian Languages in Australian Universities* or, as it became known, the Basham Report (ASAA, 1978). However, the most important rallying milestone for the ASAA was the keynote address to the 1978 Conference delivered by Stephen FitzGerald, entitled 'The Asian Studies Crisis, ASAA, Government and People'. Only two years after returning from his post as the Australian Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, FitzGerald (1978: 2) spoke emotively about the dismal state of Asian studies in Australia:

> not only are we well behind in where we ought to be today but there is some urgency in the need to reach rapidly a degree of popularisation and proficiency in Asian studies well beyond where we ought to be now.

FitzGerald claimed that Asian studies in Australia was in 'a mess'. In terms of reform, he contended, 'we are not talking about a few new courses here or another Asian language there. We are talking about fundamental reform throughout the education system' (1978: 9). The FitzGerald lecture heralded the beginning of a concerted effort by the ASAA to assume a leading role in the long and laborious process to promote and develop Asian studies in Australia.

At the same conference a resolution was passed to form a committee to conduct an inquiry into the state of Asian studies in Australia and to recommend a strategy to develop its future. Professor J.A.C. Mackie, who was also an influential figure during this period, shared with FitzGerald the dismay and mood of urgency to which the latter referred in his lecture. Indeed, it was Mackie who took the initiative to set up the inquiry
into Asian studies (Kamada, 1994:5). The committee was chaired by FitzGerald and its report, *Asia in Australian Education: Report of the Committee on Asian Studies to the ASAA*, was submitted in early 1980. The FitzGerald Report (ASAA, 1980), as it became known, concluded that nothing like 'adequate progress' in broadening the base of Asian studies and languages had been achieved as a result of the Auchmuty Report or the Asian Studies Coordinating Committee. Enrolments in many courses on Asia in schools and tertiary institutions had leveled out or had declined and students were continuing to complete their education without any exposure to meaningful studies of Asian societies (1980: 7).

The FitzGerald Report (1980: 7) found that in the context of Australian education interest in Asian languages and cultures seemed to be leveling out and, in some cases, declining. It noted that there was no consistent pattern to enrolments in Asian culture and languages courses:

> the overall picture in both schools and tertiary institutions was one of very slow growth, with the study of Asian countries and languages involving a very small proportion of the student population.

The Report acknowledged and discussed the importance of Asian studies, employment opportunities for Asian studies graduates, the situation at both tertiary and school levels and the issue of teacher education. The teaching of Asian languages was singled out for specific attention. In recognising the rapid decline in enrolments in foreign languages since 1963, the Committee noted modest increases in the study of Asian languages. However, it expressed disappointment that enrolments remained extremely small as a proportion of total foreign language enrolments (1980: 67). Asian languages in both primary and secondary teacher education were also marginal compared to course offerings in European languages and, in some cases, courses had either been discontinued or were under threat. A major inhibiting factor to the introduction of Asian languages was a shortage of suitably qualified teachers. In response to these problems, the committee made a number of recommendations, including that the ASAA work with other bodies, such as the Australian Federation of Modern Language Teachers Association to devise practical measures for attracting more teachers and to attempt to persuade state education departments to make greater financial and policy commitments to Asian studies in schools (1980: 71).
Perhaps the most important proposal of the Report was the advocacy of a national approach to developing Asian languages and studies in Australia. When the Asian Studies Coordinating Committee was disbanded in 1978, specific government commitment to the study of Asia in education also ceased. As a substitute, FitzGerald and his colleagues recommended the creation of a national body to coordinate planning and funding of initiatives aimed at improving the study of Asia in Australia across all levels of education and in each state (1980: 15). Over the next six years the ASAA campaigned hard for the establishment of an Asian Studies Council. As King (1997: 11) has written: 'The pathway from the recommendation to the establishment of the ASC was somewhat tortuous'. According to Black (1985: 56) it became a time-consuming and frustrating preoccupation of the ASAA. To maintain pressure on governments and other relevant authorities, the ASAA Committee on Asian Studies created four special purpose committees (Kamada, 1994: 6).

Coinciding with the ASAA's initiatives was the push for a national languages policy initiated by groups which believed the Commonwealth's policy of multiculturalism should be given explicit expression in the form of a national languages policy. Academic linguists, other language professionals and their respective professional associations were at the forefront. In 1981 representatives from six different organisations formed a group called the Professional Language Associations for a National Language Policy (PLANLangPol). This grouping was accompanied by the Federation of Ethnic Communities Councils of Australia, a number of Ethnic Communities Councils and a few linguists located in the Commonwealth bureaucracy. A parliamentary inquiry was commissioned to consider a national language policy in 1982. It was not charged with designing a national policy, but rather to examine all aspects associated with such a policy (Clyne, 1991: 219-220; Djite, 1994: 16; PLANLangPol, 1983; Ozolins, 1985: 290-292).

The Report of the Senate Inquiry, A National Language Policy (Senate, 1984), addressed a gamut of issues. However, LOTE constituted its main emphasis. The Inquiry was careful to pay considerable attention to the languages of Australia's numerous ethnic groups. It strove to minimise any disparity in its treatment of 'community languages', on the one hand, and languages of external significance, on the other (1984: 162; Ozolins, 1985: 293-299). 'Specialist submissions', such as the ASAA recommendation for an ASC failed to win the support of the Committee (Kipps, Clyne and Pauwells, 1995: 3). The ASAA's submission was rejected by the Committee on the grounds that another...
Commonwealth funded body would 'tend to perpetuate the fragmented situation' of language policy in Australia and inhibit efforts to develop a 'well co-ordinated approach' to languages study at the Commonwealth level. Such action, the Committee resolved, could also be seen by advocates of other languages as bias towards the study of Asian languages (1984: 163-64).

After a flurry of activity between 1980 and 1983, including the creation of a working party to consider the proposal for an ASC, in-principle support from various members of the government and endorsement at a bureaucratic level, the proposal was shelved due to federal budget stringencies and a change of government (King, 1997: 12). Interest in the proposal was revived in December 1983 when the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade announced that hearings would be held for a report to be compiled on Australia's relations with ASEAN (Australia, Parliament, 1984). The ASAA submission to the committee emphasised the importance of education for cultivating better economic and external relations with Asia. It stated that: 'A central task for the Australian government if it wishes to promote long term-term, mature Australia-ASEAN relations must be an educational program in Australia about the ASEAN countries' (1984: 213). It advised also that increased funding alone would not ameliorate the status of Asian languages and studies in Australian education. The ASAA stressed that 'although more resources were needed, there was a major need for improved planning and coordination in Asian studies provision at the national level' (1984: 3).

On the basis of it's submission, the Joint Committee endorsed the ASAA's proposal and recommended establishing a working party to look at the concept of an ASC. This working party was established on 19 April 1985 by the Minister for Education, Susan Ryan, and Bill Hayden, Minister for Foreign Affairs (Commonwealth, Department of Education, 1986: 4). J.A.C. Mackie (1985: 33), President of the ASAA at the time and a member of both working parties, sensed that this was a significant move forward. However, he also understood that it was a 'long way short of a commitment to establish such a council'. Another interdepartmental working party was established during this period and was charged with developing a detailed proposal for the Council in line with the 1986 budget process (King 1997: 14).

Nonetheless, the Report and proposal for a national coordinating body went to Cabinet in mid-1986 and the Asian Studies Council (ASC) was established in May. Its first
meeting was convened in November. The ASC consisted of eight members representing Commonwealth and state education authorities, higher education, other government authorities with an interest in Asian studies, business and industry as well as a representative from the trade union movement. Stephen FitzGerald was appointed chairman. The Council was given an extensive list of objectives. These included: raising national awareness of Asia; advise on and guide a national strategy for improving the study of Asia in Australia; facilitate communication between providers; and to increase Asian content in courses and curricula at all levels of education, particularly in areas of economic significance (Commonwealth, Department of Education, 1986: 12).

The decision to establish the ASC complemented the Labor government's broader agenda for engagement with Asia and general economic restructuring. Appealing to the potential economic fruits of closer economic relations with Asia in the name of the national interest appears to have been an effective strategic move by the ASAA. Indeed, in his well-known Buntine Oration, FitzGerald (1990: 6) reflected on the lobbying which preceded the creation of the ASC. He conceded that 'The arguments were about our future and our national survival in Asia, and it was on these arguments that the recommendation sailed through Cabinet and secured financial support'. The Asian studies movement now had a central, reasonably well-funded coordinating body through which to enhance awareness of Asia in Australia and to improve cooperation between education providers.

**The National Policy on Languages**

In July 1986, the same year that the ASC was established, the Commonwealth finally moved to have a national languages policy prepared. However, after the Report was submitted in December 1984, its findings were not acted upon. This had the effect of prompting renewed action by the Federation of Ethnic Communities Councils of Australia, the PLANLangPol and Aboriginal groups who had held great hopes for the Report. Even though the Senate Inquiry Report was never intended as a definitive statement on languages policy, it was expected by many to give momentum to the very process it had initiated (Djite, 1994: 18). Only after he and other groups had consistently lobbied government officials to act, was Jo Lo Bianco assigned by the Minister, Senator Susan Ryan, to the task of writing a comprehensive national policy on languages (Lo
Lo Bianco completed the *National Policy on Languages* (NPL) in November 1986 and it was released in May 1987. Lo Bianco produced a document in orientation not dissimilar to the Senate Inquiry Report. Its distinctiveness however, lay in its more sophisticated philosophical form of argumentation, definitive implementation goals and specific budgetary requirements (Ozolins, 1993: 242-249 and Clyne, 1991: 228). Whereas the Senate Inquiry was concerned mainly with the feasibility of a national policy on languages, Lo Bianco had actually developed a policy for implementation (Clyne, 1991: 226-27; Djite, 1994: 18-19).

The Report justified multilingualism in terms of cultural and intellectual enrichment, employment and international trade, social justice and Australia's place and role in the region and world affairs (Lo Bianco, 1987: 44). It supported the concept of providing opportunities for all people to learn a second language. While emphasising the importance of teaching and maintaining all languages, Lo Bianco adamantly argued for the need to prioritise some languages rather than others. In what Ozolins (1993: 234) claims to be 'its most controversial recommendation', the NPL referred to 'languages of wider teaching', a group of languages to be promoted at a national level over and above specific support for other languages (Lo Bianco, 1987: 125). The languages of wider teaching included those of economic significance and many of Australia's community languages. Emphasising the overlap between them enabled Lo Bianco to navigate a course through this politically hostile area of language policy creation (1987: 120-124). Identified as 'languages for wider teaching' were: Chinese (Mandarin), Indonesian/Malay, Japanese, French, German, Italian, Modern Greek, Arabic and Spanish.

Approximately $94 million was allocated by the Commonwealth to fund a number of NPL programs between 1987-88 and 1990-91. These related to the areas of adult literacy, ESL for new arrivals, cross-cultural training, maintenance of Aboriginal languages, LOTE and Asian studies. The Australian Advisory Council on Australia's Language Policy (ACALP) was also created to monitor the development and implementation of the

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28 The Australian Advisory Council on Australia's Language Policy (AACALP) was renamed the Australian Advisory Council on Languages and Multicultural Education (AACLAME) to more clearly highlight the Commonwealth's commitment to multicultural education and ethnic affairs later in 1987 (Ozolins, 1993: 248).

Other outcomes of the Lo Bianco Report were the Australian Second Language Learning Program (ASLLP) and the Asian Studies Program (ASP). Allocated $22.5 million for three years, the ASLLP was used to initiate, develop and coordinate programs in languages other than English to help achieve the objectives set down in the NPL (1987: 155-57). In a paper published by the ASAA at the time with the assistance of the ASC, Lo Bianco (1988: 23, and see 1990) explained that the initial signs were that the bulk of this funding was being channeled by the states into Asian languages. The Asian Studies Program, which was funded to the tune of almost $2 million in each of two years, aimed to boost Asian studies in Australia by, for example, the development of curriculum materials for school teaching and establishing research centres in universities. The Asian Studies Program was administered by the ASC. This funding was crucial in developing the national school curricula (which be be discussed directly) in Chinese, Japanese and Indonesian in cooperation with the states between 1988-1991.

The NPL led a remarkable revival of second language education in Australia by providing funding and a comprehensive and coherent framework for the expansion of languages other than English in Australia, including Asian languages (Muller, 1996: 54) Responding to the realities of multicultural Australia and the exigencies of an increasingly competitive and globalising economy, the NLP prefigured the mainstreaming of languages other than English in schools across Australia. Djite (1994: 20) argues that the NPL 'started the important process of turning language policy making into language planning and implementation'.

However, many sensed that the NPL and the bodies it had established would favour second language education in the name of economics, and hence Asian languages. Ozolins (1993: 249), for example, notes that Prime Minister Bob Hawke and the Minister for Education John Dawkins, preceding and subsequent to the inauguration AACLAME, made speeches that conspicuously emphasised trade and particularly Asian languages (see also Kipps, et al 1995; Eltis, 1991). Australia's economic performance in the Asia-Pacific region would become a key element in all future language policies. The establishment of the ASC in 1986 had already highlighted the nexus between trade and linguistic skills and cultural understanding. The tension between community and Asian languages would be borne out in the experiences of the ASC.
The establishment of the ASC was a particularly significant point in the development of Asian studies in Australia, in three ways. First, it closely examined and prescribed remedies to tackle the problems which plagued the area of Asian studies. At the level of schools, teachers, curricula, TAFE’s and universities, the ASC organised programs accordingly. It focused strategies on specific Asian languages and adopted new approaches to promoting Asian studies. Second, the ASC designed a national strategy to promote Asian studies and carried out projects in collaboration with state government officials, teachers, curriculum consultants and university academics. This had the effect of improving cooperation and communication between different stakeholders. Third, the ASC sought support for Asian studies by framing them in terms of Australia’s economic interests (Kamada, 1994: 7).

Projects and Initiatives

Under the NLP the ASC’s core operating budget of $681,500 received a $1.95 million boost for the financial year 1988-89 (AACLAME, 1990 and Djite, 1994: 20). To achieve its goal of embedding the study of Asia in Australian education the ASC carried-out a number of projects. In collaboration with state governments, the Council directed the National Language Curriculum Project which developed standard curricula and teaching materials in Japanese, Chinese, and Indonesian (k-12), Vietnamese (lower and upper Primary), Korean (7-10 and 11-12) and Thai (11-12) (Kamada, 1994: 9 and ASC, 1991: 2.2). Moreover, in cooperation with the Australian Broadcasting Commission and the Key Centre for Asian Languages and Studies at Griffith University, the ASC developed ‘The Dragon’s Tongue’, a Chinese language series for schools, comprising cassette tapes, videos and resources materials (Mackerras 1991; Kamada, 1994 and ASCb, 1991: 2.2).

In relation to studies of Asia the ASC, in collaboration with various subject associations, developed curriculum and teaching materials with Asian content in History, Economics, Politics and Geography at the secondary level and social science materials on Japan, China and Indonesia at the junior-secondary and primary school level. The Council
funded an initiative of the Queensland government, the Asian Studies Curriculum Development Project. This initiative was carried out with the assistance of the Asia Education Teachers Association and resulted in the publication of curriculum materials for the subject of politics and was published in 1992. The development of resources for History was carried out by the History Teachers' Association of Victoria, Geography by the Geography Teachers Association and Economics by the Victorian Commercial Teachers Association (Kamada, 1994: 10).

The ASC also funded the Asia Wise Project. This initiative consisted of a fortnightly television series on current affairs in Asia produced by the Tasmanian Department of Education and the Arts and the Australian Broadcasting Commission. The series was complemented by the publication of a magazine targeted at students at the junior-secondary level (ASCb, 1991: 2.2). And, in November 1990, the Council brought together curriculum workers, teachers, academics and officials from the Commonwealth and state education jurisdictions for its First National Conference on Asian Studies in Schools (Jeffrey, 1991: 5-7). Following a workshop held in October, the National Conference canvassed a number of critical areas associated with Asian studies in schools including teacher supply, incentives for teachers to augment their knowledge base with training in Asian studies and the role of teacher-training institutions in providing the appropriate courses for this purpose (1991: 1-5).

Although the ASC did not develop any teacher training projects, it nevertheless recognised that the role of teachers in creating Asia-literacy was crucial. It supported professional development for studies and languages teachers by sponsoring language teacher up-grading courses and used some funds as financial incentives for teachers to introduce Asian content to existing curricula in schools. The Council also produced a professional development framework for Asian languages and studies teachers (ASC, 1991b: 2.2 and Kamada, 1994: 10). The issue of teacher education was also a priority focus in the Report, *Asia in Australian Higher Education: The Report of the Inquiry Into the Teaching of Asian Studies and Languages in Higher Education* (Ingelson Report), which was published in 1989 (ASC, 1989a). It was the result of an inquiry commissioned by the ASC which comprehensively appraised the state of Asian studies and languages at the tertiary level with a strong emphasis on teacher training and supply.

The ASC collaborated with a number of studies associations to develop country strategy
documents and, through these, devised bilateral educational programs, for example, the Japan Teacher Trainer Program jointly funded by the Japan Foundation and the ASC (ASCb, 1991). It also initiated contact with the Australian Curriculum Assessment and Certification Authorities on Asian languages and studies at senior secondary level. It actively sought to encourage discussion on issues facilitated by the publication of numerous other research reports and national conferences including, the 'Current and Future Demand for Asia-Related Skills in the Australian Workforce' (ASC, 1989b), and the national conference in November, 1990, 'Asia Across the Curriculum' (Jeffrey, 1991). Arguably the most important of these was a report it prepared entitled, *A National Strategy for the Study of Asia in Australia*, (the National Strategy) which was released in 1988 (ASC, 1988).

A National Strategy for the Study of Asia in Australia

The National Strategy became the ASC's philosophical blueprint for the promotion of Asian studies and outlined a rationale and framework within which the Asian studies cause was pursued. It was intended to achieve more than just encourage discussion. Since its publication the Strategy has been cited frequently in the literature on Asian studies, attracting both praise and derision (Garnaut, 1989; Mahony, 1990 respectively). It was a meticulously compiled and thoroughgoing document which deplored the miserable current state of Asian studies in Australia

The National Strategy declared that 'there is no certainty today that students at any level in the education system will have opportunities to study systematically any subject matter relating to Asia' (ASC, 1988: 14). It pinpointed the problems which had given rise to the parlous state of Asian studies and languages and which would need to be rectified before significant progress could take place (1988: 16-17) including: (i) inadequate teacher training and supply programs, (ii) insufficient curriculum and materials development and (iii) a serious lack of continuity between primary, secondary and tertiary institutions. It argued for the need to determine a more effective role for tertiary institutions and industry and business in promoting and supporting Asian languages and cultures in education. The importance of creating community awareness of the importance of such studies was also discussed in the document (1988: 24-29). The Report proposed a broad strategy and framework for the implementation of the Strategy.
It set a number of targets, including that 'Asian content is an element in all appropriate subjects in all years of education from the beginning of primary to the end of tertiary education'. In the study of Asian languages the objective was 'one in which the number of students studying an Asian language as a mainstream subject... is 15 per cent of each of the total primary, secondary and TAFE student populations... by 1995, and 25 percent... by 2000' (1988: 4). The National Strategy also set objectives for building a qualified teaching force with high levels of proficiency and the development of high quality curriculum and teaching materials (1988: 5).

The National Strategy, albeit to the chagrin of some, is noteworthy for its recognition that government commitment to the promotion of Asian studies and languages rested with economic rather than intellectual or multicultural matters. It put this point urgently when it decreed that: 'The proper study of Asia and its languages is about national survival in an intensely competitive world' (1988: 2). 29 This was the same rationale on which the ASAA had based its case for the establishment of the ASC initially. Promoting the study of Asian languages and cultures in schools to enhance Australia's economic and political prospects in the region correlated neatly with the government's broader strategy to engage with and gain a competitive edge over its counterparts in Asia. At this time, the Commonwealth Minister for Employment, Education and Training (1987-1991), John Dawkins, attempted to reorient the curriculum at all levels of education towards instilling students with skills and knowledge which aimed to make the Australian economy operate more competitively in the international marketplace.30 This

29 However, the Report was also notable for attempting to intellectualise the study of Asia by pointing out and challenging the entrenched Eurocentricity of Australian society. In contrast to the Auchmuty Report, for example, the National Strategy recognised that at the heart of the entire Asian languages and studies movement should be the desire to build a 'distinctively Australian culture' which embraces the 'great cultural traditions and languages of the world, Asian as well as European'. So, not only did it insist on transforming the curriculum in Australia to reflect the nation's economic and geopolitical reality, it engaged in discourse about re-orienting the Australian mind (1988: 6-7).

30 During this period we can assume that political and economic elites in Australia decided to harness education to strengthen the Australia economy and match global economic and technological trends (Kenway, Bigum, Fitzclarence, Collier and Tregenza, 1994: 318; Henry and Taylor, 1997). In terms of Dawkins' intentions for schooling in Australia see the policy statement, Strengthening Australia's Schools (1988a). In this statement he explains that: 'schools are the starting point of an integrated education and training structure in the economy' and that schools 'also form the basis of a more highly skilled, adaptive and productive workforce'. Although the clearest manifestations of the 'new vocationalism' are present in the Training and Further Education sector (Marginson 1997: 173), the burning desire to equip young Australians with practical and work-
reconceptualisation of education represented a departure from the traditional perception of education as serving broadly intellectual and liberalist-humanist functions towards those which view education as the key to building a more productive economy (Kennedy, 1988: 363-364 and Marginson, 1993: 145-152; Dudley and Vidovich, 1995).

The instrumentalist dimension of the National Strategy was given important credibility a year after its release by the Report *Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy* (1989), or the Garnaut Report. This was a very significant document in terms of legitimating Australia's economic integration with East Asia and lending weight to the ASC's National Strategy, since it too recommended the dramatic expansion of Asian languages and cultures courses in schools and tertiary institutions. Although those working in the field were aware of the extraordinary economic growth rates and broader socio-political changes taking place in Northeast Asia, the Report represented a significant historical shift in how Australia conceptualised Asia. Maximising the benefits which would inevitably flow from increased trade with the countries of North East Asia, Garnaut argued, would 'depend more than anything else on the scale and quality of its investment in education' (1989: 17). His report recommended that 'all students should be exposed at school to the serious study of Asian history, geography, economics, politics and culture' and that 'all secondary schools should teach at least one Asian language by the end of the century' (1989: 17).

related skills has also entrenched vocationally oriented subjects in school curricula (Kennedy, 1988: 368 and Crittenden, 1995).

31 The Garnaut Report, so named because it was written by Hawke's principal economic advisor Ross Garnaut, examined the phenomenal economic transformations taking place in Northeast Asia and alerted governments to the special opportunities which existed in that region for Australian business and trade.

32 Ross Garnaut submitted his report to the Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Gareth Evans, in mid 1989. When the Report became public in October it was a leading story in most daily Australian newspapers and figured prominently in leading television news programs. The Report was sold-out in only a matter of days (Lim, 1990: 53).

33 Although the Report was very general, neglected to describe exactly how its objectives could be met and failed to confront some crucial issues such as teacher shortages and the 'crowded curriculum', it became a very powerful statement for placing Asian languages and studies in the curriculum. Garnaut's advocacy was particularly significant because it emerged from a report commissioned by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade. Moreover, its recommendations arguably became the blueprint for Australia's economic engagement with Asia.
The National Strategy and the Garnaut Report built a strong case for the promotion and resourcing of Asian studies in education by drawing attention to the long term economic benefits of such action, in the same way the ASAA had argued for the establishment of the ASC. As a way of prompting decision makers to take notice it proved quite effective. However, the instrumental logic driving Asian studies in the 1980s was a divisive issue because it suggested that some languages should be given priority over others. For instance, to placate protagonists for community languages, the NPL had nominated a wide range of priority languages. Included were both Asian and community languages as an expression of multicultural Australia. In doing so, it dealt with this problem reasonably effectively. Kamada writes in relation to the broad problem of language prioritisation:

The main reason for the difficulty in selecting priority languages is that ethnic communities support the teaching of their own languages in schools, especially with the popularisation of multiculturalism since the late 1970s. States and territories with ethnically diverse populations, such as New South Wales and Victoria, have to make sensitive decisions when selecting priority languages other than English to be taught in schools (Kamada, 1994: 11).

The ASC found itself in competition with proponents of community languages. In an interview with Nancy Viviani, an integral member of the ASC for most of it’s five year term, Kamada found that 'the ASC had ongoing battles over resources with proponents of community languages' (Viviani, cited in Kamada, 1994: 11). According to the Chair of the ASC, Stephen FitzGerald, this competition 'was always an issue'. In all states 'it was a politically sensitive area that they had to step around' He recalls that even in Queensland, which was perhaps the most progressive state in terms of Asian studies, the government had to tread carefully. And, in some states 'there was outright hostility to the introduction of Asian languages'. In these states there was no effort to introduce Asian languages, 'it was just far too competitive' (Interview with Stephen FitzGerald, 4 August 1999).

The competition between Asian and community languages was also prevalent in terms of funding. In many states Asian studies were resisted because they were seen to be competing for funds. As the former Executive Director of the ASC explained, there were reservations that 'it (Asian studies) was going to compete with other languages in a limited
envelope of funding'. Indeed, when the ASC started promoting Asian languages in the states, there was already immense competition in the schools' education budget for funding across all areas of the curriculum. When the push for Asian languages gained momentum, the fear was that these languages would 'take money away' from community languages which would then be left with a severe funding shortfall. Advocates believed that the teaching of community languages was an essential expression of multiculturalism which helped to 'make up the fabric of Australian society'. Peacock concludes that 'it was that perception that there was going to be competition for the same bucket that generated a lot of tension' (Interview with Roger Peacock, 14 September 1999).

Language prioritisation and the tensions between Asian and community languages were addressed by FitzGerald in his 1990 Buntine Oration. FitzGerald (1990) asserted that the ASC would have no part in a divisive policy or public debate about the relative worth of various language groups, whether it be a debate about 'European' versus 'Asian', or 'economic' versus 'cultural' languages. Such adversarialism, he claimed, 'is no way to go for anyone seriously interested in the opening of the Australian mind to language learning'. However, FitzGerald also pointed out that hard decisions about language learning had to be made. In reference to the languages policies of some European countries, and the resources necessary to teach languages, he remarked that 'it is totally unrealistic to suggest that all languages must be equally supported'. Since we live in Asia, he continued, 'That ought to be a determinant in our choice of languages' (FitzGerald, 1990: 17, original emphasis)

The Desire for National Coordination

At the beginning of this chapter, it was explained that responsibility for school education rests with the state governments. As a consequence, it is very difficult to achieve national objectives. When the Commonwealth identifies what it deems to be national needs and priorities, such as Asian studies, it must encourage the states to cooperate in the development of national policy frameworks, since it exercises no coercive power. The Commonwealth, due to its superior fiscal position in the federation, normally encourages cooperation by way of specific purpose funding. However even then the states are very protective of their jurisdictions and wary of any form of Commonwealth intervention. For these reasons, the ASC, as a Commonwealth agency, was not a policy maker but,
rather, an advocate for Asian studies.

To organise a common and coordinated approach to the problems facing Asian studies, the ASC endeavoured to encourage the cooperation and support of the state education agencies. It relied heavily on the power of persuasion, and what FitzGerald has referred to as ' "quiet work": - discussions behind the scenes with state ministers and key people in the states' education hierarchy', because it wielded no coercive power (FitzGerald, 1988: 14). The ASC targeted its meager funding to induce the states into action on ASC initiatives. This process was described in the National Strategy as using ASC funds 'as a catalyst to produce enough activity of the right kind in the right area to stimulate other activity and other contributions from other governments and from private enterprise' (ASC, 1988: 21). FitzGerald described the approach adopted by the ASC in an interview:

You had to approach state governments with great care, because if you came in as giving a Commonwealth view and started demanding this and proposing that... anyone who has worked with the states in any area will recognise this issue; so there is not an automatic enthusiasm for collaboration; every state and territory has its own agenda; has its own views about languages; its not just a question of Commonwealth and states, it's a question of state and state operation as well, so you have to go in a persuasive mode (Interview with Stephen FitzGerald, 4 August, 1999)

Thus, the greatest barrier to the achievement of the Council's objectives was its very status as a Commonwealth government body; the nature of the federal structure itself. At the core of the challenge was accomplishing coordination across all education jurisdictions. As FitzGerald (1988:14) explained:

As we have seen it is in the schools that a Commonwealth agency has most difficulty operating. National education objectives are not easily pursued in such a decentralised system, and the states are very wary of attempts by the Commonwealth to make them follow the lure of money

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34 In terms of 'the lure of money', FitzGerald has noted that 'some of the states were prepared to cooperate with anything if you said you were going to put the money there, probably on the condition that they could take it away and use it however they wanted' (Interview with Stephen FitzGerald, 4 August 1999).
Lobbying senior figures in the states' education hierarchy was crucial for gaining support for Asian studies. In addition to approaching individual state education authorities, the ASC also pursued its objectives in the Australian Education Council (AEC). In this forum the ASC sought to build institutional commitment to the advancement of Asian studies and to encourage collaborative efforts between the states and the Commonwealth. The main intent was to establish and a nationally coordinated approach to Asian studies.

For instance, with the aim of examining the increasing importance of Asian languages and studies in schools and universities, the ASC organised a seminar to coincide with the 57th meeting of the AEC in Darwin, June 1988. Several resolutions were passed by ministers of education which sought greater prominence of Asian studies and languages in schools. The first resolution recognised the significance of the Asian region to Australia: 'the AEC accepts the importance of Asia as a region of the world which will significantly effect the long-term future of Australia' (AEC, 1988). More importantly, ministers agreed that a 'coordinated' approach to developing Asia-literacy was necessary. The AEC (1988) resolved:

> to accept that there is a need to consider a coordinated approach, through the Conference of Directors-General, to the teaching of Asian languages and studies, including the development of curriculum materials and structures, inservice and preservice training and supply... that because it is the responsibility of the states and territories to develop programs and curriculum and to develop appropriate policies in this area, states and territories should undertake to introduce/support appropriate initiatives which promote the teaching of Asian languages and studies within their school systems.

After the endorsement of these resolutions, the ASC formed a working group to produce a final draft report for the AEC. The terms of reference for the Asian Studies and Languages Working Group were adopted by both government and non-government education authorities. It was managed by the New South Wales Department of School Education and was composed of experts invited to participate by the ASC.

The Working Group's Report was completed in March 1991 and identified three primary objectives (ASC, 1991a). The first objective was that: 'The numbers of students
studying Asia and Asian languages be increased through high quality curriculum development, supported by excellent teaching and other resources'. The two remaining goals pertained to the study of Asia across the curriculum and increasing the number of teachers skilled in Asian languages and studies. When the ASC met for the final time in June, it recommended that the federal Minister for Education, Mr John Dawkins, table the Report at the AEC meeting in October. However, the minutes of that meeting indicate that the release of the ALLP in August, as well as the Finn Review of Post Compulsory Education (Finn, 1991) in July, meant that a number of the Report's recommendations were already considered in the context of these larger policy initiatives (AEC, 1991c). The AEC referred the Report to the AEC/MOVEET Working Party on the ALLP for the preparation of a costed priorities/options paper for consideration at the next meeting of the AEC/MOVEET to be held in February 1992. Following that meeting, the Report was passed to a sub-committee of the Working Party which was requested to 'consider the Report in detail' and make recommendations which were to be put to Commonwealth and state education ministers sometime in the future (DEET, 1992: 175). It was at this point in time, however, that Queensland's proposal for a national approach to Asian studies, the beginning of the NALSAS Strategy policy process, was put to heads of government. This took place in December when COAG met in Hobart. Thus, the the AEC/MOVEET developments described above were overtaken by a parallel set of events occurring in Queensland.

Although much effort was expended trying to improve coordination between education jurisdictions, its relative absence was a serious impediment to the development of Asian studies in schools and universities. The ASC found it difficult to develop a framework for

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35 Nonetheless, as the minutes of the joint AEC and MOVEET meeting indicate, five aspects of the ASC Reports recommendations remained 'highly relevant'. Of these issues, two pertained directly to the necessity for a coordinated national approach to matters relating to the teaching of Asian studies. First, ministers concurred that it was necessary for education and training 'to develop a national statement of principle for teaching and learning about Asia' and, second, to develop 'national goals of proficiency for teachers of Asian languages'. These issues, it recommended, could either be referred to an appropriate working party or parties of the AEC/MOVEET for a costed/priorities paper for the next AEC/MOVEET meeting (AEC, 1991c).

36 As part of the Commonwealth's agenda to reconceptualise education as part of its broader microeconomic reform agenda, a Ministerial Council on Vocational Education, Employment and Training (MOVEET) was established in 1990. From October 1990, it met jointly with the AEC. The intent of this rearrangement was to integrate areas of policy across all jurisdictions and place greater emphasis on training and the requirements of industry. Henceforth, the ministerial council will be called the AEC/MOVEET.
Asian studies at all levels of education in Australia. Developing a national effort to use resources more efficiently, share curriculum materials and train teachers, was a difficult task for the Council. As Kamada (1994: 10) attests in regard to the ASC:

While it is generally agreed that it was necessary to have nationwide coordination and cooperation in the areas of curriculum and materials development, resource sharing and teacher training, it was also recognised that this was difficult to achieve in practice.

Despite the stated intentions of education ministers and the ASC's key recommendation that governments develop a coordinated approach to teaching Asian languages, this never materialised to the extent desired.

Disbanding the ASC

Despite lobbying hard for a three-year extension of its term, the ASC was disbanded in June 1991. In its final report to the minister, the Council listed its achievements during its five-year term, pointing out that it contributed significantly to an increase in the number of students studying an Asian languages in schools and that primary and secondary school enrolments had risen from 1 to 3 per cent and 3 to 7 per cent respectively. The rise in the teaching of Asian languages at the tertiary level was particularly dramatic, approximately 50 per cent (ASC, 1991b).

Although over its five-year term the ASC laid the foundation for creating an Asian-literate society, the ASC accepted that there still existed many areas where progress was insufficient. The Report set out the key policy issues the Council believed its successor body would need to consider. First, since some progress had been made in the area of

37 Ingleson (1991) wrote later that year that: 'The ASAA has been heavily involved in lobbying the government about what we see as its short-sightedness in abolishing it'. There is very little available information about why the ASC was disbanded. However, FitzGerald explained in an interview that Commonwealth bureaucrats saw the ASC as too 'independent'. He observed that during the ASC's term 'the cooperation of bureaucrats was very mixed, and part of the reason for that is that bureaucrats do not like bodies second guessing, or which they regard as second guessing policy recommendations... we had constant evidence of intentions of actions to try to undermine the work of the Council, because in my opinion it was too independent, had an independent line to the minister and so on' (Interview with Stephen FitzGerald, 11 August 1999).
Asian languages, there was a need to balance this activity with the development of Studies of Asia in the core curriculum. Second, the Council believed future efforts should be directed toward teacher education and supply. The Council's Second Term Strategy Document\(^{38}\) of September 1999 stated that more teacher training programs were necessary to 'develop rapidly a cadre of high quality teachers' (ASC, 1991b).

Of equal concern was that the growing interest and heightened awareness of the significance of Asia which emerged in the 1980s had failed to convert into long-term national commitment to Asian studies in schools. A major issue facing Asian studies was: 'The development of long term institutional commitment to Asian studies and languages beyond the current situation of fragmented activity by state/territory education systems'. This sentiment was also expressed in the ASC's Second Term Strategy Document, which states that: 'the current high level of interest in Asia, in part stimulated by Commonwealth funding initiatives, is only patchily translated into long-term institutional commitment'. As a recommendation for remedial action on this issue, the Council advised that: 'The task is to engage state/territory and non-government education systems in negotiations to ensure cohesive, high quality and enduring national commitment to Asia-literacy'. These recommendations, as well as the ASC's ongoing programs, were taken over by the DEET through the ALLP. It is to this policy that we now turn.

**The Australian Languages and Literacy Policy (ALLP)**

In December 1990, the Commonwealth government released a discussion paper which canvassed options for a new national languages policy: *The Language of Australia: Discussion Paper on an Australian Literacy and Language Policy for the 1990s* (Commonwealth, DEET, 1990a) (Green Paper). After consultation with interested parties and the receipt of 343 submissions in response to the discussion Paper, *Australia's Language: The Australian Language and Literacy Policy (ALLP)* (Commonwealth, DEET, 1991b) was released in August 1991 (White Paper). It received funding in the budget of the same month and expenditure began in 1992. The ALLP and the Green Paper on which it was based, were really extensions of the NPL and aimed to build on its progress and achievements. The

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38 The Document was attached to the ASC's final report to the Minister for Education (ASC, 1991b).
Commonwealth sought to 'fine tune' the NPL and modify it to reflect recent developments and the current language needs of Australia.

The 'Green Paper' was berated by many for reasons of excessive instrumentalism, over-emphasis on English for all and, hence, inadequate recognition of community languages, ambiguity concerning the provision of language services and a general narrowing of the goals determined in the NPL (Eltis, 1991; Moore, 1991). Ozolins (1993) went so far as to brand the Green Paper a 'document in which, in an intellectual and policy sense, probably marks the nadir of Australian language policy in recent years' (1993: 252). Thus, the White Paper was considerably modified. The ALLP acknowledged that learning languages other than English was an important expression of multiculturalism, a valuable intellectual and educational pursuit and crucial in terms of Australia's location in the region. However, many still believed that the ALLP was biased in favour of the enhancement of Australia's trading relationships with the rest of the world; that the underlying focus of the policy had changed only minimally (Clyne, 1991: 13-20; Ingram, 1991: 4-14; Nicholas, 1992: 25-30).

The ALLP's principal policy position was that Australians become 'literate' and 'articulate' in Australian English, the national language (DEET Policy Paper, 1991b: iii). Proficiency in the national language was a necessity to enable the full participation of citizens in Australian society. Important too, was the need for Australians to 'communicate with the rest of the world'. As the second of its four stated goals, the ALLP asserted that: 'The learning of languages other than English must be substantially expanded and improved to improve educational outcomes and communication with both the Australian and the international community' (1991b: 14). The Paper noted that the study of LOTE in Australia had fallen dramatically in the last 25 years. 'Today', it pointed out, 'fewer than 12% of Year 12 students do so, and many of these are native speakers' (1991b: 15). With this statistic in mind the ALLP set two targets for LOTE; the first was to have 25 per cent of Year 12 students studying a language other than English by the Year 2000; and the second, that all Australians will have the opportunity to learn a LOTE in accordance with their needs by the Year 2000 (DEET Companion Volume, 1991b: 62).

39 The ALLP was presented in two parts: a Policy Paper, which outlined programs and strategies and was relatively brief, and a Companion Volume to the Policy Paper, which provided background information and a fuller and more detailed statement about the policy.
In what was a distinguishing aspect of the policy, the Commonwealth compiled a list of priority languages to help achieve its target from which each state was requested to select eight. In light of the problematics associated with selecting priority languages due to the wide range of languages spoken by the Australian community and limitations imposed by scarce curriculum, teaching and financial resources, the policy argued that some prioritisation was unavoidable. In establishing priorities the policy maintained that, 'attention must be given to languages of broader economic interest'. Under the current global economic conditions, it continued, 'Australia's location in the Asia-Pacific region and our patterns of overseas trade should continue to be a factor in this selection of priorities' (Policy Paper, 1991b: 15).

In contrast to the NPL, which paid particular attention to the languages of Australia's various ethnic communities, the new policy was criticised for emphasising the teaching of languages relevant to Australia's international economic and political interests. Many language professionals believed that the NLP had managed to straddle the political divide between 'community' and 'economic' languages by emphasising the necessity to consider both in language policy planning, but the ALLP was less convincing. Ingram (1991: 5) and Clyne (1991: 13-20), for example, argued that the goals of multiculturalism were insufficiently stated in the policy and that the concept of multiculturalism itself did not really figure at all (See also Nicholas, Moore, Clyne and Pauwels, 1993: 21). Thus, the policy was censured for stressing languages considered to be of economic significance.

Asian languages were emphasised in the ALLP in accordance with their perceived economic importance. In the context of it prescriptions for LOTE, the ALLP stated that it would continue to promote Asian languages in Australian schools, mainly through the implementation of relevant parts of the ASC's Second Term Strategy. To this task the Commonwealth allocated $1.04 million per year in 1991-92 and 1992-93 (Companion Volume, 1991b: 87). Under the ALLP, the Commonwealth also pledged to continue support for Asian languages by giving priority to Asian languages when allocating any additional places which it funded in higher education and for funding projects under the National Priority (Reserve) Fund. Asian languages had been a priority area for the allocation of higher education student places funded by the Commonwealth since 1989. Since then the fund had already provided $4.6 million for various projects (1991a: 17). Responsibility for the implementation and coordination of the languages dimension of the...
ALLP was charged to the AEC/MOVEET. To ensure a national focus the Commonwealth established the Working Party of the AEC/MOVEET to monitor, coordinate and help implement its programs and strategies.

The policy also paid some specific attention to the non-language element of Asian studies. This element 'should be strengthened', it stated, explaining that, in light of the language focus of the ALLP, 'there is a danger that this important focus, which has so far not been addressed in a sustained way, could be lost (Companion Volume, 1991b: 85). As a replacement to the ASC and as a means of continuing its work, the Asia Education Foundation (AEF) was established at cost a of $0.5 million in 1991-92, increasing to $1.0 in 1992-93. The Commonwealth also established the Asia in Australia Council to advise the government on building stronger links with Asia and to help raise the level of Asia-literacy and national awareness of Asia in Australia beyond educational means.

**National Statement on Languages Other Than English**

The final major collaborative development which favoured the teaching of Asian studies, particularly the languages' element, was the decision by the AEC in 1992 to establish LOTE as a key learning area in the curriculum. This decision was made as part of the national curriculum exercise which was fundamental to Dawkins' schooling reform agenda (Dawkins, 1988a; Marsh, 1994; McCollow and Graham, 1997). The process commenced in 1986 when, under the auspices of the AEC, Ministers of Education and their Directors-General agreed to work collaboratively towards national consensus on priorities for Australian education. In April 1989 the Council achieved a major break-through when it announced ten common and agreed National Goals for Schooling in Australia (AEC, 1989). The 'Hobart Declaration', as it became known, was significant because it was the first time that agreement had been reached on a set of national priorities in Australian education (Marsh, 1994: 47). One of the areas identified was the enhancement of students' English literacy, numeracy skills and knowledge of science and technology. Within the same group, developing in students 'a knowledge of languages other than English' was also identified as a goal.

LOTE became a key learning area in its own right when eight areas of learning based on the ten national goals of the Hobart Declaration were established and confirmed by the
AEC in April 1991 (1994: 18). In September the AEC created the Curriculum and Assessment Committee and charged it with developing national statements and profiles for each of the eight agreed learning areas. The formal consultation draft in April, 1992, of the National Statement on Languages Other Than English makes the following statement:

An agreed national goal is to significantly increase and improve the rate of student participation in learning languages other than English in order to enhance the educational outcomes of students and socioeconomic outcomes for Australia as a nation in the international community (AEC/MOVEET, 1992: 8).

Conclusion

Since the release of the Auchmuty Report in 1970 a number of policy initiatives at the Commonwealth level have responded to the problems identified by Auchmuty and sought to increase the teaching of Asian languages and studies in schools. The formation of the ASC in 1986 was perhaps the most significant step towards creating an Asia-literate Australia. The efforts of this body, particularly in relation to Asian languages, was greatly assisted by the second language movement in Australia, the implementation of the NPL in 1987-91 and the programs associated with the ALLP in 1992. The ASC also attempted to expand the teaching of Asian studies through the AEC in the late 1980 and early 1990s, though its achievements were limited.

When the ASC was disbanded in June 1991 it felt that it had made considerable progress in the area, but conceded that there was still much to be done. Studies of Asia remained in a precarious state, with the vast majority of Australian school students still completing their compulsory years of schooling without any substantive engagement with Asia in curricula. There were still problems with teacher supply and training, insufficient curriculum and teaching materials, though this was probably the area in which the ASC made one its greatest contribution and, although significantly increased, relatively low participation in Asian languages. For instance, in 1992 the proportion of Year 12 students studying a LOTE was in decline. In 1970 almost 40 per cent of final year students were studying a second language. But, by 1982 just 16.1 per cent of Year 12 students were studying a LOTE. The situation had deteriorated even further by 1992 when the figure
fell to 12.5 per cent. Of the total Year 12 cohort, only 4 per cent were studying a priority Asian language* (Japanese, 16.9; Chinese (Mandarin), 8.9; Indonesian, 4.2). Even though this represented an increase on previous years, the proportion of the total number of students studying an Asian language remained very small (Rudd, 1994: 14).

A major theme running through this chapter is the link between support for Asian studies and Australia's economic relations with East Asia. Thus, the development of second language policy in Australia must be thought of in terms of shifting progressively away from the promotion of social justice, by targeting European languages spoken by various and well established community groups, towards greater stress on Asian languages significant to the Australian economy. Since the mid 1980s, successive Commonwealth government language policies have increasingly been re-designed to reflect Australia's changing business and trading relationships with the rest of the world. The Dawkins reforms were particularly important in this context, for they dovetailed neatly with those pushing for more support for Asian studies. It is in this context one should endeavour to understand the rise to prominence of Asian languages in education. Given that the forces lobbying for the development of a national policy in the early 1980s consisted of a large ethnic element, the economic precepts which underpinned subsequent language policies were routinely denounced for over-stating the importance of Asian languages. The ASC was especially cognisant of the struggle for resources and sponsorship between Asian and community languages.

The analysis of the development of Asian studies policy presented in this chapter also demonstrates the difficulties the ASC faced as a Commonwealth body operating in the area of schools, that is, the problems associated with the coordination of Asian studies in the Australian federation. It has shown that almost all of the reports and commentary on the issue has indicated a desire for greater attention to the establishment of centralised coordinating machinery. The ASC itself was intended to perform such a function and, of course, it did so with considerable success. According to Kamada (1994: 12):

Despite the ASC's strong commitment to improving Asian studies education in schools, progress has been slow. In view of the fact that each state and territory

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40 The NALSAS Strategy focuses attention on what is referred to as 'the four priority Asian languages'. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
has its own education system and has responsibility for reforming it, more complex approaches to improving overall education about Asia are required. State and territory governments claim that, without funding injections by the Commonwealth, substantial changes to teaching are difficult to realise (Kamada 1994: 12)

In 1992 the Queensland government took decisive action to accelerate the uptake of Asian languages in Australian schools. It was motivated by a widespread perception that past attempts to boost Australia's performance in Asian studies had been unsuccessful and that current provision for Asian studies in school was far from sufficient.
Chapter Four: The Making of the NALSAS Strategy

Introduction

Whereas the previous chapter sketched a history of Asian studies policy in Australia, this chapter traces the sequence of events leading to the ratification of the Rudd Report by Australian heads of government in February 1994 and a funding agreement reached by the Commonwealth and Queensland government the following August. The Rudd Report developed the NALSAS Strategy, a strategic framework for the implementation of a national Asian studies program in schools, the case for study in this research. A primary purpose of this exercise is to investigate Kevin Rudd's role in the policy process, with a view to later analysing this role in terms of the concept of policy entrepreneurship. On the one hand, the aim is to determine his role in terms of the idea for a national strategy and, on the other, to establish how he achieved this objective in the face of considerable Commonwealth opposition. This chapter demonstrates that Kevin Rudd was the primary driving force behind the NALSAS Strategy. It shows how he based the Strategy on Queensland's own foreign language program, which was implemented by the Goss Labor government after it came to power in December 1989. In what amounted to significant reform of school curricula in Queensland, Rudd was also a key policy actor.

Touching on a number of the issues raised in the previous chapter, such as the community/Asian languages struggle and language prioritisation, as well as the problem of national coordination, the current chapter attempts to reconstruct the NALSAS Strategy policy process. This is described at length and in considerable detail; from its genesis to its conclusion (as accurately as one can feasibly be expected to distinguish the stages of any policy process).\(^4^1\) Like completing a jigsaw puzzle, it looks at how the policy was actually made in terms of the actions taken by various actors. Based on the personal accounts of actors who participated both directly and indirectly, it attempts to reconstruct the events which took place with as much accuracy as possible. Hence, it is in this chapter that the bulk of the primary evidence is presented. It should be stated, however, that this chapter

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\(^4^1\) See Lindblom and Woodhouse, (1993: 10) who write that policy making does not proceed in completely rational order, unlike 'writing a term paper with a beginning, middle and end, with each part tied logically to each succeeding part'.
does not seek to analyse the policy process. Its intention is not to elucidate and judge the various forces which influenced the shape of the strategy, nor to form an opinion about Rudd in terms of policy entrepreneurship, for that occurs in the next chapters. Rather, it endeavours simply to piece together the available evidence to describe the process.

The chapter is divided into two parts. The first begins with an overview of the Queensland foreign language program, or what became known as the 'LOTE initiative', introduced by the Goss Labor government when it came to power in December 1989. It then proceeds to show why Rudd and others, by the middle of 1992, believed a national Asian studies strategy was necessary in Australia, and how the Queensland policy could form the basis on which to model such a strategy. It briefly looks at the events surrounding Goss’s tabling of the proposal at the December 1992 COAG meeting in Hobart, its subsequent endorsement by heads of government and their agreement to establish a working group to prepare a report developing a strategic framework for the implementation of a school-based Asian languages and cultures program. This part concludes by examining why Rudd employed COAG rather than the AEC, the usual venue for negotiating national education policies, to push his proposal.

The second part of this chapter commences with the release of the Report titled *Asian Languages and Australia’s Economic Future* or, the Rudd Report as it became known and to which it is referred in this chapter, as well as the acceptance of its recommendations by COAG in February 1994. Outlined in some detail is its main rationale for a national strategy, its key recommendations and some of the criticism it attracted when it was released. Of particular concern to many was the overtly economic rationale on which the Report based its case for increased funding and a national approach. The response of Rudd and his colleagues to these criticisms is also canvassed. This part then revisits some of the main recommendations of the Report and investigates the basis of Commonwealth resistance to them. It reconstructs the arguments presented by the Commonwealth and Rudd, both against and in support of the recommendations and shows how Rudd and Goss finally managed to overcome these problems by striking a funding deal with the Prime Minister in August 1994. This part concludes with a brief examination of the implementation machinery which was recommended by the Rudd Report and finally established in September 1994.
Part One: Origins and Opportunities

The Queensland LOTE Initiative

Second language education was an important element of the Labor Opposition's election platform and long-term vision for education in Queensland. In its principal policy statement on education released in January 1989, prior to the State Election in December, Labor's Education Blueprint: Schools, the Opposition vowed that in government it would: 'Implement a statewide program of foreign language study in primary schools' (ALP, Queensland Division, 1989: 8). It would:

provide resources for a major foreign language and culture program in state secondary schools so that at least 10% of students graduating from Year 12 will be literate in a foreign language and culture, with an eventual target of 20% (ALP, Queensland Division, 1989: 9).

The Opposition also pledged to fund the retraining of teachers 'as specialist primary school language teachers' in every Queensland primary school and to 'offer foreign language and culture courses at primary level' (1989: 10). There was no clear indication in the document that Asian languages and cultures would constitute a major emphasis in a new foreign languages and cultures initiative.\(^4\) The Minister for Education in the first Goss government, Paul Braddy,\(^4\) explains that in Opposition:

Wayne Goss and I had determined that it was very important, or he determined I should say, that education was going to be one of the major planks for arguing why Labor should be elected. I determined, and he determined independently as well, that we had to become a much more Asia-literate society and that LOTE should play a much greater role in the future' (Interview with Paul Braddy, 21 July

\(^4\) Goss was warned by a number of his Shadow Cabinet colleagues that an emphasis on Asian languages and cultures in schools may be politically dangerous, but he pursued the policy nonetheless (Interview with Wayne Goss, 22 July 1999).

\(^4\) Braddy was the Labor Member for Kedron from 1985-2001. He was Minister for Education from December 1989 to September 1992.
After coming to power on 2 December 1989, the Goss Labor government set about implementing the various policies from Labor's Education Blueprint - Schools. The Minister for Education, Paul Braddy, along with personnel from the state Education Department, initiated a project called 'Strategies for the Advancement of Policies in Relation to Foreign Languages and Cultures' and charged it with achieving the languages and cultures goals outlined in the Blueprint. As part of this initiative, the government commissioned Professor David Ingram from Griffith University to conduct a review of the teaching of languages and cultures in Queensland schools and to develop a strategic plan for implementing its foreign languages and cultures policy.

The Report titled The Teaching of Languages and Cultures in Queensland: Towards a Language Education Policy for Queensland Schools, was completed in June 1990. Although it was not conspicuously weighted in favour of Asian languages and cultures, they were, nevertheless, given extra consideration due to past neglect in the Queensland school system. While the Report put a case for an increase in resource allocations for all languages, Ingram also argued that allocations 'need to weigh in favour of Asian languages'. By the late 1990s, he wrote, 'there needs to be approximately equal distribution of students in and consequent resource allocation to European and Asian languages' (Ingram, 1989: 20). Although other

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44 Braddy announced the initiative in parliament on 22 March 1990. He told the parliament that to progress the government's foreign language and culture program 'I have requested the Education Department and others to prepare a report on foreign language and culture studies in Queensland. The services of Professor David Ingram, from the Centre for Applied Linguistics and Languages at Griffith University, have been engaged and his report will be submitted to me by the end of April. Once I have considered the Report, I will set about the task of implementing programs that will guarantee that our children are well versed in the languages and cultures of our near neighbours, making them more confident and able to deal with the world in which we live, particularly the Pacific rim. My intention is that, through an innovative and committed approach to this issue, Queensland will develop a reputation as the foreign language and culture capital of Australia' (Braddy, Hansard, 1990a: 611).

45 The Report made 94 recommendations, including two main target enrolments where: 'By January 1996, the study of a language other than English should be compulsory in Years 6 to 8 in all schools' and that by that same date 'all secondary schools should be offering at least one language other than English through all years to Year 12' (Ingram, 1990: 35). It also made a number of recommendations in relation to increasing the language proficiency, professional competence and supply of language teachers (1990: 64-73).

The release of the Report was also reported in the Courier Mail, June 1990. Braddy stated that 'language teaching in schools was now "haphazard and fragmented" and that the The Griffith University Report, by Professor David Ingram and Mr Glyn John, is a basis for comprehensive and universal language and culture studies throughout Queensland schools' (Walker, 1990: 3).
rationale were identified, the case for Asian languages was based overwhelmingly on their significance as languages of trade and in terms of their economic benefits to Queensland. Hence, the languages of the Asian-Pacific region were emphasised in the Report. Ingram wrote:

Since Australia is part of the Asia-Pacific region and since our major trading partners are in Asia, clearly there is urgent need to increase the level of skills available in the Asian languages and cultures... (Ingram, 1990: 20)

Based on Ingram's findings and his recommendations, the government pushed languages education, especially languages other than English, to the forefront of its agenda for long-term educational reform.

46 Language teaching and learning is justified by Ingram also in terms of: its 'mind-broadening' effect; the liberalising effect on one's attitudes to other cultures; the necessity for non-English speaking Australians to have the opportunity to achieve a high level of English proficiency; linguistic and cultural maintenance; equality of rights and opportunities; and the favourable effect on intellectual growth and educational attainment (Ingram, 1989: 22).

47 The Queensland Treasurer, Mr Keith De Lacy, had also stressed the economic significance of teaching Asian languages and cultures. The Treasurer, according to The Courier Mail, said that the government's decision to make 'Asian languages available in all Queensland primary schools... would be the cornerstone of the state government's plan to create an "export culture". The government's foreign languages program, he stated, would compliment 'other export-related initiatives' and the establishment of 'an Asian market penetration program targeting Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan and Hong Kong' (Watson and Walker, 1990: 3).

48 On 8 November 1990, Braddy made a statement to the Queensland Legislative Assembly outlining the government's intention to expand the teaching of foreign languages, particularly Asian languages in schools. Braddy indicated that the commitment was rested on two basic principles: (i) the educational and cultural benefits of language learning (ii) the economic benefits for the Queensland economy. He explained that 'Queensland's economic future is inextricably linked to that of our neighbours in the Asia/Pacific region. Without the ability to communicate with our neighbours we cannot hope to understand their cultures and we will have little chance of maximising the much-needed trade and export opportunities they represent'. In what he called 'our ambitious new program' he proposed a number of learning targets and to begin the introduction of LOTE and cultural studies in primary schools and foreshadowed plans to increase the supply of suitably qualified teachers (Braddy, Hansard, 1990b: 4635-4636).

In the Queensland parliament on 8 November, the Opposition spokesman for Education (and Minister for Education in the previous National Party government), sought to ensure that the National's own record on Asian languages and cultures in schools would not go unrecognised. Mr Littleproud pointed out that before the Goss government came to power in 1989, 'more people were learning Japanese than in any other state of Australia'. He proceeded to note that in 1989 the Education Department had been placing 'much more emphasis on the study of Asian languages and cultures' and recounted a trip to Hubei Province in China as Minister in 1989 with Assistant Director General, John Tainton, and other departmental personnel, where a teacher exchange agreement was signed (Littleproud, Hansard, 1990a: 4644-4644).
As a further indication that the government was eager to make effective progress in the area, Minister Braddy engaged the services of Professor Stephen FitzGerald, Chair of the ASC and Director of the Asia-Australia Institute at the University of New South Wales, early in 1991 to advise on the implementation of the program. Similarly engaged was Professor Nancy Viviani, a political scientist from Griffith University, and former member of the ASC. Both were experienced specialists in the area of Asian languages and cultures policy in Australia (Interview with Paul Braddy, 21 July 1999; see also Livingstone, 1991b).

In July 1991 Paul Braddy announced his government's new 'LOTE initiative'. He stated that in 1990, the government had committed $65 million to the area of languages over a ten year period and described the Queensland foreign language program as 'perhaps the most important of our long-term reforms' (Braddy, 1991: 2). Braddy declared that 'the LOTE initiative is about opening Queenslanders' eyes to the world and equipping them to operate successfully in it'. He continued by pointing out:

> We are permanently anchored in the Pacific and Indian oceans, alongside that great region of dynamic change, Asia. For Australia, and for Queensland in particular, most of our economic fortune lies in this region (Braddy, 1991: 2)

Braddy identified as priority languages German, French, Japanese, Chinese and Indonesian (1991: 7). The three Asian languages were given priority because they were the principal languages of the region in which Queensland was located. In his statement Braddy also set some clear targets: 'Our targets are clear: the progressive expansion of languages to all students by the year 2000', including 20 per cent of Year 12 students studying a language other than English by the same year; providing all students in Years 6, 7 and 8 with an opportunity to learn a LOTE by 1994; and by the year 2000 to have introduced second language learning in Years 1 to 5.49

It was also reported by the *Sunday Mail* in January 1989 that the Ahern government would introduce foreign language learning to primary schools for the first time. Littleproud, who was then Minister for Education, announced that 'Chinese, Japanese, German, Italian, French, Indonesian, Spanish and Vietnamese would be taught in schools from Atherton to the Gold Coast. In response to community demand, Japanese will be the most widely taught language' (Livingstone, 1989: 11).

49 Allan Langdon, Manager at the Languages and Cultures Unit (LACU), indicated that the LOTE statement provided a framework for the implementation of the government's foreign languages policy (Email correspondence from Allan Langdon, 2 February 1998).
In 1990, and in 1991-92, the government's LOTE initiative was funded to the tune of $10.7 million. To achieve the Year 12 participation targets outlined by Braddy, LOTE was introduced to primary schools. While enrolments in LOTE at the primary level increased three-fold as a result, growth at the secondary level grew much more slowly. It was expected however, that growth at this level would rise as former primary school students reached secondary school. And, although only 8 per cent of Year 12 students were studying a second language by the end of 1991, it was expected that the target of 20 per cent would be reached (Viviani, 1991: 245).

To overcome some of the perennial problems associated with second languages education, particularly an inadequate supply of quality language teachers and an absence of continuity of language learning between primary and secondary schools, the Queensland government allocated considerable financial resources to the LOTE initiative. It had sought to upgrade teacher qualifications through professional development programs, considered the quality of teachers graduating from universities and initiated a number of teacher exchange programs. The Education Department had developed teaching and curriculum materials for teachers and encouraged state-wide language-teacher networks. Finally, the government had also designated five priority languages. Unlike other states, which had not chosen to prioritise, Queensland was hoping to maximise its resources by teaching a small number of languages well rather than a plethora poorly taught (1991: 246).

Towards the end of 1991 Viviani was able to proclaim that the Goss government had progressed towards entrenching second language learning in the curriculum of Queensland schools. Viviani (1991: 245) wrote: 'With significant political backing from the Premier, Mr Goss, and the Minister for Education, Mr Braddy, LOTE is being mainstreamed in Queensland schools so as to become part of the core curriculum in both primary and secondary schools'. She added that: 'The Queensland government has finally bitten the bullet, unlike other states, on choice of languages... These are exciting times on the languages and studies front in Queensland', she continued, 'with some clear directions, significant resources and a challenging environment for implementation' (1991: 246). During the September 1992 election campaign, the Premier, Wayne Goss, also declared that the success of the LOTE initiative program was one of his government's 'greatest
achievements' (ALP, Queensland Division, 1992: 1).

Obtaining data from any of the state government education authorities regarding the uptake of second languages, proficiency levels, improvements in continuity, teacher training and supply is notoriously difficult. Thus, the researcher has made a number of futile attempts to gather data on the effectiveness of the Queensland LOTE policy and its implementation since the early 1990s. Besides an internal review undertaken by the Queensland Department of Education in 2000-2001 (which has not yet been released), there exists no official report or any documentation evaluating the outcomes of the policy. Nonetheless, the Education Department's 1996-97 Annual Report does state that: 'While LOTE continues to expand there is a constant need for more staff for LOTE teaching. The current pool is insufficient and strategies need to be devised to increase the supply and stem the attrition' (Education Queensland, 1997: 25). Although it acknowledges the perennial problem of teacher supply, the Report is short on detail and says nothing about Asian languages. More recent Annual Reports of the Department proved most disappointing for they provide even less information about LOTE.

Opposition to Labor's LOTE Initiative in Queensland

While not outrightly opposed to the LOTE initiative, there were some who questioned aspects of its design and implementation. The Queensland Teachers Union, the National/Liberal Party Opposition and elements in the Department of Education all, to varying degrees, queried the program during Goss's two terms as premier.

In February 1990 the Queensland Teachers Union, while endorsing the statewide plan for language learning in schools, drew attention to the problem of teacher supply. In response to comments about the introduction of Asian languages to primary schools by the Queensland Treasurer, Mr Keith De Lacy, the president of the union, Mary Kelly, said 'the plan was a reasonable concept and one which the union would be happy to look at but there would always be a resources problem'. She said that 'priorities would have to be examined and the language course weighed against other urgent issues like a need for

50 Goss also made reference to the success of the foreign languages program in his 1992 State Election policy speech on 6 September (ALP, Queensland Division, 1992).
remedial teachers'. In regard to the priority languages, which she referred to as "trade languages", 'there are just not enough people trained in those languages'. Kelly remarked that: 'Exposure to other languages should be part of the core experiences students get in school, but whether you restrict that to an Asian language or include European languages has to be looked at' (Kelly, cited in Watson and Walker, 1990: 1).

The National Party Opposition was generally supportive of the government's expansion of Asian languages and studies in schools. The Liberal Party spokesman for education, Bob Quinn, on the other hand, harboured some reservations about the government's LOTE initiative. While broadly of the same opinion as his National Party counterpart, particularly in recognition of the importance of Asian languages in strengthening Australia's political and economic ties with East Asia, Quinn expressed concern about the supply of suitably qualified language teachers. To the Queensland Parliament in November 1990, he noted that: 'Great prominence has been given to introducing foreign languages to primary schoolchildren.' Quinn stated his endorsement of the policy:

The possession of an Asian language will be a decided advantage to Australians as we realise the need for our country to have closer trade and political ties with Asia—our natural geographic sphere of influence (Quinn, 1990: 4653).

In the same speech to the Parliament, Quinn added the caveat that 'although the Minister's plans look good on paper, they present some daunting problems that will have to be overcome'. Reflecting on problems surrounding previous attempts to teach Italian in schools, Quinn cautioned that:

Teachers fluent in foreign languages are always scarce but the use of quickly, but inadequately, retrained teachers to fill the void must be avoided. Poor quality teaching due to insufficient knowledge and skill and an ad hoc approach will achieve similar results (Quinn, 1990: 4653).52

51 In the parliament on 30 November, the Opposition Spokesman for Education, Mr Littlepround, commended the government for its commitment to the teaching of Asian languages and cultures in schools (Littlepround, Hansard, 1990b: 5669).

52 Quinn also took issue with the dangers of overloading the curriculum. He said that 'The other aspect to this question is the potential for curriculum overload as schools are required to accommodate more demands from society. Concern is already being expressed by parents and teachers that today's schools are teaching a little about a lot, but nothing substantial in particular.
However, the most resistance to the LOTE initiative came from the Department of Education itself. The evidence suggests that the desire and determination of the Goss government, particularly that of Braddy and Goss to introduce Asian languages into school curricula, was not matched by bureaucrats from the Department. Paul Braddy, the Minister for Education at the time, recalled that during this period he was kept reasonably busy deflecting criticism and ensuring that the languages program was not blocked or derailed by Departmental officials: 'there were people in the Department who were enthusiastic about it but there were many who were not'. He recalls that those who resisted were concerned about the perennial problem of prioritisation and scarce resources. For those Departmental officials whose full cooperation was not forthcoming, according to Braddy: 'they would have preferred to spread the money across something else'.

Braddy and Goss stress that the Goss government came to power with a mandate that included the implementation of a statewide foreign language program. Braddy remarked

(Quinn, Hansard, 8 November 1990: 4653).

53 During the two terms of the Goss government, there appears to have been considerable general dissatisfaction with the way it sought to achieve its policy objectives. Of particular concern for many, it appears, was the 'politicisation' of the roles played by some staff in the Queensland Office of the Cabinet and its interference in line department business. This was briefly considered in in Chapter Two. Roger Scott (1996), a former Director General of the Queensland Education Department (1990-1994), expressed these concerns in an article he wrote in 1996. Reflecting on the period in which he held the post he wrote: 'In the public service, there was a striking hiatus between the rhetoric of a reform agenda, with a commitment to "letting the managers manage" as a component of that agenda, and the practice of much direct interference, frequently in ways inconsistent with the reform agenda'. In a direct reference to the Cabinet Office, Scott observed that: 'Indeed, it sometimes seems to line managers that the Cabinet Office staff aspire to steer the whole machinery of government, including CEOs'.

Scott's insights clearly highlight the level of frustration that he and others endured during the period. Although he makes no direct reference to the government's LOTE initiative, we can speculate that it may have been a case in point. It should be noted, that it is not my intention to make judgements about such things. My aim is simply to use the collected evidence to gain an insight to this period so as to achieve the particular aims of this study.

54 Former Deputy Director General of the Department of Education, Frank Peach (1995-1998), concurred with the view that the LOTE Initiative was driven by the politicians and not the bureaucrats: 'it clearly came from the whole-of-government perspective and not from the Department itself' (Interview with Frank Peach, 22 July 1999).

According to Allan Langdon: 'The languages program has had its detractors during the course of Goss's two terms. I think you will find articulated at a number of levels that the party's philosophy about this was: "This is something which is good to do, it will not necessarily be popular" ' (Email
that 'it was a politician Labor-led reform, it was not an Education Department-led reform (Interview with Paul Braddy, 21 July 1999). According to former Premier, Wayne Goss, the only way to overcome resistance to the timely implementation of the LOTE initiative was to drive it centrally:

Now the government had determined that we wanted to pursue this policy. They weren't so interested in it down at Education; it doesn't matter if its Education or whatever, if the government has the policy and the government gets elected on that policy, then we are going to do it. Now, if the Education Department won't do it, well we'll do it. It's necessary therefore to drive those policies centrally (Interview with Wayne Goss, 22 July 1999).

It was through the Languages and Cultures Unit (LACU) administered by the Division of Schools in the Department of Education that Goss was able to drive the implementation of the initiative centrally. Originally a recommendation of the Ingram Report (1989: 28) to monitor and coordinate the implementation of the LOTE initiative, LACU was linked into the government's central policy coordination agency, the Office of the Cabinet, of which Kevin Rudd was the Director General. LACU was established in May 1991. The Manager of LACU, Allan Langdon, recollects that it was established by Goss to ensure the LOTE initiative was implemented in accordance with the government's political mandate: 'Goss set up a unit which I have headed to see that that particular vision is implemented. I suppose it was a fairly top-down proposition' (Interview with Allan Langdon, 8 December 1997).55

As detailed in Chapter Two, the Office of the Cabinet was established to coordinate and develop policy in major areas of a cross-portfolio nature. It was also responsible for ensuring that government agencies implemented policy in accordance with the objectives of the government. In terms of the circumstances described above and the part played by the Office of the Cabinet, Davis's (1995: 84) description of its role as a 'defender of cabinet principles' is most relevant, as is Peter Coaldrake's comment that the role of the

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55 One central agency official confirmed that: 'In the early period of the Queensland government, there was a definite attempt to centralise responsibility for what were seen as some of the big issues of the day and the role of the Cabinet office in that is an obvious issue' (Interview with Brian Head, 19 July 1999).
Office of the Cabinet was to 'make sure policy is being followed' (Coald rake, cited in Davis, 1995: 85).

The Key Players Behind the Queensland LOTE Initiative

The previous discussion demonstrated that the Queensland LOTE initiative introduced by the Goss government was a policy direction a number of key figures in the Labor Party were determined to pursue, even when in Opposition.\(^\text{56}\) Notwithstanding resistance to the program, the evidence suggests that these powerful and strategically located individuals in the Labor Party Opposition were also responsible for the formulation and implementation of the program when it was elected to govern the state in December 1989. For instance, while in Opposition, Paul Braddy explained, there was a coalescence of the intentions of key figures in the Opposition who were eager to institute significant reforms:

Kevin Rudd arrived during Opposition as Goss's private secretary, and he also had a similar ambition. So in a way, it was a happy coincidence that three people with primarily similar aims; one the leader of the Opposition; two, the Shadow Minister and three, the Private Secretary with the background he had in foreign affairs. We all basically agreed with each other without having to sit down very often to discuss it (Interview with Paul Braddy, 21 July 1999).

When in government the same players became the driving forces behind the push for the teaching of Asian languages and cultures. Frank Peach, former Deputy Director General of the Queensland Education Department (1994-1998), pointed out that:

The Queensland strategy (state government policy) clearly came with the change of government from the Coalition to the Goss government in 1989. There is no doubt that Kevin Rudd, Paul Braddy and Nancy Viviani were the three key players in Queensland in doing that. Rudd has a passion for Asian languages due to his

\(^{56}\) In an interview, Goss explained that: 'We had basically come up with a policy, and driven a policy when in Opposition in Queensland... I said for a range of reasons, economic, social, cultural; if we want to be part of the region, we have to be in a much more comprehensive way and you can't do that unless you understand something about the languages and culture. We did it and the reaction was very positive' (Interview with Wayne Goss, 22 July 1999).
own interest and background and professional expertise. Paul Braddy had been the Shadow Minister for Education spokesman for some time and had become enmeshed in that agenda as well and was supported by Nancy Viviani from Griffith University. Paul became Minister for Education in the first Goss Labor government and was a very strong proponent of Asian languages. I think those three people were the key players and had the political clout in Cabinet and government to make sure the thing went ahead (Interview with Frank Peach, 22 July 1999).

Peach argues that Rudd and Braddy were instrumental to the form and implementation of the innovative Queensland LOTE initiative. But he also places Viviani close to the centre of the reforms. Positioned, as she was, as an advisor to the Department of Education, Viviani played an integral role in the formulation and implementation of the Queensland foreign languages policy. According to Allan Langdon, Viviani 'was intimately involved with both the initial policy formulation and acted as a guardian angel during the first few years of the program’s implementation' (Email correspondence from Allan Langdon, 2 February 1998).

As Goss's Principal Policy Advisor and then as Director General of the Office of the Cabinet after February 1991, Rudd was also instrumental in bringing the government's vision for greater teaching of Asian languages in Queensland schools to fruition. Indeed, Rudd became a very significant player in the government's overall agenda for reforming the Queensland public service, including the establishment of new cabinet rules, processes for policy submissions and the general way in which government agencies operated. In terms of the LOTE initiative, Rudd provided the political clout necessary to overcome Education Department resistance to various aspects of the LOTE initiative and, as Chapter Two of this study showed, he had a background in foreign affairs, particularly Australia's relations with Asia, and himself spoke fluent Chinese (Mandarin). Rudd passionately believed in Australia's engagement with Asia and saw the Queensland LOTE initiative as a useful means of facilitating the engagement process. In Opposition, Rudd explains, it was decided to progressively introduce Asian studies at the primary and secondary school level. He explains: 'I drafted the policy commitment leading up to the poll and once we became government it became policy' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 11
A small number of influential players were responsible for reforming languages policy in Queensland during the early 1990s, of which the most significant dimension was the introduction of a comprehensive second languages program with a specific focus on Asian languages. Thus, it was on the basis of the Queensland policy and a perception that the entire country needed to pursue a similar program of reform that the government pursued a 'national' Asian studies policy. It is to the origins and reasons for the national initiative that we shall now focus our attention.

*Origins of the NALSAS Strategy and Reasons for its Pursuit*

Although there had been much innovative reform in language teaching in Queensland, the Premier, his Office of the Cabinet CEO, Kevin Rudd, and the Education Minister, Paul Braddy, believed that the same could not be claimed for language teaching at the national level, particularly with regard to Asian languages. There was also a belief that many previous initiatives had failed to induce significant change, particularly in terms of instituting a nationally coordinated approach to overcoming problems associated with the teaching of Asian studies in Australia. Moreover, many were reconciled to the belief that the Commonwealth government was no longer prepared to show leadership on the matter. This was frustrating for those seeking change, given numerous Commonwealth statements to the effect that it saw great value in increasing the number of students studying Asian languages, on the one hand and, engagement with Asia, on the other. In light of these perceptions and in order that Australia as a whole maximised its engagement with East Asia, Rudd and Goss decided to pursue a national Asian studies strategy modeled on the Queensland policy.

Chapter Three demonstrated that since the early 1970s, numerous government and non-government commissioned reports drew attention to the parlous state of Asian languages teaching in Australia. The problems included a shortage of suitably qualified teachers, an inadequate teacher training system, the absence of quality teaching and curriculum materials, no means to measure teacher and student proficiencies, a shortage of funding and the absence of a nationally coordinated means by which these problems could be resolved. These reports argued that the absence of a nationally coordinated approach to
teaching Asian languages was, in large part, responsible for these ongoing problems. Despite the advocacy of a national effort there was, in Queensland, Allan Langdon remarked, a belief that 'no one had really gotten off their rear-ends and done something about it':

it was our view at the time that the country had been stuffing around with the notion for fifteen years. We wanted a descent amount of funds committed to a national policy where everyone was actually going to pull in the same direction (Interview with Allan Langdon, 8 December 1997).

Rudd\textsuperscript{57} described the situation in similar terms:

Over the course of those twenty-five years very little had been done. Sixteen reports were written over that period of time in which people said it (Asian languages and cultures) was a worthy thing and committed themselves to further action which was never followed through (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 11 December, 1997).

Notwithstanding a long history of valuable Commonwealth involvement and initiative in the area of Asian studies, a number of developments indicated that its commitment was waning and that by late 1991-92 Asian studies was falling off its agenda. First, despite its request for another term, the ASC was disbanded in June 1991. Chapter Three showed that the ASC became the Commonwealth's most significant initiative to promote Asian studies and was a reasonably influential advisory body with direct access to the larger education bureaucracy in Canberra. In fact, the ASC along with the AACIME and the National Consultative Council for International Literacy Year were replaced by a new Commonwealth advisory body, the Australian Language and Literacy Council (ALLC) (DEET, 1992: 174). It will be shown later in this chapter, that the ALLC actually opposed Queensland's NALSAS Strategy proposal. The AEF, which was established to complete ongoing ASC projects and carry out many of the tasks the ASC identified in its Second

\textsuperscript{57} In 1995 Rudd wrote about the disappointment which helped to prompt his and Goss's pursuit of the NALSAS Strategy: 'There is clearly a huge disparity between our national rhetoric on the importance of understanding the languages and cultures of the region on the one hand and the reality of what occurs in the nation's classrooms on the other. We have talked a lot but done very little' (Rudd, 1995: 22).
Term Strategy, was also announced in the ALLP in August 1991. However, although it was announced in the middle of 1991, it was opened to tender in January 1992 and only began operating in July 1992. Thus, for more than a year there existed no government-attached body advancing the cause of Asian studies in Australia. Moreover, the AEF was only funded at the rate of $3.5 million over three years and, not discounting the valuable work that it would eventually carry out, its brief was to promote the Study of Asia only (McGregor, 1993).

Under the ALLP, as the previous chapter demonstrated, responsibility for Asian studies was transferred to the Working Party on the AEC/MOVEET, the group which established to implement and coordinate the LOTE element of the ALLP. It should also be recalled that, the ASC Report *Studies of Asia and Asian Languages in Australian Schools* and its recommendations, were also passed to a sub-committee of this group in the middle of 1992. In short, there was a feeling that very little Commonwealth or state activity aimed at properly funding and advancing Asian studies was taking place in a timely fashion. In Queensland there was a feeling that, short of strategic government intervention at the highest level the findings of reports, their recommendations and the good intentions that accompanied them, would continue to just float around rather than be bought to ground in the form of solid nationally collaborative programs and strategies.

The second reason for doubting the Commonwealth's commitment to Asian studies was that its language policy, the ALLP, failed to take a decisive stance on the prioritisation of languages, and thereby indicating that the government was reluctant to commit itself to national leadership on the issue. Instead, the Commonwealth designated fourteen priority languages and provided vague criteria by which states could make decisions about which languages to promote. As an incentive for the states, the Commonwealth would provided an annual $300 grant for every Year 12 student studying one of the priority languages. Although seven of the priority languages were Asian languages, there were no additional or special measures beyond the annual incentive payment to induce state governments to promote them. This demonstrated that the Commonwealth was prepared to leave decisions about prioritisation in the hands of the state governments (Nicholas *et al*, 1993: 25-9). In a direct response to the ALLP and the issue of prioritisation and its

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58 See Nicholas *et al* (1993) for a comprehensive review and critique of the ALLP. A key recommendation of their report is for the Commonwealth to 'adopt the practice that priority lists of languages should contain only those languages which have been identified as being in need of
implications for Asian languages, Viviani concluded that:

The latest state of play at the federal level, despite Mr Keating's rhetoric, is that the federal government has given up federal leadership on Asian languages, because of the politics of the issue, and has handed this can of worms to the states. We may expect that language policy will now be decided principally on the politics of these issues within each state (Viviani, 1992: 64). 59

Apart from lamenting the fate of Asian languages and their subjection to state politics, Viviani also criticised the Commonwealth for not matching its rhetoric about Asian studies with substantive action on the ground. When Paul Keating became Prime Minister in December 1991, the rhetoric of Asian engagement was stepped-up. Keating started to advocate engagement with Asia with greater enthusiasm and vigour (Keating, 1992; 1993). However, Goss, Rudd and others were increasingly of the view that Keating's statements on the issue were not being matched with action 60. Allan Langdon pointed out that 'Goss's view was that the Commonwealth had been making noise about Asian languages and studies but the Commonwealth had done nothing about it' (Interview with Allan Langdon, 8 December 1997). In an article he would write several years later about the forces which prompted the NALSAS Strategy, Rudd asked the question:

Are we content to bask in the warm afterglow from extravagant political language about 'Australia's future in Asia', while all along believing in our hearts that one day all those 'Asians' will simply learn English, in which case what's the point in Australians trying to master Japanese Kanji? (Rudd, 1995: 23).

59 The article was a revised version of an address to the 'Asian Studies in Schools' Conference of the Asian Studies Council, Monash University, November 1990.

60 A Senior Office of the Cabinet Official also noted how Goss and Rudd exploited Keating's position and rhetoric on Australian engagement with Asia. He stated that: 'clearly there was a lot of rhetorical stuff from the Commonwealth that could be fed into that (the proposal for a national strategy) in terms of just rationale and symbolic stuff and so on, so that it could, in effect, give back to the Commonwealth its own words and say, well, this is an example of something that you would be supportive of given your interest in these fine ideals' (Interview with Brian Head, 19 July 1999).
In the context described above, the Queensland government decided to launch its own proposal for a national initiative in mid 1992. The initiative would become known as the NALSAS Strategy. And, given its successful implementation since 1990, Rudd and Goss believed that their own state-based foreign languages program could form the basis of the proposed national strategy. Indeed, they wanted to take the Queensland LOTE policy and implement it at the national level. They would use the successful implementation of the Queensland model, combined with the federal government's policy of engagement with Asia, as arguments to help win support for the idea. Rudd explained:

You had a state which had already trailed through its own school system a comprehensive languages and studies program which if then had been taken nationally would have put flesh on the bones of that policy direction (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 11 December 1997)

Former Queensland Minister for Education, Pat Comben, who replaced Paul Braddy in September 1992, explains that there was a view in Queensland that 'We had a template that was there and this thing should be spread out a bit wider, and so did the agendas of Goss and Rudd' (Interview with Pat Comben, 1 December 1999). Moreover, to infuse Commonwealth rhetoric with substance, there was also a view that the Commonwealth should make a significant financial contribution to the national program. Goss argued that if the Commonwealth government was serious in its talk of engagement with Asia 'then why shouldn't they contribute'. Goss thought 'it was important... and needed to be pursued at the federal level' He concedes that, 'it was a big ask financially and in policy terms'. Nonetheless, he held the view that since the Commonwealth operated a well-resourced Education Department it should contribute money to the proposed strategy: he believed that 'there should be a Commonwealth involvement'. The rationale was clearly summarised by one close observer, the Education Minister, Mr Braddy:

61 It could be argued that Rudd and Goss recognised the lack of enthusiasm for Asian studies at the top of the Commonwealth DEET. As one senior DEET official observed in 1992, many felt that the 'Asian language case had dropped out of national awareness, and by then Dawkins, who was very keen on Asian languages and the need for Australians to be much more fluent, had gone, and then it became Beasley and then Crean. Now neither Beasley nor Crean were terribly into schools' issues; Ross Free did most of that at the time, he was an ex-teacher, wasn't very radical (and did not want to) rock things'. In relation to Dawkins' support for the teaching of Asian studies, see Dawkins (1988a, 1988b). For an insight to his views on national education coordination see Dawkins (1988a).
Wayne Goss and Kevin Rudd were the key figures because they wanted to move what we had done in Queensland and use it as a springboard. Goss as Premier had the power position and was very enthusiastic about it, as I was, but as I said, my role was to keep an eye on and drive the Department. They could then argue from a position of strength; Queensland has done this, it works...I think they were able to jolt the Commonwealth government at the time, who were perhaps, to some extent, mouthing rhetoric but were not actually doing a lot about it. Goss, with Rudd's assistance, was able to say hey, we are actually doing it (Interview with Paul Braddy, 21 July 1999).

Goss and Rudd wanted to establish a coordinated approach to teaching Asian studies in Australian schools so as to maximise Australia's economic performance in East Asia. Equipping future generations with Asian linguistic and cultural skills was necessary to facilitate not only Queensland's, but Australia's economic, social and cultural engagement with the region. It was thought that a genuinely collaborative approach accompanied by a greater commitment of resources by Commonwealth and state governments would also arrest the decline in the number of students studying a second language and resolve many of the problems plaguing the teaching of Asian studies in schools. Goss gave two main reasons:

The first reason is that Australia is and should be part of the Asia-Pacific. We need to more comprehensively engage, that was what our policy was about; not just continuing to sell coal to Japan and Korea and sort of racing back for the cheque; a more comprehensive engagement. The second genuine reason is that Australia, not just Queensland, should have this place in the Asia-Pacific (Interview with Wayne Goss, 22 July 1999).

If Australia was going to successfully and comprehensively meld itself into the Asia-Pacific region, then future language policies would need to be coordinated at a national level. Queensland had shown through its own innovative policies what could be achieved. Allan Langdon clarified these points:

At the time we realised that we could do these things in Queensland and probably did not need to worry about the rest of the country. But if Australia was actually going to be drawn forward with its engagement with Asia then something had to
Earlier discussion argued that Rudd was an important actor in the push to increase the teaching of Asian languages and cultures in Queensland schools. However, he was the primary driving force behind the national strategy. Rudd explained that, after going into the 1989 State Election promising to increase the teaching of Asian languages in the state school system and implementing the policy throughout 1990-1992, 'Both myself and the Premier were actually interested in taking the state's reforms nationally'. He continues, stating that, 'I actually wanted to achieve a policy outcome which would be implemented and funded as far as Asian languages and studies in Australian schools education was concerned' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999). Goss affirms Rudd's centrality to the initiative, asserting that in terms of its origins Rudd was a profound influence: 'when it came to the national policy Kevin was the key driver'. Frank Peach explained:

I have also no doubt that Kevin Rudd's passion and genuine commitment to the whole process was very critical. Had he not been there it wouldn't have happened. I would put Kevin Rudd at the centre of it (Interview with Frank Peach, 22 July 1999).

During the latter half of 1992, Rudd placed his proposal for a national Asian studies strategy on the agenda of the COAG Senior Officials Steering Committee as a possible item of inclusion and consideration on the agenda of the December 1992 COAG meeting to be held in Perth (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999). As Chapter Two has already explained, the Senior Officials Steering Committee was the central committee amongst a network of other more specialised committees, which met prior to COAG meetings to organise the agenda of items for consideration by heads of government. The committee comprised the head of the DPM&C and the CEO's of state government Cabinet Offices or Premiers' Departments, depending on state government coordination machinery. As Director General of the Office of the Cabinet in Queensland, Rudd took the proposal direct to his counterparts in the other states for their consideration.

Rudd and Goss's proposal for a national program was reported by the *Courier Mail* just a few days prior to the COAG meeting in Perth on 7 December. The Report stated that:

Queensland wants the rest of Australia to adopt comprehensive national Asian
studies programs modeled on those developed by the Goss government. Premier Wayne Goss will ask the Council of Australian Governments meeting in Perth on Monday to put Asia languages high on the national agenda... Mr Goss will be armed with a letter paying glowing tribute to the Queensland approach when he pushed in Perth for the adoption of the state’s system (Morley, 1992: 5).

The Report cited Goss as saying that "I will be urging the meeting to set the end of the decade as a target for having a comprehensive Asian languages and cultures program in all Australian schools". The Australian Financial Review also reported Prime Minister Keating's view on the proposal, and the tabling of Queensland's proposal to the Federal Cabinet, several days before the COAG meeting Perth:

Mr Keating put a proposal for a national Asian studies plan to Federal Cabinet last night and he hopes to get the premiers to agree to it when they meet in Perth on Monday (Kitney, 1992: 3).

The timing of the proposal and the push to have it endorsed by Keating and the other state leaders can be explained by reference to a number of circumstantial factors which provided a unique opportunity. First and foremost among these was the opportunity represented by Keating's well-known desire for Australia to become more closely engaged with the Asia-Pacific region and an active and respected participant in regional affairs. This will be discussed in much greater detail shortly.

While also signifying opportunities to push for change, there were three other arguments Goss and Rudd were ready to employ as leverage had prime ministerial support for the proposal not been readily forthcoming (Interview with Allan Langdon, 19 July 1999). First, they were prepared to argue that if the Commonwealth wanted to take over the TAFE sector, then it should also be ready to provide more support for its own stated

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62 Early in 1992 the Commonwealth offered to assume full responsibility for TAFE and vocational education and training. Under the proposal the states would retain responsibility for management and administration of the systems. However, the states were concerned about the implications of full Commonwealth control implicit in the offer. An extended period of intense negotiations took place which sought to balance the constitutional reality with the need for a national and adequately funded vocational education and training system. From these negotiations came an agreement between heads of government to establish a new training body, the Australian National Training Authority (ANTA), responsible for advising state and Commonwealth governments on appropriate policies to move towards a national focus for the vocational education and training sector (Finn, 1995).
priority of teaching Asian studies. Secondly, Goss felt that, if Keating was unwilling to consider reforming federal financial arrangements, then it would be reasonable to expect the Commonwealth to financially support the national Asian studies proposal. This was a particularly important argument in light of Keating's proclamations in his speech to the National Press Club in 1991 that the Commonwealth's fiscal dominance vis-à-vis the states was necessary for it to provide national leadership (Keating, 1991; and see Painter, 1998: 18-19). Finally, Rudd and Goss were prepared to argue that, if the SPC and COAG were truly 'national' initiatives, then Queensland should not only be entitled, but assisted in its endeavour to pursue a genuinely national initiative such as the one it was proposing.

To ensure that his proposal was given proper consideration at the steering committee level, Rudd had previously discussed the initiative with the Prime Minister and his office in Canberra. Rudd understood that for matters to be considered by the Council, the endorsement of the Prime Minister was imperative. Consequently, Rudd recalls that the first and most critical step was to get the Prime Minister and his office on the bus. This entailed 'several extensive discussions in his office in Canberra between myself and his advisors, between myself and Premier Goss and, from time to time, with the Prime Minister himself on the worthwhileness of this initiative' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 11 December 1997). The primary argument employed by Rudd was that his proposal would neatly complement Keating's broader policy of Australia's engagement with Asia. Rudd saw the proposal as 'putting flesh on those bones'. In short, he remarks, 'it represented a neat fit in terms of a pre-determined national policy direction by the Commonwealth'.

The smaller states feared the consequences of the initial Commonwealth proposal for a full funding takeover because in those states the sector was a significant instrument of local development and one of the last policy areas over which the states exercised full autonomy. Wayne Goss was particularly hostile to the proposed Commonwealth takeover and, as Painter (1998: 75) writes, 'fought hard on the side of the smaller states'.

63 Brian Head, then Executive-Director of the Policy Planning Unit in the Queensland Office of the Cabinet, explained that the establishment of ANTA in Brisbane (a decision for which Goss and Rudd were both largely responsible; see also Painter, 1998: 75) was 'part of convincing the Commonwealth that "national" initiatives were not Commonwealth initiatives and could be shared around... if Melbourne and Sydney could have national institutions, why couldn't Brisbane, Adelaide and Hobart if it were truly national' (Interview with Brian Head, 19 July 1999).
Keating on Asia: An Opportunity for Change

Goss and Rudd perceived Keating's increasingly frequent pronouncements about deepening Australia's links with Asia as an opportunity to push their proposal for a national Asian studies policy. They also knew that the proposal would only succeed if it received prime ministerial support. Engagement with Asia was pursued by Bob Hawke during the 1980s. The single most important symbol of this aspiration was his involvement in the creation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in November 1989. However, after this initial thrust by successive Hawke governments, the Keating government breathed new life into Australia's historic shift towards Asia and met the associated challenges with renewed vigour. Keating's agenda for deeper engagement with Asia surpassed Hawke's own acute awareness of the economic, political and strategic importance of the region to Australia (Cotton and Ravenhill, 1997: 1-2). In his book *Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific*, Keating (2000) identifies three convictions about Australia's place in the world which he brought to the Prime Ministership. One of these is particularly relevant to Queensland's proposal for a national Asian studies policy. Keating (2000: 17) was convinced that Australia's destiny was with Asia. He believed:

Asia was where Australia's future substantially lay and that we needed to engage with it at a level and with an intensity we had never come close to doing in the past. This was not because we had not been interested in Asia before. But what was different in 1991 was that never before had all our national interests - coalesced so strongly in the one place as they did now.

It was on the basis of Keating's deep and genuine commitment to Asia that Rudd, in association with Premier Wayne Goss, believed he could persuade the Prime Minister to financially support the Strategy. Rudd recalled:

Both myself and the Premier were actually interested in taking the state's reforms nationally and we saw an entrepreneurial opportunity given the PM's repeated statements about Australia's future economic integration with East Asia, and that this particular programme would attach flesh to those bones (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).

Goss also read the situation as one which provided an opportunity to push for a national
strategy. Paul Keating, he explained, 'was very big on Asia and it fitted in quite neatly to that and we didn't miss the opportunity' (Interview with Wayne Goss, 22 July 1999).

The sincerity of Keating's desire to more closely integrate Australia's economy with the dynamic Asia-Pacific region is clearly elucidated in a number of the speeches he delivered in the early 1990s. For example, in his first major foreign policy address after becoming Prime Minister in December 1991, Keating unveiled his vision for Australia's future in Asia and spoke of the challenges that this enterprise inevitably posed. In a speech delivered to the Asia-Australia Institute in April 1992, he referred to Australia's British heritage and the necessity for Australia to start thinking of itself as a separate, autonomous and independent nation. He spoke of an Australian attitude 'which still cannot separate our interests, our history or our future from the British'. The attitude that Australia's well-being is somehow dependent on our attachment to Britain he remarked, 'still exercises at least a subliminal influence on our thinking'. Keating warned that this view of Australian identity has 'long been, and remains debilitating to our national culture, our economic future our destiny as a nation in Asia and the Pacific'. Australia must come to terms with its close proximity to Asia he contended, and realise that 'Asia is where our future substantially lies; that we can and must go there; and that this course we are on is irreversible' (Keating, 1992).

Keating also emphasised Australia's economic interests in Asia. Citing a number of promising trade statistics, Keating stressed that 'the opportunities for Australia cannot be overstated'. Manufactured exports were increasing, exports of services were growing and Australian investment in Asia was expanding: 'We can live and prosper in the Asia-Pacific', he claimed. He also articulated his vision for APEC. Keating understood APEC as a regional institution which could both stabilise and preserve the economic prosperity of the region and assist Australia's integration with Asia. Whereas Hawke and Evans had envisioned the process to be one which focused on collaborative activities, Keating wanted to shift the emphasis towards trade liberalisation. He argued that the value of the APEC process was 'its promotion of regional economic co-operation within a framework which embraces North America and East Asia'. Keating wanted APEC to consist of a series of on-going meetings between heads of government. Periodic meetings between Asia-Pacific leaders, he held, was the best formula for conducting regional affairs (Keating, 1992; and see Gordon, 1996: 285, Ravenhill, 1997: 100; Evans and Grant, 1994: 10).
It was clear that Keating believed Australia’s national destiny was becoming increasingly intertwined with the destinies of numerous Asian countries in the region. The rhetoric shows that he was not only vigilant of the direction in which history appeared to be moving but illustrates that he also sought to ensure Australia seized the opportunities this shift presented. And, rather than be a silent observer, Keating wanted Australia to play an active part in the transformations taking place. It is also clear that, in Keating’s Asia-rhetoric, Rudd and Goss detected an opportunity to garner Commonwealth financial support and endorsement for a national Asian languages strategy. Rudd recognised that it was a particularly suitable juncture to pursue such a strategy given the Prime Minister’s predisposition towards Australia’s engagement with Asia. According to Rudd:

It was our general view that the Prime Minister had carved out a national policy direction of comprehensive engagement with East Asia. We saw this policy as putting flesh on those bones. Therefore it represented a neat fit in terms of a predetermined national policy direction by the Commonwealth (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 11 December 1997).

There is significant evidence to suggest that when Paul Keating became Prime Minister in December 1991, there was a shift in the priorities of the leadership which augured well for Rudd and Queensland. This will be discussed further in the next chapter. But Rudd and Goss saw further opportunities to facilitate their intentions in the recently established COAG, named as such by Keating as the successor initiative to the SPC’s convened by Hawke in 1990-91 (See Chapter Two) It is to COAG and its role in the NALSAS Strategy policy process that we now turn.

The Council of Australian Governments

Rudd consciously chose not to pursue his initiative through the normal channels. Rather than use the AEC/MOVEET, the ministerial council concerned with making policy and resolving issues with interjurisdictional dimensions in school education, he decided to use a forum more sympathetic to the economic framework within which the national Asian studies proposal was cast. Since he was attempting to sell the idea on the basis that it would facilitate Australia’s economic engagement with Asia, that is, as an economic reform, Rudd employed COAG (Correspondence from Kevin Rudd, 22 May 2001).
Indeed, COAG itself was established to initiate, negotiate and implement policy reforms of national economic significance which required joint Commonwealth-State action. The creation of COAG was part of the broader Hawke/Keating agenda of microeconomic reform aimed at preparing the Australian economy to compete successfully at the global level, particularly in East Asia. Of course this was precisely how Rudd and Goss had decided to market their proposal for a national Asian studies policy.

The initiative was presented as a branch of national economic policy. Rudd made a conscious decision to use COAG and justified their choice by arguing that the initiative was about enhancing economic competitiveness rather than education. As Tim Spencer from the Queensland Office of the Cabinet remarked, the initiative 'was seen as a major economic reform, rather than just a reform in the education system' (Interview with Tim Spencer, 25 May 1999). But there is a compelling body of evidence which suggests that the COAG was used for reasons other than its economic purpose and nature. The evidence demonstrates that as a heads of government policy making body, COAG could exercise significantly more political power than a ministerial council. As will be demonstrated, it has frequently been alleged that ministerial councils are notoriously incapable of making progress on matters which involve large amounts of money and are not prone to the development of innovative approaches to policy development. By employing COAG, and therefore having the matter dealt with by heads of government and their central agencies, Rudd was provided with direct access to the Prime Minister and premiers and their chief executive officers and largely sidestepped line departments, ministers and the relevant ministerial council.

In federal systems there is a significant degree of jurisdictional interpenetration and thus, a need for mechanisms which enable communication between the different levels of government. In Australia a complex arrangement of intergovernmental forums and institutions, such as ministerial councils and committees, allows ministers and officials to seek mutually agreed policy responses to policy matters as they emerge (See ACIR, 1984 and DPM&E, 1994 for list of existing ministerial councils). Ministerial councils have long played an important part in intergovernmental relations and the coordination of policy across the different levels of government. Wettenhall (1985: 34) describes them as 'valuable lubricants making the operation of our system of cooperative federalism more effective'. Chapman, similarly, defines a ministerial council as follows:
Councils provide a forum in which the component units of the federal system can come together to arrive at a common understanding of the issues... They are tools of effective policy-making in a federal system; ways of coping with the inevitable conflicts of jurisdiction and interest that emerge over time (Chapman, 1988: 107).

Ministerial councils provide opportunities for interaction between ministers who would normally operate autonomously within their own jurisdictions and make decisions on a unilateral basis. Councils enable ministers to discuss and resolve issues with cross-jurisdictional dimensions together, often in a very non-partisan fashion (Wettenhall, 1985: 35).

However, it is argued by some that ministerial councils are neither effective nor efficient. Certain commentators and participants in intergovernmental relations argue that ministerial councils are unable to carry out far-reaching national policy reform. There are two closely related reasons for this. First, as ministerial councils endeavour to maintain a harmonious and non-partisan working relationship, non-sensitive political matters become the main focus of council discussion. Instead of reaching decisions which pre-empt real policy action, ministerial council outcomes result in 'minimum tolerable consensus' (Chapman, 1988: 117) or similarly, using Wettenhall's metaphor, the 'lowest common denominator effect' (1985: 35). Second, and this is particularly the case during times of great economic and social change, ministerial councils are often unable to respond quickly to urgent matters of national significance. One academic has explained that 'there is a heightened potential for councils to become bottle-necks which prevent the timely development of national policy' (Hede, 1993: 205).

The creation of COAG was partly aimed at alleviating some of these problems. In his

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64 There are also concerns about the accountability of ministerial councils to executive government. Councils often make decisions which are not accountable to parliaments, their cabinet colleagues and therefore their electoral constituencies. The proceedings of meetings are often shrouded in a veil of secrecy and, as Saunders (in Galligan et al 1991, 50) points out, state governments are less likely than their Commonwealth counterparts to gain direct access to detailed accounts of ministerial meeting discussions and negotiations.

65 As far as improving accountability is concerned, COAG made two important decisions in relation to ministerial councils when it met first in 1992. First, heads of government agreed on a set of operational protocols on the way ministerial councils operated, and the second and most significant decision, was to commission a review of ministerial councils which considered the
review of the SPC and COAG reform process, Weller (1996: 103) argues that 'because central agencies had less invested in particular policies, they could be more ambitious or radical in developing solutions'. Central agencies did not carry with them the historical baggage which burdened portfolio ministers. Consequently, contentious national policy questions which may have been ignored, or dealt with by appeal to the lowest common denominator at the ministerial council level, were engaged head-on by central agencies who were not locked into pre-determined policy positions. Furthermore, the creation of COAG intended to overcome the problems associated with 'bottle-necking'. Weller explains with regard to the SPC and COAG initiative:

it is as a contrast to the ministerial councils whose numbers were proliferating and whose focus was often narrow and too limited to allow any real innovation or progress... COAG sought to make progress where ministerial councils had failed (1996: 103)

Reflecting on his own experiences of COAG senior officials meetings and COAG generally, Rudd explained that devolving important national issues to the relevant ministerial council was often a recipe for policy paralysis:

I think the universal refrain in most COAG senior officials meetings, and I attended all of them from 1990, although COAG was not called that then, until 1995, was that we cannot allow this particular matter, whatever it happens to be, transport reform, other areas of microeconomic reform, or social policy areas of health and housing, simply to be devolved back to the ministerial council arrangement because that was usually, not universally, but usually the inevitable formula for ensuring that nothing actually happened. So when frustration levels within either the Commonwealth or states rose to the surface about non-progress in a particular policy area, we now had a constructive outlet, which was to elevate it from the ministerial council agenda to the heads of government agenda. And of course the organisational dynamics of that and interpersonal dynamics of that were

operation, scope and number of ministerial councils. When it met in June 1993, COAG considered the review and decided to reduce the number of ministerial councils from 42 to 21 (Commonwealth-state relations Secretariat, DPM&C 1994). Hede (1993: 201) argues that the new protocols, and particularly the rationalisation of ministerial councils, signaled COAG's desire to assert more control over policy coordination across all ministerial councils.
a bit like international negotiations between heads of government, that is, suddenly
the intractable trench warfare between line departments from well rehearsed
positions going back to when Adam was a boy, suddenly were all up for grabs
again; as a new series of policy players were introduced into the field who are not
instinctively captive to historical departmental positions, or in the case of
international negotiations, historical national positions. There are some clear
analogies (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).

In his authoritative 50 year history of the AEC, Spaull (1987: 306) points out that for most
of its life the AEC has failed to 'seize the political moment to become a proactive agent in
educational change, especially in Federal/State relations'. Far from pursuing exciting and
innovative ideas, the AEC 'has often appeared introspective in thought and cumbersome
in action'. However, Spaull adds the caveat that over time, particularly by the end of the
1980s, the AEC had developed the potential to make significant policy contributions. 66
Another observer, Greg Ramsay, a former Chair of the National Board of Employment,
Education and Training, explains that when achieving national education policies 'the
AEC approach works well where no funds, or very few funds, are involved and individual
state perspectives are consistent with the national interest'. Nevertheless, he argues,
'Often the agreements are too general to provide a basis for effective action in national
sense' (Ramsay, 1991: 36). 67

66 Spaull writes that: 'At the start of the decade the AEC was widely seen as an important interest
group in national education... By the end of the decade, the AEC had emerged with the potential
to become an important source of policy formulation in national education' (Spaull, 1987: 254). In
accounting for this new found potential, Spaull cites the inclusion of the Commonwealth Minister
on the Council since 1972, which has meant that ministers have had to respond to the
Commonwealth's national education agenda and provided a forum for initial negotiations between
the Commonwealth and states over funding issues and other initiatives. Innovations such as the
establishment of a secretariat, working parties and the AEC seminar were largely the ideas of

Other commentators have drawn attention to the growth of the 'ministerialisation' of education
since the late 1980s and corresponding usurpation of the influence of the Directors-General.
Lingard, Porter, Bartlett and Knight (1995: 43) write that 'the increasing ministerialisation of policy
formation saw it become a more significant policy body'.

67 Frank Peach explained that the rapid turnover of council ministers and officials was also a
problem which confronted the MCEETYA during his term as Director General of Education in
Queensland in the 1990's. He recalled that 'the first thing really is the coincidence of history.
There needs to be some stability of the participants there, and in my five years of going to
MCEETYA, that at any given time the most experienced minister in the room had been minister
for education for about 2 years. If you could do better that that it was a bloody miracle. So that
was a significant factor. There was no organisational, or no memory amongst the political people.
It wasn't much better when it came to DGs either' (Interview with Frank Peach, 22 July 1999).
However, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, there were few signs that the AEC was making real progress towards advancing the teaching of Asian languages and studies in schools during the 1980s and early 1990s. In Chapter Three, and earlier in this chapter, it was noted that certain elements of the ASC's Second Term Strategy as well as its report, entitled *Studies of Asia and Asian Languages in Australian Schools*, were placed in the hands of the AEC/MOVEET Working Party on the ALLP in February 1992. A sub-committee of that body was then formed to consider future directions. Through the ministerial council state education ministers and directors-general of education proclaimed their support for Asian studies by resolving to increase the number of students studying Asia and Asian languages and develop curriculum and training courses accordingly. Better coordination was also agreed by the but this never took place. This lack of real progress and inability to innovate was a key factor in Rudd choosing COAG rather than the AEC/MOVEET. Asked why he and the Premier chose to drive the Strategy through the COAG, Rudd replied:

As the Report notes, and previous reports that had been done, very little, if anything had been achieved in practice. So if you were serious about it and you wanted an outcome this was the forum to use. No other would produce such results. So you used a much more direct approach. By getting the premiers and the Prime Minister on board you are almost there (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).

Rudd's view is supported by a number of others. Tim Spencer, a senior official located in the Office of the Cabinet, explains that the decision to use COAG was due to the inability of the AEC/MOVEET to make sufficient progress on the matter. He recalled:

That was the real driver, that is, the inability of councils to make progress... It needed to be lifted out of the day to day participants in the education field who

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68 Frank Peach commented more generally and reinforced the view that the ministerial council was inefficient and often ineffective: 'I don't think that in my experience the premiers that I have dealt with or their senior bureaucrats have got a very high opinion of educators and their management capacity, capacity to deliver. Put them with their ministers in MCEETYA and it is well-known that they won't deliver. There are just too many sacred cows there for them to be likely to succeed, unless you have got a whole set of particular factors in place beforehand' (Interview with Frank Peach, 22 July 1999).
quite probably have focused on delivering within a set paradigm and set of policies. What Asian languages tried to achieve was a quantum shift in them. Therefore it necessarily flowed into a different level. COAG was at that time seen as a useful vehicle for pushing things through or getting change in certain areas (Interview with Tim Spencer, 25 May 1999).

Former Deputy Director General of the Queensland Department of Education, Frank Peach, agrees that COAG was deliberately chosen to ensure the proposal was adopted and implemented in a timely fashion:

Using COAG was part of a deliberate strategy to ram the thing through... I have no doubt that they were determined to get their agenda up. Although there was never any discussion with me personally about MCEETYA\(^69\) not being able to do it, I have no doubt that that would have been the case, no doubt (Interview with Frank Peach, 22 July 1999).

The political power of COAG resides in its nature as a heads of government policy venue. By driving his proposal through COAG, the process in which Rudd became embroiled automatically became part of the jurisdiction of Commonwealth and state government central agencies. As was argued in Chapter Three, the Council's policy development and reform process concentrates political power, control, and decision making capacity within the central agencies of state and Commonwealth bureaucracies, and thereby compromises the deliberative capacity of line departments (Fletcher and Walsh, 1992: 607-08). Tim Spencer affirmed the vital role the Queensland Office of the Cabinet played in the NALSAS Strategy policy process:

In this case a central agency driving the process was absolutely essential. It would not have moved anywhere without it. At the Office of the Cabinet level, it was essential to be driven at that level. There was no strong motivation for it in line departments; they were working from within there particular paradigm. I think that it was also important that the Premiers Department and the other key central agency, Treasury, was involved because you needed both the policy drive and the

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\(^69\) The Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA) was created in December 1993 (to also include Youth Ministers) to replace the AEC/MOVEET.
financial rigour to be able to implement any policy outcomes that were
determined. There is no doubt that it became a crash through exercise which is
something only the top tier of the bureaucracy can really achieve (Interview with

In short, the COAG provided Rudd and Goss with the means to gain access to the most
powerful decision makers in Australia, and enabled them to avoid the AEC/MOVEET,
the normal forum in which such an initiative would be negotiated. Since it was driven by a
central agency through the intergovernmental machinery of the New Federalism, the
potential for paralysis and blockage was avoided, just as the Office of the Cabinet was able
to ensure that the Queensland LOTE initiative proceeded according to plan.

When the COAG met in Perth on 9 December 1992, heads of government endorsed the
Queensland proposal for a national Asian studies strategy. The Courier Mail reported that
this was decided 'after it unanimously accepted a Queensland sponsored move'. It was
agreed that Rudd would 'chair a key Commonwealth-States taskforce aimed at giving
Asian languages priority in Australian schools'. Goss, according to the newspaper report,
'was delighted the initiative had been agreed to, because of the importance to Australia in
its future economic relations, especially in trade, investment and tourism - with Asia'
(Courier Mail, 1992: 2).

The communique released by the COAG following the Perth meeting read as follows:

Council noted:

• the importance of the development of a comprehensive understanding of Asian
  languages and cultures through the Australian education system if Australia is to
  maximise economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region... and agreed that Asian
  language development is a matter of national importance, requiring urgent and high-
  level attention to a national level.

• Agreed that Asian languages development is a matter of national importance, requiring
  urgent and high-level attention to a national level; and
agreed to establish a high level working group to prepare a report for the Council by the end of 1993
outlining current efforts of the Commonwealth and states in Asian languages and culture education; and
developing a strategic framework for the implementation of a comprehensive Asian languages and cultures program in Australian schools (and, where relevant, TAFE's by the end of the decade (COAG, 1992: 9).

Preparing this document would become Rudd's responsibility for the next nine months.
Part Two: The Rudd Report: Content, Criticism and Resistance

The National Asian Languages and Cultures Working Group was chaired by Kevin Rudd. The Commonwealth government was represented by senior officials from the DPM&C and the DEET, and state premiers appointed both senior central agency and Education Department officials to represent their interests. An independent consultant also attended some meetings. There were thirty-four Working Group members in total. It met on seven occasions between May 1993 and February 1994 and received over ninety submissions from industry and education sectors, including higher education and TAFE, as well as teachers associations, parent bodies and others.

The report of the Working Group was completed early in 1994, distributed to heads of government and tabled at the COAG meeting in February 1994 in Hobart. The Report titled, *Asian Languages and Australia's Economic Future*, which had been compiled over a period of nine months, was endorsed by heads of government pending an agreement on funding. The COAG communiqué read that heads of government 'welcomed the release of the Report... and its recommendations for a strategic framework for the implementation of a comprehensive Asian languages and cultures program in Australian schools' (Rudd, 1994: 15-16). The approval of the Report by heads of government was reported by *The Australian*. It stated that the strategy, 'which will result in year 3 students beginning to study a second language in 1996, is aimed at producing an Asia-literate generation to boost Australia's international and regional economic performance' (King, 1994: 8). In Brisbane, the national affairs editor of the *Courier Mail* 70

70 In the same edition of the *Courier Mail* Rudd was reported to have commented that 'This will equip the next generation of Australian children with the skills to maximise Australia's access in regional export markets and generate greater economic growth and therefore employment' (Brown, 1994: 2).

Another article, which appeared in the same edition of the *Courier Mail*, favourably discussed the economic thrust of the Report. It pointed out that 'The thrust of the Council of Australian Government's decision to back a Queensland-led Asian language teaching policy is that this country's economic future is firmly tied to East Asia and the Pacific'. More specifically, the article argued that 'Loading applicable language skills and cultural awareness into the education system will, over the years, produce business operators who are in tune with those to whom they wish to
reporting on the outcomes of the COAG meeting, wrote that: 'Four Asian languages are to be taught in all Australian schools under a comprehensive strategy endorsed by the Council of Australian Government' (Brown, 1994: 2).

**The Rudd Report**

The Report clearly stated that, in accordance with its terms of reference, its primary focus was on Asian languages and cultures as a means of improving Australia's economic interests in East Asia. This objective, it explained, was to be understood in the context of broader policy aims regarding the internationalisation of the Australian economy (Rudd, 1994: 2). Previous reports dealing with Asian studies had uniformly identified a nexus between linguistic capacity and economic performance. Since 1969, it asserted, no less than 15 reports pointed to this nexus and recommended the need to increase second language teaching, particularly Asian languages. It pointed out that despite the findings of these reports, only 4 per cent of Year 12 students were studying a priority language. The Working Party concluded that: 'In the absence of strategic intervention by government, these trends are unlikely to be substantially arrested or reversed' (1994: 17). (See Appendix A).

Based on research undertaken by the East Asia Analytical Unit of the DFAT, the Report identified the four Asian languages of greatest economic significance to Australia: Japanese, Chinese (Mandarin), Indonesian and Korean. These became the four priority Asian languages to be targeted for future development. Chapter Three of the Report is where Rudd and the Working Group argued an economic case for Asian studies. It described the long term economic significance of East Asia to Australia and provided a rationale for increasing the Asian studies education profile in Australia (1994: 79).

The Report lamented the parlous state of Asian studies in Australia, even though it notes a slight increase in the proportion of Year 12 students studying an Asian language:

The delivery of second language education in Australia tends to be patchy and piecemeal with an absence of agreed proficiency standards for students, variable approaches to the intensity and continuity of study and deficiencies in teacher sell' (Laidlaw, 1994: 30; and see Roberts, 1994).
supply and course material (1994: 95).

The Report also argued too, that the provisions for Asian studies were also inadequate. It states that the ad hoc delivery of second language courses in schools: 'Is mirrored by the current piecemeal approach to the studies of the society in which the target language is spoken' (1994: 94). To remedy the inadequacies of the current provision of Asian studies programs and to increase the number of students studying a second language in schools, the Working Group proposed a school-based program (1994: 97-102). Such a program was necessary, the Report argued, to ensure adequate length and intensity of study over time in order to develop skill in Asian languages and cultures and because a 'child's intellect is more receptive to second languages learning' during the primary years of schooling. It was also thought that to build an export culture in Australia by developing a culture of second language learning it must be done nationally and comprehensively across the school system. Only expansion at the schools level, it argued, would generate the critical mass necessary from which to draw the range of skills necessary to carry out business in Asia.

Among numerous recommendations, the Report recommended that governments approve the target of 25 per cent of Year 12 students studying a second language, as proposed in the Commonwealth's ALLP, but extend the target date from 2000 to 2006. It noted that based on trends over the last decade, the Commonwealth's target would not be met unless second language provision was significantly increased from 1995, beginning in primary schools and flowing through to secondary schools over the next ten years. Even with the extended target date, strategic intervention by government would be required. In addition, the Report recommended that governments agree to meet the national target by having 15 per cent of Year 12 students studying a priority Asian language by 2006 (up from the current figure of 4 per cent), with the other 10 per cent of the Year 12 target be met by studying other languages (1994: 106). Finally, the Report recommended that ministers agree that by 2006, 60 per cent of Year 10 students be studying a priority Asian language.

Apart from making recommendations regarding the achievement of quantitative targets, the Report stressed the importance of measuring the effective implementation of the program in qualitative terms as well, that is, in terms of 'the knowledge, skills and understandings acquired through the learning of a second language and the individual's
ability to use the target language effectively and in culturally appropriate ways'. To this
end the Report recommended that, in relation to students studying one of the four priority
languages, COAG request education ministers to develop agreed proficiency scales and
testing and reporting instruments for the four priority Asian languages, the finalisation of
which should be by early 1995 and implementation at the beginning of school year 1996

The Report also recommended a number of combined quantitative and qualitative
targets in order to match numerical targets with appropriate proficiency levels. For Year
10 graduates it was expected that they reach "survival proficiency"; that the 15 per cent of
Year 12 students, by 2006, attain a level of proficiency defined, first, as "minimum social
proficiency" (13 per cent of Year 12 students); second, "minimum vocational proficiency."
(2 per cent of Year 12 students) and; three, "useful vocational proficiency (1 per cent of
Year 12 students) These were matched with measures to ensure proficiency in Asian
cultures, broadly defined to include the societies, history, politics, economic, geography,
arts and religion of East Asian countries, in accordance with length and intensity of study.

To improve the supply of language graduates and so as to achieve the target of 15
per cent of Year 12 students studying a second languages by 2006 (10 per cent of these
studying a priority Asian language), the Report recommended progressively mandating the
study of a second language over the next decade during the compulsory years of
schooling, but to maintain electivity for Years 11 and 12 (1994: 115). Among other points
and recommendations of note, the Report endorsed that: Year 3 was the most appropriate
age to begin study of a second language (1994: 123); recommended the development of a
national standard for the proficiency of Asian language teachers; a long-term Asian
language teacher supply program (1994: 129); and that education ministers be requested to
produce curriculum statements and frameworks and high quality teaching materials (1994:
131).

The Working Group recommended three separate programs for implementation: the
Asian Languages/Studies in Australian Schools Program (the largest of the three); the
Asian Language Immersion Program, and the Young Australians in Asia Program and the
establishment of a national collaborative mechanism to implement these programs (1994:
134). They decided that coordination of the implementation of the programs could be
achieved through the existing committee system of MCEETYA, created in December
1993 to replace the AEC/MOVEET. To this end, it recommended that the LOTE sub-committee created by the former AEC/MOVEET working party on the A_ LP be modified to include an official's Asian Languages and Cultures Steering Committee, and for the first three years, a permanent part-time chair (1994: 150). The steering committee would need to be serviced with modest secretariat support provided by a state and territory government.

The Report explained that the function of the Steering Committee would be to:

- develop a detailed plan for the NALSAS (to be endorsed by MCEETYA) based on the endorsed recommendations of the Report
- ensure the implementation of the NALSAS
- develop and ensure the implementation of a publicity/awareness strategy on the importance of Asian languages/cultures education; and
- provide an annual report to the MCEETYA and, for the first three years of the strategy, an annual report to COAG

Finally, the entire strategy was costed at A$1442.2 million for the period 1995-2006 to achieve its objectives, beginning at a cost of $11.3 million in 1995 and peaking at $207 million in 2006. A dollar-for-dollar costing arrangement was proposed, whereby the states and the Commonwealth would contribute equally (1994: 170).

In accordance with its terms of reference, *Asian Languages and Australia's Economic Future* developed a strategic framework for the implementation of a comprehensive Asian studies strategy for Australian schools. It set some quantitative targets for the number of students studying a second language generally, and Asian languages particularly, as well as making a number of recommendations to ensure adequate qualitative outcomes. The Rudd Report also recommended appropriate machinery through which the three programs it recommended could be implemented. Perhaps, most importantly was the way in which the Report used Australia's national economic interests to argue a case for the significant expansion of Asian studies in schools. Indeed, more than half of the Report consists of argument and evidence of the long term economic significance of East Asia to Australia and the nexus between linguistic/cultural skill and improved economic performance. It was this aspect of the document which drew disparaging remarks from educationalists, linguists and other interested parties. Let us now examine these criticisms in more detail.
Criticisms of the Rudd Report

The Report and its recommendations attracted a reasonable amount of criticism. There was criticism of its inadequate treatment of the problems associated with training enough properly qualified language teachers and its inadequate consideration of pedagogy (Cavalier, 1994; Wilson, 1995; ALLC, 1996; Rizvi, 1997). It was also for understating the difficulties of learning Asian languages and the related issue of contact hours (Kirkpatrick, 1995). For one observer, the Report failed to properly consider and fund the studies of Asia element of its recommended programs (Wilson, 1995: 112-14). However, the most predominant criticism was aimed at the overt economic rationale by which the Report justified the teaching of Asian studies.

The Report clearly stated that in accordance with its terms of reference its primary focus is on Asian languages and cultures as a means of improving Australia's economic interests in East Asia. This objective, it explained, was to be understood in the context of broader policy aims regarding the internationalisation of the Australian economy (Rudd, 1994: 2). The Report asserted that to improve the cost effectiveness of Australian exports:

Australia requires an export culture which is "Asia-literate" - i.e. one which possesses the range of linguistic and cultural competencies required by Australians to operate effectively at different levels in their various dealings with the region - as individuals, organisations and as a nation (1994: 2).

Opposition to the Report emerged from the liberal education camp who hold that it is educational, intellectual and multicultural concerns which should constitute the rationale for language policy design. The Report's most public and strident opponent was Rodney Cavalier, chair of the Commonwealth advisory body, the ALLP. Among a number of

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71 In a short and frequently cited article, Max Charlesworth (1988: 33) outlines the 'liberal' purposes of language study. Charlesworth concedes that there are 'valid utilitarian' reasons for learning languages but asserts that 'they are subordinate to a more fundamental rationale for language study'. Learning languages, he contends, should be held to be 'mind-expanding and mind-enriching', just as we conceive the study of history, literature and the pure sciences. Unless utilitarian concerns are subordinated to those of a liberal and intellectual nature Charlesworth concludes, 'any large scale language program will be based on shaky foundations'.

72 Rodney Cavalier became one of the most vocal and scathing critics of the Rudd Report. He launched a major assault on the efficacy of its aims and rationale. Cavalier publicly outlined his criticisms in an address at the National Language and Literacy Institute of Australia's (NLLIA) Expo in Sydney in July 1994. A condensed version of the speech appeared in the NLLIA's,
criticisms he leveled at the Report, Cavalier took issue with the overtly economic rationale for teaching Asian languages it expounded. He argued that the Report offered no reasons why a student should study Asian languages, 'except on strictly economic determinist grounds'. Cavalier continued, explaining that:

You will search in vain for any arguments about personal enrichment from language study, arguments of intellectual growth or passports that true understanding of another language provide to another culture. There is nothing of the value of another self that knowledge of another language provides. The Report wants students in Australian schools to study Asian languages because they will one day be better traders in Asia (Cavalier, 1994: 10).

Other critics argued that promoting Asia-literacy to improve Australia's economic relations with the region would reinforce rather than dissipate the 'otherness' which dominates our perceptions of Asia. Although Rizvi (1997: 18) applauded the recent developments in the teaching of Asian languages and studies in education, he recognised also that the new interest in Asia was located squarely within an instrumentalist logic. In reference to the Rudd Report, Rizvi argues that utilitarianising the teaching of Asian languages and studies has serious implications for Australian citizens and Australia-Asia relations. Reducing Asian studies to the economic, he argues, will help to entrench, rather

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Australian Language Matters and later in Information Bulletin, the monthly publication of the Australian Federation of Modern Language Teachers Association (AFMLTA). Cavalier's views have also been reflected in two reports published by the ALLC entitled Speaking of Business: The Needs of Business and Industry for Languages Skills (1994) and Language Teachers: The Price of Policy (1996).

73 Jo Lo Bianco, a member of the ALLC, claimed that the ALLC was not united in its criticism of Asian Languages and Australia's Economic Future. He stated that 'I should point out that there was no unanimity of view, in my opinion, about our (ALLC) response to COAG. I and others took the view that the chair had put a strong, and overly critical, position to the COAG and also to the Commonwealth Minister' (Facsimile from Jo Lo Bianco, 16 June 1998).

74 As a consequence of the economic argument for creating an Asia-literate Australia, some maintain that the economic policy image may have negative implications. They argue that Asia becomes distinguishable in terms of a split between those countries or regions which are of economic significance, on the one hand, and those which are not, on the other (See Reeves, 1992: 66; Viviani, 1992: 64; Mahoney, 1991).

75 Instead of articulating the value of such studies in terms of Australia's economic interests, Healy (1990: 74) argues that: 'We need, though, to think of education quite differently, as something concerned with intellectual endeavour, the changing of accepted practices and interpretations, the stimulation of critical thinking, scholarship, the promotion of greater social awareness and sensitivity, and other equally fashionable pursuits'.
than transcend 'the colonialist frame that has traditionally formed their perceptions of Asia' (1997: 119). For Rizvi, the Report 'fails to realise that education policy is also linked to cultural concerns, and that the history of Australian racism towards Asia are not entirely disconnected from a policy that stresses the importance of Asian languages' (1997: 120). According to Rizvi, the distance between the Australian 'us' and the Asian 'other' would widen if gaining knowledge of Asia through education is consistently construed as a means to an economic end.

Other commentators concur with Rizvi. Lo Bianco (1996: 56), for instance, believes that such an approach to educating Australians about Asia will entrench the veil of 'otherness' which distorts our view of Asian cultures and people. However, he approaches the subject from a slightly different angle. While wholeheartedly approving of the progress made thus far in regard to creating an Asia-literate Australia, Lo Bianco challenges the monocultural nature of the study of Asia in schools. Alternatively, the development of Asia-literacy in Australia should embrace and include Australia's essential multicultural nature. He explains that 'Asia literacy will be the more powerful by articulating with, rather than distancing itself, from the pluralist culturally-inclusive images and definitions of Australia'. Failing to develop and pursue a pluralist conception of Asia-literacy, Lo Bianco warns, will deplete our capacity to deflect the commonly held assumption by many in Asia that 'we are merely Britannia displaced'. In an interview with Lo Bianco in relation to the NALSAS Strategy he stated:

There are residues of Orientalism\(^\text{76}\) and a refusal to see Australia as a plural nation.
It is morally right, educationally necessary and ultimately, as far as the success of these policies is concerned, indispensable to acknowledge the plurality of Australia and the problems of Orientalism (Interview with Jo Lo Bianco, 19 June 1998).

Lo Bianco argues that the Report's failure to acknowledge the culturally pluralist nature of Australian society is clearly highlighted by the Strategy's four chosen priority languages.

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\(^{76}\) The term 'Orientalism' was coined by Edward Said (1978). Said defines Orientalism as 'a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient's special place in European Western experience' (1978: 1). The distinction between East and West, the 'Orient' and the 'Occident', has been a central beginning point for many who have written about and described the Orient. In Orientalist terms, Asia, particularly the Middle East in Said's case but also in terms of American perceptions of East Asia, has often been described as inferior, uncivilised, disordered, mysterious, dangerous, erotic, exotic, diseased, poor and evil.
Particularly conspicuous is the absence of Vietnamese, on the one hand, and the prominence of the languages of principal economic significance to Australia, on the other. Lo Bianco applauds the Report’s commitment to Asian languages, but takes exception to this fundamental flaw. He explains that: 'I don’t disagree with anything in the strategy except the divisive prioritisation; I think that is unnecessary. I think it is terrible Vietnamese wasn’t included, just appalling’. Just as the ALLP rejected pluralism, he holds, so to does the Rudd Report. Regarding Asia as ‘a resource’ has always been a problem, he argues, one that advocates of Asian studies ‘have never resolved’.

For Lo Bianco the Rudd Report was too heavily focused on gains for the Australian economy, and not enough on addressing the needs of multicultural Australia. Thus, in his remarks we can clearly see the ongoing struggle between Asian and community languages for recognition and sponsorship, the impact of which was discussed in Chapter Three. In broadly laudatory article written in response to the Rudd Report, Lingard (1994), was disappointed with the it’s expressly economic thrust. Lingard wrote that Rudd could, and should have, broadened the scope for selecting the priority languages to include the languages spoken by Australia’s various ethnic communities:

the one dimensional rationale for the mandating of trade languages and the neglect of community languages and the resources of NESB speakers in Australia, does suggest the perpetuation of at least a neo-Orientalist perception… a broader rationale for expanding language teaching in Australia could have possibly accommodated both trade and community/multicultural rationales for language teaching (Lingard, 1994: 26)

**Selling the NALSAS Strategy: Australia’s Economic Future in Asia**

It is not the purpose of this study to judge the veracity of the claims made above. There may well be strong foundations for such criticism, but the aim here is to simply demonstrate how they were countered by Rudd and his colleagues and why, instead, the Report was articulated in terms of Australia’s economic future. Indeed, the evidence suggests that to win support for his proposal it was necessary to emphasise its benefits to the Australian economy. Recognising that the NALSAS Strategy would fit neatly into the Prime Minister’s broader agenda for Australia’s engagement with Asia, Rudd deliberately
promoted the Strategy in economic terms. Rather than persuade decision-makers to endorse and fund the Strategy for educational and multicultural reasons, Rudd articulated it in terms of Australia's future economic integration with the region. He wanted decision-makers to conceive of the policy in a particular way and to persuade them to approve the policy by using rhetoric which heavily favoured the economic benefits of such a policy.

In essence Rudd sought to define a proposal congruent with the economic orthodoxy of the period. A neo-liberal, or economic rationalist approach to economic management was adopted by Australian governments and succoured by business elites throughout the 1980s and 1990s which led to large-scale privatisation and microeconomic reform programs, the improvement of competition and the restructuring of the public sector (Carroll and Manne, 1992). The model favours neo-classical and positivist economic assumptions about public policy making rather than others which may advocate the importance of social or cultural outcomes (Pusey, 1991). In relation to education policy, economic and political issues have become the main concern of policy makers. Rather than defining education policy as a 'mix of social, economic and cultural policy', Marginson (1993: 56) explains, education policy is understood as 'a branch of economic policy' (see also Dudley and Vidovich, 1995). Chapter Three has shown that by the late 1980s, especially as a result of the Dawkins reforms, the traditional liberal purposes of education were progressively subordinated to vocationalism in order to advance Australia's global economic competitiveness, especially in the Asian region. Having the proposal understood in these terms was exceedingly important for it fit the prevailing orthodoxy. According to Tim Spencer from the Queensland Office of the Cabinet and member of the Working Group:

> the other big hurdle which needed to be overcome was the acceptance that this was a big issue and was something that COAG needed to focus on as a major element of an economic strategy; improving our ability to trade with the region. I think that was the major hurdle. Once it was seen in this broader light then acceptance came more readily. This was the initial starting point as well as being very prominent in the Report. It was seen as a major economic reform, rather than just a reform in the education system (Interview with Tim Spencer, 25 May 1999).

In the case of the Rudd Report and the NALSAS Strategy it was very much the broader
economic environment and vocationalisation of education which Rudd and his team used to sell their idea. Spencer recalls that 'I think with the Asian languages project we were trying to link the reform to very much broader economic goals, basically trade related economic goals'. This claim was also supported by another policy actor involved with the writing of the Rudd Report, a Working Group member representing the Commonwealth, senior DEET official, Anna Kamarul:

They (Rudd and his colleagues) were actually looking for a way to get support and they knew it would cost money... But Rudd was keen to find a hook to try and sell the idea. Australia doesn't have a good perception of itself to have the capacity to learn languages. Rudd bought forward this idea of the economic dimension and trade. I don't believe Rudd believed that the economic is the only reason to learn languages. But he was really looking for something that would sell. If you are a bureaucrat trying to sell something to a minister it is a good option and, of course, a government trying to sell it as well (Interview with Anna Kamarul, 21 November 1997).

The title of the Report, *Asian Languages and Australia's Economic Future*, clearly demonstrates the intent of Rudd and his Queensland colleagues in terms of etching a rationale for teaching Asian languages and cultures in schools. The evidence suggests that this was the case for a very sound reason, namely that it was on an economic basis, and an economic basis only, that they could win the support of heads of government. In an article which assessed the Report, Wilson (1995: 98) ponders its economic emphasis, pointing out that the Report is different in that 'it has overtly, one might say, unashamedly, linked language learning to national economic performance and put considerable resources... to realising its goals'. Wilson asserts that the Report:

deliberately emphasises the economic importance of languages-learning with a particular audience in mind, in this case, state premiers, territory chief ministers, federal cabinet and the senior bureaucrats who advise them. This is a message they can understand, uncomplicated by the addition of, dare one say, a non-economic rationale (Wilson, 1995: 99).

This concurs precisely with the explanation that Rudd himself provided. Rudd articulated the initiative in terms of Australia's 'economic competitiveness' and the 'national economic
interest'. He spoke to heads of government in a language they could hear and understand. This discursive methodology, he maintains, was mobilised to gain the support he needed from central agency officials and heads of government, especially the Prime Minister:

the only way you would get the Prime Minister, premiers and treasurers across the nation to address a new priority program on Asian languages and studies was to articulate the argument in terms of it servicing Australia's long-term economic performance and not as an expression of pre-existing policy of multiculturalism. I think part of the objection of the Report was not so much its content, but (that) its terms of reference firmly established that linkage with economic requirements (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 11 December 1997).77

In relation to the Rudd Report another Working Party member, Allan Langdon, explained:

Our view was that it wasn't there to be an educational document, it was there to get Commonwealth money and it achieved its aim and states and territories have gone off and used very, very sound educational rationale to build programs. I don't think any of us, at least I don't, make any apologies for the fact that it was unashamedly a bit of political and economic lobbying, that's fine. We have the money and the outcome (Interview with Allan Langdon, 8 December 1997, 8).78

When Rudd flagged his proposal for a national Asian languages and cultures policy he consciously chose not to assemble his case on the pretence that learning an Asian language was intellectually and cognitively valuable, nor was it educationally or culturally legitimate. Nor did he promote such studies as an expression of multiculturalism. He discovered another means of attracting the interest of the key decision-makers. Rudd highlighted instrumentalism and economics rather than intellect and education. He sold his idea on

77 Rudd proclaimed his support for the teaching of community languages in an interview where he argued that: 'The bottom line is that I and the Queensland government at the time were strong supporters of multiculturalism, strong supporters of the role of community languages as an expression of multiculturalism... (but that)... is conceptually entirely distinct from the national economic requirements of Australia addressing its long term economic needs in the region' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 11 December 1997).

78 Langdon recalled that 'The Rod Cavalier's of the world were vehemently opposed to it, people like Jo Lo Bianco wasn't actually wrapped in the notion. There were lots of my colleagues in the language teaching fraternity who called me a traitor and all sorts of things. I think the outcomes have been worthwhile' (Interview with Allan Langdon, 19 July 1997).
the more powerful grounds that teaching Asian languages in schools was economically significant.

**Commonwealth Resistance to Key Recommendations**

Arguing that the proposal be adopted for economic rather than education or multicultural reasons was a powerful means of winning support for the proposal for a national Asian studies strategy. However, the actual process of writing the Report and securing funding for the NALSAS Strategy which it developed, was fraught with difficulty. Indeed, on a number of accounts it was actively resisted by the Commonwealth bureaucracy. While Rudd believed he had the support of the principal vehicle necessary to gain endorsement of the proposal, his counterparts on the COAG Senior Officials Steering Committee, the same could not be said of the Commonwealth bureaucracy.

Senior officials from the DEET and DPM&C, as well as members of the ALLC, particularly its chair, Rodney Cavalier, actively opposed Rudd's proposal. According to Rudd, they attempted to significantly modify the shape and focus of the Report and to minimise the Commonwealth's funding commitment to the strategy. He recalls that 'at the operational level within the Commonwealth we encountered a fair bit of resistance, initially from the DPM&C and DEET’ (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 11 December 1997).

Allan Langdon, one of Queensland's representatives of the Working Group, also recalled:

> What appeared to us as we went through the process, was that every time we put a position the Commonwealth was coming back with a counter position that didn't seem to based on anything other than simply blocking progress (Interview with Allan Langdon, 19 July 1999).

Langdon explains that the preparation of the Report followed a process whereby a writing team in Brisbane put together drafts which were then put to the Working Group to make modifications as it saw fit. The evidence suggests that there was substantial disagreement during this process about many of the Report's recommendations which manifested itself in a clear division between Queensland and the other states on the one hand, and the
Commonwealth, on the other:

If you looked at the proceedings of the writing exercise it was always the states and territories versus the Commonwealth and decisions were always split down that line; and it was DEET and PMC, who also had a representative, and they were always on the outer as far as that was concerned. Sometimes they were extremely on the outer (Interview with Allan Langdon, 19 July 1999).

There were a number of minor issues over which there was disagreement, but the matters on which the Commonwealth and Queensland mainly diverged centered on (i) the nexus between linguistic and cultural proficiency and trade performance (ii) the recommendation to progressively mandate the study of a second language during a student's compulsory years of schooling (iii) the four priority languages identified for future expansion in Australian schools (iv) the cost of the proposed program and the funding implications for the Commonwealth. Together, these represented the main forms of resistance.

The Nexus Between Language and Culture Skills and Economic Performance

Rudd's case for a national Asian languages policy rested on a number of arguments.79 As the previous section demonstrated the main rationale was to facilitate Australia's economic relations with the countries of East Asia. Rudd's view was that furnishing Australians with linguistic and cultural skills would prepare them better for conducting trade and business in East Asia. That is, if Australia was to maximise its regional and global economic performance the way of doing that was 'to equip our major economic operators, traders, investors, providers of consultancy services etc, with the linguistic and cultural skills necessary to be more effective operators in the economies of principal relevance to Australia' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 11 December 1997). Nonetheless, whether such skills actually give individuals and companies a competitive edge in their dealings with their counterparts is questioned by some. During the preparation of the Report, the Commonwealth disputed the relationship between Asia-literacy and economic competitiveness. As Rudd recalled 'The initial line of resistance was whether in fact

79 The Report lists ten different arguments in support of improving Asian studies in Australia (Rudd, 1994: 79).
linguistic and cultural competence did anything to enhance economic performance' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).

In its Report titled, *Speaking of Business*, the ALLC (1994) considers the needs of business and industry for skills in LOTE and the understanding of other cultures. It also 'assesses the economic value attached to languages'. In regards to the latter, the Report argues that: 'Language assumes its importance for business as an ancillary skill'. Linguistic competency is an adjunct skill to the professional and/or managerial skills for which the individual should already possess. The Report concludes that: 'Facility in a language other than English is not pre-eminent in determining the success of business and industry. It is, however, one of many factors that can enhance their performance, especially in international trade' (1994: 3).

In an attack on the Rudd Report, the Chair of the ALLC, Rodney Cavalier (1994) questioned the level of demand for Asian language skills by Australian business and industry and indeed, whether such skills were a necessary ingredient for business success. Based on the research of the ALLC discussed above, Cavalier attacked the Rudd Report on the grounds that it made no concerted attempt to make a connection between trading success and languages. Cavalier explained that if one were to speak to those doing business in the international arena, it would be discovered that the ingredients for success 'are no different for overseas trade than they are for domestic: competitive pricing, reliability of supply and service' (Cavalier, 1994: 10).

The DPM&C was particularly concerned about the lack of evidence that linguistic skills and cultural knowledge actually contributed to economic performance. As a result the former Deputy Secretary of the Commonwealth-State Relations Secretariat (no longer in existence) in the DPM&C, Alan Henderson, questioned Rudd's proposal for a national Asian studies strategy to improve the competitiveness of Australian businesses operating in East Asia. He pointed out that although the Department recognised the importance of enhancing Australia's engagement with Asia, it queried whether Rudd's proposal was the

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80 Similar reservations have been expressed by Healy (1990: 74), writing in response to the Garnaut Report (1989). He asserts that 'The notion of a functional relationship between the education and economic system, which Garnaut appears to assume, is highly problematic. The contribution of education to economic performance and growth has been exaggerated: it is neither direct nor necessary'. 
best means of achieving this aim. Henderson argued that: 'You can accept that it is a very important issue but debate as to whether this policy was in fact a great way to address it' (Interview with Allan Henderson, 17 November 1999).^{81}

In fact, the Report never denies that multiple factors effect the competitiveness of firms in the international environment. Rudd clearly acknowledges that this is the case. He makes a distinction between "objective" costs to firms, including the cost and quality of inputs, quality control mechanisms, and formal trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas, and "non-cost" factors, which are nationally and culturally specific. Rudd suggests that in light of evidence which demonstrates significant costs to firms which lack languages and cultures knowledge, policies which endeavour to reduce these factors (combined with other policies which seek to reduce 'objective' costs to firms, such as those associated with microeconomic reform in Australia) 'will improve the international competitiveness of Australian firms' (Rudd, 1994: 53-4).

Rudd buttresses his stance with reports (most of which were commissioned by agencies and departments of the Commonwealth government) which drew the same conclusion. Chapter Three showed that ever since the Auchmuty Report of 1970 there has been a belief that Australian industry would benefit from being well versed in the languages and cultures of our Asian trading partners. Indeed, the entire languages movement, to varying degrees, was predicated on this perception. In the Rudd Report, a number of professional and government reports and publications are cited which argue that linguistic and cultural skills are important factors affecting export competitiveness, hence reinforcing the nexus between languages and trade performance. These included the DFAT commissioned Garnaut Report (1989), *Australia and the North-East Asian Ascendancy*; the Leal Report (1991) entitled *Widening our Horizons*, a report into the teaching of languages in higher education, commissioned by the DEET; the ASC's (1988) *National Strategy for the Study of Asia in Australia*; and Valverde's (1990), *Language for Export*, commissioned by the Office of Multicultural Affairs of the DPM&C. Rudd used these and a number of other reports^{82} to support his claim that that there was indeed a nexus between trade and linguistic

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^{81} Anna Kamarul from DEET also suggested that doubts about the language/trade nexus were prevalent in the DPM&C (Interview with Anna Kamarul, 17 November 1999).

^{82} They also refer to a DFAT survey cited by Stanley, Ingram and Chittick (1990) which reinforced the nexus. It notes 8 overseas publications supporting the language/export nexus (Rudd, 1994: 49).
proficiency. As Rudd explained, when the validity of his assertions were questioned:

My response to that was to simply point to several Commonwealth reports over the years which had asserted that linkage. The Commonwealth was then put on the spot to argue against its own accumulated wisdom on the subject (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 11 December 1997)

On this issue Allan Langdon agreed:

For example, the nexus between linguistic competence and trade performance. I would have thought the Commonwealth would have commissioned enough of its own research to suggest, and in fact had endorsed enough of its own research, that that was the case (Interview with Allan Langdon, 19 July 1999).

Rudd also commissioned the marketing company AGB McNair to determine the attitudes of Australian firms towards the importance of linguistic skill and cultural sensitivity in their business activities in East Asia. The survey, designed to ascertain future demand for Asian languages, found that 71% more businesses surveyed (25% of which were already using Asian languages skills in some aspect of their operations in Asia) 'believed that they will have a future need for Asian languages skills compared with those businesses now using Asian languages skills' (Rudd, 1994: 68). Thus, Rudd and his colleagues were able to amass a considerable body of evidence confirming both the nexus between linguistic skill and economic performance and the demand of businesses for such skills.

The opposition to this aspect of Rudd's case for change indicates that the extent to which linguistic competence enhances economic performance is contested. It needs to be noted, however, that determining precisely how and to what degree such competencies have a positive impact is difficult to establish. Indeed, there is very little empirical evidence to support the claim; measuring performance improvements is almost impossible given the range of factors which influence a firm's economic performance. Important as these issues are, it is not necessary to discuss them any further here, for they are dealt with in more detail in the next chapter.
The Issue of Compulsion

While the DPM&C harboured reservations about the extent to which business people skilled in Asian languages and cultures could contribute to Australia's economic performance, there were a number of issues that caused concern for another Commonwealth agency, the DEET. This agency played a primary role for the Commonwealth during the period in which the Report was written by having several senior officials representing it on the Working Group. However, it appears that it was from the departmental management level where most opposition to Rudd's initiative was generated. A senior Commonwealth official who represented the Department on the Working Group explained that at very senior levels of the DEET there was considerable opposition to the cost and general thrust of the proposal:

There was a key player in the department who had looked after the schools division and then became Deputy Secretary and was an ex-teacher. And his view of what was good policy in the schools area and what wasn't good policy in the schools area had a lot of sway in the department, and also with the minister. His view was very much that the curriculum was overcrowded; he didn't accept, I think, that language learning was something that the Australian community wanted; he had a policy bent against making it compulsory and that English was the growing language of world trade (Interview with Anna Kamarul, 17 November 1999).

83 At the time Kamarul was head of the Language and Literacy Branch, which monitored the operation of the ALLP, in the Student and Youth Programs Division of the Department. Prior to 30 June 1993, this Branch was located in the International Division.

Although Kamarul held some concerns about the Queensland proposal and the implications for her own department, she was not as vehemently opposed to it as other more senior figures. Indeed, she recalled that during the writing of the Report her manager appointed another representative to the Working Group to oversee proceedings and ensure that Kamarul followed the departmental line. Rudd himself also detected such a split. He explained that 'there was a part of DEET that we were dealing with at the policy level was reasonably sympathetic to what we were trying to achieve' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).

84 The 'crowded curriculum' is a term commonly used to describe competition for inclusion in the curriculum between subjects and learning areas, especially at the present time when students are expected to graduate from school with an extensive range of knowledge, skills and competencies.
This statement shows that the Deputy Secretary in question was opposed to Rudd's proposal for a number of reasons. The individual harboured concerns, first, about where LOTE would fit in an already cluttered curriculum; second, that proficiency in a second language was not something the Australian public desired; third, disputed the efficacy of teaching Asian languages for commercial reasons given that international trade was increasingly being conducted in English; and finally, was adverse to mandating the study of a second language.

The evidence suggests that the final point of opposition was the most important, for there was a perception in the Department that mandating the study of a second language, and hence would cause resentment towards language studies and be counterproductive in the long-term. The Working Group recommended that governments 'over the next decade progressively mandate the study of a second language during a student's compulsory school education' (Rudd, 1994: 115). According to the Report, making the study of a second language a non-elective part of the core curriculum from early/mid primary school up to Year 10, was thought necessary to achieve the reports key specified numerical target for the acquisition of language skills in the future: that 60 per cent of Year 10 students should be studying a priority Asian language by the year 2006 (1994: 106). This would also enable the generation of a critical mass of students to satisfy the target of 25 per cent of Year 12 students studying a priority Asian language

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85 This Deputy Secretary left the DEET in 1997. The person in question took up an overseas position before the researcher was able to conduct an interview. A brief long distance telephone conversation and an email exchange was all that could be achieved. Both instances of contact gave the researcher the impression that the individual was reluctant to speak about the matter.

86 See Rudd (1994: 49-79; 1995: 34-5). A number of government reports have cautioned against placing too much emphasis on teaching Asian languages for commercial purposes, arguing instead that English is the main language of business. In Speaking of Business, the ALLC warns that 'The new emphasis on Asia and Asian trade as the basis for this new concentration on language overlooks the fact that the economic elites of Asia are becoming proficient in English... It is the major international language for business purposes... English is now an Asian language' (ALLC, 1994: 9). See also Stanley et al, (1990).

87 It should be mentioned that in 1993 most language policies of Australian governments were moving towards mandating language learning for at least part of every student's school life. The governments of Victoria (LOTE Strategy Plan, November 1993, and numerous prior policy statements), New South Wales (the White Paper, Excellence and Equity, 1989) and Queensland had either taken this decision or were proceeding in that direction. The decision of Minister's of Education to make LOTE one of eight key learning areas that together constitute core curriculum under the so called 'Hobart Declaration' in 1989 and the subsequent development of the LOTE National Statement and Profile in the early 1990s was also important (see Chapter Three).
by the set date (1994: 114).

A related concern was the unacceptability of the funding implications for the Department and the Commonwealth more generally, given the extra resources necessary to implement a compulsory second languages policy (this point will be considered in due course). However, it was genuine reservation about the educational rationale guiding the Report and the programs it recommended, particularly the proposal to mandate a second language, that predominated. As one official said: 'I do think the policy concern was the greater one; I think that if they'd accepted that it was good policy then the funding wouldn't have been such a concern' (Interview with Anna Kamarul, 17 November 1999). 88 Mandatory second language learning was seen as an unwise policy direction to pursue:

Fundamentally, their was a concern that compulsory language learning would fall flat on its face in Australia and that it was hard enough to keep Australian kids at school without forcing languages other than English down their throat (Interview with Anna Kamarul, 17 November 1999)

Senior bureaucrats in the DEET argued, alternatively, that a more desirable approach would be to focus on building a small group of linguistically competent people to negotiate Australia's economic future in the region. Another Department official recalled:

There was one school of thought which emerged that said; why do you need 60 per cent of kids doing Asian languages? Why not take a few kids really good at languages, given that this exercise is related to Australia's economic future, and get some kids up to speed rather than having masses of kids poorly trained (Interview with Naomi Kronenberg, 17 November 1997).

The Department believed that student enrolments should be contingent upon the quality and supply of teachers. Failure to ensure second languages were properly taught risked alienating a generation of languages learners, it believed. This position on the issue:

88 Anna Kamarul explained that 'The same Deputy Secretary and Ross Free, who was Minister (for Schools and Vocational Education), had a good understanding; they were both ex-teachers; both from the New South Wales government school system; I think they were at one in terms of the policy wisdom, or otherwise of this initiative, and they both weren't convinced' (Interview with Anna Kamarul, 17 November 1999).
concurred with the ALLC and Rodney Cavalier, who was emphatically opposed to almost every aspect of the Report. Cavalier (1994: 11) argued that mandating language learning, particularly if the languages were taught by poorly qualified teachers, would foster a dislike of languages amongst students and, as a consequence, be entirely counterproductive for the future teaching of languages in Australia. Referring to non-voluntary take-up of languages as the 'compulsion monster', Cavalier argued that while 'one or two percent of students will enjoy their language studies and achieve meaningful proficiency... The majority of students will achieve next to nothing (or nothing) and are very likely to hate every minute of their language classes'. Instead, Cavalier believed that rather than making languages compulsory the number of students should be increased incrementally and in line with increases in teacher supply. This would result eventually in:

... a snowball effect because you would be training the teachers to teach the subject. You increase the teachers and increase the students and then over time, as you create more teachers and more students you are going to create critical mass (Interview with Rodney Cavalier, November 1997).

In the Report titled, *Language Teachers: The Pivot of Policy*, the ALLC (1996) argued that compulsion was the single most important reason that enrolments would increase in the future. Pointing out that during the preparation of the Rudd Report the 'Council argued trenchantly against compulsion and fixed targets for students' it recommended, as another option, that 'student enrolments should be contingent upon the quality and supply of teachers' (1996: 164). Officials from the DEET accepted these criticisms and employed them to argue against Rudd's principles of gradual compulsion and student number targets:

A serious criticism of the Report was the wrong-endedness of it. How do you begin such a program without having the teachers? Maybe you should not prescribe targets, but rather start training teachers. When they come through the system they could then be placed in a number of schools to begin teaching

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89 The ALLC Report titled *Language Teachers: The Pivot of Policy*, placed great emphasis on the problems regarding teacher supply and warned that governments and system planners needed to address some 'questions of striking immediacy' with regard to the supply of proficient language teachers (ALLC, 1996). See also Nicholas (1993) for a detailed explanation of the complexities associated with language policy in terms of teacher demand and supply.
languages (Interview with Naomi Kronenberg, 21 November 1997).

The DEET's key argument was that meeting the level of demand created by the Report's quantitative targets by a policy of gradual compulsion would fail due to a severe shortage of suitably qualified language teachers. And, in the process of attempting to reach its targets, there was a fear that many students may receive second-rate teaching. It proposed that rather than making languages compulsory they should be introduced incrementally.

Similar skepticism about mandating the study of a second language pervaded the views of Senior officials from the DPM&C. Michael Keating⁹⁰, then Secretary of the Department, refused to be drawn on what his department's advice was to the Prime Minister. Nonetheless, he conceded that he 'was never a great enthusiast for the strategy' and made several other remarks which suggested why this may have been the case (Interviews with Michael Keating, 18 November 1997 and 13 July 2000). In relation to the issue of compulsion he remarked:

I'm no expert on this but people who are rather closer to education than either Kevin Rudd or Goss had some doubts (about) the educational wisdom, if you like, (of) conscripting an eight year old into learning a foreign language. And I mean conscripting in terms of everybody, not just in terms of suitability or anything else, but the lot of them. All I'm saying is that not all educationalists thought that was the best thing that could ever happen. There were real doubts about it (Interview with Michael Keating, 13 July 2000).

Rudd recalled the recommendation of compulsion was one to which the Commonwealth was opposed. He remarked that 'a policy objection coming from DEET was about the mandatory nature of the programme; mandating as opposed to voluntary take-up'

⁹⁰ Keating was Head of the Australian public service and Secretary to the Prime Minister and Cabinet (1991-1996).

⁹¹ Keating was reluctant to state precisely what was the Department's advice to the Prime Minister. When asked this question he said that 'our responsibility was to inform the Prime Minister of a variety of considerations'. He commented that 'in the end, when the PMC was giving its advice it has to make a judgement on all the implications, and that's the role of the PMC; it's one of the unique organisations in this country, which is there not to represent a particular interest, but the whole of government. That is its unique position. I'm not saying what PMC eventually advised'. (Interview with Michael Keating, 13 July 2001).
Supporting the recommendation in the Rudd Report is listed a number of reasons, or advantages, of compulsion. These included, first, that compulsion would make language study a core part of the curriculum; second, that it would contribute to long term attitudinal change in Australia - the study of an Asian language and culture would become an accepted and normal part of the Australian education experience; third, by year 10 students who leave school would have a basic level of linguistic capacity which could be improved and adapted in their working lives; fourth, a large cohort of Year 10 students would provide sufficient critical mass and a sufficient retention rate to meet the target of 25 per cent of Year 12 students studying a second language (Rudd, 1994: 112-115).

On the issue of teacher supply, the Report conceded that: 'Teacher supply remains a concern. The shortage of adequately skilled teachers is one of the most commonly mentioned reasons for the low levels of provision and participation in second language courses' (1994: 92; see Rudd, 1995: 41). It registered concern and recognised that a supply of competent language teachers was crucial to the success of the programs it proposed. To develop solutions to the problems of highly variable proficiency levels of the existing cohort of language teachers, the failure of tertiary institutions to produce the necessary number of language graduates and the continuing dominance of languages other than Asian languages, the Report made a number of recommendations. These included that governments agree to a minimum agreed national proficiency standard for Asian language teachers, the development of a teacher training strategy, a long term teacher supply strategy to ensure a supply of suitably proficient Asian language teachers and teachers of Asian cultures and a program to provide teachers with some in-country experience.

As well as his attack on compulsion, Cavalier also derided the Report for not adequately considering the problem of student proficiency. Proficiency, he remarked, 'should be the graveman of the Report's strategy' (Cavalier, 1994: 10). Although he commended the Report for emphasising measurable proficiency as a necessary outcome for one per cent of language students he maintained, nevertheless, that 'The mass of students lost along the

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92 In a response to Cavalier's criticisms of the Report after it was released and endorsed by COAG, Langdon argued that mandating second language study was also aimed at changing 'the view that the study of languages and cultures is a 'soft option', not a 'hard' or 'serious' option like mathematics or science' (Langdon, 1994: 35; see also Rudd, 1995: 40).
way will presumably (only) emerge with some cultural awareness and a few phrases that will get them to and from the airport' (1994: 11). Cavalier emphasised the need for people to acquire a level of proficiency which enabled them to conduct trade negotiations with 'native-like' skill. These views concur with those of our senior DEET official who, in reference to both Cavalier and the Deputy Secretary, pointed out:

They didn't accept the Kevin Rudd view for instance, which was that it didn't really matter if you weren't particularly fluent; you didn't have to conduct your negotiations in Mandarin or Vietnamese, or whatever; but if you were like a lot of Europeans are, that is, semi-conversant, if you could hold a bit of small-talk in the language; if you could address people in a way they were comfortable with, it actually added a dimension to the interpersonal stuff that goes on in trade negotiations and makes those people respect you and like you more and it makes you respect them and like them more. So it was at a very subtle level that Rudd was arguing the case, which the Deputy Secretary I am talking about and people like Rodney Cavalier absolutely were unaware of and didn't want to countenance; they had this view that it was all about hard-core language learning... ' (Interview with Anna Kamarul, 17 November 1999)

This is not to suggest that Rudd believed proficiency to be unimportant. According to Anna Kamarul, 'Rudd wanted much more rigour in the way teachers were trained, he wanted much better bench-marks for proficiency levels reached (Interview with Anna Kamarul, 1997). Rudd (1995: 36-37) himself would write later, that it was never the intention of the Working Group to develop a program which sought to produce a nation of 'simultaneous interpreter's. He argued, to the contrary, that 'a critical mass of students with sustained exposure to the languages and cultures of the region is necessary...'. In order to engage socially, culturally and economically with the region Australia needs a 'broad layering of national expertise'. Supporting this standpoint and in a direct response to Cavalier's remonstrations, Allan Langdon has also written that the Report never sought to 'turn out academic linguists'. Rather, what it did aim to produce was 'young Australians with varying degrees of language proficiency in a range of languages - some of which will be the four priority Asian languages' (Langdon, 1994: 15).

The Four Priority Asian Languages
A major recommendation of the Rudd Report was that four Asian languages be targeted for future expansion throughout Australian schools and education systems. Based on research undertaken by the East Asia Analytical Unit (EAAU) of the DFAT, the Report identified four Asian languages of greatest economic significance to Australia; Japanese, Chinese, Indonesian and Korean and recommended that Australia focus on these in the future (Rudd, 1994: 47).93 It was Commonwealth resistance, Rudd explained, particularly from the DPM&C, to the selection of just four exclusively Asian languages which provided the grounds for further opposition to the Rudd Report:

We had this ridiculous foray about the definition of priority languages. They wrote a letter suggesting that we add a virtually infinite list of languages, including Aboriginal dialects, against the terms of reference provided to us by the heads of government which asked us to address the priority Asian languages. So you had PM&C at the time all at sea internally (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).

Criticism of the selection of the priority languages was countered quickly and effectively by Rudd. Rudd94 drew attention to the terms of reference given to the Working Group by heads of government which clearly stated that Asian languages of significance to the Australian economy were to constitute the main emphasis of the program:

I think the thing which ultimately won the intellectual argument against this Balkanisation of the proposal into any language you could think of was that our terms of reference said that we were to come up with a Strategy teaching priority Asian languages; Question? how do you define which has priority and which does not. That was the exercise we consciously engaged in with the DFAT and the EAAU to model ahead of those languages we need. So when ever you ran into the Commonwealth after that we could just quote the Commonwealth back to the Commonwealth and say, well, your Department and the EAAU has done this analysis for us which says that here are the priority export markets for this country

93 A chapter in the Report is devoted to describing the long-term economic significance of East Asia to Australia (1994: Chp 3) and provides rationale for increasing Asian languages and studies education in Australia (1994: 79).

94 Allan Langdon also explains that 'the Lo Bianco Report supported the idea of prioritising languages. So to come back now and say you shouldn't prioritise languages was the stuff of nonsense. Essentially as those things came up they were belted back' (Interview with Allan Langdon 19 July 1999). See Rudd (1995: 40).
for the next 20 years. What other methodology do you suggest we should use to determine the priority languages? 95 (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999)

The DPM&C argued that the list of priority languages should be broadened in scope to include the languages of significance to Australia's various ethnic communities. 96 Rudd argued that 'the policy exercise had not been passed as one to address the requirements of Australian multicultural policy'. Rather, the group was asked to:

... develop a policy in relation to Australia's future language and culture policy needs consistent with the nation's long-term economic interests and therefore we had to prioritise within the region... These objections were put by officers from DEET and PMC at the working party period (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 11 December, 1997).

Rudd buttressed his argument for a small number of Asian languages alone with another which rested on the assertion that scarce resources and a small population restricted implementation of extensive language programs in Australia. He argued that the combination of a small population and 'scarce resources' meant Australia would be better 'to do several languages well through our teacher and education institutions rather than a plethora of languages poorly' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 11 December 1997)

Commonwealth Funding

Funding was fundamental to almost every aspect of the policy exercise in which Rudd participated because the Report, the NALSAS Strategy it recommended and its

95 In an interview Rudd conceded that 'Having something to do with the drafting of those terms of reference I knew specifically what was intended' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).

96 When planning language policy, governments seek to mirror community views and they respond to political pressures. The decisions about the prioritisation of target languages is done with this in mind. Michael Keating expressed this concern in relation to the Rudd Report: 'I suspect there was some doubts in some people's minds about the political wisdom of it. I mean Pauline Hanson wasn't a household name at the time; you know, they (governments) weren't completely stupid. They could understand that there was a group of Australians out there who didn't think they should have to learn a language; out there in rural and regional Australia they weren't going to think that this was the best thing that could happen to their bloody 12 year olds. You know, these were the sort of considerations' (Interview with Michael Keating, 13 July 2000).
implementation hinged upon a Commonwealth government financial commitment. The Queensland government wanted to enlist the Commonwealth's financial strength to support the expansion of existing state-based language programs and to fund a national approach to Asian languages and cultures education. Almost every action taken by Queensland aimed to channel Commonwealth money into the proposed strategy. Langdon states quite clearly that the Report on which Queensland argued its case for a national program 'was intended to drag federal money to pursue a national Asian languages and studies policy' (Interview with Allan Langdon, 8 December 1997). The Commonwealth was also particularly aware of this. It was concerned about the cost of the program. One official from the department conceded that 'it would certainly cost a lot'. In particular, 'it would cost an absolute fortune to get Australian English speakers up to competence. The fear harboured by the senior echelons of the DEET was:

... that if this became a bit of a push, gaining sort of momentum, they would have to subsidise it, and they were just being careful not to sort of start something that may be difficult for them to control down the track (Interview with Anna Kamarul, 17 November 1999)\(^7\)

According to Rodney Cavalier, the Commonwealth was apprehensive because of the huge costs associated with the Strategy. The Commonwealth government he argues, was skeptical about the strategy because it 'involved the expenditure of money, and it involved the expenditure of a great deal of money and they had a lot of other priorities, not the least of which was literacy'. Cavalier continued explaining that: 'There had always been pushes for Asian languages, but anyone whose connected with the costs of trying to teach them knows that it is seriously a big ticket item' (Interview with Rodney Cavalier, 19 November 1997).

On this matter Rudd claims that Commonwealth officials attempted to influence

\(^7\) A related point of apprehension as far as the Commonwealth was concerned was whether its money would in fact end up in schools. Kamarul explains that: 'DEET was convinced that the funding would end up in schools; they just weren't convinced that these were funds that would be used for LOTE; they could have been used for other things... ' (Interview with Anna Kamarul, 17 November 1999).

Allan Henderson expressed a similar concern (Interview with Allan Henderson, 30 November 1999 and telephone discussion, 13 June 1999).
outcomes by floating recommendations and proposals which would impose a diminished funding burden. Commonwealth policy actors sought to minimise the funding burden which would be ultimately placed on the Commonwealth. Indeed, Rudd believed the Commonwealth was attempting to 'water-down' his program at the bureaucratic level, and possibly destroy it and the internal policy debate over the proposal's shape and emphasis. This he contended, was partly motivated by the Commonwealth desire to prevent fiscal pressure being applied to the minister. He claimed that the Commonwealth was attempting to undermine the policy at officer level, 'who obviously feared the ultimate funding ask that the states would then put on the Commonwealth for half the funding' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 11 December 1997). His colleague, Allan Langdon, perceived the resistance in similar terms:

My view of the Commonwealth blockage was very much in terms of their awareness of how much it was going to cost. There was a lot of concern over what they were going to be letting themselves in for. There seemed to me to be a sense that, and it comes back to being a state initiative, that these federal states were putting up something (that would) force us into agreement and then they would be committed in budget terms in time immemorial, and there goes the economy. It was that sort of thing (Interview with Allan Langdon, 19 July 1999).

In order to meet the objectives of the Report, the Working Group costed the entire strategy at A$1442.2 million for the period 1995-2006, beginning at a cost of $11.3 million in 1995 and peaking at $207.8 in 2006. Program funding would stabilise in the year 2010 at an ongoing cost of $202.2 million per year (Rudd 1994: 156) (See Table 1). A dollar-for-dollar costing arrangement was proposed by the Working Group:

Each year’s funding requirement for implementation of the strategy be met by a 50% contribution from the Commonwealth, with a matching contribution necessary to achieve programs being met by the states, with the distributional considerations at the 1994 Financial Premiers' Conference (Rudd, 1994: 170).

Table 1

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Compared to the funding of other language programs, for example, the Asian Studies Coordinating Committee in 1970 ($1.5 million), the ASC (less than $7 million for five years) and the NPL ($93 million for three years) and the AEF (under $2 million per year), the funding of NALSAS Strategy proposal was substantial indeed. The problems associated with funding are patent in the Report itself, for although it endorsed all of the recommendations, the Commonwealth reserved its position on the funding of the Strategy:

It is the view of Commonwealth officials that the recommendations... in relation to the overall funding requirement of the strategy and, in that context, the funding responsibility of the Commonwealth, will need to be considered in the context of the Commonwealth's overall budgetary circumstances. The Commonwealth therefore reserves its position on these matters (1994: 169)

The Report suggested that 'the distributional considerations for Commonwealth funding to the states and territories be determined at the 1994 Financial Premiers' Conference'. (1994: 169). As Allan Langdon stated: 'The original negotiated package and funding commitment was not forthcoming after February 1994'. Langdon believed that the DEET was still 'interested in slowing it down or stopping it':

One of the real problems... was that the Commonwealth had not really decided on its position in the whole thing. You might notice in the Report that the Commonwealth actually reserved its position on funding. That must have been a result of the Commonwealth Finance Department being reticent to get itself committed to what looked like blowing out into a substantial commitment. The way the program was put together the Commonwealth contribution blows out quite significantly after 1998. It was based upon progressive implementation (Interview with Allan Langdon, 19 July 1999).

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98 During this period, Langdon pointed out, there was substantial written correspondence between Goss and Keating aimed at resolving the funding problems being experienced with the Commonwealth bureaucracy and threatening the Strategy. He also claimed that the
Concerned about the funding implications of the Report, Anna Kamarul recalled that the DEET drafted another funding proposal after the Report was endorsed by the COAG in February 1994 with costings significantly lower than those set out in the Rudd Report. It was at this point that Rudd moved to engage the government at the prime ministerial level and at the highest level of the Commonwealth bureaucracy. Frustrated with what he perceived to be bureaucratic politicking aimed at either postponing or preventing the implementation of the Strategy, Rudd went to the Prime Minister's Office (PMO):

> When it got down to the pointy end of the process and that we were experiencing sticking points... I intervened with the PMO and with the Secretary of his Department, Michael Keating, and Don Russell,99 and said this is just not working and its inconsistent with the original objectives (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).100

Rudd's intervention with the PMO demonstrated that in addition to dealing with the DEET and DPM&C at the bureaucratic level, he was also dealing with the Commonwealth at the political level. Indeed, Rudd had developed an understanding with the PMO and quite a close and effective working relationship with Keating and his advisors. It was this which gave him the leverage needed to overcome the resistance of the DEET and the Prime Minister's own department, the DPM&C:

Commonwealth was continually 'getting the figures wrong', but speculated that this may also have been a stalling tactic.

Also, in July 1994, the Premier of New South Wales, Mr Fahey, wrote to the Prime Minister warning him that 'New South Wales will not implement a program to encourage the study of Asian languages in schools unless the Commonwealth increases its funding of the project'. According to the Report in the Sydney Morning Herald, Fahey claimed that 'New South Wales had been expecting the Commonwealth to commit about $88 million to the program, spread over four years, to be matched by the states and territories' but had committed only 38 per cent in 1996-97 to 6 per cent 2005-6 (Coultan, 1994: 5).

99 Don Russell was Prime Minister Keating's chief of staff.

100 Anna Kamarul explained that 'In the end a couple of times Kevin Rudd just rang Keating's office and said you know this doesn't seem to be moving; what's going on here; we just got the fall out of it because they would ring us up and say what's going on; and this has happened; and things would be put back on the rails again. PMC got themselves into the position of having to kind of put this thing back on the rails, although the bureaucrats themselves were actually no more enthusiastic about it than the higher echelons of DEET' (Interview with Anna Kamarul, 17 November 1999).
When the process began I went and briefed the PM's Office on what we were proposing to do and what the likely shape of the outcome would be and that we would keep them continually advised. I did that throughout the 12 months over which the thing was worked up (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 19 July 1999).

Rudd believed that the DEET and DPM&C were not fully aware of his dealings with the PMO. He said 'I think the agency involved in the overall negotiations which neither of those two agencies were aware of was the PMO, which I spent a lot of time dealing with'. He explained:

I negotiated all the way through. Whether they would agree or not was always an open punt. But I was quite transparent with them from the outset that I wished to achieve a national policy outcome which everyone would sign-up to, but that the balance of the equation at the end of the day would be a sharing of the costs. I would have to say I was franker with the PM's Office at a political level on that than I was with PM&C at the bureaucratic level. Because if you were frank with PM&C at the bureaucratic level about that earlier they would see what they could do to undermine you in the policy negotiations. As soon as they got wind of what we were up to we had already developed a reasonable head of steam. Its far easier to strangle these things at birth than after they have rocked along for a while (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).

Alan Henderson\textsuperscript{101} from the DPM&C recalled that Departmental officials working on the NALSAS Strategy proposal were less than acquainted with Rudd's affiliation and dealings with the PMO: 'With the benefit of hindsight, we did misread it', Henderson conceded. In the end it was a prime ministerial edict to both the DPM&C and DEET, raw political power, which finally overcame the Commonwealth's blocking strategy. Rudd believed that in the final analysis, 'the PMO issued a fairly clear directive to subordinate Departments that this proposal was not to be road-blocked' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).

\textsuperscript{101} Allan Henderson from the DPM&C indicated in an interview that he was struggling to recall the precise detail surrounding this particular claim. In a telephone discussion some months prior to the interview, however, he stated that DPM&C had mis-read the situation and did not realise 'the head of steam that Rudd and Goss had got up at the political level', thereby suggesting that the Department did not realise Goss and Rudd had strong political support (Telephone discussion with Allan Henderson, April 1999).
Rudd finally resolved the main bureaucratic elements of resistance to the funding of the NALSAS Strategy during the period between the February and August 1994 meetings of COAG. However, there remained some political obstacles to overcome. Ensuring the Commonwealth committed funding consistent with the costings set out in the Rudd Report required a deal to be brokered at the August meeting of the COAG. The evidence suggests that in return for his cooperation on the matter of the NALSAS Strategy, that is, to commit funding, Keating wanted something in return. In short, the Commonwealth committed funding to the Strategy in return for Queensland cooperating on range of other non-related and more significant COAG agenda items. Participants in the research were reluctant to provide details of the deal which was struck, but there is sufficient evidence to suggest that it was related to the Commonwealth's agenda for microeconomic reform and national competition policy, particularly reform of the electricity industry and the creation of the National Electricity Grid. Although there is however, strong reason to believe that Keating's vision for Australia's future in Asia, particularly the role of APEC, remained the most influential factor in the decision to commit funding. This has already been partly established.

A National Competition Policy was a high priority for Keating, and one he was determined to see eventuate (Edwards, 1996: 519). Ratified by Australian governments at the April 1995 meeting of COAG, the National Competition Policy aims to introduce competition into the public sector (COAG, 1995; Althaus, 1996: 65). The entire SPC and COAG initiative described in Chapter Two was, in one way or another, and as part of the government's broader agenda for microeconomic reform, aimed at achieving such a policy. Keating wanted to expose the state-based utilities, such as electricity, gas and water, to the competitive environment of the free market. Along with road and rail transport, these had remained shielded from the hand of the market and from competition (Hughes, 1998: 89; Scales, 1996: 69). More specifically, Keating wanted to develop a

102 For example, on the issue of the four priority languages Rudd claims that: 'To give Mike Keating his due, the head of PMC, while he periodically took exception to the robustness with which we pursued the arguments and the fact that we, or I, was not yielding, at the end of the day he did not fault the rationality of the project and in a direct response and in a public forum of senior officials said that the Commonwealth arguing that there should be a plethora of languages made no sense' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).
National Electricity Grid to connect users and producers from Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania. Given that the generation of electricity and the provision of gas and water was the preserve of the state governments, Keating needed the support and cooperation of the state premiers in order to create a truly competitive national market.

Microeconomic reform was always on the agenda of SPC and COAG. But it was only firmly placed on the agenda at the June 1993 meeting, and when it met the following February in Hobart when it dominated matters for discussion. It was at this meeting also, it should be remembered, that heads of government approved the Rudd Report. Among numerous resolutions taken in Hobart, the Council agreed to broaden its pursuit of comprehensive microeconomic reform, including water resources policy, free and fair trade in natural gas and electricity reform. At the meeting in Darwin in August 1994, one combined with the Annual Premiers Conference, COAG dealt with only two issues; the National Competition Policy and electricity reforms (COAG, 1994). In Darwin, heads of government agreed in-principle to the adoption of a national approach to competition policy (Scales, 1996: 70). A raft of detailed decisions relating to the electricity supply industry were also taken. These were quite technical by nature but generally meant that the states and territories fully committed themselves to the National Electricity Grid and to the subjection of the state-based electricity monopolies to intra and interstate competition.

Because National Competition Policy inevitably meant financial and political pain for state governments carrying out the necessary reforms they were, at first, reluctant to sign on. As a result, the Commonwealth was forced to provide incentives in the form of a series of Competition Payments, the first tranche of which commenced in July 1997 and paid quarterly thereafter. Competition payments to the states since 1997-98 have totaled over $1.2 billion (COAG, 1995). In short, state governments were not prepared to follow the Commonwealth unless they were compensated accordingly.

In concert with the evidence suggesting that Rudd out-maneouvred the Commonwealth bureaucracy by having the Prime Minister intervene, it was at this level too that he, with the assistance of Goss, finally secured the necessary funding. It was Keating who finally agreed to fund the initiative, and through his Office that a deal was struck, the very agency which, unbeknown to senior officials in the DEET and DPM&C, Rudd had been
constantly working with over the duration of the exercise. Rudd engaged in negotiations for funding with the Prime Minister's advisors and the Prime Minister himself on occasions. Keating and Premier Goss also discussed the matter. The Minister for Employment, Education and Training, Simon Crean, argued that although it was Rudd who had driven the process it was Goss whose task it was to argue the case with Keating; it was Goss that 'had to get Keating on board' (Interview with Simon Crean, 28 January 1998). Given the status of COAG as a heads of government forum, all final negotiations were carried out between heads of government, even though senior officials during this period were very influential and, as Chapter Two showed, there was a very close interplay between some premiers and their chief advisors. Notwithstanding this knowledge, Rudd was at the centre of the negotiations and conceded that there was indeed some deal-making, but offered no details:

I think broadly that's correct... As you know it occurred in a two stage process. The policy agreement was made in Hobart 1994 and the funding agreement in Darwin and that was part of the rest of us playing ball on other policy issues. So yes, everyone has stakes, everyone has objectives to realise; there is a common denominator underpinning most initiatives, a high degree of policy rationality and different levels of political pain and discomfort associated with each of them (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).\(^\text{103}\)

This account of events fits neatly with those described by Keating's social policy advisor, Mary-Anne O'Loughlin. There was a series of discussions between Rudd and members of the Prime Minister's Office leading up to the August 1994 COAG meeting, she explained. Rudd, Goss and Keating met on occasions to discuss the issue and a set of briefings were considered from Simon Crean's office, who had recently been appointed Minister for Employment, Education and Training. O'Loughlin explained that 'it was due to his (Keating's) relationship with Goss and the broader Council agenda, that is, other issues the Prime Minister wanted to get up at COAG for which he needed Goss's support'\(^\text{103}\)

\(^{103}\) Even though Rudd conceded that there was a deal for Commonwealth funding, he argued that it should not be overstated: 'it would be wrong in your script to overplay the, shall we say, the deal-making across the agendas. If the totality of the NALSAS deal equals a factor of ten, cross-agenda deal-making would equal perhaps 1-2 points; 8 constituted the intrinsics of the package prior to them being negotiated through. So what you are alluding to is an element in the equation, but by know means even a major, let alone a dominant element in the equation' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).
Simon Crean was largely in favour of the initiative and was present at both the February and August COAG meetings. He offered some interesting insights to the events surrounding the agreement which was finally struck between Goss and Keating. Crean maintains that 'there is no doubt he (Rudd) was a driving force, but the thing wouldn't have happened if it were not for other Council issues for which Keating needed Goss's support'. In short, Crean argues, 'it was a quid-pro-quo' (Interview with Simon Crean, 28 January 1998).

Based on the evidence presented thus far, we can assume that the funding of Queensland's national Asian studies strategy was inextricably connected to other Council matters. But we can really only speculate about the details surrounding the deal which was finally made. However, there is some evidence to suggest that the government funded the initiative to secure Queensland's cooperation on the issue of electricity reforms. Rodney Cavalier, the Chair of the ALLC, provided a useful insight:

In the nature of politics and in the best traditions of Commonwealth-State relations, there was a quid pro quo, and the quid pro quo was national competition in the utilities. For the first time gas, water and electricity were to be subject to competition beyond the state-based monopolies, the states would no longer run these enterprises directly, they would be corporatised at least, if not privatised, there would be multiple companies and multiple providers and in the fullness of time all consumers could by those services and products. And the Queensland conditions for signing-off on that was the National Asian Languages Strategy (Interview with Rodney Cavalier, 19 November 1997).

A second factor to influence Keating's decision was of course Australia's engagement with Asia. Asia held pride-of-place on Keating's foreign policy agenda. He strongly desired a closer association and a more effective business and trading relationship with the countries of East Asia. It was on the basis of Keating's obsession with Asia, and therefore within a policy trajectory which had already been set by the Prime Minister that Rudd was able to gain prime ministerial endorsement and Commonwealth funding. It was Keating's own articulation of a foreign policy direction aimed at comprehensive engagement with East Asia which provided the leverage Goss needed to negotiate an agreement.
According to O'Loughlin, Keating's decision to fund the Strategy was overwhelmingly dictated by Australia's deepening integration with Asia, particularly the APEC project. O'Loughlin identifies the Prime Minister's agenda for Australia's engagement with Asia as the first reason on which he based his decision to fund the Strategy and the COAG related issue the second:

The primary concern for the Prime Minister was that the policy fitted his broader agenda for APEC. The Prime Minister was a passionate believer in APEC and that Australians had to have a better understanding of Asia and alignment with Asia and less of looking towards Europe and the USA. He was a passionate believer in that. In which case getting people at young ages to have more appreciation and understanding can only be good. It came very much from the APEC agenda for the Prime Minister (Interview with Mary-Anne O'Loughlin, 7 May 1998).

There is no doubting Keating's steely determination to advance Australia's engagement with the East Asian region. Similarly, there can be no plausible reason to doubt that he was resolute in his pursuit of substantial microeconomic reforms through COAG. The main point is that based on the evidence gathered there was a deal which resulted in a substantial Commonwealth funding contribution to the NALSAS Strategy. In the first 4 years the Commonwealth contributed almost $74 million to the strategy. In the 1998-99 budget it allocated a further $42.6 million for the NALSAS Strategy to the end of 1999 (MCEETYA, 1998: 2). Although these contributions fall below the costing of the strategy according to the Report ($ 85.8 million in the first 4 years) they represent, nonetheless, a significant Commonwealth contribution.

The NALSAS Taskforce

Problems associated with funding in fact continued after the deal of August 1994. For once the funds were committed, there was confusion about how they would be used and distributed between the states. The resulting dispute manifested itself in the form of some traditional Commonwealth-State rivalry. Despite a conflict-ridden genesis, the NALSAS Taskforce, which was established to implement the recommendations of the Rudd Report,
managed to sort out the relevant problems by January 1995. Hence, implementation really only began then (Interview with Allan Langdon, 19 July 1999).

The NALSAS Taskforce\textsuperscript{104} was a key recommendation of the Rudd Report; a merging of the relevant stakeholders in a national collaborative arrangement to ensure the effective implementation of the Strategy. Rudd argued that in nearly all states there is 'an absence of central coordination of second languages teaching programs (including Asian languages teaching programs) across systems' (Rudd, 1994: 134). This was largely due to devolution of decision-making to the school level and the splintering of central control. The Report pointed out that the centrally driven strategy it proposed would necessitate 'More effective national collaboration and coordination'. To enable a more collaborative effort it recommended that 'an appropriate national collaborative mechanism be created and charged by all participating governments with responsibility to give effect to the recommendations of this report' (1994: 134).

The Working Group agreed that the implementation of its program could be effectively achieved through the existing MCEETYA. It recommended the creation of an Asian Languages and Cultures Education Steering Committee, with the appointment for three years of a permanent part-time chair. According to Rudd:

\begin{quote}
...you needed dedicated implementation machinery which people were prepared to support, and as you saw it was necessary to locate that hanging off MCEETYA. It was capable of developing its own momentum while still anchored in the established educational bureaucracy of the federation (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 11 December 1997)
\end{quote}

This was precisely the sort of collaborative arrangement various Asian studies advocates had been seeking to establish ever since the 1970 Auchmuty Report. On September 9 1994, the Chair of the MCEETYA, the NSW Minister for Education and Training, Ms Virginia Chadwick, announced the establishment of a national taskforce on Asian language study in schools. The NALSAS Taskforce was charged with the responsibility of implementing the NALSAS Strategy. Appointed to chair the Taskforce was Asian studies specialist, Professor Colin Mackerras from Griffith University. MCEETYA also

\textsuperscript{104} In the Rudd Report it is referred to as the Asian Languages and Cultures Steering Committee.
established a secretariat in Queensland hosted by the LACU of the Department of Education. Allan Langdon, the Manager of the Unit was appointed Executive Officer to the Taskforce and Manager of the Secretariat. The Taskforce and its operation and impact on Asian studies since its inception will be discussed in the Conclusion to this study.
Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that Kevin Rudd was the main force behind the NALSAS Strategy. Not only was he a key player in the NALSAS Strategy policy process but he was also central to the formation and implementation of the Queensland LOTE initiative on which the national initiative was based. Even in Opposition, Rudd, Goss and Braddy were intent on allocating significant resources to a comprehensive foreign languages program when, and if, they gained power. After winning the State Election in December 1989, the new government pledged $65 million to the program over ten years with a heavy emphasis on Asian languages. Despite some resistance to the program, mainly from the Education Department, the LOTE initiative went ahead.

While satisfied with the progress taking place in Queensland, Rudd and Goss were not so enamoured by developments occurring at the national level. Using the Queensland initiative as a template for implementation, they endeavoured to persuade the other state governments and the Commonwealth to support a national Asian studies strategy. Both Rudd and Goss felt that the Commonwealth was dragging its feet on the issue despite the latter, particularly the Prime Minister, Paul Keating, making Australia’s relations with Asia the cornerstone of his government’s foreign policy. Indeed, Rudd argued that his national Asian studies proposal would put flesh on the bones of the Prime Minister’s stated policy of engagement with Asia. Prime ministerial support was an absolute necessity, for the proposed national strategy rested on a substantial Commonwealth funding contribution. The pursuit of this funding commitment constituted the main focus of the policy process.

Late in 1992 COAG endorsed the proposal, when it was presented by Goss and Rudd to heads of government in Hobart. A COAG working group was established to prepare a report developing a framework for the implementation of a national Asian studies program in Australian schools. The COAG was employed by Goss and Rudd to bi-pass the normal forum which makes national education policy the ministerial council, to ensure a speedy outcome, adequate funding and the powerful political sanction of heads of government. The Rudd Report was completed early in 1994 and endorsed by COAG in February.

The Report was criticised by some who thought it over-emphasised the economic
rationale for teaching Asian studies in schools. They attacked the Report on the basis that it failed to state why language learning is important for educational reasons, or as an expression of Australian multicultural society. Rodney Cavalier, the chair of the ALLC was particularly scathing of this aspect of the Report. However, according to Rudd and others, stressing the economic benefits was necessary to garner the support of heads of government, especially Keating, who saw the strategy fitting neatly into his broader agenda of engagement with Asia. A number of problems were encountered during the writing of the Report, and were expressed by the Commonwealth bureaucracy in the form of resistance to several recommendations. Questioned was the nexus between linguistic and cultural skill and economic performance; the feasibility of mandating the study of a second language; the selection of four priority Asian languages and; the implications of the costing of the strategy for the Commonwealth, who was asked to contribute 50 per cent of the total funding requirement.

On all of these issues Rudd managed to overcome the resistance with which he was confronted, but prime ministerial intervention was necessary to defeat opposition to the funding implications of the Strategy. Rudd enlisted the support of the PMO, that is, the Prime Minister himself and some of his advisors, to bring the DEET and DPM&C into line and finally secure funding for the strategy. Nonetheless, Keating was not prepared to fund the strategy unless he received Queensland's support on other COAG related matters. The evidence strongly suggests that they struck a deal; funding for the strategy would not flow unless Queensland agreed to cooperate on the competition policy-related issue of national electricity reform.

After a slow and precarious beginning as a result of ongoing problems associated with funding, the NALSAS Taskforce was officially created in September 1994. Its brief was to implement the recommendations of the Rudd Report, particularly the NALSAS Strategy.

In this chapter the NALSAS Strategy policy process was been pieced together in as coherent a fashion as possible. It has traced the process from its genesis to its conclusion. Our next task is to examine this process from the perspectives of policy entrepreneurship discussed in Chapter One. The aim is to make sense of what has been presented in this chapter by recourse to concepts of policy entrepreneurship. Specifically, Chapter Five analyses the NALSAS Strategy policy process with a special focus on Kevin Rudd so as to
determine the degree to which he behaved like, and was involved in, the activities normally associated with policy entrepreneurs. This will pave the way for further development of the researchers own theoretical framework of policy entrepreneurship unveiled in the Introduction but which is further developed in the Conclusion.
Chapter Five: Analysis of the NALSAS Strategy Policy Process in Terms of Policy Entrepreneurship

Introduction

This chapter employs the concepts and frameworks in the literature reviewed in Chapter One to analyse and make sense of the data presented in the case study in Chapter Four. Its main purpose is to determine the degree to which the characteristics and actions of policy entrepreneurs can be detected in the role played by Kevin Rudd in the NALSAS Strategy policy process. The characteristics and activities listed in the inventory which appears at the end of Chapter One will be used to guide the analysis and to establish if and how Rudd's involvement in the policy process was entrepreneurial. For instance, it will probe the case study for evidence of his alertness to opportunity and whether he capitalised on those opportunities when they appeared, the degree to which he exploited the federal system's multiple entrance points to the policy process and if he fulfilled key entrepreneurial criteria by attaching a solution to a problem and defended that solution by recourse to extensive argumentation. Another primary aim of this chapter is to identify factors in addition to Rudd's personal behaviour and activities which influenced the policy process. It seeks to determine the extent to which the policy change exemplified by the NALSAS Strategy was effected by the context in which he operated.

To carry out the analysis with sufficient rigour, the chapter is divided into three levels of analysis. The first level identifies characteristics which, according to the writers and inventory in Chapter One, are definitive and therefore essential characteristics of the policy entrepreneur. They include innovation and creativity and argumentation and persuasion and were most obvious in the case of Kevin Rudd and the NALSAS Strategy policy process. The second level of analysis comprises non-definitive characteristics. As the Chapter One inventory attests, these are characteristics and activities commonly associated with policy entrepreneurs but not universally accepted like those which fall into the level one category. In this study, alertness to opportunity, strategic sense (policy image and policy venue), the use of networks and bargaining were very significant. The third and final level of analysis identifies contextual factors. These are factors other than the policy
entrepreneur's own characteristics and which, in the main, served to support his actions. They include policy institutions, positional power and the nature of the division of powers in the Australian federal system.

The third level of analysis highlights the importance of contextual factors in the outcome of the NALSAS Strategy policy process. These types of factors appear only to have been addressed by scholars in passing. Concerted attempts to situate their policy entrepreneurs in specific institutional contexts do not appear to have been made. Despite engaging with institutions by way of the concept of 'policy venues' Baumgartner and Jones (1993), for instance, have not done so in great depth or breadth. Thus, the third level of analysis is particularly important because in many ways it represents, if not a departure from, then a vital addition to, the existing body of research on policy entrepreneurship. Finally, although the class of activity called 'tactics and manoeuvres' is a non-contextual one, it is included in this level of analysis since it figures in only one of the reviewed texts. It should be noted that neither this activity nor the contextual factors listed above appear in the Chapter One inventory.

First Level Analysis

Innovation and Creativity: Attaching Solutions to Problems

Chapter Three traced the development of Asian studies policy in Australia. It showed that since the early 1970s how various individuals, groups and governments have sought to increase the teaching of Asian studies in schools. However, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was clear that Asian studies education in Australia was still in urgent need of attention. A number of reports showed that while the situation in terms of the availability of teaching and curriculum resources, participation rates in Asian languages, and teacher supply and training had improved, there was still much progress to be made. The absence of central coordination machinery to manage the continuing shortage of suitably qualified Asian language teachers and the generally 'patchy and piecemeal' (Rudd, 1994: 95) delivery of second language education in Australia, the Rudd Report asserted, all required 'strategic intervention by government' (1994: 17). Perceiving what he thought was the parlous state of Asian studies in Australia, Rudd displayed a key defining characteristic of policy entrepreneurship; he identified a problem.
Furthermore, in pushing his proposal for a national Asian studies strategy, Rudd was also developing a solution. Rudd's solution to the problem was a national approach and mechanism, one where all education jurisdictions could work collaboratively to increase enrolments in Asian languages, train more suitably qualified teachers and develop high quality teaching and curriculum materials. National collaboration and coordination, that is, a centrally driven program, would encourage the pooling of resources and effort, would enable education authorities to learn from each other and minimise duplication and overlap. The Rudd Report developed the framework and programs through which the reforms could be carried out, significant state and Commonwealth funding was committed to ensure they were affected and the NALSAS Taskforce was established to implement the reforms.

By attaching solutions to the problems facing Asian studies Rudd also addressed problems associated with accomplishing closer economic integration with Asia. Promoted by Prime Ministers' Hawke and Keating, Australia's engagement with Asia was part of both their agendas to internationalise the Australian economy. Economic growth and development in East Asia, it was believed, presented Australian producers and service providers with lucrative opportunities to sell their products. However, to facilitate this process and make business competitive in Asia was problematic. Political and economic elites in Australia believed that microeconomic reform in Australia was the best way of preparing Australian industries to compete in East Asian markets. These reform efforts were carried out in the 1980s and the early 1990s, many through COAG and in which most Rudd himself was intimately involved. Rudd endorsed this approach but believed there was a 'missing link'. He believed that the problems Australian companies faced doing business in Asia could also be solved, or at least alleviated, by equipping their employees with Asian languages skills and cultural knowledge of the region. According to Rudd:

Microeconomic reform was getting price signals right. But in the absence of an improved skills mix - of which languages and cultures skills is an important sub-component - the reforms would not yield full results for the Australian economy' (Email correspondence from Kevin Rudd, 22 May 2001).

In this instance we see Rudd not only recognising the barriers to closer engagement, and hence the problems attached to this enterprise, but the development of a non-economic
approach, or solution to engagement. Rudd argued that equipping traders, consultancies and other service providers with linguistic and cultural skills would maximise Australia's economic performance in the region, and thereby alleviate the problem of how to advance Australia's engagement with Asia.

The case study demonstrated that Rudd identified problems and endeavoured to solve them. This finding matches existing research on policy entrepreneurship. Indeed, almost all of the writers examined in Chapter One hold that problem-solving is the primary role of the entrepreneur. For instance, the policy entrepreneurs of Roberts and King (1996: 2) are 'catalysts of innovative change' and central to the 'creative' phase of the innovation process. Creation, they explain, 'marks the emergence and development of an innovative idea, with some need, problem or concern' (1996: 7). Similarly, Kingdon (1995) argues that policy entrepreneurs perceive a problem and endeavour to develop a solution. Kingdon's entrepreneur 'hooks solutions to problems'. Walker (1981: 85) also refers to policy entrepreneurs devising 'new ideas and techniques', causing 'new departures in policy' and performing the 'crucial matching of problems and solutions', while Bardach's (1972: 5) entrepreneur possesses the qualities of 'inventiveness' and 'creativity'. For the public entrepreneurs of Schneider et al. (1995: 42) the 'discovery of unfulfilled needs in areas of social and political activity' is important though 'not necessarily difficult'. For Schneider et al. and his collaborators, devising an effective solution requires significant skill. The authors argue that the detection of a problem may be one task: 'But selecting the appropriate ways to satisfy those needs often requires exceptional insight'. Finally, as Mintrom (2000: 129) points out, attaching problems with solutions is the primary function of the policy entrepreneur. When selling ideas, entrepreneurs 'carefully explain the nature of the problem as he or she sees it and, having done this, suggest the kind of innovation that might address that problem'.

Having established that attaching solutions to problems is a central function of the policy entrepreneur, a closer examination of the most sophisticated analysis of this particular function reveals considerable variation in precisely how they are connected by policy entrepreneurs. According to Kingdon's (1995) Multiple-Streams Framework, policy entrepreneurs push solutions to the fore when a 'window of opportunity' opens. For Kingdon, entrepreneurs develop their solutions and then wait until a problem arises. Consequently, solutions are often developed well in advance of the problem emerging. Entrepreneurs 'develop their proposals and then wait for problems to come along to
which they can attach their solutions' (1995: 88).

For Roberts and King (1996: 3-5), on the other hand, the process operates in reverse. Bringing about policy change, or an innovation, is a matter of design and purpose rather than opportunity and chance. Instead of 'reacting to the political climate, they created it by stirring up interest and debate for their own chosen issue'. This is, of course, at odds with Kingdon's view, in which neither the absence or existence of fleeting opportunities dictate the terms for change. Change affected by plan and design suggests that policy entrepreneurs detect a problem first and then endeavour to connect it with a solution, they do not devise solutions and wait for problems to present themselves. Roberts and King add the caveat, nonetheless, that the process will not always run according to plan; there will always be a degree of chaos, disorder, circumstantial negatives and just sheer bad luck (1996: 10, 233).

It is Roberts and King's (1996) approach to the problem-solution nexus which describes the NALSAS Strategy process with the greatest precision, for Rudd identified the problem first and then developed a solution. He then consciously set out to win Commonwealth endorsement and financial support for the NALSAS Strategy and enlisted the approval of state governments based on the case argued in the Rudd Report. This was achieved by conscious planning. This is not to say that Kingdon's entrepreneur chooses not to plan. It is to suggest, more exactly, that Rudd's solution was devised after the problem was discovered rather than in the reverse. Moreover, Mintrom (2000: 280) discovered, through his own study of school choice, that policy entrepreneurs consciously planned their strategies rather than waiting for policy windows to open. These policy entrepreneurs, he writes, 'have deliberately sought to join solutions, problems, and politics on a permanent basis'.

Argumentation and Persuasion

People present arguments to convince others of the validity of the their assertions. In terms of policy making, argumentation is necessary to persuade decision makers that change is necessary and that the proposed course of action is the best and most viable option. According to one writer, argumentation 'is always directed towards a particular audience and attempts to elicit or increase the adherence of the members of the audience
to the theses that are presented for their consent' (Majone, 1989: 22). For Smith, on the other hand, 'persuasion exists when a political actor changes another's actions or dispositions solely by communicating the virtues of, or reasons for, such a change' (Smith, 1989: 16; see also Wrong, 1979: 32-4).

Just as innovating and creating are activities of the policy entrepreneur, so to are argumentation and persuasion. They are contained in the skills repository of every policy entrepreneur. For Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 29): 'Argumentation and creation of a new understanding of an issue are at the heart of the political process, and an essential 'political weapon in their efforts to manipulate political debates'. Bardach (1972: 5) is broadly in agreement, for an element in his thesis of political entrepreneurship is the key activity of obtaining consensus from authoritative decision-makers. Building consensus for a proposal necessarily involves argumentation. Kingdon (1995: 126-131) too, is instructive. He points out that argumentation plays an important role in what he refers to as the 'softening up' process. This is where policy entrepreneurs attempt to persuade often reluctant policy communities to countenance alternative approaches to change in order to gather acceptance for their proposals. He captures the place of argumentation in the minutiae of the policy process in the following passage:

As officials and those close to them encounter ideas and proposals, they evaluate them, argue with one another, marshal evidence and argument in support or opposition, persuade one another, solve intellectual puzzles, and become entrapped in intellectual dilemmas (Kingdon, 1995: 125).

The ability to argue persuasively is also a characteristic attributed to policy entrepreneurs by Mintrom (2000: 272). Mintrom gathered evidence which suggested that 'talk and argumentation are the stuff of politics and coalition building'. He concluded, as a result, that 'the critical determinants of legislative consideration and adoption of school choice appear to have been the strength of the arguments made by policy entrepreneurs and the number of influential people to whom these arguments could be presented'.

If argumentation and the art of persuasion are central facets of the policy process and key skills of the entrepreneur embroiled within, where and how did Rudd demonstrate them in the NALSAS strategy policy process? First, these skills were employed by Rudd and his colleagues to convince decision-makers that there were indeed serious problems
with the teaching of Asian languages in Australia. Second, the skills are discernible in his attempt to persuade decision-makers of the importance of the economic rationale for the policy, and to downplay other competing purposes of second language policy, such as, for purely educational reasons or as an expression of multiculturalism. On this matter, it should be recalled how Rodney Cavalier and others criticised the Rudd Report for being too focused on the trade-related reasons for teaching Asian studies. However, as far as COAG was concerned Rudd argued persuasively that the need to develop an 'export culture' in Australia could be achieved if it endorsed his idea of a national Asian studies strategy.

A third and related example of Rudd's participation in argumentation was in persuading decision makers to accept the nexus between economic performance and linguistic skills. However this, the third point, will be discussed in further detail below. Fourth, he was required to argue the case for mandating the study of a second language. This Rudd sought to accomplish by arguing that it was necessary to meet the quantitative targets set by the Report for the acquisition of language and cultures skills in the future and to have second language study accepted as a normal part of every student's educational experience. Fifth, Rudd was forced to defend his selection of the four priority Asian languages. This he did by drawing his opponents attention to the Working Group's terms of reference, which explicitly stated that it was to develop a strategy dealing with Asian languages of economic significance to Australia and not as an expression of multiculturalism support. Rudd also argued that Australia lacked the resources to support the teaching of a wide range of languages.

These arguments were made vigorously by Rudd so as to attract Commonwealth funding for the strategy. The evidence implies that heads of government and the officials who sat with Rudd on the Senior Officials Standing Committee of COAG were, more or less, persuaded by these arguments. However, since the Commonwealth bureaucracy resisted key elements of the proposal, we can assume that Rudd was not entirely successful on each of the above accounts. Persuasion was a necessary but not sufficient condition for gaining acceptance of the proposal. Or, as Kingdon (1995: 127) concedes, 'Superior argumentation does not always carry the day, to be sure'. While some appear to have been more sympathetic to Rudd's plight, certain senior officials from both DEET and DPM&C remained dubious about the validity of his arguments. How Rudd managed to overcome this resistance will be analysed in a later section.
A further dimension to the process of argumentation in which Rudd engaged was his use of empirical evidence to buttress and fortify his arguments. By collecting empirical evidence to support his claims, usually in the form of an official report or survey results, Rudd demonstrated another entrepreneurial characteristic. When Mintrom (2000: 273), for instance, studied the activity and behaviour of school choice policy entrepreneurs in the US, he discovered that they adopted a number of strategies aimed at persuading others of the worth of their ideas. Some of them, he found, 'took care to marshal facts and figures' about conditions in their respective states and used the information to justify their arguments, while others assembled evidence of the successful implementation of school choice policies in other states. Bardach (1972: 215) is also insightful in terms of how entrepreneurs use certain political resources in order to have their desired policies adopted. Among various types of resources, he explains that are 'analytical' resources, 'the means whereby the entrepreneur produces competent and insightful studies of a policy problem and recommendations that can be transformed into a political proposal'. The entrepreneur appeals to research reports and empirical data which verify the extent of a problem and which also suggest solutions.

Jack Walker's (1981) work on the diffusion of policy innovations within and between communities of experts must also be noted. In what amounts to the reinforcement of Bardach and Mintrom, Walker argues that research data and knowledge, if deployed strategically, can be used as ammunition by policy entrepreneurs to defeat their opponents and persuade decision-makers that the proposed course of action should be pursued:

New departures in policy cannot be forced upon completely unreceptive agencies, but if a body of research emerges providing clear justification for the use of a given solution, and if an easily understood indicator is available showing that problems exist with which established agencies are unable to cope, an opportunity exists to break traditional patterns with a dramatic proposal for change (Walker, 1981: 91).

Rudd pursued various strategies to gain support for his proposal, which entailed the use of empirical evidence. He relied heavily on report findings and data to strengthen his case.
for the NALSAS Strategy. The document on which he placed most emphasis was the report, *Asian Languages and Australia's Economic Future*, the Rudd Report. In this document Rudd set out the case for his proposal and presented evidence in support of his claims. He then used the Report as leverage to argue the case for Commonwealth funding. The Report became, to use Walker's phrase, Rudd's 'dramatic proposal for change'. Rudd pointed out that the report would be the sixteenth of its type to not only draw attention to the problems of language teaching in Australia, but to also make a connection between Asian languages and the Australian economy. The Report also developed a solution in the form of the NALSAS Strategy and cited numerous other reports and their conclusions to further strengthen his plea for support.

As was established in Chapter Four, there is no consensus that a nexus between linguistic competence and economic performance really exists. This was one of a number of issues on which Commonwealth senior officials from DEET and DPM&C based their opposition to Rudd's initiative. Rodney Cavalier, the Chair of the ALLC, also criticised the Report on these grounds. He argued that 'the report spends little time making a connection between trading success and languages'. Hence, Cavalier concludes that 'the report cannot adduce any empirical evidence for its Asian languages strategy'. The absence of 'hard' data to confirm the connection is a significant problem, but one which Rudd himself concedes. In arguing his case for the NALSAS Strategy Rudd wrote that 'it is difficult to test the precise impact of language an cultural factors within overall cost'. He continues, pointing out that, it would be 'empirically problematic' to conduct a study which compared the performance of two different companies; one which sought to equip some or all of its staff with such cultural and linguistic skills and another which just ignored them. It is difficult to make a definitive judgement about this issue. Notwithstanding the lack of empirical evidence supporting a nexus, it would be disingenuous to suggest a complete absence of one, given the existing research and reports which posit the connection.

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105 It is interesting to note that in his review of SPC and COAG, Weller (1996) emphasised the relevance of reports in terms of gaining consensus on different matters. Pointing out that recognition that a problem exists is the first stage of the Council's policy cycle, he writes that: 'All players need to be persuaded to recognise the problem' and that heads of government must be willing to discuss reform' (1996: 98). Weller points out that often problem recognition is achieved 'by a widely circulated and accepted report, of the need for change'. Reports and other empirical data are used as tools of persuasion, which Weller (1996: 98) discovered can play an important part in the COAG policy process.
In the Rudd Report too, were the results of an AGB McNair survey employed to vindicate the assertion that there was a significant demand for employees with Asian languages and cultures skills in Australian businesses houses and corporations. Moreover, DFAT data projecting Australia's long-term trading patterns, the grounds on which Rudd justified the selection of the four priority Asian languages, were also vital in overcoming Commonwealth resistance. Tim Spencer from the Queensland Office of the Cabinet pointed out that the arguments for a national strategy were supported by reliable research and reporting and that this was reflected in the Rudd Report. Although not everyone felt the NALSAS strategy was technically feasible, especially members of the Commonwealth bureaucracy, Spencer observed that Rudd was a strong advocate of policy rationality:

Kevin always emphasised the need for rigorous policy argument through the process at the political level, and this project certainly had that and that was demonstrated by the Report. The policy arguments were there and they were rigorously argued with a lot of empirical evidence, as well as theory. He was well prepared to take it to governments to be accepted (Interview with Tim Spencer, 28 May 1999).

Asian Languages and Australia's Economic Future, according to Rudd and his colleagues, was a document replete with empirical evidence and its recommendations were supported by rational arguments. As Rudd remarked in reference to other initiatives dealt with through the SPC and COAG process, they had to be 'defensible against any measure of policy rationality, and any argument raised against NALSAS was invariably not of that nature' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).

Second Level Analysis

Innovation and creativity, or attaching solutions to problems, and arguing persuasively are aspects almost universally accepted by researchers to represent the essential characteristics and functions of the policy entrepreneur. They were shown to be dominant in the current study of the NALSAS Strategy policy process. However, this study also shows that Rudd demonstrated a number of other important characteristics and skills which, while not as
frequently recognised as such by writers were, nonetheless, vital in the context of this study. This study shows that policy entrepreneurs are alert to opportunities to promote their ideas, exhibit sound strategic sense by defining their proposals with certain audiences in mind and by using appropriate policy venues in which to push their proposals. It also highlights how policy entrepreneurs engage in bargaining and exploit personal and professional networks when promoting innovations.

**Alertness to Opportunity**

Alertness to opportunity is an entrepreneurial skill which, while not frequently classified as such in the literature, is absolutely central to understanding the NALSAS Strategy policy process and the actions of its main protagonist Kevin Rudd. The entrepreneurial function of alertness to opportunity does not dominate the thinking of those who have conducted research on the matter. For example, within their theoretical framework of Punctuated-Equilibrium, Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 99) emphasise the importance of maximising opportunities, but the idea constitutes only a minor focus in their overall theory of the policy process. Nonetheless, they do recognise that major policy change occurs when opportunities are detected and exploited by policy entrepreneurs. Schneider *et al* (1995: 42-3), on the other hand, discuss the relevance of alertness to opportunity in terms of the activities of policy entrepreneurs, but their discussion of the function is framed in terms of alertness to 'unfulfilled needs' rather than political opportunities to trigger policy change. This was addressed in the previous level of analysis under the heading of innovation and creativity.106

It is Kingdon's (1995) work on agenda-setting however, which is particularly instructive in terms of explaining how policy entrepreneurs discover and exploit political opportunities, particularly in the case of this study. In Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework, policy windows materialise when the problem, solution and political streams converge and can be joined by the entrepreneur. Most often a window opens when there are changes in the political stream, thus providing entrepreneurs with the chance to define the problem for decision-makers and 'push their pet solutions'. The political stream, according to

106 Mintrom (2000: 124-26) means more or less the same thing when he discusses the idea of policy entrepreneurs being 'socially perceptive'.

Kingdon, is composed of the public mood, pressure group campaigns, election results and changes of administration (1995: 153-59). In relation to the final element of the political stream, Kingdon explains:

When it involves government actors, agenda change occurs in one of two ways. Either incumbents in positions of authority change their priorities and push new agenda items; or the personnel in those positions change, bringing new priorities onto the agenda by virtue of the turnover (Kingdon, 1995: 153).

In terms of the NALSAS Strategy, it was the Prime Minister's meta-policy proclamations about Australia's future in Asia which were perceived by Rudd as a political opportunity to push his proposal for a national Asian studies policy. Using the term 'entrepreneurial' to describe this dimension of the policy exercise, Rudd explained that he and Goss 'saw an entrepreneurial opportunity' to push the proposal, given Keating's 'repeated statements about Australia's future economic integration with East Asia' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).

Keating's transition to the Prime Ministership late in December 1991 represented, to use Kingdon's phraseology, a window which opened in the politics stream. More specifically, it signaled a turnover of key personnel. As Goss explained, 'Paul Keating was very big on Asia and it fitted in quite neatly to that and we didn't miss the opportunity' (Interview with Wayne Goss, 22 July 1999). Keating's active and overt promotion of Australia's relations with Asia was an opportunity to push the Strategy, and allowed Rudd to couple the politics, problem and solution streams. It could be suggested that there was a shift in the priorities of the leadership which brought new items onto the agenda, for despite Keating's predecessor, Bob Hawke, having expressed considerable interest in forging closer economic relations with Asia, Keating's vision of engagement superseded that of Hawke's (Cotton and Ravenhill, 1997: 1-2). Keating pursued this objective with much more enthusiasm and made it a cornerstone of the government's foreign policy during his time as Prime Minister.

Keating also surrounded himself with advisors who were sympathetic to the cause including, Ashton Calvert, who Keating appointed as his foreign affairs adviser on coming to the position at the end of 1991 and later, Allan Gyngell, appointed in 1993. The former Prime Minister recalled in a book he recently authored that: 'While somewhat different,
Calvert and Gyngell shared common views with me about how Australia should set itself up in the region and how and where we should point it over the long haul (Keating, 2000: 12). His chief of staff, Don Russell, and economics advisor, John Edwards, were also important in this respect (See Edwards, 1996). Rudd acknowledged the significance of such figures and recalled that he 'knew personally many of the senior players at a political and bureaucratic level and that that would be a temporary window' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).

Kingdon's metaphor of the policy window parallels its real-world counterpart not only by opening but also closing. And, since policy windows often stay open for only a short time, the policy entrepreneur must be ready to seize the opportunities it affords. Kingdon writes (1995: 169) that: 'Once a window opens, it does not stay open long. An idea's time comes, but it also passes'. In the case of the NALSAS Strategy policy process, we can observe the window closing in two possible ways. First, by late 1994, Rudd had resigned from his position as Director General of the Office of the Cabinet in Queensland to begin pursuing a career in federal politics. It will be recalled that the policy process, or at least the most intensive phase, was only completed in August 1994 when Keating finally agreed to contribute funding to the Strategy. In this way Rudd's departure from the scene could symbolise a closing policy window. Second, not only was it imperative that he act before his own exit but Rudd needed to take advantage of the presence of Keating and his advisors before they departed from the policy setting.

Strategic Sense

*Policy Image*

Policy actors use manipulation of the understanding of policies, that is, how policies are defined, as tools to push their proposals for change and to gain the approval of decision makers. Since the ways in which policies are manipulated and understood differ, there is competition between actors and the definitions they apply to policies. Stone (1988: 299) contends that: 'Problem definition is the active manipulation of images of conditions by competing political actors'. Hence, how a policy is defined is fundamental to the political battle.

Those who have dedicated research to learning about the characteristics and activities of
policy entrepreneurs have acknowledged the important ramifications policy definition can have for policy making outcomes. Although a very brief consideration, Roberts and King (1996:188) have discussed the matter. They make the pertinent observation that: 'The challenge for policy intellectuals and entrepreneurs is to manage the meaning and shape the problem definition so that their interpretation becomes acceptable and appropriate in the existing context'. It is disappointing however, that they do not explore this assumption any further. Kingdon (1995) is also vigilant of the importance of policy definition. He points out that: 'Getting people to see new problems, or see problems in one way rather than another, is a major conceptual and political accomplishment (1995: 115, 109). Although these authors acknowledge the importance of issue definition, only Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and, to a lesser degree, Schneider et al (1995) consider it in significant detail and include it in their inventories of entrepreneurial characteristics.

Schneider et al (1995), who borrow heavily from Riker (1986), examine 'issue framing' in the context of shifting attitudes towards economic growth and non-growth in local government, that is, the policy debate between those whose interests are served by promoting economic growth (progrowth entrepreneurs; the alliance of local business interests and politicians in the pursuit of economic development) and those who oppose rampant economic growth (antigrowth entrepreneurs; citizens and community groups seeking, for instance, neighbourhood and environmental preservation). Antigrowth entrepreneurs, for example, affect change by alerting people to dimensions of the debate that differ to those on which progrowth entrepreneurs base their positions. The authors argue that antigrowth entrepreneurs seek to redefine the terms of the policy debate, and thereby shift the terms and outcome of the debate using 'heresthetics'. That is, by alerting citizens to the potential negative effects of progrowth policies on the natural environment and peoples' quality of life, antigrowth entrepreneurs can undermine the position of their opponents (Schneider et al, 1996: ch, 7).

The crucial activity of issue definition does not escape the purview of Baumgartner and Jones (1993). Indeed it is they, again heavily influenced by Riker (1986), as well as noteworthy contributions from Cobb and Elder (1983) and Schattschneider (1960), who have developed the most sophisticated conception of policy definition. They refer to the definition of a policy, or the way a policy is understood and discussed, as its 'policy image'. For policy entrepreneurs, it is to the creation of policy images that they are required to turn their hand; the modification of the perception of an issue to which they must set their
minds. However, people hold different images of the same policies and programs. Policy images are contested. Just as the pro/antigrowth entrepreneurs described by Schneider et al compete with each other by advancing alternative policy definitions, so too is there competition between particular policy images: 'there may be considerable conflict over the proper way to describe or understand it. Often, proponents of a policy focus on one set of images, while opponents refer more often to another set of images' (1993: 26).

The idea of the policy image is a useful conceptual tool for understanding the NALSAS Strategy policy process and the role of Kevin Rudd, especially in arguing the case for the Strategy with the key decision-makers. Rather than persuade decision-makers to endorse and fund the Strategy for either educational or multicultural reasons, Rudd articulated and defined the Strategy in terms of Australia's future economic integration with East Asia. By defining it like this, decision-makers were encouraged to conceive of the policy in a particular way. They were persuaded to endorse the Strategy by a policy image which heavily favoured its economic benefits. In adopting this approach, Rudd shifted the dimension of the policy debate; he created an alternative to the competing educational and multicultural policy images. As Healy (1990: 69-71) states, in relation to the equally instrumentalist Garnaut Report (1989):

I am the first to admit that an economic justification for Asian studies is a politically advantageous argument with which to bludgeon the ears of a government highly receptive to the principles of economic rationalism and possessing a narrow instrumentalist conception of education.

*Asian Languages and Australia's Economic Future* clearly demonstrates the intent of Rudd and his Queensland colleagues in terms of etching out a policy image. Rudd sought to win the support of heads of government by crafting a policy image which drew attention to Australia's economic performance in the Asia-Pacific region. Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 26) also point out that specialists, who will often be policy entrepreneurs, have an advantage over others because they have the capacity to explain the proposal in terms which can be understood by non-specialists. Although specialists usually converse with each other, they often have to explain their policies to the public or to elites who have only a passing interest in the matter. Expertise is also regarded by Kingdon (1995: 180) as an entrepreneurial quality which contributes to the success of individual policy actors.
because it gives them some claim to a hearing. 107

By defining Asian studies in terms of helping to facilitate Australia's engagement with Asia, rather than as an expression of multiculturalism or for broader educational benefit to students, Rudd was able to win the support of key decision-makers and attract significant Commonwealth funding. By articulating his case for the Strategy in terms of maximising Australia's economic performance in the region he built a powerful 'policy image'.

**Policy Venues**

Closely associated with the concept of 'policy images' is the notion of 'policy venues', a phrase again used by Baumgartner and Jones (1993) to describe policy and law making forums such as legislatures, legislative committees, the courts, statutory authorities and government agencies. Apart from extensive treatment by Baumgartner and Jones, policy venues occupy only a minor place in the literature on policy entrepreneurship. For instance, Roberts and King (1996) demonstrate the importance of institutions and venue choice, but rather than locating policy entrepreneurs central to the change process, the authors place them on the periphery. In their study of schools choice in Minnesota, the authors argue that a discussion forum was established to encourage debate about school choice. This forum was an important aspect of the innovative process because it helped to hammer out educational policy prior to the legislature and 'to allow more reasoned debate' than that which characterised the legislature (1996: 193).

Baumgartner and Jones (1993), on the other hand, argue that entrepreneurs exploit existing official policy venues in the federal system rather than create unofficial forums for discussion to achieve short-term objectives. On the basis of their research into the phenomena of radical policy innovation, Baumgartner and Jones argue that policy-making in the US is characterised by extended periods of incremental change marked by intermittent periods of radical innovation. Policy venues, they argue, are 'the institutional

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107 Wrong (1980: 53) has explained expertise in terms of a form of authority: 'competent authority is a power relation in which the subject obeys the directives of the authority out of belief in the authority's superior competence or expertise to decided which actions will serve the subject's interests and goals'. See also Considine (1994: 194), where expertise is understood in terms of 'technocracy' - rule by experts; technocrats influence policy by virtue of their technocratic expertise.
locations where authoritative decisions are made concerning a given issue' (1993: 32). They play an exceptionally important part in the policy process. Federal systems of government provide particularly fertile soil for the growth of policy venues as a result of multiple legislatures and levels of government, policy committees, councils and specific and numerous intergovernmental fora. In these venues policy innovations can be initiated and pursued. They argue that federalism provides 'opportunities for strategically minded policy entrepreneurs to shop for the most favourable locus for their policies' (1993, 25).

Closely associated, indeed interlocked with the notion of 'policy venues', is the development of complementary 'policy images', as previously discussed. According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 31), policy images and venues interact with each other. They explain that 'Some types of image may be well accepted in one venue, but considered inappropriate when raised in another institutional arena'. Hence, policy entrepreneurs search for policy venues sympathetic to the images they have created. Since authority to make decisions is not usually the sovereign right of any one particular policy venue, and some venues are often more receptive of one image than another, policy entrepreneurs 'shop' for the most sympathetic venue. They assert that: 'Each institutional venue is home to a different image of the same question'.

In terms of policy venues in Australia, there are the conventional sites of policy and law making, including federal and state legislatures, the courts system, some statutory authorities and parliamentary committees. However, the cooperative imperative of the federal system means that there also exists a number of intergovernmental policy venues, including ministerial councils and their associated officials' committees. And, as Chapter Four explained there was in full-flight during the first half of the 1990s, COAG established to facilitate Commonwealth-State collaboration on major issues of national significance. This study has also argued that Rudd framed his proposal for change in the image of an economic policy, and not in terms of an educational policy. The strategy he pursued was aimed at enhancing Australia's economic competitiveness in East Asia. Rudd was convinced that if the proposal was dressed in economic garb COAG, which was at the time primarily concerned with increasing the competitiveness of Australian industry and businesses, would not only countenance his initiative, but they would endorse it. Rudd and his colleagues carefully framed the proposal in terms of Australia's economic future with the knowledge that, as Baumgartner and Jones propound, 'some venues are more receptive of one image than another'. Both Rudd and Tim Spencer argued that once
COAG began to view the proposal as an economic rather than as an educational reform acceptance of the proposal was more readily forthcoming.

The AEC/MOVEET, the relevant ministerial council and more logical policy venue through which to seek endorsement may not, one could speculate, have been as readily amenable to a proposal which blatantly painted the teaching of Asian studies as an economic reform, especially when the ministerial council in question was, and remains, concerned primarily with making education policy. In this way the policy venue/image nexus serves as a reasonably useful tool for analysing how Rudd won the support of heads of government. The COAG policy venue was, it is suggested, chosen due to its nature as an economic policy making institution, and hence one more receptive to the policy image shaped by Rudd. However, besides shopping for an appropriate policy venue receptive to the policy image he crafted, the case study clearly exposed other important reasons why Rudd sought endorsement through COAG. The image-venue dichotomy is instructive in this case, but it is only a necessary explanatory tool rather than a sufficient one.

The other factor which prompted Rudd to drive his proposal through COAG was the Council's superior political power, and thus its capacity to overcome resistance which, if met at the ministerial council level, may have precluded a satisfactory outcome. In the previous chapter, it was advocated that ministerial councils were quite cumbersome and tended to have a high capacity to 'lock-up' issues and were often unable to achieve consensus, except at the lowest common denominator level. COAG, on the other hand, was driven by heads of government through their respective central agencies. Its record of achievement during the period in which it was most productive is evidence that the Council was an effective policy making institution. It wielded sufficient political clout to progress matters that were stagnating at the ministerial level. As Wayne Goss remarked, in the early days it 'became obvious immediately to Commonwealth government and state leaders that this forum could be a very important forum to bring the weight of leaders behind issues that were not proceeding at the ministerial councils level' (Correspondence from Wayne Goss, 27 May 1999).

The development of Asian studies in Australia which, in this study was presented in Chapter Three, suggested that by 1992 ministerial level efforts to further expand the teaching of Asian studies in schools through the aegis of the AEC/MOVEET had indeed languished. In what was really a reaction to the sheer frustration associated with the way
in which Asian studies was being dealt with, Rudd decided to push his proposal through COAG rather than the AEC/MOVEET:

If you wanted an expeditious outcome and a capacity for it to be agreed and implemented it was the only show in town. If you wanted to play games with it and make it into a perennial process until we all grew old, there were plenty of other forums in town to do that (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).

Brian Head, then Executive Director of the Cabinet Secretariat in Queensland, was not officially involved in the policy activity surrounding the Strategy, but was close enough to be aware of the process. He concurs with Rudd:

at the practical level, if you are dealing with eight jurisdictions that have to implement it, namely the six states and two territories, you are dealing with some very practical and bureaucratic, and often quite negative factors. So taking it out of the AEC environment and putting it into the heads of government environment was a smart move in terms of forum shopping (Interview with Brian Head, 19 July 1999).

In short, since it was a ministerial level policy venue, it lacked the political power to make and enforce wide ranging education policy reforms. Recognising the political and funding limitations of the AEC/MOVEET, Rudd looked to the most powerful decision makers in the country and the new forum in which many innovative intergovernmental initiatives were being carried out. In many respects then, Rudd was swayed by the prospect of a fruitful outcome borne of sheer political power. Frank Peach explained this bluntly, but accurately: 'If you go back to COAG and get the premiers to agree, the premiers will come back and tell education ministers what to do, which of course is where you are with the NALSAS Strategy' (Interview with Frank Peach, 22 July 1999).

In terms of policy entrepreneurs carefully targeting decision makers with political weight to push there policy proposals, it is perhaps Bardach who endows us with the most useful insights. Bardach (1972: 10) asserts that one of the main problems facing the entrepreneur is to identify the number and type of interests that will support his proposal:

If we postulate a rational entrepreneur trying to accumulate enough support for a
proposal, we can easily see that one of his political problems will be to identify and select from among the number of several plausible combinations of interests of those that will produce this level of support. This entails, at a minimum, designing a proposal and some acceptable, if unrevealed, alternatives; ascertaining the disposition of the various interests who might support them; and assessing how weighty their views are among the relevant authorities (Bardach, 1972: 10).

Rudd made a careful and educated decision about the interests which would most likely countenance his policy innovation. According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993), the aim of the policy entrepreneur is to draw into the political battle new sets of interests amenable to the proposal's image. However, as far as Bardach is concerned another consideration must be the political weight of the those to whom the proposal is presented for approval. In terms of this study, the evidence appears to strongly support this assumption. Michael Keating, the Secretary of the DPM&C is adamant that it was necessary for the proposal to be pushed at the heads of government level:

Normally something like Asian languages would not have got to COAG. But its probably fair to say that it wouldn't have got funded if it had not have been pressed at the highest level. That's why it got to COAG. The education ministers would not have found the money (Interview with Michael Keating, 18 November 1997).

The findings of this study suggest that the policy venue in which the individual pushes a proposal and negotiates it with decision makers must be carefully selected. COAG, rather than the ministerial council for schools, was chosen on the basis that it was expected to be more receptive of the proposals policy image, and would more effectively evade the negative bureaucratic aspects of the ministerial council and allow Rudd and Goss access to powerful Commonwealth and state decision-makers whose support was necessary to ratify the NALSAS Strategy.

Bargaining

Bargaining is an essential and indispensable facet of governing and politics, particularly in democratic states. In Politics, Planning and Welfare, Dahl and Lindlom (1963) argue that
governmental or 'political' bargaining, 'is itself frequently a politico-economic process by which decision about scarce resources are arrived at'. In establishing why political leaders engage in bargaining:

Leaders bargain because they disagree and expect that further agreement is possible and will be profitable-and that profit sought may accrue not merely to the individual self, but to the group, an alliance of groups, a region, a nation, unborn generations, "the public interest". Hence bargaining takes place because it is necessary, possible, and thought to be profitable (Dahl & Lindblom, 1963: 326).

For only Bardach (1972), Eyestone (1978) and Kingdon (1995) is the role of bargaining seen as a crucial function of the policy entrepreneur. According to Bardach, the capacity to strike a bargain is necessary because persuasion and argument may not alone achieve the desired outcome. He considers bargaining as winning the favour of those who are neutral or opposed to a proposed initiative or policy. Bardach points out that some 'will not find in persuasion, whether reasonable or rhetorical, sufficient incentives to come out in support of the proposal'. Bargaining becomes a secondary resort in this instance 'which entails sacrificing something of political value to himself in exchange for support' (Bardach 1972: 206).

Bargaining, or brokerage, is also an activity in which policy entrepreneurs must participate, according to Kingdon (1995: 183). In reference to the role that entrepreneurs play in joining problems, policies and politics streams, he argues that entrepreneurs are normally involved in two separate activities. In addition to advocating their pet proposals, the first of these activities, entrepreneurs also act as brokers when coupling the streams. They look to make compromises with those whose support they require because superior argumentation does not always carry the day. For Eyestone (1978: 94) too, brokerage is one of two key roles played by policy entrepreneurs. Although it is not bargaining in the sense described above he explains, nonetheless, that 'issue brokerage' is carried out by those who hold government positions. These 'inside-dopesters', as he labels them, carry out lobbying campaigns with government figures, some times directly with key decision makers (1978: 94).

The policy process through which the NALSAS Strategy was driven, exhibits a discrete instance of political bargaining. The case study illustrates that in the early 1990s
Prime Minister Keating pursued a two-pronged strategy, first to break Australia's legacy of Eurocentrism and dependency on the US by vigorously promoting strong and extensive ties with East Asia and, secondly, to prosecute domestic microeconomic reform, of which the establishment of a National Electricity Grid was a fundamental component. Although some of the details surrounding the deal between Goss and Rudd and Keating are somewhat unclear, and the extent to which Commonwealth funding for the NALSAS Strategy actually hinged on a bargain remains uncertain, the evidence presented in Chapter Four leaves little doubt that there was a compromise of one sort or another. It suggests that Keating agreed to fund the Strategy to facilitate his commitment to forging closer relations with Asia in exchange for Queensland's cooperation on another matter about which he felt strongly, most probably the establishment of the National Electricity Grid.

The case study shows that argumentation, reasoning and persuasion were essential weapons in the policy process and in Rudd's armoury of entrepreneurial skills. But it also revealed, however, that resistance to Rudd's proposal was not eclipsed by reasoning strategies alone, either at the bureaucratic or the political level. During the report writing phase, officials from DEET and DPM&C resisted on a number of fronts, especially on the issue of funding. It required political intervention to resolve this issue and a number of others which were also subject to bureaucratic resistance, including the issue of compulsion and the four priority Asian languages. Efforts to persuade Keating and his advisors, on the other hand, were successful for they supported the proposal and made their position on the matter clear by the very act of intervention. Nevertheless, Keating and Goss, for it was Goss who had to argue the case with the Keating at the COAG meeting in August 1994, realised the agreement was possible and, to use the phrase of Dahl and Lindlom (1963), profitable not merely for themselves but for the nation. Both had to compromise in exchange for support.

Bargaining is an inescapable fact of politics. In terms of intergovernmental policy making in the Australian federal system, this is indeed the norm rather than an exception. Thus, notwithstanding the successes of COAG, it was subject to the same political horse-trading and bargaining which is such an inextricable feature of policy making in a federation. Common and agreed approaches to reform were only achieved and ratified after prolonged and laborious processes of negotiation. As Painter (1998: 40) explains, 'the negotiations and discussions surrounding some of these issues and agreements involved a great deal of brinkmanship, strong-arm tactics and complex, ingenious deals and
compromises'. Similarly, as Edwards and Henderson (1995, 24) attested at the time, 'COAG, in contrast to premiers conferences, does engage in substantive negotiation and bargaining...'. In this sense COAG was another method, another intergovernmental mechanism, according to Chapman (1988: 101), through which the political entities of the Australian federal system could 'communicate, negotiate, bargain, exchange, reciprocate and generally interact'.

Networks, Trust and Credibility

One of the earliest attempts to consider the effect of actors' personal contacts on policy making was Hugh Heclo (1978). He described the webs of policy actors who influence policy outcomes as 'issue networks'. Issue networks, according to Heclo, 'comprise a large number of participants with quite variable degrees of mutual commitment of dependence on others in their environment' (1978: 102). Membership of issue networks is also fluid. The line which separates the network from its environment is almost impossible to discern since actors move in and out of issue networks. Network members are not necessarily technical experts, though they may be, but also 'policy activists who know each other through the issues' (1978: 103). Considine (1994), on the other hand, employs the phrase 'actor networks' to describe the pattern of multiple interactions between individuals in policy systems,108 or 'the informal and semi-formal linkages between individuals and groups in the same policy system' (1994: 103). Actor networks are composed of formal organisations, government agencies and international groups which provide channels for communication on a regular and continuing basis. They afford participants in the same policy system the opportunity to arrive at mutually agreed positions on policy issues and to developing methods to facilitate communication (1994: 104).

In the literature on policy entrepreneurship references to the importance of the networks of the entrepreneurs are reasonably frequent. One contributor to the genre, Bardach (1972), provides a useful preliminary insight to the matter. For Bardach, the resources a policy entrepreneur requires to market a proposal, that is, to persuade decision makers to accept a proposal and resist any opposition, includes an extensive and carefully nurtured

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108 Actors in a policy system are connected by institutions, groups and networks, and other relationships and 'based on shared understandings, values, common sources of disagreement, and patterned interactions (Considine, 1994: 8).
set of interpersonal contacts. Such contacts, he contends, are necessary to maintain channels of communication with strategically placed individuals and one's allies. Bardach elaborates:

The significance of interpersonal contact in most channeled transmission implies that the entrepreneur should, over the long-run, establish many contacts and from time to time refresh them so as to keep channels open (Bardach, 1972: 219).

Bardach's work, it must be remembered, is set at a low level of theoretical abstraction and thus his engagement with the topic is not highly sophisticated. However, there are others who have pitched their analysis on a higher plane and in a fashion consistent with the likes of Heclo and Considine. Kingdon's contribution, for instance, is set well within the issue/actor network tradition described initially. In his discussion of policy actors developing ideas and solutions in the 'policy stream', Kingdon (1995: 117) argues that 'policy communities - specialists in a given policy area' - perform a critical function, for it is within these communities that proposals and alternatives are generated but also where some survive while others will die. Apart from common membership and concern about one particular policy area, actors in policy communities have in common 'their interactions with each other'. Kingdon's research found that community members 'know each other's ideas, proposals, and research, and often know each other very well personally'. Kingdon also nominates the entrepreneur's 'political connections or negotiating skill' as a major entrepreneurial quality (1995: 181).

In their study of entrepreneurship in local government, Schneider et al (1995) regard networks as resources on which entrepreneurs frequently draw. They argue that in networks, actors communicate not by means of formal linkages in a bureaucracy as such, but through individuals engaged in reciprocal, mutually supportive actions (1995: 58). Like their counterparts in the private sector, 'public sector entrepreneurs also rely on networks, making repeated use of contacts they have established over the course of years of professional and political activities'. In a perceptive addition to this equation, the authors also stress the importance of trust, reputation and credibility in networks. Since networks are more flexible than formal hierarchies, they hold, the development of trust between network members is essential. Entrepreneurs need to develop trust in
relationships and networks in order to achieve their goals (1995: 175-84). Mintrom (2000: 126) has developed this idea further in a recent publication, where he asserts that 'a well-developed set of social and professional contacts can make the difference between success and failure in the launch of an innovation'. He continues:

For entrepreneurs who seek to introduce change in the form of innovations, the key social task is to establish sound connections and relationships of mutual trust with those they need to work with, while recognizing that their very interest in promoting is likely to mark them out as distinctive and potentially threatening (Mintrom, 2000: 127).

Observing the case at the centre of this study, it is clear there are a number of parallels with the conceptions described above. Leaving aside the trust factor for the moment, the evidence indicates that a collection of strategically placed contacts aided Rudd's cause. These were personal and professional relationships built-up over a period of time. Rudd's colleague, Tim Spencer, from the Queensland Office of the Cabinet elaborated:

He had both the background, the intellectual capacity and profile nationally in terms of his counterparts in other bureaucracies, plus key contacts in the political world, if you like, which enabled the thing to be driven, and driven very, very hard (Interview with Tim Spencer, 25 May 1999).

Rudd himself conceded that he had some good solid contacts at the Commonwealth level which he saw as an opportunity to push his proposal: 'I knew personally many of the senior players at a political and bureaucratic level and that would be a temporary window', he recalled (Email correspondence from Kevin Rudd, 21 May 2001). It is noteworthy that before his exploits in Queensland and his time as Director General of the Office of the Cabinet, Rudd was a diplomat with the DFAT and therefore employed by the Commonwealth. Hence, the Commonwealth, he states, 'was not a foreign country'. Moreover, during the early days of the Hawke/Keating New Federalism exercise which preceded his push for the NALSAS Strategy and as Goss's Principal Policy Advisor 109 It is important to remember that Mintrom collaborated with Schneider and Teski on the 1995 publication. It appears that the trust dimension may have been the result of Mintrom's contribution, since the idea was also developed in another article (Mintrom and Vergari, 1998) and his recent book (Mintrom, 2000).
(before he became chief executive of the Office of the Cabinet), Rudd had dealt with numerous Commonwealth people at the bureaucratic and political level. He had worked with Hawke's and Keating's advisors on a range of matters. With some of them Rudd had developed a good working relationship. According to Rudd, 'with some there was a reasonable working relationship. But I was not an unknown figure walking through the door; but it would be wrong to say we were drinking mates' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).

In many ways, the nature of Rudd's network of contacts appears to have been of the formal issue/actor and policy community type explicated by Kingdon and Schneider et al. However, the network in which Rudd was placed did not constitute a policy community, to use Kingdon's phrase, in the sense that it was confined to a specific policy area. It did however, share a number of common characteristics by virtue of the broader economic reform objectives of COAG and New Federalism. Painter (1998) bears this out quite well in his analysis of the COAG policy reform process. He has observed that heads of government 'shared a common mindset' in terms of economic, public sector and federal reform and, to make real gains and effectively facilitate the process, political leaders 'developed a sense of teamwork in the initial months of preparations', particularly before the first SPC in 1991. He also argues that the common commitment shared by heads of government was comparable to senior officials and ministerial advisors involved in the New Federalism initiative. Painter writes that: 'Just as their leaders found common intellectual ground and struck up close personal and professional relations, so too did these officials' (1998: 65). The close working relationships between premiers' advisors can be seen in the crucial role of central agencies and their CEO's in the establishment and maintenance of the process, which Weller (1996: 104) has termed 'the central agencies club'.

Extrapolating beyond what Painter and Weller have determined, one could speculate too, that there was a sizeable repository of trust which bound officials and leaders together during SPC and COAG. Although technically feasible policy ideas are essential, Mintrom posits, a healthy reputation is a vital ingredient for gaining the approval of one's policy community. Policy entrepreneurs, he argues, 'must also strive to demonstrate their own credibility and trustworthiness as sellers of their ideas' (Mintrom, 2000: 214). Again, his colleague, Tim Spencer, vouches that Rudd 'had a good profile which gave him the credibility with which to drive the policy through'. Rudd himself argues that he had not
only developed a good personal and professional reputation, but that Queensland itself had also won healthy respect as a robust and effective participant:

if you have dealt with that someone for 3-4 years and they have a good track record and are politically sensitive then you tend to listen to them with some credibility. Reputations, actually the state, had a good reputation. We were a pretty substantial player across the game (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).

In this section it has been argued that Rudd exploited his personal and professional network of contacts and traded on his reputation as a robust policy negotiator, particularly in his dealings with the Commonwealth, to help gain approval of his vision for change.

Third Level Analysis

Having demonstrated that Kevin Rudd performed many of the functions of a policy entrepreneur in the NALSAS Strategy policy process, the third level of analysis searches for other forces which may have effectuated its final outcome. It asks the question: What factors besides the activities and characteristics of the policy entrepreneur need to be considered to fully understand this instance of policy innovation? That is, what were the situational and contextual factors, if any, which may have aided or constrained the policy entrepreneur as he went about his business?

The third level status of this analysis also implies that existing research on the subject of policy entrepreneurship has tended not to emphasise these types of factors in their analyses. A glance at the Chapter One inventory, in which these factors do not appear, makes this clear. It is proposed in this section that contextual factors significantly influenced the work of Rudd, the policy process and its final outcome. Thus, where appropriate the views of writers unassociated with policy entrepreneurship will be vetted to help clarify some of the concepts with which this section deals as well as to assist in the critique of those who have failed to adequately consider the factor of context. However, first it is necessary to consider another of Rudd’ actions which could not be dealt with in the previous level of analysis, since by only one contributor to the policy entrepreneurship literature is it addressed, and even in that treatment it is only addressed briefly.
Tactics and Manoeuvres

The central principles of military strategy themes include ascertaining the strengths and weaknesses of one's opponents and then avoiding the former while exploiting the latter, outflanking, effective use of strategic reserves, tension and release, forcing opponents to over-stretch their resources and so on. In terms of business management, on the other hand, a strategy often implies a plan: a consciously conceived course of action. This is particularly the case in the private sector, where the strategic plan shows how the firm will achieve its objectives; a strategy is the set of guidelines by which the company is to achieve its objectives. Business sector strategists also have much in common with their military counterparts. For instance, in their book on the development of strategic management thought, Mintzberg and Quinn (1992: 13) perceive strategy in terms of a 'ploy': 'a specific "manoeuvre" intended to outwit an opponent or competitor... manoeuvres are employed to gain advantage'. They point out that strategies are necessary to respond to the 'potential actions or responses of intelligent opponents who can seriously effect the endeavours desired outcomes' (1992: 6).

Strategy can also be understood in political terms. Machiavelli's *The Prince*, of course, is the classic account of types and uses of political strategy. According to Hood (1989: 6), 'strategic action' is a natural aspect of political behaviour. When we act strategically, our 'behaviour relates to and depends on the moves of others'. Bardach (1972) is the only writer who discusses strategic action and particular strategies which entrepreneurs may use to outwit their opponents. He lists a number of possible actions that can be taken when the entrepreneur is met, or is potentially met, by an opponent. Primarily, the entrepreneur should endeavour to stall his opponent for it is better, as far as the entrepreneur is concerned, that opposition present itself later, rather than sooner, in the policy process. Two of the strategies identified by Bardach are particularly instructive in terms of Rudd's prosecution of the NALSAS Strategy policy process. The first is secrecy:

The most clear-cut stalling tactic involves keeping the proposal secret from its likely enemies... since it is assumed that a proposal in its incubation period is unusually vulnerable to attack by its opponents (Bardach, 1972: 237).
And the second, entrapment:

Another useful stalling tactic involves entrapment - defining the proposal in such a way that interests whose support is problematic will appear to the attentive public to be inconsistent, unprincipled, or hypocritical as they rise to oppose it (Bardach, 1972: 239)

In the NALSAS Strategy policy process, we can see both strategies employed by Rudd. Evidence of the first case, where the proposal is kept secret from potential opponents, can be seen in the way he dealt with the DPM&C, DEET and the PMO. Whereas Rudd had made significant progress towards persuading the Prime Minister and his advisors to support the proposal prior to the COAG meeting in December 1992, he had kept it secret from the DPM&C, or at least much of the detail concerning his vision for the Report and the Strategy. The case study showed that when the DPM&C finally became aware of the funding and policy implications of the proposal it was largely too late, since the Prime Minister, notwithstanding the funding agreement, had already given tacit support to the proposal. As Rudd said, in remarkably similar language to Bardach, 'we had already developed a head of steam. Its far easier to strangle these things at birth than after they have rocked along for a while' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1997).

The second case, where the entrepreneur defines the proposal in a way that appears hypocritical when opposed by its enemies, is detectable in the way Rudd defined the proposal in terms of it facilitating Australia's economic integration with Asia. The economic policy image which Rudd had crafted fitted neatly with the results of a number of Commonwealth reports, which not only posited a link between linguistic competence and trade/business performance, but strongly advocated increasing government resources and effort in the area of Asian studies. When the Commonwealth objected to the proposal on the grounds that there was little evidence to sustain such a claim, Rudd simply pointed towards the relevant Commonwealth reports and asked the latter to argue against the finding of its own research. This was a way of 'trapping' the Commonwealth, according to Bardach. To Rudd and his colleagues, the Commonwealth's opposition to these issues was 'problematic'; its support appeared 'inconsistent' and 'hypocritical'. It is worth quoting Allan Langdon in relation to Rudd's ability as a political strategist. He remarked that: 'you have to give Kevin his due, he is and remains, a supremely efficient tactician in these sorts of things (Interview with Allan Langdon, 8 December 1997).
Institutions

The term institution can be applied in a broad-ranging way referring, on the one hand, to its more abstract conceptions, such as the state, constitutions and federalism as well as the discrete institutions of governance including, legislatures, courts and bureaucratic and administrative agencies (Keating et al 2000). In what has become known as the 'New Institutionalism', political scientists, James March and Johan Olsen, (1989: 16), assert that institutions are 'fundamental features of politics' which 'contribute to stability and change in political life'. March and Olsen acknowledge the broader meaning of institutions but their focus is mainly on the administrative institutions of the government. The authors argue that most contemporary theories of politics have paid excessive attention to the way the external environment imposes order on institutions. Analysis has focused too much on the impact of forces external to institutions rather than on institutions as sources of order and change in their own right. To balance the ledger March and Olsen re-assert the primacy of political institutions, particularly administrative institutions, by showing how they provide order and influence change in politics. How political life is organised, they argue, 'makes a difference, and institutions effect the flow of history' (1989: 159). They add, subsequently, that: 'Without denying the importance of both the social context of politics and the motives of individual actors, therefore, institutional analysis posits a more independent role for political institutions' (1989: 17).

For Considine (1994: 99) institutions are distinguished by norms of behaviour. Institutions are characterised by 'their own rules of access, routines for consideration of claims, and standard ways of making decisions'. By adopting protocol and universally

110 The phrase 'new institutionalism' was coined by March and Olsen in a celebrated 1984 article. See Peters (1996), for an examination of the various strands of thinking contained in the new institutionalism.

111 Rothstein's (1996) overview of how political institutions have been treated in the history of political science, particularly during the behavioural period, is most enlightening. Rothstein (1996: 140) argues that 'The general neglect of the analysis of political institutions during the behavioural period can be understood as a reaction against the lack of ambition towards positive theory in earlier political studies'.

112 See Parsons (1995: 323-336) who argues that in recent times policy analysts have grown aware of the importance of placing policy studies in institutional contexts. Parsons also presents a detailed overview of the different approaches to institutional analysis.
accepted methodology uncertainty is minimised and matters are dealt with rationally and consistently. Institutions can be 'used for settling, calming and improving interactions among actors in policy systems... they lay down pathways for action and send signals to actors about how to move forward... they enable change'. Considine's characterisation of political institutions neatly complements that of March and Olsen.

It can quite feasibly be argued that the existence of two key policy institutions were very important in terms of helping to bring about the NALSAS Strategy. First, the Office of the Cabinet, the institution in which Rudd was situated and from where he launched the proposal and, COAG, the intergovernmental institution through which Rudd chose to negotiate the proposal. Both were crucial in the policy process. Rudd employed both of them to bring the political weight of the Prime Minister and premiers behind the initiative in order to push it through. How policy/political institutions may influence the work of policy entrepreneurs is often not considered by analysts. Frequently, as they endeavour to learn more about the policy process and the world of the policy entrepreneur, treatment of the institutional context in which policy entrepreneurs are located is left in abeyance. How they structure and mould the activities of the latter is regularly absent. While the impact of institutions may be acknowledged in some accounts, analysis of how and why they impact on the policy entrepreneur usually lacks detail.

For instance, Walker's (1981) treatment of policy entrepreneurs is of limited use. Although policy entrepreneurs are located in government institutions, their impact on the latter is not considered. The team of entrepreneurs on which Roberts and King (1996) center their attention are situated, by contrast, outside officialdom and can only be considered vigilant of institutional power inasmuch as they assert the importance of contacts with 'policy champions' in elected positions in political institutions. Kingdon (1995), on the other hand, whose case study participants are located in political institutions, perceives them neither as important vehicles for change, nor as mediating forces in the everyday activity of policy entrepreneurs. Institutions appear to be very much on the outer.

In a critique of Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework from the perspective of institutional analysis, Edella Schlager points out that the framework is rooted firmly in the
behaviourist tradition\textsuperscript{113} of political science and is, consequently, more or less an institution-free approach to understanding the policy process. Schlager writes that the framework 'only implicitly takes account of institutional arrangements, and such arrangements play only a very minor role in explaining major policy change' (1999: 248).

Thus, for Schlager, Kingdon's treatment of the institutional settings in which policy entrepreneurs operate is insufficient. Of Kingdon's three streams, Schlager suggests, it is the political stream for which a consideration of institutional forces would be most useful (1999: 247). However, although he recognises the importance of the positions held by policy entrepreneurs in government institutions, particularly political appointees and members of Congress, Kingdon pays little attention to the nature of those institutions, that is, as Schlager suggests, to 'capture the specific traits of specific governing structures' and their effect on the activities of the policy entrepreneur.\textsuperscript{114}

Among those to have engaged with the concept of policy entrepreneurship, it is in the Punctuated-Equilibrium Framework of Baumgartner and Jones (1993) that institutions feature prominently. For these authors institutions are near the centre of the policy process. The institutions on which they concentrate are referred to as 'policy venues', and it was demonstrated in the previous level of analysis that such 'policy venues' also played a critical role in the making of the NALSAS Strategy. A chief role of policy entrepreneurs is to exploit policy venues agreeable to the policy images they have created. Entrepreneurs seek policy venues amenable to the way in which the issue has been defined. However, according to Schlager, the 'policy venues', or institutions at the heart of their explanation of the policy process, 'are conceptualized at a relatively gross level' (199: 248). To furnish the framework with more robustness and enhanced explanatory power, Schlager advocates further explication of the roles, structures and resources of 'policy venues'. She poses a number of possibilities for further research, such as determining if and why some venues are more effective than others and to discover how venues are connected. Suggested too,

\textsuperscript{113} The behaviourist tradition in political science commenced in the post-war period and advocated a more scientific approach to explaining politics. It was concerned mainly with individual behaviour rather than how institutions influence policy and political outcomes. Theory development and the use of quantitative analysis were also hallmarks of the tradition. In comparative politics systems approaches were widely employed for general use across all types of government (Peters, 1996: 206).

\textsuperscript{114} Another noteworthy critique has been leveled by Nikoloas Zahariadis (1999: 89). Zahariadis, who has conducted large-scale research using the Multiple Streams Framework, remarks that it is necessary for Kingdon to more closely examine how the role of institutions could be incorporated into his framework, that is, to 'anchor his framework within specific institutional contexts'.
is the incorporation of a more 'federal flavour' into the framework by looking at how policy venues in state governments may effect policy change.

In terms of the current study Schlager's suggestions are somewhat prescient. For instance, it was noted in the previous level of analysis that the policy image/policy venue concept developed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993) proved a valuable tool for explaining key aspects of the NALSAS Strategy policy process. Nonetheless, it was also argued that, while necessary, the nexus alone was not an adequate means of explaining the choice of policy venue. It was shown that Rudd chose COAG to push his proposal rather than the relevant ministerial council for reasons other than the former's predisposition to the economic policy image. The ability of COAG to fast-track the proposal and its sheer political power were also vital factors affecting the choice. In this instance it is useful to consider Mintrom's (2000) take on the matter. In a somewhat unique insight compared to other contributors to the literature, Mintrom implores us to think about the impact of the policy entrepreneur's context.

The context, or 'policy milieu' in which the policy entrepreneur is embedded, according to Mintrom, is the combined effects of the institutional structures which control policy making, current policy settings and the actions and expectations of other policy actors (2000: 123). In considering contextual effects Mintrom discusses four policy milieu cases with each containing a combination of two main variables. First, there is the degree of change, which is measured by the preferences of groups and citizens and the impact of public sector management reforms in and around particular policy jurisdictions: in some the pace of change is slow while in others it is comparatively rapid. Second, there are venues for political participation, such as state legislatures and local governments: some of these are more closed and open than others. Mintrom contrasts venues controlled by elite interests (relatively closed) and venues typified by direct democracy (relatively open) to

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115 Heintz and Jenkins-Smith (1988) have also argued that policy analysts can maximise the effects of their contributions to the policy process by manipulating the policy context by judicious selection of the policy forum. They write: 'The optimal choice in selection of an analytical forum will be based in part on how persuasive the analysis is, and on the sponsoring coalitions political resources. If the analysis is compelling, the analyst should attempt to steer the issue into a professionalized forum, perhaps by soliciting highly respected bodies like the National Academy of Sciences to sponsor studies and/or conferences on the issue. If the analysis is less compelling, but the coalition has abundant political resources, the manager is more likely to meet with success by routing the issue to an open political forum, like the U.S. Congress' (1988: 272).
illustrate how milieus differ. The configuration of these variables in any given policy milieu dictates opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to promote policy innovations (2000: 118).

The third case described by Mintrom, for instance, is a policy milieu with qualified opportunities for entrepreneurs to pursue policy change. In this case 'Although the pace of change is fast, the venues for political participation are relatively closed' (2000: 118). Mintrom uses the example of entrenched interest groups which are inclined to dominate the policy making process and reduce the possibilities for outsiders to influence policy making. To influence policy outcomes in these circumstances, individuals need to join or align themselves with the established interests. Although neither this nor any of the other cases described by Mintrom are directly applicable to the NALSAS Strategy, the general approach he embraces provides us with clues about how to begin conceptualising the roles played by the key institutions in the policy process. Moreover, Mintrom's approach represents a positive response to Schlager's suggestion that institutions, especially in the Punctuated-Equilibrium Framework, be studied in more detail.

In relation to the NALSAS Strategy policy process, we know that two main policy institutions were involved: the Office of the Cabinet in Queensland (state level) and the COAG (intergovernmental level). As the discussion of the institutional environment in Chapter Three demonstrated the essence of New Federalism, the SPC and COAG, were established to enhance collaboration between governments and to initiate, develop and implement policy reforms in the national interest. For various reasons stated in Chapter Two, COAG was an effective policy making institution during the early 1990s. Of most significance, it could be argued, was the supreme power of its heads of government status, and it's central agency and whole-of-government approach to prosecuting reform.116

The Queensland Office of the Cabinet was established by the Goss government in

116 Painter (1998) has also noted the SPC and COAG developed accepted protocols and standard operating procedures to help manage the reform process. These are comparable to the rules, routines and decision making styles which Considine (1994) postulates is the essence of institutions: 'Protocols and operating procedures were developed, and extra attention was devoted to developing the most effective manner of guiding issues to successful fruition'. He adds that much of this work was carried out by the Commonwealth-State Relations Secretariat in the DPM&C and the leading central agency figures in the states. These officials, Painter explains, 'already had a wealth of experience from their coordinating roles in their own governments' (1998: 69).
1991 to coordinate policy development across the whole-of-government. The main responsibility of the Office was to serve the Cabinet through the Premier. It was also charged with providing advice to the Premier on all submissions to Cabinet, monitoring the analysis of the implementation of cabinet decisions and identifying major policy issues with cross-portfolio dimensions over which the Office of the Cabinet would have policy development responsibility. Considering its close proximity to the political hub of the government, the Office of the Cabinet was an extremely influential component of both Goss governments. Goss's reform of the machinery of government in Queensland also aimed to assist the government in its intergovernmental relations. The government particularly sought to maximise its capacity to negotiate effectively with a unified voice in Commonwealth-State matters during the period of the Hawke/Keating New Federalism exercise.

Having already established why COAG was chosen as the forum through which to push the NALSAS Strategy, we can hypothesise more generally that policy entrepreneurs attempting to promote their innovations will search for venues which exercise significant political power. It can be suggested too, that policy entrepreneurs may also be attracted to policy venues which are managerialist and executive in nature. This speculation provides a satisfactory response to Schlager's suggestions for further research regarding the perceived weaknesses of the institution/policy venue concept developed by Baumgartner and Jones; it shows that some policy venues are more pivotal than others. It also augments Mintrom's approach to determing the effect of institutional structures and context on the choices of policy entreprepreneurs seeking favourable policy venues.

Besides showing why some venues may be more effective than others, the above discussion, and study more generally, incorporates federalism into the study of institutions. By showing how state-based policy venues may affect policy change, this study provides some answers to a further concern of Schlager's, namely, that state policy venues are not properly addressed by Baumgartner and Jones nor, for that matter, are they adequately addressed by any of the other scholars. The Office of the Cabinet was a critical venue not

117 The Goss reforms in Queensland have been described by Davis (1995) in terms of an attempt to achieve better coordination of the various activities of the government: 'Coordination is achieved through ordinary, daily processes, set down as rules, understood as required practices and the mechanical performance of certain acts' (1995: 3). Again, this description accords very closely with those of Considine (1994) and other scholars, such as Rothstein (1996) and Peters (1996).
only in Queensland but in terms of managing the state's intergovernmental relations. The case of the NALSAS Strategy is no exception and, like COAG, its managerialist and executive nature was significant.\textsuperscript{118}

Finally, in bearing out the relationship between the Office of the Cabinet and COAG this analysis of the NALSAS Strategy indicates that connections between policy venues can also have a significant impact on the activities of policy entrepreneurs and their innovations. The connection between central coordinating agencies in the states and SPC and COAG was an essential component in the success of the New Federalism exercise. This was equally true in terms of Rudd and the NALSAS Strategy. In short, the Office of the Cabinet provided Rudd with a direct line to officials on the Senior Officials Steering Committee and thereby access to heads of government. Access to these decision makers enabled him to garner support for his proposal. By exposing the link between the Office of the Cabinet and COAG we have taken some initial steps towards addressing Schlager's final suggestion that connections between policy venues be subjected to closer scrutiny.

\textbf{Positional Power}

Max Weber ascribed to bureaucracy a number of basic features that ensured organisational and administrative efficiency.\textsuperscript{119} Among these was hierarchy. Hierarchy means that each official is situated in a 'hierarchical division of labor' and reports to a superior officer (Beetham, 1996: 9). Hence, the authority of the official is derived from one's position in a hierarchical structure, and the power vested in that office (1996: 15).\textsuperscript{120} Weber's model of bureaucracy holds that a centralised hierarchy of authority is necessary to coordinate the

\textsuperscript{118} Learning about the role of state governments in affecting policy change with the Punctuated-Equilibrium Framework could be pursued by incorporating insights from the policy innovation and diffusion literature. See Walker (1969) for a view from the U.S. and Nelson (1985) for an Australian perspective.

\textsuperscript{119} The other features he distinguished were continuity (offers a career path), impersonality (issues are dealt with according to rules and with impartiality) and expertise (officials are trained in a specific area) (Beetham, 1996: 9).

\textsuperscript{120} Since Weber, many have rightly pointed out that the official's authority also resides in his or her own expertise, such as financial, technical or professional expertise, social networks and control of information (Beetham, 1996: 15-16).
numerous, routine and repetitive tasks carried out by organisations. The greatest positional power, naturally resides at the top of the hierarchy.

In a study of the location and exercise of power in organisations, Pfeffer (1992: 75) observes that power 'comes from the control over resources... and from the formal authority one obtains because of one's position in the hierarchy'. Pfeffer discovered that one's position in an organisation is a telling indicator of one's capacity to influence outcomes. He observes that: 'Authority and responsibility is vested in positions and one's ability to broker is affected significantly by where one sits in the structure of interaction' (1992: 76). He also argues that power is sourced from 'the ties one has to powerful others'.

Of the scholars to have engaged with the subject of policy entrepreneurs few have considered the effect of hierarchical power on their activities and prospects of affecting change.121 Mintrom and Vergari (1998) broach the issue in brief by arguing that successful policy entrepreneurs are often those 'well placed' to persuade politicians of the virtues of their proposals, but they choose not to elaborate about where on the scale of hierarchical authority the 'well placed' policy entrepreneur may be located. A better treatment of the positional power issue is proffered by Schneider et al (1995). In their study of bureaucratic and political entrepreneurs operating at the local government level, Schneider et al (1995) found that the position of mayor provides entrepreneurs with great leverage. They explain that:

the office of the mayor is a critical institutional position for many local political entrepreneurs, as it maximises access to the resources necessary to implement the programs and policies the entrepreneur desires in the pursuit of his or her vision of the future' (1995: 90).

While they do acknowledge the significance of positional power, Schneider et al do not

121 The issue of positional power is also considered by Roberts and King (1996). In the course of defining types of public entrepreneurs, they remark, simply, that 'we can expect an association between an entrepreneur's behaviour and base of power'. However, it is the policy entrepreneur's proximity to well-positioned executive and bureaucratic entrepreneurs inside the system which provides the team with a form of positional power. It is not the policy entrepreneurs themselves, but their 'close ties to insiders' which is important. In this way the authors acknowledge the importance of positional power, but not in a substantive fashion.
probe the issue in detail. And, while Kingdon (1995) discovered that political appointees in the US were very influential political actors, identifying those appointed by the President to powerful leadership positions in departments and agencies as the second most powerful policy actors (1995: 27-30), he does not pursue this as a priority. In the Multiple Streams Framework, the positions of those endeavouring to couple the streams and push for change are not treated as change variables in their own right. The only other indication of sympathy to the power of position by Kingdon is reflected in the remark that an important entrepreneurial quality is to be 'well connected' (1995: 181).

By contrast, and as a consequence of extensive research on policy innovation using the Multiple Streams Framework, Nikolos Zahariadis (1999) argues that the matter of 'entrepreneurial position' is one which needs to be taken seriously. Zahariadis (1999: 84) observed that: 'Entrepreneurial position is very important in coupling the streams. Well-connected and persistent entrepreneurs are more likely to be successful at coupling', he asserts. Positioned as a member of the government of the day, as a minister, or as a ministerial advisor 'increases the political clout of the entrepreneur's ideas ... higher administrative or partisan rank increases access and potential influence over decision makers'.

The discussion shows that the relationship between positional power and entrepreneurial effectiveness is something which figures infrequently in research on policy entrepreneurs and, that when it does, it is usually considered with brevity. This study, by contrast, demonstrates that the positions of officials, especially those of senior status and the power commensurate with them, are factors of critical significance. This can be seen in Rudd's position of power as Director General of the Queensland Office of the Cabinet. As the Chief Executive of this Office Rudd was one of the most highly ranked and most powerful bureaucrats in the state. From this position too, he became the leader of

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122 Kingdon (1995: 27-30) points out that even when a political appointee may not be the initiator of a particular idea, they are regularly responsible for placing them on the agenda of those in a position to drive the matter forward. Policy ideas are always circulating but it is only when a high profile political appointee decides to consider and take an interest in a matter that it becomes a priority.


124 The Courier Mail often described Rudd as the most powerful bureaucrat in Queensland. For instance: 'A mandarin of reforms at 34, Kevin Rudd is easily the most powerful public servant in Queensland' (Charlton, 1992: 32). In his biography of Wayne Goss, Jamie Walker also writes
Queensland's official level negotiations with the Commonwealth and other state governments, and was thereby accorded access to key Commonwealth and state decision makers, and thus, the leverage required to achieve his vision. Through COAG Rudd was able to negotiate with those whose support for the NALSAS Strategy was necessary.

Positioned as he was in the hierarchical structure and by virtue of the power vested in the position he held, Rudd was well-placed to pursue his vision. Short of holding the position of Premier, Rudd would have been unlikely to succeed at joining the streams if otherwise located. In the intergovernmental forum COAG Rudd was, as Zahariadis observed, allowed 'access and potential influence over decision makers'.

Complementing his positional power was the political nature of the position and his close proximity to the very center of power in Queensland, the Premier, Wayne Goss. Contrary to Weber's model of bureaucracy, where officials are distinguished by impartiality and detachment from elected functionaries, Rudd was appointed not only for his policy expertise, but his sympathy to the political objectives of the government. In many respects he was a political extension of the Premier (Wiltshire, 1992). Moreover, in addition to the conducive nature of their formal relationship, Goss and Rudd enjoyed a close personal relationship. As Goss remarked 'We developed not just a good working relationship; but importantly we developed a good friendship and he is still a good friend' (Interview with Wayne Goss, 22 July 1999). Pfeffer's postulation that closeness to 'powerful others' is a vital source of positional power is most apt in this case.

This close professional and personal relationship conferred on Rudd considerable discretionary power and a degree of flexibility and movement when it came to negotiating initiatives carried out in SPC and COAG process. Painter (1998) has observed that the closeness of some of the relationships between leaders and chief central agency advisors provided the driving force behind SPC and COAG process: 'In some cases, this rested on the personal authority that these officials carried as trusted advisors of their Premier or

125 This was not unusual in context of public sector reform in the 1990s in Australia. See Chapter Two

126 See the Courier-Mail, (Charlton, 1992: 32) where Rudd is described as Goss's 'closest confidant'; and Gillespie (1991: 21) where they were described as 'firm friends' since the 1980s.
Prime Minister - they spoke with the latter's authority as well as their own' (1998: 69; see also Weller, 1996). Rudd also pointed out that it was necessary for officials, by the nature of the negotiations, to exercise some discretion. Although Rudd negotiated closely with his counterparts in the other states and the Commonwealth and, in some cases with heads of government it was, in the final analysis, Goss's responsibility to do so.

There was, in fact, a distinct division of labor between officials and leaders when it came to making final decisions. Goss explained how this division of labour functioned between him and Rudd during the negotiations over the NALSAS Strategy. We can assume that this applied in other instances too. He observed during the NALSAS Strategy policy process that, even when heads of government had agreed to a course of action and reached agreement on the terms of reference, one was still required to apply pressure, 'you had to go and bang them on the head, and that was Kevin's job when it came to the actual Committee that he was chairing. But that had to be done again and again and again, and then Kevin would have to do it again and again at the committee level and I would have to do it again and again at the Premier's Conference' (Interview with Wayne Goss, 22 July 1999). Although blunt, this account of how Goss and Rudd operated during negotiations is insightful for it shows the very close working relationship they shared, as well as the general interplay between politicians and officials during COAG negotiations. We can speculate that given Rudd's deep and passionate determination to see his vision come to fruition that he relied heavily on Goss to do the bidding for the NALSAS Strategy at the heads of government level.

Rudd was keen to point out that during SPC and COAG negotiations officials always negotiated in accordance with the wishes of their political masters, but that often they had to use some discretion: 'prior to entering into any of these negotiations, any sensible bureaucrat will clear their positions first, and secondly, prior going into ultimate negotiations with the Cabinet... every substantial COAG agenda for Queensland was a complete one; we never flew blind on that; we always acted on instructions. But having said that, the reality is that in official level negotiations what you are doing, whether you care to admit it or not, is narrowing negotiation after negotiation, the focus of the policy enterprise prior to it ultimately devolving to the political level for the final decisions... If you are a practitioner they all do it; from the head of PM&C to the DG's of premier's departments and cabinet offices. The degree to which they do it on a particular negotiation may vary depending on their confidence of their anticipation of what their head of government, minister or cabinet is likely to wear. But none of us can ever have complete instructions. Similarly, that applies to international negotiations; if you are in Kyoto negotiating the greenhouse protocol' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).
The States and Federalism

In Australia, Commonwealth-State relations are characterised by conflict and acrimony. There is a long-standing tradition of mistrust. More specifically, state governments since the post-war period have been suspicious of Commonwealth intrusion into areas of state government responsibility. This can largely be explained by the interdependence of state and Commonwealth governments which developed throughout the last century. Contrary to classical conceptions of federalism, in which federal systems are characterised by a clean line separation between the roles and responsibilities of the tiers of governments, the Australian federal system is typified by a high degree of jurisdictional overlap (Sharman, 1991: 23). In Australia, at least, it is explained by the expansion over time of Commonwealth government activity into new policy spheres. The creation of new Commonwealth departments of agriculture and industry and, later, the establishment of agencies responsible for education, the environment and Aboriginal affairs, best illustrates this expansion (Davis et al 1993: 50). These phenomena, Sharman (1991: 30-33) argues, have been caused by political developments, including the 'partisan goals of national governments' in new areas of policy, the 'expansionist ambitions' of the Commonwealth and an acceptance of Keyensian interventionist economic management after the Second World War.

Most importantly, however, this interventionism has been facilitated, indeed enabled, by the Commonwealth's position of fiscal dominance in the federation (Matthews and Jay, 1972). Before the Howard government's reform of the taxation system in July 2000, a severe fiscal imbalance characterised fiscal relations between the Commonwealth and the states, where the states relied heavily on Commonwealth financial grants for over 50 per cent of their capital outlays. The Commonwealth assists the states to meet the funding shortfall through the grants powers conferred to it by the Constitution and, in doing so, uses this capacity to pursue its objectives in areas of state policy jurisdictions, such as roads, education, health and housing. Walsh (1992: 25) has argued that this severe vertical imbalance has had counterproductive implications for the conduct of intergovernmental relations in Australia, particularly the effectiveness of federal institutions such as the Loans Council, Premiers Conference and ministerial councils. 'Ritualised conflict' has prevented the discussion of issues 'of genuinely national interest'.

The Commonwealth's capacity to influence areas of state government responsibility by
virtue of the factors outlined above has meant that the states jealously guard their areas of responsibility, as they provide a power base. Wiltshire explains in typically apposite fashion:

It is without question the whole bargaining position of their outlook. So in a mysterious way those imaginary lines, the boundaries of the Australian states, take on a profound importance. No trespassers are allowed. Every physical and even metaphysical item within those borders is regarded as the property of that state (Wiltshire, 1990: 115).

The case at the center of this study, the NALSAS Strategy, appears to be interesting and unusual in terms of national policy-making because it was proposed and driven through the policy process by a state government. National education policies, of course, have historically been pursued by the Commonwealth due to its charter to act in the national interest and because it has the financial capacity to do so. For instance, a number of collaborative but Commonwealth driven initiatives resulted in discrete national policies in the 1980s. This is not insignificant in terms of the NALSAS Strategy policy process and its final outcome, for it meant that many of the tensions which usually accompany national proposals were minimised. It was not a case of the Commonwealth attempting to lure the states (by the power of the purse) into a national policy in an area over which it had no formal responsibility. Rudd explained that, given the rise in Commonwealth power and parallel decrease in state autonomy since the 1940s, Commonwealth initiatives have often been met with deep suspicion. In the case of the NALSAS Strategy, however, this suspicion was considerably reduced:

when the Commonwealth initiates a policy initiative through any of the federal mechanisms it is usually greeted with biological suspicion on the part of the states, given their historical experience of what the negotiation inevitably means, irrespective of its policy worth. That's the first point. Secondly, is the corollary

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128 These included *The National Policy for the Education of Girls in Australian Schools* (Commonwealth Schools Commission, 1987), the first national policy in Australian schooling and *The National Aboriginal and Torres Islander Education Policy* (DEET, 1989). Other initiatives included endorsement of the *Common and Agreed National Goals for Australian Schooling* (Hobart Declaration) (AEC, 1989), acceptance of a National Equity Strategy, agreement to the production of an annual *National Report on Schooling in Australia* in the same year, the creation of the Curriculum Corporation to aid collaborative efforts in curriculum in 1990 and the National Curriculum Frameworks exercise in the later 1980s and early 1990s.
therefore, that if a state is to initiate a national measure then the traditional hostility is ameliorated, not removed, ameliorated' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).

Rudd’s reluctance to declare that state government hostility was totally removed is not a consequence of any residual hostility towards the Commonwealth, but of other state governments suspicions that the Queensland government was 'acting as a stalking horse' for the Commonwealth, since both governments were of the same political persuasion. However, Rudd pointed out that in the case of the NALSAS Strategy, when in 1994 the Queensland government was the only Labor-led state government in Australia129 (and in 1993 only one of two, the other being the government of Lyn Arnold in South Australia), it was 'only a minor consideration on behalf of the non-Labor states'.130

Rudd’s standpoint on the benefits of state initiation in terms of the minimisation of states' hostility is supported by Michael Keating, who stated that 'if the Commonwealth had have proposed it, it would have met with a lot more resistance' (Interview with Michael Keating, 18 November 1997). Allan Langdon too, observed that 'being driven by Queensland it had a very unifying effect'. During the preparation of the Rudd Report, this was particularly the case since the states were unusually forthcoming with costing and other necessary details. Langdon remarks that:

Pushing the initiative did have an effect, especially at the time of writing, and it definitely did in terms of getting the Report to the level of detail that we achieved because we had the cooperation of state/territory treasuries who actually provided the data without any hassle at all, and I suspect if the push had been coming from the Commonwealth that level of detail would not have been possible and that level

129 See Painter (1998: 44-49) for an account of how this particular configuration of state and Commonwealth governments effected the broader SPC and COAG policy reform process.

130 Rudd argued that the Goss government’s robust dealings with the Commonwealth leading up to the NALSAS exercise demonstrated that this was not the case. He also pointed out that their was another side to the equation, namely, that the Commonwealth itself was wary of Rudd’s intentions regarding the NALSAS Strategy. He explained that although 'you might decrease state reservations you may at the same time encounter unprecedented levels of Commonwealth suspicion as to what the hell you are actually up to, particularly at the end of the day if they expect you to put your hand out and ask for money, which we did albeit graciously, and on the basis of policy rigour' (Interview with Kevin Rudd, 21 July 1999).
of overall agreement wouldn't have been possible because there is always a suspicion that the Commonwealth wants information for reasons that are not going to serve our purposes (Interview with Allan Langdon, 19 July 1999).

This study shows that specific constitutional arrangements effect the type of interaction between members of a federation, and thereby the capacity of policy entrepreneurs to pursue policy change. However, there is very little in the literature on policy entrepreneurs which recognises if and how one's location in federal arrangements influence the policy entrepreneur and broader policy processes. This is a weakness of Kingdon's Multiple-Streams Framework which, according the Zahariadis (1999: 89). Viewing federalism as an institution in a more abstract way, Zahariadis observes that in Kingdon's framework 'multiple levels of government and their interaction, or specific constitutional arrangements is not systematically explored'. Moreover, although federalism performs a vital role in the theory of Punctuated-Equilibrium, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) do not give due treatment to the question of how power-sharing arrangements influence policy outcomes. Thus, further probing of policy venues in a federal context could substantially boost the explanatory power of the framework. As Schlager (1999: 249) has remarked, 'the role that state venues play in inhibiting or promoting major policy change could be further spelled out'.

The hallmark fiscal and legal aspects of Australian federalism had an important impact on the Queensland government and Rudd and their pursuit of the NALSAS Strategy. Thus, this study shows that how constitutions divide power between the national and sub-national units of the federation significantly effects policy outcomes. It suggests that because the NALSAS Strategy proposal was state driven the hostility and suspicion which would normally accompany Commonwealth initiated national education policies was tempered. Hence, recognising the peculiarities of the division of powers in the Australian federal system, as this study has done, suggests that comparative policy studies need, as an imperative, to take into account the nature of constitutional arrangements in the political systems under analysis.131

131 One could suggest that given the uniqueness of its financial and legal structure, there may be a stronger imperative to consider constitutional arrangements in studies of policy making in the Australian federal system. See Wright (1991), Painter (1991) and Sharman (1991) respectively for comparisons of intergovernmental relations in America, Canada and Australia.
Conclusion

This chapter has analysed and interpreted the case study presented in Chapter Four by using the conceptions of policy entrepreneurship in Chapter One. It used the inventory in Chapter One to guide the analysis, and to ensure a robust analysis the chapter was divided into three different levels of analysis. The analysis showed that Kevin Rudd was involved in a number of activities and demonstrated specific types of characteristics when pursuing the NALSAS Strategy. He was innovative and creative, argued his case persuasively, was alert to political opportunities, showed strategic sense in crafting a policy image to which the chosen policy venue was receptive, exploited personal and professional networks, engaged in bargaining and performed some specific tactical manoeuvres.

Even though the analysis confirmed the observations of others it also showed that in this study some entrepreneurial characteristics shone with greater intensity than in others. This was demonstrated by the distinction between levels one and two of the analysis. These entrepreneurial characteristics were demonstrated by Rudd as he went about the business of promoting his policy innovation; they were apparent both in seeking support for the initiative and in deflecting resistance.

Besides identifying these activities and characteristics and showing how they effected the policy process, the chapter also contended that Rudd's actions were assisted by a number of contextual factors. Laid out and analysed in the third level of analysis, these included the institutional context, positional power and the specific nature of the Australian federal system. Often these issues are not sufficiently acknowledged in the literature; by a few they are recognised but by others not at all. The Conclusion which follows attempts to develop a theoretical framework which encompasses both the individual and contextual factors identified in this chapter and lay the foundation for future research. Importantly, it posits an interplay between the individual characteristics of the policy entrepreneur and the context in which he or she may operate.
Conclusion

Introduction

Identified in the preceding chapters has been the main elements of policy entrepreneurship and a consideration of how Kevin Rudd applied them to produce significant education policy change. Chapter One reviewed the key texts on policy entrepreneurship so as to compile an inventory of generally recognisable entrepreneurial activities, behavioural characteristics and skills. The next chapter placed the policy entrepreneur in his situational context, while Chapter Three provided important background information about the specific policy area in which the innovation was carried out. Chapter Four meticulously reconstructed the sequence of events which led to the adoption of the NALSAS Strategy and Kevin Rudd's role in these events. Chapter Five proceeded to analyse and interpret the case study on the basis of the key entrepreneurial characteristics identified in Chapter One, on the one hand, and in relation to the contexts described in Chapter Two, on the other. The aim of this, the final installment, is to draw some conclusions about policy entrepreneurship. So as to provide researchers with a foundation on which to conduct future studies a theoretical framework of policy entrepreneurship is developed. Hopefully, this framework will provide researchers with a useful set of guidelines by which to prosecute further research, especially in Australia.

The framework developed consists of two interrelated dimensions. Concurring with analysis levels one and two in the preceding chapter (including the class titled 'Tactics and Maneouvres' which is placed in the level three analysis), the first dimension considers the various activities and skills of policy entrepreneurs which were shown and efficaciously employed by Rudd to dramatically influence the final outcomes of the policy process. The second dimension consists of contextual factors, including those discussed in the third level of analysis in Chapter Five. It postulates a complex interplay between these factors and those identified in the first dimension. It argues that public policy is the outcome of the interplay of individual and contextual factors, that is, while recognising that policy entrepreneurs do have an influence on policy outcomes, the scale of their influence is mediated by factors beyond their control. Accepting that the policy entrepreneur is constrained, though not determined, the policy entrepreneur is cast as a 'strategic political actor', one who identifies opportunities for promoting innovations in a complex policy
environment and who perceives courses of action from within and among existing contextual arrangements. In this way the policy entrepreneur negotiates his way in the world, conscious of the limitations imposed by his context, but vigilant of the ways and means of overcoming them.

While the development of a theoretical framework dominates the Conclusion, some other potentially fruitful cites are suggested for further research into policy entrepreneurship in the Australian political system. I also consider whether the NALSAS Strategy can be classified as an 'innovation', according to the criteria laid down by some of the scholars discussed in Chapter One. I then look at the impact of the NALSAS Strategy in terms of school participation rates, student enrolments in the four priority languages and teacher numbers in comparison to the original targets set by the Rudd Report. A few summary remarks are then proffered in a final reflection on the study and its findings.

Policy Entrepreneurship: Towards a Theoretical Framework

The analysis in Chapter Five provides us with fertile ground on which to begin building a theoretical framework of policy entrepreneurship. In simple terms a framework attempts to show how something happens, that is, to explore and help us learn about complex sociopolitical problems and processes (Parsons, 1995: 57-58). A theoretical, or conceptual framework, according to Sabatier (1999: 6), is 'a set of variables and the relationships among them that presumably account for a set of phenomena'. Or as Schlager (1999: 234) has written, 'frameworks provide a foundation for inquiry by specifying classes of variables and general relationships among them, that is, how the general classes of variables loosely fit together into a coherent structure'. The framework developed here focuses on the relationship between individual and contextual variables and their interaction.

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132 The two phrases can be used interchangeably.

133 Frameworks do not purport to posit explanations or to predict behaviour and outcomes. Prediction and scientific explanation, according to Schlager, 'lie in the realm of theories and models' (1999: 234). A framework, thus, is different to a theory or model. According to Ostrom (1999: 222), 'a theory is a tighter and more scientifically informed approach to discerning relationships between variables'. A model, on the other hand, seeks to represent real life or a specific set of circumstances and is designed to predict political outcomes.
The policy entrepreneur in this study participated in numerous activities and displayed certain behavioural characteristics in order to have his proposal accepted and funded by decision makers. These were presented in analysis levels one and two of Chapter Five. All form the basis of the framework to be developed here and the grounds for proposed extensions to conceptions of policy entrepreneurship as they presently stand. Here each activity will be discussed in reference to the NALSAS Strategy.\[^{134}\]

Policy entrepreneurs must be *creative and innovative* when identifying problems and developing solutions. The policy entrepreneur in this study identified problems with the teaching of Asian studies, as well as obstacles to Australia's economic engagement with East Asia. He also devised the NALSAS Strategy as a solution to these problems. As part of this process the policy entrepreneur engaged in extended argumentation with other policy actors, using empirical evidence to support his case. The policy entrepreneur was required to demonstrate that there were problems with the teaching of Asian studies in Australia and special challenges associated with Australia's desire to become a more active player in regional affairs. He also had to persuade decision makers of the worth and feasibility of his proposal. Thus, policy entrepreneurs must be able to *argue persuasively*.

In accordance with the characteristics identified in the second level of analysis policy entrepreneurs must also be *alert to opportunities*, that is, alert to political opportunities to promote their innovations. Rudd was also alert to the possibility of prime ministerial support for his proposal represented by Keating's assumption of the leadership and his broader policy agenda of engagement with East Asia.

The policy entrepreneur must also demonstrate *strategic sense* in crafting a 'policy image' which appeals to decision makers as well as selecting a 'policy venue' to which it is receptive. By articulating the proposal in economic rather than in educational, multicultural or intellectual terms, Rudd crafted a powerful 'policy image' which was well received by heads of government and senior central agency officials. The economic

\[^{134}\] It is acknowledged that the Conclusion repeats much of what has already been clearly stated. Unfortunately, by the nature of the study, such repetition is unavoidable. I felt that it was important to re-state the characteristics and activities of the policy entrepreneur here to give the framework a sense of completeness.
'policy image' not only appealed to heads of government and others, but to the general economic nature of the reforms being carried out by COAG. Thus, the 'policy image' crafted by Rudd also influenced his choice of 'policy venue'. He chose COAG rather than the relevant ministerial council because it was perceived to be more sympathetic to the economic 'policy image'.

Rudd also chose COAG for other reasons, mainly because it was Australia's peak intergovernmental body. COAG's heads of government status meant that it could bring considerable political weight to bear on policy matters which were not progressing at the ministerial level. Thus, the policy entrepreneur considered it a useful and effective policy venue through which to negotiate his proposal. It is important to note that COAG's political clout was probably the main reason it was the preferred policy venue.

Policy entrepreneurs must also engage in bargaining. The policy entrepreneur in this study was involved in a bargaining process with decision makers in order to ensure the Commonwealth's funding contribution to the Strategy. Goss and Rudd pledged their support for other COAG issues of concern to the Prime Minister in return for significant Commonwealth financial support for the NALSAS Strategy. In federal systems of government bargaining is particularly important.

As he went about introducing his policy innovation the policy entrepreneur also utilised an extensive network of bureaucratic and political contacts to help gain support for his proposal. During his time with the DFAT, in Queensland advising Goss in various capacities and leading the state's intergovernmental relations, Rudd developed a useful network of contacts. It was also discovered that he was perceived to be a trusted and credible policy actor by his counterparts in the other states and at the Commonwealth level.

Finally, Rudd prosecuted a number of specific strategic manoeuvres to overcome resistance to his proposal. Although dealt with by only one contributor to the topic, it proved to be relatively important in the NALSAS Strategy policy process. These manoeuvres had the effect of stifling attempts by Commonwealth bureaucrats to oppose the innovation.
The characteristics described above must form a central component of a theoretical framework of policy entrepreneurship. This study shows that a number of specific activities define the policy entrepreneur. However, the findings of this study suggest that a framework of policy entrepreneurship needs to account for factors other than the specific characteristics and actions listed above: they indicate that the interplay between the policy entrepreneur and his/her context needs to be considered.

The Interplay Between Individual and Context

Contextual factors influence the activities of policy entrepreneurs and thereby the policy process. The second dimension of this framework posits that individual and contextual factors should not be seen as mutually exclusive but, rather, as closely interrelated. It proceeds from the view that policy entrepreneurship is characterised by the interplay of individual and contextual factors.135 Here the third level of analysis in the previous chapter comes into play.

Besides Mintrom (2000), few have devoted adequate attention to considering both the policy entrepreneur's characteristics and the context in which he or she operates. Thus, Mintrom is somewhat unique. He describes the policy entrepreneur's context as a 'policy milieu'. It will be recalled that this milieu consists of such things as the institutional structures in which the entrepreneur is embedded, current policy settings and the attitudes and behaviour of other policy actors. He insightfully suggests that the milieus in which policy entrepreneurs are located effect their actions. Indeed, 'it shapes the opportunities

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135 In terms of isolating the determinants of policy, Hawker et al (1979) argue from a similar point of view. For these writers on policy making is influenced by numerous different forces. The individual policy actor is just one of a set of factors which shape public policy, including institutions and structures through which policies pass: 'The sources of policy include strategic individuals in powerful organizations who attempt to shape policy, the political processes and structures through which policy proposals pass, and the political and social environment in which relevant activity takes place' (Hawker et al, 1979: 23).

Similarly, Simeon (1976: 549), while acknowledging the obvious centrality of political and administrative institutions and individual actors, draws attention to the 'broader framework' in which bureaucrats and politicians operate. He asserts that such factors as prevailing ideologies, assumptions and values, structures of power and influence, patterns of conflict and division, and so on, are very important policy determinants. For a further discussion see also Lindblom and Woodward (1993).
and the actions open to policy entrepreneurs, but not in a deterministic fashion'. Instead, Mintrom prefers to think about the effects of context in terms of 'tendencies'. Mintrom adds that 'a given milieu will not necessarily support or inhibit a given set of actions on the part of policy entrepreneurs'. Importantly, he concludes, by analysing the characteristics of a given milieu, 'we can form some expectations about the possible role that policy entrepreneurs might play in generating support for specific policy innovations' (2000: 123).

Contexts help to shape the opportunities and actions open to policy entrepreneurs promoting innovations. The context in which they function mediates the magnitude of change which they can affect. This study has demonstrated that a number of contextual factors influenced the policy entrepreneur and the outcome of the policy process. In terms of Mintrom's policy milieu, it was contextual factors of the institutional type which were most important. In many respects, the presence of these factors facilitated his enterprise; they helped to shape his opportunities to pursue change. Indeed, it could be argued that if not present, the policy entrepreneur's actions would have been inhibited and his chances of success diminished. Thus, the actions of policy entrepreneurs are at once limited and enabled by the very existence and availability of policy making institutions, the power of the institutions in which they are located as well as their positioning within those institutions and, finally, the nature of existing constitutional arrangements, particularly financial arrangements and the division of powers in federal systems of government.

The policy entrepreneur in this case found his institutional context favourable; it tended to enable rather than constrain his activities. This demonstrates, perhaps, that it is the configuration of prevailing contextual factors that helps to shape the entrepreneur's opportunities to act purposefully and effectively. It suggests also that a key function of the policy entrepreneur is to detect where in their contexts the most lucrative opportunities to promote innovations lie; policy entrepreneurs make sense of the contexts in which they are located so as to discern how it may inhibit or assist their actions. Consequently, in this framework the policy entrepreneur is cast as a 'strategic policy actor'; there is an 'interplay' between the individual and his context. Albeit in quite indirect fashion, other scholars have touched upon this issue.

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136 It is worth quoting the remark of one research participant that clearly describes the interdependent relationship between Rudd and COAG: 'The drive of the individual would not be enough without the forum that was conducive to it and the forum could not have produced the results without the driving force of the individual' (Interview with Brian Head, 19 July 1999).
For example, in discussing policy entrepreneurs, Roberts and King (1996) observe that 'their circumstances were not beyond their control' (1996: 234). While not disagreeing that conscious action is constrained or 'bounded' by other factors, they 'argue that it is possible for individuals to make a difference, if they apply their energies to the proper point in the chaotic system around them' (1996: 3). Though they fail to fully develop the idea, Roberts and King, at least, detect and acknowledge the interplay between the policy entrepreneur and his or her context, even though context in their study is understated. The perceptive and strategic dimension of policy entrepreneurship is also stressed by Baumgartner and Jones (1991: 1045). Policy entrepreneurs employ a 'dual strategy'; while they 'try to control prevailing images' they also seek to 'alter the roster of participants who are involved in the issues by seeking out the most favourable venue for the consideration of their issues'. They describe this process in terms of 'strategic action'.

'Strategic action', or the policy entrepreneur's perceptiveness to the benefits and opportunities afforded by his or her context, was an enormously important skill of the policy entrepreneur in this study and is thereby central to the framework developed here. Following Heclo (1974: 4), whose work is most instructive in this case, policy is made because people put their minds to the task. He puts it like this: 'policy is not a self evident, independent behaviour fact. Policy acquires meaning because an observer perceives and interprets a course of action amid the confusion of a complex world'. Here Heclo is alluding not only to the interplay of individual and context, but to the capacity of individuals to prosecute change by 'strategic political action'. Individuals decide a course of action based on their interpretation of the current institutional landscape and the degree to which it may assist or inhibit the pursuit of their objectives. If the situation appears to be inhibitive the policy entrepreneur will alter his strategic vision accordingly. Amidst the complex political and administrative environment of any given policy area, policy entrepreneurs discern a course of action and develop political strategies which enable them to achieve their objectives.

**Grounds for Further Research**

The theoretical framework and the case study from which it was developed is not intended to be definitive or to supplant what we already know about policy entrepreneurs. Rather,
it is intended to reinforce the current stock of knowledge, or at least some facets of this knowledge, and to augment previous observations and existing frameworks of policy entrepreneurship. In this way, it has generated theory by suggesting new interpretations and concepts and by reexamining earlier concepts and interpretations in new and major ways. Consequently, the framework can help other researchers to learn more about policy change if applied in other settings. Due to the depth and richness of this its findings are highly suggestive of the activity of policy entrepreneurship and can pave the way for further studies.

This study has taken the first tentative step towards using the concept of policy entrepreneurship to help explain an instance of policy change in Australia, and hence only begins to lay the foundation for further research. Nonetheless, the theoretical framework and the findings on which it is based could be employed to guide research in any number of areas, particularly in Australia, where the concept of policy entrepreneurship has not, until now, been employed to study the policy process. Naturally, further episodes of policy making through SPC and COAG in the first half of the 1990s could be investigated. There is already anecdotal evidence that a number of these policy exercises were championed by particular individuals. For example, Gary Sturgess from the Cabinet Office in New South Wales was instrumental on the issue of Mutual Recognition during the early phases of the New Federalism initiative, according to Painter (1998; and see Carroll, 1995). A number of participants in this research alerted me to his centrality in that process when asked to name other critical policy actors during the New Federalism period. Weller (1996) has also reported that most SPC and COAG policy exercises required a 'policy champion' to develop and maintain the momentum of the various policy matters. Studies of premiers and senior central agency officials which focused on how they went about pushing policy proposals and promoting change could be fruitful. It would be interesting to learn if and to what degree these policy actors engaged in entrepreneurial activity.

An analysis such as this one could also be a useful platform on which to study policy change beyond COAG. At national, state and the local government level the opportunities for further research are literally endless. For instance, the back-benches of parliament could be a potentially fertile setting for further research. Legislation passed by parliament could constitute actual cases and the actions of parliamentarians could be studied from the perspective of the conclusions of this study and the framework of policy
entrepreneurship I have developed. Indeed, such a study might reveal that 'backbench' parliamentarians behave very much like policy entrepreneurs. It may, on the one hand, show that some are particularly more effective than others at bringing about change. On the other hand, it may also demonstrate their ineffectiveness given that power in the Australian political system tends to be concentrated in the hands of the executive and in the political parties. Theories of policy entrepreneurship would need to be altered accordingly.

Is the NALSAS Strategy an Innovation?

Since for some innovation is closely associated with the work of policy entrepreneurs, it is necessary to determine whether the NALSAS Strategy can be labeled an innovation. By other scholars, particularly the work of those canvassed in Chapter One, an 'innovation' is understood broadly as change. Mintrom (2000: 114), for example, sees innovations as 'changes that are deliberately designed to lead or force people to break out of particular routine behaviours and come to new understandings of their environments' while, for Roberts and King (1996: 2), 'policy change in government, radical or incremental, is treated as policy innovation'. The central element of an 'innovative idea is its departure from existing practice'. The authors prefer to perceive innovation in terms of levels (i) inventing brand new ideas (ii) adapting ideas that originate with others for use in different situations (iii) borrowing ideas directly from others.

By using the definitions above as a guide, the NALSAS Strategy is classifiable as an innovation. For example, the NALSAS Taskforce represents a collaborative approach to teacher training and professional development, program delivery, and the production of teaching and curriculum materials. Being a 'national' strategy, that is, a partnership between the states, the Commonwealth and other education authorities, all of whom make financial contributions to the Strategy, means that it is collaborative by design and in the way it functions. These characteristics alone set it well apart from any previous comparable initiative to increase the teaching of Asian studies in schools. For instance, the ASC was not a national entity, it was a Commonwealth body. And, although the AEC was a collaborative institution it failed to produce or initiate any significant change in the way education authorities approached the teaching of Asian studies in school, that is, until heads of government instructed education ministers to establish a Taskforce for the
express purpose of developing an Asia-literate Australia. To use Mintrom’s terms Rudd, through COAG, enforced change by making education ministers and officials 'break out of particular routines and behaviours'.

If we were to consider Roberts and King (1996) the NALSAS Strategy would also be considered a 'policy innovation', simply because it was a 'policy change in government'. Moreover, it is an 'innovative idea' because it represents 'a departure in existing practice'. In terms of their three levels of innovation we can observe elements of all three in the case of the NALSAS Strategy: it is a new idea in terms of its collaborative approach to meeting challenges and advancing the teaching of Asian studies; however, it adapts this approach from similar initiatives, not necessarily in education, but across a range of policy areas; nonetheless, the case study showed that participation targets and the means of reaching them were modelled on the Queensland LOTE initiative. In this way the Strategy could also be considered as borrowing from other specific initiatives.

**Implementation and Impact of the NALSAS Strategy**

The NALSAS Taskforce was established in September 1994 as part of the machinery to implement the NALSAS Strategy. It was initially composed of an independent Chair, Professor Colin Mackerras, from Griffith University, with Mr Dennis Ralph, Chief Executive Officer, Department of Education, Training and Employment, South Australia, as Deputy Chair. Membership consists of senior representatives from state government and non-government schools and systems, the Commonwealth government, Australian Vice-Chancellors Committee, the Vocational Education and Training sector and MCEETYA, with some jurisdictions also providing observers (MCEETYA, 1999).

At its 10th meeting in Adelaide in April 1999 the MCEETYA agreed to continue the work of the Taskforce and appointed a new chair, Mr Wal Czernezkyj, the Secretary of the Northern Territory Department of Education. The terms of reference for the Taskforce were revised and it was asked to develop a strategic plan for the second phase of the Strategy (1999-2002). Although the new plan was based on the recommendations of the Rudd Report, they were modified according to two separate reviews of the Strategy and four years of experience since the inception of the Taskforce. Four strategic areas are to be focused upon for the current triennium: curriculum delivery; teacher quality and
supply; strategic alliances; and, outcomes and accountability. The Commonwealth has agreed to continue funding the Strategy at the rate of about $30 million a year to the end of 2002 (MCEE1YA, 2000). This of course, falls well short of the original funding level which was to be somewhere in the vicinity of $53 million for 1999 increasing to $71 million in 2002 (Rudd, 1994: 156)

In 1999 the NALSAS Taskforce prepared an interim progress report for the MCEE1YA. In the Foreword to Partnership for Change, the Chair of the Taskforce, Professor Colin Mackerras, was able to report that 'the partners in this initiative have carried out their mandate extremely well'. The progress by the Taskforce was reflected in the effect that the NALSAS Strategy has had on the policies of several jurisdictions; the implementation of policy in nearly all jurisdictions; the increase in the level of enrolments; the number of schools offering the target Asian languages; and, the increase in the number of schools teaching studies of Asia (over 1000 in 1998) (MCEE1YA, 1999: iii-iv).

According to Partnership for Change nearly 4000 government schools (53.4% of the national total of government schools) were offering a priority Asian language (Chinese (Mandarin), Japanese, Indonesian and Korean) in 1997-98. Student participation data for 1997-98 showed an increase of approximately 66% from 1994 figures, when over 600,000 students were studying a priority Asian language. This constitutes approximately 20% of the current school age population and almost 25% of the target population for the NALSAS Strategy (Years 3-10). The original target in the Rudd Report was to have 60% of students in Years 3-10 studying a priority Asian language by 2006, a target the NALSAS Taskforce believed was still achievable if the Strategy were continued. Increases of 115% and 120% in participation were recorded in Indonesian and Korean respectively, although the numbers in the latter are quite small.

In government schools, the Report states, there has 'been a striking increase in some jurisdictions, with a number showing participation increases of more than 100% for the period' (1998: 7). In Western Australia and Victoria this was the case. Some of the smaller jurisdictions also showed significant increases in the number of students studying an Asian language. In the Australian Capital Territory in 1997 a total of 37.7% of students studied an Asian language and, of the students studying a LOTE in Tasmania in 1998, a total of 65% were studying Japanese or Indonesian.
The Report points out that the student participation rates recorded were due to all partners in the Strategy putting significant effort into increasing the number of suitably qualified teachers and the development of quality curriculum resources and materials. According to the Report, 2500 teachers have been trained or retrained in the four priority languages since 1995. Given that teacher supply has always been a problem in terms of Asian languages, this was a particularly significant improvement (1998: 9).

A number of activities in the area of Asian languages and studies have been pursued collaboratively by partners via the NALSAS Taskforce aimed at creating and sustaining both national infrastructure and local infrastructure to support direct program delivery in schools. These include, teacher training and professional development (with a focus on distance mode courses in some languages and a national proficiency standards project for teachers of Asian languages), program delivery (with an emphasis in distance education), curriculum resources projects and international and co-operative partnerships (including sister-state relationships, internships, cultural exchanges programs and in-country opportunities) (1998: 11-18)

**Final Reflections**

Casting our minds back to the early 1970s it will be recalled that the Auchmuty Report identified a number of factors inhibiting the expansion of Asian studies. These included an inadequate supply of Asian language teachers, a lack of appropriate curriculum and teaching materials and, importantly, the absence of a national mechanism to facilitate the expansion of Asian studies across the country. These problems continued to plague Asian studies throughout the 1970s and well into the 1980s, despite the valuable work of bodies such as the ASAA and the ASC. The NALSAS Strategy was designed to overcome these problems through increased funding and a national collaborative approach, the NALSAS Taskforce. Based on reasonably current figures it has significantly increased the number of students studying an Asian language and the supply of suitably qualified Asian language teachers and the development of national collaborative projects through the NALSAS Taskforce. There is still much work to be done but, nonetheless, these advances represent a vast improvement in the overall state of Asian studies in Australia.

In accordance with the criteria outlined previously, it has been suggested that the
NALSAS Strategy is a genuine policy innovation. It has been postulated that the presence and activity of a policy entrepreneur was largely responsible for placing the proposal on the policy agenda of key decision makers, pushing it through the policy process and for bringing it to fruition. The policy entrepreneur was the innovator, the catalyst for change. In arriving at this conclusion, numerous observations and theoretical assumptions, almost exclusively of American origin, were employed to guide the study. In compliance with the findings of the study and the direction of existing theories, a theoretical framework was developed to inform and guide prospective studies of policy entrepreneurship and policy change, particularly in Australia. It is hoped that the conclusions of this study will indeed provide a firm foundation on which to conduct further studies of policy making.
### Appendix A

#### Table A

**Study of Second Languages at Year 12, 1982 to 1992, Australia**

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<td>17462</td>
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<td>20630</td>
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<td>15.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
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<td>13.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Number of Students</td>
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<td>2607</td>
<td>2439</td>
<td>2494</td>
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<td>5140</td>
<td>5824</td>
<td>6117</td>
<td>6787</td>
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<td>* As % of Total Students</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>29.9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Japanese Students</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>* Number of Students</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>1266</td>
<td>1395</td>
<td>1918</td>
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<td>3828</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Number of Students</td>
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<td>1043</td>
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<td>854</td>
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<td>1213</td>
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<td>995</td>
<td>890</td>
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<td>* As % of Total Students</td>
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<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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<td>81.1</td>
<td>85.1</td>
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<td>72.8</td>
<td>72.5</td>
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