Sports City: 
A critical analysis of Melbourne’s Sportscape

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Abstract

Adopting an urban entrepreneurial approach of selling the city of Melbourne as an attractive place in which to locate global footloose capital, the State Government of Victoria has, over the past three decades, strategically invested public funds into major sporting events. The aim of this thesis was to examine the production, representation, consumption, identification and regulation of Melbourne as a neoliberal 'sport city'. A (con)textual analysis of newspaper articles was conducted in conjunction with interviews of influential cultural producers of the sport city – most notably state Premiers, Members of Parliament, CEO's of Public Sports Trusts and journalists. Four case studies were employed to examine ‘urban entrepreneurialism’ and the re-regulating state. Characterising the ‘sport city’ as a cultural artefact, Melbourne’s sportscapes were inserted into the ‘circuit of culture’ to illustrate that the ‘sport city’ does not passively emerge but rather is actively produced, represented, consumed, identified and regulated as various interest groups engage in a struggle to (re)construct their social world. Adopting Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of capital, field and habitus along with Loïc Wacquant’s understanding of neoliberalism as the reengineering and redeployment of the state, I illustrate the use of elite sport as a form of cultural glue to re-regulate the city in favour of market-like mechanisms that benefit the urban and political elite. The Victorian state has successively re-regulated this neoliberal urban entrepreneurial strategy, often preventing dissident groups from resisting neoliberal activities, through its monopoly over the legitimate use of symbolic and material violence.
Student Declaration

"I, Alistair John, declare that the PhD thesis entitled Sports City: A critical analysis of Melbourne's sportscape is no more than 112,000 words in length including quotes and exclusive of tables, figures, appendices, bibliography, references and footnotes. This thesis contains no material that has been submitted previously, in whole or in part, for the award of any other academic degree or diploma. Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own work".

Signature

Date 18 December 2015
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<tr>
<td>ACGA</td>
<td>Australian Commonwealth Games Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>Australian Football League</td>
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<td>AGPC</td>
<td>Australian Grand Prix Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGP Act</td>
<td>Australian Grand Prix Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Australian Labor Party</td>
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<td>ARU</td>
<td>Australian Rugby Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOOT</td>
<td>Build, Own, Operate, Transfer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBD</td>
<td>Central Business District</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUB</td>
<td>Carlton and United Breweries</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTF</td>
<td>Docklands Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIA</td>
<td>Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile</td>
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<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>Grand Prix</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOOP</td>
<td>Hands Off Our Parks</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTAV</td>
<td>Lawn Tennis Association of Victoria</td>
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<tr>
<td>M2006</td>
<td>Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>Melbourne City Council</td>
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<td>MCG</td>
<td>Melbourne Cricket Ground</td>
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<td>MMEC</td>
<td>Melbourne Major Events Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOPT</td>
<td>Melbourne and Olympic Parks Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIEIR</td>
<td>National Institute of Economic and Industry Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>New South Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Tennis Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-GA</td>
<td>Pseudo-government authorities</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-Private Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPPG</td>
<td>Royal Park Protection Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANZAR</td>
<td>South Africa, New Zealand, Australia Rugby</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Save Albert Park</td>
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<tr>
<td>VCAT</td>
<td>Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal</td>
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<tr>
<td>VFL</td>
<td>Victorian Football League</td>
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<tr>
<td>VMEC</td>
<td>Victorian Major Events Company</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The city of Melbourne is often referred to as the ‘sporting capital of Australia’. The emphasis on sport within the city is notable in landscape, policy and culture. Indeed, the State Government of Victoria has, over the past three decades, strategically invested in the construction of urban sports infrastructure and events in an attempt to (re)position Melbourne as a ‘sport city’. The aim of this introductory chapter is to briefly locate the ‘sport city’ within a wider discussion of urban entrepreneurialism. In addition, I will present the aims of my research and its wider significance to the (sport) sociological field. I conclude this chapter by outlining the structure of this thesis and acknowledging assumptions and potential limitations of the study.

In 2015, Melbourne was named the ‘world’s most liveable city’ for the fifth year in a row by the Economist Intelligence Unit (‘Melbourne named’, 2015). The practice of ranking cities across various categories, including liveability, tourist attractions, affordability, safety, shopping, nightlife and sport appears to be an increasing exercise amongst economic and tourism organisations; especially online industry magazines. However, the attempts to categorise cities as the ‘most liveable’ is clearly an imprecise activity as evidenced by variations in ‘titles’ awarded in 2015. Monocle ranked Melbourne fourth in its ‘Quality of Life’ survey behind the winner Copenhagen (‘Quality of life,’ 2015), while Mercer ranked Melbourne sixteenth in its ‘Quality of Living Survey’ with Vienna ranked in top spot (‘2015 Quality of living,’ 2015). Indeed, Holden and Scerri (2011), in response to Melbourne’s dethroning of Vancouver in the 2011 Economist Intelligence Unit’s ‘most liveable city’ award, questioned the validity and significance of the title:

Such livability rankings are an exercise in technocratic over-reach, one that glosses over the complicated ‘lived’ experiences of what they purport to measure; ‘livability’ or, increasingly, ‘sustainability.’ Such indices say little about issues that may sit beyond their scope, such as economic distribution, social inclusion, the ecological footprint, working conditions or a range of other criteria. The indices create conditions for a self-fulfilling prophecy of

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1 The Economist Intelligence Unit is an independent business within the Economist Group media company.

2 For example, Travel Channel ranks the best shopping cities, the Guardian ranks the best cities for students, Timeout ranks the best cities to visit and, Business Insider ranks the most violent cities.

3 As further evidence of this inconsistency, Tokyo was ranked first in the 2015 Monocle survey and ranked 44th in the 2015 Mercer survey.
sorts, one that sets its own measures of success while casting failure simply as failing to live up to the measures set by the prophecy itself. (para. 7)

Holden and Scerri’s (2011) commentary includes the assertion that the indices of awards, such as the most liveable city, tend to gloss over important questions regarding social equity. Moreover, as Freiler and Holden (2012) illustrate, specific ‘liveable needs’ such as affordable housing are often omitted from the criteria of liveability awards. Because the indicators, by which these awards are judged, come from a predetermined list, Holden and Scerri (2011) argue that civic leaders may focus on these areas for public investment; ultimately celebrating and justifying ‘award winning’ civic policies as a success rather than encouraging critical questions regarding the continued marginalisation of some citizens.

Like the ‘most liveable city’ award, Melbourne has, over the past few years, consistently ‘won’ the ‘Ultimate sports city’ award (Vojdinoski, 2014).⁴ Presented by SportBusiness International magazine, the award aims to place a value on the hosting of major sports events, the secured rights for future events, sport and sport-tourism infrastructure (including transport and accommodation), government support for sport, sporting legacies, the public’s sporting interest and, unsurprisingly, the ‘quality of life’. In a similar manner to those inconsistencies surrounding the ‘most liveable’ city awards, British sports market intelligence company Sportcal placed Melbourne as low as 49th in its 2014 ‘Sport city’ award (‘Global sports cities,’ 2014; Westerbeek, 2014).

Despite these discrepancies, the SportBusiness International endowed title of ‘Ultimate sports city’ has enabled the State Government of Victoria and city boosters to market Melbourne as the ‘sports capital of Australia’ and sometimes going as far as to proclaim Melbourne as the ‘sports capital of the world’ (see DPCD, 2011; ‘Sporting Capital’, 2010). For example, upon winning the award in 2014, Louise Asher, the Victorian Minister for Tourism and Major Events, explained that “it is a huge achievement … Major Events are important to Melbourne” (‘Melbourne wins top,’ 2014, para. 3-4) and the State Government is “ensuring we remain the sports capital of Australia … [because] the major events calendar also contributes to Melbourne’s liveability” (‘Melbourne wins top,’ 2014, para. 4-5). Meanwhile, Invest Victoria – the investment promotion agency of the Victorian

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⁴ In 2014, Melbourne was awarded the title of Ultimate Sports City, in the large city category (with a population between three and six million citizens), coming second to London in the overall ‘Ultimate Sports City’ category (Vojdinoski, 2014). In 2012, Melbourne was likewise beaten by London for the overall title but won the large city category. While in 2006, 2008 and 2010 Melbourne was awarded the overall title.

⁵ Sportcal ranks cities based on the economic impact of hosting major sporting events (‘Global sports cities,’ 2014).
Government – claimed that the ‘Ultimate sports city’ awards “underline the strong support for sport by the people of Melbourne and the investment in sporting infrastructure by the Victorian Government … [which] contribute to Melbourne’s liveability” (‘Melbourne reaffirms,’ 2014).

Indeed, the association of being a ‘sport city’ with Melbourne’s ‘liveability’ appears to be an important component for tourism marketing and city boosterism in order to entice external resources (specifically high quality labour and tourism dollars) to the city. Harvey (1989) refers to the process of ‘selling’ the city as a place to live, invest in and visit as urban entrepreneurialism. This strategy of governance focuses on promoting the economic competitiveness of the city (Short, 2008) and presenting the city to multinational corporations as an ideal location for capital investment (Harvey, 1989). It is argued by the political and urban elite that successful branding of the city will spur economic growth to the overall benefit of the urban residents; commonly referred to as ‘trickle-down economics’. Deindustrialisation and global economic restructuring since the 1970s has led to a number of post-industrial cities adopting an urban entrepreneurial approach (MacLeod et al., 2003; Silk & Amis, 2005) as governments abandoned Keynesian macroeconomic policies in favour of free-market economic policies championed by the Chicago school of economics, Milton Freidman and Friedrich Hayek (Brenner, 2004; Gaffikin & Warf, 1993).

Faced with shrinking budgets and services from federal government reforms (Brenner, 2004),6 many cities have divorced themselves from their manufacturing reliance (Spirou, 2011). Subsequently, urban governments have undertaken an outward search for alternative forms of investment, engaging in a competitive process of economic and cultural repositioning (Hubbard, 1996a; MacLeod et al., 2003; Rowe, 1993; Silk & Amis, 2005) to attract the managerial and administrative arms of major public and private organisations. This ideological shift in the role of government, Hubbard (1996a) explains, has resulted in a move away from local services and welfare provision towards a focus on economic growth, external investment and employment opportunities. The tendency to re-present the city as an ideal location for global footloose capital (capital/industry/services which may be (re)located in various urban places without effect from factors such as resources and transport) and consumption has led to an urban design which re-packages the landscape to exhibit the city as an exciting, clean and safe space for work and leisure (Schimmel, 2001; 2006). The spectacle of elite sport, with a high presence of security and surveillance (Schimmel, 2012), has thus become a key tool used by governments to re-

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6 Brenner (2004) explains that neoliberal political agendas have included measures such as cuts in welfare spending, trade liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation.
orientate the cityscape around spaces of consumption (Silk & Amis, 2005; Zukin, 1998). In addition, the pervasiveness of elite sports media has provided political and urban elites with the marketing opportunities to reimage their city to ‘sports tourists’ (Smith, 2001) as a desirable location to visit, and to professionals, associated with mobile capital (Schimmel, 2001), as a ‘liveable’ place.

However, concern has been raised regarding the way in which these spaces of spectacle have become a form of ‘bread and circuses’ (Harvey, 1989; Hubbard, 1996a; MacLeod et al., 2003) which distract the citizens from important socio-economic problems such as deteriorating public health services, an education system that fails some socio-economic groups and an inefficient or unsafe public transport network (Boyer, 1992). As such, questions regarding the use of public resources which appear to serve the interests of commercial investors and local elites need to be explored.

John Bale (1996) describes the monocultural use of space for sport as the ‘sportscape’. These spaces, like many urban spaces, are often highly contested as parties with vested interests in (commercial and non-commercial) sport struggle with those with alternative desires for limited spaces around our cities. As such, an examination of who makes decisions, for what purposes, as well as what resistance is evident in the (re)construction of sportscapes is crucial to gaining an understanding of these struggles.

While sporting culture has a long history in Victoria, I argue that the 1984 ten-year economic strategy, *Victoria: The Next Step*, released by the Victorian State Labor Government commenced a more specific use of sport as an economic tool. Davidson (1984) explained that the document illustrated Labor’s selection of a number of perceived competitive strengths, as “real engines of Victorian growth” (p. 13), in which the State Government could then intervene to improve efficiency. One ‘engine’ identified in the document was “the national role of Melbourne as a major trading, cultural and sporting centre, and the land-use opportunities to further develop that role [emphasis added]” (Parliament of Victoria, 1984, p. 7). Moreover, the strategy explicitly cited the desire to host sporting events in order to promote Melbourne, attract tourists and entice corporations to relocate their administrative headquarters to the Victorian capital. In addition, the document expressed a desire to return investment and attention to the Central Business District (CBD) through a process of re-imaging the city as a desirable place to work and live – which notably requires the resources and activities, such as sport, that suit the lifestyles of urban professionals (Schimmel, 2001; 2006). During the next eight years of governance, Labor constructed a new tennis complex to host the Australian Open tennis Grand Slam, submitted a bid for the 1996 Olympic Games and established a state-owned company with the explicit remit to acquire major (sporting) events.
Throughout the 1990s, the Liberal-National Coalition government, led by Premier Jeff Kennett, employed a strategy of place promotion and place marketing in an attempt to capture a larger share of investment, jobs and tourism from rival states (Engels, 2000). Adopting a ‘Thatcherite agenda’ (Sandercock and Dovey, 2002) of free-market reform, Kennett emphasised Melbourne as the corner stone of Victoria’s promotional strategy by attempting to entice major sports events with prominent global media broadcasting appeal to the city. It was hoped that re-imaging Melbourne’s rust-belt reputation into a desirable place to live, along with corporate-friendly laws, would result in economic confidence being restored; persuading domestic and international capital investment to flow into the state. In order to seduce event organisers and supply the capital necessary for elite sport (for example, stadiums), the Victorian government (re)invested public funds obtained through gambling taxes (as a result of a recently constructed mega-casino) into capital works projects – including the controversial construction of a temporary Grand Prix racetrack at Albert Park. Indeed, the secret procurement of the Australian Formula One Grand Prix from Adelaide in 1993, according to Lowes (2004), symbolised the Kennett government’s neoliberal urban entrepreneurial agenda.

Labor governments in power between 1999 and 2010 continued to emphasise the benefits of investing public funds into sporting events and elite sports infrastructure. During the 11-years of control, Labor approved the construction of a football stadium less than two kilometres from Melbourne’s CBD and commissioned a significant redevelopment of Melbourne Park (site of the National Tennis Centre, which hosts the annual Australian Open Tennis Championships). In addition, despite multiple reports concluding the economic failure of the Grand Prix, Labor twice extended the Australian Formula One Grand Prix contract. The Liberal-National Coalition government that regained power in 2010 also quickly moved to extend the Grand Prix contract and approved the investment of additional public funds into the National Tennis Centre. These decisions to invest public resources into sporting enterprises over the past three decades illustrates the state’s recognition of elite sport as a legitimate ‘public’ activity; that is, the state deemed it in the public interest to intervene in providing urban sportscapes for elite sport (see figure 1.1).

Silk and Andrews (2012) explain that “sport, as a component of popular culture, acts as a powerful educational force that, through pedagogical relations and practices, organizes identity, citizenship, and agency within a neoliberal present” (p. 1). Moreover, as Hall (2006) argues, the public construction of many modern commercialised sportscapes fuses entrepreneurialism with neoliberalism, illustrating ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ (Brenner, Peck & Theodore, 2009; Peck & Theodore, 2012; Wacquant, 2012) as the state guides the “intensification of market rule and commodification”
Of specific interest in this study is the role of the state in creating an environment conducive to neoliberal activities, which a number of scholars argue reproduces social and economic inequalities (c.f. Bourdieu, 2003; Harvey, 2007; Hilgers, 2011; Jessop, 2012; Peck, 2008; Wacquant, 2010).

Following Loïc Wacquant (2012), the premise of this thesis defines the state as a ‘Leviathan’ which is central to driving the neoliberal agenda forward. The Leviathan comes from a Hobbesian (1651/2010) understanding of the state as comprised of a mass
of people who have, through an unwritten but mutual social contract, granted all legal power to an authority (such as a government) in return for protection; from outside invaders and from themselves. In doing so, the state holds a monopoly of legitimate physical force (Weber, 1991) or physical violence (Bourdieu, 1994a). Wacquant (2004) explains that for Bourdieu the state, rather than just the monopoly holder of physical force, is also the “central bank of symbolic capital guaranteeing all acts of authority” (p. 8). Bourdieu (1994a) asserts that state-controlled cultural apparatus (such as the school system and media) allow the state to (re)confirm the legitimacy and recognition (referred to by Bourdieu (1994a) as symbolic capital) of its authoritative position. This symbolic capital, or ‘worldmaking power,’ permits the state to impose the “legitimate vision of the social world and of its divisions” (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 13) by authorising certain visions and ideologies as well as the social instruments and institutions that construct reality (Bourdieu, 1994a). Moreover, through the sanctioning of certain activities and regulations, Bourdieu argues that the public misrecognises “the economic and political interests present in a set of practices” (Swartz, 1997, p. 89). As such, Wacquant (2012) contends that the neoliberal project consists of the “reengineering and redeployment of the state as the core agency that sets the rules and fabricates the subjectivities, social relations and collective representations suited to realising markets” (p. 66). It is with this understanding of the state and neoliberalism that I aim to examine the sport city.

**Aim**

The creation of urban landscapes according to Harvey (1989) is a “spatially grounded social process in which a wide range of different actors with quite different objectives and agendas interact through a particular configuration of interlocking spatial practices” (p. 5). Notably, the re-packaging of urban space is not simply a physical modification, but rather “the urban landscape acts in an ideological sense, supporting a set of ideas or assumptions about the way a society is and the way it should be” (Hubbard, 1996a, p. 1445). Moreover, decisions regarding the construction, or relocation, of sports facilities using public funds or public land, have been the focus of intense public debate both in

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7 Bourdieu refers to utilisation of symbolic power as symbolic violence; the “violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity” (Bourdieu, 1998a, p. 167, italics in original).

8 While Harvey acknowledges the social processes in producing urbanisation, he regards economic agents as central to neoliberal activities. However, I aim, following Wacquant (2009; 2010; 2012; 2013), to illustrate the central position of the state in determining spatial, social and economic practices.
Melbourne and around the world in recent times (c.f. Giulianotti, Armstrong, Hales & Hobbs, 2015; Lowes, 2004; Scherer & Sam, 2008). Therefore, analysis of the sportscape must consider the ideological and socio-political processes that guide these decisions and debates. Indeed, Vertinsky (2001) argues that in order to understand these power struggles, we need to explore the power relations present within the decision-making process; that is, who benefits from, who resists, and who ultimately determines, decisions that impact on the sporting landscape. As such, the aim of this thesis is to examine the production, representation, consumption, identification and regulation of Melbourne as a neoliberal ‘sport city’.

In order to examine Melbourne’s sportscape, a socio-historical reconstruction of the sport city will first take place. While it would be ideal to capture all sporting events and activities that compose the ‘sport city,’ in order to provide a detailed analysis of specific events the study is delimited to four case studies consisting of (a) the construction of the National Tennis Centre, (b) the bid for the 1996 Olympic Games and hosting of the 2006 Commonwealth Games, (c) the acquisition and staging of the Australian Formula One Grand Prix and, (d) the construction of two urban football stadiums. The time-frame of this analysis focuses on the period from 1984 – when the Victorian State Government announced its intention to construct a National Tennis Centre on the perimeter of Melbourne’s CBD to secure the hosting rights for the Australian Open Tennis Championships – through to 2014. However, due to the multi-disciplinary nature of this research, it is important to provide a contextualisation of Melbourne as a place; therefore some analytical discussion prior to 1984 will transpire. Six sub-questions were posed to help guide the examination of Melbourne’s sportscape:

1. How did sport occupy these urban spaces and what policies/ideologies/values best explain its dominant political position?
2. What regulating practices/policies have been put in place to maintain sport’s prominent position?
3. What were the competing policies/ideologies/values, and why were they less successful in securing prime position for an alternative cultural identity?
4. How is the ‘sports capital of the Australia’ identity created and employed by cultural intermediaries and political decision-makers?
5. How is the cultural practice of sport used to support the neoliberal project in Melbourne?
6. Is ‘sport’ a form of capital in the sport city?

I will provide a short historical account of Melbourne’s European history as well as begin my political contextualisation in 1982 when the Cain Labor government entered office.
These guiding questions not only encapsulate the many problematic issues surrounding the selling of cities like Melbourne, but also demand the interrogation of all the ‘stakeholders’ that have impacted upon the identity formation process.

My exploration of the ‘sport city’ will employ du Gay, Hall, Janes, Mackay and Negus’ (1997) ‘circuit of culture’ along with Pierre Bourdieu’s (1994a) concept of the bureaucratic field and Loïc Wacquant’s (2010) conceptualisation of neoliberalism. The ‘circuit of culture’ is a theoretical framework, widely used in cultural studies, to examine the biography of a cultural artefact or text. The circuit involves transporting the artefact through five cultural processes; production, representation, consumption, identification and regulation. Bourdieu (1994a) explains that the struggles to define and regulate legitimate social activities and (re)distribute public resources occur within the arena of the bureaucratic field. Extending Bourdieu’s research, Wacquant (2013) argues that under neoliberalism we have experienced the right-ward tilting of the bureaucratic field which has led to a naturalising of the ‘market’. However, according to Wacquant (2012) neoliberalism is not simply an economic project but a political project that entails not the dismantling but the reengineering of the state.

**Significance, assumptions, limitations & delimitations**

Increasingly, governments around the world appear to be using major events and infrastructure as a fundamental instrument in their urban entrepreneurial strategies. Major sporting events are widely promoted by governments, both in the Global North (see Essex & Chalkley, 1998; Gratton & Preuss, 2008; Horne, 2007; Pye, Toohey & Cuskelly, 2015; Rowe & McGuirk, 1999; Smith, 2010; Veal, Toohey & Frawley, 2012; Whitson & Horne, 2006; Whitson & Macintosh, 1996) and more recently in the Global South (see Cornelissen, 2004; Gaffney, 2010; Reis, de Sousa-Mast & Gurgel, 2014; Xu, 2006), as preeminent public investments for economic growth, urban regeneration, social cohesion and sports participation legacies. As such, sporting spectacles such as the Olympic Games, Formula One Grand Prix and Rugby World Cup are consistently defended by political and urban elites as deserving of public funds. Meanwhile, ‘awards’ such as Sport Business International’s ‘Ultimate Sport City’ award, are often employed by governments to justify these public investments into activities which previously may not have been regarded as a responsibility of the state. Moreover, these subjective awards are subsequently utilised as markers of government urban entrepreneurial success. Studies have analysed the ‘sport city’ from an economic (see Gratton & Henry, 2001; Kurtzman, 2005) and cultural regeneration (Rowe, 2008; Sam & see Hughson, 2011; Silk, 2002) perspective. However, to date, limited discussion of the neoliberal sport city with a specific
focus on those political decision-makers appears to exist. Likewise, while many studies of sports impact on the city focuses on one-off major events, an analysis of multiple events over a long duration specific to one sport city appears absent in current literature. By presenting four sporting case-studies on the city of Melbourne this study aims to capture a greater understanding of the processes and struggles that exist in creating, consuming and regulating the sport city.

With regards to studies and literature at the local level, a neoliberal analysis of the Grand Prix was produced by Lowes in 2004; however since this time studies of the event appear to have been restricted to cost-benefit analyses (see Abelson, 2011; Fairley, Tyler, Kellett & D’Elia, 2011). Historical accounts of tennis in Melbourne exist but much of this provides little critical examination of the National Tennis Centre (c.f. Bodo, 1995; Bradshaw, 2004; McCarthy & Frawley, 2008; Michie, 1998). Minimal discussions of Melbourne’s 1996 Olympic Bid (see Jobling, 1994) and hosting of the 2006 Commonwealth Games (see Kellett, Hede & Chalip, 2008; Lockstone & Baum, 2008; 2009) are present in academic literature. Moreover, while a significant store of literature on stadiums is available, particularly from the United States, analysis of the development of sports stadiums in the Australian and Victorian context is relatively limited (see Alomes, 2000; Hay, Haig-Muir & Mewett, 2000; Searle, 2002).

du Gay et al.’s (1997) ‘circuit of culture’ has been widely employed as a theoretical framework in cultural studies research including the study of ‘place’ (see Chatterton & Hollands, 2002; Han & Zhang, 2009). By defining the city as a ‘cultural artefact’ that has been produced through power struggles, I aim to illustrate the usefulness of du Gay et al.’s model for analysing the contest of power evident in the production of city landscapes and ‘urban imagineering’ (Short, Breitbach, Buckman & Essex, 2000). More specifically, by analysing the ‘sport city’ through the circuit of culture, I endeavour to illustrate the complex power struggles present in Victoria’s sporting urban entrepreneurial strategy. Complementing the ‘circuit of culture’ with an application of Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of the bureaucratic field, I aim to advance an understanding of neoliberalism as defined by Loïc Wacquant by inserting sport, an influential mode of popular culture, as a significant component in the reengineering of the neoliberal state.

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10 Andrews and Silk (2012) provide a brief discussion of the neoliberal sport city while Pye et al. (2015) present a framework to explore the consideration of social benefits during the planning of sports cities.

11 While literature on the Australian Open Tennis Championships exists, this is largely descriptive and does not focus on Melbourne Park.
The research will be conducted with a number of assumptions and acknowledgment of certain limitations. It is assumed that some researcher bias will be present – indeed, as a social scientist that is critical of capitalism and neoliberalism, I enter this research process with an inherent scepticism of elite sport. It is assumed that interviewees will answer questions truthfully and accurately; however I acknowledge that with research that covers a time-frame of more than 30 years the details of some events may not be recollected in full. Furthermore, due to some information being sensitive or confidential, participants may not be willing to divulge all content regarding political decisions on events and activities. Moreover, the use of media material may result in an inaccurate representation of events due to the media’s editing process which discounts some opinions and content.

With regards to analysing this specific ‘sport city’, I acknowledge that theory used to understand urban entrepreneurialism and neoliberalism in this thesis have largely been developed to analyse cities in the Global North and, as such, have been used to explain and understand social, political and economic developments in post-industrial cities of developed nations. While appropriate for analysing Melbourne (a post-industrial city in a developed nation), these theories may not be as suitable for analysing ‘sport cities’ in the Global South.

As noted above, I have delimited this research to four case-studies. I acknowledge that these case studies were ‘selected’ after discussions with my supervisory team and an initial review of literature to determine some key moments in the (re)creation of Melbourne as a ‘sport city’. As such, some moments which may add to the research findings were omitted; in particular analysis of the Melbourne Cricket Ground as the ‘home of sport’ and the Melbourne Cup horse race (‘the race which stops a nation’) which influences Victorian culture so significantly that it has its own public holiday. Furthermore, by extending the time-frame of analysis to cover events pre-1984 a deeper understanding of the historical construction of Melbourne’s sporting culture may be discovered which could subsequently influence the ‘sport city’ cultural artefact.

Structure
The following chapters follow a ‘traditional’ thesis structure. I begin by conceptualising the key terms of urban entrepreneurialism and sportscapes in chapter 2, which frame my analysis. The social geography concept of urban entrepreneurialism underpins much of

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12 While Bourdieu’s early research examined Algeria (in the Global South), I employ Wacquant’s understanding of neoliberalism, based on an extension of Bourdieu’s concepts, which emerges from analysis situated in the United States of America.
the discussion throughout this thesis. That is, the aim of investing public funds into cultural activities by governments is to present the city as an ideal location for capital investment (Harvey, 1989). I then move on to define sportscapes, as John Bale (1996) does, as sites of power contestation which allows me to analyse the sporting landscapes of Melbourne as places of struggle.

Next, I conceptualise the state and neoliberalism (chapter 3) before outlining the theoretical frameworks and methodological devices (chapter 4). I explain the tools of my analysis to firstly reconstruct and then examine the sport city. These tools include semi-structured interviews with key cultural producers and political decision-makers, (con)textual analysis of newspaper reports over a 30-year period, relevant government policies and transcripts of parliamentary debate. It is also within chapter 4 that I outline du Gay et al.’s (1997) ‘circuit of culture’ and Pierre Bourdieu’s (2010 [1984] key concepts of habitus, capital and field. A contextualisation of Melbourne is provided in chapter 5. Specifically, I focus on the political environment of Melbourne during the period from 1982 to 2014 as well as the historical sporting and cultural contexts of the city.¹³

In chapters 6 to 9 I present my four case studies on the National Tennis Centre and the Australian Open Tennis Championships; Multi-sport events with a focus on the 1996 Olympic Games bid and hosting of the 2006 Commonwealth Games; the Australian Formula One Grand Prix and finally; the construction of two sports stadiums on the fringe of Melbourne’s CBD. These case studies were selected to provide an illustration of some – not all – sporting developments which have occurred around Melbourne’s city centre in the past three decades.

du Gay et al.’s (1997) ‘circuit of culture’ is applied in chapter 10 to explain the production, representation, consumption, identification and regulation of the sport city cultural artefact. Following this analysis of the sport city cultural artefact I deliberate the existence of the sport city through the use of Loïc Wacquant’s (2010) conceptualisation of neoliberalism, employing Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of capital, habitus and field; specifically the bureaucratic field. It is here that I illustrate and explain the reengineering processes of the neoliberal state and the use of sport as a form of cultural glue, binding the actions of the neoliberal state together.

I conclude by firstly collating the research findings before expressing a need, and desire, to engage in a public sociology. In addition, I reflect on some of the limitations of

¹³ While the focus of my study is the period from 1984 – when the National Tennis Centre was initially proposed – I begin my political context in 1982 when the Cain Labor government first entered parliament.
this study as well as provide suggestions for future research in order to critique and expand on this analysis of the 'sport city'.
Chapter 2: Bread and Circuses - Urban entrepreneurialism & the sportscape

Cities are the defining artefacts of civilisation. All the achievements and failings of humanity are here. Civic buildings, monuments, archives and institutions are the touchstones by which our cultural heritage is passed from one generation to the next. We shape the city, then it shapes us. (Reader, 2004, p. 1)

Reader (2004) describes the city as being structural but also structuring. The city is not simply a footprint of civilisation; while the city reflects modern human development it also represents the values and ideologies that shape society. It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the historical construction of the city; however it is important to understand how contemporary cities have been shaped. As such, through this section I will briefly outline developments to the post-industrial city which have seen a shift in urban governance away from managerialism towards entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989). I will begin by explaining changes that have occurred to the urban landscape of industrial cities during the second-half of the twentieth century before conceptualising ‘urban entrepreneurialism’; a key concept which frames my analysis of the ‘sport city’. Following this discussion of a shift in urban strategy, I discuss the role of sport as an often used tool for urban entrepreneurialism.

A number of scholars have outlined changes to the urban landscape of industrial cities in developed nations during the post-World War II period (see Biddulph, 2011; Brenner, 2004; Castells, 1977; 1983; Harvey, 1989; Hubbard, 1996a; Lever, 1991; MacLeod, Raco & Ward, 2003; Molotch, 1976; 1993; Schimmel, 2001; 2006; Short et al., 2000; Silk & Amis, 2005; Spirou, 2011; Stilwell, 2005; Winter & Brooke, 1993; Zukin, 1991; 1995). In particular, a process of suburbanisation during the 1950s and 1960s combined with deindustrialisation and global economic restructuring since the 1970s (see

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14 Social philosophers and urban geographers such as Lewis Mumford (1966; 2002) and John Reader (2004) detail the development of the city from its beginnings in the Neolithic period, through to the great ancient cities of Athens, Rome and Babylon until the modern metropolis of today.

15 Molotch (1976; 1993) conceptualises the city as a ‘growth machine’ in which the purpose of the city is continual growth to service the needs of the urban elite. Sassen (1992; also see Brenner, 1998; Smith, 2002), using the term ‘Global cities’, explains that a global hierarchy of cities exist as key spatial nodes of the world economy while Harvey (1989) and Hubbard (1996a) examine the shift from welfare, managerialist urban governance to a period of entrepreneurialism and city competition.
Brenner, 1998; 2004; Harvey, 1989; Sassen, 1990; 1992; Smith, 2002) has resulted in “many urban landscapes pockmarked with horrific scars, whether in the form of derelict warehouses, dilapidated housing or obsolete waterfronts” (MacLeod et al., 2003, p. 1656). As such, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, many developed nations abandoned Keynesian macroeconomic policies – which had failed to solve economic stagflation during the 1970s – in favour of free-market economic policies advocated by economists such as Milton Friedman and the Chicago school (Brenner, 2004; Gaffikin & Warf, 1993).

Brenner (2004), Harvey (1989) and Winter and Brooke (1993) explain that federal reforms – specifically “neoliberal political agendas such as welfare state retrenchment, trade liberalization, privatization and deregulation” (Brenner, 2004, p. 468) – resulted in falling revenue for urban governments and a reduction in federal government infrastructure spending at the local level. Faced with shrinking budgets and services, cities divorced themselves from their manufacturing dependency (Spirou, 2011) and urban governments undertook an outward search for alternative forms of investment in order to develop a prosperous city with employment opportunities for citizens (Hubbard, 1996a). As such, many post-industrial cities have engaged in a competitive process of economic and cultural repositioning (Hubbard, 1996a; MacLeod et al., 2003; Silk & Amis, 2005; Spirou, 2011), replacing warehouses and manufacturing with “managerial and administrative arms of the public and private sectors” (Winter & Brooke, 1993, p. 264) often associated with international finance, information and communication services and, consumption (Silk & Amis, 2005).

Spirou (2011) analyses plans for stadium-development in Chicago to illustrate that cities are actively endeavouring to replace manufacturing identities of the past with “culturally based representations relying on entertainment, leisure and urban tourism” (p. 7). Silk and Amis (2005) explain that the rationale for re-orientating the cityscape around these spaces of consumption “is to dramatically redefine the city for residents and potential visitors, repairing the ‘pockmarks’ of the dilapidated and obsolete urban core” (p. 16).


17 These reforms were not the same in all nations however Harvey (1989) explains that similar effects occurred throughout post-industrial cities. See Harvey (1989, p. 4) for a brief discussion on US reforms; Winter and Brooke (1993, p. 265) for Australian reforms and Brenner (2004) for Western European reforms.
Schimmel (2006), likewise, expresses that competition for ‘circulating capital’ and ‘footloose consumption’ has led to urban design which re-packages the landscape to present the city as an exciting, clean and safe space/place for work and play in an attempt to attract “tourism revenues and fixed capital investment from corporate, government, and retail sectors” (p. 164). In striving to re-orientate, re-image or re-package the city, civic boosters and politicians have employed an entrepreneurial mode of policy planning.

David Harvey (1989) explains that geo-political factors since the 1970s have led to universal changes in urban governance, despite politico-cultural differences existing between local governments:

…the shift has something to do with the difficulties that have beset capitalist economies since the recession of 1973. Deindustrialisation, widespread and seemingly ‘structural’ unemployment, fiscal austerity at both the national and local levels, all coupled with a rising tide of neoconservatism and much stronger appeal (though often more in theory than in practice) to market rationality and privatisation, provide a backdrop to understanding why so many urban governments, often of quite different political persuasions and armed with very different legal and political powers, have all taken a broadly similar direction. (Harvey, 1989, p. 5)

Harvey (1989) explains that an entrepreneurial approach to governance has been adopted, in part, due to “the declining powers of the nation-state to control multinational money flows” (p. 5), in which local/urban governments attempt to position their city as an attractive location for the administrative and services (particularly finance-sector) of global capitalism. That is, the role of urban governments is no longer to simply manage the economic development of a place, but to actively seek or create new enterprises and economic activity.

The Entrepreneurial City

Urban geographers/sociologists have labelled the shift in urban design, politics and character since the 1970s as ‘urban entrepreneurialism’ (see Hall & Hubbard, 1996; Harvey, 1989; Levine, 1987; MacLeod, 2002). Harvey (1989), a frequently cited scholar

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18 Neil Brenner (1998) provides a useful summary and critique of ‘world city theory’; in the process he specifies that, rather than an erosion of the state, the state occupies a new role as a facilitator of global capital.

19 A number of scholars have also used ‘urban regime theory’ to explain public-private partnerships and urban policy (see Misener & Mason, 2009; Mossberger & Stoker, 2001; Schimmel, 2001; Stone, 1987). While I propose to analyse “the collaborative arrangements through which local
on urban entrepreneurialism, explains that the strategy aims to present the city to multinational corporations as an ideal location for capital investment. Short (2008) defines the urban governance strategy as a “process whereby city elites promote the economic competitiveness of the city through attracting investment and spurring economic growth” (p. 328). Hubbard (1996a) explains that urban entrepreneurialism has seen an ideological shift in the role of government, away from local and welfare provision towards economic growth: “the focus of much urban governmental activity is no longer the provision of services for city residents, but a concern with the prosperity of the city and its ability to attract jobs and investment” (p. 1441).

Harvey (1989), while conceptualising urban entrepreneurialism, explains that public-private partnerships occupy a central facet of urban policy in which traditional civic boosterism is integrated with the use of local powers to attract external sources of funding, new investments and avenues of employment. Many of these public-private activities have an element of risk or speculation as opposed to rationality (Harvey, 1989; Hubbard, 1996a); as a result, successful activities (for example bids for sporting mega-events) may return high rewards. While there are examples of entrepreneurial projects that procure benefits to the citizens of a city – Glasgow is often cited as a city successfully employing urban entrepreneurialism (Boyle, 1994; MacLeod, 2002) and Barcelona’s use of the Olympic Games for urban renewal is also frequently referred to as a success (Essex & Chalkley, 1998; Gold & Gold, 2008) – and these cases serve to justify the replication of specific entrepreneurial strategies by policy-makers and civic boosters, Harvey (1989) claims that it is often the case that the public sector absorbs any risk while the private sector receives much of the reward. Indeed, this is a key difference from previous civic boosterism activities in which private capital was at risk and investment activities generally more prudent (Harvey, 1989).

It is through a careful orchestration of the media that public support for this entrepreneurial approach to urban governance is often obtained (Hubbard, 1996a; McCann, 2004). Indeed, the neo-liberal think tanks that are regularly at the heart of urban governments and private actors assemble the capacity to govern” (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001, p. 812); I will not specifically apply urban regime theory to my analysis.

This process has also been termed the urban ‘growth machine’ (see Molotch, 1976; 1993) and civic boosterism (see Boyle, 1997; Waitt, 2001; Whitson & Macintosh, 1993).

See Harvey (1989, pp. 7-8) for his conceptualisation of urban entrepreneurialism. Harvey (1989) summarises his conceptualisation by asserting that: “The new urban entrepreneurialism typically rests, then, on a public-private partnership focusing on investment and economic development with the speculative construction of place rather than amelioration of conditions within a particular territory as its immediate (though by no means exclusive) political and economic goal” (p.8).
entrepreneurial policies have successfully used, or encouraged, the media to drive the strategy by gaining public support for government-funded investments into speculative infrastructure/activities (Alomes, 2000; Cahill, 2004). In addition to gaining local support, ‘urban imagineering’ through the media is frequently adopted to sell the city to external agents and organisations (Short et al., 2000). Short et al., (2000) explain that the reputation of a city, its images, “are presented to the world in TV advertisements geared towards potential tourists, in trade or industry magazines promoting business parks, or, increasingly, on web sites intended for travellers, possible new residents or potential investors” (p. 320).

In addition to strategies adopted at the local level, increasing globalisation is a key factor in the seemingly universal ideological shift to urban entrepreneurialism. As noted earlier, Harvey (1989) explains that greater emphasis on ‘local places’ may be due to the weakening powers of the nation-state to control multinational money flows, therefore investment takes the form of a negotiation between transnational corporations. Local authorities are doing what they can to ensure that the space in which these transactions might take place (the city) is appealing. The entrepreneurial approach is “embedded in a framework of zero-sum inter-urban competition for resources, jobs and capital” (Harvey, 1989, p. 5); in other words, the mobile capital available is limited and cities are therefore enthralled in competition with each other to obtain a share. The result of this is that much of the power is in the hands of those transnational corporations and elite individuals who demand incentives (for example tax-supported infrastructure) to (re)locate their capital (Harvey, 1989; Jonas & McCarthy, 2009; Schimmel, 2001). Furthermore, Hubbard (1996a) expresses concern with the strategy of urban policy-makers to distinguish the urban area by highlighting a city’s unique social, cultural and environmental character which may then be appropriated by, or more attractive to, international investment.

In order to compete with rivals, many cities are adopting a ‘best practice’ approach by replicating perceived successful projects embraced in other cities. Harvey (1989) expresses that inter-urban competition almost certainly operates “as an ‘external coercive power’ over individual cities to bring them closer into line with the discipline and logic of capitalist development” (p. 10). As such cities around the world have reproduced certain

22 McCann (2004) provides a useful discussion about media discourse on the ‘good life’ and ‘good places’ which supports an urban entrepreneurial approach. McKewon (2012), discussing climate change, illustrates the influence that neoliberal think tanks have in public debate through control of Australian media discourse.

23 The term imagineering, often credited to the Disney Corporation, is a blending of the words ‘imagination’ and ‘engineering’ to express the strategic approach of (re)creating the image of a place (see Archer, 1997; Kaltmeier, 2011).
patterns of development (Biddulph, 2011; Hubbard, 1996b; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Zukin, 1998) such as world trade centres, waterfront developments, postmodern shopping malls, tourist focussed observation sites (for example the London Eye, Singapore Flyer and Toronto’s CN Tower) and, commercial stadiums. The imitation of these developments, Harvey (1989) explains, has rendered any competitive advantage ephemeral as cities become ‘placeless’. Biddulph (2011), however, argues that the concern of ‘placelessness’ is often overstated as local iconic place symbols/designs remain and are actively protected. Despite Biddulph’s conclusions that iconic places of difference remain, most writers on the subject agree that the shift to urban entrepreneurialism from urban managerialism, has certainly had a marked impact on the aesthetics of the modern city.

A number of scholars have commented on the spatial result of urban entrepreneurialism in capitalist nations resembling ‘theme park cities’ (see Sorkin, 1992) where public and private spaces are orientated around consumerism and spectacle. Biddulph (2011) explains that urban policy makers are in essence “mimicking actors in other competitive markets, appropriating the city and treating it as their product which they are at liberty to sell” (pp. 64-65). The city is re-packaged from a production/manufacturing site into a site for consumer activity (Zukin, 1998) that makes the city more ‘liveable’ and thus attractive to the mobile capital that civic boosters are targeting (Hall, 2000; Hall & Hubbard, 1996; Schimmel, 2001). Concern has been raised about the way in which these spaces of spectacle have become a form of ‘bread and circuses’ (Biddulph, 2011; Harvey, 1989; Hubbard, 1996a; MacLeod et al., 2003) which distract the citizens from important socio-economic problems:

The awareness of highways in disrepair, charred and abandoned tenements, the scourge of drugs, the wandering homeless, subway breakdowns and deteriorating buses, visual litter and auditory bombardment – all are erased and ignored in the idealized city tableaux set up before the spectator’s eyes and presented as an entertaining show. (Boyer, 1992, p.191)

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24 A number of scholars have recently analysed the re-imaging of city waterfronts (see Dovey, 2005; Dovey & Sandercock, 2002; H. Meyer, 1999; Oakley, 2011; Shaw, 2013; Wood, 2009). The development of modern stadiums are designed not solely for sporting use but are also sites for cultural and music events (Dovey & Sandercock, 2002). Furthermore, modern stadiums are sites of consumerism through the use of stadium tours (Ramshaw & Gammon, 2010), sports museums (Moore, 2008), and consumption practices – particularly food, drink and sports merchandise (Zinganel, 2010).

25 Schimmel (2001) and Zukin (1998) explain that a key element of civic boosters’ desiring a ‘liveable’ city is to entice highly skilled workers to relocate to their city rather than a city in which a rival company is located.
Therefore the consumerist and spectacle space of the city serves the needs of investors and local elites sometimes at the expense of local residents (Biddulph, 2011).

Dingle and O’Hanlon (2009) discuss the dismantling of Australia’s manufacturing base as a result of globalisation, tariff reductions and three recessions between the mid-1970s and early 1990s.26 The authors illustrate the significant impact of deindustrialisation on Melbourne; including a substantial decrease in manufacturing jobs in the inner-city, as factories and warehouses downsized and/or relocated to green field sites on the urban fringe.27 Spatially, this led to the fragmentation of inner-suburbs and the running down of waterfronts, docklands and the railways (see Dovey, 2005). Dingle and O’Hanlon (2009) chart the spaces left by manufacturing in Melbourne. Some suburbs, such as Fitzroy were initially occupied by “innovative small manufacturers” (p. 66) and cultural and artistic entrepreneurs that took advantage of the “modest rents resulting from the collapse of departure” (p. 66) of larger manufacturers. Gentrification soon followed or occurred simultaneously in other suburbs such as Carlton, ultimately driving up rents and forcing many small manufacturers out of the city and inner-suburbs. Meanwhile, areas such as the docklands, sections along the Yarra River and parts of Port Phillip Bay remained scarred by industrialisation or under-utilised and underdeveloped (Dovey, 2005). The solution, like that adopted by many post-industrial governments across the globe, was to adopt ‘entrepreneurial strategies’ in an attempt to re-focus capital investment to the city.28

Harvey (1989) explains that adopting the capitalist urban entrepreneurial mode of governance shapes the conditions and circumstances of capital circulation and accumulation which serves to reproduce capitalism. Harvey, referring to cities in Britain and the USA – particularly Baltimore – demonstrates that as global capital has become more mobile in a world of heightened competition since the post-war boom years “the

26 However, while these macroeconomic explanations appear to have had a big impact on manufacturing in Melbourne, Dingle and O’Hanlon (2009) explain that local Keynesian economic management or ‘big government’ structures were also the cause of manufacturing’s decline and departure from central Melbourne.

27 Dingle and O’Hanlon (2009) explain that for manufacturing businesses in Melbourne “the inner suburbs had become increasingly congested. There were few new sites, and land prices were rising” (p. 59).

28 While I do not have space here to discuss the variety of these strategies, some include the repositioning of the city, or spaces and identities associated with the city, to emphasise (i) architecture, heritage & history; (ii) arts & education; (iii) design, fashion & retail; (iv) media, communication & IT; (v) banking & finance; (vi) health, medicine and pharmaceuticals; (vii) gardens, parks open space; (viii) gourmet food and drink; (ix) specialist manufacturing; (x) conferences; (xi) music and theatre and; (x) sport events.
search to procure investment capital confines innovation to a very narrow path built around a favourable package for capitalist development and all that entails” (Harvey, 1989, p. 11). Moreover, the shift to urban governance that values and employs public-private partnerships, Harvey (1989) asserts, “amounts to a subsidy for affluent consumers, corporations, and powerful command functions to stay in town at the expense of local collective consumption for the working class and poor” (p. 12). Continuing, Harvey (1989) explains that;

The kinds of service activities and managerial functions which get consolidated in urban regions tend to be either low-paying jobs (often held exclusively by women) or very high paying positions at the top end of the managerial spectrum. Urban entrepreneurialism consequently contributes to increasing disparities in wealth and income. (p. 12)

Indeed, Dingle and O’Hanlon (2009) outline the socio-economic changes in Melbourne during the latter third of the twentieth century; confirming that “the new post-industrial economy generates high-level, well-paid work in the fields of financial and business services, it also creates less well-paid jobs in the retail, hospitality, and tourism industries” (p. 56). Of further concern, McGuirk, Winchester and Dunn (1998) assert, has been the active expunging of a local identity and history (for example convict heritage or working class identities of the industrial era) in an attempt to present the city as a retail and recreational attraction to tourists and investors.

Of particular importance to this study is that the re-packaging of the urban landscape is not simply a physical modification. As Hubbard (1996a) explains, social, political and cultural processes determine and define the use and meaning of space; as such, “the urban landscape acts in an ideological sense, supporting a set of ideas or assumptions about the way a society is and the way it should be” (p. 1445). Indeed, by ‘reading’ the landscape we can understand much about the dominant cultures and ideologies that exist in the past, present and future. Biddulph (2011) encapsulates this expertly:

There is nothing more real than the built environment. We understand it through design, and after it has been built through concepts which help us interpret its qualities and evaluate its impacts. These concepts come to be meaningful and symbolise or represent something to us. Subsequently when we see a bit of the built environment which echoes the form or activity elsewhere, it comes to stand for a particular set of meanings. (pp. 70-1)

As such, the built environment of Melbourne - consisting of multiple sports stadia and recreational facilities intertwined with office blocks, towers of commerce, apartment
buildings, cafes, bars and entertainment facilities - serves to indicate some of the dominant or valued meanings of Melbourne city culture.

As a site of culture and ideology, the city and its values are a contested space. Harvey (1989) explains that many power struggles take place within the city and that urban ‘governance’ should not be simplified to urban ‘government’. Instead, “the power to organise space derives from a whole complex of forces mobilised by diverse social agents” (Harvey, 1989, p. 6). Zukin (1998) explains that new forms of urban lifestyles have formed in the city with increasing immigration and while the ‘Disneyfying’ (Zukin, 1991; 1995) of major cities is taking place there exist areas of hybrid identities where domination by corporations do not occur. MacLeod et al. (2003) also note that the actions of the corporate and individual elite are not simply meet passively by the citizens that live in the city:

To be sure, the work-based trade union and labour activities so pivotal to the institutionalisation and performance of the industrial city are struggling to maintain their significance in today’s post- and new industrial landscapes. Nonetheless, a range of social movements and political and ethnically motivated groups are bravely confronting the razor-sharp edges of 21st century globalising capitalism. (p. 1657)

MacLeod et al. (2003) continue on to explain that cities are not homogenous spaces serving or representing the identities of a single or few groups, rather “the active promotion of a plurality of urban cultures and modes of expression can also be detected” (p. 1657). Indeed, within many modern cities districts of unique culture are well defined (for example the Greek Precinct of Melbourne, the Gay Village of Manchester, Little Italy of New York and, the Art Zone of Beijing). These are spaces for expression of alternative cultures in an idealised multicultural city. However, some (cf. Esping-Andersen, 1990; Zukin, 1998) have argued that the commercialisation of these spaces shifts some power away from those that have created the space and towards the corporations/tourist industry which seek to capitalise on the uniqueness. Indeed, many cities, Melbourne included, are actively promoted as multicultural, at least in part because of the economic contribution that these precincts provide to the city as tourist attractions.

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29 Harvey (1989) expresses that the structural processes that govern the city involves the interaction and struggles between “a wide range of different actors with quite different objectives and agendas” (p. 5).

30 Bhabha (1994) explains that hybridization is a form of resistance to power but not necessarily an oppositional act. Rather, the subjugated group maintains features of their identity while adopting certain aspects of the dominant culture.
Despite the critiques of an urban entrepreneurial approach to governance outlined in this section, Harvey (1989) highlights that when urban entrepreneurialism incorporates the multiple identities within the construction of the city, social and economic benefits can prevail:

If everyone, from punks and rap artists to the ‘yuppies’ and the haute bourgeoisie can participate in the production of social space, then all can at least feel some sense of belonging to that place. The orchestrated production of an urban image can, if successful, also help create a sense of social solidarity, civic pride and loyalty to place and even allow the urban image to provide a mental refuge in a world that capital treats as more and more place-less. (p. 14)

Likewise, Hubbard (1996a) explains that (re)created spaces within the city, while often designed to be attractive to potential investors and tourists may rebuild the internal confidence of those already living in the city. Indeed, events such as the Olympic Games or FIFA World Cup are often ‘sold’ to the citizens of a city on the basis it will ‘lift spirits’ or unite a community. However, despite the continued ‘unity’ and ‘wellbeing’ discourse that often accompanies the claims of economic prosperity; few (sporting) major events appear to actually achieve the benefits proclaimed by urban decision-makers (Horne, 2007; Whitson & Horne, 2006).

The Sportscape

John Bale, a pioneer in the geographical study of sport, has published extensively on the relationship between sport, place and the landscape (see Bale, 1988; 1989; 1991; 1993; 1994; 1996; 2000; 2003; Bale & Philo, 2002). In 1993 Bale released ‘Sport, Space and the City’ which specifically focused on the role of the football stadium in the city – that is, the spatial meaning of football to different groups and the impacts of changes to this space on the wider urban environment. The following year, Bale (1994) published ‘Landscapes of Modern Sport’ which encompassed a wider ‘reading’ of the sporting landscape to illustrate the ‘placelessness’ of many monocultural sports environments as well as the ambiguity of the meaning and value of these spaces. In addition to Bale’s texts, two edited collections addressing the notion of ‘sport in the city’ have been released in the last two decades. Gratton and Henry’s (2001) ‘Sport in the City: The role of sport in economic and social regeneration,’ with an emphasis, although not exclusively, on the economic impact of sport in the city highlights the use of sport to re-image the city, promote urban development and fund urban renewal projects. Adopting a similar title in acknowledgement of the continued relevance of Gratton and Henry’s publication, Sam
and Hughson’s (2011a) ‘Sport in the City: Cultural connections’ illustrates the use of sport for the cultural regeneration of the city; specifically the actions of political, business and cultural elites with a vested interest in the outcomes of this regeneration.

The two ‘Sport in the City’ books, along with Bale’s extensive publishing biography, illustrate the diverse scholarly interest in the study of the sporting city. Bale’s geographical insight highlights the multiple meanings present within the spaces of sporting places; Gratton and Henry (2001) illustrate the significant political-economic issues associated with sport in urban places while Sam and Hughson (2011b) assert the significance of civic connections with sport “because they so often reveal a complex process of constructing a credible (but fragile) sense of identity for local citizens” (p. 1). While my position tends to more closely follow the social-cultural emphasis ascribed by Bale and Sam and Hughson (in part due to my economic inaptitude) I acknowledge that the economics of sport, sporting infrastructure and sporting events, remains the dominant discourse within public (media) debate; and as such will be discussed intermittently throughout this thesis.

The ‘sportscape’ is central to the analysis of the ‘sport precinct’ or ‘sport city’. Bale has frequently used the term in order to illustrate the importance of the sporting place to the city. Bale (1996) explains that when a space is devoted to sport the “monocultural land use may be termed sportscape” (p. 167). Furthermore, this sport place affects the surrounding city landscape as well as the human body and can be viewed as a contest of power. Bale (1996) provides a couple of examples to highlight the impact of sport on both the landscape and human body:

In many cases this can be in the form of affection, as when a lawn tennis court is lovingly tended and maintained or when an athlete is nurtured carefully by her coach in a trusted relationship of mutual respect and affection. On the other hand it can be one of true dominance – the construction of a new ski piste which totally and permanently damages slopes and vegetation cover, or the cruel trainer of a boxer who allows his charge to continue to fight until his health is impaired. (p. 167)

While sportscapes in the city may involve natural powers – such as the flooding of a sports field – the power contest is usually a social phenomenon.

The sportscape is often the focus of intense power struggles; for example the building of stadiums and the infrastructure surrounding it (such as transport networks and consumer/retail outlets), the relocation or closing of a sports facility and, the temporary or permanent closing of public space for sporting events. One factor in this power struggle results from the often strong sense of affection, or ‘topophilia’ (Tuan, 1974), that is held
for these human constructions. Bale highlights topophilia as being abundant with sports fans that regularly site their ‘home’ stadium as being of significant cultural importance – this strong sense of affection is clearly illustrated during public debate about stadium relocation or destruction (see Hay, Haig-Huir, Mewett, Lazenby & Lewis, 2001; Hay, Lazenby, Haig-Huir & Mewett, 2002; Kennedy & Kennedy, 2010; Vamplew, Coyle, Heath & Naysmith, 1998; Wood, 2005). Vertinsky (2001) argues that to analyse the power struggles associated with sports places, we need to explore the power relations “as they appear in the planning design, constructions and use of particular buildings for sport” (p. 15). Therefore, research into who makes decisions regarding the (re)construction of the ‘sportscape’, who is effected and who challenges these decisions, as well as the purpose of these decisions and rationale for challenges, is crucial to gaining an understanding of these struggles.

In contrast to topophilia, Bale (1996) explains that the sportscape does not always provide an affectionate experience. Instead, the sportscape can often become a place of exclusion in which ‘topophobia’ (Tuan, 1974) - the fear of place - is experienced. Bale (1996) explains that examples of topophobia in sport are plentiful:

[T]he idea of hostile and disliked places is particularly appropriate to the landscapes and places of modern sports. Sport-related fear ranges from the attitudes of residents who live near sports stadiums and for whom sport generates ‘negative externalities,’ to parents who fear for the lives of children who may be lured into participation in life-threatening sports such as boxing, horse racing, rugby or motor racing ... A landscape of love for some becomes a landscape of fear for others. (p. 168)

As such, the creation of a ‘sport city’ which values sport and sportscases that are topophilic for some and topophobic for others needs to be explored.

The use of sport (infrastructure and events) as an urban entrepreneurial tool is not a new development. Whitson and Macintosh (1996) explain that the modern Olympics, during the early twentieth century, were used to showcase technological, commercial and social accomplishments of the host nation in order to enhance trade relations (also see Silk & Amis, 2005). However, there currently appears to be an increasing demand for events as cities increasingly target sporting carnivals as a strategy to acquire global

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31 Tuan (1974) defines topophilia as the “affective bond between people and place or setting” (p. 4). In a sporting setting, this topophilia is specifically evident in the strong sense of place that people hold towards stadiums or sporting environments.
footloose capital.\textsuperscript{32} This increased demand has occurred, in part, because sport has recently been accepted by civic elites as a valid cultural activity for urban re-imagery (Hughson, 2008; Spirou, 2011). As such, sporting events have increasingly become fundamental tools for the regeneration (Hall, 2006; Kellett, Hede & Chalip, 2008; Misener & Mason, 2008; Rowe, 2008; Schimmel, 2006; Silk & Amis, 2005) and marketing (Chalip & Costa, 2005; Smith, 2010) of urban centres.

In addition to reimagining and renewing derelict areas, sports events and infrastructure have been embraced by urban policy-makers to enhance the provision of cultural services to “cater to a growing, more sophisticated and differentiated public demand” (Spirou, 2011, p. 7) for leisure activities required by those professionals associated with the mobile capital that is being enticed to the city (Schimmel, 2001; Whitson & Macintosh, 1996; Zukin, 1998).\textsuperscript{33} On the surface, these ‘theme park cities’ (Zukin, 1998), or ‘islands of affluence’ (Judd, 1999) are presented as making the city more ‘liveable;’ however, it is often the case that these developments marginalise certain sections of the citizenship.

These spaces often present a distorted reality of the urban area; “walled off from the presumed dangerous places (and people)” (Schimmel, 2006, p. 167), these urban leisure zones are designed to shield “both suburbanites and tourists from the city’s continuing urban problems” (Silk & Amis, 2005, p. 292). Furthermore, the rhetoric surrounding the advantages of major sporting developments and events often centres on community benefits, however any rewards resulting from these developments often filter into the pockets of the urban elite. As Whitson and Macintosh (1996) assert; “Although business leaders and their political representatives routinely claim that international events benefit the city as a whole, the reality is that some groups are better positioned than others to take advantage of their presence in a city and to benefit afterward from the kinds of redevelopment they stimulate” (p. 281). Indeed, the gentrification of post-industrial areas often results in increased property prices or the replacement of social housing with leisure facilities (Whitson & Macintosh, 1996); consequently forcing some citizens out of the city. Whitson and Macintosh (1996) explain that a common claim for hosting major sporting events is that they leave a legacy of facilities for future community

\textsuperscript{32} Arguably there is also an increase in the supply of events when ‘second order’ and ‘third order’ (Black, 2008) competitions such as the Rugby World Cup and age-level world cups in football are considered.

\textsuperscript{33} Markusen (1996) explains that as capital and people become more mobile, there is a need for ‘places’ to become ‘sticky’ in order to attract and retain capital.
use; in practice however, “most facilities such as the main stadium or arena come to serve primarily as venues for professional sport” (Whitson & Macintosh, 1996, p. 282).

Hall (2006) expresses that the growing desire by corporations and governments to host major sporting events along with media discourse on place competitiveness cannot be separated from the commercialisation of sport on a global scale and advances in communication technology. That is, with advances in communication technology, corporations and governments are able to globally market a ‘place’ as desirable for residency and tourism. Moreover, increased commercial opportunities associated with sport has led to the perception that hosting global sporting carnivals will leave a positive economic impact for the host city/nation as well as those industries attached to the event. It is not uncommon for ‘economic impact studies’ to tout the benefits of hosting major sporting events and teams or constructing significant sports infrastructure, despite Schimmel’s (2006) assertion that “almost two decades of social science research refutes the claims made by local-level growth advocates about the supposed benefits to the ‘city as a whole’ of sport mega-project development” (p. 163). Indeed, previous claims of an economic ‘trickle-down’ effect associated with major events have been largely refuted by most economists (see Quiggin, 2011).34

Claims of local community benefits by hosting major sporting spectacles through a stronger sense of unity and identity are also regularly declared. Schimmel (2006) explains that the discourse surround sporting events is that they provide “a focus point for ‘us to rally around,’ generates a sense of pride, and symbolizes ‘us’ as a ‘major league’ or ‘world class’ city. According to this mantra, sport stadia and major sport teams are ‘community assets’ that enhance our quality of life” (p. 166). As such, criticism of these developments is framed as a criticism of development for the community. Hall (2006) also explains that the ‘community interest’ discourse surrounding major events serves to gloss over the reality that it is a “rather narrow community, in the form of elite interests, which direct and influence hallmark event proposals” (p. 64). Likewise, Davison (1997) raises concerns at the use of major (sporting) events to reflect and celebrate local identity:

In the global economy of tourism and high finance, cities have been turned from workshops into playgrounds … Its calendar is no longer that of the agricultural seasons of the business year but the round of conventions, sporting contests, arts festivals and street processions that draw tourists and locals to its cafes and hotels … [These] celebrations are conventionally

34 Aghion and Bolton (1997) highlight the belief of the ‘trickle-down effect’: “It is widely believed that the accumulation of wealth by the rich is good for the poor since some of the increased wealth of the rich trickles down to the poor” (p. 151).
occasions for asserting group identity and unity but, when we look closely, there is often someone being excluded and something being denied. (p. 64)

It is not hard to notice the exclusions or denials when event organisers are often tasked to re-package the identity and history (usually neglecting negative events) of an urban area or entire nation through a two-hour opening ceremony of a major event such as the Commonwealth Games or onto a glossy A5 promotional poster. As such, questions regarding what images or identities are being (re)presented, who (re)constructs these images and identities, and for what purposes need to be asked.

Andrew Smith (2001) explains that the sportscape is increasingly used for ‘imageability’ in the process of destination marketing. Increasingly we are witnessing a deliberate move to “construct urban features and space which have the capacity to generate a significant reaction from the observer” (Smith, 2001, p. 135) and entice ‘sports tourists’ to these places. Sports stadia often increase the imageability of cities with buildings which are distinctive (for example the ‘bird nest’ in Beijing, Wembley Stadium’s arch or Melbourne’s Rectangular Stadium). But it is not simply new constructions which enhance this imageability, rather a number of sporting locations around the world are commercially promoted as important historical and cultural sites which city boosters have incorporated into tourism campaigns (for example, the official website of Lords claims it is ‘The home of cricket’ and the ‘Spiritual headquarters’; St Andrews Links is regarded as ‘The home of golf’; the Melbourne Cricket Ground professes to be ‘Australia’s favourite stadium,’ ‘birthplace of test cricket,’ and ‘home of Australian football’; Madison Square Garden is promoted as ‘The world’s most famous arena’ and, Old Trafford, ‘The Theatre of Dreams’).

Some urban tourism strategies have attempted to showcase city heritage in order to ‘export’ their unique cultural identities (Biddulph, 2011). An example of the ‘selling’ of a local cultural identity is provided by Gee and Jackson (2011) in their study of Dunedin, New Zealand as a ‘Southern Man city’. More specifically, the authors demonstrate how sporting places and associated commodities (for example a local beer) stimulate and reproduce a particular vision of masculinity. The authors examine the construction of

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35 Smith (2001) alludes to ‘imageability’ as referring “to the quality in a physical object which gives it a high probability of evoking a strong image in any given observer” (p. 135).
36 Indeed, it is becoming common for stadiums to win architecture awards (see Major Projects Victoria, 2014a; ‘Olympic Stadium’, 2012) for their unique designs.
37 These are the promotional titles advertised on the official web page of each of these sporting locations.
38 As previously noted, this view differs from Harvey’s (1989) prediction of ‘placelessness’.
“tangible masculine places (i.e. buildings and structures), embodied through (somewhat traditional) masculine practices and events – such as sport – and represented by masculine images in promotional culture” (p. 102). Furthermore, Gee and Jackson (2011) highlight the role of the media in the (re)production and (re)presentation of masculinity, as well as other identity markers:

In essence, our sense of place, community, and identity are constitutive of and constituted by a range of traditions, practices, interactions and images all of which are progressively being experienced and interpreted through the media. (p. 101)

As such, there is a need to examine the promotional practices of cities and city spaces in the same way that Gee and Jackson (2011) examined the promotions of a commodity linked to a specific place. Indeed, the city is consistently being promoted through tourism campaigns and major events in a strategic branding effort to acquire global awareness, or to be ‘put on the map’. The (masculine) promotions of sporting events such as the Formula One Grand Prix and Australian Football League (AFL) Grand Final, consistently represented within promotional material for Melbourne – the self-confessed ‘sporting capital of Australia’ – requires further critical attention; “whose collective memory is being performed, and whose interests are being furthered” (Silk & Amis, 2005, p. 285).

Conclusion

Peck and Tickell (2002), following Harvey (1989), explain that the zero-sum inter-urban competition of the urban entrepreneurial ‘game’ forces cities to “actively – and responsively – scan the horizon for investment and promotion opportunities, monitoring ‘competitors’ and emulating ‘best practice,’ lest they be left behind” (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 394) in the continued search for mobile capital. As such, the organisers of sports events such as the Olympic Games or owners of professional sports franchises are in a powerful position to dictate terms (such as stadium construction or public subsidies) in order to locate their asset in a specific place; as well as threaten to relocate to a competing city (see Chalkley & Essex, 1999; Delaney & Eckstein, 2007; Jones, 2001; Lenskyj, 2000; Whitson et al., 2006). It is this desire, or perceived requirement, to be competitive that “is often integral to gaining public acceptance of bids to host mega-events by private interests” (Hall, 2006, p. 63) or support professional sports franchises that provide a platform to present the city as a ‘world class’ destination (Schimmel, 2006). Indeed, the economic spin-offs and positive global exposure that results from showcasing a city though major sporting events often appears to be unquestionably endorsed by urban boosters, political decision-makers, commercial media and, the public in general.
The neoliberal agenda of entrepreneurialism adopted by many urban governments to replace the managerial approach to governance “is essentially concerned with reviving the competitive position of urban economies, especially through the ‘liberation’ of private enterprise” (MacLeod, 2002, p. 604). As such, the city has been (re)defined as a ‘growth machine’ (Moltch, 1976) which ‘naturally’ competes with other cities for resources in order to continue providing economic wealth to citizens – particularly those citizens driving the neoliberal agenda (Hall, 2006; MacLeod, 2002).

In addition to the naturalising of competition, the neoliberal strategy of creating quasi-public corporations (Whitson & Macintosh, 1996) or semi-autonomous public/private authorities (Silk & Amis, 2005) has been critiqued. In particular, the bestowing of significant powers and responsibilities to develop major sporting infrastructure, or run sporting events, raises concerns (see Silk & Amis, 2005; Hall, 2006; Whitson & Macintosh, 1996). This power is often authorised through legislation which limits the transparency and accountability of these quasi-government authorities as well as preventing advocacy groups and others from mobilising political opposition through anti-protest laws (Lowes, 2004; Whitson & Macintosh, 1996). Silk and Amis (2005) express that the result is:

[A] shift of power from democratic local governing regimes to semi-autonomous public/private authorities [which] has fragmented urban politics into a constellation of public/private institutions that operate largely independently from democracy and with little public accountability. (p. 285)

With little public accountability and legitimate power to define the physical and imagined landscape of specific spaces, an analysis of the decisions made by urban policy-makers (both public and private actors, often with a vested interest in the outcome) is essential in the process of understanding the role of sportscapes in the (re)production of power inequalities evident in post-industrial cities.
Chapter 3: The state, neoliberalism & sport

For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Naturoll, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the Soveraignty is an Artificial Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body. (Hobbes, 1651/2010, p. 8)

The state, defined by Hobbes (1651/2010) as a great beast with the sovereign as its soul, sets the foundation for my argument of the neoliberal state as a reregulating, rather than deregulating, political system that is establishing market-like devices on everyday life. As Gray (2010), discussing the public bailout of private banks during the global economic crisis, asserts; “An increase in state power has always been the inner logic of neoliberalism, because, in order to inject markets into every corner of social life, a government needs to be highly invasive”. In order to understand neoliberalism, it is first necessary to explain the ‘state’. As such, the aim of this chapter is to conceptualise neoliberalism by firstly defining the state and secondly outlining the current dialogue surrounding the conceptualisation of neoliberalism within social science literature; indicating clearly where I position my work within this debate. In addition, I explain the role of sport as a reflection, as well as an important driver, of neoliberal processes which has served to reproduce social and economic inequalities.

The State

In the same way that Paul du Gay (2012) begins his discussion of the state, I first believe it is important to define the state at its most basic level “as the political apparatus that delivers the governmental capacity needed to protect [emphasis added] the members of a territorial population from each other and from external enemies” (du Gay, 2012, p. 399).

The definition of the state as a protector of its citizens emerges from Thomas Hobbes’ 1651 seminal text, Leviathan. Hobbes’ Leviathan, depicted on the book cover as a crowned giant, composed of over 300 humans, emerging from the landscape (British

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39 Bourdieu (2004a) explains that the shift from a dynastic state to a bureaucratic state occurred during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries when the crown, rather than royal blood, was positioned as the symbol of legitimate power. In conjunction with this re-positioning of legitimate power, Bourdieu explains that individuals – the sovereign’s ministers – with specialist skills or capital were recruited to provide guidance to the sovereign. In doing so, these individuals were bestowed some legitimate power, but importantly it was not the individual that held the power; the legitimate authority was given to the office, position or title of the minister, not the person.

40 Leviathan is a biblical sea monster or creature mentioned in the Book of Job.
symbolises the contracted leader who draws strength from the collective ‘protection’ agreement of the citizens. Hobbes (1651/2010) explains that all individuals of a society have mutually agreed a ‘social contract’ with the state in which a legitimate authority – for example a king/queen or parliament – governs by agreed-upon laws and in return offers protection. This protection is required because human beings, according to Hobbes (1651/2010), are ‘naturally’ concerned with their own fears and desires above all other concerns and without the state, the life of man (sic) is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (p. 97). Hobbes (1651/2010) explains that at the core of the state is the provision of security; citizens rationally relinquish their ‘natural’ right to self-protect in return for protection by the state so that peaceful coexistence occurs. In bestowing all citizen rights of protection to the authority, the state holds a monopoly of legitimate violence which ensures peace.\textsuperscript{41}

In Europe, it was during the late 16\textsuperscript{th} and early 17\textsuperscript{th} centuries that the modern bureaucratic state developed (du Gay, 2012). Skinner (2009) explains that during this period writers began to critique absolutist theory – that the individual sovereign had been endowed by God with absolute authority over their state – by referring to the state as not “a passive and obedient community living under a sovereign head, but rather to the body of the people viewed as the owners of sovereignty themselves” (p. 332). While Hobbes expressed that there can be no such thing as the ‘body of the people’ as humans are inherently at war with each other, Hobbes’ ideas of a social contract allowed critics of absolutist theory to argue that sovereign power can be held by a single authority such as a king or by a collective group such as a parliament (Skinner, 2009). Skinner (2009) explains that events throughout Europe (such as the English civil war and Revolution which increased the influence of parliament) instigated intense debate around the concept of the state and sovereignty. Following Hobbes’ Leviathan and the idea of a social contract, sovereignty was slowly redefined as authority over people and territory which is located within specific institutions and “was no longer envisaged as a particular human being” (du Gay, 2012, p. 401). Consequently the state was defined as “a single, integrated system of authoritative political and legal decision-making over a given territory and subject-population” (du Gay, 2012, p. 401).

\textsuperscript{41} Max Weber’s definition of the state likewise focuses on the monopoly of legitimate physical force; the state is “a human community that (successfully) claims the \textit{monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force} [original emphasis] within a given territory” (Weber, 1991, p. 78). Meanwhile, Bourdieu adds the monopoly over symbolic violence to physical violence in his definition of the state (see Wacquant, 2004).
The development of this bureaucratic state, as explained by du Gay (2012), relied on the separation of the ‘office’ from the ‘person’ that held that office: “the distinction between an office and the person holding that office became sharper and began to harden as a separate, highly structured domain of offices arose, and, associated with those offices, a greatly accumulated set of powers developed” (p. 400). As such, the person may leave or be forced from office but the power of that office remains. Bourdieu (2004a) and du Gay (2012) explain that the jurists played an important role in creating this bureaucratic state through “producing a theory of the state” (Bourdieu, 2004a, p. 30) which “came to designate this abstractly defined set of offices and associated powers” (du Gay, 2012, p. 400). Through the process of (re)defining and outlining laws “the jurists sought to impose their vision of the state, and in particular their idea of ‘public benefit’” in order to construct a secularised body “legitimating royal power” (Bourdieu, 2004a, p. 31).

Following Hobbes’ understanding of the state, van Dun (2005) characterises the modern Western democratic state as a Hobbesian democracy;

[A] politically organised society, a State, with a clear distinction between ruling positions and non-ruling positions. Its main characteristic is the presence of the position of an Absolute Sovereign, the occupants of which are elected by a substantial part of the subject population and legally empowered to impose any rules and policies they decide to make. (p. 6)

Meanwhile, Held (1992) explains that this ‘representative’ democracy tends to be expressed in liberal terms in contemporary states. Held (1992), expresses that liberal and liberal democratic theories have pursued justifying the sovereign power of the state in addition to asserting constraints on its interventionist role. Following Hobbes’ articulation of the state, Held explains that one obligation of the state is the protection from the repressive use of political power (Held, 1992). The representative state, according to Held (1992), becomes an umpire or referee

42 Bourdieu (2004) notes that the jurists “often borrowed from the ecclesiastical tradition and destined to undergo a process of secularization” (p. 30) while du Gay (2012) explains that the state had to depart the need for “‘higher’ religious, philosophical or moral justification” in order to ensure peace amongst “the transcendent beliefs of the rival communities over which it ruled” (p. 402).

43 Held (1992) provides a useful history of democracy, explaining that following ‘Athenian’ democracy, where citizens were directly involved in decision-making about public affairs, most ‘democratic’ states have adopted “liberal or representative democracy, a system of rule embracing elected ‘officers’ who undertake to ‘represent’ the interests or views of citizens within the framework of the ‘rule of law’” (p. 12).
to govern laws that allow individuals to pursue their own interests within a system of economic competition insured by the state which intervenes in certain situations; “for instance, to regulate the behaviour of the disobedient, and to reshape social relations and institutions if, in the event of the failure or laissez-faire, the greatest happiness of the greatest number is not achieved” (p. 16). As such, the state is in a constant process of (re)regulation (Wacquant, 2012) in order to uphold its protection responsibility.

The power of the state to perform its responsibility emerges through the state’s considerable possession of various forms of capital. Bourdieu (1994a) explains that the “state is the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital: capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), economic capital, cultural or (better) informational capital, and symbolic capital” (p. 4). In addition, much of this capital is unique to the state, which leads Bourdieu (1994a) to regard the state as the holder of a sort of meta-capital, labelled statist capital (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), which grants power over other types of capital within the state’s social space. Bourdieu (1994a) defines four species of capital as key dimensions of statist capital:

- **Capital of physical force** refers to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence through the army to protect from external threats and the police (and associated penal institutions) to assert internal force and protection.
- **Economic capital** is obtained through an efficient fiscal system and the creation of a national market. As the legitimate power for collecting and spending taxes, the state has accumulated vast economic capital. Furthermore, the state holds a monopoly to the right to coin legal tender and ensure the use of legal currency within its borders.
- **Informational capital** – of which cultural capital is one dimension – is obtained through the state’s concentration and redistribution of ‘official’ information as well as its ability to produce legitimate ‘unification’. Bourdieu explains that through cultural apparatus, such as the education and legal system, the state “imposes common principles of vision and division” (p. 7) and by “universally imposing and inculcating (within the limits of its authority) a dominant culture thus constituted as

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44 In Chapter 4 I outline Bourdieu’s theory of practice, including a conceptualisation of ‘capital’.

45 Also see Swartz (1997) who expresses that Bourdieu “suggests that with the rise of the bureaucratic state there emerges a new form of capital, ‘statist capital,’ … Statist capital is a form of power over the different fields and different types of capital that circulate within them. It functions as a kind of ‘meta-capital,’ in that it exercises power over other forms of capital and particularly over their exchange rate” (p. 138 [footnote 45]).
legitimate national culture, the school system, through the teaching of history (especially the history of literature), inculcates the foundations of a true ‘civic religion’ and more precisely, the fundamental presuppositions of the national self-image” (p. 8).

- **Symbolic capital** is defined by Bourdieu (1994a) as “any property (any form of capital whether physical, economic, cultural or social) when it is perceived by social agents endowed with categories of perception which cause them to know it and to recognize it, to give it value” (p. 8). Bourdieu (1994a) argues that it “is in the realm of symbolic production that the grip of the state is felt most powerfully” (p. 2) because the state has the apparatus, through control of culture, to (re)confirm its actions as legitimate and recognised. As such, the state is not only abundant with symbolic capital as the institution that often imprints the seal of ‘authority’ through specific laws or non-laws, but also, through state-controlled and regulated cultural apparatus such as the school system and media, the state is able to (re)confirm its position of power and add to the legitimacy, recognition and authority of its actions; or in the words of Bourdieu (1994a), “the state has imposed the very cognitive structures through which it is perceived” (p. 14).

By having a monopoly or abundant accumulation of the above species of capital, Bourdieu (1994a) explains that “In our societies, the state makes a decisive contribution to the production and reproduction of the instruments of construction of social reality” (p. 13). The state’s role as the organiser and regulator of social and cultural practices therefore permits it to exert “durable dispositions through the whole range of constraints and through the corporeal and mental discipline it uniformly imposes upon all agents” (Bourdieu, 1994a, p. 13).

Bourdieu however argues that the democratic system results in “the veritable transubstantiation whereby a group comes to exist through the words and deeds of its ‘representative,’ who receives from the collective the paradoxical power to make it act as such but also to shape it – and even betray it” (Wacquant, 2005b, p. 5). That is, citizens elect an individual or group of individuals to represent their needs; however the ‘needs’ prioritised by the citizens may have been constructed or framed by the individual or group of offices representing the citizens. Bourdieu (1992) explains that only those with sufficient material and cultural instruments are able to engage in the struggles within the political field which results in political ‘censorship’:

The boundary between what is politically sayable or unsayable, thinkable or unthinkable, for a class of non-professionals is determined by the relation between the expressive interests of that class and the capacity to express
these interests, a capacity which is secured by its position in the relations of
cultural and thus political production. (p. 172)

As a consequence, some have little or no representation in the democratic process “which
force citizens, all the more brutally the more economically and culturally deprived they
are, to face the alternative of having to abdicate their rights by abstaining from voting or
being dispossessed by the fact that they delegate their power” (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 171) to
the ‘representative’ who fails to represent. Therefore, through struggles between
representatives to (re)distribute public resources as well as frame social needs and
issues, the liberal democratic system appears to fail those citizens most deprived of
economic and cultural capital as it strives to protect a free-market ideology while
controlling, or policing, resistance to the capitalist endeavours that serve to reproduce
social and economic inequalities.

As such, the state is a structure or system rather than the accumulation of
individual agents working towards their own goals and needs. The government holds the
legitimate power to ‘represent’ the citizens of a state, this legitimate power (monopoly of
legitimate violence), has been decreed to the ‘representative(s)’ by the citizens through
the abstract ‘social contract’ (Hobbes, 2010 [1651]. Within the bureaucratic state, or
modern Hobbesian democratic state, power struggles occur as members of parliament,
and others within the bureaucratic field (Bourdieu, 1994a; Wacquant, 2012), are locked in
an ongoing struggle for the legitimacy to distribute and redistribute public resources. It is
the conflicting and complimentary functioning between and within these offices that are
the mechanical workings of the capital-rich beast, or Leviathan, that is the state.

Neoliberalism
Understanding the state as a Leviathan in which the offices, rather than the bureaucrats,
hold legitimate power provides a useful platform in which to analyse the impacts of
system which functions to ensure the safety of its citizens, while others assert that the
neoliberal state serves to (re)produce social and economic inequalities (Bourdieu, 1998b;
Wacquant, 2012). The aim of this section is to conceptualise neoliberalism by outlining
recent debate surrounding approaches to its use within social science. I will initially
provide a broad definition of the concept before discussing neoliberalism as either a

46 The ‘centrality’ of this system remains a debated element of the concept, with scholars such as
Bourdieu (1994) and Wacquant (2005b) arguing that the state is the central bank of symbolic
capital while others employ the understanding of the state as being embedded “within an ensemble
of institutions and procedures of rule over a national territory” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 176).
homogeneous or heterogeneous process. I will then detail the economic and
governmentality approaches to neoliberalism before discussing Loïc Wacquant’s *via media* approach, which I intend to apply to this study.

Neoliberalism has been described as a ‘rascal’ and ‘chaotic’ concept (Brenner, Peck & Theodore, 2009; Jessop, 2013; Peck & Theodore, 2012) predominantly used by its critics to illustrate the reduction (Ong, 2006) or redeployment (Hilgers, 2012; Lemke, 2002; Wacquant, 2012) of the state. Brenner *et al.* (2009) express that the concept of neoliberalism within the social anthropology field is “promiscuously pervasive, yet inconsistently defined, empirically imprecise and frequently contested” (p. 184). An economic understanding of the neoliberal process emphasises the multitude of market-friendly policies that currently exist in neoliberal nations. Economic deregulation, privatisation of public resources along with public-private partnership ventures and inter-place competition (Harvey, 2007), for example, appear to indicate the shrinking of the state. However, a number of social scholars argue that neoliberalism has not rendered the state obsolete; contrary to the economic approach, neoliberalism is a political project to ‘reengineer the state’ (see Bockman, 2012; Brenner *et al.*, 2009; Hilgers, 2011; 2012; Jessop, 2013; Peck & Theodore, 2012; Wacquant, 2010; 2012; 2013). Various approaches to neoliberalism exist (see Brenner *et al.*, 2009; Hilgers, 2011); as such, my examination of Melbourne’s political landscape must first be grounded with a conceptualisation of neoliberalism as I understand it.

A specific definition of neoliberalism is often avoided by scholars discussing the concept, however some have attempted to provide a broad definition which can be worked with. Hilgers (2011) provides three presuppositions which are common amongst various conceptualisations of neoliberalism: (i) the term has no single definition which all agree upon; (ii) practical neoliberalism – “characteristically embedded in the categories of perception and practices of social agents and institutions” (p. 352) – often differs from theoretical neoliberalism and; (iii) neoliberalism emerges from a historical process, resulting in a specific form of capitalism that includes global economic institutions (for example the International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organisation and World Bank), political regimes (for example Thatcherism and Reaganomics) as well as the pervasive spread of a free-market ideology. Brenner *et al.* (2009) broadly define the concept as denoting “a politically guided intensification of market rule and commodification” (p. 184) which “first emerged with the (already) unevenly developed institutional landscapes of the 1970s, which were being radically unsettled through the combined impacts of accelerated geoeconomic restructuring, sustained geopolitical crises and intensifying regulatory failure” (p. 184). Meanwhile, Jessop (2013) provides a more simplistic baseline definition of neoliberalism as being “a political project that is justified on philosophical grounds and
seeks to extend competitive market forces, consolidate a market-friendly constitution and promote individual freedom” (p. 70). Indeed, the key aspect of the concept includes policies which promote free-market thinking with the accompanying goals of enhancing opportunities for competition and valuing individual responsibility. However, debate exists as to how this political project is implemented, the heterogeneous/homogenous nature of the movement and the resulting impact on the state.

A major difficulty in conceptualising neoliberalism stems from the lack of a founding doctrine (Brenner et al., 2009; Peck & Theodore, 2012), as such, ‘actually existing’ neoliberalism cannot be compared to any specific theoretical aims and methods of the approach. In addition, the beginning of the process is often unclearly defined. Peck and Theodore (2012) cite a number of localised neoliberal political regimes (“Thatcherism” in the UK, ‘Reaganomics’ in the USA, ‘Rogernomics’ in New Zealand, ‘Chicago Boys’ in Pinochet’s Chile) that occurred concurrently during the 1970s and 1980s as evidence of no single birthplace of neoliberalism. Jessop (2013) expresses that the theory of neoliberalism has a complex intellectual history and began to unfold in the interwar years in Europe and the United States. Practical trials of neoliberalism, Jessop (2013) explains, were first adopted “as an economic programme and political project in its Ordoliberal form in postwar West Germany and in its neoliberal form in Chile” (p. 66). Meanwhile, Wacquant (2009) maintains that the United States is the epicentre of neoliberalism citing the country as the “living laboratory of the neoliberal future” (p. xi) and as “the historical crucible and the planetary spearhead” (p. xv) of neoliberalism.

Wacquant’s premise that the United States is the laboratory of neoliberalism materialises from his claims that the United States penal system, for which he credits as a key vehicle driving neoliberalism, has been replicated across Europe and Latin America (see Wacquant, 2010). Wacquant’s positioning of the United States as the pivot on which neoliberalism spins is critiqued by Hilgers (2012). Citing research on various African nations and regions, Hilgers’ (2012) research illustrates clear differences between actual existing neoliberalism in sub-Saharan Africa and the Western world, concluding that “penalisation of poverty is not necessarily a core element of the neoliberal project” (p. 89) outside of the Western world. As such, the evidence of the United States penal system being replicated in various Western nations, may result in a homogenous type of Western neoliberalism; however variances evident in non-Western nations leads Hilgers to conclude that the trajectory of neoliberalism may not be as uniform as Wacquant conceptualises it.

Indeed, Jessop (2013) provides four types of neoliberalism evident across various regions of the globe in an attempt to “cast light on the variability and heterogeneity of neoliberalism and its fragilities” (p. 70); (i) Atlantic Fordism in advanced capitalist
economies, (ii) import-substitution industrialisation in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, (iii) export-oriented growth in East Asia and, (iv) state socialism in the Soviet Bloc, China and Indo-China. Jessop’s typology highlights that political-historical context is an important element in understanding actual existing neoliberalism; my own understanding of the process likewise values contextual differences. Wacquant accepts that context is important in actual existing neoliberalism, explaining that “the velocity, magnitude and effects of this institutional torque will vary from country to country, depending on its position in the international order, the makeup of its national field of power and the configuration of its social space and cultural divisions” (Wacquant, 2011, p. 74).

Moreover, Wacquant (2012) follows Peck in asserting that “neoliberalism has always been an open-ended, plural and adaptable project” (Peck, 2008, p. 3). However, the insistence that an ‘institutional core’ of neoliberalism exists comes from Wacquant’s (2012) belief that “for local species of neoliberalism to emerge through ‘mutation,’ there must be a common genus they all arrive from” (p. 71, footnote 5). While a homogenous/heterogeneous debate still exists (most commentators agree that the historical-cultural context is an important element in the application and impact of neoliberalism), the fundamental debate surrounding the concept involves approaching neoliberalism as either an ‘economic-model’, as ‘a system’, as ‘governmentality’ or some combination, or via media, of any of the above.

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47 It is beyond the scope of this study to outline each of these approaches in detail, see Jessop (2013) for a brief illustration of the different methods and outcomes of each type of neoliberalism. Importantly, Jessop expresses that the four types of neoliberalism discussed are not meant as a replacement to “one quintessential structural whole” (p. 70) and likewise, further neoliberalism methods/outcomes may also exist.

48 Wacquant, although criticised for viewing neoliberalism as too rigid (see Brenner et al., 2009), grounds his argument with Bourdieu’s notion of the bureaucratic field which asserts that on-going power struggles between agents and organisations implement the neoliberal regime within context. Through Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, Wacquant acknowledges that agents internalise social conditionings and social limits which are a result of context and history. Therefore, while theoretical neoliberalism will result in a specific system, variants are evident in practical neoliberalism. Indeed, Wacquant has acknowledged continental differences by expressing that a sudden crumbling of the working-class in the United States during the 1960s has resulted in African-American ghetto’s, while a slow decomposition of the working-class in many European Union countries has led to anti-ghettos (see Wacquant, 2013).
Approaches to neoliberalism

In addition to debate surrounding the spatial convergence or variability of neoliberalism, a rigorous debate exists around how to approach the concept in order to apply it to social issues and activities. In danger of becoming a catch-phrase of globalisation (Jones, 2012), sociologists, social anthropologists and social geographers are engaged in discussions surrounding the economic, structural and pervasiveness of neoliberal processes. Hilgers’ (2011) discussion of ‘neoliberalism as culture’ provides a useful base for discussing various approaches to the concept. While not a theory per se, some scholars focus on the cultural elements in an attempt to “highlight principles commonly shared in representations and practices that can be assimilated to a neoliberal culture” (Hilgers, 2011, p. 353). In accordance with this approach, culture becomes the central element (re)creating, (re)constructing and (re)presenting neoliberal ideology. Defining culture as unstable, flexible and shaping political decisions, Hilgers (2011) explains that studies focusing on the emergence of a global neoliberal culture tend to illustrate the erosion of the state as global institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organisation, Multi-national corporations and international political-trade unions) spread the operating tenants of neoliberalism. A focus on specific groups or domains (for example education, politics or business) illustrates that neoliberal ideology disperses through the classic agents of culture such as family, schools and religion. Hilgers approves of this approach in studies aimed at illustrating ‘actual experiences’ of neoliberalism and linking the local to the global; however, a failure to “clarify the mechanisms of its diffusion” (Hilgers, 2011, p. 355), a tendency to over-generalise or under-define neoliberal structures and, claims of the erosion of the state remain major criticisms of the ‘neoliberalism as culture’ approach.

An economic approach to studying neoliberalism focuses on the ideas and policies emerging from the schools of thought from Friedman, Hayek, the Chicago school of economics and the ‘Washington Consensus,’ which were implemented by governments such as Reagan, Thatcher and Pinochet, as well as supra-structures like the World Trade Organisation, International Monetary Fund and European Union (see Jones, 2012). Marxist scholars, like David Harvey (2007), express that neoliberalism liberates “individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (p. 2). Others reject this approach to neoliberalism as too economically deterministic (Brenner et al., 2009; Collier, 2012; Hilgers, 2012) and adopt either a structurally-oriented ‘system’ approach (Wacquant, 2012) or a fluid and de-centred ‘governmentality’ approach (Rose, O’Malley &
Valverde, 2006). As such, I feel the need to outline broad differences that exist along the trajectory of neoliberalism in order to position my research within, or aligned to, an existing approach. Three approaches to neoliberalism will be discussed – political-economic, governmentality and reengineering the state.

**Political-Economic**

The often cited Marxist geographer David Harvey (2007) defines neoliberalism, in his book ‘A brief history of neoliberalism’, as:

... in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. (p. 2)

Harvey’s definition corresponds with many others within the social sciences that neoliberalism is a political project; however Harvey tends to emphasize the economic elements of the model. The state, according to Harvey, serves as a facilitator or campaigner of capital accumulation. Wacquant (2012) explains that this economistic conception of neoliberalism entails the “triadic combination” (p. 69) of deregulation, privatisation and a shrinking state which results in state intervention “only to foster a business-friendly climate for capitalistic endeavours, to safeguard financial institutions and to repress popular resistance to the neoliberal drive toward ‘accumulation by dispossession’” (p. 69). While I agree with Harvey’s view that neoliberalism has created a system which encourages an ‘urban entrepreneurial’ approach (Harvey, 1989) adopted by many post-industrial cities, I concur with Wacquant’s (2012) criticism that Harvey’s

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49 Hilgers (2011) refers to three approaches to neoliberalism; ‘neoliberalism as culture’, ‘neoliberalism as system’ and, ‘neoliberalism as governmentality’. Similarly, Brenner et al. (2009) provide a broad overview of approaches to understanding “neoliberalism within three influential strands of heterodox political economy” (p. 182). Brenner et al. (2009) categorise these three approaches as; ‘varieties of capitalism’, ‘historical materialist international political economy’ and, ‘governmentality’ – before proceeding to provide their own ‘variegated’ model. Wacquant (2012) on the other hand, asserts binary views of neoliberalism (economic model and governmentality) before proposing his own via media approach.

50 Harvey’s adopts the term ‘accumulation by dispossession’ to assert that Marx’s concept of ‘primitive accumulation’ does not allow for the on-going process of dispossessing capital from the proletariat by the bourgeoisie in a continual search for capital accumulation which drives capitalism (see Harvey, 2004).
Marxist view of neoliberalism fails to recognise the “remaking of the state as stratification and classification machine that is driving the neoliberal revolution from above” (p. 71). For Wacquant (2010), the political-economic model of neoliberalism is too close to the liberal-economic model used by advocates of neoliberalism. As such, Wacquant proposes that social scientists “reach beyond this economic nucleus and elaborate a thicker notion that identifies the institutional machinery and symbolic frames through which neoliberal tenets are being actualized” (2010, p. 213).

Wacquant (2010) illustrates the role of the penal institution in order to criticise Harvey’s conceptualisation of neoliberalism as “woefully incomplete” and “surprisingly restrictive” (p. 215). Wacquant argues that Harvey’s political-economic model neglects to incorporate the penal system and law enforcement/judgement as key tools used by the state to reassert state sovereignty. For Harvey, the penal institution serves to protect corporate interests by coercively controlling protests and riots when the neoliberal order breaks down. However, Wacquant (2010) argues that the penal institution serves to actively – rather than reactively – accommodate and “contain the urban disorders spawned by economic deregulation and to discipline the precarious fractions of the postindustrial working class” (p. 198). While Wacquant (2012) agrees with much of Harvey’s understanding of neoliberalism as a political project which extends the market or market-like mechanisms with a motivating discourse of individual responsibility; Wacquant (2012) asserts a process of state re-regulation, rather than de-regulation:

[Neoliberalism] wishes to reform and refocus the state so as to actively foster and bolster the market as an ongoing political creation…the state actively re-regulates – rather than ‘deregulates’ – the economy in favour of corporations and engages in extensive ‘corrective’ and ‘constructive’ measures to support and extend markets for firms, products and workers alike. (p. 72)

As such, an approach that encompasses a wider understanding of neoliberalism is required. While Wacquant argues that a focus on the re-regulation of the state is crucial to understanding neoliberalism, others adopt the Foucaultian concept of governmentality to express that the state is not the only force driving neoliberal processes.
Governmentality

Foucault’s *governmentality* has become a popular concept amongst social scholars attempting to explain neoliberalism and the impacts of neoliberal processes on specific sites. Hilgers explains that:

Neoliberal governmentality is based on two types of optimisation technology, which are crucial to its spread. On the one hand, the technologies of subjectivity encourage agents to optimise their individual choices through knowledge and to perceive the world in terms of competition. On the other, technologies of subjection regulate populations for optimal productivity. Neoliberal governmentality is thus constituted by the concerted functioning of techniques of the self and technologies of power. This combination is brought about by logics of competitiveness, commercial rationale, and risk calculation. (Hilgers, 2011, p. 358)

While Hilgers’ brief conceptualisation of governmentality is useful, it requires further clarification.

As Lemke (2002) asserts, an understanding of what ‘government’ is and the raison d’état – the reason of state or goals of the state – is required in order to understand Foucault’s governmentality. Lemke (2002) explains that for Foucault, the term government does not just equate to the political context, but, in addition to management by the state includes philosophical, religious, medical and other texts of control. According to Lemke (2002), “Foucault endeavours to show how the modern sovereign state and the modern autonomous individual codetermine each other’s emergence” (p. 51) which first requires shifting the “state from its central role in political analysis” (Donzelot, 1979 cited in Rose et al., 2006, p. 87). Rose et al. (2006), citing Foucault’s 1977-1978 lectures, explain that the contemporary reason of state displaced interests which were borrowed from traditional virtues (such as justice and respect for divine laws), or from common abilities (such as prudence and thoughtful decisions) and gave way “to an art of governing that assigned priority to all that could strengthen that state and its power and that sought to intervene into and manage the habits and activities of subjects to achieve that end” (pp. 83-4). Furthermore, Rose et al. (2006) express that “Liberalism differs from reason of state in that it starts from the assumption that human behaviour should be governed, not solely in the interests of strengthening the state, but in the interests of society understood

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51 In this section, I provide an understanding of neoliberalism by scholars that have been influenced by Foucault rather than attempting to deconstruct Foucault’s understanding of neoliberalism.
as a realm external to the state” (p. 84). As such, the shift to neoliberalism is the result of neoliberal processes, through all forms of government – not just the state – becoming accepted, by both the self and institutions which dis/empower the self, as *optimal* processes to strengthen the interests of society.

Government, in its broadest sense, consists of “procedures for directing human behaviour” (Rose *et al.*, 2006, p. 83) but Lemke (2002) explains that governing people, according to Foucault, “is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself” (p. 53). Rose *et al.* (2006) illustrate the role of government by portraying the governed as “members of a flock to be nurtured or culled, juridical subjects whose conduct is to be limited by law, individuals to be disciplined, or, indeed, people to be freed” (2006, p. 86).

Rose *et al.* (2006) express that Foucault regards liberalism as “not so much a substantive doctrine of how to govern. Rather, it is an art of governing that arises as a critique of excessive government – a search for a technology of government that can address the recurrent complaint that authorities are governing too much” (p. 84). Likewise, MacKinnon (2000) asserts that the use of governmentality results from scholars dissatisfaction “with the tendency to locate political power within the institutional structures of a centralised state…Their alternative approach draws on Foucault's notion of power as a ubiquitous feature of modern societies, one that is not confined to any particular set of institutional sites” (p. 297). In challenging the notion that the state is the central body of control, governmentality scholars search society for other institutions which hold a form of governing power; “instead of seeing any single body – such as the state – as responsible for managing the conduct of citizens, this perspective recognizes that a whole variety of authorities govern in different sites, in relation to different objectives” (Rose, *et al.*, 2006, p. 86). As such, governmentality focuses on the *how* of government; the specific mechanisms, techniques and procedures adopted by political authorities (MacKinnon, 2000).

Governmentality scholars search within a wide range of institutions (see Cole *et al.*, 2004) including non-government organisations, pseudo-government authorities (P-GA), traditional agents of socialisation such as schools and religion and, cultural

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52 There are a number of terms for these state Trusts/Organisations, such as quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (quango), non-government departments, statutory authorities, state-owned corporations. For simplicity, I refer to all of these under the term pseudo-government authorities.
institutions: “Culture itself, then, could be analysed as a set of technologies for governing habits, morals and ethics – for governing subjects” (Rose et al., 2006, p. 97), that is, through cultural institutions such as museums, cinema, music and sport, subjects are governed/shaped.

The notion that techniques “to enable the state to divest itself of many of its obligations, devolving those to quasi-autonomous entities that would be governed at a distance by means of budgets, audits, standards, benchmarks, and other technologies” (Rose et al., 2006, p. 91) may lead some to conclude we are witnessing the weakening of the state (Ohmae, 1995). However, while the processes of neoliberalism are driven through a wide range of institutions, Lemke (2002) explains that:

… the so-called retreat of the state is in fact a prolongation of government: neoliberalism is not the end but a transformation of politics that restructures the power relations in society. What we observe today is not a diminishment or reduction of state sovereignty and planning capacities but a displacement from formal to informal techniques of government and the appearance of new actors on the scene of government (e.g., nongovernmental organizations) that indicate fundamental transformations in statehood and a new relation between state and civil society actors. (p. 58)

As such, governmentality scholars claim the state is not shrinking but expanding and transforming by filtering into non-governmental organizations such as public trusts and public-private ventures.

While there are many strengths in using governmentality to explain and assess neoliberalism – in particular the manner in which neoliberal processes emerge in, and reshape, various social sites – the fluidity of the approach limits the opportunity to clearly compare the various sites and institutions driving neoliberalism (Brenner, et al., 2009; Hilgers, 2011). In explaining the heterogeneity of actual existing neoliberalism, Rose et al. (2006) argue that neoliberalism should not be viewed as a ‘master category’ and reject the notion of “totalizing tendencies, replete with the overtones of grand theorization that explains the transformation of society into something substantially novel” (p. 98). The work of Aihwa Ong (2006) has been particularly critiqued by scholars attacking governmentality for approaching neoliberalism as too ubiquitous (see Brenner et al, 2009; Hilgers, 2011; Peck & Theodore, 2012; Wacquant, 2012). In approaching neoliberalism as occurring ‘everywhere’, questions of definition are raised:

53 Indeed, Collier (2012) argues that critics of Ong’s work have been overly reliant on Ong for definitions of governmentality; “I find this nearly exclusive focus on Ong’s work both puzzling and misleading, since it paints a distorted picture of the non-structural alternatives” (p. 190).
By studying neoliberalism in its ‘capillarity’, the approach based on
governmentality reveals that effects can be seen everywhere but that, at the
same time, there are a great many exceptions to the principle of deliberate
optimisation. At this point the subject of study becomes harder to define.
(Hilgers, 2011, p. 360)

Wacquant’s (2012) criticism of governmentality goes even further, calling it “devoid of
specificity” (p. 70) and a “conception of neoliberalism just as thin as that propounded by
the economic orthodoxy it wishes to overturn” (p. 70). I now turn to Wacquant’s
understanding of neoliberalism as a rightward tilting political project being driven by the
state.

Reengineering the state
The Marxist approach to neoliberalism advocated by David Harvey (2005) and the
governmentality approach adopted by Foucaultian scholars are viewed by Loïc Wacquant
(2012) as being too economic on the one side and too loose on the other. As such,
Wacquant (2012) poses a via media between the two approaches which is to be:

Understood not as an invasive economic doctrine or migrating techniques of
rule but as a concrete political constellation: from a ‘thin’ economic
conception centred on the market to a ‘thick’ sociological conception centred
on the state that specifies the institutional machinery involved in the
establishment of market dominance and its operant impact on effective
social membership. (p. 71)

Wacquant (2012) includes three theses within his approach: (i) neoliberalism is not an
economic but a political project; it entails not the dismantling but the reengineering of the
state; (ii) neoliberalism entails a rightward tilting of the bureaucratic field and spawns a
Centaur-state and; (iii) the growth and glorification of the penal wing of the state is an
integral component of the neoliberal Leviathan.

Wacquant (2010) has recently led the way in assertions of the ‘reengineering of
the state’ through neoliberal processes. Wacquant (2013) claims to “offer a way to rethink
neoliberalism as a transnational political project, a veritable ‘revolution from above’ that
cannot be reduced to the naked empire of the market (as both its opponents and its
advocates would have it)” (p. 4) or as the ubiquitous diffusion of governmental
technologies of neoliberalism everywhere and nowhere (c.f. Ong, 2006). The basis of
Wacquant’s conceptualisation of neoliberalism is formed from his conclusion that
“restrictive ‘workfare’ and expansive ‘prisonfare’ are coupled into a single organizational
contraption to discipline the precarious fractions of the postindustrial working class”
(Wacquant, 2010, p. 197). In the article ‘Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare, and Social Insecurity’, Wacquant (2010) uses conclusions from his 2009 book Punishing the Poor to illustrate that the rise in penalisation and public investment programs of ‘law and order’ – police, courts and penitentiary – is not due to an increase in criminality but rather is used as a tool to control the urban anarchies resulting from economic deregulation. In addition, a growing and more visible penal institution reasserts the authority of the state as well as buttressing any deficit of legitimacy suffered from failing to achieve the social and economic protection mechanisms established during the Fordist-Keynesian era (Wacquant, 2010). That is, the state justifies its significance and defends its protection role by demonstrating symbolic violence in the form of internal ‘law and order’ at the same time as it relinquishes its welfare role in the name of liberalism and individual responsibility.

Wacquant (2010) employs Bourdieu’s little-used concept of the bureaucratic field to “map the ongoing shift from the social to the penal treatment of urban marginality” (p. 201). In treating the state as Leviathan, with its ‘protection’ covenant, Wacquant explains that the bureaucratic field involves two internal struggles. The first, a vertical struggle, is between the ‘higher state nobility’ who promote market-oriented reforms and the ‘lower state nobility’ attached to traditional missions of government. The second, a horizontal struggle, involves the ‘Left hand’ and ‘Right hand’ of the state:

The Left hand, the feminine side of Leviathan, is materialized by the ‘spendthrift’ ministries in charge of ‘social functions’ – public education, health, housing, welfare and labor law – which offer protection and succor to the social categories shorn of economic and cultural capital. The Right hand, the masculine side, is charged with enforcing the new economic discipline via budget cuts, fiscal initiatives, and economic deregulation. (Wacquant, 2010, p. 201)

In using the bureaucratic field, Wacquant (2012) concludes that neoliberalism has resulted in the tilting of state priorities from the Left hand to the Right hand.

Framing neoliberalism within the bureaucratic field allows Wacquant to follow Bourdieu’s concerns to transcend the subject/object dichotomy (Swartz, 1997). The state, as a structural body consisting of a Right and Left hand, is involved in ongoing struggles to maintain its protection convent. The bureaucrats, or agents, are likewise involved in an ongoing struggle to maintain and increase legitimate authority for their office which transpires to strengthen or weaken certain functions of the Right/Left hand of the state.

54 I discuss the concept of ‘field’ further in chapter 4.
As noted previously, Wacquant (2012) does not neglect context, market-like mechanisms or individual responsibility as key elements of actual existing neoliberalism. Wacquant (2010) explains that neoliberalism “entails not simply the reassertion of the prerogatives of capital and the promotion of the market-place, but the close articulation of four institutional logics” (p. 213). Wacquant (2010; 2012; 2013) discusses these four institutional logics as:

- **Commodification as the extension of the market or market-like mechanisms** – rather than deregulation, the state re-regulates social life to replicate the liberal market in all forms of human activities.

- **Welfare state devolution, retraction, and recomposition** – a shift in social policy that has limited/decreased protective welfare in favour of ‘workfare’ in which “lower-class recipients, treated not as citizens but as clients or subjects” (Wacquant, 2010, p. 213) are provided social assistance “conditional upon submission to flexible employment and entails specific behavioural mandates” (Wacquant, 2012, p.72).

- **An expansive, intrusive, and proactive penal apparatus** – “the penal apparatus is a core organ of the state, expressive of its sovereignty and instrumental in imposing categories, upholding material and symbolic divisions, and moulding relations and behaviours through the selective penetration of social and physical space” (Wacquant, 2010, p. 211). In combination with a shift from welfare to workfare and expansive ‘law and order’, the state safety-net is replaced by a cane in order to repress those that do not conform to the ideal neoliberal citizen

- **The cultural trope of individual responsibility** – the “motivating discourse and cultural glue that pastes these various components of state activity together” (Wacquant, 2012, p. 72).

As such, the process involves imprinting market-like mechanisms on everyday life in combination with the retraction of the Fordist-Keynesian welfare safety-net and incorporation of disciplinary ‘workfare’ policies; increasing penalisation to contain disorder and re-assert the (symbolic) violent authority of the state while advocating individual responsibility to reduce state accountability in matters social and economic.

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55 Bockman (2012) is critical of Wacquant’s ‘glorification’ of the Keynesian period and cites Apartheid South Africa and Jim-Crow-era United States as evidence that neoliberalism has not caused a unique situation of exclusion and abandonment. However, Wacquant does not stress this is unique, but rather that policies of penalisation are a contemporary tool to further, or permit, this abandonment at the ‘bottom’ in order to liberate those at the ‘top’.
The shift to monetarism, deregulation and market-based reform policies promoted by Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek and supporters (see Jones, 2012) which mandated the shrinking of the Keynesian welfare state, deemed to be inefficient, in favour of a free-market ideology based on individual liberty and limited government intervention has, according to Wacquant (2012), resulted in a Centaur-state. That is, a state that “embraces laissez-faire at the top, releasing restraints on capital and expanding the life chances of the holders of economic and cultural capital” while directing, or dictating, “the behaviour of the lower class” through authoritative measures (Wacquant, 2010, p. 214). As such, neoliberal processes serve to maintain or (re)produce inequalities as the state restricts the working class while assisting economic and political freedom for those wealthy in economic and cultural capital.

As previously indicated, my intention is to apply Wacquant’s understanding of neoliberalism as reengineering the state. I accept the premise of other scholars on neoliberalism that the phenomenon is a political project to drive a free-market economic ideology (Harvey, 2005) as well as accepting that neoliberalism emerges in and shapes various social sites (Hilgers, 2011); however, I approach my examination of Melbourne as a ‘sport city’ by conceptualising the state, like Bourdieu (1998b), as the “the repository of all the universal ideas associated with the idea of the public” (p. 102), or as the central bank of symbolic capital (Wacquant, 2005b), which shapes and defines society. I now turn to a brief discussion of sport and neoliberalism to explain the cultural, political and economic role of sport in assisting neoliberal processes.

**Sport and Neoliberalism**

The role of sport as a reflection, or driver, of neoliberalism has been illustrated by a number of scholars (see Coakley, 2011; Silk and Andrews, 2012; Volker, 2010). My intention here is not to provide an overview of social research that has examined sport and neoliberalism; rather I simply aim to illustrate the significance of the subject within social science. As such, I briefly explain how sport scholars have approached an examination of neoliberal processes so that I may then insert my own analysis of the ‘sport city’ within or alongside this existing and growing body of literature.

In their edited book, *Sport and Neoliberalism: politics, consumption and culture*, Michael Silk and David Andrews (2012a) engage the reader in a critical dialogue of neoliberal sport by “illuminating and exposing the practices, policies, and processes responsible for the normalization of neoliberal sporting cultures – processes that are clearly anchored in power relations that serve particular ends and thereby perpetuate structural inequalities” (Silk & Andrews, 2012b, p. 5). Silk and Andrews (2012a) bring
together the research from a number of well-respected scholars within the social (sport) science to examine the ‘architects’ of neoliberal processes and the institutions through which these processes manifest; the role of government and governance in implementing ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ and; the consumption of, and consent to, neoliberal processes through cultural practices that shape identities. The editors explain that a critical role of the sport social scientist is to expose how the neoliberal “project of the right has been nurtured and expressed in and through the affective realm of popular culture and within the structures and institutions of the state, of which the sporting economy is a significant component” (Silk & Andrews, 2012b, p. 10).

Coakley (2011) asserts that sport, as a highly valued and visible cultural practice, is a site that frequently reproduces and sometimes resists neoliberalism. In particular, elite sport often serves to reaffirm “a belief in competition as the primary basis for assessing merit and allocating rewards” (Coakley, 2011, p. 75). As such, an ideology that perpetuates the notion that “economic winners deserve power and privilege” while “economic failure is due to poor choices or weak character” is constructed (Coakley, 2011, p. 75). Likewise, Silk and Andrews (2012b) explain that when sport is located or articulated as an element of cultural politics, the researcher can begin to interrogate and understand sport “as a site through which various discourses are mobilized in regard to the organization and discipline of daily life in the service of particular political agendas” (p. 5). We can then “begin to understand how sport serves as an economy of affect through which power, privilege, politics, and position are (re)produced” (Silk & Andrews, 2012b, p. 5). By positioning sport as a utopic reflection of an ideal ‘liberal’ society, in which all participants have agency to act within the rules of the game which govern all actors equally; social, economic and political structures that (re)create and (re)produce inequalities are concealed.

Jay Coakley (2011) provides a useful summary of the study of neoliberalism within the sociology of sport. Coakley (2011) explains that the growing popularity and hegemony of elite, organised, competitive, commercial sports serves to reproduce, represent and celebrate: “(a) the use of competitive reward structures to allocate rewards, (b) the use of market values to determine merit, (c) a focus on the individual and individual responsibility, (d) the belief that capital drives all forms of progress, and (e) popular acceptance of inequality and hierarchical organisation” (p. 69). Coakley (2011) asserts that the ruling elite in a neoliberal capitalist economy rely on a sense of unity among citizens to preserve a position in the competitive global market and patriotic support of elite sports teams and athletes is useful for maintaining this sense of unity amongst, at least a portion of, the population. Furthermore, these elite sports teams and athletes provide a key vehicle for corporations to “inject into public discourse messages promoting
consumption as a lifestyle" (Coakley, 2011, p. 75). As such, elite sport is a useful tool in promoting a specific way of life which serves to reproduce social inequalities while at the same time uniting a population to support the ‘common-sense’ hierarchical system of meritocracy, individual responsibility and consumerism.

While my study is limited to a focus on the neoliberal processes associated with the development of the ‘sport city’, a number of scholars outline the impacts of neoliberalism on a multitude of sport and physical activity related subjects. For example, some scholars have focused on the ‘obesity epidemic’ and resultant impact on health/physical education policy in regards to individual responsibility and victim-blaming associated with neoliberal ideology (see Ayo, 2012; Burrows & Wright, 2007; Fusco, 2012; Silk & Andrews, 2012b); while Scherer and Rowe’s (2014) edited collection analyses ‘citizens rights’ to access sport through public broadcasting and the impacts of neoliberal processes on cultural policy. Furthermore, Volker (2010), Hayes and Horne (2011) and Molnar and Snider (2012) illustrate the manner in which security and surveillance is employed at mega-events to regulate the poor and maximise growth opportunities for the private sector, and Hayhurst (2009) demonstrates how ‘sport for development and peace’ policy models serve to reproduce neoliberal development interventions. Combined, these studies serve to illustrate and challenge neoliberalism and the associated social inequalities that appear.

As I referred to in chapter 2, the use of sport as an urban entrepreneurial tool is not a new phenomenon, however it appears that sports infrastructure and events are increasingly being used for urban reimageengineering and regeneration of ‘derelict’ areas. The desired result is a sanctioned urban space (Silk & Andrews, 2012c) that is fortified from perceived dangers (Schimmel, 2006; 2012) to permit “consumption-oriented capital accumulation" (Silk & Andrews, 2012c, p. 127). The creation and regulation of these spaces of consumption, Silk and Andrews (2012c) explain, appears to occur through “formal mechanisms such as increased surveillance and door security staff, restrictive bylaws and design of the built environment, and attempts to literally sanitize through style” (p. 137). Continuing, Silk and Andrews (2012c) express that the neoliberal ‘sport city’ is a space of spectacle, consumption and leisure which has been “designed, built, and administered by those affluent enough to do so, but it is done with the wants and

56 The definition of an area as ‘derelict’, it should be noted, is socially constructed; it is often the political and urban elite that label an area as derelict and therefore in need of improvement.

57 Silk and Andrews (2012c) explain that the capital space of the urban environment is a sanctioned space, that is, it has been designed to be used by those citizen’s and tourists that fit the social and economic requirements to enter the arena.
sensibilities of the similarly affluent consumer in mind” (p. 137). Of particular concern is that these, often, public spaces are frequently created using public money – and with the backing of public authorities – but serve private interests. In addition to assisting private interests (the Right hand), the state’s ability to provide welfare (the Left hand) is diminished, as Schimmel (2012) expresses; “the state’s role in contributing huge sums of public money to urban [sport] megaprojects…further erode[s] its ability to provide for urban social services” (p. 171).

Sport is often (re)presented as symbolic of an egalitarian and meritocratic society. Legitimising sport as meritocratic serves to ‘misrecognise’ economic, social and political structures which (re)produce inequalities. As such, the pervasiveness of (elite) sport in neoliberal societies serves to reproduce symbolic violence through misrecognition. In addition to being a valued cultural tool within neoliberal societies, elite sport is also an economic vehicle that has been used by the urban and political elite to further private interests; often through the use or support of public resources which clearly illustrates the tilting of the state to the right (Wacquant, 2012).

In this chapter I have conceptualised the (bureaucratic) state, following Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan*, as incorporating a social contract which permits a sovereign power (such as an elected government) to impose rules and regulations. By adopting Loïc Wacquant’s (2012) understanding of neoliberalism as “the reengineering and redeployment of the state as the core agency that sets the rules and fabricates the subjectivities, social relations and collective representations suited to realising markets” (p. 66) throughout this thesis, I aim to illustrate the important role that sport has played in shaping neoliberal Melbourne. In the chapter which follows, I outline Bourdieu’s (2010 [1984]) ‘theory of practice’ which is grounded with du Gay et al.’s (1997) ‘circuit of culture’. In addition, I provide the methodological tools adopted to conduct an examination of the ‘sport city’.
Chapter 4: Analytical tools

This chapter outlines the methodological tools and approaches adopted to examine the (re)production, (re)presentation, consumption, identification and regulation of the neoliberal ‘sport city’. Following S.J. King’s (2005) explanation of cultural studies, the aim of this chapter is not to provide a prescription of the methodological technique applied during this research, but rather to detail my understanding of the key concepts and theory which will be exercised in the examination of Melbourne as a ‘sport city’. I begin this chapter by locating my research within cultural studies. I then explain the theoretical framework of Pierre Bourdieu, with specific focus on his understanding of ‘fields’. Following, I briefly explain du Gay et al.’s (1997) circuit of culture before outlining the multiple methodological tools I employed to enable an examination of the ‘sport city’.

From the outset I believe it is important to reveal that I position my research within the critical cultural studies discipline. S.J. King (2005) claims that the benefits of adopting cultural studies as a critical approach to the examination of sporting phenomena comes from its interdisciplinary, anti-formalised and flexible methodology. As such, I have obeyed the call of a number of scholars to employ a multi-method approach (Agger, 1992; Andrews, 1998; Best & Kellner, 1991) in addition to adopting the theoretical framework of Pierre Bourdieu (extended by Wacquant (2010; 2012) to analyse neoliberal processes) in combination with du Gay et al.’s (1997) circuit of culture— a model which has frequently been used for the analysis of cultural artefacts (see Carvalho & Burgess, 2005; Curtin & Gaither, 2005; Han & Zhang, 2009; John & Jackson, 2011; Kobayashi, 2012; Scherer & Jackson, 2008).

Silk, Andrews and Mason (2005) express that in order to conduct a critical interrogation of sport a contextualisation of “sport within networks of political, economic and social linkages” (p. 1) is required. Furthermore, Howell, Andrews and Jackson (2002) express that sport is too often inserted into specific social and historical contexts and add that sports sociologists need to acknowledge that sporting and cultural practices are also “actively engaged in the ongoing constitution of these contexts” (Howell et al., 2002, p. 171). Meanwhile, S.J. King (2005) argues that once a researcher has decided upon the methodological tools that will best answer his or her research questions, the assembled sources must be analysed within an economic, political and social context as a strategy for mapping the complex struggles and contests present within cultural life. As such, the first stage of this research involves a ‘reconstruction’ of Melbourne in order for contextual linkages to be made when examining the ‘sport city’ as a cultural artefact that has been (re)produced, (re)presented, (re)constructed, regulated and (re)engineered.
Pierre Bourdieu and the ‘theory of practice’

French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’, incorporating the concepts of habitus, capital and field, will be used to examine Melbourne as a place where the production, representation, consumption, identification and regulation (du Gay et al., 1997) of sport stimulates and reproduces dominant cultures and the ‘reengineering’ of the state (Wacquant, 2010). Bennett, Frow, Hage and Noble (2013) explain that Bourdieu’s concepts are to be used as tools for research rather than truth pronouncements. Following Bennett et al.’s (2013) assertion, I plan to use Bourdieu’s concepts as methodological tools to guide my analysis, but do not intend to ‘test’ these concepts through application to Melbourne’s sportscape. While it is not my intention here to provide a detailed discussion and critique of Bourdieu’s theoretical framework; a greater understanding and appreciation of the value of his concepts to the analysis of the ‘sport city’ will be developed throughout this thesis.58

Jenkins (1992) and Swartz (1997) explain that the central aim of Bourdieu’s work was to transcend the subjective/objective dichotomy found in social theory as he believed it hindered “the development of a unified theory of practices” (Swartz, 1997, p. 5). To achieve this aim, Bourdieu “proposes a structural theory of practice that connects action to culture, structure and power” (Swartz, 1997, p. 9) which emerges through the key concept of habitus. Habitus (explained later) allows Bourdieu to integrate the forces that occur through social structures with the agency of the individual, without positioning either in a dominant position.

Swartz (1997) explains that a further central aim of Bourdieu is to discover “how stratified social systems of hierarchy and domination persist and reproduce intergenerationally without powerful resistance and without the conscious recognition of their members” (p. 6). In order to do so, the social researcher needs to discover what has been ‘misrecognised’. Bourdieu (1994b) explains that dominant discourse in society is “a structured and structuring medium tending to impose an apprehension of the established order as natural” (p. 169) and misrecognition or the “denial of the economic and political interests present in a set of practices” serves to maintain the social systems of hierarchy and domination (Swartz, 1997, p. 43).59

58 For a more in depth discussion of Bourdieu and his works see Gorski (2013); Jenkins (1992); Robson and Sanders (2010); Sapiro (2010); Swartz (1997) and; Susen and Turner (2011).

59 Swartz (1997) explains that Bourdieu “understands ideology, or ‘symbolic violence,’ as the capacity to impose the means for comprehending and adapting to the social world by representing economic and political power in disguised, taken-for-granted forms” (p. 89).
For Bourdieu, all actions by individuals in social arrangements are interest-driven. As such, social struggles occur between agents in an attempt to “maximise their gains and accumulate resources under different forms of capital (economic, social, cultural, symbolic)” (Navarro, 2006, p. 14). It is through these historical social struggles in the persistent search for accumulation of resources that hierarchies have developed and in turn (re)legitimise social differences (Navarro, 2006). Swartz (1997) asserts that according to Bourdieu, “actors by and large ‘mis-recognize’ how cultural resources, processes, and institutions lock individuals and groups into reproducing patterns of domination … [and] it is the misrecognition of those embedded interests that is the necessary condition for the exercise of power” (pp. 9-10), therefore, by exposing this misrecognition to the public, the legitimacy of this power will be destroyed; enabling alternative social arrangements to develop.

Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) refer to this reproduction of inequalities through disguised or taken-for-granted forms of economic, political and cultural power as ‘symbolic violence’. Bourdieu (1991) defines symbolic violence as “a struggle over the power to impose (or even inculcate) the arbitrary instruments of knowledge and expression (taxonomies) of social reality” (p. 168). It is through consent of the legitimising of specific types of capital or political and economic relations that both the dominant and dominated reproduce existing social conditions (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977).

Bourdieu (1977) explains that what is thinkable (unthinkable) and doable (undoable) in a specific field is limited. Referring to this limited way of thinking and acting as the doxa (see Bourdieu, 1977; Chopra, 2003; Grenfell, 2004), Bourdieu explains that at one end of the spectrum we have the dominant vision (orthodoxy) and at the other end the resisting vision (heterodoxy). All current actions and thoughts by agents fit within the orthodoxy/heterodoxy spectrum. Swartz (1997) expresses that the agents within a field, by acting only within the limits of the doxa, help create conditions for the ‘misrecognition’ of power relations in which “the natural and social world appears as self-evident” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 164). Furthermore, Grenfell (2004) explains that ultimately it is the state which “holds the most power to impose its official forms of orthodoxy” (p. 28)

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60 ‘Misrecognition’, for Bourdieu, is similar to the idea of ‘false consciousness’ found in Marxist works (Swartz, 1997).

61 ‘Symbolic violence’ occurs through ideology (Swartz, 1997) and is expressed in a similar manner to Gramsci’s ‘Hegemony’ in that it involves complicity to social harm (Giulianotti, 2005).

62 Bourdieu (1977) challenges social researchers to escape the doxa and provide an alternative understanding of social realities so that the reproduction of social inequalities evident within the doxa can be dismantled.
through its regulatory (legitimising and defining) control over key economic, cultural and social institutions.

In *Distinction*, Bourdieu (2010 [1984], p. 95) offers the following equation as a summary formula:

\[
\text{[(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice.}
\]

Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’, Swartz (1997) explains, “conceptualizes action as the outcome of a relationship between habitus, capital, and field” (p. 141) but importantly, “Practices are not to be reduced to either habitus or field but grow out of the ‘interrelationship’ established at each point in time by sets of relations represented by both” (Swartz, 1997, pp. 141-2). Habitus captures the notion that structure and agency are interrelated elements; “The habitus is not only a structuring structure, which organizes practices and the perception of practices, but also a structured structure” (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984], p.166). Bourdieu (1990a) defines habitus as a:

System of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them.

(p. 53)

Or more clearly defined by Wacquant (2005a), habitus is:

The way society becomes deposited in persons in the form of lasting dispositions, or trained capacities and structured propensities to think, feel, and act in determinate ways, which then guide them in their creative responses to the constraints and solicitations of their extant milieu. (p. 316)

It is through habitus that social practices are neither limited by structures nor do individuals have the capacity to act independently in the pursuit of free choices (Navarro, 2006). As Swartz (1997) explains; “Actors are not rule followers or norm obeyers but strategic improvisers who respond dispositionally to the opportunities and constraints offered by various situations” (p. 100). Continuing, Swartz (1997) explains that the “dispositions of habitus predispose actors to select forms of conduct that are most likely to succeed in light of their resources and past experiences. Habitus orients action according to anticipated consequences” (p. 106). Importantly for Bourdieu, habitus functions “below the level of consciousness” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 73), so while the agent may ‘select forms of conduct’, as Swartz (1997) expresses above, this selection occurs without thought. In a practical sense, Bourdieu (1998a) explains that habitus is “a ‘feel’ for the game, that is,
the art of *anticipating* the future of that game, which is inscribed in the present state of play" (p. 25).

The second key concept within Bourdieu’s framework is capital. Whilst habitus is the embodied social history of an individual, it is capital that determines the position of an individual within the ‘field’. Tomlinson (2004) explains that for Bourdieu capital is a form of power.:

The degree of capital available to the social agent will determine the extent of control he will have over himself and others. Bourdieu talks of economic capital, cultural capital, educational capital and symbolic capital … The challenge is not to take these one by one and analyse them separately, but to see how they interact in the case of specific practices and social classes. (p. 168)

For Bourdieu, economic capital includes resources such as money and property; cultural capital includes cultural goods and services as well as educational credentials; social capital is developed through acquaintances and social networks; and symbolic capital is gained through the ‘legitimation’ of the various species of capital (see Bourdieu, 1986; 1989; Swartz, 1997). Bourdieu (1989) explains that these capital resources “become active, effective, like aces in a game of cards” (p. 17) during the “competition for the appropriation of scarce goods” (p. 17). That is, agents use their capital in struggles to gain further capital and power within a social space.

Navarro (2006), extending Tomlinson’s explanation of capital as a form of power, asserts that for Bourdieu, “resources function as capital when they are ‘a social relation of power’ because this is precisely what determines value upon resources after interest is manifested (and/or disputed) by people” (p. 17). Therefore, capital holds its power when it is appreciated and recognised by others as a *legitimate* form of capital. Of importance is that no one type of capital is more valuable than another; instead the value is determined

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63 Indeed, as Swartz (1997) explains, Bourdieu’s extension of capital to include all forms of power – “whether they be material, cultural, social, or symbolic” (p. 73) – is one way in which Bourdieu distances himself from Marxism.

64 Swartz (1997) explains that “His concept of cultural capital covers a wide variety of resources including such things as verbal facility, general cultural awareness, aesthetic preferences, information about the school system, and educational credentials” (p. 75). Bourdieu (1986) refers to cultural capital as existing in three forms – embodied state (dispositions of the mind and body); objectified state (in the form of cultural goods such as books and instruments); and the institutionalised state (such as educational credentials).

65 Bourdieu (1989) explains that symbolic capital “is the form that various species of capital assume when they are perceived and recognized as legitimate” (p. 17).
by the social context in which it is held and this value — as well as the power that is
granted with it — will fluctuate over space, time and context (Swartz, 1997). Furthermore,
one form of capital may be converted into another form of capital; for example economic
capital may be used to accumulate cultural capital through acquiring a university degree
or purchasing tickets to the final of a tennis tournament.

Bourdieu (1989) expresses that capital determines the place an agent occupies
within the social space:

Thus agents are distributed in the overall social space, in the first dimension,
according to the overall volume of capital they possess and, in the second
dimension, according to the structure of their capital, that is, the relative
weight of the different species of capital, economic and cultural, in the total
volume of their assets. (p. 17)

Agents draw on their bank of capital in their attempts to exercise power or resist the
power of others. The third Bourdiesian concept is field which is used to explain the social
space in which capital and habitus operate.

Swartz (1997) explains that Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and capital were
evident in his earlier work in the 1960s, while the third concept of his trilogy was
developed during the 1970s and 1980s in order to break from the positivist concepts of
milieu, context and social background and “draw attention to the latent patterns of interest
and struggles that shape” existence (Swartz, 1997, p. 119). Field is defined by Bourdieu
and Wacquant (1992) as:

Network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions. These
positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations
they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present
and potential situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of
power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific
profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to
other positions (domination, subordination, homology etc.). (p. 97)

The field is the arena for potential or active struggles around the production, accumulation
and circulation of capital (Navarro, 2006; Swartz, 1997; Tomlinson, 2004). Within fields,
the actors ‘play the game’ to accumulate different — and more importantly legitimate —
kinds of capital. In the process of this game, the actors struggle over defining what is
considered to be the most valued resources within the field of play, that is, “for the right to
monopolize the exercise of ‘symbolic violence’” (Swartz, 1997, p. 123). Of particular
significance to the examination of Melbourne as a ‘sport city’ is the struggles that take
place within the arena referred to by Bourdieu (1994a) as the ‘bureaucratic field’.
Wacquant (2004) explains that Bourdieu’s understanding of the bureaucratic field is a major contribution to sociology and adds to his theory of the field of power and of the state as the agency that successfully claims monopoly over the legitimate use of material and symbolic violence. By reconceptualising “the state as the central ‘bank of symbolic capital guaranteeing all acts of authority’ situated at the barycentre of the field of power” (Wacquant, 2004, p. 8), Bourdieu breaks from the “vision of ‘the state’ as an organizational monolith” (Wacquant, 2004, p. 8) to explain that the state’s influence is also inculcated within the agent, as a form of state habitus (Bourdieu, 1994a).

Wacquant (2013) explains the bureaucratic field, by focusing on “the web of administrative agencies that both collaborate to enforce official identities and compete to regulate social activities and enact public authority” (p. 10) and puts the “spotlight on the distribution (or not) of public goods” (p. 10). As such, a central goal of this thesis is to critically analyse the Victorian Government’s economic strategies (that is, the ‘official’ vision for the distribution of public resources), regulation of major sporting events and any resistance to these events, in conjunction with the state’s central role in constructing a social reality that values major sporting events located in the city of Melbourne.

Before my examination of the state as the central bank of symbolic capital driving the processes of neoliberalism (Wacquant, 2004) materialises, I will firstly provide the context in which the Victorian state operates (chapters 5-9) and secondly illustrate the (re)production, (re)consumption, (re)presentation and regulation of the ‘sport city’ as a cultural artefact (chapter 10). Positioning the ‘sport city’ as a cultural artefact, I employ du Gay et al.’s (1997) circuit of culture to ground my examination of Melbourne. As such, I will now turn to an explanation of the oft-used circuit of culture.

The Circuit of Culture

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66 As noted at the beginning of chapter 2, Reader (2004) explains that cities are artefacts that reflect human development as well as representing the values and ideologies that shape a society.
67 Chatterton and Hollands (2002) employ a similar technique when analysing ‘urban playscapes’.
68 Hall’s encoding/decoding theory argues that the dominant ideology is typically inscribed as the ‘preferred reading’ in a media text, but this preferred reading is not automatically adopted by the reader. The social situation of the reader will determine if they adopt the preferred reading or negotiate or oppose the dominant reading (Hall, 1992). Johnson’s (1986) model consists of a circuit involving four ‘moments’: production, texts, readings, and lived cultures/social relations. As a whole, the diagram represents “a circuit of the production, circulation and consumption of cultural
method for examining the biography of a cultural artefact. du Gay and colleagues present a theoretical model based upon the articulation of five major cultural processes or ‘moments’: production, representation, identity, consumption and regulation (see figure 4.1). The authors explain that in order to study a cultural artefact, the researcher needs to “explore how it is represented, what social identities are associated with it, how it is produced and consumed, and what mechanisms regulate its distribution” (1997, p. 3). The articulation, or linkage, of the five cultural processes is a key component of the model; while defined as a circuit, the authors explain that each cultural process articulates with another but in no prescribed order. The authors assert that the absence of a beginning or conclusion to the circuit is due to meaning-making being an ongoing process that “does not end at a pre-ordained place” (du Gay et al., 1997, p. 85). du Gay et al. (1997) explain that each part of the circuit becomes an element of the next part, for example representations become an element of how identities are constructed and what regulatory issues may be raised.

du Gay et al. (1997) present a case study of the Sony Walkman to illustrate the circuit of culture in motion and to provide a “method of analysis involved in doing a ‘cultural study’” (p. 2). The significance of the circuit of culture as a methodological tool is evidenced by the wide range of use within cultural studies to analyse cultural artefacts; including sports advertising campaigns (John & Jackson, 2011; Scherer & Jackson, 2008), a coffee shop in Beijing (Han & Zhang, 2009), mobile phones (Goggin, 2006), a global disease (Curtain & Gaither, 2006), Arab cultural values (Al-Kandari & Gaither, 2011), football hooligan culture (Poulton, 2013) and urban tourism (Wynn, 2012).

du Gay et al. (1997) express that analysing the production of a cultural artefact involves understanding how the object is culturally produced in addition to how it is technically or physically produced. We therefore need to understand how the artefact is products” (p.46). Johnson explains that each moment depends on the others and is indispensable to the whole. However, each moment “is also distinct and characteristic changes in form” (p.46). Johnson explains that to understand these transformations, we must understand specific conditions/contexts of consumption or reading.

69 du Gay et al. (1997) define articulation as “the form of the connection that can make a unity of two or more different or distinct elements, under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, or absolute and essential for all time; rather it is a linkage whose conditions of existence or emergence need to be located in the contingencies of circumstance” (p. 3). Therefore, the context and location in which these linkages occur is vital in the understanding of the cultural artefact.
Figure 4.1: Circuit of culture (adapted from du Gay et al., 1997, p. 3)

‘encoded’ during production and the cultural influences that lead to this encoding. Linking this to ‘the city’, Melbourne has historically been produced and reproduced over time; for example Melbourne’s identity as a manufacturing city in the mid-twentieth century has strategically been re-imaged as a cultural (including sport) city (this shift is outlined in chapter 5). The production of the cultural city is encoded through various vehicles, such as government policy, tourism documents, journalist’s opinion pieces, and city infrastructure. This ‘product’ is then sold to consumers (tourists as well as citizens) through, for example, promotional material, election campaign promises and newspaper reports which encourage the consumer to attend cultural events and approve of government investment in cultural infrastructure.

The representation of a cultural artefact occurs in distinct ways. In particular, representation occurs as a practice of constructing “meaning through the use of signs and language” (du Gay et al., 1997, p. 24). That is, the meaning of an artefact – which impacts on how it is (re)produced and consumed – occurs through a complex process of meaning-making. du Gay et al. (1997) explain that this process involves engaging with the meanings that have been accumulated as the artefact moves through the circuit (for example, during the production of the artefact) as well as historical meanings already attached to the artefact. This ‘moment’ in the circuit involves a contest to construct identification between the consumers of the artefact and the constructed meanings.70 As the authors explain, a ‘cultural language’ is required to speak on behalf of the product as

70 I have not specifically focused on explaining the ‘identity’ phase of the circuit of culture. A discussion of the ‘sport city’ identity is infused throughout my analysis, specifically how the construction of a sporting identity for the city has been used to justify public investment in sporting events and infrastructure.
the artefact does not have an intrinsic meaning and the artefact cannot express its meaning to the consumer (du Gay et al., 1997). Of importance to this ‘moment’ in the circuit of culture is what Bourdieu (2010 [1984]) calls the cultural intermediaries. In the oft-cited passage, cultural intermediaries are classified as the new petite bourgeoisie that: …comes into its own in all the occupations involving presentation and representation (sales, marketing, advertising, public relations, fashion, decoration and so forth) and in all the institutions providing symbolic goods and services. These include the various jobs in medical and social assistance (marriage guidance, sex therapy, dietetics, vocational guidance, paediatric advice etc.) and in cultural production and organization (youth leaders, play leaders, tutors and monitors, radio and TV producers and presenters, magazine journalists), which have expanded considerably in recent years; but also some established occupations, such as art craftsmen and nurses. (p. 359)

Negus (2002) expertly encapsulates the role of cultural intermediaries by explaining that they “shape both use values and exchange values, and seek to manage how these values are connected with people’s lives through various techniques or persuasion and marketing and through the construction of markets” (p. 504). Arguing that Bourdieu’s notion of cultural intermediaries is too narrow, Negus (2002) explains that the strength of the notion of cultural intermediaries is that it allows for a focus on the ‘workers’ who continually engage “in forming a point of connection or articulation between production and consumption” (p. 503). Negus (2002) asserts that a wider range of occupations (citing senior managers and accountants) are involved in the symbolic production between production and consumption; indeed throughout this study I intend to add politicians – particularly those contemporary politicians that are media savvy – to journalists, as key cultural intermediaries in the symbolic production of the ‘sport city’.

The Consumers (citizens and tourists in the current study) of cultural artefacts are not passive in this circuit. du Gay et al. (1997) explain that the meanings of a cultural artefact are contested, and although producers attempt to ‘control’ the meaning through, for example, design, marketing and advertising, the meanings received by consumers are made in usage. Although the producer may represent an artefact with strategic meaning (encoding in Hall’s (1992) terms), the consumer may use (decode) the artefact in an alternative way. du Gay et al. (1997) incorporate a Marxist understanding of this production/consumption relationship, citing Marx’s unfinished manuscript, Grundrisse, to express that a produced cultural artefact drives consumption of the artefact while at the same time, consumption of the artefact drives further production (see Marx & McLellan,
In terms of the ‘sport city’, the production of infrastructure and sporting representations occur when citizens and tourists consume, or are perceived to demand consumption, of the product while at the same time, consumption of the product furthers the desire to produce the product and shape its meaning towards the consuming market. By conceptualising production/consumption as articulated, consumer activities play a role in determining the production of the cultural artefact, as du Gay et al. (1997) express; “the processes of production only provide a series of possibilities that have to be realized in and through consumption” (p. 59).

Finally, the moment of regulation completes du Gay et al.’s circuit. Curtain and Gaither (2007) detail the regulation phase of the circuit of culture:

The moment of regulation comprises controls on cultural activity, ranging from formal and legal controls, such as regulations, laws, and institutionalized systems, to the informal and local controls of cultural norms and expectations that form culture in the more commonly used sense of the term. It’s in the moment of regulation that meanings arise governing what’s acceptable, what’s correct. In simplistic terms, it helps form the context in which public relations activities take place. (p. 38)

As such, regulation of the ‘sport city’ does not simply occur through government laws but may also result from (re)constructed social and cultural norms that exist within the city. Furthermore, regulation may also occur through resistance such as organised public protests or challenges to policies aired through the media.

du Gay and colleagues (1997) explain that in order to adequately study a cultural artefact it must be passed through all five phases of the circuit. It is my intention, in chapter 10 to outline the manner in which the ‘sport city’ has been (re)produced, (re)presented, consumed identified and regulated. In addition, these processes will be infused throughout my examination of the ‘sport city’ in chapter 11. The next section outlines the technique employed to gather material in order to reconstruct specific events that have transpired in the ‘sport city’ during the past thirty years.

Reconstructing the ‘Sport City’

The collection of resources and analysis of material for this thesis is in line with the call from some scholars to implement a multi-method approach to cultural studies (Agger, 1992; Andrews, 1998; Best & Kellner, 1991). This multi-method approach was adopted to

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71 In addition to this Marxist approach to consumption, du Gay et al. (1997) employ a Bourdieusian understanding of consumption by explaining that through consumption, taste is expressed.
first contextualise and then analyse specific practices within particular historical and cultural circuits of power. In order to narrow the field of study, discussions were held with my supervisory team to determine key events that have shaped Melbourne as a ‘sport city’ in recent times. I acknowledge that these ‘key events’ were subjectively selected; indeed certain major events, such as the Australian rules football Grand Final and Melbourne Cup racing carnival along with a specific focus on major sporting infrastructure such as the Melbourne Cricket Ground (MCG) and Melbourne Sports and Aquatics Centre are not included as a focus in this study – although each of these are briefly discussed within the context of the selected case-studies. In addition to narrowing the events, a restricted timeframe was decided to encompass key political and sporting decisions occurring after 1984 – that is, from the time after the release of the State Labor government’s *Victoria: The Next Step* economic strategy which included a stated aim of using sport as a ‘competitive advantage’ for the state. As such, it was determined that analysis should focus on:

1. The National Tennis Centre (location of the Australian Open Tennis Championships),
2. Multi-sports events (specifically the failed bid for the 1996 Olympic Games and successful bid and hosting of 2006 Commonwealth Games),
3. The Australian Formula One Grand Prix, and
4. City-centred Sports Stadiums (specifically Docklands stadium, the Rectangular Stadium and closure of the suburban Waverley Park stadium).

Each of these events represents a new sporting development in Melbourne, within the study’s timeframe, rather than the expansion of an event or updating of infrastructure – such as refurbishments of Flemington race-track or upgrades to the MCG.

S. J. King (2005) explains that in order to ‘do’ cultural studies, “it is necessary to reconstruct or fabricate the network of social, political, economic, and cultural articulations, or linkages, that produce any particular cultural phenomenon and trace, in turn, how the phenomenon (re)shapes the formation of which it is a part” (p. 27). As such, a contextual analysis of media material, specifically newspaper articles, editorials and ‘letters to the editor’ was the first methodological step undertaken in order to reconstruct the events and highlight issues of contest. Media content was limited to two mainstream newspapers, *The Age* and *Herald Sun,*\(^{72}\) which were selected due to their wide

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\(^{72}\) The *Herald Sun* is made up for the *Herald* and the *Sun* newspapers which amalgamated in 1990. As such, both the *Herald* and *Sun* newspapers were searched for events that occurred prior to 1990.
In addition, the selected newspapers represent two of the largest media companies operating in Australia; *The Age* is a broadsheet newspaper published by Fairfax Media while the *Herald Sun* is a tabloid newspaper owned by News Limited. Content was narrowed by ‘selecting’ key moments in the development of events during each case-study (see Appendix A). These key moments included announcements of new developments, events and Government Acts as well as the selection of sites for development, completion of infrastructure construction and the hosting of the sporting events and ‘opening’ of stadiums.

Initially, articles, editorials and letters were collected using microfilm at the State Library of Victoria (microfilm rather than an online database was employed because digitising of the selected newspapers did not cover the entire period of analysis). This content was subsequently added to by searching for material using the search engine available on each newspaper’s website in an attempt to ensure minimal content was overlooked. All newspaper articles, editorials and letters that mentioned the ‘key events’ of any of the four case studies was collected for analysis. In addition, transcripts from parliamentary debate obtained through Hansard on the Parliament of Victoria website was collected to ‘check’ reliability of journalist reports and provide additional Political voice. Moreover, transcripts from parliament debate along with government policy and public audit reports (such as those released by the Auditor General) were collected to help contextualise the ‘political field’. While policy analysis was not undertaken *per se*, government policies over the period of study were employed to illustrate the strategic focus and vision of the state government throughout the period of analysis.

The material acquired from newspapers, policy and parliamentary debate is useful for contextualising the case studies, however for a deeper understanding of the contests is required. As such, semi-structured interviews with key ‘decision-makers’ – including former state premiers, current members of parliament and CEO’s of major state sports

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73 The *Herald Sun* claims a readership of 1.3 million Victorians each day (Herald Sun, 2014) while *The Age* claims an average daily readership of 0.7 million (Fairfax Media, 2014).

74 While specific events were ‘selected’ with specified search time-frames, in searching for selected events material for other case-studies was often discovered. Rather than ignoring or excluding material that did not fit within the searched time-frame, the material was included to add greater detail to the illustration of struggles and contests that emerged in each case-study.

75 However, the archive content from these search engines is limited to material post-1990 due to the newspapers not digitising material pre-1990.

76 Again, I acknowledge the subjective ‘selection’ of key moments in which to focus my search of Hansard. Once issues emerged through the newspaper search, such as the Grand Prix Act, I searched Hansard for relevant parliament debate using the website’s search engine.
trusts – was undertaken to delve further into the reasons why decisions were made and what impacts these decisions had. In addition to political decision-makers, the president of a major resistant group was interviewed along with a sports journalist and a former editor of *The Age* (see Appendix B). Participants were purposively selected to represent the various decision-makers and cultural producers of the ‘sport city’. Access was obtained through direct (email and telephone) requests and chain referral or ‘snowballing’ (see Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). I acknowledge the role of serendipity (Amis, 2005) in this snowballing process as interviewees provided invaluable access to further, previously unattainable, contacts.

As a number of scholars note, social research is often influenced by the experiences and background of the researcher (see Amis, 2005; Hammersley & Gomm, 1997; Plymire, 2005). Therefore, I acknowledge that the ‘reading’ of these interviews is influenced from my own experiences and background and as such, acknowledge that the stories told are not other people’s stories; rather I am telling my take on their stories (Bruce, 1998; Maguire & Young, 2002). In addition, as Bruce (1998) explains, the quotes used throughout this thesis are selected, edited and represented in ways to make them more comprehensible and readable.

Interviews were semi-structured and designed with a ‘general interview guide’ (Amis, 2005) (see Appendix C). Following Amis’ (2005) interviewing recommendations, all interview transcripts were returned to the participant for review and amendment. In addition, a number of participants requested specific extracts of the transcript would be used for analysis, as such, these were provided to the participant for approval. Participants were provided the option of anonymity; however all but one participant agreed to be identified.

Some limitations and barriers were met throughout the interview process. Not all interview requests were accepted; with particular difficulty encountered during attempts to obtain interviews with current state politicians and representatives from the *Herald Sun* newspaper despite repeated requests. Due to some of content being commercially sensitive, some participants were unable to divulge all information about specific issues and events. Furthermore, as the time-frame of this analysis covers an era of more than thirty years, some participants may have been unable to recollect all events that

77 Despite numerous attempts, all requests to interview journalists/editors from the *Herald Sun* were rejected.

78 Bruce (1998) and Maguire and Young (2002) explain that different interpretations and understandings of reality exists, none of which comprise the one and only ‘truth’.
transpired; as such, the contextual information obtained from newspaper reports and Hansard were intended to triangulate participant responses and ‘fill-in any gaps’.

The ‘consumption’ of the ‘sport city’ was illustrated through ‘letters to the editor’, I acknowledge the weaknesses inherent in this technique – specifically, these letters are ‘edited’ and ‘selected’ by a newspaper editor (a significant cultural intermediary) and the individuals that are willing and able to write to the newspaper are not necessarily a reflection of the population. While I incorporated newspaper opinion polls in my discussion in an attempt to grasp a wider understanding of public opinion, I likewise acknowledge the inherent weaknesses of this data as representative of the population.

Throughout this chapter I have outlined the analytical tools that will be employed for this study. Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice, incorporating the concepts of *habitus*, *capital* and *field*, will be applied to the examination of the ‘sport city’; meanwhile du Gay *et al.*’s (1997) *circuit of culture* will ‘ground’ the analysis. Accepting Silk *et al.*’s (2005) assertion of the importance of context, expressed at the beginning of this chapter, I now move forward to outline the political context in which decisions were made regarding Melbourne’s sporting infrastructure and events. Once an understanding of this political context has been grasped, I provide four sporting case-studies to illustrate the struggles and contests that are evident within the ‘bureaucratic field’.
Chapter 5: Context
The city of Melbourne, in the last 30 years, has been (re)constructed and re-imaged as a result of deindustrialisation and the adoption of an urban entrepreneurial approach to governance. In order to examine the ‘sport city’ it is important to provide the political background in which decisions were being made and the environment in which contests and disputes were occurring. As such, the aim of this section is to illustrate the context in which the ‘sport city’ of Melbourne has formed. The scope of this section does not include an entire history of the city; however I will provide a brief overview of the development of Melbourne - socially, politically and culturally before outlining a sporting history of Australia and Melbourne. I will then outline the political context of Victoria from 1982 to 2014 in order to reveal the broad political ideologies of the governments that have directed the (re)construction of the city, with a specific focus on strategies that have employed sport and major events as key economic drivers for the state.

A brief history of Melbourne
Melbourne was ‘founded’ by Europeans in 1835 when settlers of Tasmania (then Van Diemen’s Land) formed the Port Phillip Association with the purpose of pastoral exploration (City of Melbourne, 1997; 2012; Newnham, 1985). The village that would develop into the city of Melbourne was situated by John Batman approximately six miles up the Yarra River (City of Melbourne, 1997; 2012). At the time, British settlers treated Australia as terra nullius - as un-owned land (Banner, 2005; Buchan & Heath, 2006). By 1837, the area around the settlement had been surveyed, a design for a town was planned and allotments were auctioned off by the Crown to purchasers who were required to “erect a substantial building on the land within two years” (City of Melbourne, 1997, p. 12). The settlement was accorded the title of ‘town’ on August 12, 1842 and then granted

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79 Banner (2005) explains that defining Australia as terra nullius initially occurred because early European discoverers believed few Aborigines lived on Australia and those that did live on the continent were nomadic people and as such did not ‘occupy’ any land. In addition, it was assumed that the Aborigines “would not offer as much military resistance as other indigenous peoples the British had encountered” (Banner, 2005, p. 131). Buchan and Heath (2006) explain that when Australia was established as a British colony the sovereignty of British law was proclaimed and no other law or sovereignty was recognised; Aborigines immediately became defined as ‘subjects of the Crown’ and as such, prior right to land was instantly shorn. Despite terra nullius, John Batman had attempted to purchase the land that has since become Melbourne from eight Aboriginal chiefs, however the purchase agreement was deemed illegal by the Crown for fear that it indicating prior Aboriginal land ownership (see Banner, 2005, City of Melbourne, 1997; 2012).
city status by Queen Victoria on June 25, 1847 (City of Melbourne, 1997; 2012). In 1851, governance of the area was separated from New South Wales (NSW) and Melbourne became the capital of the self-governing colony named Victoria. In 1901, the six British self-governing colonies (NSW, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia) federated, forming the Commonwealth of Australia; with each colony – now a state – keeping a high degree of autonomy for the governing of its territory.

Substantial urban growth in Melbourne occurred over three periods according to Davison (1997). In the 1850s, with the discovery of gold in Victoria, the city of Melbourne experienced an influx of migrants looking to prosper from the resource and associated industries (City of Melbourne, 1997; Davison, 1997; Newnham, 1985). Soon after the gold rush, property speculators drove the Melbourne ‘land boom’ between 1883 and 1889 (Davison, 1997; 2004; Museum of Victoria, n.d.). However, with slowing growth, business confidence stalled and the boom collapsed, leading to an economic depression which Davison (2004) explains caused Melbourne to be surpassed by Sydney in population, as a place for investment, and general ‘zest’. The third period of growth for Melbourne came in the 1950s and 1960s with post-WWII migration (Davison, 1997; 2004). The Australian government actively encouraged immigration, the Department of Immigration “proclaimed the need to ‘populate or perish’” (Walsh, 2008, p. 794) and Melbourne served as the first port of call for sea-borne European immigrants (Davison, 2004). Walsh (2008) explains that immigration served three purposes; (i) to help exploit and cultivate the natural resources of Australia, (ii) to “establish scale economies by expanding labor and consumer markets” (p. 794), and (iii) to “establish a nationally aggregated economy insulated from external factors and competition” (p. 794). In particular, foreign workers were recruited to fuel industrial expansion (Walsh, 2008). Luckins (2009) explains that it was as early as the 1950s that Melburnians began to describe their city as being cosmopolitan, in recognition of the migrants from Continental Europe, especially Greece and Italy, “who settled in the inner suburbs… [and] brought with them a cosmopolitan mentality and influenced food, fashion, music, design, business, sport, dance, religion and art and craft” (p. 267).

In addition to post-WWII European migration, the mid-twentieth century decades included significant American investment in the motor car and expansion of electrical

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80 Officially, Melbourne was not a city until August 3, 1849 when the Act of Colonial Legislature was approved (City of Melbourne, 1997; 2012).

81 Walsh (2008) notes that while immigration was encouraged, it was encouraged firstly from Britain and secondly from Europe, meanwhile non-European migration remained largely restricted.
industries throughout Australia, particularly in Victoria (Winter & Bryson, 1998). Further to the influx of American manufacturing, Australia began to shift political allegiance away from Britain towards America (Winter & Bryson, 1998). Rolfe (1997) provides a useful illustration of the ‘Americanisation’ of Australia from the 1940s to 1960s. Rolfe asserts that Fordism and the ‘politics of productivity’ that it entails had a significant impact; ‘Americanisms’ such as the “language of ‘productivity’, ‘growth’, and ‘way of life’ were adopted to change the old Australian banners of full employment and ‘rising standards of living’ and modernise Australia along Fordist lines” (Rolfe, 1997, p. 192). Continuing, Rolfe explains that the Liberal Party, while in opposition in the late 1940s, successfully combined with business leaders to propagate the ‘American way of life’ while condemning the Australian Labor Party for its socialism and responsibility for Australia’s post-war resource problems.

A key element of this ‘American dream’ and Fordism was suburbia; “the bungalow in the sprawling suburbs, with all the consumer treats and a car in the driveway, was the focus for a vast Fordist complex” (Rolfe, 1997, p.191). Supporting the suburban dream, federal and state governments of Australia actively encouraged a rush to the suburbs through policies such as the 1956 Commonwealth State Housing Agreement (Rolfe, 1997; Winter & Bryson, 1998). Moreover, with new factories being located on ‘greenfield’ sites in the outer suburbs of Melbourne, many people chose to live in the suburbs, close to their employment (Frost & O’Hanlon, 2009). Furthermore, the undesirability of the inner-city as a place to live (Shaw, 2005) and an increase in car ownership (Frost & O’Hanlon, 2009; Winter & Bryson, 1998) led to Melbourne resembling a ‘doughnut city’ in which the centre was emptied of people and activity after business hours (Department of Infrastructure, Victoria, 1998). Davison (1997) encapsulates the context of Melbourne during the post-war period; between 1950 and 1970, Melbourne became the fastest growing capital in Australia and “exemplified the Fordist paradigm of urban growth – high

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82 This reorientation occurred, in part, because of the military weakness of Britain, and strength of the USA, in the Pacific region (Lee, 1992; McLean, 2006) as well as the USA’s identity as a global power (Winter & Bryson, 1998).

83 The use of the term ‘Americanisation’ refers to the American importation of corporations and culture, but I acknowledge that this is not a one-way process of cultural imperialism.

84 In the late 1940s many countries outside of the US, including Australia, endured food shortages and rationing (Rolfe, 1997).

85 Winter & Bryson (1998) explain that home ownership is a “predominant feature of Australian social and institutional life” (p.62) and “Australian governments have always been reluctant landlords” (p.62); the Commonwealth State Housing Agreement (1956) supported the financing of home ownership through federally managed funds (Dodson, 2012).
investment in manufacturing, especially protected consumer products such as cars and electrical goods, high levels of immigration, high levels of car and home ownership and high levels of government interventions in the provision of infrastructure” (p. 66). Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Sydney continued to grow quicker than Melbourne and was the preferred economic location for investment in Australia. Melbourne, with its ‘cosmopolitan' identity continued to strengthen its “cultural and scientific institutions and its vibrant restaurant and fashion culture” (Davison, 2004, p. 320). Melburnians, Davison (2004) explains, began to congratulate their ‘civilised' way of life as being of greater importance than Sydney’s economic progress.

This period is most notable for the deindustrialisation of Melbourne that followed the reduction of protective tariffs in the early 1970s (Howe, 2009). The process began rapidly, according to Dingle and O’Hanlon (2009), when the Whitlam Labor Government introduced a 25 per cent tariff cut across-the-board. The global recession of the early 1970s led economists around the world to conclude that the heavily protected economy was unsustainable in the long term, and that deregulation and privatisation would create an efficient market-place (Dingle & O’Hanlon, 2009). A growth in the service and finance sector along with a decline in manufacturing was a major feature of this economic restructuring (Forrest, 1995; Sandercock & Dovey, 2002). O’Hanlon (2009) explains that during the 1970s the number of manufacturing jobs in inner-Melbourne declined by one third. In addition, when the federal government further deregulated the Australian banking system in 1983, most of the new jobs and investment flowed to Sydney rather than Melbourne (Sandercock & Dovey, 2002; Searle, 1998).

By the early 1980s, Melbourne was deteriorating with inner-city business/factory closures resulting in derelict buildings throughout the CBD (O’Hanlon, 2009). Harkness (2013) explains that despite attempts by the Hamer/Thompson Liberal governments to reverse the effects of deindustrialisation, the business community became impatient with a Liberal government that had been in power for 27 years. As a result of continued economic recession, ‘dubious’ land purchases and an efficient media campaign by the Labor Opposition (see Harkness, 2013) the Liberal party lost some of its safe seats in the south-east of Melbourne, handing power to the John Cain-led Labor party in April, 1982.

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87 Forrest (1995) explains that Melbourne was over-represented in protected industries (such as, clothing-textiles-footwear) while Sydney’s manufacturing sector was more focused on the unprotected or less protected sector (such as basic metals fabrication) and therefore deregulation had a greater effect on the Melbourne manufacturing industries.
Turner (1994) explains that during the 1980s a discursive shift in political debate occurred; the ‘economy’ moved to a central position in all issues, even those once consider ‘social’ such as racism and gender discrimination. Turner explains that prior to the 1980s, Australians were suspicious of deregulated competitive capitalism as the “principles of solidarity fundamental to Australian laborism ... militated against a great enthusiasm for gung-ho capitalists. Anyone whose life was dominated by the making of money had to be doing so at someone else’s expense and therefore could not be trusted” (Turner, 1994, p. 16). While Australia is not unique in its political and cultural shift to competitive capitalism; Turner explains that the case of Australia is interesting in demonstrating the remarkable escalation of an ideology that celebrates competitive capitalism in a nation that prided itself on the principles of laborism. Moreover, the support for such an ideology came from the left; “the alliance between business and Labor governments at the state and federal level since 1983 is probably unprecedented in Australian history” (Turner, 1994, p. 22).

In Victoria, the Cain Labor government won election through criticism of Victoria’s weakening economy under the Hamer/Thompson Liberal government of the 1970s and duly implemented a Keynesian-style interventionist economic strategy based on selecting and investing in Victoria’s perceived competitive strengths. Cain was followed by Jeff Kennett, a political larrikin (Economou, 2006), who adopted an extreme neoliberal agenda which has largely been replicated by successive Labor and Liberal-National Coalition governments. Nicholas Economou (2006) illustrates the philosophy of Kennett, and arguably subsequent premiers of Victoria: “Kennett conceptualised modern government in corporate terminology with himself as the CEO, the Cabinet as the board of directors and the citizens of Victoria as the shareholders” (p. 371). The first goal for Kennett was to get his company back in the black. A more in-depth discussion of the political years 1982-2014 follows a brief history of sport in Australia and Melbourne.

**Historical sporting context**

The aim of this section is to briefly outline the importance of sport to Australians and Melburnians. I begin by discussing the intervention of sport in Australian society in the decades soon after British settlement. I then discuss potential reasons as to why a strong

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88 While a detailed history of Victorian sport is not provided here, an ‘encyclopaedia’ of Victorian sport has recently been published by Nadel and Ryan (2015) under the auspices of the Australian Society for Sports History (ASSH). For a complete social history of Australian sport, see Cashman (1995); Mangan and Nauright (2000) and Vamplew and Stoddart (1994).
sporting culture exists in Melbourne before providing a succinct historical account of the sports analysed in the four case studies which follow this chapter.

Sports historians have explained that Australia’s sporting culture emerged as a result of European colonisation occurring at a time when sports were being rationalised and codified in Great Britain and Ireland (Adair, 2009; Cashman, 1995; Hay, 2010; Macintyre, 2000; Vamplew, 1994). Adair (2009), for example, asserts that race courses, cricket ovals and football pitches were part of the colonial drive to recreate the sportscapes of the land they had recently departed. Meanwhile, Vamplew (1994) states that “sport was part of the cultural baggage brought out to Australia by the convicts, the free settlers and the accompanying administrative and military personnel” (p. 1). Cashman (1995) explains that a number of additional factors led to sport becoming a foremost cultural pastime of many Australians during the late nineteenth century, and subsequently forming a key component of early Australian identity. These included town planning, which strategically located sport in accessible and central locations, early economic prosperity (due to an economic boom between 1860 and 1890) which meant elaborate sportscapes were created by state governments and private clubs while a large section of the working class had the financial means to indulge in sport and, in the absence of a great war which could unite the populace, sport (particularly cricket) filled the gap and was actively used to unite Australians.

However, despite this ‘unification’ through sport, women and Aboriginal people were largely absent from Australian sport (Hay, 2010; Vamplew, 1994). Vamplew (1994) explains that women’s participation in ‘feminine’ sports was approved of and that this participation, like in many other countries, has increased since the 1960s – despite a media which still underrepresents and sexualises women’s involvement in sport. While Vamplew (1994) asserts that sport is the activity that Aboriginal people have received the most recognition from amongst the white Australian population; this celebration of Aboriginal participation in sport has largely been restricted to boxing, rugby league and Australian rules football. Hay (2010) however expresses that while there is now an

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89 That is not to say women were completely absent, indeed Hess (2000) illustrates the role of women during the early years of Australian rule football while Burroughs and Nauright (2000) explain that girls were playing tennis in inter-school competitions during the late nineteenth century and netball became a popular female sport from the early twentieth century.

90 I refer to ‘sport’ in this instance as rationalised/codified European sport.
overrepresentation of male Aboriginal athletes in senior Australian rules football, between 1906 and 1980 only 18 athletes who played at senior level were Aboriginal.\textsuperscript{91}

While sport is generally considered an important element of being ‘Australian,’ Melburnians regard their city as having the strongest sporting culture across the nation. Cashman and Hickie (1990), comparing Melbourne with Sydney, suggest seven possible hypotheses as to why the cultures of the two cities diverged and Melbourne seemingly developed a greater sporting culture: (i) dullness of Melbourne leads to high spectatorship at sport due to a lack of alternative leisure activities – the authors largely rule this hypothesis out as some sort of Sydney-based facetious theory; (ii) early administrators in Melbourne were able to organise sporting infrastructure in an efficient and business-like manner due to a more homogenous elite from 1835 which emerged from the Melbourne Club, Melbourne Cricket Club and Victoria Turf Club and represented an ‘inner circle’ who were the leaders of Melbourne society;\textsuperscript{92} (iii) the timing of European settlement in Melbourne occurred when sports were increasingly being rationalised in Britain; (iv) Melbourne had a larger network of boys public schools which encouraged inter-school competition in various sports – most notably Australian rules football – at the end of the nineteenth century as the Victorian population and economy surged with the 1850s gold rush and 1880s land boom; (v) wealth from the 1850s gold rush led to sporting products being in demand as sportscapes (such as race-courses and sporting ovals) could be created and utilised by a wealthy population in terms of gambling and spectatorship; (vi) Melbourne’s relatively flat geography facilitated the formation of sporting grounds – of significant size – as well as the creation of a transport network to service these

\textsuperscript{91} In addition, Hay (2010) outlines the arguments regarding the influence of Aboriginal games and culture on creation of Australian rules football but concludes that it is unlikely Aboriginal influence was too strong.

\textsuperscript{92} Indeed, two current major sportscapes in Melbourne were established very soon after the city was founded in 1835. The Melbourne Cricket Club was established in 1838 (Cashmore & Hickie, 1990; Hay, 2010) and selected the current site of the Melbourne Cricket Ground in 1853 as the location for its cricket matches. In 1839 a search was initiated for a suitable site for a racecourse and the first race meeting, at what is now Flemington Racecourse, occurred in March, 1840 (Cashmore & Hickie, 1990; ‘The story of Flemington’, 1910). While both these sportscapes remain iconic in Melbourne, the significance of the ‘Clubs’ associated with these places was captured by Hay (2010). Hay explains that membership of leading institutions, including the Melbourne Cricket Club and the Turf Club, “overlapped and, before and for the first years after the establishment of representative government in the colony, they collectively formed its social and political establishment” (p. 955). As such, it appears that a connection to or through sport significantly impacted on the political, social and cultural establishment of the city.
recreational spaces, which enabled large crowds to attend events and; (vii) the town planning of Melbourne avoided urban congestion by spreading outwards through the creation of suburbs which meant that “the city of Melbourne was much less densely developed hence there was more available space for recreation in the immediate vicinity of the city” (Cashman & Hickie, 1990, p. 42). Cashmore and Hickie (1990) conclude that the availability of space – due to geography and town planning – in ideal locations enhances the significance of an activity to the local community. Therefore, by allocating sport to preferred and convenient spaces in and around the city, a culture of valuing sport was constructed by the political elite during the early phases of Melbourne’s establishment.

Davison (1997) cites the 1956 Olympic Games as a pivotal event in the modernisation of Melbourne, asserting that it served as a catalyst to social and political change; specifically the rise to power of the entrepreneurial political and business class.93 The Games, Luckins (2007) explains, stimulated Melburnians to reflect on the urban culture of the city which “once had been cosmopolitan but had become submerged by restrictive practices” (p. 83). Demonstrating the ideological shift in urban governance, Davison’s (1997) analysis focuses on the organisation of the Games which centred on a contest between two visions of civic progress; traditional and modernising.94 While the ‘traditionalists’ viewed the Games as a sporting event which highlighted and emphasised amateurist ideals,95 the ‘modernisers’ promoted a business approach to organising the Games, and viewed the event as an opportunity to brand Melbourne to the world. Davison concludes that the Games were essentially sought to impress the world and claims that, 93 “The Melbourne Olympics may be seen as a curtain-raiser to the rise of modernist Melbourne. Between 1950 and 1970, Melbourne became … the main beach-head of American economic and cultural influence and the leading centre of modernist innovation in art, architecture and design” (Davison, 1997, p. 66).
94 In addition to this ideological and organisational dispute, Davison (1997) highlighted the disputes over the main stadium and financing (some viewed the event as extravagant and specifically cited a need to address a public housing shortage). Furthermore, Davison illustrated the Anglo-centric representation of Melbourne, through the Games opening ceremony and associated promotional material, despite more than a decade of increased immigration from continental Europe.
95 Eitzen (1989) explains that the amateurist ideals of sport is fundamentally about the love of the game and implies that “(1) the amateur derives pleasure from the contest; (2) the activity is freely chosen; (3) the process is every bit as important as the outcome; (4) the motivation to participate comes from the intrinsic rewards from the activity rather than the extrinsic rewards of money and fame; and (5) because there is a love of sport for its own sake, there is a climate of sportspersonship surrounding amateur sport” (p. 95).
with an emphasis on reimagining the city, the modernisers were successful in progressing Melbourne. In addition to modernising Melbourne, Magdalinski (2000) explains that the Games has a lasting significance on the city’s (and Australia’s) identity by positioning Melbourne and the nation as a sporting state which has helped legitimise public investment into sport ever since.⁹⁶

I now shift focus to briefly discuss the sports central to the four case studies of this thesis; that is, tennis, the Olympic/Commonwealth Games, the Australian Grand Prix motor race and, various codes of football. In the late nineteenth century tennis gained popularity around Australia (Kinross-Smith, 1994; O’Farrell, 1985) due to the conducive climate for outdoor sports, abundance of land and the association of tennis with ‘Britishness’ (McCarthy & Frawley, 2008). Moreover, early success by individuals and teams in the Davis Cup – an international men’s team competition – helped give the sport legitimacy and heightened media coverage (McCarthy & Frawley, 2008). While promoted to all social classes (McCarthy & Frawley, 2008), tennis largely remained a sport for the middle-upper classes in Australia (O’Farrell, 1985). Indeed, O’Farrell (1985) expresses that tennis in Australia “must be analysed in terms of the growth of an egalitarian spirit” (p.69) which has resulted in the sport being “an integral part of the Australian national heritage and character [despite] being the exclusive domain of the rich” (pp. 77-78). As such, the class divisiveness of tennis is overridden, in Australia, by a strong sense of nationalism which has been built upon the historical success of Australian tennis athletes.

While other major sporting events such as the Australian rules football Grand Final and Melbourne Cup promoted the city of Melbourne to a domestic audience, it is arguably the 1956 Olympics which was the first sporting event strategically used, by Melbourne’s urban and political elite, to advertise the city to a global audience in order to acquire international economic investment and to ‘modernise’ the city.⁹⁷ It is within a context of increasing ‘cosmopolitanism’ as a result of European migration, along with American-influenced ‘Fordism’ that Melbourne hosted the 1956 Olympics Games; it would be 50 years until Melbourne next hosted a major multi-sport event - the 2006 Commonwealth Games. In the meantime the Victorian government submitted a bid for the 1974

⁹⁶ As Cashmore and Hickie (1990) and Hay (2010) explain, Melburnian’s valued sports early in its foundation but many sporting events were ‘local’ including the Melbourne Cup and Australian rules football. The 1956 Olympics, Davison (1997) argues, allowed Melburnian’s to showcase their sporting passion on the global stage and, as such, re-emphasised this sporting identity at a grander level.

⁹⁷ Davison (1997) notes the similarity between the use of the Melbourne International Exhibition in 1880 at a time of urban growth in the city from the land booms and the 1956 Olympics during the post-WWII phase of urban growth as global events to ‘sell’ the city.
Commonwealth Games (losing the vote 36 to 2 to Christchurch), considered a bid for the 1988 Olympic Games (withdrawing after it became evident that federal political support was absent (Jobling, 1994)) and, won a bitter internal bidding process but lost the international bid for the 1996 Olympic Games (see chapter 7).

Despite motor-racing having a significant history in Australia and Victoria, little academic research exists on the sport. Vamplew and Stoddart (1994) and Mangan and Nauright (2000) make no mention of motor-racing in Victoria in their respected books on the social history of Australian sport. Meanwhile, Cashmore (1995) and Booth (1995) only briefly refer to the State Governments of Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia, since the 1970s, competing for motor-racing events to showcase their capital cities. As such, a historical analysis of motor-sport in Australia and Victoria more specifically is required. It is generally accepted that the first Australian Grand Prix was held in 1928 at Phillip Island, Victoria (see Howard, 1986). Subsequent races have been held across Australia with only the Northern Territory not hosting an event. A number of locations in Victoria have hosted the Australian Grand Prix, including Albert Park in 1953 and 1956. However, a Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile World Championship race was not held in Australia until 1985 when the South Australian government successfully bid for the event (Burns, Hatch & Mules, 1986). Adelaide hosted the Formula One Grand Prix eleven times before the race moved to Melbourne in 1996 in controversial circumstances (Lowes, 2004; see chapter 8).

All forms of football are played across Australia, however rugby union and rugby league are often regarded as codes popular in New South Wales and Queensland while Australian rules, the ‘indigenous’ game established in Victoria, is usually considered the main football code in Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory (Hess & Nicholson, 2007; Hess, Nicholson, Stewart & De Moore, 2008). Despite soccer sometimes being referred to as the ‘ethnic’ sport (Baker & Rowe, 2014; Hallinan, Hughson & Burke, 2007; Hay, 2006; Vamplew, 2015), in reference to the non-Anglo identity of many clubs and supporters, it maintains the highest rate of participation across the nation (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009). Australian rules

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98 Indeed, the 1970s, Nicholson and Hess (2007) contend, should be regarded as the ‘tipping point’ in Australian sport as government, media and public appeal for Olympic success gained impetus, while state governments increasingly saw a value in hosting major sporting events.

99 Due to the various codes of football played in Australia, I will refer to Association football as ‘soccer’ throughout this thesis.

100 Hallinan et al. (2007) explain that soccer is often represented as “un-Australian – or less Australian than other sports – because many teams and clubs were founded by, and remain linked organizationally, to non-Anglo ethnic communities” (p.284).
football, Hess and Nicholson (2007) explain, was originally known as ‘Melbourne rules’ and administrators of the sport began attempts to spread the game around Australia soon after the sport originated in 1858. However, the ‘Victorian’ name of the game, the authors explain, “provides some indication as to why New South Wales, or at least the insular press of Sydney, resisted attempts to popularise the Victorian game” (p. 44). In addition, the rise of rugby union internationally – as evident by successful New Zealand and South African tours of Britain – allowed boosters of rugby in NSW to claim it as the most important form of football in developing an Australian identity. Zakus and Horton (2007) outline the history of rugby union in Australia revealing that the sport has been played in Sydney since 1865 and, in part, through a sporting rivalry with Queensland the administrators were able to ground the sport as significant in those two states at a time when Australian rules football and soccer were encroaching. While both rugby union and league have a history in Melbourne, media coverage and resources have always been dwarfed by Australian rules football. Soccer was a relatively late starter in Victoria, with the first game in 1883 (at least 25 years after Australian rules football). Hess and Nicholson (2007) explain that, “soccer enjoyed several surges of popularity, notably in times of prosperity…but these boom periods were fuelled by immigrants rather than by locally born participants” (p. 56). These new citizens were dissatisfied with the suburban or district structure of Australian sport and “tended to establish their teams with an ethnic bias” (Hess & Nicholson, 2007, p. 56).

I acknowledge again that this is far from a complete historical picture of the football codes, tennis, motor-racing and multi-sport events in Melbourne. However, it is evident that a strong culture of sport – with many of those covered here at the epicentre – existed in Melbourne soon after European settlement and as such has served to shape the cultural and physical landscapes of the city.

**Political Context (1982-2014)**

I have, so far, provided a brief history of the state of Victoria and the city of Melbourne as well as indicated the historical construction of a sporting culture; I will now outline the political context of Victoria from 1982 to 2014 with an emphasis on the political use of

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101 Hess and Nicholson (2007) explain that origin of football in Australia is rather ‘murky’ but most regarded the beginning of a codified style of the sport in 1858.

102 Partly in response to the ‘ethnised’ nature of soccer, Football Federation Australia sought to ‘corporatise’ the code with the establishment of the A-League in 2004. Hallinan et al. (2007) highlight the manner in which the “new A-league appears to have diluted the multicultural character of Australian soccer in favour of a ‘one Australia’ sporting domain” (p. 288).
major sporting events during this era. While I do not claim that Cain’s 1982 government began Melbourne’s adoption of sport as an economic driver – indeed, Graeme Davison (1997) clearly illustrates the role of the 1956 Olympic Games as a device to drive the economy and modernise Melbourne – the implementation of Cain’s *Victoria: The Next Step* economic strategy document in 1984 appears to commence an increased focus on hosting major sporting events for the city of Melbourne (O’Hanlon, 2009). Cain’s economic strategy arguably set in motion the adoption of sporting events and sports infrastructure as a key urban entrepreneurial tool for successive state governments over a 30-year period at a time when many urban governments across the globe adopted similar strategies. The aim of the next four sections is to briefly contextualise the political environment of Victoria from 1982 to 2014; briefly outlining the political ideology adopted by each government and the use of major (sports) events and projects as a central tool in propelling the Victorian economy.


In 1982 the Victorian Labor Party, led by John Cain II (John Cain hereafter), achieved election success for the first time in 27 years. Defined as reformist (Cain, 1995; Considine & Costar, 1992; Harkenss, 2013; Shamsullah, 1992), Cain entered parliament with a social agenda to tighten gun laws, legalise prostitution, enhance gender equality and ensure openness and accountability through freedom of information legislation amongst other initiatives (Harkness, 2013). Considine and Costar (1992) highlight that Labor successfully campaigned during the 1982 election with the position that a change in management style and personnel was required in order to “revive a flagging Victorian economy” (p.5). Through a reform process which involved higher levels of consultation, both with public/community groups and with private/business leaders, Cain’s government gained popularity amongst Victorian voters.

The demographics of the Labor Party in Australia, and arguably policy interests, have changed significantly over the past few decades (Harkness, 2013). Since the 1960s the Australia Labor Party (ALP) has been moving closer to the political ‘centre’ in an attempt to gain votes from the middle-classes and in Victoria specifically, “Labor needed to reinvent itself to enable it to function adequately and to be electorally viable” (Harkness, 2013, p. 31). As such, a visible shift in the make-up of the Victorian Labor Party is

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103 Likewise, Shamsullah (1992) notes that when entering in 1982, “Labor promised to reinvigorate government in Victoria, pursuing reform to modernise the state’s administration and promote economic development while ensuring that the social justice objectives of the contemporary ALP were not neglected” (p. 11).
illustrated by Harkness (2013) who argues that the demographics of the Victorian Labor Party under Cain’s leadership reflected a middle-class identity. Harkness (2013) explains that other than a couple of ministers from working-class and union backgrounds “the majority of Cabinet members came from professional and white-collar backgrounds, with teachers the stand-out occupation…It was essentially a middle-class Cabinet leading, in essence, a middle-class parliamentary team” (p. 35). The identity of Australian Labor and its corresponding state political organisations has effectively become bourgeoisie, despite being founded upon a working-class identity and the union movement. Arguably a key element of this shift is the reliance or increased focus on economic strategy and links to business leaders.

While in Opposition the Cain Labor party accused the Hamer and Thompson Liberal governments of the 1970s and early 1980s of failure to reverse the declining Victorian economy and “asserted that it was within the power of the state government to ensure a return to prosperity for Victoria” (Shamsullah, 1992, p. 12). In order to return prosperity to the state, Cain adopted a Keynesian-style interventionist approach to governing with a determination to implement a social justice strategy (Harkness, 2013). In addition to implementing social justice policies, Cain “promised to restore growth and prosperity to the private sector, to protect the state’s manufacturing industry and to create a Victorian Development Fund” (Harkness, 2013, p. 36) which would support local firms to boost the local economy. Cain’s desire to stimulate the Victorian economy through massive capital works projects appeared to be successful during his first term evidenced by high business confidence and low unemployment (Harkness, 2013).

Throughout his first term of government, Cain “enjoyed the sympathy and active support of unions, community groups, welfare organizations, environmentalists, school teachers, feminists and large sections of the arts community” (Considine & Costa, 1992, p. 3). In addition to these ‘natural allies’ of Labor, Cain was successful in gaining support from large sections of the business community which “had previously been hostile or indifferent to Labor in Victoria” (Considine & Costar, 1992, p. 2). The Labor government, according to Considine & Costar (1992), created a culture in which the key interest groups were allowed to engage in “open debate and share opportunities to make

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104 Of importance to this study is the use of land in Melbourne. Economou (1992) explains that the Cain Labor government was largely supported by environmentalists but department restructuring resulted in the consultative Department of Conservation, Forests and Lands being responsible for rural environmental issues in the state but urban environmental issues, under the Ministry of Planning and Environment, tended to be dealt with in an ad hoc manner which often favoured development proposals asserting economic growth.
decisions”. The early success during Cain’s first few years of leadership permitted a long-term economic strategy, or vision, to be developed for the state.

The *Victoria: The Next Step* document (Parliament of Victoria, 1984) outlined the ten-year economic strategy of the Victorian Labor Party with a specific aim of “maximising Victoria’s ability to export to interstate and overseas markets” (Davidson, 1992, p. 36).

Exports, in this case, are considered to be anything that is shipped beyond the region or sold to a non-resident; as such, culture, education and sport are considered exports when tourists or international students are consuming the product. To achieve this export aim, *Victoria: The Next Step* highlighted the need to identify and enhance Victoria’s competitive strengths to create an environment in which ‘export’ revenue could be produced by supporting ‘leading’ industries (see Davidson, 1992; O’Hanlon, 2009; Shamsullah, 1992). The strategy identified nine areas of competitive strength including Victoria’s diverse industrial skill base, world-class scientific institutions, natural coal and oil resources and, “the national role of Melbourne as a major trading, cultural and *sporting centre*, and the land-use opportunities to further develop that role [emphasis added]” (Parliament of Victoria, 1984, p. 7). While the use of sport for economic development was not a new initiative at this time, but this document certainly appeared to outline an increased focus on sport compared to previous economic/development strategies of Victoria.  

Specifically, the *Victoria: The Next Step* document cited key benefits to the state from being the national sport capital as: (a) the publicity and tourist activity associated with hosting sporting events, (b) employment opportunities through administration headquarters being located in Melbourne, (c) economic benefits through the sales and distribution of sporting goods, and (d) indirect links to other industries, such as the fashion industry’s association with the Melbourne Cup horse race.

A further cited element of this perceived competitive advantage was “the availability of low-cost land suitable for future development” which included the Government having “extensive holdings of land ready for redevelopment within the central city area” (Parliament of Victoria, 1984, p. 167). The desire to shift focus to Melbourne’s Central Business District (CBD) was further acknowledged within the document through

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105 For example, the mention of sport was largely absent throughout the 1981 economic strategy, *Victoria’s Strategy for the Eighties: Jobs and Growth*, produced by the Victorian Liberal Party when in government. The use of snowfields for tourism (Parliament of Victoria, 1981, p. 17) was cited as well as intent to bid for major events such as “conferences, conventions and cultural and sporting events” (Parliament of Victoria, 1981, p. 25).

106 Winter & Brooke (1992) explain that Labor’s *’Central Melbourne: A Framework for the Future’* document emphasised large government landholdings being sold to “capture investment and thus regenerate the property market, the building industry and CBD” (p. 267).
the expression of the need to re-image “Melbourne’s ambience [original emphasis]” because “decision makers prefer to build their headquarters in cities which offer their staff a pleasant environment and a satisfying lifestyle” (Parliament of Victoria, 1984, p. 167).

In stark contrast to the federal Labor government’s economic strategy during the 1980s to reduce government intervention (Considine & Costar, 1992), the Victorian Labor Party’s neo-Keynesian approach attempted to “co-ordinate and focus resources of the Victorian public sector” in order to “draw forth an appropriate response in terms of investment and expansion from the private sector” (Parliament of Victoria, 1984, p. 2).

That is, the state had a central role in identifying and enhancing economic interests rather than allowing free-market forces to determine the state’s economic strengths. In doing so, the strategy was criticised by many in Canberra “as a futile ‘Keynesian’ attempt to ‘pump prime’ an ailing economy and ‘pick winners’ instead of creating a ‘level playing field’” (Shamsullah, 1992, p. 33).

By 1986 the sport-specific document, Victoria – Playing to Win: Sport and Recreation Industries Strategy, was released which highlighted some of the developments undertaken by the government in the area of sport during its first term of governance (Parliament of Victoria, 1986). These included, but were by no means limited to: assistance for Flemington Racecourse (home of the Melbourne Cup, a recognised major event) to redevelop a grandstand, contributions towards the construction of lighting towers at the Melbourne Cricket Ground (the location of two annually recognised major events; the Australia rules football Grand Final and Boxing Day cricket test) and, the ongoing construction of the National Tennis Centre (which would become the site of the Australian Open Tennis Championship when completed in 1988). In addition to providing assistance to existing major events and sporting infrastructure, the government expressed that “action will also be taken to identify high profile sporting events and activities which might be slotted into present off-peak periods, to ensure an even spread of high level sporting activity throughout the year” and “two new annual sporting events will be introduced in the ‘Sporting Calendar’ to enhance the international image of Melbourne and provide a focus for future tourism promotion” (Parliament of Victoria, 1986, p. 28).

Thus, a major events strategy had been formed.

The re-imaging of the city, through selected competitive advantages, is a lasting legacy of the Cain government of the 1980s. Five-years after resigning as premier, Cain’s

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107 As such, the government intention to actively seek new major sporting events to develop a year-long sporting calendar to enhance tourism for the state actually began five years prior to the official foundation of the Victorian Major Events Company – set-up in 1991 by the Kirner Labor government and extended by the Kennett Liberal-National Coalition government.
autobiography clearly illustrated the urban entrepreneurial purpose of the 1984 economic strategy. As Cain notes, putting the city ‘on the map’ as a location for investment was a key element of the strategy; "Melbourne’s leadership in finance, culture and sport demanded that we make the city a more attractive place to live" (Cain, 1995, p. 269). Indeed, the economic strategy associated with using the national role of Melbourne as a competitive advantage concluded that; “The government will build on Melbourne’s major assets and advantages – its traditional leadership roles in finance, commerce, sports and the arts; its natural advantages of Bayside setting and parkland environment; and its cosmopolitan way of life – to attract new investment to the city” (Parliament of Victoria, 1984, p. 174).

Attempting to overturn the impacts of deindustrialisation, place initiatives were adopted to reverse the socio-economic trends that were associated with the loss of manufacturing by enticing new industry and corporate headquarters to the city. Central to this place-marketing strategy was the acknowledgement that the emerging cities in a new global hierarchy partly had an iconographic competitive advantage (for example Sydney had its harbour bridge and opera house); therefore Melbourne needed to construct or re-image similar icons (Sandercock & Dovey, 2002). One such re-imaging was the Yarra River; transformed from “an industrial junkyard into a postindustrial ‘landscape of desire’” (Sandercock & Dovey, 2002, p. 151) which was initiated by the Cain government as part of a strategy to turn the Southbank into an ‘arts and tourism’ zone (O’Hanlon, 2009). Further re-imaging of the city’s waters were planned for the docklands; “conceived initially in the late-1980s as a public-private framework of publicly controlled infrastructure intended to guide private development” (Dovey & Sandercock, 2002, p. 84) but abandoned by Labor due to the recession of the early 1990s and failure to win the bid for the 1996 Olympic Games (see chapter 7).

The economic and political success of the Cain Labor government started to decline during its second term (Harkness, 2013). Economic rationalism adopted by the

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108 The ‘zero-sum’ risk associated with this strategy was noted in the 1986 ‘Victoria – Playing to Win’ strategy document: “other capitals are now developing major sporting and entertainment complexes, and the Victorian Government will need to take positive action to ensure it continues to host major international events and reap the economic benefits” (Parliament of Victoria, 1986, p. 14).

109 Harkness (2013) expresses that the Labor party has had a history of factional disputes. Cain successfully united the factions in the lead-up to being elected and managed the factions well during his first term in government. Division between the factions began to re-appear towards the end of Labor’s second term of government. And after the 1988 election, these divisions became more distinct, both privately and publicly.
federal Labor government resulted in the “deregulation of the financial sector, the admission of foreign banks, the floating of the dollar and much relaxed rules for foreign investment” (Considine & Costar, 1992, p. 5). The opening up of Australia’s economy to the world (Harkness, 2013; Winter & Brooke, 1992) significantly impacted Victoria, as tariff cuts unsealed the previously protected manufacturing industry (Engels, 2000; Harkness, 2013; O’Hanlon, 2009). In addition, by 1985 federal financial assistance to the states decreased (Considine & Costar, 1992; Winter & Brooke, 1992). The property boom and associated state revenue from stamp duty allowed most states to fend off financial difficulties during the mid-1980s; however the end of a property boom in the late 1980s decreased state revenues substantially (Winter & Brooke, 1992).

A national recession from 1989 to 1992 together with major institutional failures – particularly the Victorian Economic Development Corporation, State Bank and Pyramid Building Society – dented business and community confidence in the Victorian Labor government (see Considine & Costar, 1992; Davison, 2004; Engels, 2000; Harkness, 2013). During these recession years, economic production in Victoria fell by 5.5 per cent and state unemployment became the highest in the nation, Victoria consequentially gained “a reputation as a strike-bound and almost bankrupt basket case at the mercy of left-wing trade unions” (Engels, 2000, p.476).

The financial difficulties, largely beyond the control of the state government, certainly led to a number of Victorian voters to depart from the Labor Party but it was not just external factors that resulted in government failure. Considine and Costar (1992) and Harkeness (2013) note that the state government’s problems were as much to do with unachievable social justice promises as the institutional failures outlined above. Considine and Costar (1992) explain that:

110 The Victorian Economic Development Corporation which had been a crucial tool for Cain and his Keynesian economic approach by providing financial assistance to firms doing business in the state in return for equity or part-ownership, collapsed after the 1987 global stock market crash when many of these firms folded or were unable to pay back debts (Harkness, 2013). Tricontinental, the merchant banking arm of the State Bank, adopted a risky investment strategy after the deregulation of the banking industry and amassed over $2 billion in bad debts (Engels, 2000; Harkness, 2013); ultimately leading to the sale of the State Bank to the privately-owned Commonwealth Bank in 1990. The Pyramid Building Society was on the point of collapse in June 1990. In an attempt to reassure investors and build business confidence, the government proclaimed the stability of Pyramid Building Society. However when Pyramid Building Society later folded, the government was targeted for giving misleading information to many small investors who lost finances (Davison, 2004; Harkness, 2013).
Stung by opposition criticism that taxes and charges had increased sharply after 1982, Cain promised during the 1985 election campaign that there would be no new taxes. Labor followed this with a ‘family pledge’ during the 1988 campaign which specified that most available areas of state revenue raising would not be increased. While electorally appealing, these commitments tied the government’s hands and, as interest rates increased, left it with inadequate means with which to address the emerging debt servicing problems of the early 1990s. (p.7)

Struggling to maintain co-operation amongst the factions of the Labor Party in the face of declining votes, in June 1990 “Cain gave an ultimatum to the factions – cease open disharmony or he would resign. They didn’t, so he did – on 7 August 1990” (Harkness, 2013, p. 38). Deputy Premier of Victoria, Joan Kirner, was elected leader of the Labor Party and thus became Victoria’s first female premier.

In terms of this study, two important events occurred during Kirner’s time as premier of Victoria; the founding of a state-funded major events company and the legalisation of gambling. The Victorian Major Events Company (VMEC) was set up in 1991 as an “events acquisition group ... with an entrepreneurial vision for creating and securing major sporting, entertainment and cultural event opportunities for Melbourne and Victoria” (VMEC, n.d., para. 1-2).\(^\text{111}\) The pseudo-government body was set up following the failed bid for the 1996 Olympics and interestingly headed by the Federal Treasurer for the Liberal Party, Ron Walker (Lowes, 2004; Gilchrist, 2004). The VMEC has since acquired sports events such as the Formula One Grand Prix, Commonwealth Games, Presidents Cup (golf), State of Origin (rugby league) and FINA World Swimming Championships (see VMEC, n.d.).

The second significant event that occurred during Kirner’s reign as premier was the passing of legislation to permit electronic gaming machines (‘poker machines’) and a casino in Victoria.\(^\text{112}\) The approval of a casino and introduction of gaming machines were widely perceived as a response to the fiscal crisis that hampered the state towards the end of Cain’s premiership (Costello & Millar, 2000; Livingstone, 2001; McKay, 1999; Winter & Brooke, 1992). While Cain resisted the approval of these vehicles of gambling in the state, Kirner quickly accepted them as an important generator of state revenue in 1991 (Livingstone, 2001). As Winter and Brooke (1992) express shortly after the legalisation of gambling in Victoria:

\[^{111}\] Initially the company was named the Melbourne Major Events Company (MMEC).

\[^{112}\] Other forms of gambling, such as on horse-racing, have a long history in Victoria (see Costello & Millar, 2000).
With a lack of ‘bread’ because the State coffers are depleted from federal cuts and because of a refusal to raise State taxes, the State government has turned to ‘circuses’ in an attempt to raise revenue, pinning its hopes on the renowned passion of Australians for gambling. (p. 275)

The significance of the Labor premier legalising these forms of gambling in Victoria would not be lost on the soon to be elected Liberal-National Coalition government when questions were raised regarding the social impacts of gambling in Victoria during the 1990s (Green & Koutsoukis, 1995; Ewing, 1996a; Wilson, 1996a).

Throughout the 1992 election, Coalition leader Jeff Kennett promised to restore prosperity to the state while portraying Labor as economically incompetent (Engels, 2000) and depicted the neo-Keynesian strategy of a strong public sector as inherently unproductive and inefficient (Shamsullah, 1992). Kennett's rhetoric had been strongly supported by neo-liberal think tanks, such as the Tasman Institute and the Institute of Public Affairs, which were hostile to the interventionist political philosophy applied by Labor (Cahill & Bedner, 2005; Harkness, 2013; Hayward, 1999; Shamsullah, 1992). Despite opinion polls regarding Kirner as “more honest, reliable, intelligent and in touch with people’s needs that they did Kennett” (Harkness, 2013, p. 39), the Liberal-National Coalition “achieved extraordinary electoral success in October 1992 even though the voters had reservations about its poorly defined policy programme and misgivings about the character of its leadership” (Shamsullah, 1992, p. 13).


Jeff Kennett’s reign as premier of Victoria is often characterised as having a “Thatcherite agenda” (Sandercock & Dovey, 2002, p. 157) and being “the most far-reaching program of ‘free market reform’ in the state’s history” (Davison, 2004, p. 321) with a “relentless application of neoliberal economic theory [which] constitutes a clean break from Victoria’s long tradition of social liberalism” (Costar & Economou, 1999, p. v). Prior to the Liberal-National Coalition parties winning the 1992 state election, the Tasman Institute and Institute of Public Affairs (neoliberal think tanks) established ‘Project Victoria’ in an attempt to provide a detailed set of proposals for public policy reform to solve the economic budgetary issues facing the state without increasing the burden of taxation (see

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113 By 1995 when reports of gambling problems were aired by the media and Labor Opposition (see Green & Koutsoukis, 1995; Ewing, 1996a), the Liberal-National Coalition government defended the use of taxes from gambling for ‘circuses’ rather than social welfare (Forbes, 1995), and promotion of the industry in general, by explaining that it was the previous Labor government that introduced gambling to the state (Wilson, 1996a).
Cahill & Bedner, 2005; Hayward, 1999; Teicher & Van Gramberg, 1999). Funded by major corporations and employer groups, the preliminary report of Project Victoria, *Victoria – An Agenda for Change*, “provided policy guidelines to the Kennett opposition for privatisation, corporatisation and franchising of government services” (Teicher & Van Gramberg, 1999, p. 162). Teicher and Van Gramberg (1999) argue that despite reflecting the interests and perspectives of the business sector, the proposals detailed in *Victoria – An Agenda for Change* were presented as being in the public’s interest.

Cahill and Bedner (2005) illustrate the influence that Project Victoria had on the Victorian Liberal Party and Victorian public in the lead-up to the 1992 election.\(^{114}\) The authors express that Project Victoria “provided the Kennett government with the intellectual rationale for privatisation … Rather than a blueprint, it gave an intellectual and discursive framework within which the interests of the business sectors pushing for neo-liberal reform could be converted into a broad policy agenda and defended publicly” (Cahill & Bedner, 2005, p. 46).\(^{115}\) A key element in the success of Project Victoria’s influence on the Liberal Party’s policy and the implementation of these policies was the significant media coverage Project Victoria received in the lead-up to the election. As a ‘shock troop’, “Project Victoria softened up the public for Kennett’s neoliberal policies, heightened the perception of a fiscal crisis of the Victorian state, and sought to lay blame for Victoria’s economic woes on unions, state-ownership of industry and Keynesian-inspired economic management” (Cahill & Bedner, 2005, p. 47). In other words, media coverage provided a platform for Project Victoria’s neoliberal discourse to become legitimised within public debate.

Kennett was elected after a campaign that focused on the financial mismanagement of the Labor government which Engels (2000) explains “permitted the new government to blame the outgoing Labor administration for all economic problems confronting a once proud state and its capital city, while appealing to the electorate’s ‘sense of place patriotism’ in order to legitimate whatever reforms were deemed

\(^{114}\) Furthermore, Project Victoria had a lasting impact on the Victorian Labor Party, Cahill and Bedner (2005) allude to the appointment of the “Tasman Institute’s Bruce Cohen as an economic advisor” (p. 47) to the Labor Party while in opposition during the Kennett years as evidence of Labor “framing its opposition in terms set by the neo-liberals” (p. 47).

\(^{115}\) Similarly, Teicher and Van Gramberg (1999) explain that Kennett was already committed to an economic rationalist agenda, but Project Victoria provided the ‘substance’ for policies to be designed and implemented.
necessary” (p. 477). Defining Melbourne as a ‘rust belt city’ (Jackson, 2009) the Kennett government expressed that Victoria needed to compete harder with other states to capture a larger share of investment, jobs and tourism which would be achieved through place promotion and place-marketing (Engels, 2000). Continuing, Engels (2000) describes the strategy as consisting of an endeavour to reduce the budget deficit through wide-ranging spending cuts, public sector down-sizing and privatisation and, increased house-hold taxes in combination with the modification of any laws which could impede the decision of footloose capital to relocate to Melbourne. In doing so, Kennett hoped that economic confidence would be restored and domestic and international capital investment would flow into the state. As such, many people in Victoria, Kennett urged, would have to go through short-term pains for long-term gains and “any criticism was labelled ‘un-Victorian’” (Sandercock & Dovey, 2002, p. 157).

Crucial to executing the above fiscal and legal measures was the Liberal-National Coalition control of both the upper and lower houses of parliament as a result of the substantial victory in the 1992 election. In essence, the Kennett government did not need to negotiate with Labor or any of the minor parties to implement change “which clearly suited the authoritarian political style of the Premier…from the beginning parliament acted as a rubber stamp for executive decisions” (Shamsullah, 1999, pp. 4-5). As political scientist John Waugh (1999) explains, in Victoria the “State constitution is so open and flexible that the government can turn public administration upside-down without changing the constitution, as long as it has one vital advantage: control of both houses of parliament” (p. 53).

The implementation of neoliberal policies by the Kennett government upon election in October 1992 was rapid; passing 34 bills in 12 sitting days (Carlyon, 2012) including the introduction of a variety of regressive taxes and charges and a new gambling tax to utilise the recent introduction of electronic gaming machines and future casino as a vital revenue generator for the state (Hayward, 1999). Hayward (1999) illustrates the extent that public sector cuts had on the state:

116 Hayward (1999) argues that the ‘fiscal crisis’ regarding out-of-control state-debt compared favourably to finances in other states at the time and around the world; as such, the reference of economic mismanagement by the Cain/Kirner government’s is misleading.

117 Teicher and Van Gramberg (1999) illustrate the wide-reaching neoliberal agenda through a discussion of labour-market reform which took place during Kennett’s premiership: “Implementation of the government’s policies was dependent upon the creation of a ‘hard’ market environment [high demand for employment] utilising devices such as insecure employment, high unemployment and the marginalisation of unions. These measures would assist in delivering a malleable and compliant workforce” (p. 162). Union-led strikes disrupted the labour-market, and therefore state
By the end of 1993, it was revealed that some 37,000 public servants and 8000 teachers (the equivalent of 20 per cent of the budget-sector workforce) had lost their jobs; 35,000 employees of government businesses were made redundant; over 300 schools were closed; and many programs were simply axed or were retained with large increase in user charges. In total, $1.2 billion was cut from departmental spending, and $1 billion of new taxes and charges were introduced. (pp. 136-7)\(^\text{118}\)

Over the seven years of control the Kennett government acquired close to $40 billion (Mayne, 2006a) through the privatisation agenda which included the State Electricity Commission of Victoria, the Gas and Fuel Corporation, public transport, the Totalisator Agency Board and several prisons (see Woodward, 1999).\(^\text{119}\)

Of significant interest to this study is the Agenda 21 program of major civic projects which was launched six months after Kennett entered office (Sandercock & Dovey, 2002). Agenda 21 aimed to “revitalise Victoria’s capital city and restore its cultural and commercial dominance by the turn of the century” (Office of the Premier of Victoria, 1993, cited in Glow & Johanson, 2004, p. 132). The capital works program, funded by revenue received from gambling taxes, in particularly from Crown Casino (Birrell, 1993), “embarked upon an ambitious rebuilding of central Melbourne” (Engels, 2000, p. 478) and included construction of an exhibition centre, city square (Federation Square), public museum and two sports venues (the Multipurpose Venue at Melbourne Park and the Melbourne Sports and Aquatics Centre at Albert Park). In addition, the city tram route was extended, upgrades to the state library and art gallery took place, and Albert Park and the Docklands were redeveloped (see Engels, 2000; Parliament of Victoria, 1994a, p. 2212).\(^\text{120}\) These developments were aimed at serving the needs of large businesses or the professional workers that accompany global footloose capital as well as tourists (Sandercock & Dovey, 2002). In addition, Engels (2000) explained that the strategy relied on the hosting of “hallmark cultural and sporting events… [to] add to the allure that a re-

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\(^{118}\) Many of these public sector workers took voluntary redundancy (see Mayne, 2006a).

\(^{119}\) The use of $ through this thesis refers to Australian dollars unless otherwise stipulated.

\(^{120}\) In 2008, it was revealed that the casino owners pay the Victorian government just $1 a year in rent for the first 40-years of a 99-year lease of the south bank site (Warner, 2008a).
equipped and re-imaged Melbourne could now offer to the discerning tourist and corporate executives” (p. 478).

Two major developments, instigated during the Kennett-era, have significantly (re)shaped the city of Melbourne; the construction of a private casino on the south bank of the Yarra River and the ‘stealing’ of the Formula One Grand Prix from Adelaide. Both were shrouded in controversy and remain points of contention. While it was the Kirner Labor government that approved a casino for the city (Dixon, 1991), it was the Kennett government that oversaw the $1 billion contract tender process (Neales, 1993a) and construction which was criticised for cronyism and secrecy. Meanwhile, the capture of the Formula One Grand Prix from Adelaide, through secret deals with the Bernie Ecclestone Formula One Group, raised questions of transparency and environmentalism. Moreover, a strong link between individuals associated with both developments has been questioned.

The casino’s links to the Grand Prix (GP) were politically criticised at both state and federal levels over a number of years. A few days after the announcement that the GP was coming to Melbourne, Sue Neales (1993b), a journalist for The Age, reported that during the tender process for the casino, only one bidder, the Crown Group, knew that the GP contract had been signed. The Crown Group consortium that won the casino bid consisted of a number of high-profile individuals that were also inside the Victorian Major Events Company (VMEC) ‘Loop’. Neales (1993b) explained that the Crown Group, which included three major companies won the casino licence and;

- The heads of all three companies – Hudson Conway’s Mr Ron Walker, CUB’s [Carlton and United Breweries] Mr Pat Stone, and Federal Hotels’ Mr John Haddad – sit on the board of the Government body [VMEC] that has been negotiating the Grand Prix deal since late last year. (p.1)

Crown Casino’s chairman, Lloyd Williams, acknowledged that the Crown Group knew of the GP before submitting their final bid for the casino contract (Neales, 1993b). Williams justified Crown’s advantage by expressing that those individuals associated with both the Crown Group and VMEC had worked hard to entice the GP to come to Melbourne; therefore it was fair the Crown Group was rewarded (Forbes, 1994; Neales, 1993b). Rival casino bidder, Sheraton-Leighton claimed they “may have bid more, based on the boost the race would give to casino revenue” (Neales, 1993b, p. 1) had they known about the GP contract. Opposition leader, John Brumby, conveyed support for both the GP and casino but was concerned that a fair tendering process did not occur and expressed that the public needed to feel confident with the awarding of lucrative contracts by the government (Neales, 1993b).
Specific concerns were aired regarding the close-ties that the Kennett government had to certain individuals in the business community associated with the casino and the reluctance to allow independent investigation of government practices – similar concerns were raised with the GP (see Lowes, 2004). Towards the end of 1994, many questions surrounding the awarding of the casino licence to the Crown Group were being asked. The state Labor Opposition called for an official inquiry into the awarding of the licence to the Crown Group (Forbes, 1994). Labor Prime Minister, Paul Keating, threatened to call a federal inquiry (Harvey & Pinkney, 1994) and suggested the casino deal was corrupt, “like a dead cat in the middle of the road-stinking to high heaven” (Keating, cited in Hamilton, 1994, p.19). Despite these requests, no inquiry too place.

The Crown Casino construction itself became an issue when vast changes to the original plans occurred in November 1994. The final design, 50 per cent larger than the endorsed design, was approved during a midnight sitting of government (Neales, 1994a). An editorial in the Herald Sun called the consent of the new plans absurd as “ministers professed they didn’t know what the new design looked like” (‘The crowning insult’, 1994, p.12) when accepting the planning amendments. Opposition leader John Brumby had, one week earlier, criticised the Crown Group and government for holding secret design meetings and urged a final plan to be released (Johnston & Phelan, 1994). Brumby also suggested Kennett was advantaging his mates when offering the Crown Group the casino licence and then allowing alterations to design plans which enlarged the casino complex (Brady, 1994).

The Opposition continued to accuse the government of failing to run a fair tender process throughout 1996 in the lead up to the State election. One Opposition minister claimed that Kennett and his treasurer, Alan Stockdale, were privy to information about the individual bids before the Victorian Casino Control Authority recommended a consortium to the government; this concerned many as the Crown Group, with links to government through the VMEC, had altered its bid just before the tender deadline (Brady, 1996). Losing bidder, Sheraton-Leighton, claimed that Crown’s last minute bid alteration occurred because the Crown Group was privy to knowledge about Sheraton-Leighton’s bid (Forbes, 1994; Ewing, 1996b). John Brumby called the bidding process “an example of the Kennett Government’s dishonesty” (Robinson, 1996, p. 1) and repeated requests for a judicial inquiry into the casino bid process; the Kennett government again rejected these requests (Robinson, 1996). The Crown consortium claimed they had had no discussions about the tendering process with any members of the government and would welcome an independent inquiry (Robinson, 1996). The GP, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 8, and casino are clear examples of the manner in which Jeff Kennett operated; the casino tender process was closed to public discussion in order to ensure
the development proceeded, while the GP, deemed a ‘major event,’ was cloaked in legislation to prevent and overcome vocal opposition.

In order to urge Victoria ‘on the move,’ Kennett streamlined the planning approval process for projects deemed to be of significance to the state. Many of these projects benefited businesses (for example the exhibition centre) or were justified because they would suit the cultural needs of the professional urban elite associated with the footloose capital being targeted (for example the museum, state library, and leisure/entertainment infrastructure). To execute this urban entrepreneurial strategy, Sandercock and Dovey (2002) argue that Kennett redefined the public interest: “the notion of the public interest was employed to promote projects portrayed by the Kennett government as enriching the cultural life of the city. But this public interest was proclaimed and advertised rather than constructed through public debate” (p. 157). It was in the public interest, according to the Kennett government, that the city of Melbourne became an economic hub; the role of the state was to provide the infrastructure (cultural and physical) which would attract capital to the city and benefits would then ‘trickle-down’ to the wider Victorian public.

Further to streamlining the planning process, corporations submitting a tender for the developments were protected though secrecy provisions, such as commercial confidentiality agreements signed with the state, which limited public debate on many of these projects (Sandercock & Dovey, 2002). Lowes (2004) expresses that: “Citizen’s rights were suspended [in] the name of a boosterist agenda that has benefited entrepreneurial interests (both local and international) much more than it has benefited anyone else” (p. 84). The implementation of commercial confidentiality agreements ensured the protection of private interests, while community consultation was deemed to delay development projects and framed as an obstruction to progress (Sandercock & Dovey, 2002).

While the Kennett government has been strongly criticised for a lack of consultation, Sandercock and Dovey (2002) assert that the approach to fast-track the development of major projects was actually initiated by the previous Labor government through its Major Projects Unit and as such appears to be associated with the ‘competitive city’ environment rather than a specific political-economic style. Engels (2000), also largely critical of the Kennett government, explains that the Kennett government was very successful in attracting new capital investment to Victoria. Others commended Kennett’s investment into the arts and cultural infrastructure of Melbourne, such as the

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121 “Victoria - On the Move” was the slogan for the state during Kennett’s governance.

state library and a public museum (Feneley, 2005; Glow & Johanson, 2004; 2007), and his stance on multiculturalism (Economou, 2006; Rubenstein, 1999) at a time when right-leaning political parties across the nation discriminated against foreign migration and cultural diversity.

Despite these favourable legacies, most writers have focused on the economic costs of the state boosterism approach adopted by Kennett, including the estimated “$1.2 billion in payroll tax exemptions to footloose capital over 1993-94 alone” (Engels, 2000, p. 490) and the operating losses associated with the Australian Grand Prix which have been absorbed at the taxpayers’ expense. Shamsullah (1999) asserts that public opinion shifted against the government by the fifth year of Kennett’s reign as “concerns about ‘cronyism,’ a ‘casino culture,’ questions of accountability, and depletion of the state’s public services and assets” (p. 12) mounted and began to hold value with Victorian voters. Despite Kennett and Stockdale, declaring that the gains from fiscal stringency would be deposited into health, education and social services, the provisions did not satisfy the expectations of the electorate (Shamsullah, 1999).

The downfall of Kennett, according to most political commentators, came as a result of Kennett’s city-centric focus (Engels, 2000; Sandercock & Dovey, 2002; Shamsullah, 1999). Sandercock and Dovey (2002) explain that “those out of sight of the new urban spectacle…felt abandoned by the privileging of the central city over suburbs and regions, of image over infrastructure, of global interests over local” (p. 159). As such, citizens outside of the urban playground “began complaining about being neglected by a government ostensibly preoccupied with the metropolis” including the “attention given by the government to securing sporting and cultural events for Melbourne … [and the] infrastructure program Agenda 21, which included a preponderance of inner urban projects” (Shamsullah, 1999, p. 12).

**Bracks/Brumby Labor: 1999-2010 – ‘Victoria - The Place To Be’**

Labor returned to government in late 1999 after an unexpected election victory as a consequence of a hung parliament and three rural Independents announcing support for a minority Labor government if changes to the structure of the Upper House of parliament were enacted (Hayward, 2006). Labor had campaigned extensively in rural areas, promising investment in rural infrastructure (Hayward, 2006) and a shift from Kennett’s city-centric focus, as well as a more open and transparent government in light of the

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123 Glow & Johanson (2004; 2007) explain that Kennett’s generosity to the Arts has been praised; however the authors are critical of the industry approach to the arts that was adopted and the censorship of art critical of the government.
controversies surrounding Kennett’s handling of Crown Casino, the Grand Prix, and privatisation of state assets (Coffey, 2012; Shaw, 2013).

Bracks promised to deliver an economically responsible government, with growth across the whole state, improved services – particularly train networks – and restoration of democracy (Bracks, 2000). With a consultative approach to governance (Hayward, 2006) Bracks was regarded as being the polar opposite of the authoritarian Jeff Kennett. However, despite differences in leadership style, a number of scholars have explained the neoliberal ideology of the Kennett era was continued by Bracks and his treasurer, John Brumby (Coffey, 2012; Kroen & Goodman, 2012; Mees, 2003; Nabben 2011; Shaw, 2013; Spiller, 2013). Kroen and Goodman (2012) explain that the first term of the Bracks government was rather stationary as Labor had not fully prepared alternative policies due to being surprised at being elected to govern in 1999; “government was reluctant to make swift changes ... Adherence to many neoliberal ideas therefore went unchallenged” (Kroen & Goodman, 2012, p. 317). Shaw (2013) expresses that Treasurer Brumby “embraced the theory that the private sector is best positioned to deliver public services” (p. 147), in part because it allowed the government to avoid taking complete responsibility for any cost blow-outs which may have furthered Labor’s reputation of financial mismanagement leftover from the Cain/Kirner Labor governments.\textsuperscript{124} As such, commercial outlets have been incorporated within many ‘public development projects,’ such as a Melbourne’s central train station and convention centre; “The privatisation of public land was seen as a necessary by-product of replacing or upgrading” (Shaw, 2012, p. 147) Melbourne’s infrastructure.

Meanwhile, Bracks’ claims of transparency and democracy were challenged early in his premiership when it became evident that business leaders of major corporations in Melbourne were being privately briefed by Bracks “on key government decisions before they were announced publicly” (Hannan, 2000, p. 1). Further questions of transparency regarding the Formula One Grand Prix were raised throughout the Bracks/Brumby era. Despite Bracks’ claims for greater transparency, the Formula One Grand Prix contract was not disclosed to the public. Consequently, the general public and media criticised the government and became frustrated with the governments excuse that disclosure was not possible due to the ‘commercial confidentiality’ agreement (see chapter 8). Additional criticism of the government’s major events strategy, in particular the Grand Prix, was aired in 2006 when it was rumoured that a change in the Auditor-General was occurring.

\textsuperscript{124} Shaw (2012) explains that, as a result of adopting this belief, “almost every major public infrastructure project under the Labor government between 1999 and 2010 was delivered through some kind of partnership” (p. 147).
because a critical inquiring into the Major Events Strategy was to be conducted (Davidson, 2006).

While Bracks’ first term was relatively uneventful, according to many it was during his second term that the Labor premier began to make his mark on Victorian politics (see ‘A budget’, 2005; Colebatch, 2005; Nabben, 2011). In 2005 a journalist for The Age explained that “Brumby and Steve Bracks are essentially fiscal conservatives who have maintained the legacy left by the fiscal radicals, [Alan] Stockdale and Jeff Kennett. Victoria is still a state of small government, cautious prioritising of spending, and an obsession with being a competitive business environment” (Colebatch, 2005, p. 31).

Challenging this ‘small government’ perspective, Bracks allocated an increased spend on social services such as hospitals and roads in his 2005 budget while Brumby expressed a “clear and strong commitment to help the most disadvantaged Victorians” (cited in Austin, 2005, p. 25). This lead some commentators to announce that the Labor government had finally become distinct from the previous Liberal government; “The Bracks government is starting to write its own story: it will from now on be an identifiably Labor government, not just a pale version of the Kennett government but with a friendlier face” (Austin, 2005, p. 25). Four years later, Austin (2009) reaffirmed the belief that Bracks, despite being ‘boring’, had successfully restored Labor’s basic aims to Victorian governance by increasing the education, health and policing budgets.

Others, such as Nabben (2011), Kroen and Goodman (2012) and Shaw (2013) have been less congratulatory of the Bracks government. Nabben (2011) discusses the Bracks government’s community development policies which were aimed at addressing social inequalities that existed throughout Victoria. Furthermore, while the policies had social justice rhetoric, this was framed within an economic discourse which illustrated the government’s priorities to financial growth rather than community development: “Social justice under this ‘progressive’ government had meant little more than being less regressive than its predecessor” (Nabben, 2011, p. 294). Despite citing consultation as an important process for policy decisions, Nabben (2011) explained that the Bracks government often failed to listen to community opinion. For example, Mees (2003) and Kroen and Goodman (2012), in discussing the formulation of the Melbourne 2030 metropolitan plan express than most consultation was ignored or overruled by policy makers.125

A consistent pattern emerges. There were indeed technical reports; there was consultation with the public; there was a community reference group. But each of these produced answers that the Departmental officials

125 Melbourne 2030 was launched by the Labor government in 2002.
responsible for preparing the strategy disagreed with, and were therefore ignored or overruled…But while these made no contribution to the substance of the strategy, they did give the Department an indication of the concerns it would need to pretend to have addressed in the published strategy. (Mees, 2003, p. 295)\textsuperscript{126}

While the *Melbourne 2030* plan was framed as providing the public with an opportunity to determine the shape of Melbourne’s future, the government largely refused to listen. Continuing the legacies of the Cain/Kirner and Kennett governments in valuing sports contribution to the economy, *Melbourne 2030*, included a focus on making Melbourne ‘a more prosperous city,’ which stipulated a need to strengthen “central Melbourne’s capital city functions and its role as the primary business, retail, sport and entertainment hub for the metropolitan area” (Department of Infrastructure, Victoria, 2002, p. 80). The strategy document expressed that “Large-scale sport and entertainment facilities of State or national significance will be located within Central Melbourne and close to the Principal Public Transport Network” (p. 80). The Yarra river in particular remained the specific focus with the government aiming to ensure the “area [was] capable of hosting major festivals and events” (p. 82) such as the upcoming 2006 Commonwealth Games. In addition, the plan advocated for the concentration of sport investment in the sports precinct on the banks of the Yarra, such as the upgrading of the MCG and Melbourne and Olympic Parks.

Bracks unexpectedly resigned as premier in 2007, handing the reins over to John Brumby.\textsuperscript{127} Shaw (2013) describes the difference between the two Labor leaders: “In a transition from the ‘new Labor’ ethos of the Bracks government to a more business-oriented approach, Brumby’s trademark was conservative economic management” (p. 2171). Bracks was often deemed to have been too measured in making decisions – a sign of his consultative approach – which led to a perception of inactivity to tackling emerging problems (Austin, 2010). Inheriting an economically prosperous state from the Kennett and Bracks administrations, Brumby’s early announcements as premier cited a desire for “making up lost time on infrastructure work” (‘No guarantees’, 2007). However, the successes of the first two terms of the Bracks/Brumby Labor government arguably added to its downfall. An editorial in the *Herald Sun* claimed that the state was “cracking

\textsuperscript{126} Kroen and Goodman (2012), in discussing *Melbourne 2030*, explained that: “The development of the strategy had involved input from both planning professionals and the general public, yet it did not incorporate much of this advice and so failed to get sufficient broad support” (p. 312).

\textsuperscript{127} Bracks resigned, citing a need to spend more time with his family after his son was involved in a car accident that allegedly involved alcohol (Cuthbertson & Northover, 2007).
under the weight of its success” (‘Take two’, 2008) with transport congestion and water supply in need of immediate attention. Complaints of a lack of public spending on education, health and affordable housing, despite a budget surplus being maintained through the global financial crisis (Shaw, 2013), were aired by the public; but it was “repeated failures in the public transport system [which] are widely cited as the key reason for the unanticipated demise of an otherwise well respected and competent Labor government in Victoria in November 2010” (Spiller, 2014, p. 370).128 Liberal leader Ted Baillieu won a close election in late-2010 and held a one seat parliamentary majority as a Coalition government with the National Party.

Significantly for this study, the Bracks/Brumby Labor governments continued with the major events strategy which, over the eleven-year period, included a $363 million upgrade to the National Tennis Centre (see chapter 6), developing infrastructure and organising the 2006 Commonwealth Games (see chapter 7), renewing the Formula One Grand Prix contract (see chapter 8) and, constructing a rectangular stadium (see chapter 9). In addition, the state government supported (financially with public resources) the hosting of two rugby league State of Origin matches (2006 and 2009), two rugby union Bledisloe Cup matches (2007 and 2010) and snared the Heineken Golf Classic tournament from Perth (Johnston, 2000) as well as contributing to the $3.3 million appearance fee to have Tiger Woods attend the 2009 Australian Masters golf tournament (Baum, 2009).

### Baillieu/Napthine Liberal-National Coalition: 2010-2014 – ‘Vic-Stay Alert Stay Alive’

Academic material on the Ted Baillieu Liberal-National Coalition government is relatively limited at present, possibly because, as Hayward (2006) explains, “Assessments of premiers are easier with the passing of time, for their contribution to history is clearer not when it is in the making, but well after it has been made” (p. 382). Like Steve Bracks, Ted Baillieu entered government with promises of openness and transparency: “there will be no hidden agenda, no spin, no secrecy. Accountability and transparency will be the principles that underpin our government” (Baillieu cited in McMahon, 2010, para. 21).

However, evidence of secrecy and privilege soon emerged.

In Opposition, the Liberal Party criticised the Labor government’s “improper practice of giving major donors to the ALP [Australian Labor Party] exclusive access to the premier and ministers” (‘Baillieu sits’, 2011, p. 12). However, it was revealed in 2013 that:

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128 In particular, the myki ‘smartcard ticketing system’ was criticised for over-costs, delays and operational difficulties (see Lucas, 2010a).
that Planning Minister Matthew Guy and Baillieu were promoted as ‘special guests’ at a private dinner to property developers that were willing to pay an annual fee of $10,000 to the Liberal Party fundraising organisation (Baker & McKenzie, 2013); this was represented in the media and by the Labor Opposition as selling government access to the private sector. Further hypocrisy emerged in 2013 after it was revealed that the government had hired at least ten former Liberal ministers, or close friends of Premier Baillieu, for positions on boards and agencies around the state, despite Baillieu’s past criticism of the previous Labor government’s propensity to offer ‘jobs for mates’ (Tomazin, 2013).

Fiscally, the Baillieu government prioritised maintaining a budget surplus. In order to achieve this, Baillieu initiated public sector cuts of 3,600 jobs in late 2011 with further cuts made in 2012 (Gordon, 2012). In addition, the Baillieu government cut $300 million in funding to ‘TAFE’ education. As a result of public sector cuts, public school teacher’s held pay-strikes in June and October 2012 and February 2013 and, public nurse’s held a strike in March 2012 (see Jamieson, 2013). In late-2012, The Age reported that business and community leaders in Victoria felt the Baillieu government had been slow in making decisions over its first two years in power (Tomazin, 2012). However, before much action could be taken, Baillieu was forced to resign as premier when Liberal MP, Geoff Shaw, quit the party to sit as an Independent; resulting in a minority Liberal-National government (see Ferguson, 2013). Baillieu’s replacement, Denis Napthine, has announced major transport projects – including a rail link to the airport, a new metro tunnel and most controversially, a tolled freeway – and conveyed a desire to ‘get tough on crime’ (Gordon, 2014) but has been represented in the media as doing little else since becoming premier (see Gordon, 2014; Keane, 2014; Richardson, 2014). Nevertheless, two significant developments, for this study, include Napthine’s announcement of an extension to the Grand Prix contract (Rolfe & Johnston, 2014) and $298 million towards redevelopments of the National Tennis Centre at Melbourne Park (Campbell, 2014); clear indication of a desire to retain the major events strategy.

The development of Melbourne has undergone a number of key phases in its relatively short history: foundation, a gold rush, 1880s land boom, 1890s depression, industrialisation and a post-war boom, deindustrialisation and neoliberalism combined with urban entrepreneurialism (Davison, 1997). Each of these periods has shaped the physical, political and cultural make-up of the city and its citizens. Furthermore, Melbourne’s neoliberal capitalist values are arguably represented through the physical, political and cultural factors that constitute the city. An urban entrepreneurial strategy focusing on major (sport) events was initiated by the neo-Keynesian Cain government during the 1980s and expanded by the neoliberal Kennett government during the 1990s.
Subsequent governments, both Labor and Liberal-National have retained a neoliberal approach to governance along with a strategy to ‘sell’ the city as a desirable place for footloose capital and international investment. The next four chapters illustrate, through sporting events/developments, the manner in which Victorian governments over the last 30 years have adopted an urban entrepreneurial approach to re-image Melbourne as a ‘sport city’.
Chapter 6: National Tennis Centre

This chapter addresses the establishment of the National Tennis Centre (NTC) and its positioning as the pivot for Melbourne’s sport precinct. It thus examines the development of Melbourne Park – formerly Flinders Park – as well as resistance that emerged. Particular attention is paid to the use of public funds to finance this development, and the concurrent alienation of surrounding parkland. In discussing, in chronological order, the developments at Melbourne Park, I will firstly discuss the significance of the NTC to the ‘sport city’ before explaining how and why the Australian Open Tennis Championships were relocated from the Kooyong Lawn Tennis Club to a newly built National Tennis Centre. Following, I will outline the first stage of development of the NTC between 1984 and 1988, including the passing of the National Tennis Centre Bill. I will then discuss the 1995 name change of Flinders Park to Melbourne Park before detailing the upgrades to the complex that occurred in 1998 and 2010.

Introduction

In examining the creation of the National Tennis Centre, it is important to recognise that a number of pressure groups and stakeholders, with specific interests, were involved in the process. As a result, there were frequent disputes around key issues, particularly between the ruling political party and Opposition. Rosanne Michie (1998) reported that:

   The venue was born of adversity and has endured controversy and criticism. Created by the Labor State Government, its debt blew out initially. This gave the Opposition ammunition to ask some hard questions. But as Melbourne Park is famed for its consummate flexibility, the same juxtaposition spread to political position. Because it was only thanks to the great support of a subsequent Liberal Government that the impressive $23 million Stage Two [upgrade] was possible. (p. 11)

Michie highlights the variable positions that state politicians adopted regarding public investment into the National Tennis Centre and its reincarnation as Melbourne Park. While in power, governments appear to trumpet the success of Melbourne as evidenced by the multitude of major events, often sporting events, and the public infrastructure that accommodate these activities. However, while in Opposition these same political parties are quick to denounce the public expenditure as wasteful, unsustainable and opaque.

   In late 1984, Labor Premier John Cain announced a new $53 million – eventually costing $85 million (Baragwanath, 1993) – Tennis Centre. Initial plans for an eight hectare

\[129\] Some of this material has previously been published see John, Stewart and McDonald (2013).
complex were later downgraded to a six hectare site comprising of 16 match courts (in addition to five indoor practice courts), three of which were ‘show courts’ including a 15,000-seat stadium with a retractable roof (Tennis Digest, 1985). The motivation for building this new facility was three-fold: To keep the Australian Open in Melbourne, shift control of the event away from the private Kooyong Lawn Tennis Club and, as an economic driver for Victoria (Cain, n.d.a). Cain’s 1984 economic strategy document *Victoria: The Next Step* highlighted Victoria’s ‘competitive strength’ in sport, specifically referring to tennis and the Australian Open as key tools in Victoria’s economic development. Subsequent Liberal-National Coalition and Labor governments have continued to highlight the importance of the Australian Open to Victoria’s economic success as a Major Events city, justifying large investments of public funding in order to upgrade the size and design of the complex.

As discussed in chapter 5, the Cain Labor government of the 1980s gained a reputation for having a strong environmental and consultative record (Considine & Costar, 1992; Economou, 1992), however some concern existed regarding urban planning which appeared more *ad hoc* than the systematic consultation involved in regional/rural land issues (Economou, 1992). Indeed, the major point of resistance regarding the National Tennis Centre was its siting in Flinders Park, a public parkland area on the edge of Melbourne’s CBD (see figures 6.1-6.3).

The Kennett government of the 1990s adopted a more forceful strategy of urban entrepreneurialism by investing in the symbolic capital of the city (Sandercock & Dovey, 2002). A change in the name Flinders Park to Melbourne Park in 1995 illustrated Kennett’s desire to ‘brand’ Melbourne to a global audience. The Labor government of the 2000s maintained the rhetoric of promoting Melbourne as a ‘sports city’. As such, in 2010 it was in the public’s ‘best interest’ that the government invested $363 million – with minimal public consultation – to redevelop Melbourne Park and ensure the survival of the

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130 Originally the complex was to take up 8.3 hectares but this was later reduced to six hectares for the first stage of development (see Tennis Digest, 1985).
131 Tennis Australia desired a move as they had been frustrated with the lack of control when hosting the event at the private Kooyong Club (Yallop, 1984a). By relocating to a new tennis centre, Tennis Australia were able to gain control over the running of the event (Anonymous, personal communication, October 5, 2012).
132 Throughout his years as Premier, Cain kept an audio-recorded diary which has now been written up into 1600-pages of material. While Cain does not plan to publish this material, he does make it available for researchers (see Money, 2012). At the conclusion of my interview with Cain, he gave me two manuscripts entitled ‘National Tennis Centre’ and ‘The Melbourne Cricket Ground – the last decade’, I am grateful for this invaluable material.
Australian Open Grand Slam tournament in Melbourne (Grace, 2010). Furthermore, the now Liberal-National Coalition government have extended the commitment to positioning Melbourne Park as a key economic driver for the state; announcing a further $338 million in 2014 to upgrade facilities (Campbell, 2014).

Figure 6.1: Flinders Park view from the CBD in 1960 (adapted from MOPT, 2009).

Figure 6.2: Premier John Cain in Flinders Park in 1984 (‘Once were Premiers’, 2012).

\[\text{Photo taken on the day Flinders Park was announced to the public as the location for the National Tennis Centre.}\]
Departing Kooyong

The Australasian Championships initially had no permanent home – events were hosted across Australia and New Zealand (Foenander, n.d.). The event became the Australian Open in 1969 when Tennis Australia permitted professionals to compete in the tournament (Grasso, 2011). But it was not until 1972 that the Kooyong Lawn Tennis Club (hereafter referred to as the Kooyong Club) was awarded the long-term hosting rights of the Australian Open (Foenander, n.d.). While the Kooyong Club had some

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134 Solid white line indicates boundary of Flinders Park. Solid black line indicates area of the National Tennis Centre just prior to opening in 1988. Broken black lines indicate area of National Tennis Centre in 2015.

135 Tennis Australia has operated under a range of names, including the Lawn Tennis Association of Australasia and the Lawn Tennis Association of Australia (see Foenander, n.d.; McCarthy & Frawley, 2008). However, for the purposes of this paper, I will refer to the organisation as Tennis Australia throughout.

136 The Kooyong Lawn Tennis Club, a private tennis club, is located in the Melbourne suburb of Kooyong. The Kooyong Lawn Tennis Club also administered tennis in Victoria through the Lawn Tennis Association of Victoria (LTAV) until 1989 (Kooyong Club, 2011b). LTAV committee consisted of 19 members from the Kooyong Club and 53 nominated members from affiliation clubs around Victoria and ran some of its tennis operations at Kooyong but the LTAV did not control the
success in hosting the event, with crowd numbers consistently high, by the early 1980s there was some angst amongst organisers, supporters, broadcasters and sponsors due to a lack of high profile international athletes making the journey to Melbourne (Bodo, 1995; Bradshaw, 2004; McCarthy & Frawley, 2008). Two main reasons were cited for high profile players avoiding the Australian Open; the time of year when the event was held was too close to the holiday season for international players (see McCarthy & Frawley, 2008) and the facilities at the Kooyong Club were not of the same standard as the other major tournaments (Mitchie, 1998). In addition to Kooyong being viewed unfavourably by the global tennis community, conflict between Tennis Australia and the Kooyong Club existed regarding the control of facilities during the tournament and the share of profits, which ultimately resulted in Tennis Australia seeking an alternative venue.

It was reported as early as September 1982 that Tennis Australia was considering building a new national indoor tennis centre (Yallop, 1982). Fears that an American campaign was mounting to steal the ‘grand slam’ status from the Australian Open, because Kooyong amenities were substandard (‘Whither’, 1982), prompted Tennis Australia to propose that the Kooyong Club could keep the Open but would need to significantly upgrade its facilities. However, Tennis Australia would not commit to providing the Kooyong Club with a long-term contract to host the Open (‘Kooyong Problems’, 1983). As a result, the Kooyong members rejected their council’s recommendation to invest one million dollars of club funds into an upgrade in July 1983 (‘Kooyong Problems’, 1983). Despite Sydney indicating an interest in hosting the Australian Open if Tennis Australia decided to move the event from Kooyong (Kooyong Problems, 1983), reports in October 1983 claimed that Tennis Australia was “in close contact with the Victorian Government’s Department of Planning… [with] three or four Melbourne sites under consideration” (Trengove, 1983, p. 10). By December, 1983, it was publicly revealed that the Tennis Australia president was seeking state government support for a new stadium (Yallop, 1983).

Premier John Cain explained that it was not just Tennis Australia but also the International Tennis Federation which desired a move from Kooyong:

facilities. Likewise, as a private club, the Kooyong Club did not control the Australian Open; rather it staged the event on behalf of Tennis Australia who paid a rental fee for the use of the facilities (see Yallop, 1984a).

\footnote{Between 1977 and 1985 the event was held in December. From 1987, the Championships have been held in January, with no event staged in 1986.}

\footnote{While some members of Kooyong objected to being evacuated from their club for a couple of weeks each year, others maintained that the Open resulted in important funds for the club (see Byrne, 1980; Yallop, 1984b).}
Philippe Chatrier who was...head of World Tennis...made it very clear that Australia, or Melbourne wouldn’t be able to hold the Australian Open, as a Grand Slam tournament, unless we did something better than Kooyong ...
The facilities were pretty ordinary. The good players weren’t coming out in the early 80s. They just regarded it as being too close to Christmas...So that was made very clear to us. (J. Cain, personal communication, April 16, 2013)

Cain expressed that he “saw international tennis...as being perhaps the most attractive sport in terms of economic benefits that the State could have...[the] government had to do all we could to ensure that we retained the Australian Open in Melbourne” (Cain, n.d.a, p. 3). As a global sport, Cain valued the exposure that Melbourne received from hosting the grand slam event, but also valued the prestige of linking Melbourne to other global cities; “I emphasise why I believe it was important; the Grand Slam cities - New York, London, Paris, Melbourne - so you’re up there with the big players” (J. Cain, personal communication, April 16, 2013). As such, Cain authorised Neil Trezise, the Minster for Youth, Sport and Recreation, to discuss improvements to the Australian Open with Tennis Australia (Cain, n.d.a).

Announcing the National Tennis Centre
On 7 October 1984 the Cain Labor government officially announced that Flinders Park, less than one kilometre from Melbourne’s CBD, would be the site of the National Tennis Centre (Yallop, 1984c). Earlier that year, Cain had allocated $50,000, along with an equal contribution by Tennis Australia, to assess the suitability of a number of locations around Melbourne for a Tennis Centre (‘Tennis Topics’, 1984; Yallop, 1984a). Yallop (1984e) reported in the Age that three sites – Flinders Park, Albert Park and Olympic Park – were considered for the 15,000-seat stadium and that Kooyong had essentially been ruled out after negotiations with Tennis Australia failed.\(^{139}\) While Kooyong was viewed as an

\(^{139}\) Austen (1984) explained that 12 sites were considered; likewise Cain (n.d.a) alluded to at least ten sites but notes that only four were ever seriously considered – Flinders Park, Olympic Park, Albert Park and Kooyong – “In the end it came down to a choice between the Flinders Park site and Albert Park” (p. 10). Cain asserted that Albert Park would have politically been the easier option (J. Cain, personal communication, April 16, 2013), Upgrading and extending the Kooyong Tennis Club was discussed in the media (see Ballantine, 1984) – indeed detailed plans of a Kooyong upgrade were printed in the Tennis Australia Magazine as late as 1985 (see Devereux, 1985), six months after Flinders Park had been announced.
unlikely choice, publicly it remained an option with redevelopment plans drawn up (see Matthews, 1984; Yallop, 1984e). Privately however, Kooyong was ruled out, as explained by a member of the Treasury Department at the time:

- On the inside it was absolutely clear to us, that Kooyong was not a starter, it simply would not work...there was a real threat that the Australian Open was going to lose its Grand Slam status which was clearly seen as a big problem and so certainly internally, from the very start of the work, it was clear that we needed a new venue. (Anonymous, personal communication, October 5, 2012)

Questions in the *Tennis Australia Magazine* focused on who was going to pay for the construction of the Centre (Editorial, 1984). Tennis Australia discussed the concept with the Federal Tourism Minister in the hope of attracting Federal money (Cain, n.d.a); the Federal Tourism Minister made representation to the Victorian government on behalf of Tennis Australia but did not confirm financial support. Shortly after, the *Victoria: The Next Step* economic strategy was released, which stated “moves to assist the location of a new National Tennis Centre in an appropriate Melbourne location close to services” had begun (Government of Victoria, 1984, p. 171). In addition, the economic strategy expressed the need to ‘fast-track’ some major projects “through the regulatory and decision making process” (Government of Victoria, 1984, p. 187). While not necessarily stipulating that the Centre would be funded by state tax-payers, the government had strongly indicated a willingness to support – financially and regulatory – Tennis Australia in constructing a National Tennis Centre.

During the five months that the government and Tennis Australia conducted site feasibility studies there was little media discussion about the National Tennis Centre. One point of discussion involved the playing-surface that would be laid at a new centre. Two arguments were posed; the tennis fraternity appeared keen to maintain having the Australian Open played on grass as this was perceived to give Australian tennis players an advantage. The government, on the other hand, indicated that the level of funding they would provide was directly linked to how the centre could be used for alternative economic activities (Austen, 1984); therefore appealing for a synthetic surface (Yallop, 1984d). The employee of the Treasury Department explained that “the economic forecast came back saying, ‘yes it is viable with a number of key criteria,’ one of which it had to be a multi-use venue, that it wasn't going to stack up as a tennis centre alone...And the second was that it had to be centrally located” (Anonymous, personal communication, October 5, 2012).
Despite athletes indicating a desire to play on grass (see Matthews, 1984; The Stars, 1985), the Tennis Australia Council – in effect, its Board of Directors - focused on the financial returns, therefore selecting a synthetic surface:

[Tennis Australia] president Brian Tobin told council members that financial projections showed that the centre ... would make an extra $40 million over the first 2 years of operation if a synthetic surface was laid ... Faced with those figures, the council voted for a new direction for Australian tennis. (Yallop, 1984f, p. 48)

Then Premier John Cain explained, with economic undertones, that the government stipulated the multi-use element of the new Tennis Centre; “We made the condition that it had to be multipurpose and that’s why grass disappeared. They had to have a roof; it had to be adaptable for other uses which it is. The concert income there is quite considerable” (J. Cain, personal communication, April 16, 2013). As such, the new tennis centre would operate as an entertainment venue, in addition to functioning as a site of sport.

After the announcement that the National Tennis Centre would be constructed at the Flinders Park site – at a tax-payers cost of between $50 million and $60 million (Austen, 1984; Yallop, 1984c); a larger media discussion began to emerge. Questions about the transparency of the feasibility study were asked; with the Conservation Council of Victoria requesting that the report be made available (see Hogan, 1984) while the Melbourne City Council (MCC) recommended Olympic Park as being more suitable (Austen, 1984). In announcing the stadium, Cain admitted that “the Planning Department had not finished an environmental study on the site” (Austen, 1984, p. 11). Criticism therefore was aimed at the certainty of the government’s announcement that Flinders Park would be the site for the centre:

Questions of public consultation and alienation of Crown land seem to have been ignored in the interests of establishing a preferred location for the Australian Open of the future ... Before any decisions are made about the possibility of locating the National Tennis Centre at Flinders Park a full environment effects statement must be undertaken ... It makes a farce of the whole Environment Effects Act if before the public consultation process even begins; a decision to proceed with development has already been made. (Hogan, 1984, p. 16)

Michael Hogan, the director of the Conservation Council of Victoria, in the above letter to the Age, illustrates the concern of his organisation when Cain announced, prior to any public consultation, that Flinders Park would be the site for the Tennis Centre. When announcing the site, Cain did attach the condition that the “Government would introduce
legislation to give the centre the go-ahead once any big problems had been considered and over-come” (Austen, 1984, p. 11). However, in already publicly announcing the site and stating that problems would be over-come, Cain had essentially already signed off on the location.

The National Tennis Centre was formally approved in June, 1985. An Age headline expressed: “Tennis centre approved, but it draws fire” (Clarke & Slamet, 1985, p. 5); while the Sun, on the same day asserted: “Tennis centre plan slammed” (Merrigan, 1985, p. 11). Meanwhile the Conservation Council of Victoria and state Opposition claimed the Tennis Centre would destroy “irreplaceable inner-city parkland” (Clarke & Slamet, 1985, p. 5). Michael Hogan asserted that “the State Government had made a mockery of the notion of public consultation” (Clarke & Slamet, 1985, p. 5). Furthermore, Hogan claimed the views of the Conservation Council of Victoria were ignored by the State Government and called for a new study into the financing and environmental impact of the stadium (Merrigan, 1985). The Opposition alleged that alternative sites had not properly been investigated and expressed that “Flinders Park was part of Melbourne’s heritage and one of the city’s most-used open spaces” (Merrigan, 1985, p. 11). The Opposition supported a new tennis stadium but regarded Kooyong, Albert Park or land near Flemington as more suitable locations (Merrigan, 1985).

In response to Opposition claims of parkland alienation, Cain suggested hypocrisy by alluding to a government proposal in 1981, when the Opposition was in power, to use Flinders Park for the 1988 Olympic Games (‘Cain accuses Opposition’, 1985). Cain later explained the parkland issue in depth:

We always knew that the choice of the Flinders Park site created huge problems for us so far as the parkland issue was concerned… I knew it well and I had been told, reliably I believed, that it was an area of passive recreation… What I understood was that if you were choosing a parkland area close to the city then it was hard to find one where there was less arguable impact on other users… I believe we soon established that the impact on the community generally, and on any organised group for that matter, was minimal. The key however to our being able to sell the Flinders Park site was our undertaking to replace the overall open space with other open space… In summary the criticism that came around the announcement of the site was primarily from the Melbourne City Council and the State Opposition. The usual groups that universally express concern about any variation in the use of land, even remotely suggested as being parkland, were generally silent. (Cain, n.d.a, pp. 16-17)
As such, while there was some reported criticism from the Conservation Council of Victoria, Cain felt that overall criticism was politically motivated – from the Opposition and Melbourne City Council.

The ‘tradition’ associated with Kooyong hosting the Australian Open was mentioned a number of times by journalists and members of the public; despite only being the permanent host since 1972 (Coyne, 1984; Lasry, 1985; Leaman, 1985). Others suggested the government re-think its spending priorities – with housing shortages (Frommer, 1985) and health-care (Graham, 1985) specifically targeted. *Sun* journalist Douglas Wilkie (1985), in an opinion piece, suggested that the tennis centre would become a monument to Cain’s term in office and regarded the construction as a strategy to win votes.

**National Tennis Centre Bill**

Parliament of Victoria records in the lead-up to the reading of the National Tennis Centre Bill illustrate that parkland remained the priority issue. The Liberal Opposition consistently questioned the motivation of the state government to use Flinders Park, rather than alternative sites. In addition, questions were asked regarding the land swaps that would take place to ensure no net-loss of public parkland would result from the Tennis Centre occupying Flinders Park (Parliament of Victoria, 1985a). Cain had indicated that some of the Jolimont railway yards would be transformed into public parkland as compensation for the Victorian public. The Liberal Opposition however highlighted that this railway land (see area A, figure 6.4) was not due to be passed over to the State until 1991, three years after the Tennis Centre was due to open (Parliament of Victoria, 1985a). Media reports indicated that the land occupied by the federal army at Olympic Park (see area B, figure 6.4) would be given to the state, so that it could then be used to compensate the public for land lost due to the tennis centre (Clarke & Slamet, 1985; Lasry, 1985); Liberal MPs challenged the government to confirm if a formal contract existed between the state and federal governments over this land (Parliament of Victoria, 1985a; Parliament of Victoria, 1985b).

During the second reading of the Bill, Labor MP Joan Kirner failed to specify what land-swaps would take place, simply explaining that “In terms of the alienation of public land, the Bill specifies that the total area of land to be excised from Flinders Park and

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140 This land was subsequently turned into tennis courts, as shown in figure 6.4.
Yarra Park for the purposes of the National Tennis Centre, will not exceed 6 hectares” (Parliament of Victoria, 1985b, p. 380). In his unpublished manuscript, Cain (n.d.a) acknowledged that it “was not until sometime in 1989 that we were finally able to formalise the swap” (p. 17) with the Federal government. 142 Twenty-five years later, Cain maintains that the land-swaps were to the overall benefit of Victorians:

The opposition was [saying], ‘You’re filching park land,’ which we were. And we had to restore the five acres, whatever it was, with other park land

141 Dotted black-line designates the original National Tennis Centre. Black area indicates current land occupied by the National Tennis Centre. Area ‘A’ designates railway land used to compensate the Victorian public to ensure no net-loss of public parkland (A road cut through the area with the right-side later appropriated by the tennis centre for additional tennis courts while the left-side was transformed into – Birrung Marr, a public park). Area ‘B’ is the location of the former army barracks, used to compensate the Victorian public to ensure no net-loss of public parkland. Area ‘C’ is the 1998 MPV. Area ‘D’ is the Melbourne Entertainment and Sports Centre. Area ‘E’ is the 2010 redevelopment of the National Tennis Centre.

142 Cain (n.d.a) notes that an Old Children’s Court site was to become public open space and the Army Barracks near Olympic Park would be involved in a land swap to become public open space – this was Commonwealth Land and as such the Federal government needed to approve this, which it did in 1989. In addition “replacement will come from the return to public use of part of the Jolimont Railways land. A good discretion remains there for the government to designate substantial parts for that land where it sees fit to replace the parkland required for the Centre” (Cain, n.d.a, p.17). However, while this former railway land was redeveloped, part of it was occupied by extensions to the tennis centre.
purchase, which proved a benefit. Because in the deals we did to offset the loss of that park land, we got part of the Point Nepean reserve. We built the first park that had been built for 60 years, under the West Gate Bridge. We got the land from the Commonwealth, from the old drill hall further down Batman Avenue adjacent to Olympic Park...[and] we got the High Court Building in Little Bourke Street. There was a whole host of land swaps that it generated that were to Victoria’s and Melbourne’s long-term benefit, so it wasn’t all downside. (J. Cain, personal communication, April 16, 2013)

Unsurprisingly, Liberal MPs took the opportunity during the reading of the National Tennis Centre Bill to express their opposition to the siting of the tennis centre at Flinders Park. Member of Parliament, Roy Ward was particularly vocal during the debate, asserting that “The Bill will raid, plunder and commercially rape and violate this nation’s heritage to maintain the power of big sport” (Parliament of Victoria, 1985b, p. 733). Ward continued to convey irritation that the land is being ‘given away’ rather than sold; expressing that Flinders Park “belongs to the people of Victoria, not to just one section of the community” (Parliament of Victoria, 1985b, p. 735). In defence, Cain (n.d.a) explained that the Centre was always designed to be used by “the people of Victoria” (p. 11) as evident by the stipulations that it be open for public use when events were not being held.

Despite this opposition, the Liberal Party supported the need to build a National Tennis Centre in order to ensure the Grand Slam status of the Australian Open in Melbourne. One Liberal MP explained that “The Opposition supports in principle the idea of a tennis centre but it deplores the methods by which the Government has gone about the project” (Miles, cited in Parliament of Victoria, 1985b, p. 758). Continuing, the MP declared that the Opposition condemns the Government because it has:

Refused to provide adequate information when requested to do so. It has refused to provide adequate details on the transport and traffic problems to and from the centre, as well as problems associated with car parking. The Government has refused clearly to define, in answer to many requests, the proper financial guidelines necessary for the Opposition even to debate the project sensibly. Above all, in my opinion, it has become the law in this House that the Government should refuse-as it has refused on many occasions, to answer honest questions on any issue-clearly to state what is happening with the replacement of parkland. (Miles, cited in Parliament of Victoria, 1985b, p. 758)

The main issue appeared to be the lack of disclosure of information regarding the National Tennis Centre, as such, the Opposition and Victorian public were unable to
debate, at length, the benefits and costs of building a National Tennis Centre with public money on public parkland.

Cain’s assertion that little resistance to the National Tennis Centre existed outside of politics was challenged by Liberal MP, Bruce Reid, who named a number of organisations that opposed the siting of the centre in Flinders Park. In addition to the Liberal Opposition and Melbourne City Council (MCC), Reid cites the Moomba organisers as being concerned due to Flinders Park previously accommodating the annual Moomba festival; the Conservation Council of Victoria being angered by the appropriation of parkland and; “Twenty-eight amateur sports involved in the Olympic Park Committee Management” (Parliament of Victoria, 1985b, p. 756) as being opposed to the siting of the centre.

In response to this criticism, Joan Kirner defended the decision to locate the National Tennis Centre in Flinders Park and claimed consultation had occurred with many of the organisations cited by Reid. While acknowledging the opposition from the MCC to the alienation of parkland, Kirner alluded to previous comments by the MCC for the need to have a centrally located all-purpose indoor centre for the purpose of entertainment and sport (Parliament of Victoria, 1985b). In addition, Kirner stated that the organisers of the Moomba festival met with the government and were consulted throughout. The Olympic Park management committee, Kirner explained, would be represented on the National Tennis Centre Trust, therefore giving some voice to the amateur sports organisations that rely on the area (Parliament of Victoria, 1985b).

John Cain explained that in order for the National Tennis Centre to be approved, support from the National Party was required:

So the Opposition – Capital ‘O’ Opposition in the Parliament, which was then led by Liberal Jeff Kennett, they very noisily said they weren’t going to support this and we didn’t have majority of the Upper House to get it through. So we had all sorts of political problems. The Melbourne City Council, which controlled the land as the local government body, opposed it. Oh look the opposition, not to mention the Kooyong people, the opposition was pretty ferocious. The only reason we got the legislation through, I was able to do a deal with the National Party, which was the corner party in the Upper House ... They [National Party] recognised the benefits of it, I think. And they weren’t totally friendly…with the Liberal Party … [The National

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143 Moomba, which translates as “let’s get together and have fun” (City of Melbourne, 2014a); but alternatively may translate as “Up your bum” (see Kelly, 2011) is an annual free festival in Melbourne’s CBD, which has occurred since 1955 (Kelly, 2011).
Party] leader Peter Ross-Edwards...he didn’t get on well with Jeff Kennett anyway. (J. Cain, personal communication, 2013, April 16)

Parliament of Victoria records confirm the support from the National Party, with MP David Evans expressing the support of his party and defending the site selection of Flinders Park (Parliament of Victoria, 1985b). In addition to proclaiming support for the National Tennis Centre, Evans recommended the Bill be approved immediately to quash competition from other states desiring to host the Australian Open:

It is important also that this project be commenced and under way as soon as possible and that the completion date be as early as possible. Clearly, other States such as New South Wales, and Queensland in particular, would be most anxious and willing to become the site and the home for one of the Grand Slam tennis tournaments. (Parliament of Victoria, 1985b, p. 746)

The threat posed by other states and cities wanting to ‘steal’ the Grand Slam from Melbourne would later be used to justify redevelopments to the National Tennis Centre in the late 1990s and 2000s.

During the reading of the National Tennis Centre Bill, Joan Kirner outlined the significance of the complex, expressing the need to maintain the Australian Open in Melbourne:

This Bill, therefore, sets the framework for a National Tennis Centre of premier international standard along with a capacity for mass entertainment. In so doing, the aim is for the Australian Open to retain its pre-eminence as a Grand-Slam tournament and to be staged in Melbourne. Additionally, the centre will make an important contribution both in its beneficial effects economically and in its increasing provision of sporting, recreation and entertainment opportunities for all Victorians. (Parliament of Victoria, 1985b, p. 380)

As such, the government passed the ‘National Tennis Centre Act, 1985’ which re-zoned the land from Crown Land for a ‘public park’ into ‘Crown Land (Reserves)’. The Crown Land (Reserves) Act of 1978 explains that Crown Land can be reserved for a specific public purpose (Managing Crown Land, 2012), in this case, “for public purposes being in particular the purposes of a national tennis centre” which is specifically “for the purposes of tennis, other sports and other entertainment” (National Tennis Centre Act, 1985, p. 537).

Gabriel-Jones discusses Victorian land planning law with a central focus on how sustainability fits into current Victorian land law. Gabriel-Jones (2003) explains that the public-private dichotomy of Crown land use in recent times has deteriorated and we have
become “more tolerant of private use of public land” (p. 11). Gabriel-Jones continues on to note that “until very recently public land was seen as sacred: it must be kept totally free from blight of commercialism” (p. 11). However, now the use of public land for commercial enterprises has become ‘natural’ – for example many restaurants, coffee shops and kiosks are located on the beach foreshore; enterprises that are now regarded as being integral to the visitor experience. Furthermore, Gabriel-Jones (2003) explains that:

The Crown Land (Reserves) Act 1978 struggles to protect reserved Crown land from inappropriate private use through a set of restrictions which are inconsistent, illogical and often quite unintelligible. (p. 12)

Therefore, law regarding public land in Victoria appears to be rather vague. As previously alluded to, the Cain government incorporated a very consultative method into land-use policy; however this was largely focussed at regional/rural developments. In passing the National Tennis Centre Act, 1985 with what appears to be little public discussion; the Tennis Centre serves as one lasting example of the Labor government’s failure to conserve an important municipal public park land.

In addition to Political conflict over the land-swaps, one member of the public highlighted that the ‘quality’ of the land being lost – a large, uninterrupted central park – was superior to the compensation land (see Rzesniowiecki, 1985). While a letter to the Sun highlighted that some of the land to be reclaimed had previously been public land ‘stolen’ by a previous government for railways (Dunstan, 1985). In addition, Dunstan (1985) asserted, “It will be well into the 1990s before those railway yards are shifted and where will we find Mr Cain then?” (p. 8).

Richard Yallop, a tennis journalist for the Age and Tennis Australia Magazine, encapsulated the development in September 1985:

The speed with which the stadium has moved from someone’s grand idea to an architect’s building plan is a credit to the willpower and vision of those at the LTAA [Tennis Australia] and in the Government who have abandoned bureaucratic caution and ‘thought big’. There were lobbies to be overcome – the environmentalists and Kooyong, principally, who have argued the stadium would destroy public parkland and waste public money – but they were no match for Messrs Brian Tobin and Colin McDonald, respectively the LTAA’s president and executive director. (Yallop, 1985, p. 84)

While Yallop correctly highlights that environmentalists and the Kooyong Club challenged the locating of the sporting complex in Flinders Park, it was the political conflict within government that shaped the creation of the National Tennis Centre. As a result there was
not only an ‘abandonment of bureaucracy’, but also an abandonment of public consultation in the name of ‘thinking big’ or urban entrepreneurialism.

At the same time as the National Tennis Centre Bill was being approved, the National Tennis Centre Trust was set up as a body corporate responsible for “the care, improvement, use, promotion and financial management of the Centre” (Baragwanath, 1993, p. 5). The Trust included five members of parliament, three members of the Melbourne Cricket Ground (MCG) Trust, one member from the Olympic Park Committee of Management and one member of the MCC which were all nominated by the Minister for Sport & Recreation. In addition, two members of Tennis Australia and one member of the Victorian Tennis Association were included on the Trust. Premier Cain (n.d.a) explained the justification for the structure of the Trust, alluding to a need to maintain the governments’ control of the centre:

We were concerned about the management structure and having some capacity as a government to exercise control over the Tennis Centre in future years … We felt this Trust structure had the advantage of giving “precinct representation”, but at the same time, giving government overall authority and control over the composition. (pp. 30-31)

Cain, who had required the support of the National Party to have the Bill passed through the Upper-House explained that he included National Party leader Peter Ross-Edwards on the Trust along with, Lindsay Thompson, an ex-Liberal premier to limit political resistance to the Centre:

When we set up the administration … I created a trust like … the MCG trust, with party representation. Peter Ross-Edwards was on it. I put in Lindsay Thompson who was the former Liberal premier. So to some extent neutralizing the political angst and they were all personally very supportive of it. (J. Cain, personal communication, 2013, April 16)

As such, the apolitical Trust had representation from all of the major political parties as well as sporting stake-holders in the precinct; however the government retained control with Trustees being ‘nominated’ by the Labor Minister for Sport & Recreation – presumably the Minister would nominate individuals who support Labor’s vision for the Centre.

**Tennis begins at Flinders Park**

The inaugural Australian Open at the National Tennis Centre was held in 1988 and mediated as a success. Larger crowds than at previous Kooyong tournaments attended the Championships, leading the government to proudly claim the venture was worth the
cost. A member of the Treasury Department explained that “Once the Tennis Centre opened the people just said, ‘look this is a fantastic facility’ … but up until its opening the Opposition came up with the idea that this was Cain’s Cathedral and there was quite a lot of criticism saying this is going to be a big white elephant, and it’s taking parkland away” (Anonymous, personal communication, October 5, 2012). For months after the event, the *Australian Tennis Magazine* ran articles trumpeting the economic and sporting benefits of the National Tennis Centre. The only criticism cited was the poor treatment of the anti-apartheid protesters who had attended (Ray, 1988). However, by October – nine months after the event – discussion about the priority of corporate seating emerged. ‘ Preferential’ customers cited difficulty in applying for tickets (Reid, 1988; Smith, 1988), with one tennis fan explaining she had been informed by the ticket office that corporate seating was a revenue earner and took priority (Bellamy, 1998). It was apparent that the government defined success economically; the notion that this was a ‘public’ sporting facility was being challenged.

Despite the proclaimed success of the first Australian Open, the National Tennis Centre reported a $4.3 million loss in its first six months of operation, largely due to heavy interest repayments as a result of the financing arrangements of the Centre (Keenan, 1988). Peter Sheehan, Director General of the Department of Management and Budget at the time, explained that:

> The then Opposition stopped the government from putting any capital into it [tennis centre] so it was entirely debt-funded so that as soon as…interest rates rose…it ran into financial problems. So this was purported to be a sign of financial mismanagement, although it was actually a decision foisted on the government by the Opposition. (P. Sheehan, personal communication, April 4, 2013)

Cain (n.d.a), likewise, explains that criticism of the Centre’s finances mounted in the late 1980s and early 1990s as, despite a profit being made on the running expenses, the interest bill resulted in yearly losses. Chesleigh Baragwanath, the Auditor-General, reported that up until June 1991 the Centre had lost $35 million; largely as a result of high interest but also due to lower than expected non-tennis related revenues and higher than

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144 Just prior to the Australian Open, Australian tennis player Pat Cash had attended a tournament in apartheid South Africa. As such, anti-apartheid protesters attended the tournament to voice their disapproval. Ray (1988) explains that the majority of protesters were peaceful but received a lot of abuse by tennis fans. Whilst an agreement was reached between protesters and Tennis Australia to prevent disruption of matches (‘Apartheid protesters make cash deal’, 1988) black tennis balls were thrown across centre court during Cash’s first round match (Pirre & Stilver, 1988).
projected operating costs (Baragwanath, 1993). Baragwanath was critical of the
government for being slow in providing financial support for the Trust – in August 1991 the
government began a 12-year annual grant of $12 million ($144 million in total) to the
Trust; in return, Tennis Australia guaranteed the Australian Open at the Centre for 25
years. In addition, Baragwanath was critical of the support package, arguing that the fixed
payment of $12 million per year was not the most efficient system and a variable ‘formula
based subsidy’ (see Baragwanath, 1993, pp. 38-41) would have being more beneficial for
the government – saving approximately $3.2 million over the twelve years. Cain (n.d.a)
expressed that $12 million a year “is a very modest investment for the considerable return
that the Centre brings” (p. 27), claiming that the Australian Open added between $34
million and $58 million to the state economy each year. Despite being critical of the
financing agreement, Baragwanath was supportive of the Trust and its operations.
However, the Auditor-General did flag concerns of a potential conflict of interest with
Tennis Australia’s role as a Trustee. Baragwanath illustrated the conflict by citing the
1992 Davis Cup tie against the United States of America; Tennis Australia decided to play
the tie at Kooyong as the grass courts benefited the Australian athletes; resulting in a loss
of potential earnings for the National Tennis Centre. As such, Tennis Australia put its
tennis interests ahead of the Trust’s financial interests.

Labor lost the 1992 state election to the Liberal-National Coalition. While Labor
was in power, the Coalition controlled the Upper house of parliament. Winning the 1992
election comfortably, the Coalition gained control of both the Upper and Lower houses of
parliament, allowing sweeping changes to be made. In regards to the financing of the
National Tennis Centre, Coalition Treasurer Alan Stockdale explained that:

Cain built it on the basis that it was going be a PPP [Public-Private Partnership] and it’d make a profit and it would be a venue for concerts and things. And we said, “Look, that’s just ridiculous. It’s not servicing its debt, let alone making any return.” So we went in there, and we assumed a whole lot of debt, restructured under a commercial footing, renegotiated the agreement with Tennis Australia – tried to get more business-like incentives into it. But basically recommitted to the idea, we had to make sure everybody wanted to come to the Australian Open ... And there’s been bipartisan support for that, but I think we actually made it all really work. It hadn’t worked for the first few years because it was reported all the time as losing a massive amount of money. (A. Stockdale, personal communication, May 6, 2013)
As such, Stockdale acknowledges that the initial financing structure of the Centre, in part, led to the early financial losses. But Stockdale fails to acknowledge that the reason for the debt-funded structure was due to conflict between political parties; indeed, it appears that both Labor and the Coalition agreed that government capital should have originally funded the National Tennis Centre. The political ‘game’ of opposing rival party decisions resulted in early struggles in operating the Centre and as a consequence, Victorian taxpayers inserted an extra $144 million into the sporting complex.

**A Public Sports Centre or Entertainment Money-Spinner?**

On 4 May 1995, after ten years of governments building the tennis 'brand', both the *Herald Sun* and *Age* newspapers reported that Flinders Park would have a name change (Gettler, 1995; Rados, 1995). The Kennett-led Coalition government clearly stated their desire to create a sports precinct and to promote this to a global television audience. Coalition Treasurer, Alan Stockdale, explains the rationale for changing the name of the park as a result of Kennett viewing the Australian Open on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) while in London:

> The Australian Tennis Open Men’s Final was about to start and the BBC had a sign saying, you know, “Stand-by, start of the Australian Tennis Open” superimposed over a logo of the Sydney Opera House. And as a result of seeing that, Jeff decided we need to change the name Flinders Park to Melbourne Park. And we covered the whole tennis stadium in the word Melbourne. (A. Stockdale, personal communication, May 6, 2013)

While the *Australian* Open clearly branded the nation to a foreign market, images related to Sydney appeared to be symbolic of Australian-ness. As such, legislation was introduced – with no evidence of public consultation – to rename the area ‘Melbourne Park’ in an attempt to educate an international market of the location of the Championships. In the space of a decade, the official narrative surrounding the National Tennis Centre had gone from Cain’s “a place for the people” (McDonald, 1985, p. 12), to Kennett’s ‘billboard for Melbourne’. No further comment or criticism about the name change emerged in either newspaper; implying that there was little resistance, or alternatively, suggesting that the newspapers chose not to report it.

Minimal government debate occurred surrounding the name change with the Labor Opposition largely supportive of the strategy (Parliament of Victoria, 1995a). During the second reading of the Melbourne and Olympic Parks (amendment) Bill, Labor MP Janet Wilson expressed regret about the name change, asserting that the name Flinders Park had gained national and international recognition (Parliament of Victoria, 1995a).
Included within the amendment to the Melbourne and Olympic Parks Bill was a restructuring of the National Tennis Centre Trust, which a larger discussion appeared.

The Liberal-National Coalition government proposed to amalgamate the National Tennis Centre Trust with the Olympic Parks Trust to create the Melbourne and Olympic Parks Trust (MOPT). The amalgamation was supported by the Labor Opposition; however concern regarding the Trustee composition was aired. The MOPT would have 12 Trustees; nine nominated by the Minister for Sport, Recreation and Racing, two nominated by Tennis Australia and one nominated by the Victorian Tennis Association (Parliament of Victoria, 1995b). Janet Wilson explained that not all relevant organisations would be represented on the new Trust:

The opposition believes the trustees of the Melbourne Cricket Ground, who currently have 3 members on the National Tennis Centre Trust, the Melbourne City Council, which currently has 1 on the National Tennis Centre Trust, and a member of the Olympic Park Management or the users of Olympic Park should be afforded some sort of representation on the new trust. (Parliament of Victoria, 1995a, p. 1560)

While the Opposition was apprehensive about ‘representation’, of greater concern was the selection process of the trustees of the new MOPT which may have advantaged the proposed City Link toll road development:

The opposition also asks the minister to assure the house that the motive behind the bill is not an attempt to clear the decks prior to the implementation of the government's City Link plans...there is some suspicion that the government is attempting to remove any opponents to its plans for City Link and to replace them with people sympathetic to the government's proposals. (Parliament of Victoria, 1995a, p. 1559)

City Link is a network of toll roads which includes the Domain Tunnel running under the southern perimeter of Olympic Park (see figure 6.5). The development received a lot of resistance, including environmental groups concerned about its impact on Olympic Park, Yarra Park and the Royal Botanic Gardens. Indeed, just a week after the Opposition voiced concern, Labor MP Donald White reported that parts of Olympic Park would soon be closed and “Athletes and greyhound trainers at Olympic Park have been informed that the training facilities at the park will cease to be available for up to two years when construction commences on the City Link project” (Parliament of Victoria, 1995c, p.

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145 Labor supported the amalgamation of the Trusts but did critique the lack of consultation with park users; “None of the Olympic Park user groups was consulted on any aspect of the bill; they were told it was happening!” (Wilson, cited in Parliament of Victoria, 1995a, p. 1559).
Furthermore, the greyhound track was later demolished when it became apparent that City Link facilities would need to occupy the area permanently (The Meadows, 2008).

The next major development at the National Tennis Centre occurred in 1998. Premier Jeff Kennett announced that the construction of a $65.4 million Multipurpose Venue (MPV) was to begin, with a target to be completed by 2000 (see area C, figure 6.4). This ‘super stadium’ would be designed to host tennis, basketball and cycling;

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146 As a consequence of the City Link development, part of the greyhound track was occupied permanently, as such, the Olympic Park greyhound track was demolished despite the Melbourne Greyhound Racing Association having thirteen years of lease remaining on the site (The Meadows, 2008); the state upgraded the Sandown greyhound track as compensation (see Parliament of Victoria, 1997).

147 The image shows Melbourne and Olympic Parks prior to the redevelopment of Melbourne Park. The solid black border indicates Melbourne Park at the time, the dotted-border to the right indicates the current developed area of Melbourne Park.

148 In May 1998, when announcing the MPV, both the Herald Sun and Age newspapers alluded to the authorisation of the venue as well as providing a plan which indicated where the MPV would be sited. As such, readers of both papers could be led to believe that the construction was approved. However, Hansard records illustrate that amendments to the Melbourne and Olympic Parks Bill only stipulated that the government would have power to re-zone the land, if an environmental effects statement and financial reports supported the development (Parliament of Victoria, 1998). The Opposition argued the purpose of the Bill, as the amendments only appeared to provide the
in addition to hosting concerts to replace the Melbourne Entertainment and Sports Centre located across the road (Das, 1998; Owen & Hansen, 1998) (area D, figure 6.4). Jeff Kennett justified the MPV in the following terms: “The venue will significantly enhance Melbourne’s competitive strengths in attracting major events and is an integral part of our bid for the 2006 Commonwealth Games” (cited in Owen & Hansen, 1998, p. 3). The ‘competitive strengths’ that Labor Premier Cain identified in 1984 continued to be a key concept in Melbourne’s Liberal economic strategy over a decade later. Indeed, it must also be highlighted that during the few years before this announcement, Kennett had also approved an upgrade to the MCG, the construction of a new 50,000 seat indoor sports venue at the docklands (see chapter 9) and ‘stolen’ the Formula One Grand Prix from Adelaide (see chapter 8). Some members of the public voiced their disapproval towards Kennett’s spending strategy, arguing that welfare areas such as hospitals (Lee, 1998; Russo, 1998), schools (Bell, 1998; Monbulk, 1998; Scarce, 1998) and permanent employment (Sale, 1998) were being neglected for elite sport.

The Coalition government claimed that through a complex process of re-zoning occupied land as public parkland, the people of Victoria would receive a net-gain of 14 hectares of land as compensation for additional land at Melbourne Park being alienated for the National Tennis Centre. In addition, the government cited the failings of the previous Cain and Kirner Labor governments to reimburse Victorians with parkland when constructing the tennis centre. However, in claiming a 14 hectare net-gain of parkland, the Coalition government included re-zoned land from the army barracks at Olympic Park and Jolimont railway yards – land which Cain had previously promised would be transformed into public parkland. As such, it appears this land was ‘given’ to the public twice and used twice to justify the alienation of public parkland (Parliament of Victoria, 1998). Moreover, the definition of parkland was challenged by the Labor Opposition; the demolished greyhound track was to become an “events car park” (Parliament of Victoria, 1998, p. 1649) with artificial grass while eight hectares of the 14 hectare net-gain in public parkland was Federation Square – a public square in the CBD which consists of buildings and a large concrete open space (Parliament of Victoria, 1998).

While debate surrounding the parkland existed, the Labor Opposition supported the Coalition government’s idea to build a MPV which would suit basketball and cycling as government with the legislative power to excise public parkland with no specific details of the plans (Parliament of Victoria, 1998). The public therefore were led to believe the development had been approved which may have limited some resistance to the project.

\footnote{The Entertainment and Sports Centre was later redeveloped at a cost of $20 million before being ‘given’ to the Collingwood Football Club (see Chapter 9).}
well as add to Melbourne’s chances of winning the 2006 Commonwealth Games (Parliament of Victoria, 1998). In addition, the MPV was to have a retractable roof, allowing the government, MOPT and Tennis Australia to claim the Australian Open as the only grand slam tournament to have two roofed stadiums (Browne, 1998; Baker, 1999). As such, Melbourne – and Tennis Australia – could sell itself as being unique from the other three grand slam tournaments and at the forefront of technology.

Redevelopment of Melbourne Park

More than a decade later, in 2010, the now Brumby-led Labor Government announced a $363 million redevelopment of Melbourne Park (Grace, 2010). Two years earlier, during the Australian Open tournament, Brumby announced a $2 million business study to determine improvements of Melbourne Park amid media speculation that China wanted Australia’s Grand Slam event (Rood, 2008a; Whinnett & Edmund, 2008). Brumby stated that “Unquestionably we would have lost that event … It would have gone to China (J. Brumby, personal communication, September 11, 2013). Brumby explained the business study was to explore improving a number of elements of Melbourne Park, including spectator, media and player facilities as well as “opening up the precinct to greater community use” (cited in Whinnett & Edmund, 2008, p. 5). Just prior to Brumby’s announcement, Tennis Australia had warned in its annual report that Melbourne may lose the Grand Slam status unless a major redevelopment of Melbourne Park occurred (Schlink, 2008a). Herald Sun journalist Leo Schlink (2008a) expressed that the other Grand Slam venues, as well as stadia in Asia and the Middle East, are superior to Melbourne and the announcement of the business study was good news. One reader of the Herald Sun questioned the priorities of the government and suggested Brumby’s ultimate aim was to gain votes; “are there more votes in sport than health” (Cowes, 2008, p. 84).

Australian International Olympic Committee member, Kevan Gosper, supported the investment by alluding to the need for Melbourne to retain major sporting events; “Whether we like it or not, sport is our nameplate to the world, our identity, and we had better hang on to what we’ve got” (cited in Reed, 2008, p. 90). Highlighting the risk in using major events for place-making, just days prior to the announcement that $2 million would be invested into exploring an upgrade of Melbourne Park, capsicum spray was used by police on Greek fans at the Australian Open defined by the Herald Sun as ‘yobs’ and ‘hooligans’ (Schlink, 2008a; 2008b). Deputy Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, said the

150 The state government would provide $1.5 million and the MOPT would provide the other $0.5 million (Whinnett & Edmund, 2008).
scenes tarnished Australia’s global image (Whinnett & Edmund, 2008) while former tennis star, Pat Cash expressed worry that the violence may increase the likelihood of Melbourne losing the grand slam, probably to China (Schlink, 2008b).

In January 2009, a year after the business study announcement, the Age and Herald Sun reported that Brumby would soon announce a multi-million dollar revamp to the National Tennis Centre. The Age explained that Senior State Government sources had informed the paper that the Government had agreed to a list of demands by Tennis Australia which would result in a renewed 20-year contract to keep the Australian Open in Melbourne until 2036; in addition, the price tag of $300 million was estimated (Houston, 2009). Included in the demands was an upgrading and extension of Melbourne Park, as well Tennis Australia receiving a larger slice of revenue from the Grand Slam event. Melbourne and Olympic Parks Trust CEO, Brian Morris, explained that:

The previous agreement was due to expire in 2015 and Melbourne was in danger of losing the grand slam event to another state or country. Options being considered were Spain and parts of Asia. Discussions with Tennis Australia were brought forward to ensure that the event remained in Melbourne based on its clear economic benefits to Victoria. (B. Morris, personal communication, August 30, 2013)

The media reported that Sydney, Shanghai, Madrid and Dubai were interested in the Grand Slam (see Higginbottom, 2009; Houston, 2009) while a Herald Sun editorial supported “any reasonable expense to retain an Open that attracts more than 600,000 – many of them children – and contributes an estimated $100 million to the Victorian economy” (‘Grand Slam must stay’, 2009, p. 22). In a similar strategy to the 2008 business study announcement, Brumby waited for the 2009 Australian Open to commence before pledging “$5 million for a capital works program as well as detailed design and costing’s for the projects first stage” (Milovanovic, 2009, p. 3). Indeed, the timing of these announcements, when Victorians are celebrating and therefore value the Australian Open, appeared to be a strategy adopted by Brumby to ensure limited resistance to the use of tax-payer funds for the tennis centre. The redevelopment project was now estimated to cost anywhere between $300 million and $500 million and would, according to Brumby, “ensure Melbourne Park remains a world-class sporting precinct and the home of the Australian Open tennis tournament until 2036” (cited in Schulz & Schlink, 2009, para. 11). A few letters to the editor were printed, requesting the government to focus less on sport and more on hospitals, education and transport (Duke, 2009; Geard, 2009; Stroud, 2009).
Continuing the strategy to use the event as a platform, Brumby announced plans for a $363 million first stage redevelopment of Melbourne Park on the second day of the 2010 Australian Open.\footnote{Initially it was announced as a $363 million redevelopment; however the Federal Government also added $3 million to the funds to make it $336 million.} The first stage of the redevelopment consisted of installing a retractable roof and an extra 1,500 seats on the ‘Margaret Court’ show court (see area E, figure 6.4); an ‘Eastern Plaza;’ 21 new courts (eight indoor); a footbridge connecting the MCG, Melbourne Park and the Rectangular Stadium; landscaping; additional car parking spaces and; improved athlete facilities (Grace, 2010). On announcing the redevelopment plans, Brumby and Sports Minister, James Merlino, continued to defend the expenditure on the basis that the upgrade guaranteed the Australian Open in Melbourne until 2036 (‘Melbourne Tennis Centre’, 2010).

A number of letters to the editor were published; the main concern to the public was the cost of the redevelopment. Housing (Rogers, 2010; van Dorssen, 2010), health (O’Conner, 2010; Wayne, 2010), policing (Millsom, 2010; Bryan, 2010) and education (Hughes, 2010; Millsom, 2010) were mentioned as being in more need of the $363 million invested into the Tennis Centre. Morris expressed the need for the money was supported and a diligent process was followed in making the decision; “I think there was a general recognition that money needed to be spent on the precinct but as always there is a very diligent review and high level of scrutiny that’s carried out on any proposed expenditure” (B. Morris, personal communication, August 30, 2013). While complaints about the cost of the redevelopment were aired, little was mentioned regarding the additional occupation of land for the Tennis Centre.

The Eastern Plaza and additional courts (including indoor courts, gymnasium and athlete warm-up/warm-down facilities) were built on land reserved for the Tennis Centre as part of a ‘stream-lining’ Bill approved more than two years earlier (see figure 6.6). In October, 2007, the Labor government amended the Melbourne and Olympic Parks Act which resulted in the MOPT being responsible for all land between the railway tracks and Swan Street (see figure 6.4). The land, which was previously managed by the Melbourne City Council (MCC), was re-zoned as Crown Land (reserved); “reserved for ‘tennis, other sports, recreation and entertainment’” (Parliament of Victoria, 2007a, p. 3593). The Bill aimed to “modernise the land management arrangements in the Melbourne and Olympic parks precinct” (Parliament of Victoria, 2007b, p. 3287) to allow a single management authority, the MOPT, to be in charge of the entire area. The government argued that pockets of land were managed by various organisations which led to inefficient use of the land. As such, the land was reserved for the National Tennis Centre prior to
redevelopment announcements being made. At the time, the Opposition did not raise concern about possible further alienation of parkland, instead focusing on the government’s process in transferring land management from the MCC to the MOPT with no consultation; querying whether this would set a precedent for any future adjustments to authority over public land around Victoria (Parliament of Victoria, 2007a).

Figure 6.6: Melbourne & Olympic Parks in 2015 (MOPT, 2015)

In regards to the cost of the redevelopment, the Herald Sun revealed that the government does not have an overall estimate for the three-stage redevelopment plans of Melbourne Park (Wright, 2012). Suggestions that it could be as much as $1 billion were not declined by the now Liberal-National Coalition government as “the final [two] stages of the 15-year project had not been costed before the deal to retain the grand slam was made” (Wright, 2012, para. 4). The government criticised the previous Labor government for failing to undertake extensive studies into the second and third stages of the redevelopment. As such, the Coalition government allocated a further $5.5 million to study the design and estimated costs of the second stage of the redevelopment (Wright, 2012) – although no indication of the costs of the third-stage have been announced. Echoing the strategy of using the event as a platform for major announcements, Liberal-National Coalition premier Dennis Napthine revealed a government contribution of $298 million towards a $338 million second stage redevelopment to Melbourne Park the day before the 2014 Australian Open – the remaining $40 million would be provided by the MOPT (Campbell, 2014). The second stage of the redevelopment includes a new bridge to the west of Melbourne Park, upgrades to Rod Laver arena and a new administration and media building (Campbell, 2014; Major Projects Victoria, 2014b; MOPT, 2014b). Premier Napthine explained that the upgrade “is critical to continue attracting global sporting,
music and other cultural events such as the Australian Open” (cited in Campbell, 2014, para. 4).

Conclusion

The construction and redevelopments of the National Tennis Centre at Flinders/Melbourne Park highlights the strategic framework in which major projects were developed in Melbourne. It began with an initial announcement of a feasibility or business study. The feasibility study was used to ultimately confirm the economic benefits and environmental suitability of the venture, which in turn supported government claims of the need to proceed with the development. In addition, external threats posed by competing cities or nations to secure the event were used to further justify the need for the government to invest tax-payer funds on behalf of the citizens. These threats were also used to add symbolic value to the asset as public demand - real or perceived - increased. Consultation with the community was largely bypassed. And, the community involvement that did occur was usually done at arms-length. This involved individuals being represented as stake-holders on pseudo-government authorities such as the National Tennis Centre Trust or MOPT. Opposition to the Government's Melbourne Park development program was always evident as political parties and members of parliament vied for the claim to represent the citizens of Victoria. While in power however, the economic Right hand of government was most valued, while in opposition the needs of social welfare and the environment - the Left hand of government - intensified. Throughout the process, democratic rights were demanded by those that resisted the government's 'urban entrepreneurship' venture. Letters to the editor frequently asked for voice and openness, while the Opposition claimed that crucial information was withheld, consequently quashing opportunities for rigorous debate.
Chapter 7: Multi-sport Events: 1996 Olympic Bid & 2006 Commonwealth Games

The use of international multi-sport events such as the Olympic Games and Commonwealth Games has become a common strategy for city branding (Horne, 2007; Kellett, Hede & Chalip, 2008). Davison (1997) argues that the 1956 Olympic Games introduced the world to Melbourne and Melbourne to the world. It was through these Games that Melbourne was able to position itself as a viable site for international businesses and the urban elite to (re)locate. But the Games also forced Melbourne to ‘catch-up’ with cultural (for example, abandoning six o’clock closing) and infrastructural advances of the modern world. By 1988, with Melbourne again about to submit a bid to host the Games, the rationale for doing so remained the need to ‘put Melbourne on the map’ and to encourage foreign capital investment in the city which was fast becoming a ‘rust-belt’ due to a declining manufacturing industry as a result of cuts to tariff protection.152

Despite failing to win the hosting rights for the 1996 Olympic Games, the government of Victoria had put in motion an economic strategy focused on hosting Major Events. The Victorian Major Events Company (then Melbourne Major Events Company) was set-up by Premier Joan Kirner not long after the Games bid was lost, with the specific aim of identifying and attracting Major Events (such as conferences, sports events, cultural festivals) which would “bring economic, broadcast/media exposure, cultural and social benefits to Victoria” (Victorian Auditor-General, 2007, p. 12). One such event targeted, and subsequently obtained, by the Victorian Major Events Company (VMEC) was the 2006 Commonwealth Games.

The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the use of multi-sport events in Victoria’s economic strategy of urban entrepreneurialism and city branding. Beginning with the failed attempt to win the hosting rights to the 1996 Olympic Games, I will outline why the state government bid for the event and the issues that emerged through the bidding process. The second section of this chapter focuses on the 2006 Commonwealth Games. I discuss disputes that occurred from the bidding for the event in late 1999 through until the review of finances in late 2006. The financial cost to tax payers appeared to be the main issue during the Olympic Games bid; the use of public parkland, the ‘fast-tracking’ of major projects along with financial costs emerged as key concerns during the 2006 Commonwealth Games bid and hosting.

152 This is explained further in Chapter 2. The cuts to tariff protection in the 1980s meant that many local manufacturing industries were unable to compete with cheaper foreign imports.
1996 Olympic Bid

Melbourne’s 1990 attempt to win the rights to host the 1996 Olympic Games arguably begins Victoria’s shift to a Major Events strategy. The National Tennis Centre, completed in 1988, was regarded by Premier Cain as an important economic tool for Victoria but the main justification for construction was retaining an event, rather than obtaining an event. Premier during the majority of the bid process, John Cain, explained that the Olympics “was about a government initiative to see sports as creating an opportunity for economic activity and for tourism, and boosting Victoria and Melbourne in the eyes of the world” (personal communication, April 16, 2013). Cain’s Victoria: The Next Step economic strategy had been operating for four years by the time the bid was announced; the attempt to host the Olympics fitted in well with the view of Victoria’s competitive strength in sport. Indeed, a member of the bid committee explained that the Olympics would have added to Melbourne’s sporting identity as well as provided an opportunity for urban regeneration:

And, of course, the promotion, continual promotion and building on one of the key planks of Melbourne and Victoria is sport, whether its football, tennis, golf, cricket, basketball, netball, swimming, the whole thing. Melbourne is very much about that ... So it [Olympic Games] gave that opportunity to be able to capitalise on all of that. Improve it, redevelop, renewal, community motivation and momentum, and morale, economic benefits, with that strong underpinning backing of the key players, and the governments, and local government. (D. Bethke, personal communication, April 11, 2013)

A few months after the host city was announced, Labor Premier Joan Kirner announced the foundation of the Victorian Major Events Company (Gilchrist, 2004) which has subsequently been credited with attracting a number of major events to Melbourne (including the Grand Prix and 2006 Commonwealth Games).

City nomination & submitting the bid

Attempts to bid for the 1988 Olympic Games failed to materialise in the early 1980s as financial and political support was lacking (D. Bethke, personal communication, April 11, 2013). After Brisbane’s failed bid for the 1992 Olympics in 1986, Melbourne, along with Sydney, requested to be the nominated Australian city for the 1996 Olympic Games (Jobling, 1994). Brisbane decided to again bid for the Games, leading to an internal selection process, in which Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane submitted a bid document as well as a presentation to the Australian Olympic Federation.
The internal bidding process was regarded as a bitter ‘fight,’ mostly between Melbourne and Sydney. Victorian premier John Cain openly criticised Sydney’s bid through the media in the lead-up to the Australian Olympic Federation’s selection meeting. Cain slammed Sydney’s bid as being too expensive and a burden for tax-payers nationally as substantial Federal government funding would be required (Dixon, Metherell & Frail, 1988). Suggestions that the potential site for Sydney’s Olympic stadium was a former chemical dump was also used as an argument against the New South Wales city representing Australia as a bid city (Harding, 1988; Skeggs & Rindfleisch, 1988). Brisbane representatives argued that it had the best weather for an Olympics while Sydney’s reputation as the most internationally recognised Australian city was regarded as a major strength. The Melbourne newspapers, through articles, editorials and public letters, highlighted reasons why Melbourne deserved to win – consistently the themes of sports capital of Australia, existing world class facilities in a central location, large sporting attendances and, current major events (Australian Open Tennis, Melbourne Cup, Test cricket, Victorian Football League Grand Final, 500cc Motorcycle Grand Prix) were touted as advantages (see Abjorensen & McAsey, 1988; Easterbrook, 1988; Jenkins, 1988).

Few media reports or letters to the editor challenged the benefits of bidding for, or hosting, an Olympic Games. Editorials in The Age, The Herald and The Sun expressed the infrastructural benefits to the city of hosting the Olympics. Indeed, the economic elements of the bid gained the most column space in all three papers, with quotes from Premier Cain and advocates for the bid claiming that the Games would generate substantial revenues. While there appeared to be slight discrepancies about the exact benefits, the reported news usually cited a Victorian state profit of between $79 million (Millett, 1988) and $86 million (McAsey, 1988a) with a $4.5 billion benefit to industries over the decade of the 1990s (Millett, 1988) and an increase in 31,000 jobs (McAsey, 1988a; Millett, 1988; Rindfleisch, 1988a); all after an outlay of $1.092 billion (Donohoe & Lee, 1988; Skeggs, 1988a).

Melbourne was announced as the winning city to represent Australia in the bid for the 1996 Olympic Games on the 19th November, 1988. John Cain was praised by The Age for his ‘politicking’ in beating Sydney’s premier Nick Greiner (Abjorensen, 1988), while Lord Mayor Winsome McCaughey and the Melbourne City Council (MCC) were regarded by the state Opposition as the origin of success (Pirrie, McAsey & Dixon, 1988).

153 Some articles highlighted that the Greek population of Melbourne was supporting Athens to host the 1996 Games as it marked 100 years since the first modern Olympics in Athens (Colin, 1988; Constantinidou, 1988; Credlim, 1988; Bone, 1988).
The day before the bid announcement, McCaughey explained why she invested so much time in seeking the Games:

the reason I have supported the Olympic bid so strongly is because it, more than any other mechanism can help bring about the very things Melbourne needs – inner-city housing, public transport and a change in community attitude to the city. Even if the bid fails, the framework to achieve these things is now in place. (McCaughey, cited in Symonds, 1988, p. 2)

Editorials from The Herald and The Sun newspapers repeated the sentiments of McCaughey that the bid process itself created the necessary plans for urban renewal:

...Melbourne's success in winning the nod to place the Australian bid has already created the wherewithal for a much-needed program of urban renewal and upgrading. The plans to redevelop the city's docklands...should go ahead regardless of the outcome of our bid. ('Melbourne wins gold', 1988, p. 16)

We won the nomination as Australia's Olympic Games city. We were officially acknowledged as the sporting capital of the nation...Now we need to get cracking on upgrading existing facilities and building new ones...We've had enough of plans, studies and proposals...the endless bits of paper so beloved by bureaucrats because they delay the need for hard decisions. For action. Action is what we need. ('Now let's get cracking', 1988, p. 2)

An editorial in The Age simply regarded the win as recognition of Melbourne’s ‘sport capital’ status and stated “All Victorians will be delighted” ('Melbourne wins', 1988, p. 13).

Little published resistance was evident in the newspapers in the build-up to the Australian city nomination, however immediately after the city nomination announcement a number of letters were published requesting the state government to cease with the bid and invest public funds into the State Library (Linaos, 1988) and healthcare (Milton, 1988). Others called for a social impact study by the Victorian

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154 One member of the public, in a letter to the Age just prior to the announcement of the Australian city nomination called for money to be spent on upgrading the State Library along with a need to solve the growing number of homeless children in Victoria (Potter, 1988).

155 In terms of financing the bid itself, the bid budget was announced as $20 million of which $9 million would come from the state government, $1 million from the Melbourne City Council and $10 million would come from the private sector through the ‘100 Club’ – 100 companies investing $100,000 each (in the end, 101 companies invested in the bid) (Heath, 2006). Alford (1990)
Council of Social Service – specifically to look at rising accommodation costs and cost of living if the Games came to Melbourne (Green, 1988; ‘Olympic rivals’, 1988; Hurley, 1988; Rindfleisch, 1988b).

In the lead-up to the bid document being submitted to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in early 1990 the Melbourne media consistently mentioned when IOC delegates were visiting the city and IOC delegates were subsequently quoted as being impressed by Melbourne (Easterbrook, 1990a; 1990b; ‘Olympics boost’, 1990). The main cause for concern for the bid team was a public transport dispute during the visit by the president of the IOC, Juan Antonio Samaranch (Easterbrook & Wilson, 1990). Indeed, this transport dispute, along with the well-publicised financial issues of the state government during the late 1980’s and early 1990, were later highlighted in a ‘confidential’ IOC report obtained by The Age months after the bid announcement as the reasons why Melbourne failed to win the bid to host the Games (Alcom, 1990).

The day prior to the bid book being submitted, The Age expressed that community support, the sporting facilities, enthusiasm for sport and a multi-cultural society were the strengths of Melbourne’s bid (‘Melbourne gains’, 1990). In the week after submitting the bid book, The Sun and The Age continued to focus on the financial consequences of hosting the Games; including an estimated benefit to the Australian economy of $7.8 billion (Easterbrook, 1990c) and a new $250 million sporting complex – three times the size of the then National Tennis Centre – to be built at Albert Park (Hitchings, 1990), which would be included in the overall Games cost of $1.28 billion, generating a $41 million profit to the state (Skeggs, 1990a). The $79-86 million profit estimates proclaimed in November 1988 had already halved. In addition to these ‘benefits’ of hosting the Games, The Sun also reported on a public forum, run by the Melbourne City Council to update the public on plans to ensure the Games did not have a negative social impact (Skeggs, 1990b). The forum also provided an opportunity for the public to voice their concerns, which included a fear of rising house prices, the environmental impact of planned developments in the docklands area and decreasing public space at Albert Park as a result of planned sporting infrastructure (Skeggs, 1990c). Melbourne Olympic bid board member Des Bethke explained that while there were barriers to overcome when creating the bid, on the whole it was a smooth process with minimal resistance:

explained that the state government ended up spending an extra $5 million, resulting in a total budget of $25 million being spent on the bid.

This dispute included 33 days of trams (250 in total) parked in Melbourne’s Central Business District (Lucas, 2010b).
There would always be some issues to be reconciled that – which would get in anything of that magnitude – but it was more about how we do it and not whether we do it, if you understand. There can be tensions around where particular facilities should be, which one should be used, but it didn’t swamp the bid in that sense at all. So, robust debate, robust discussions, but there were timelines and deadlines to be met and people had to deliver. And that’s what, in fact, happened. (D. Bethke, personal communication, April 11, 2013)

In expressing that the focus was on how, rather than whether, the city could host the Games, Bethke indicated that the bid was largely supported by the public, media and political parties on both sides of government.

Host city announcement
With the bid book submitted, the next significant event was the September, 1990 announcement of the host city for the 1996 Olympic Games. An editorial in The Age declared that the “newspaper strongly supports Melbourne’s bid as one to bring real benefits to this city…Win or lose…we should confidently push on with our plans regardless” (‘Winning is not all’, 1990, p. 14). Meanwhile, The Herald reaffirmed the economic benefits that the Games would bring to Australia and Victoria (‘Melbourne deserves’, 1990) as well as approving of the risk taken in bidding for the event:

So far it has cost about $30 million to stage our bid. Some Jeremiahs are already moaning that’s a lot of money to spend in pursuit of an elusive, glittering prize…[During] the 1956 Olympics…we grew up. And we learned, perhaps to our surprise, what Melbourne was capable of, and the experience gave our morale a tremendous boost…Today, Victorians need to have their spirits lifted…The Olympics would generate new jobs, new commercial activity. (‘Hopes ride’, 1990, p. 8)

Somewhat surprisingly, The Sun did not have an editorial focusing on the Games. While The Sun’s editorial discussion on the Olympics was absent, some articles reported updates as well as potential political ramifications of the Bid.

The Sun political editor expressed that the state Opposition would be unable to leverage votes off a failed bid, if that happened, as Jeff Kennett (the Opposition leader during the majority of the bid process) had publicly announced his support for the Olympic bid throughout the campaign (D. Wilson, 1990). Joan Kirner, the new Labor premier who had replaced John Cain in August 1990, announced that a ‘social justice package’ would be set up to focus on house prices, cost of living and the environment (Franklin, 1990a);
but that it would not have any legislative teeth and would merely ‘advise’ the government (P. Wilson, 1990a). Therefore, while Kirner acknowledged the need to plan for potential negative socioeconomic impacts resulting from hosting a major event such as the Olympic Games (for example rising living costs), she was unwilling to give any political empowerment to the cause.

Melbourne City Council representative on the bid board, Des Bethke, asserted that there was public, media and corporate support for the Olympic bid:

And what the bid did, it focused the city. It really united the city, I have to say. The general public at large were getting behind the bid. It had a good feeling about it. The publicity was strong from the newspapers, and the media at large. People were starting to believe in something. It gave you something tangible almost to hang on to. And it was lifting spirits and morale. Corporations were putting in big dollars. (D. Bethke, personal communication, April 11, 2013)

Indeed, it may be that the media support not only existed but actively generated public appeal for the Games; John Cain explained that there were “a lot of puppet supporters generated by the tabloid media” (personal communication, April 16, 2013). In addition to the media’s role in generating support, a strategy to involve the community was employed by the bid organisers. Bethke explained that a key element to the bid was the level of public support for hosting the Olympic Games, as such, community engagement was important:

Because one of the elements in the bid is, what’s the level of community support? So you’ve got to be pushing the community support side of it and then the public know what’s going on and getting them to be involved. (D. Bethke, personal communication, April 11, 2013)

The general consensus from those interviewed in this case study and media reports in The Age, The Herald and The Sun was that the Games would have been a positive event for the city of Melbourne.

Minor resistance was reported just prior to the host city announcement in the form of a letter from the group ‘Bread Not Circuses’. Set-up in Toronto as an anti-Olympic coalition to resist the Toronto city bid for the 1996 Games (CBC, 2014; Hall, 2001), a Bread Not Circuses cell also ran out of Melbourne to argue that “Melbourne is in no fit state to host the 1996 Games” (Pinkney, 1990, p. 2). The group expressed that it was “neither anti-sport nor anti-Melbourne” but claimed Melbourne was “unsuitable because of its battered economy, poor record in caring for the disadvantaged and the dangerous closeness of the proposed [Docklands] Olympic village to chemical storage depots on
Altona Coode Island” (Pinkney, 1990, p. 2). Bethke acknowledged the presence of the group but expressed their awareness was limited:

There was a group that was running in [Toronto]; I think it was the Bread Not Circuses group… they were opposed to any of these events and I had a feeling there were some like group, sort of, forming a little bit in opposition, so I won't say that there was no opposition. But they really didn't have a strong push or lead, a strong public profile to that degree. But we were certainly aware of them and that was the start of them. (D. Bethke, personal communication, April 11, 2013)

The IOC announced Atlanta would be the host city for the 1996 Olympic Games on the 19th September, 1990. The media reports on the announcement illustrated a feeling of disappointment and heartbreak by most Victorians. However, the Bread Not Circuses spokesman for Melbourne, Andrew Mahar, was reported in *The Age* as expressing his delight in the bid failing and suggested the government invest any money it budgeted for the Games into helping out the disadvantaged in Victoria instead (Longo, Johnson & Messina, 1990). Editorials in *The Age* and *The Herald* argued that while Melbourne had missed out on an opportunity to boost its economy, the bid process was valuable so long as plans for development – particularly the docklands area – proceeded:

$20 million was not a waste and the plans for development should still go ahead. (‘Well done, Atlanta’, 1990, p. 13)

There was good news in Joan Kirner’s pledge that the Olympic village dockland project will go ahead anyway. (‘Life after’, 1990, p. 6)

Premier Joan Kirner announced that the bid, despite losing, was a success; “We are back on the world stage…we have got well-developed plans for the Docklands and the Albert Park Sports Centre. Those projects will go ahead…this is still a great day for Melbourne” (cited in P. Wilson, 1990b, p. 2). The foundation of the Victorian Major Events Company has been credited to Joan Kirner and her belief that the bid provided Melbourne an opportunity to brand itself to a global audience (Gilchrist, 2004; Silkstone, 2007). Ron Walker, the inaugural chairman of the VMEC, explained that, “Joan Kirner, to her credit, decided to use the resources of those people that had been trying to get the Olympics to start the [VMEC]” (cited in Gilchrist, 2004, para. 8).

After the announcement of the bid loss, *The Sun* directed comment towards those that had not supported the Games; as well as politicians, unions and some business leaders deemed to be the cause for Melbourne’s economic predicament:
There are a few among us who rejoice at Melbourne’s loss. It is a shame they never realised the benefits staging the Games would bring. (‘Let’s keep the ball rolling’, 1990, p. 2)

Now it’s time for the people to fight back…with ‘people power’ we can ask questions and demand answers from our politicians. We can insist union leaders consider the effects of their actions. We can force big business to listen. (‘Let’s get Melbourne moving’, 1990, p. 3)

Both sides of government were targeted by *The Sun* as slowing down development in the city; the Opposition were chastised for its “tactic of frustrating [Labor] at every turn [which] increasingly paralyses the running of the state” (‘Games over’, 1990, p. 24).

One day after losing the bid for the 1996 Games, Premier Kirner announced that Melbourne would bid for the 2000 Games. *The Age* congratulated Kirner on the announcement:

The announcement that Melbourne will bid for the Olympics again in the year 2000 should be welcomed…there is still much to be gained and not a lot to be lost in having another try at getting the Games. (‘If at first’, 1990, p. 11)

Both *The Herald* and *The Sun* newspapers however argued that the state government needed to focus more on encouraging private enterprise in the state (see ‘Time to forge’, 1990; ‘Games over’, 1990). Indeed, only days before the bid announcement, *The Sun* ran an editorial congratulating the Liberal-National Opposition’s stance that a casino would enhance the city:

There is no doubt a high-class casino would be a plus for Melbourne…The State Government has put forward no really valid grounds to keep opposing casino gambling… [and] the question on behalf of the majority is whether the State has any business to be playing nanny to its adult citizens” (‘A casino’, 1990, p. 71).

It would not be long until a new Premier would run the state of Victoria and tout similar lines of deregulation while investing in infrastructure and major events with taxes obtained from a casino.

State Opposition leader at the time, Alan Brown,\(^{157}\) stated that the government’s plan to bid for the 2000 Games was a “diversion from serious and immediate problems

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\(^{157}\) Alan Brown was the leader of the Victoria Liberal Party from 1989 to 1991, after Kennett had lost the 1988 state election as leader of the party; Kennett re-gained leadership in 1991 after a party coup (see Economou, 2006).
confronting Victoria” just prior to an election (Carter & McAsey, 1990, p. 1). The Melbourne City Council was also reported to be unhappy with Kirner’s announcement of a new bid because it is the MCC which has the authority to enter a bid, not the state government (Borrell, 1990).

Consistent arguments for why the Olympic bid was unsuccessful were aired throughout all three newspapers. These were the corrupt nature of the IOC and failures in the transparency of the bidding process (McFarline, 1990), the North American market being superior to Australia for corporate profits and income for the IOC (‘Life after’, 1990), Coca-Cola having an influence in the bid – Coca-Cola’s headquarters are in Atlanta, the successful bidder for the 1996 Games – (Franklin, 1990b; Hall, 1990), and economic failings of the state government that pictured the city in a poor light to IOC members (Dixon, 1990). Cain explained that, while the bid team knew the pitfalls of the Olympic bidding process, they did not know “how rotten the whole” process was (personal communication, April 16, 2013). In addition, Cain expressed that the Sydney-Melbourne city rivalry hindered the possibility of Melbourne being successful (personal communication, April 16, 2013); reports emerged which alleged that AOC members had sabotaged the Melbourne bid by leaking sensitive information to Atlanta officials because powerful individuals regarded Sydney as a more suitable location (see Heath, 2006; Milliken, 1994; Reed, 2013).

The bid for the 1996 Olympic Games was an economic strategy aimed at boosting the economy of the Victorian state. The bid itself began with an intense city rivalry between Melbourne and Sydney and ended with claims of corporate corruption as Atlanta won the rights to host the Games of the XXVI Olympiad. While Melbourne’s bid ultimately failed, the creation of the Victorian Major Events Company to leverage potential benefits from the bid remains an important political legacy. The bid received little media criticism. This may be due to the potential use of tax payer dollars and public land being intangible; simply earmarked as estimates and possibilities within the bid document, and it is not until these plans become more definite that opposition emerges.158

2006 Commonwealth Games
In the years between losing the 1996 Olympic Games bid and announcing the 2006 Commonwealth Games bid, Liberal Premier Jeff Kennett re-gained the Motorcycle Grand

158 Burbank, Heying and Andranovich (2000) found that while political opposition to the potential use of public funds for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics existed during the bid process, public resistance only emerged after Los Angeles had been announced as the host city. Likewise, the authors explain that no organised resistance was evident in Atlanta prior to Atlanta being announced as host city for the 1996 Games.
Prix that John Cain had lost to Sydney, re-named Flinders Park to Melbourne Park in an attempt to enhance city’s brand through the Australian Open Tennis Championships and most significantly, seized the Formula One Grand Prix from Adelaide. The acquiring of these events illustrates the extension of the Major Events strategy that the Kennett-led Coalition government implemented through the 1990s. While the Grand Prix’s and Australian Open are the type of global annual events that the VMEC tends to focus on, the Commonwealth Games was viewed as a lower-tier event which would enhance Melbourne’s image throughout the Commonwealth. Chief Executive of the Melbourne Commonwealth Games bid organisation, Dr Campbell Rose, explained the rationale behind procuring the 2006 Commonwealth Games:

[The Commonwealth Games bid] was a very good positioning, post-Sydney 2000, to position Melbourne, within the Commonwealth, not so much internationally ... It was a perfectly-sized event, it wasn’t overly expensive in comparison to other Commonwealth Games – or Olympic Games; it had all of the froth and the bubble and it had all the excitement. And it’s a part of our proud tradition as being part of the Commonwealth. (C. Rose, personal communication, August 27, 2013)

Melbourne submitted its bid for the Commonwealth Games in 1996, four years before the world’s attention would focus on the Sydney Olympic Games. As Rose explained, by hosting the Commonwealth Games, Melbourne could benefit from any post-Sydney 2000 legacies. While Kennett justified the bid as an economic driver for the state, he also explained that the act of ‘winning’ these events was a political benefit in itself: “we wanted to keep proving to our electorate that as a community we were winners. We knew we could deliver sport well. We knew the public would rise up as one and support it” (personal communication, May 6, 2013). In ‘knowing’ that the public would support the event, Kennett and other politicians, are able to use sports events for political capital.

The 2006 Commonwealth Games bid process for Melbourne was similar to the 1996 Olympic bid, in that first the city had to be nominated by the Australian Commonwealth Games Association (ACGA) as Australia’s representative city. Kennett announced that Melbourne would bid for the Games, citing the potential economic impact of up to $200 million (Hill & Brady, 1996). Opposition leader, John Brumby immediately confirmed the Labor party’s support for the bid but called for full transparency of the financial process (Hill & Brady, 1996). Minimal resistance was aired in 1996 when Kennett announced the city’s intentions to bid.

Early in 1996, Brisbane, Darwin, Perth and Adelaide signalled their intention to the ACGA of their wish to bid for the 2006 Games. In July, 1996 Adelaide and Perth failed to
sign an endorsement contract and were subsequently expelled from the nomination process. The Adelaide and Perth bid teams argued that by signing the endorsement contract, the remaining candidate cities had essentially signed a blank cheque for the Games (Barnes, 1996a). Victorian Premier, Jeff Kennett declined to disclose the contract details but argued that he had forced changes to the contract to make it more beneficial (Farouque, 1996). A tabled copy of the contract in the Western Australian state parliament suggested Victoria would have to pay $20 million plus franchising fees to host the Games if successful in its bid (Farouque, 1996). In the lead-up to submitting Melbourne’s bid document to ACGA, Kennett and the Victorian Major Events Company explained that only some details of the bid would be made public but not the estimates on all financial costs and benefits (Fyfe, 1996). Indeed, the minimal resistance aired throughout the lead-up to the bid may be a result of a lack of information disclosed by the government and VMEC.

A proposed list of venues for athletic events was made public on the announcement of Melbourne’s bid to the ACGA (see Martin, 1996a), but some financial costs, specifically a payment to the ACGA, were kept ‘commercially confident’ (Wilson, 1996b). Neill Jillett (1996), in an opinion piece for The Age, criticised Kennett for a lack of specificity and criticised Brumby for failing to perform the Opposition role of ensuring government accountability. In regards to Kennett’s estimates of a $200 million profit for the state, Jillett (1996) explained; “Our Jeff’s estimates have an off-the-top-of-the-head ring. Spending $72 million, he says, will give the Victorian economy a $200-million boost. Before that, we have to gamble $5 million or so on promoting Melbourne’s case as host” (p. 12). Indeed, the ‘gamble’ that Jillett refers to was a philosophy Kennett was happy to adopt; “So in order to win, you’ve got to be prepared to invest, and you’ve got to be prepared to run some risks…Some win, some fail. As long as you win on 80% of what you’re doing, you’re in a pretty good position” (J. Kennett, personal communication, May 6, 2013). Editorial’s in The Age, while approving of the Games bid (‘Sporting Melbourne’, 1996), called for Kennett and the VMEC to fully disclose the potential costs to tax-payers, rather than expect the public to simply accept that Kennett was acting in the best interests of the state (‘Chasing the games’, 1996; ‘The rules’, 1996).

On the announcement that Melbourne had won the right to represent Australia as its bidding city, a Herald Sun editorial expressed that the Games would change the city in much the same way that the 1956 Olympics did, and therefore the expected cost of $146 million to host the event was justified (‘Melbourne off the blocks’, 1996). Similarly, The Age voiced approval of the Games bid and proclaimed that most Victorians were in favour of hosting the Games (‘A win for Melbourne’, 1996). Hansen (1996), writing for the Herald Sun, touted the importance of the Games to Melbourne’s status as an events capital while economic figures stated that $50 million would be spent on sporting infrastructure.
(Barnes, 1996b) and the state would benefit by $200 million with up to 70,000 tourists attending the Games (Barnes, 1996c). Articles within The Age outlined the new facilities that could be built for the Games, including an athlete’s village in Royal Park (Martin, 1996b). John Pandazopolous, Shadow Minister for Sport and Recreation, “called for financial commitments to be made and capital works to begin as soon as possible” (cited in G. Costa, 1996, p. A2), indicating that bipartisan support for the games continued. In addition to the economic and ‘branding’ benefits of hosting the Games, Pandazopolous later asserted that the Games provided an opportunity to unite the community through a strategic cultural program (J. Pandazopolous, personal communication, April 17, 2013).

Initially, there was minimal published resistance to the Games in the newspapers; although a writer to the Herald Sun asked Premier Kennett to think of homeless kids instead of the Casino and Commonwealth Games (Ryan, 1996), while two letters to The Age called for more investment in hospitals rather than the Games (McPhee, 1996; Grenfell, 1996). Not reported in the papers was the foundation of the ‘Royal Park Protection Group’ (RPPG) in 1996; founded, in part, because of plans to upgrade the Hockey and Netball centres in Royal Park to increase the attractiveness of the Games bid (RPPG, 2005). However, the RPPG would, over the next decade, gain greater public awareness.

The RPPG, in The Age in 1998, claimed that the Melbourne City Council (MCC) were treating the park “as though it were merely real estate” and construction of a new Hockey and Netball centre was “at the behest of the Commonwealth Games Bid Committee” (Lyon, 1998, p. 7) rather than a required and wanted construction by the public.\footnote{The new centre involved destroying the existing netball centre and extending the size of the current hockey centre to incorporate a new netball stadium and netball courts. The old netball centre would be turned into parkland, prompting the government to declare that parkland had been gained, rather than lost, as a result of the new development.} A chairperson of the Royal Park Master Plan Project Committee justified the new construction as a necessary upgrade of sports facilities which was not related to the Commonwealth Games (Lyon, 1998). In late 1998 however, it was reported that the state government had “by-passed Melbourne’s planning regulations to enable it to build a new hockey and netball centre in Royal Park for the 2006 Commonwealth Games bid” (Munro, 1998, p. 3), in the process “freezing out the City Council and residents from further consultation” (Munro, 1998, p. 3). Detailed plans showed that the number of netball courts at the centre would be reduced from 24 to nine; the reduction in courts was to accommodate a new 3,000 seat stadium with five indoor courts. The MCC voiced disapproval at being left out of any future consultation while Hockey Victoria and Netball...
Victoria expressed delight in having the new facilities (Munro, 1998) despite the reduction in courts for amateur sport.

Throughout 1999, the MCC and RPPG were cited in *The Age* as being unhappy with developments of the State Netball and Hockey Centre at Royal Park. The MCC urged the State Government to consider alternative sites, such as the AFL’s Waverley Park, the Showgrounds or Docklands (Munro, 1999a) while RPPG protesters attempted to disrupt construction work at the Royal Park site (‘Games protest’, 1999). The RPPG also planned to stop the project by taking the case to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, however, just days before the case was due to be heard the State Government introduced a bill to fast-track the construction:

The State Government yesterday moved to head off a legal bid to block the new hockey and netball facilities set for Royal Park. The Royal Park Land Bill, introduced yesterday, is expected to be passed by the lower house today, just days before the Royal Park Protection Group launches its case to stop the project in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal...The Lands Minister, Mrs Marie Tehan, said it was in the public interest for the rights to the site to be clarified...The bill removes any rights of appeal for compensation to the Supreme Court. (Munro, 1999b, p. 5)

The bill which ultimately confirmed the development and fast-tracked the construction for the Commonwealth Games bid was deemed to be in the public’s interest despite the public being omitted from consultations of plans for the facilities and use of the public parkland. Chief Executive of the Melbourne Commonwealth Games Bid, Dr Campbell Rose, explained that consultation with RPPG, the MCC and sporting organisations took place during the bid process.

We ran an enormous amount of public consultation. I’m not sure we ran community workshops as such. Although, we did run some workshops through the sporting organisations of their communities as to what they wanted from the games, as the legacy of these games ... We met with the council, we met with the – I remember the Save the Parkville Group (RPPG). That was basically the only people we needed to meet with. There was no one else in the community complaining. (C. Rose, personal communication, August 27, 2013)

As such, the perceived strong public support for the Commonwealth Games justified the exclusion of the public in the planning process for facilities and use of public parkland.

All of the competing cities in the 2006 Commonwealth Games bid had withdrawn before the bid submission deadline, except for Melbourne (see Johnson, 1999a). As such,
Melbourne was unofficially declared the winner on the 10th April, 1999 (bid submission deadline) and officially declared host on the 10th October, 1999. Neither newspaper dedicated editorial space to the announcement that Melbourne would be hosting the games, however many articles – including front page headlines - did report on the victory.

On submission of the bid document, *The Age*, reported that bid budget had been $4.5 million and the Games were expected to generate $500 million in economic benefit (Johnson, 1999b). Further articles explained that the state government expected to make an operating loss of $93 million, but this would be written off by the government allow the “bid team [to] promise no debt” (‘Bid team’, 1999, p. 8). Six months later the expected economic boost to the economy had risen to $600 million and it was announced that a total of “$400 million had been allocated by MCC and the State and Federal Governments to spend on projects that would help Melbourne cope with the influx of athletes and sporting enthusiasts” (Saltau & Barker, 1999, p. 3).

**Preparing for the Games**

In the six years between winning the Commonwealth Games bid and hosting the Games, two main issues were mediated by *The Age* and *Herald Sun*; (a) the cost of hosting the event, and (b) the use of Royal Park for an athletes village. 

Soon after Melbourne won the hosting rights of the 2006 Commonwealth Games, Labor won the state election. As such, Labor’s Justin Madden, as Commonwealth Games Minister, became responsible for overlooking the preparation of the Games. By mid-2000, Madden announced that the $300 million budget allocated by the Kennett government was inadequate and estimated a further $70-100 million will be required (Shaw, 2000). The Opposition, citing the bipartisan support during the bid process as approval the financial plans, challenged Labor to operate within the allocated budget; failure to do so would be evidence of Labor’s inability to manage state finances (Lally, 2000).

Four years later, the Games budget had risen to $697 million (Gray, 2004). Kenneth Davidson (2004), a journalist for *The Age*, critiqued the government’s investment in sporting facilities for a “third-rate athletics event” (p. 17). Expressing that the Games was a “circus without bread,” Davidson (2004, p. 17) questioned why alternative needs, such as health, education and transport, were being neglected by the government. At the request of Davidson to respond, a letter by Justin Madden was printed in *The Age* one week later. Madden (2004) chose to focus on the branding opportunity of having an estimated one billion people viewing the games, explaining that this would reaffirm

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160 This six year period was not a selected ‘data period’ for this case study. However, articles were collected while researching the other three case studies of this thesis.
Melbourne as the most liveable city in the world and enhance Victoria’s ability to attract major events. In addition, Madden expressed that the community programmes incorporated into the Games allowed Victorian’s to celebrate inclusion, diversity and Victoria’s Aboriginal spirit and history.\textsuperscript{161} An editorial in The Age the following day accepted the intangible benefits which may result from the Games but claimed that Madden failed to address the economic issues raised by Davidson; asserting that “These are substantial matters involving large amounts of public money. The public deserves a substantial response” (‘What price’, 2004, p. 14).

Querying the ‘hidden costs’ of the Games in July 2005, journalist Millar and Ker (2005b) highlighted that total costs had risen from the 1996 estimates of $135 million to an estimated $1.1 billion. Millar and Ker’s estimate included security costs which the government excluded from its $697 million budget, citing disclosure of costs would be a security risk (see Phillips, 2005),\textsuperscript{162} as well as Games-related spending from government departments.\textsuperscript{163}

The Royal Park Protection Group, Melbourne City Council and Green Party resisted the siting of the athletes’ village at Royal Park. The MCC and RPPG preferred alternative locations for the athletes’ village – either the Jolimont railway yards or the Docklands area (Milovanovic & Costa, 2002; Davidson, 2002) – while the Green Party and RPPG were reported to be unhappy with the Labor Government for ignoring community needs in favour of developer’s needs (Bell, 2004; Murphy, 2004; Tomazin, 2004).\textsuperscript{161}

\textsuperscript{161} As some debate exists as to what name to use to identify with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island people (see Jamieson, 2012 and Korff, 2014a) I believe it is important to express that the use of the term Aboriginal people will be used throughout this thesis in reference to those Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island people from mainland Australia. In addition, the use of Kulin will be used more specifically in reference to Aboriginal people from the Port Phillip area which included the \textit{Woi wurrung} and \textit{Bun wurrung} nations who occupied the greater area of, what is now, Melbourne (see City of Port Phillip, n.d.).

\textsuperscript{162} Phillips (2005) reported that security costs would be excluded from the state government’s $697 million spending cap; the government justified this by expressing that revealing the security budget prior to the event would be a security risk in itself and promised to disclose full costs after the Games (Phillips, 2005).

\textsuperscript{163} This included the Department of Sport and Recreation spending $3 million on refurbishing the aquatics centre and funding a state-wide promotion ‘Warming up for the Games Day’, the Department of Human Services spending $1.6 million on paramedic training in preparation for a possible terror attack and a number of companies in which the state and federal government are shareholders sponsoring the games (e.g. Telstra, Royal Mint, Australia Post).
Two days after announcing Royal Park as the location for the village, the state government conceded that an environmental impact study had not been conducted prior to approving the site (Tomazin, 2002b). Justin Madden justified the fast-tracking of the decision: “We need to have these facilities developed in time for the Commonwealth Games. With those traditional processes, they can be bogged down over time and thus delayed and not built on time” (cited in Tomazin, 2002b, p. 2). While the ‘traditional processes’ referred to by Madden would usually be a requirement in gaining planning permission for the development; powers that overrode heritage, planning and environmental laws relating to the Commonwealth Games had been bequeathed to Madden in 2001 as part of the ‘Commonwealth Games Arrangements Act 2001’ (Commonwealth Games Arrangement Act 2001, 2001). In passing the Act, Madden claimed that a strict process to ensure full public consultation would exist (Birnbauer & Millar, 2002). MCC Councillor Kevin Chamberlin however argued that no consultation of the athletes’ village site had taken place (Birnbauer & Millar, 2002).

A 2003 amendment to the ‘Commonwealth Games Arrangements Act 2001’ revoked all reservation over the land earmarked for the athletes’ village. The RPPG viewed this amendment as “an attempt to end debate over the site’s status as parkland” (Millar, 2003a, p. 8). Five months later, four Royal Park Hospital buildings were, under the directions of Minister Madden, demolished; despite a buildings heritage request pending (Quantock, 2003). Rod Quantock of the RPPG compared the Bracks Labor government to the Kennett Coalition government; “The dinosaur approach to our history, precious public open space and process is worthy of the public land grab-and-greed Kennett years. It demeans the Labor Party, denies the future its past and makes fools of those who had faith in the Bracks Government to be better than the devil we knew” (Quantock, 2003, p. 10).

Fears that the athletes’ village would be over-crowded and too hot (with no air-conditioning) were reported in 2004 (Heinrichs, 2004; Phillips, 2004). Despite the predicted over-crowding, the government rejected plans to extend the village site. According to the Herald Sun, an area extension was rejected because it would give campaigners against the Parkville site “ammunition by moving outside the original 20ha precinct” (Phillips, 2004, p. 4). Instead, the village was redesigned “at a cost believed to

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164 The Green Party asserted that Developers were being provided with 20 hectares of prime central real estate to build the athletes’ village. The land would then be sold after the games; generating a profit for the Developers and Government (see Tomazin, 2002a).

165 Later in 2003, The Age reported that the remaining Hospital buildings would be heritage listed and $5 million of public funds would be spent on restoring of the buildings (Millar, 2003b).
be tens of millions of dollars” (Millar & Ker, 2005a, p. 1); Games Minister, Justin Madden, “would not disclose the cost of the changes but said it would not blow out the $697 million Government expenditure cap for the Games” (cited in Millar & Ker, 2005, p. 1). The redesign consisted of renovating heritage buildings, previously excluded in accommodation plans (Millar & Ker, 2005a).  

In addition to organised resistance letters to the editor claimed there was little difference between the current state government and the Ancient Roman’s (bread and circuses) and that $700 million of taxpayer money would be better served on hospitals, schools, policing and roads (Gardner, 2004; Miller, 2005). Chief executive of the Games bid, Campbell Rose, explained that resistance from the RPPG and others was expected but also illustrated the diversity of the city:

But there’ll be angst anywhere when you build a [Games] village of that nature … there was the Save the Parkville Group [RPPG] and a whole range of people. But, that’s a part of diversity in the city, and diversity of opinion. And there will always be those who don’t want it in their backyard. Or those who will decide that that environment is not the right environment … There would’ve always been a group who would have decided that it was not the right thing to do. (C. Rose, personal communication, August 27, 2013)

Rose’s comment indicates that the expected resistance was viewed as a normal barrier in the process of developing areas for Major Events. However, on the other hand, this resistance also serves to shape the city, allowing for diverse opinions to be aired and challenges of government to be made.

Pre-Games

In the fortnight leading up to the opening ceremony of the 2006 Commonwealth Games, two members of the Labor Party were criticised for breaching trademark rules by using the Games logo for Party fundraising activities (Ker, 2006a; Tomazin, Ker & Murphy, 2006; Whinnett, 2006; Whinnett & Gardiner, 2006), while a broader discussion on Republicanism emerged as a result of a decision not to play the ‘God Save the Queen’ British anthem during the opening ceremony (Khadem, 2006; Phillips, 2006a). The Age expressed that the Queen deserved the respect of having the anthem played, despite The Age having “long declared that this is a republican nation at heart and must eventually

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166 The Commonwealth Games Arrangements Act 2001 excluded the need for the Minister to gain consent to develop Heritage sites if “the development or use of a Commonwealth Games venue or designated access area is for the purposes of a Commonwealth Games project” (Commonwealth Games Arrangements Act 2001, 2001, pp. 12-13).
formalise that status" (‘At last’, 2006, p. 16). Likewise, the Herald Sun expressed that the anthem would simply make the Queen feel welcomed and “not make us a nation of sycophants or colonials” (‘They’re playing her song’, 2006, p. 32). Further articles in the Herald Sun reported that royalists and some federal politicians would encourage the crowd to sing the anthem during the opening ceremony (Tinkler, 2006a) and a poll, conducted by the paper, indicated that Victorians were split evenly on the debate (Phillips & Mickelburough, 2006). Letters to the editor illustrated a mixed reaction to the absence of ‘God Save the Queen’ at the opening ceremony (see C. Kelly, 2006; Lee, 2006). In addition to discussing republicanism, a Herald Sun editorial called on the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union to guarantee that no strikes would threaten the Games after threats that strikes to air-travel may occur if Qantas announced job losses; the editorial expressed that “Disruptions to services would be, rightly, seen by the public as an act of sabotage” (‘Cynical games’, 2006, p. 22). Furthermore, Aboriginal rights protesters set-up a camp in Kings Domain – located close to Games facilities – in order to gain coverage of their ‘Stolenwealth Games’ campaign (discussed further in chapters 10 and 11) which mandated for the creation of an official treaty to give Aboriginal people greater rights (see Holroyd & Ker, 2006; Millar, 2006).

The topic of Graffiti emerged as an issue just prior to hosting the 2006 Commonwealth Games.167 Games organisers and the MCC argued that graffiti would be

167 A similar discussion took place immediately after the failed 1996 Olympic bid when The Sun began a campaign entitled ‘Let’s Get Melbourne Moving’. The campaign quickly turned reader’s attention to Melbourne’s graffiti. On the back of the failed bid, The Sun newspaper ran a campaign entitled ‘Let’s Get Melbourne Moving’ in which the public, and The Sun journalists, were encouraged to develop ideas about how to enhance Melbourne’s economic and civic progress. On day one of the campaign a journalist from The Sun expressed disgust at the graffiti around Melbourne and particularly on public transport (Johnstone, 1990). This resulted in a snow-ball of articles over the following week focusing on Melbourne’s ‘graffiti disease’ (Mevissen, 1990) in which Melbourne was referred to as the “world leader of graffiti” (Rindfleisch, 1990, p. 4) and to illustrate the graffiti crisis, The Sun informed the public of the economic cost of graffiti; “…vandalism and graffiti bill topped $17 million a year” (‘Move on transport’, 1990, p. 4). At the same time as The Sun was encouraging the public to police graffiti by calling a graffiti hotline, Premier Kirner was “calling for an arts-led recovery for Victoria” which The Age expressed involves “the drive, the energy, the desire to nurture our own creativity and show it to the world” (Fairfax & Badham, 1990, p. 15). While Kirner may not have been discussing graffiti art specifically, many urban geographers have highlighted the value of graffiti art to the urban make-up of cities (see Dovey, Wollan & Woodcock, 2012; MacDowall, 2006; Young, 2010). Just over fifteen years later, in build-up to the Commonwealth Games, the contested discourse between Melbourne’s graffiti art and graffiti vandalism would emerge as a ‘crisis’ once again.
visible to tourists and global media, and should be cleaned - $1 million was initially allocated to cleaning graffiti and vandalism around the city (see Mittmann, 2006). Artists and some members of the public expressed that this money should be used to support the arts rather than deleting ‘urban art’ and that the Games should represent the real Melbourne (see Mittmann, 2006; Rowville, 2006). A ‘Graffiti Games Organising Committee’ gained attention by setting up a website which encouraged people to graffiti the city; the group accused the MCC and State Government of ‘cultural cleansing’ for fear of cluttering up the view for wealthy tourists (Edwards & Kleinman, 2006; J. Kelly, 2006) and expressed that the “council had reneged on a consultative approach with the graffiti community to project a false image of the city” (Edwards, 2006, p. 10). As a result, the MCC announced that they would invest further funds, up to $2 million, to combat the ‘graffiti protest’ (Edwards & Kleinman, 2006; Edwards, 2006). The issue of graffiti and the discourse around its purpose within the urban landscape – that is, as a form of urban art or a stain of vandalism – encapsulates the wider conflict of seeking to attain mega-events such as the Olympic Games (see Dovey, Wollen & Woodcock, 2012; MacDowell, 2006; Young, 2010); are these events for the citizens of the host area, or do they merely serve as a political tool for the urban elite?

Editorially, the Games were presented as evidence of Melbourne’s claim to being the sporting capital of Australia and proof of a successful Major Events economic strategy. The Herald Sun exclaimed:

[The MCG] will be the setting for reaffirmation of Melbourne’s fame as the nation’s sporting capital…Melbourne began six years ago readying for the $1 billion Games, which over the next 12 days will show a return of priceless publicity for the host city as a television audience of up to 1.5 billion tunes in. ('Let the Games begin', 2006, p. 34)

The Age called for Victorians to forget about the costs, predicted traffic congestion and graffiti blemishes and to focus on enjoying the Games ('The spirit', 2006) which will “sustain Melbourne’s liveability into the future” ('At last', 2006, p. 16). Letters to the editor claimed resentment in “taxes being used to provide ‘bread and circuses’ to distract the populace” (de Visser, 2006, p. 16) as well as anger at the Games being used to promote/brand the City instead of serving as a friendly sporting interaction amongst Commonwealth nations (Goad, 2006).

The best Commonwealth Games ever
At the conclusion of the Games, Premier Steve Bracks proclaimed the event “the best Commonwealth Games ever” (cited in Berry, 2006, para. 7) and Justin Madden reminded
the public that “the Games would boost Victoria’s economy by $1.5 billion and generate an extra $3 billion of economic activity” (cited in Rose, 2006, p. 2). The following day, Madden announced his desire for Melbourne to bid for the Football World Cup; “The Games have been highly successful and I think people now expect us to do something as significant again in the future…The question is: What is out there? There are only a few events that compare to this and one of them is the World Cup” (cited in Phillips, 2006b, p. 10).

_The Age_ (‘Marvellous moments’, 2006) provided a glowing report of the Games as a success, congratulating the general public for embracing the Games, festivals and visitors. In addition, the newspaper called for the Government to disclose all of the costs and ensure pre-Games promises were kept – particularly those made about public housing at the athletes’ village site. Likewise, the _Herald Sun_ praised Ron Walker, Justin Madden and Andrew Walsh (director of the opening and closing ceremonies) and expressed that the “Citizens will enjoy the $484 million legacy of the new MCG, plus other improvements for the next half-century. But cleaning up after this $1.1 billion party leaves financial and political questions for the Bracks Government” (‘Historic party’, 2006, p. 16).

Premier Steve Bracks penned an article in the _Herald Sun_ the day after the Commonwealth Games. He declared that Games were a platform to illustrate Victoria’s “love of sport,” “cultural diversity,” “friendliness” and “reputation for hosting major international events” to a global audience (‘Historic party’, 2006, p. 16). Meanwhile in _The Age_, Bracks compared the 2006 Games to the 1956 Olympics:

> Just as 1956 was about a legacy that has been left to make sure we have the best major events anywhere in the world and great liveability in Melbourne, Victoria, so 2006 is all about a legacy. The great and mighty Melbourne Cricket Ground would not be here in its current form with the renovation of 53 per cent of the ground unless we had the Commonwealth Games. The Melbourne Sports and Aquatic Centre is another legacy, the new outdoor competition pool for the future. (Cited in Murphy, 2006, p. 2)

John Brumby, then Labor Treasurer, proclaimed the Games a success which left a physical sporting legacy; “[The Games] provided an opportunity to improve the MCG, to improve some of the other sporting events around town and I think it was a fantastic things for Melbourne and for the Commonwealth Games, no one before or after will ever get the sort of crowds we got” (personal communication, September 11, 2013). Likewise, Bid Chief Executive Campbell Rose alluded to the tangible legacy, focusing on non-sporting as well as sporting infrastructure:
... look at the upgrade to the MCG, look at the upgrades that have taken place to all the sporting infrastructure, the building of Birrarung Marr. I mean, there’s a whole range of things that evolved out of that [Commonwealth Games]. One thing these major events do is they bring a very sharp focus to community infrastructure, amenity, and aesthetics and the positioning of a city - so that it actually is on show. (C. Rose, personal communication, August 27, 2013)

However, Opposition leader Robert Doyle expressed that the true legacy of the Games could not be verified by the tangible assets built for the sporting events. Doyle asserted that tourism and ‘putting Melbourne on the map’ to attract future investment would be the marker of any successful legacy of the Games (Murphy, 2006). Meanwhile, letters to The Age announced the Games as a success in “lifting the spirit” (McDonald, 2006, p. 14) of Victorians and as evidence of Melbourne as the most liveable city with community pride (Iyer, 2006).

Immediately after the Games, the Herald Sun claimed that costs for the event could rise to $1.5 billion, prompting Liberal MP Louise Asher to demand that all costs be made public (Tinkler, 2006b). Almost six months later, the Auditor-General’s report on the Games was released. Despite confusing headlines in the Herald Sun – Games earned $300m for State’ (2006) and ‘Games cost us $1.229b (Warner, 2006a) – the report concluded that the government remained under its $697 million budget; spending $691 million (Ker, 2006b; Warner, 2006a). The figure of $1.229 billion included spending across all levels of government, including Federal spending, while the Commonwealth Games Organisation ‘earned’ $274 million through sponsorship, ticket sales, television rights and merchandising to help off-set expenses of $539 million.168

The 2006 Commonwealth Games are regarded by most Victorian’s as a successful event. Prior to the Games newspaper editorials encouraged Victorians to support the event in addition to supporting the government investment being made on behalf of its citizens. At the conclusion of the sporting carnival, newspaper editorials announced the Games as a success and the state government congratulated its economic expertise by proudly proclaiming costs were within the $697 million budget cap; despite original estimated costs being as low as $72 million when Jeff Kennett announced Melbourne’s intentions to bid for the Games a decade earlier. A report by the Auditor-General approved the budget, significantly this came at a time when the Major Events

168 The remainder of the expenses was covered by state government grants of $265 million (Ker, 2006b).
strategy was being questioned; specifically in relation to the Formula One Grand Prix (see chapter 8).

The Games were not without their controversy and criticism. In submitting documentation to the Australian Commonwealth Games Association, Premier Jeff Kennett failed to outline the full costs that the Victorian tax-payers would be contracted to – instead using the common excuse of ‘commercial confidence’ to justify the secrecy surrounding payments that would be made to the ACGA once Melbourne had been nominated. The selection of Royal Park for the athletes’ village resulted in public and media criticism. Labor’s Minister for the Games, Justin Madden introduced the Commonwealth Games bill in 2001 to fast-track development in Royal Park and limit potential protest disruption; particularly from members of the Royal Park Protection Group. Further ‘protest laws’ were introduced just prior to the Games to repeal any threat from Aboriginal rights protesters.

Bipartisan support for the Games was shown by the Labor and Coalition governments. Labor MP at the time, John Pandazopolous later explained that Labor’s support for the Games helped the Party re-appropriate Major Events has an economic strategy:

It was certainly an interesting time in the nature of the bidding because it was the Kennett government that bid; but, as part of the bidding process, one of the things that I think maybe assisted it from our side, strengthening the view of the importance of major events, was that as part of bidding they had to actually give bipartisan support … which is a really awkward thing for Jeff having to get a letter of sign-off in the bidding document from John Brumby as Opposition leader. But, it did assist the [Labor] Party in actually helping break away from some trying to use it (Major Events) as a political divide, so that if you’re Liberal you support major events, if you’re not - that’s…the view that Kennett had around the Grand Prix, even though we started the Major Events Company. (J. Pandazopolous, personal communication, April 17, 2013)

By issuing support for the Games, and subsequently organising the Games, Pandazopolous felt Labor was able to re-gain the Major Events economic strategy first formalised by the 1990-1992 Kirner Labor government. By detailing the events that took place over a ten-year period in which both the Coalition and Labor government had input, this case-study illustrates the importance of sport to political parties in Victoria, the opaqueness of bid documents and planning strategies associated with major events and, most importantly, the active use of political power to dissipate resistance campaigns.
Conclusion

Horne (2007) explains the two central facets of mega-events, “first, that they are deemed to have significant consequences for the host city, region or nation in which they occur, and second, that they will attract considerable media coverage” (p. 82). Premier John Cain explained that the rationale behind bidding for the 1996 Olympic Games was to use the event to drive economic investment into the city. Politicians from both-sides of politics as well as mainstream media asserted the Games would leave a lasting economic benefit for the state. Indeed, it was during the 1980s that, according to Turner (1994), we witness the somewhat seamless transition of business media into front-page stories. This shift occurs through the legitimising and subsequent naturalising of capitalism and economic laws of the market. A result of this common-sense understanding of the workings of the market is that the state’s economy becomes more important than the citizens (Turner, 1994).

The 2006 Commonwealth Games, also justified through an economic rationale, was deemed to be a good fit with the strategy of branding the city of Melbourne to a global audience – or in this case, a Commonwealth audience. In setting and achieving the budget cap of $697 million, the Labor government was able to announce the event as a success. Economically there was limited resistance to the Games; however, some criticism was aired regarding the intervention by government to ‘fast-track’ infrastructure by overriding planning, heritage and environment laws along with new policing protocols to prevent potential disruption by protesters. As such, the governments of the 1990s and 2000s played a key role in advocating the economic benefits of these major events and implemented policies to dissipate potential conflict from those challenging the value – economic, social and environmental – of the event.

In January 2009, The Age announced that Melbourne was seriously considering launching a bid for the 2024 or 2028 Olympic Games. A ‘source’ said that Labor Premier John Brumby was keen for the Victoria Major Events Company (VMEC) to investigate the prospects and costs of a bid while former Premier Jeff Kennett declared the financial burden of a bid ‘irresponsible’ but noted that “we should concentrate on attracting other events like the football World Cup” (Reilly, 2009, p. 1). An editorial on the same day entitled ‘A Melbourne Olympics bid would be costly, but worth it’ supported the efforts of Brumby and the VMEC for pursuing and securing major sporting events:

Attempting to hold a second Olympics would highlight Melbourne’s status as a sporting capital. Its cavalcade of sports spectacles undoubtedly promotes tourism and employment, and injects millions into the economy.
The Victorian Major Events Company should be applauded for pursuing the initiative and congratulated, along with the Brumby Government, for seeing off a challenge to steal this month’s big ticket sporting event, the Australian Open (Tennis). (‘A Melbourne Olympics’, 2009, p. 20)

The following day, letters to *The Age* argued that a bid for the Olympics would be a waste of tax-payers money and the Government should be focused on fixing public transport issues in the state (Jordaan, 2009). While a bid for either of these Games did not eventuate, the announcement illustrates the continued focus by Victorian politicians to consider these types of events as a useful strategy of spending taxes on behalf of the people of Victoria.
Chapter 8: Formula One Grand Prix

With a global estimated television audience of 500 million, the Formula One World Championship is said to be the most watched annual sporting series in the world (Cave & Miller, 2015; Richards, 2015). Beginning in 1950, the value of the Formula One franchise has grown to over $10 billion with a projected post operating income in 2015 of $620 million (Cave & Miller, 2015). Host cities, in 2007, paid an estimated combined annual franchise fee to the Formula One Group of $555 million while television rights exceeded $500 million (Lefebvre & Roult, 2011). Grand Prix (GP) races take place on every continent with over 30 nations having hosted a GP since its inception. Despite a number of controversies and scandals in recent times (see Kahuni, Rowley & Binsardi, 2009; Lowes, 2004; Masefield, 2010; Pfahl & Bates, 2008), Formula One is regarded as an important sporting event for multinational corporations to leverage their brands. Indeed, as Jenkins (2010) explains, controversies may have facilitated the commercial growth of the sport:

[1994 was a] disastrous year for F1 with the deaths of drivers Roland Ratzenberger and Ayrton Senna … Images of Senna's fatal accident were shown across the world and prompted widespread condemnation of F1 and its safety standards. Ironically worldwide outrage also created global exposure for F1 and viewing figures climbed significantly. (p. 901)

The global audience and association with multinational corporations have led to GP races becoming a prized asset for a number governments attempting to showcase their city.

The acquiring of the Formula One Grand Prix from Adelaide in 1993 symbolised the neoliberal approach to governance of Victoria’s Kennett-era (see Lowes, 2004). Lowes argues that Kennett's “approach relied on a growth agenda premised on fast-tracking urban development and a cynical abuse of legislative power” (2004, p. 83) which essentially privatised a public park in “the name of a boosterist agenda that has benefited entrepreneurial interests” (2004, p. 84). In the ten years since Lowes' enlightening article, Victorian governments (both Labor and Liberal-National Coalition) have extended the Grand Prix (GP) contract that exists between the Australian Grand Prix Corporation (AGPC) and the Formula One Group, while continuing to keep secret contract details and failing to involve the Victorian public in consultation.169 This case-study highlights the

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169 The Australian Grand Prix Corporation is a statutory authority subject to the direction and control of the Minister administering the Australian Grand Prix Act (see Australian Grand Prix Corporation, 2014). The Corporation is responsible for staging the Australian Formula One Grand Prix and the Australian Motorcycle Grand Prix. While a detailed description of the Formula One Group is beyond the scope of this chapter, I believe it is important to provide a brief outline of the
‘place marketing’ approach adopted by successive Victorian governments to encourage inward investment in order to drive economic growth (see Kearns & Philo, 1993). The Formula One Grand Prix was strategically targeted by the Victoria Major Events Company (VMEC) as a ‘jewel’ for Melbourne’s major events crown, but unlike the Tennis Centre and Commonwealth Games, has come under heavy criticism. Despite this criticism, the Victorian government persists with the event which is blemished by secrecy and questionable economic value. In this chapter I will outline how and why the Victorian government firstly obtained and has subsequently retained the GP, despite open and consistent resistance from various groups; particularly Save Albert Park (SAP). I provide a chronological account of successive government announcements associated with the GP; including the announcement of the event, details of the track construction in an urban public park, the passing of the Australian Grand Prix Act with multiple exemptions from common laws and, extensions to the contract with the Formula One Group.

Acquiring the Grand Prix

On December 17, 1993 the front page of the afternoon edition of the Herald Sun declared that “It’s Our Grand Prix” (Edmonds, 1993, p. 1) in reference to a yet-to-happen announcement by Premier Jeff Kennett that Victoria had won the rights to host a Formula One Grand Prix (initially, the first Grand Prix was to be staged in 1997, this was later brought forward to 1996). In addition to ‘predicting’ the subject of Kennett’s

administrative structure of Formula One. The sport of Formula One is sanctioned by the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) and is operated by Formula One Group. The Formula One Group – through Formula One World Championship Ltd (formerly Formula One Administration) – negotiates a contract for Grand Prix races with local organisers (e.g. AGPC) for a fee. The local organisers receive all profits from ticket sales, however commercial rights are owned by Formula One Group – through its subsidiary organisation, Formula One Management. The income received by Formula One Group is distributed, under the ‘Concorde Agreement’, to the FIA, Formula One teams and Formula One Group. Bernie Ecclestone, often referred to in the media as the Formula One ‘Supremo’ holds shares in the Formula One Group (through Delta Topco) and until recently was CEO of Formula One Management and Formula One World Championship Ltd, and a board member of Delta Topco (he resigned in January 2014 due to being indicted on bribery charges in Germany).

The Victorian Major Events Company at the time was called the Melbourne Major Events Company; for clarity I have referred to the organisation throughout as the Victorian Major Events Company or VMEC.

The Adelaide Grand Prix organisers had difficulty attracting sponsors after the news that Melbourne would become the new host of the GP. As such, a deal between the Adelaide and
announcement, the *Herald Sun* article informed readers that the race would occur around Albert Park Lake (three kilometres south of Melbourne’s CBD) where the event had previously been located during the 1950s and that the VMEC – the organisation that pursued the Grand Prix – had been informed of the successful bid for the contract overnight.¹⁷²

The following day, Jeff Kennett and VMEC chairman, Ron Walker, formally announced the successful venture for the event. Both *The Age* and *Herald Sun* newspapers declared that the GP would benefit Victoria through global marketing exposure resulting in a $50 million boost to the economy (Pinkney, 1993a; ‘What a coup’, 1993). Kennett claimed the GP would serve to ‘reposition’ Melbourne as an events city (Neales, 1994b). At the time, Kennett expressed that the GP would “add energy to our society, build confidence among the people, create jobs, add to our economic wealth and position this city internationally in a way no over event could” (cited in Neales, 1994b, p. 5). Two decades later, Kennett explained the significance of the GP in shifting the psyche of Victorians; “It actually gave people extraordinary hope that we were once again seen as winners” (J. Kennett, personal communication, May 6, 2013).

The government and those individuals associated with bringing the GP to Melbourne justified the acquiring of the event in a number of ways. While the touted $50 million in economic benefits was validation in itself, the demand for the event by other cities and nations was cited as a reason why Melbourne should desire the GP.¹⁷³ Therefore, in winning the contract, the citizens of Melbourne were told to feel proud about living in a GP city, and more importantly celebrate those people that brought the GP to Victoria. Kennett called the GP the “jewel in Victoria’s crown” and expressed that the “event complements the Government’s plans to revitalise Melbourne ... and will make Melbourne an international star attraction” (cited in Pinkney, 1993b, p. 4). Ron Walker asserted that the GP coup made up for losing the 1996 Olympic bid (Pinkney, 1993b) and the GP would sell Melbourne better than an Olympic Games (‘Secret race’, 1993). Both Kennett and Walker instantly positioned the GP as an event to ‘put Melbourne on the map’ which would drive economic growth for the state as inward investment would be attracted to the city.

Melbourne GP organisers was struck which meant shared sponsorship and promotion for the 1994-96 Grand Prix races and Melbourne purchasing some track material from Adelaide (Neales, Winkler & Stenberg, 1994).

¹⁷² Often the media are informed of the content of media announcements prior to the announcement through authorised or unauthorised ‘leakers’ (see Flynn, 2006).

¹⁷³ Initially it was claimed that China, Indonesia and Malaysia all desired the GP (Pinder, 1993; ‘What a coup’, 1993).
Editorially, both *The Age* and *Herald Sun* celebrated the GP 'coup'; *The Age* expressed that the GP would be a psychological boost to Victorians and as well as valuable publicity:

The economic and psychological benefits to a state as battered by recession as Victoria, a state that lost the bid to host the 1996 Olympics, and which has been badly losing out to Sydney in attracting tourists, are obvious...The Grand Prix will put Melbourne on the world map; it will enable us once again to show not only the world, but ourselves, what we can do. ('At last, Melbourne wins', 1993, p. 17)

The *Herald Sun* celebrated the GP’s economic potential – “The event is expected to inject $50 million into Victorian [sic] annually and create 1000 jobs” ('Melbourne in pole', 1993, p. 18) – and supported Kennett’s sentiments of the GP being a central element of the major event strategy as well as a psychological boost to the state – “With justification Mr Kennett calls it Victoria’s ‘jewel in the crown’. We needed the psychological boost it will bring” ('Melbourne in pole', 1993, p. 18).

The Opposition leader, John Brumby issued his support for the GP (Neales, 1993c) but argued that Albert Park was not a suitable location; “We never opposed the Grand Prix, it’s really important to make that point, in spite of the way that we were portrayed, but we did oppose it going to Albert Park, we did think there were better locations” (J. Brumby, personal communication, September 11, 2013). Two local Mayors in the area surrounding Albert Park held differing opinions on the Grand Prix. South Melbourne Mayor, Frank O’Connor, on announcement of the GP, welcomed the event as a benefit for Melbourne but expressed concern about motor-racing’s suitability for a park and disappointment that neither the council nor local residents had been consulted ('Mayor cool', 1993). Furthermore, O’Connor held concerns that the Government would ‘fast-track’ development of the area with minimal public consultation and concern for the environment (Harvey & Pinkney, 1993). Meanwhile, St Kilda Mayor, Tim Costello, acknowledged that noise and environmental issues may be a concern to residents but celebrated the GP as an opportunity for local businesses ('Mayor cool', 1993).

In contrast to the *Herald Sun*’s initial claims in December, 1993 that the contract had recently been signed, both newspapers later explained that the contract had in fact

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174 Brumby specifically suggested the docklands as a suitable site (Schauble & Forbes, 1994). The docklands had earlier been suggested as an alternative location for the Grand Prix by South Melbourne Mayor Frank O’Connor (Forbes & Thompson, 1993); but the media largely attributed the idea to Brumby and throughout 1994-96 interviewed Brumby about the docklands possibility.
been signed on September 16, three months earlier, and kept secret (Pinkney, 1993b; ‘What a coup’, 1993).\footnote{Ron Walker explained that “we kept the secret between about six people” (Walker cited in Coster, 1993, p. 5); although the day before, Walker was cited as saying that only four people knew, himself, Kennett and two others (‘Secret race’, 1993, p. 17)]. Further confusing the accuracy of these comments Jeff Kennett explained: “there were only three of us who knew – Alan [Stockdale], myself and my head of department, which was Ken Baxter” (personal communication, May 6, 2013). The justification for maintaining secrecy for so long was political. A state election was held in South Australia on December 11, 1993; just one week prior to the announcement that Victoria had won the GP contract. After a year of turmoil for the South Australian Labor Government (including the collapse of the state bank and resignation of Premier John Bannon) the Liberal party led polls and were strong favourites to win the election for the first time in eleven years (Neales, 1993b). As such, Victoria’s Liberal leader, Jeff Kennett, along with the Liberal Party’s federal treasurer, Ron Walker, had no desires to cause any political ripples across the border. By waiting until after the South Australian state election to announce that Melbourne had ‘stolen’ the GP from Adelaide, Kennett and Walker ensured that the Liberal candidates in South Australia were not targeted by their constituency for any connections to the Liberal government in Victoria.

Indeed, the secretive nature of acquiring or attempting to acquire sporting events became somewhat of a trademark strategy for the Kennett government during his first term, referred to by Costar (1994) as the ‘crash through or crash’ method. Kennett and the VMEC covertly attempted to win the 2002 FIFA World Cup in 1994 (see Costar, 1994; Rados, 1994; Tuckerman, 1994). In 1995, Kennett reveal that the 500cc Motorcycle Grand Prix would return to Victoria (see Brady, 1995a; A. Mitchell, 1995a; 1995b) however, like the Formula One Grand Prix, this revelation was kept secret for a few months until after the New South Wales (NSW) state election “so as not to undermine the [NSW] Liberal Party’s chances of re-election” (Brady, 1995b, p. 4). Further to these two events, Kennett ‘donated’ $1.5 million of public funds to oneAustralia’s 1995 America’s Cup campaign on the basis that if oneAustralia was successful, the Cup defence would be held in Port Phillip Bay. However, Kennett did not reveal this donation, or risk, to the public until three months after the oneAustralia yacht had sunk during the event (see Carney & Green, 1995; Green & Koutsoukis, 1995), effectively ending its America’s Cup campaign. Ron Walker defended the secretive method after the failed FIFA World Cup bid fiasco, stating “I think that by doing things with some secrecy and stealth, with a lot of energy, you can achieve them much better” (Walker, cited in Coster, 1994, p. 5).
In addition to keeping the Grand Prix event bid a secret, the cost of the licence fee for the race also remained a secret. Ron Walker immediately stated that “No one will ever know how much I paid [for the contract] or what the conditions are. It will remain secret forever” (cited Easdown, 1993, p. 4). Indeed, Walker and successive state governments have been very successful in keeping the licence fee secret from the Victorian public. Various estimates have been claimed by the media, however until now no definitive amount has been confirmed by those who are privy to the contract details.

Public opinion, as evident by letters to the editor, opinion polls and protest action illustrated the mixed views of the Grand Prix. Letters to The Age were largely critical of the Kennett government’s absence of public consultation (Forster, 1993; Ward, 1993) and the selection of Albert Park as a location for a car race (Kemp, 1993; McLachlan, 1993). Letters to the Herald Sun presented mixed feelings of shame in ‘stealing’ the GP from neighbouring South Australia (Morrell, 1993; Furlong, 1993) and celebration (Proud, 1993) in having a leader with “the guts to make hard decisions” (Stambanis, 1993, p. 18). An opinion poll in The Age concluded that 88 per cent of Victorian’s desired the GP, but only 32 per cent believed it should be staged at Albert Park (Schauble & Forbes, 1994). A Herald Sun poll however claimed that 48 per cent of Victorian’s supported Albert Park as a suitable location for the GP (‘What you said’, 1994). Meanwhile, the ‘Albert Park Users Group’, which represented 60 of the 80 sports clubs that used Albert Park, was cited as supporting the GP and the potential redevelopments the GP would bring to the park (Cook & Magazanik, 1994; Tennison, 1994a). Contradicting this view however was the news that a number of the clubs represented by the ‘Albert Park Users Group’ believed the GP would harm their use of the park (Cook, 1994a).

Organised resistance to the Grand Prix came from the activist group, ‘Save Albert Park’ (SAP) (see figures 8.1 & 8.2). SAP was formed in February 1994 and consists of community members from around Melbourne and Victoria. SAP president Peter Goad explained the aims of the group:

The basic aim is to get rid of all motor racing out of the park…our policy is to relocate the Grand Prix, not to oppose the Grand Prix per se … We think it’s a waste of money and environmentally damaging … And we also oppose what we call any inappropriate development in the park, because it should be retained as public parkland. (P. Goad, personal communication, October 1, 2012)
Protests reached their peak in May 1994 when 10,000 people attended a rally organised by SAP (Neales & Magazanik, 1994). Kennett was reported to be “surprised at the strength of feeling among the 10,000 people” (Dugdale, 1994, p. 1) that attended the protest. Kennett attempted to reduce the seriousness of the rally by explaining that new facilities would revitalise the park. According to Kennett, once the official plans were released the protesters, who Kennett referred to as ‘confused’, would approve of the redevelopment work (Neales & Magazanik, 1994).

In the days following the protest, letters published in *The Age* accused Kennett’s attendance and statements at the protest rally as provocative and arrogant (Kingsford, 1994) and his reference to ‘confused’ protesters was deemed disrespectful (Kinsman, 1994; Reed, 1994; Robinson & Keith, 1994). Letters published in the *Herald Sun* tended to reflect a pro-GP attitude arguing that protesters were selfish and ignored the wider economic benefits the GP would bring the state (Arnold, 1994; Pro GP, 1994). A *Herald Sun* editorial suggested the “Public disquiet over the impact on Albert Park of the Formula 1 Grand Prix is due in part to ignorance of what the Government and organisers intend” (‘The battle’, 1994, p. 14). In support of the Government, the *Herald Sun* argued that once

![Figure 8.1](image)

**Figure 8.1:** Protesters at Save Albert Park’s first protest rally in 1994 (Florance, 2015)

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176 SAP held a daily vigil at Albert Park for 2,589 days between November 1994 and 2004 (see McCauley, 2013) as well organising a number of rallies at the Park and supporting other activist groups (for example the Royal Park Protection Group).
the renovation plans for Albert Park were released, the controversy surrounding the park would decrease. GP organisers claimed that there was no point in challenging the location of the GP at Albert Park (Tennison, 1994a). Head of Formula One, Bernie Ecclestone, consigned all responsibility to the AGPC and alluded to the legally binding contract; “Any attempt to move it would be a breach of contract...We didn’t choose the venue. It was proposed to us by the organisers” (cited Ellingsen, 1994, p. 3). VMEC chairman Ron Walker expressed that Ecclestone wanted a ‘city circuit’ race and that Albert Park serves Melbourne’s best interests as it highlights the attractiveness of the city to a global television audience (Neales, 1994c).

In addition to the predicted economic benefits to the state, Kennett proclaimed that “Victorian taxpayers would not be asked to meet the cost of the event, with the State Government only prepared to act as a guarantor for loans required to establish the race” (Pinkney, 1993b, p. 4). Kennett explained that the VMEC would stage the race and recoup loans through sponsorship and attendance (Magazanik, 1993). Kennett’s claims contradicted a South Australian government inquiry into Adelaide’s GP in 1992 which concluded that the GP “was unlikely ever to make a profit” (‘Race chief’s dilemma’, 1993, p. 4). Six months after stating that taxpayers would not fund the event, Kennett – at the request of Ron Walker – announced the government would fund the $104 million capital...
costs required to accommodate the race but declined to provide details of any cost-benefit studies that had been conducted (Neales, 1994b; 1994d).

Preparing the Grand Prix

The Albert Park master plan was released in May, 1994; the government claimed upgrades to the park as a result of the GP would be an improvement (see figures 8.3 and 8.4), critics however revealed that upgrades were planned prior to the GP announcement. Kennett hoped the release of the plan would reduce public aversion to the race by expressing that no net loss of open space would occur and existing facilities would be significantly improved (Tennison, 1994b). The Albert Park plan included a $52 million sports and aquatic centre, $25 million for upgrading facilities and $20 million to build the GP track (Tennison, 1994b). The race track would slice through the South Melbourne Hellas Soccer Stadium (Tennison, 1994b), as such, the Lakeside Oval, which had been home to the South Melbourne Cricket Club for 134 years (Cook, 1994b) was to be demolished and turned into a $3 million soccer stadium to accommodate South Melbourne Hellas. The South Melbourne Cricket Club criticised the plans for their eviction and lack of consultation throughout (Cook, 1994b; Jamieson, 1994) whereas the South Melbourne Hellas voiced distaste at the protesters for their attempts to prevent a GP that would “bring life, people and recognition to the city” (Coffey, 1994, p. 11).

The main criticism of the plan was aimed at the government’s assertion that the GP was the catalyst for the upgrades to Albert Park (Cook, 1994b). SAP president Peter Goad explained a draft strategy plan for upgrading Albert Park had been released a week before Kennett announced Melbourne’s success in acquiring the GP; six months later the draft strategy plan was replaced with the Albert Park master plan – “the Grand Prix was [said] to be a catalyst for revitalising and upgrading the Park when in fact it was all planned prior to the Grand Prix … it’s all the same, except they have a Grand Prix circuit” (P. Goad, personal communication, October 1, 2012). As such, SAP felt that the Government was attempting to fool the public into believing that upgrades to Albert Park were because of the GP rather than revealing that a Grand Prix track had been added to planned upgrades. Furthermore, the mayor of South Melbourne argued that the GP actually “conflicted with the Government’s recently stated master plan for Albert Park, which had designated the area as mainly for passive recreational purposes” (O’Connor cited in Farrant & Taylor, 1993, p. B).

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177 The $52 million Sports and Aquatics Centre had been announced a week before the release of the Albert Park plan (see Burstin & Rados, 1994).
Editorials in both papers were largely supportive and endorsing of the Albert Park Plan. The *Herald Sun* claimed that the park plan was an “acceptable compromise” with “no net loss of open space in accommodating the circuit, replacing old dilapidated

![Albert Park prior to Grand Prix track](image)

**Figure 8.3**: Albert Park prior to Grand Prix track (adapted from Harris, 1993, p. 17)¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁸ Dotted line illustrates the road circumnavigating Albert Park Lake prior to alterations to Aughtie Drive in order to create the Grand Prix track including the Pit lane and pit lane buildings. Melbourne CBD presented at the top right of the image.
Figure 8.4: Albert Park Master Plan with Grand Prix track inserted (The Hassell Group & Melbourne Parks & Waterways, 1994, p. 47)
buildings with new facilities, and in relocating sporting grounds” (‘Other sites’, 1994, p. 14). An editorial in *The Age* on the same day expressed that the plans “should convince the majority of Victorians that the project should proceed” (‘At last, some facts’, 1994, p. 17). However, *The Age* also conveyed criticism of the government for failing to reveal all costs – particularly the licence fee – associated with the GP but concluded that; “we still believe that the Grand Prix is a good thing for Melbourne. And, at last, we can also have confidence that it will not destroy Albert Park” (‘At last, some facts’, 1994, p. 17). In an editorial a few months later, *The Age* expressed that the Kennett government had failed to clearly convey its message; “Its inability to sell itself and its ideas is illustrated by contrasting the uproar over Albert Park with the professional smoothness with which the Cain Government sold its excision of prime parkland for the building of a vast tennis stadium” (‘An L-plate Grand Prix’, 1994, p. 19). Indeed, comparisons between the ‘failures’ and ‘resistance’ associated with the Grand Prix and ‘success’ and ‘support’ of the National Tennis Centre has been a common theme in the discussions of Melbourne’s strategy to use major sporting events for economic development.

**Australian Grand Prix Act**

With a majority of both the upper (Legislative council) and lower (Legislative Assembly) houses of parliament, the Kennett government was able to pass Bills into law with limited opposition and amendments. In September 1994, the state government tabled the Australian Grand Prix Bill (Parliament of Victoria, 1994b) with the Australian Grand Prix Act (AGP Act) passed into law in October with only minor revisions (Lowes, 2004). The AGP Act includes a number of exemptions to existing Acts; such as the Planning Act, Environment Act and Freedom of Information (see Lowes, 2004). As such, the AGPC has essentially been given power to design, construct and run the Grand Prix with minimal accountability and scrutiny.

During the second reading of the Grand Prix Bill, State Minister for Tourism, Patrick McNamara, justified the exemption of the Australian Grand Prix Corporation from certain common laws on the basis that similar legislation existed for the South Australian

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179 The editorial also informed readers that the public can comment on the plans, however “the location of the main facilities in the park is now settled” (‘Other sites’, 1994, p. 14) so minimal changes to the plan were possible.

180 Interestingly, a reader of *The Age* had, earlier in the year, highlighted the different action associated with the Tennis Centre and GP when asking “Where were these protesters when John Cain ignored Kooyong and took over a Richmond park for his tennis centre? I believe he promised us a new park in return – but he forgot to give us the location” (Kellar, 1994, p. 14).

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Grand Prix (Parliament of Victoria, 1994b). Deputy Leader of the Labor Opposition, Demetri Dollis, challenged McNamara’s claims that the Grand Prix Bill was similar to the South Australian Grand Prix Act. Dollis explained that “the Victorian Bill releases the corporation from liability for any compensation payable in respect of anything done” in addition to preventing “the Supreme Court from awarding compensation” (Parliament of Victoria, 1994b, p. 410). The South Australian Act, on the other hand, “provided for fair and reasonable compensation for any damages or loss that may be suffered by any person” (Parliament of Victoria, 1994b, p. 766). McNamara explained why the Supreme Court was bypassed:

... that is necessary in realising the overall plan for Albert Park, the establishment of a temporary grand prix circuit and associated infrastructure and the staging of the formula one event. (Parliament of Victoria, 1994b, p. 415)

In explaining that the prevention of any possible Supreme Court cases was necessary for the event to be established and staged, the government were, in a sense, admitting that plans set in place for the GP were likely to result in the AGPC being liable to pay compensation under regular common laws.

The issue of compensation became a major point of discussion throughout 1995 once construction work had begun on the GP race track. A number of houses were allegedly damaged as a result of dynamic compaction during the construction of the race-track.\(^\text{181}\) While home owners were not permitted to apply to the courts for compensation, the Kennett government granted compensation to those affected by the compaction (Gibson, 1995). $400,000 was made available for the 104 houses that were approved for compensation (114 home owners applied). However, in accepting the compensation, the home owner would have to sign a release form preventing them from seeking further compensation in the future. The president of the Council for Civil Liberties, Robert Richter QC, explained that the government was providing compensation as an act of grace, not as an act of right (Gibson, 1995). Richter continued to explain that:

One of the consequences of it being an act of grace is that if there’s disagreement about what damage was caused or how much it is, the people are entirely at the mercy of the executive Government and that is something that ought not to happen because it means that the Government becomes the judge in its own cause. (Richter, cited in Gibson, 1995, p. 6)

\(^{181}\) A resident attempted to sue the AGPC, however “evidence did not satisfy the magistrate that the construction work was to blame” (Lowes, 2004, p. 78).
In other words, home owners were given a ‘take it or leave it’ choice when it came to compensation, with no opportunity for appeal. Jan Cossar, on behalf of all those affected by the compaction, wrote to *The Age* to state the belief that their basic rights had been denied (Cossar, 1995). Cossar explained that residents were given seven days to decide on whether to accept a lump sum payment or have the Office of Building complete any repairs; as such, residents did not have sufficient time to seek independent assessments and quotes to ascertain if the lump sum payment was sufficient to cover costs as well as the likelihood of future damage that may occur – considering no further compensation could be claimed due to the compulsory waiver of future compensation.

An editorial in *The Age* attacked the Kennett governments “political arrogance” to “avoid scrutiny, disregard criticism, stifle protest and, worst of all, protect itself from legal challenge and redress” (‘Stop laughing’, 1994, p. 16). The editorial reaffirmed its overall support for the GP but with a lot of reservation:

This steamroller approach to any conceivable hindrance, challenge, claim or embarrassment is excessive in scope, draconian in effect, and outrageous in its audacity. There is much to admire in a Government that is determined to get things done and prepared to fast-track developments of economic importance to the state. And, despite our misgivings about the lack of community consultations, the clandestine negotiations with the race promoters, and the choice of an inner-city park as the site, we agree that the Grand Prix should be a great boost to the state. But none of this excuses the way in which the Government is inclined to impose its will and brush aside opposition. (‘Stop laughing’, 1994, p. 16)

As such, with the Victorian recession still fresh in the minds of many, the Kennett ‘can-do’ approach was valued by *The Age*, however editors felt the Premier needed to be more open to critique and accountable to any failings.

**The inaugural Grand Prix, 1996**

The first GP was held in Melbourne in March 1996. In the week leading up to the event Kennett announced the State election for the end of March; a month which included the inaugural GP, the Moomba festival and the opening weeks of the Australian rules football season. It was claimed by *The Age* that Kennett broke a previous promise to govern for his maximum term – until October – and was using the month-long party as a political tool (‘Victoria’s chance’, 1996). In addition, *The Age* expressed that Kennett’s strategy to announce the election would result in the GP becoming a curtain-raiser to, or distraction from, the election campaign (‘The race is on’, 1996). Kennett claimed that the GP and
election timing were not connected (Hill, 1996). John Brumby, Opposition leader at the time, however believes the Grand Prix was a political tool used by Kennett to win the election:

The more I look at it in hindsight, the more I think it was probably a deliberate strategy because he probably thought the more controversial he made it, the better; the more people would notice it, the more he’d have ownership of it, and the more he’d be able to position the Opposition as being opposed to it...The Grand Prix was a huge success for him, particularly with young male voters, who would traditionally have been Labor voters...So despite the way it was ram-roded through, despite the commitments on cost where he and Ron Walker said it would never cost taxpayers a cent, politically it was a huge winner for him in those days, and unquestionably won him comfortably the '96 election. (J. Brumby, personal communication, September 11, 2013)

Brumby’s analysis highlights the value of the event as a political tool for adopting a ‘wedge politics’ approach. In gaining ownership of the event, with the support of the media, Kennett was able to attract those voters traditionally opposed to Liberal ideology.

On the evening before the official opening day of the first GP, 50 protesters blocked traffic at the main entrance and 13 protesters stormed the security gates – however no arrests were made (McKay & Gettler, 1996). Kennett admitted some admiration for the SAP protesters and their persistence but declared that now the event had begun they depart; he also claimed that SAP had cost the state $2 million in extra security (McKay & Gregory, 1996), fuelling some anger towards the SAP group (‘Jeers for protesters’, 1996; Prendergast, 1996). The Age acknowledged that Kennett’s autocratic style was inappropriate but claimed “it would be quite wrong, now, for protesters to disrupt the races or to spoil the enjoyment of the hundreds of thousands of people who are expected to attend” (‘The race is on’, 1996, p. 18).

The Herald Sun viewed the

\[\text{182} \text{ Wilson and Turnbull (2001) explain that the tactical effect of wedge politics is “twofold: to use strategically populist measures to appeal to an opponent’s political base, which then forces the opposing party either to distance itself from unpopular causes or face political marginalisation” (p. 386).}
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\[\text{183} \text{ The Age also continued to voice frustration with Kennett’s reluctance to outline the full financial costs of the event. The paper demanded Kennett to release financial accounts before the election at the end of the month (‘The race is on’, 1996). Kennett explained that he would release all financial details, however stated it would take time and not happen until after the election (‘GP protests’, 1996).} \]
protesters in a slightly different light, referring to many of them as professional agitators who are ideologically opposed to Kennett rather than being motivated to protect Albert Park (‘Formula for excitement’, 1996). The Herald Sun emphasised the redevelopment of Albert Park as being positive and expressed that residents should patriotically accept any disruptions “as a small price to pay” (‘Grand prix our chance’, 1996, p. 42) for the good of the city of Melbourne. Furthermore, John Brumby was criticised in the Herald Sun for failing to halt SAP protesters by adding moral support to their campaign (‘Formula for excitement’, 1996). The protesters themselves were said to have “redefined democracy as the right of a few to spoil everyone else’s fun” (Ballantine & Jones, 1996, p. 2). In a further blow to the image of the protesters, Kennett revealed that Ron Walker, Judith Griggs (AGPC chief executive) and himself had all received death threats in the lead-up to the first GP (Green, 1996a; Pinkney, 1996). SAP convenor, Jenni Chandler, denied any responsibility from the group and claimed that several members of SAP had also received obscene phone calls and bomb threats (Pinkney, 1996). As will be discussed further in chapters 10 and 11, the marginalisation of SAP protesters illustrates a key process of neoliberalism; that is, seeking to destroy or prevent forms of collective action that may potentially limit opportunities for individuals or corporations to benefit from commercial or profiteering activities.

The first race was announced as a success by Kennett and the media (see Hamilton, 1996). The Age claimed that the GP was further proof of Melbourne’s ability to successfully host major events but condemned Kennett’s failure to detail all financial costs (‘Winners and grinners’, 1996). The Herald Sun also alluded to the GP as evidence of Melbourne’s claim to being a ‘sport city’, adding the GP to the Australian Open Tennis and AFL Grand Final as major annual events (‘Sports home’, 1996). In addition, the Herald Sun claimed that economic benefits for the state have been substantial and the protesters should accept the GP as a valuable event (‘Sports home’, 1996). However, some businesses were cited in The Age and Herald Sun as viewing the event as a failure, with trade down on estimations and expectations (Gettler, Blake & Winkler, 1996; Jamieson, 1996; ‘…And losers’, 1996).

Immediately after the first race, letters by The Age readers focused on the Grand Prix Act, specifically the prevention of protest rights (Scholl, 1996) and, the environmental destruction caused by the GP (Pressing, 1996). Some pro-GP letters were published in The Age which congratulated the GP organisers for running a successful event (Anderson, 1996). Letters to the Herald Sun were largely congratulatory of Kennett and the AGPC (see Jennings, 1996; Gerard, 1996; M.F., 1996); but some questioned the overall cost of the event (D.S., 1996) and the anti-social corporations (for example alcohol and tobacco companies) that sponsored the race (Bowes, 1996).
In the days after the race, and just weeks before the 1996 state election, Brumby was challenged to make a stance on re-locating the GP. The *Herald Sun* in particular pursued Brumby to propose a policy plan with headlines such as ‘Brumby pushed on GP’ (Wilson, 1996c) and ‘Brumby slower on Grand Prix plans’ (Millar, 1996). The *Herald Sun* expressed that Brumby had promised to outline if the Labor government would relocate the GP to docklands before the election (Wilson, 1996c), however Brumby stated that he could not comment on relocating the GP until he had seen the confidential contracts (Millar, 1996). A finance spokesman for the Labor party informed *The Age* a few days later that no plans to relocate the GP were included in their election budget (Green, 1996b). The Kennett-led Coalition comfortably won the 1996 election, as a consequence Brumby and the Labor party strategically voiced approval of the Grand Prix at Albert Park.\(^{184}\) Brumby explained the need to re-position the Labor Party view on the Grand Prix:

> In terms of our position and my position, shortly after the ’96 election, I needed to reposition the party on this issue so we made it very clear that we supported the Grand Prix and supported the Grand Prix at Albert Park. That was not an easy thing within the party, but nevertheless it needed to – We were never gonna shift it. That’s the reality. We weren’t gonna break a contract. (J. Brumby, personal communication, September 11, 2013)

SAP president Peter Goad explained the dismay at Brumby’s shifting views on running the event at Albert Park:

> The Labor party embraced it in 1996 … Brumby decided that perhaps the blue collar element would like the race, and he changed his tune … much to our disgrace. (P. Goad, personal communication, October 1, 2012)

As such, post-1996 both major political parties supported the Grand Prix as well as Albert Park as the location for the event.

Six months after the first race, the financial statements of the GP were released which concluded that the AGPC had made a loss of $1.75 million but the state economy had been boosted by $96 million (Gettler, 1996). Details of the licence fee paid to Bernie Ecclestone’s Formula One Group were not revealed in the government report. Grand Prix Minister, Louise Asher, alluded to the $1.7 million spent battling protests and $6.9 million received by the government through tax-receipts when defending the $1.75 million loss from the GP (Miller & Mayne, 1996). The following week, a report from the Auditor-General revealed that the total loss of the GP was $60 million (Hansen & Mayne, 1996).

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\(^{184}\) The forced re-positioning of the Labor party on the basis of the election loss further illustrates the ‘wedge politics’ strategy surrounding the GP (see Wilson & Turnbull, 2001).
which included construction costs and an operating loss of $11.7 million – as $10 million had been ‘given’ to the AGPC by the government to help with administrative costs (Mayne, 1996). Letters to The Age were largely critical of the expenses on the GP; one reader asked why the ‘social costs’ – felled trees, access to parkland, illegal arrests, traumatised animals, closure of schools – were not included within the balance sheet but intangible benefits, such as city – branding, are consistently referred to by GP organisers and the government (Kelly, 1996).

Subsequent Grand Prix

Three further GP’s were run under the Kennett-led government. The 1997 GP was marred by vandals dumping 200 litres of diesel on the track in the week before the race (SAP denied involvement, although media included the group as possible suspects) (Byrne, Buttler & Edmunds, 1997; Koutsoukis & Boreham, 1997). Further disruption resulted from transport workers organising a strike;\(^{185}\) resulting in an expected $2.9 million surplus becoming a $2.7 million loss according to Ron Walker (Miller, 1997; Johnston, 1997).\(^{186}\) SAP continued to protest the event and held a daily vigil throughout this period (see McCauley, 2013). Editorially, the Herald Sun maintained strong support for the GP and the role it played in preserving Melbourne’s image as the sporting capital of Australia and the economic benefits of branding the city to a global audience (‘Melbourne in pole position’, 1998). In addition, the paper called for Unions to stop using the Grand Prix for their own political agendas (‘End the Grand Prix blackmail’, 1997).\(^{187}\) The Age also continued to voice overall support for the event; however strong criticism of Kennett’s reluctance to reveal the licence fee persisted (‘A grand result’, 1997).

The Kennett-led Coalition government lost a close-fought 1999 state election, with Labor’s Steve Bracks being sworn in as the new Premier. During Bracks’ election campaign, he claimed that Labor would be a transparent and open government (Dargan, 1999; Crooks, 2000). In announcing an extension to the GP contract in 2000, Bracks claimed that Labor “had lived up to its commitment to open and accountable government by setting a $40 million-a-year cap on major events spending” (Rollins, 2000, p.17). Treasurer at the time, John Brumby, explained that “One of the things we did early in the

\(^{185}\) Transport workers threatened to strike ahead of the 1996 GP also but struck a deal with the government to prevent strike action during the GP (‘Deal struck’, 1996).

\(^{186}\) The state government, AGPC and MCC used private buses to transport the public to Albert Park (see Edmunds, 1998).

\(^{187}\) A strike was planned for the 1998 event but the government agreed to increase tram driver wages by 3 per cent (Brammall, 1998).
government, we set aside a budget for major events, we made it transparent, unlike the kennett government … we didn’t specify specifics because they’re in confidence and other states would just bid you up” (personal communication, September 11, 2013). indeed, in failing to reveal the exact cost of the licence fee, the liberal opposition were provided the opportunity to highlight the hypocrisy of a government that had criticised kennett’s secrecy surrounding the contract. Bracks, using a similar defence to kennett, claimed that the confidentiality clause in the contract prevented him from disclosing the cost of the licence fee (rollins, 2000). The SAP organisation claimed that Bracks had reneged on election promises of openness (Cusworth, 2000). Brumby expressed his views on the challenges in consulting with SAP:

There’s not much consultation, and the Save Albert Park people, they have got a view and that is, ‘close it down’. It’s not like – it’s not a compromise position that they are in… And contractual negotiations, you hold them in private, you negotiate, and you hope you get the best deal. And you’re never really in a position of strength. (J. Brumby, personal communication, September 11, 2013)

Brumby’s assertion of being in a weak position during contract negotiations with organisations such as the formula one group is evidence of the risk associated with a major events strategy and indeed, in urban entrepreneurialism. Once the investment in infrastructure (for example, roads, grandstands or stadiums) has been outlaid by the host city, the ‘cost’ (politically and financially) of permitting the event to depart arguably increases. Indeed, Brumby explained that “you would only let the Grand Prix go if you had something substantial to replace it with” (personal communication, September 11, 2013).

The Herald Sun supported the contract extension and criticised SAP; referring to the group as as ‘Dinosaurs’ and ‘irrelevant’ (Singer, 2000, p. 18). Articles and letters in The Age focused on the lack of openness adopted by the Bracks government and challenged Bracks’ claims of democracy being restored through the announcement of a spending cap (see Crooks, 2000; Lane, 2000; Ward, 2000). Journalist Terry Lane, in an opinion piece discussing democracy and the GP, expressed that “Entering into secret deals with foreign circus-owners does not fit within any known definition of democracy” (Lane, 2000, p. 14). Indeed, in the early years of the GP it appeared the public were not irritated with the government investing tax-payer money; rather the lack of transparency in entering deals with Bernie Ecclestone was the focus of criticism.

Over the next few years, the cost to taxpayers of hosting the GP became a talked about topic. By 2004, it was revealed that a loss of $12.6 million was recorded in the AGPC annual report (‘Grand Prix races’, 2004). Bracks continued to defend the costs by
alluding to the exposure to an international audience and the enhancement of Melbourne’s reputation as a major events capital (‘Grand Prix races’, 2004). Ron Walker attempted to put a financial value on the GP, asserting that the event had “generated more than $1 billion in economic benefit for the state since 1996” (cited in ‘Grand Prix races’, 2004, p. 8); although no research was provided to support this claim. In 2005, a report by the National Institute of Economic and Industry Research (NIEIR) concluded that the GP contributed $170 million to the Victorian economy (Edmund, 2005); which helped the Labor government justify ‘giving’ the AGPC $14 million to balance its books. A clash of major events occurred in 2006 with the GP occurring just days after Melbourne had hosted the Commonwealth Games and on the opening weekend of the AFL. While the trio of events were promoted as evidence of an increasing sporting reputation for the city, the result was a decrease in attendance at the GP (Warner, 2006b). The Liberal Opposition, in a similar vein to Labor’s critique when in Opposition, condemned the government for hiding financial details from scrutiny; Liberal MP, Phil Honeywood stated that “We have put in requests to try and get details on how much the Government is subsidising the event. We can never find that out because the Government plays smoke and mirrors” (cited in Holroyd & Berry, 2006, p. 5).

A damning report of the Grand Prix was released by the Auditor-General in 2007. The report on Melbourne’s major events, which specifically focused on the Grand Prix, concluded that Grand Prix costs outweighed the benefits by $6.7 million (Gordon, 2007). This is in stark contrast to earlier reports produced by NIEIR which claimed benefits to the state of $170 million. The AGPC criticised the Auditor-General’s report for including intangible costs such as noise but excluding benefits such as brand exposure and civic pride (Gordon, 2007). Auditor-General, Des Pearson, responded by explaining that no reliable data exists to calculate these intangible benefits which is why they were excluded. NIEIR economist, Dr Peter Brain, accused Pearson of being out of his depth on economic issues (Gordon, 2007) and being driven by ideology rather than objectivity (Gardiner, 2007). Premier Bracks defended the NIEIR economic model as robust and strong; however acknowledged the Auditor-Generals report would be carefully considered before entering into a new GP contract (Gordon, 2007). Both The Age (‘Events audit’, 2007) and Herald Sun (‘Major questions’, 2007) criticised the Auditor-General’s economic method but suggested the government follow Pearson’s call for greater transparency and openness as well as cease the political spin that is used to justify spending taxpayers money on major events. Both papers maintained that major events, including the GP, are of value to the state.

In July, 2008, the new Labor Premier John Brumby announced that the Victorian government had extended the GP contract by five years to 2015 (Rood, 2008b).
deal included a later start time of five o’clock but not a night race as desired by Ecclestone. *The Age* congratulated Brumby’s negotiations with the headline; ‘Deal a triumph for Premier and humiliation for formula one supremo’ (Austin, 2008). Brumby, following Bracks and Kennett, refused to outline the licence fee for the contract. Opposition leader Ted Baillieu “welcomed the agreement but said the onus was now on the Government to cut the cost” of running the event (Mitchell, 2008, p. 7). Editorials in both papers proclaimed Brumby’s success in resisting Ecclestone’s demands for a night race (‘Racing ahead’, 2008; ‘Two cheers’, 2008) but denounced Brumby’s excuse that commercial confidentiality limited the disclosure of the licence fee. At the end of 2008 it was revealed that the most recent GP had cost taxpayers $40.1 million, doubling the cost since 2006 (Doherty, 2008). Unsurprisingly, further criticism of the government’s strategy to fund major events rather than social welfare projects was articulated through letters to the newspapers (Custance; 2008; Hayton, 2008; Hilton, 2008; Rome; 2008).

By 2011, with the Liberal-National Coalition back in government the GP was costing Victorian taxpayers $50 million. Tourism and Major Events Minister, Louise Asher, justified the $50 million bill by referring to an economic impact report from Ernst & Young which concluded that the GP “increased Victoria’s gross state product by between $32 million and $39 million” (‘Grand Prix bill’, 2011, para. 2). Asher acknowledged that the report indicated an economic loss but expressed that the branding benefits of the event increased its value (‘Grand Prix bill’, 2011); in addition, Asher claimed it was the former Labor government that was to blame for the soaring costs as they had negotiated the contract (Sexton, 2011).

In early 2012, the government confirmed to *The Age* that it would soon begin negotiations to extend the GP contract beyond 2015 (Cook, 2012). The possible contract extension announcement resulted in members of SAP asserting that the government were hypocrites for being critical of the cost of the event while in Opposition and then planning to renew the contract when in Government (Dowling & Sexton, 2012). The determined support for the event when in power, and loud criticism of contract secrecy when in Opposition, is a clear theme throughout the GP’s history in Melbourne. Green Party MP Sue Pennicuik expressed her dismay at the contradictory views adopted by the major political parties:

> Every time the ALP [Labor Party] has been in Opposition they have criticised the Grand Prix. They were opposed to it when the Kennett government

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188 Interestingly, *The Age* editors were demanding the government reveal the contract details at the same time as Ron Walker – who was privy to the contract details in his role in the VMEC – was the chairman of Fairfax Media; the company that owned *The Age*.
brought it to Albert Park. But when they ran government after Kennett, more secret deals with the Ecclestone establishment were made and the contract was extended. Now in Opposition, the ALP are opposed to it again. (S. Pennicuik, personal communication, August 13, 2013)

Likewise, SAP president Peter Goad (personal communication, October 1, 2012) explained that after Brumby re-positioned the Labor Party to be in support of the GP at Albert Park, the SAP organisation now regards both Labor and Liberal governments with disdain.

In addition to the costs and contract transparency; the official attendance figures have also been an area of contestation. The level of attendance at a sports event may represent, or help validate, the public interest in an event and therefore justify the use of taxpayer’s funds. Questions about how the AGPC calculated attendance at the inaugural GP were asked in 1996 by *The Age* but no clear response was provided (see Overington, 1996). SAP and more recently Sue Pennicuik of the Green Party have consistently challenged the AGPC on attendance figures. For example, Miller (1997) reported in 1997 that SAP "had volunteers counting spectators entering each gate … [claiming] Friday’s real figure was 38,986, much lower than the AGPC’s figure of 66,000" (p. 11). In an attempt to highlight the discrepancies, SAP commissioned two reports on attendance figures published in 2000 and 2003 (see Smith, 2000; 2003). Green MP Sue Pennicuik, in 2013, moved a motion in state Parliament to have a “full and accurate count of attendance” (cited in Dowling, 2013, p. 4) which was rejected. Pennicuik explained that:

Following the re-emergence of the interest in the estimation of the crowds and the growing evidence that they were just making it up, I put the motion to parliament that the Grand Prix organisers be required to put in turnstiles and accurately count how many people are attending…They get so much public money and they’re not even required to be accurate about how many people are there. (Personal communication, August 13, 2013)

In addressing the criticism of attendance figures, a spokesperson for Ron Walker referred to a Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) decision which supported the AGPC’s attendance claims:

In a decision handed down by Senior Member Ian Proctor on 13 September 2013, in relation to a FOI [Freedom of Information] application by the Save

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189 A decade later, *The Age* revealed that attendance “figures were calculated exaggerations” (Ker, 2006c, p. 3); however *The Age* did not expose their source.

190 SAP’s website includes a number of links to material which challenges the AGPC attendance figures (see SAP, 2014a).
Albert Park group, VCAT found in favour of the Corporation in respect of documents related to the Corporation’s methodology for calculating estimated attendances at the 2012 event. (Cerny, 2014, para 9)

With the VCAT ruling in favour of the AGPC and the Victorian government rejecting Pennicuik’s motion for crowd turnstiles, the current method for calculating attendance figures has been legitimised. In addition to the method of estimating attendance, SAP has criticised the media for blindly accepting the AGPC figures and moreover, representing these figures as actual, rather than estimated attendances (SAP, 2014b).

In July 2012, the Herald Sun reported that new research from Formula Money estimated Melbourne’s 2012 GP delivered publicity valued at $217 million (Rolfe, 2012). In response, SAP member Peter Logan wrote to the Herald Sun to explain that in 2011 Formula Money “published a report claiming the world-wide telecast was worth only $262,552 for Melbourne, so who paid them to change it to hundreds of millions?” (Logan, 2012, p. 20). In an online dialogue between Logan and a representative from Formula Money, it was explained to Logan that the $262,552 figure was the value of the ‘Melbourne’ logo which is branded trackside; while the $217 million referred to the “total value of exposure for the city of Melbourne” (Reid, 2013a, para. 3) through mentions and coverage of the city in race broadcasts, qualifying, news bulletins, print publications and online media. Logan argued that either way, the $217 million did not eventuate into hard capital for the city and citizens of Victoria (Logan, 2013). Economist Roderick Campbell from ‘Economists at Large’, a group which estimated the 2012 GP had a net-loss of $61 million (Economists at Large, 2013), entered the online discussion and queried the values Formula Money attached to branding exposure. Campbell alluded to a 2009 report from research consultants ‘Comperio Research’ which valued the exposure significantly lower; highlighting the ambiguity associated with valuing media coverage (Campbell, 2013).

**Contract extensions – competing cities/nations**

As previously noted, the demand for a GP from other cities/nations was cited as a reason why Victorians should desire a GP, and moreover, congratulate or reward those individuals that obtained the GP on behalf of Victorians. As each contract extension was discussed and subsequently signed, the list of cities and/or nations that were ‘beaten’ by Victoria’s achievement in obtaining and retaining the GP was also proudly announced by politicians, the VMEC, the AGPC and newspaper journalists. When the Grand Prix was obtained from Adelaide in 1993 – reportedly beating out China, Malaysia and Indonesia (Pinder, 1993) – some criticised Victoria’s urban-competition strategy to obtain events in
order to enhance the city image, stimulate urban development and encourage investment and tourists (see Kearns & Philo, 1993). The federal shadow treasurer was unhappy with the secrecy of the VMEC and the consequences for South Australian businesses (‘Bitterness’, 1993), while the Australian travel industry called “Victoria’s attempt to shift the event a few hundred kilometres to the east a piece of cannibalism that may satisfy some … but in the context of southern Australian tourism, it is a waste of resources which would be better deployed on new and innovative schemes” (see ‘Leading teams’, 1993, p. 3). Ron Walker justified the move by asserting that Victoria had benefited Australia by hosting the GP which would otherwise have been lost to another nation; “I am absolutely confident that if Melbourne hadn’t seized the opportunity it would have gone overseas” (Walker, cited in Forbes & Thompson, 1993, p. 1).

In 1998, when the Kennett government extended the GP contract by five years from 2001 to 2006, it was claimed that Adelaide, China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Macau all wished to host a GP (Edmunds, 1998; Owen & Edmunds, 1998). In early 2000, with the Steve Bracks-led Labor government now in power, concerns were voiced that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Korea, China, South Africa and India desired a GP-round; therefore Melbourne’s GP was vulnerable to being terminated if a new contract was not signed (Papps, 2000). As a result, a four-year contract extension to 2010 was signed five months later; justified to prevent “competing countries, believed to include Egypt, Russia, Lebanon and Korea” from obtaining Victoria’s GP (Cusworth, 2000, p. 9).

With two-years remaining on the contract in 2008 it was again time to discuss an extension. Bernie Ecclestone demanded that Melbourne run a night-race to increase revenue from television exposure in Europe (Whinnett, 2007a), otherwise Melbourne’s GP would be moved to South Korea or India (Packham & Warner, 2008). A number of letters were published in both the Herald Sun and The Age arguing against a night Grand Prix on the basis that the environmental impact, particularly energy costs, of lighting up Albert Park would be too great (see Heard, 2007; Mitchell, 2007; Taylor, 2007; Walter, 2007). Premier Bracks announced that the government, while not necessarily supporting the night Grand Prix concept, was considering night trials to examine its feasibility (‘GP anger’, 2007). In March, 2008, Ecclestone was reported as expressing that Melbourne would lose its Grand Prix if it did not become a night race (Packham & Warner, 2008) while the NSW government announced that it was conducting a feasibility study into upgrading Sydney’s Eastern Creek circuit with lights in an attempt to obtain the GP (Ottley, 2008; ‘Sydney GP plan’, 2008; ‘Sydney steps up’, 2008). Just prior to the now Brumby-led Labor government announcing a five-year contract extension to 2015 (see Mitchell, 2008), it was claimed by a ‘government source’ in the Herald Sun that the new
deal “spoils the party for interstate raiders who wanted to lure it to NSW, Queensland and South Australia” (Rolfe, 2008, p. 12).

The continued framing of external demand for the GP sustained in the lead up to more recent contract negotiations. In 2014, for example, a journalist from The Age alluded to ‘several other countries’ (Fogarty, 2013) that were willing to pay more than Melbourne for the GP contract.¹⁹¹ A new 5-year contract, signed in August 2014, was referred to by Liberal-National Coalition Premier Dennis Napthine as a “better deal” (Rolfe & Johnston, 2014, para. 1) for Victorians despite it being “not appropriate to disclose the actual cost of the contract, that is part of the commercial in confidence arrangements” (Rolfe & Johnston, 2014, para. 5). A year later, during the NSW election it was reported that NSW Premier Mike Baird would seek to bid to host the GP in Sydney if re-elected (Clennell, 2015). In response, the now Labor Victorian Government moved quickly to extend the contract by a further three years to 2023 (Willingham & Choahan, 2015). Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews clearly justified the investment through reference to the demand for the event; “NSW desperately wanted it. There are other states in Australia who are interested, other countries in our region that would do almost anything to have this race in their city” (cited in Willingham & Choahan, 2015, para. 8). Andrews continued to argue for the need to keep contract details a secret, explaining that “It is not our practice, and we will not be giving to all our competitors the number that they have to beat” (cited in Willingham & Choahan, 2015, para. 9) in reference to the annual payment made to the Formula One Group.

This consistent media and political reference to ‘rival’ cities has served two purposes. Firstly, the Grand Prix is perceived as a valued event, as evidenced by the high demand for the event from external states. Secondly, by naming the potential cities or nations which demand the contract, the media (and other ‘experts’) reinforce the concept of an urban battle; that is, Melbourne is in competition with other places for these limited events which serves to justify the need to retain the event without necessarily scrutinising its value or cost. Indeed, despite the wide range of cities mentioned throughout the five contract periods, no firm evidence of another city desiring Melbourne’s GP has been provided – all claims of other cities’ desire for the event were made by ‘experts’ within Melbourne. Hilgers (2013, p. 81) explains that “neoliberalism assumes the necessity to

¹⁹¹ In March, 2014, the Herald Sun revealed that a deal had been rejected by Walker and a revised contract – approved by the AGPC – was with the State Government (Rolfe, 2014a). Rolfe (2014a) explained that the deal was rejected as it removed ‘sweetheart conditions’ written into the Albert Park contract; these conditions included the right to using the “Melbourne” brand around the circuit and profit from corporate and VIP areas.
intervene; leaders claim the importance of [adaptability] … in order to set up ideal conditions for the market to function” (p. 81). Claims that rival cities desired Melbourne’s GP permitted the state to justify the necessary ‘market-led’ changes (including the rescheduling of the GP contract and change to a later start time) to the GP in order to retain the prized asset. Continuing, Hilgers (2013) suggests that the symbolic capital held by the state offers the opportunity to present a social reality (for example, a demand for the GP from other states) in which constant change is necessary; “institutional and social legitimacy masks the power relations through which much cultural arbitrariness (i.e. indicators, figures, statistics) is produced and naturalised to increase the belief in the constant necessity of change” (p. 81). Indeed, the state’s use of facts and figures such as the value of brand exposure, global television audience and estimated attendance illustrate the ‘neoliberal audit culture’ present in the state of Victoria. By increasing the external demand for the event through the citing of other nations that have ‘lost’ to Melbourne, the government, media, AGPC and VMEC have added symbolic capital to the GP in an attempt to ensure it is perceived as an important asset for the people of Victoria – despite the prevention of information to the public.

Conclusion
The secrecy surrounding the Grand Prix licence fee between the VMEC and Bernie Ecclestone’s Formula One Group was, according to the Herald Sun, broken in January 2013. The paper claimed it had viewed GP documents which asserted that “the overall cost of Mr Ecclestone’s licence fee – kept secret for four successive state governments for almost two decades – for the five-year contract is close to $170 million” (Hudson & Johnston, 2013, para. 2). Tourism and Major Events Minister, Louise Asher, proclaimed the GP as “a ‘terrific’ event for Melbourne but did cost too much at the moment … she was unable to comment on Mr Ecclestone’s fees, because of the Grand Prix contract terms” (Hudson & Johnston, 2013, para. 9 & 16).

Of possible concern to the AGPC and Victorian government is the retirement of Ron Walker from the AGPC in April, 2015 (Choahan, 2015; Rolfe, 2014b). This could be concerning because Ecclestone has, in the past, claimed that he will only deal with Walker in negotiating a GP contract (see Hoy, 2014); although he negotiated a new contract with the Victorian Premier in 2015. In addition, when Melbourne obtained the GP from Adelaide in 1993, it was only possible after John Bannon had resigned as South Australian premier. At the time, Walker and Kennett asserted they knew Bannon and Ecclestone had become close friends, and with his resignation Ecclestone would be willing to relocate the GP (Neales, 1993b; Coster, 1993). With Walker retiring from the
AGPC, Ecclestone may now be willing to relocate the GP to other states which have consistently been reported as desiring the event.

A passage during the second reading of the Grand Prix Bill in 1994, by National Party leader Patrick McNamara, captured the government’s positioning of the GP as a key element in its major events economic strategy:

The importance of the grand prix to the economy of this state and to the profile of Melbourne as an international city should not be underestimated. The Melbourne grand prix will showcase our capital city to a worldwide audience of hundreds of millions of people, attract an audience of hundreds of thousands to the event, and result in tens of millions of dollars being pumped into the economy. Some of the immediate benefits will be in the creation of jobs; particularly in key service industries…The grand prix will reaffirm Melbourne’s status as Australia’s sporting and cultural capital and will add renewed impetus to the city’s traditional festivals. (McNamara cited in Parliament of Victoria, 1994b, p. 411)

The importance of the GP to Kennett’s desire to brand Melbourne as a sporting and cultural city to a global audience was justification for the AGP Act to empower the AGPC to such an extent that it was beyond most common laws. The event has often been referred to by politicians on both sides of parliament as the jewel in Melbourne’s major events crown. This jewel however was created through secret dealings within the VMEC and a select few members of Kennett’s Liberal caucus and has been encased in controversy ever since.

Despite The Age criticising the lack of transparency associated with GP deals, the two major newspapers of Melbourne have supported the GP since its announcement in 1993. A recent editorial in the Herald Sun reconfirmed the paper’s support for the GP as an important event in Victoria’s major events calendar but expressed that the government, when negotiating an extension for the GP contract, needed to include the people of Victoria in the “debate and that they should be armed with all relevant information to help them arrive at a decision about whether the contract should be extended” (‘Bernie Ecclestone’s Formula One’, 2013, para. 14). Indeed, the question which best encapsulates the Grand Prix is whether the people should have a say in the event or if the government, as a democratically elected body bequeathed with legitimate power, should make decisions on behalf of ‘the people’ (at times without full disclosure of details) and if so, in whose interests are these decisions being made?
Chapter 9: Urban Stadiums

The city of Melbourne has seen a number of new sporting facilities built in the last three decades. As previously discussed, the National Tennis Centre in Melbourne Park symbolically represents the shift to an urban entrepreneurial strategy of governance that has repositioned the once ‘rust-belt’ city as a place for ‘footloose’ capital and tourism. Meanwhile the Formula One Grand Prix clearly illustrates the neoliberal philosophy embraced by successive Victorian governments. The additional sports infrastructure around Melbourne’s CBD has supplemented the city’s drive for major events as well as enhanced Melbourne’s sports capital. While the aim of this chapter is not to focus on all stadium constructions/demolitions in Melbourne, discussion will specifically focus on the Docklands Stadium and Rectangular Stadium as well as including examination of Olympic Park/Gosch’s Paddock, Waverley Park, and some re-developments to the Melbourne Cricket Ground (MCG).  

The majority of these developments have relied on tax-payer funding provided by the state government and/or government Trusts such as the Melbourne and Olympic Parks Trust; with Docklands Stadium, the first private stadium in Australia, a notable exception.

Docklands Stadium

The Docklands area of Melbourne, a 200 hectare site of publicly owned land, river and harbour located 600 meters to the west of the CBD (Dovey & Sandercock, 2002), like many other dockland areas around the globe suffered from deindustrialisation and changes in transport technologies during the 1980s resulting in the area becoming disused (Oakley, 2011; Wood, 2009). An attempt to host the 1996 Olympics was initially viewed as an opportunity to redevelop the Docklands; however the bid failed, so the Kirner Labor government appointed the Docklands Task Force (DTF) in 1990 to develop a strategy for renewal of the area (Shaw, 2013; Wood, 2009). Dovey and Sandercock (2002) explain that two plans for the Docklands were proposed during the early 1990s. The DTF, a branch of the public service, adopted a consultative method to design a vision for the Docklands. At the same time, the Committee for Melbourne, a

192 The Melbourne Sports & Aquatics Centre and the State Netball and Hockey Centre are not included in this section as they were discussed briefly in chapter 7.

193 The stadium at Docklands, initially named Docklands Stadium has also been referred to as Colonial Stadium (2000-2002), Telstra Dome (2002-2009) and Etihad Stadium (2009- ) due to changes in the naming rights.

194 The area was previously swamp which had been excavated in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Dovey & Sandercock, 2002).
group of leading business and civic identities, produced a glossy, advertising-like, booklet of their vision of the Docklands; concluding that a quasi-government department – the Docklands Authority – be given full planning control of the area. The Docklands Authority, with a Board largely consisting of members from the Committee for Melbourne, was set-up in 1992 by the Kirner government and given full planning powers of the area “with a strong political imperative to get something started” (Dovey & Sandercock, 2002, p. 87). A change to a neoliberal government in late 1992 also led to a change in the development philosophy of the Docklands; illustrated by a report released by the Docklands Authority in 1993 which is notable for rejecting the DTF’s consultative approach in favour of a market-driven approach to developing the Docklands in which private developers would apply for tenders to build one of seven precincts on crown land (Dovey & Sandercock, 2002; Shaw, 2013; Wood, 2009).

Despite a pledge that no public money would be spent on the area, Liberal Premier Jeff Kennett invested public funds to develop infrastructure (street extensions, two bridges, telecommunications and decontamination costs) in the hope it would help drive investment by the private sector (Dovey & Sandercock, 2002; Shaw, 2013). In addition to infrastructural support, the Kennett government and Docklands Authority actively championed and facilitated a high-tech, 52,000-seat privately owned sports stadium; ultimately becoming the first major development in the Docklands.

The suggestion of a stadium in the Docklands area of Melbourne was first mooted in November 1994 when News Limited (now News Corp Australia) announced its intention to locate a rugby league team in Melbourne for a new competition (the Super League) and build a 30,000-seat rectangular stadium for games (Ballantine, 1994; Farrant, 1994). Coalition premier Jeff Kennett applauded the decision to build a new stadium and expressed that it would “confirm Melbourne’s reputation as the mecca of sport” (cited in Ballantine, 1994, p. 1). However, a week later, The Age revealed that reports of the News Limited funded stadium were false (Masters, 1994). Melbourne was viewed as an important expansion location for both the Super League and Australian Rugby League organisations; as such, both were lobbying the Victorian government for support. The reported stadium was to be the carrot to sway government support in

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195 These included science, technology, commerce, nature and leisure (Dovey & Sandercock, 2002). While seven precincts were planned, the Docklands Authority allowed flexibility by expressing that non-complying bids would be accepted if they made a positive contribution to the area (Wood, 2009).

196 For further information on rugby league’s split in Australia see Phillips and Hutchings (2003) and Rowe (1997).
favour of the Super League and encourage New South Wales rugby league clubs to join
the Super League, giving the break-away organisation some legitimacy. While the News
Limited stadium did not eventuate, the idea that a stadium for the football codes (soccer,
rugby league and rugby union) which are played on a rectangular field would be beneficial
to Melbourne had taken flight. The day before the 1996 state election, The Age
communicated Kennett’s wishes “to develop three world-class sports venues – a
velodrome, a football (soccer) and rugby stadium and the Sports and Aquatic Centre”
(Kermond, 1996, p. 5). The Age reported that Kennett’s sport and recreation policy would
prioritise finding a site for the velodrome (which became the second tennis stadium at
Melbourne Park) and “planning the redevelopment of the area around Olympic Park and
the Tennis Centre into a soccer and rugby stadium” (Kermond, 1996, p. 5).

Six months later however, The Age reported that a stadium, with a retractable
roof, was being proposed as part of the Government’s plans for developing the Docklands
(Happell, 1996). The Herald Sun reported updates on the yet-to-be announced stadium
(Rados, 1996) informing readers that it would cost $200 million, but did not outline where
funding would come from. The earlier mentioned Super League competition was still
being planned and with an announcement that Melbourne was tipped to become the 11th
franchise of the competition, Kennett reaffirmed his support for the team and any links it
may have to a new stadium; “Mr Kennett was quick to jump on the Super League
bandwagon, saying he would consider a $200 million injection of funds to build a new
venue in the Docklands area” (Thirsk, 1996, p. 67). Kennett’s comments that he would
consider News Limited’s injection of funds to build a new stadium was in line with his
deregulation philosophy – that is, the stadium should be privately-funded; unlike much of
the existing publicly-funded sporting infrastructure in Victoria, such as the MCG and
National Tennis Centre.

In October 1996, The Age and Herald Sun reported that the state government had
agreed on plans for a $200 million, 52,000-seat, high-tech stadium in the Docklands for
the purpose of Australian rules football, soccer, rugby league and entertainment (Barnes,
1996c; Linnell & Green, 1996). It was confirmed that the stadium would be privately built
on crown land with significant funding for infrastructure, such as a new bridge and
extension of tram lines, to be paid by the state. Labor MP, John Pandazopolous,
explained that while the stadium was not a public project, the surrounding infrastructure
and land was provided by the public; “[government investment] was indirect, it was sort of
crown lease [and the] government had to build a whole lot of infrastructure in the public
realm there that didn’t exist” (J. Pandazopolous, personal communication, April 17, 2013).

The project was to be financed as a BOOT-model, that is, a private developer
Builds, Owns, Operates and then Transfers the facility (Rados, 1997). Initial reports
expressed that after 30 to 40 years of private ownership the stadium would be passed to
the state government (Barnes, 1996a). The Herald Sun supported the decision to give
responsibility of the development of the Docklands, including the stadium, to the private
sector; an editorial expressed:

In keeping with the Kennett Government model, private interests will have to
fund the projects themselves, with no risk borne by the public. We support
this concept … Developers will have to clean up one of the most
contaminated sites in Melbourne before the project gets underway. This is
welcomed … The drastic improvement to the site would ensure Melbourne
retained its reputation as the world’s most liveable city. (‘Blueprint for ugly
west end’, 1997, p. 18)

The Docklands site was selected ahead of other sites, specifically Olympic Park, because
of existing public transport infrastructure that accessed the Docklands in addition to the
belief that a 52,000-seat stadium at Olympic Park, in close proximity to the MCG and
National Tennis Centre, would cause too much traffic congestion. The Docklands plan,
publicly released by the Docklands Authority in 1996, segregated the area into seven
precincts (see Barnes, 1996d; Hurley, 1996; Places Victoria, 2013). The stadium would fill
one of these precincts and it was hoped that this would spark interest in the other six.
Premier Kennett explained the rationale for approving the stadium development:

Very simply, we decided to turn the face of the city to the water. We’re one
of only a few cities in the world that were located on water that hadn’t turned
its face to water ... So we entered into a 30-year development programme,
and the stadium became the first project and became an anchor project
down in that precinct. (J. Kennett, personal communication, May 6, 2013)

The Labor Opposition welcomed the stadium but criticised the Kennett government for
taking too long to begin developments in the Docklands area (Linnell & Green, 1996).

An editorial in The Age expressed support for the Docklands development and the
Docklands Stadium, blaming lack of progress in the area on the Docklands Authority
under the Kirner government and the Cain-Kirner government decision to tie development
on the condition of a successful 1996 Olympic Games bid:

Past visions for the Docklands have been blighted, indeed stillborn, for at
least two reasons. Either they entailed the creation of a planning colossus –
such as the Docklands Authority proposed by the Kirner Government – or

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197 This promotion of private development on public land was despite recent criticism regarding the
breach of planning by Crown for the Casino development on the South Bank of the Yarra river
(Neales, 1994a)
they shared the fate of an even grander dream, such as the choice of Melbourne to hold this year’s centennial Olympics. The new Docklands vision stands on its own, as it should. (‘This is the place’, 1996, p. 32)

*The Age’s* criticism illustrates the risk of adopting an urban entrepreneurial strategy of attaching development to major events on the one hand, and approval of adopting an urban entrepreneurial strategy of using local powers to attract external sources of funding on the other hand (see Harvey, 1989; Hubbard, 1996a). The entrepreneurial strategy associated with attaching development plans to the Olympic Games was critiqued due to the failure in attracting the much-sort-after major event. On the other hand, the bureaucracy associated with urban development planning organisations was deemed to have prevented planning approval; it is only once the Docklands Authority adopted a market-driven vision – ultimately shifting control of the area to private developers at the expense of public consultation – with the support of government legislation that progress could proceed.

While the government was receiving praise from both *The Age* and *Herald Sun* for progressing development at the Docklands, the Melbourne City Council (MCC) voiced disappointment at its omission from the planning process (Birnbauer, 1997). Subsequently, editorials in both papers adopted the MCC’s concerns and expressed a need for the government to include the MCC in decision making as a voice of the people:

…should the community’s interests be formally represented in planning for the Docklands? … The State Government has reformed local government; it must now restore it to its rightful place in the democratic process. For the Melbourne City Council, that must mean a partnership with the Docklands Authority. (‘Now for the real debate’, 1997, p. 10)

Melbourne City Council has also expressed concerns that it is being excluded from the planning decisions. Certainly if the government is to have the wholehearted support of the people it must involve the community in one of the biggest changes ever made in one hit to this city. (‘Kicking goals’, 1997, p. 18)

The decision to exclude the MCC from planning decisions was justified by the government on the grounds of commercial confidentiality; “It is believed the Docklands Authority is concerned about an apparent conflict between the need for probity and confidentiality and
the fact that a Melbourne City Council representative would have some responsibility to the public” (Birnbauer, 1997, p. 2).\textsuperscript{198}

Despite the Docklands Task Force’s initial intentions to consult with the public through traditional planning procedures, the Docklands Authority identified itself as a development rather than planning agency (Dovey & Sandercock, 2002; Wood, 2009) with a responsibility to attract private developers rather than undertake consultation.\textsuperscript{199} For example, Dovey and Sandercock assert that the 1996 Docklands Plan lacked planning detail which essentially “paralysed public debate, which was compounded by the fact that everyone involved with the Authority had signed secrecy agreements” (Dovey & Sandercock, 2002, p. 91). Susan Oakley (2011) explains that in Australia, states are increasingly transferring planning control to “quasi-government development authorities” (p. 222) that are usually “expected to provide an annual dividend return to government” (p. 222). Adopting a market-driven approach to development, the Docklands Authority’s focus shifted from planning to income generation; as Wood (2009) expresses, “members of the general public were no longer ‘citizens’ of a state but were now occupying the subject position of ‘shareholder’” (p. 198).

The Docklands Stadium was viewed as a catalyst for additional development at the Docklands; as such, the Docklands Authority was under pressure to ensure the stadium was an attractive investment to private developers. In order to sell the stadium to prospective investors, the quasi-government Docklands Authority negotiated with the Australian Football League (AFL) to confirm their tenancy and guarantee the supply of events at the venue. The Docklands Authority arranged a deal with the AFL to play 30 games a year, with the potential to attract in excess of 40,000 spectators, at the stadium (see Denham, 2011; Searle, 2002).\textsuperscript{200} Mike Fitzpatrick, part of the Docklands Stadium Consortium which won the tender for the BOOT project,\textsuperscript{201} explained that the AFL’s

\textsuperscript{198} Almost a decade later, the MCC was given control of the Docklands; however the state government continues to restrict this power by keeping planning control (Kleinman, 2006). More recently, an article in The Age criticised the early development of the Docklands for allowing private developers too much control while failing to consult with the public (see Munro, 2012).
\textsuperscript{199} Dovey and Sandercock (2002) explain that the planning scheme “was released for a short period of public comment on Christmas Eve 1995 which effectively precluded any debate” (p. 89).
\textsuperscript{200} This contract was re-negotiated in 2009 so that AFL clubs would receive a greater share of match-day revenue in return for the number of games per year being increased to 40 at the Docklands Stadium (see Denham, 2011)
\textsuperscript{201} Fitzpatrick founded Hastings Management Limited (Hastings) which was one of a number of companies in the Docklands Stadium Consortium – including News Limited, Channel Seven, Westpac, Merrill Lynch, Citipower and Honeywell (see Hastings, n.d.; Landlease, 2011)
involvement with the stadium was the key element financially; “the key thing with this one was we actually had … games from the AFL … We felt with the AFL underwriting it, [the stadium] had a chance of succeeding” (Personal communication, April 9, 2013). Indeed, the AFL was a central figure to developments with stadia in Melbourne during the 1990s as evident by the impact of Docklands Stadium on the MCG and Waverley Park.

**Waverley Park, the AFL & MCG**

The announcement of a new stadium in the Docklands precinct had a significant impact on sport stadiums across Melbourne, including two large stadia; the MCG and Waverley Park. The Docklands Stadium, as an inner-city venue, was in direct competition with the MCG for sports and entertainment events; in particular, concerns were raised by those associated with the MCG about the impact the agreement between the Docklands Authority and AFL would have on revenue for the MCG (Smith, 1997; Timms, 1997). In addition to concerns that the Docklands Stadium would decrease the MCG’s revenue, the belief that the AFL would relocate to the Dockland Stadium led to a number of news articles predicting the closure of the AFL-owned Waverley Park (see Connolly, 1997a; Poulter, 1996; Smith 1996; Timms, 1996).

In 1962, the then Victorian Football League (VFL) purchased 200 acres of land, 20 kilometres South East of Melbourne’s CBD (see figure 9.1), in the City of Monash, and opened Waverley Park football ground in 1970 (Hay, Haig-Muir & Mewett, 2000). The site was selected by the VFL because it was predicted that the City of Monash would soon become the demographic centre of Melbourne, as urban sprawl occurred. One purpose for the VFL building its own stadium was to give the League “an independent source of revenue, because apart from the [Melbourne Cricket Club-controlled] MCG, local municipalities controlled all the other VFL grounds” (Hay *et al*., 2000, p. 160). This source of revenue enabled the VFL to “break the shackles of the ground managers and the MCC [Melbourne Cricket Club] Trustees over the income of football” (Hay, Haig-Muir, Lazenby, Lewis, 2001, p. 5). Because all revenue from game days at Waverley Park went to the VFL – unlike the agreement with the MCG in which only a portion of revenue was received by the VFL – it was repeatedly argued that Waverley Park should host the lucrative Grand Final (Hay *et al*., 2000).
In order to protect the MCG, Labor Premier John Cain threatened to introduce legislation to ensure the football Grand Final would remain at the MCG (Cain n.d.b; Hay et al., 2000). While legislation was not introduced, the threat encouraged a 40-year agreement between the Victorian Government, government-appointed MCG Trust, Melbourne Cricket Club and (now) AFL, signed in 1991 to ensure a minimum of 45 games are played at the MCG including the Grand Final each year (MCG, 2014a). In return, the AFL was given increased revenue from gate receipts and additional area of the MCG for
its members. Cain explained that a private organisation should not be subsided through the public purse:

Well they [AFL] made it clear that their footy ground out at Waverley Park … was to be the centre of [AFL] activity. They weren’t going to play the finals at the MCG. The contract was running out I think in ’85 … So they said that the government should provide public transport out to Waverley which was then a desolate far eastern outpost. And so that the footy could be played [at Waverley Park] they wanted trains and trams and so on. And I just said to them, very clearly, that that is not in our priorities. We’re not the servicer of a professional sporting venue with resources that can be better applied elsewhere for other sectors of the community. And I said … you’ve got the best – arguably one of the best sporting grounds in the world located at the doorstep of the city. So the MCG is where it should be. (J. Cain, personal communication, April 16, 2013)

Furthermore, in his unpublished manuscript *The Melbourne Cricket Ground – The Last Decade*, Cain explained that the MCG was the ‘people’s ground’ and therefore the government had a role to ensure it remained the centre of sporting activity:

I was firmly of the view that a city of Melbourne’s size could only afford to sustain one top grade stadium. The MCG was not a top grade stadium but it should be. Secondly, as both my father and Sir Henry Bolte who was then Chairman of the [MCG] trustees had said to me on several occasions the MCG was the people’s ground. They both said it should be preserved as such and the Government of the day had an obligation to take whatever steps were necessary to see that it was. I thought they were correct. (Cain, n.d.b, p. 6)

As such, the State Government intervened significantly to ensure that Victoria’s most iconic sporting event would take place in central Melbourne, rather than in the outer-eastern suburbs.

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202 This agreement has since been amended; the Grand Final will now be played at the MCG until 2037 and AFL clubs will receive addition gate-revenue (MCG, 2014b). In addition, the state government agreed to invest $30 million to upgrade the AFL members section of the Great Southern Stand and $6 million towards a water-saving project.

203 Interestingly, Waverley Park was also referred to as the ‘people’s ground’ during the ‘Save Waverley’ campaign as it was situated in the demographic centre of the Melbourne and therefore was most accessible to ‘everyday’ Victorians (see Hay, Haig-Muir, Mewett, Lazenby & Lewis, 2001).
Despite the MCG having a minimum quota of matches, the Docklands Stadium was still viewed as significant competition to the Melbourne Cricket Club and MCG Trust (Timms, 1997). The Melbourne Cricket Club (as operators and developers of the MCG) claimed that the new stadium would delay plans to rebuild the Northern Stand of the MCG (Timms, 1997) – which could impact the 2006 Commonwealth Games bid. Indeed, the state government was conflicted in this sense, while having a vested interest in the MCG through the MCG Trust, the state government also viewed the Docklands Stadium as an important component of the 2006 Commonwealth Games bid. Furthermore, if a successful bid for the Commonwealth Games occurred, the government would be able to justify the use of tax-payer funds to upgrade the Northern Stand of the MCG (see Alomes, 2000; Chessell, 2000). As such, the state government supported the Docklands Stadium as a key component for the Games bid but the government-appointed MCG Trust and Melbourne Cricket Club opposed the development. Current AFL Chairman, Mike Fitzpatrick expressed that:

…to be frank, the MCG ran a bit of a campaign on it, so they basically, spent a fair bit of time just bagging it to the press, so that was interesting. I didn't really quite realise why, but the reason for that fundamentally was when Waverley was built, when it was first built, their [MCG] waiting list went to zero. So that's been seared in their minds that, you don't want to have a competing stadium … They [MCG] really bagged the place … they didn't stop until they got the approval to do the Northern Stand [in 2002]. (M. Fitzpatrick, personal communication, April 9, 2013)

Notwithstanding Fitzpatrick’s claims that the MCG ‘bagged’ the Docklands Stadium to the press, both papers appeared supportive of the stadium; with football commentators acting as ‘stadium boosters’ (Zwartz, 1999). Stadium support from the Herald Sun was unsurprising as News Limited – the paper’s owner - was part of the Docklands Stadium Consortium. While the MCG held concerns about the financial implications of Docklands Stadium, the main concern for the public appeared to be the impact the stadium would have on Waverley Park.

Although many media reports in 1996 and early 1997 stated, with certainty, that the AFL would play matches at the Docklands Stadium and close down Waverley Park, no formal agreement existed between the AFL and Docklands Authority for matches at Docklands until March, 1997 (Connolly, 1997b; Nicholson, 1997). Indeed, the AFL refrained from signing a contract with the Docklands Authority until it was agreed it could gain “complete, or part, ownership of the stadium” (Rados, 1997, p. 1) at some point in the future. It was only once future ownership of the stadium had been promised to the
AFL that a contract was signed. The contract involved the AFL supplying a lump-sum payment of $30 million to help with building the new stadium (Connolly, 1997b); in addition, the AFL would play a minimum of 30 games a year (Searle, 2002). In return, the AFL would have scheduling priorities at the stadium and receive its freehold in 2025, rather than the stadium being transferred to the state government as originally planned (Connolly, 1997b; Nicholson, 1997). Rugby league officials, still in negotiations to locate a team in Melbourne, expressed disappointment at the deal with both the Super League and Australian Rugby League organisations stating that they would not have their scheduling bullied by the AFL if they brought a team to Melbourne; therefore neither expressed continued interest in locating a team at Docklands (Howell, 1997). The stadium, originally proposed because the ‘rectangular’ football codes required a venue, was quickly appropriated by the incumbent and pervasive football code of the state.

Shortly after signing the contract with the Docklands Authority, the AFL announced its intention to sell Waverley Park in order to generate the $30 million required for Docklands Stadium (Fate, 1997). Both sides of government proclaimed their wish to keep Waverley Park in operation; Premier Kennett however stated that there would be no government intervention (Coffey & Timms, 1997). Organised resistance to the closure was evident in the form of the ‘Save Waverley’ campaign, led by the Greater Dandenong Council. ‘Save Waverley’ campaigners advocated for AFL matches to continue at the

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204 Indeed, the absence of AFL at Waverley Park was rather symbolic of the national expansion and ground rationalisation agendas of the Australian Football League (see Andrews, 2000). Operating as the ‘local’ Victorian Football League (VFL), blockbuster matches were scheduled for Waverley Park and the MCG while suburban grounds across Victoria hosted the remaining VFL fixtures to continue traditional links between the clubs and their local communities. Under the ‘national’ AFL, matches are spread across Australia and those games in Victoria now largely take place at either the MCG or Docklands Stadium. As such, the construction of Docklands Stadium and redevelopments to the MCG has resulted not only in the ‘death’ of Waverley Park but also the gradual demise of many suburban ‘home’ grounds in Melbourne.

205 The Mayor of Greater Dandenong, in a letter to the *Herald Sun*, accused the AFL of being “seduced by the city-centric policies of the Kennett government” (Long, 2000, p. 19) and ignoring “the suburbs, where most football supporters live” (Long, 2000, p. 19). Advocates for retaining Waverley Park claimed that the state government had not done enough to support the venue with public infrastructure such as public transport (Niall, 1999). Proponents of Waverley Park’s closure argued that the ground was poorly designed, causing traffic chaos and spectator exposure to the elements (wind and rain) (see Hay, Lazenby, Haig-Muir & Mewett, 2002). Others expressed that the AFL’s move away from the suburban Waverley Park to the urban Docklands Stadium was symbolic of a new corporate culture within the sport (Zwartz, 1999; Alomes, 2000)
ground as it served as an important community site for Melburnians living in the Eastern suburbs (see Hay et al., 2001).206

Premier Jeff Kennett announced the 1999 state election in the same week as the final AFL game at Waverley Park. The potential closure of Waverley Park continued to remain a popular topic of public discussion, as such, Labor leader Steve Bracks pledged to save Waverley Park as part of his Party’s election campaign (Brown, 1999). In response, the AFL expressed that the future of Waverley Park was in their control, not the government’s (Brown, 1999). While Labor won the election, the promise to save Waverley Park was abandoned. One year after the election the Liberal party claimed that Labor had used the issue for political gain and minimal endeavour to save the park was exercised; claiming the Labor government had only meeting with the AFL twice to discuss Waverley Park (Buivids, 2000).

Despite failing to convince the AFL to continue scheduling matches at Waverley Park, the Greater Dandenong Council continued to resist the sale of the venue. As such, a report was commissioned to detail the cultural and heritage significance of Waverley Park in the hope that it would be heritage listed (Thompson, 2000).207 The AFL expressed disappointment in the Council’s actions and stated that through heritage listing, the AFL would be unable to sell the Park in order to fund the $30 million investment into Docklands Stadium, as a result the AFL would have to borrow money and pay-off potential interest charges (Rielly, 2000) which could lead smaller profits being distributed to the clubs – some of which were reliant on payments from the AFL for survival (Munro, 2000). While the heritage listing delayed the sale of the park, forcing the AFL to borrow funds and pay interest charges on the loan, Waverley Park and the surrounding land was eventually sold for $110 million in 2001 (Keenan, 2001). The Dandenong Council was successful in heritage listing the oval and grandstand (Smithers, 2000) which is now used by Hawthorn Football Club for training purposes.

206 Prior to the decision of the AFL to schedule games at Docklands Stadium, the Greater Dandenong Council had requested that the government upgrade transport facilities to Waverley Park and called for the AFL to increase marketing of games at Waverley Park (Barnes, 1997). Meanwhile, letters to the Herald Sun expressed that Waverley Park was never given the opportunity, by the AFL, to succeed through lack of investment (James, 1997) and lack of big games (Newman, 1997).

207 See Hay et al. (2002) for a discussion on the heritage listing of Waverley Park. Also see Heritage Victoria (2014) for the heritage listing report.
Rectangular Stadium - announcement

The original rationale for building Docklands Stadium was to serve as a home for the rectangular football codes of soccer and rugby league. However, the oval design was more suited to, and ownership strategically prioritised, Australian rules football. The Melbourne Victory Football Club (soccer) predicted and achieved large crowds during the 2004 inaugural A-League season, prompting it to select Docklands Stadium as its home venue. The Melbourne Storm rugby league club, with a smaller fan base, opted for the 18,500-seat Olympic Park as its base in 1998 and continued to use Olympic Park after Docklands Stadium had opened. The catalyst for discussions of a publicly-funded upgrade to Olympic Park or construction of a new rectangular stadium (near the Olympic Park stadium, one kilometre from Melbourne’s CBD) to suit the football codes of soccer, rugby union and rugby league occurred in 2004 when the Super Rugby competition announced that a Super 14 rugby union franchise could be offered to Melbourne.

The Super Rugby competition, played between clubs from South Africa, New Zealand and Australia announced that it would expand from 12 to 14 teams for the 2006 season. One of the additional teams would come from Australia, sparking a bidding competition between Perth and Melbourne for the rights to the franchise. As part of the Melbourne bid, Premier Steve Bracks announced that the state government would commit to a $100 million re-development of Olympic Park (Fuller, Paxinos & Lynch, 2004), contributing $70 million of tax-payer money along with $30 million provided by the Melbourne and Olympic Parks Trust (obtained through borrowing, ticket sales, stadium naming rights, sponsorship and tenancy). Bracks stipulated that the re-development was contingent on Melbourne securing the Super Rugby team; however Sports Minister Justin Madden explained that a smaller re-development would be examined if the bid failed (Fuller, Paxinos & Lynch, 2004). The Herald Sun was critical of Bracks’ statement that any investment was conditional on the success of the Super 14 bid, expressing that the codes of soccer and rugby league were more deserving of a stadium than rugby union, specifically rugby league with the News Limited owned Melbourne Storm – News Limited also owns the Herald Sun – having invested financially and culturally into the city of Melbourne over the past six years (‘Play fair’, 2004). John Brumby, treasurer at the time, explained that the Super 14 bid was the catalyst but, importantly, many influential Victorians were rugby supporters who encouraged the government to construct the rectangular stadium:

208 The Melbourne Storm played their home games at Docklands Stadium for the 2001 season after high average attendances in 2000; but returned to Olympic Park in 2002.
So really it [Rectangular Stadium] came about as part of the Super [14 Rugby] ... which we thought we’d bid for...And there’s a lot of rugby people in Melbourne. Yeah, we got Melbourne Storm [rugby league] but there’s a lot of [rugby] union people as well, particularly business opinion leaders. They’re all fanatics on rugby union ... So there’s quite a lot of community support, from opinion leaders, for a stadium where you could play rugby. (J. Brumby, personal communication, September 11, 2013)

MOPT CEO, Brian Morris, explained that the government needed to financially justify the stadium; “at the time there was a substantial examination of the need for the stadium and obviously the cost; whether the cost was appropriate” (Personal communication, August 30, 2013). *The Age* and *Herald Sun* informed the public that a Super Rugby team would generate $14 million of economic activity per year, thus vindicating any tax-payer funds used for the construction (Fuller, Paxinos & Lynch, 2004; Stevens & Mickelburrough, 2004). However, despite the government’s financial commitment to a prospective stadium, the Australian Rugby Union (ARU) announced the selection of Perth as the location of the Super Rugby team in December 2004 (Fuller, 2004).

The news that Melbourne would not have a Super Rugby team for the 2006 competition failed to prevent both *The Age* and *Herald Sun*, along with politicians from both sides of government (see Mickelburrough & McRae, 2004; Smith, 2004), advocating for a re-development of Olympic Park; despite Premier Bracks’ earlier claims that a re-development was contingent on the success of the Super Rugby bid. *The Age* expressed that as the nation’s sports capital, rugby would have flourished in Melbourne and the stadium should still be built for the football codes of rugby league and soccer:

> [The Government’s] $70 million commitment was contingent on Melbourne hosting a Super 14 team. This is regrettable. For a start, soccer-playing Victorians of all ages vastly outnumber rugby players. Second, in a city dominated by oval grounds, players and supporters of non-AFL codes have for too long had to settle for second best – the original promise of Telstra Dome [Docklands Stadium] as a multi-purpose stadium has failed to eventuate. (‘A lost opportunity’, 2004, p. 8)

*The Age* explained that the ARU believed Perth had a greater ‘connectivity’ to the sport of rugby than Victorians did (Fuller, 2004). Perth was also viewed as having a large British ex-pat population which engaged with rugby (‘Super 14 showdown’, 2004). In addition, Perth was viewed as a good ‘stop-off’ location for teams travelling to, and from, South Africa for matches in the geographically wide-spread competition (‘Super 14 showdown’, 2004).
Unsurprisingly, the Herald Sun confirmed their believe that the other football codes, particularly the News Limited owned Melbourne Storm rugby league franchise, were more deserving than rugby union, as they have demonstrated loyalty to the state:

Curiously, the Bracks Government was using the rugby union pitch as a prerequisite for funding an upgrade needed by several other long-suffering sports…The Olympic Park plans suggested the Government has plenty of spare cash. Now the ARU has turned its back on the state, the Government should bestow it on sports that have been loyal to this state. (‘Getting us offside’, 2004, p. 18)

Four months after Melbourne had lost the bid for a Super Rugby franchise, Labor Premier Steve Bracks announced that a $100 million stadium would be built for the rectangular football codes (‘Labor kick’, 2005; Lynch & Paxinos, 2005).

John Pandazopolous explained that the stadium reflects the ‘acceptance’ of these football codes in Victoria:

There was an acceptance that finally other forms of football have emerged in Victoria; and they need to have a good place of their own…with the state becoming more culturally diverse, and with the nature of more regular movement of people, so you’re now getting a lot of Northerners moving down here for work, professional reasons, immigrant countries with a culture of rugby and soccer – overtime that market will grow. (J. Pandazopolous, personal communication, April 17, 2013)

Pandazopolous’ assessment that professional migration created a demand for the rectangular sports illustrates a consequence of adopting an economic strategy aiming to attract skilled labour to the city. The Victorian government and civic boosters have, since the 1980s, repackaged the city from a production/manufacturing site into a site for consumer activity that makes the city more ‘liveable’ and thus attractive to the mobile capital (see Hall, 2000; Hall & Hubbard, 1996; Schimmel, 2001; Shaw, 2005; Zukin, 1998). In order to attract and retain external labour, the provision of leisure for this diverse workforce is needed.

Continuing, Pandazopolous explained that the demand for the foreign football codes was partly created, or enhanced, by government-supported events:

The A-League was formed, and rugby league came to Melbourne. They weren’t getting any Major Events funding but we’d supported, of course, some big international events that helped create some of the branding opportunities around building momentum around the strategies; around an
A-League comp and around a NRL [National Rugby League] comp. (J. Pandazopolous, April 17, 2013)

Indeed, some of the events that occurred prior to the new stadium being built included the 1997 and 1998 Bledisloe Cup rugby union matches at the MCG (Fuller, 2005),210 a 2001 British and Irish Lions rugby union match at Docklands Stadium, numerous international football matches (for example, against France and Uruguay at the MCG 2001), seven Rugby Union World Cup matches in 2003 (Johnson, 2002) and, State of Origin rugby league matches in 1994, 1995, 1997 and 2006 (Smart, 2014).211 While the government did not necessarily ‘buy’ these events, tax payer resources were used for policing, extra transport and marketing; as such, the state essentially championed these sports as being of value to the citizens of Victoria.

Despite stadium approval from newspaper editors, some resistance was evident from the public; a reader of The Age questioned why tax-payers were subsidising professional sports – referring to the stadium being built for the Melbourne Storm and Melbourne Victory – when these franchises should be building their own stadium (B.M. King, 2005). Meanwhile, published letters in the Herald Sun highlighted the need to increase spending on health, education and public transport rather than sporting infrastructure (see Ireson, 2005; Mason, 2005).

**Olympic Park/Gosch’s Paddock – the eviction of athletics and public recreation from the sports precinct**

The announcement of a new Rectangular Stadium, rather than an upgrade to the Olympic Park stadium, led to changes in the Olympic Park/Gosch’s Paddock sports precinct. The new stadium was to be located at Edwin Flack Oval with Olympic Park to be demolished once the new stadium was completed (see figure 9.2). In order to acquire Edwin Flack

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210 This was a VMEC venture although no payment to the Australian Rugby Union took place. Since the 1997 match the Victorian Government has paid the Australian Rugby Union rights fees in order to host other international rugby union matches (see Fuller, 2005)  
211 State of Origin matches in Melbourne have become more regular and in 2012 the state government reportedly offered the Australian Rugby League $12.5 million to host a match each year for 5 years (Honeysett, 2012) and in 2014 Premier Napthine confirmed that two matches at the MCG will take place between 2015 and 2018 (Parliament of Victoria, 2014)
Oval, the government needed to re-accommodate Collingwood Football Club (AFL) which had a long-term lease to use the oval as a training ground.\textsuperscript{212} In September 2005 *The Age*

\begin{figure}[h]
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\caption{Edwin Flack Oval in 2006 (AMMI Park, n.d.).\textsuperscript{213}}
\end{figure}

revealed that ‘confidential documents’ recommended the government “by-pass council and public objections and approve a revamp of the sporting and park precinct in South Yarra that included Gosch’s Paddock and the Edwin Flack Oval” (Millar, 2005a, p.1). The documents expressed that the Collingwood FC would be given the public parkland area of Gosch’s Paddock number one ground for training purposes (see figure 9.2). The MCC voiced concern “about the potential loss of parkland if Collingwood and other clubs were to turn a public park [Gosch’s Paddock] into training facilities” (Millar, 2005a, p. 1). Collingwood President, Eddie McGuire expressed desire to be given the Olympic Park site – to the west of Edwin Flack Oval - once the old stadium was removed as it was closer to the Collingwood Football Club’s headquarters at the Melbourne Sports and Entertainment Centre (MSEC);\textsuperscript{214} “We’re not going east: we’re going west. We will be

\textsuperscript{212} Collingwood FC had a 25-year lease at Edwin Flack Oval and therefore the government, in breaking the contract, was liable to provide Collingwood FC with a new training area that was, according to the contract, no further from the MCG than Edwin Flack Oval (Millar, 2005a).

\textsuperscript{213} A small part of Olympic Park to the left, and Gosch’s Paddock to the right, can be seen

\textsuperscript{214} The Melbourne Sports and Entertainment Centre (built as the 1956 Olympic swimming venue) had been occupied by the Collingwood FC and the Victorian Institute of Sport. In 2002, $13 million
making sure we are not the only ones going backwards in this deal” (cited in Millar, 2005a, p. 1).215 At the time, the Melbourne Storm rugby league team was the only elite football team using Gosch’s Paddock for training – training on Gosch’s Paddock number two ground (see figure 9.3).

Later in 2005, in an article entitled ‘State set to hand over public parkland’, The Age journalist Royce Millar outlined concerns the MCC had for the Olympic Park/Gosch’s Paddock area:

In a sweeping planning amendment, the Government has sought to ease the way for Collingwood and possibly Melbourne [AFL] football clubs to use Gosch’s Paddock, near Olympic Park, for training and to promote sponsors … Melbourne City Council has warned that Melburnians will lose more parkland if they do not fight to defend it … Last week the Government fast-tracked planning for the rugby and soccer stadium, declaring it a project of state significance; assumed planning control of Gosch’s Paddock to build two training grounds; and lifted the prohibition on commercial advertising, despite council protests. (Millar, 2005b, p. 3)

of taxpayer funds was used to refurbish the centre for Victorian athletes (Baker, 2009); however Collingwood FC is now the sole occupier of the facility.

Gosch’s Paddock is slightly further away from the MCG than Edwin Flack Oval, meaning the Olympic Park site was the only site that met the stipulation that Collingwood FC not be relocated further from the MCG.

Figure 9.3: Olympic Park precinct in 2007 (adapted from Googlemaps, 2013)
With the stadium declared as a project of state significance, the government was able to ‘fast-track’ development and planning procedures. At this time, Gosch’s Paddock was under the control of the Melbourne City Council; however the MCC had a history of being more conservative than the government with permitting development on public parkland (D. Bethke, personal communication, April 11, 2013). As such, the wheels were put in motion to make an amendment to the Melbourne & Olympic Parks Bill to shift control of Gosch’s Paddock to the MOPT (Parliament of Victoria, 2007c); a body more favourable to commercial activity. Significantly, this resulted in arrangements with elite football clubs to train on Gosch’s Paddock, ultimately reducing public access to this public parkland.

A further article by Millar in December 2005 outlined the loss of parkland around Melbourne as a result of elite sport:

In a 1990 letter to the Melbourne City Council, then premier John Cain promised that as compensation for the tennis centre land grab, a three-hectare army depot in nearby Gosch’s Paddock would be converted back to parkland. That letter and the promises are long forgotten. And for the good of a sport-crazed city, the Bracks Government is now preparing to build a rugby league and soccer stadium on the spot. (Millar, 2005c, p. 13)

Continuing, Millar expressed that the preferential treatment of land-use shown to elite sport in Melbourne was not a new development but greater demand for sporting space was transpiring:

The arrival of the two codes has put a squeeze on Aussie rules, which has had a long and privileged place in Melbourne’s parkland history, occupying prime spaces and paying peppercorn rents on Crown and council land across the city. To make way for the new soccer stadium the Government has had to find training space for Collingwood, and maybe Melbourne [AFL], football clubs – on the remaining bit of Gosch’s Paddock on Punt Road. (Millar, 2005c, p. 13)

Millar encapsulates the powerful actors at play in re-defining how public land is used. In a city which strongly identifies with sport, and governments that have valued and supported elite sport, the defined purpose of large pockets of public land has gradually shifted towards professional sports.

By 2006, plans for the stadium to be sited at Edwin Flack Oval and Collingwood FC to train at Gosch’s Paddock number one ground during the construction of the new stadium had been confirmed (Wilson, 2006); however, contest over what would happen with the Olympic Park site continued. Collingwood FC expressed a desire to turn the area into its training ground while advocates for athletics valued the site’s history (Warner,
in particular John Landy stopping mid-race to assist the fallen Ron Clarke before winning the 1956 National mile event and the stadium’s significance as a training venue for the 1956 Olympic Games. Despite complaints from the athletics community, *The Age* reported in 2008, that Collingwood FC had been granted exclusive use of the Olympic Park site (see figure 9.4) and the Victorian Institute of Sport, Athletics Australia and Athletics Victoria would all be moved to a $50 million state-funded redevelopment of Lakeside Stadium at Albert Park (Gleeson, 2008).

![Figure 9.4: Artist impression of the completed Olympic Park precinct](adapted from Major Projects Victoria, 2014b)

*The Age* later reported that documents obtained by the paper showed that Collingwood FC had had private discussions with the government regarding the occupation of Olympic Park while other sporting codes were not consulted (Baker, 2009). Furthermore, *The Age* insinuated that government and athletics connections to Collingwood FC had secured the best deal for the professional football club at the expense of the Victorian Institute of Sport and Athletics community; referring to Premier John Brumby as “a passionate [Collingwood] Magpie fan” (Baker, 2009, p. 1), highlighting Eddie McGuire’s dual role as Collingwood FC president and board member of Athletics.

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216 Eddie McGuire, arguably in a conflict of interest in his dual roles as President of Collingwood FC and director of Athletics Australia, stated a desire to have a new athletics stadium built at Gosch’s Paddock in addition to permitting Collingwood FC to acquire the Olympic Park site (see Millar, 2005a).

217 The football pitch was also significant in that it was the first Australian soccer pitch recognised by FIFA (Austadiums, 2013).
Australia and, informing readers that Athletics Australia president, Rod Fildes is a former Collingwood FC player (Baker, 2009; ‘Black-and-white’, 2009).

Claims of political favouritism towards Collingwood FC were later dispelled by Anne Lord, president of Athletics Victoria in 2012. Lord explained that Collingwood FC was not the perpetrator in the move; rather it was the Melbourne and Olympic Parks Trust that forced Athletics out of Olympic Park (Gleeson, 2012). Lord explained that the MOPT “wanted a tenant that could pay” (cited in Gleeson, 2012, p. 16) the rent for the site, Athletics “was more a participant sport, than a spectator sport” (cited in Gleeson, 2012, p. 16) and with limited funds could not meet the requirements of the MOPT. As a government Trust, the MOPT is required to run, in effect, as a business; generating income from its tenants and events. However, MOPT CEO Brian Morris explained that the transfer of athletics to Albert Park was a government decision but supported the move as benefiting the Victorian public:

The decision … to rebuild new facilities for athletics at Albert Park under the auspices of the State Sport Centre Trust…was a state government decision and it enabled the Trust [MOPT] to create a new piece of parkland…To me it’s an enhancement of our recreational and open space obligations. (B. Morris, personal communication, August 30, 2013)

Morris’ assertion that open space was created is questionable. The Olympic Park site is officially defined as public open space where previously it was a closed stadium; however this has simply replaced Edwin Flack Oval which was previously public open space and is now a closed stadium. Moreover, the definition of public open space is fluid, as the Olympic Park site is closed to the public whenever Collingwood FC occupies the area for training.

State government intervention in the Olympic Park/Gosch’s Paddock area is significant. The Labor government essentially turned Olympic Park into a pseudo-public park which is defined as ‘open’ to the public for recreational use only when Collingwood FC – a private club - are not training on the ground. Likewise, Gosch’s Paddock has essentially become a venue for elite sports training with the Melbourne Storm, Melbourne Victory and Melbourne Rebels rugby union teams having priority use of the number two ground; the public can use this public parkland only when it is not occupied by these professional football clubs. Furthermore, Gosch’s Paddock number one, as feared by the MCC in 2005, has become the training ground for the Melbourne Demons AFL football club after Collingwood vacated the ground for Olympic Park in 2012 (Brown, 2013).

In addition to this prioritising of elite sport use on public parkland, the government evicted three not-for-profit sports organisations (Victorian Institute of Sport, Athletics
Australia and Athletics Victoria) from the area, compensating them with a redeveloped Lakeside Stadium at Albert Park; at a cost of $50 million to the taxpayer (Baker, 2009). Premier at the time, John Brumby explained that Olympic Park was in need of replacement but acknowledged the opposition by athletics and need to ‘soften’ resistance with financial compensation:

We looked at Olympic Park where you could just do it up and restore the facility there; restore the running track and all of that. When we went through that you just – you couldn’t remotely justify it. It was just in such tired condition and technology and tracks and electronic equipment and things have moved on so much so the difficult, but right, option I think was the one we took which was to move Athletics Victoria … So was everybody rapt with that? No. People like John Landy weren’t rapt with that. We put some more money on the table … so we put another 12 million [dollars] on the table, I think, to assist with that facility or soften the blow. (J. Brumby, personal communication, September 11, 2013).

The decision to build a rectangular stadium for professional football clubs in the codes of rugby union, rugby league and soccer was represented as symbolic of Melbourne’s acceptance of a diverse sporting interest in the city. However, in providing an entertainment space to watch rectangular football, the state government – through its pseudo-governmental department the MOPT – has essentially downgraded the public’s use of open space in the Olympic Park/Gosch’s Paddock area behind the needs of professional sport.

**Rectangular Stadium - construction**

The design details of the Rectangular Stadium were released to the public on April 7, 2006. Both *The Age* and *Herald Sun* informed the public that the stadium would seat between 20,000 and 25,000 people at an estimated cost of $190 million of which the state would contribute $149 million – significantly higher than previous estimated costs (Ker, 2006d; Mickelburgh, 2006). Labor Premier Steve Bracks explained that the government “wanted to meet the needs of the two football codes [rugby league and soccer]” (cited in Mickelburgh, 2006, p. 5). In addition, Bracks asserted that “the venue would become a signature part of the city’s sporting infrastructure” (Lynch, 2006, p. 15). Opposition spokeswoman for Major Projects, Louise Asher, neither confirmed nor denied support for

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218 In addition, Bracks’ expressed that facilities within the stadium would meet the needs of other Victorian athletes (Mickelburgh, 2006). The facilities include an elite training gym, gymnasium, lap pool and office space (MOPT, 2013b).
the stadium but warned the public not to expect the stadium to be completed on schedule due to the Labor government’s “poor history on completing projects on time” (Mickelburgh, 2006, p. 5).

A Herald Sun editorial, on the day of the stadium’s announcement, hailed the new stadium as “a winner” for the “sporting capital of the world” (‘Spoilt for sport’, 2006, p. 24). The following day, The Age editorial supported the construction and location of the stadium, which would complement existing sports infrastructure and the rectangular football codes; however The Age did voice concerns about transport access and possible congestion on game days (‘Thinking outside’, 2006). The subsidising of professional sports teams was again questioned in letters to The Age (Robertson, 2006) and Herald Sun (Scotts, 2006); letters also suggested alternative options for government spending – roads, public transport, hospitals, health, education and environment (see Christiansen, 2006; Johnson, 2006; Knox, 2006; Martin, 2006). One reader also questioned the priorities of the Labor government; “Premier Steve Bracks has a warped sense of the role of government. It seems he is happy to lavish money on the circus of sport while the fundamentals of our community continue to diminish” (Robertson, 2006, p. 10).

With the location and design of the new stadium confirmed, the Melbourne and Olympic Parks Trust, as operator of the stadium on behalf of the state, now needed to contract tenants. The Melbourne Storm (rugby league) franchise agreed to play games at the stadium and the Melbourne Demons (AFL) located their club administration within the stadium. Significantly, as a construction which the state justified as vital for soccer, the MOPT needed to sign the Melbourne Victory Football Club as a tenant. However, at a size of 20,000 the stadium was regarded as too small for the Melbourne Victory that was achieving large average home attendances.

During negotiations between the MOPT and Melbourne Victory, The Age reported that Melbourne Victory and the Football Federation Australia were putting pressure on the state government to increase the stadium capacity to 30,000 (Ker, 2007). A threat from Major Projects Minister Theo Theophanous to seek a second A-League franchise for

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219 For example, the average home attendance in the 2006-07 season was nearly 28,000; including a match played in front of 56,000 at Docklands in September, 2006 (Football Federation Australia, 2011).

220 The government was restricted in approving a larger stadium due to the contract with Docklands Stadium stipulating that a stadium of similar size could not be built near Melbourne’s CBD. On the one hand, the government had helped create demand for soccer by hosting major soccer matches; on the other hand, the government’s contract with the owners of Docklands Stadium limited the size of the Rectangular Stadium; therefore reducing the appeal of the venue to the Melbourne Victory Football Club.
Melbourne to play home games at the Rectangular Stadium was quickly dismissed due to an agreement between Football Federation Australia and Melbourne Victory which meant a second team could not enter the competition until the 2010-11 season at the earliest (Harrison, 2007; Whinnett, 2007b). After the government agreed to increase capacity to 30,500 at an additional cost to the tax payer, the Melbourne Victory signed a deal to play some games at the Rectangular Stadium, but to play at least five ‘blockbuster’ games predicted to achieve high attendances at Docklands Stadium (Lynch, 2007). The construction cost for the stadium had now increased to $268 million (Lynch, 2007) from the original $100 million estimate (Fuller et al., 2004).

As briefly explained earlier, in order to ensure that the construction of the stadium was completed on time, new Labor Premier John Brumby announced that the state government would strip the Melbourne City Council of planning control of the Olympic Park/Gosch’s Paddock sports precinct (Parliament of Victoria, 2007c; Whinnett, 2007c). The removal of responsibility from the MCC to the MOPT was required, in part, to ensure that elite sports teams could use Gosch’s Paddock for training purposes. The Herald Sun explained that the three tenants of the stadium (Melbourne Storm, Melbourne Victory and Melbourne Demons) were concerned that the MCC would only grant three-year training permits for Gosch’s Paddock; the government, still in negotiations with the clubs to base themselves at the Stadium, empowered control of the land to the MOPT who offered 21-year training permits (Whinnett, 2007c). A media release from James Merlino, Minister for Sport and Recreation, explained the six tracts of land in the sport precinct were managed by various organisations, the amended bill would allow the MOPT to manage the entire area to “provide stronger long-term protections for the preservation, management and retention of public open space – particularly at the popular Gosch’s Paddock” (Premier of Victoria, 2007). Merlino’s comments that the MOPT is better equipped to manage the area may well be correct; with greater financial resources than the MCC, Gosch’s Paddock was redeveloped by the MOPT in 2009 (MOPT, 2013a). However the public’s access to this open space has diminished with greater demand for Gosch’s Paddock for elite sports training.

The stadium and land was now managed by the MOPT and the Melbourne Storm, Demons and Victory were all to be tenants. In May of 2008, Football Federation Australia proposed increasing the number of A-League teams from eight to twelve, possibly with an additional team from Melbourne (Lynch, 2008). The Melbourne Heart (now Melbourne City) football franchise was announced on the June 12, 2009 to enter the competition for the 2010-11 season and would play the majority of its home games at the Rectangular Stadium (Silkstone, 2009a). The MOPT now had four confirmed tenants for the stadium; with one more about to arrive.

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In 2009, SANZAR (South Africa, New Zealand, Australia Rugby), the governing body of Super Rugby, decided to expand the competition to fifteen teams. The Australian Rugby Union (ARU) nominated Victoria as a candidate state for the fifteenth licence. Melbourne was issued the fifteenth Super Rugby licence ahead of the South African based Southern Kings franchise after much debate within SANZAR (see Melbourne Rebels, n.d.). The Victorian Rugby Union, backed by wealthy media magnate Harold Mitchell, was awarded the licence by the ARU and entered the Melbourne Rebel’s – Australia’s first privately owned rugby club - into the Super 15, naming the Rectangular Stadium as their home ground.221 The Age used the news of the new stadium tenant to congratulate the ‘risk’ taken by the Brumby government to build the stadium for the rectangular football codes; “[the stadium] began life with just two residents and with the Brumby government hoping hard for two more. With the expansion of the A-League and yesterday’s news [announcing the Melbourne Rebels], the gamble had paid off” (Silkstone, 2009b, p. 5).

One year later, after the official launches of the Melbourne Heart football club and Melbourne Rebels rugby league club, The Age reconfirmed its support. The Age explained that the addition of these professional sports teams to Melbourne was further evidence of Melbourne’s claim to being a sporting capital and voiced support for the government’s strategy to use sport for economic activity; “State support for the clubs and a purpose-built rectangular stadium is justified by the experience that sporting activity generates economic activity” (‘Sporting capital’, 2010, p. 16). As such, the capital associated with the ‘sport city’ brand appeared to partly justify the construction of a new stadium.

Shortly after the launching of the Melbourne Heart and Rebels football clubs, the state government announced the decision to further financially support sport in the city by helping to fund a re-development of the MCG’s Southern Stand. In explaining that the state would add $30 million to the $25 million provided by the Melbourne Cricket Club to upgrade the Southern Stand, “[Premier] Brumby admitted that he had been under pressure from AFL figures after funding the rectangular stadium” (Brodie, 2010, para. 12). AFL Chairman, Mike Fitzpatrick explained that the AFL had felt the rival football codes, in a competitive market, were being assisted by the government:

We were very disappointed with AAMI Park [Rectangular Stadium] … the AFL in the end has funded, and unlucky equity funded, Etihad [Docklands

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221 Originally the licence was awarded to the VicSuper15 consortium (Smith, 2008), but after the ARU declined to give VicSport15 a $4.3 million grant (Ella, 2010) the licence was awarded to the Victorian Rugby Union.
Stadium. When you cut through it, without footy the MCG wouldn’t be there, no matter what they think [MCG Trust, Melbourne Cricket Club, state government]. I guess, our main competition … the rugby sports and soccer, basically just got a total freebie with AAMI Park … it’s not exactly a level playing field. (M. Fitzpatrick, personal communication, April 9, 2013)

Therefore the government’s decision to support the growing appeal of the rectangular football codes in Melbourne resulted in $30 million compensation to the MCG – to the advantage of the AFL – rationalised by the necessity to have an impartial government conducive to generating a competitive environment; a key criteria for a neoliberal state.

Conclusion
The Victorian state government has played a central role in the shifting sportscape of Melbourne through its urban entrepreneurial agenda. During the 1980s, Labor Premier John Cain made it clear to the VFL (now AFL) that the government would not provide public infrastructure to the privately owned Waverley Park. In addition to declining financial and planning support for Waverley Park, the Cain government intervened by threatening to introduce legislation to ensure the AFL Grand Final was always played at the state-owned, urban MCG. In marked contrast to Cain’s assertion that the government should not be a ‘servicer of a professional sporting venue’, the Liberal-National Coalition government of the 1990s actively promoted and financially supported the privately-owned, centrally located, Docklands Stadium.

Kennett’s Liberal-National government initially claimed that public funds would not be used for the Docklands venture. However, with a lack of interest by the private sector to develop the area, the Kennett government ‘invested’ tax-payers funds to provide necessary infrastructure (roads, bridges, telecommunications) for the area in an attempt to raise its appeal to private developers. In addition to providing infrastructure, crown-land was essentially given away to a private developer to build a football stadium which would ultimately compete with the MCG.\(^{222}\) Furthermore, the pseudo-government Docklands

\(^{222}\) Further government intervention occurred in 1998 when Kennett restructured the MCG Trust. The restructure involved decreasing the number of Trustees from twenty to seven (see Melbourne Cricket Ground (Amendment) Bill 1998). This was, according to Jeff Kennett, needed because “the 20-member Trust needed to be streamlined to make it ‘more proficient’ and able to compete against other sporting venues such as the Docklands” (Linnell & Gibson, 1998, p. 5). Ex-premier John Cain argued that the new structure silenced public representation on the Trust (Linnell, & Gibson, 1998). This restructuring clearly illustrates Kennett’s neoliberal philosophy centred on an ideology of competition creating efficiency.
Authority brokered a deal with the AFL which will result in the transferring of the stadium to the AFL in 2025, rather than to the state government.

A further decade later, the government (and MOPT) promised a $100 million carrot to upgrade or build a rectangular stadium in an attempt to acquire the licence for a professional rugby union franchise. Despite failing to win the licence, the government proceeded with the rectangular stadium – at a final cost of $268 million. In an attempt to make the stadium profitable, legislation was passed to strip the Melbourne City Council of control of land in the sports precinct so that the MOPT could offer long-term training leases, at Gosch’s Paddock, to four professional football clubs (Melbourne Demons, Victory, Storm and later the Rebels) to ensure these clubs would locate themselves at the Rectangular Stadium. Meanwhile, three not-for-profit sports organisations were evicted from the sports precinct and compensated with a publicly funded athletics stadium in Albert Park.

The methods adopted by the Kennett government and Docklands Authority to attract private developers to build, own, operate and then transfer the Docklands Stadium illustrates the neoliberal philosophy embraced by a government attempting to implement a market-driven model of urban development to reposition the city as a place for ‘footloose capital’ and tourism. The success in attracting the external labour that is attached to this ‘footloose capital’ created a demand for, or acceptance of, the rectangular football codes in Melbourne. As such, the state government constructed a new urban football stadium, in the process dislocating non-profitable sporting codes from the city and redefining the purpose of public parkland in favour of professional football training over the recreational activities of the Victorian public.
Chapter 10: The sport city as a cultural artefact

The aim of this chapter is to take the reader through each element of the circuit of culture. du Gay et al. (1997) present a theoretical model to examine the biography of a cultural artefact based upon the articulation of five major cultural processes or 'moments': production, representation, consumption, identity and regulation. As explained in chapter 4, the production phase involves examining how an artefact is technically or physically created; representation entails the practice of meaning-making through signs and language; consumption occurs through the contested reception of meanings and usage of the artefact; identity is constructed as consumers contest the meanings and values of the artefact and finally; regulation comprises of controls (and freedoms) on the cultural activity. In doing so, I reflect upon the four case studies by illustrating clear links and deviations that have served to (re)produce, (re)present and regulate the 'sport city', which in turn is consumed and encoded with a unique identity. While du Gay et al. (1997) assert that there is no beginning or predetermined direction in which the circuit operates; I have selectively initiated this discussion with the production of the ‘sport city’ to then show how this produced artefact has been (re)presented to a local and global consumer for consumption. Following an analysis of the consumption of the artefact, I discuss the ‘sport city’ identity and conclude with the manner in which the artefact has been regulated.

Production

This section outlines the production of Melbourne as a sports city. It not only involves building infrastructure and securing events, but also involves reimagining the city as a sport precinct. This is done by focussing on government strategies and the operations of pseudo-government authorities (P-GA), and explaining how they are used to encode the city as a sporting destination. The conflicting relationships present through the encoding process are also outlined.

Formalising the sport city

John Pandazopolous, a Victorian Labor MP for over 20 years, encapsulated the (re)production of Melbourne as an official ‘sport city’:

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223 While a media portrayal of Melbourne as a ‘sport city’ is important in the production of the ‘sport city,’ I have left this discussion for the representation section of this chapter. Furthermore, I acknowledge that an architectural analysis of the sportscape would add to an examination of the production of the ‘sport city’ (for example, the manner in which stadiums have been built with commercial interests in mind) and suggest this in future studies of the production of the ‘sport city’.

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We were a sport city way before we realised we were a sport city. But having a tag of a major event helps make it easy for us to go and reinvest in, say, all the reinvestments [that have] gone into Melbourne Park in recent times as part of an attempt to maintain the Australian Open…It makes it a lot easier for the public then to accept that expenditure versus putting it into schools or hospitals or another road. (J. Pandazopolous, personal communication, April 17, 2013)

Pandazopolous, a politician centrally involved in the struggles and contests within the bureaucratic field, illustrated the consequence of producing the ‘sport city’ as a legitimate identity; that is, the sporting label permitted further investment at the expense of alternative public needs. Pandazopolous expressed that sport has occupied a significant space in Melbourne’s history, but in recent times, this significance has been formalised symbolically and economically through government policy and structure – specifically the creation of the Victorian Major Events Company (VMEC), a P-GA tasked with luring major (sporting) events to the city.

This formalising process, or legitimising of elite sport as a resource worthy of public expenditure, was expressed clearly in the Labor governments *Victoria: The Next Step* (1984) economic strategy. Dr Peter Sheehan, Director General of the Department of Management and Budget which was assigned the responsibility to produce *Victoria: The Next Step*, explained that:

> We were just looking for aspects or characteristics of Victoria in general, Melbourne in particular, that could be the foundation of long term competitive growth in an international context … I think that [sport] was identified fairly early as a long-term competitive strength. (P. Sheehan, personal communication, April 4, 2013)

Continuing, Sheehan explained that the use of sport, rather than for wellbeing, was selected as “an economic driver, [to] bring people, or bringing industries, or bringing the development and sale of services” to the state (P. Sheehan, personal communication, April 4, 2013). The document itself issued an embracement of private enterprise with the government re-positioned as the manager of public resources with an overall aim to “promote and stimulate private sector investment and employment” (Holmes, 1995, p. 11). Holmes (1995) explains that reforms of government in the 1980s led to the administration of public utilities being directly accountable to a Minister; previously these utilities had

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224 This economic emphasis supports the assertion of Pye, Toohey and Cuskelley (2015) that limited social benefit planning has been undertaken by governments seeking to create ‘sport cities’. 
operated at ‘arm’s length’ of government. Public utilities such as electricity and water were “instructed to operate on modern business lines, and required to contribute a 5% social dividend to consolidate revenue for community welfare” (Holmes, 1995, p. 5). The government, Holmes (1995) argued, was functioning as a corporation. The blueprint of “Cain Labor Incorporated” (Holmes, 1995, p. 11) relied on a Keynesian approach of selecting key areas for capital investment which would yield economic returns and employment for the state. As such, *Victoria: The Next Step* outlined Labor’s vision that (re)presented the state government as the facilitator of public-private projects which had predicted strong growth prospects (Holmes, 1995).

By selecting sport as a competitive advantage, the Cain Labor government set in motion the legitimising of sport as a valid tool for economic investment. However, I reiterate that Cain’s decision to select sport as a cultural and economic tool did not occur outside of historical context; Melbourne has long had a strong sporting identity. Indeed, sport appears to hold a central role in the development of Melbourne culturally and physically (one only needs to view the city from above to note the pervasiveness of sports fields, ovals and golf courses). Certain sports events in particular, the Melbourne Cup horse racing carnival, Australian rules football Grand Final and Boxing Day Test (cricket), are often held-up as being of significant importance to the cultural fabric of the city. As such, these sports are the cultural glue, or stamp of sporting legitimacy, to which subsequent events (The Australian Open Tennis Championships, Formula One Grand Prix, A-League Football (soccer), Super 15 Rugby Union and National Rugby League) have been attached.

**Myth-making**

The sense of sporting history and nostalgia associated with Melbourne has been used by some interest groups to justify, or legitimise, recent sporting events and infrastructure. Berlatsky (2003), employing Kundera and Spiegelman’s notions of individual and collective memory advancing political interests, discusses history as ‘memory as

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225 This is particularly so when viewing the satellite image on googlemaps and following the Yarra River to the North-East of the CBD.

226 The Melbourne Cup is promoted as ‘the race that stops a nation’ and is an official public holiday (see Flemington, 2014). Cusack and Digance (2009) discuss the place of the Melbourne Cup in contemporary Australian identity-formation. The MCG is regarded as the ‘spiritual home’ of Australian rules football and Cricket in Australia (MCG, 2014c; Visit Victoria, n.d.a).

227 I include the A-League in this list of ‘new’ sports due to the former NSL competition being viewed as an ‘ethnic game’ and largely ignored by Australia’s media; as Hallinan, Hughson and Burke (2007) explain, “soccer at the club level has failed the test of ‘Australian-ness’” (p. 284).
forgetting’. Because memory cannot incorporate all truths, collective and individual memory is a form of selecting some truths and forgetting other truths. Furthermore, collective memory involves the selecting and editing of reality which often allows narratives of events to serve specific political interests. Likewise, Gee (2009) refers to Roland Barthes’ (1957) definition of myths as “partial truths of fictions which give emphasis to particular versions of reality and not others” (Gee, 2009, p. 582).

The production of the ‘sport city’ has relied on remembering certain events while forgetting others. For example, the representation of Albert Park as the ‘home’ of the Australian Grand Prix by the Herald Sun, based on the event being held at Albert Park twice in the 1950s, illustrates the construction of nostalgia to serve political and commercial purposes. In the lead-up to the first event, the pro-Liberal Herald Sun, an avid promoter of the GP, published a number of ‘souvenir lift-outs;’ all laden with commercial advertising. A number of articles in these lift-outs reflected on the two previous GP’s at Albert Park with specific focus on the historic association between the park and motorsport (‘The GP returns’, 1993; also see Edmonds, 1993; Harris, 1993; ‘It won’t be a picnic’, 1993;). Furthermore, the ‘memory’ of Albert Park as a Grand Prix circuit was recollected many times by the media, politicians and those with a vested interest in motorsport during the build-up to the first race in 1996 (see Harris, 1994; ‘Is Albert Park the wrong site’, 1994; Tennison, 1994b; ‘Formula for excitement’, 1996; Harris, 1996). This positive memory of previous events occurred despite a successful political, media and community campaign in the 1950s to remove motorsport from Albert Park as it was deemed an unsuitable activity (environmentally and audibly) for an urban public park (see Costigan, 1996).

Likewise, in attempts to prevent the Australian Open moving to the National Tennis Centre in 1988, some commentators advocated for the event to remain at its ‘traditional’ home of Kooyong (Lasry, 1985; Leaman, 1985) despite the Open having only been permanently located at Kooyong since 1972 (Foenander, n.d.). Meanwhile, the Olympic Games and Commonwealth Games bids were both sold to the public on the basis of memories of a successful 1956 Olympics which were represented as an excellent investment of tax-payer funds that had left a positive legacy on the urban environment and psyche of Victorians (‘Hopes ride’, 1990; ‘Melbourne off the blocks’, 1996; Murphy, 2006). Media and political discussions of the economic and cultural conflicts that occurred prior to the 1956 Olympic Games (see Davison, 1997; Magdalinski, 2000) were absent.

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228 Also see Osmond (2011) who uses Barthes (1957) definition of myths as partial truths.
throughout the bidding process for the 1996 Olympic Games and 2006 Commonwealth Games.229

**Pseudo-government authorities & public consultation**

The case studies presented in this thesis commenced with a focus on the construction of the National Tennis Centre, however Pandazopolous expressed that it was the 1996 Olympic Games bid which accelerated the (re)production of Melbourne as a ‘sport city’:

> It started basically, to resonate a lot more in the Atlanta 1996 Olympics bid. We lost that, we didn't want to use all this IP, the intellectual property that we'd actually learned about ourselves at that period of time, which actually helped us move from the rust-belt reputation. Kennett took it and made it his own, even though it started earlier than that. (J. Pandazopolous, personal communication, April 17, 2013)

The ‘it’ that Kennett took, was the idea that sport could be used as an urban entrepreneurial tool to reshape Melbourne as a space to locate footloose capital. Meanwhile the public investment into sport as a tool to create a prosperous urban environment was formalised with the founding of the VMEC, which, through the symbolic power that the state holds to declare organisations ‘official’ (Bourdieu, 1989), immediately became a legitimate P-GA.

The VMEC was set-up as an apolitical P-GA, developed to operate at arm’s length of government. However, as Cain explained, these P-GAs have tended to operate *under government control*:

> Most of those bodies are run by government-appointed committees under an Act of Parliament … and government influence/direction is there to be used if they want to … Autonomous bodies like the MCG Trust and the Melbourne and Olympic Parks Trust, they are beholden to the government, not just for money, but they can be directed and governments … don't do it with a

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229 Davison (1997) highlights the overall benefits of the 1956 Olympic Games to Melbourne but explains that a number of struggles were evident, such as political struggles over the use of public funding and conflict between the ‘traditionalists’ and ‘modernisers’ over the purpose of the Olympic Games and the effect the Games would have on Melbourne culture. Magdalinski (2000) explains that “the 1956 Olympic organizers were confronted with a range of problems, including the threat of losing the Games, boycotts, post-colonial struggles and Cold War politics. The ‘war on the water’ between Soviet and Hungarian water polo players, the Egyptian boycott and other more ‘unsavoury’ elements have been all but erased from the popular Australian remembering and reconstruction of 1956” (p. 316).
Indeed, Cain’s use of the term ‘osmosis’ is rather apt for describing the hegemonic process of coercion and consent by, and within, the state nobility (Bourdieu, 1998c). As Bourdieu (1998c) explains, a number of social struggles within the bureaucratic field illustrate “the revolt of the minor state nobility against the senior state nobility” (p. 2). That is, the Left hand of the state (minor state nobility) opposing the Right hand of the state. However, the capital rich Right hand of the state, under neoliberalism, is able to determine the direction of the ‘game’ by constructing (consciously and subconsciously) a social reality that ‘naturalises’ the market. As such, the perceived process of ‘osmosis,’ rather than a sledgehammer, occurs as the neoliberal state regulates the market to suit the interests of the urban elite.

While Cain explained that the government was in a position to direct these apolitical authorities, it is of further concern that specific individuals, with vested interests, were able to influence the vision of these P-GAs. In the next chapter I discuss the role of Ron Walker as a central figure propelling the production and regulation of the ‘sport city’.

The production of the sportscape occurs through power struggles (Bale, 1996) rather than a one-way process of actions and decisions directed from the political and urban elite. In many modern democratic societies, public consultation or some sort of public involvement in large-scale projects or laws is common practice; although not necessarily a key trait of democracy. While it appeared that the citizens of Victoria were consulted on many major projects; the consultation process often seemed ineffective or simply symbolic of a declaration that public involvement has occurred during the decision-making processes.

In developing the Victoria: The Next Step economic strategy, Dr Peter Sheehan (personal communication, April 4, 2013) explained that public consultation did not occur until after the strategy had been released to the public; that is, the 10-year vision for the state was produced by the government with the public to be involved in consultation during the implementation of this vision. However, an advisor to the Cain government (Anonymous, personal communication, October 5, 2012) explained that the economic

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230 Also see Bourdieu (1996) for a more in-depth discussion of the state nobility; most notably the role of education in reproducing the power (as well as habitus) of the state nobility.

231 Indeed, the Victorian government includes a specific webpage outlining projects and topics in which the public are requested to provide opinion and suggestions (see State Government of Victoria, 2014)
strategy involved some consultation prior to public release, but this was limited to Union
groups and the business community. Indeed, these are two key stakeholders in the Labor
Party which benefit from keeping close ties to the government.\textsuperscript{232}

In the first case study of this thesis, I explained that the National Tennis Centre
was built on public parkland. This occurred at a time when the state government was
being praised for conservation. However, Economou (1992) has argued that the Cain
government had an \textit{ad hoc} urban environmental planning process in contrast to a
systematic consultative regional/rural conservation strategy. Indeed, the National Tennis
Centre serves as an example of this \textit{ad hoc} approach to urban planning with only
moderate consultation with the public and environmentalists, which became a point of
criticism by environmental groups and the Liberal Opposition (Hogan, 1984; Clarke &
Slamet, 1985). Despite some criticism of the National Tennis Centre, John Cain was
praised for his overall consultative approach to governance (Considine & Costar, 1992);
Jeff Kennett however was widely criticised for his authoritarian style.

Cahill and Beder (2005) claim that the Kennett government replaced consultation
with persuasion; choosing to spend funds on promoting its vision through advertising
campaigns rather than seeking public opinion (also see Lowes, 2004). Kennett explained
his philosophy of governance was about output:

Once the government decided to so something we governed. We weren’t
elected to form committees. People have the right every three or four years
to throw out the government if they don’t like what they’re doing. (J. Kennett,
personal communication, May 6, 2013)

In addition, the Kennett government in keeping with its ‘free market’ approach employed a
strategy of putting projects out to tender and subsequently employing a P-GA to suggest
recommendations to the government. Kennett outlined his government’s approach:

When we decided to building something … we invariably put it out to a public
competition … we accepted the decision of the expert committee … So
when I say we had no consultation, we governed but we tried to employ the
best people around us to actually do the work and make a lot of the
decisions. (J. Kennett, personal communication, May 6, 2013)

The definition of ‘public’ here is interesting. While Kennett explained that a public
competitive tender was employed, arguably it is only a limited section of the public – and

\textsuperscript{232} The Unions tend to provide funding and electoral support (as well as supply delegates and
influence pre-selection) (Harkness, 2012; Victorian Labor, 2014) while the business community is
also influential in financial support and denouncing or advocating government success through the
media.
indeed more likely to be private corporations – that had the economic and cultural capital capable of entering the process. As such, it appeared that the Kennett government accepted the expert panel’s voice as a sufficient substitute for public consultation. Indeed, Winter and Brooke (1992) argue that P-GAs in Victoria serve to exclude the public from the decision-making process.

Public involvement in determining the official evolution of the ‘sport city’ during the 1990s was amorphous as evidenced by the redevelopment of Albert Park to incorporate a Grand Prix racing track. Deputy Premier Patrick McNamara, responding to criticism by the Labor Opposition regarding public consultation of Albert Park redevelopments, explained that the first draft of the Albert Park plan – released for public comment prior to the Grand Prix announcement in December 1993 – was in essence the opportunity for the public to express their opinion on Albert Park (Parliament of Victoria, 1994b). The lack of consultation by previous governments also appeared to be used by politicians to quell any criticism of plans for development. McNamara claimed the Opposition was hypocritical in their argument for greater public consultation about Albert Park:

Melbourne's bid for the 1996 Olympic Games featured a plan by the former government to develop a $250 million sporting centre at Albert Park in place of the historic South Melbourne Cricket Ground and surrounding parkland ... The opposition's suggestion that community consultation should have occurred before the announcement of the grand prix is therefore not only unrealistic but smacks of absolute hypocrisy. (Parliament of Victoria, 1994b, p. 413)

A decade earlier, John Cain had likewise claimed hypocrisy of the Liberal Opposition’s criticism of public consultation when constructing the National Tennis Centre by expressing that the Liberal Party, when in power, had planned to use Flinders Park as a site for an Olympic Games bid without consulting the public (‘Cain accuses Opposition’, 1985). As such, failures by previous governments to consult were subsequently used as justification for the sitting government’s absence of public consultation.

Marginalising dissident voices
Finally, the process of public consultation itself appeared flawed as decision-makers and community groups seemed to enter the activity with preconceived animosity of each other. For example, Save Albert Park (SAP) president Peter Goad (personal communication, October 1, 2012) expressed his aversion towards both major political parties in response to their actions with the Grand Prix; “As far as we are concerned now, Labor is virtually the pits, just minimally above the [Ted] Baillieu [Liberal-National...
Coalition] government in terms of what we reckon a government or to be” (personal communication, October 1, 2012). Former Labor Premier John Brumby claimed that SAP were unwilling to negotiate (personal communication, September 11, 2013) while Jeff Kennett, initially by-passed the public consultation phase when locating the GP at Albert Park and subsequently implemented strict security measures to prevent public protest and protect private interests (see Lowes, 2004). In addition, Brumby explained that while consultation took place when selecting Royal Park as the site of the 2006 Commonwealth Games Athletes’ Village resistance groups were, and often tend to be, unwilling to compromise:

Well, consultation was a big part of what we tried to do. With the village it was a tender process obviously ... The local association didn’t much like it, Parkville Association or the Save Carlton residents or whatever they’re called…they don’t much like governments anyway. No matter what you do, they’re always going to oppose it and even if you do the right thing...they still want to get stuck into you; so some of these groups are difficult to consult with. (J. Brumby, personal communication, September 11, 2013)

Likewise, Dr Campbell Rose, CEO of the 2006 Commonwealth Games bid expressed that resistance from environmentalists and local communities was expected as “there’ll always be angst anywhere when you build a village of that nature” (personal communication, August 27, 2013). In an attempt to ‘listen’ to the local community, the Commonwealth Games Minister did allow one member of the RPPG to sit on the Commonwealth Games Community Liaison Committee for the Games Village. However, as the RPPG expressed at the time; “This is a complete misnomer as there are only 5 community representatives out of 24 who are mainly drawn from private enterprise and government departments” (RPPG, 2004, p. 1). As such, the structure of this public-private statutory authority (expert panel) appeared to favour private/commercial interests. Indeed, a number of scholars have illustrated the weaknesses inherent in the public consultation procedure which can often be skewed to support the interests of the urban and political elite (see Fishkin, 2006; Reid, 2013b; Scherer, 2011; Scherer & Sam, 2008).

Victorian state governments, over the past thirty years, have had limited consultation with the public regarding major sporting events and infrastructure. Despite previously being labelled the ‘Garden State,’ indicating a sense of identity with parks and gardens, the Victorian government has often located sporting infrastructure within public parks (for example, the National Tennis Centre in Flinders Park, Australian Grand Prix in Albert Park and 2006 Commonwealth Games Athletes’ Village in Royal Park). In order to justify this lack of consultation a number of arguments have been used; (a) key decision-
makers have expressed that a need to keep plans secret from rival states/nations is an important strategy in acquiring events (for example the Grand Prix), (b) previous governments have failed to consult the public sufficiently; therefore Opposition criticism is hypocritical and lacks legitimacy and, (c) the public are given a voice through apolitical P-GAs and ‘expert panels’. Limiting public involvement has aided the production of the ‘sport city’ which appears to largely be in the hands of the political and urban elite who have dictated a corporate vision for the state that serves the interests of decision-makers and their political allies.

The production of the ‘sport city’ has occurred by formalising sport, as an economic strategy and urban entrepreneurial tool, through P-GAs which, while established to operate at arm’s length of the government, appear to serve as a useful tool for government. Indeed, as outlined in each of the case-studies, a consistent trend was the by-passing of public consultation by P-GAs to permit urban development which supports major sporting events.

**Representation**

The representation moment of the circuit of culture, du Gay *et al.* (1997) explain, occurs through a complex process of meaning-making; particularly “through the use of signs and language” (p. 24). A number of strategies are adopted to make meaning out of an artefact through the representational process including the extension of existing meanings into new meanings (for example, sport as a leisure activity into sport as an economic tool) and the contrasting and comparing of the artefact to similar artefacts (for example, comparing Melbourne as a ‘sport city’ to Paris as a ‘fashion city’) in order to emphasis meaning (see du Gay *et al.*, 1997, pp. 24-25). In this section I initially explain the role of those cultural intermediaries who are central to the mean-making process through representations of the sport city. I then illustrate how these representations often support the political visions of the state before discussing the barriers faced by cultural intermediaries attempting to provide an alternative representation of social reality.

**Journalists: Cultural intermediaries**

Many of the values of the cultural artefact are shaped by cultural intermediaries (Bourdieu, 1984; du Gay *et al.*, 1997; Negus, 2002) such as journalists who occupy an important position in (re)presenting the ‘sport city’. However, as Bourdieu (2010 [1998])

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233 Swartz (1997) explains that “Bourdieu assigns a key role to cultural producers (e.g. artists, writers, teachers, and journalists) in legitimating the social order by producing symbolic capital through symbolic labour … Cultural producers mediate the relationship between culture and class,
argues, the journalist's capacity for autonomous production of news – or the representation of issues associated with the 'sport city' – is limited by 'the authorities, the government in particular … through their monopoly on legitimate information – government sources are the obvious example' (p. 66). In addition, Bourdieu (2010 [1998]) asserts that commercial media is restricted by audience ratings in the same manner as election polls dictate 'key issues'. Because audience ratings are the measure of success, if newspaper X produces an article which receives high readership, then newspaper Y is forced to produce a similar article to (re)gain its share of readership. This process ultimately results in a restriction of what can be said and how it can be said; what Shultz (2007) calls the journalistic doxa. As such, competition based on economic rewards (as a consequence of advertising revenue following high readership) tends to converge the opinion and representations within the journalistic field. Michael Gawenda, editor of The Age between 1997 and 2004, suggested that the construction of the news is a complex process involving journalist/editor agency, readership feedback and market research:

A newspaper is not just a reflection of what marketing tells you people are interested in. It's also about providing a journalism that our readers might not have thought about, might think they're not interested in, but in fact, we consider is important and is done in such an engaging way that it will engage our readership. So, it's a combination of sort; of what editor's think is important and interesting, what the marketing tells you our readership is saying and what readers' feedback is telling you in terms of what you're doing. (M. Gawenda, personal communication, September 13, 2013)

In addition to these complexities, the battle for audience ratings discussed by Bourdieu (2010 [1998]) must be included in discussions of media representation as rival or competing media sources shape what is 'newsworthy'.

Gawenda described the vision of The Age as being a liberal paper which aimed to service a market traditionally comprising of tertiary educated readers. This tertiary educated readership indicates the location of The Age within the journalistic field in comparison to the Herald Sun. The Herald Sun, a conservative newspaper with Australia's largest readership, is rich in economic capital (through advertising revenue and circulation income) whereas The Age holds more cultural capital; however, as a commercial newspaper with an emphasis on profits The Age is still relatively starved of cultural capital (see Benson, 2006). Indeed, the highly converged media in Australia (see Flew & Swift, 2013) has arguably resulted in limited opportunities for alternative media

between infrastructure and superstructure, by constituting cultural markets, or fields, that are vested with their own particular interests” (pp. 93-4).
voices, richer in cultural capital, to exist. As such, the journalistic doxa in Victoria is constrained and tends to (re)produce a commercialised discourse with those rich in economic capital shaping the journalistic field.

Sports journalist Greg Baum explained that while he felt there was no “compelling need to formalise Melbourne as a place of a sporting city … the way the world works is you have to market yourself and you have to create a place for yourself” (personal communication, April 11, 2013). In other words, there is a need to be ‘put on the map’. The place-marketing of Melbourne increased significantly during the Kennett years of government (1992-1999) in an attempt to (re)present the city as a place with a good business climate. Engels (2000) explained that the first step in Kennett’s ‘place promotion initiative’ was to reduce the budget deficit through spending cuts and privatisation, followed by modifying laws that could impede business transactions and, finally, upgrading physical infrastructure including cultural and entertainment facilities so that the city could be presented to a global audience through hallmark events. In order to achieve these aims, the government needed to ‘sell’ the benefits of undertaking such an approach to its citizens. It is here the media and journalists played an important role, as key cultural intermediaries, in providing the ‘cultural language’ to speak on behalf of the ‘sport city’ artefact (du Gay et al., 1997). As alluded to earlier, it is important to understand that the media does not operate freely from external forces; indeed the media is regulated (politically and commercially) and often encounters barriers through limited access to information. As such, representing the ‘sport city’ cultural artefact occurs through a complex process of presenting, arguing and selling information, knowledge and vision(s).

While I limit much of my discussion here to the Kennett-era of representing the ‘sport city’ due to the extensive place-marketing that occurred under his government, I do not wish to diminish the impact of the representation of the ‘sport city’ during the Cain/Kirner Labor governments prior to Kennett, or the Brumby/Bracks Labor and Baillieu/Napthine Coalition governments post-Kennett. Indeed a significant interaction – or lack of interaction - between cultural intermediaries and the political producers of the ‘sport city’ occurred during the 1980s when the Cain government, in what is widely believed to be a first, set up a centralised media unit to control or manipulate media

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234 Benson (2006) expresses surprise with the inattention by Bourdieu to highlight differences between United States print media and French print media as a result of French state intervention in the form of subsidies for newspapers with low advertising revenues which broadens the range of debate in the public sphere.
access to ministers (Harkness, 2013). Furthermore, my focus is on newspaper journalist’s representation to a Victorian market - the internal consumer of the artefact – but I also acknowledge that a deeper examination of the representation of the ‘sport city’ would occur through an analysis of television and online media in combination with print media, as well as tourism material and corporate advertising (for example, Crown Casino’s Grand Prix-related advertising) which is used to ‘sell’ the artefact externally. Such an undertaking was deemed too extensive for the scale of this research project, although I anticipate future research projects will focus on the impacts of these representation vehicles.

Supporting sports and politics
As illustrated through the four case studies of this thesis, the major Melbourne newspapers have, over the past thirty years, supported the formalised production of the ‘sport city’ through the VMEC and the associated acquired events which are deemed necessary to promote the city to a global audience, boost tourism revenue and increase ‘liveability’. Editorially, the Herald Sun and The Age have been avid supporters of major events – this is unsurprising considering the close relationship between corporations, major events and commercial media (Buist & Mason, 2010). Newspaper reports and editorials supported the development of, and upgrades to, the National Tennis Centre, claiming its importance in keeping the Grand Slam tournament in Melbourne and subsequent economic benefits associated with the event. Both papers supported the 1996 Olympic Games bid and encouraged the government to proceed with the planned development of city infrastructure despite the bid losing. Both papers also supported the 2006 Commonwealth Games bid, however The Age called for greater transparency over the costs of the event in light of criticism surrounding the cost of the Formula One

235 The Bracks Labor government, a former editor of The Age explained, also had a very detailed media strategy which limited journalist access to information (M. Gawenda, personal communication, September 13, 2013).
236 Buist and Mason (2010) express that as a benefactor of “expansionist urban policies, the local newspaper may skew reporting in favour of pro-growth initiatives, including stadium development” (p. 1494).
Grand Prix (GP). Furthermore, both papers declared the Commonwealth Games a resounding success and evidence of Melbourne’s claim to being the sporting capital of Australia; as well as proof of the government’s successful major events economic strategy.

The construction of new stadiums in close proximity to the CBD was supported by the media with both the Herald Sun and The Age championing the Docklands Stadium and the BOOT-model adopted by the Kennett government. Despite both papers raising concerns about the structure of the Docklands Authority and the lack of Melbourne City Council representation in the decision-making process, the overall discourse surrounding the docklands development – including the stadium – was that it would enhance the liveability of Melbourne. Likewise, the idea for the Rectangular Stadium received media support, specifically by the Herald Sun which has vested interests in the Melbourne Storm rugby league club. The Herald Sun and The Age espoused the economic benefits of hosting various professional football clubs in Melbourne which helped justify any public expense for the new stadium. Furthermore, an increased diversity of professional football clubs – specifically the introduction of the Melbourne Rebels rugby union franchise, addition of the Melbourne Heart FC (soccer) and the on-field success of the Melbourne Storm rugby league club – was evidence, according to both papers, of Melbourne’s status as a ‘sport city’. Indeed, the consistent claims of being a ‘sport city’ have served to legitimise this identity and thus help justify the use of public money to support the major sport event economic strategy.

Initially, editorials in both papers supported the acquiring of the GP as the ‘jewel’ in Melbourne’s major events crown. On the release of the Albert Park Master Plan in 1994, both papers reaffirmed their support for the GP by expressing that the event was driving the redevelopment of the park, despite claims from local activists that the plan was actually a recycled document with the addition of a GP circuit. However, shortly after,

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241 In addition to editorial support (see ‘Blueprint for ugly west end’, 1997; ‘This is the place’, 1996) Swartz (1999) argued that football journalists acted as stadium boosters.
244 See Fuller et al. (2004) and Stevens & Mickelburough, (2004).
247 See ‘At last, some facts’ (1994) and ‘Other sites’, (1994).
The Age began to critique the government’s lack of economic transparency associated with the GP contract and the cost of hosting the event. The Age made it clear that it supported the GP but described Kennett as politically arrogant and called for increased scrutiny of the costs and proclaimed benefits.248

Despite a continued reluctance by the government to disclose full information surrounding the costs of the GP, both The Age and Herald Sun congratulated the Brumby government for extending the GP contract in 2008, while further calling for full disclosure of the contract details.249 The recent extension to the GP contract in August, 2014 was again supported by the Herald Sun, with some reservations regarding the opaque economics.250 However, the contract extension appeared to be heavily criticised by The Age, with journalist Greg Baum (2014) questioning the inflated costs of the Melbourne event in comparison to the Montreal GP; meanwhile an article by Green (2014) appeared to sympathise with the SAP activist group.

Media scrutiny
Notwithstanding a lack of editorial criticism and the friendly media (re)presentation of public investment into sporting developments in Melbourne, a few media voices of resistance were transmitted. One voice of consistent criticism came from journalist Royce Millar, writing for The Age, who was critical of the loss of public parkland during the 2005 reshuffle of land in the sports precinct to accommodate the Rectangular Stadium and Collingwood Football Club at Olympic Park (Millar, 2005a; 2005b; 2005c). In addition, Millar provided vocal criticism about the use of Royal Park as a site for the Commonwealth Games Athletes’ Village (Birnbauer & Millar, 2002; Millar, 2003a; 2003b; Millar & Ker, 2005a). Also writing for The Age, Kenneth Davidson was highly critical of the public cost of hosting the Commonwealth Games and the major sports events strategy in general.251 While this resistance was present (in The Age at least), the overall media discourse supported and arguably justified the use of public money for elite sport infrastructure and events. Indeed, both papers often simultaneously announced a major event in unison with an uncritical proclamation of the economic benefits the event would insert into the state. In doing so, the media served to legitimise the use of public funds before a public debate could begin – of course, it is important to acknowledge the role of

250 See Rolfe (2014c) and Rolfe and Johnstone (2014).
251 See Davidson (2002; 2004; 2006)
the state in this legitimising process as these economic figures were usually provided by
government ministers or their spokespeople.

Discussing the role of the media, specifically with regards to the GP, Gawenda claimed that *The Age* had a responsibility to inform the public and rigorously scrutinise the benefits of major events (M. Gawenda, personal communication, September 13, 2013). Gawenda expressed that *The Age* had serious doubts about the value of the GP for Victorian taxpayers during the 1990s; however, the ability to critique the government and the heavily commercialised GP event was challenging. Gawenda stated that during his time as editor he felt there was pressure to support the GP:

> The pressure was coming from the government … Not that I ever got it directly, but I am fairly sure there would have been representations to the board and to senior management about *The Age’s* position on the Grand Prix … There was this view in the business community…that *The Age* was somehow anti-Melbourne and anti-business and anti the Grand Prix as a kind of knee jerk reaction to the Kennett government. (M. Gawenda, personal communication, September 13, 2013)

This ‘pressure’ that Gawenda discussed illustrates the way in which journalistic discourse and debate is controlled and limited. Furthermore, while journalists in Australia, Hanusch (2013) explains, politically tend to lean to the left of centre, those in senior editorial roles are more likely to lean to the right. As such, Hanusch (2013) states that research challenges the view that “journalists are merely a ‘bunch of lefties’, and suggests that those in positions of power in Australian newsrooms hold slightly more conservative views” (p. 39).\(^{252}\) Therefore, those political elites producing the ‘sport city’ – particularly during the Kennett-era – and the editorials representing the ‘sport city,’ appeared to support conservative politics and the free-market.

Seymour-Ure (2003) explains that a key weapon in the modern-day politician’s arsenal is the ability to control images and information. Indeed, Kennett, a co-founder of advertising company KNF, spent a lot time and resources controlling and manipulating his media profile (see Mayne, 2009). White and Economou (1999) assert that traditionally *The Age* has been an anti-Conservative newspaper, however throughout the Kennett period, *The Age* “never editorialised for anything other than a vote for the Kennett government” (p. 28). However, despite pro-Kennett editorials, articles within *The Age*

\(^{252}\) In addition, Hanusch (2013) explains that an overwhelming majority of journalists in Australia come from a white, Anglo-Saxon background and as such the worldviews and cultural backgrounds of Australian journalists are not representative of the general population. Also see the work by John Hillingham during the mid-1990s for a discussion of Australian journalists.
were often critical of the lack of transparency and probity of the government's affairs (Shamsullah, 1999; White & Economou, 1999). As a consequence, Shamsullah (1999) explains, Kennett endeavoured to bypass critical media outlets by giving privileged access to the tabloid Herald Sun. Gawenda, likewise holds the view that Kennett sought to control the representation of government by favouring “the Herald Sun in terms of leaking information and [cutting] The Age, and to a certain extend the ABC [Australian Broadcasting Corporation], out of that process” (personal communication, September 13, 2013). The monopoly over legitimate information was therefore used as a tool, by the Kennett government, in an attempt to manipulate a positive (re)presentation of political decisions and actions.

A further tool in the control of image and (re)presentation has been the use of media ‘buffers’. Gawenda and Baum explained that buffers were inserted between journalists and politicians in order to ‘spin’ minister and premier actions, block media access to key individuals and prevent media scrutiny:

There are teams of communications people between politicians and journalists who field calls, who try to spin what their ministers and the premiers are doing. (M. Gawenda, personal communication, September 13, 2013)

The buffers that have been put in place … those PR departments, Corporate Affairs departments or whatever you want to call them are now used to shield every organisation from any sort of inquiry. (G. Baum, personal communication, April 30, 2013)

In addition to media buffers, Gawenda cited the commercial contracts between the government and businesses as a barrier to journalist scrutiny; “there’s always these questions of confidentiality in terms of the business case, which makes it almost impossible for journalists to scrutinise” (personal communication, September 13, 2013). Continuing, Gawenda explained that “I think that all governments come to power promising more openness, but in the end, they’re not more open than their predecessors, in my experience” (M. Gawenda, personal communication, September 13, 2013).

From a politician’s point of view, John Pandazopolous explained the difficulties in full transparency, particularly when operating within a commercial environment:

I think…as a rule of thumb, you should [give out publicly] as much information…as you can that doesn’t disadvantage the state … We deal in the commercial world. Over time, I think you can ameliorate that by releasing - and we used to release - the contracts after a period of time … I really don’t think anyone wants to keep stuff secret, even my political opponents, I don’t
think really want to keep secrets, have secrets. I just honestly think that there’s good justifiable reasons why it’s done which is all about trying to benefit the state rather than negatively impact on the state, I mean, we do all this stuff to benefit the state. (J. Pandazopolous, personal communication, April 17, 2013).

Pandazopolous’ statement indicates that politicians have a desire to be open in their actions; however the structure of the bureaucratic field, which has been infused with neoliberal commercial mechanisms, prevents full transparency. I will discuss this further in the next chapter.

Overall, *The Age* supported the ‘sport city’ (re)construction of Melbourne but had concerns with the lack of political transparency and scrutiny in regards to the benefits of major events to the Victorian taxpayer:

> We had no problem with Melbourne being a sort of sporting capital of Australia, but, we wanted to know, we wanted to see what the price of that was going to be and whether it was worth having at the price that we would have to pay for it. (M. Gawenda, personal communication, September 13, 2013)

While no representative from the *Herald Sun* was willing to take part in this research, it appears from an analysis of *Herald Sun* articles and editorials that the newspaper was supportive of the formalisation of Melbourne as a ‘sport city’ and (re)presented the state’s urban entrepreneurial activities positively.

**Consumption**

As outlined in the previous section, media reports appeared to support the investment of public resources into producing sports major events and infrastructure. In order to verify public support for this investment, both *The Age* and *Herald Sun* often employed the strategy of using ‘vox-pop’ or ‘person on the street’ surveys – that is, asking passers-by their opinion on a specific topic, such as the location of a sports facility in a public park. In addition, each paper also conducted opinion polls, usually with a method of requesting readers to phone-in with a “yes, no, don’t know” response to a specific question; with results published the following day. Furthermore, ‘official’ attendance figures were often cited by journalists and government sources as evidence of public appeal. Finally, a number of letters to the editor were also published in order to illustrate individual opinions on current events. In this section I discuss the representation of consumption of the sport

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253 In the material collected, this ranged from asking five to nine people for their opinion.
city, the consumption of each case study and finally the rejection of the sport city by some consumers.

(Mis)representing consumption

The use of ‘person on the street’ surveys was a widely employed strategy by both *The Age* and *Herald Sun* to represent public opinion on contemporary issues and events. In most cases the representation of public opinion favoured government investments into sporting events and infrastructure; for example all eight people surveyed by the *Herald Sun* on the day of the announcement of the GP supported the event (‘Secret’, 1993); while six months later, seven out of nine supported GP plans (‘Voice of people’, 1994). An obvious limitation of using a ‘person on the street’ survey as a gauge of public opinion is the representative sample. Indeed the surveys produced by both *The Age* and *Herald Sun* had an overrepresentation of men which arguably illustrates a bias towards representing public opinion as pro-sport.  

Furthermore, the majority of participants appeared to come from an Anglo background. While street surveys were published as qualitatively presenting the public’s opinion, quantitative opinion polls were provided in an attempt to represent wider public view. I focus my discussion here on the Grand Prix as opinion polls were utilised more frequently by the media during GP debate than in the other three case studies analysed in this thesis. The polls produced to represent public views regarding the GP illustrate the potential for misrepresentation of public opinion when employing this method. In 1994 the *Herald Sun*, using a ‘person on the street’ survey presented seven out of nine Victorians as supporting the GP (‘Voice of people’, 1994), however a week later a poll of 400 Victorians concluded that 52% of the public supported the GP (‘Community split on prix’, 1994); highlighting the inaccuracies within the media’s approach to reflecting public opinion (Bourdieu, 1979). While the *Herald Sun* simply polled participants on their support for the GP, an opinion poll conducted by *The Age* during the same month concluded that 88% of Victorians supported the GP but few (32%) wanted it at Albert Park and many (68%) were unhappy with public consultation through the decision-making process (Schauble & Forbes, 1994). As such, the *Herald Sun* – a pro-Liberal Party newspaper –

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254 For example, see ‘Secret’ (1993) which surveyed eight people, four of which were men; ‘Voice of the people’ (1994) which surveyed nine people, seven of which were men; Murphy (2000) which surveyed six people, five of which were men and; ‘Voxpop’ (2004) which surveyed five people, four of which were men.

255 The surveys did not include ethnic identification but photos of the participants and names were included.
failed to represent a public that was concerned with the government’s actions surrounding the Grand Prix event. Furthermore, both papers, in using polls and ‘person on the street’ surveys as representative of public opinion failed to encapsulate the complex issues and broad public views that were present during the early development of the GP in Melbourne.

Bourdieu (1979), in questioning the use of opinion polls, explains that three implied assumptions exist; everyone has an opinion, all opinions have the same value and, there is prior consensus that the topic is worthy of opinion. Bourdieu argues that opinion polls serve the political and journalistic elites by imposing the illusion that a public opinion exists. Significantly, the illusion that all opinions are of equal value serves to reproduce the fallacy of the existence of democracy. As Bishop (2005) explains, in our complex society there are some individuals and groups which influence the decisions of administrators, legislators and policy makers more than others. Furthermore, the questions asked in opinion polls, according to Bourdieu (1979), reflect the interests of the political and journalistic elite and often further the interests of the elite by legitimising certain issues as being of more importance than others. In Victoria, the media’s use of opinion polls served to reframe and simplify debates surrounding the Grand Prix; that is, should it be held in Melbourne and where should it be held. Wider social questions regarding the government’s role in allocating public resources, the commercial use of public parkland, the lack of public consultation, the use of neoliberal security policies and, the denial of protester rights were largely ignored by the media when seeking public opinion. As Champagne (2004) explains, closed-ended questions frequently employed in opinion polls serve to misrepresent the full range of public opinion that may exist. Moreover, the common-sense use of opinion polls as representing public opinion, Bourdieu (1990b) argues, is often presented as ‘scientific’. The often biased formulation of questions and failure to allow all possible opinions to be expressed serves to limit public opinion and demote alternative political action. As such, polls are an instrument of political action which devalues “other means of group-making, such as strikes, demonstrations, or the very elections whose formally equalitarian aggregative logic they ostensibly mimic” (Wacquant, 2004, p. 7).

Official attendance figures were also produced and represented as evidence of public support for events. For example, The Sun stated that 70,000 Victorians gathered in the city to hear the announcement of the 1996 Olympic Games bid (P. Wilson, 1990b) and The Age asserted that 64% of televisions in Melbourne were tuned in to watch the 2006 Commonwealth Games closing ceremony (Ziffer, 2006). Questions regarding

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attendance figures surrounding the Grand Prix illustrate the problems in employing attendance as representative of public consumption. The Australian Grand Prix Corporation (AGPC) released estimated attendance figures each year, which include free tickets (Doherty & Gordon, 2008). Justifying estimated figures, the AGPC explained that the number of tickets given away was kept secret to avoid undermining the commercial value of the event which organisers claim is be the best-attended GP in the world (Doherty & Gordon, 2008). However, Save Albert Park (SAP) and Green Party MP Sue Pennicuik argued that reported figures were often exaggerated to serve the organiser’s interests of continued public funding and to sell the event to potential corporate sponsors. Furthermore, SAP condemned the media for uncritically accepting and representing estimated attendance figures as ‘official’. Indeed, this illustrates the monopoly of symbolic power the state and P-GAs have; the attendance figures released by the AGPC are represented as ‘legitimate’.

Reflecting public consumption: letters to the editor

Letters to the editor were largely critical of major sporting events, claiming a lack of transparency, inappropriate land use and more worthy alternative social welfare needs. The use of public funds for education, healthcare, housing, policing and transport were consistent suggestions across all four case studies as alternatives to the (re)investment of taxpayer money into sporting infrastructure and the acquisition of major sports events.

Few letters to the editor supported the construction and redevelopment of the National Tennis Centre with most letters critical of the costs involved. The use of parkland for an elite sport facility was also criticised by some during the construction of the facility; however as the Tennis Centre expanded in 1998 and 2009 there appeared to be minimal criticism of the further alienation of parkland. Indeed, the National Tennis Centre was often referred to as a ‘best case example’ for major events infrastructure, especially in relation to the Formula One Grand Prix. Certainly, Ron Walker, in an interview with The Age, questioned why Victorians were reluctant to support the GP while many embraced other major sporting events such as the Australian Open Tennis:

We still don’t know till this day why the grand prix is not as favourably embraced as the tennis and the [AFL] grand final and the Melbourne Cup [horse race], because we sell more tickets on a single-day basis than any of them…And of course, the biggest thing that we have is that it’s a free-to-air

257 This may support Smith et al.’s (2005) claims that letters tend to reflect extreme views and may be selected by editors to “exaggerate the portrayal of conflict in the arena” (p. 1196).
[television] event throughout the world, whereas the others are mainly cable. (Walker, cited in Green, 2012, para. 7)

Continuing, Walker cited the cost of the tennis centre at $935 million and Rectangular Stadium at $268 million as examples of how the public seemed to forget that $50 million per year for a GP was good value for money (Green, 2012). In response to Walker’s questions of the public, a number of letters to the editor explained that the environmental impact of the GP, secrecy surrounding contracts and disruption to the general public were reasons why the GP was not viewed favourably (see Gerrand, 2012; Hill, 2012; Hilton, 2012; Luxton, 2012).

Like the Tennis Centre, bids for both multi-sport events received positive media coverage and minimal criticism from the public; although the letters to the editor that were published suggested alternative public needs such as affordable housing, improved education facilities and healthcare. Because community support was a specific criterion in the judging of these multi-sport bids, a specific focus on harvesting public support was included during the bidding process. While the use of Royal Park as the site for the Athletes’ Village received some criticism in the planning years for the 2006 Commonwealth Games, issues such as not playing the British anthem; cleaning up graffiti to (re)present Melbourne to a global audience and the appropriateness of Aboriginal protests in a public park received greater public dialogue in the lead-up to the event. At the conclusion of the Games the majority of letters congratulated the organisers and particularly the volunteers for putting on the spectacle (Iyer, 2006; McDonald, 2006; Benney, 2006; Garick, 2006; Booth, 2006); arguably indicating that the event was well consumed by much of the Victorian public.

The Formula One Grand Prix has received mixed public opinion since it was first announced in 1993. Despite editorials supporting the GP, *The Age* appeared to present the public as opposing the GP while the *Herald Sun* presented the public as supporting the event (see Forster, 1993; Kemp, 1993; Morrell, 1993; Proud, 1993); this may be an indication of the political-leaning of the readership of these newspapers.\(^{258}\) While the 10,000 people that attended protests opposing the GP in Albert Park was evidence of strong public opinion against the event (Neales & Magazanik, 1994), a number of individuals were quick to claim that a pro-GP march would likely have received more than 10,000 people (Arnold, 1994; Pro GP, 1994). In addition, it could be argued that attendance figures over the GP weekend each year illustrated public appeal for the event.

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\(^{258}\) As previously alluded to, *The Age* is deemed to be a more liberal newspaper and the readership as such is more likely to be concerned with environmental issues than the more conservative *Herald Sun* readers.
Indeed, the AGPC, VMEC and politicians often defended the event by alluding to considerable local and international attendance; despite concerns of attendance accuracy raised by SAP and the Green Party. While early criticism of the GP focused on the lack of transparency with the GP contract and the absence of public consultation when determining Albert Park as the location for the event, more recent criticism shifted to the use of taxpayer’s money; particularly from 2004 when it was revealed that the GP was making an annual loss of over $12 million which has risen to a loss of over $50 million per year.

Notwithstanding some concerns regarding commercialism and privatisation, the Docklands Stadium largely received positive feedback from the public. Of greatest concern was not the Stadium itself but the impact the new stadium would have on the suburban Waverley Park football ground. Indeed, the Save Waverley campaign illustrated the manner in which some Melburnians – particularly those residing in the outer-suburbs of Melbourne – consumed the (re)focusing of the ‘sport city’ towards the CBD.259 That is, concerns were raised regarding the ‘death’ of suburban football (Zwartz, 1999) as well as the marginalisation of Victorians living and working outside of the CBD.

While Docklands Stadium raised concerns that private and corporate interests could dictate the sport of AFL; the announcement of the publicly-funded Rectangular Stadium led some to criticise the intervention of the government into elite sport and the public subsidisation of infrastructure for professional sports teams (B. M. King, 2005; Roberston, 2006; Scotts, 2006). Some public criticism of the eviction of athletics from the sports precinct to accommodate the Collingwood Football Club was also evident, however most criticism of the use of public parkland was left to journalists such as Royce Millar and Kenneth Davidson from The Age.

Regurgitating the sport city
Despite the media’s representation of public support for major events and sports infrastructure, organised resistance was evident in the form of campaigns by SAP, the Royal Park Protection Group (RPPG), Bread Not Circuses, and Black G.S.T. The use of local public parkland for elite (commercialised) sport was the main focus for resistance by SAP and RPPG while Bread Not Circuses – a multinational activist group – voiced concerns regarding the use of public money for multi-sport events which service the urban/political elite while failing to adhere to social welfare obligations. Meanwhile, Black

259 See Alomes (2000), Hay et al. (2000), Hay et al. (2001), Hay et al. (2002) and Heritage Victoria (2014) for further discussion on the Save Waverley campaign. Hay et al. (2001) explain that 30,000 Victorian’s signed petitions to preserve Waverley Park as an AFL football ground.
G.S.T. used the Commonwealth Games as a political platform to illustrate Aboriginal oppression.

Just prior to the 2006 Commonwealth Games beginning, Aboriginal rights protesters set up a fortnight-long camp in Kings Domain, an inner-city park, located close to the MCG and Government House where the Queen resided during part of the event (Holroyd & Ker, 2006). The camp, organised by Black G.S.T., labelled the Commonwealth Games the ‘Stolenwealth Games’ (Millar, 2006) and viewed the event as symbolic of the colonialism and oppression of the Aboriginal people of Australia and of other Commonwealth nations (see ‘Aboriginal anger’, 2006; ‘Stolenwealth Games’, 2006). Millar (2006) explained that on the same day that Black G.S.T. set up camp, the Government;

Introduced sweeping laws controlling behaviour in public parks, Docklands, the St Kilda foreshore and railway stations. Outlawed behaviour includes camping, defacing any Games structure or furniture such as chairs or tables, hunting animals and paddling in water…it will be an offence to ‘preach’, ‘declaim’, ‘harangue’ or ‘deliver any address’ that might disturb or annoy others. (p. 4)

Stan Winford, a Melbourne-based lawyer, expressed that “he feared [the laws] would be used to restrict people’s rights to protest and to ‘move on’ homeless people from public spaces” (cited in Millar, 2006, p. 4) and that some “regulations appeared to be aimed specifically at Aboriginal protesters” (cited in Millar, 2006, p. 4). While no arrests were made, the implementation of these laws exemplified the desire by the state to (re)present Melbourne as a ‘clean,’ corporate-friendly zone. In support of the protesters, The Age (‘At last’, 2006) and one reader of The Age (Toscano, 2006) condemned Australia’s reconciliation record with Aboriginal groups over colonial dispossession. Meanwhile, a letter published in the Herald Sun criticised the government for allowing camping in a public park (Rudelbach, 2006). This example of Aboriginal consumption, or regurgitation, of the ‘sport city’ illustrated some of the contests involved in constructing or (re)presenting a harmonious group-identity as well as the risks associated with using sports events to increase a state’s soft-power – its prestige or image (see Grix & Houlihan, 2014).

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260 The group aimed to highlight ‘Genocide, Sovereignty and Treaty’ (G.S.T.): genocide to be stopped, sovereignty to be recognised and treaty to made (see ‘Stolenwealth Games’, 2006). The Stolenwealth Games website also included a link to the ‘Graffiti Games’ – discussed briefly in Chapter 7 – illustrating the mutual support that some groups had when resisting the government and organisations associated with the Melbourne Commonwealth Games.
The main evidence of organised resistance came from SAP and the RPPG which both expressed similar goals of protecting public parkland from commercial development. Indeed, an attempt was made to coordinate resistance groups campaigning against the use of public parkland in the mid-1990s. The group ‘Hands Off Our Parks’ (HOOP) was created as an alliance of local lobby groups “inspired by the apparent increase and intensification of threats to public open space in the pursuit of profit” (Miller, 1997, p. 5). However, as SAP President Peter Goad explained, HOOP ultimately failed because individual lobby groups were too busy with the needs of their own community to support the campaigns being undertaken by other lobby groups (personal communication, October 1, 2012). Furthermore, the maintenance of resistance groups appeared to be a challenge. Goad explained that in 2002, when it became apparent the new Labor government would not remove the GP from Albert Park “there was a big split in SAP … because one section of the group felt that … the organising committee was too friendly or apologetic to Labor, and that resulted in a mass walk-out” (P. Goad, personal communication, October 1, 2012). In addition to this perceived favouritism towards Labor, despite the groups apolitical stance, Goad expressed that exhaustion caused many campaigners to depart the group; “in 2002, a lot of people thought, honestly I think they were burnt out it was so intense, you have no idea how intense it was. We had to have meetings in secret because we thought phones were being bugged” (P. Goad, personal communication, October 1, 2012). Goad’s revelations indicate the difficulties with challenging the powerful organisations, including the state, who advocate for development projects.

The focal argument opposing the ‘sport city’ was the use of public resources, specifically the use of parkland and tax-payer funds for commercial activities. The arguments presented within letters to the editors over the past thirty years expressed that the state’s role is to protect its citizens through the provision of education, healthcare, affordable housing and security as well as provide resources for economic growth; particularly a good transport network. While the investment in sporting events and infrastructure was viewed by some Victorians as subsidising the urban elite, the media has largely represented major events as benefiting the entire state.

**Identification**

The cultural artefact, du Gay *et al.* (1997) explain, is encoded with certain meanings during its production which is aimed at establishing identification. These meanings occur through the contests to (re)present and resist the ‘sport city’ as well as through the struggles involved in applying the government’s vision of the city space. In this section I
illustrate how the consistent use of the perceived status attached to being a ‘sport city’ was used to justify public investment into sporting events and infrastructure. In addition, I provide a discussion of the (desired) identity of each government and the encoding of the city – through valuing elite sport – as a space for commercial consumption. Finally, I outline some concerns in how the commercial media fails to accurately represent the diverse groups engaged in the (re)creation of the ‘sport city’.

‘The sporting capital’

When announcing the Docklands Stadium, Jeff Kennett expressed that it would cement the city as a sporting capital which would; “guarantee Melbourne maintains its position atop the world sporting event mountain well into the 21st Century” (Kennett cited in Barnes, 1996a, p. 23). On the opening of Docklands Stadium, the Herald Sun claimed that “Our new temple of sport and entertainment … has opened, cementing the role Melbourne has as the nation’s sporting capital” (‘New era dawns’, 2000, p. 20). Similar discourse was used in 2005 with rumours that a new stadium would be built for the rectangular football codes. The Herald Sun expressed that the new stadium would “cement the area as one of the world’s best sports and entertainment precincts” (Mickelburough, 2005, p. 1) while Melbourne Storm chief executive Brian Waldron stated that “In recent years our position as premier sporting state has been challenged and this commitment … will not only mean that we are the premier state, we’ll have the best sporting and arts precinct in the world” (cited in Mickelburough, 2005, p.4). On the announcement of the Rectangular Stadium, the Herald Sun claimed that “The sporting capital of the world is on another winner” (‘Spoilt for sport’, 2006, p. 24) while The Age cited Premier John Brumby as expressing that the new stadium “would cement Melbourne’s position as the sports capital of the country” (Lynch, 2007, p. 2).

Furthermore, the day after the opening of the stadium, the Herald Sun stated that “The only missing link in Melbourne’s already sound claim to being the sporting capital was bridged last night … our sporting precinct is unmatched – anywhere” (‘Sporting jewel’, 2010, p. 77). An article the same day cited Premier John Brumby as re-affirming Melbourne’s sporting identity and expressing that the new stadium “locked in that reputation” (Johnston, 2010, p. 5).

The diversity of the teams that use the stadium advanced claims by the media and politicians that Melbourne is a ‘sport city’. The Age celebrated the announcement that two new professional football franchises (Melbourne Heart and Melbourne Storm) would play their home games at the Rectangular Stadium, and declared that the additions were further evidence of the ‘sport city’ title (‘Sporting capital’, 2010). Indeed, both Brumby and Labor MP John Pandazopolous, explained that while the Rectangular Stadium is not
financially viable, it still serves a significant role in adding to the sport capital of the city; physically and culturally:

Does it pay for its way like the ‘G [MCG] or Etihad [Docklands Stadium]? No, it doesn’t. But does it play a really crucial part in Melbourne’s armoury of infrastructure and places? Yes it does. So it’s a good fit. (J. Brumby, personal communication, September 11, 2013)

Look it assists with the vision for the whole Olympic Park precinct… it was more about the growth of newer sports, rather than being driven by a clear major events agenda which is what most of the other sports facilities were driven by. (J. Pandazopolous, personal communication, April 17, 2013).

The stadium, as such, was justified in part because it broadened and enhanced Melbourne’s ‘sport city’ status by recognising a wider range of (elite) sports.

In addition to justifying investment into sports infrastructure to maintain and increase the ‘sport city’ status; the threat of decreasing sporting prestige was often declared by the Opposition when the government failed in attempts to entice elite sport to the city. For example, the Docklands Stadium was initially proposed as a venue for some of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games football matches; however in 1997 Kennett abandoned the idea claiming that he could not guarantee the stadium would be completed in time. The state Opposition asserted that the failure to guarantee the stadium as an Olympic venue “had badly damaged Melbourne’s ability to lure big sporting events” (Pollard, 1997, p. 2).

Moreover, immediately after the announcement, in December 2004, that Victoria had failed in its bid for a Super 14 Rugby franchise, Sports Minister Justin Madden felt the need to reassure Victorians of their sporting identity by insisting that “Victoria’s claim to [being] the sporting capital remained justified” (Mickelburough & McRae, 2004, p. 2). Linking the failed bid for a Super Rugby franchise to the ‘sport city’ identity and ego of Melburnians; The Age expressed that Melbourne is “known as the nation’s sporting capital… So [the bid failure] comes as a blow to the city’s sporting ego, and a genuine disappointment to its sports fans” (‘A lost opportunity’, 2004, p. 8). As such, the identity of being the ‘sporting capital’ of Australia was (re)presented by politicians and the media as being important to Melburnians. Indeed, the consistent self-reassurance of the city’s ‘sporting identity’ has been claimed by some as evidence of Melbourne’s inferiority complex at being Australia’s second city behind Sydney (see Feneley, 2005; Marshall, 2011). By (re)constructing the identity of this ‘imagined community’ (Anderson,

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261 This was along with an inability to find a sponsor for the Motorcycling Grand Prix at Phillip Island (Pollard, 1997).
1983) the state and cultural intermediaries justified and promoted further investment of public resources into sporting events and infrastructure.  

**Desired city identity**

The vision of the political parties in power over the thirty year period gives an insight into the identity, or desired identity, of each government. The Labor government of the 1980s entered parliament with a social agenda to enhance equality while promoting economic development (Shamsullah, 1992). Premier during much of the 1980s, John Cain explained that the Labor government’s vision was about:

> Social justice, about a fairer society … Labor values were about … the best interests of the great mass of the people. And certainly, revenue raising, taxation, a progressive tax system, all those kinds of things. (J. Cain, personal communication, April 16, 2013)

In order to achieve this vision, Labor adopted a Keynesian-style interventionist approach to governance, investing public funds into capital ventures to boost the economy. In doing so, the government ‘selected’ key projects or fields for investment (outlined in *Victoria: The Next Step (1984)*) which arguably indicates the dominant or desired identities of the state. It is at this stage that sport, built on a foundation of (re)constructed historical importance, emerged as a key economic vehicle for the state.

Succeeding the Cain/Kirner Labor governments, Liberal Premier Jeff Kennett employed an economic strategy of budget-cutting and privatisation; however Kennett did reserve government intervention for cultural infrastructure to support the arts and sport:

> We wanted to make Victoria a vibrant place. We saw Victoria as being a diverse community, not reliant on mining as Western Australia or Queensland, not dependant on any one issue, but we also recognised the importance of a modern city having a strong cultural heart. So we had a strong emphasis on things artistic in terms of re-establishing the capital infrastructure, basically arts and also sporting … The arts have always needed patrons, and in our environment the patron has got to be the government. I mean, there are other patrons but, in terms of the critical mass, the government’s got to be the patron (J. Kennett, personal communication, May 6, 2013)

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262 Benedict Anderson (1983) explains that the nation and nationalism has been created to serve political and economic interests. A national community, Anderson asserts, is imagined “because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (p. 6).
As such, Kennett’s desire for Melbourne to be identified as a cultural city resulted in public investment into cultural activities while other public infrastructure (for example, roads, electricity, prisons and the ambulance service) were privatised and left to operate under market-like mechanisms.\textsuperscript{263}

John Brumby, Treasurer or Premier of the state between 2000 and 2010, explained that his Labor government had “a vision of wanting to make Victoria the intellectual, cultural and sporting capital of Australia. So that was part of the vision, the lexicon, the language” (J. Brumby, personal communication, September 11, 2013). Continuing, Brumby expressed the desired outcomes of focusing on knowledge, culture and sport:

The desired result is, well in terms of innovation and culture, is that you… keep the best and brightest people [and] you attract the best and brightest from around Australia, around the world, which is what happened, they came to Melbourne, and so the key in that are things like the quality of the cultural life, quality of the intellectual life, the opportunities, Melbourne’s liveability … What’s liveability? It’s the intellectual environment, it’s the quality of life environment, it’s the content; sport, culture and everything else, and if you get the best people, you’ll have the best economy. So the end outcome of that is building a strong economy and a strong quality of life. (J. Brumby, personal communication, September 11, 2013)

Brumby’s comments encapsulate the urban entrepreneurial approach to governance explained by Harvey (1989) and Hall and Hubbard (1996a). That is, the Brumby government – and those governments immediately before and after – have tried to promote the ‘liveability’ of Melbourne to the global labour market in an attempt to procure ‘desirable’ citizens who will boost the local economy. While the Cain government arguably began the formalisation of the ‘sport city’ identity, subsequent governments – both Liberal-National and Labor have enhanced and progressed the major (sport) events strategy and thus furthered the ‘sport city’ identity associated with Melbourne. By selecting elite sport as a cultural activity to identify the city with, the Victorian state has valued and normalised many practices associated with neoliberalism (Silk & Andrews, 2012b). For example, as a highly valued and visible cultural practice, sport reflects neoliberal ideology by reaffirming the meanings and beliefs of rewards through competition and merit (Coakley, 2011). Moreover, the close alignment of sport with consumer culture (Horne, 2006), through commercial sponsorship/branding, sports-related products, sporting celebrities and

\textsuperscript{263} While Arts infrastructure was supported by the government, Glow and Johanson (2007) illustrate the extreme ‘industry approach’ to the arts adopted by the Kennett government.
sports-related advertising, serves to encode the urban landscape, that promotes and values the meanings of elite sport, as a place for consumption. The encoding of these consumer meanings and values, through the production and regulation phases, are subsequently decoded during the consumption phase. As such, the ‘sport city’ identity is developed and (re)produced through commercial ventures associated with an urban entrepreneurial strategy, driven by the state, which serves to encode the city space as a site for consumer activity. In addition, the neoliberal promotion of free-market ideology, competition and individual responsibility inserted into the cultural space of the city furthers the ‘common-sense’ understanding of neoliberal mechanisms which ultimately serves to reproduce social and economic inequalities.

**Competing identities**

This ‘encoding’ however is not a one-way process, rather, it is flexible and dynamic. As such the values and meanings of the ‘sport city’ cannot simply be determined by the government but involves a complex engagement with other groups. The ‘sport city’ identity of Melbourne runs parallel with a number of other state-sanctioned identities. A quick internet search illustrates the myriad of identities promoted by the Victorian state as evidence of Melbourne’s liveability; including Melbourne as the ‘coffee capital,’ ‘comedy capital,’ ‘culinary capital,’ ‘cultural capital,’ ‘fashion capital,’ ‘music capital’ and ‘street art capital,’ as well as being a ‘city of literature,’ ‘knowledge city,’ ‘multicultural city’ and ‘most liveable city.’ Promoted by the state, through ‘official’ websites of the government or government-funded events, these identities are encoded with legitimacy. These alternative ‘legitimate’ identities, like the ‘sport city’ identity, have emerged through conflict and contest. For example, Homan (2010) illustrated the contest between a music coalition (consisting of musicians, performers, music venue owners and music patrons) and the Victorian state government regarding security laws imposed in 2002 and 2009 which resulted in some music venue closures or restriction of music events; impacting on live music culture within the city (also see Shaw, 2005). Similarly, Dovey et al. (2012); MacDowall (2006) and Young (2010) have highlighted the challenges ‘street artists’ in Melbourne have faced due to graffiti regulations being imposed to project a clean,

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264 See Hall (1980) for an explanation of the production, dissemination and interpretation of (media) messages through the encoding/decoding model.


266 Homan (2010) outlines state regulations which enforced music venues, categorised as ‘high risk’ for violence, to hire security personal and install CCTV cameras at a cost to the venue owner.
corporate-friendly image of the city. Both of these examples illustrate the manner in which alternative identities (particularly those associated with youth subcultures) are regulated by, and for, the state – the identities are used to promote the ‘liveability’ of Melbourne but at the same time the monopoly of legitimate violence held by the state is used to control activities to ensure they serve to produce a space that meets the needs of “tourists and place-mobile capitalists” (MacLeod, 2002, p. 605).

These alternative identities may challenge or complement the ‘sport city’ identity through the competition and sharing of space and public funding. The struggles that occur between these cultural activities have shaped the urban landscape of Melbourne. In addition, those that resist the ‘sport city’ also play a key role in the (re)construction of the city, by challenging or approving of the actions and decisions made by the producers of the cultural artefact. Adding to the complexity of this process is the representation of those that resisted the ‘sport city’; that is, the manner by which cultural intermediaries framed or represented the identity of these resistance groups to a mass audience.

(Mis)identifying resistance

The media’s role in (mis)representing the identification of resistance groups was discussed in a 1995 interview of then Save Albert Park convenor Iain Stewart. Printed in Green Left Weekly – an alternative media source produced by activists – Stewart discussed the media’s shifting representation of the SAP activist group:

At the beginning of the campaign in late 1993, Richmond [school occupation] had been and gone. Northlands [College closure] was the only people’s struggle that the media had to grab hold of. But because it predominantly involved the Koori populace, the mass media had difficulty dealing with

267 Because the government has a limited budget it must make decisions as to what ‘identity’ to invest in, such as upgrading an elite swimming pool or public library. However, these cultural activities/practices are not just in competition with each other but may indeed complement each other, for example the National Tennis Centre was justified in part because it would also serve as a venue for music.

268 Indeed, the cultural intermediaries ‘encode’ the discussion of the production and resistance of the ‘sport city’ (for example describing and explaining issues surrounding the Grand Prix) which are ‘decoded’ by an audience (Hall, 1992). However, as Buist and Mason (2010) explain, the media tends to favour sporting development and as such these cultural intermediaries are likely to encode discussion with meanings and values that supplement the production of the neoliberal ‘sport city’.

269 Some Aboriginal people prefer to identify themselves with the area where they live; Koori is a name for the current areas of Victoria and New South Wales (see Korff, 2014a).
it. For the media [SAP] were a godsend because we were white, middle-class, relative conservatives taking on [Jeff Kennett] the King of the conservatives. We started with them welcoming us as good news but later they said we were just a bunch of self-interested folk. There was a lot said of the NIMBY [Not In My own Backyard] syndrome. As the campaign started to be seen as more than an overnight sensation, they said that we were just a vehicle for the ALP [Australian Labor Party] to push its political barrow. As the group's militancy grew, we heard extraordinary outbursts from the premier and others that we were all members of the International Socialist Organisation! Other sections of the media suggested that we are really a front for a dissident group of Liberals who want to unseat Jeff Kennett! The more threatening we become as a political force, the greater the vilification and denigration has become. And through all that, the editorials have remained steadfastly dogged in their commitment to the Grand Prix. (Ian Stewart cited in Smith & Whitworth, 1995, para. 1)

According to Stewart, the media initially provided a positive representation of SAP as having a valued (white, middle-class, conservative) identity but as the campaign progressed, and in light of Michael Gawenda’s comments above of pressure to support the corporate Grand Prix event, the media (re)presented SAP’s identity as undesirable (as socialist and anti-development) in a capitalist society.

Furthermore, Stewart’s reference to the Koori highlights the potential problems with media representations of significant issues within society. Because the media, or more specifically journalists, are less likely to feel comfortable reporting on issues foreign to their own identity and understanding (see Kennamer, 1992; Phillips, 2009; Schudson, 1995), issues of importance to marginalised groups (for example ethnic minorities) may be excluded from media coverage, trivialised or discriminately (re)produced. Indeed, the Kulin – the Aboriginal people from the Port Phillip area – were only mentioned in one media report regarding protests over the use of Albert Park for the GP. Moreover, no articles in either The Age or Herald Sun reported any historical importance of Flinders/Melbourne Park or Royal Park to Aboriginal people; illustrating the ‘whiting out of Aboriginality’ by Australia’s mainstream media (Banerjee & Osuri, 2000).

Australian media in general is Anglo-centric, both in its coverage and journalistic representation. Banjereee and Osuri (2000) refer to the ‘whiting out’ of Aboriginality in

270 G. Meyer (1999) outlines the mainstream media’s lack of understanding of the Northlands Secondary College issue with specific focus on the ignorance of the media towards Aboriginal history and the Koori community.
Australian media coverage; that is, the media has tended to focus on issues and events that are of importance to Anglo-Australians. McCallum and Holland (2010) explain that while improvements since the turn of the century are evident, Australia’s mainstream media reporting on Aboriginal issues continue to provide audiences with a narrow framing of events and limited range of understandings about cultural diversity in Australia. Meanwhile, Phillips (2009) explains that Australian journalists tend to be of Anglo origin and Australian news remains ‘Anglo-looking’ despite demographic changes in wider Australian society (also see Hanusch, 2013).

The perceived prestige associated with the ‘sport city’ title has been used in various ways to justify stadium constructions, bids for major sporting events and support for professional sports franchises. Throughout the four case studies of this thesis, the title of ‘sport city,’ ‘sports capital of Australia’ or ‘sports capital of the world’ was used by the media and politicians to (re)present Melbourne as a ‘place’ of outstanding liveability. State governments of Victoria have regarded sport as an important public commodity, since 1984, which has been built on a sense of nostalgia and collective history. The increasing emphasis on sport as an economic tool has served to ‘encode’ the city space as a place for commercial consumption. In addition, the relatively homogeneity of cultural intermediaries has led to a largely Anglo-centric representation of Melbourne’s identity, including the significance of a sporting identity.

**Regulation**

The state government occupies a central role as the legislating authority, as well as the holder of symbolic capital required when defining the activities that are deserving of public resources. However, the regulation of the ‘sport city’ artefact is not driven by the state alone. While the following chapter provides an in depth discussion of the neoliberal re-regulation of the state, in this section I provide a discussion and illustration of the methods applied, through the four cases, to regulate the ‘sport city’. I firstly discuss the empowering of P-GAs to organise sporting events and make infrastructure decisions in the guise of operating at arm’s length of the government. I then illustrate the state’s direct role in regulating the ‘sport city’ through decisions made regarding the allocation of public resources. Finally, I express that while the state holds significant power in regulating and directing the (re)production of the ‘sport city’, this regulation does not occur without contest and challenge.
Empowering pseudo-government authorities

The Victorian Major Events Company (VMEC) was set up by the state to acquire major events and ultimately serves to construct or produce the ‘sport city’. Once acquired, the organisation and regulation of events is passed onto P-GAs such as the Melbourne and Olympic Parks Trust (MOPT), the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games Corporation (M2006) and the Australian Grand Prix Corporation (AGPC). Despite functioning as apolitical organisms, the P-GA, which is at the nucleus of decisions regarding the ‘sport city’, tends to reflect the government’s political vision. These organisations are structured to be accountable to a government Minister while the government ensures members of parliament occupy strategic positions within these trusts or government corporations. As John Cain (n.d.a) explained, the 13 person National Tennis Centre Trust was founded with trustees selected by the Minister of Sport and Recreation – including five members of parliament – in order to guarantee the government could exercise control over the Centre in the future. Moreover, when the National Tennis Centre Trust and Olympic Park Trust were combined to form the MOPT in 1995, the Minister of Sport, Recreation and Racing was empowered with nominating nine of the twelve trustees; as such the Minister was able to ‘select’ trustees who were likely to favour the vision(s) of the government.

The government’s desire to ensure representation within key decision-making bodies was clearly illustrated during bids for major multi-sporting events. During the bid for the 1996 Olympic Games, Premier John Cain made it clear that as the potential chief financier of the event, representatives from the government should have major representation on the bid Committee (Cullen, 1988; Skeggs, 1988b; McAsey, 1988b). The contest for political representation within P-GAs was also clearly illustrated during the creation of the 2006 Commonwealth Games organising committee. In August 1999, a few weeks prior to the announcement of the 2006 Commonwealth Games host city, the Herald Sun reported that Premier Jeff Kennett had already ‘hand-selected’ the Melbourne 2006 Organising Committee in an attempt to ensure strong Liberal representation (Salom, 1999b). The state Opposition voiced concern that Kennett had formed this committee just months before the 1999 State election with Labor’s John Pandazopoulos expressing that the organising committee should have been unveiled after the election so that the Labor Party, if elected, could have the opportunity to add some of its own members (Salom,

However, despite Cain’s desires for a majority committee, the final makeup of the 12-member board consisted of two from the city council, three from the Australian Olympic Federation, four from the private sector and three from state government (Skeggs, 1988c).
Meanwhile, the Herald Sun raised concerns regarding the ‘ownership’ of the games and the subsequent political asset the event could become:

According to the Melbourne 2006 bid document, the company that runs the Games would have a single share held in trust by the premier of the day. Thus, Mr Kennett, or alternative Premier Steve Bracks would actually own the Games. It would be very hard for either man to stay at arm’s length from the running of such a popular and glamorous event. (Salom, 1999a, p. 19)

Contradicting these concerns however, the Herald Sun endorsed Ron Walker as the leader of the M2006, explaining that he would not be “diverted by grassroots community and political interest groups” (Salom, 1999a, p. 19) despite his close ties to the Liberal Party as the Federal Liberal Party treasurer.

Further evidence of government intervention within apolitical organisations is demonstrated by Dovey and Sandercock’s (2002) analysis of the Docklands Authority. Dovey and Sandercock (2002) explain that the Docklands Authority, the P-GA created to guide development of the docklands precinct including the Docklands Stadium, has reflected the political philosophy of the government since its foundation. Set up by the Kirner Labor government in 1992, the Authority initially held a development philosophy that valued public consultation. However, the operation and philosophy of the Authority changed to a market-driven, tender strategy approach under the Kennett government.

In order to empower these organisations to regulate the ‘sport city’, the state government has often implemented new legislation. For example, a key element of the 1985 National Tennis Centre Act was the re-zoning of public parkland into crown land (reserved) for the purpose of a national tennis centre. Subsequent amendments to the Act permitted extensions of the tennis centre across Melbourne Park with what appears to be minimal public consultation. Likewise, the Royal Park Land Bill was introduced by government to fast-track development of the Hockey and Netball Centre just days prior to the Royal Park Protection Group’s Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) hearing to prevent construction (Munro, 1999b). The Bill’s purpose, according to the Minister for Conservation and Land Management, was to protect the ‘public’s interest’ in hosting the Commonwealth Games (Munro, 1999b); as such the ‘public’s interest’ was safeguarded by denying the public an opportunity for consultation (see Munro, 1998).

Further fast-tracking of development took place in Royal Park with the construction of the Athletes’ Village, as a result of the Commonwealth Games Arrangements Act (Millar, 2003a) which, like the tennis centre at Flinders/Melbourne Park, re-zoned the land to permit a housing development on the site. In addition, the government declared the Rectangular Stadium a ‘project of state significance’ in order to fast-track development
and avoid public consultation (Millar, 2005a). Furthermore, to make space for the Rectangular Stadium the state redefined control of Gosch’s Paddock; declaring the MOPT as the manager (Whinnet, 2007c), rather than the commercially adverse Melbourne City Council (Millar, 2005a). This decision led to commercial activity being permitted on this section of public parkland so that Collingwood FC was able to train on Gosch’s Paddock while the Rectangular Stadium was being constructed.

These moves by the government to by-pass the Melbourne City Council has occurred since the 1980s; as Des Bethke explained:

The council were probably more restrictive and conservative in their approach as to how the city should develop and expand and grow … Whereas it may have been said government is about wanting to approve and get things done, whereas the council would’ve taken a tougher line. So there was some tension around all of that. (D. Bethke, personal communication, April 11, 2013)

Continuing, Bethke explained that during the 1980s the Melbourne City Council was “strongly opposed to any alienation of parkland” (personal communication, April 11, 2013) but the state has gradually shifted control and management of parkland away from the Melbourne City Council to organisations such as the Melbourne Cricket Club and the MOPT. As such, the state has actively regulated the management of the city’s parklands to position these in the hands of organisations that are more willing to act out the government’s vision; indeed, as I have previously explained, these organisations often consist of significant government representation while the Melbourne City Council does not have the same political affiliation.

The most often cited sporting example of the Victorian Government legislatively empowering a P-GA involved the Australian Formula One Grand Prix (see Lowes, 2004; Mendes, 2002; Noone, 1994; Waugh, 1999). After acquiring the Formula One Grand Prix in 1993, the state passed the Australian Grand Prix Act 1994 which included the creation of the AGPC as the statutory authority which has the responsibility of staging the annual event. Significantly, the AGP Act permitted the AGPC to circumnavigate a number of existing planning laws as well as essentially preventing the public’s right to protest (see Lowes, 2004) in order to ensure the event would proceed.\footnote{Lowes (2004) discusses an element of the AGP Act which allowed the AGPC to fence or cordon off any areas of Albert Park to legally become private land operated by the AGPC. As such, activists would no longer be permitted to be in that area and police/security force could be used to eject the protesters. Indeed, this occurred while SAP members picketed the South Melbourne Hellas soccer ground (see Lowes, 2004).} Illustrating the close political
links, since its establishment up until April 2015, VMEC chairman and Federal Liberal Party treasurer Ron Walker has chaired the AGPC which is also “subject to the direction and control of the Minister administering the Grand Prix Act” (Australian Grand Prix Corporation, 2014, p. 6). Moreover, the state government’s involvement with the Grand Prix extends beyond the AGPC’s accountability to the Minister of the AGP Act. In cooperation with the AGPC, the state government has continued to negotiate Grand Prix contract extensions with the Formula One Group but persists in keeping contract details secret; again expressing that this is done in the ‘public’s interest’.

Investing public resources in the ‘public’s interest’

In addition to empowering P-GAs, the state regulates the ‘sport city’ by investing public resources on behalf of the citizens. This public investment has included the allocation of public funds (taxes), public law enforcement (police and security), public infrastructure (such as roads) and the provision of public land. The (re)regulation of this investment was clearly illustrated through negotiations associated with the construction of the Docklands Stadium. Premier Jeff Kennett initially announced that no public expense would be incurred during the construction of the stadium; however the government later intervened to commit public capital works, such as transport infrastructure connecting the docklands to the CBD, to fashion the precinct as more appealing to private developers (Shaw, 2013). Furthermore, initial plans for the Docklands Stadium to be transferred to the state after 30 to 40 years of private ownership (that is, the stadium would ultimately become a public asset) were shelved due to the overwhelming desire to tempt private developers to build the stadium. Unable to secure sufficient events for the stadium, the state government essentially agreed to give the public’s asset to the Australian Football League in return for guaranteed AFL matches which lured the private Docklands Stadium Consortium to build and operate the facility. Indeed the stadium was significant, Kennett explained, as a catalyst in driving further development of the docklands precinct (personal communication, May 6, 2013). As such, the state was willing to exchange a valued ‘sport city’ asset (the stadium) in order to attract additional private developers who, it was hoped, would add tax-revenue to the state coffers.

A decade later, and in contrast to the Kennett government’s strategy of employing a private developer to build and operate the Docklands Stadium, the Labor state government directly invested tax-payer funds into the construction of the Rectangular Stadium; defining the stadium as a requirement for Melbourne’s diverse sporting interests. Consequently, the construction of a stadium which services four professional football clubs was justified as evidence of the government’s support for the diverse
population which emerges, in part, from the urban entrepreneurial strategy of attracting
global footloose capital and labour.

The state’s symbolic power allows the government to (re)define the public interest
(Bourdieu, 1989). A shift in definition of the public interest was evident in decisions
regarding the government’s role in supporting sport stadia. The Cain Labor government
defined the public capital works necessary for the survival of the privately-owned
Waverley Stadium as being outside the remit of the government’s responsibility; or not in
the public’s interest. However, as the regulator of public space, the Cain government
intervened to legislate for the AFL Grand Final – a major cultural activity – to be located at
a central public place (the MCG). In doing so, the state agreed to spend public taxes to
upgrade the MCG. As such, Cain determined that it was in the public’s interest to force
the private AFL organisation to relocate their prized cultural activity to the state-owned
MCG. A decade later, the Kennett government determined that public capital works for
the private Docklands Stadium were necessary in order to entice private investment to the
city; as such, Kennett defined the attraction of commercial development as being in the
‘public’s interest’ and used sport as a vehicle for attracting private investment.

It is important to note that regulation of the ‘sport city’ cultural artefact does not
simply occur through formalised government institutions. As outlined in the previous
section, resistance campaigns have endeavoured to (re)construct or dismantle the ‘sport
city’ in the form of public protests (such as those organised by Save Albert Park, Save
Waverley and the Royal Park Protection Group), vandalism (in the form of graffiti prior to
the Commonwealth Games and a diesel spill prior to the 1997 Grand Prix) and judicial
proceedings (for example SAP have applied to VCAT regarding Grand Prix attendances).
Indeed, despite the state’s overwhelming support for elite/commercial sporting
developments in Melbourne, local councils – as representatives of local communities –
have often lent their support to resistance campaigns such as the Save Waverley and
Save Albert Park campaigns.273

The struggles that have shaped and regulated the ‘sport city’, within the
bureaucratic field, were evident in all four case studies of this thesis. When in power,
political parties have appeared eager to develop commercial sporting infrastructure and
promote elite sporting events. In Opposition, these same political parties have been quick

273 The Greater Dandenong Council led the Save Waverley campaign (see Hay et al., 2001); in
addition, Labor MP for Dandenong, John Pandazopolous, explained that he was heavily involved in
the campaign (personal communication, April 17, 2013). Meanwhile, SAP president Peter Goad
explained that the City of Port Phillip Council has always campaigned against the Grand Prix’s
Albert Park location (P. Goad, personal communication, October 1, 2012).
to criticise the government’s economic (mis)management, avoidance of social welfare responsibilities and failures to protect public parkland. Following Wacquant’s (2010) understanding of the neoliberal state, it appears that in power political parties value the economic Right hand of the state with its focus on economic discipline, welfare cuts and development initiatives to boost the economy. Meanwhile, these same parties, when in Opposition, have more strongly advocated for activities coordinated by the social welfare Left hand, or feminine side of the Leviathan.

The ‘sport city’ does not naturally emerge; rather it is produced and reproduced, consumed through struggles and (mis)represented by actors with an ability to control and regulate the images and actions which construct a collective urban identity that values the commercial sporting spectacle. A number of interest groups engaged in the (re)construction of the ‘sport city’ artefact, those with a vested interest in sporting events and infrastructure for economic and political gains tended to advocate for the use of public resources (particularly funds and space) to develop the sporting place and encode this place with consumer ideas and practices. The media representation of the ‘sport city’ has been overwhelmingly positive, particularly through editorials. While some journalists highlighted and discussed the lack of transparency and public consultation with decisions regarding the ‘sport city’ over the past three decades, these voices tended to be drowned out by a commercial media that has supported major events and the development of sporting infrastructure close to Melbourne’s CBD.

Meanwhile, those (dis)interested groups that resisted the use of public funds and space(s) for sport argued for the benefits of investing in alternative social welfare practices and retaining of public space for non-commercial activities. As outlined throughout this chapter, P-GAs have occupied a central role as decision-makers; however, despite being organisations that are structured to be at arm’s length from government, political representation tends to be infused within P-GAs. The historical association with sport has allowed contemporary governments to ‘brand’ Melbourne as a ‘sports capital’ which has subsequently been sold to the public as an important cultural and economic identity for the city. As such, Victorian governments have strived to maintain or build upon this identity while constantly denouncing the ‘threat’ of rival cities competing in the urban entrepreneurial game. Indeed, the repetitive acknowledgement of ‘rival’ cities with a desire to dethrone Melbourne as the ‘sporting capital’ appears to serve as a tool to justify additional public expenditure in sporting events which have been framed as vital to the state’s future prosperity. In the next chapter I discuss, further, the role of the state in re-regulating the ‘sport city’.
Chapter 11: Sport: Cultural glue of the neoliberal State

The neoliberal Hobbesian democratic state (van Dun, 2005) is comprised of a network of power struggles, as agents within the bureaucratic field are locked in a contest for the legitimacy to distribute and redistribute public resources (Bourdieu, 1994a; Wacquant, 2012). In Melbourne, a self-proclaimed and industry awarded ‘sport city’, the use of public resources to support elite sport during the past three decades has been prevalent. The decision to focus public investment on sport has been framed by an urban entrepreneurial approach to governance that supports a policy agenda of investing public funds to present the city as an ideal location for capital investment under the guise that wider benefits for the state will be achieved. By strategically using elite sport, a cultural activity which serves to reinforce neoliberal ideology (Andrews & Silk, 2012; Coakley, 2011), the Victorian state has supported the (re)construction of a ‘legitimate’ culture which accepts and naturalises neoliberal processes. In order to regulate this sporting urban entrepreneurial strategy, the Victorian government often employed tactics to prevent full disclosure of information to the public along with mechanisms – specifically anti-protest laws and government Acts which exempted sporting events and infrastructure from existing Acts – to control the public’s ability to organise resistance.

The adoption of neoliberal policies and mechanisms since the 1970s has resulted in what Wacquant (2010) calls a centaur state; embracing freedom and competition for those rich in economic and cultural capital while simultaneously directing and policing the lower classes. This centaur state emerges from not only the promotion of the free-market but also the systematic regulation of the lower classes through welfare and incarceration agendas. Wacquant (2010) regards the “expansive, intrusive and proactive penal apparatus” (p. 211) as a core organ of the neoliberal state along with a shift in social policy that decreases protective welfare in favour of workfare.

In addition to the workfare/prisonfare ‘double regulation’ of the lower class, Wacquant (2010; 2012; 2013) explains that the turn to a culture that celebrates individual responsibility and the commodification of all human activities is an overarching

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274 The state’s investment in, and protection of, elite sport occurs within a wider national framework of advancing this cultural activity. Indeed, the federal government has directly invested in elite sport through the Australian Sports Commission and Australian Institute of Sport while protecting media coverage of ‘value’ sporting events through anti-siphoning legislation.

275 Like Wacquant, Bourdieu (1998d) explains that “the state is splitting into two, with on the one hand a state which provides social guarantees, but only for the privileged, who are sufficiently well-off to provide themselves with insurance, with guarantees, and a repressive, policing state, for the populace” (p. 32).
component of the neoliberal state. It is here that sport plays an important role as the ‘cultural glue’ in the reengineering of the neoliberal Victorian state. Miller (2012) articulates the link between neoliberalism and sport: “Sport is [neoliberalism’s] most spectacular embodiment, through the dual fetish of competition and control, individualism and government” (p. 24). Meanwhile Andrews and Silk (2012) explain that neoliberal policies include the ‘commercialising’ of the urban landscape as a place for consumption; which often consists of building shopping malls, entertainment zones and elite sporting infrastructure for spectacle. The ‘sport city’, with a focus on commercial/elite sport, serves to symbolise the valuing of this entertainment cityscape which exists as a space for consumption and profiteering. The Victorian state (including the government and pseudo-government authorities such as the Melbourne and Olympic Parks Trust) has played an active role in this spatial shift during the past three decades, supplying much of the sporting infrastructure and redefining public spaces for consumer activity to take place.

The aim of this chapter is to insert the ‘sport city’ into the understanding of neoliberalism as the re-regulating, rather than de-regulating, state. Adopting Loïc Wacquant’s (2010; 2012) conceptualisation of neoliberalism, I first contextualise Melbourne with a brief discussion of the social policy shift from welfare to workfare combined with the increased (privatised) incarceration of the urban poor. I then outline the manner in which elite sport serves to reproduce notions of neoliberalism before discussing Melbourne’s neoliberal doxa. Following, I discuss three types of capital evident within the bureaucratic field of Melbourne’s sportscape: (i) symbolic capital and the redefining of ‘the public’, (ii) social capital associated with the inner-circle of the bureaucratic field and, (iii) political capital acquired through sport along with the Political habitus of politicians driving decisions within the bureaucratic field. Finally, I illustrate that while opposition to these neoliberal processes does occur; resistance is regulated by the state and often occurs within the neoliberal doxa.

While ‘glue’ is used here, following Wacquant’s (2012) adoption of the term, it is important to emphasise that sport and culture are not fixed concepts, rather, they are dynamic and fluid. As such, a contest and struggle exists in determining and shaping the cultural glue of sport but certain groups, such as the state, hold significantly more power/capital in shaping these struggles.

I refer here to a big-P Political habitus as opposed to a small-p political habitus; the former refers to the habitus of Politicians in parliament (see Bourdieu, 2010/1984, pp. 398-476 and Kauppi, 2003 who discusses the Political habitus of those individuals in the European Parliament). The latter refers to the habitus of individuals to engage in politics/activism (see Bourdieu, 2010/1984, pp. 398-467 and Harrits, 2011 who discusses inclusion/exclusion within the practices of everyday political participation).
The double regulation of the precariat

In order to include ‘sport’ in Wacquant’s approach to neoliberalism, I will firstly outline the “double regulation of the insecure fractions of the postindustrial proletariat via the wedding of social and penal policy at the bottom of the polarized class structure” (Wacquant, 2010, p. 210).278 Wacquant (2010) explains that during the later decades of the twentieth century, the urban poor were not only disciplined through penal policy but were controlled through social welfare restrictions. Accordingly, Wacquant (2010) continues, this illustrated “an exercise in state crafting” (p. 210) with a clear focus on socio-ethnic selectivity; that is, “the penal apparatus is a core organ of the state [employed during] … the remaking of the state after the breakup of the Keynesian social compact” (p. 211). This form of state crafting Wacquant (2012) asserts has continued under neoliberalism. And as such, Wacquant expresses that neoliberalism does not simply entail the celebration of capitalism and the promotion of the market place but involves the “reengineering and redeployment of the state as the core agency that sets rules and fabricates the subjectivities, social relations and collective representations suited to realising markets” (Wacquant, 2012, p. 66). Wacquant (2010) contends that a key process of neoliberalism involves the shifting management of “precarious workers and the unemployed, postcolonial migrants, and lower-class addicts and derelicts” (p. 212) from social to penal treatment. Under neoliberalism, the postindustrial proletariat – or the precariat – are therefore forced to accept their precarious position (constructed as a consequence of the deregulation of industry and services) in the absence of a social welfare net. The neoliberal state regulates this acceptance with the threat, or deployment, of its penal apparatus along with the retraction of social welfare. While I do not discuss Australia’s penal and welfare system in any depth here, it is important to provide a brief overview in order to insert the ‘sport city’ into a context that confirms Wacquant’s theoretical assertions.

Wacquant (2010; 2012) explains that a key mechanism of the re-regulating neoliberal state is welfare devolution, retraction and re-composition; that is, a shift in

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278 Wacquant (2010) explains that the rolling back of welfare and rolling out of incarceration to control the precariat is a central technique of neoliberal state crafting: “For the punitive containment of urban marginality through the simultaneous rolling back of the social safety net and the rolling out of the police-and-prison dragnet and their knitting together into a carceral-assistential lattice is not the spawn of some broad societal trend—whether it be the ascent of “biopower” or the advent of “late modernity”—but, at bottom, an exercise in state crafting” (p. 210).
social policy that limits or decreases protective welfare in favour of workfare. Workfare, or ‘work for the dole’ (as it is called in Australia), turns “social support into a vector of discipline” (Wacquant, 2012, p. 72) where governments aggressively attempt to remedy and reform recipients behaviour and morals. The workfare discourse of ‘individual responsibility’ (welfare recipients need to actively seek work) and providing a ‘net contribution to society’ serves to indoctrinate recipients (as well as those citizens paying taxes towards welfare) into a culture where society no longer has an obligation to the poor but the poor have an obligation to society (Peck, 2002; Wacquant, 2012).

Welfare in Australia is predominantly distributed by Centrelink, a branch of the federal Department of Human Services. Spies-Butcher (2014) illustrates that while social spending has increased in Australia since the 1990s a redistribution of social welfare has occurred. A number of recent studies illustrate the ‘joint paradox’ (Mendes, 2009) of welfare distribution in the ‘dual welfare’ Australian state (Spies-Butcher, 2014). This dual system has emerged with the state increasingly focusing welfare distribution to the middle-classes through, for example, tax breaks for first home buyers and investments into private superannuation funds, while tightening obligations on welfare recipients through ‘workfare’ practices and paternalistic mechanisms; particularly towards the unemployed and Aboriginal communities (see Mendes, 2008; 2009; 2013; Mendes, Waugh & Flynn, 2014; Spies-Butcher, 2014; Wilson, Meagher & Hermes, 2012).

Castles (2001) explains that historically a strong emphasis on benefits means-testing in Australia excluded the well-off from welfare; however changes during the 1980s and 1990s (particularly under the Howard Liberal-National Coalition government) have undermined this distinctive, and celebrated, aspect of the Australian welfare system. The result, Wilson et al. (2012) explain, is that federal Liberal-National Coalition governments between 1996 and 2007 have “encouraged greater stratification in the Australian welfare system, through a hierarchy of norms and instruments applied to different claimants on the welfare state” (p. 323). Workfare policies appeared to be maintained rather than extended by the Rudd/Gillard Labor governments (2007-2013) (see Archer, 2011; 2012).

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279 Workfare involves assistance being provided to lower-class recipients “conditional upon submission to flexible employment and entails specific behavioural mandates” (Wacquant, 2012, p. 72).

280 Welfare has been distributed by the Commonwealth (federal government) since 1909. For a brief overview of social security in Australia see Herscovitch and Stanton (2008) and for a deeper discussion see Mendes (2008).

281 These paternalistic mechanisms include tight restrictions on what welfare income can be spent on; in particular the prevention of purchasing alcohol, tobacco and pornography (see Mendes, Waugh & Flynn, 2014).
Deeming, 2014; Dusevic, 2010). Under the Abbott Liberal-National Coalition government, workfare has however resurfaced as a significant policy agenda with the proposal that job seekers, from July 2015, be required “to look for 40 jobs a month and perform up to 25 hours of community service as part of a new job placement program” (Hutchens, Patty & Harrison, 2014, para. 2).

Mendes (2008) explains that the shift from welfare to workfare has been shaped by an ideological agenda. Australian neoliberals, Mendes (2008) asserts, advocate for the partial withering of the welfare state but pause before touting the complete abolition of welfare. For those championing neoliberalism, welfare serves as an important tool to “motivate and discipline welfare recipients, and reintegrate them with mainstream social values and morality, such as self-reliance and the work ethic” (Mendes, 2013, pp. 495-6). As such, recipients should be “pressured to choose employment over welfare” (Mendes, 2013, p. 496) through a welfare system which is “minimal and not comfortable, so as not to reduce the incentive to work” (Mendes, 2008, p. 50).

Australia’s welfare to workfare shift began during the Hawke/Keating federal Labor governments and was aggressively extended by the Howard Liberal-National Coalition government (Mendes, 2008). This shift occurred as neoliberal think tanks, policy advisors and politicians “promoted antipathy towards the welfare state, welfare producers and welfare beneficiaries” (Mendes, 2008, p. 65) in addition to “attacks on welfare advocacy groups” (Mendes, 2008, p. 8). Wilson et al. (2012) assert that it was during the Howard-era in particular when this shift occurred with government social policy discourse distinguishing “government incentives for mainstream families from the pathologies of ‘welfare dependence’” (p. 339). The ‘production’ of welfare incentives as separate from welfare dependence during the Howard years led to a mixed consumption of social welfare. As a result, the Australian voter during the late 1990s and early 2000’s was “more likely to correctly recognise generosity to the middle class” (Wilson et al., 2012, p. 340) while being less likely to recognise “toughness of [welfare] reforms confronting … new immigrants and unemployed people” (Wilson et al., 2012, p. 340).

Linking increased incarceration to the devolution, retraction and re-composition of state welfare, Wacquant (2010; 2012; 2013) regards the use of the penal system as

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282 Hutchens, Patty & Harrison (2014) explain that “Under the proposed overhaul, job seekers under 30 will be ineligible for welfare payments for six months after applying for benefits, and will have to work 25 hours a week for six months of the year. Those between 30 and 49 will be asked to do 15 hours’ work a week for six months a year, while those aged 50-60 will undertake 15 hours a week of an approved activity, such as training. But young job seekers will also have to apply for 40 jobs a month and meet other activity requirements for unemployment benefits” (para. 10) (also see Badham, 2014; Borland, 2014).
central to the workings of the neoliberal state. Wacquant (2010) explains that “the penal apparatus is a core organ of the state, expressive of its sovereignty and instrumental in imposing categories, upholding material and symbolic divisions, and moulding relations and behaviours through the selective penetration of social and physical space” (p. 211). As such, the police, courts and prison “constitute core political capacities through which the Leviathan governs” and not simply “technical appendages for fighting crime” (Wacquant, 2012, p. 76). Wacquant (2012) explains that governments have employed an increase in penalisation because of its promises to help resolve two dilemmas of neoliberalism; (i) curbing the mounting urban poor on social welfare by incarceration and, (ii) restoring the authority of the state by reaffirming its monopoly on ‘law and order’ in the face of globalisation and the associated capital rich external organisations (such as multinational corporations and supranational bodies).

A snapshot of the current penal environment in Victoria reflects a number of Wacquant’s assertions. A number of authors explain that recently prisons in Victoria have become over-crowded despite a lack of evidence to suggest society has become more dangerous (see Arnold, 2014; Millar & Spooner, 2015; Silvester, 2014a; Silvester, 2014b; Rubinsztein-Dunlop, 2014; ABC, 2013). Indeed, most commentators explain that the government’s political stance to be ‘tough on crime’ is the major reason for increased incarceration rather than an increase in serious criminal activity (Arnold, 2014; Millar & Spooner, 2015; Norden, 2012; Silvester, 2014b). In addition to increased incarceration, the use of private prisons in Victoria has risen (Penter, 2014). Since the 1990s the state government of Victoria, and other state governments in Australia, have engaged in the privatising of some prisons on the basis that the private sector will operate more efficiently, saving government funds to invest in alternative social needs (see Andrew & Cahill, 2009; Sands & Hodge, 2014). Sands and Hodge (2014), however, conclude that no operational cost-saving has been evident in Victoria’s prisons since 1992 and instead there appears to be a rise in costs since the privatisation agenda began. Furthermore, the privatisation of Victorian prisons since the 1990s has led to Victoria now possessing “the highest level of prison privatization of any jurisdiction in the world” (Penter, 2014, para. 3) with nearly one third of Victorian prisoners held in private prison cells (Norden, 2012).

The use of private prisons clearly raises concerns about the profiteering from imprisonment. Norden (2012) explains that a report released by the Productivity Commission in 2012 expressed that “expenditure on prisons has increased by 18% over

Penter (2014) explains that in Australia there has been an increased incarceration into private prisons by 95 per cent in the last 15 years; during the same time public prisons have had a 50 per cent increase in incarceration.
the past five years” in Victoria; which has subsequently benefited the shareholders of private prisons. The inclusion of private prisons has been supported by liberal media outlets such as the *Herald Sun* which has expressed that the construction of private prisons benefits the labour market (see Humpage, 2014). Indeed, illustrating the global demand to construct private prisons, the contract of a recently approved prison in Ravenhall (23 kilometres west of Melbourne’s CBD) was awarded to the GEO Group Australia (Capone, 2014), a subsidiary of the American based GEO Group, Inc. which operates 98 “correctional, detention and community reentry services” across the United States, United Kingdom, South Africa and Australia (GEO Group, 2014).

The rise in incarceration simultaneously with a shift from welfare to workfare is no coincidence (Wacquant, 2010; 2012; 2013). Piven and Cloward (1993) explain that the state constricts and expands welfare in order to ‘control’ citizens; “historical evidence suggests that relief arrangements are initiated or expanded during the occasional outbreaks of civil disorder produced by mass unemployment, and are then abolished or contracted when political stability is restored” (p. xv). However, Wacquant (2010) explains that while this model worked in the age of Fordist industrialism, in “the age of fragmented labor, hypermobile capital, and sharpening social inequalities and anxieties” (p. 202) the central role of welfare in regulating the precariat and maintaining social order “is displaced and duly supplemented by the vigorous deployment of the police, the courts, and the prison in the nether regions of social space” (p. 202). As a result, “punitive containment offers relief not to the poor but from [original emphasis] the poor by forcibly ‘disappearing’ the most disruptive of them, from the shrinking welfare rolls on the one hand and into the swelling dungeons of the carceral castle on the other” (Wacquant, 2010, p. 204).

According to Wacquant (2010), the struggles between the social functions of the Left and economic and law enforcing functions of the Right hand of the neoliberal state, within the bureaucratic field, have led to the double regulation of poverty with the Left hand constricting welfare and employing workfare while the Right hand aggressively incarcerates the urban poor in order to create a desirable market place for the political and urban elite.

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284 For example, a recent article in the *Herald Sun* expressed that a “New high security prison at Ravenhall [would] generate up to 700 jobs during construction and an additional 600 ongoing jobs” (Humpage, 2014, para. 3).

285 While Wacquant (2010) agrees with Foucault that penalty “must be given pride and place in the study of contemporary power” (p. 204), Wacquant’s understanding of the prison system differs from that of Foucault. Wacquant (2010, pp. 205-6) outlines four challenges to Foucault’s view of the functioning of the punitive society; 1) rather than retreating, “penal confinement has made a stunning comeback and reaffirmed itself among the central missions of Leviathan”, 2) instead of
Neoliberal culture in the ‘Sport City’

Peck et al. (2009) explain that neoliberalism involves a belief that “open, competitive and ‘unregulated’ markets, liberated from state interference and the actions of social collectivities, represent the optimal mechanism for economic development” (p. 1). However, this explanation of neoliberalism fails to acknowledge that for market-like mechanisms to be injected into all spheres, an invasive state must exist in order to permit and regulate the conduction of these activities (Gray, 2010). The first of Wacquant’s (2010) four institutional logics of neoliberalism is ‘commodification as the extension of the market or market-like mechanisms’. Wacquant (2012) explains that rather than being liberated by the state, “the state regulates social life to replicate the liberal market in all forms of human activities” (p. 72). As the holder of statist capital, the meta-capital which grants power over other types of capital (Bourdieu, 1994a; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), the state is able to define what is legitimate within its social space; under neoliberalism the state has legitimised market-like mechanisms across diverse economic, cultural and social spheres. In the city of Melbourne, the state has played an important role in regulating neoliberal processes; including reengineering the definition of elite sport as being within the public’s interest. In this section I initially discuss the marketisation of (elite) sport in Melbourne and the discourse of city competition which exists under urban entrepreneurialism. I then discuss the regulation of public resources by the government to support commercial activities.

Elite sport, Coakley (2011) argues, reproduces and represents key elements of neoliberal ideology; specifically a reward structure based on competition, merit determined by market values, individual responsibility, a belief that capital drives progress and, the acceptance of inequality and hierarchical organisation. In addition, sport is a useful tool for creating a common identity (Bairner, 2001) in order to maintain a sense of

‘training’ and ‘taming’ the body to be docile and productive, the overcrowded, resource depleted contemporary prison is “geared toward brute neutralization, rote retribution, and simple warehousing”, 3) the discipline and punish devices of the prison system “have not spread throughout society, in the manner of capillaries irrigating the entire body social” but have rather been discriminating “along sharp gradients of class, ethnicity, and place, and it operates to divide populations and to differentiate categories according to established conceptions of moral worth” and, 4) law and order, rather than disappearing from public view, is displayed in ritualised form by the authorities, particularly through commercial media in ‘reality shows’ such as Australia’s ‘Highway Patrol’ and ‘The Force: Behind the line’ and fictional dramas such as ‘Police Rescue’ and ‘Water Rats’.

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unity amongst an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983). Because all Melburnians will never have an opportunity to meet or know every citizen of their state, the pride they feel in being part of a ‘sport city’ and in celebrating iconic sporting events allows them to identify with each other; therefore possibly willing, and certainly encouraged, to make personal sacrifices in the name of community interests (for example, residents of Albert Park were advised to tolerate the Grand Prix each year for the benefit of all Melburnians). However, a great number within this imagined community are harmed in the capitalist process of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2004; 2008). As such, the valuing of elite sport by the state serves to unite – through an imagined common identity – those disempowered citizens with those that have been empowered through the capitalist mechanisms that have expanded social and economic inequalities under neoliberalism. Furthermore, this sense of a common identity, linked strongly to a sport city identity, strengthens sport as a form of cultural glue which binds Victorians to a neoliberal ideology.

I have previously explained that the valuing of elite sport was evident in ‘official’ documents such as the Victoria: The Next Step (1984) economic strategy. Just over a decade later, a report from the Department of Infrastructure used sportscapes to assert the need to re-focus development initiatives and economic activities towards Melbourne’s CBD. The 1998 report From Doughnut City to Café Society emphasised the need for continued development of Melbourne’s CBD after fears during the 1970s that Melbourne could become a ‘doughnut city’ (Department of Infrastructure, 1998). The opening page of the report included two images, one adopted Waverley Park as the ‘symbol of 1970s Melbourne’ and the other adopted Docklands (with an image of the stadium at the forefront) as the ‘symbol of 1990s Melbourne’ (see figures 11.1 and 11.2). These two sportscapes encapsulated the shift to ‘centralisation’ in Melbourne as well as the commercial privatisation of landscapes. Haughton and McManus (2012) explain that a “recurrent theme in neoliberal thinking involves an emphasis on introducing market discipline into the public sector by opening it up to the private sector” (p. 92). Indeed, the gradual ‘privatisation’ of elite sport in Melbourne, both in ownership and location, has been evident throughout the past three decades.

The move from public to private is clearly evident with the relatively recent introduction of professional sports franchises entering the Victorian sporting realm. McKay

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286 The report refers to trends in North America and Europe where the suburbs prospered at the expense of the city centre which, after business hours “emptied of people and activities…becoming a sort of twilight zone” (Department of Infrastructure, 1998, p. 1).
and Miller (1991) explain that traditionally Australian sports teams/clubs have maintained a strong local, suburban identity while mostly being administered by ‘old boys’ (McKay & Miller, 1991). However since the 1980s:

…the form and content of Australian sport have changed dramatically. The once hegemonic amateur ideology has become increasingly marginal and residual, as all professional (men's) sports have been reorganized on the

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287 While many sports clubs expressed a suburban identity, some clubs, particularly in soccer were strongly linked to ethnic identities (see Hallinan, Hughson & Burke, 2007; Mosely & Murray, 1994).
basis of management science with executive directors and specialists in advertising, marketing, and public relations. (McKay & Miller, 1991, p. 87)

In addition to this corporate structure of elite sport in Australia, new teams adopted (or were forced to acquire) urban, rather than suburban identities (see Hallinan & Burke, 2005; Hallinan, Hughson & Burke, 2007). Indeed, the Melbourne Storm, Melbourne Rebels, Melbourne Victory and Melbourne Heart all illustrate an injection of the North American, business-centred, franchise model into the sporting climate of Melbourne.

However, despite this shift to sport franchises, the location of 'private' sport has remained largely on public land and in publicly funded stadiums. Previously, many of the suburban elite sports teams across Melbourne and Victoria competed on grounds which were owned by local councils. Adair (1998), Phillips (1998) and Phillips and Murray (1999) describe the Australian sporting environment as uniquely suburban up until the 1980s. With the reorganisation of Australian sport that McKay and Miller (1991) refer to above, the central governing bodies acquired a more corporate identity (Alomes, 2000; Hallinan, Hughson & Burke, 2007; McKay & Miller, 1991; Phillips, 1998; Phillips & Nauright, 1999; Stewart, Nicholson, Smith & Westerbeek, 2004) which has included, in Melbourne in particular, a strategy of ‘stadium centralisation’. That is, in order to make their respective sports more profitable, the top tier games of Australian rules, rugby union, rugby league and soccer have been moved away from suburban venues and into the three Melbourne city stadiums – the MCG, Docklands and Rectangular Stadium. The result has been the standardisation and homogenisation of the sportscape with events not only being limited to three city-centre stadiums but the environment and experience encountered within the stadiums being largely similar – for example, seats, catering, big screens, ground announcers, pre-game and half-time entertainment and, merchandise stalls (Higham & Hinch, 2009). While this transformation may appear to be driven solely by corporate interests (from the clubs, sponsors, sports governing bodies and stadium owners in the case of Docklands Stadium), the state government and pseudo-government

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288 Victorian-based AFL clubs have, however, maintained symbolic links to the suburbs (McConville, 1998).

289 Some AFL clubs have also, at some time in their history, been privately owned (such as the South Melbourne/Sydney Swans and North Melbourne) as the VFL/AFL undertook its expansion agenda through the issuing of ‘licences’ to inter-state clubs. Illustrating the fluid ownership and identity of these sporting franchises, the second A-League franchise for Victoria was recently purchased by the owners of Manchester City FC and re-branded as Melbourne City FC.

290 As explained in chapter 9, while Docklands Stadium is a privately owned stadium, it is located on public land and relies on public infrastructure.

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authorities such as the MOPT have also being responsible in the centralisation of Victorian sport.

**Government re-regulation**

The Cain Labor government of the 1980s played an important role in contracting the AFL (then VFL) to stage its annual major event – the Grand Final – at the MCG; deemed by Premier Cain to be the flagship stadium of Victorian sport. The threat of legislation forced the AFL to permanently locate the Grand Final at the urban MCG, rather than at the suburban Waverley Park and ultimately led to the AFL and state government signing a 40-year contract to situate games at the MCG. At a similar time, the Cain government was in the process of approving the public construction of the National Tennis Centre (NTC) at Melbourne Park (then Flinders Park) in order to ensure that the Australian Open Tennis Championships retained its ‘grand slam’ status and remained located in close proximity to Melbourne’s CBD.

The case of the National Tennis Centre (NTC) clearly illustrates the re-regulation of the Victorian sporting environment. Built by the state government on public parkland, the tennis and entertainment arena challenged the notion of the deregulating shrinking state – previously the Australian Open was located at the private Kooyong Lawn Tennis Club with minimal government intervention. In addition, the NTC highlights the state’s involvement and encouragement of commercial activities (indeed an economic stipulation of the tennis stadium was that it could host commercial concerts and events) in public spaces previously free of commercialism; consequently serving as an example for subsequent governments to permit similar commercial endeavours in public parklands around Melbourne (see Millar, 2005c). Furthermore, the establishment of the Melbourne and Olympic Parks Trust (initially as two separate Trusts) as a statutory corporation with a remit of managing state resources profitably, illustrates the state’s desire to operate within the private sector. Moreover, the government has consistently retained majority representation on the board of the Trust, further implanting the state within the market place and the market place within the objectives of the state. As such, the NTC, presented as a ‘public sports facility’, operates under market conditions with an objective of returning a profit to the state through the hosting of elite sport and commercial entertainment.

Contrasting the publicly owned and operated NTC is the privately owned and operated Docklands Stadium. Proposed as the venue for a media/corporate inspired rugby league club, the stadium was eventually built to primarily host AFL matches. Docklands Stadium further ‘centralised’ sport by essentially cementing AFL’s move to the
city from the suburban Waverley Park. Haughton and McManus (2012) explain that as a consequence of exercising an agenda to reduce public sector debt since the mid-1980s, both main political parties in Australia have employed “funding models such as PPPs [Public-Private Partnerships], since they allow major infrastructure projects to be built without the costs appearing in government accounts” (p. 94). Despite the Docklands Stadium being presented as a private development, the state, courtesy of the pseudo-government Docklands Authority acted to re-define this public place as a commercial/entertainment space (Dovey & Sandercock, 2002). During this process, the public were largely excluded from consultation and the decision-making process. Meanwhile, the Kennett Liberal-National Coalition government essentially donated public land to private developers (which will subsequently be passed on to the AFL once the 25-year ‘lease’ expires) in addition to devoting public funds for capital investment (particularly transport access) to encourage private developers to invest in the stadium and the surrounding Docklands precinct.

Returning to a state-owned model of sporting infrastructure, the Labor government approved the construction of the Rectangular Stadium at the beginning of the twenty first century. The stadium was proposed by the Bracks government as a carrot to SANZAR (the administrators of the Super Rugby professional rugby franchise competition) in an attempt to win the bid for a Melbourne-based Super Rugby franchise. The proposal was supported strongly by rugby fanatic “business opinion leaders” (J. Brumby personal communication, September 11, 2013) and commercial media – particularly the Herald Sun which at the time owned the Melbourne Storm rugby league club; a potential benefactor of a new stadium. Despite losing the bid for the Super Rugby franchise, momentum behind a public-funded rectangular stadium grew, with commercial media, privately-owned football franchises (Melbourne Victory soccer and Melbourne Storm rugby league clubs) and politicians all advocating for the stadium. These influential parties argued that it was in the public’s interest for Melbourne to ‘accept’ these alternative football codes (in addition to Australian rules football) in order to serve the interests of the diverse workforce attracted to the city through the urban entrepreneurial strategy. In approving the construction of the stadium, the government utilised public funds to provide the leisure/entertainment infrastructure which helps attract skilled labour to the urban space for the benefit of big business that require this form of labour.

As noted in chapter 9, the stadium was initially proposed by News Limited as a location for a corporate-owned Melbourne rugby league club for the Super League competition. In addition to AFL, the stadium was also used as a location for concerts, large conferences and other commercial sports such as cricket and soccer.
Complementing the approval of public funds, the state government regulated the control and use of land surrounding the Rectangular Stadium at Gosch’s Paddock to meet the needs of private AFL clubs – in particular the wealthy and media-connected Collingwood football club (see Heathcote, 2013). Amendments to the Melbourne & Olympic Parks Act in 2007 shifted the control of land away from the conservative Melbourne City Council towards the commercially-friendly MOPT. The MOPT regulated this public space with a market-like agenda, removing athletics – which was unable to pay its way (Gleeson, 2012) – from the precinct and amended rules to meet the needs of elite football clubs that desired to use the public land for training purposes (Whinnett, 2007b); this was in addition to lifting the prohibition on commercial advertising on this segment of public parkland (Millar, 2005b).

Extending the state’s intervention into sports stadia, the government was also influential in re-designing and regulating Albert Park as a location for a temporary race track to host the annual Australian Formula One Grand Prix. Illustrating the state’s urban entrepreneurial desires, the Grand Prix Act, enacted to establish the Australian Grand Prix Corporation (AGPC) as the organising body of the Australian Grand Prix, exempted AGPC actions from a number of existing government Acts. As a pseudo-government authority the AGPC has a remit to operate under market-like principals to provide a return to the public for its financial investment into the event. Initially the event was sold to the public on the premise that it would return an annual profit. However, after failing to achieve a tangible economic return to the state – continued corporate support indicates that economic returns are received by private interest groups – the AGPC and associated organisations (state government, VMEC, media and business groups) emphasised economic-related intangible returns. These intangible benefits specifically consist of ‘global exposure’ of the city and the centrality of the event to Melbourne’s ‘sporting capital’ status and ‘major events strategy’ (see AGPC, 2014). Despite debate continuing around the associated economic benefits (tangible and intangible) to Melbourne, of greatest concern remains the significant symbolic capital bestowed upon the AGPC which has

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292 Eddie McGuire, the President of Collingwood Football Club, has been the host of a number of television shows including the ‘Footy show’ and ‘Who wants to be a millionaire’, as well as being the host of radio breakfast show and sports commentator on both television and radio (Huxley, 2013). In addition, McGuire was CEO of the Nine network (television). In addition to McGuire, Gary Pert, the CEO of Collinwood, previously held roles as managing director of the Nine Network and general manager of Austereo (radio) (‘Brand Profile’, 2013).

293 The 2014 AGPC annual report lists a number of strategic priorities including, the promotion of Melbourne through the event and the maximising of revenues and minimising of costs to “increase return on investment” (AGPC, 2014, p. 7).
essentially legitimised the Corporation as transcending existing state laws (exemptions from environmental, planning and freedom of information) in the name of city boosterism (Lowes, 2004) or urban entrepreneurialism.

**Neoliberal Doxa**

Bourdieu (1977) explains that, within each field, practices and dispositions are limited by the doxa that acts to create conditions for the ‘misrecognition’ of power relations so that the “natural and social world appears as self-evident” (p. 164). In 'Neo-liberalism, the Utopia (Becoming a Reality) of Unlimited Exploitation,' Bourdieu (1998b) argues that neoliberalism is a political programme that, with the aid of economic theory, has constructed a scientific (economic) description of reality. In explaining the force of neoliberalism, Bourdieu (1998b) expresses that:

> Neo-liberal discourse is not a discourse like others … it is a ‘strong discourse’ which is so strong and so hard to fight because it has behind it all the powers of a world of power relations which it helps to make as it is, in particular by orienting the economic choices of those who dominate economic relations and so adding its own – specifically symbolic – force to those power relations. (p. 95)

Those that benefit from neoliberalism are also the ones driving the neoliberal discourse, the “Politicians, think tanks, experts (especially economists), journalists, and public intellectuals” (Sapiro, 2010, p. xiv). The engine of the vehicle is the state which is instrumental in (re)creating a neoliberal doxa that permits the all-pervasiveness of neoliberalism to operate through the advocating of specific economic, cultural and social policies that limit what is thinkable/doable within modern societies (Chopra, 2003).²⁹⁴ The neoliberal view, Bourdieu (1998d) argues has, in large part, gained prominence because it is the only view being presented; “Everywhere we hear it said, all day long – and this is what gives the dominant discourse its strength – that there is nothing to put forward in opposition to the neo-liberal view, that it has succeeded in presenting itself as self-evident, that there is no alternative” (p. 29). As such, a whole set of presuppositions are imposed as self-evident; specifically that “it is taken for granted that maximum growth, and therefore productivity and competitiveness, are the ultimate and sole goal of human actions; or that economic forces cannot be resisted” (Bourdieu, 1998d, pp. 30-31).²⁹⁵

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²⁹⁴ Chopra (2003), discussing the dominant discourse of neoliberalism across Indian social space, inserts Bourdieu’s concept of doxa to explain how a consensus of the positive effects of globalisation and liberalisation have been established.

²⁹⁵ Bourdieu (1998d) explains that “work was done…to impose as self-evident a neo-liberal view which, essentially, dresses up the most classic presuppositions of conservative thought of all times
The political and media discourse surrounding the significance of Melbourne’s sportscape illustrates the emphasis on economics and limits to the neoliberal doxa that frames decisions. For example, while some media reports criticised the non-economic deficiencies of the Grand Prix, such as the lack of transparency surrounding the contract, the overwhelming argument opposing the event emphasised its economic failings. This tactic arguably supports neoliberals in their economic framing of the social world.

Bourdieu (1998d) explains that by separating the economic from the social we consent to the power of economics and value economic discourse above other forms of dialogue. By critiquing the GP event with the tool of economics, that is the tool that the neoliberals have acquired ownership over, the debate remains entwined within the neoliberal doxa (what is thinkable and unthinkable) and serves to empower those richest in economic capital and economic knowledge (a specific form of cultural capital).

In Victoria, the state has positioned elite sport as a tool which benefits the underclass by increasing the tax coffers of the state (increasing the potential provision of social welfare) as well as increasing employment opportunities for individuals – that is, as a celebrated cultural activity which also drives economic development. By positioning elite sport as a cultural activity which produces wider economic benefits, the state has successfully constructed a ‘cultural glue’ which produces a sense of what it is to be a Melburnian while also reflecting, reproducing and valuing key processes of neoliberalism. However, much of the opportunities that arise from major sporting events for the urban lower class (or precariat) occur as casual/seasonal or temporary employment and has little overall effect on the employment levels of the urban area (Crompton, 2001; Ingerson, 2001). In ‘Job Insecurity is Everywhere Now’, Bourdieu (1998e) argues that not only do flexible or casual working contracts make the future uncertain for the employee but also affects their “basic belief and hope in the future that one needs in order to rebel, especially collectively, against present conditions, even the most intolerable” (p. 82). That is, neoliberals advocating for flexible contracts ultimately benefit by having a labour unit that is less likely to challenge inadequate working conditions. The use of neoliberal language such as deregulation, ‘slimming’ and globalisation, Bourdieu (1998d) explains, “tends to imply that the neo-liberal message is a universalist message of liberation” (p. 31). This universal message has been presented as a natural phenomenon which serves to battle against any gains of the welfare state (Bourdieu, 1998d). The natural ‘myth’ of globalisation, Bourdieu argues, has resulted in the self-evident belief that workers in one and all countries in economic rationalizations…Thatcherism was not invented by Mrs Thatcher. The ground had been prepared over a long period by intellectuals most of whom wrote columns in the leading newspapers” (p. 30).
state need to compete with workers from rival states. In order to compete, there is a need for flexible working contracts, working nights and weekends; “things which have always been part of the employers’ dreams” (Bourdieu, 1998d, p. 34). As a result of such common-sense workings of the globalised labour market, many manual workers, as well as many in the middle classes, are exposed to the threat of sudden job loss and a feeling of insecurity; in addition to losing important employment benefits such as health insurance and pension rights. It is ‘insecurity’ at all levels which results in the “structural violence [original emphasis] of unemployment” (Bourdieu, 1998b, p. 98).

The neoliberal doxa sets the presupposition that maximum economic growth within a system of competition is self-evident which has led to cities, such as Melbourne, becoming engaged in inter-city competition for mobile capital, including major sporting events.

**Symbolic capital & the ‘public’: land, interest & identity**

We call events and occasions ‘public’ when they are open to all, in contrast to closed or exclusive affairs—as when we speak of public places or public houses. But as in the expression ‘public building,’ the term need not refer to general accessibility; the building does not even have to be open to public traffic. ‘Public buildings’ simply house state institutions and as such are ‘public.’ The state is the ‘public authority.’ It owes this attribute to its task of promoting the public or common welfare of its rightful members. (Habermas, 1962/1991, pp. 1-2)

Habermas (1962/1991) defines the notion of the ‘public' by expressing its opposition to the ‘private’: the closed or exclusive. Moreover, the above definition tasks the state with responsibility to represent the public and determine the public’s use of public resources.

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296 Bourdieu (1998b) refers to the structural violence of unemployment as “Insecure employment and of the fear provoked by the threat of losing employment” (p. 98). Bourdieu (1998b) explains that the structural violence of unemployment exists because “of a reserve army of labour made docile by insecure employment and the permanent threat of unemployment” (p. 98). As such, “casualization of employment is part of a mode of domination of a new kind, based on the creation of a generalized and permanent state of insecurity aimed at forcing workers into submission, into the acceptance of exploitation” (Bourdieu, 1998e, p. 85) within a political system that values individuality and competition, including those in the underclass who relinquish collective power in order to avoid being added to the ‘reserve army’ of labour. While Bourdieu uses the term ‘reserve army’ to describe the unemployed that are willing to work, he also acknowledges that “the term ‘army’ is inappropriate, because unemployment isolates, atomizes, individualizes, demobilizes and strips away solidarity” (Bourdieu, 1998b, p. 98).
However, with the rise of consumer capitalism the demarcations between the state and society, the public and private, have become blurred as powerful interest groups compete to represent and define ‘the public body’ (Habermas, 1962/1991). As McCarthy (1991) explains, “the public sphere of social-welfare-state democracies is rather a field of competition among conflicting interests, in which organizations representing diverse constituencies negotiate and compromise among themselves and with government officials, while excluding the public from their proceedings” (p. xii). The use of public resources, particularly public parkland and taxes were common discussion points across all four case studies of this thesis. In addition, decisions made by the state that were deemed to be in the public's interest tended to focus on, or were justified by, economic returns but often failed to engage the public in consultation. Moreover, the continued emphasis on the sporting major event strategy was often justified by politicians and those within pseudo-governmental authorities through the use of Victoria's sporting identity which is founded upon an uncritical history and deemed to be a 'natural' reflection of the Victorian publics' values.

The annexation of public land for commercial activities is a significant political topic in many urban areas and has certainly been the case in Melbourne. The National Tennis Centre was built on, and continues to expand across Melbourne Park (formerly Flinders Park), the Rectangular Stadium was constructed on Edwin Flack Oval with subsequent developments on Gosch’s Paddock and Olympic Park, the Grand Prix is held annually through Albert Park and Docklands Stadium was erected on public land at Melbourne’s Victoria Dock. In addition to these developments, which primarily involve sport related commercial activity; the seizure of a segment of Royal Park for private housing illustrated the use of a major sporting event (2006 Commonwealth Games) for non-sport related private gain. In this case, the state government fast-tracked the decision to approve the construction of the ‘Athletes’ Village’ in Royal Park, rather than accommodate athletes in University halls of residence or on cruise ships as was suggested by some critics of the housing development (Davidson, 2002; Millar, 2003a). With minimal public consultation the housing development was put out to commercial tender; the Village Park Consortium won the bid to build the 1000 dwelling complex on 20 hectares of prime inner-city crown real estate (Tomazin, 2002a). The contract permitted Village Park Consortium to build the Athletes’ Village; with the houses sold to the public after the Commonwealth Games and profits shared between the state and the private housing developer (Tomazin, 2002b). In essence the state government and Melbourne

297 The Village Park Consortium consists of property developers Australand Holdings and the Citta Property Group.
2006 Commonwealth Games Corporation (M2006) adopted a commercial strategy of tendering the Athletes’ Village to the biggest bidder in order to achieve the short-term economic objective of balancing the books. In the process, the state by-passed public consultation and sacrificed the long-term community asset of open public parkland in close vicinity to the CBD.

The sporting developments and events outlined in this thesis were often framed by the state as being decisions that were in the public’s interest. Bourdieu (1998b) conceptualises the state structure as the “repository of all the universal ideas associated with the idea of the public” (p. 102). As such, the state, shapes and (re)defines what is in the public’s interest. Sandercock and Dovey (2002, p. 152) explain that cities contain “multiple publics, characterized by differences and diverse interests” and any attempt to “resurrect a workable notion of the public good” can only be “constructed through democratic public debate”. The authors analyse changes to Melbourne’s riverscape during the 1990s, illustrating that the commercial Southbank development serves the interests of some of the public, most notably those that hold sufficient economic capital to produce and consume leisure/entertainment activities, while other public interests are excluded or ignored. The political process of reconstructing this riverscape, Sandercock and Dovey (2002) explain, was largely devoid of public involvement; as such, it was left to urban designers, politicians and the business elite with privileged political access to determine a public’s interest for this urban space. In much the same way, the ‘fast-tracking’ of sporting infrastructure to house sporting events in Melbourne, with minimal public consultation, illustrated the manner in which the Victorian government and pseudo-government authorities, determined the public’s interest in an urban entrepreneurial fashion which emphasised the economic benefits (often filtered to the urban elite) of constructing urban spaces around entertainment and consumption.

The construction of Melbourne as a ‘sport city’, unlike many other ‘sport cities’ such as Dubai, Doha (see Smith, 2010) Singapore (see Yuen, 2008) and Kuala Lumpur (see Silk, 2002), is founded upon a claim of (global) sporting histories. The political and media discourse constructing Melbourne’s historical connection to major sporting events (for example the use of the 1956 Olympic Games to justify the 1996 Olympic Games and 2006 Commonwealth Games bids and claims of Albert Park as the ‘home’ of the Grand Prix on the basis of two events in the 1950s) combined with accusations of ‘rival’ city desires to pilfer Melbourne’s major sporting events has served two purposes. Firstly,

298 While the cities referred to have sporting histories, the global sports – such as Formula One and Tennis – that ‘sport cities’ often aim to attract may be termed ‘western sports’ and as such have a relatively shorter history in non-western nations.
citizens of Melbourne are encouraged to feel a sense of unity in protecting their assets and maintaining their ‘sport city’ or sporting capital identity and secondly, a culture of competition is normalised.

The public costs of constructing, or upgrading, ‘world class’ facilities, it appears in Melbourne, has become a public project of city pride. Indeed, Jeff Kennett explained that one of the key benefits in acquiring the Grand Prix from Adelaide included the psychological lift it provided to Melburnians: “It [GP] actually gave people extraordinary hope that we were once again seen as winners…that played a huge role, I think, in changing the psyche of people” (J. Kennett, personal communication, May 6, 2013).

Meanwhile the investment of public money into elite sporting events and infrastructure was, in part, justified on the basis of the ‘cultural’ – and perceived ‘biological’ – importance of sport to Melburnians:

“Sport has always been part of the DNA of Victorians”. (J. Kennett, personal communication, May 6, 2013)

“…it’s the culture; it’s in the blood of people in Melbourne to want to support events”. (J. Brumby, personal communication, September 11, 2013)

Both Jeff Kennett and John Brumby explained that watching sport is ingrained in the citizens of Melbourne, meanwhile John Cain explained, in more detail, the historical connection to sport:

See, Victoria was settled in 1834, even before it’s a district of the colony of New South Wales, Port Phillip District, run by a bloke called La Trobe. But by 1838 or ’39, they’re playing cricket, you’ve got to if you’re a colonial power or colonial outpost, and they’re horse racing. So they’re into it pretty early. The cricket club has ground allocated to it by La Trobe back in the 1840s and ’50s I think. It’s got a settled spot, the place where it is now [at the MCG] – 1857 or 58, whereabouts. The [horse] races at Flemington – again it’s public land - by about the 1850s or 60s. The Melbourne Cup 1861, Stawell Gift, don’t forget that. So all of those early phenomena, if you like, entrench sport in the colony. (J. Cain, personal communication, 17 April, 2013)

As such, the former premiers justified their decisions for the continued emphasis on elite sport as a valued cultural activity for Victorians and consequently a legitimate endeavour for the state to support. Indeed, Bourdieu (1989) explains that “retrospectively reconstructing a past fitted to the needs of the present” (p. 21) is one of the typical strategies of imposing a legitimate vision of the social world. In addition, Bourdieu (1991) explains the importance of political slogans in defining the vision of the social world, and
as such the di-visions of social order.\textsuperscript{299} The official representation of Melbourne as a ‘sport city’ through government documents and promotional activities of government-related organisations (for example Tourism Victoria and the MOPT) has served to emphasise and legitimise the sporting title for the city. The (re)presentation of Melbourne as a ‘sport city’ and indeed a ‘commercialised sport city’, ultimately serves to empower the urban and political elite (those most closely associated with the benefits of urban entrepreneurialism) while systematically reducing alternative identities of the city (for example, the trade union movement). The state’s construction of this historical or ‘natural’ sporting identity has provided an ideal foundation upon which to lay the neoliberal project. That is, the people of Melbourne have consented to the valuing of elite/commercial sport as a key component of their identity and are therefore hesitant to question those activities which enhance this unique identity. As such, elite sport serves as a form of cultural glue in binding neoliberalism to the public’s interest.

Secondly, a common-sense culture of competition is reproduced and normalised by the urban entrepreneurial strategy which frames inter-city competition as a zero-sum game. Harvey (1989) explains that a neoliberal discourse of competition is espoused through the notion of urban entrepreneurialism as being “embedded in a framework of zero-sum inter-urban competition for resources, jobs, and capital” (p. 5).\textsuperscript{300} Meanwhile Hall (2006) explains that the “fusion of urban entrepreneurialism with neoliberalism … provides the ideological justification for place-competitive re-imaging strategies including the hosting of sports mega-events” (p. 64). The production, regulation and consumption of Melbourne as a ‘sport city,’ that is the strategic construction of a legitimate identity – or the cultural glue – which has been accepted by citizens, occurs through these neoliberal cultural processes. Furthermore, the hegemony of the urban entrepreneurial strategy and neoliberal ideology has resulted in a public acceptance that the city is in a zero-sum competition with other states and must ‘de-regulate’ or adopt free-market mechanisms in order to compete (Bourdieu, 1998d).

Hobbes’ (1651/2010) conceptualisation of the Leviathan relies on the understanding that the state offers protection to its citizens through a mutually agreed ‘social contract’. The state, the central bank of symbolic capital (Wacquant, 2005b) and

\textsuperscript{299} See ‘Slogans and mobilizing ideas’ (pp. 188-192) in Political Representation: elements for a theory of the political field.

\textsuperscript{300} Harvey (1989) however does express that urban entrepreneurialism is not necessarily harmful to citizens of capitalist states. Instead, Harvey (1989) explains that “urban entrepreneurialism and even inter-urban competition may open the way to a non zero-sum pattern of development” and questions whether or not urban entrepreneurialism “could lead towards progressive and socialist transitions in the future” (p. 5).
holder of statist capital (a meta-capital) defines the public, and indeed determines the use of public assets/resources in order to achieve this protective function. Bourdieu (1989) explains that the construction of social reality is structurally contested, and that the “structuring structures … are themselves socially structured” (p. 18). That is, the structures that are involved in the contest to define space have been socially constructed and therefore analysis of the contests and struggles that occur in the (re)formation of these institutions (for example, the government, P-GAs and the media) is also necessary when studying the construction of social realities. Continuing, Bourdieu (1989) explains that because these contests persist – the visions of reality are indeterminate and dynamic – a “plurality of visions of the world which is itself linked to the plurality of points of view” (p. 20) exists and “provides a base for symbolic struggles over the power to produce and to impose the legitimate vision of the world” (p. 20). In other words, because a number of competing visions are present, agents (representing themselves as well as official offices and their constituencies) are engaged in a constant struggle to define the legitimate social reality; or as Bourdieu (1989) refers to it, “a power of ‘world-making’” (p. 22). However, the ability to construct official definitions of the public emerges through the struggles to acquire symbolic capital (such as official titles or educational credentials) which “tend to reproduce and to reinforce the power relations that constitute the structure of social space” (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 21). That is, symbolic capital is acquired through the structures (such as degrees from universities and official titles from the government) which the state uses to “impose common principles of vision and division … universally imposing and inculcating (within the limits of its authority) a dominant culture thus constituted as legitimate” (Bourdieu, 1994a, pp. 7-8). The neoliberal state, which imposes the neoliberal doxa, presents a self-evident vision of the social world that values free-market economics and associated neoliberal mechanisms, including the use of culture (sport) as an economic tool.301 Presenting elite sport as being within the public’s interest has permitted the Victorian state to invest public resources into an activity which reflects many neoliberal values (Coakley, 2011). In addition, legitimising Melbourne’s identity as the ‘sporting capital’ of Australia illustrates the states symbolic power to define social life, by manufacturing the cultural glue, in neoliberal/urban entrepreneurial terms; further authorising elite sport as a legitimate public endeavour.

301 Bourdieu and Wacquant (1994a) explain the self-evidencing of a particular vision which benefits those rich in symbolic capital by asserting that doxa is “a particular point of view, the point of view of the dominant, when it presents and imposes itself as a universalist point of view – the point of view of those who dominate by dominating the state and who have constituted their point of view as universal by constituting the state” (p. 15).
The inner-circle (social capital)

Bourdieu (2010 [1984]) explains that social capital is a “capital of social connections, honourability and respectability” (p. 116). This social capital is the actual or potential for individuals to mobilise through membership of organisations and social networks (Ecclestone, 2004). This form of capital, Swartz (1997) explains, can then be manipulated into economic, political and social advantages. Of course, the individual must have a legitimate position or be legitimately accepted into the social network; as such a certain quantity of symbolic capital is required. Indeed, Bourdieu (1986) expresses that “It goes without saying that social capital is so totally governed by the logic of knowledge and acknowledgement that it always functions as symbolic capital” (p. 257). I focus here on Ron Walker – and to a lesser extent Graeme Samuel – to illustrate the close connections between political decision-makers and individuals that are rich in economic, cultural, symbolic and social capital who occupy influential roles within P-GAs; that is, within the bureaucratic field.

Ron Walker occupied a central role in the bureaucratic field as chairman of the Victorian Major Events Company (VMEC) along with his private business ventures (including Crown Casino), political position as treasurer of the federal Liberal Party and former Lord Mayor, and personal friendship with key decision-makers (such as Bernie Ecclestone and Jeff Kennett).302 The state, the distributor of symbolic capital (Wacquant, 2004), bestowed the VMEC with the authority to legitimately acquire major events using public funds. Walker’s position as chairman of the VMEC significantly increased his social capital through access to information and political networks, which he was subsequently able to transform into economic capital (the link between the GP and Casino is a clear example of this transformation in action).

Criticism of Ron Walker’s role as head of the VMEC often alluded to the secretive method he adopted in obtaining major events.303 Walker expressed that the method was

302 The Herald Sun defines Walker as a ‘self-made man’ after developing a chemical business from a Collingwood shop-front (see Hamilton, 1994; Rule, 1996) and claims Walker’s hobbies include skiing and golf (Hamilton, 1994). The Age describes Walker as a self-confessed petrol-head (‘The key players, 1993) and suggests that Walker’s educational background was unsuccessful (at Caulfield Grammar and Melbourne University) but he quickly rose in the political ranks to become Lord Mayor at the age of 35 (Rule, 1996). By 2011, it was estimated that Walker’s wealth totalled $810 million (Kitney, 2011).

303 Letters to the editors were critical of Walker’s tactic however the Herald Sun has supported the approach as effective, explaining that secrecy is needed “because other countries or states already have the prizes Victoria is going after” (Tennison, 1995, p. 22). The Age has often challenged the
vital in obtaining events for Melbourne (Walker, 1996) and defined those involved in the secret deals as ‘city boosters’. For example, in relation to the individuals that were privy to the secret deal being struck to bring the Formula One Grand Prix to Melbourne in 1993, Walker explained that; “We are all part of the Loop. All the best deals are closely-kept secrets – kept in a loop of people who respect that need” (cited in Neales, 1993a, p. 1). As such, Walker asserted that opaqueness was needed to obtain events for the benefit of Victorian citizens (Walker, 1996); however it often appears that significant benefits from this method filtered to the gate-keepers of important ‘public’ secrets.

Neales (1993a) described the VMEC as a vehicle which links individuals of the most powerful companies in Victoria; “Officially a Government-owned and non-profit company, its tentacles spread into board rooms and party chambers through the impeccable connections of its board” (p. 1). The individuals that were privy to the secret deals being orchestrated by the Victorian government and Bernie Ecclestone were at the “heart of Melbourne’s power-broking circles” (Neales, 1993a, p. 1); institutions such as the Liberal party, Carlton and United Breweries (CUB) and Crown Casino. Each of these

nature in which Melbourne obtains events but tends to support and celebrate these events as important for the state (see ‘Stop laughing’, 1996; ‘At last’, 2006; ‘The spirit’, 2006).

Walker (1996) penned an article in The Age expressing that his motivation for bringing the Grand Prix to Melbourne was because of his affection towards the city as well as asserting the usefulness of sport as an urban entrepreneurial tool: “I didn’t do it for the love of motor sport, but out of passion for Melbourne…In a nutshell, the Grand Prix is really all about selling the attributes of Melbourne to the world…Melbourne’s future as a tourist venue can only be based on its reputation as Australia’s premier city for major sporting events” (p. 13).

While I have previously discussed concerns regarding Crown Casino and the Grand Prix (see Chapter 8), suggestions of insider information were likewise raised regarding CUB’s timely ending of a nine-year sponsorship with the Adelaide Grand Prix organisers just three weeks before the Victorian government announced the arrival of the Grand Prix to Melbourne. Three weeks prior to Melbourne announcing the Grand Prix; Fosters – a CUB brand – informed the Adelaide Grand Prix organisers that it was ending its nine-year title sponsorship of their event (see Harris, 1993; Neales, 1993a). Shortly after, journalist Roy Masters asserted that “Foster’s decision to withdraw from next year’s 1994 Adelaide Grand Prix is surprising” (Masters, 1993, p. 53). In hindsight, it is of little surprise, as Pat Stone, the CEO of CUB was also a board member of the VMEC and one of few people aware of the secret contract between the AGPC/VMEC and Formula One Group (Neales, 1993a; ‘The key players’, 1993); Stone would later become a board member of the Australian Grand Prix Company. In addition, newspaper reports claimed that Ken Carnie, a CUB marketing director, was in attendance at key meetings between Ron Walker and Bernie Ecclestone (Coster, 1993; Forbes & Thompson, 1993). Fosters did not become the title sponsor of the 1996 Melbourne Grand Prix, but it held ‘pouring rights’ as the official beer of the Australian Grand Prix.
institutions clearly benefited from the knowledge of Melbourne’s acquirement of the Grand Prix prior to any public announcement of the event. Likewise, individuals acting in a public role, such as Ron Walker, were able to use this knowledge (cultural capital) in order to benefit privately – the Crown Group which won the rights to build Melbourne’s first casino was the only bidder to know about the Grand Prix, Ron Walker as co-founder of the Crown Group made significant economic gains from this venture (see Neales, 1993b; Hoy, 2014).

The relationship between Victorian Liberal Party leader Jeff Kennett and VMEC chairman Ron Walker drew much criticism throughout the 1990s; most notably because it was the Kennett government that awarded the Casino contract to Walker’s Crown Group consortium. Outside of their professional relationship, Walker and Kennett were known to have a private relationship; as Walker explained in 1994: “The Premier and I became friends during my Melbourne City Council days when he was a backbencher. The friendship has gone on with our families all this time. We’ve enjoyed the good times and the bad times” (Walker, cited in Hamilton, 1994, p. 19). Walker’s role as chairman of the VMEC was often defended by Liberal politicians and the media on the basis that it was the Kirner Labor government that appointed Walker to the VMEC (Birrell, 1994). However, his position within the Crown Group was widely criticised as a conflict of interest (see Forbes, 1994; Neales, 1993b) and evidence of political favouritism (see Brady, 1994).

In addition to Walker’s positions within the VMEC and Crown Casino, his close relationship with Formula One chief Bernie Ecclestone has been questioned (Hoy, 2014). Specifically, queries regarding Walker’s friendship with Ecclestone and his role as a Trustee on Ecclestone’s family trust have raised concerns about how a ‘friend’ of Ecclestone can negotiate the best deal for Victorian citizens (Hoy, 2014; SAP, 2012). Recent ‘conflict of interest claims’ by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation resulted in the following response by a spokesperson for Ecclestone:

As a former Lord Mayor of Melbourne and prominent Australian businessman, Mr Walker is proud of his achievements in attracting and managing major sporting events in this State, including as Chairman of the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games Corporation and as Founding

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306 Indeed, two years after the casino contract had been issued it was revealed in The Age that Kennett had been concerned with Walker’s dual roles and a possible conflict of interest (Green, 1996c).

307 Walker sold his shares in Hudson Conway, the property development company which operated Crown Casino, in 2000 (Fisher, 2012).

308 Walker has been quoted in the Herald Sun as stating “I speak to Bernie every second day, he’s one of my closest friends” (cited in Warner, 2006, p. 9).
Chairman of … the Victorian Major Events Company. In both these roles, Mr Walker acted in a voluntary capacity as he does in his role as Chairman of the [Australian Grand Prix] Corporation. He is committed to ensuring that the Australian Grand Prix promotes Melbourne and Victoria prominently on the international stage as part of Victoria’s major events calendar. (Cerny, 2014, para. 6)

Likewise, Victorian premiers, both Liberal-National Coalition and Labor, along with the AGPC have often defended Walker’s dual positions by expressing that he has, in a voluntary role, secured major events for Victoria which result in economic benefits for the state (see Neales & Magazanik, 1994; Rollins, 2000; The Directors, 1996). While both The Age and Herald Sun published articles that raised questions about Walker’s ‘conflicting’ roles, both papers usually represented Walker as a philanthropist who, rather than aiming to improve his personal wealth (see Hamilton, 1994; ‘The key players’, 1993), always desired to position Melbourne as an international city to benefit the citizens of Victoria (see Neales, 1994e). Holding significant social capital, and being positively represented by cultural producers, has allowed Walker to amass economic capital, in no small part due to his symbolic capital associated with sport in the ‘sport city’.

Graeme Samuel, another influential mover-and-shaker within Victorian political and business circles, further illustrated the close connection evident within and between the pseudo-government authorities that determine and shape Melbourne’s sportscape. For example, between 1997 and 2003, Samuel was a board member on the Docklands Authority, trustee on the MCG and MOPT Trusts, commissioner of the AFL and held a consultation role within the Kennett government. Prior to these public positions, Samuel was, amongst other things, Treasurer of the Victorian Liberal Party (1989–1992). Indeed, Samuel’s appointment to a multitude of roles, like Ron Walker, illustrates the manner in which individuals with strong political connections (social capital) are able to access non-democratically appointed positions of power within the public domain.

The purpose of a P-GA is to ensure that the state’s commercial operations are kept at arm’s length from the government and political ideology in order to ensure neutrality, transparency, accountability and efficiency in the free-market. However, the cases of Ron Walker and Graeme Samuel illustrate the complexity and often conflicting positions held by those entrusted to operate and strike deals in the best interests of their interests.

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309 The interest in media-ownership and arguably control of ‘representation’ is evident through Walker’s attempts, through his Hudson Conway company, to buy Fairfax Media – owner of The Age – in the early 1990s (Crook, 2012); Furthermore, Walker later served as chairman of Fairfax Media from 2005-2009.
stake holders; most notably the citizens of Victoria. With high profile public positions (symbolic capital), these individuals have access to significant information (cultural capital) and networks (social capital) which have allowed, Ron Walker for instance, to transform this into economic capital through his links to the Casino.

**Sport: Political capital in Melbourne**

Political capital is a concept that has not gained wide currency within the academic field despite frequently being used by mainstream journalists (Birner & Wittmer, 2000).\(^ {310} \) This may be, in part, because Bourdieu did not elaborate on the concept in any great detail (Schugurensky, 2000; Bénit-Gbaffou & Katsaura, 2014). However, Bourdieu (1991) does briefly define political capital as “a form of symbolic capital, credit founded on credence or belief and recognition or, more precisely, on the innumerable operations of credit by which agents confer on a person (or on an object) the very powers that they recognize in him (or it)” (p. 192). As Bénit-Gbaffou and Katsaura (2014) explain, symbolic capital can be acquired through respect and notability and then “converted into political capital in an ‘inaugural moment’ (speaking up in public when there is a crisis, a political void)” (p. 1814) or through a position or title delegated by an institution (such as a political party).

Conceptualising political capital in such a way permits us to illustrate how some actors, outside of the Political (government) environment have gained significant influence over Political decisions (for example, the significant political capital acquired by actors such as Ron Walker through his delegation role as chair of the VMEC as well as his respect and notability – particularly within politico-economic circles – and access to media to provide an opinion in public about political issues). This process of acquiring respect and notability is a ‘game’ often played by politicians and, importantly in the ‘sport city’, sport appears to be a key weapon in their armoury (Allison & Monnington, 2002; Jarvie, 2003), specifically used to attach themselves to the ‘common people’ of their constituency.

Successive premiers of Victoria have hijacked and mobilised sport (particularly Australian rules football) “as a preeminent signifier of [Victorian-ness] in the pursuit of political fortunes and the remaking of the [Victorian] social fabric as common sense” (Scherer & McDermott, 2012, pp. 271-2).\(^ {311} \) Indeed, as Green (2010) points out, in the

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\(^ {310} \) See Booth and Richard (1998); Leicht and Jenkins (1998) and Bénit-Gbaffou and Katsaura (2014) who refer to ‘political capital’ in their writings.

\(^ {311} \) The use of sport for political capital is not unique, for example Scherer and McDermott (2012) illustrate the manner in which a right-wing PM in Canada (Stephen Harper) has hijacked and mobilised “hockey as a preeminent signifier of ‘Canadian-ness’ in the pursuit of political fortunes and the remaking of the Canadian social fabric as common sense” (pp. 271-2).
2010 Victorian election as many as eight candidates had played AFL/VFL, including Justin Madden – the Minister for Sport and Recreation (1999-2006) and Minister for Commonwealth Games (2002-2006). In addition, other high profile Victorian politicians have strong links to AFL clubs; for example Jeff Kennett was president of Hawthorn F.C. from 2005-2011, Alan Stockdale served as a director of Melbourne F.C. from 1999-2001, Steve Bracks vocally supports Geelong F.C. and was recently appointed to establish and lead the Kardinia Park Trust (Dundas, 2015) and,312 John Brumby, who was criticised for holding private meetings with Collingwood F.C. regarding Olympic Park, is a strong supporter of the football club (Baker, 2009). As such, it appears in Victoria that those holding significant ‘football’ capital are able to seamlessly enter the field of politics and business while simultaneously those with significant ‘political’ capital are able to enter the field of football administration. But it is not just ‘Aussie rules’ that has been politically hijacked, rather, sport, as a valued cultural institution in the state of Victoria has been appropriated by the political and business elite.

Many of the individuals directing the entrepreneurial activities and decisions of the Victorian state over the past three decades have had strong interests in sport. For example, Alan Stockdale, discussing the Kennett government, explained that the “cabinet, starting with Jeff [Kennett] and myself and Tom Reynolds [Minister for Sport, Recreation and Racing], had a whole lot of people who were extremely passionate about sport” (personal communication, May 6, 2013).313 Since leaving parliament, John Cain has been a trustee on the MCG Trust and MOPT which indicates some level of interest in the sporting domain. Meanwhile John Brumby simply stated “I love sport” (personal communication, September 11, 2013). Furthermore, Green (2010) and Latham (2013) illustrate the close connection between Victorian and Australian politicians and sport. Leading business figures likewise maintain strong links to Melbourne sport. Some high profile examples include founder of Hastings Funds Management Limited and former chairman of the Victorian Funds Management Corporation Mike Fitzpatrick (ex-VFL athlete, current AFL commissioner); director of VMEC, former CEO of the Nine Network television company and high profile media personality Eddie McGuire (president of Collingwood F.C. and former board member of Athletics Australia); founder of Belgravia Group venture capital business Geoff Lord (inaugural chairman of Melbourne Victory) and; founder of Mitchell & Partners media buying agency Harold Mitchell (former majority

312 Kardinia Park is the home ground of Geelong Football Club.
313 Stockdale continues to explain that this passion “wasn’t to the exclusion of other things. Jeff was a huge champion for the arts…we believed it [sport] was essential to rebuild public confidence” (Stockdale, personal communication, May 6, 2013).
shareholder of Melbourne Rebels). Indeed, in the words of Bourdieu (2010/1984), having a ‘taste’ for sport appears to be important cultural capital within Victorian politics and business.

**Political habitus**

Victoria’s case of politicians and influential business people employing the use of sport as a tool for political and social capital is not unique and is indeed common across the globe. Arguably of greater concern is the lack in diversity of those determining Melbourne’s sportscape which may be evidence of a kind of ‘Political habitus’. Bourdieu (1991; 1994a) describes the political field as the site where agents wrestle to impose a particular vision of society as well as a “struggle for power over the ‘public powers’ (state administrations)” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 181). As Mihai (2014) explains, “because capital (economic, cultural, symbolic) and leisure are not distributed evenly within the citizenry, disadvantaged individuals are divested of the resources necessary for developing the kind of practical sense that would enable them to engage meaningfully in politics” (pp. 18-9).

According to Bourdieu (1991; 1998c) the political field consists of ‘professional politicians’ with ‘special training’ from a class that holds considerable cultural and symbolic capital (through well-reputed academic degrees and social prestige). Mihai (2014) explains that the ‘special training’ of the professional politician, has resulted in these agents becoming “the state nobility who has specific knowledge of concepts, traditions, rhetoric, and, most importantly, a practical sense of the field” (p. 19); what Bourdieu (1991) refers to as a “feel for the political game” (p. 179). Continuing, Bourdieu (1991) explains that the special training:

- Includes in the first instance, of course, the entire apprenticeship necessary to acquire the corpus of specific kinds of knowledge (theories, problematics, concepts, historical traditions, economic data, etc.) produced and accumulated by the political work of the professionals of the present or the past, or to acquire the more general skills such as the mastery of a certain kind of language and of a certain political rhetoric – that of the *popular orator*, indispensable when it comes to cultivating one’s relations with non-professionals, or that of the *debater*, which is necessary in relations between fellow professionals. But it is also and above all that sort of *initiation*, with its ordeals and its rites of passage, which tends to inculcate the *practical mastery* of the immanent logic of the political field and to impose a *de facto submission* to the values, hierarchies and censorship mechanisms inherent in this field, or in the specific form that the constraints and control mechanisms of the field assume within each political party. (p. 176)
Bourdieu asserts that those agents engaged in struggles within the political field must be able to debate and express opinions (in the correct ‘political’ style) however these skills by themselves are not adequate, rather the agent must also have consciously and unconsciously learned/embodied the political doxa; what is and is not doable and sayable within the field.

The political habitus, like other forms of habitus, is difficult to analyse and define (Jenkins, 1992; Reay, 2004). In order to study the political habitus, Bourdieu (1991) asserts that:

We would have to analyse the entire process of production of the professionals of ideological production, starting with the way they are marked out, according to the frequently implicit definition of the desired competence, which designates them for these functions, then considering the general or specific education which prepares them to assume these functions, and finally examining the action of continuous normalization imposed on them, with their own complicity, by the older members of their group, in particular when, newly elected, they gain access to a political organization into which they might bring a certain outspokenness and an independence of manners which might be prejudicial to the rules of the game. (p. 176)

That is, in order to understand the habitus of politicians we need to map the dispositions the individual politicians have acquired outside of the political field (through, amongst other things, education) as well as the structuring structures (including the habitus of established politicians) within the political field. My aim here is not to attempt to outline the specificities of a political habitus in Victoria’s political field but to firstly demonstrate some of the attributes of those four leading politicians interviewed in this research project (Cain, Kennett, Stockdale and Brumby) and secondly to illustrate that clear identities are present and absent within Victoria’s political field; which may illuminate some of those characteristics which have been predisposed with significant habitus to ‘play the game’ of politics in Victoria.

John Cain’s political habitus likely emerges, in part, from family upbringing. His father, John Cain senior was premier of Victoria for three terms and led the Labor Party from 1937 (when Cain was six years old) until 1957. Cain, a law graduate from the University of Melbourne, attempted to enter government at the age of 26 losing a pre-selection for his late father’s seat; eventually entering Politics at the age of 45 in 1976, quickly rising to Labor Party leader in 1981. Cain might be defined as a professional
politician, despite practicing law prior to his entry to politics (see John Cain Foundation, 2014).

Jeff Kennett’s background is somewhat different to the other three professional politicians I discuss in this section. Economou (2006), Parkinson (2000) and Carlyon (1996) refer to Kennett’s military experience (firstly in Scotch College Cadet Corps and then in the Australian Army between 1968 and 1970) as a significant influence on his political style – loyalty to hierarchy, punctuality, and intolerance of disobedience. Prior to military conscription Kennett attended one year at the Australian National University, initially enrolled in Law but studied economics, however Kennett failed the year (Tan, 2010) and returned to Melbourne to work in advertising. After, military duty Kennett continued in advertising, founding the KNF advertising company with Eran Nicols and Ian Fergan; indeed this interest in advertising and the skills acquired through this profession arguably illustrate Kennett’s ability to (re)present images and sell ideas – key attributes of the modern politician (Seymour-Ure, 2003; Mayne, 2009). Kennett has claimed that he does not identify as a politician (Carlyon, 1996); however Kennett’s association with politics is extensive. Kennett explained that he attempted to enter politics at local council level shortly after military duty before succeeding at state level in 1976; “I was an advertising agent at that time. I’d stood for local council twice and lost, thank Christ! And it was [1976], so it was the Whitlam years here; high interest rates, small business being knocked around. So I decided I’d get in there and change the world. And I won pre-selection in my local area” (J. Kennett, personal communication, May 6, 2013). Kennett continued on to explain that his economic capital provided him the opportunity, at a young age, to enter parliament; “I was 28 when I won office … The only reason I went in was that I’d had a wonderful life and I wanted to make a contribution” (Carlyon, 1996, p. 15). Kennett asserts that he served in politics for much longer than he originally planned; “I only came in for a short time. I only said I was ever gonna stay there six years and stayed there 23” (J. Kennett, personal communication, May 6, 2013; also see Carlyon, 1996).

Once in the political field, Kennett was initially regarded as a “bumbling boofhead, a political loser who was the butt of endless jokes, a figure to be ridiculed, to be laughed at” (Gawenda, 1996, p. 17) – possibly evidence of his learning how to ‘play the game’ – but

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314 “Up until recently, when I’ve had to fill in a form, I’ve put my profession down as ‘advertising’ – not politician” (Kennett, cited in Carlyon, 1996, p. 15).

315 In an interview with Carlyon (1996), Kennett explained that he did not want to be a politician; “I wanted to be a vet… [but] wasn’t bright enough. I did one of those stupid aptitude tests at school – you know, where you’ve got to match squares and shapes to each other. The test said I should be an architect” (p. 15).
quickly rose to leadership within the Victorian Liberal Party in 1982.\textsuperscript{316} Gawenda (1996) explained that, after ten years in Opposition, Kennett was able to empty the “corridors of power and influence … the old elites who once ran the state and treated Kennett with contempt” (p. 17). Continuing, Gawenda (1996) asserted that the political field changed – in line with a global political environment of neoliberalism during the early 1990s – which allowed Kennett to contest and ‘defeat’ the dominant establishment:

Who were these people? They ran the state, but more than that, they defined its culture, set its political imperatives, gave the state and Melbourne, in particular, its sense of itself. The artists, writers, journalists, academics, public servants, trade union officials, the welfare lobby, the essentially conservative Melbourne business establishment … He waited. He absorbed all the ridicule and the contempt. During those long and seemingly endless years of opposition, Jeff Kennett may have wondered if he would ever get his chance to govern. What he did not do was attempt some sort of political metamorphosis in order to make himself electable. Kennett hardly changed: what changed were the times. The old elites failed Victoria … the old elites had become smug and complacent. They did not foresee the crisis that was looming before it was too late. (p. 17)

It appears that this ‘crisis’ resulted in a shift in the political field, or a change to a neoliberal doxa, which provided Kennett with significant political capital. The ‘crisis’ involved the dismantling of the Keynesian state and the insertion of a new political liberalism (not just in Australia but throughout the post-industrial world). Within this new doxa, Kennett was able to redefine the political field in terms of economics – that is, in the terms of the Right hand of the state:

Mr Kennett often talks as if he is running a business, not a government. He refers to his management team, not his Cabinet. He talks of the electorate as shareholders. He has often referred to Victoria as the second biggest business in the country after BHP. In this scheme of things, the 30 March election is Victoria’s annual general shareholders’ meeting. (Gawenda, 1996, p. 17)

The shift to a doxa which valued the logic of the market (re)constructed the bureaucratic and political field to position the likes of Kennett in a more powerful location. Using the logic of the market, Kennett was able to justify the economic efficiencies of carving up

\textsuperscript{316} In addition, part of Kennett’s persona has been referred to as being a larrikin (see Economou, 2006) and it was during the rise of Kennett that larrikin businessmen (see Turner, 1994) began to take centre stage in Australian commerce and politics.
municipal boundaries (affecting some of those that had ridiculed Kennett during the 1980s), amalgamating local councils and selling off public schools (in the process overcrowded schools in under-resourced suburbs increased the demands for private education). Within this new political field, economic rationalists such as Alan Stockdale and John Brumby were repositioned to hold significant political capital and became major players of the game.

Alan Stockdale illustrated his interest in governing by explaining that politics is “the sort of thing that it’s in your blood. I was always interested in politics. Always interested in sport, too, but always interested in politics. I majored in politics in my Arts degree, had stood for pre-selection. I’d been member of the party virtually the whole of my life. So it was a core interest” (A. Stockdale, personal communication, May 6, 2013). Like Cain, Stockdale was educated in Law (and Arts) at the University of Melbourne (see Rule, 1995). Stockdale was regarded by many as “the sensible half of the two-man show in Spring Street” (Rule, 1995, p. 1) in reference to the Kennett-Stockdale government of the 1990s. Rule (1995) interviewed a number of people close to Stockdale in an attempt to understand Stockdale’s influence on Victorian politics; consistent mentions of his love of sport (particularly AFL, tennis and golf) and ideological drive to economically rationalise and de-regulate government are presented. Rule (1995) explained that Stockdale comes from a family with wealth (his father owned successful bakeries in South Yarra) but not too much wealth; “not so much dough that young Alan is robbed of the hunger to make his own” (p. 1).

John Brumby graduated from the University of Melbourne with a commerce degree before completing a diploma in Education and initially teaching secondary school commerce. Brumby explained that he had always been interested in politics, but despite being active in the teachers’ union during the mid-1970s did not become a member of the Labor Party until the late 1970s (personal communication, September 11, 2013). Brumby was elected to the Australian federal parliament in 1983 before entering the Victorian parliament in 1993 after federal Labor’s defeat in 1990. Like Cain, politics appears to run in the family of Brumby whose father served as a councillor for a local government in regional Victoria (‘Victorian premier’, 2010) and his brother Jim Brumby worked in Treasury in New Zealand (Robinson, 1996). Brumby, profiled by Robinson (1996) during his time Opposition Labor leader during the Kennett government, is presented as an economic rationalist; Brumby explained that “He wears the economic rationalist tag put on him by the Left as a badge of honor: ‘If you want to say that, by conservative, I’m

While Stockdale was not a premier, I include him here as he is often regarded as the ‘intelligence’ behind the Kennett-led government (‘Kennett anticipates’, 1999; Mayne, 2006b).
responsible financially … The record shows that I was financially responsible in Canberra. Too right I was” (cited in Robinson, 1996, p. 10). As noted above, it appears that, within the shifting neoliberal doxa, those rich in economic knowledge (a specific form of cultural capital) were able to transfer this form of capital into significant political capital in Victoria during the 1990s and 2000s.

My discussion of four individuals is by no means a comprehensive representation of Victoria’s Political habitus, however certain comparable identities and attributes shared by the politicians are vivid – namely white, middle-aged males. Bourdieu (2001) explains in *Masculine Domination*, that gendered differences which may appear to be eternal are:

…merely the product of a labour of eternalization performed by interconnected institutions such as the family, the church, the state, the educational system, and also, in another order of things, sport and journalism…[which] reinsert into history, and therefore to restore to historical action, the relationship between the sexes that the naturalistic and essentialist vision removes from them. (Bourdieu, 2001, p. viii)

In other words, the socialising institutions, of which the state is central as the holder of statist capital, naturalises gender roles. McLeod (2005) asserts that Bourdieu’s comments on gender “is hardly news for feminists” (p. 19) as the sexual division of labour was a founding insight of feminist theory in the 1970s. However, McLeod (2005) argues that Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and field, despite failing to explain “processes of change and how patterns of difference and inequality might take different forms in different historical eras” (p. 20), are important tools within feminist research “for understanding patterns and continuity” (p. 20). While I do not attempt here to present a detailed image of the gender and ethnic patterns of Victoria’s political and journalistic field, a cursory examination of the demographics of these fields illustrates the lack of diversity of those in key (sport) decision-making and representation positions in Victoria; arguably illustrating the demographics of those that are not predisposed and embodied to ‘play the game’.

While there are some notable exceptions, it appears that the gender and ethnic composition of those in decision-making and representation positions of the ‘sport city’ have been relatively homogenous in the last thirty years. Aboriginal representation within Victoria’s parliament is completely absent – to date, Victoria has had no Aboriginal MPs (Waters, 2014). Meanwhile, women make up approximately 30% of Victoria’s

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318 Additional identities such as age, social class and sexuality may also be included.
319 The state of Victoria, with 0.5% of the population identified as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander, is the least populated state in Australia, in terms of percentage of total population (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2005).
parliament (Lumb, 2013), but a closer inspection illustrates the lack of leadership within political parties. Joan Kirner was the un-elected Premier for a short-time while Winsome McCaughhey was Melbourne Mayor (1988-89) and Commissioner of the 1996 Olympic Games bid. More recently, Louise Asher has been prominent as Minister of Tourism and Major Events and Deputy Premier as well as being Shadow Treasurer while in Opposition. However, the state of Victoria still has not had an elected female Premier or a female Treasurer (arguably the most influential political role after the Premier in a neoliberal state).

Furthermore, cultural producers and subsequently the representations of society in Melbourne appear to be rather homogenous (Banjeree & Osuri, 2000; Hanusch, 2013; Phillips, 2009). Adding to this homogeneity is the highly concentrated ownership of Australian media (Flew & Swift, 2013; Lewis, 2001). Indeed, Dwyer and Martin (2010) explain that compared to democratic nations Australia has perhaps the most concentrated media ownership. However, it is not just concentrated ownership that limits voice diversity. The duplication of news stories “across co-owned publications and multiple media platforms” (Dwyer & Martin, 2010, p. 2) further limits diverse representations of society. As such, the political and journalistic fields of Victoria appear to be the arena of a select few which arguably serves to reproduce a social reality that values the interests of this homogenous group. However, ‘world-making’ is not a one-way process; resistance in the form of public protests often occurs as evidence of the heterodox in the doxa.

Protests

Springer (2009) explains that the rhetoric of ‘order’ and ‘stability’ used by governments and global institutions operates to control political and social protests. ‘Order’ and ‘stability’ acts to “preserve an economic system that serves to maintain the power and privilege of indigenous elites at the expense of the poor” (Springer, 2009, p. 139). The state, with a monopoly over the legitimate use of material and symbolic violence (Wacquant, 2004) is able to define social reality and regulate resistance by employing mechanisms of violence (including the police, army and more recently authorised private security firms) to control opposition to capitalist activities in the name of harmony. As such, any state violence is justified through a discourse of economic productivity and citizen safety. However, as Springer (2009) asserts, “although order and stability may appear as worthwhile goals, we must ask why ‘order’ always seems to benefit the

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320 Springer (2009) discusses the neoliberal asphyxiation of indigenous democracy in Cambodia.

321 Bourdieu (1994a) explains that state physical violence is only deployed when symbolic violence is insufficient to gain the consent of the dominated.
preservation of the status quo and in whose interest our nations and cities are being ‘stabilized’” (p. 139). Resistance to the ‘sport city’ largely opposed the use of public funds and public space – specifically public parks – for sports-related facilities and events. I have previously mentioned the opposition to using tax-payer funds for sporting events – including a brief assertion that the economic argument against the ‘sport city’ may in fact benefit neoliberals by framing the discussion in ‘their’ language. In this section, I focus on the contested use of public space, the repeated wide spread opposition to the authorised sportscape and the regulation of this struggle by the state.

Lefebvre (1974/1991) categorises public space as either regulated (representation of space) or actually used (representational space). This distinction draws attention to the difference between the ‘official’ or legitimate status of public space and the appropriated use of this space by the public (Springer, 2009). D. Mitchell (1995) explains that public space often originates as a representation of space which the state has regulated and defined for specific use (for example a park for recreational use or a park as a nature reserve) but this place may become a representational space if appropriated by various groups (for example a specific corner of a public park used for protests or the area under an urban bridge used by skateboarders). Springer (2009) encapsulates the contestation of public space between those that regulate and those that use space:

On the one hand, the ordered view constitutes public space as the site of control and is typically associated with authoritarian tradition where panopticism and repression are used to maintain order and stability. This vision is rivalled by the unmediated view, which conceptualizes public space as the site where the voiceless can make their demands seen and heard, as a medium for the contestation of power, and as the space which identity is constructed, reified, and contested. (p. 140)

As such, public spaces involve a struggle over definition for use and, more specifically, level of control or freedom of activities within space. However, the state regulates this freedom within public spaces by creating laws to define acceptable activities (legitimate symbolic violence) and subsequently enforcing (legitimate material and symbolic violence) these laws through various forms of legitimate security (significant police/army presence, surveillance cameras, and airport-style security gates) which Schimmel (2006; 2011; 2012) calls the militarization of the urban (sporting) terrain.322 Therefore, despite the eternal contestation over public space – indeed the state often permits debate to occur on

322 Bennett and Haggerty (2011) and Hayes and Horne (2011) illustrate the manner in which security and surveillance is employed at mega-events to regulate the poor and maximise growth opportunities for the private sector.
how a space is used – the state is ultimately able to exert violence through its ‘world-
-making’ power of imposing and then regulating a “legitimate vision of the social world”
(Bourdieu, 1987, p.13).

In Melbourne, like many other modern cities, sporting places and public spaces are heavily regulated by the state. For example, the Aboriginal protests held during the 2006 Commonwealth Games in the public place of Kings Domain firstly illustrated the state’s permission for a group to resist the ‘sport city’ (by using public space for political purposes) but secondly demonstrated state regulation through increased police presence and new laws which were designed to control public behaviour in the park; explicitly banning harangues (Millar, 2006). Meanwhile, the high level of security surrounding major sporting events such as the Australian Open Tennis Championships (see Rolfe, 2015) and 2006 Commonwealth Games (see Phillips, 2005) reveals the ‘militarization’ of the Melbourne sportscape. Furthermore, legal Acts, such as the Australian Grand Prix Act, exhibit the states re-regulating role in neoliberal corporate affairs; essentially permitting the corporate-focussed AGPC to fence or cordon off areas of Albert Park to prevent protester interference and permit police/security force in the name of free-market activities (Lowes, 2004).

In an environment where statist capital exists as a form of meta-capital (Bourdieu, 1994a; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) a question arises as to what role protests and public demonstrations can play in shaping a neoliberal democratic society. Piven and Cloward (1992) refer to the ‘normalizing of protests’ which occurs within the neoliberal political doxa (Samuel, 2013). della Porta and Fillieule (2004) explain that protests have largely lost political effectiveness as they have become “widespread, acceptable, and more predictable” (p. 235). Protests which are disruptive or violent are heavily policed and framed (by the media as well as those richest in capital within the field in which the protest occurs) as unethical which, Samuel (2013) explains has resulted in the decreased legitimacy or symbolic capital held by the protesting group. As a result, many protest organisers have shifted away from a strategy of disrupting social order and instead adopted an approach of coordinating with the state (police in particular). As such, social movements are forced to increase their capital not by disruption but by increasing membership; that is, following the rules of the democratic political game of acquiring majority support. Indeed, during the early years of the Australian Grand Prix at Albert Park, SAP had a significant supporter base and included events in excess of 10,000 protesters. But with media and state criticism of SAP, along with the cementing, or naturalising, of the event in Victoria’s major events calendar, SAP’s supporter base decreased along with its media coverage and arguably political effectiveness; despite the overall message of the campaign remaining the same. Indeed, while these protests
demonstrated the possible loosening of the cultural glue, through state criticism, supported significantly by commercial media (which has a vested interest in elite sports), a refastening of neoliberalism occurred; illustrating the reengineering strength of the neoliberal project. Moreover, the media’s consistent undermining of SAP along with political discourse which positions protesters as selfish and ‘un-Victorian’ has served to harden the cultural cracks which appeared during the Albert Park protests. Furthermore, while Albert Park residents largely opposed the Grand Prix in its foundation years, the event is now widely used to promote the rental advantages of homes in the area. As such, sport is simultaneously a neoliberal economic project and also a social project employed to coerce the populace to buy-in to these ideas of the market, individualisation and competition.

Interestingly, SAP and other protest groups have previously discussed the prospect of amalgamating, which may actually increase their economic, social and cultural capital; and as such lead to increased symbolic capital. However, as Peter Goad explained, the attempt to create an over-arching group to protect Victoria’s parklands “never got off the ground because people have only got enough energy for one thing and that’s their local scene. Once … it gets outside your own scene, you just haven’t got the energy to do much about it. Mostly, the locals have to fight their own battles” (personal communication, October 1, 2012). As such, it appears that major organisations (government, P-GAs, media, educational institutions, corporations amongst others) and individuals rich in capital are at a substantial advantage in the ‘game’ of shaping social values at a wider level than the local; the result is that these capital rich groups are able to serve their own needs while denouncing resistance/challenges to neoliberal social values. Indeed, Bourdieu (1998d; 1998f) in Acts of Resistance explains that in order to challenge the neoliberal institutions (including the state itself) an internationally co-ordinated resistance movement is required; a movement that consists of significant accumulated capital through membership.

While increased capital through share quantity of opinion may help even up the ‘game’, this does not address the problem of quantity being the valued currency of protest movements (the more protesters the more effective the resistance). Indeed, the

323 SAP president Peter Goad (personal communication, October 1, 2012) referred to sharing of information between SAP and other anti-Formula One Grand Prix groups around the world – particularly South Korea – as well as the failed drive to create a Victorian environmentalist group, Hands Off Our Parks (HOOP).

324 Bourdieu (1998f) referring to the creation of the European Union denounces the single market but points to a need for internationalism that is “capable of promoting a transnational social state” (p. 66) throughout Europe.
heterodoxy of protesting through mass reflects the market-like mechanisms central to neoliberalism. Of further concern is that within the democratic political game some groups have less access to the necessary resources – such as the media or ability to influence political decisions via exclusive closed-door meetings with politicians – required to voice widespread opinion and acquire considerable support (della Porta and Fillieule, 2004).

Indeed, Samuel (2013) argues that protests in their current form, located within the neoliberal political doxa, are always doomed to fail due to an inability to acquire the necessary social, symbolic, cultural and economic capital in order to challenge various capital-rich groups (for example, corporations rich in economic capital and the state rich in symbolic capital).

The orthodoxy of democratic politics involves the struggle for power through legitimate mechanisms such as election rallies, political debates and general elections. Heterodoxical actions include protests, strikes and alternative forms of legal anti-establishment action which have been accepted as ‘normal’ (despite governments increasingly introducing barriers to unions for legal strike action). Meanwhile, illegal protests and vandalism, while not necessarily approved of, are not uncommon events and, specifically graffiti, have become a common-sense form of political expression (especially by youths). The level and degree of these protests however remain regulated by the state through legitimate violence (specifically the police and justice system) to ensure that the heterodoxy persists within the political doxa. Indeed, the majority of protests to decisions associated with the ‘sport city’ by the Victorian government are evidence of approved political resistance and are firmly located within the political doxa of the neoliberal state.

Organised protests by SAP and RPPG appeared to operate alongside a large police presence or took place in the form legitimate expression through letters to newspaper editors. Likewise, newspaper images (see figure 11.3) of police presence amongst the Aboriginal Land Rights protest that transpired during the Commonwealth Games illustrates that while resistance took place, this occurred in a state controlled

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325 As della Porta and Fillieule (2004) explain, “the distribution of resources that allows one to adapt to the new rules of the game of ‘opinion-gear democracy’ is neither equally nor randomly distributed among social groups” (p. 236).

326 Samuel (2013) describes the symbolic capital evident within black protest movements during the June 2010, Toronto G20 summit, explaining that various protest groups themselves competed for symbolic capital to become the ‘legitimate’ protest group. In competing for capital to become the legitimate protesters, protest leaders condemned the illegal actions, or conversely close ties to the police, of rival protest groups; ultimately denouncing the activists that were in fact fighting similar goals.
setting. Meanwhile, when heterodoxical activities happened away from the eyes of the state, a market justification was used to inject public funds into controlling or restoring the status quo. For example graffiti, which was viewed as damaging to brand ‘Melbourne’ ahead of the 2006 Commonwealth Games, was quickly cleaned up at the tax-payers expense with the political and urban elite arguing that public funds ‘invested’ into cleaning up the city would help increase the ‘value’ of Melbourne as a place to invest mobile capital. Indeed this attack on graffiti or ‘illegal’ public expression also occurred immediately after the 1996 Olympic Games bid loss. Supporting the urban entrepreneurial agenda, the Sun newspaper ran a campaign (‘Let’s Get Melbourne Moving’) which largely consisted of criticising graffiti around Melbourne and encouraging the public to police graffiti by phoning a ‘graffiti hotline’ (see Johnstone, 1990; Mevissen, 1990; ‘Move on transport’, 1990; Rindfleisch, 1990). Interestingly, while graffiti in the early 1990s was viewed by the urban and political elite as a blemish on the desired urban landscape, today Melbourne’s graffiti has been regulated through the state’s allocating of ‘street art’ – specific laneways – which form a key part of many commercialised city tours (see Melbourne street art tours, 2014; Melbourne Walks, 2015).

The clearest example of illegal, unauthorised and illegitimate resistance within the case studies of this thesis occurred in the run up to the 1997 Formula One Grand Prix when diesel was purposefully spilled on the track ahead of the practice session days. This action is clearly situated at the heterodoxical end of the doxa spectrum. In order to ‘control’ this type of illegitimate resistance, neoliberal structures such as the state (government, police and AGPC) and media were quick to criticise the actions of these protesters. Various representatives of the government, AGPC and police expressed dismay that activists had attempted to ruin the ‘public’ sporting event and ‘public’ funds would be required to repair the race track. Meanwhile, newspaper articles focussed on the

Figure 11.3: Aboriginal protester leads police Senior Sergeant to protest camp (Holroyd & Ker, 2006, p. 4)
violent destruction of the race track rather than the violence experienced by locals – violence here defined as harm – such as the appropriation of parkland and economic violence to some nearby individual households through compaction damage.

Authorising significant public places in Melbourne as ‘sportscapes’ (Bale, 1996) has added weight to the sporting identity of the city and the citizens of Melbourne. Those opposed to the regulation of public space often argue for these ‘public’ sites to remain sites of freedom to ensure that alternative identities can be expressed (see McCann, 1999; D. Mitchell, 1995; 2003; Low & Smith, 2006) within an urban environment increasingly transformed into spaces of consumption (Silk & Amis, 2005). As explained in chapter 2 of this thesis, the sportscape according to John Bale (1996) can be a place of topophilia (place affection) and topophobia (place fear). Despite these mixed public feelings about the sportscape, the state government of Victoria has strategically used sporting events and infrastructure as an urban entrepreneurial tool to showcase the city of Melbourne in an attempt to entice global footloose capital. In order to provide the infrastructure necessary for sporting events, the state government over the past three decades has often labelled sporting developments as being of ‘state importance’. This authorising stamp of ‘state importance’ has permitted the government to justify the fast-tracking of construction and the by-passing of planning, heritage, environment and freedom of information laws (as was the case with the Commonwealth Games Athletes’ Village and Rectangular Stadium). In addition, limited public consultation and lack of transparency have often occurred in the name of the public interest. The result, as Millar (2005c) illustrated, is the depletion of open urban public parkland by the sportscape (in the case of the National Tennis Centre engulfing Flinders Park/Melbourne Park, the Grand Prix race track emblazoned on Albert Park and the Commonwealth Games Athletes’ Village absorbing a wedge of Royal Park) or the enclosing of open and accessible sportscapes by fixed structures (such as the Rectangular Stadium on Gosch’s Paddock). The statist capital monopoly held by the state permits it to re-regulate the social world through its ‘world-making’ power while simultaneously controlling resistance through legitimate symbolic and material violence. As such, despite some public protests attempting to resist the appropriation of public parkland for elite (commercial) sporting activities in Melbourne, the state and its various arms hold substantial capital in order to drive the neoliberal, urban entrepreneurial agenda forward.

**Conclusion**

The urban entrepreneurial strategy of ‘selling’ Melbourne as a place of consumer liveability and capital investment indicates the ‘desired’ citizens of the city space.
Specifically, commercial and entertainment city spaces have been constructed and identified as locations for economic transactions to fit the needs of those individuals most equipped to drive (and benefit from) these transactions. As outlined in this chapter, the state occupies a central position in the re-regulation of these spaces. Bourdieu (1994a) encapsulated the world-making capacity of the state by explaining that:

Through the framing it imposes upon practices, the state establishes and inculcates common forms and categories of perception and appreciation, social frameworks of perceptions, of understanding or of memory, in short state forms of classification. It thereby creates the conditions for a kind of immediate orchestration of habituses which is itself the foundation of a consensus over this set of shared evidences constitutive of (national) common sense. (p. 13)

This ability to define allows the state to construct a social world which reflects the interests of those richest in various forms of capital. Of importance, as Wacquant (2004) expresses, is that “the state does not exist only ‘out there,’ in the guise of bureaucracies, authorities, and ceremonies: it also lives ‘in here,’ ineffaceably engraved in all of us in the form of the state-sanctioned mental categories acquired via schooling through which we cognitively construct the social world” (p. 8). That is, the citizens of the state have been socialised to consent to the actions and visions of the state through education and other state-sanctioned institutions such as the media and ‘legitimate’ cultural activities. In the state of Victoria, elite sport has been legitimised by the state as a resource deemed suitable for public investment which appears to receive limited resistance. This has occurred, in part, because the people of Victoria have accepted a sporting identity as embodied cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) which, in a neoliberal society, has increasingly been infused with economics and notions of intercity competition. Moreover, it appears the political and urban elite of Melbourne have actively associated themselves with sport; adding to their personal cultural, social and political capital while extending the cultural legitimacy of elite/commercial sport.

In Melbourne, like many other ‘modern’ cities, evidence of the double regulation of the precariat exists. This has occurred in combination with a redefinition of the public interest in urban entrepreneurial terms, including the valuing of elite commercialised sport as an activity for state intervention. However, of concern is that most of the benefits from this entrepreneurial strategy appear to filter to the urban and political elite; rather than ‘trickle-down’ to those most in need. This follows Wacquant’s (2010) assertion that when this ‘double regulation’ is combined with the ‘cultural glue’ of individuality, competition and market-like mechanisms on everyday activities, the state executes a laissez-faire system.
for those at the top while operating a disciplining and scrutinising system for those at the bottom. Meanwhile, as I have briefly alluded to, despite attempts to resist the neoliberal sport city, those weak in various forms of capital attempting to play the orthodoxical ‘game’ of democratic politics within a neoliberal doxa appear doomed to fail. That is not to say that resistance to neoliberalism is futile, indeed in my concluding chapter which ensues I outline, following Bourdieu (1998f; 2003), possible suggestions for resistance to neoliberalism; most notably a public sociology that forges relationships of mutual benefit between the academy of social sciences and social movements (Mathers & Novelli, 2007) and the advocating for supra-national social movements which may be able to more capably function outside the doxa of the state.
Chapter 12: Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to examine the production, representation, consumption, identification and regulation of Melbourne as a neoliberal ‘sport city’. That is, the sanctioning of urban sportscapes and public resources to permit and encourage “consumption-oriented capital accumulation” (Silk & Andrews, 2012c, p. 127).

Characterising the ‘sport city’ as a cultural artefact, I inserted Melbourne’s sportscapes into du Gay et al.’s (1997) circuit of culture to illustrate that the ‘sport city’ does not naturally emerge but rather is actively produced, (re)presented, consumed and regulated as various interest groups engage in a struggle to (re)construct their social world. Adopting Bourdieu’s concepts of capital, (bureaucratic) field and habitus, I then applied Loïc Wacquant’s (2012) understanding of neoliberalism as “the reengineering and redeployment of the state as the core agency that sets the rules and fabricates the subjectivities, social relations and collective representations suited to realising markets” (p. 66). By following Bourdieu’s (1998b) positioning of the state as “the repository of all the universal ideas associated with the idea of the public” (p. 102) that shapes and defines society, I revealed the role of ‘sport’ as a form of ‘cultural glue’ (Wacquant, 2012) appropriated by neoliberal, and indeed pre-neoliberal (if the Cain government is considered to be Keynesian), Victorian governments to re-regulate the post-industrial city.

Four case studies were examined which exhibit urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989) and the re-regulating state. The urban entrepreneurial approach of branding/selling the city through major sporting events began in the 1980s, was extended during the 1990s and continued throughout the 2000s. This strategy has been employed by the state in an attempt to re-image Melbourne as an attractive place in which to locate global footloose capital; that is, capital which is mobile and may be located in any urban space and as a consequence, urban governments are increasingly competing to attract and retain this capital. The state has successively re-regulated this strategy through its monopoly over the legitimate use of symbolic and material violence; preventing dissident groups from resisting neoliberal activities. In this chapter I initially extract the key themes from the four case studies and two ‘discussion’ chapters before discussing the challenges to resisting or contesting neoliberalism. I conclude with suggestions for future research as well as explaining some limitations of this research project.

Reconstructing the ‘sport city’

Following a conceptualisation of the neoliberal bureaucratic state (chapter 3) and a socio-political contextualisation of the ‘sport city’ (chapter 5) I provided four case studies to illustrate the urban entrepreneurial strategy adopted by Victorian state governments.
across three decades. My first case study focused on the construction of the National Tennis Centre (NTC), in 1988, which Cain (n.d.a) asserted was worthy of public investment due to the economic benefits for the state from positioning Melbourne (Australian Open Championships) with a select group of international ‘grand slam’ tennis cities - London (The Championships, Wimbledon), Paris (French Open) and New York (US Open). Subsequent governments extended the state’s positioning of the NTC as a cornerstone of the major sporting events strategy with state-funded extensions to the NTC in 1998 and 2009.327 My second case study – Multi-sport events – similarly highlighted attempts to revitalise the state of Victoria and city of Melbourne more specifically. The Cain/Kirner Labor governments aimed to thrust Melbourne into the global limelight associated with the Olympic Games by submitting a bid in 1990 with promises of significant capital investment into the city and subsequent regeneration. Regardless of the bid loss the Kirner government, resoundingly supported by local corporate media, persisted with the urban entrepreneurial strategy of branding the city through major event acquisition by creating the Melbourne Major Events Company (later Victorian Major Events Company (VMEC)). One event acquired was the 2006 Commonwealth Games which I explained were used by both sides of government for political gain; the Labor government – in power during majority of the construction and hosting – argued that the Games symbolised Melbourne’s competitiveness and success on the global stage, while the Liberal Opposition emphasised the ballooning financial costs of the event as evidence of Labor’s inability to manage tax-payer funds (despite the Liberal-National Coalition government conducting the financial feasibility study for the Games bid). As such, the Commonwealth Games highlighted the political and social pursuits associated with a one-off major event; meanwhile the analysis of the annual Formula One Grand Prix illustrated the sustained use of sport as an urban entrepreneurial apparatus.

My chapter on the Grand Prix extended the work of Mark Lowes (2004) by incorporating a discussion of activities in the decade since Lowes’ research was published. Moreover, with access to Jeff Kennett and Alan Stockdale, two key figures in bringing the Grand Prix to Melbourne, and John Brumby, an early opponent but later champion of the event, I was able to gain a greater insight into the government’s motives at the time. In addition, interviewing Peter Goad, the president of Save Albert Park (SAP), provided me with an understanding of the workings of the most publicised resistant group

327 The NTC and Australian Open Tennis Championships were often referred to when major events (such as the Formula One Grand Prix and Commonwealth Games) or sporting infrastructure constructions (such as the Rectangular Stadium and Docklands Stadium) were announced by the state, media and pseudo-government authorities.
to Melbourne’s Formula One Grand Prix. The collection of substantial media material on
the Grand Prix allowed me to first re-construct events that have taken place at Albert Park
since 1993 but more importantly demonstrate the overall media, corporate and political
support for the event; that is, support by those political and urban elite rich in various
forms of symbolic, social, cultural and economic capital in Victoria. The Grand Prix, as
Lowes (2004) encapsulates, illustrates the neoliberal workings of the Victorian state which
has adopted “a governance framework in which unregulated or ‘free’ markets operated by
entrepreneurial individuals – or urban ‘growth boosters’ – are regarded as the optimal
solution not only to economic but also to political and social problems related to urban
development” (p. 70). While Lowes’ (2004) criticism appeared to specifically target the
Kennett Liberal-National Coalition government, I illustrate that the “authoritarian and
autocratic rule” (Lowes, 2004, p. 84) of the Kennett government was not unique, and
instead similar neoliberal actions and justifications were adopted by the centre-left Labor
government upon election at the beginning of the millennium. Indeed, since Kennett’s
departure from parliament the Grand Prix contract has been extended no less than three
times, however public consultation remains absent despite a damning report from the
Auditor General in 2007, continued resistance from SAP and escalating annual tax-payer
costs in excess of $50 million.328

The final case study focused on the construction of public and private sports
stadiums in Melbourne which, like in many post-industrial cities (c.f. Scherer & Sam,
2008; Sam & Hughson, 2011b; Schimmel, 2001; 2006; 2012; Spirou, 2011), have been
swathed in controversy. During the 1980s, the Labor state government intervened into the
activities of the Victorian Football League (VFL, now AFL) by coercing the governing body
to locate the annual Grand Final at the urban Melbourne Cricket Ground rather than the
VFL-owned suburban Waverley Park. Little more than a decade later the Docklands
Authority, under the Liberal-National Coalition state government, oversaw negotiations to
locate a significant amount of AFL matches at the privately built, owned and operated
Docklands Stadium; further migrating elite Australian rules football to the fringe of the
Central Business District. The AFL’s rationale for ‘centralising’ Aussie rules was the need
to compete with rival sports; particularly the National Rugby League’s expansion strategy.
The state, operating a neoliberal urban entrepreneurial strategy of competing against rival
cities for global footloose capital, along with the AFL operating a neoliberal strategy of

328 While reports of the escalating cost of the event have been made public, contract details
including how much the Victorian government pays the Formula One group each year are yet to be
made transparent.
competing against *domestic* competitors reflect the neoliberal logic which has been embodied in the ‘sport city’ across various levels of operation.\(^\text{329}\)

Key themes to emerge from the case studies included: (i) the use of public resources for entrepreneurial activities; (ii) the establishment of pseudo-government authorities (P-GAs) with responsibility to manage major sports events and sporting infrastructure; (iii) the (re)presentation of domestic and international cities as threats to Melbourne’s major events and ‘sport city’ title; (iv) a lack of public consultation and; (v) the enacting of government laws to permit neoliberal activities. In locating the NTC at Flinders Park, the state indicated a willingness to appropriate a limited and valued public resource (urban public parkland) in the name of city boosterism (later symbolised with the name change to Melbourne Park) with limited public consultation. Similarly, the temporary use of Albert Park for the annual Australian Grand Prix and the alienation of a wedge of Royal Park for the Commonwealth Games Athletes Village along with the siting of the Rectangular Stadium on Edwin Flack oval (and consequent authorising of Gosch’s Paddock for elite sports use) all highlighted the state’s propensity to prioritise the use of public parkland for commercial development. Moreover, the commercial nature of the activities associated with these sports developments, (in open spaces that were previously free of commercial intervention) illustrates the shifting role of the state to immerse itself within the commercial environment by adopting a governance strategy of urban entrepreneurialism rather than urban managerialism (see Harvey, 1989).

Despite two strategies for stadium construction near Melbourne’s CBD being employed in recent times (the BOOT-model adopted by Kennett for Docklands Stadium and the state-funded approach adopted by Bracks/Brumby for the Rectangular Stadium) the common strategy of authorising the use of public land for private commercial activities with minimal public consultation was evident. Indeed the state’s urban entrepreneurial justification to donate land and fund capital works for the private Docklands Stadium on the basis that the stadium would provide the space for activities desired by professional workers, the urban elite and tourists, supported the architectural design of a stadium that was, to all intents and purposes, too large for the rectangular sports that the stadium was initially proposed for (with exception of some international matches, state of origin rugby league and the occasional A-league ‘block-buster’). As a consequence, further public resources (land and taxes) were used by the state to build the Rectangular Stadium on the contention that it serviced the needs of professional workers, the rugby union urban elite, and migrants from Europe and the Northern states of Australia. Importantly, the

\(^{329}\) Hilgers (2012) explains that neoliberalism is the “embodiment of a principle of competition and maximisation in the categories of perception and practice of social agents and institutions” (p. 81).
Rectangular Stadium was also approved on the basis that it reinforced Melbourne’s sporting identity. In the process of investing public funds to build this stadium for elite sport, less profitable activities (athletics) were evicted from the ‘sports precinct’, a historically important sportscape was privatised (Collingwood’s occupation of Olympic Park) and commercial sports franchises were given priority use of open public parkland (Gosch’s Paddock).

During the 1990s, Public-Private Partnerships (PPP’s) became an accepted and conventional method of governance by many state governments. In order to permit PPP developments to occur, the Victorian government created P-GAs. These authorities which operate at arm’s length to the government hold significant power but have minimal responsibility to the public in terms of consultation and democratic structures. Prominent P-GAs such as the Melbourne and Olympic Parks Trust and Australian Grand Prix Corporation illustrate the significance of sport within the remit of the Victorian government while even a cursory analysis of their aims elucidate an emphasis on ‘profit’ generation, rather than social wellbeing. Of greater concern has been the role of the government, as ‘law-maker’ for the state, in providing these P-GAs with significant exemptions from various state laws (for example, heritage, environmental and freedom of information laws) in order to encourage commercial activity along with increased ‘security’ powers to avoid public resistance. Moreover, the retracted powers of local government (Melbourne City Council) which often provided representation for commercially adverse local views and the introduction of laws to prevent public protests have acted to permit commercially-friendly activity on public parkland. Indeed, the continued regulation of resistance has illustrated the power of the neoliberal state; law changes were implemented to fast-track developments (at Albert Park, Flinders/Melbourne Park and Royal Park) as well as prevent SAP/RPPG protests prior to events while temporary anti-disruption laws were put in place to limit the effectiveness of Aboriginal protests during the

330 As explained in chapter 6, Trusts such as the National Tennis Centre Trust were established as apolitical but often have strong government representation on their boards. While the P-GA has a responsibility to return an economically sound service or profit to the public, in order to provide this return for the public’s investment P-GAs have often been offered considerable flexibility in various practices such as the re-zoning or annexion of public parkland, concealed commercial contracts or freedom from environmental and heritage laws; all with little or no public consultation.

331 The MOPT states its purpose as being “a world class business delivering world class experiences” (MOPT, 2014c, p. 4, emphasis added) while the Australian Grand Prix Corporation states its mission as providing “…Melbourne and Victoria with world class international motorsport events that deliver increased promotional and economic benefits to the State of Victoria” (AGPC, 2014, p. 6).
Commonwealth Games. This corporate-friendly environment has been shaped by the government’s urban entrepreneurial agenda of enticing global footloose capital by reducing the rights of the public in order to support the interests of (global) corporations through redefining the public’s interest as consisting of government support for economic productivity at the summit in the guise that benefits will trickle-down to the wider public.

Threats from cities posited as rivals in the zero-sum urban entrepreneurial game justified the need for state-funded sporting facilities such as the NTC and Grand Prix infrastructure at Albert Park. This was, in essence, framed as an economic investment made by the government on-behalf of the citizens. These ‘threats’ allowed the government and P-GAs managing major events to position elite sport as holding significant cultural capital in the post-industrial city. References to ‘rival’ city attempts to ‘steal’ Melbourne’s Grand Prix or the ‘grand slam’ status of the Australian Open, with little tangible evidence, has served to (re)produce the common-sense belief amongst the Melbourne public of the need to continue and re-invest in the urban entrepreneurial strategy. Moreover, the sustained citing of the uniqueness and (often intangible) economic value of sporting events to the city has served to (re)present, in the minds of Melbourne’s citizens, the importance of the political and urban elite’s desires to position the city near the crest of the “global urban status hierarchy” (Schimmel, 2006, p. 160). The perceived importance of maintaining this paramount position has allowed subsequent governments to extend investment of public resources into the sportscape by claiming this investment ensures Melbourne’s ‘sport city’ identity is preserved.

Resistance towards sporting developments has come from a few left-wing journalists at the Age, Public park activists (SAP and RPPG), Aboriginal land-rights protesters and the urban graffiti community. Nevertheless, events have largely been presented by the media and politicians as an economic success – either directly or indirectly through global awareness of the city – and thus an essential component of the city and vital function of the state. Despite political Opposition frequently calling for greater transparency, increased public consultation over land and tax use and more diverse representation on decision-making Trusts, the state (under both left and right-wing governments) consistently demonstrated the valuing of the economic Right hand over the social Left hand of the Leviathan.

**Sport city: cultural artefact & neoliberal glue**

Characterising the ‘sport city’ as a cultural artefact allowed me to critically analyse the production, representation, consumption, identification and regulation of Melbourne’s sportscape by employing du Gay *et al.*’s (1997) ‘circuit of culture’. Labor’s economic
strategy *Victoria: The Next Step*, which designated sport as one of Melbourne’s competitive advantages, along with the creation of the state-owned VMEC illustrated the state’s urban entrepreneurial strategy of encoding Melbourne as a sporting destination during the 1980s. The continued (re)production of sports importance to the state – myth-making through emphasising partial truths (Barthes, 1957) – was evident with references to Melbourne being the ‘home’ of the Australian Open Tennis Championships, Albert Park as a previous location of the Australian Grand Prix and the uncritical acceptance of Melbourne’s success in hosting major sporting events – in particular the 1956 Olympic Games. Attaching new events and infrastructure to the cultural importance of existing and historical sporting events paved an easier trail for the state to justify investing public resources into elite sport and (re)positioning sport as a homogenous cultural activity within a city of diverse identities. Indeed, a key element in producing the neoliberal city has been the re-defining of the public interest in market-like urban entrepreneurial terms (Sandercock and Dovey, 2002). As the central bank of symbolic capital (Wacquant, 2005b) and the “repository of all universal ideas associated with the idea of the public” (Bourdieu, 1998b, p. 102), the neoliberal Victorian state has successfully (re)defined the public interest in favour of urban entrepreneurial economic developments which service the urban elite. Commercialised elite sport is one area which, in Victoria, has been defined as essential in delivering the urban entrepreneurial agenda; as such, elite sport has been classified as deserving of public resources.

The Victorian media or commercial newspapers at least, have positively represented the production of Melbourne as a ‘sport city’ and the associated public investment into elite sport. Notwithstanding occasional articles from a minority of journalists offering critique of sporting developments, newspaper editorials have consistently supported and indeed encouraged government investment into sporting infrastructure and bids for sports events and franchises. As Buist and Mason (2010) assert, this media support is unsurprising due to the close ties between media outlets and commercial enterprises, that is, those that appear to benefit the most from a city hosting sporting events or elite sports teams. While corporate media support was unsurprising, the role of those representatives of the state, as gatekeepers of information, was significant in the reporting of sporting initiatives. The Kennett government in particular was

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332 Some public critique was evident and represented in the media through letters to the editor; however this resistance strategy appears to be largely ineffectual. Indeed, if the purpose of an editorial is to represent the views of the readers, and the letters to the editor represent the opinions of the readers, it seems contradictory that most letters were in opposition to the editorial viewpoints when it came to discussions of sporting infrastructure and events in Melbourne.
cited by representatives from the *Age* as manipulating 'official' information in order to present a favourable public representation of political actions and decisions. Furthermore, professional media buffers employed by political parties appeared to prevent media scrutiny of government decisions. Commercial contracts signed between the private sector and the state further obstructed public access to information regarding the use of public resources for (elite/commercial) sporting enterprises. As a result, not only is a favourable portrayal of the ‘sport city’ (re)presented by the media for commercial reasons, but the government (politicians and media buffers) and commercially sensitive contracts act as barriers to transparency. In this neoliberal environment, the state has occupied the role of information ‘gatekeeper’ tasked with re-regulating “social life to replicate the liberal market in all forms of human activities” (Wacquant, 2010, p. 213). This task has been achieved, in part, by reducing public access to information concerning commercial development – and therefore diminishing opportunities for public resistance.

Despite this corporate-friendly media representation, resistance to the consumption (or regurgitation) of the sport city was evident throughout the four case studies. Activist groups, particularly associated with public places, attempted to challenge government decisions to construct elite sporting infrastructure in spaces designated as public parkland. Meanwhile, other marginalised groups, notably Aboriginal land activists, attempted to use sporting events – symbolic of many of the causes of Aboriginal marginalisation, such as capitalism, consumerism and colonialism – as a political platform to voice claims of dispossession by the Commonwealth. Wider public critique focused on the economic consequences of producing the sport city, and more accurately, the opportunity cost of hosting major events and constructing leisure facilities.

The ‘sport city’ identity has been exercised by politicians and those influential in producing and representing (or encoding) Melbourne to secure public support for state investment into sporting events and infrastructure. The political rationale for strengthening the ‘sport city’ identity has been that it serves to enhance local pride which boosts business confidence; subsequently increasing economic and political capital for

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333 This regurgitation of the ‘sport city’ contrasted the states consistent references to high attendance figures at sporting events as evidence of public consumption of the urban entrepreneurial strategy. Arguably, the misrepresentation of ‘official’ attendance figures has served to exaggerate the consumption of some sporting events in Melbourne and over-emphasise a sporting identity for the city.

334 The Anglo-centric identity of those cultural intermediaries and drivers of neoliberalism have led to an Anglo-centric representation of Melbourne’s ‘sporting’ identity; the sports which are invested in seem largely to involve sports historically developed in the global West (for example various forms of football, cricket, tennis and motor-sport).
those driving the urban entrepreneurial agenda. The consequence of building and emphasising this sporting identity is that elite sport, as a consumer commodity, has become legitimised. Together with the redefinition of the public interest in market-like principals, the premise that consuming elite sport is an important element of ‘being Victorian’ has served to reinforce a neoliberal doctrine of economic productivity through individualisation, competition, meritocracy and consumerism. In this manner, sport has become a form of ‘cultural glue’ (Wacquant, 2012) which fastens the values and motives of the public to neoliberal ideologies. As noted above, the framing of domestic and international cities combined with the cultural hegemony of the urban entrepreneurial strategy has led to the continued re-investment of public resources into sporting developments in order to maintain the ‘sport city’ identity. Moreover, the desire to retain this ‘unique’ identity has permitted neoliberal practices (commercially sensitive contracts between the state and private sector and legislation to prevent dissident activities at corporate-friendly events) to be employed by the state.

In the penultimate chapter I discussed the use of sport as a form of cultural glue that “pastes the various components of [neoliberal] state activity together” (Wacquant, 2012, p. 72). I began by contextualising the double-regulation of Melbourne’s precariat through tightening obligations of welfare (now workfare) recipients in combination with increased (private) incarceration which has transpired under a shift to the right within the neoliberal bureaucratic field (Wacquant, 2010). Positioning sport as a tool in its urban entrepreneurial strategy, the Victorian government has employed its statist capital to construct a social world which legitimises and approves the values of elite sport; that is, a cultural activity which mirrors many of the sermons by neoliberal think tanks and those driving the neoliberal agenda. In the ‘sport city’, the valued culture of elite sport serves as an important cog in the neoliberal machine, presenting a self-evident social, cultural and economic world which is framed within the limiting neoliberal doxa. Moreover, an emphasis on economic discourse appears to surround discussions of Melbourne’s sportscape (financial cost of infrastructure, economic value of branding the city, attendance statistics etcetera); marginalising or erasing social discussion from public and political debate.

I briefly alluded to various forms of capital held by individuals within Melbourne’s bureaucratic field. While I did not provide the type of detailed graphical illustration of

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335 The uniqueness of the ‘sport city’ identity is arguably limited as many other cities across the globe also claim to be a ‘sport city’ or ‘sporting capital’.

336 The ‘sport city’ tends to emphasise opportunities to attend and consume major sporting events rather than actively engage in participating in sporting pursuits.
capital that Bourdieu delivers in *Distinction*, I have demonstrated, using Ron Walker as an example, the ability of an individual to manoeuvre around and within the bureaucratic field in order to acquire considerable capital. Furthermore, a brief analysis of the interests of Victorian political leaders illustrates the existence of a form of sporting habitus within Victoria’s bureaucratic field which arguably increases the political capital of those determining the use of public resources. Of course, the actors mentioned in this thesis, it should be emphasised, are merely ‘playing the game’ that is determined by wider neoliberal structures which have shaped the bureaucratic field. Indeed, the rise to power of Jeff Kennett during the 1990s was arguably only possible because of a dramatic shift in the bureaucratic field which provided the space for an individual to proclaim the virtues of de-regulation and privatisation.

As noted throughout my thesis, a contest over the definition and use of public space between various interests groups exists in Melbourne. However, the state’s monopoly over legitimate symbolic and material violence has permitted it to (re)regulate protest movements in order to (re)create a favourable environment for corporate interests to occur. As such I asked what role protests and public demonstrations can play in shaping a democratic society under neoliberalism. The ‘normalising’ of protests has resulted in many movements simply attempting to gain a strong public profile through increased membership. While this endeavour may force decision-makers to take note of activist action, it often fails to provide protesters with the same access to political decision-makers as those driving the neoliberal agenda forward (for example the now customary exclusive meetings the business elite are offered with state Premiers). Additionally, the media’s portrayal of protest movements as disrupting the ‘social order’ appears to limit the effectiveness of many resistance campaigns. I now turn to a discussion regarding an approach in which those neoliberal processes that serve to construct a centaur state (Wacquant, 2010) might be challenged.

**Public sociology and glocal activism**

Throughout this thesis I have attempted to examine and understand ‘actually existing’ neoliberalism (Brenner et al., 2009; Peck & Theodore, 2012; Wacquant, 2012). The next step is to engage in a challenge of neoliberalism, rather than simply rest on the contribution of this thesis to broadening an understanding of the neoliberal ‘sport city’. Indeed, Bourdieu (2003) advocated for the scholar to exit their ivory tower, engage as a

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337 Moreover, concerns regarding the homogeneity of those actors most dominant in the bureaucratic field and those cultural producers who represent Victoria’s social reality need to be addressed.
‘public intellectual’ and invest his/her “artistic or scientific competency in civic debates” (p. 18). My aim in this section is to express a desire to extend my research from a critical understanding of neoliberalism to an engagement in public debate with activists by following the requests of public sociologists such as Bourdieu (2003) and Burawoy (2005).

According to Bourdieu (2003) a key role of the academic should be to help collaborate between groups resisting the neoliberal agenda; finding the connections between groups which have specific goals, to help uncover the macro-level neoliberal mechanisms which are at the crux of many social inequalities. Bourdieu (2003) calls on intellectuals to form “into a veritable collective intellectual capable of defining by itself the topics and ends of its reflection and action – in short, an autonomous collective intellectual” (p. 20). This collective intellectual’s responsibility is to critique, debunk and challenge the neoliberal ideologies produced and imposed by ‘think tanks’ who “support and broadcast the views of experts appointed by the powerful” (Bourdieu, 2003, p. 20). Moreover, the role of the collective intellectual, Bourdieu (2003) contends, is to fulfil both a negative and positive function.

The negative function of the collective intellectual consists of producing and disseminating material to defend “against symbolic domination that relies increasingly on the authority of science (real or fake)” (Bourdieu, 2003, p. 20). The responsibility here is to dispute the dominant neoliberal discourses produced by journalists and counter the “pseudoscientific authority of authorized experts (chief among them economic experts and advisors) with a genuinely scientific critique of the hidden assumptions and often faulty reasoning that underpin their pronouncements” (Bourdieu, 2003, p. 21). Similarly, Andrews and Giardina (2008) call for a ‘performative cultural studies’ in which intellectuals construct a political history of the neoliberal present in order to provide the empirical theorizing for people to act more strategically in combating neoliberal social order.

The positive function, Bourdieu (2003, p. 21) explains, involves “contributing to the collective work of political invention”. This is where a ‘public sociology’ (Burawoy, 2005; Donnelly, 2015) – an interchange between sociologists and populations they are working with – needs to emerge, to tackle the rhetoric of neoliberalism and common-sense political, social, cultural and economic activities that evolve.338

A public sociology, Burawoy (2005) explains, is required because:

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338 Burawoy (2005) asserts that the “interest in a public sociology is, in part, a reaction and a response to the privatization of everything. Its vitality depends on the resuscitation of the very idea of ‘public’” (p. 7).
We have spent a century building professional knowledge, translating common sense into science, so that now, we are more than ready to embark on a systematic back-translation, taking knowledge back to those whom it came, making public issues out of private troubles, and thus regenerating sociology’s moral fiber (sic). (p. 5)

Furthermore, as Piketty (2014) asserts, social scientists need to “redefine the terms of the debate” (p. 3) by, according to Donnelly (2015), drawing “connections between their work and the larger debates and problems, and by seeking ways to engage various publics when disseminating that research” (p. 422). By ‘redefining’ the debates away from market-like discourses that appeal and advantage those advocating for a neoliberal environment, the social scholar can support a much needed shift in the visions of our social world – this needs to occur at the state-level as the state is central to imposing the doxa that determines or limits the visions of our social world through cultural apparatus such as the education and legal systems (Bourdieu, 1989; 1991; 1994a). However, while changes at the level of the state are necessary, a critical global conversation is also required. As Denzin (2007) explains:

We need to foster a critical (inter)national conversation on what is happening, a coalition of voices across the political, cultural, and religious spectra: the socialist left; greenpeace (sic); women’s; gay; lesbian; African American, Asian American, and Latino movements; libertarians, young, old, students, workers, the clergy, and persons from all religions; and intellectuals. (p. xiv)

Indeed, while various groups with wide-ranging interests exist to challenge neoliberalism, a coherent cooperative strategy appears absent. Bourdieu (2003) explains that it was when socialism was silent that neoliberal think tanks were provided the opportunity to forge a new political direction.339 In the unlikely event of neoliberal advocates similarly retreating anytime soon, an active public sociology is required; one that acts not just at the local level but at the global level. That is, in the same manner in which neoliberalism and neoliberal activities operate.

The challenges faced by local activist groups presented in this thesis (most notably the capital deficiency compared to those political and corporate organisations they oppose) illustrate the often futile attempts to simply act local. As such, it is essential for a global movement to address – by revealing misrepresentations – widespread neoliberal activities which pervade social, cultural and political structures at the local and global

339 Also see Mathers and Novelli (2007) for a brief discussion of the retreat of the socialist project.
level. Thus, cooperation through information and resource sharing between activist groups is of immense importance. The role of the scholar in this situation is therefore to actively engage in the subjective study of social movements, helping to develop advice and information on the causes of success and failures of these movements in the challenge against the capital rich neoliberal organisations, think tanks and political advocates. Following this call from Bourdieu, Mather and Novelli (2007) conducted an ‘engaged ethnography’ in an attempt to locate the social scientist within the community. In addition to challenging “the conventional roles of relationships established by academics and generate new ones,” (p. 245) Mather and Novelli (2007) asserted that “utilizing the privileged location of the academy to assist in making visible the invisibility of marginalized social movements” (p. 245) would strengthen the legitimacy of the activism within the public sphere. Furthermore, the authors explain that engaging at the foundational level of resistance may provide the academic with a rich source of material in order to advance their own ‘academic capital’.

Towards the end of the previous chapter I noted the frequent failure of authorised or, indeed, unauthorised protests to achieve their aims. And as such, I followed Samuel’s (2013) assertion that localised protests on specific issues may not be the most effective method for challenging neoliberal activities. While I am not advocating for some form of anarchy, the localised nature of many protest movements appear only to slow or decrease the impacts of neoliberal activities; rather than reverse any negative effects or social inequalities. Instead, a globalised movement – such as the Occupy movement or the public demands for states to accept increased numbers of Syrian refugees in 2015 – may be a more successful approach. A globalised (Robertson, 1992) protest movement could provide the capital – particularly social and symbolic capital - required to challenge the political and urban elite that are advancing neoliberalism. However, as Roberts (2012) outlines, even movements such as Occupy have a number of limitations, most notably a lack of organisation and willingness to engage with the democratic structures

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340 Mathers and Novelli (2007) draw upon Bourdieu and Santos, as two opponents of neoliberalism, to engage in ethnographic studies of two instances of organised resistance to neoliberalism. The authors repeat Burawoy’s calls for a public sociology.

341 Indeed riots do not seem to advance the anti-neoliberal project - as evidenced, for example, by the reaction to the London student riots in 2011 in which students failed to convince the English parliament to over-turn a significant increase in university fees. Furthermore, as Roberts (2012) explains, the Occupy Wall Street movement failed, in part, because of the anarchist philosophy adopted and enacted by many of its members.

342 See Robertson (1992) for a discussion on glocalisation; that is, local variances of global activities.
that have supported and (re)constructed the neoliberal environment. Rather than ignoring or disengaging, I believe that activists and social researchers need to utilise the state, with its significant symbolic capital and monopoly over legitimate symbolic and material violence, as the place where welfare and economic re-regulation can take place.

While protests may still serve as an important function in erecting a platform to provide the voices of disempowered locals, the role of the media in producing or reducing these voices must be a central subject for intellectuals. Bourdieu raises concerns regarding the role of the media in scrutinising neoliberalism:

The number of people involved in a protest is now less important than the amount of media coverage and political impact achieved by a demonstration or action. But media visibility is by definition partial as well as hardly impartial and, above all, ephemeral. The spokespersons are interviewed, a few emotion-laden reports are broadcast, but the demands of the movements are seldom taken seriously in public debate, as a consequence of the media’s limited understanding. This is why it is essential to sustain activist work and an effort at theoretical elaboration over the long term, irrespective of opportunities for media exposure (Bourdieu, 2003: 41).

The difficulty in defining and explaining the complexities of neoliberalism (as discussed in chapter 3) is most likely a factor in the media’s limited understanding of the neoliberal debate. In addition to educating the media, the redefining of protesters is important. At present, many protesters are simply presented by corporate-friendly media and the political right (and centre-left) as hippies, ‘professional’ or ‘serial’ protesters or greenies. In order to challenge or re-produce these representations, the collective intellectual needs to be immersed within the mass media. Indeed, Burawoy (2005) explains that a traditional public sociology involves the use of the media; locating sociologists within the media to write or broadcast opinion pieces on matters of public importance. Corporate-friendly traditional forms of media are likely to deflect or block the messages of the anti-neoliberal sociologist; as such, it appears that social media may serve a purpose in providing an initial platform for diverse voices – although it must be acknowledged that social media is itself immersed within the corporate world, in addition to being censored or heavily regulated in many environments and key messages may get lost in the ‘clutter’. Despite

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343 Burawoy (2005) also refers to organic public sociology “in which the sociologist works in close connection with a visible, thick, active, local and often counter-public” (p. 7). However, Burawoy (2005) continues to explain that the traditional and the organic are not antithetical but complementary; the organic public sociologist “can make visible the invisible, to make the private public, to validate these organic connections as part of our sociological life” (p. 8).
these pitfalls, the use of social media to allow collectives to instantly and globally communicate may serve as a useful tool in anti-neoliberal campaigns.

A successful public sociology needs to use the media to help redefine the terms of debate and correlate the messages that activists convey through their protests. While these protests, by themselves, may not be effective, they still serve as a useful platform for presenting the voices of marginalised communities. As such, the collective intellectual needs to assemble these voices and engage them with the state in order to help support a shift in the visions of our social world.

Of concern to the sport sociologist attempting to engage in public sociology is the often claimed intangible benefits associated with international sport and major sporting events. While a fight against the ‘corporate monsters’ that drive capitalism and benefit from the decisions of the neoliberal state has gained some traction amongst the public, major sports events are still often viewed as providing economic and social benefits to the local community – including increased pride, civic identity and psychic income (i.e. the ‘feel-good factor’). Indeed, numerous critics of sports events have illustrated the fallacy of claimed economic benefits (Crompton, 1995; Gratton & Henry, 2001; Horne & Manzenreiter, 2004; Whitson et al., 2006) while the ‘known unknowns’ (Horne, 2007) of various claimed psychic income benefits associated with sporting events remain “problematic because few can offer counter-evidence” (Sam & Scherer, 2008, p. 66). As such, sport sociologists may need to increase their contribution to the broader field of sociology in order to illustrate sport’s significant role as a form of culture glue that helps bind neoliberalism. Through inserting a valued analysis of ‘sport’ in mainstream sociology, it may be possible that the influence of this popular cultural pastime gains greater traction and attention in public debate.

Limitations and Future Research

Limitations were present in this research; however by adopting Wacquant’s understanding of neoliberalism as the re-regulation of the state, I have both broadened a ‘sport’ understanding of the neoliberal, urban entrepreneurial city as well as extend Wacquant’s theory to incorporate the substantial field of sports as a form of cultural glue that helps bind the neoliberal state together. In this section I will briefly reflect upon the limitations of this study as well as provide some ideas for future research.

A number of barriers were confronted during the collection of material required to ‘reconstruct’ the sport city for analysis. Most specifically, I was unable to interview representatives of the Herald Sun or current politicians from the centre-right Liberal Party. This was not due to a lack of determination and repeated attempts – via email and phone
calls. However, in gaining access to Jeff Kennett and Alan Stockdale, two influential members of the Liberal Party during the 1980s and 1990s, a rich supply of Liberal Party representation was obtained. Further interviews with current and past politicians could have provided greater insight into the political debates and decisions regarding the case-studies; indeed, only one female Member of Parliament was interviewed in this study which arguably indicates a gender bias of political voice represented in this thesis.

Collection of ‘media’ content was restricted to newspapers – both print and online. I recognise that a wider media analysis (incorporating Television, radio and on-line media) would add substantially to an examination of the sport city and indeed, there is scope for this in the future; particularly tourism material produced by the state government that (re)presents the city to potential tourists, migrants (particularly elite professionals) and the citizens of the state. In future, incorporating public opinion regarding political decisions through collection of public comment on Twitter, Facebook and various online campaigns (for example Change.org) would be appropriate due to the shift in media consumption towards social media/online platforms. A further weakness was acknowledged at the beginning of my ‘consumption’ section in chapter 10, where I asserted the methodological limitations of using media material in order to gauge public consumption of the ‘sport city’ cultural artefact. Aside from the media’s ‘edited’ version of social reality, opinion polls fail to encapsulate all public opinions and, as Bourdieu (1979) asserts, falsely present the public as ‘having’ a valid and ‘valued’ opinion.

My analytical discussions and conclusions indicate a number of future research possibilities and recommendations. The scope of my research was quite broad in attempting to scrutinise events over a 30-year period. A deeper historical analysis may add insight into the construction of the ‘Victorian sport-identity myth’ and the overall production of the sport city. Moreover, additional case-studies would likely wield further supporting material for many of the claims made in this thesis. These case studies should focus on the state-funded investments into upgrading facilities at – and around – the Melbourne Cricket Ground; Flemington Race Course (venue of the Melbourne Cup horse racing carnival) and; state-funded permanent sporting facilities surrounding Albert Park lake (the Melbourne Sports and Aquatics Centre and Lakeside Stadium were only briefly discussed in this thesis).

Continued focus on Melbourne should involve a closer examination of the existence of a ‘sporting habitus’ amongst prominent past and current Victorian politicians, as well as the representation of the ‘sport city’ through diverse media sources. Extending the scope of my research to include a more detailed analyse of the ‘double-regulation’ of Melbourne’s urban precariat would likewise enhance an understanding of Melbourne as a neoliberal ‘sport city’. My analysis is limited to an examination and understanding of the
neoliberal sport city, however a greater focus on the impact of the sport city strategy on the local population is required.

Broadening the focus on sporting facilities to include the design of stadiums would also be of interest. Indeed, Horne (2011) notes that the critical analysis of stadium architecture is an area worthy of research. Horne cites the work of Stevens (1998) who adopted a Bourdieusian approach to understanding the architectural ‘field’ as cultivating distinctive styles and tastes. In post-industrial societies, stadiums are being designed as icons of commercial cities and as such, the architects and artists, play an important role in (re)defining the consumerist sportscape. Certainly, Melbourne appears to be fixated on designing ‘world class’ stadiums (for example, the most roofed tennis courts; first indoor cricket stadium; iconic Rectangular Stadium design) which are determined by, and for, the market. A critical analysis of the architecture and architects of these stadiums, therefore, may add useful knowledge in further understanding the (re)production phase of the neoliberal sport city.

Departing Melbourne as the focus, a Bourdieusian analysis of other self-proclaimed and industry-awarded ‘sport cities’ would add knowledge to the field. Comparing and contrasting distinct places would enrich our understanding of the neoliberal project, illustrating the fluidity of the neoliberal agenda across national, cultural and political landscapes. Replicating the current study on places such as Glasgow, Sochi, Singapore and Doha for example (all of which have recently demonstrated a strategy of enticing sporting events) would provide essential fabric for comprehending sports use within the global neoliberal project. However, caution must be adheered to prior to transposing the theoretical analysis adopted in this thesis onto emerging ‘sport cities’. Indeed, as Schimmel (2015, p. 594) asserts, “despite the population growth, emerging economic influence and shift in global spotlight to cities in the Global South, urban theory suffers from an overshadowing Global North focus”. As such, examination of the increasing desire of governments in the Global South to acquire sports events is required but this examination needs to be achieved with urban theory that is geopolitical-specific.

The above recommendations outline a desire to continue examining the sport city by performing the negative function of Bourdieu’s collective intellectual. In order to perform the positive function, I suggest that scholars follow the work of Mathers and Novelli (2007) by analysing the internal mechanisms of anti-neoliberal resistance organisations – for example, groups that are opposing the use of public funds for stadium development or bids for major sporting events. Through ethnographic research, a greater emphasis on the voices of those participating in activism would go some way to filling a large gap in the current sports literature.
Appendix A
Selected events for analysis

Case Study 1: National Tennis Centre

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Search time-frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Locations considered for a National Tennis Centre (NTC)</td>
<td>March 3, 1984</td>
<td>March 2 – 30, 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100,000 feasibility study into Flinders Park as a location for NTC</td>
<td>June 8, 1984</td>
<td>June 8 – 29, 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flinders Park confirmed as location for the NTC</td>
<td>October 6, 1984</td>
<td>October 6 – 27, 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$53 million of public funding approved for NTC</td>
<td>June 27, 1985</td>
<td>June 27 – July 18, 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flinders Park renamed Melbourne Park</td>
<td>May 4, 1995</td>
<td>May 4 – 25, 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention to upgrade NTC announced</td>
<td>January 18, 2009</td>
<td>January 18 – February 8, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$363 million upgrade to NTC announced</td>
<td>January 19, 2010</td>
<td>January 19 – February 9, 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Case Study 2: Multi-sports Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Search time-frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

344 Key events were selected after reading through the monthly published Tennis Australia Magazine between 1980 and 2013; in doing so, articles published in this magazine were also collected in order to contextualise the case study.

345 A three week search time-frame was decided upon to ensure as many articles and letters to the editor were collected; however a four week search was conducted on the first event as it appeared to remain ‘news worthy’ for this duration.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time-frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bid document submitted</td>
<td>April 10, 1999</td>
<td>April 7 – 21, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melbourne declare host city for 2006 Commonwealth Games</td>
<td>October 10, 1999</td>
<td>October 7 – 21, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletes village location announced</td>
<td>October 23, 2002</td>
<td>October 22 – November 11, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth Games event</td>
<td>March 15, 2006</td>
<td>March 1 – 16, 2006 &amp; March 25 – April 8, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auditor-General’s report on Commonwealth Games released</td>
<td>September 15, 2006</td>
<td>September 14 -29, 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Case Study 3: Australian Formula One Grand Prix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Search time-frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian Formula One Grand Prix (GP) to be relocated to Melbourne</td>
<td>December 17, 1993</td>
<td>December 17 – 31, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 people attend GP protest</td>
<td>May 16, 1994</td>
<td>May 15 – 27, 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Park plan released</td>
<td>May 27, 1994</td>
<td>May 27 – June 10, 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Prix Act passed</td>
<td>October 18, 1994</td>
<td>October 16 – 30, 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycle Grand Prix announcement</td>
<td>May 5, 1995</td>
<td>May 5 – 19, 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First GP event</td>
<td>March 10, 1996</td>
<td>March 3 – 31, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP financial report released</td>
<td>October 10, 1996</td>
<td>October 10 – 24, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP contract extended</td>
<td>August 16, 2000</td>
<td>August 16 – 30, 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selected Event</strong></td>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td><strong>Search time-frame</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Docklands Stadium proposal</td>
<td>September 3, 1996</td>
<td>September 3 – 17, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stadium plan formally announced</td>
<td>October 31, 1996</td>
<td>October 31 – November 14, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL announces intention to close sell Waverley Park</td>
<td>March 23, 1997</td>
<td>February 23 – March 30, 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCG Trust restructure</td>
<td>April 4, 1998</td>
<td>April 4 – 18, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final match at Waverley Park</td>
<td>August 29, 1999</td>
<td>August 22 – September 5, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Docklands Stadium opening</td>
<td>March 9, 2000</td>
<td>March 2 – 23, 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposal for publicly-funded rectangular football stadium</td>
<td>November 11, 2004</td>
<td>November 11 – 14 December, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rectangular stadium announced</td>
<td>April 30, 2005</td>
<td>April 30 – May 14, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stadium design plans released</td>
<td>April 7, 2006</td>
<td>April 7 – 21, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Melbourne A-League club</td>
<td>June 12, 2009</td>
<td>June 5 – 19, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melbourne Super 15 rugby franchise</td>
<td>November 13, 2009</td>
<td>November 6 – 20, 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³⁴⁶ In the lead-up to the sale, there was a lot of media discussion regarding the pros and cons of a sale. As such, the search time-frame began four weeks prior to the event to incorporate this media debate.

³⁴⁷ At the time of the initial proposal for the stadium Melbourne had bid for a super rugby franchise, the announcement of the bid result occurred in early December, 2004. As such, the time-frame incorporates that announcement and subsequent media discussion.
## Appendix B

### Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baum, G.</td>
<td>Senior sports journalist for <em>The Age</em> (1989 - )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethke, D.</td>
<td>CEO of Melbourne City Council (board member of 1996 Olympic Games bid) (1980-1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gawenda, M.</td>
<td>Editor for <em>The Age</em> (1997-2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goad, P.</td>
<td>Save Albert Park member (1993 - ) &amp; Save Albert Park president (2002 - )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morris, B.</td>
<td>CEO of Melbourne and Olympic Parks Trust (2006 - )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pandazopolous, J.</td>
<td>Labor MP (1992 - )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennicuik, S.</td>
<td>Green MP (2006 - )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheehan, P.</td>
<td>Director General Department of Management &amp; Budget (1982-1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockdale, A.</td>
<td>Liberal Treasurer of Victoria (1992-1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weatherill, S.</td>
<td>CEO of State Sport Centres Trust (1995 - )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Treasury advisor (involved with the National Tennis Centre) (1984-1992)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C
Semi-structured Interview Schedule

- What is/was your role and can you give me a quick background/pathway as to how you arrived in this position (e.g. education, previous jobs, and motivations to work in this environment)?

- What is/was the vision of this organisation?
  - How does 'sport' (sports capital of Australia) fit into this vision?
  - Were there barriers to achieving this vision?
  - Did/has this vision change(d) at all?

- What is/was the benefit of hosting elite sports events to Melbourne and Melburnians/Victorians?

- Are/were there any negatives &/or alternatives to using sport?

- What resistance exists/existed?

- What relationship do the government/your organisation have with sporting organisations/trusts/P-GAs/government?

- What were the reasons for investing/hosting/constructing [insert specific case study]?  
  - Was there any resistance?
  - What consultation took place with the public?
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