THE INDONESIANS TEACH US HOW TO HATE THEIR VIOLENCE BUT ALSO HOW TO RESIST
East Timor - 19 Years of Resistance

by

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The Indonesians teach us how to hate their violence but also how to resist: East
ABSTRACT

This thesis gives a brief scenario of events which culminated in the invasion of East Timor by the Indonesian armed forces in December 1975.

It looks at the nature of the consequences of life under Indonesian occupation; examines the quality and nature of the resistance by the East Timorese people against their new coloniser; examines the leadership of the resistance movement and its re-structuring and examines the role of the United Nations and international diplomacy.

There is also a discussion of East Timor in the context of global politics and the National Council of Maubere Resistance Peace Plan.
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INTRODUCTION

For fourteen years, after the invasion and occupation of East Timor by Indonesia armed forces, East Timor was a closed place to the outside world. It was not ‘opened up’ to the outside, even to other Indonesians until 1989. Indonesia claims that the East Timorese chose ‘integration’ with Indonesia in July 1976. The reality is that the ferocity of the invasion and occupation taught the East Timorese to resist the occupying forces and its apparatus. Some Timorese observers claim that had the occupation been benign and ‘persuasion’ rather than ‘coercion’ used to convince the East Timorese that they should be part of Indonesia, there wouldn’t have been resistance to the integration.

However, the environment in East Timor quickly became one of terror, death, fear, mass killings, arbitrary detention without trials, disappearances, rape of women, forced settlement in concentration camps and the uprooting of the majority of people from their traditional lands and their subsequent resettlement in areas much easier for the Indonesian administration to scrutinise and control. As a result the East Timorese became determined to resist both passively and aggressively. The Indonesian invasion has been a catalyst in the political development and maturity of the East Timorese. Today inside and outside East Timor, we Timorese have a sense of oneness, that was not evident under the Portuguese coloniser and our resistance can truly be called Timorese resistance. The seeds of freedom were implanted in East Timor when, on the 25th April 1974, Portugal changed from a fascist dictatorship to a leftist democratic regime. The decision of the new regime was to grant freedom and independence to its overseas provinces which included East Timor. For eighteen months, within Portuguese Timor political awareness and consciousness was developed by the Portuguese authorities, as part of a decolonisation process. Political associations developed which envisaged an independent Timor and they promoted the idea of an act of self determination for the people of East Timor. Their vision was reflected in their social programmes which promoted social and cultural links within the territory, links with Portugal and with the international community.

Lack of political maturity on the part of the leaders of the political associations led the Timorese to become entangled in the power politics of the cold war. The withdrawal of the American forces in Indochina created a fear in Indonesia, Washington and Australia that an independent East Timor could destabilise the region.

The background for the tragedy in East Timor lies in the U.S. global planning in the post-World War II period. The political problems of South East Asia were to be solved in such a way as to enable the region “to fulfil its major function as a source of raw materials and a market for Japan and Western Europe. (Chomsky 1981:304).

Other major factors which contributed to our problems were our geography, the question of whether we should integrate with Indonesia (a debate primarily sparked by the actions of Indonesia and abetted by our big neighbour, Australia)
or the ongoing and at times vicious internal debate as to whether to maintain links with Portugal or to demand immediate independence.

It is well documented that immediately before the Indonesian invasion of East Timor President Ford and U.S Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with Indonesia’s President Suharto. Most Timorese believe that they gave Suharto the green light for the invasion.

The invasion has been condemned by the United Nations Security Council. Several General Assembly Resolutions have called on Indonesia to withdraw. Indonesia has never abided by them claiming the UN has no jurisdiction over the matter. For nineteen years Indonesia has maintained that the Timorese people have already expressed their wish to join Indonesia.

The Timorese are aware of these machinations yet have never relented from their original position which is covered by the United Nations Charter on the right to independence. Their position continues to be that self-determination and independence is the unalienable right of all nations, no matter how small they are. Recent changes to boundaries, using these principles, such as those which have occurred for example with the Baltic States, Namibia and Eritrea reinforces Timorese belief that one day East Timor will join these nations and become a member of the United Nations (UN).

The East Timor issue is a complex problem. I propose to examine it in broad terms by first providing the historical events that has brought about the current situation. Secondly, documenting the impact of the invasion and occupation on the population. Thirdly, discussing the strategies developed to resist and fight the enemy. Fourthly, examine international diplomacy in relation to East Timor and to examine alternative ways to find a solution, by bringing about meetings between Indonesia officials and Timorese resistance leaders.

This thesis presents a pragmatic approach. It argues that the resistance has been conditioned by the internal factors of living in East Timor and of having faced the enemy daily without outside help. Moral support from outside by exiled Timorese and solidarity groups, has helped keep the flame of freedom alive. The resistance led by Jose Alexandre Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao has made far reaching strategic reforms in bringing under one umbrella the total Timorese resistance movement, encouraging all Timorese to take part in political decision making and to participate in the struggle for freedom from our oppressor.

I am a nationalist Timorese in exile in Australia. Therefore the events recorded in this thesis have not been confined to that of a traditional, neutral, participant voyeur. I am politically active in our struggle to achieve self-determination and independence, but am not a supporter or member of any of the Timorese political associations formed in 1974. I have deliberately kept myself neutral in order that there is some balance to some of the tendentious views that have been written from Timorese and non-Timorese perspectives in the past nineteen years. I left East Timor before the Indonesian invasion and therefore cannot claim to have experienced first hand that which my countrymen and women have endured since the Indonesian onslaught and subjugation. Nevertheless, I have been affected, experiencing enormous anger and frustration towards Jakarta and grieving silently for my family and for all the Timorese in East Timor.
I regard myself as an old hand in Timorese politics. I saw the formation of the various political associations, and directly participated in the setting up of student and youth political organisations in Dili, Portuguese Timor in 1974/75. This experience taught me that ideologies lead people on different paths. School mates of five and six years suddenly turned against each other because of the adoption of new conflicting ideologies and of non Timorese world views, again which differed or conflicted with each other. I witnessed the cruelties of a civil war, when friends and even family members turned on each another because of new political allegiances.

I have actively participated in exiled Timorese community activities, Timorese political organisations and solidarity groups which support East Timor’s right to an act of self-determination.

Most of the views expressed in this are solely mine. For the past twenty years dealing with East Timorese problems has been the major part of my life. The difficulty for me with this text has been to put the issues in a dispassionate academic context. Although I have strived to be impartial in my views, as a Timorese Nationalist I cannot detach myself completely. The reader should beware that there is no doubt some of the views expressed in this thesis will have some bias associated with them.

There are some terms used in this text which require definition. The word Timor is used to describe the whole island of Timor, but the use of East Timor and Portuguese Timor refer to the same half of the island. I have tried to keep these references in some sort of historical perspective, using the term Portuguese Timor when referring to the period prior to December 7th 1975 and East Timor for events since then.

I prefer, for reasons to do with their legality under the Portuguese constitution, to use the word associations rather than parties when referring to the political groups which formed during the decolonisation process in Portuguese Timor following Portugal’s decision to give independence to its former colonies. However, on some occasions, mostly to enhance literary style the word party has been used in place of association.

Chapter Two, deals with the consequences of the invasion and life under Indonesia occupation and control.

Chapter Three, deals with Timorese resistance and opposition to the invasion and occupation. The tactics used by FRETILIN and the Indonesian military which led to the demise of FRETILIN is discussed; followed by a brief documentation of the role the Catholic Church has played in supporting the Timorese people. The reorganisation of the resistance after its almost total collapse in 1979 is also included.

In Chapter IV, I examine the re-structure of FRETILIN and of FALANTIL and the setting up of CNRM (National Council of Maubere Resistance) as perhaps the most pivotal and influential body of the Resistance Movement both inside Timor and on the diplomatic front abroad.
Chapter V, looks at the role of the United Nations and the voting patterns of United Nations resolutions regarding East Timor. Spheres of influence in political and economic interests of Indonesia, Australia, U.S.A. and the moral obligation of Portugal towards East Timor are also discussed here.

Chapter VI, gives an insight into the current scene of global politics, vis-à-vis East Timor. Currently world politics is all about consensus, dialogue, consultation and participation in finding common grounds when dealing with issues such as East Timor. Serious attempts are being made to get appropriate parties to the same conference table.

Chapter Seven very briefly makes some conclusions.

The next chapter, Chapter One, sets the scene for all other discussions in this text. It provides a brief summary of East Timor’s historical background from the arrival of Portuguese colonialism, through the invasion by foreign powers and Japanese occupation during the Second World War to the Indonesia invasion and occupation.
CHAPTER I - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Links with Timor

East Timor comprises half of the island of Timor, the enclave of Oe-Cusse inside Indonesian West Timor and the islands of Atauro and Jaco, the total area being approximately 19,000 square kilometres. The partition of the island of Timor into two parts, east and west, resulted from the fallout between foreign powers that for three centuries had economic and strategic interests in the Southeast Asian area. It is more than mere coincidence that in 1975, Yasuo Nakamura a visitor to East Timor and probably a Japanese intelligence officer, represented the Japanese government’s view when he said:

Japan had a vital interest in Timor. The island was in the middle of Indonesia, Australia and Papua New Guinea, an important market and supply area. (Nicol, 1978: 261).

Japanese government interest in Timor was merely following the tradition set by the Portuguese.

Before the arrival of the first European power, the Portuguese, the island of Timor was already known to Indian and Chinese traders for its rich abundance of sandalwood. This abundance was mentioned as early as 1436 in a document during the Ming dynasty (Dunn J, 1983:15). The Chinese and Indians obtained their supplies of sandalwood from Javanese, Sulawesian and Malaccan traders.

Portuguese interest in Timor was aroused by the fact that the Indians and Chinese who monopolised the sandlewood trade were profiteering handsomely by exporting it to the Middle East and Europe. The Portuguese conquest of Malacca in 1511 by Afonso de Albuquerque facilitated direct Portuguese access to the sandalwood trade.

One of the first Portuguese to visit Timor was Duarte Barbosa in 1518 (Taylor: 1991). Barbosa described the abundance of sandalwood on the island and confirmed its value in the international market. Trade between the Portuguese and the Timorese commenced in 1566 from Solor, where a Portuguese settlement had been built. Portuguese traders arrived at the same time as some Dominican Friars who converted the Queen of Mena (where Atapupu is today) to catholicism. This important social interaction and relationship started the christianisation of the Timorese, introducing them to a foreign culture and society. These influences shaped Timorese socio-political and economic structures for generations to come.

Portuguese Settlement and Colonisation

The first settlement on the island of Timor was at Lifau (Oe-Cussi) which became the first capital of Timor. From there settlements were built along the coast in the 17th and 18th centuries, firstly at Kupang in the extreme west of the island, then at Atapupu, Batugade, Dili and Manatuto on the central northcoast. The purpose of Portuguese settlements was to gain control of the sandalwood trade and to propagate the christian faith. The powerful kingdom of Wehale in West Timor
was at that time considered by the Portuguese as the political and religious centre of indigenous people.

Resistance against Portuguese occupation of what is now East Timor was bitter and protracted with many battles fought over the centuries

The current boundary that delineates East Timor was shaped by a third player, the Dutch. Changes to Portugal’s political history led the Dutch to fight the Portuguese for its colonies in the early 17th century. Spain ruled Portugal from 1580-1640. During this period the rivalry between Spain and The Netherlands led them to attack Portuguese settlements in South America, Africa and Asia. As a consequence the settlement of Solor was attacked and occupied by the Dutch and the fort at Kupang fell to them in 1653. From this point on the two colonial powers tried to exert their hegemony over the island using the tried and true colonial strategies of divide and rule. These strategies served the Portuguese well as Boxer (1973) points out:

The endemic inter-tribal warfare which prevailed in the island of Timor from time out of mind until well into the nineteenth century meant that whenever some clans rebelled against the (largely nominal) overlordship of the Portuguese Crown, their jealous rivals could be depended upon to support the ‘partido real’ (royalists) (Boxer 1973:148-49).

These royalists were known as ‘Topasses’ or also as the black Portuguese who were ‘mestizo’ descendants of marriages between native women and Portuguese soldiers, sailors and traders who had settled in Solor. These Portuguese settlers became political brokers as well as traders by marrying the local women. It was the offspring of these settlers who became known as Topasses. In order to take control of the sandalwood trade and establish their own power base in opposition to the Portuguese the Topasses sided with any Timorese kings who fought the Portuguese. For approximately 130 years these Topasses ruled the western half of Timor and yet at the same time maintained loyalty to the Portuguese Crown.

When eventually conflicts arose between the Topasses and the Portuguese these gave the Dutch another opportunity to take territory from the Portuguese and they sought help from the kingdom of Serviao in central western Timor. Together they defeated the Portuguese at the battle of Penfui. This battle was instrumental in the Dutch taking control of West Timor.

During the 16th and 17th centuries Timor was under the control of the Portuguese Viceroy in India. The first governor directly appointed to Timor and domiciled in the capital Lifau was Antonio Coelho Guerreiro. The Topasses and the Dominicans opposed the appointment of a local governor because they believed his presence would curb their influence, prestige and authority. Although Lifau had been attacked by the Dutch several times it was finally destroyed and burned by the Topasses and local Timorese in 1769. Following the sacking of Lifau the Governor established the new capital at Dili in October 1769.

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1Caílaco, Saniri, and Cotubaba from 1719-25; Manufahi,Hato-Tete (Hatolia), Obulu, Marobo, Bebonaro, Balibo, Cova and Irlelo (Atsabe) 1869-1899; Manufahi 1911-12.
Social and Political Structure

For the next two hundred years the Portuguese used and relied upon indigenous social and political systems in order to exert their hegemony over Timor. When the Portuguese arrived in Timor the country was divided into many native kingdoms. The most prominent kingdoms were Serviao which included most of the present West Timor and the kingdom of Belu which ruled in the south west of what is now East Timor. Most kingdoms were independent from one another, but there were close alliances between many of them.

The social system linkage was maintained through exchange of goods and gifts and alliance through marriage between kingdoms and clans members was a fact. (Guterres, 1994).

These loosely-knit localised territorial groups were in general a hierarchy of clans, each related through marital exchange. The kingdoms were a collection of villages that had an allegiance to the same Liurai (king) who controlled the kingdom and had the supreme power. Each village had its own headman or chief and a Datu (council of noblemen). The Liurais and Datu were hereditary rulers.

The Portuguese controlled the coastal areas and were not able to exert authority over the interior of what is now East Timor until after the last major native revolt. The topography of the land and the fierceness of the local kings made it hard for them to penetrate the interior. Constant raids on Dili by the local Liurais made it difficult for the Portuguese authority to carry out proper administration, let alone develop the area. The last native insurrection lasted some seventeen years from 1885-1912 culminating in the battle of Manufahi led by Liurai Dom Boaventura. An account of the battle was summarised in the Argus, a Melbourne based newspaper. The Portuguese had been under constant pressure from dissident Timorese for some two years, but won the decisive battle of Manufahi only because they had received reinforcements in time from Mozambique and a cannon ship from Macau.

The ‘Argus’ reported that some 3,000 Timorese were killed and 4,000 Timorese were captured. After this battle Portuguese hegemony was exerted throughout East Timor.

The Portuguese made pacts of alliance with native kingdoms, awarding Liurais with titles equivalent to Portuguese titles of nobility and army ranking. For example Dom/King, became Dom/Tenente-Coronel, members of the Datu were titled captain. These alliances were made as part of the divide and rule tactics of the Portuguese which resulted in them gaining control over the territory and the population.

All the revolts and rebellions against the Portuguese authority have taken place in the western part of East Timor. Perhaps the reason is because the eastern kingdoms appeared to accept Portuguese presence and Portuguese rule.

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2My grandparents told me stories of how people from Baucau (see Map 1) were recruited to fight alongside Portuguese troops against people from the west side of East Timor. In one of these fracas my great-grand uncle took captive a young girl and adopted her as his daughter; she later married a paternal uncle.
The colonial border between the two Timor's became a recognised reality in 1913.

The Dutch and the Portuguese agreed on the boundary separating Portuguese Timor and West Timor in the 1880's and it was formally ratified at the 1913 Hague Round Table Conference (Horta 1987:63).

During the colonisation period existing Timorese kingdom boundaries were altered to accommodate the Portuguese colonial administrative system. Administrative divisions recognised and maintained by the Portuguese were Povoacoes (villages), sucos (kingdoms), postos (sub-district) and concelhos (districts). Most of these administrative divisions were set up in the 1920's and 1930's and this structure has basically been retained by the new colonisers.

World War Two - Invasion

From the end of the Manufahi war until World War two there was comparative peace in Portuguese Timor. Portugal was neutral during World War Two and this neutrality led to a dilemma for the allied forces. British, Dutch and American governments attempted to persuaded Lisbon to let the allied forces use Portuguese Timor, in order to prevent Japanese forces from using it as a base to attack and invade Australia. Portugal maintaining its neutrality refused. This refusal led to an invasion by Dutch and Australian soldiers in December 1941 followed some two months later by the imperial Japanese army.

...Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar was able to skilfully lay claim upon Anglo-American support for the maintenance of the Portuguese overseas territories (including Timor) in exchange for allied access to the mid-Atlantic base facilities on the Portuguese controlled Azores Islands. (Gunn 1988:2).

Tokyo was also in a dilemma with Lisbon because of their occupation of Portuguese Timor. Japan could not afford to break diplomatic relations with Portugal, because Japan, rather than Portugal, would have been the big loser.

So concerned was Morishima (Prime Minister) by the threat of a possible diplomatic break between Japan and Portugal over the issue that he sought the Japanese Foreign Minister's approval for a plan to evacuate Japanese residents from Portugal to Madrid. (Gunn 1988:10).

It needed Portugal, because Lisbon was important to them (the Japanese) for intelligence gathering.

One important aspect of history that appears to have been overlooked in the literature is the relationship between Japan and Portugal. This relationship, which is relatively close, has existed from the 16th century and continues up to the present. Portugal was the first European country to have reached and made contact with the Japanese and at the beginning of the Second World War there were Japanese residents living in Lisbon.

Portugal's main concern was that occupation by any of the warring parties might arouse anti-Portuguese feelings in the Timorese. This had occurred in other European colonies invaded by the Japanese in South East Asia. In those colonies eg. Malaya and Burma, feelings of nationalism against European domination were heightened.
While all this diplomacy was carried out, the Timorese were suffering large numbers of casualties. During the foreign occupations, from the middle of December 1941 to September 1945 more than 40,000 Timorese died as a result of malnutrition, massive aerial bombardments from Japanese and allied forces, forced labour by the Japanese and retaliation by the Japanese against Timorese suspected of helping the Australian troops carrying out a guerilla war against the Japanese on Timorese soil.

I well remember my parents reminiscences of their wartime experiences of their constant fear of being bombed whilst attending the crowded Sunday weekly market in Baucau. They described how big black planes flying from the east, I think from Australia, dropped bombs killing hundreds of people indiscriminately. Dili, Manatuto, Baucau and other towns were bombed to the ground by both the Japanese and mainly American and Australian airforces.

Reconstruction and Development

After the war Portuguese authority on Portuguese Timor was quickly re-established. Although buildings, roads, essential infrastructures destroyed during the war were rebuilt and schools and hospitals were built, (the Baucau hospital was built in 1948), there was neglect of advancement of Timorese society. The Portuguese were primarily concerned with christianisation of the Timorese people and with maintaining their power and authority. For the first 20 years after World War Two the education system of the colony was in the hands of the Catholic Church. They were primarily interested in producing Timorese trained catechists and teachers. Most of these were trained at the Dare seminary situated in the mountains overlooking Dili, or, at the Lahane Teacher’s college situated on the outskirts of Dili.

There was much pressure on Portugal through the auspices of the UN to give independence to its colonies. Revolts in Angola, Mozambique, and the invasion of Goa by Indian forces forced Lisbon to change its policy of neglect in its colonies. In Portuguese Timor from the 1960’s onwards primary schools were opened in all postos and sucos. In Dili there was one high school (Liceu), one technical school (Escola Tecnica), one teacher’s training school (Escola Canto Resende). There was an agricultural college run by the Salesian orders in Fatumaca. By the late 1960’s junior high schools had been opened in all districts. These were to facilitate entry to the high school, to the technical school or the teachers’ training school in Dili. There were a handful of university graduates who had graduated from Portuguese tertiary institutions in Portugal and Macau. Initially scholarships were provided only for privileged students i.e. Mestizo or children of Liurais. However, by the beginning of the 1970’s scholarships were being awarded on merit to all capable students.

By 1974 there were 39 students attending higher education in Portugal (Taylor 1991:17).

Portuguese colonial rule sooner or later had to end. Most of the European colonies in Africa and Asia had already gained independence in the first twenty years after World War Two. Portuguese Timor’s new beginning started when the ‘Mother Country’, a term used by Timorese to describe Portugal, changed its political structure. This drastically altered the course of Timor’s history.
A Portuguese Armed Forces movement (O Movimento das Forcas Armadas) staged a coup d'état and brought down the Caetano dictatorship on the 25th April 1974, bringing a new era to Portuguese politics. The leaders of the coup decided to give independence to all overseas Portuguese territories including Timor.

There was both euphoria and misgivings in Timor because politically we Timorese were not prepared for this sudden shift. Now we had personal freedom, democracy and the opportunity to choose Timor’s destiny. Three major political associations were created with different ideologies and aspirations for Timor. There were three other political associations formed, but their membership was insignificant and they took little part in the political process.

Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) (Uniao Democratica Timorense) was a conservative association which wanted continued links with Portugal was the first association formed on the 11th of May 1974. The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) (Frente Revolucionario por um Timor Leste Independente) was a social democratic progressive group which wanted immediate independence from Portugal and was formed two weeks later. By the last week in May 1974 the Popular Democratic Timorese Association (APODETI) (Associacao Popular Democratica Timorense) which stood for integration with the Republic of Indonesia, was formed.

According to Guterres (1992) these three parties had different lines of orientation. UDT’s main aims were,

Defence of Democracy. The preservation of the traditions of the Timorese people based on their cultural identity. Maintenance of links with Portugal in order to safeguard the historical and political culture of the Timorese people (Guterres 1992:12)

UDT also proposed that Portuguese Timor be known as Timor Dili whilst FRETILIN coined the term ‘Timor Leste’ (East Timor) to the world to distinguish East Timor from Indonesian controlled West Timor. Its aims were according to Guterres (1992):

... It stood for immediate recognition by the Portuguese government of de Jure Independence of East Timor; claimed itself as the only legitimate representative of the people of East Timor. Co-operative management with the Portuguese government in the reconstruction and development of East Timor. (Guterres, 1992:13).

APODETI was the third party formed on 27/5/74. It stood for integration with the Republic of Indonesia, but with Timorese retaining their autonomy. APODETI based this policy on geographical, cultural and racial grounds (Gutteres:16).

In analysing the aims of the three groups it is clear that UDT and FRETILIN had a common aim, independence for East Timor. Their differences on this issue had to do with the timing of independence. In early 1975 they formed a coalition aimed at achieving independence and at the same time countering APODETI’s policy of integration into the Indonesian Republic.

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3 I use the term political associations rather than political parties because legally their existence was not recognised by the Portuguese or the UN.
However, conflict between the two parties ensued because of ideological differences and strategies used to establish grassroots support. UDT was a conservative party while FRETILIN was ideologically left-wing oriented. FRETILIN was far more pragmatic in their political campaigns than UDT. Political immaturity on the part of the leaders of both parties was far more important in the disintegration of the coalition than were issues of ideological incompatibility.

UDT conservatism and its xenophobia regarding communism led it to stage a coup against the colonial administration on 11th August 1975. It demanded the Portuguese Governor expel from Timor all ‘communists’ together with two members of the Governor’s cabinet who UDT believed were helping and serving FRETILIN interests. FRETILIN staged a counter attack and overran UDT forces, with the help of Timorese soldiers from the Portuguese army, within a week. This forced UDT fighters, supporters and their families to flee to the border region and eventually to cross into West Timor. Fighting during this war was particularly intense in Dili, resulting in many people being evacuated to Australia, including me on the S.S Macdilli, the last ship anchored at Dili wharf. Casualties from the two week confrontation resulted in around 1,500 deaths (Dunn 1983:208).

When FRETILIN gained control of East Timor its leadership requested the immediate return of the Portuguese governor to complete decolonisation process; however on instruction from Portugal the Governor declined.

The Portuguese Governor attempted to bring the two factions together to negotiate, but failed. He then moved the government to the offshore island of Atauro on 26/8/75.

Courting Jakarta

During the 1974-1975 period to clarify their respective political positions both UDT and FRETILIN leaders visited Jakarta. Their immature diplomatic and negotiation skills were no match for the Indonesians.

APODETI’s integrationist policy was supported with financial help by Jakarta through its consulate in Dili. The Indonesian government also supplied goods which were distributed to APODETI members. In early 1975 members of UDT and FRETILIN leaderships made verbal threats against APODETI on the radio. This resulted in APODETI deciding to run a political propaganda campaign along the lines that APODETI and its members were being persecuted. APODETI’s secretary Jose Osorio Soares claimed he sent a telegram to the United Nations regarding this and the contents were read out during APODETI’s radio program.

The majority of the people of Portuguese Timor who support the objectives of APODETI, fear intimidation and repression by the collaborators of the Portuguese government in the mountains and in the interior of the colony so that the genuine will of the people can be changed by the use of force. There is disorder and violence in some regions and assassinations in the region of Atsabe...

We are convinced of the need for attention and intervention to avoid the possibility of a second massacre like that in Viqueque in the years of 1959. (Nicol 1978:66).
This campaign created fear, and destabilisation in UDT and FRETILIN leadership. The reality was that what Soares was claiming was false. There were minor incidents between supporters of the other two parties and APODETI members, because of APODETI’s integrationist policy. Soares’ call for outside intervention was calculated, because he knew that Jakarta would intervene if violence and disorder took place in Portuguese Timor. The Portuguese Governor, retaliating against the fiction in the broadcast, suspended APODETI’s radio program for 45 days. This suspension, in my opinion, was perhaps a misjudgment by the Governor, as it played into Jakarta’s hands. They claimed that because Soares and APODETI were being intimidated and their voice was being repressed that they were justified in facilitating APODETI broadcasting to East Timor from Kupang.

Jose Ramos Horta representing FRETILIN was the first of the political leaders to visit Jakarta. He met with Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Adam Malik in July 1974. His visit was to find out the attitude of Jakarta towards East Timorese aspiration for independence; and to give assurances that an independent East Timor would seek to have a close cooperation in economic, foreign affairs, security and education issues with the Republic of Indonesia. Malik assured Horta that independence was the right of every people and that included the people of East Timor and gave assurances that Indonesia had no territorial ambitions in East Timor. As a proof of Indonesia’s support of East Timorese aspirations for independence, Malik wrote to Horta on the 17th July 1974. The following is part of that letter.

The government of Indonesia until now still adheres to the following principles:

I. The independence of every country is the right of every nation, with no exception for the people in Timor.

II. The government as well as the people of Indonesia have no intention to increase or to expand their territory, or to occupy other territories other than what is stipulated in their constitution. This reiteration is to give you a clear idea, so that there may be no doubt in the minds of the people of Timor in expressing their own wishes.

III. For this reason whoever will govern in Timor in the future after independence, can be assured that the government of Indonesia will always strive to maintain good relations, friendship and cooperation for the benefit of both countries. (Jolliffe 1978:66).

Horta visited Jakarta a second time in April 1975 with Alarico Fernandes the elected Secretary General of FRETILIN. The trip was to clarify FRETILIN’s position because of propaganda by APODETI that FRETILIN was ‘communist’. There were fears by Indonesia that an independent East Timor would be a threat to its security. They feared that East Timor could become a haven for Indonesian communists, dissidents and separatists to work together to overthrow the Indonesian government.

We especially assured Moertopo that Indonesia should rest assured that an independent East Timor would not harbor PKI remnants nor would it support separatist groups in Indonesia. (Horta 1978:66).
The spectrum of big bad wolf ‘communism’ influenced the posture of the UDT leadership in the break up of the coalition and again in the civil war in August 1975. The coalition was called off when Francisco Lopes da Cruz and Augusto Mousinho returned from their visit to Australia and Jakarta in May 1975, where in both countries pressure had been brought to bear on them to end the coalition.

In late July 1975 Lopes da Cruz, Joao Carrascalao and Domingos de Oliveira, three UDT leaders, made a second trip to Jakarta to seek assurance and clarification from the Indonesian leadership that Jakarta would not oppose the wishes of the Timorese people to gain independence. General Ali Murtopo (Head of Indonesian Intelligence Service) stated that Indonesia would not tolerate an independent East Timor under FRETILIN control because FRETILIN was a communist movement. However, Jakarta would accept an independent East Timor under a non-communist organisation, like UDT, and would cooperate in economic and social development. Political innocence prevailed, for the UDT leaders believed in the truthfulness and the promises of Murtopo.

Carrascalao and Oliveira apparently trusted Murtopo and Sugyianto, little suspecting that their hosts were in fact key figures in the operation to bring about the incorporation of their country into Indonesia (Dunn 1983:167).

Because of their belief in the honesty of the Indonesian leaders the UDT leadership staged their coup in August 1975 and Carrascalao, in attempting to placate Jakarta, formed the ‘Movimento Anti Comunista’ (MAC) (Anti Communist Movement). This whole sequence of events was part of a charade. Jakarta knew well that UDT did not have massive grass roots support and would be unable to control East Timor. They also would have known that UDT would be overrun by FRETILIN. It was an open secret in Dili that the sympathy and support of the Timorese troops in the Portuguese army was with FRETILIN. The Indonesian response to the UDT leaders was part of a strategy called Operasi Komodo (operation dragon) organised by General Murtopo to create confusion, uncertainty and destabilisation inside East Timor.

The threat of communism was Jakarta’s excuse to the international community for its action in fulfilling its promise of invading East Timor when FRETILIN declared unilateral independence the Democratic Republic of East Timor on 28th November 1975. FRETILIN’s decision to make the declaration of independence was only taken when it became obvious that an Indonesian invasion was imminent. The Indonesian military had repeatedly attacked Timorese border towns in the west for the preceding nine weeks and the Indonesian Navy could be seen massing in the straits between Dili and Atauro.

**Invasion**

The ‘friendly’ warning to the UDT leaders became a reality when on the early morning of 7th December 1975 Indonesian armed forces formally invaded East Timor by attacking Dili from both the air and the sea.

I was waked by the deafening spray of automatic rifles, I asked some FALANTIL (Armed forces for the Liberation of East Timor) troops what was happening.
Indonesian forces are landing by sea and air” was the reply.... At about 8am I watched and counted as the last sixty paratroopers landed. At about 9am seven warships commenced bombarding the southern skirts of the city of Dili (Guterres 1992:32).

Not only are there accounts of eyewitnesses, but also a Timorese radio message was recorded calling on the outside world to help and to stop the invasion. They are trying to take over all Timor ... Indonesians... SOS, please help us ... SOS, SOS, we call for your help, we call for intervention of International Red Cross to stop them... they are flying over Dili, dropping out more and more paratroopers, more and more ... this is an urgent call. (Nicol, 1978:313).

This cry for help was in vain because 19 years later the East Timorese population is still at the mercy of their invaders and occupiers.
CHAPTER II - CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVASION

Killings, Torture, Rape

The troops invading Dili had been told that they were fighting ‘communists’ and because they could not distinguish who was or was not labelled communist many civilians were killed indiscriminately. People were rounded up at random. Young people, old men and women and children were killed on the spot. Eyewitnesses now living in Australia tell how anyone, including whole families, found in the vicinity of a dead Indonesian soldier were killed. There were also systematic killings with ironically many APODETI supporters being among those killed. Many people were killed at the waterfront. These included Borja da Costa (a very talented Timorese poet) and Rosa ‘Muki’ Bonaparte (both FRETILIN central committee members). Roger East (an Australian journalist) was among the thousands reputed to have been killed on the first day of the invasion. Women and young girls were raped. Homes and shops were looted. From Dili many people were evacuated to the mountains by FRETILIN. Thousands more fled into mountain areas where it was known there were FALINTIL (Forcas Armadas de Libertacao Nacional de Timor, Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor) forces. The Timorese Army were no match for the thousands of Indonesian paratroopers being landed, nor could they sustain the bombardment from the sea.

Killings took place in other parts of the territory. For weeks, after the invasion, there were killings in Liquica, Maubara, Baucau, Same and Suai. The population of these towns also fled to the mountains to join FRETILIN and FALINTIL for protection. The death and destruction which was horrific ensued. In April 1976 Lopes da Cruz, an ex UDT leader who changed sides and supported the Indonesian invasion), stated that since the invasion 60,000 people had been killed. Sources within the Catholic Church were estimating at the time that the death toll was around 100,000. It has been estimated that since the invasion and occupation more than 200,000 have died. (Horta, 1987:2)

Before the invasion East Timor had a population of 680,000 (Dunn 1983:3). By 1990 the population was 747,557 (Aditjondro 1994:36).

These figures suggested there has been zero growth in the population. It substantiates the estimated claim of population loss of more than 200,000 since the invasion and occupation. This was the result of massive bombardments with napalm and toxic bombs, in which many villages were destroyed. People were not able to stay permanently in their villages or in the new places they moved to therefore they couldn’t grow food.

In all towns there were arbitrary mass arrests and detention without trial. There were many authenticated reports of mass killings and massacres. The most prominent was the “Kraras massacre” in 1983 where 400 people almost the whole population of the town were rounded up and executed; a small number of women and children were spared. Many Timorese that I have met in Australia have horrific stories about how they suffered at the hands of the invaders. Graphic details of how their tormentors dished out physical and psychological punishment

^On the 20/8/1975 FALINTIL was formed as the armed wing of FRETILIN.
on them. Others have testified at the United Nations, at Human Rights Conventions, to Non Government organisations about their personal experiences at the hands of Indonesian military. Most of these people do not know each other, but the language and symbolism used in their stories is constant and seem to be a script written for a movie or play. Once arrested, and to extract information about FRETILIN and the resistance, a person is subjected to all forms of torture.

In her book Telling (Turner:1992) records some of these experiences:

Beating with a rubber hose about three inches thick was common, they hit, head, body, just anywhere... There was kicking, hitting with gun butts, burning with cigarettes and shocks from the electric cable. (Turner 1992:180)

As I entered the room, a soldier struck me in the stomach with his fist... I was again ordered to stand up...a soldier trampled on my head so hard that three of my upper front teeth were broken... I continued to refuse to answer their questions. Because of this, they started using electricity. It was done by means of battery in a contraption that was something like telephone. The negative wire was tied to my hand and the positive wire was put inside my ear. But sometimes they just plugged a live wire into a socket and use that... (Turner 1992:186-187).

To frighten me, they had carefully arranged on the table various instruments of torture such as whips, clubs, truncheons, chair legs, electric wires, cigarettes, matches and the like... Then they brought in my sister who arrived scarred all over by instruments of torture. Her skin was covered in dried blood, there were countless cigarette burns where the Indonesians had put out their cigarettes on her flesh as if she were an ash tray. They threatened me, saying 'if you don’t tell the truth, you’ll get the same treatment. (I am a Timorese, 1990:6).

The most common places of torture mentioned are the Sang Tai Ho Building and Comarca Prison in Dili, and the Hotel Flamboyant in Baucau.

In the villages and in the bush those captured were subjected to the same type of cruelties to that of their fellows in the cities and towns. When a resistance fighter is captured, he/she are made examples of and paraded before the local population. This strategy is used to create an environment of terror and fear in the population to show that whoever tries to help the resistance or oppose Jakarta will have the same destiny. Persons are brutally tortured. They are often knifed and badly mutilated, their sexual organs may be cut off in the men and breasts cut from women, prisoners are often beaten to death. In one reported instance cannibalism was practiced by a commander of an Indonesian military unit. The heart of a resistance fighter was cooked for the commander to eat. Macabre pictures have been sent abroad which show Indonesian soldiers exhibiting as trophies the decapitated heads of Timorese people killed exhibiting as at the tip of guns or sticks.

The torture is not only physical, but also psychological. People released from detention or prison are subjected to constant harassment and surveillance. They can be picked up at any time by the Indonesian security apparatus for interrogation and torture and many disappear without trace. The domino effect of
collective fear spreads from individuals to family members and to the community in general.

Concentration/Resettlement Camps

In their attempts to control the territory Indonesian forces were forced to subjugate the Timorese civilian population. The invading forces were aware of the supportive role the general population were giving to the resistance fighters. In the towns, villages or mountains Indonesian troops could not differentiate a guerrilla fighter from a civilian and this prompted the Indonesian authorities not only to move people from their traditional grounds to settlements along roads where they could be more easily observed and controlled, but to resettle civilians who surrendered in late 1977-78 in similar localities. This led to the almost universal uprooting and shifting of most of the Timorese population from their traditional lands.

The amnesty promulgated by Soeharto in August 1977 (Taylor 1991:97) to FRETILIN fighters, that they would be pardoned encouraged many hundreds of fighters and thousands of civilians to surrender. The dishonouring of this amnesty by the Indonesian authorities reinforced Timorese perceptions of the nature and quality of Indonesian integrity.

Thousands of those who surrendered were jailed and tortured with many disappearing without trace (Guterres 1992:45).

Until to March 1977, the Indonesian military occupied only the towns with the Timorese resistance controlling the rest of the territory. In an attempt to end the resistance the Indonesian military launched three massive security operations. The nature and quality of these operations brought great devastation and loss of life and impacted on the total population. The Indonesian military divided East Timor into three zones; western region, central region, and the eastern region. The first security operations were the biggest and were directed at the eastern zone in the area of the Matebian mountain ranges. This was an encirclement and annihilation campaign which commenced with massive bombardments of target areas and lasted from March 1977 to September 1979. Thousands of people were killed and many captured.

In 1981 Operation Security (Operasi Kemanan) also known as ‘the fence of legs’ was used to round up most of the population in the central zone. In this operation thousands of Timorese men and boys were forced to walk in a straight line from the eastern and western sides to flush out the resistance fighters in the central areas. If fighters were captured they were jailed or killed.

The third operation known as Operation Unity (Operasi Persatuan) also known as operation Clean-sweep was commenced by General Benny Murdani when he declared war again against East Timor following the breakdown of the five month cease fire negotiations in March 1983.

The operation involved the recruitment of tens of thousands of Timorese men and boys; it was also intended to ‘punish’ the Timorese population for its persistent support of the resistance movement (Budiardjo 1984:41).

Many concentration camps, Jakarta calls them resettlement camps, were set up. Among them was a huge one on the island of Atauro to which thousands of
people were transported because it was easier to control them there. In many areas, particularly in the mountains, people were moved from their place of origin to military built and supervised resettlement camps. These camps were built close to main roads which made them easy to access and to control. Another strategy used was that local village people who were allowed to stay in their place of origin were not allowed to go more than five kilometres radius to work their gardens or forage for food. These controls resulted in an acute famine.

**Land Dispossession/Transmigration**

Traditional land ownership was recognised as legal by the Portuguese administration. That administration did not interfere greatly with or dispossess people from their land. Jakarta’s policies have changed traditional land ownership. Their policy is to confiscate abandoned lands. Timorese living in Australia, have tried to secure and legalise their lands and property titles.

The majority of indigenous Timorese do not have a title to their land. There was no need as everyone knew what land belonged to whom. Every tree in East Timor had an owner and that owner was known to all. Indonesian law demands evidence of a title as proof of ownership of land. Timorese will lose their land because of this policy. Moreover, most of the dispossessed cannot return to their lands because of the Indonesian resettlement policies.

Abandoned lands, whether voluntarily or compulsorily, are given to new settlers under Jakarta’s program of transmigration. Most of the fertile valley areas of Maliana, the banks of the River Lois and the south eastern plains near Suai are settled by these new arrivals.

Visitors from Australia who have visited East Timor since ‘opening up’ in 1989, say that most of the trading in the markets are in the hands of Indonesian traders, usually Makassarese and some from Sulawesi. The Timorese resent the settlement of transmigrants, but are unable to take any action because these transmigrants are protected by the Military.

The flood of new comers will create competition with the indigenous inhabitants which could sow the seeds of communal conflict. Within indigenous East Timorese circles a feeling of hatred has arisen towards the Makassarese and Bugis. (Mubyarto et al: 1991: 54)

Most senior government positions in East Timor are occupied by Indonesians. Those Timorese who have senior positions are appointed as a token gesture by Jakarta to appease pressure from the international community. Timorese generally occupy lower level positions. All facets of activities from economics, health to education, are controlled by the military.

**Development**

Based on development discourse, many apologists for the Jakarta regime argue that since the occupation Jakarta has built more schools, houses, roads, bridges than the Portuguese did in 400 years, insinuating that the Timorese should be grateful for this. Whilst it is true that there is more infrastructure than before, it is

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5 Opening up refers to 1st January 1989 when Indonesia allowed outside access to East Timor for the first time since the invasion.
rare for the Timorese to benefit directly from the economic developments that 
have been created.

The new housing being built is inappropriate for the terrain and the climate. Roads 
and bridges are built primarily for military security and strategic aims. Roads to 
places of no strategic interest to the military are in gross stages of disrepair. To 
the Timorese all development is seen as a sign of oppression and repression, only 
built to legitimise Jakarta occupation.

There is a lot of development going on in East Timor, but it is not 
development dictated by the East Timorese people themselves... And if you 
talk about development in East Timor in the sense of the Indonesian 
government has pumped in so much money - they say 900 billion rupiah -into 
East Timor, we should also discount the subsidy paid by the Timorese, first 
by their lives - ... and financially, in terms of the subsidies they have had to 
pay by getting underrated coffee price and also by all the other monopolies 
run by Indonesians in East Timor (Aditjondro 1994:56-57).

Right here in Australia, as a developed country has a high standard of living. Yet 
the infrastructures in the areas of health, education, employment, etc, have not 
benefited the original inhabitants of this country. In 1994 they are still fighting for 
an equality and justice, which has been denied to them for over two centuries.

Education/Family Planning

One of the priorities that Jakarta implemented in East Timor was in education. 
Education is a tool of empowerment. Jakarta uses it as an instrument of control, 
conformity and subjugation. I can still recall the Portuguese state principals: God, 
country, family. Under Indonesian occupation Timorese children are forced to 
learn Indonesian state ideology, Pancasila as well as Bahasa Indonesian. The five 
points of Pancasila are: a) Belief in one God; b) Indonesian unity; c) Democracy; 
d) Humanitarianism; e) Social justice.

These principles have been a positive learning process for the Timorese, young 
and old because although Jakarta preaches them, the reality is that they do not 
implement them. The Timorese see quite clearly the paradox. The Portuguese 
colonial masters neglected the educational development of the Timorese, but 
allowed them to maintain and preserve their social and cultural identity. Young 
Timorese educated under the Indonesian system say that they learn much about 
the state ideology of Pancasila and how to be good model Indonesian citizens of 
Indonesia. The time spent on being acculturated to being an Indonesian citizen is at 
the expense of other educational topics such as maths, science etc.

Portuguese language was still taught at some schools, like Externato de Sao Jose, 
run by the Catholic Church, but these were closed in the late 1980’s. It was 
alleged that these schools were subversive and anti-Indonesian. Portuguese 
language has been banned as a language of instruction.

Influential Timorese, such as members of the Catholic clergy and Timorese 
members of the Timorese provincial parliament, have encouraged the youth to 
concentrate on their education. This encouragement supports Jakarta’s policy of 
integration which includes educating the youth to embrace Indonesian 
assimilationist policies and to end resistance to the occupation. The result has
been the opposite. There are hundreds of Timorese students attending tertiary education throughout Indonesia. Claims by some Indonesians that the East Timorese are backward and poor, created awareness in the Timorese students in Bali, Java, etc, of the inferior status with which many Indonesians regarded them. They also observe the living conditions of the general population throughout Indonesia. There is hostility toward Indonesians, but in general the Timorese are learning a way of life which allows them to survive their tyranny.

Another aspect of education introduced is that of family planning. However, the genocide which has been perpetrated on the population is such that Timorese women want to reproduce not to be sterilised. From a Timorese perspective Jakarta’s use of family planning and education to improve the standard of health of Timorese women are smoke screens for a deliberate political and military strategy. Jakarta wants to reduce Timorese fecundity. By reducing the number of Timorese births, this will eventually result in Indonesian settlers and their offspring outnumbering the Timorese in their own land. If a ‘referendum’ as an act of self-determination were held in 20 years time the one person one vote principle would drastically disadvantage the Timorese. Timorese now living in Australia tell of incidents of welcome to foreign dignitaries where the military use the transmigrants to portray happy Timorese gracefully accepting integration into Indonesia.
CHAPTER III - RESISTANCE AND OPPOSITION TO THE OCCUPATION

Fretilin Leadership

The FRETILIN leadership, from the outset of taking control in East Timor, was aware that Indonesia would invade. The many armed clashes on the border due to Indonesian military incursions, in the three months prior to the invasion were proof of that. According to a Timorese fighter and leader, Timorese experience of the border clashes showed the Indonesian soldiers to be tactically not very good fighters. The advantage for the Indonesian military invading through Dili was that there could be aerial and naval support. The Indonesian invasion of Dili took place on the 7th December 1975.

The FRETILIN leadership and by extension FALINTIL, were not prepared to fight the invaders openly because of logistical problems. When the invasion commenced FRETILIN retreated to the mountains with a majority of its central committee members. These men made the decisions and adopted the strategies on how FALINTIL, the military wing, was to fight and resist the enemy.

Until mid 1997 these strategies were very successful. Indonesian forces were only in control of the main towns, and in daylight only, the main roads linking Dili, Baucau, Lospalos, Viqueque, Ermera and Maliana. At this time FRETILIN claimed that virtually 90% of the territory was still under Timorese control. The majority of the population had retreated into the mountains and were living in ‘Resistance’ controlled areas.

Some authors such as Budiardjo (1984) have referred to these Resistance controlled areas as ‘liberated areas’, insinuating they were FRETILIN liberated areas. These areas had not been fought over either before or after the Indonesian invasion and to refer to them as liberated is a misnomer.

The FRETILIN leadership recognised that open clashes with the Indonesian military would not favour FALINTIL fighters. Meeting on 20th May 1976 the central committee adopted the following policy:

...the strategy of a people’s war meant that urgent changes were needed in political, military and organisational affairs. On the military front FALINTIL was reshaped into a regular army and small units called shock brigades were set up to launch short sharp attacks on the Indonesian troops. (Budiardjo, 1984:58).

This resulted in the territory being divided into sectors, with each sector having its own regional command. The objective was to facilitate favourable engagement conditions and to disperse the Indonesian military advance. According to FALINTIL sources, for some time, direct clashes in these regions resulted in heavy casualties being inflicted on the enemy. It is significant that the Indonesian military has never published personnel losses in East Timor.

At this time the Resistance was not totally under FALINTIL or FRETILIN command. There were many small organised groups who gave no allegiance to FRETILIN who were fighting the Indonesian military. At the same time there were members of both UDT and APODETI who were fighting with FALINTIL.
In the resistance controlled areas political consciousness rising was active, with the objective of instilling into the Timorese the notion of ‘belonging’/‘sameness’. This strategy was devised to bring unity among the Timorese to improve fighting and resistance capacity against the invaders. At the same time, this strategy was also seen as a way to overcome divisions in Timorese society caused by the pre-invasion conflicts and differences. In a sense, the invasion brought a new dimension to the hearts and minds of the Timorese people. It created a new identity, a ‘new nationalism’, a sense of Timorese identity which was different to that which had been forged by the Portuguese colonial administration. The identity which had been created for the Timorese by the Portuguese was a sense of belonging within the boundaries of Portuguese Timor and of belonging to Portugal. In no way was a sense of being Timorese fostered. This new identity created a sense of being Timorese and that it was the duty of all Timorese to oppose the invaders, simply because one was Timorese and they were the enemy of all Timorese. The important point is that this strategy resulted in people identifying as Timorese rather than by their ethno-linguistic group, which is how they would have identified before.

The success of the Indonesian military encirclement strategies which took place between 1977-1979 were almost a mortal blow to FRETILIN, because it led to the death or capture of most of the central committee members. FRETILIN was a ‘front’ and among the central committee there were several factions with differing ideas regarding the conduct of the resistance. Budiardjo et al. described it this way:

...the 52 member central committee represented a diversity of ideological and political positions, a broad front of nationalist ideas and political perspectives encompassing social democracy, Marxism and populism (Budiardjo et al 1984:54).

A second issue which did not help the resistance, was that many of the unit commanders of FALINTIL, were Timorese professional soldiers in the Portuguese army who had joined when the invasion took place. The biggest obstacle for the unit commanders in their conduct of the resistance was that there were large civilian populations living in the controlled areas. Since it was the controlled areas that the Indonesian military were continually attacking, these unit commanders argued with the central committee members that for them to be successful in combat, the civilians should be moved. The FRETILIN leadership, on the other hand, recognised and argued that for the type of guerrilla war the resistance was forced to adopt, could only be successful if the total civilian population was involved in the conduct of the war. In terms of passive resistance this theory functioned extremely well in later years, but at that time their military strategy did not operate as successfully as hoped. It soon became apparent that when a raid or clash took place the soldiers could escape but the civilian population could not. The huge death toll among the civilians led to much soul searching by many of the unit commanders.

FRETILIN consisted of several groups, each of which had slightly different agendas. These groups had some aims in common, principally in a quick separation from Portugal. They formed FRETILIN and their agendas are mirrored in FRETILIN’s 1975 manifesto.
By mid 1977 there was open disagreement among FRETILIN central committee members both over tactics, or, whether to surrender or try to negotiate with the enemy. All members of FRETILIN wanted independence, but the reality of their situation forced some to make independent decisions and act accordingly when no consensus was reached.

Kinship and alliance system loyalties, played decisive roles not only in the placement of regional commanders, but also in the demise of the FRETILIN central committee members. Aquiles Soares from Quelicai and Xavier do Amaral from Turiscai played important roles in their region of origin. In both cases they were the unit commanders of those areas. They were older and understood the nature of the invasion and its effect on the total population. Soares, son of a liurai and a sergeant in the Portuguese army understood war strategy. He knew that, militarily, FALINTIL could not defeat the invading forces. Whilst witnessing the effects of the brutal killings, the massacres perpetrated by the enemy and the effects of the famine, he would have realised some unpopular compromise measures would have to be taken or adopted. Therefore I do not agree with Taylor (1991), see quote below, that ‘localism’ influenced his decision in trying to negotiate with the enemy a cease fire in his zone.

As a local liurai, responding to the requests from areas in his zone, Soares used his support in the traditional networks to organise a movement to replace more nationalist-oriented leaders in his region. (Taylor 1991:96).

Soares was very unfortunate. He was detained and like so many others was later executed on the orders of the then FRETILIN leadership.

Xavier Amaral who adopted similar strategies and policies to those of Aquiles Soares was also arrested and detained on the orders of Nicolau Lobato (the Prime Minister of the Government of the Republic of East Timor), and demoted from the position of President of the party. Nicolau Lobato was appointed as the new President of FRETILIN. Amaral was captured by the Indonesian military at Remexio (not far from Dili) and is currently living in Jakarta.

Alarico Fernandes, the Secretary General of FRETILIN, surrendered to the Indonesian military in Turiscai, handing over the mobile radio used by FRETILIN to contact Darwin. The external delegation of FRETILIN at that time alleges that Fernandes tried to remove other FRETILIN leaders through an Indonesian sponsored military operation code named Skylight. He currently lives in West Timor.

Following the arrest of Amaral and Fernandes, all but two of the rest of the central committee members were killed. Guterres, who was living and working in East Timor at that time said:

Nicolau and 72 of his body guards were encircled in the area between Maubisse and Turiscai. Nicolau was shot by and Indonesian soldier from West Timor who was later rewarded by being promoted to Sergeant.

(Guterres 1992:39).

Nicolau Lobato was killed on 31 January 1978 and immediately after Jakarta declared that a total victory over the resistance has been achieved.
**Passive/Popular Resistance**

The popular belief, internationally, is that only FRETILIN is continuing the fight against the invaders and that all Timorese society support FRETILIN. This is patently untrue. How could any Timorese stand and witness the barbaric acts of the invaders, torture, indiscriminate killings, rape, looting, occupying land, taking jobs from Timorese, being deprived of their language and their ‘modus operandus’ and do nothing? In this situation the alternatives are, to continue to resist and to fight on, to join the enemy in an effort to minimise the pain and suffering, or to resist passively under enemy control. And if the last 19 years has proved anything, it has proved that the vast majority of Timorese, both internally and externally, have continued the fight, often in their own ways and certainly for many, not under the control or direction of FRETILIN.

After the collapse of FRETILIN and FALINTIL survival strategies became paramount for hundreds of thousands of Timorese who were forced by famine and military harassment to surrender to the Indonesian authorities. Collaboration with the enemy, for many, became a condition of their continued survival. The Indonesian military regarded this as a sign that the Timorese had capitulated and this encouraged them to embark on a more liberal strategy to coerce the population to their will. To win compliance, some Timorese were given inducements of money, gifts and promises of jobs if they would reinforce the Indonesian claim that the Timorese had accepted the annexation. This approach was also an attempt to divide the Timorese community. However, as soon as the resistance reasserted itself, which it did toward the end of 1981, the persecution and lies to the international community began again. Nine years after the invasion a Timorese working for the Indonesian administration in Dili remarked to a European visitor:

> I have been an official of the Occupying Government for nine years. I receive a good salary, enough for me and my family to live comfortably. However, I am troubled to see most of my Timorese brothers suffering. I read the news papers and magazines, listen to the radio and watch television and I encounter more lies than truth... (Amnesty International Report 8/91).

Testimonies from Timorese in the diaspora give a sense of what was happening. Physical and psychological tortures become daily occurrences for many people. They became resigned and learned to accept and harbour their anger. As a Turner (1992) informant remarked:

> ...He hits and kicks, goes away and comes back and says, “So you have enough money now”? Asks questions again, the same things, if I am Fretilin, who is Fretilin - then beats again. I didn’t have anything to do with Fretilin then so I said again and got beaten again, from about three o’clock in the afternoon for hours into the night. ...I am being beaten when I am innocent so I will be guilty. It was then that I started to help the resistance. A lot of hatred built up inside so I just did what I could to help. I wrote code to give to Fretilin people to broadcast. I was afraid of the Indonesians, but after they beat me I was proud I did this. (Turner 1992:163)

> ...They don’t care so much about the beatings, it’s a common thing for them now, and they expect it. Instead of giving up they fight back, learning to
Timorese resistance members now living in Australia describe how ordinary people in the villages are active in the resistance. Old men, women, young boys and girls are couriers in intelligence gathering and supply. They use the normal routines of going to Dili, or the nearest large towns on market days as a cover.

Many Timorese have joined the Indonesian military or military police, ostensibly to fight their brothers and sisters. However, there is much anecdotal evidence that the majority of these Timorese serve the interests of the Resistance*. Some Timorese units within the Indonesian army have gone into operation against the guerillas without losing a man, but have lost their weapons and ammunition. Many Timorese conscripted into Indonesian military units have defected to join the Resistance in the bush taking their weapons and ammunition with them. These examples have been recounted to demonstrate that the occupying forces are not just fighting the guerrilla in the mountains, but virtually the total population.

The Timorese soon discovered that often, members of Indonesian officialdom in East Timor were corrupt and that it was possible to bribe your way out of anything if you had the financial means to do so. The majority of Timor-born currently in the diaspora left East Timor by bribing members of the military or administrative officials; many paying thousands of dollars for their freedom.

Role of the Catholic Church

Although human rights groups were successful in highlighting the plight of the East Timorese among the international community, for the first twelve years the Catholic Church was the only consistent voice coming from inside East Timor to condemn the brutalities of the invasion and occupation. It has been a pillar of strength, the sole defender and protector of the East Timorese within East Timor. Both the apostolic administrators appointed to Dili have openly challenged Jakarta to stop the cruelties and barbaric acts carried out by the Military.

The Catholic Church in East Timor is administered directly from Rome and the Vatican has never recognised Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor. Although during the invasion church buildings in Dili were used by people seeking protection from the conflict, for the first five years of the occupation the Church in East Timor suffered silently with the people. Then its posture changed when some of its clergy began to speak out directly against the policies being carried out by the Indonesian administration. This change in stance has created antagonism between the Indonesian Military and the Church.

Monsignor Martino da Costa Lopes, an indigenous Timorese, was appointed apostolic administrator of the Catholic Church in East Timor in 1977. On a visit to Australia in 1983, in a meeting with, me and other members of the East Timorese community in Melbourne, he said:

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*From now on when the word resistance is used with a capital R it is to convey that after FRETILIN reorganised, probably in late 1979, they successfully managed to take control of all armed resistance to the Indonesian military. They established the CRNN Conselho Revolucionario de Resistencia Nacional (Revolutionary Council of National Resistance).
For five years I used the behind the scene policy. I approached and pleaded with the military commanders, not to torture or continue to kill the people that gave themselves up in the bush; to stop the soldiers abusing and raping women and young girls. Of course the abuses and atrocities intensified. I could not stand, I had to speak out. During a service in honour of Our Lady I condemned the abuses, without naming Indonesia. That was the first time I spoke out publicly. (Melbourne 1983).

After Monsignor Lopes began to speak out, Jakarta, in 1983, successfully pressured the Vatican to have Monsignor Lopes removed from office. Jakarta’s efforts at this time, exerted through the Indonesian Bishop’s conference, to persuade the Vatican to have the Church in East Timor directly integrated into the Indonesian Catholic Church, failed.

Monsignor Lopes removal was a blessing in disguise because he brought to the outside world the real picture of the resistance movement. After being removed from office, Lopes toured the world disseminating information about the oppression and suffering of the East Timorese people, and at the same time conveying to the International community the wishes and aspirations of the Timorese to obtain an act of self-determination and achieve independence. It was Monsignor Lopes who brought out evidence and news of the 1983 cease fire between the Resistance and the Indonesian Military. It must have been a great shock to Jakarta to see, pictures of their military commander, in East Timor sitting at a conference table dialoguing with the leader of East Timorese resistance movement, while on the world media at the same time, Jakarta was denying there was organised resistance in the province.

The Indonesian authorities attempted, with some success, to discredit Monsignor Costa Lopes by claiming he was spreading ill founded lies. This was in response not only to his claims of continuous abuse, but also the statements the prelate was making regarding a famine in East Timor. Jakarta used Gough Whitlam (a former Australian Prime Minister) to discredit Costa Lopes. After a visit to East Timor in March 1982 Whitlam, in an interview broadcast on Radio Australia, stated:

I believe that the Bishop is suffering a crisis of identity. He does not realise that the days of the Portuguese - under whom he received his education, under which he was the deputy, the Member of Parliament for Timor for some period in the national assembly in Lisbon - that those days are past. And he (I regret to say, up to half the clergy, at least half the clergy in Timor) are nostalgic: they miss the Portuguese. They were used to the Portuguese language, they were used to the Portuguese tradition, they were part of the Portuguese system. And it upsets the bishop and these clergy when they come to realise that Indonesia is now doing much more for the people of East Timor than the Portuguese ever did. Oh yes! I say he’s a liar. He is a mendacious and malicious correspondent... (Whitlam March 1982).

This emotional outburst from Whitlam helped Jakarta to continue with its genocidal policy in East Timor. Moreover, he petitioned the United Nations (UN) Decolonisation Committee on behalf of Jakarta arguing against the independence aspirations of the East Timorese, saying:
It is high time that the question of East Timor was voted off the United Nations agenda. (Horta 1987:130).

Horta, the East Timor representative at the UN for many years, replied by saying:

Whitlam is carrying his loyalty to General Suharto to new extremes, desperate to rewrite history and erase his shabby part in it... (Horta 1987:130).

I believe the Catholic church of East Timor is being persecuted not because of its propagation of faith, but because of its political stand. Most of the clergy, nuns and laity are under constant physical and psychological pressure. Witnesses now living in Australia, describe how Indonesian military commanders physically assaulted and beat priests because the priests defended and stood against the injustices inflicted on their Timorese congregations.

The removal of Monsignor Costa Lopes caused deep concern not only inside East Timor, but also to the Timorese in exile. The concern was because of the appointment of the current apostolic administrator Bishop Belo, another indigenous Timorese. We became aware that this then young and inexperienced member of the Salesian Order had returned to East Timor on an Indonesian passport. This act signified to us that he regarded himself as an Indonesian citizen and we were unhappy about his appointment. Moreover his appointment was not welcomed or supported by the majority of the Timorese clergy in East Timor. Their fears and concerns have proved to be ill founded. It was assumed Belo would work and co-operate closely with Jakarta, instead he has followed the path of Costa Lopes. It was a huge embarrassment to Jakarta when a letter written in February 1984 by Belo to Costa Lopes detailing military massacres and sadistic behaviour as commonplace, was published. Belo’s position has resulted in a majority of all Catholic clergy in East Timor supporting their leader. Although, according to some Timorese refugees now in Australia, there is a small number of clergy in East Timor who are pro-Indonesian in that they believe that integration is the best option for the Timorese people.

During the periods 1985-1989 Bishop Belo’s challenges and criticisms of Indonesian human rights record has intensified. He gained international recognition for East Timor when, on the 6th of February 1989 he wrote a letter to the Secretary General of the UN (a copy of this letter is cited in Appendix 2) urging that body to conduct a ‘referendum’ in East Timor to determine whether the majority of East Timorese want integration or independence.

As the person responsible for the Catholic Church and as a citizen of Timor I hereby request Your Excellency to initiate a genuine and democratic process of decolonisation in East Timor to be realised through a referendum. (I am Timorese 1990:40-41).

His stand resulted in three attempts on his life, constant surveillance with surveillance equipment of his residence and most of the time INTEL (Indonesian secret services) personnel guard the entrance to his home (personal communication from the Bishop whilst on a pastoral visit to Melbourne in November 1993). Priests in Timor continue to be physically assaulted, churches searched and people taken away for questioning by the military. These strategies
of intimidation have obviously been devised to discourage people from visiting the Bishop and to scare the clergy into submission.

After the Bishop’s letter Jakarta further intensified their counter offensive measures against the Bishop by again putting pressure on the Vatican to bring the Catholic Church in East Timor under the jurisdiction of the Indonesian Catholic hierarchy thereby integrating it into the Indonesian church.

... Frans Seda, a leading Indonesian Catholic politician and a member of the Vatican’s Pontifical Commission for Justice and Peace, called for the church to recognise officially the integration of the East Timorese into the Indonesian Catholic Church. (Taylor 1991:155).

The Vatican stand was tested when it announced that His Holiness John Paul II would visit Indonesia, including East Timor in October 1989. The announcement brought positive and negative reactions from various quarters, depending on whether one was for independence or integration. Indonesian authorities claimed the Vatican was about to formally recognise the integration. Timorese clergy inside East Timor opposed the visit because they also believed the visit would lead to the Catholic Church in Rome to formally recognising the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. Also they were unhappy about the site for the mass to be celebrated by his Holiness. Taci-Tolo (three lakes), the site chosen, was a place of horror; thousands of Timorese had been massacred there in 1980. The language in which the prayers and mass would be spoken was also a bone of contention. Mass in Bahasa Indonesia would offend the Timorese. Portuguese or Tetum (the Lingua Franca of East Timor) would not satisfy Jakarta. In the end the Mass was celebrated in Latin. The stand by the Timorese Catholic clergy shows, how sensitive they are to any issues which give legitimacy to the Indonesian occupation, and that they are unwilling to give Indonesia any room for diplomatic manoeuvres, or initiatives which will entrench their legality.

In the diaspora controversy surrounded the action of the Pope in not kissing the ground on his arrival in Dili. Some Timorese interpreted this as a sign of recognition of integration. Others argued that the Pope came to East Timor to visit his diocese rather than to visit a sovereign country, therefore it would have been inappropriate to kiss the ground as he did when he landed in Indonesia.

The Timorese have used their church and their faith as weapons to resist the occupation. The Santa Cruz massacre on 12th November 1991 is an example. This massacre resulted in enormous support for East Timor from Catholic bishops around the world. Letters of condolence and support were sent to Bishop Belo, such as:

We, the Japanese Bishops, gathered for our Annual Assembly, wish to express our great sorrow about the massacre (sic). We also wish to convey to our heartfelt sympathies to you, Bishop Belo, who represent the East Timorese Catholic Church which is always so close to the people of East Timor. (Crowe et al 1992:53).

This support of international solidarity, together with many representations to the UN by fellow Bishops, broke the long silence and little support from Catholics outside East Timor.
Bishop Belo has been very vocal and determined in defence of human rights. He has especially condemned Jakarta’s family planning policies in particular sterilisation of Timorese women and the use of the drug ‘Depo Provera’. His opposition to ‘Family planning’ is not solely based on Catholic teachings, but also because war and occupation has reduced East Timor’s population substantially. East Timor needs population growth, not a reduction in the birth rate.

Pancasila (part of the Indonesian constitution) requires that all people have a belief in one God and align themselves with one of the five major world religions. This requirement forced the bulk of the Timorese to choose one and they chose Christianity. Before the invasion, according to George Aditjondro:

There were 220314 catholics and 460112 non catholics followers of traditional religion, animism. In 1990 there were 676.402 catholics to nil animism (Aditjondro, 1994:36).

Currently the Catholic Church, both directly and indirectly, in East Timor is being challenged yet again by Jakarta through the use of agent provocateurs. On the 28th of June 1994, in the town of Remexio, two Indonesian soldiers (non-christians) desecrated the Host during Holy Communion. Many arrests for protesting against the sacrilege occurred. Bishop Belo protested strongly and directly to the military commander about the loutish behaviour of his subordinates. The soldiers involved were arrested but what action taken against them, if any, is unknown.

On the 13th of July 1994 Indonesian agents insulted Catholic nuns at the University of East Timor. There were strong, angry protests and a peaceful demonstration (for which permission had been obtained) from the University students. The military used violence to break up the demonstration with one death reported and several protesters seriously injured. Jakarta denied any involvement in the disturbances. I believe Jakarta is responsible for the serious disturbances. Catholicism has been the main bastion for the Timorese people sporting their resistance to the occupation. Many Timorese believe that these sectarian events have been orchestrated by the military to flush out members of the Resistance movement in order to arrest them. Others believe the rise of sectarianism is a ploy to create destabilisation in East Timor, thus allowing the military to continue using their repressive style of repression in their attempts to break the strong and unwavering passive resistance of the majority of the Timorese.

Student and Youth Movement

For fourteen years East Timor was closed to the outside world. Most of the visits by foreigners were guided tours set up by the Indonesian authorities in Dili. ‘Opening up’ brought hope to the Timorese people especially the younger generation. Particularly, for those who have been educated under the Indonesian education system. Young Timorese, recent arrivals in Australia, claim that before ‘opening up’ many students disappeared, suffered, died, without the outside world knowing of their predicament. The fourteen years of fear, terror and uncertainty for many of them became a normal part of their existence of their daily lives.
We became more daring with the opening up because we can see that many foreign visitors were coming frequently. (former Timorese student who is currently resident in Australia).

After ‘opening up’ the young people in Dili became aware that many tourists and visitors to Timor were sympathetic with the Timorese struggle. This encouraged them in their decision to publicly demonstrate to bring international media attention to the type and quality of oppression occurring in East Timor. Their first major demonstration was during the visit of the Pope when demonstrators scuffled with Indonesian security forces in front of the world media who were covering the Pope’s visit. Many young people and students took part with some shouting “Viva Timor Leste” others waving banners with slogans in English proclaiming Independence for East Timor or Viva Xanana... Their second demonstration, in January 1990, was in front of John Monjo, the United States Ambassador to Indonesia, who was visiting Dili. This demonstration became violent when the student demonstrators were attacked by soldiers resulting in the death of a demonstrator. This incident was witnessed by two Australian tourists who described the scene:

Jenny’s off shooting with her camera, getting Monjo and the students....

Dozens of soldiers with perspex riot shields and jungle green helmets and heavy black batons charge in, surrounding the fleeing students and running riot, beating the kids, pushing them back into a bloody pile against an iron picket fence just a couple of metres in front of us. There are may be forty teenagers in there, getting beaten and clubbed with batons and boots and the butts of M-16s (McMillan 1992:113).

The young people have progressively and increasingly more daring, demonstrating more often and carrying out intifada type activities against Indonesian collaborators and military. On the 12th of November they marched to the Santa Cruz Cemetery to lay flowers on the grave of a dead brother shot dead two weeks earlier by the military. This led to the Santa Cruz massacre which became world news. Some ‘tourists’ who were present videotaped the shooting and beating incidents which resulted when the military moved against the procession. The international publicity given to the footage smuggled out of East Timor was the most telling blow to date against Jakarta. It brought to the outside world’s attention the reality of the continuing situation in East Timor. The Indonesian media widely reported the events and the corollary of this was that the Indonesian people who had hitherto been kept in ignorance of what was happening in East Timor learnt for the first time about the situation in East Timor. Timorese students in Jakarta and Bali demonstrating against the massacre were arrested and given long prison terms. Soldiers put on trial by the Indonesian military, in an effort to satisfy international pressure were either acquitted or given very short prison terms.

An extremely important and contentious issue has been how many people were killed at Santa Cruz. The obvious answer is too many. The Indonesian military version is that only nineteen people were killed, but according to extremely reliable Timorese sources 271 people were killed and more than 200 have either disappeared believed killed, or their whereabouts are unknown.
Arguably, the biggest blow to the Indonesian security apparatus was the direct contact made by the Australian Robert Domm, on 27th September 1990 in the mountains of East Timor, with Xanana Gusmao the leader of the East Timorese Resistance movement. This filmed contact dispelled forever Indonesian claims that Xanana Gusmao was a myth. Gusmao was the most wanted man in East Timor with thousands of Indonesian troops continually trying to capture him. This meeting, of extreme embarrassment to the Indonesian security system inside East Timor, was made possible because of the skills and strength of the clandestine network system operating inside Indonesia and in East Timor. The audio and visual materials brought out by Domm enhanced and re-vitalised international support.

It was also a catalyst for the Timorese diaspora and led to almost universal recognition by the Timorese in exile that Xanana was the leader of their resistance movement. Jakarta could not refute the meeting, but retaliated by sending in more troops to capture Xanana and conducted a massive review of the security system in place in East Timor. These activities on the part of the Indonesian military led to the arrest of all Timorese (most of them clandestine members of the Resistance) who had been seen with Domm. As a result almost all lines of communication between Resistance groups in the province were broken and had to be painstakingly rebuilt.

However, the biggest shock to the East Timorese inside and outside East Timor, the solidarity groups, and the international community, came when on 20 November 1992 Xanana was captured in Dili by the Indonesian military. After his capture the UN recognised Xanana Gusmao as the leader of the Timorese National Resistance Movement. This recognition had not occurred before. Jakarta was triumphant with the capture claiming that it was the end of the resistance movement in East Timor. Again Jakarta has been proved wrong, because after his capture the resistance elected a new commander of FALINTIL, Konis Santana. The farcical trial and consequent heavy sentence of 20 years has not diminished Xanana’s role as the supreme leader of the Resistance. He maintains the authority vested in him by the Timorese and continues to lead the struggle from within Cipinang Jail in Jakarta. Jose Ramos-Horta, the Special Representative of CNRM (National Council of Maubere Resistance) has said that Xanana is now undeniably the true leader of the Timorese. UN representatives have visited Xanana at various times in jail to consult and seek his views on the CNRM Peace Plan and other matters related to the conflict.
CHAPTER IV - THE RE-STRUCTURE OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Role of Fretilin/Falintil

In 1983, I watched footage of a video cassette released by a New Zealand TV crew interviewing Colonel Purwanto, the commander of the Indonesian armed forces in East Timor, who stated that there were only 200 unarmed and disorganised FRETILIN fighters left in the mountains. At this stage there was no communication between the Resistance in the bush with the outside world and this TV footage had a major psychological effect on the Timorese in the diaspora.

After the FRETILIN External Delegation received written information that FRETILIN/FALINTIL inside Timor had reorganised, after the deaths of the FRETILIN Central Committee members. The two members of the central committee who survived had, with extreme difficulty, reorganised the Resistance movement. They were Jose Alexandre Gusmao better known as “Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao” commander in chief of FALINTIL and leader of the Conselho National de Resistencia Maubere -CNRM- (National Council of Maubere Resistance) and Mau-Huno, Xanana's deputy. The deaths of the central core of FRETILIN had forced Xanana to review and reassess the circumstances of the resistance and to change the direction of the struggle. Soon there were regional commanders of FALINTIL units spread throughout the territory.

In an audio tape to the Timorese abroad, in March 1989, Xanana stated that “Learning the strategies of the war in the war, killed and being killed...” showed that after 14 years of physical and psychological struggle it was necessary to re-evaluate the direction of the Resistance movement.

In March 1983 the resurgence of the Resistance under Xanana’s leadership forced the Indonesian military commander on East Timor to agree to a cease-fire. There are two views of why the cease fire was agreed to. The first view argues that, the Indonesian government were willing to try a ‘win the hearts and minds’ campaign on the Timorese because they had been unable to win Timorese acceptance of Indonesia occupation by force. Therefore they agreed to launch the cease-fire and use ‘persuasion’ rather than ‘coercion’. This decision was particularly important psychologically for the Timorese Resistance, because it was the Indonesians which took the initiative to contact Xanana.

This became a golden opportunity for Xanana, on behalf of the Timorese people, to let the Indonesians know what the aspirations of the Timorese were. He insisted that the UN be informed that preliminary talks, as a starting point to bring about a solution to troubled East Timor, had commenced.

Sadly the cease-fire was broken after five months and fighting resumed.

Re-Structure of Falintil

FALINTIL was originally set up as the armed forces wing of FRETILIN. At the time of the invasion many Timorese joined FALINTIL and UDT and APODETI supporters became staunch resistance fighters. From 1981 the organised resistance came under the umbrella of Conselho Revolucionario de Resistencia Nacional (CRNN) (Revolutionary Council of National Resistance). CRNN has
been a successful strategy developed by Xanana to bring together non FRETILIN supporters under FALINTIL command in order to better serve the national interest. Xanana became the President of CRNN and Commander in chief of FALINTIL.

To strengthen the alliance brought about by the setting up of CRNN it was necessary to review the roles of FRETILIN and UDT as political associations within the Resistance. Inside East Timor the priority was to fight as a united front against the occupiers. In the diaspora it was imperative that UDT and FRETILIN leaderships work out strategies to better utilise their diplomatic skills, rather than waste their energy continuing with the antagonisms brought about because of past history.

To meet the spirit of the Convergence FALINTIL was no longer the armed wing of FRETILIN but became a separate entity. It is now known and accepted as the Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor with no party political allegiance. In a written message to the diaspora in 1987 Xanana said:

For the glorious FALINTIL to fulfil its mission within a government framework, whatever its political character may be, it is fundamental to affirm from this moment on the neutrality of the Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor. (Letter from Xanana dated 7/12/1987).

To implement this neutrality and non partisan stand Xanana resigned from FRETILIN in December 1988. Since then Xanana has become for all Timorese people the symbol of the Resistance movement, its hero and its leader. For twelve years he had been a legend, but had not been recognised as the leader of the Resistance for all Timorese among many sections of the diaspora.

In my analysis, the steps taken by Xanana in setting up CRNN and separating FALINTIL from FRETILIN showed political maturity, because these measures facilitated in overcoming the deep internal divisions prevalent within the diaspora. Surely after 11 years enough time had elapsed for a degree of political maturity to develop and allow the reconciliation of differences. As de Magalhaes Barbedo, a Portuguese academic long interested in Timorese politics, said:

Corresponding to the unity achieved in the interior of the territory, where members of UDT, APODETI and other parties which had supported integration participated in the Resistance the leaders of FRETILIN and UDT beyond the borders of Timor signed on 18 March 1986, a mutual cooperation agreement in which they created a joint entity called Timorese National Convergence, and declared their support for the installation of a western style democracy in East Timor” (Barbedo 1992:42).

These changes impacted on the Timorese diaspora because they brought new direction to the struggle. The perception changed that FRETILIN was the only force fighting the occupying forces inside East Timor.

The dilemma for all Timorese was what would happen to the Resistance if he were captured or killed. However, Xanana foresaw the problem and during his leadership he prepared and educated his successors. Today his successor is ‘Konnis Santana’ who on taking over the Resistance leadership has succeeded in making the Resistance stronger than ever.
CNRM leadership has shifted since Xanana’s capture in November 1992. In Portugal and Australia, where the majority of Timorese community in exile now live, FRETILIN members and supporters opposed Xanana’s posture, arguing that it represented the demise of FRETILIN. To clarify his position Xanana wrote in 1989:

For 14 years, FALINTIL has showed its true position in defending our homeland, without links to any political party whatsoever. FALINTIL are not involved in politics, but it is committed to build a free and democratic society, based on respect for the freedom of thought, association of expression and total universal human rights. (Letter from Xanana dated 5/10/1989).

National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM)
The National convergence has never functioned as it was envisaged, because it reflected only UDT and FRETILIN members participation. Independent persons with capacity and experience were excluded from the convergence because both UDT and FRETILIN determined that individuals must join one or the other to have a say in the political process. The convergence gave UDT and FRETILIN legitimacy, something they had not had before within the diaspora, and the leaders of the convergence proclaimed themselves as the sole representatives of the people of East Timor.

This led to constant bickering within sections of the diaspora and forced Xanana to adopt a new approach to the structure of the Resistance. He decided to establish a supreme co-ordinating body in order to facilitate a more efficient Resistance. In 1988, from inside East Timor, he launched the CNRM (O Conselho Nacional de Resistencia Maubere - National Council of Maubere Resistance). Participation in CNRM is open to all East Timorese nationalists seeking self determination and independence, regardless of any political party affiliations they may hold. The aim of this organisational structure is to unite all Resistance factions into one effectively co-ordinated body. CNRM brings together the leadership of FALINTIL, the Clandestine Front operating inside Indonesia and the occupied areas and the Diplomatic Resistance Front operating overseas.

The Clandestine Front operating within East Timor and Indonesia is composed of a diversity of groups which represent and reflect not only divergent political persuasions but also Catholic Youth. These groups are as follows:

1. The Executive of the armed resistance and FALINTIL is headed by Konis Santana.
2. PENETIL Resistencia National de Estudantes de Timor Leste (National Resistance of East Timorese Students), is composed of tertiary students in Jakarta, Bandung and Denpasar.
3. OJECTIL - Organizacao de Jovens Estudantes Catolicas de Timor Leste (East Timor Catholic Youth Student organisation) operates in Dili Baucau.
4. CRNJL - Comissao de Resistencia Nacional de Jovens Timorenses in Dili (Timorese National Resistance Youth Commission), operates in all major towns.
FITUN - FRETILIN iha Timor Unidade Nafatin (Fretilin Unity inside Timor) which operates in the Dili area.

All of these organisations operate autonomously, but are linked to FALINTIL the military front. Members of these groups provide communication, intelligence gathering and information dissemination networks, which operate in cells.

Information dissemination is carried out in three stages. The military front delivers instructions or information to one of these organisations in Timor. Which ever group is entrusted with it undertakes to send it to Jakarta or Bali and from there it is sent to the diplomatic front and organisations overseas. This strategy of using all of the organisations regardless of affiliation puts an emphasis on national interest as a priority over party/organisational sectional interests. By working together there is degree of success and overcoming personal, ideological and personal interests.

The Resistance has changed its name to Frente Clandestina (Clandestine Front) and now operates both inside East Timor and Indonesia. The Clandestina Front is headed by Sabalae. CNRM is currently lead by a troika consisting of Konis Santana, Jose Ramos-Horta who heads the diplomatic front abroad and Xanana Gusmao who even though in prison remains an active titular head of the Resistance.

Timorese youth are the bulwark of the Clandestine Front. This continues with a tradition that began in April 1974. At that time it was the young who became active in politics and participated directly in the political processes during the 1974-75 periods. As a member of that generation I was involved in youth and student politics from day one when the flames of freedom arrived in Timor on 25th April 1974. It has been individuals who gained experience of the political process during that period, who have continued the struggle in East Timor whilst those abroad have kept the plight of the Timorese before the international community. The dynamics of participation and alienation has not deterred many of us, in ensuing the flame of freedom for East Timor. Many students of my era (1974/75) were the most active workers in our struggle when they were sent to study in Indonesia. Before the ‘opening up’ of East Timor they were the couriers of information to the outside world.

In 1974-75 there were two student movements in East Timor. The first one UNETIM (Uniao National the Estudantes Timores -(National Union of Timorese Students) advocated the union and interests of all Timorese students. It was initially non party political, but it deviated from its original aim and became a youth student organisation linked to FRETILIN. A group dissatisfied with this outcome broke ranks and formed a rival group, LESVALT (Liga de Estudantes para Valorizacao de Timor - Students League for Timor Development). Many members of this group remain politically active in the diaspora, working towards the right of the people of East Timor to attain independence. Thus we see that the early tradition of Timorese youth involvement in Timorese politics has been carried on by the current young generation. In East Timor, Portugal, Indonesia and elsewhere it is always the Timorese youth and student groups who lead the protests.
Currently there is a high level of participation and cooperation between Timorese abroad in their efforts to keep up the political struggle. The reforms by Xanana’s actions in East Timor has led to splits within the leaderships, in the diaspora, of both UDT and FRETILIN. Xanana’s reforms forced changes to leadership structures as long held executive positions were challenged and elections held. These changes also altered the aims and objectives of the political parties which resulted in both UDT and FRETILIN splitting into factions. This has led to large decreases in their membership, with a majority of Timorese, particularly the young, now supporting CRMN thus making the two political parties redundant in terms of the Resistance. CNRM has developed policies and strategies to find a solution to the present circumstances and future of East Timor.

**Reconciliation and London Talks**

The word reconciliation has been overused in the past few years. No more so than by the Australian Foreign Minister Senator Gareth Evans who has continually called on Timorese to reconcile with the Jakarta regime. The majority of Timorese see this call as an insult to their intelligence. There is no common ground whatsoever to reconcile with Jakarta. There are no cultural, social or ethnic links between Jakarta and East Timorese.

To overcome the present impasse, diplomacy, confidence building, consensus, dialogue are tools that could be used to approach Jakarta. However, the approaches made by Abilio Araujo, the former central committee member and head of FRETILIN External Delegation abroad who was deposed recently, and other Timorese who have also adopted a conciliatory stance toward the Indonesian government are not the way to go. Their approaches, in the eyes of the majority of the Timorese Diaspora, are undermining the wishes of the majority who continue to pursue for an act of self-determination.

Indonesia has reinvented the strategies it used to destabilise the politicization process in East Timor in 1974/1975. Now they call them ‘reconciliation talks’ as opposed to ‘integrate with Indonesia strategies’. Again they are attempting to divide Timorese on the basis of ideology in their attempts to achieve a solution on their terms. Abilio Araujo led a delegation of Timorese from the diaspora (who had been given no authority to speak for the diaspora) which met with a delegation from Indonesia led by Francisco Lopes da Cruz in London in December 1993. This meeting has undermined the process set up under the auspices of the United Nations. It is perceived by Timorese as another trick from Jakarta to derail the good work of the UN Secretary General who has been given a mandate by the UN General Assembly to attempt to bring about solution through compromise by all the parties involved, East Timorese, Portuguese and Indonesians.

Abilio’s line of action is also undermining the CNRM Peace Plan process. It is widely believed by Timorese that Abilio’s action is in revenge for being dumped as leader of FRETILIN’s external delegation and for being expelled from FRETILIN. A prominent member of UDT, Manuel Tilman, a Timorese lawyer and former Portuguese parliamentarian, has also sought reconciliation with the Indonesians. He has visited East Timor and declared support for an autonomous East Timor which remains a province of Indonesia.
Constancio Pinto, CNRM representative to the USA and the UN stated on the 13th July 1994.

There is no doubt that the reconciliation talks are orchestrated by the Indonesian government with the purpose of demobilising the Timorese Resistance, and of halting any diplomatic attempts by the international community. (C. Pinto 1994).

There is the possibility that Jakarta maybe using the reconciliation process as a way of getting out of East Timor without losing face.

History is repeating itself

Two days later the proclamation of Independence by FRETILIN resulted in the signing of the Balibo Declaration of Integration of East Timor into Indonesia by the leaders of APODETI, KOTA, TRABALHISTA and some UDT leaders. (Guterres 1992:30).

In 1975 some of the Timorese who signed the Balibo Declaration, some out of sheer frustration and revenge requested that East Timor be integrated with Indonesia.

Some of the signatories to the Balibo declaration did so out of frustration and revenge. Others later went to the UN and testified they signed the declaration under Indonesian duress. Today Abilio Araujo and his supporters appear to be following the same path as others. They are using negotiations with Jakarta both out of frustration and as a form of revenge - it is doubtful they believe that Indonesia will withdraw and grant independence to East Timor.
CHAPTER V - INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY

United Nations Resolutions

Since the invasion on the 7th December 1975 there have been two United Nations Security council resolutions and eight General Assembly votes calling on Indonesia to withdraw its troops from East Timor. On 12th December 1975 the United Nations General Assembly voted in favour of a resolution calling on Indonesia to withdraw its troops from East Timor immediately. On 22nd December the Security Council’s first resolution unanimously condemned Indonesia’s action and ordered it to withdraw from East Timor.

Jose Ramos Horta FRETILIN’s representative at the UN for more than ten years gave us an insight into the political games played by UN member states in his book Funu. UN codes of conduct, or indeed resolutions that have been passed are not necessarily followed by UN member states. Each State play’s their own political games, often to the detriment of their stated principles. Lobbying ambassadors, charge d’affairs, delegates, is not an easy task, because most of the time promises made behind the scenes are not carried through when voting takes place in the Committees or the General Assemblies.

The way countries vote at the UN has little to do with universal principles. There are exceptions but most delegates make use of the centuries old “quid pro quo” tactic to gain concessions. Diplomats usually understand what the other side expects in return for support on a given issue... In Timor’s case, Indonesia has explored every possible angle, including promises of increased trade, import of arms, export of oil and offers of aid to less endowed countries.(Horta:1989:127).

Australia’s pragmatic position regarding East Timor is a classic example of a UN member state acting in its own interest. Moral values are put aside when economic interests are at stake. Australia broke with UN resolutions when on 11th December 1989 when it formally signed with Indonesia an agreement on joint oil exploration in the Timor Sea. Portugal severed diplomatic relations with Indonesia when it invaded East Timor and yet there are economic exchanges between the two countries.

On 10 February last, 15 tones of cotton fibres were imported from Indonesia and unloaded at Leixoes wharf without any difficulties.(reported in Correio Portugues: 4/4/94).

According to Manuel Macedo, the president of Portuguese -Indonesian friendship Association, although Portugal decreed a trade boycott with Indonesia, trade between the two countries is legal, because there is trade between other European Community members and once Portugal joined the European Common Market it became legal to trade with Indonesia. The Indonesian government interfered in the internal affairs of the Philippines when it threatened their government with economic sanctions if the Asia Pacific Conference on East Timor to be held in Manila on 31/5/94 to 3/6/94 was not stopped. Manila caved into the pressure and banned the participation of foreign guests. Fidel Ramos the Filipino President said:
We cannot let the Philippines be used as a platform for political propaganda against a friendly nation and member of ASEAN. (O Portugues na Australia: 8/6/94).

Timorese representatives were stopped at the airport in Manila and turned away. This negative behaviour backfired against Indonesia. The media coverage was excellent propaganda for the East Timorese struggle, because once again on the world stage Indonesia was shown to be a tyrant and a bully and at the same time it promoted East Timor’s profile internationally.

The Indonesian government has been loosing ground in its diplomatic war to win international support for its incorporation of East Timor since the demonstrations and international concerns expressed after the Santa Cruz massacre. At the time of the invasion due to Timorese lack of appropriate skills Indonesian propaganda was successful with the international community. From the mid 1980’s Timorese youth living outside East Timor together with the help of solidarity and support groups have been conducting a propaganda counter offensive. They attend international conferences, international meetings on East Timor and almost all international human rights conferences with the express purpose of exposing and refuting Indonesia propaganda. Their strategy has worked, because Jakarta now uses pro integrationist Timorese to combat opposition Timorese at these forums.

The strongest weapon used by Indonesia at the UN and other international meetings to justify its incorporation of East Timor is the petition to formally integrate East Timor into the Indonesian Republic put to the Indonesian government by the ‘East Timorese popular representative assembly’ on the 31 May 1976.

On June 17 president Suharto promulgated a law which accepted the May 31 petition. On July 17 1976 East Timor was formally integrated into Indonesia. (Guterres 1992:36).

The Security Council did not act urgently when the invasion took place because the General Assembly resolution urged the Security Council to safeguard the right of the East Timorese to choose their own destiny.

The Algerian draft was adopted as G.A.Res.34895 (XXX). It called on the Security Council to “take urgent action to protect the territorial integrity of Portuguese Timor and the inalienable right of its people to self-determination.” (Horta 1989:106).

All Security Council and General Assembly resolutions voted on have always been carried and these resolutions have condemned Indonesia and urged it to withdraw. However, Indonesia’s non-compliance has been working to their advantage. In 1981, the last time a General Assembly resolution regarding East Timor’s status took place, it was almost a defeat for East Timor. The voting was in their favour by only the slender margin of just four votes. Realising that if a vote was taken in 1982 that Indonesia might succeed in removing East Timor from the UN agenda, Horta worked hard to prevent a vote taking place on the previous resolution. Instead he successfully brought about resolution 37/30 (1982) (Horta). This resolution led to the creation of a UN sponsored task force to coordinate and bring together the parties concerned, Portugal and Indonesia. East Timorese participation such as representatives from FRETILIN or any of the
other Timorese political associations was not included because the UN does not recognise any of them.

Role of Portugal/Former Portuguese African Colonies

The UN recognises East Timor as a territory still under Portuguese administration and the Portuguese Constitution also continues to recognise East Timor as a Portuguese territory. Timorese have Portuguese citizenship status.

There have been meetings between Portugal and Indonesia under the auspices of the UN Secretary General. The latest was held on the 6th of May 1994 in Rome. Portugal has continued to maintain its position that an act of self-determination has never taken place in East Timor and has continued to urge Indonesia to withdraw and let the Timorese decide their own future. Jakarta maintains that an act of self-determination took place in 1976 when the Timorese Parliament petitioned for incorporation and continues to assert that the majority of Timorese opted for integration. In the last round of talks Portugal advised and requested Jakarta to allow the direct participation of Timorese representatives at the talks. Indonesia, as usual, refused and threatened to call off the meetings if Portugal keeps pressing for Timorese participation. Timorese participation in the talks is vital if agreement is to be found on those issues which affect the Timorese directly.

For 19 years Portugal has been accused by Indonesia and Australia for abandoning East Timor in a badly neglected state after having being in the area for many centuries. It cannot be denied that from a developmental discourse there was neglect. Portugal exploited and oppressed the Timorese, nor did it develop the territory or the people in any significant way. Some infrastructure such as some bridges, roads and an airport were constructed and there were a minimum health and education service in place. The Portuguese did not significantly interfere with the Timorese cultural identity, but through the Catholic missionaries the Timorese were given literacy, a western language and religion and a western orientation. These inherited tools from the Portuguese, such as education, language, religion, social and cultural values have been used to resist the Indonesian occupation.

The 12th of November 1991 massacre happened because the first delegation of Portuguese parliamentarians to visit East Timor since the Indonesian invasion was cancelled. The Timorese people, both young and old, know that Portugal still has a role to play in their future and their sorrow, anger and frustration over the failure of this visit was expressed in the student march to the Santa Cruz cemetery. They had been pinning such high hopes on the visit believing that here was the possibility of a breakthrough in negotiations with the Indonesians. Their feeling of dependence on Portugal was summed up by Paulo Pires, the former president of the UDT Political Commission which revived UDT as a political association after the Civil war stated:

For centuries, lasting links have been created between the people of Portugal and of Timor, links of friendship, of culture, etc. These links cannot be broken by momentary events in history. In spite of present circumstances, these links are still alive and strong. It was Portugal who made us different from our Indonesian neighbours. It was with Portugal that we built, decade after decade, century after
century, our cultural and spiritual identity. Therefore, Portugal is just as responsible as we Timorese are for maintaining our own identity, our culture, our religion, our history... The intangible links between us are beyond time and space, beyond the formal content of laws and norms that govern the relations between peoples. (Paulo Pires, Lisbon 1990).

As a member of the powerful European Community, Portugal has used its membership to disseminate the plight of the Timorese under Indonesian occupation. The Portuguese speaking countries in Africa⁹ have played crucial roles in the defence of East Timor at the UN, Pan African Congress and at the Non Aligned Movement organisation. They defend East Timor because of the common bond based on language and culture inherited from Portugal.

⁹Cape Verde islands, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome & Principe, Angola and Mozambique. They are known as PALOP (Países Africanos da Lingua Oficial Portuguesa) Portuguese Speaking African Countries.
CHAPTER VI - FUTURE PERSPECTIVES FROM THE CURRENT IMPASSE

Scenarios of world politics
Glasnost and Perestroika provoked the fall of the Berlin wall in October 1989. The wall had long stood as a symbol of division and of isolationism. The collapse triggered a domino effect in world politics with regard to the socialist block countries. The decade of the 1990’s is viewed generally as the decade of hope, consensus, consultation, negotiation and participation. Restoration of ethnicity, religion, nationality and boundaries has led to the formation of new nations and the settling of, or, working toward the settling of, long endemic ethnic conflicts.

The Baltic States, annexed by Russia during World War Two are now independent sovereign states. Apartheid has been abolished in South Africa and a democratically elected black African president has taken place. The seemingly intractable Israel-Palestinian conflict, characterised by deep religious and ethnic rivalries which have existed for thousands of years, is slowly working itself toward a resolution. Northern Ireland, an area of conflict for centuries, is also on the way to some sort of settlement with the confidence building measures now in place. These examples have shown that there would be no loss of face for Indonesia if it were to sit at a conference table with the Timorese and Portuguese under UN auspices. By comparison to some of the conflicts mentioned above solutions to the East Timor situation are simple and easy to implement.

National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) Peace Plan
When Major Purwanto led an Indonesian delegation to conduct preliminary cease fire talks with the Timorese Resistance in March 1983, Xanana Gusmao, the Timorese Resistance leader, requested that Jakarta must notify the UN Secretary General of the cease fire. After the UN had been informed Xanana presented the following:

1. Unconditional withdrawal of the Indonesian occupying forces from East Timor.
3. The holding of a referendum by the Timorese people regarding the question of their independence.
4. Maintaining of FALINTIL in the mountains in order to safeguard the people from undue pressure from the Indonesian military.

These peace plans were never implemented because the cease fire was broken by the Indonesian military in August 1983. Since then Indonesia has been intransigent in taking part in any peace negotiations with Timorese Resistance leaders. Nevertheless, recently there has been signs that Jakarta may be interested a settlement. Ali Alatas, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, met with an East Timorese Diplomatic Front Coordinating Committee in New York on the 6th of October 1994. This front was composed of Joao Carrascalao (UDT), Jose Luis Guteres (FRETILIN) and Jose Ramos Horta (CNRM). The discussion focused on substantive issues such as Indonesian troop withdrawal, release of political prisoners including the Xanana Gusmao currently held in Cipinang prison in Jakarta. The outcome was that although Alatas did not
agree on the points for discussion from a diplomatic perspective the fact that the meeting took place at all was a breakthrough for the Resistance movement. In 1989, before his capture Xanana put forward a peace plan of 'Negotiations without pre conditions' to the Indonesian Government. At the time the Indonesian regime refused to consider it. However, the Resistance has some confidence a CNRM peace plan will be considered at a forthcoming meeting scheduled for April 1995 between representatives of the Indonesian Government and Timorese leaders under the auspice of the UN.

The Resistance movement knows that it cannot defeat Jakarta militarily, but it is also aware that Jakarta will not win the war by military means unless the whole Timorese population is completely wiped out. To assist the mandate given by the UN to the Secretary General to obtain a solution to the East Timorese conflict, CNRM presented a new three phase peace plan which is a conciliatory plan rather than of a confrontationist one. This plan is an olive branch, a gesture of good will from the Timorese people to Jakarta.

My understanding of CNRM's peace plan and initiatives are us follows:

**Phase One - First 1-2 year period.**
To end the armed conflict in East Timor, with a UN peace keeping force in place. Reduction of Indonesian military and civil servants, in East Timor, to be phased out. To release of all Timorese political prisoners.

Population census to be conducted, to establish the extent of Indonesian migration into East Timor. Development of essential services.

The resettlement of Timorese to their original homes under the supervision of international aid agencies.

The immediate lifting of restrictions on the use of the Portuguese language in East Timor. The immediate appointment to East Timor of a representative of the UN Secretary General, or a representative of the Portuguese Government.

**Phase Two - Over the following 5 year period:**
During this period the Timorese prepare themselves for self government through existing institutions set up during the first phase.

The election of a Timorese governor by the Timorese General Assembly. Formulation of legislative powers to cover such items as international trade relations, immigration etc.

The complete withdrawal of Indonesian troops and civil servants. The establishment of a judiciary system which represents Timorese understandings of law and justice. The creation of a territorial police force and the possibly of this replacing a Timorese army.

**Phase Three - over the following 10 year period:** The first year of this period will be the preparation for a referendum on self determination. This referendum will determine whether the Timorese will choose to remain with Indonesia or become a sovereign state.

The CNRM Special Representative, Ramos Horta, has reported that the plan has been accepted by both the office of the UN Secretary General and the European
Parliament. Both organisations have praised the CNRM proposals, describing the peace plan as an excellent document which is viable for all parties concerned.

The idea of a five year period of autonomy is not being well received by members of UDT and FRETILIN. They argue it does not reflect the true aspirations of the Timorese people. We Timorese in general are sceptical of Indonesia’s future intentions regarding peace negotiations. Before the New York meeting Ali Alatas met privately with Abilio Araujo and Francisco Lopes da Cruz, neither of whom have authority to speak for the Timorese people, where autonomy and the release of political prisoners was discussed.

**Changes inside Indonesia**

For many years the Indonesian public have been kept in the dark about its government policies in East Timor. The 12th of November massacre at Santa Cruz was reported widely in the Indonesian press and informed the Indonesian people of the quality and severity of oppression perpetrated by the Indonesian military in East Timor. Some Indonesian intellectuals, in spite of the oppressive nature of the Indonesian Military which suppresses freedom of expression and bans media reporting, are challenging their government to come clean and to tell the Indonesian people what the intentions and policies are for East Timor. As Noam Chomsky suggests:

> Intellectuals are in a position to expose the lies of governments, to analyse actions according to their causes and motives and often hidden intentions. In the western world at least, they have the power that comes from liberty, from access to information and freedom of expression. (Chomsky, 1981:60).

On March 22nd 1994, Lateline an Australian AB/TV program aired an interview with one of Indonesia’s foremost academics, Dr. George Aditjondro. His open criticism of Indonesian actions in East Timor was viewed with hostility by Indonesian Government officials, which dismissed his opinions as without foundation, claiming he was not an expert on East Timor. Timorese students and intellectuals in Indonesia have worked closely with Dr. Aditjondro over many years sharing with him the 19 years of struggle against Jakarta. In addition he had published articles on East Timor in Indonesian academic journals. He has also attended many and varied conferences in Portugal, Australia and the U.S.A on East Timor. His visits to Portugal were against the barriers erected by diplomatic pragmatism. Since going public Dr. Aditjondro has been threatened with arrest and dismissal from his job as a university lecturer and at one stage requested support and solidarity from groups outside Indonesia.

> The risk is quite clear in my home town, in my home province, because just last week the military commander of Central Java already stated in the Indonesian media that measures could be taken to George Junus Aditjondro if what he has stated in the Australian media is true... So certain pressures could be built on the Satya Wacana Christian University, to the leadership of the University, to expel me from the University. (Aditjondro 1994:59).

From a Timorese view point Aditjondro’s stand is a big step. It has put the issue of East Timor squarely in front of the Indonesian intellectual establishment and Indonesian human rights groups. However, one cannot wait for the regime to
change. Pressure must come from the Indonesian people for change. One of the priorities for intellectual and human right’s groups in Indonesian is to debate the CNRM Peace Plan publicly within Indonesian. Participation in a debate of this nature would bring a greater dimension to social and cultural aspects of Indonesian society as part of the international community. Rather than make East Timor a pebble in Indonesia’s shoe it would make life difficult for the Jakarta administration internally as well as internationally.
CHAPTER VII - CONCLUSION

After nineteen years and more than 200,000 lives lost since the occupation in December 1975 the Timorese are more determined than ever to attain their independence. For nineteen years the Timorese have endured the horrors of death, torture, fear, starvation and uncertainty. These have became so endemic that a collective consciousness of passive resistance has developed. This has demanded that Timorese individuals must work with the enemy to minimise loss of life.

This thesis suggests that inside East Timor the leadership of the organised resistance has taken the initiative in reshaping the nature and character of Timorese defiance. It has also worked hard to create a national consciousness of Timorese identity and brought together the politically diverse groups which operated before the invasion. The restructuring of the resistance movement in all its facets, by Xanana Gusmao, to accommodate all Timorese factions in the struggle has shown that it is possible to use local models rather than rely on outside models to bring about change.

Living and sharing the same space with the enemy it was necessary for the Resistance to adopt strategies which could disseminate information and reports on the events inside Timor to the outside world.

The Catholic Church has been the pillar of strength for the Timorese, both internally and abroad, in defence of their political, cultural and human rights.

The Clandestine Front networks have been crucial in the armed and passive struggle against the enemy. Ironically the Indonesian education system has been beneficial to the young Timorese in their struggle. Learning their enemy’s way of life, its language, its values and mores has been a successful strategy. These have been the tools the young Timorese have used to fight the enemy.

The opening up of East Timor to the outside world which resulted in frequent visits by foreigners encouraged the young generation to defy openly the Indonesian military in pursuit of media coverage to harness international concern. They are taking direct action and confronting the enemy whenever there is a publicity gain to be made, regardless of consequences. For 19 years thousands of their brothers and sisters have died silently without the outside world knowing about it. The open defiance of the Timorese youth has stimulated and has given courage to young Timorese in the diaspora who, especially in Australia, to continue to demonstrate and harass Indonesian diplomatic missions and Indonesian businesses operating there. This is being done not only to show solidarity with their brethren in East Timor, but also to continue making the Australian community aware of the ongoing plight of their homeland.

This thesis has shown that the East Timor issue is well and truly on the international agenda and it is the responsibility of the International community to resolve it. The UN represents the International community, therefore Indonesia, as a UN member cannot continue to claim it is an Indonesian internal matter. If Indonesia does not abide by past UN resolutions and enter into dialogue with the Timorese, the problem will not diminish. The issue has been internationalised and
Timorese access to international organisations has become greatly enhanced in the past five years.

Realpolitik has been a factor in finding solutions to overcome the impasses. Trade and economic interests have been used as bargaining chips to the detriment of human rights and the right of a minority to attain independence.

The collapse of the Iron Curtain, represented by Berlin Wall, has helped redefine boundaries based on ethnicity and race; new nations have emerged in the past few years. The Baltic states annexed by Russia during World War Two, Namibia from South African occupation, Eritrea annexed by Ethiopia, to name just a few, have attained their independence.

The end and fear of communism domination, has brought a new discourse of negotiation, consultation, participation and decision-making. The occupation of Palestine by Israel has been partially solved. It would have been unthinkable a year ago that in North Ireland the Irish Republican Army would attempt to sue for a peaceful negotiated settlement, but this has occurred. In the spirit of these changes Indonesia cannot remain intransigent to the demands of the international community; it cannot continue to reject the direct Timorese participation in the Portugal - Indonesian talks under UN auspices.

Moreover, the Indonesian Government cannot continue to ignore peace plans offered by the Timorese. Indonesia’s international reputation and dignity cannot be restored with the International community unless East Timor is brought into the community of new nations. Indonesia’s reputation has been severely tarnished over the last 19 years because of its illegal occupation of East Timor.
APPENDIX 2

BISHOP BELO’S LETTER TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Dili, 6 February 1989
His excellency Sr. Dr. Javier Perez de Cuellar
Secretary General of the United Nations
New York
USA

Your Excellency
First allow me to give my sincere and respectful greetings.

I am taking the liberty of writing to your Excellency to draw to your attention the fact that the process of decolonisation of Portuguese Timor has still not been resolved by the United Nations, and it is important that this should not be forgotten. For our part, we, the people of East Timor, think that we must be consulted on the future of our land. That is why I am writing, as a leader of the Catholic Church and as citizen of Timor, to ask you, as Secretary General, to start in Timor the most normal and democratic process of decolonisation, i.e. the holding of a referendum. The people of Timor must be allowed to express their views on their future through a plebiscite. Hitherto the people have not been consulted. Others speak in the name of the people. Indonesia says that the people of East Timor have already chosen integration, but the people of Timor themselves have never said this. Portugal wants the problem to be solved over time; meanwhile our people and nation are dying.

You are a democrat and a friend of human rights. Therefore act to show your respect, Your Excellency, for the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter, which grants to all the peoples of this planet the right to choose their own destiny, freely, consciously, and responsibly. Your Excellency, the most democratic means of ascertaining the supreme wish of the Timorese people is to hold a referendum promoted by the United Nations for the people of East Timor.

Sr. Perez de Cuellar, I thank you for all your sympathy with the people of Timor and conclude by expressing once again my best wishes.

With admiration and respect, I remain,

Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo SDB
Titular Bishop of Lorium
Apostolic Administrator of Dili
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