John Howard’s Australia and September 11

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Student Declaration

I, Ben Anwyl, declare that the thesis entitled ‘John Howard’s Australia and September 11’ is no more than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of figures, transcribed recordings of interviews and references. This thesis contains no material that has been submitted previously, in whole or in part, for the award of any other academic degree or diploma. Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own work.

Ben Anwyl

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Abstract

The literature on the performance of Australia’s centre-right government led by John Howard (1996-2007) has tended to underplay the role of September 11 in his electoral success. To win four terms of continuous government in the contemporary political scene is, however, no mean feat, ensuring Howard a place in the pantheon of celebrated conservative leaders in the English-speaking world.

Our framework is the celebrated gestalt developed by Fred I. Greenstein to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of each American President. Based on a series of interviews with Howard, the inner sanctum around him, other players in the political scene, and expert commentators, this thesis interrogates the leadership of John Howard in Greenstein’s terms.

Each of the six skills and attributes in the Greenstein typology is viewed in specific ways from the standpoint of the two dozen interviewees. In areas where Howard was in some sense or other deficient or lacking, his experience in government, notably September 11, had a positive effect on his capacity for leadership.

This analysis serves to help us approach the central question of this thesis, namely, what is the role of leader in the formation of a nation’s foreign policy? This question has been debated in the International Relations (IR) field for several generations of scholarship, and is most closely associated with the name of James N. Rosenau.

The case of John Howard in the reformulation of Australian foreign policy in the aftermath of September 11 is an example on the ‘yes’ side of the ledger in that important debate.

Where the Greenstein framework is important is to help us to see that these epochal events in IR can shape leaders as well as be shaped by them.
Introduction: The Why, the What, and the How of this thesis

The basic problem: The Why

The twentieth century saw many powerful leaders (Hitler, Stalin, Churchill, FDR) whose role in world affairs invites scholarly debate. We ask questions about the role of individual leaders in the making of foreign policy, because there is academic discussion about whether or not individual leaders matter. Drawing upon this author’s elite interviews this thesis examines John Howard’s overall significance as the Prime Minister of Australia following the terrorist events of September 11 2001 (9/11) in influencing the formation of his nation’s foreign policy. I focus on Howard as Prime Minister post-9/11 because it provides a hitherto unique opportunity to understand more about his personal significance as leader and his influence in making foreign policy. This thesis is original in its use of elite interviews as the basis for its analysis of national leader’s role in foreign policy formulation.

Howard declared he was responsible and directly accountable for the foreign policy of Australia immediately following the initial crisis of 9/11 in his role as Prime Minister. This thesis investigates whether this was especially true, or false, using elite interviews as the research method. I seek answers to the following questions in order to understand Howard’s significance as leader post-9/11:

- Does a leader like Howard matter more than the many other multiple factors in forming foreign policy?
- Does the leader as an individual shape foreign policy or can it be explained by other factors?
- Was Howard’s leadership role in a foreign policy crisis like 9/11 more important than other factors?

Taken together, answers to these questions help us in understanding how significant Howard was as leader in the formation of post-9/11 foreign policy in Australia.
Scholarly opinion is divided on the issue of how leaders respond to periodic crises like 9/11 and then frame foreign policy through their political actions. A leader matters because in some way because he or she has the capacity to influence the outcomes of foreign policy. There is an important connection that exists between the leader and the resolution of foreign policy issues. Howard is an interesting example when it comes to understanding the effects of 9/11 as an event on foreign policy. As individuals, leaders often provide a very public and self-justificatory explanation of their own foreign policy, yet other factors are typically used to weigh up the causes and consequences of shifts in foreign policy. Scholarly opinion continues to differ on the question of whether or not leaders matter in the shaping of foreign policy.

Scholars often interpret why leaders act the way they do when confronted with and responding to decisive crises like 9/11 without a clear consideration of foreign policy. Scholars have been concerned with understanding the politics of government or behaviour over foreign policy issues in many different ways. The studies of leadership and explanations of foreign policy are not always carried out in unison. Yet leadership and foreign policy are obviously causally connected with one episode following another when it comes to scholars making sense of events changing the world. The numbers of different or combined factors often creating an explanation for making up foreign policy outcomes have produced no firmer understandings of the prominence of an individual or the leader role. If a leader does indeed decide foreign policy, then that story should be told unambiguously.

The study of leadership involving foreign policy helps to explain the basis of why states act the way they do and how they survive. Individual decisions in effect translate to foreign policy. To various degrees what foreign policy becomes is always dependent on the efforts of leadership. But leaders vary considerably and exercise leadership to different degrees. Different leaders make different decisions and their influences are not always fully appreciated. Understanding leadership is essentially problematical and challenging. Other factors constitute the field of foreign policy, including, for example,
societal influences and the global environment. So the pattern of leaders making decisions and their resultant foreign policy can be confused and hard to sort out.

Leaders reveal aspects of themselves in their daily business of running governments. The role of the leader can be hard to distinguish in the hurly-burly of day-to-day political life. The average leader has more on his or her mind than just foreign policy. Domestic factors can profoundly shape the leader. The political study of leaders and their foreign policies are clearly both interrelated at various intervals but often distinguished by the demonstration of some direct influence or other forces of the leader to achieving resultant outcomes by decision-making. Leaders do not always determine just how a foreign policy works by themselves. But typically the leader is credited with important enough distinction over decision-making despite the many influences. Leaders are also capable of being interpreted within a myriad of different explanatory models.

Similarly there are numerous and quite varied frameworks for understanding foreign policy. Where the leader fits into the workings of particular frameworks is not straightforward. In particular situations the leader’s actions seem to explain foreign policy decisions and directions, but at other times different factors predominate. Yet, despite so much variation leaders are typically an important part of the ensemble of factors needed to understand the international system as a whole.

There is then a problem in determining just why it is that a certain leader acts the way that they do in a role when it comes to the making of foreign policy. The theoretical models relevant to this question are not only numerous but start from quite different assumptions about leadership and the extent to which foreign policy settings can be attributed to the work of individuals occupying leadership roles.

The varied approaches to foreign policy offer different insights when it comes to assessing the role of the leader. Neack (2003, p. 70-71), for example, in investigating what makes foreign policy analysis (FPA) confirms that the individual influence on foreign policy but wants to see the individual as exercising a choice among the many
different ways of implementing a foreign policy option. For some scholars just the definition of leader is evidence enough to assume an influence on foreign policy – leaders are, therefore, leaders do, in all areas of governmental action, including foreign policy.

A different tack is to consider how different styles of decision-making might affect foreign policy: realist rational choice, decision-making models and cognitive style approaches attempt to isolate the individual attributes at the smallest level of analysis (Neack 2003, p. 70). Some foreign policy analysts believe that narrowing the factors that influence foreign policy down to individuals does not imply that factors from other levels of analysis may not be crucial. Some also maintain that the individual leader’s foreign policy is confirmed through a narrow conceptual lens that focuses only around the leader and the concentration of the crucial part of the individual variable (Neack 2003, p. 71). Still others have unravelled the definition of leader by ‘leadership matters’ as leadership is a crucial driver of analysis in coming to terms with the divide between international and domestic politics (Neack 2003, p. 71). Another means of assessment is interpreting leadership as similar to analysing a governing ‘regime’ operating from the highest decision-making unit of the country (Neack 2003, p. 71). Writers of the realist persuasion, in making their assessment of the leader, imply that the importance of governing for national interest renders the study of individual leaders no matter who they or personality differences to be inappropriate and irrelevant (Neack 2003, p. 71). For these realists, cost-effective analysis by the leader produces a framework for understanding strategic policy calculations of foreign policy. The cognitive style scholars, on the other hand, question whether a universal rationality exists to define leadership and examine the boundaries of rationality in specific belief systems. Metaphors can also be used to define different each leader’s own patterns of information action (Neack 2003, p. 71).

Rosenau’s (1966) well-known comparative approach calls for a further elaboration upon the individual, whereby societies are ranked according to their relative potencies in which five sets of variables underlying the external behaviour of sixteen different types of societies and three types of issue areas are classified (Rosenau 1966, p.
When all levels of analysis of all variables that make up foreign policy are considered, Rosenau’s framework for understanding the influence on foreign policy assumes that Australia is a large (in geographical terms), open (democratic) and developed country (GDP/capita) and that the order of importance in explaining Australia’s foreign policy should be (1) role, (2) societal, (3) governmental, (4) systemic, and (5) the idiosyncratic personal characteristics of the political leadership. Foreign policy has been dominated by differing explanations that have rightly or wrongly underplayed the individual role of the leader. The Rosenau approach applied to Howard’s case study would produce quite singular conclusions.

If we break leadership into constituent variables, a true or false response could be applied to highlight the attributes of leadership as a means of understanding the importance of the role that leaders play in particular crucial events that have determined the course of foreign policy. In this regard the individual variable only becomes a factor amid the interplay of the other variables on process. Such a framework conquers the weight of individual attributes through its larger selection of variables. Crucially leadership matters to Rosenau only after all the variables are accounted for. This does not imply that leadership does not matter to overall results but places a leader’s personal attributes in the explanatory model.

A leader as a person possessing individual attributes can be defined as a collection of the elements that make up the idea of being a person and achieving personhood. Leaders themselves maintain a common set of standards that can be measured by their cognitive and emotional abilities to provide an assessment of their individual attributes. In the fields of anthropology and ethicists, it is well assumed that what defines a person includes a set of human standards including showing self-awareness, an ability to understand complex emotions and a capacity for empathy. The anthropologist Dawn Prince-Hughes (2004, pp. 138-56) argues that the great apes and human counterparts had evolved a set of standards required to determine the common elements of what defines person and therefore the idea of evolving a common personhood. This includes having: self-awareness; comprehension of past, present and future; the ability to choose to risk
and those consequences; a capacity for empathy; and the ability to think abstractly. A leader can be defined and measured through all the elements it takes to understand personhood.

Differing authors make assessments of the leader’s efforts by connections of importance to state, with levels of decision-making and interpreting the individual at personal characteristic levels of their contribution to foreign policy in order to decipher the influence on foreign policy. These studies have undoubtedly and in many instances left ambiguities about clearly understanding the characteristics of the leader, their personal roles and their effects on decision-making on comparisons of governments over the long history of time. The ways forward clarify the need for making an assessment of the leader at an individual level of analysis in order to understand foreign policy.

Not surprisingly there are still large debates about these matters. The role of leadership in foreign policy analysis sits at the intersection of quite contrasting approaches from separate disciplines (political science, psychology, sociology, history) that share a common interest in the question but start from divergent assumptions. There are various ways of incorporating a study of the leader into various kinds of analysis. Or else the leader can be defined as being in control of the levels of analysis producing results. Rosenau’s (1966) method can be used to rank states and to mix the relevant potencies of independent intervening fixed variables in order to determine a country’s foreign policy outcomes. The important point is that these methods either increase or decrease our chances of locating the significance of the influence of the leader in foreign policy. Or do other explanations and different, independent limitations really matter more when it comes to governments making their foreign policy decisions for outcomes? Thus the debate about influences and results is as much to do with the theory that performs best for the equation.
Our research question

As Australia’s leader in the aftermath of 9/11 was Howard significant in the formation of foreign policy? Answering this question is the principal goal of this thesis. The hypothesis is that a fresh study of Howard’s performance – his individual idiosyncrasies, his personality and other personal characteristics – is just as an important means for understanding how 9/11 shaped foreign policy outcomes as any other approach. We propose to use Howard as a case study of the role of the individual leader in the formation of a particular middle power state’s response to one of the most important events in recent world history. This case study will contribute to the overall debate about the role of leaders in FPA.

Inside the overall research question is a series of smaller questions that, taken together, make up the bigger question. There is no doubt that different leaders and their circumstances will create different outcomes in foreign policy. But it is how to explain how these outcomes were a consequence of the actions and dispositions of a particular leader, or any leader in theory, that is especially challenging. Or it may be that intervening variables have a greater say over the patterns and process that make up foreign policy as a result of different events. Establishing the significance of the leader is a way of understanding his or her influence on foreign policy.

One historical example not far back in Australia’s past illustrates the debate surrounding the significance or otherwise of different leaders on foreign policy. Australia during World War Two faced with the threat of the Japanese invading and the fall of Singapore in 1942 changed the course of future security. Prime Minister John Curtin played a leadership role in this. Australia remained entwined in a policy of imperial self-sufficiency at the end of the 1940s, however, Curtin made crucial decisions in a famous New Year’s speech linking Australia with the United States. As leader, Curtin exercised a powerful individual role, heralding a different direction for Australian foreign policy and an end to British protection. Without Curtin’s unique characteristics, would the future course of history and Australia’s foreign policy have been altered so dramatically?
The large part played by Prime Minister Robert Menzies in Australian history (1949-1966) also raises similar questions. Australian foreign policy moved out of the war years confronting a new variety of challenges in terms of the threats and opportunities faced within the international system following the lead set by Curtin. With Menzies’ return to government, defeating Ben Chifley in 1949, Australia increasingly sought closer economic ties increasingly with America. A large immigration program accompanied by the problems in gaining capital from Britain for development and out-of-date infrastructure, focused the need for significant changes and the eventual restructuring of the dominance of the British Commonwealth ascendancy in Australia’s international relations in favour of America. A ‘Free World’, anti-communist approach to Asia and the world by America and a continued defence of the British colonial interests in Malaya, Singapore and Borneo dominated American and British foreign policy approaches. The threat of Japan diminished after its defeat. The onset of the fear of Communism directed at the Soviet Union and China, and the American doctrine of containment enmeshed in the new structures of the Cold War, were to dominate in Australia’s regional and global outlook until the end of the 1980s. So began a restructuring of Australia’s defence and foreign policy, premised on giving support to, and being supported by, its great and powerful friends. Menzies was indisputably central to the process, just as was Curtin’s role in leading Australia during World War Two was Churchillian in its grandeur.

This historical example helps to identify the significance of leadership as an issue in the field of foreign policy. From historical examples how do we go about identifying key individuals and their exact roles? How important were the leaders in influencing foreign policy? How successful have been the key traditional strategies used by social scientists to resolve these fundamental questions and to what extent did they fully resolve these historical questions? What remained of the relevant international circumstances? What was happening in the national political consciousness of the period that was so crucial to determining Australia’s foreign policy? To what extent does Howard’s significance in the aftermath in 9/11 meet the same standard of leadership in foreign policy as those earlier leaders?
These are fundamental questions about leaders as individuals in shaping foreign policy. More is needed to be known about the field of leadership and influence on foreign policy. We need to resolve a framework within which to develop a proper understanding of individual leaders and their role in foreign policy.

When we turn to ‘leadership’ as a discrete area of political science, we encounter the work of Fred I. Greenstein and his long-running study of the US presidency. American commanders-in-chief are, to employ the hackneyed phrase, ‘leaders of the free world’. They make an excellent case studies in leadership because their ‘role’ (to use Rosenau’s term) necessarily implies some sort of engagement with foreign policy. They also have a ‘societal’ function because they are expected to embody what it means to be American, both in a transcendent sense, across time, and in the specific circumstances of the era of their term in office. They are to the same extent operating in a ‘governmental’ fashion, in that their freedom of action is (mostly) constrained by the behaviour of Congress, and the self-appointed Cabinet members are required to exercise leadership on their behalf in their specific areas of responsibility (Defence, Treasury, State Department, etc) And it goes without saying that Rosenau’s fifth category, ‘the idiosyncratic personal characteristics of the political leadership’ (that is, the Washington zeitgeist) is profoundly influenced by the character of the incumbent president. President-elect Donald Trump might have promised ‘to drain the Washington swamp’, but the capital city (like most capitals worldwide) exercises an influence over every US President, regardless of what person or what political party is in power.

Greenstein proposes a set of six key attributes or skills required by the US President for him (or her) to be successful. The President must have superior cognitive skills to think through the problems that beset him on a daily basis. He must have sufficient emotional intelligence to work with people and to regulate his own behaviour in public. He must have a clear policy vision, a sense of where he wants his nation to go. He must be an outstanding communicator. He must be able to organise his government. And he must, perhaps least controversially, have political skill of the kind made famous
by Machiavelli in *The Prince*. If any of these skills are absent or deficient the leader will quickly be found out, and his tenure will be shattered as a result.

Each of Greenstein’s six skills and attributes is relevant to the formation of foreign policy, and for this reason they fit perfectly our present purposes. We can use them as a framework for sifting and sorting the observations made about the Howard years in power. We can see them developing as aspects of Howard’s personal skill set, and we can triangulate this development from a variety of standpoints – those close to Howard (including the PM’s self-assessment), those further away, and the more distant commentators.

It remains next in this Introduction to explain the What of this thesis, that is, the boundaries of this case study.

**The argument: The What**

This thesis is a case study of the role played by leaders in the determination of a nation’s foreign policy. It will examine whether John Howard played a critical role in the remaking of Australian foreign policy after September 11. The study of individual leadership and ways of looking at particular roles is a dynamic and ongoing research study with further potential. The value of this argument in this thesis will prove the study of the leader can be just as dominant as the other factors influencing foreign policy. It will add focus to the study of foreign policy by increasing the understanding of the individual as leader. This thesis revolves around Howard as a person.

Sometimes leaders are confronted with few options for survival. And at other times there are a number of choices for providing a greater leeway in their ability to shape the foreign policy of a country. There is some difficulty of framing any analysis in focussing on a leader’s personality in that the public persona may present very different images from what they are in private. Early years and formative experiences usually only can provide a rough guide and a smaller measure to motivations as leader. Many different
strategies are available to assess the personality of a leader and to thus go on to predict outcomes as a result. Some involve depicting external influences on domestic factors, others focus on events, and some emphasise the particular characteristics of the individual based on rationalising outcomes.

According to Alan Bryman (2004, p. 730) the amount of leadership research has changed markedly since the 1970s and 1980s to include greater optimism about the field and a greater methodological diversity.

This case study deals with Howard’s accession to Prime Ministership in 1996, his early foreign policy initiatives (particularly the East Timor intervention of 1999), the cataclysmic 9/11 terrorist event, and the subsequent episodes in the ‘War on Terror’ that followed, up to the point where Howard lost office in 2007. The story of this period is told mostly through eyewitness accounts by key participants.

**Research methods and procedures: The How**

The elite interviews used as the interviews basis were designed to extract vital information about Howard’s leadership and his significance in foreign policy. Fifteen elite interviews were undertaken across the years 2006-2010 of key players, including Prime Minister Howard and his significant Ministers, foreign policy experts, and academic experts.

These elite interviews were triangulated with other sources from the public domain – including Hansard, political speeches, autobiographical accounts, newspaper articles, and secondary accounts. Some of these publications also relied on elite interviews. These particularly include George Megalogenis (2006), Greg Sheridan (2006) and Donald Debats, Tim McDonald and Margaret-Ann Williams (2007), and a number of other authors. In particular, Debats, McDonald and Williams interviewed Howard and several of his key associates who were with him in the fateful week in Washington around September 11. We extend the sample to include Howard’s most important
Ministers, some senior officials, and certain commentators. These interviews provide depth and perspective on the developments on and after September 11.

Oral history of the kind employed in this present study enables us to probe more deeply into Howard’s skills and attributes than is possible using conventional printed sources. Elite interviewing is a specialist face-to-face method of data collection that provides particular benefits for researchers interested in better understanding how people of influence remember and sometimes rationalise events in which they have participated or with which they have been closely identified. A recent study of Western Australian premiers from David Brand in the 1950s up to Colin Barnett today shows how this technique can be used to document quite lengthy periods of political history (Kennedy 2014). Peter Kennedy is a respected journalist who relies more on his interviews than on printed sources to examine the complexities of modern Western Australian political history. In doing so he provides fresh insights into that state’s history. Elite interviewees have the motivation and the capacity to recall quite detailed events about which they feel a close connection. Lewis Dexter (1970, p. 5) argued that elite interviewing is a form of oral history that allows the interviewer to obtain valuable knowledge and data through a ‘non-standardised treatment’ of information collection. From the interviewer’s standpoint these interviewees select themselves if their work is relevant to a project. The method is successful because it builds upon an interviewer’s situational perspective, requires the interviewer to have a structured knowledge of the interview, and permits the interviewer to set up an understanding of the relevant outline of the problem at hand (Dexter 1970, p. 5).

Elite interviewing is a comprehensive and exhaustive process of inquiry. The elite interviewing requires the interviewer to have researched the events in question in such detail as to triangulate the memories of the interviewees. Elite interviewing, with the right-sized sample of informants, produces a style all of its own in finding a way through to a deeper understanding of elite activities. To the usual benefits of oral history, elite interviewing adds the additional virtue of giving the researcher a front-row view of elite players in action. Dean and Whyte (1970) raise two necessary core elements in
determining the kind of truths derived from elite interviewing: what light do the statements throw on the subjective sentiments of the interviewee and how much does an informant’s report correspond to the fact of objective reality (see Dean & Whyte 1970, p. 5). But Dexter’s own critique of this argument supports the central proposition of treating these so-called truths as ‘facts’. Inference and analysis through the use of elite interviewing provides the interviewer with knowledge of a kind not readily discoverable through standardised structured interviews (Dexter 1970, p. 131).

Elite interviewing offers researchers the opportunity to meet higher standards than mere responses to straightforward data collection or fact checking (common features of many interviewing methods). It comprises a more informal free-wheeling interview style than more traditional forms of standardised question interviews. More nuanced understandings of the issues at hand are likely from this style of questioning. The interviewee is typically more relaxed in the informal style of interviewing and is free to comment and ask questions in return across the range of topics.

Each successive interview also builds on the ones that preceded it, leading to a more complex understanding of the issues and variations in how the participants understood the events in question from their respective standpoints. Because elite interviewing allows for more flexibility in the kinds of questions that are asked, the interviewer can make specific comparisons from one interview to another and on such occasions learn from a comparison of interviews. In the current project, the repeat elite interviewing of Charlie Edwards (in 2006 and again in 2007) was undertaken deliberately with similar questions that provided useful comparisons and a more elaborate view of the ‘truth’. Elite interviewing also permits the addition of fresh questions that emerge quite naturally from the interviewee’s original answer. In terms of the sequencing of the elite interviews, the key decision-makers (in this study, John Howard and his inner circle) are usually left until last as a means of verifying or modifying crucial findings in the collection of the data.
One of oral history’s great virtues as a historical tool is that the interviewees reveal though their choice of words and phrases important aspects of the matter at hand. For example, these elite interviews provide a rich set of primary sources on the language employed by governments seeking to prosecute an anti-terrorist campaign as a new kind of ‘war’, ‘a War on Terror’. Instead of understanding the terrorists as ‘criminals’ (and a criminal minority at that) the use of military discourse can be seen to provide a rationale for governments to adopt a war footing. Elite interviews were used as a method to discover and find out more about this particular ‘truth’ than was on the public record.

The elite interviewing specifically assisted me in focussing on a larger set of primary evidence about the changes to Australian foreign policy as a result of 9/11. A list of all the possible interviewees was originally proposed, based on satisfying what emerged as the key criteria. Obviously an interview with both John Howard and with Alexander Downer was critical to the success of this elite interviewing. When they had kindly agreed to an interview, others in their inner sanctum were approached, followed by commentators closely associated with the Howard Government, and then the academics and political scientists who had researched the aftermath of 9/11 already and were happy to extend their thoughts more broadly.

As a matter of courtesy to the former Prime Minister, and in line with the ethics of elite interviewing, Howard was the last interview. Interviews required me to travel widely across Australia and the United Kingdom. (Resources did not permit a research visit to the United States.) The British interviews helped me put into perspective the traditional Westminster model of government that was historically strong in Australia. This comparison, by way of contrast, added to my understanding of the Washington elements of the post-September 11 governments of Australia.

I also interviewed parliamentary librarians at both the Western Australian Parliament and inside Federal Parliament in Canberra to both contextualise and clarify my elite interviews. I found out exactly what types of information politicians used to make their relevant decision-making judgements about 9/11 and whether and how
actively they researched for evidence to support these decisions within the Parliamentary library. Mostly politicians did not use library services but use private advisers to gather information outside of the parliament. Despite the extensive research service facilities available and the assistants provided, few politicians used the Parliamentary research services regularly to make judgements or prepare policy. This insight helped me to prepare in my elite interviews a background for understanding just how politicians made relevant decisions.

Elite interviews were conducted over the life of the thesis and a 321-page volume of transcripts was compiled. In all, I conducted more than 15 taped interviews between 2006 and 2010 using the same protocol of questions. As already noted, interviewees were given the latitude to take the discussion into areas that they wanted to elaborate upon. Each interview lasted roughly for two hours. I transcribed the recorded interview and wrote up the findings as soon as the interview was completed.

In two instances (with Andrew Shearer and Chris Sturgeon), owing to security concerns, only shorthand notes were allowed, but the analysis was completed fully. The Kim Howells interview was done by telephone. All interviews were conducted successfully except with the controversial journalist Andrew Bolt. Bolt reneged after long negotiations, first accepting a sit-down interview, and then writing back limited and unsatisfactory answers to my questions presented in email. This interview was eliminated as it did not meet the ethical professional standards of the other 15 elite interviews conducted.

In the transcripts of these elite interviews we can readily see the ‘underlying assumptions, beliefs and values’ that oral history purports to reveal. Key words used by high-ranking individuals contain histories and ‘embedded meanings’. An internal analysis of each interview reveals important continuities from one interviewee to another, as well as interesting discontinuities (see Jackson 2005, p. 25 for a comprehensive overview of the elements of analysis of a critical discourse of the War on Terror). We framed these
transcripts with Howard and his closest advisors at the centre, a circle of people around that inner circle, and a wider centre of interested onlookers.

The 15 elite interviewees that follow include both the ‘peers’ of Australian government decision-making during the aftermath of 9/11, and some ‘observers’. The observers who individually witnessed 9/11 and commented on the process of the Australian government are experts in the field of politics or foreign policy and international relations. The response of two British government skilled insiders (‘observers’ from an Australian viewpoint) who demonstrated their knowledge of Australian government foreign policy was particularly useful. Also helpful were interviews with an Australian ‘observer’ from the London think tank Demos (collected over two interviews) and with that of a high-ranking influential player inside the independent international pressure group and non-government organisation, the International Crisis Group (headquartered in Brussels). The latter represented globalisation and pressure group influences on modern politics.

Plan of the thesis

Following this introduction arguing the why, what and how of studying John Howard’s in leadership analysis this thesis will proceed as follows. Chapter 1 identifies the central problem of how to study leadership in foreign policymaking. The solution identified the use of Greenstein’s typology of leadership skills in the analysis of three ‘layers’ of perspectives on the leadership qualities of John Howard. This highlights to the reader that International Relations (IR) has tended to downplay the importance of individual leaders in international politics. In moves from Realism from theorists Morgenthau to Waltz and throughout the spread of Neoclassical Realism there is a distinct absence of the study of individual leadership in the analysis. The absence of individuals is also apparent in other key IR approaches – including Neoliberalism with its focus on economic and governing structures, and Reflectivism with its focus on discourse. A conceptual framework of leadership is developed using the synthesis of Greenstein’s elements of political style and how to recognise them to determine a leadership analysis. The research method is further

The study of Howard occupies Chapters 3 and Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. From elite interviewing the personal views of the individual leader, peers and observers are presented across each of the three time periods to confirm judgement of an effective style – arranged from before 2001, after 2001, and after 2003. Chapter 3 evaluates the cognitive style and emotional intelligence of Howard as leader. Chapter 4 evaluates his vision and public communication. Chapter 5 evaluates the organisational capacity and political skill of Howard as leader.

A final Conclusion follows, reiterating the major argument, presenting the particular conclusion, and presenting the key elements of the argument and thesis. A reminder is made of the subject matter and to consider what research should be done in the future.
Chapter 1: Leadership and Foreign Policy Analysis

1.1 Introduction

This thesis evaluates the leadership of Prime Minister John Howard as it pertains to Australian foreign policy before and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. In order to undertake this task, it is first necessary to address the question of how we ought to study leadership in foreign policymaking. This represents a challenge because the field of foreign policy analysis (FPA) has tended to overlook the roles played by individuals in foreign policymaking. In order to address this challenge, this chapter proposes the employment of the model of leadership analysis advanced most fully by Fred I. Greenstein (2004) in the context of his work on US presidents. This chapter explains how Greenstein’s approach to leadership analysis can be applied to the study of Australian political leaders, such as John Howard. In doing so it sets out the analytical framework that shapes the empirical analysis carried out in the remainder of this thesis.

This chapter is organised into four parts. The first section shows how and why the roles played by individuals have tended to be overlooked within the discipline of International Relations in general, and within the field of FPA more specifically. Foreign policy analysts have acknowledged the importance of individual leaders, but they have tended to situate this issue amidst many other factors. The second part introduces the conceptual framework of leadership developed primarily by Greenstein, suggesting that this framework can be used in order to fill important gaps in our knowledge regarding leadership in foreign policy. This framework helps us to identify the key skills and attributes that successful leaders generally need to possess. The third part of this chapter spells out in more detail how the conceptual model of leadership developed by Greenstein ought to be applied in the context of empirical research. As such, it shows how these leadership skills can be assessed.
1.2 The individual in International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis

However complex these subjects might be, both international politics in general, and the foreign policy behaviour of specific countries, are matters that are shaped, ultimately, by the actions of real, individual people. This notion is one that seems taken for granted in the coverage of international politics in the media, where commentators speak of the actions of individual leaders, great and otherwise. Yet when we turn to the academic study of international relations and foreign policy, we see a different tendency at work. Scholars of IR and FPA who have long grappled with the complexity of their respective subject matters, have generally avoided the examination of the roles of individual people in world politics.

The discipline of IR has long been characterised by theoretical diversity; a glance through any contemporary IR theory textbook illustrates the wide array of approaches that scholars can and do adopt in their studies of world politics. It is notable, however, that amidst this wide array of approaches, there have been very few that have taken seriously the role played by individuals. Indeed, theoretical traditions have marked their own development in terms of the outright rejection of approaches that place analytical weight on the individual. The most obvious example of this is the Realist school of thought. Early Realist works, and most notably, Hans Morgenthau’s (1948) *Politics among nations*, acknowledged the importance of many different factors in the shaping of world politics. These included systemic factors, such as the distribution of material power resources across countries and state-level factors, including national morale and the quality of government, but they also included individual factors, such as the quality of leadership, particularly as it related to the military capacity of a country (Morgenthau 1948, p. 138).

Over subsequent decades, however, Realism developed along lines other than those charted by Morgenthau. A key feature of Realist thought in the latter decades of the twentieth century was the extraction from Realist theory of references to individuals. This
trend is clear in the work of Kenneth Waltz. In his 1959 work, *Man, the state and war*, Waltz acknowledged the relevance of different levels of analysis in the study of war, including that which focused on the role of the individual. However, in his later work, *Theory of international politics* (1979), Waltz focused his attention on the explanation of features of world politics through the analysis of the structure of the international political system. Such an approach necessitated the abandonment of a concern for the role of individual leaders in world politics. This approach, later labelled as Neo- or Structural Realism, became a key source of influence on the analysis of world politics by Realists, and by others.

Liberalism in IR, like Realism, has a long history and can be divided into different camps. But few of these camps place much emphasis on the role played by individuals. Instead, Liberals have focused on state-level and systemic factors in their efforts to explain outcomes in world politics. Liberalism has addressed the challenges associated with cooperation under conditions of anarchy, as well as the mediating role that international institutions can play. It has also considered the importance of transnational ties in the shaping of world politics, and the power of international rules and norms to regulate the behaviour of states. This latter area of investigation is also characteristic of the work of some Constructivist scholars, who have attempted to show that international norms and social structures constitute the very identities of states, as well as regulating their behaviour. These approaches to the study of world politics are varied, but what is common to most is the lack of attention paid to the study of the individual within IR.

To some degree, the theoretical traditions that dominate the discipline of IR have also shaped research in the field of FPA. It is worth noting in this context that scholars working in that field have commented on both the challenges that arise from the theoretical diversity that characterises IR and the general lack of attention that is paid within IR to the role of individuals in world politics. Christopher Hill (2003, p. 10), for example, has suggested that scholars of foreign policy need to go beyond established IR theories, both to escape the theoretical debate that has overtaken parts of the discipline of IR, and to allow the re-inclusion of analyses of the roles that decision-makers play in the
making of foreign policy. In taking such a step, Hill advocates the continued
development of strands of thought in FPA that have traditionally sought to incorporate
within research the study of the various factors that can and do shape foreign policy. It is
worth considering some of these early efforts in FPA and the ways in which the roles
played by individuals have been situated within broader analytical frameworks.

Three key works that were published during the 1950s and 1960s helped lay the
groundwork for the development of the field of FPA. In each of them is evident a
recognition of the importance of the role of human agency in the making of foreign
policy. The work of Richard Snyder, Henry Bruck, and Burton Sapin (1954) in Decision
making as an approach to the study of international politics urged researchers to analyse
the role of key decision-makers in the explanation of international political outcomes.
Margaret and Harold Sprout (1956) in Man-Milieu relationship hypotheses in the context
of international politics presented a related argument, one that sought to highlight the
importance of the ‘psycho-milieu’ of the individuals and groups making foreign policy
decision. This milieu was understood as shaping the ways that such individuals perceived
and interpreted the world in which they operated, an argument that is similar to that
deployed later by Goldstein and Keohane (1993, pp. 3-31).

Perhaps more significantly in terms of its impact on the direction of FPA was
James Rosenau’s (1966) ‘Pre-theories and theories of foreign Policy.’ This was an
important work for two reasons. On the one hand, it made the case that foreign policy
analysis could not be advanced through a competition between theories of foreign policy
that each sought to focus on a single level of analysis; instead, some form of theoretical
synthesis was necessary. On the other hand, within such a synthesis, argued Rosenau,
must be the theoretical tools needed to examine the roles played by individuals in the
foreign policy-making process. As such, Rosenau’s early work served to legitimate the
study of individuals in the realm of FPA.

There should be no doubting the difficulty of adopting a multi-level model of
analysis of foreign policy, however. Integrating different variables within such a model
has proven a complex and challenging task, and what is clear from the literature on FPA is that the identification of the relevant variables at different levels of analysis has proceeded unevenly. As such, FPA continues to be shaped more by research focusing on systemic and state-level forms of analysis than by that which focuses on individuals. There are a number of reasons for this imbalance in FPA; some have to do with the difficulty of gaining access to the individuals that are most central to foreign policy decision-making, while others have to do with the relative lack of analytical tools needed to study individual decision-makers.

There is no doubt a much larger amount of ideas and literature presenting reasons for studying the importance of individuals in FPA exists in multiple areas of the wider field of world study. Greenstein (1967, p. 641) concludes a reason for focussing on the study of personality and the role of the individual depends on not just equating to ‘finding the simplest of answers’ but rather to what is overall ‘an extensive examination of the terrain of politics in terms of the diverse ways in which ‘the human element’ comes into play’. Further literature that supports that individuals are important in FPA exists in these following works. Many of the different old and new studies of the individual and leadership in politics open up to be vast in quantity and nature. Authors such as Bass (1990); House & Aditya (1997) and Yukl & Van Fleet (1992) have produced exhaustive comprehensive reviews of the leadership literature as it relates to covering the understanding of different types of leadership processes and outcomes.

One key area in which there has been some development of the analytical tools needed to study how individuals can shape foreign policy has been that of leadership studies. This area of research has sought to explain how and why certain leaders are particularly effective at shaping the behaviours of governments and, in the realm of foreign policy, whole countries. The following section seeks to outline an analytical framework that draws on leadership literature. Its purpose is to help us understand how we might approach the study of individuals in foreign policy-making.
1.3 A conceptual framework of leadership

As Joseph Nye (2008) notes, ‘leadership’ is a subject about which both a great deal and very little has been written. There are thousands of books that profess to explain leadership, and yet, in the academic realm, there remains relatively little research that has been carried out on the operation of leadership in the realms of government and foreign policy. In order to build an analytical framework within which to situate a study of the leadership of John Howard, therefore, it is necessary to turn to some of the key figures who have ventured into this terrain. Most prominent among these is Fred I. Greenstein. Greenstein has, over several decades, built a framework that highlights the key skills and attributes that are necessary for successful leadership, particularly within the context of the United States presidency. This section shall present this framework and, in particular, outline the six skills that Greenstein has suggested are necessary for successful leadership. This section begins by reviewing the evolution of Greenstein’s work on the analysis of leadership, before examining in detail his six key leadership skills and attributes. Whilst Greenstein’s work is considered to be of primary importance here, this section will also draw upon the works of others who have sought to add to and refine Greenstein’s approach to leadership analysis.

Greenstein’s approach to leadership analysis is most clearly demonstrated in his classic work of 2004, *The presidential difference*. In this book, Greenstein outlines the analytical framework that he uses to distinguish and evaluate the six distinctive skills and attributes that he has found to be central to successful leadership. These skills and attributes are as follows: cognitive style, emotional intelligence, vision, public communication, organisational capacity and political skill. Greenstein then applies this framework in his evaluation of the leadership of twelve United States Presidents from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to George W. Bush. In this work, Greenstein helps to clarify and illustrate the value that his model of leadership analysis offers to those interested in explaining successful leadership in American politics. However, it is important to note that Greenstein’s 2004 publication is itself a culmination of a research trajectory that spans five decades. While it provides a useful illustration of the value of Greenstein’s
model, it is necessary to review the development of that model so that the key features of each of the six skills and attributes can be clearly identified.

Throughout his many works Greenstein’s general focus has been on leadership in politics. Within this space Greenstein has written on a number of more specific topics, including the quality of individual leaders, the influence of personality, the impact of psychology on policy-making, the essence of good and bad decision-making, and the leadership of individuals in the context of particular events of importance in the context of US politics. It is worth noting here that many of these works are related to fields of academic inquiry other than that of International Relations. However, there is no doubting the relevance of Greenstein’s work on leadership to the analysis of practices that are intimately connected to IR in general, and foreign policy analysis in particular.

The earliest of his works that relates to the field of leadership studies is Greenstein’s (1967) investigation of the role of personality within politics. Greenstein (1967, p. 629) argued here that there is a great amount of political activity which can only be properly explained by taking account of the personal characteristics of the actors involved. In his quest for developing a more systematic and solidly grounded body of knowledge on personality and politics, Greenstein (1967, p. 641) called for the clarification of standards of evidence and inference appropriate to this subject matter. The key point that Greenstein made in this early work was to claim that the analysis of the role of personality in politics ought not to be examined in a general manner; instead, what was needed was the orderly dismantling of this question into its component parts. The refining of relevant sub-questions would, according to Greenstein (1967, p. 641), allow the more extensive examination of the diverse ways in which ‘the human element’ shapes political outcomes.

Later, Greenstein (1975a) built upon this foundation in his work *Personality & politics: Problems of evidence, inference and conceptualization*. In this work Greenstein sought to develop analytical tools that would allow a more intensive study of this subject matter, something that Greenstein (1975a, p. xxi) described as the building of an
‘epistemological methodology’ for studying the correlation between personality and politics. This, for Greenstein, necessitates reviewing the relevant personality and politics literature, addressing the possible objections that threaten to derail that line of study, and offering a plan for future research. Such a plan would need to take into account relevant material from a wide range of fields, including the disciplines of psychology, social psychology, psychiatry, and anthropology as well (see Greenstein 1975a, p. xxix). Elsewhere, Greenstein (1975b, p. 72) noted that this incorporation of material from different disciplines would not be easy. In particular, he noted the state of the discourse in psychology, the lack of connections between psychology and politics, and the unresolved disagreement in the literature about resolving such matters.

According to Greenstein, the development of a plan for research would also need to respond to the following challenges. Firstly, to test the idea that personality matters in the shaping of politics one must resolve the analytical and empirical challenges of distinguishing the relative influences of social and personality characteristics. This, he argued, is particularly hard given the complexity of human psychology and the difficulty of identifying the links between individual and collective behaviour (Greenstein 1975b, p. 72). Secondly, one must challenge the belief that factors of personality distribute randomly and, in social and political contexts, work to cancel one another out. Thirdly, one must build from those cases which most clearly counter the notion that individuals do not shape political outcomes, cases such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and Woodrow Wilson’s failure to obtain ratification of the Versailles Treaty (Greenstein 1975a, pp. 31-32). If it could meet such challenges, the analysis of the role that personality plays in politics could grow to become an important feature of political science literature. Greenstein saw that growth in the following terms: firstly, one could study single political actors; secondly, one might be able to start to identify and catalogue different types of political actors, and; thirdly, one might engage in studies accounting for the aggregate effects of personality characteristics on political systems (Greenstein 1975a, p. 142). Greenstein resolves to remedy the situation by increasing research.
Greenstein developed this case for the study of personality in politics by reviewing the presence of this topic in existing analyses of policymaking in the US (Burke & Greenstein 1989, p. 3). In this work Greenstein and Burke engage in a comparative analysis of presidential decision-making, using as examples two administrations that had engaged in decision-making regarding Vietnam and Indochina. As will be seen, some of the key skills and attributes that became central to Greenstein’s later work on leadership were central to this analysis. These included the ability of Presidents to organise their advisory systems, their ability to manage interpersonal relationships, and their capacity to understand and operate successfully within the political environment (see Burke & Greenstein 1989, p. 5). In this book Burke and Greenstein (1989, p. 7) affirmed that the personal characteristics of the president – his personality, belief system and leadership style – really do matter.

Greenstein’s efforts to clarify the key skills and attributes that are connected to presidential success culminated in the publication in 2000 the first edition of his work, *The presidential difference* (2000/2004). It is in this book that Greenstein presents a conceptual model designed to aid in the evaluation of leadership, and applies that model to the comparative analysis of modern US Presidents from FDR to George W. Bush. A later publication (Greenstein 2003) paid further attention to the leadership of George W. Bush, in order to demonstrate the relative importance of emotional and cognitive forms of intelligence. Greenstein then applied this analytical model to the study of earlier US Presidents, producing both works on individual Presidents (such as his 2010 analysis of the presidency of James K. Polk from 1845 to 1849) and another major comparative analysis of presidents, this time ranging from George Washington to Andrew Jackson (Greenstein 2009).

Throughout these works, Greenstein (2003, p. 13) uses this model as a way of unpacking the job requirements of the modern presidency. Emotional intelligence and cognitive style as terms are used to describe the personal qualities that have a bearing on the actions of the individual but also apply to the chief executive of a global superpower. Public communication and organisational capacity refer to inner and outer faces of the
president’s leadership, being proficient as the boss of many, and overall effectiveness in selection and then management of the many different subordinates which are central to the operation of the modern presidency. For any leader political skill is always important, but alongside the possibility of stalling manoeuvres promoted by a formal system of checks and balances, it becomes a vital possession. And political skill must be joined with policy vision if a leader is to accomplish significant goals.

Before examining each of these six skills and attributes in more detail, it is important to note that Greenstein’s work on leadership has already been brought into the writings of those with a focus on international relations and foreign policy analysis. In particular, Joseph Nye (2008) has sought to build on some of Greenstein’s insights regarding leadership in order to better understand the nature of power in modern international politics. Nye’s work is worth considering briefly here, because his incorporation of some of Greenstein’s insights into his own work helps us to clarify the definitions of some of the skills and attributes.

Nye (2008) has written about the relationship of hard and soft power (essentially smart power) to leadership. He talks about the many ways that have been used to define leadership, some of which have been characterised by confusion. Some 221 different definitions from the 1930s to the 1990s can be broken down into early definitions seeking to stress the ability of a leader to impress their will on others, and older ones drawing together relations between leaders and followers (Nye 2008, p. x). For Nye, the definition of a leader is someone who helps a group create and achieve shared goals. Some try to impose their own goals, while others derive them from the group, but leaders mobilise people to reach those objectives. Leadership remains a social relationship with three key components – the leaders, the followers, and the context of the interaction (Nye 2008, p. xi). For Nye the current standing of leadership theory is in need of making more careful specifications.

Nye describes the nature of ways of comprehending leadership and the world as changing as the onset of globalisation and the information revolution has been
transforming politics and organisations. Essentially there are differences to be accounted for between what are good leaders and bad ones. Nye helps to understand this reasoning. People are becoming less supportive of authority and organisations and politics. This means for Nye that the role of soft power is becoming more important (Nye 2008, p. 1). This aspect of Nye’s writing on leadership clearly builds on his own, earlier work on the conceptualisation of power. However, when he turns to consider the skills that leaders must possess in order to exercise power (through good leadership), Nye (2008, pp. 69-84) draws directly on the work of Greenstein (whilst using some lightly-modified labels). Thus, Nye refers to the need for leaders to possess some combination of emotional intelligence, communications skills, vision, organisational skills and Machiavellian political skills. Each of these skills and attributes is defined in direct reference to Greenstein’s writing on leadership, thus confirming the continued centrality of Greenstein’s model of leadership to contemporary work on leadership in world politics.

1.3.1 How to recognise Greenstein’s elements of political style

This thesis applies the model of leadership developed by Greenstein in order to evaluate the leadership of John Howard, before and after 9/11. In order to do so, it is important that we understand clearly how we might recognise each of the six skills and attributes that are central to Greenstein’s model of leadership analysis, as we will encounter examples and evaluations of all six in the representation of Howard upon which we draw. The remainder of this chapter defines each of these skills and attributes, drawing on the writings of Greenstein, Nye, and others who have contributed to the study of leadership. These skills and attributes are considered below in the same order in which they will be examined in the remainder of this thesis: cognitive style, emotional intelligence, policy vision, public communication, organisational capacity and political skill.

Cognitive style

Cognition is one of the three traditional spheres of mental activity (alongside motivation and affect) critical to learning, thought, judgement, and other forms of thinking (Mayer &
Salovey 1997, p. 22). Cognitive style (or, more precisely, style of thought) represents the way individuals perceive, analyse, remember, and utilise information. Contextual intelligence may also be thought of as judgement or wisdom. It means to understand the situation and how one might shape events in the future. Leaders with contextual intelligence are skilled at defining those emerging problems that groups will eventually confront.

All leaders vary differentially in terms of their cognitive style. This could depend on their respective levels of strategic intelligence which is needed to get at the exact heart of a problem and formulate solutions (Greenstein 2004, pp. 220-21). Greenstein (2009, p. 2) elaborates on recognising cognitive style. One of the many determinants that demonstrate effectiveness is a leader’s ability to process the large amounts of advice and information that they receive. Also important is whether or not they possess the ability to avoid getting bogged down in detail, and whether or not they have the versatility to attend to many different types of problems in a short timeframe. Greenstein notes that this type of intelligence was essential for early presidents because there were no formal presidential staff, and the chief executives typically had to manage their presidencies themselves (Greenstein 2009, p.3). However, as Greenstein and others have noted, modern leaders also require significant intelligence, though the cognitive styles suited to modern leadership may be somewhat different to those required in earlier eras. In the contemporary era, leaders tend to enjoy increased institutional support, but they also face a more complex and dynamic environment in which they must operate.

To lead effectively in such an environment Nye (2008), in particular, has emphasised the importance of what he terms contextual intelligence (which should be understood as a particular cognitive style). To have contextual intelligence is to be able to understand the evolving environment, capitalise on trends (‘creating luck’) and, adjust one’s style to the content of one’s message and the needs of one’s followers (Nye 2008, p. 83). Good contextual intelligence broadens the leadership bandwidth, allowing the development and adoption of strategies for different situations (Nye 2008, p. xiii). Leadership uses the power relationship between leaders and followers (Nye 2008, p. 84).
According to Nye, contextual intelligence is a leader’s intuitive diagnostic ability that can help them to align tactics with objectives to create smart strategies in varying situations. Cultural intelligence is also an important part of contextual intelligence, as is the ability of leaders to assess the distribution of power resources in a group. All of these elements of cognitive style help leaders to adjust to the needs and demands of followers (Nye 2008, p. 97).

Finally, it is worth noting a couple of additional points. Firstly, according to Nye, contextual intelligence is something that can be developed through experience and learning. This is worth noting because it implies that a leader’s contextual intelligence, and therefore their cognitive style more generally, might develop over time (Nye 2008, p. 88). Secondly, it is also important to note the connections between a leader’s cognitive style and their other key skills and attributes. As Nye argues, managing the changing information flows that are important to the new age is essential to providing contextual intelligence (Nye 2008, p. 103). As such, skills related to public communication and organisational capacity will not be unrelated to a leader’s cognitive style and contextual intelligence. Similarly, contextual intelligence is closely linked to emotional intelligence (Nye 2008, p. 89).

**Emotional intelligence**

The quality of emotional intelligence is important as an individual attribute and element of leadership skill. Emotional intelligence can determine political ability. Some emotions do not matter, but demonstrating significant emotional disturbance can be detrimental to office (Greenstein 2004, p. 221). Greenstein (2004, p. 223) offers the warning signal to be wary of the presidential contender who lacks emotional intelligence, for in its absence all else could still turn to ashes.

Greenstein (2009, p. 3) elaborates on how we should recognise emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence describes the ability to have control over one’s emotions and turn them into the most constructive uses. US Presidents whose own
defective emotional intelligence impaired their leadership were Woodrow Wilson, who showed a rigid lack of willingness to compromise which led to the defeat of the Versailles Treaty; Richard Nixon, who destroyed his leadership by showing a degree of suspicion and impulse to strike out at his perceived enemies; and Bill Clinton, whose lack of self-control resulted in a sexual affair that led to a call for his impeachment (Greenstein 2009, p. 3).

What is known through psychology is that emotional intelligence requires ‘the ability to perceive emotions, to access and generate emotions so as to assist thought, to understand emotions and emotional knowledge, and to reflectively regulate emotions so as to promote emotional and intellectual growth (Mayer & Salovey 1997, p. 5). This definition promotes the idea that emotion has the ability to make thinking more intelligent and that we can think intelligently about our emotions. This means that intelligence and emotion are connected to actions (Mayer & Salovey 1997, p. 5).

Nye (2008) elaborates on the recognition of emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence is the ability to manage relationships and to project charisma. It also implies emotional self-awareness and control (Nye 2008, p. 83). Emotional intelligence thus involves both self-mastery and discipline on the one hand, and the capacity to be empathetic towards others on the other. Such skills allow leaders to channel their personal positions and attract others. Therefore, whilst some might argue that emotions always interfere with thinking, it should be clear that emotional intelligence suggests that the ability to understand and regulate emotions can make thinking more effective. Two factors involve the ongoing mastery of the skill and its outreach to others (Nye 2008, p. 69). Emotional intelligence helps merge charisma and personal magnetism throughout the operation of many changing contexts (Nye 2008, p. 70).

Policy Vision
Having vision has many acceptable meanings, including the capacity to inspire. Vision is the preoccupation with policy content, the ability to present policy feasibility, and the possession of a set of overarching goals (Greenstein 2004, p. 220).

Greenstein (2009, p. 3) elaborates on recognising policy vision. Without a policy vision anchored by enough skill even the most politically gifted leader will be limited to what can be accomplished in office. Yet the president who advances policies that are doomed to failure may still be less successful than one who lacks a sense of direction. Lyndon Johnson is the example of being the political virtuoso who demonstrated being insensitive to the workability of policies that led him to turn his skill towards a counterproductive policy purpose, namely, the ill-advised Vietnam military escalation (Greenstein 2009, p. 3). Vision is usefully elaborated by Nye (2008). He says a vision is attractive to followers. And vision is effective when it balances ideals and capabilities (Nye 2008, p. 83). Furthermore, to have and to use vision is to provide people with a picture that both generates a shared sense of meaning and inspires others to act. For many followers, then, one of the primary tasks of leaders is to communicate the vision and values of the organisation. Vision matters, as good vision can solve problems, while poor vision, or overly ambitious vision, can be harmful (Nye 2008, p. 74). Therefore, in analysing vision it is importance to judge the balance between realism and risk and to ask whether it balances objectives and capabilities. The scale of vision success will determine the effective leader (Nye 2008, p. 76).

Building a successful vision is not something that leaders can do in isolation: in practice vision is built as the needs of the group are formed and articulated by the leader. As such, vision must be attractive to followers and stakeholders. Again, one can see the link between this skill and others. There is clearly a link between emotional intelligence, cognitive style, and the ability to build a successful vision, and, to understand the needs of followers, public communication is crucial.

**Public communication**
To possess public communication skills is to have the ability to transmit one’s message clearly and persuasively to the public. This skill is one needed by leaders in many settings, including those in education, religion, or the media (Greenstein 2004, p. 217).

Greenstein (2009, p. 2) elaborates on recognising public communication, defining it as the leader’s external face. However, what ‘good’ public communication looks like varies depending on the context. For example, the earliest US presidents, it is claimed, avoided communicating directly with the public, mostly directing their messages to Congress. Jefferson wrote out his speeches rather than deliver them. Over time, however, the need to communicate directly to the public has increased dramatically, and it became more and more important for Presidents to be skilled at addressing the public at large, through public speaking and by arranging for their policies to be publicised in newspapers. Importantly, the environment in which public communication takes place has changed significantly. New ways of information dissemination can create power with the ability to network knowledge. Due to the information revolution (shaping the context and merging systems) now there is even greater opportunity to communicate (Nye 2008, p. 47). On the one hand, this increases the capacity of leaders to communicate, but on the other, it also increases the importance of managing the flow of information inputs and outputs in decision-making positions.

Nye (2008) has expanded on Greenstein’s definition of public communication to assist in further recognising it. Communication as a key leadership skill requires the ability to persuasively employ words, symbols and examples in order to mobilise followers. One must also be able to communicate to followers both near and distant (Nye 2008, p. 83). Communication is an inspirational skill. It is used alongside vision, emotional IQ and in transactions (Nye 2008, p. xii). Communication can be inspirational (leading from the front by example) or it can produce effects through persuasion, and it can generate belief, respect, and trust among others. Communication skills are connected to both cognitive and emotional forms of intelligence. Leaders can persuade through the use of reason, emotion, and rhetoric, and they may appeal to a sense of nationalism through the use of patriotic rhetoric. Such communication can empower others, or it may
serve to eliminate criticism from any public discussion. At times of stress or emergency, public communication might spill over into what we might recognise as propaganda and indoctrination (Nye 2008, p. 39).

Public communication is, again, a skill that is linked to others identified by Greenstein as being central to leadership. Nye suggests that the soft power skills that are linked to inspirational leadership include those of communication and vision and emotional intelligence. On the other side of the equation, Nye sees organisational capacity and political skill as hard power skills.

**Organisational capacity**

Demonstrating a capacity to organise involves successfully creating a team, while at the same time also minimising the work that the average subordinates tend to tell the leader what they sense he should hear. The leader must demonstrate proficiency in creating institutional arrangements. One indicator of effectiveness is what is said about the leader after his or her term is finished (Greenstein 2004, p. 218).

How should we recognise this skill? Organisational capacity is defined as the inner face of presidential leadership. For instance the chief executive’s organisational strengths and weaknesses are less visible than the president’s own ability as a public communicator. However, a badly organised presidency – and a badly organised leadership structure – is an invitation to fail. During the presidencies since the 1930s, the president’s organisational capacity has manifested itself in how the president managed the extensively staffed Executive Office of the President. The earlier presidents had little or no assistance from staff. The cabinets replaced the equivalent of a modern-day presidential staff. From earliest times the president’s ability to appoint able associates and forge them into an effective team has always been crucial to making a successful presidency work (Greenstein 2009, p.2)
The expansion of Greenstein’s definition, using Nye’s (2008) conceptualisation of organisational capacity, will assist further recognition. Organisational capacity is the effective capability to manage reward and information systems. It is also the ability to successfully manage the inner and outer circles (those who have direct and indirect access to individual leaders) (Nye 2008, p. 83). Organisational capacity as a skill is demonstrated in the management of the structures, information flows and reward structures of a group. A leader must possess the effective skills for keeping control of information flows important to decision-making success (Nye 2008, p. 77). Good leaders must also have capacity to organise their advisors successfully, so that decision-making processes produce effective outcomes (Nye 2008, p. 78).

**Political skill**

Associated with organisational capacity are a number of other skills and attributes, including political skills. Nye refers to these as the Machiavellian political skills needed to bully, buy, and bargain so as to build and maintain winning coalitions (Nye 2008, p. 83). These are hard power and transformational skills and are closely related to defining a political skill within the capacity to organise. Because the complex twist of politics is diverse, involving intimidation, manipulation, and negotiation it includes other skill sets of inspiration, building new beneficial arrangements and network development. Demonstrating political skill can involve using one’s powers of office assertively, building and maintaining public support, and establishing the reputation among fellow policymakers as the skilled, determined political operator (Greenstein 2004, p. 219).

As Greenstein notes, early Presidents often professed to be above politics. In the early years of the US, political parties were seen as illegitimate, and it was held that the chief executive should be a dispassionate arbiter of the other entities in the political system rather than just a participant in the political fray. Despite this impression, during every period of American history Presidents have faced problems that could only be met with the exercise of political leadership. Political skill is not a singular skill and can manifest itself in many ways. Drawing a distinction between tactical and strategic skill
proves useful for what ensues in practice. The tactical skill manifests itself in short-run movement such as ‘bargaining and persuasion’, while strategic skill is represented by policy vision and therefore consists of advancing policies that remain attainable and that can accomplish their purposes (Greenstein 2009, p.3).

Nye (2008) highlights the connections between political skill and the other skills and attributes that we have noted, especially in his discussion of the notion of smart power. The use of smart power involves the combination of skills and resources. At its heart is the ability to mobilise support, but that mobilisation of support must be shaped by an appreciation of the political terrain in which one is operating. As such, contextual intelligence is of great importance. Furthermore, if a leader has the capacity to shape the organisational context in which they operate, then political skill will be closely aligned with organisational capacity. Finally, one’s capacity to persuade will be shaped by their emotional intelligence and their capacity to generate a strong vision that others can buy into.

1.4 Conclusion

Greenstein's combination of leadership skills can be readily assessed through the analysis of different perspectives on leadership. The six skills can be reduced to three pairs of skills. The three styles, now joined to form individual chapters, are: (1) cognitive style and emotional intelligence; (2) vision and public communication; and, (3) organisational capacity and political skill. To complete an analysis these three like-minded set of styles we will examine evidence from contents of: (a) the views of the individual leader; (b) the views of peers; and (c) the views of observers. In each case we have an abundance of primary sources (Hansard, public speeches, memoirs), some secondary materials (scholarly articles and books), but, above all, a new resource – elite interviews with 15 participants and observers of the Howard years.

Greenstein’s six domains of leadership have clearly been found to have powerful heuristic value in considering the performance of US presidents, from the early years of
the Republic to today. We now turn to our analysis of an equivalent Australian leader, PM John Howard, using the Greenstein scheme to assess his steerage of the nation before and after September 11. We will divide our work into three pairs of attributes, beginning with a contextual chapter that traces his personal and professional trajectory.
Chapter 2: John Howard: From fatherless childhood to father of the nation

2.1 Introduction

Before undertaking our detailed analysis of Howard’s leadership of Australia from 1996, this historical chapter will provide an overview of Howard’s personal life and professional career, together with an account of the Australian system of government. We will begin with some observations of Howard's political fortunes, followed by a brief history of the Australian Conservative party – known somewhat incongruously as the Liberals – before examining Australia’s place in the world, its recent economic history, and then some of the peculiarities of its form of government and administration.

2.2 The making of John Howard

I should begin with my initial impressions of Howard on the times I met him. When I first met Howard on 15 August 2007 he was at work as Prime Minister, inhabiting a whole different world before his final election, crossing a corridor from the National Security Committee room to his working room in Parliament with his entourage. It is his caution that first strikes you. Howard always maintained that every election you win could be close. Howard’s rule was: ‘You can never take any election for granted’. And this indicated that a degree of individual political caution was required to guarantee success. His predecessor Malcolm Fraser had famously also said that ‘life was not meant to be easy’ and this implied that success required hard work. Howard immediately gave me the impression of a politician engrossed in his work. After his term as PM, when I met him more casually in his Sydney office for my interview on 22 April 2010 I got a mixture of both the private and personal Howard who was totally committed at that stage to finishing his autobiography (to be entitled Lazarus Rising). Now the professional politician and statesman belonged to an individual with deeply held personal traits.
In one sense these two sides of John Howard – the cautious professional politician and the private person he is – were brought together, perhaps fused completely, by the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the supposed ‘War on Terror’ that followed. Howard saw better than most the political consequences of these moments in history – September 11, the search for bin Laden in Afghanistan, the Bali bombing of 12 October 2002, the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 – and, taken together, they gave him a convincing narrative for his four terms in office. He became a stronger Prime Minister in the process. It is precisely that quality of his national leadership that we will be examining in the chapters that follow.

Even before the life-changing events of 2001 Howard stood apart from the general run of Australian politicians. He had the look of a ‘wise guy’, someone who knew his way around the political scene. He was a conservative in ideological terms, but he was already driven by a prodigious work ethic, which lent him an image of being a good honest worker. This image, which he honed over time, tended to obscure his innate conservatism. A brief account of his childhood, the traditions of his political party, and a survey of Australia’s place in the world before 2001, will help provide a context for what would happen after September 11.

Aspects of Howard’s personality were strengthened by his earlier political setbacks. He had experienced political failure as the party leader, but came back in 1996 to defeat Keating and then a succession of Labor leaders until 2007. This is why he called his autobiography *Lazarus Rising*. He had literally come back from the political dead and this success, viewed as a quintessential Australian story of stoic endurance against the odds, had the effect of widening his electoral support. This narrative of a man reborn fitted easily with the version of his childhood that resonated with a majority of the public. As a boy he had lived through the 1930s Great Depression and then the Second World War. He had struggled with congenital deafness early on. Portraying himself as a ‘tolerant conservative’, he had managed to construct an image of himself as a hard-working activist for the Right who pursued a conservative economic agenda through pragmatic means that spoke to ‘ordinary’ Australians (see Megalogenis 2006, p. 165).
Howard’s quest for economic reform balanced pragmatism and tactical sense built upon an ordinariness that with which voters identified (Grattan cited in Garran 2004, p. 14). For some, personal conviction and moral fibre reflected the sensitivities of the electorate (Garran 2004, p. 14).

Howard's popularity was helped by his awkward personal manner. He was driven by a strong conviction, an obsessive personality, and a stoic demeanour (Ramsey 1 December 2001, p. 36; McGregor 20 June 1987, p. 41). His style of speaking was halting rather than fluid; he used language that was unadorned and lacking intellectual affectation; and he evinced a ‘never give up’ attitude. According to the Australian journalist Craig McGregor (1987), ‘Basically, it's lower-middle-class Methodism, a strong sense of community responsibility and doing something worthwhile with your life’. ‘We expect to find a hard-right Puritanism that Howard has never had the will or imagination to get rid of’ (McGregor 20 June 1987, p. 41 cited in Mitchell 2007, p. 151). Howard’s older brother Bob identified him as ‘a rather serious-minded fellow, a conservative’ who ‘really does believe that every man [makes] is his own fortune’ and for whom ‘the free market system works best of all’ and ‘there's a lot of our mother’s character about him, he’s a very strong person, very conscientious’. Bob added that his brother, ‘believes in all the old values like duty, loyalty’ and, ‘he’s not at all sceptical, he doesn't realise those values and symbols can be used by particular interests for their own ends’ (Bob Howard quoted in McGregor 20 June 1987, p. 41).

After losing his father early in life, at the age of sixteen, Howard’s ambitions for leadership owed a great deal to his mother, but also to the Methodist church in which he was raised, and then to his wife and mother of three children, Janette. During his Prime Ministership, they were photographed together far more often than any other Australian leader with their partner. As a boy he shared with his brother a passion for foreign affairs based on their reading of Time magazine. His boyhood reading of Time was dominated by the Cold War, the invasion of Hungary, and the Suez Crisis. He developed his capacity for political debate through school, including one occasion where he put the case for the Allied invasion of Egypt during the Suez Crisis (Cockburn 7 January 1989, p. 35).
Howard’s intense interest in politics began at a very early age. At the age of 18, Howard joined the Young Liberals whilst studying Law at Sydney University.

Born in 1939, Howard grew up in an Australia dominated by Menzies, who established 23 years of Conservative rule with his electoral victory of 1949, when Howard was 10. He recalled later in life coming home from ‘the pictures’ (a film night) with his parents and his brother to learn that Menzies had won the election. Howard’s father exulted in the news that his garage no longer had to suffer petrol rationing (Cockburn 7 January 1989, p. 35). For a young Conservative like Howard, the Menzies style of leadership provided a template for how the young politician-in-the-making believed the country should be run. The bitter divisions in Liberal ranks after the retirement of Menzies in January 1966 were anathema to Howard, who wanted to reunite the party after Labor's sudden win in 1972 under Gough Whitlam.

To achieve this aim, Howard was required to connect two otherwise separate traditions in Western political thought: the classic liberalism of John Stuart Mill and the equally significant conservatism of Edmund Burke. Howard’s mainstream liberal philosophy was church-minded and averse to extremes of any kind. The Liberal Party, according to Howard, was a party opposed to collectivism of any kind, encouraging the individual not to forget society but to accomplish goals encouraging each person to do better. Howard endorsed families, national pride and cultural self-belief, and was supportive of institutions that applied a ‘Burkean’ inspired method of reform and change. The status quo should be kept if it performed well (Howard 19 June 2009).

Reflecting in 2009, two years after he lost office, Howard emphasised the need for a successful political party to develop a consistent position and hold to it:

Ultimately politics is a battle of ideas. Those who triumph politically are those who have not only superior arguments but also the capacity to present those arguments in a compelling fashion. Consistency of philosophy as well as consistency in the narrative of a political party, whether it is in government or opposition, are essential ingredients to success. (Howard 19 June 2009)
In the international arena, he continued, Conservatives should look for allies, not merely on agencies such as the UN, to prosecute their aims:

[Liberals] should always remember that for all the value of certain international organisations, friends are more enduring than forums, and that common values bind nations together more effectively and in a more enduring way than undue faith in the efficacy of process and international structures. (Howard 19 June 2009)

To borrow a phrase he used often to describe to the Australian polity, that his worldview included only those with whom he felt ‘relaxed and comfortable’. Paul Keating’s clarion call for Australians to be more ‘engaged’ with Asia seemed to Howard to wish for a world that was far too ‘edgy’.

2.3 The conservative tradition in modern Australian politics

There is a tradition of ruthless management within the Liberal Party room’s processes and ideology. The leader is expected to be a martinet – to be a taskmaster of the party. Howard overcame any competition in his party room through the force of ideology and, sometimes, cloak and dagger behaviours.

Writing in 2001 the journalist Paul Kelly (27 October 2001, p. 21) emphasised Howard’s Liberal Party context:

It is Howard’s life story, proving that he is as good as his rivals and predecessors. His prime ministership is conducted in the shadow of Menzies, Fraser and Keating. He sits at Menzies’ old desk, measures himself against Fraser’s failures and, as each year advances, by design and by opportunity, he dismantles Keating’s political structure.

Howard’s search for a stable and united Liberal Party has to be understood in the context of a party racked by disunity in the aftermath of the mysterious disappearance of Harold Holt, Menzies’ anointed successor, in 1967.
When Menzies announced his retirement in 1966 the Liberal Party, which he had founded back in 1944, seemed invincible. But with Holt’s drowning off Cheviot Beach, things fell apart. There was a brief interregnum with ultra-protectionist ‘Black’ Jack McEwan at the helm, and as leader of the junior party in the governing coalition he was able to determine Holt’s substantive successor, putting John Gorton ahead of William McMahon on the grounds that McMahon’s free-trade agenda put Australian farmers at risk. The 1969 election saw the Liberals returned, but with a reduced majority. When McMahon finally took the leadership (after McEwen’s retirement), a badly divided party limped into the 1972 elections and Labor won in an historic moment, followed by a second win in 1974. McMahon had been replaced by Billy Snedden; now, as a consequence of Snedden’s poor showing in 1974, the mantle of leadership was passed to Malcolm Fraser.

Fraser proved a worthier opponent to the Left. During 1975 he confected a crisis in the second Whitlam Government’s Supply, casting doubts on whether the Labor Government had control of the numbers in parliament to assure its continuation. Whitlam was dismissed on 11 November 1975 by the Governor-General, Sir John Kerr. Howard had won the seat of Bennelong in Sydney’s North Shore in the 1974 election and now accepted Cabinet positions under Fraser. He served as Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs, and then as Treasurer from 1977. The mid-1970s saw in Australia, as elsewhere in the Western democracies, the adoption of neo-liberal economics.

When Fraser was defeated in 1983 by Bob Hawke, Labor’s rising star, Andrew Peacock took over as leader of the Liberals. Peacock defeated Howard for the role of Fraser’s successor, but was forced to choose Howard as his deputy. In 1984 Hawke won a second term; Peacock did better than expected and sought to replace Howard as his deputy with John Moore. The party room decided otherwise, so Peacock quit the top job, which then went to Howard. Howard moved Peacock to the position of Shadow Foreign Minister. Howard then faced up to Hawke in the 1987 election, with Labor seeking an unprecedented third term in office. This loss affected Howard badly, according to Peter
Costello (later to serve as Howard’s Treasurer), writing in 1994, before Howard eventually won the job he had sought for quite some time:

I think there was a certain sadness yes because I think John Howard has always wanted to be the leader and the PM and he has always had a claim on it and the circumstances conspired against his one opportunity and I think it was the ruling off of a long time ambition. (The Liberals 1994)

Peacock returned as leader but could do no better than Howard. Labor won again in 1990. Having Peacock attempting twice to wrest government from the other side of politics, it was the turn of John Hewson. Hewson managed to lose the ‘unlosable’ election of 1994 to Paul Keating, Hawke’s successor as Labor leader. Then it was Alexander Downer’s turn, but Downer was prone to gaffes, and Howard replaced him in 1995, going on to defeat Keating in the 1996 election. Downer went on to become a highly successful Foreign Minister under Howard, and we will see that his comments on Howard’s style of leadership are important to our analysis, earning a reputation as the ‘foil’ to Howard’s hostile tendencies (Garran 2004, p. 9). Costello, for his part, had never imagined Howard would make a successful return to the top job in the Conservative ranks; again, his interview and commentaries on Howard will prove useful in this examination of Howard’s leadership. Costello believed that Howard should never have run for the leadership in the first place as he had no hope (Megalogenis 2006, p. 163).

It is important to rehearse these details of the troubles within Liberal Party ranks since the death of Holt in 1967 because they go a long way to explaining Howard’s tenacious grip on the political party he led for more than a decade from 1995 onwards. Howard wanted desperately for his party to return to the stability it had known in the Menzies era. The decision to use Menzies’ old desk when he was Prime Minister was not merely symbolic. Howard saw himself as an heir to the Menzies tradition, and, in another sense, as its rival (Garran 2004, pp. 10-27; Strangio 11 June 2003). He wanted to develop the Liberal Party from its Menziad foundations, to use its loyalties and traditions to build something stronger. The Right-wing side of Australian politics had benefitted from the stability of those 18 years from 1949 to 1967. The party had built a formidable federal
structure. Its mass base meant that it was not merely the catspaw of Big Business in Australia. The Liberals recruited exclusively from the ranks of Protestant Australia as they understood only too well the power of religious sectarianism as a tactic to unify their party and overcome petty divisions. Women were attracted into the base and far more likely to join the political party than its main left-wing rivals.

Howard wanted to do better than Menzies and Holt. He wanted to transcend the old politics of social class by redefining leadership as a ‘conduit for individualism’. One of Menzies’ achievements was to restore faith in the mixed economy after several years of Labor-led state planning in the Curtin-Chifley era. Howard wanted the party to be liberal in economic terms and conservative in the social: this was his reading of John Stuart Mill and Edmund Burke. To open the economy meant moving Liberal thinking from the McEwen days; to tighten the social conventions of Australian life meant to re-assert some older national values that belonged to his 1950s adolescence and seemed to him to be disappearing. As he won each election, especially with his third win in 2004, any tepid reformism on Howard’s part hardened into revolutionary zeal. Far from deflecting him from this course, the debate on terrorism proved congruent with Howard’s overall aims and strategies for a new Conservative hegemony in the post-Menzies age.

In the area of foreign policy, Howard also wanted to return to the Menzies formula, and, if possible, do better. Menzies’ first success here was the attainment of the 1951 ANZUS Treaty, despite Menzies’ private view that the Australian friendship with the US counted for more than the ‘jelly’ nature of the Treaty. Nonetheless, Menzies would later claim this Treaty to be one of his finest achievements (Dobell 2008), and the role of Sir Percy Spender in winning it was forgotten. After narrowly winning the 1961 election, Menzies called for another election on 30 November 1963. The assassination of John F Kennedy towards the end of this campaign boosted Menzies’ stocks, and Labor under Arthur Calwell lost 10 seats. It was a sure sign that the US alliance mattered in Australian domestic politics, and it was a lesson not lost on young Howard.
Howard shared with Downer a conviction that this American connection was critical to Liberal success during their time in government. Howard’s term as Prime Minister coincided with the Presidency of George W. Bush. Howard and Bush Jr. had a friendship based on both their Conservatism and their self-image as ‘conviction politicians’. They spoke of being good ‘soul mates’, joined not only by political accident but also by a genuine friendship (Grattan 14 September 2001, p. 10). The Labour leader of Britain, Tony Blair, who had come to power a year before Howard under the New Labour banner, also claimed to be a politician of ‘conviction’. All three wore their religious commitments publicly. Rather like Bush, Howard also downplayed the role of multilateral agencies, such as the United Nations, where the Anglo democracies were forced into sharing power. Howard wanted to assert the role of nation-states in dealing with problems in the international order, even if, as a medium power, Australia was constantly required to punch above its weight. In Howard’s terms, what mattered more than lofty rhetoric was foreign policy that actually ‘worked’ (Garran 2004, p. 17).

Howard’s political conviction stemmed partly from what he knew of the fates of two other notable neo-liberal governments, those of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan (McGregor 20 June 1987, p. 41). Blair and Howard became good friends, and interpreted conviction politics as a function of ‘law and order’ policies (Author interview Howard, 2010). Their war on drugs, street crime, and home invasion and family breakdowns fitted comfortably with their combat of terrorism. Howard revealed he had enough political conviction to be a modern day political leader.

During the last term of the Howard Government, Tony Abbott, then a member of the government, justified the moral position of Howard’s administration:

There is a moral case to be made for the policies of the Howard Government such as Work for the Dole, the war in Iraq, the mandatory detention of illegal boatpeople along with much else which is supposed to indicate its heartlessness. But it’s a much harder and more complex argument than that which holds that the proper role of government is to play the Good Samaritan on an epic scale. To some, the moral quality of a government which has stood up for Australian values, stood by Australia’s friends and
delivered more jobs, higher pay and lower taxes to the Australian people is self-evident. On the other hand, in the absence of argument and reassurance, a sceptical public could conclude that the good the Government has done happened by accident or conspiracy - especially given the ferocious public muggings which seem to be the inescapable fate of all conservative leaders. (Abbott 23 January 2004, p. 13)

This call for morality in government was a counterweight to neo-liberal economics.

Howard used moral outrage at key moments in his first two terms of office. He responded to the Port Arthur massacre by calling for gun control. His arguments for the military intervention of 1999 in East Timor drew from a moral consideration of the fate of the Timorese people at the hands of the Indonesian militia. Even his tough stand on ‘illegal boat people’ during the Tampa crisis of 2001 managed to grab the moral high ground, a significant enough achievement when the parable of the Good Samaritan ought to have come more readily to mind in a Christian electorate.

Support for the American alliance in the Menzies period extended to provide ‘regional forward defence’ against the Communist regimes of East Asia (Lee 2006, p. 183). Having fought with the British in Malaya in the late 1940s, it was a small step to join with the US forces in Korea in 1950, and again in Vietnam during the 1960s, and then to allow the Americans to build three secret spy bases on the Australian continent.

Australia did not see itself as an Asian nation in this period. The threat to regional security posed by China had a profound influence on Australia during the 1950s and 1960s. An Australian mission was established in Taipei in 1966 because Taiwan was seen as a legitimate nation, while wheat continued to be sold to mainland China. This so-called ‘two-China’ policy lasted throughout the 23 years of Liberal Party rule (Lee 2006, p. 208).

The policy of discouraging Asian immigration to Australia, the ‘White Australia Policy’, began to lose ground around 1970. The Whitlam Government recognised the
People’s Republic of China; the Fraser Government accepted a flow of Vietnamese refugees into Australia after the fall of Saigon in 1975. In domestic policy, Australia adopted ‘multiculturalism’, following the Canadian example. Regional military cooperation replaced the use of force that ended so badly in the Vietnam War (McDougall 1998, pp. 8-9; Lee 2006, p. 209).

The issue of East Timor complicated Australian relations with Indonesia from 1974 for 25 years. Suharto had surreptitiously began acquiring the Portuguese territory, which was conquered in 1975 by Indonesian military forces (Lee 2006, p. 209).

Under Labor, after 1983, the combination of an open economy and engagement with Asia was a successful formula during the period of globalisation in the late 1980s and 1990s. The Hawke and Keating Governments used the end of the Cold War to facilitate better relations with Germany, the European Union, Russia and the former Soviet republics. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Australian trade initiative, came into force in November 1989 (Lee 2006, p. 280).

The end of the Cold War represented a new direction in world affairs. Large-scale conflict seemed less likely, but certain problems presented new challenges: terrorism; ethnic and religious conflict; the threat of rogue states; inter-state violence, exemplified in the Balkans in the 1990s; and continuing conflict posed by the quest for natural resources (Lee 2006, p. 280). A significant arsenal of nuclear weapons left over from the Cold War highlighted the continuing threat of WMD falling into the wrong hands. Exacerbating catastrophic nuclear predicaments was the increasing gap between rich and poor nations (Lee 2006, p. 280).

When Iraq challenged the US by invading Kuwait in 1990, Australia supported the UN, sending armed forces. Australia’s defence preoccupations focused on a dichotomy between the viability of a self-reliant and regional defence doctrine and purely defensive strategies reworked into a new version of forward defence (Lee 2006, p. 281).
2.4 September 11

The attacks on the US orchestrated by Osama bin Laden came at an important moment for Howard. He was near the end of his second term as Prime Minister, and was visiting Washington. The occasion was, ironically enough, a celebration of 50 years of the ANZUS Treaty, the document which Howard’s role model had accepted as significant, if in retrospect. The effect of the al-Qaeda attack was dramatic.

Howard was evacuated from his Washington hotel by the Secret Service and rushed to the basement of the Australian Embassy (Romei, Eccleston & Shanahan 12 September 2001, p. 1). Howard moved into the ambassador’s residence. There he announced that security for American and Israeli facilities in Australia had been tightened. In his speech he echoed Franklin D. Roosevelt’s description of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Because Howard was accompanied by the Australian press gallery, including Australia’s top political correspondents, he was given enormous media attention. An extraordinary question and answer session took place between the press and Howard as fires burned in the World Trade Centre (Henderson 2 October 2001, p. 16). Howard was able to respond personally. Bush publicly vowed the US would ‘hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts’ (Romei, Eccleston & Shanahan 12 September 2001, p. 1).

Howard’s planned address to Congress and trip to New York was abandoned (Allard & Grattan 13 September 2001, p. 14). On Wednesday 12 September (US time), the House and Senate condemned the attacks in a Congressional Joint Resolution whilst Howard was acknowledged, sitting in the visitors’ gallery, in what House Speaker Hastert termed a show of solidarity with Americans. On September 13, Australia’s political leaders were united in backing retaliatory action against the terrorists and any nations found to be harbouring and supporting them.
Soon after arriving back in Australia from 9/11 Howard promptly called a Federal election for November. But before calling an election there were more immediate responses to follow up on. Howard responded as if he was in total control of the entire landscape of world politics as it had changed on 9/11. Supporting the United States was now paramount to Howard’s foreign policy approach, as was taking the appropriate responses necessary to defeat terrorism, and to follow up on protecting Australia with increased national security. Following 9/11, Howard presented himself as freshly arrived from the scene of the crisis and permitted himself to act on behalf of Australia in setting out a new course for Australia to follow in a changed new world paradigm as he defined it.

Within a year or so, the 9/11 crisis had been absorbed into the Australian body politic. There were those, like Downer, who saw the 9/11 attacks as simply further evidence of a modern jihad directed against the West. This view did not see a major role for Australia, as a middle power with limited diplomatic influence. The other position, shared by Howard and the rest of his inner sanctum, took the view that 9/11 justified an anti-terrorist stance, a War on Terror even, that would separate Australia from other nations, even stopping valuable ties to trading nations in the Middle East, if they did not accept the Western repugnance of al-Qaeda. In the parliamentary debates on 17 September 2001, intriguingly, it was only Downer who used the term ‘War on Terror’. Before too long this had been the catchall phrase popular with politicians and their advisors throughout the West.

Television along the east coast of Australia broke 9/11 live during Channel 10’s late evening news. Major free-to-air channels carried US event coverage all night. Events were systematically covered live on television. All regular programs were cancelled, an unprecedented move.

An initial poll released on the third day after 9/11 illustrated the effect on party politics, as government support rose to its highest rating between 2001 and 2003 of 44 per cent, compared to 36.5 the previous week. In that poll Howard’s approval rating rose
to 65 per cent compared to Beazley, the Labor leader, at 45 per cent. In the same period Howard was preferred prime minister by 53 per cent to Beazley 31 (Morgan-Nine Network Opinion Poll, cited in Grattan 2001, p. 52). Howard returned to the polls in November and won easily.

On 7 October 2001, at approximately 9pm, the US and the UK attacked the Taliban in Afghanistan. In announcing the war Bush also thanked Australia’s support as a ‘close friend’ that had pledged ‘forces as the operation unfolds’ (Jackson 8 October 2001, p. 3). Protests occurred, for example in Pakistan, but there were far fewer than had been predicted. Iran and Iraq condemned the attacks (Alcorn 9 October 2001, p. 1). With the Afghanistan War, the War on Terror gathered intensity and escalated the chance of further terrorist attacks. Following 9/11, Australia had quickly committed to joining the US-led coalition against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

On the same day 7 October 2001, President Bush demanded that the government of Afghanistan, the Taliban, surrender Osama bin Laden to US authorities. With the UK and a so-called Northern Alliance of pro-West Afghan clans, Australia was part of this first Allied invasion in October 2001. Australian forces were to remain in Afghanistan for more than a dozen years, the longest military commitment in the nation’s history.

The Bali bombings were the Australian equivalent of September 11. This atrocity occurred just a year later, on 12 October 2002, at the Sari nightclub. Total Australian deaths reached 88, with many more injured. Another three suicide bombers also detonated themselves in restaurants in Bali on 1 October 2005 in a subsequent but separate incident. Although the bombings took place on foreign soil, Bali is well known as an Australian holiday destination, so the propaganda value for al-Qaeda was considerable.

Bali was also a demonstration that in taking the US fight against al-Qaeda as an Australian cause, Howard was risking his fellow citizens to the wrath of jihadists.
Australians agreed with what he had done. From here on, the new War on Terror had gained its own momentum.

After 2003, there was no comparable debate within Howard’s inner circle, no sudden departures of senior Ministers. Conversely, in both his interview with me and in his autobiography, his decision to enter the war against terrorism looms very large, almost as if it were more important than any other aspect of his time as Prime Minister.

The war in Iraq followed logically from these events. The National Security Committee approved the ‘forward deployment’ of 1550 Australian military personnel to the Persian Gulf, weeks before the invasion proper commenced. General Peter Cosgrove (later Governor-General) advised Senate Estimates that planning for the war began as early as 23 July 2002, three months before the Bali bombings (Kitney 13 February 2003, p. 11).

The war in Iraq officially started on 20 March 2003. Howard informed the Australian parliament that the decision ‘has been taken against a background of a world environment changed forever by the events of September 11’, and the putative threat of WMD (Howard quoted in Lewis 19 March 2003, p. 3).

Howard won a fourth term in the 2004 elections, while this war was still fresh and the long-term consequences not obvious. The 7 July 2005 bombings in London seemed to support Howard’s tough stance. But by 2007 the magic no longer worked and Howard was defeated in the 2007 election by Labor’s maverick Kevin Rudd.

The London bombings of 7 July 2005 reinvigorated the argument that Australia ought to increase its homeland anti-terrorism security.

In the Australian political system Howard’s leadership prowess and party ascendancy were in decline as demonstrated by voting in the 2007 election, despite eleven and a half years in office, during an era of economic prosperity. Howard lost the
2007 election campaigning with new and more junior staff (Costello & Coleman 2008, p. 307). The Labor and opposition successfully called for change, against which Howard’s vision was ineffectual. Grahame Morris was sacked, Max Moore-Wilton went in 2002 and Arthur Sinodinos moved in 2006. Questions now grew around Howard’s foreign policy, especially his unquestioning pro-Bush support, and the effects of the Iraq war. Howard’s foreign policy suddenly seemed to have failed to have kept up with the shifting contours of Australia’s foreign policy needs.

Howard’s political denouement coincided with the growing unpopularity of the Iraq War. In the end Howard lost both his own seat of Bennelong and the election.

2.5 The traditional Australian state

Howard’s defeat in 2007 should not detract from his considerable political achievements in bending the Australian state to suit his own political agenda. One of the key purposes of any state is, naturally enough, the building of institutional structures designed to understand, interpret, and respond to foreign threats to its sovereignty. What becomes clear is that the Howard model of government worked with the Parliament in particular ways and borrowed from other governments specific organisational strategies to deal with what it saw as the principal antagonists threatening national security. The United States was not only a key ally after September 11; it provided elements of state apparatus that could be copied and grafted on to the existing structure. The Howard Government’s machinery of government moved closer to a Washington model, although the American concept of a separate Homeland Security Department was not taken up, and Howard’s state retained certain key Australian characteristics.

In analysing the Australian state, the fact that an external event such as September 11 could so profoundly alter the balance, structure and operations of government is in itself an important clue to the nature of that state. Just as the fall of Singapore in the Pacific War set in train fundamental alterations to the Australian state under John Curtin and Ben Chifley, September 11 was a powerful trigger for change in the political
circumstances of a Conservative government in the middle years of its life. Singapore was a British naval bastion, so its fall in February 1942 led the Australian Prime Minister Chifley to look ‘without pangs’ to America for an alliance in the war against Japan. September 11 seized the imagination of the Australian public to the same degree. All normal television transmissions on all stations gave way to 24 hours of continuous broadcasts from New York and Washington. No other event in Australian history has occasioned this response. Howard called the election on 5 October, just weeks after the terrorist attacks (in Australia, as in Britain, the incumbent government can decide the date of an election), and set Saturday 10 November 2001 as the polling date. Labor suffered its worst result since 1934 and Beazley resigned as leader of the opposition (he was later recalled to the post).

Australia is a federation of the six self-governing colonies of British settlers established in different parts of the continent between 1788 and 1890. Although the Commonwealth of Australia was formed only in 1901 it is guided by political processes that are deeply-rooted in the progressive English traditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These democratic political aspirations found their earliest expression not within the imperial metropolis, but on the boundaries of empire (Markoff 1999, pp. 660-90). The Australian state was thus formed within a vigorously democratic polity. September 11 offered a rare opportunity to reshape this state within a particular party-political context. In a political system where party positions are finely tuned and one carefully calibrated issue can swing an election result, the fear of foreign Islamic terrorists could be used to great effect and the resources of the state mobilised in support of this political agenda.

The ideological position of political parties in a democratic system like Australia’s become modified when a party wins government. This is partly due to the challenges of guiding a state, with its own particular logic and momentum, and partly due to the knock of external events, of which September 11 is an extreme example. In Government the work of the political party is carried out by the Cabinet, and it is in the directing of Cabinet that a Prime Minister like Howard seeks to put in place what he or
she sees as the appropriate policy direction of their Government. But Howard, as we shall see, used September 11 as a device for engineering a raft of changes to the operations of the Australian state. Some of this reshaping will no doubt remain long after the supposed threat of September 11 has come and gone, much as the fundamental changes brought about by the Fall of Singapore were left in place by Menzies when he succeeded Chifley as Prime Minister in 1949.

The Australian Constitution was written toward the end of the nineteenth century by founding fathers typified by Sir Edmund Barton (1849-1920) (see Parkin & Summers 2010, pp. 51-72). Barton also went on to be Australia’s first Prime Minister (1901 to 1903). These men were well read in the classic political philosophy texts of the early modern and modern periods, and also well-versed in the development of the United States Constitution and its system of government. The United Kingdom Parliament enacted the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act of 1900. This Constitution guaranteed the old colonial (state) constitutions and legislative powers as part of the specific provisions of the Commonwealth Constitution Act. The position of Governor General, as the Queen's representative, was created to appoint ministers to form each consecutive Government. The Separation of Powers in the Constitution gave to government power divided among the executive, judicial and legislative branches. Provisions were made for a High Court of Australia and other courts that Parliament might establish to exercise judicial power within the new Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Parliament consisted of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Following the Swiss example, the Constitution could only be changed by referendum. The referendum power in the Australian Constitution reflects the Lockean view that power is derived ultimately from the sovereignty of the people.

The six colonies making up the Federation originally ceded to the new Commonwealth only those powers that were in their mutual interest to vest in a central authority. Defence was foremost among these, and the new state put the establishment of an Australian military force high on its agenda. There had been internal violence in the settling of Australia as the Aborigines resisted the British in what are now called the
‘frontier wars’, but external aggression from real or imagined enemies did not occur until the Japanese attack of 1942. After 1901 it would also be decades before this new state developed a capacity for its own national foreign diplomacy. Part of the significance of the Fall of Singapore was, indeed, the recognition that this young state could not rely for all time on the British Empire for its external protection and relationships.

The Constitution and Separation of Powers guarantees Australia’s Executive government and law-making. Cabinet politics allows foreign policy through executive leadership subtle translations of constitutional powers like those found in the US. Different size and levels of bureaucratic decision-making controls existed as Executive-Cabinets took shape or changed. The Australian Parliament also maintains individual bureaucracies. Ministers and their private staff head respective ministerial departments managing public servants who form the bureaucracy.

The ideal Cabinet and NSC routines are outlined in the Cabinet Handbook (2004) and Gyngell and Wesley (2007, pp. 93-95). PM&C’s Annual Report makes yearly records of arrangements which are tabled in Parliament. Decision-making becomes a product of the overall rules and conventions of the Cabinet system including Ministry, Cabinet and its elements, including Cabinet committees. The bureaucracy advises and acts upon Cabinet decision-making, turning policy into action.

The Parliament does little more than process the policy decisions made by Government (see Lovell 1994, pp. 120-26). In everyday practice, however, real power is focused in Cabinet. Despite the careful formulations within the Australian Constitution, state power resides with the Prime Minister and his or her Cabinet. Cabinet’s aim is to set up and monitor the broad directions of Government. No legislation controls its actions. While Hansard puts parliamentary debates on immediate public record, Cabinet minutes are kept secret for 30 years. The founding fathers implied that the Prime Minister, once elected, would appoint the Ministers and a Cabinet would be formed around him. Labor has Ministers appointed from its party Caucus, and Labor Prime Ministers then assign them their specific portfolios (for details see Commonwealth of Australia 2002, p. 1).
The Crown-in-Cabinet principle underpins the constitutional monarchy model in operation in a modern democracy like Australia. Although the power of the state is mediated through a democratic political process, the concentration of power in the Cabinet is the key driver of this system (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, p. 1; Gyngell & Wesley 2007, pp. 93-95). Thus, how a Prime Minister elects to use their Cabinet is fundamental to how he or she drives the state (Edwards 2007, p. 22).

On a day-to-day basis the policy decisions made by Cabinet are informed by the advice it receives, particularly as filtered through the ‘central agency’ departments – the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Treasury, and the Department of Finance and Administration. Any decision supported by the three respective Ministers (and their bureaucratic heads) is almost certain to be approved in Cabinet (Edwards 2007, pp. 22-23). In the other departments, the so-called ‘line’ departments, however, resides all the policy wisdom a Government could ever need on any issue. A Howard Government observer explained it this way:

Government is enormous. A huge number of issues confront government every day. The information management task is vast. It is not possible for one person, or even a single team of hundreds of people, to be across all of the detail of all of the issues confronting a government on any one day. Government’s approach to tackling this information problem is to divide up the work between the line agencies and the central agencies. Each line agency knows a lot about a small number of issues. In line agencies each bureaucrat works on an issue or a narrow group of issues. They will know all about the legislation, the personalities, the idiosyncrasies and the history of a particular international agreement, industry start-up program or environmental disaster. (Edwards 2007, p. 23)

Governments operate through a specific way of working this state apparatus:

By contrast, central agencies have to be across everything. Each central agency bureaucrat will have a broad brushstroke understanding of dozens of issues. But it means they don’t know very much about each one. The ideal of this system is that the line agency will provide depth and the central agencies will provide breadth. The line
agency can detail the options for a railway contract being negotiated with a state
government. And the central agency will know how that contract affects other
intergovernmental agreements. Or that is the theory. (Edwards 2007, p. 23)

The dominant paradigm used by these central agencies to filter and organise the
work of the line agencies is ‘economic rationalism’. A broadly economic model has
operated since the 1940s: that framework was initially Keynesian, before neo-classical
economic theory became hegemonic in the late 1970s. (With the global financial crisis of
late 2008 some commentators were predicting a return to Keynesian thinking; others
foretell the development of a new ‘sociological’ model.) Before the onset of the
economic model in the 1940s, a broadly ‘legal’ approach dominated the outgrowth of
late-colonial ideas about government and the rule of the state. This legal approach
remains in a fossilised form in certain line agencies, notably state Departments of Justice
and Corrections. These agencies see the regulation of citizens as their main purpose –
they pay little attention to the economic or social effects of their work. In some
Australian states the economic management was at a distance from government – for
example, Victoria’s transport, utilities and urban infrastructure were put in the hands of
quasi-autonomous government organisations, and the Commonwealth created similar
structures for big projects like the 1940s Snowy Mountains Scheme. Economic
rationalism consigned these organisational forms into the dustbin of history (Alford &

2.6 Reshaping the Australian state

How to use Cabinet in responding to the foreign threats symbolised by September 11
therefore posed a problem for Howard. The three central agencies with the biggest say in
Cabinet were not necessarily the ones with the repositories of expert information to deal
with this War on Terror. Journalist Paul Kelly noted that Cabinet met less often under
Howard than previous prime ministers, and revealed how the National Security
Committee of Cabinet (the NSC) took over a more central role. He did not, however,
reflect on what this means in terms of the configuration of the Australian state. It did not
cause him any undue concern that ‘the intelligence agencies’ now had ‘a weight and an influence that exceeds their role during the Cold War’ (Kelly 2005, p. 20).

Instead, as we shall see, the NSC became the focal point for Howard’s interventions in foreign relations. In this period the National Security Committee of Cabinet comprised the Prime Minister as Chair, the Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Treasurer, Defence Minister and Attorney-General, plus others as needed. Officials in attendance included the Secretaries of Prime Minister and Cabinet (Secretary of PM&C), Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Defence, Treasury, and Attorney General’s Department; the Commander of the Defence Force; and the Directors-General of the Office of National Assessments (ONA) and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). Others often included the Federal Police Commissioner, the Prime Minister’s International Advisor, and staff from the offices of the Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister (Gyngell & Wesley 2007, p. 94).

Howard’s Minister for Defence in this period, Peter Reith, made a virtue of his Government’s necessary use of the National Security Committee of Cabinet. In the heady weeks after September 11, Reith contended the NSC came into its own. He said that although the NSC had existed under the previous Labor Governments, it had been used only for classified intelligence and security matters and did not generally deal with defence or foreign policy issues. Only 228 NSC matters were adjudicated by Labor in office, he claimed, over a period of almost thirteen years, from Hawke’s first term in office (from 1983) to Keating (1991 to 1996). A Coalition promise in the 1996 election campaign saw the NSC’s remit broadened to consider all matters relating to defence, foreign affairs, intelligence and justice. The NSC decided 418 matters from 1996 until October 2001. The NSC met operationally on a daily basis over East Timor and for full-day sessions to develop the Defence White Paper (Reith 2001). This historical comparison is hotly contested by Beazley, who had been the Minister for Defence under Hawke and therefore well-placed to respond to Reith’s assertion. The activities of the NSC were not so much increased under Howard, retorted Beazley, but ‘fetishised’ for the benefit of making short-term domestic political gains (Beazley 2007, pp. 273, 299-300,
305-07). It was not so much that the Committee now undertook more work, but it took itself rather more seriously and was talked up by Howard. Hawke and Keating simply made pronouncements on matters such as the First Gulf War and the crisis in Fiji; Howard was more likely to preface his remarks with the observation that he had taken advice from his National Security Committee of Cabinet. This lent his remarks a certain gravitas and indicated that Cabinet, acting as a specialist Committee, was backing the Prime Minister’s position on any matter, including the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Beazley 2007, pp. 273-74, 291).

Midway through Howard’s time in Government the state and territory governments all fell to Labor, including (surprisingly) Victoria, a Liberal stronghold, in 1999, and Western Australia in 2001. These eight governments were then portrayed by Howard as suited only to the delivery of services, such as hospitals and transport systems. National security, he claimed, could only be entrusted to a strong Conservative government in Canberra. Some commentators called this the ‘Mars/Venus’ strategy. The Venus-like state governments might well do a good job in caring for their citizens, but only a Mars-like government that was tough on foreign policy and the War on Terror could protect the nation as a whole. The reshaping of the state under Howard therefore had distinct political purposes in a federal system like Australia.

To strengthen his arm in the foreign policy area required Howard to provide the NSC with direct inputs from the national state apparatus and greater powers of autonomy, allowing it to work some distance away from the Cabinet of which it was formally a part, and from the bureaucracy as a whole. The NSC soon came to garnishee all of Cabinet’s defence decisions, meeting to decide issues of foreign policy and to navigate the nation through various international crises, such as the East Timor intervention and the Bali bombing. Howard’s strengthened NSC necessitated the hiring of many more staff in Howard’s personal office. By March 2002, Howard’s office contained 40 people, with another 350 Ministerial staff and 72 liaison officers (Steketee 2002, p. 32).
The NSC meetings gave Howard an arbitrary and informal relationship with the highest-level decision-makers in the national security arena. The Prime Minister as Chair controlled proceedings:

An agenda and formal submissions are circulated, but ministers and officials are free to raise other issues. The Prime Minister can ask for issues to be brought to the committee. His chairmanship of the committee has strengthened the Prime Minister’s influence over the foreign policy process (Gyngell & Wesley 2007, p. 42).

Supporting the NSC is the Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS), known in Canberra-speak as ‘scones’. SCNS is chaired by the Secretary of PM&C and comprises Secretaries from Foreign Affairs, Defence, the Attorney General’s Department and Treasury, as well as the Commander of the Australian Defence Forces (ADF), and the Directors-General of the Office of National Assessments (ONA) and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). Off-the-cuff agencies and department heads can be represented if necessary (Gyngell & Wesley 2007, p. 95).

The purpose of the SCNS is to prepare submissions for the scrutiny of the NSC. Ministers can also directly attend the NSC to speak to proposals. SCNS coordinates and in a limited manner formulates some policy-making. Only the Prime Minister commissions SCNS to undertake work, not individual ministers or departments. Importantly, under Howard the Secretariat for both the SCNS and the NSC was provided by the Cabinet Division in the Prime Minister's Department (Gyngell & Wesley 2007, p. 95).

SCNS provided a structured bureaucratic level in which the Prime Minister’s policy dominance was enhanced through the exercise of state power. The degree of political influence exerted by officials of the PM&C has added their largely domestic emphasis to the foreign policy process (Gyngell & Wesley 2007, p. 94). The Prime Minister and Cabinet Department thereby achieved a successful penetration of the work of the state’s existing foreign policy bureaucracies – particularly, the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Treasury, the Department of Defence, and the various intelligence agencies.

Looking ahead to some of the issues that would affect the operation of the National Security Committee in the aftermath of September 11, it is clear that the Committee’s role was now firmly established in the Howard-led state. On 30 October 2003 the Department of PM&C took over policy coordination of the input that previously went from the Attorney General’s Department through the Attorney General to Commonwealth Cabinet and state co-ordination. In other words, Attorney-General Daryl Williams was no longer accountable as the chief law officer within the Government. Who was ultimately responsible for the co-ordination of the nation’s security effort was now moot (Bergin & Woolner 2002, p. 11). Was it still Williams, or the National Security Committee, or the full Cabinet, or Howard himself?

This administrative entanglement was connected to a broader disregard for traditional Westminster conventions of ministerial responsibility, and to a process of winning the silence of the bureaucrats. The Tampa crisis of September 2001 provided the first obvious example that Defence officials, until now seen as impartial commentators on routine military matters, were to remain silent when their Ministers wanted to offer a particular ‘spin’ on events (Chulov 2001). Comments about the Bali nightclub bombing of October 2002 by Australia’s chief policeman, Australian Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty, were publicly attacked by Howard (Manne 2004, p. 13). Federal Police from this point on were exposed as not enjoying the same degree of independence from their political masters as their state counterparts, in part because much of their policing work was directly connected to foreign policy imperatives, but also because of Howard’s reshaping of the Australian state. State police continued to enjoy their relative independence as a consequence of the traditional position of the English constable; they were expected to perform autonomously in keeping peace and order, with legal privileges such as the power to read the Riot Act. Australian Federal Police, although also charged with conventional policing in the ACT, were expected to operate within the foreign
policy framework laid down by the Government of the day. They were reduced to the operational autonomy of DFAT functionaries (Gyngell & Wesley 2007, p. 227).

The reshaping here was an alteration in the balance between the military and the civilian sides of the state. The Australian state was remoulded by Howard during his term in power in ways that find their precedent in the Curtin/Chifley years. September 11 provided Howard with the chance not merely to win a historic third term in 2001, but, more fundamentally, with the capacity to change the nature of the Australian state. The NSC took on a newly enhanced role within Government and provided a source of power within the complex apparatus of government.

One of the best commentators on this reshaping has been the journalist Paul Kelly, a strong supporter of Howard. Kelly’s account of how the Australian state (or in his word, ‘governance’), was reconstituted under Howard tallies with many of our findings (Kelly 2006, p. 3). The key difference is one of philosophical motivation: what Kelly portrays as Howard’s Burkean conservatism and an appeal to the people, our analysis would see as an instinctual response to the political opportunities provided by September 11. Just as Menzies understood the value of the Red Scare in the Cold War era, so Howard quickly grasped the value of the War on Terror as a political master-narrative.

Although it is important to analyse the War on Terror as an ideological construct, it may be that its enduring legacy is a new form of the Australian state that no future Prime Minister will dare to alter. It may just be that unaccountable and large allocations to Defence will be a permanent feature of the Australian political landscape.

After 2001, Downer is a potential exception – he understood better than all his colleagues in the inner circle of government that September 11 was part of a much bigger agenda – but the other key actors kept Downer confined to his role as Foreign Minister. Having failed to hold his role as leader of the Conservatives a few years earlier, Downer was in no position to assert the kind of leadership on this occasion that arguably his
knowledge and experience in international relations warranted. Instead, each of his Cabinet colleagues responded in ways that reflected their ministerial roles. As Treasurer during 9/11 Costello had nothing to contribute. As the nation’s chief lawmaker Williams saw the crisis as specifically a legal and constitutional problem for a federation like Australia. But it was Howard who took the mantle as Prime Minister. As our interview shows, he needed to move from the emotion of the event (which he had witnessed first-hand) to a more rational and calculated deliberation of his potential part to play as the nation’s elected leader.

Howard’s responses embroidered 9/11 as a major thread in Australia’s foreign policy in the Parliament. The crisis of the threat of terrorism produced a subsequent narrative which became known as the War on Terror. This War on Terror included anti-terrorism measures, such as new laws opposing terrorists, homeland security and a promotion of a stronger national interest in protecting Australia’s borders. Howard and his peers (including members of the NSC) responded immediately amid the crisis started by 9/11. The unknown consequences of Australia fighting ‘Terror’ by following the United States lead was about to develop into a much longer war against this so-called terrorism. The critical weight of observers cautioned against such a knee-jerk war against the unknown agents of Islamic terrorism (misnamed the Jihadists) and called for proper foreign policy planning in the defence of the nation. Nonetheless, the eventual consequence became this War on Terrorism.

Howard’s own description of these two events is relatively muted, because in many ways things were getting out of his Government’s direct control. Just as the public in 1999 had willed him (against his own judgement) to enter the East Timor fray, the Afghanistan invasion of 2001 was similarly an event that saw Australian opinion more decisively ahead of where he had positioned his Government’s response to 9/11. His initial response to the Twin Towers attack, as we have seen, was to strengthen the nation’s boundaries, to surround the country with a kind of cordon sanitaire. ‘Be alert, not alarmed’ read the fridge magnets distributed widely across Australia. This public-awareness campaign was launched on 28 December 2002 in the immediate aftermath of
the Bali bombing. The $15 million campaign was designed to run for the three months of summer, and its associated website, nationalsecurity.gov.au, has continued to operate and be regularly updated since 2002. It was clear from the public enthusiasm for the Afghanistan incursion and the grief caused by the Bali bombing, however, that the public wanted more. The fridge-magnet episode has fallen out of the memory of Howard’s inner sanctum precisely because it failed to meet the demands of the public for more robust action.

Taken together, the initially popular invasion of Afghanistan (with the ousting of the Taliban) and the horror of the Bali bombing a year later confirmed for most Australians the validity of Howard’s general approach and the naming of this set of events as a War on Terror. Whether this rhetoric of an ongoing war set in motion by 9/11 would continue to play in the Australian electorate was about to be tested by a much deadlier war. As 2001 receded from popular memory, its talismanic effect on Australian foreign policy was about to weaken with the passage of time and the electorate’s wartime exhaustion.

The public moved ahead of the government. After 2003, The Iraq war in 2003 brought a new focus to Howard’s decision-making. After the military intervention in Afghanistan and the Bali bombing, the Iraq war challenged the ways in which Australia responded to the aftermath of 9/11. Howard’s justification for intervening in Iraq remained as controversial and contentious during his Prime Ministership as after. Howard was aware of this and still claims the intervention was justified. Howard over time has proved to be very outspoken in providing his own reasons for committing Australia to the Iraq War.

It was the National Security Committee which coordinated the Government’s response to September 11, to the Bali bombings, and to the much-anticipated invasion of Iraq. In each case no serious disjuncture of policy was tolerated. Changes in Defence in the Howard state were equally dramatic.
Defence matters keenly to any Government. Defence was already a naturally compliant element within the Australian state. After September 11 its position was assured and no budget was spared in providing Defence with whatever it needed, or thought it needed. The problem became one of monitoring the expenditure on Defence, not on its size overall. Whenever the National Security Committee of Cabinet demanded certain courses of action, Defence was the recipient of government spending largesse. Australia’s interests in regional security were not questioned – there was no systematic assessment of the kinds of equipment needed by Defence to secure Australia’s national sovereignty in its immediate region, merely a platitudinous notion that Australian defence required unlimited additional investment. On 10 November 2000, Howard gave Defence a 4 per cent increase in its budget, and a 3 per cent real rise for the decade (Grattan 2000, p. 4).

The Defence budget, if analysed from 2002, would reflect this pattern of increase. Defence in the 2002 budget gained $524 million in troop deployment costs in ‘the War on Terror’, covering 2001-2003 over the $1 billion already allocated. A budgetary surplus of fully $2.1 billion now existed. $1.3 billion went to upgrade domestic security. Australian Federal Police (a doubling of its strike team), Australian Protective Service and intelligence agencies together received $539 million. Measures on border security were increased to $2.872 billion, above the $1.635 billion pledged in the 2001 budget to be spent over five years (Costello 2002, p. 12). The 2003-04 Budget added another $1.4 billion to the billions known to be spent on terrorism with a ‘Safer Australia’ package worth another $411 million (Wright 2003, p. 14). National defence expansions included border protection, reformatting counter-terrorism security at home and international priorities in Australia’s contributions to the War on Terror. Over two billion dollars in surplus government expenditure was earmarked in Costello’s Budget speech (an amount possibly set aside for Iraq) and were still not fully acquitted in Defence revenue (Costello 2002, p. 12).

The Defence budget accrued $14.3 billion between 2002 and 2003. Over $107 million of new funds in the 2002 budget were allocated to Defence for new measures, but
despite the global threats the sum was proportionate to the December 2000 Defence White Paper costing. $330 million in total went in new measures responding to September 11 and $194 million went to the military operation in Afghanistan despite a shrinking commitment (monthly $40 million in the previous financial year and in this Budget set at only $16 million). $40 million went in measures to protect Defence from terrorists. Defence analyst Hugh White’s attitude was that this was a preliminary defence budget if Australia was going to invade Iraq (White 2002, p. 11). Real defence spending, taking into account inflationary and foreign exchange fluctuations, spiralled upwards from 1993-94 to 2003-04. This rate of spending far exceeded the capacity of the state to monitor, assess and ultimately control how it would be spent. Profligate spending was permitted to an extent that no conservative government would have consented in areas like health, welfare and education.

2.7 Conclusion: A Greenstein perspective on John Howard

The stage is now set to make a closer examination of the leadership of John Winston Howard, Australia’s 25th Prime Minister, in that role from 11 March 1996 to 3 December 2007, making him the second longest serving leader of his young nation. To do so we will explain the analytical template devised to measure US presidents by the political science doyen Fred I. Greenstein.
Chapter 3: Cognitive style and emotional intelligence

3.1 Introduction

This chapter begins the evaluation of the leadership of John Howard in earnest, concentrating on the first two of the six leadership skills and attributes identified by Greenstein. It examines both Howard’s cognitive style and his emotional intelligence. As Greenstein and others have noted, these are important skills and attributes for leaders operating in the contemporary era; they have an impact on the capacity of an individual such as Howard to lead effectively.

All leaders vary in terms of their cognitive style. They also vary in terms of their levels of strategic intelligence, which refers to their ability to get at the heart of a problem. According to Alexander George (1980, p. 139) the term cognitive style describes ‘the way in which [the leader] defines his informational needs for the purpose of making decisions and his preferred ways of acquiring and using information and advice.’ Such an attribute is important in part because, as Greenstein (2004, p. 6) notes, there is typically a ‘Niagara of advice and information that comes [a leader’s] way’. A cognitive skill is closely related to the overall organisational skill of the leader in ways that connect to the acquisition of advice and information and the method through which this will shape and determine the coordination of policy making sessions through the advisory team (Bose 2006, p. 33). Cognitive style is of great importance. It can determine a leader’s political survival because it has an impact on their capacity to solve complex problems and adapt to succeed over time in the policy making process. Importantly, because cognitive style is something that is affected by one’s experience, individual leaders’ styles often evolve over time as they learn from their successes and failures.

Emotional intelligence, to move to the second key attribute, describes one’s ability to understand oneself and relate to others. While sometimes ignored, emotional intelligence can nonetheless determine the level of a leader’s political ability. On the one hand, emotional mastery of oneself can be useful in leadership, at least insofar as one can
avoid those significant emotional disturbances that can be detrimental to office. On the other hand, an ability to understand the emotional states of others can be a valuable skill in the context of leadership. Some degree of emotional intelligence is required if one is to achieve success. Finally, it should be noted that these two skills – knowledge of the emotional states of oneself and of others – are interlinked. In short, emotional intelligence is all about how a leader reasons with and understands emotion.

This chapter seeks to identify Howard’s cognitive style and evaluate his emotional intelligence. Evidence is drawn from the public record and from the interviews carried out with Howard, with some of his key colleagues, and with expert observers. Overall, the chapter demonstrates that Howard’s capacity in these areas grew dramatically during the course of his national leadership, and was very evident to members of his inner sanctum.

3.2 Emotional intelligence and cognitive style: Howard

As a leader, Howard is remembered as a successful and long-lasting politician, as well as Australia’s second longest-running Prime Minister. Howard dedicated his life to politics, and his long career, especially as Prime Minister, illustrates the role that emotional intelligence can play in contemporary Australian politics. His attraction to politics, which had been present since his childhood, materialised in part through his experience of observing his local member in 1949 (Howard 2010, p. 3). Observing this member in an early campaign started a lifelong fascination with politics. From that time onwards, Howard identified politics as a career in which he could be successful, and thus his political and personal lives were very much merged from an early age (Howard 2010, p. 23). Howard began his political career after finishing a Sydney University law degree. Howard was not involved in student politics, something that distinguished him from many other aspiring politicians who began by following this pathway. Instead Howard’s initial steps into formal politics began whilst he was practising as a Sydney Pitt Street solicitor. He met his wife Janette in 1970 and they married at St Peter’s Anglican Church in Watson’s Bay. Howard has explicitly acknowledged his wife’s commitment to his
cause and their shared belief that ‘politics was the only game in town’ for him to follow. Janette, knowing Howard’s heart was set on politics, shared all his motivations for taking a political career over other professions.

The way Howard thought and felt about politics was also influenced from his earliest years. Thus, his mindset was influenced by his experience of the struggles of his parents. His parent’s generation offered examples of stoicism amidst the drama, deprivation and sadness produced by three major international crises: World War I, the Great Depression and World War II (Howard 2010, p. 4). As with any child, the experiences of his parents had a direct impact on his own bearing, including on his emotional intelligence. From an early age, Howard learned the need to reflectively regulate his emotions so as to promote his emotional and intellectual growth, and this showed a direct influence on his ability to monitor emotions in others. This is an important skill if one is to be able to demonstrate emotional understanding of others of that generation.

Howard gained more than emotional resilience from his early family experiences; he also embraced many of his parents’ attitudes regarding the importance of hard work and optimism in life. When he was growing up, both his mother and father were strong supporters of the Liberal Party, agreeing with the party’s emphasis on private enterprise and small business (Howard 2010, p. 24). Howard has noted that politics was often discussed at home, and by listening to these discussions he learned a lot about world events, as well as specific issues affecting Sydney and Australia. Howard recalls that being the youngest in the family meant that what he learned from parents and elder brothers naturally shaped his political development. His parents wanted success for their children, and did all in their power to bring this about. Howard was taught the importance of particular character traits, such as being polite to those doing menial tasks and the avoidance of taking sides (Howard 2010, p. 16). His reading included sports, history and biographies. As his tastes expanded, he also became interested in exploring American culture and politics and in the 1950s, the rise of hostility towards communism (Howard
Developing an interest in current affairs was a particular memory of primary school before attending a selective High School.

Howard’s career in politics before taking the Lodge stretched from 1974 to 1996. During this time he held roles as leader, backbencher, shadow minister and leader again (Jones 2010, p. 8). Throughout this time, Howard maintained an unflagging interest in politics and what he was doing. The bedrock of Howard’s approach to politics was the development of enough initial emotional strength to see it through his own eyes. This determination to persevere in pursuit of political success proved a key component of Howard’s mindset from the early stage of 1970s and throughout his long career. At the heart of this was Howard’s belief that politics was the correct vocation given the motivation that it stirred inside him (Howard 2010, p. 23).

Starting life in the state apparatus of the Liberal Party, Howard conceived of politics as a process through which to channel his ideas about policy, ideas that could be ‘debated, contested and adopted’ (Howard 2010, p. 24). Howard was brought up to believe that with the right people government could do good things, and that contestation over the ideas that would drive policy was a key part of that process. In other words, Howard’s lifelong view has been that politics is ‘more than anything else’ a ‘battle of the ideas’ (Howard 2010, p. 24). Similarly, Howard’s main mentor John Carrick believed that politics is a ‘philosophical contest’ and not just ‘a public relations competition’ (Howard 2010, p. 30). In addition, however, Howard’s experiences showed that reform had limitations imposed by necessity and circumstance. Howard recognised in the defeat that removed him from Liberal leadership in 1989 that ‘politics is about today’s reality’ and not ‘the great realm of what might have been’ (Howard quoted in Jones 2010, p. 8).

A key question that arises here is where the ‘right’ ideas come from? On the one hand, Howard took from his own experiences that good leadership ‘interprets and applies the received values of a nation’ (Howard quoted in Jones 2010, p. 8). This suggests that the role of political leaders is to translate social values into public policies. On the other hand, Howard has shown a persistent reliance on his inner tendencies, theoretical insights
and personal political experience. Balancing these different visions is central to Howard’s cognitive style regarding politics.

Another feature of Howard’s cognitive style is his belief in the value of knowledge gained directly through experience. Howard has long advanced this position; namely, that being successful at political activity is an art that requires mastery through experience. Furthermore, Howard’s career evidences his belief in this position. In July 1964 Howard gave up the leadership of the Young Liberals and then travelled to the United Kingdom in pursuit of gathering more political and life experience (Howard 2010, p. 35). This position is also central to one of the most challenging phases of his career; his experience of a long period in opposition. Howard used this period as a learning experience, and applied the lessons he learnt when he later sought to reform Australia as Prime Minister between 1996 and 2007 (Jones 2010, p. 8).

Certain tendencies reinforce emotional content and set lifestyle examples. These could be the emotional facilitation of thinking, or the use of perception, appraisal and expression of emotion. Howard’s determination to be successful underpins much of what he has achieved. In addition, his development of his own mental stamina and emotional resilience has been central to his success in engaging in the contest of politics – and ‘the battle of ideas’ – on his way to leadership. Throughout this process, Howard saw himself as being embedded within the social fabric of Australian life: understanding this social fabric was particularly important to Howard’s political evolution.

Religion also played a role in Howard’s worldview. At church Howard followed the fundamentals of Christian belief and practice. This religious faith was important for two reasons. Firstly, a belief in God’s existence offered, for Howard, the best available explanation of the complexity and wonder of human life (Howard 2010, p. 15). Secondly, there is no doubting the connection between Howard’s faith and his emotional resilience. Howard has seen life as naturally resulting in the testing of one’s calibre – as a means of examining one’s inner emotional strengths – and thus as offering a chance for individuals to achieve success through self-refinement. Again, this helps to explain Howard’s
determination even in times of difficulty: failure is something to be experienced, appraised, and learnt from, both in terms of the practical lessons about how to succeed and in terms of the development of the emotional strength that is needed to conquer new heights.

By rejoining the state executive, Howard went from being a member of the Young Liberals to a representative of the full membership of the party (Howard 2010, p. 37). He made this step at a crucial time in Australian politics. The Vietnam War in 1968 and beyond would provoke bitter divisions in Australian society, and conflict over this issue only intensified as time passed. Howard participated in debates on Australia’s involvement in Vietnam, thus setting his political activism in the context of a particularly emotional issue. Howard has described these debates as tough encounters before large and hostile audiences. Being hissed and booed, though, helped Howard to build his emotional resilience and to develop his understanding of the emotions of others and the place that emotion played in politics. In terms of political experiences, such encounters were ‘priceless’. They confirmed the importance of inner strength because during these encounters. Howard was forced to ‘confront’ and ‘satisfy’ his own beliefs on issues (Howard 2010, p. 38).

In 1968 Howard attempted to take the challenging step from state to federal politics, when he failed in his attempt to stand for the seat of Drummoyne in New South Wales. Howard was devastated by this outcome but offered no excuses. Instead, he saw this as ‘an early’ and ‘hard’ lesson in ‘the maturity of the voting public’ (Howard 2010, p. 41). Howard responded to this lesson by seeking to address his raw political inexperience in part by engaging in community activism. An ability to regroup and rebuild was a key part of Howard’s journey to success.

Howard revelled in challenging for roles to increase his opportunity in the party. From his 1968 loss, Howard accelerated his ambitions and sought professional encouragement while becoming more involved within the party organisational affairs (Howard 2010, p. 45). Howard suffered through a second pre-selection loss (Howard
2010, p. 60), but then began a period in his life which he refers to as having been momentous. He married in 1971 and, in 1972, saw both the ending of 23 years of coalition government and his election soon after (1974) into the safe seat of Bennelong. He has describing this experience as one in which he knew that the ‘moment of truth had arrived’ in his political career (Howard 2010, p. 58).

There is no doubt that Howard’s early experiences had an impact on his emotional resilience and his belief in the power of experience to develop one’s political skill, shaping his career as a Federal politician. Howard repeatedly encountered challenging circumstances and events, and his responses to such challenges were often similar, being centred on his confidence in his own principles and his willingness to accept and overcome specific failures in his pursuit of a larger goal.

Such an approach was evident during Howard’s early years in Federal Parliament. According to Howard, during the 1970s the two contesting political parties ignored huge global changes (Howard 2010, p. 54). Laying down conservative economic policy and foreign affairs was ‘uppermost’ in Howard’s mind (Howard 2010, p. 67). In 1974, Howard closely followed Fraser’s attitudes in both of these policy areas (Howard 2010, p. 66). The Cold War dominated international politics and the Vietnam War continued to divide Australians (Howard 2010, p. 68). In 1975, following Fraser’s election, Howard became a Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs amid ‘a fragile economy’ (Howard 2010, p. 90). By the next Federal election (in 1977) Howard’s political skills had seen him rise within the party and ascend to the position of Treasurer. Howard remained ambitious and cultivated supporters who would be useful in the future (Howard 2010, p. 115).

Over the coming two decades, Howard and the coalition experienced a number of challenges. Stagflation occupied the 1970s and 1980s. Despite economic and political theory, the public mood was set upon the human consequences of recession. 1983 began as a sad year with Howard’s mother passing (Howard 2010, p. 131). Hawke’s election destroyed a strong close ‘professional' working relationship between Fraser and Howard,
in part because of their economic policy disagreement (Howard 2010, p. 135). Howard supported economic reform during thirteen years of Opposition. From 1983 Howard went through ‘everything’ as the four Liberal leaders ensued (Andrew Peacock (twice), John Hewson, Alexander Downer and Howard (twice)) as Liberals combated the Hawke and then Keating governments into 1996 (Howard 2010, p. 139). In that year, with Australians eager for change, Howard entered the Lodge victorious as Prime Minister. By 2001, Howard was confident of his political skills and his capacity to manage the country. He had established a strong emotional identity to overcome opponents and propel government. Howard wanted to lead with conviction a move towards economic liberalism and social conservatism (Howard 2010, p. 254). In September of that year, however, Howard faced one of the greatest challenges of his career – that posed by the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11.

Howard’s role in September 11 began with the accident of him being in Washington on that very day. This placed Howard at the heart of this crisis, giving him a perspective on it that might have differed had he merely been a detached observer. Of course, a lot of politics is about luck and timing, but Howard’s presence clearly tested his emotional intelligence, as well as presenting him with a significant political and policy challenge. Howard’s recollection of this period suggests that the enormity of this event did not overwhelm him:

I knew what had happened. I knew that the two planes had been driven into the twin towers. I knew that the plane had been driven into the Pentagon. That happened while I was having a news conference… I therefore knew as soon as that was over that there was a serious terrorist attack on the United States. And like every other person in the world I wondered whether there were going to be other attacks. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Howard immediately offered this summary of the problem he confronted with the US:

And the preoccupation of Americans after 9/11 was when will another attack come? And where will it come from, and that drove their thinking. (Author interview Howard, 2010)
Howard was quite adamant that as the first events unfolded it was always him in the driving seat of Australia’s response. The confidence that underpinned this vision of his leadership stemmed in part from Howard’s belief that he understood the basic fears and motivations of the Australian people; that he could anticipate how they would feel about this event. It was with such confidence that Howard made the first decisions in response to 9/11:

So from the very beginning I drove the response. It’s documented of course that we invoked the ANZUS Treaty. That we decided as a government to do that immediately after I returned from being in the United States. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

The invocation of ANZUS was more than merely a symbolic gesture. Howard demonstrated his political conviction by making the decision to commit troops to Afghanistan based on what he believed was the need to defeat terrorism. The speed with which this decision was reached suggested that it was made based on the convictions of Howard, and not based on a lengthy analysis of whether it was popular or not popular among the voting electorate. Indeed, there is little indication that this decision was made by Howard after lengthy consultation with his party:

Well, the actual policy decision to commit Australian forces to fight beside the Americans?... [I decided that by myself] when I was in Washington, when I had that press conference. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Whilst the detailed policy position adopted by Australia regarding the War on Terror would later be shaped by the advice of others, this initial step was one that Howard took alone:

Well you have a hundred individual decisions but the driver of all of those individual decisions was the first decision. And that happened in the manner that I described. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

This approach to decision-making illustrates Howard’s self-confidence and his emotional resilience.
Howard did turn to seek advice after the making of some key initial decisions. However, even when doing so, he continued to see his own experience and knowledge as being of particular value in the process of decision-making:

I have, well, I have my own experiences as Prime Minister and the advice I got from Departments and the advice I got from individual advisors and the advice I got from world leaders when I talked to them…And also [I received] advice from Security Agencies. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

In weighing up the relative importance of the respective positions of himself and his advisors, Howard places a clear emphasis on his own knowledge and experience:

It’s sensible to have people to give you advice. Yeah and in the end, you rely on your own instincts but it’s always a good idea to get advice. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

This reliance on one’s ‘own instincts’ is a common feature of Howard’s decision-making, and offers us a key insight into his own perspective on his ability to understand others and anticipate the positions that they would support:

You have got to understand that when I make an announcement like that or I decide something like that, I am informed by the knowledge of . . . the certain knowledge that it is something that all my senior colleagues would support. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Here and elsewhere, Howard explained that his decision on Afghanistan was justified by his forming of an opinion for himself on how he should respond. He was assured by his own feelings that he was making the right decision on the invasion of Afghanistan. Afghanistan was a leader’s decision, and not a moment specifically following what happened on 9/11 where he sat down and called for broad consensus from his colleagues or searched for popularity. Howard went deeply into the process he often used to justify his decision-making. In our interview, the larger threat to Australia of terrorism, or further threats from Osama bin Laden, was not mentioned. Howard’s decision to help
attack Afghanistan originated from opinions already formed immediately after the fateful day on September 11, and from support for America he wanted to offer:

Yeah, I mean there was nobody that said to me after I got back to Australia, ‘Well gee, we should have had an opportunity to discuss it, I am not sure that we should back the Americans’. And everybody – I knew that the people would agree. And it was a case of making it absolutely clear immediately where Australia stood. And I knew I could speak with confidence in making that commitment. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Again, this approach to decision-making was adopted by Howard in terms of the immediate response to 9/11, though he acknowledged that the more granular details of Australian policy were subsequently developed through a more consultative process:

[T]he point I am making is that I was so familiar with [my colleagues] and so across what I knew would be the Australian response and the Australian attitude, that I was able to make that statement [supporting the US]. But that was really the point at which the policy was declared and then from then on the details of how we would provide assistance. Well that went through the normal processes of NSC discussion and exchange between Defence, Foreign Affairs - my Department - the Security Agencies and so forth. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Howard returned to Canberra to address Parliament with a set of responses to September 11 that, he was confident, would speak to the electorate at large. This was important because the attacks of 9/11 occurred only months before the 2001 federal election. As such, Howard knew he would have to explain and justify his responses again and again, as the party machinery began to campaign in the lead-up to the election. Furthermore, the need to explain publicly the government’s position regarding the War on Terror would occur even as further advice and information about 9/11 flowed inwards to the Prime Minister. This information prepared members of the NSC and Howard’s inner circle who were waiting back in Australia in readiness for Howard’s approach to the situation overseas. The responses to 9/11 of Howard and the coalition government were also presented in a context where a strong Opposition was prepared to challenge Howard on his response to the crisis.
On the one hand, Howard returned from the United States knowing he had an opportunity to make political capital from 9/11. On the other hand, however, he faced a choice in terms of how to best represent the attacks of 9/11. His choice in this matter is instructive regarding his cognitive style; in explaining the new context in which Australia found itself, he drew not from any specific notions about Islamic jihad, but by reference to the failings of Neville Chamberlain and the European diplomatic policy of appeasement in the late 1930s:

I have a worldview that . . . you have to be prepared for ultimate confrontation with destructive and evil forces in the world. I think the history of the world has taught us that if people of goodwill are not prepared to take a stand at certain times a far worse outcome will eventuate. The history of the 1930s surely told us that. I am not saying that you can draw a direct parallel in arguing that. But I think you can argue that the history of the 1930s told us that if, umm . . . some action had been taken earlier in the piece, a greater disaster would have been avoided. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

This is a classic conservative position; one that invokes the lessons of history in an effort to understand contemporary problems. It is also, however, consistent with Howard’s cognitive style in terms of the identification of knowledge with the lessons of experience.

As well as situating Australia’s response to 9/11 in relation to the lessons of the 1930s, Howard also framed the debate in terms of Australia’s ties with the United States. He declared it to be in the national interest to support the United States:

I thought it was a legitimate national interest decision to involve Australia in both Afghanistan and Iraq - and the fact that we were doing it alongside the United States and the British to a lesser, but still significant, extent. That was a continuation of a tradition in the Liberal Party’s foreign policy. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Thus, Howard placed Australia’s position in the War on Terror very much within the context of key traditions in Australian foreign policy.
Howard’s instinct told him that he could use 9/11 to provide a practical direction for Australia. In order to do so, however, links needed to be drawn between the attacks on 9/11 and the potential risk to Australians:

What 9/11 told me was that there could be unprovoked attacks on innocent Australians carrying out their normal lives. And that could happen anywhere. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

By universalising the threat of terrorist attacks on Australian nationals in this way, Howard justified the potential use of the Australian military in any part of the world. In addition, he also deployed a powerful argument within the context of the federal election; one that encouraged voters to choose stability (through the re-election of the Coalition) rather than change during this time of crisis.

Howard contended that there was nothing abnormal about using terrorism as the key issue for the November 2001 election:

Well it became - I mean there was nothing artificial about the relevance of terrorism in these election campaigns. I mean terrorism had arrived with the 11th of September. And it’s never left. And I mean the big preoccupation of the world is still the danger that crazy people will hand weapons of mass destruction to terrorists. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Howard was aware that terrorism had existed long before the events of 9/11, but he also recognised the qualitative distinctness of those attacks:

[The threat of terrorism is] not something that just combusted in a short period of time…[but], I mean 9/11 was such a decisive, different, frighteningly new event. There was nothing artificial about the responses to it. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

These statements highlight Howard’s confidence in his ability to engage in both policy-making and politics. Both his policy response to 9/11 and his sense of how 9/11 might impact on Australian domestic politics were shaped by his belief that he had an excellent understanding of how others – his colleagues in government and the Australian
electorate, would feel about 9/11. Importantly, these features of his cognitive style and emotional intelligence were not distinctive to his reaction to 9/11; they were also visible in his responses to later foreign policy issues and decisions.

Another notable example of the importance of these features of Howard’s leadership was evident in his reaction to the Bali bombing in 2002. The Bali bombing affected Australians directly, and its unexpected occurrence encouraged many to relive their fears from 9/11. The attacks also confronted Howard very personally, and confirmed his earlier sense that the War on Terror would not be confined to Afghanistan and that there would be an increasing need for strong anti-terrorism policies. As Prime Minister, Howard had already understood that 9/11 produced a paradigm shift in the way international politics operated. The Bali bombing confirmed much of Howard’s existing ideas about terrorism in general, and anti-terrorism policies in particular:

Did 9/11 prepare me in any way for Bali? The answer to that is, yes. It did. . . I frequently said it could happen in Australia. It umm . . . with Bali it really did happen in a way in Australia. Because of Bali being such a popular holiday destination for so many Australians. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

The Bali bombing demonstrated after 9/11 that security concerns and threats could get worse. For Howard the events of Bali produced a second societal blow for Australia in regards to dealing with terrorism:

Now you asked me about what did the Bali bombings mean to Australia in an Australian societal sense?...Well I mean Bali was sort of the second blow. You had 9/11 which affected everybody. Then what Bali did was to sharpen the terrorist threat and bring it to home. It had a very big impact on people. I think I use the expression in a speech I made that it was the end of any sense of innocence that we any longer had. And so it had a really very, very strong impact. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Bali thus constituted another foreign policy crisis, and a test of how Australia handled crises in a post-9/11 era.
Bali helped to affirm the real risk of terrorism for Australians, but it also was important in a personal sense, reaffirming Howard’s worldview and his understanding of how leadership ought to operate in the realm of foreign policy. Some have labelled Howard’s worldview a ‘Realist’ one, but as he has himself noted:

It depends what you mean by realist…I mean I always have trouble with [such terms] because they mean different things to different people. I mean, I still believe that we live in a world of nation states. I am not a great believer in multilateral institutions. I still think the coalitions of the willing are the way ultimately you get things done. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

This gives us a clear insight into Howard’s expectations regarding the possibilities of leadership in world politics. Leadership in foreign affairs is a prerogative of those who represent sovereign states, and that leadership operates in a context in which states are – and ought to be – largely autonomous. Importantly, this position is consistent with Howard’s conservative cognitive style – one that values knowledge and institutions that have withstood the test of time.

It is important to remember that, for Howard, leadership in the realm of international affairs was a comparatively new experience:

Well look I think it’s fair to say until I became Prime Minister, most of the policy preoccupation I had was in domestic areas. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

As such, the Bali bombing of 2002, and before that, the events of 9/11, represented very real tests of Howard’s fundamental capacity for leadership and of his capacity to learn.

As is noted above, a desire to learn from experience is central to Howard’s cognitive style, and this featured in his response to the challenges of terrorism:

Oh look, I found all of it, all of it, stimulating. And I don’t know if enjoy is the right word, but I certainly handled it comfortably. I didn’t come to it with no views. I had views but it’s just that I hadn’t had the occasion previously to go into it. That was really the thing. (Author interview Howard, 2010)
Howard has himself recognised the effect of learning about this new policy area on his role as Prime Minister:

How did my role as Prime Minister change? The best way I can answer that is that I had a much greater preoccupation with issues relating to terrorism. And I knew that this was something that was going to be permanently on the minds of people. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Ever the historian, however, Howard did not see his own experience of leadership in the context of 9/11 and Bali as being unique: ‘I think the Prime Minister did what he was expected to do. I mean Prime Ministers have always led in times of emergency. There is nothing particularly new about that’ (Author interview Howard, 2010).

Howard was conscious that he became more preoccupied in developing foreign policy skills as the Prime Minister. He also, in hindsight, concludes that the actions taken by himself and his government regarding terrorism have proven to be successful:

Well, given that 9/11 was not an attack on the Australian homeland and given the way that we cooperated with Indonesia in responding to Bali, I think we have done quite well. But I mean the question is whether we have gone as far as America to me is academic. It’s a question of whether we had the appropriate response to protect Australian interests and I thought we did. I thought we had the appropriate changes to the laws. I think we had the appropriate military and defence response by cooperating with the Americans and continuing to do so in Afghanistan. I think we had all of those things. People criticise Bush, but he kept America safe from another attack. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

As significant as 9/11 and the bombings in Bali were as tests of Howard’s leadership skills, they both constituted events to which policymakers such as Howard were forced to react. Howard’s reaction to each event was characterised by a belief in his ability to know how others would feel about these events, and by a belief that these events offered opportunities for him to learn how to lead in foreign affairs.
The third and final event considered here presented Howard with a very different sort of leadership challenge. This event was, of course, the 2003 invasion of Iraq. What is interesting here is that Howard’s description of his approach to the decision to support the US-led invasion of Iraq is very similar in tone to that related to the response to 9/11, despite the fact that the former event resulted from an extended period of deliberation rather than the need to respond to a sudden event:

It was instinctive that we should align ourselves with the Americans in both Afghanistan and Iraq, because I believed that we had entered a new more dangerous world as a result. I didn’t argue that Saddam was involved in 9/11, I didn’t argue that. Nobody argued that seriously. But I nonetheless felt that he could be the source of a future attack. And so did the Americans and I thought they were justified in taking him out. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

In Britain and the United States leaders had also made the case for an Iraqi intervention with their respective citizenries. On the one hand, Howard has emphasised that his decision-making process was independent of those that occurred in London and Washington; on the other, he has continued to highlight the similarities in the outcomes reached in the different governments, which again highlights his belief that his cognitive style is characterised by a desire to respond in a rational fashion to the challenges with which one is presented:

[O]n Iraq and the response to 9/11 Bush, Blair and I had similar views. But we arrived at them through our own independent thought processes. And as far as Blair is concerned – he and I had very similar views on terrorism and Iraq and whatever. We may have had some different views on other issues but, when you become a Prime Minister, the political differences, the party political differences mean less. You just focus on cooperation between the two countries. Blair was quite courageous because most of his party were at best nervous, and in some cases quite hostile. [But] I didn’t just automatically go along with their response because of that. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Despite suggesting that his decision to follow the United States into Iraq was, to some degree, ‘instinctive’, Howard recognised the different challenges that the Iraq
invasion posed relative to the crises of 9/11 and Bali. In particular, the decision to support
the invasion of Iraq necessitated a longer public relations campaign as well as a more
critical response from, amongst other entities, the media. Howard was critical of the role
played by the media in politics more generally, arguing that ‘the media gets, only ever
gets half, if you’re lucky, right’ (Author interview Howard, 2010). The involvement of
the media, particularly during this more protracted campaign, had an impact on decision-
making. Howard stated that the media ‘can sometimes aggravate the decision-making
process and it can complicate the process of public explanation’ (Author interview
Howard, 2010).

One of the issues at the heart of the media’s coverage of the Iraq invasion had to
do with the real or implied connection between the regime of Saddam Hussein and global
terrorism. On the one hand, and as has been noted above, Howard did not argue that
Hussein had had any direct role in 9/11. On the other hand, Howard had little doubt that
9/11 had galvanised the United States and, in doing so, made the invasion of Iraq more
likely. Howard was well aware that Iraq had been on the US foreign policy radar well
before 9/11. Indeed, Howard stated that ‘Iraq was always, always, on the American mind.
They always thought it was a bit of unfinished business’ (Author interview Howard,
2010). In Howard’s recollection of the Washington mindset in the lead-up to March
2003, 9/11 had weakened the American sense of security and deepened its resolve to stop
Iraq’s potential as a rogue state run by a dictator capable of anything. From this
viewpoint, the United States feared the thought of Iraq, and then potentially terrorists,
gaining possession of illegal weapons of mass destruction.

In 2013, ten years after the war began, Howard used a Lowy Institute address to
reiterate the major themes underlying his decision-making on the Iraq intervention.
Throughout this important speech Howard draws on three distinct themes he finds to be
appropriate for explaining his behaviour on Iraq war in the aftermath of 9/11. First,
Australia believed that Saddam Hussein possessed at the very least the capacity to
develop weapons of mass destruction. Second, that the threat of these weapons of mass
destruction far outweighed any post hoc assessments of the consistency and variability of
intelligence data. And thirdly, the overall result of the Iraq War, while terrible, was still favourable to the potential effects of not having acted at all.

In this 2013 speech, Howard was adamant about the effect of 9/11 on his decision-making on Iraq:

Early in 2003 the world still lived in the shadow of 11th September 2001; the United States had entered a new phase of profound vulnerability and remained preoccupied with when and where the next terrorist attack on her homeland would occur; the notion of an Arab Spring was unthinkable, and here in Australia we had just felt the full force of Islamic extremism in Bali almost as if it had been on our own soil, and we had begun to embrace tough new anti-terrorism laws designed to smother home-grown threats to our peaceful society. (Howard 2013, p. 1)

Howard went further in highlighting how great a paradigm shift the impact of 9/11 had produced on foreign policymaking:

The 9/11 attacks challenged our normal understanding of international threats and conflict. They had not inaugurated a conventional war, no ultimatum had been delivered and no armies had rolled across borders, as they had done as recently as in 1991, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. It was a world away from the Cold War when mutually assured destruction spawned a nervous peace. This was new and different, because of its scale, impact and sheer audacity. The stunning success of the attacks unnerved Americans, and many others. (Howard 2013, p. 2)

It is at this point that we can begin to see another example of Howard’s emotional intelligence at work. Central to Howard’s understanding of the significance of 9/11 and its link to US policy towards Iraq is his understanding of how Americans and others felt as a result of the 9/11 attacks:

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were a greater violation of the American homeland than even Pearl Harbor. They produced amongst Americans an unaccustomed sense of vulnerability, which would last [for] years. Vulnerability is a counter-intuitive concept when it comes to the United States. How can the most powerful nation the world has ever feel vulnerable? Yet it did after September
2001, and also, importantly for Australia, commensurately grateful for friends. Only in
the absence of further attacks on America at home has that vulnerability gradually
dissipated. (Howard 2013, p. 2)

While the sense of vulnerability felt by Americans may have ‘gradually dissipated’,
Howard saw that feeling as being central to understanding Americans’ adoption of a
policy of regime change with regard to Iraq:

Yet, central to a proper understanding of why the US acted as she did over Iraq, and the
implications that had for a close ally such as Australia, is to recognise that
vulnerability. Americans thought their country would be attacked by terrorists again,
and soon; to many in the United States why wouldn't a rogue state like Iraq supply
dangerous weapons to terrorist groups; why wouldn't there be further plane hijackings,
and that the next time a hijacked plane headed for a tall building it might contain a
chemical, biological or even nuclear weapon? Such sentiments might seem exaggerated
today. They didn't in the United States in the wake of 9/11. (Howard 2013, p. 3)

Crucially, Howard saw American – and, to a lesser degree, Australian – policy as having
been driven by ‘the huge psychological shift in…attitudes following 9/11. A policy of
relaxed containment might have worked prior to the terrorist attacks. In the changed
atmosphere of vulnerability, when Americans genuinely thought another attack on their
homeland was only a matter of time, and action should be taken to pre-empt it,
containment must have seemed to many oddly passive’ (Howard 2013, p. 6).

Furthermore, Howard’s confidence in his ability to understand and respond to the
emotions of citizens remained strong a decade after the events of 2003. He continued to
argue that the Australian position regarding Iraq was appropriate for the time:

After the fall of Saddam, and when it became apparent that stockpiles of WMDs
[weapons of mass destruction] had – to me unexpectedly – not been found in Iraq, it
was all too easy for certain people, who only months earlier had said Iraq had the
weapons, to begin claiming that Australia had gone to war based on a ‘lie’…I
acknowledge that my government’s decision on Iraq polarised attitudes in Australia. It
is unlikely that the passage of time has softened attitudes towards that decision. It
remains my conviction, however, that it was right because it was in Australia’s national interests. (Howard 2013, pp. 9, 15)

A review of Howard’s statements and writings provides us with valuable insight into his emotional intelligence and his cognitive style. With regard to the former, it is clear that Howard conceives himself as having two key skills: emotional resilience (understood as the ability to control one’s emotions in order to make ‘clear-headed’ decisions) and the ability to anticipate the emotions of citizens. With regard to the latter, what is evident throughout this analysis is Howard’s conservatism – not in terms of ideology but in terms of his desire to set events in a historical context and to rely on policies that, in his eyes, had been historically tested. Below, the evaluation of Howard’s emotional intelligence and his cognitive style is continued through an examination of the views of, firstly, some of Howard’s peers and, secondly, a range of external observers of the Howard years.

3.3 Emotional intelligence and cognitive style: Howard’s peers

In 1996, Howard chose his first Cabinet, describing it as ‘the hardest people-orientated task’ he had ever undertaken (Howard 2010, p. 255). The politicians that he chose would heavily influence public policy and determine the success or failure of the government, and Howard was determined to select the best available people. Peter Costello became Treasurer and Alexander Downer the Foreign Minister. These two would share the length of Howard’s prime ministership and gain significant insight into his decision-making. Daryl Williams was appointed as Attorney General, though he retired in the third electoral term. In order to achieve power Howard had to convince other politicians that he had the political skills necessary to lead the Liberal Party. In turn the Cabinet declared its loyalty to Howard. As a once defeated leader himself, Alexander Downer saw it fit to follow Howard’s leadership. Finally, Howard also worked in close collaboration with key policy advisers, including Andrew Shearer who acted as his foreign policy adviser.
Before considering the perspectives that some of these peers of Howard have held regarding his leadership, it is worth noting briefly the emphasis that several of them placed upon the collective nature of decision-making and leadership in the Australian system of government. Both Williams and Downer highlighted that Howard – like any Prime Minister – rarely if ever acted as a sole decision-maker, something that is somewhat at odds with Howard’s description of his role in the aftermath of 9/11. Williams noted that the ‘the Prime Minister was the chair [of the National Security Committee] and exercised significant influence in that capacity. But he didn’t operate it as a one-man band’ (Author interview Williams, 2008). Downer also asserted that, while the Prime Minister would certainly express a view regarding any security issue, policies are the outcome of ‘collective decisions made by the Cabinet’ (Author interview Downer, 2010). This is important both because it gives us a greater appreciation of the context in which Howard operated as Prime Minister, and because it reminds us that leadership positions – and the skills and attributes needed to act successfully within them – may well differ from country to country.

Daryl Williams stated that Howard was ‘a very accomplished politician’, and suggested that Howard’s ‘political antennae’ distinguished him from most other politicians of his era (Author interview Williams, 2008). This can be read as a judgement of Howard’s emotional intelligence, particularly as it relates to his ability to understand how others, especially voters, were feeling about an issue such as global terrorism. Alexander Downer made a related point in stating that Howard held a very clear ‘view of society’ or, in other words, a strong sense of the overall patterns of emotions and interests held by the Australian public (Author interview Downer, 2010).

Daryl Williams contended that Howard had a great ability to sum up situations – particularly in terms of their political effects – very quickly. Again, this supports the notion of Howard as a decisive figure – someone able to make decisions in a quick and confident manner (Author interview Williams, 2008). Andrew Shearer, in his role as a foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister John Howard, advanced a very positive image of Howard’s cognitive style and decision-making process, one that is largely consistent with
the analysis presented above. Shearer noted that Howard’s basic approach to decision-making could be labelled as ‘principled pragmatism’ (Author interview Shearer, 2007). Explaining this point further, Shearer suggested that Howard brought a ‘core set of values’ to all aspects of his decision-making, and that these were used in the context of his assessment of situations and trends. He noted that the pragmatism in Howard’s decision-making meant that his responses to particular events and issues were not ‘driven by a particular ideology’ and that this allowed Howard to pursue policies in a ‘clear-headed way’ (Author interview Shearer, 2007). This reinforces Howard’s suggestion above that his decision-making was centred on the need to respond pragmatically to the events with which he and his government were confronted.

While Shearer suggests that Howard was not driven by ideology, the fundamental conservatism of Howard and his consequent emphasis on historical lessons and legacies are indeed visible in Shearer’s assessment of his decision-making. Shearer noted that ‘the history of Australia is very important to John Howard’ and that Howard’s foreign policy can be best understood as an application of historical lessons to current problems. This is part of the reason that, like others, Shearer did not see Howard as having fundamentally transformed Australian foreign policy. Instead, he saw Howard’s responses to 9/11 as being based on underlying principles that were not dissimilar to those that had traditionally underpinned Australia’s foreign relations (Author interview Shearer, 2007).

This conservatism was most evident in Howard’s attitude to the fundamental importance of Australia’s alliance with the United States. Downer described the relationship with the US as one of great importance, and noted that Howard had rightly judged that many in his government deeply supported the aid offered by Howard to the US in the aftermath of 9/11 (Author interview Downer, 2010). Williams too saw Howard’s response to 9/11 as stemming primarily from his recognition of the deep importance of the US relationship. Indeed, it was because of this that, for Williams, Australia involvement in any war in Iraq was very possible:

Because of the importance of the strength of the alliance with the US, if the US is conducting a foreign policy initiative like going to war, then Australia will always
closely consider whether it will be a part of it. And that’s whether it’s a Coalition government or a Labor government. (Author interview Williams, 2008)

Evidence gleaned from interviews with some of Howard’s close colleagues offers some support for the conclusions we have already reached regarding Howard’s emotional intelligence and cognitive style. In terms of emotional intelligence, there is some support for Howard’s claim that his leadership benefited from a deep appreciation for the feelings of Australian citizens. There is considerably more support for the claim that Howard’s cognitive style was characterised by pragmatism and a belief in the value of historical lessons in the forming of policy decisions.

3.4 Emotional intelligence and cognitive style: Observers

The remainder of this chapter examines John Howard’s emotional intelligence and cognitive style from the perspective of observers of the Howard government. We draw on the insights provided by the political scientist and biographer, Peter Van Onselen, the political scientist Felix Patrikeeff, policy advisor Nick Grono, and international development expert Richard Leaver. These experts take a mostly academic interest in the workings of government and political leaders like Howard. In general, observers’ perspectives on Howard confirm a number of points we have already made, particularly regarding Howard’s cognitive style. These include the importance of Howard’s upbringing in shaping his emotional resilience and worldview, and the prominence of his conservatism in terms of his worldview and decision-making style.

Political scientist Peter Van Onselen described the influence of Howard’s background on his response to 9/11:

His father and his grandfather fought in World War I and he has a strong identification with the US alliance through that…And his avid reading of history probably dovetailed with his interest in continuation of that. Menzies was a big advocate of that US alliance. So he sees that as just a continuation…I think that Australia’s close ties with the United States were made more the case post-September 11 because of his
friendship with George W. Bush, but also his being there when it actually happened, being in Washington at the time. (Author interview Van Onselen, 2008)

Van Onselen in the course of writing and editing his biography of Howard was struck by the same evidence of personal involvement in September 11 that had emerged in our interview. Howard was very much hurt by the tragedy of 9/11 personally and this would have played out in his responses:

I think it was very formative. His Chief of Staff told me for an interview that he did with me…that he thought that September 11 was crucial to Howard’s decision-making thereafter – having been there. And in my own interviews with Howard, we did ask him about the significance of being there and he confirmed that he thought that was significant to him. (Author interview Van Onselen, 2008)

Van Onselen’s point is relevant, and important, due to the independence which Howard appeared to have enjoyed in crafting the immediate response to 9/11. The more times that an individual leader acts with autonomy, the more that individual’s personal attributes can shape public policy.

Patrikeeff also suggested that Howard played an autonomous role in shaping Australia’s foreign policy response to 9/11; indeed, he has argued that Howard’s role was, if anything, too independent:

My worry in that regard is the fact that we could have an executive decision, made without deep consultation with the relevant bodies. In…Howard’s case it was really an epiphany. You know, as [he] faced those particular problems the response was without any shade. It was just 100% commitment to a particular position. Now that to me is interesting because it is policy-making on the run. (Author interview Patrikeeff, 2007)

Interestingly, Patrikeeff went on to link the significance of the impact of 9/11 on Howard to his upbringing. The ‘epiphany’ that shaped Howard’s foreign policy response was, for Patrikeeff, a result of Howard having been in Washington at the time of the 9/11 attacks (Author interview Patrikeeff, 2007). Patrikeeff suggested that this experience amounted to ‘the biggest adventure that [Howard] had ever had’. He also argues that ‘you can’t
underestimate the impact of [such an event] on a person’s consciousness and especially a person who emerged from the Western suburbs and a tiny little sheltered and secluded suburb of Sydney’ (Author interview Patrikeeff, 2007).

This emphasis on the dramatic nature of the events of 9/11 and their impact upon Howard would seem to imply that we would have seen a significant shift in Howard’s foreign policy post-9/11 but, according to many, this is not the case. On the one hand, we might put this lack of a sudden shift in policy down to Howard’s emotional resilience – his determination to be ‘clear-headed’ in his response despite the drama unfolding before him. On the other hand, it is important to note the conservatism that many observers saw in Howard’s basic worldview and cognitive style.

Nick Grono offers important insights into Howard’s worldview, arguing that:

Howard is deeply conservative. I mean it’s not a game for him. He is deeply conservative and those conservative values revolve around strong ties to the alliance in the kind of American approach to these things. And also he has an understanding of the deeply conservative nature of the Australian population in many respects. And I think Howard understands that better than pretty well any other politician. And he understood that post-September 11, Australians would react to this. So yeah all of that feeds into his understandings and he’s been able to use that and build upon that in his responses. (Author interview Grono, 2007)

What is also evident in Grono’s comments is the link that he draws between Howard’s own conservatism and his capacity to understand the Australian public, thus showing a link between his worldview and his emotional intelligence.

This conservatism, not as ideology but as respect for historical legacy, was evident from the earliest years of Howard’s leadership. Before 2001, observers were conscious of Howard’s emotional intelligence and his conviction to strong values and beliefs in conservative leadership. As well as noting these features of Howard’s cognitive style, observers also were quick to make comparisons between the type of skills Howard possessed and those wielded by other ‘conviction leaders,’ including people like Tony
Blair (Author interview Edwards, 2006). Others, such as Van Onselen, also referred to Howard as a ‘conviction politician.’

In seeking to characterise Howard’s cognitive style as it applied to the realm of foreign policy, Van Onselen confirmed a number of the points made above:

I think his worldview, to the extent that he has one as coherent as that, he would fall into the category of, I guess, being a foreign policy realist. So he would see he doesn’t believe in institutions or the liberal approach to foreign policy. So he is a realist and believes it’s an anarchical society and therefore places great stock on the US alliance for example, and far less weight, given that he’s not pro the institutions, the international institutions. He puts far less weight on things like the United Nations, and that’s the way his approach to the war in Iraq for example, played out. Now I think that is his general worldview. But he is also enough of a politician to know the institutions can have their value as long as they working towards your ends. But that doesn’t change him from being a realist essentially. (Author interview Van Onselen, 2008)

Two points stand out here. Firstly, as was already noted, Howard’s worldview is most consistent with what IR scholars would describe as a Realist conception of world politics. Secondly, however, this worldview is not drawn from the pages of IR literature, but is instead a product of a strong sense of conservatism. In other words, Howard’s Realism is less the product of ideology and more that of conviction; it is a conventional, conservative realism that seeks to protect existing structures and processes whenever possible.

Observers noted the ways in which this worldview translated into foreign policy choices made by the Howard government. On the one hand, the immediate support for the United States was consistent with a worldview that pictured this traditional, Great Power alliance as a central pillar of Australian foreign policy. On the other hand, this Realist worldview also was consistent with Howard’s general emphasis on inter-state cooperation rather than multilateral, institutionalised cooperation between and among states.
Observers did also state that Howard’s worldview was not wedded to a Realist vision of world politics. In part, as Van Onselen noted, Howard was not ‘religiously’ attached to Realism because ‘he doesn’t necessarily even know the difference between being a realist and or being a liberal in terms of foreign policy’ (Author interview Van Onselen, 2008). Instead, Van Onselen’s point was that while Howard ‘is not somebody who follows a particular approach the way that someone like Kissinger would’, ‘he displays most of those tendencies’ that we would associate with Realism (Author interview Van Onselen, 2008). This enabled Howard to exercise some flexibility in terms of his response to 9/11:

Because he is not wedded to that particular approach, he can vary from that when it suits him. So he can try to get the UN involved on East Timor, for example, because he sees it as an advantage to do that. Whereas the Realist might not even bother to do that, they might take a different approach. (Author interview Van Onselen, 2008)

Leaver, too, saw Australia’s post-9/11 foreign policy towards the Southeast Asian region as being characterised by a level of pragmatic flexibility, and as resulting in some significant variation to Australia’s regional policy before this event:

There have been dramatic changes in foreign policy since 9/11. Things that I think that were not planned had to be executed nonetheless. It’s given Howard, demanded of Howard, that he draw closer to the region. It’s not clear to me that would have happened without September the 11th. You know the kind of bureaucracy and forms of cooperation, you know, the Indonesian and Australian police. That wouldn’t have happened without September the 11th. That has actually led the government into a closer relationship with Indonesia, which it is not clear was being planned for. (Author interview Leaver, 2007)

The views of these observers thus confirm the analysis of Howard’s cognitive style presented earlier. Howard exhibited a distinctly conservative worldview in his response to 9/11, one that was in many ways consistent with a Realist image of world politics. However, Howard twinned this conservatism with a pragmatism that allowed him to respond to crises such as 9/11 in a manner that allowed some flexibility.
3.5 Conclusion

Howard’s emotional intelligence and cognitive style fitted a long career in politics from the beginning of his advancement with the other elements of political style. Howard learned quickly the lesson of success and failure to support a professional career. A search for the most effective elements was part of a much longer struggle in political career supported by mentors, family and friends and eventually fell power to those he represented for so long. It was Howard’s own desire to have developed elements of political skill and ideas necessary to defeat the opponents in his own making of politics. As time went by the professional development of Howard proved to be a remarkable gift and seconded by an intense desire to represent fellow Australians. By 9/11 the emotional maturity and emotional intelligence of Howard steps across the issues at hand and provides the basis for the use of necessary cognitive style. Both unique emotional intelligence and cognitive style are well represented in Howard’s leadership style.

There was however, a developmental aspect to Howard’s cognitive style and emotional intelligence. As noted in the title of his autobiography, Howard was ‘reborn’ through failure. He did not leap into the parliamentary world like Bob Hawke, immediately popular with the voters, but got to the Lodge, and stayed there, because of his capacity to develop his emotional intelligence and his cognitive style. In both attributes it was not theoretical study that saw his improvement – he certainly does not quote key texts or philosophical treatises as part of his preparation for a life in politics. Rather his skills in these two fundamental domains come from lived experience. This experience includes his upbringing in a modest Methodist home, a good government school education, and time in the Young Liberals.

The continued chaos in the Liberal Party ranks following the death of Holt in 1967 can be added to this list of experiences that shaped Howards’s cognitive style and emotional intelligence. He learned better than certain rivals – notably Andrew Peacock – from these setbacks. He understood that the senior conservative politicians needed to relate more carefully to their social base if they were to win national office again after
Labor’s win in 1983. This ‘reading of the public’ stands out in how we need to assess Howard’s emotional intelligence. He did not necessarily ‘read’ those around him particularly well – he fell out with Malcolm Fraser, he had strained (or ambiguous) relationships with Cabinet colleagues such as Peter Costello and Alexander Downer. But they knew that his reading of the Australian public was far sharper.

Finally we need to recast Howard’s fateful day in Washington at the moment of America’s greatest recent trauma in a new light, following Patrikeeff’s suggestion September 11 took on a personal meaning for Howard. He was there; he saw; and he learned a great secret of public life from that experience. It became yet another milestone in his long and torturous journey of self-discovery and knowledge about the world around him. He was not the first Australian politician to name it the beginning of a War on Terror (that role was played by the more bookish Alexander Downer), but he was now the first to see how the event could play out in Australian domestic politics.
Chapter 4: Vision and public communication

4.1 Introduction: Two further elements of leadership

This chapter assesses Howard’s vision and communication skills. Political vision and public communication are another two of the six elements of leadership used in measuring Howard’s success as a leader. The quality of Howard’s vision and public communication will contribute to an overall understanding of Howard’s success as leader. Howard’s vision and public communication follow logically from emotional intelligence and cognitive style as the next two elements of his political style. Vision and public communication can be tested together because they are closely related.

The absolute test of having a successful political vision is the ability of the leader to achieve their stated goals with positive outcomes. Not everybody will support or agree with a leader’s vision: it is this fact that makes it remarkable. The leader’s view of their own vision will also be determined against others’ interpretation of themselves. Once in control the ability to politically communicate this vision, among the wider skills of public communication, is essential for having achieving governmental success in the modern day.

Vision can be defined as the leader’s preoccupation with developing good enough policy content to lead, with the leadership ability to present policy through feasibility and possessing a set of overarching goals. The essential key to having sufficient vision means having the knowledge and ability for turning the idea of policy into process to the extent needed in order to govern and therefore be successful. The idea is to have enough vision generated to be successful. Ultimately a successful leader exhibits vision and, in unpacking its multiple meanings, will be able to tangibly inspire others. Vision contains the style necessary for a leader with a clear policy agenda to govern effectively.
A good leader’s vision steers a government via the clearest possible direction needed to operate through the course of events (both positive and negative), with the help of advisers and followers, and to carry this vision against any opposition. Without demonstrating enough vision to establish and maintain essential priorities then leadership will be made more demanding and difficult for any effort to go forward. A leader without enough vision is likely to falter. A lack of vision can directly affect all the other elements of political style, rendering a politician incomplete. Modern politics has fostered a news schedule that constrains how well a particular vision in political operation can be presented in a timely fashion, as well as the general exposure of leaders in the modern media. Showing enough ability to focus on a few key priorities as the ‘goals and profit’ and also from the very start ‘to hit the ground running’ are two widely appreciated aspects that makes a leader with good vision more than highly able in view of all the issues involved in modern-day leadership (Bose 2006, p. 29).

Possessing good public communication includes having the ability to speak clearly in addressing the public (Bose 2006, p 33). There are two aspects to public communication: a leader must be clearly able to communicate to other individuals and then be able to clearly channel communication through organisational means. Good public communication is critical to power; the leader needs to be consistent and highly disciplined. The type of leader who is a solid communicator has a considerable advantage against rivals.

Globalisation and the ongoing advances of media proliferation, television and radio, types of print journalism, all boosted by the impact of the internet’s growth, and social media, have together enabled communication to become a much more significant part of modern leadership (Bose 2006, p 32). Having the ability to directly or indirectly convey inspiring or specific policy recommendations in messages to the public helps the leader promote the full range of their policy agenda. From those messages specific support can also be generated among legislative supporters necessary to endorse public policy. The ability to carry on with inspirational messages and to capture the public's
imagination, even in political rhetoric, is associated with the ability to be a great communicator (Bose 2006, p 33).

Both vision and public communication are variables, not absolutes, in that they relate to changes in political circumstances. A flexible vision responds to the vicissitudes of political changes to meet the political aspirations of the times. Public communication in office requires a steadfast approach adapting a strategic and disciplined approach to maintain power.

4.2 Howard’s view of himself as visionary and communicator

The best place to start in assessing Howard’s capacity for vision and public communication is with Howard himself. While others disagree with Howard’s vision, few would deny that his clarity of vision was a vital element of his government. Howard’s own narrative of his vision speaks to his efforts to lead Australia in the aftermath of 9/11. Howard’s own test of his leadership confirms aspects of his policy vision that he confirms he successfully implemented in Australian foreign policy and that is how he is judged.

The skills for policy vision are distinctly innate, driven by personality and individual complexity, as the case of Howard shows. Howard needed to prove that his goals aligned with the event known as 9/11: in this he undoubtedly succeeded. Following 9/11, Howard succeeded in arguing that he had made Australia a safer place in the face of terrorism, and in convincing Australians of this – albeit not everyone. Howard would have to demonstrate among his individual attributes a strong capacity to develop policy for both what vision and public communication bring as individual skills into leadership. Howard has always been a complex and outspoken critic of himself and his own performance. Howard’s use of a vision for creating long-term political and public support is fundamental to his management of power. Howard’s re-imagining of Australian foreign policy is but one example of the individual leader’s role in setting policy vision.
and public communication. It became critical in the Howard government’s pursuit of the problem of terrorism following September 11.

Howard’s manner is clear. As leader Howard was protective of his accomplishments and seldom changed his views or was prepared to admit that he was wrong. Years after finishing as the Prime Minister, Howard still maintains that he was right and never wrong to act the way he did. Howard may be described as a strong ‘conviction leader’ when it comes to style but it is also his interpretation of himself. Howard’s vision is a very personal inner quality that manifests in types of direct communications of his own self as well. From our first meeting with Howard he exuded a high degree of political experience, conveying a unique vision and a decisive interpersonal style of public communication, which could be witnessed firsthand. Conveying a sense of earnestness, responsibility, accountability, confidence, as well as a trust in evidence, Howard built an image of leadership around himself. The ability to express a vision which will create political success rests with how others will judge you. Time can be an essential factor in this context. In mastering communication skills Howard became well practised in enunciating an overarching vision that built on his political success and, in turn, further developed his communication skills. Howard was unwaveringly confident in his approach to politics. In any long-running political career it is common to remember only the successful aspects; Howard is hardly unusual in growing weary about other parts of his career that might be judged less than successful.

Right from the start of the interview Howard set out some ground rules of how he would answer the questions:

Well look that’s fine. What I might do is I’ll talk to each of these questions. I won’t because I think we’ll end up being here all day. If I answer each individual question, you know, in seriatim fashion. But what I will do is talk to them as groups of questions. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

In answering questions, Howard developed his own style of re-negotiating the views of those with whom he had a contrary view. He used a type of gradual
encirclement of his argument which was a feature of Howard’s style noted by linguists in this period. It is a rhetorical technique probably honed by his years in the Law. According to the sociolinguist Tim Moore, the secret to Howard’s success as a public speaker and therefore as an ideologue was his use of the syllogistic argument (Moore 2006, pp. 14-17). With a compelling analysis of his habitual style of argumentation Moore challenges the traditional view that Howard was no great rhetorician. Howard’s first sentence sets up a statement that is difficult to dispute; the second takes us somewhere we did not expect to go. The famous example ran as follows:

   It’s about this nation saying to the world ‘we are a generous open-hearted people taking more refugees on a per capita basis than any nation except Canada. We have a proud record of welcoming people from 40 different nations’. (Howard quoted in Moore 2006, p. 15)

and then:

   But we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come. (Howard quoted in Moore 2006, p. 15)

   Moore’s argument is that it is this ‘but’ that connects the two statements and gives the syllogism its resolute power from a rhetorical point of view. This perfectly describes the John Howard that we meet in this interview and read in the transcript. He develops his accounts of each step in the unfolding drama as a couplet. A statement like, ‘It’s sensible to have people give you advice . . .’ is of course incontrovertible – but note in this interview that it is immediately followed up by his own statement, with an implied ‘but’, in the end, you rely on your own instincts . . .’

   Howard’s rhetorical skill served to protect his particular vision of what was best for Australia and its citizens. With a confidence that improved with each election victory, Howard enunciated a personal vision for himself and his country.

   Howard was well schooled in the art of giving a good interview. Not only was he experienced, he showed an ability to convincingly explain himself. Over time he
developed a mastery of his own political ideas and a confidence in proposing solutions. It is important to recognise that this had evolved only with time and experience in public life. In our interview, what Howard wanted was all we discussed. He wanted to be seen as a successful politician, and these skills were essential and on show in the interview.

Howard was a great proponent of his own need to evince a clear and consistent vision as leader. The proof he offered was, of course, his own electoral success. In this narrative Howard’s humble beginnings and his developing identity were part of the strong vision and this enviable ability in public communication. essentially came about to produce a sound knowledge. Howard tells a story of seeking out a vision and in the process becoming a successful leader. Howard attracted support he needed for long-term political leadership.

The vision of Howard followed a clear route from childhood onwards. He had already developed a pronounced conservative ideology that framed his vision of Liberal politics and set in train the development of political and economic plans for what he sensed was required change in Australia. This was supported by a developing worldview. Howard had, in his own words, created an economic roadmap of economic liberalism and social conservatism. Howard’s familiar significant individual themes told the story from the 1990s to 2001. They were his early childhood, character development, his personality and skills, and the Liberal tradition and negotiating the economic story for prosperity from 1970s to 2001. Australia’s recent economic history appeared again central to developing a vision. But Howard was learning the political trade and better communication skills had to be developed on the horizon. Australia was changing quickly towards the future. Howard presented a robust vision of Australia that endeared him to the party faithful and set about developing the skills to attract followers. Up and running, once winning his seat, his vision took hold. Howard was content to follow Menzies and Fraser at that stage, articulating the old style of liberal thinking but would soon impress with his own ideas of conservatism. Howard was a foot soldier to the party:

Yeah, well I campaigned and I had done all of that. When we were in the Fraser Government I held domestic portfolios too. (Author interview Howard, 2010)
His efforts in taking the leadership brought a far more pronounced view and energy for separating ideology from ideas towards popular policy of the day. Howard had self-grown attitudes to society and to the act of governing through the institution of Parliament itself. The vision could finally be achieved once Howard could be the leader and Prime Minister in 1996.

Howard’s vision was his own need to lead for economic liberalism, social conservatism, eliminating debt and deficit, and reducing economic spending (Howard 2010, p. 234). The reversal of falling defence expenditure was made the immediate priority of the new Howard government. Howard wanted to change the Asia-only foreign policy focus of Keating. Asia was the only paramount region of political and economic interactions. Focus on immigration could promote Australia’s interests.

Howard’s wanted to create superiority over ideas, beliefs and ideology and turn policy into new leadership expectations, thus bringing success. He needed to produce vision to support strong leadership thus adding to electoral popularity. The resolution of ideas produced a changing message of the government. Howard’s vision and public communication establishes the record of action following 9/11.

Howard’s changing course of foreign policy was driven by his political views of domestic and international events as revealed just before 9/11 (from 26 August 2001) during the MV *Tampa* crisis. He resolved to adopt a tougher stance against refugees and boat-people entering ‘illegally’ into Australia including protecting Australia in post-9/11 fears and threats of terrorism from the dilemma of illegal immigrants. Howard recast debate on asylum-seekers with *Tampa*. He seized on the mood of Australians on the flow of unauthorised refugees entering Australia and increasing border protection (Howard 2010, p. 394).

Howard acted across a range of issues to achieve success through international issues, with domestic outcomes. Following 1996 at this time of Howard’s vision for
major political gains, it was Pauline Hanson’s attack on multiculturalism, the role of Asian immigration, and the problems of globalisation became all major issues reflecting vision and public communication. Included in Howard’s vision was the rewriting of the previous trajectory towards multiculturalism. For Howard multiculturalism demeaned British settlement and divided Australia into a nation of different tribes.

During November 1999 there was a national push for a republic that was defeated in a referendum. This allied to Howard’s stamping his vision on developing views on Australia’s position as a nation and its positioning in the anglophile world.

Indigenous policy was also a challenge for Howard. The issue of Aboriginal land rights also focussed attention on Australia’s human rights by the rest of the world. In leadership by May 2000 the ongoing attempts to find the terms to reconcile Australia’s indigenous population were discarded as the government was unwilling to apologise, reconcile and provide self determination to Aborigines (Manne 2006, p. 22). Again Howard was on the side of the vision that won out, confirming his role in leadership.

Howard downplayed earlier moves for Australia’s continuing integration with South-East Asia. Australia’s and the United Nations East Timor solution in 1999 signalled an end to dilute the Hawke - Keating era planned Asian trajectory for new foreign policy. By May 2001 Howard had led East Timor’s liberation and restored Australia’s external relations balance. Peacekeeping in East Timor on its road to independence won international praise but strained the always delicate Indonesian relations with Australia. Howard believed had Australia not supported and seized opportunities for East Timor’s independence then post-9/11 Australia-Indonesia relations might have been even more difficult. Defence preparedness thinking was highlighted in the Howard Government and the population morale boosted behind Australian military intervention (Howard 2010, pp. 357-58).

Howard had set up a determined political vision destined to control public communication with others. Multiculturalism was one problem that sought attention in
his leadership. Howard had a unique way of knowingly expressing his own views in constructing the argument for a more correct political vision. Howard’s construction of beliefs behind his vision would focus political attention. Howard’s views on the variant of multiculturalism continuously provoked response and reaction:

I mean, sure Britain has a particular problem with the disaffected native born Islamic people. The disaffected ones, but that’s a product of something that was done decades ago and that raises broader issues of whether policies of multiculturalism against integration and assimilation are preferable, which is a separate issue but I am not saying that their security response was bad. I am not saying that. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Howard set up controls on public communication once in office from 1996. As a political operator Howard wanted effective control over all communication. Howard through negative experience in the Fraser leadership years was determined that the system would function ‘productively and properly’ in his government (Howard 2010, p. 237).

Howard wanted to be dominant in his own control and the success he saw of his own leadership. He set up a cabinet policy unit whose head was the secretary of cabinet ‘valuable and trusted advisor’ (Howard 2010, p. 238). Physically located right next to Howard’s office the body interacted with the political and bureaucratic arms of government. Howard made a skilled policy specialist his principal advisor and made it practice to communicate often for advice on running government:

The other one that advised me a lot was Michael le Strange. He was a policy director.

(Author interview Howard, 2010)

But overall Howard protected himself through the work of many different advisors:

Well I had a series of advisers. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

In terms of public communication transformation in government, for better organisation Howard introduced a promised National Security Committee of Cabinet to
deal with all foreign affairs and defence issues subject to all major decisions being referred to the full cabinet for final endorsement. NSC produced effectively a whole-of-government approach, leak proof and administratively successful. Howard believed this form of communication so good he endorsed this model for other countries (Howard 2010, p. 238).

4.3 Views of Howard’s peers before 2001

As the leader Howard changed and elaborated his vision for foreign policy. It is salutary to consider the views of his inner circle when their work was moved by the new shifting paradigm of 9/11, and as the war on terror took hold. According to Downer things were just predictably normal in the relationship with the US in the days before 9/11:

Just strengthening our counter-terrorism capability. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

Beneath this bland assessment, however, things were certainly changing. One test of any government and its public service bureaucracy would be how it responded to Howard’s changes of vision, and how this would alter the way in which decisions were made by Ministers and staff and in the standard routines of the parliament. The challenging workload was one scale of political performance, as was continuing the process of communication flows:

Well there are different things. There are different levels here and there are different things. A lot of the counterterrorism work done within Australia is handled by domestic agencies. The Attorney General’s Department, ASIO, police, the Australian Federal Police, State police and so on. So the Foreign Minister or the DFAT in any case has very limited input into any of that. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

In Downer’s mind, the issue was not to get sidestepped by the process of the Prime Minister and what he wanted done in the routine of day-to-day life. The prime minister’s vision as leader prevailed over the party’s belief in individualism and the communication of decisions. Downer was insistent in expressing that the Prime Minister’s vision is the only thing that matters. But Howard had instituted control where leadership mattered:
He doesn’t make the decisions in our system. Only the media, say the Prime Minister makes decisions. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

Downer elaborated just where these decisions were really made and who had power and authority in constructing the government’s vision. It was less of a top-down approach than would become evident later:

It doesn’t really work like that. It’s not how it. I mean I am not sure how it works now. Apparently very, very centralised. It wasn’t so much centralised. The Prime Minister didn’t always make the decisions. Ministers often make the decisions. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

In following the political chain of authority Downer’s solutions to the problems of the day resonated with those of the Prime Minister, since Howard was now in command. But Downer’s previous experience of the leadership role in the party came through in some of his answers:

Or the Office is consulted. The officials of my Office would tell the Prime Minister’s office. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

The storyline explains that vision directed the communication on a daily basis. While most issues do not affect public opinion the important ones for vision-related policy will. The mix between domestic issues and foreign ones is still relevant to the completed storyline and the communication job of selling policy:

Of course. So they very seldom come together. I mean most foreign policy issues have no impact on public opinion. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

4.4 Views of observers before 2001

In the eyes of the public communication commentariat Howard was described as the first 24/7 (24 hours and 7 days a week) media Prime Minister. Howard’s office acted as the communication machine for the public. Observers explained Howard’s public communication workings as being very effective. Howard directly ‘filtered’ public
communication to the media for the people (Pembroke & Marshall 2016). This filtration edited the message for a planned strategy to express the vision of the policy content. The importance of the filter was to produce a simple clear message to convey and sell his policy (Pembroke & Marshall 2016).

Howard learned that keeping consistent control over good communication is critically important. He was known for producing a culture of discipline in his office. This included Howard’s controlling and support for the public service and bureaucracy important for influencing policy (Pembroke & Marshall 2016).

Howard was able to transform his media operation when new practices were transforming the media. Accordingly Howard practised communication for communication and kept the message straightforward and simple as media technology expanded through globalisation and social media technology was reaching prominence (Pembroke & Marshall 2016).

This involved Howard’s strategic plans spread through concise news conferences, doorstop interviews and working among the press gallery (Pembroke & Marshall 2016). All of Howard’s media transcripts were readily available on his website for public inspection. Howard effectively used talkback radio as a mini-Parliament for the people and as a focus group for his policy (Pembroke & Marshall 2016).

Howard routinely held meetings every morning when Parliament was sitting and could convene others for special circumstances. These meetings would invariably shape the process of the day. Meetings would deal with messaging the media and question time. Howard had a very effective Press Secretary, Tony O’Leary. Howard used his spokesmen as very capable articulate ministers to make complex issues seem simple for the public to understand. The Howard Government was known for using the media to talk to the electorate rather than letting the media as they do often talk for themselves (Pembroke & Marshall 2016).
Howard’s communication underscored the benefits of an enormous depth of personal political ability and knowledge though his long experience of public office. He offset language through establishing imagery with his audience. Howard planned and practised to be succinct to avoid any form of unprofessionalism. He had political knowledge and practised relentlessly in analysing his performance for the situation should it arrive (Pembroke & Marshall 2016). I noticed the analysis and intellectual routine in his office when we reviewed his debate with Hawke on Iraq on a television on his office wall just before conducting my interview with him in 2010. Howard intuitively measured his own performance and questioned others around him as he did me. He deliberately picked the form of media to suit. Howard importantly had strategies for dealing with over-zealous journalists (Pembroke & Marshall 2016).

Robert Manne (2006, p. 22) was one commentator who contested the meaning of Howard’s ten years as Prime Minister, how Australia was changed, and shed more light on Howard’s own statement of vision. Manne drew on a number of points to illuminate the ramification of Howard’s vision and communication principles and the results of his leadership in defining the future course of Australia (see Manne 2006, p. 20-32). Howard’s leadership vision was that Australia’s course towards Asian integration under Hawke and Keating had undermined ties with the United States and Western hegemony (Manne 2006, p. 22). Howard’s rhetoric did not require Australia to choose between accepting its geographical location within Asia and compromising its history of western civilisation. His slogan was that Australia did not have to choose between its own history and geography and this determined the course that was set by the leader (Manne 2006, p. 22).

As leader Howard took direct responsibility for a vision for Australia to follow. Through the Tampa crisis Howard’s solidified his electoral support basis against his opponents and stopped their momentum. Following September 11 Howard zealously worked his new vision rewriting the social and cultural patterns of Australia by integrating Australia strategically, economically, socially and culturally to the world’s most powerful superpower – the United States. Howard supported the US when he was in
Opposition and drove this home in policy terms while in Government. Howard’s relations with President Clinton were fractured to a large extent. With the election of George W. Bush Howard had a willing partner and better relations. This would take Howard to the events of September 11 that further developed and elucidated that vision. Put concisely, Howard’s vision admired the US for its foreign worth, the ANZUS treaty and the American alliance (Manne 2006, p. 22).

In supporting American global leadership, Howard demonstrated a view that the new century would belong to the US in a number of significant ways that would ultimately benefit Australia. Howard believed that America could change the world forever. He also liked America for all its characteristics, warts and all. He praised and admired its democratic function and rule of law. He praised America for giving the individual a land of opportunity and freedom. Howard admired its robust but ethical capitalism. He liked the elements that made American society, such as its family values and the strength of volunteerism. Howard could easily relate Australia’s values to values it shared with America, including mateship and the ‘fair go’ (Manne 2006, p. 22).

Howard then built his case to fully support the US. He professed to being both deeply shaken by the events of 9/11 and moved by the nature of the American people. Howard put the US alliance at the very centre of a leader-defined foreign policy relationship (Manne 2006, p. 23). Howard directly followed the US into war sending troops to Afghanistan and Iraq without question, involving Australia in a war on terrorism as a kind of down payment or perhaps a type of insurance policy (Manne 2006, p. 23).

It was Manne’s opinion that in every way politically imaginable and utterly conceivable Howard and his deputies encouraged the growth of the US into the heart of Australian foreign policy with a marriage of foreign policy that was encouraged for better or worse. This confirms Howard’s vision. Howard reversed the process of Australia from being a strategic, economic, culturally and politically nation dependent on Britain since
the 1930s and following 9/11 let it be linked to the rise of the US as a global superpower (Manne 2006, p. 32).

Looking worldwide, Simon Adams had taken the view that Australia had weighed up the pros and cons of supporting the United States and introducing a tough response on domestic security to protect its interests. Howard capitalised on his pre-existing vision as leader:

Well, this is complicated foreign policy history, don’t we kind of always attach our foreign policy essentially to somebody else, and in much of our history we didn’t have any foreign policy independent of Britain. We sort of developed a semi-independent foreign policy as an appendage of Britain. Then there’s that beginning of a fairly decisive shift at the end of the Second World War but all we do at the outcome of that is attach ourselves to the U.S. I am not one of these kinds of conspiracy theorists that believe you know that it is a completely slavish relationship. There are obviously differences of opinion between the Australian government about what its best interests are, and the American government, and the two things do not always match up. But, I think the general pattern of Australian foreign policy has always been pro-American under the Howard government and following 9/11. I am not inside the circle of the Howard government, but I think they saw it as a unique opportunity to significantly increase Australia’s kind of standing with the one remaining superpower in the world. And, they saw that the way to do that was to sign up. Howard basically signed up for the war on terror before there was even a war on terror. I would mean, I guess the one thing I would say in his defence was he was in Washington, when it was attacked, but still this response was to say we are in before we even knew that we are in for. (Author interview Adams, 2007)

The views of other countries especially with long-lasting ties to Australia were of obvious influence in Howard’s policy setting of vision. The situation the UK was in set the scene for further changes as a result of 9/11 and was a respected independent policy vision to be appreciably shared among its allies. Howard’s leadership had given strong support for his traditional allies and for Britain:
I don’t think so, I think we have, we talk about a role in the world as punching above our weight as playing a very important diplomatic role we are the bridge between America and Europe. Now, whether, that is true and actually with a re-emergent Germany, I think people will begin to debate that. I think there is a role we’ve given ourselves. (Author interview Edwards, 2006)

Howard was changing his form of public communication to keep up with the significantly changing world. It seems to imply that the lessons of history and his leadership variant strongly outweighed the dictates of the world as it already was transforming. And as a leader he was superfluous to the governing instruments of the world. Howard held down a realist view of the world that at times he fell back on to influence his vision and make him resonate as a leader. Howard argues that we live in a world of nation states and that for the foreseeable future it will be cooperation between like-minded nations which will solve the most difficult problems. Likewise, we should be wary of unqualified assent to the dictates of multilateral bodies whose rules are written sometimes by majorities which include nations neither believing nor practising the rule of law (Howard 2010, p.658). This led Howard to support the rule of US providing its version of hegemonic power over the world. It also fell in with Howard’s reasons to support Bush and not Clinton.

Another example was that Howard’s realism definition variant maintained the world was complex and dangerous a place for powerful democracies like the US to proactively impose their view on other nations (Howard 2010, p. 469). Richard Leaver looked behind the causes of anti-terrorism and 9/11 defined the newest age reached in which Australia operated:

Yeah that’s the big question. One of the things terrorism has done is I think make people aware that the violence in the international system is not simply state to state violence, and that some of these usually positively regarded things as non-government organisations could apply to terrorist groups and forms of violence. So I think, it has kind of broadened the field and made people consider non-state forms of political violence but which have been a legitimate object of study in the past, but not during the Cold War particularly, and not particularly during the 1990s, either.
Now, what has been done to challenge or change my precepts of Australian policy-making? While I guess, if you look to the Australian policy-making before 9/11, it was rather obsessively state to state and bilaterally focused, you know country to country. I have given up largely the Howard government on multi-lateral diplomacy. So I guess in that sense is one of the things I teach about is Australian foreign policy, and you know in that sense, September 11th was a big wake-up call to the Australian Government, which I think had to come up to speed very quickly on this kind of stuff. I remember before September the 11th, the landmark document, the Australian government issued on Australia was its White Paper of 1997, which was all about globalisation, economic globalisation and how this is a great thing and there were going to be no losers. That was according to Downer at the time. The globalisation now after September 11th no one talks very much about economic globalisation any more, but they talk about the globalisation of violence. So in a sense, they shifted from, if you like, globalisation as a good and positive phenomenon to globalisation as a mysterious dark terrorist phenomenon. (Author interview Leaver, 2007)

Howard’s strong views underpinned his vision. Leaver noted that Howard as an individual had such powerful sentiments and strong views that he was able very quickly see that his vision could be effectively adapted for standing behind the United States in Australia’s response to 9/11:

Well Howard was incredibly quick out of the blocks to capitalise on this and that’s not just Howard I mean, that is a long Australian tradition. I mean, when the Americans want support because we are a small country, we will only get noticed, if we are quick. So speed has been sort of an essential ingredient in Australian policy when America calls for help, and you know, I think Howard probably felt for a while there that Tony Blair had flown over, and NATO was going to be activated and he was getting a bit crowded out, and so he was really under the hammer to respond quickly and positively. He had got some of the inside running, and he was in Washington, when it happened. And he was able to use that later, partly in his economic diplomacy, partly by kind of me-tooing on just about all aspects of the war on terror. Well he is a very clever crafty domestic politician. He never bought the regime change argument, for instance. Not until after the war had . . . (Author interview Leaver, 2007).
The UK had always provided the raison d'être for world leadership even though its empire declined in world status. Supporters and non-supporters looked to the UK for examples for foreign policy. And in the UK and US support was equally paramount for leadership forming a vision over foreign policy. One signal significant in Australian foreign policy changes was that of combining simultaneously over more than a decade of Howard government, building closer relations with Asian neighbours whilst reasserting the traditional intimacy of links with US and UK:

That is 9/11 highlighted a number of failings across the sort of the British security architecture and certainly the US security architecture. (Author interview Edwards, 2006)

Edwards supported the view that Howard could presume that foreign policy was something that the leader can entertain a safe vision relatively unscathed by the electorate. And this was an initial starting point for Howard well into the war on Iraq. Howard drove foreign policy from inside his office proving that his leadership mattered over what people thought of vision:

Australians are famously uninterested in foreign affairs. (Author interview Edwards, 2006)

Edwards demonstrated Howard’s framed leadership vision where the individual responsibility placed an onus of view over the peoples dictates:

If you look at the political elite, you know Howard came to power in 1996, saying that you know he wanted Australians still to know much better about themselves. It’s very insular. (Author interview Edwards, 2006)

The world in 2001 would be a remarkably different place to set up a leadership vision for the future in terms of having the landscape to change foreign policy:

Certainly 9/11 from a DEMOS point of view brought home the importance of national security. National security wasn’t really on the agenda, but the British government had think tanks on priorities of public service reform, actually an emerging debate on
culture. On 9/11, actually terrorism becomes the phrase, the concept, the research item. And that fundamentally did change a lot of things. (Author interview Edwards, 2006)

Edwards continues to see how leadership was undertaking to defeat terrorism and how that was changing. Terrorism as an issue had been around for a long while and the UK had a lot of experience in dealing with strategy and planning to defeat the problem:

But terrorism was not really an issue. I mean it was talked upon in the foreign office, but what was dealt with, our historic issue with the provisional IRA, etc and were all there with the Metropolitan police were particularly with special Branch were sort of alert to terrorism and the Secret Service were 9/11 happens and suddenly government departments realize that they have massive gaps in their intelligence capabilities in actual policies themselves, and the political elite who had to deal with a successive number of critical failures. I mean I count foot and mouth, along with terrorism - people had to work overtime. An intelligence security committee had been established. MI6 had to approve of more Asian Muslims . . . And we duly took our eye off the ball. You know absolutely fundamental issues, and that caused some major problems. (Author interview Edwards, 2006)

Edwards held strong views that confronting 9/11 through Howard’s taking into account existing Australian foreign policy rationale made a difference to applying the future direction. Where Australia was situated by 9/11 is communicating to the world about itself as opportunities and threats:

And it struck me that Australian foreign policy since 9/11 was also . . . It kind of highlighted the threat to Brits about where Australia’s future lies. (Author interview Edwards, 2006)

The consequences for making different foreign policy directions spoke of Howard’s impending vision for building the traditional alliance of the UK into his leadership platform and how this would be communicated along with taking account of the transforming globalisation of the world including with new issues like terrorism pending:

Talking about the sort of foreign policy are we a regional player or we are really a global actor? And I think it is very interesting as well. What I am trying to establish I
am doing from basic research and speaking to people in a couple of government departments. I kind of felt you know that Australia and the UK are exactly the same in how we see our relationship with the US and I noticed Australia is also being called a lap dog and we are also known as the absurd poodles. It has struck me also that it is actually unlike the UK which has shunned playing a regional role today i.e. in Europe where Europe has now really quite simply been taken off the political radar.

Where Australia is actually facing up to the fact it probably what is primarily called fun and games in other words, terrorism, where it has to focus on Asia and focus on the Asian trading as well as you know China is one of your main export markets. (Author interview Edwards, 2006)

Howard was operating at a time when other situations demanded a response. However the UK had tracked differently under the Labor Government of Tony Blair. But this showed how prepared Howard was to support others, following 9/11. As this example shows that the UK was governed by a very different non-conservative view:

It exposed Blair’s Liberal interventionist agenda. We of course had been in Kosovo in 1999 and we had gone into to Sierra Leone in 2000, but it also related to the ongoing operations against Iraq - Desert Fox in 1998. (Author interview Edwards, 2006)

Blair was essentially juxtaposed to Howard’s governing views and was leading Britain down a completely different insular domestic course when it came to Howard’s vision. The concept of what stood apart between strong allies still dominated foreign relationships. Britain as Australia’s traditional partner also supported the US which was quintessential in giving Howard power to drive the shared ongoing relationship further when it came to future issues and ideas. The stuff of the cultural relationship oddly suited Howard’s own conservative vision and politics:

I mean, that is not just the political, but weaves itself through the fabric of British society and our relationship with America is very much based on hamburgers, Nike shoes, and our standing with America is based on this stuff. And that is why no British government will ever ask for a fairly European focus. (Author interview Edwards, 2006)
Australia’s middle power diplomacy was strong but the belief and military commitment to the Middle East was not continuous as was the case with British vision at the time before 9/11. 9/11 would unpredictably transform the UK networks and operating procedures as it did more so than under Howard with the US:

There are some fantastic statistics about how many Air Force operations there were in 1998. And it was almost a continuum of that going on in the west of the Iraq. (Author interview Edwards, 2006)

The UK had well established policy in the Middle East to protect its interests, making it very different from Australia in a shared vision of the interests of the world after 9/11:

Yes, that’s true, the relationship with Saudi Arabia is fairly key, and successive British governments have tried to develop or negotiate a settlement between Israel and Palestine, and obviously not to the same extent as the Bush administration. But we have a quite vociferous or vocal Jewish lobby, and I think that has played a key role as well. But also we were policing the no-fly zone from resolutions 687, from the first Gulf War. But you know, we have, also, a Tornado squadron based out there. We were certainly doing strategic forces operations in and around Iraq; so you can also almost hear the continuum of the first Gulf War and the fact that George Bush said why didn’t we go on and continue that? (Author interview Edwards, 2006)

The way that the world was structured before 9/11 exposed the changes that Howard made to foreign policy and the way that vision and communication was expressed. The rising tensions exhibited in the Middle East were an example Howard brought closer to his own realist vision of Australia in the world and the security that traditional allies exhibited. Howard’s older style of politics just based on economics and liberalism was to be complicated with the vision required to keep up with the changing world.

Howard was aware of political opposition to his vision. Various comments were made on Howards’s vision for Australia. Some commentators, like the electorate at large, would support Howard’s statesman-like vision for the world and others would oppose it,
as expected. Howard was able to express easily to the US that as an American believer he was attached to the US vision that separated easily from prior Australian foreign policy.

### 4.5 Howard’s views after 2001

In Howard’s vision September 11 changed Australia because the crisis changed the world in which he saw that Australia made its way as a nation. 9/11 provided a new and vital blueprint for Howard to press home his political ideas and values in foreign strategy, quite apart from Australia’s survival. Within his vision Howard foresaw long-lasting change. As he explained his rationale in our 2010 interview:

I made the point that 9/11 had a very significant long-term impact because it altered the threat and security environment for the whole world. So therefore it would have changed the nature of Australian foreign policy indefinitely. Whether if forever I don’t know. But certainly indefinitely. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

For Howard the 9/11 terrorist event demanded that real decisions were required as part of a longer plan and this was going to be a bigger influence on his sense of self as Australia’s leader:

Well it’s not just a political thing I mean it was a real life-changing event. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

So there was a real and visionary commitment on Howard’s part to influence the outcomes made possible by this crisis:

And you have to respond to it. And it’s not just political, it’s real. Here you had an unprovoked deadly attack on the American people signalling that we had entered a new more dangerous world. And therefore you react and adjust to those circumstances. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Howard argues in setting out his vision that the public wanted him as their leader to ensure Australia would not be dictated to by terrorists or Osama bin Laden in
particular. This is a reflection of determined leadership opposing the enemy as Howard defined it:

[9/11] had radically changed the world in which we lived. It was a paradigm shift of historic magnitude. A new enemy, unrestrained by borders, had arrived on the international stage. That enemy was lethal and efficient. Its dagger was aimed at the heart of a way of life which would forever be ours. The terrorists were staring straight at us; no amount of metaphorical averting of our eyes would shake their resolve to injure us and punish our way of life. (Howard 2010, p. 424)

Howard’s popular success from 9/11 derived from his ability to convey messages from inside his Government and, through managing the NSC, to communicate directly with the public domain. The message was unified and well orchestrated in terms of Howard’s vision. Howard says the media helped communicate the message:

The Press was quite good. They understood that we had entered a new world. And they did their job. They reported what was happening, and particularly the electronic media and the print media. But they gave me plenty of airplay. And I did multiple interviews from the United States on television and radio. And they essentially just allowed me to talk and asked me fairly straightforward questions. And they saw their role as providing me with a vehicle to talk to the Australian people. And that was their role and I respected them for that. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Howard could see a connection between a vision for enacting a post-9/11 agenda and at the same time honouring his regard for the liberal tradition and conservative economic policy. What followed embellished his political vision and was communicated in his own effective style:

Well I mean wait . . . you can see our response to 9/11 as being a continuation of the historic . . . [pause] willingness of Liberal governments to align Australia beside the United States in defending common values. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

4.6 Views of Howard’s peers after 2001
Downer elaborated on the causes he could recall behind the long-term foreign policy response in Howard’s vision:

The terrorists did it. I mean they’re the John Howard obvious causes. We knew nothing about what was going to happen on 9/11. And when it happened, well the government, I mean including him, responded as any government would. [As] any Australian Government would. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

Downer explained that Howard quite deliberately inserted this new reality into the vision he had inherited from his predecessors. The modern, post-Fraser neo-liberal agenda had minimised the role of the state, but 9/11 brought the state securely back into view. The Howard Government balanced its global regional role with that of the United States in setting its new policy goals, according to Downer:

I don’t think the main elements of it changed. But I think that we gave a very high priority to engaging with our neighborhood - Southeast Asia, North Asia, South Pacific and making sure that we are able to achieve our national objectives in those areas. And that didn’t change after 9/11. Some of the things we actually did change after 9/11 but in terms of the overall structure of policy that didn’t change. We placed, of course a lot of emphasis on relations with the US as a lot of us Australian governments invariably do. And the only real exception to this I would suggest was the Whitlam Government. Since the Second World War Australian governments placed a lot of emphasis on the relationship with the United States as one of the cornerstones of Australia’s security policy. Well the attack of 9/11 was on the United States. So you know we activated the ANZUS Treaty as an illustration of the point. But I mean the ANZUS Treaty was there. And in other words all the . . . not that we put it there, the Menzies government put it there. But the architecture was already created and we just utilised what was there. So in other words it was about a further phase in the implementation of a policy that already existed. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

The term being used ‘war on terror’ was American and not British:

I think that you mentioned Britain. One thing I would say about the war on terror as it is sometimes called, they hate that expression in Britain. They’ve got rid of it. (Author interview Downer, 2010)
The ultimate realisation was that the term being used by Downer the ‘war on terror’ was first defined by American and not British and in terms of the particular phase of US anti-terrorism it represented. So it had to be United States interests that had a primary fixed consideration in the making of this policy, according to Downer:

[9/11 encouraged the key tenets of Australian foreign policy?] Absolutely! The Americans, we never would have got a Free Trade Agreement with them. We didn’t do it, by the way, to get a Free Trade Agreement with the United States. But we never would have got a Free Trade Agreement with the United States if our response to terrorism had been a more qualified and hesitant response of the kind that some countries like Belgium and Spain had. Well, not Spain at that time. Actually Belgium and France under Chirac provided support. That’s really important to remember. The other thing is of course as a result of the Bali bombings. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

Downer offers Spain, Belgium and France as acceptable like-minded examples of foreign intervention to support Howard’s vision, but then immediately begins to downplay them.

According to Williams, in our 2008 interview, it could be presumed the vision instituted by Howard from 9/11 did not dramatically change Australian relationships, merely reinforced them:

I am not sure that you could say that the relationship changed. I think the relationship became more intense. But the US alliance and the long-standing relationship with the UK remained the same. It’s just that there was rather more contact between them. The message that the PM conveyed was that 9/11 had been an enormous shock to the US government and the US United States people. The fear I think was that no US President wanted to be in office when terrorists set off a dirty atomic bomb in a major US city like New York. (Author interview Williams, 2008)

Returning to Downer’s account, it appeared immediately after the Bali bombing that a level of Prime Ministerial vision was delivered differently. Howard had retained strong views against terrorism but Bali was a sensitive issue and caution prevailed to keep a
balance with Indonesia and not to inflame the neighbourhood. With the Bali bombing the response came less through Howard’s office to protect the Prime Minister’s chain of credibility against an electorate that was inflamed by the attack:

Now the important thing to remember is that in terms of policy response. So there was a consular response. I think that’s the thing you’ve got to remember. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

### 4.7 Views of observers after 2001

Not everybody shared Howard’s vision but a strong sense of bipartisanship emerged, unsurprisingly, during the September 11 crisis. As time went by this bipartisanship would just as predictably disappear. Howard was front and centre of 9/11 and able to play his part as world statesmen and to continue to interpret Australia’s vision. This was confirmed in Australia. Howard’s vision and the events of September 11 in the war on terror had altered the meaning of Australian foreign policy and this required new commentary to define exactly what was happening to that policy. Howard offered Australia’s sympathy and responded with direct action in support of the US. Howard as a leader unilaterally decided the approach and elevated his leadership in the approach. Howard’s response supported the direct needs of the US people in activating Australian responses for security. Howard’s sympathy for the US as a state that had suffered at the hands of terrorists was made to be shared directly as a problem for Australia to confront. Howard pledged Australia’s willingness to immediately support the US invoking existing rules of diplomacy and commencing strategic planning behind Bush. The policy supporting the global coalition of the willing gave value to the policies of Howard. Howard’s power relied on many things including the support he would receive from the electorate at large for his reading of the 9/11 situation and the changing policy decisions resulting from his actions:

Well, it is a nonsense term obviously, which just reflects a real genuine coalition. I guess that every war since World War II, one way or another has been affected by the language of that war. One of the things that the spin-doctors inside the White House deliberately tried to do after 9/11 was to adopt some of the language of the Second
World War in order to make people feel comfortable with what they were doing. Coalition of the willing, you know, it’s got a good ring to it. It sounds like a Hollywood movie; you know, let’s go and see the coalition are willing to defeat the evil you know. And, the axis of evil was another one. I mean, it’s a cartoonish kind of way to conduct foreign policy. And certainly, you know, I don’t think it has advanced our understanding of the problems we are facing or advanced our ability to solve those problems. (Author interview Adams, 2007)

Observers like the academic and television commentator Peter Van Onselen understood what the experience confirmed. He saw overarching power of Howard’s vision to gain loyalty and Australian foreign policy to support the US people and the government of Bush:

I think he wears the office of Prime Minister as a significant thing. And I mean this is unrelated, but it gives you an idea, when he was Opposition Leader as well as when he was Treasurer and when he was just a Shadow Minister, he always had very direct relations with the media. He was very hands-on. However once he became Prime Minister, he saw that the Office of Prime Minister was something where he would rise above that hands-on approach, so therefore he left it to his media advisors and his staff to continue that direct hands-on [approach] with the media and he was less inclined to do that. So he places great stock in the Office of Prime Minister. (Author interview Van Onselen, 2008)

For Simon Adams, the Howard vision and public communication whether it was politically right or wrong nevertheless responded directly to the US as victims and drew observation of his political actions as an individual in contrast to world perceptions and attitudes. Howard was criticised for overstepping Australia’s response in world politics. The fact that Howard was in Washington and observed the ongoing responses of the US people was not necessarily a solid reason for acting as he did. Howard brought himself forward as a leader at the centre of Australia’s responses. Adams, an Australian academic who later wrote a book about 9/11, was also in the United States as the attacks occurred. His 2004 book title reflected his own very personal experiences of the unfolding War on Terror, *All the Troubles: Terrorism, War and the World after 9/11*. He thus had a very
profound set of observations of how involvement in the issues and problems posed by 9/11 situated themselves into everybody’s political vision:

It is just incredible, and the more intense that got the closer you got to New York. I mean people in LA experienced 9/11 pretty much the same as Australians did on TV you know and second-hand. Whereas when you ended up on the east coast in New York and New Jersey you are dealing people for whom 9/11 was a real immediate wound in that a lot of people who I met over there had lost somebody in the Twin Towers or went to work, looked out the window, and saw rubble and smoke. So for them 9/11 was a much more immediate experience. (Author interview Adams, 2007)

Adams saw the vision behind Howard’s decision-making as unusual given that it was decided immediately in a foreign country despite the ramifications of the crisis and foreign support for the US:

And, I think their political response to it was therefore much more immediate than I think in Australia, notwithstanding the fact that Australians did die in 9/11. For most people, it was kind of an over there experience. Once they got over the shock and horror of the pictures. We just kind of fell into line about where we were marching towards. (Author interview Adams, 2007)

Howard was again seen to have felt his opinion and decision-making as more important only because he was in Washington during 9/11 and at the helm of Australian policy-making making important future decisions:

He was in Washington when it was attacked and I think that probably did significantly affect the way that he was going to respond in a pro-US supportive way, but I think that was properly accentuated by the you know by the situation on the ground where he was in Washington. I think they have seen in the Howard government an enormous opportunity for them to essentially raise the standing of Australia with the United States of America by signing up, with almost no escape clauses or caveats, to the war on terror, in its broadest kind of focus. I think that is incredibly dangerous for us as a country. It saddens me that we have kind of gone down that path and it makes me afraid for my children. And, just for the world that we live in. You know, I would like
Australia to be seen as a kind of a country that thinks through these questions for itself, rather than just you know, following by reflex. (Author interview Adams, 2007)

For Adams the response to Howard’s vision equally bettered other historically powerful threats to government and played heavily into Australia’s domestic awareness of the threat to all life and the construct of a viable enemy of the state. But it was still not considered as the sort of big decision that you should hurriedly make to change foreign policy this way in the midst of a complex crisis such as 9/11:

You know, I think it was Thomas Jefferson, or maybe John Adams, who said we shouldn’t go overseas looking for monsters to destroy versus people who thought the job of democracy is to go out and to expand democracy if necessarily forcibly by arms. So in some ways these debates have been the same all through America’s history and all through Australia’s history. They have just been changed in their current context, and I think that again is why history and politics helps us understand what is going on better. What worries me is this kind of almost Orwellian permanent state of war, which kind of serves political purpose.

I mean, you know, you notice in the United States now, and this was clear around the most recent election, a vote for the Democrats is a vote for terrorism. You know, a vote for the Democrats is a vote for betraying our soldiers in Iraq. This kind of using the war on terror is essentially a domestic political device. And in some ways that’s no different to the way in which politicians in the 1950s in America would roll out communism at every election. It’s no different to the way in which Menzies could, in this country. You could guarantee every time a Federal election was coming up Menzies would start talking about, you know, the red scare and the threat of Communists to our region. Well the war on terror now plays that kind of role and I just think the issues are too serious to be used as a domestic political device. (Author interview Adams, 2007)

The political scientist Felix Patrikeeff was in Adelaide as the attacks took place soon developed a keen sense that 9/11 was fundamentally going to change many things about foreign policy far too quickly. One of these was gearing the immediate speed of the development of United States relations given the balance of Australia’s affairs with the
rest of the world rested solely on the characteristics of 9/11. It was more that Howard’s own political characteristics were also an assessment in play shaping the contest to resolve the crisis of 9/11:

But it was basically arguing that we shouldn’t be too hasty in falling into alignment with American foreign policy as our national interest might actually be at slight variance. It may well be re-examined but we may have to be cautious as a country in terms of actually falling into any alliance with the United States in terms of actually addressing the issues that were so prominent for the US. As a result of that article, I got at least three bits of hate mail from readers at The Advertiser, one of which said that you know I should be ashamed of myself that the Americans had done so much for us in terms of the war that I was obviously not Australian. Another one said that I should move to Kangaroo Island and live in relative peace and security because obviously that’s what I was aiming for. While neither was the case, what I was presuming was that there was good reason not to rush headlong into any alignment with the US on the issue of terrorism, and certainly not to rush headlong into an alliance with the US on issues of actually exhorting to military action. (Author interview Patrikeeff, 2007)

As soon the initial events and responses became known, Patrikeeff was writing and commentating about 9/11 and noticed Howard’s special efforts to go out of his way at creating a strong and lasting foreign policy response. Howard stood his support over his individual and role as events unfolded and the response became clearer:

While the thing that I feared, and thing that I counselled against in that opinion piece I wrote for The Advertiser was precisely what happened, and to me what was immensely interesting was the fact that John Howard was caught in Washington on 9/11, and in seeing him and his reaction, I got the feeling that John Howard had actually experienced the biggest event in his life. And that’s probably what has actually caused him to think strongly about changes in Australian foreign policy - if it were to be informed by a knee-jerk reaction on the basis of someone who had a revelation in situ in Washington. Now it must have been an enormously affecting incident for him, and probably quite distressing, but the fact that he was so quick in offering all support that he could to the United States and its allies in this, to me rang an alarm bell, and in a sense reminded me of the time that Bob Hawke produced the knee-jerk response to keeping the 50,000 Chinese students in Australia as a result of Tiananmen in 1989. In
both cases, you have, from what I have read and heard about it, knee-jerk responses, and both really unsupported by very careful consideration by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade or for that matter, the Immigration Department. The Prime Minister, who had been seized by the moment . . . (Author interview Patrikeeff, 2007)

University of Sydney academic, Alan Dupont, understood the overreaching effects 9/11 immediately had on the world security environment and that in Australia’s response in defining it a new vision was required. There was a sense that the leader’s response outweighed the need for a critical foreign policy response to deal with the security of the world and 9/11 terrorism:

But I think it did quite dramatically change the security environment for the United States. Because the US is so crucial to us, it immediately had a chain reaction with particularly allies but the effect was more a global one. It focused everybody on something that had previously been seen as a boutique foreign affairs and security issue. Right, terrorism has really been around from long time. But it was really on the margins of security in terms of its relevance and importance and priority. That all changed overnight. And that was a very critical change. (Author interview Dupont, 2010)

Australia was busily building an explicit domestic case against domestic terrorism when it was already threatening the stability of the world, and in Howard’s initial responses to 9/11 he helped develop a sense of a renewed security. Australia was safe for the moment, thanks to his clear vision:

Yeah. I think the way security agencies were thinking about this and governments was that there was a recognition early on, immediately after 9/11, that there was a domestic dimension to terrorism. But in a sense of bad guys out there recruiting or having no sort of agents of influence in Australia, basically people from the Muslim world living here who could be susceptible to recruitment. That was the domestic issue people were thinking about. Okay. So they did recognize it as a domestic issue. It was only in the last few years that the recognition has grown that it is not just about a small proportion of our population who might have been born in the Arab world and come here and be susceptible. That Anglo-Saxon Australians and fifth generation Australians can also
turn to terrorism under the right circumstances. So I think that was an important shift in thinking about the domestic terrorism angle. (Author interview Dupont, 2010)

Howard’s vision committed to strong leadership actions incorporating threat and fear behind a policy commitment to secure and protect Australia. The reason for this vision needed to be explained. The view outside the inner sanctum by the observers was not quite as sanguine as Howard in engineering foreign policy success may have wanted. Shearer analysed the basis for a limited foreign policy and then challenged Australia’s view of its own limited role in the world and where need for fighting terrorism belonged inside the Howard vision:

Historically between Vietnam and 9/11 Australia enjoyed a benign strategic environment in terms of real and imaginary threats. Australia would be seen to be promoting its own relationships and rationalising its own behaviour in the international world. In this worldview Australia was building ‘within itself’ a benign ‘liberal internationalism’, which means in this sense also to be describing the amount of national government policies that are operating across borders expressed in the reduced role of the state and the dismantling of tariffs barriers, the deregulation and opening of the financial sector to foreign investors and the privatisation of state enterprises. This means our state relations were determined by this liberal internationalism. 9/11 and Bali refocused Australia. It became the fact that there were real threats out there and the attack caused a new focus on security and the use of Australian forces. (Author interview Shearer, 2007)

Removed from the hurly-burly of Canberra, academic observers like Adams would have preferred a longer thought-out vision and suitable approach made to 9/11. As a teacher of foreign policy, Adams offers classes for students to understand exactly how and why governments act in particular ways to produce particular results. Forming responses requires a significant methodology of planning to make proper results. Howard was very quick, like the United States, to prepare a list of suitable responses, argues Adams:

What is the problem? Here is the problem. How did they analyse that problem and how did they develop potential solutions at how do they respond to this crisis? And in some
cases, it really is just crisis management. Something is happening, you respond to it and you develop foreign policy in reaction to it. I think that’s the way America and Australia have generally responded to what’s happened since 9/11. It’s crisis management. A bomb goes off in Madrid or something happens in London, or people fly planes into buildings, and you respond to that particular thing. There is another type of foreign policy, though as well, which is about long-term strategic interests. And I think there has been a bit of this in September the 11th but in a fairly two-dimensional cartoonish kind of level, which is who are we, who are these other people, how do we understand them and their state interests. But how do we understand ourselves and our own state interests and how do we advance those interests in the future. And I think there hasn’t been enough of that because in order to address that you do need deeper historical understanding and a deeper political understanding cross cultural kind of stuff. It’s a much bigger, tougher question to answer. In some ways responding to a plane flying into a building is a lot easier than to respond to them. What made these people get on the plane in the first place, and try and kill us? And how do we stop that from happening in the long term? Because with the one approach, the solution is to go out and find the next hijackers and kill them before they can get on the planes. The other approach is to completely change the circumstances in which our two cultures interact. And so nobody wants to get on a plane and fly into a building, but that’s a much tougher problem to deal with. (Author interview Adams, 2007)

In our interview Adams thought the chance existed to make a different approach to vision and policy and a much more acceptable focus than that of the Howard long-term response to the 9/11 situation and counter-terrorism. This would encounter the problem with different attitudes and views and may have led to a totally different future scenario with Australia’s relations:

My difference from the Federal Government and from the American Government is I don’t think that they have even got a proper understanding of what it is that we are fighting, let alone who we are fighting. You know, I think they’ve got that wrong. Then if it they’ve got it that wrong, you can’t even get to the next step, which is how do we actually deal with the problem and defeat it. I think we have completely lost our focus in both of those areas. So I think you know the world has become a much more dangerous place since September the 11th. But the so-called war on terror has made it
an even more dangerous place than it needed to be. I think there was a unique foreign policy opportunity and then unique kind of social opportunity after September 11th to deal with these issues and begin to turn the tide a little bit. I think that has been missed, and we are going to be wearing the consequences of those mistakes for a long time to come. (Author interview Adams, 2007)

Adams would have wanted the internal policy debates following 9/11 to be more robust and the government to take longer in reaching a conclusion. This reveals Howard’s personal leadership vision gaining dominance over the outcomes of complex policy-making:

I think there is not enough room inside the process for fulsome debate and I think there is too much of, the government often says to DFAT to give us some views on how this might affect us, but my impression is that they only hear what they want to hear in terms of the voices that are coming back. They marginalise voices, which don’t say the things they want to hear. Even inside their own organisations. (Author interview Adams, 2007)

Howard’s own vision defied many predicted interpretations of what a sound vision of foreign policy equated to and whatever if any theoretical insight Howard used to decipher foreign policy. Patrikeeff elaborated on resolving the possible connections between Howard as an individual defining his Prime Ministerial job role and the connection to linking other types of variables to outcomes. Individuality overwhelmingly created the vision in describing Howard’s whole of government approach tactics to strategies governing and individual led foreign policy-making:

But what I’d say is that it would be interesting to actually weigh them against one another [Rosenau’s 1966 process making variables] in the context of what I would see as the Howard-led initiative. That then took us into Afghanistan, took us into Iraq, has led us down a very lonely road in terms of our foreign policy, has exposed an absence of a Middle East policy on behalf of Australia. Because every time there is something actually to do with the Middle East that emerges, there is good reason for that. We just don’t have a Middle East policy. So you know, that really does go back to the issue of what proportions and they would be very different I think for Howard compared with
the Bush and the Blair approaches. Blair I find much harder to read, much harder to read than Bush, much easier, Howard the easiest of all. We seem to be tied to the George Bush ship which is sinking at a rate of knots. (Author interview Patrikeeff, 2007)

Patrikeeff argued that Howard’s strength of vision to get the job done professionally was proven by the behaviour of others seeing that he was clearly in control of policy decision-making about 9/11:

From everything I’ve heard Howard did all his own speech writing and you get the feeling he still does a lot of it. The direction, the political direction and the political outlook is very much Howard’s. I don’t see too much of the people who have worked at his side. (Author interview Patrikeeff, 2007)

After Bali, Howard consulted widely, including getting advice from experts in the International Crisis Group, to build Australia’s protective measures. But this had no significance or effect on Howard’s vision, which continued to emanate from his basic worldview:

Yeah, we are telling them. I just spent four days in Canberra, with about 60 analysts at roundtables at DAO, ONA, AUS AID, with our Asia Program Director, DFAT. I met with Peter Varghese Head of ONA. I met with the Dep. Sec. of AUS AID, met with Downer’s advisors, talking again predominantly about Asia and we tell them a lot of things. We tell them what our research tells us about Jemaah Islamiah and the nature of the threat. (Author interview Grono, 2007)

Grono presented the situation Australia faced and Howard’s continuing view of the world following the terrorism in Bali:

Well, it’s difficult. You know it’s always difficult. I mean you can have anecdotal output. That everyone regards our work on Jemaah Islamiah as cutting edge and better than anything anyone is doing, including any of the agencies or any of the governments. So you know so that’s very direct anecdotal output. You can have a little look at cause and effect. You know we know that stuff we are saying is being listened to. I did I an op-ed on Afghanistan earlier this year calling for the need to deal with
Pakistan more effectively, because of the threat Pakistan poses to Australian troops, the need to increase our commitment. Soon after there was an increase in commitment and I am fairly certain there was absolutely no relationship between the two. But there was a focus and there was a public focus on making it clear that the Australian Government had communicated with Pakistan about concerns there. So that’s just part of the normal discourse. But I know on our South-East Asia stuff there is a great deal of interest. (Author interview Grono, 2007)

Policy advice contributed to Howard’s problem solving technique, but a think tank works differently from a government:

Well we focus on the latter side of things predominantly. I mean we are not that interested in Australian troops in Iraq. (Author interview Grono, 2007)

The process of problem-solving is complex:

Well, it’s difficult. You know it’s always difficult. I mean you can have anecdotal output. That everyone regards our work on Jemaah Islamiah as cutting edge and better than anything anyone is doing, including any of the agencies or any of the governments. So you know so that’s very direct anecdotal output. You can have a little look at cause and effect. You know we know that stuff we are saying is being listened to. I did an Op-Ed on Afghanistan earlier this year calling for the need to deal with Pakistan more effectively, because of the threat Pakistan poses to Australian troops, the need to increase our commitment. Soon after there was an increase in commitment and I am fairly certain there was absolutely no relationship between the two. But there was a focus and there was a public focus on making it clear that the Australian Government had communicated with Pakistan about concerns there. So that’s just part of the normal discourse. But I know on our South-East Asia stuff there is a great deal of interest. (Author interview Grono, 2007)

And this involved the need to express Australia’s strategic and security following the Bali terrorism. The situation reinforced the Howard Government’s resolve to protect Australia in other ways, including greater consultation with partners. It led to the reinforcing of international relations post 9/11:
I mean, the US did refocus. The US suddenly refocused on Asian extremists, Islamists, terrorism, all fundamentalism all around the world. But I think it was much more willing to take a backseat to Australia on South-East Asia. They increase their engagement. I mean the US takes a much more predominantly military approach towards all of this. So their response was to send in troops to train the Philippines. But they did not do that in Indonesia. And Australia took a much more, I think, sophisticated approach of working with their police, improving their capacities, improving their criminal forensic capacities to deal with Jemaah Islamiah as a criminal threat with very strong resolves. (Author interview Grono, 2007)

This was a new approach that followed Bali, after the event. This revealed that Howard’s response demonstrated vision and improved communication: the principles of foreign policy behind the response became clearer in the goals he set:

I think both US and Australia see Islamist fundamentalism as a very strong threat. And both are responding. I think Australia’s responses have been more nuanced and sophisticated in the region. (Author interview Grono, 2007)

4.8 Howard’s views after 2003

Howard quickly grasped the value of the War on Terror as a political master-narrative. After 2003, The War on Terrorism had grown well beyond September 11 in the context of the developments that flowed from Iraq. Many argued that Iraq bought further radicalisation and bred further terrorists. Howard argued Iraq had a brighter future and the risk of terrorism was a real and present danger even without Iraq. Controversially, he contended that the world had become a safer place when the Allies took the war against terrorism into Iraq. According to the Opposition, including Beazley, the stated reasons for war were spurious. But Howard, as Australia’s chief decision-maker, saw otherwise. From the statements of Howard it emerged that the war was a necessary expedient to protect the world from terrorism in the wake of 9/11, and he stood by his own decision to make the world a safer place as a result. Howard strongly maintained that Iraq was better
off for the incursion and it indeed marked a necessary stage of the ongoing War on Terror.

Howard also conveyed a policy vision using the effect on his emotions and how they impacted on him to describe circumstances including that the horrors of terrorism sadly did destroy innocent people’s lives. Being Prime Minister could be a difficult job he accepted all up. Terrorism weighed heavily on the individual traits of Howard.

The acceleration of events through foreign policy and from the heightened vigilance of fear and threat national security campaign of the fridge-magnet days of December 2002 to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 owed a great deal to Howard acting alone in the role as leader. Following the invasion many people felt that the Iraq War made the world more dangerous a place to live as a result of Howard’s actions in confronting terror. Howard was visiting the UK following the immediate effects of the July 7 2005 multiple home-grown terrorism London bombings. He admitted after that moment that the consequences of setting strategic policy vision not only played on his professionalism but defined his case for making the types of human decisions that openly questioned his success as leader because of vision and communication style.

Lying bed-ridden in a London hospital, an Australian woman, Louise Barry, a victim of the 7 July 2005 bombings, her fractured vertebrae supported by a neck brace, was visited by her Prime Minister, John Howard. She put the question: ‘So what do you think about all this . . . Everyone says it's because of the Iraq War, do you reckon?’ Howard responded: ‘No, I don't, but different people have different views. I don't. I mean they had a go at us, they had a go at other people before Iraq started.’ Howard used this personal exchange about his vision to maximum benefit in an immediate impromptu press conference (this conversation quoted in Shanahan 23 July 2003, p. 1).

Howard remained unambivalent and recalled that having Prime Ministerial vision involved difficulty controlling his emotions while using vision in confronting aspects of life and making necessary policy judgements:
No. I was in London two weeks later when the abortive, the Edgware Road . . . [terrorist incident happened] (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Howard described why he was in the UK when again he directly witnessed the effects of terrorism on London people:

The one where . . . Yeah, I was London two weeks . . . And I was actually talking to Blair when that broke. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Howard as part of his individual role then met the Australian victims of the 2005 first London bombing recovering in hospital including Louise Barry. This touched on emotions and the success of his vision of Australia’s anti-terrorism policy.

Something he refused to accept was that a fault of policy vision in his own anti-terrorism had destroyed their future lives:

Oh yes, I went to see all of our victims that were in hospital. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Howard was deeply moved by meeting the victims but this did not change his policy position:

No they were quite right. I mean I went to see both of them. But one . . . (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Howard describes a confrontation with Louise Barry of how he accepted her profound sense of injustice but that had not affected or changed his vision on foreign policy:

There were two of them. And there was a woman who had lost her legs and she was getting married. And she kept . . . you know . . . she got married and that was lovely. And they there was another one who had been badly hurt but - but sort of recovering. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

A tough question was asked by Louise Barry about invading Iraq. At the bedside when Howard was asked if his policy had made the world a more dangerous place. Howard

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acknowledged that despite these horrific circumstances it was Louise Barry’s right to confront and question his decisions in front of the media but that it did not overwhelmingly change the policy vision:

Well that you know that was her perfect right to do that but she . . . (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Howard accepted the right to use an alternative political vision that would largely confront but not deny his own well-held views:

Yeah. One of them contributed to a Get Up advertisement in the last election campaign.
(Author interview Howard, 2010)

After visiting Louise Barry in the hospital lobby Howard (quoted in Coorey 21 July 2005, p. 6) gave the journalists gathered there his considered definition of terrorism: ‘(Terrorism) is a perverted, twisted and totally immoral depiction of extreme Islam. I don't think it is event-specific.’ Howard admitted that despite setting policy vision in difficult circumstances the responsibilities play out on the leader’s emotions:

Oh look, they do. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Howard always confidently admonished his own decisions were better and they were proving his own political style. He had already decided to support the US from that day during 9/11 that had created his lasting response in continuum through Afghanistan, the Bali bombing and then Iraq War. He understood that his role in the post-September 11 world was at the intersection of three significant and separate roles he played: leading the Australian State, managing the alliance with Britain and the United States, and formulating a view of the foreign terrorism stalking the world.

Howard in the War on Terror had practically throughout earlier decisions committed to and driven his foreign policy to an unchangeable position. Howard maintained that it was the first responsibility of any head of government to protect their own country from attack (Howard 2010, p. 426). The need for increased national security against terrorism and supporting the fundamentals of the US alliance were inseparable
practicalities of the policy vision and undergoing constant communication and reinforcement in the public domain. While terrorism did not dwindle, the policy success became clearer and more than often routine. Howard’s own reiteration ostensibly of 9/11 condenses his vision for changing policy. 9/11 changed the world we live in including Iraq and gave him opportunity and reason. And this was not a popular view of Howard’s when taken together mixed with Iraq following the catastrophic invasion. But Howard’s logic of vision followed suit. Howard’s vision on Iraq was not an interchangeable position given 9/11. For Howard 9/11:

[Pause] . . . allowed me to witness the impact on it on . . . [Pause] . . . on the American country and on the nation. And the impact of it on Americans and that certainly heavily conditioned my response. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Howard made up his mind on the spot and this influence was being directed for the future:

Well I said while I was still in Washington that we would assist the Americans in retaliating against those responsible for the attack. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Howard’s trait was once he had communicated his position it meant he would not likely rescind or reflect on his word:

But look it is well-known that I was having a news conference and I really don’t want to discuss that. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

On using the media as a form of communication of his vision did not worry Howard:

The media in relation to 9/11 was cooperative and sensible. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

The conclusion of the lesson was obvious in imposing on Howard’s decision-making senses and setting the longer policy responses:

As far as 9/11 was concerned the decision was taken. It happened. I pretty quickly worked out that it was a life changing event. (Author interview Howard, 2010)
Howard stood by the political lessons he knew to convey the vision on other aspects of policy and to develop his apparent confident approach to problem-solving:

Common sense and mind you also have the benefit of hindsight. People obviously argued in the 1930s that appeasement was worth trying. They didn’t want the world to revisit the horrors of World War I. And I can understand that if you were a European or an Australian, because we had been a part of it. I can understand all of that. But the history lesson was you do need to take a stand. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Despite controversy, Howard acted to support Iraq and the removal of Hussein and this is communicated simply. Following 9/11 Howard believed that if Iraq did not respond satisfactorily to international pressure over its weapons of mass destruction capacity, the United States would have acted alone (Howard 2010, p. 427). Iraq’s WMD was Howard’s dilemma of vision. Howard’s thinking was that having experienced 9/11, who could blame US for thinking the next time a hijacked plane headed for a building it could contain WMD. Many Iraqis also wanted democracy (Howard 2010, p. 459).

The use of threat is essential to understanding the personal trials and tribulations in Iraq and Australia doing the right thing in backing US. Military operation against Hussein was Howard’s most controversial foreign affairs action and Howard was forced to publicly admonish his behaviour as a result. Public opinion weighed against the Iraq War. Australia would not be dictated to by terrorists and bin Laden’s example.

Australia’s allies and the Western world was an exemplar, a force against terrorism. US support in Afghanistan and Iraq was more than signalling the alliance of an expression. It was determination for a part to participate in a response to the terrorist threat. A variety of reasons made Iraq right. 9/11 was now an example to Iraq. US vulnerability and the depth of attack, promoted a first responsibility of any national head to protect from attack. Howard viewed it if Iraq didn’t respond satisfactorily to international pressure over WMD capacity, the US would act (Howard 2010, p. 427).
Howard responded to the immediacy of the Iraq War being on the agenda since 9/11 and especially from 2002 (Howard 201, p. 426). At this time the media were also very active speculating on forthcoming military action (Howard 2010, p. 426). Many Australians only heard of war arguments at 2003’s beginning. The special forces of the military were readied for Iraq well ahead of time. Howard’s personal commitment was a clear driving force to Americans, unconditionally supported by NSC and Cabinet (Howard 2010, p. 442). The button fell on Iraq with a coalition of international forces in place. The initial military offensive was quick and effective. Public opinion changed favourably. Bush was immensely grateful for the support of Howard in person. For thanks Howard visited Bush in Texas adding a personal dimension to an already close edged relationship. The free trade agreement was secured. Iraq was not perceived an impediment to Bush or Blair’s surprise in congratulatory calls at Howard’s 2004 last election victory.

Howard’s personal commitment was to give clear support to America and this was unconditionally supported by the NSC and then the entire Cabinet (Howard 2010, p. 442). This was a clear admission of Howard’s vision for foreign policy that he alone created and ran with politically on both 9/11 and the Iraq War.

4.9 Views of peers after 2003

In the longer-term says Downer summarised the extent to which the war against terrorism moved Australia into the Afghanistan War and then followed into the Iraq War and was of no direct bearing on the results on changing the ending of Howard’s government. Downer gave indications of the type of policy vision which mattered. The government could remain consistent with its over vision because Australians cared little because they do not care so much about their government’s foreign policy vision. They care about other political things:

[Downer Thinking] people had no interest in it largely in general. (Author interview Downer, 2010)
The case for response required no further justifications in settling the consequences of an unintended longer war against terrorism, when the war flared badly with voters after the Iraq invasion:

National Security issues. I mean issues coming depending on circumstances. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

By 2007 Downer maintained that the average Australian simply lost their interest in Howard’s government and turned to something new with its vote. It was not the case of Howard being outsmarted or proven to be incorrect. Issues resulting from the War on Terror largely did not matter in his opinion which avoided all of the decision-making controversy:

There was nothing that happened in . . . Nothing much that happened in 2007 that was likely to engage the public’s mind on that particular issue. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

Through the vision Australia, in the long run, was drawn closer to UK:

But you know the struggle against terrorism or whatever you call it drew us much closer to Britain, much closer to Britain. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

Downer says Howard had done Australia a greater favour with foreign policy:

You could make an out of left-field argument that it has been enormously beneficial to Australia. Because Australia’s response was loyal to its allies and traditional friends and robust and activist and unhesitatingly so. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

Downer appreciated that 24/7 media existed long before 9/11 and had a role in Howard’s constant communication skills but that it did not change the dynamic:

It’s a technological question. A political question unrelated to 9/11. (Author interview Downer, 2010)
Williams saw 9/11 and the dynamics of the continuing war against terrorism as justification for Howard's strong and decisive vision, with direct consequences for Australian law-making and politics:

Yeah, I think we are going to live with the threat of terrorism for decades. (Author interview Williams, 2008)

It was not just Howard but the issue of anti-terrorism that involved all the professions in the bigger world of politics, especially the lawyers:

I don’t think it’s affected my role but I think it has affected the profession. The legal profession institutions have I think seen anti-terrorism legislation as a threat and have become more focused on human rights issues than they previously were. (Author interview Williams, 2008)

As far as Williams was concerned the proof that Howard’s vision for Australia needed no modification was that it succeeded:

I can’t think of any specific particular issue that ought to change our international outlook. But the emphasis that has been given to the Free Trade Agreements is important, given you know the European Union and what’s involved in that. And the possibility of those sorts of things occurring in the Americas. The support for APEC and the promotion of the Free Trade Agreements ought to be continued. (Author interview Williams, 2008)

And Williams was confident that US relations should continue to be high in Howard’s vision for Australia:

Given Australia’s size and standing I think the current attitude is appropriate. (Author interview Williams, 2008)

4.10 Views of observers after 2003
Those outside the inner sanctum did not always see Howard’s militantly pro-US stance as out of step with international developments. Howard’s vision since 9/11 was following firmly in the same direction as that of its major allies in the US and UK:

From a British perspective I think the mistake that people make as well as in sort of government departments is that they really believe that Tony Blair was Bush’s poodle [sic] and that Bush says that ‘We go to Iraq!’ and Blair says, ‘All right!’.

Whereas when Blair went to Camp David to speak to Bush he already thought that Iraq, that is, the operation into Iraq, was a good idea. You know he was all for it. The attitude was two minds meeting as it were. (Author interview Edwards, 2006)

Throughout the world many different relationships among leaders co-exist at various levels including the elite:

- There are close high level relations between the Prime Minister and the President.
- There is an influence because of the same direction. Often views coincide – providing a directional lead. That is shared vision. (Author interview Sturgeon, 2006)

Dupont argued that what happened afterwards Howard’s changes still add up to explain a continuity of foreign policy as a result of what happened on 9/11. This view centres on the problem of the recycling of terrorism and successful responses to developing threats:

Yeah. I would take the view that the world didn’t begin after 9/11. Okay so terrorism was already on the security agenda, a bit on the margins, but nevertheless it was on the security agenda. We did have a counter-terrorism policy. We had agencies for counter-terrorism already funded. So all that existed pre-9/11. So I’d certainly believe that the first phase was pre-9/11 and goes right back probably to the late 70s, and even going back to the early 70s, back to Munich. So it’s been a problem for the security community for 30 years before 9/11. Right so I would see that as the first phase of modern terrorism and responses. 9/11 was like a second. If you were charting this it would be this enormous sort of peak on the graph of 9/11 which did fundamentally change, as I said, the way that we thought about terrorism and generated a major response. So that was the second part. That’s from an Australian perspective. The third part was definitely the Bali bombing. Because that brought it home that this was a
problem for us on our doorstep, and because 100 Australians had been killed. And so that was the third part. And I think the fourth phase if I have called it a phase would be this domestic recognition that this is a domestic problem as well as an international problem. (Author interview Dupont, 2010)

Peter Van Onselen emphasised the great extent to which Howard being in charge of his Government’s vision and communication kept the direction of his government constant, right through to its political demise:

Well I will start with the media. Howard’s Office was very much a servant-commander relationship with most of his media. He was the political strategist, and they were there [merely] to facilitate what he wanted to do. Now there were one or two exceptions to that. Nutt [Tony Nutt, Political Advisor to Howard] and Sinodinos [Arthur Sinodinos, Chief of Staff] were the key ones, but the media unit around him the O’Learys and the Luffs and the Mitchells, these guys were very much servants to Howard. They were very good servants, they would carry out tasks and do so very efficiently and very well. But they weren’t strategists, if you like. Howard was the strategist. So was his Chief of Staff Sinodinos. So was his Principal Private Secretary Nutt. They were the strategists.

Now that created problems for Howard, near the end. Because (a), he didn’t have Sinodinos any more because he left a year out, and (b), Nutt was thrust into a position [where] he probably wasn’t as good at as his earlier position. And he was taking on an Opposition Leader in the shape of Rudd who had a different relationship with his media. They were very much there to advise, not just to carry out tasks. So that became a problem for Howard. But that’s how he would use his Office. So in other words when his Office would contact the media and deal with the media, they were very much facilitating a strategy that had come from the top, from Howard and some of his key members. Howard’s Cabinet was very much - or Howard’s approach to the bureaucracy, I think was one of underutilisation of the bureaucracy, and separation from the bureaucracy. I don’t think that he was as well informed directly by the bureaucracy as previous Prime Ministers. I think that he tended to rely on his Prime Ministerial political Office far more. (Author interview Van Onselen, 2008)
From the perspective of an international commentator, Sturgeon, the war on terrorism was linked to anti-terrorism and what had happened in 9/11. There were solid justifications for vision:

The Iraq invasion – war on terror in a sense – was a justification for a strategic priority – a world safer from terrorism. Things shift and change with terrorism [but it will be] an issue with us for some time. It is a generational issue. To prevent terrorism will take some time. (Author interview Sturgeon, 2006)

For Adams, the backdrop to Iraq was part of a longer course involving a series of events that created room for taking account of opposing visions in leadership:

I think Australia was actually quite slow to respond after 9/11, although I guess you could say the Americans were a bit too. But certainly, I go to the States at least once a year for work or for other reasons, and most years since September the 11th I have been there twice a year. And in 2003 you still got a very strong sense of a nation at war – a nation that was conscious of its security, and it was trying - it was playing catch-up, but it was trying to respond, and they were speculating down through [the layers of the] government bureaucracy and through everything. You felt that when you are at the airport, you felt it all around you the amount of police and policing, and little things like that were the surface features of a broader phenomenon. I don’t think Australia responded in anything like the same sort of way. And, it was probably not until Bali or after, that Australia even started to really seriously think about it. This might be something that actually comes back and bites us here. And will bite us in our own region, and I think that was a shock and that they have already responded quite late . . . (Author interview Adams, 2007)

As a key observer, Nick Grono saw the reason for the Iraq response from Australia as being very specific in Howard’s vision:

I think that you have to look at the regional context and the international context. In the international context the response has been a very stark demonstration of absolute support for the US objectives and a very important support from the US perspective. So the Iraq War, I mean starting with Afghanistan, starting with the ANZUS declaration, but . . . but most importantly focusing on Iraq. That was, I think, a decision to support
the US. I mean, yes, it is in Australia’s interests to be seen or to be part of the fight against the causes of terrorism and so on. But Iraq was, you know, fairly peripheral in that in many ways. You have to look. So if you look at Australia’s response to the region, South-east Asia, as I said a sophisticated nuanced response. If you look at the blanket of wholehearted support for Iraq – that was because of the perception that Bush needed support and Australia could strengthen its alliance by demonstrating very strong support. (Author interview Grono, 2007)

Yet, even those who broadly understood the argument for the ‘coalition of the willing’ in the Allied invasion of Iraq were conscious of its negative connotations. For example, Grono also saw the war as producing negative consequences for the West. It was accepted generally that the Iraq war carried the seeds of a negative view in the future. And this would be detrimental to the way we saw Howard in years to come:

The only thing about Iraq is the way it’s impacted on perceptions elsewhere of the Western agenda. I mean it gave this very strong push to the views that the West was about crusading, occupation, destruction of Islamist leaders. (Author interview Grono, 2007)

At the time of the invasion Grono held a particular take on the reasons that Howard had for war, and this did not include the threat Saddam posed for Australia:

I think that the Australian Government probably went in, I mean, I think the Australian Government went in believing that there were WMD, that Saddam Hussein posed a threat. That it was a sufficient threat for Australia to be supportive of the US because the US was going to definitely go in. So I think all of those things. I think it was an alliance choice. And I don’t think that there was the perception that Saddam was a strong and overwhelming threat to Australia. But that there was enough credibility of the threat that he posed for Australia to go into support the US. And that is essentially the way I see it. (Author interview Grono, 2007)

The academic international specialist, Richard Leaver, was dubious about Howard’s approach to combining the supposed weapons of mass destruction with the more
important task of getting rid of Saddam Hussein as the reason for war. He saw the two events as separate to the vision Howard intended:

[There was an argument.] Get rid of Saddam. I’m talking about regime change in Iraq. He never bought that argument. He was always about weapons of mass destruction in that Iraq thing until all of a sudden, there were none and he sort of started embracing the idea. (Author interview Leaver, 2007)

Leaver saw this as a personal indictment of Howard. Was Howard acting independently of the Parliament and even his own political party? Are we only focusing on Howard’s power or are we looking at the Australian Parliament. Is that an institution that can cope by itself democratically?

[For] Howard, I think, [and] in general terms, Australian governments, just think [how Howard acted] there is no such thing as being too close to the United States. (Author interview Leaver, 2007)

And then Leaver continued to question Howard’s reasoning:

It was certainly popular at the time and he has been able to maximise that popularity over time by keeping Australians involved who were not in the front line. So you know the importance of not having big casualties becomes really important. If we had a hundred casualties like the British, the balance of public opinion would be a lot worse than that it is. But beneath it all I think Howard bore in mind - this is really one-on-one bilateral diplomacy. That is his long suit, and he came to office in 1996 saying that the ANZUS alliance had been neglected. He was going to raise its importance again, and I think that’s probably what he sees he’s done. You know, slightly different circumstances that no one has planned for, but he’s adapted the best he can. (Author interview Leaver, 2007)

Leaver continued to focus on what happened elsewhere as evidence of Australia surrendering to Howard’s vision:

Yes, it’s interesting, it’s an interesting question, and I’m not sure I know the answer. You’ve got to remember after September 11th, you know the French saying, we are all
Americans now. Everyone was aware of the United States cross-party support for at least the Afghanistan leg of the war on terror and UN mandate and so on.

Could the Parliament have coped with that? Probably. They would have obviously fallen apart over the Iraq leg - the war on terror so-called, but would it have led to developments towards a security state. I think inevitably so. I mean, the Labor Party had some misgivings about the kinds of legislation that Howard brought to it in the name of the war on terror. (Author interview Leaver, 2007)

Leaver looked at further alternatives once Howard had constructed this anti-terrorist vision:

You could have argued, and I suppose people did argue, that the appropriate response to September 11th, was not so much military action as policing action, and I am a bit sympathetic to that point of view. Yeah and that the metaphor of war is a bit misplaced and you are really talking about police, if you are talking about domestic surveillance. Nonetheless in the movement towards a kind of security state, yeah, heightened security. Howard pushed it a bit further than the Parliament would have taken it, I think, but not too much. (Author interview Leaver, 2007)

Despite 9/11 producing the War on Terror and that being often linked to getting rid of Saddam Hussein, they were clearly differently argued reasons going around at that time. Leaver wants to keep them separate:

However it is clearly in terms of the history of modern terrorism, these have been the signal events, I think no problem with that, I suppose that you leave out Iraq which I never thought fitted in the war on terror. I still don’t. (Author interview Leaver, 2007)

And Leaver could not see a positive connection between the war on terrorism and Iraq but then watched on as this argument was developed and won by Howard. In short it helped rationalise the whole War on Terror argument by presuming to be associated with it:
And Iraq in my view was never a part of the war on terror but it has slowly become a part of it. At least in part. (Author interview Leaver, 2007)

Felix Patrikeeff’s academic understanding of international relations and the reasons for the 2003 invasion led him to worry about the situation of Iraq and Howard’s vision for its overthrow:

From everything I’ve heard and understood Middle East policy is non-existent here [in Australia], which is one of the reasons why we have never had an independent position on any of the Middle East issues in terms of the current Bush government. And that’s a worry because it means that first of all, who is feeding us with the forms of understanding of what the situation in the Middle East is? And secondly, how do we create an independent outlook and an independent foreign policy on the basis of those uncertain foundations? It’s a very difficult point but we certainly are very much tied to American policies. (Author interview Patrikeeff, 2007)

From a British perspective, Charlie Edwards (2006) viewed the failing Middle East negotiations for a regional peaceful solution as colliding with the realities of the Iraq War after 2003:

Yes, I think Iraq was [important], for a number of reasons: one, it brought instability to the Middle East and the US as well as to Europe, and a number of other counties had been working hard to try and reach a situation – I guess the period of normalisation between Israel and Palestine and the wider region. It was brought on because Iraq, I think, was seen as being a haven to terrorists, which is actually true, given that the Kurdish terrorists were up in the north, actually in that region of Turkey. (Author interview Edwards, 2006)

For Edwards (2007), Iraq was a difficult war to manage, in that it put other ongoing relationships at risk:

Well, given what we have sort of said already about how the UK is really positioning itself certainly on issues like the war on terror, certainly on its withdrawal from Basra from Southern Iraq, I think the relationship [including Iraq] is strained. (Author interview Edwards, 2007)
According to Edwards, because of its ongoing complexity Iraq tarnished the reputation of Howard’s control over the bigger picture of anti-terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11:

I think only two things. First, one of Howard’s policies which clearly hasn’t worked is to try to create this united front with the US and the UK in the face or in response to the challenges of terrorism. I quite understand why he has done that. (Author interview Edwards, 2007)

Edwards argued that by his own actions Howard had created a strong narrative for offering ongoing commitment to the United States, despite the opposition growing to Iraq, including his pledge of full support to Bush following 9/11:

Yep. But it’s an empty response in the sense that whereas the UK and the US really do face terrorist attacks, as far as I’m aware and you know from what I heard when I was in Australia is that actually the threat of terrorism was really quite low on the Australian mainland. Now that wasn’t to say that in Bali or destinations where Australians may travel to, there wasn’t a threat. But it was interesting that Howard has created this coalition or this vision whereby you know he wants to stand shoulder to shoulder and in doing so he is reflecting policies that apply in the UK and the US, i.e. counter-terrorism legislation, that actually I don’t think are particularly relevant. So in fact I think it’s making the Australian people worse off. Because I don’t think there is a need or a necessity to do as much as perhaps he points out. (Author interview Edwards, 2007)

For Grono, as a political observer, there were particular reasons that caused further divisions and controversy in fighting counter terrorism after 9/11, but governments in their actions failed to weigh in equally. This was a pitch for further political acumen and policy given Howard’s strong control over proceedings:

Well, to me, September 11 is a significant demonstration of the consequences of a failure of international policy in dealing with particularly failed or failing States. It wasn’t as though Islamic extremism – Islamic fundamentalism – came as a great surprise to Australia. I had been involved very closely in the preparations for the
Sydney Olympic Games, where we were acutely conscious of al-Qaeda and the threat of terrorism. We did exercises, predicated on terrorist attacks. So it wasn’t as though this all existed in a vacuum. But what September 11 changed, I think, is the awareness of the potential serious consequences of this terrorism. I mean that there were not lines crossed, but it was just before then. Terrorism on a mass scale was perhaps the subject of speculation and movies rather than a very strong realisation of the fact that it was real. And then a lot of things flowed from that. (Author interview Grono, 2007)

9/11 instigated conflict and a lasting strong sociological and cultural response in the public mind, according to Adams which deserved more critical thought for making an alternate vision to Howard’s:

Foreign policy, you know, it’s certainly, you know, Afghanistan, and Iraq were the real focus in that period and it was a foreign policy crisis. But those are essentially beyond that, really as I said, we have got a token presence. But I don’t think they affect Australians lives, I don’t think they are issues that most Australians think about. Whereas, I think the stuff about the enemy within has been sustained over a much longer period and really, does drive people’s day to day lives, you know, and I think in some ways has far greater implications for Australian society . . . This kind of turning inwards on ourselves. (Author interview Adams, 2007)

So we’re talking about instruments and values in terms of the instruments and values of Australia’s foreign policy that have changed relatively very little even if the actual goals have. So foreign policy embraces the goals that the nation’s officials seek to attain abroad. Have these changed demonstrably? If so what has changed those goals? Adams thought, for reasons such as fear, that the world we live in had definitely had been changed as a result of 9/11. He uses the metaphor of ‘changing gears’ to illustrate his point:

The world has definitely changed since September the 11th, you know, and there is no doubt that has changed the way that America responds to foreign policy, and the way Australia responds, but it is not like everything has changed. And, I think that we do live in this increasing climate of fear.
You see the world has changed after 9/11. But it’s not like it is fundamentally changed. As American foreign policy kind of of changed gears rather than being substantially overhauled, and I think the only thing that changed from Australia’s point of view was kind of a heightened engagement and America’s kind of heightened engagement with the world but, you know, in some ways, in America there is this kind of fluctuation in its history between a kind of isolationist and interventionist foreign policy that goes right back to the debate in America in the 1790s about what kind of republic America wanted to be and what its position should be in the world. In some ways, it is really just an extension of that. (Author interview Adams, 2007)

Adams observed that 9/11 also created a set of circumstances that exacerbated existing tensions in foreign policy and produced further dilemmas than those faced by Government. Yet Howard’s was a simple message, conveyed in communication that worked well in the electorate and was therefore successful.

According to Patrikeeff the complexity of 9/11 exerted its own set of influences on Australia’s foreign policy which flowed on to its regional outlook. This compared to Howard’s actual control of the message:

Has it affected us? Yes, it has affected us deeply because again to go back to our place in the region, it is far more imperious. I suppose even before 9/11 the Howard government, for example in dealing with the South Pacific countries, was imperious and it was sort of a neo-colonial relationship anyway, in that we are the big power and you have to listen to us. That hasn’t changed, that’s stayed, but now with added force. The added oomph of that whole ‘Coalition of the Willing’ – the whole affront against an entire region and affront against an entire religion. You know, add all of that to the overall picture, and you don’t get a nice one. So it has impacted considerably, I think. (Author interview Patrikeeff, 2007)

For Patrikeeff, 9/11 introduced new responses and new directions to the landscape of foreign policy in which Australia was very much involved. Howard was the key agent in steering Australia along this direction by making the changes:
And as a result of that the very different topography that we now come across as a result of the very different indeed aggressive foreign policy resulting from that. (Author interview Patrikeeff, 2007)

Howard showed strong opportunism in his responsibility of commitment. Australia has used the implications of September 11, argues Dupont, in its bid to increase its influence as a world power:

But if you were going to benchmark Australia against other countries, I think arguably we have done better than the lot. I think we have done better than the Americans have. They have been too much focused on kinetic solutions in the first five years. You know, that is killing the bad guys. We could do more than that - I think Australia understood that earlier on and had a more integrated approach. But I think the Brits are better. (Author interview Dupont, 2010)

For Dupont, operating as an outsider observer and foreign policy analyst, the effects of 9/11 on opportunism would be long-lasting, from a US point of view:

I think it will be long-lasting. It’s going to affect US foreign policy and strategic policy for at least another decade. I can’t see beyond that. I mean I can’t tell you. But I am pretty confident that we can sit down in 2020 and we would still be talking about this. So when you say enduring that’s as far as I can see. I suspect it’s always going to be an issue beyond ten years because just the nature of the international society. You know you’re always going to have radicalised, disempowered and disenchanted groups of people wanting to change the system or challenge the system in some way. And at the moment it’s called terrorism. Before that it was called communism. I suppose, you know, there are ideologies that form around people who are alienated. Whether it’s going to be terrorism or some other ism I don’t know. And so I think for the next decade or so this is still going to be high priority for the US because it’s a global power. For Australia it may fall in the priorities if the perception grows in Australia that we don’t really have a big problem in our own neighbourhood any more, and we have kind of solved it. Yes it is a global problem for us but it’s further down the list. (Author interview Dupont, 2010)
Understanding the reasons for terrorism was a problem, as for Howard the world had changed as a result of 9/11. The direct reason for policy responses was clouded by the levels of response to terrorist actions that might take place. And if the response made things worse as a result, then defeating terrorism implied a complex multi-level problem in the way it was defined and needed to be defeated in the world, according to Dupont:

Yes. If you’re going to do a more forensic examination of the whole issue of terrorism and what it means, and how you define it and what are the components. Personally, I think you need to separate out the WMD issue, because terrorism can be anything, as you know, from kidnapping a few people, shooting a few people, blowing up a building and right through to the catastrophic scenario. But the truly catastrophic scenario is the nuclear weapon being detonated in New York City. Not just because of the number of people who would be killed and the impact and the initial impact on the global financial systems and geopolitics, but because it would trigger a US response that could well lead to a major conflagration. So there are two aspects. One is the actual catalyst of the terrorist nuclear attack but in many ways the US response could be the bigger problem. So I would separate that out as being right at the top of the list of things that I would worry about. (Author interview Dupont, 2010)

And furthermore terrorism was a real world problem and attempting to understand it was difficult for any one leader to determine:

Let’s understand we’re dealing with the real world here. I mean, I can put on a sort of detached academic hat and make some criticisms of the response and say perhaps it was over the top and perhaps they apply the prism of the global war and GWOT, that horrible term. But the GWOT prism went over everything and it and what can we say and unfortunately tended to stove pipe US thinking on security. You know everything was funnelled through this GWOT lens if you like. So I can think that is a valid criticism. On the other hand if you look at the politics of this you can’t divorce domestic politics. Bush was under enormous pressure domestically to be seen to be doing something. So he had to come up with a narrative that would justify a major response to be seen to be doing something when many Americans saw this as an attack on the heartland, on the homeland. You know many Americans still have a lot of difficulty understanding the actual emotion this generated. So I don’t think any
politician, or US President, probably would have done much different to what George W. Bush did. What you would hope would have happened, is that over time you would develop a slightly more sophisticated approach to this, but it was a learning experience for everybody. Now we are all very knowledgeable when we talk about radicalisation and counter-radicalisation and all the sorts of things addressing root causes, but it’s taken us almost a decade to start to get our strategies right. You cannot reasonably have expected Bush to have got that right in the first few months, you know. It’s an evolving thing. (Author interview Dupont, 2010)

9/11 had produced an indelible effect on foreign government responses which will endure. Edwards (2007) saw that, post-9/11, as terrorism changes, governments will take on further more intensive actions to solve what they see as the crises:

[Post 9/11 effect] But it is unquestionable that we are in a different normality to the one we were in. I really don’t see how you could argue that it just waxes and wanes. I mean here in Britain counter terrorism is now actually part of our policy production strategies. You know I mean it’s had a massive impact in all areas. Just look at how risk-adverse people are on our expert scene. (Author interview Edwards, 2007)

Dupont thinks the difference between Australia’s vision and that of the United States was striking:

First of all, there have been two quite fundamentally different responses institutionally – between ourselves and the US. The US, as you well know, set up this massive Department of Homeland Security. So they took it out of the jurisdiction of other agencies and put it in one single monolithic agency that was to coordinate all their architecture. So they did all of that. We explicitly rejected all of that. You have read the Smith Report on that. So we took the other view which was, there’s nothing wrong with the existing national security infrastructure, we just need to resource that better and make it work more effectively. And I think our approach personally has been better in terms of outcomes and value for dollar, and how you want to measure it, than the Americans have been. I think it’s been a superior institutional response. So that’s in terms of structures. Then I think the other point I have made a few times is about the balance between the instruments of policy. So the first thing is that we got the balance right with all of the different agencies which have part ownership of the problem. Have
we weighted them correctly? Have we resourced them properly? Are they working effectively together? And the answer is yes, I think that we have done that reasonably well. But there is obviously still a lot of areas that we can improve on. Then there’s the strategy. And this is where I’m probably a bit more critical. (Author interview Dupont, 2010)

Dupont offers one important caveat that followed Howard’s efforts to defeat terrorism and protect Australia by redefining the needs of foreign policy:

Comparatively with the US I think I can make the same criticism of both countries. I think the strategy still needs a lot of work. So we’ve gone from the sort of kinetic approach to kill the bad guys. (Author interview Dupont, 2010)

From the perspective of his everyday work Dupont saw the full-scale changes that September 11 exerted on Howard’s vision and that of his successors:

So I am reasonably confident there will be unfortunately enough terrorist incidents in the future to keep it fairly high on the agenda, even if they are not involving Australians. A terrorist incident, you know, in our neighbourhood has quite an important indirect impact on Australia. It keeps it high profile with a public response, when I’m talking to government ministers. Whatever we think personally about terrorism, and wherever it is on the pecking order, the Australian public is clearly going to see this is one of the, if not the principal security threat, as people are being blown up and kidnapped and nasty things are happening. And that’s probably right. (Author interview Dupont, 2010)

Shearer adequately summarised what should be the important conditions of vision and communication as a result of the long war that started against terrorism as a result of 9/11:

The popular term in terminology used to describe George Bush’s statements declaring war on terrorists for 9/11 and through the axis of evil speeches as the war on terror, does not adequately describe the conditions for Australia. The war on terror is not a war but is a longer engagement in the struggle against terrorism. Statements therefore of Prime Minister Howard and Foreign Minister Downer would dispute the question
that this is actually a war. Both have maintained that the war on terror is in actual fact a long conflict. (Author interview Shearer, 2007)

From an outside observer of the Australian international perspective, Howells saw the possibility of further world terrorism following 9/11 posing a longer-term threat as it is forever going to be changing government outlook further – if and when it intensifies:

I am one of those people who said well we will have to wait and see, it’s not going to be easy and it’s going to be a very long haul. I think terrorism has and will continue to take a whole range of forms and it will manifest itself right across the globe and some of the worst instances have occurred down in east Africa, Argentina, Istanbul, Bali, it’s about as wide spread as it possibly can get in Moscow, Chechen. Islam terrorism – it’s a very wide spread phenomenon and its one that seen a resurgence, it’s not new but it’s certainly has a new and added impact because of its world-wide nature. (Author interview Howells, 2006)

4.11 Conclusion: Enunciating a vision; communicating it

Howard’s vision and public communication evolved dramatically within the overall matrix of elements making up his political style. His long record in politics demonstrates his patterns of achievement that can be explained by both his vision and the quality of his public communication. Having developed these political skills, so vital to success in government, Howard consolidated his overall potential to become a successful leader. Howard had a vision for himself and others informed by policy. From the time of his election to the Prime Ministership, and increasingly after 2001, Howard’s exercise of power had the effect of sharpening his capacity for both vision and public communication. Both individuality and power over authority combined to make Howard’s vision a political force. Individuality and authority and power also combined to complete what was needed for strong policy vision. Howard was not always popular and was often controversial in vision terms. Howard believed he made few mistakes when it came to both vision and public communication. He developed and modernised the way Australian national politics was communicated in setting out his vision and communicating very personally his message to win voters’ support. Howard’s views
defined by the orthodoxies of Liberal power, combined with an individual pursuit of doctrine to demonstrate how to succeed with a range of policies, changing the old into the new, using his views and lessons from the past to entice voters. Policy vision was kept to a simple focused message. Howard’s personality traits of sound judgement and knowledge underpinned his various attitudes to domestic policy and bolstered people’s confidence in his foreign policy and in his ability to get results and get the job done. Howard impressed others. He accomplished his policy vision based on hard work, while his type of response to public communication defined his career as a successful leader. Through success and failure Howard learned to broaden these skills with communication attracting support from his ideas. He was relentless in his pursuit to develop his political skills, plus the images and ideas necessary to outflank opponents with his own political vision.

As time went by the professional development of Howard proved a remarkable gift to politics and underlined his intense desire to continue to represent Australian people. Howard was fortunate in developing his communication skills. From 9/11 he was in the position to change foreign policy, articulating his own policy with demonstrable success and in a highly personal style. Howard earnestly believed that Australia was a safer place, given his role in changing Australian foreign policy after 9/11. 9/11 confirmed his leadership skills in both vision and public communication. By example he used both effective vision and good communication to sway voters and achieve results. If posterity would judge key aspects of his vision harshly, especially the invasion of Iraq in 2003, in its day Howard’s obdurate vision, coupled with his improved public communication, worked in his favour.
Chapter 5: Organisational capacity and political skill

5.1 Introduction

This chapter continues the evaluation of the leadership of John Howard by examining the final two leadership skills noted by Greenstein: organisational capacity and political skill. Again, this examination is carried out in the context of Howard’s leadership in the periods before and after 9/11. Following 9/11, Howard argued that the world had changed and that steps must be taken if Australia was to be made a safer place against terrorism. As we shall see, in this context Howard’s capacity to organise governmental structures in the fight against terrorism, and his political skill at mobilising support for his goals, were of great importance. Furthermore, these skills operated in conjunction with those skills and attributes that have already been examined, including Howard’s emotional intelligence, cognitive style, policy vision and public communication skills.

To have strong organisational capacity is to possess a capacity to organise institutions, systems and processes in ways that enable the pursuit of political goals. This can involve the creation of teams, the rewarding of success and the construction of channels of communication that support effective decision-making. To be successful, leaders in government must be able to demonstrate proficiency in creating institutional arrangements that allow them to gather, manage and analyse information and to implement, monitor and evaluate the policies that a leader settles upon. Possessing the ability to establish and maintain an effective advisory team is also central to Greenstein’s notion of organisational capacity. A carefully designed advisory team can empower a political leader in the complex realm of contemporary politics. The problem of executing policy across domestic and foreign policy tests the ability to be successfully organised (Bose 2004, p. 32). It is for these reasons that Greenstein suggests that having organisational capacity ranks as one of the most important skills and attributes for leaders to possess.
Political skill, the final of Greenstein’s suggested requirements for leadership, can be described as the Machiavellian ability to use powers of office assertively, to build and maintaining public support, and to establish one’s reputation among fellow policymakers as a skilled, determined political operator. Political skill is required to translate ideas into policy. More broadly, we might think of political skill as the ability of the leader to work with the parliamentary governing mechanism and other key actors to pass a political agenda (Bose 2006, p. 30). As much as political skill is connected to one’s ability to use formal, sometimes coercive powers associated with a given leadership position, it is also, especially in modern democratic governments, connected to one’s ability to persuade others. As such, political skill may involve the creation of consensus as much as it may involve the suppression of opposition.

5.2 The views of the individual leader before 2001

By 2001 Howard had already been recognised as a successful politician, having led the coalition government to electoral success in 1996 and 1998. Howard’s successes in government stemmed from his promotion of the needs of Australians, particularly as they related to economic policy and security. Such policy was crucial to Australia as it adapted to changing conditions in the world. Howard also sought to continue to represent the Liberal tradition, which tended to focus on economic liberalism and social conservatism (Howard 2010, p. 234). In this success one can see the importance of Howard’s organisational capacity and his political skill. One can also trace the development of these skills back to one of Howard’s first experiences in politics, namely, his election in 1962 as the Young Liberal representative on the state executive of the New South Wales division of the Liberal Party. This involvement in genuine politics formed the beginning of a lifetime spent learning, amongst other things, how to construct and operate successfully within those organisational structures in which a life-long political career must be forged (Howard 2010, p. 30).

One of Howard’s key opportunities to demonstrate his capacity for organisational design came in his earliest years as Prime Minister. Interestingly, one of the key areas
that Howard focused upon was that related to foreign and defence policy. Before 9/11 occurred Howard was already intent upon improving the management of government power in that field. He sought to streamline the operation of decision-making authority putting greater emphasis on his role as an individual leader. To do this, Howard made a number of changes to the organisation of government, particularly as it related security policy. Howard effectively dominated the Cabinet and National Security Committee (NSC) of Cabinet organisation to a much larger extent than had his predecessors. Full Cabinet became Howard’s optional decision tool and decided most trade issues. Howard in the 1996 election campaign chose to broaden the NSC to consider all matters relating to defence, foreign affairs, and intelligence.

Howard moved to take full control over a parliament that in Australia has little say in foreign policy. Parliament gathers information and scrutinises government performance regarding foreign policy through question time and parliamentary committees (Firth 2005, p. 81). Party discipline ensures that Cabinet, rather than parliament, has decision-making power. Foreign policy is controlled by the executive government of Australia; the prime minister and foreign minister make decisions almost single-handedly, without the assistance of parliament. Howard’s own foreign policy power was harnessed through the NSC, which is composed of senior ministers, an armed force commander, one of the intelligence chiefs and optional expert advisors (Firth 2005, p. 80). These changes enhanced the Prime Minister’s authority over every function of leadership. According to Firth (2005, p. 86):

Parliament might inquire and report, but the executive decides. Parliament involves the public in its foreign policy inquiries, governments answer foreign policy questions in Question Time, and the hearings of the Senate Estimates Committee on the operations of DFAT make governments marginally more accountable.

Another important step taken by Howard was the enhancement of the power of the Prime Minister through the expansion of the role played by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PMC). By putting the Prime Minister’s Department in charge of the Executive and Cabinet processes Howard revolutionised his ability as leader to
govern the organisational structures of government from the top down. Howard had given himself full controls as leader of the governmental foreign policy cluster that includes the role of bureaucracy, which has become more politicised since the Menzies government. The federal public service experienced a managerial revolution through which public servants became judged by their performance and the expectations of taskmasters in government. As a result, since Menzies’ time the public service has no longer been neutral. The senior ministerial advisors are appointed for political reasons; they are increasingly influential and rank alongside ministers and departmental secretaries. DFAT, which is usually usurped by ministerial power, came into existence in 1987, incorporating the old Department of Trade and Department of Foreign Affairs (Firth 2005, p. 78).

The structure of the Australian governmental input has evolved due to circumstances, responding to domestic and external challenges. Howard emphasised taking direct control of the means of policymaking. DFAT, which consists of 14 divisions and offices, illustrates the changing influence of economics in Australia’s foreign affairs and is the home base of diplomats and diplomatic missions for Australia (Firth 2005, p. 78). Influential bureaucratic decision-makers include the Prime Minister, Cabinet, and the Departments of Defence, Treasury and Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. The growth of the bureaucracy is partly a result of globalisation. As Jenning (2005, p. 19) has argued, bureaucratic complexity led to a number of problems in terms of the operation of Australia’s security policy, which:

...was the product of powerful bureaucratic departments, each closely guarding their sectional interests. Where issues crossed bureaucratic boundaries, interdepartmental committees would broker often uneasy compromises. The result of this was policies that often paid closer attention to the interests of departments than in producing a seamless response across the whole of government.

In order to effectively manage this increasingly complex structure, Howard strengthened the roles played by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) and the NSC. In addition, the Strategic Policy Coordination Group was responsible for coordination involving DFAT, Defence and the PM&C. The independent research centre Australian Strategic Policy Institute, founded in 2002, has added to the bureaucracy by
increasing the number of policy process inputs outside of the defence force and public service (Firth 2005, p. 80). Howard prevailed over the NSC and Expenditure Review Committee of Cabinet (Budgeting) that influenced Cabinet decisions. Constitutional flexibility allowed Howard as executive leader to take centralised control over the bureaucracy by using a few chief bureaucrats and advisors. As well as enhancing Howard’s control over foreign policy decisions, this also helped to prevent US-like departmental rivalry or turf wars that might have hampered the exercise of power.

Howard’s increasing exploitation of Executive power in 1996 substantially reformed the bureaucracy. Bureaucracy followed leadership design, implementation, control and means. In 1996, Howard was the Head of Cabinet and its committees overseeing foreign policy and consequentially all national security. A 1996 National Commission of Audit recommended streamlining five controlling departments to three. Howard replaced Keating’s foreign policy reliance on Cabinet with himself. Howard understood that Keating’s earlier Cabinet system (1991–96) failed because of its narrow outlook on advisors and the sharpness of their image (Shanahan 2006, p. 34). Howard’s 1996–2003 NSC was a thinned committee structure defined from the cabinet process by smaller groups of ministers who managed particular issues, often accompanied by officials and ministerial advisors (Gyngell & Wesley 2007, p. 94).

Howard’s desire to exercise responsible and effective control of Australia was strengthened by the work of the NSC. Here the professionalism of Howard’s political organisational capacity could be found. Howard himself has argued that the quality of his organisation of the NSC, in particular stating that, in his experience, Australia’s ‘NSC worked better than the comparable arrangement in either the United States or Britain’ (Author interview Howard, 2010). He was particularly critical of the fragmentation of the American system which, he said, ‘didn’t deliver in Washington… [W]e [Australians] always spoke with a single voice on these issues. And I think [the NSC is] a model that others can follow’ (Author interview Howard, 2010).
One of the common themes in Howard’s organisational changes was that he sought to work using a small group of others in the process of decision-making. The rationale behind assisting the Westminster style executive decision-making with an NSC, and Howard’s authority over it, was to make government more focused in its responses to foreign policy challenges. Howard tried to explain his role in the NSC during our interview, he moved very quickly, almost seamlessly, from the ‘field’ to the ‘participant’, from ‘the Prime Minister’ in one sentence to ‘we had everybody there’ in the next:

Yeah, you have a deep thing like that. But the Prime Minister is meant to be front and centre of it. But not, you know, not to the exclusion of others. But that’s where the NSC [National Security Committee of Cabinet] works so well because we had everybody there when all the major decisions were taken and that was very effective.

(Author interview Howard, 2010)

It is clear that Howard never doubted his own capacity for producing successful organisational structures.

5.3 The views of peers before 2001

The organisational capacity and political skill of Howard’s was recognised by colleagues working with him in government. The successful operation of Parliament requires complex organisational capacity. The positive effects produced by the changes that the Howard government made to the foreign and security policy decision-making structures were recognised by Andrew Shearer. Shearer described Australia as having an ‘efficient format in which to conduct foreign policy’, particularly in comparison to the structures employed in other countries (Author interview Shearer, 2007). Shearer described the Australian process in detail:

The framework in which the Prime Minister makes decisions is effective and efficient in the process. The process involves advice travelling upwards from the Secretaries’ Committee and Interdepartmental Heads through to a working level of IDCs making advice on particular issues, then through to the Secretaries Committee on National
Security Meeting, and lastly to the National Security Committee which the PM chairs, to make his decisions. (Author interview Shearer, 2007)

This system allowed Australia to develop a better political framework with regard to foreign policy than that in the US.

As much as the general structure for foreign policy decision-making was, even prior to 9/11, well organised in Australia, the specific parts of that structure that related to anti-terrorism policy remained limited in scope. For example, Daryl Williams noted that the Attorney General’s department prior to 9/11 had only a limited role in implementing national security policy, primarily because that department focused on the domestic elements of national security policy and, prior to 9/11 and the increased focus on terrorism, most national security issues were largely unrelated to domestic affairs (Author interview Williams, 2008). Williams also suggested that the level of direct involvement of the Department of PMC in national security policy was far lower prior to 9/11 than was the case after the attacks. In addition, the internal organisation of that department was also less shaped by national security than would later be the case (Author interview Williams, 2008). In general, Howard’s peers generally believed that his government had been successful in reorganising the upper echelons of decision-making structures as they related to foreign affairs, even prior to 9/11.

At a lower level, institutional structures related to anti-terrorism efforts had also been changed, though this was mainly as a response to the hosting in 2000 of the Sydney Olympics. The hosting of this international event, and the preparations made for that event, were important in the context of later efforts to bolster Australia’s anti-terrorism capabilities. Alexander Downer noted that: ‘we had to make preparations for the Sydney Olympics on a grand scale. But the truth is the Sydney Olympics were a one-off event [and]… I think perhaps it would be fair to say after the Sydney Olympics finished there was a sense of let us wind this down a little bit’ (Author interview Downer, 2010). As such, the Sydney Olympics was identified as being a successful example of the organisational capacity Australia possessed as it related to anti-terrorism
5.4 The views of observers before 2001

Others confirming Australia’s organisational capacity and political skills responded to Howard’s ongoing success at the helm. Shearer related his understanding of the efficiency of the process of Australian foreign policy-making, repeating Howard’s claim about the superiority of the NSC. According to him, Australia was seen as being more effective than the United States in terms of the coordination of its decision-making processes:

The view that Australia’s foreign policy development and its lack of efficiency, spearheaded by the need to develop a better understanding of international relations in policy became an issue. Andrew Shearer says that after the experience serving in Washington US officials and people would come to him and demonstrate that Australia was lucky to have such an efficient format in which to conduct foreign policy. The reasons for this were because Australia is smaller and well-coordinated with quite agile and responsive mechanisms. There is room for improvement and room for issues to be addressed, and things can always get better.

Australia has a better political framework than that the US in coming to terms with decision-making through the National Security Committee of Cabinet, which provides integrated response to the overall decision-making. Such things as bureaucratic rivalry and intelligence wars make countries less secure. In a very real way, Australia is nowadays safer. There is a better-advanced sharing arrangement for intelligence opportunities. These opportunities improved radically in changing to the present organisational structure and decision-making framework. The framework in which the Prime Minister makes decisions is effective and efficient in the process. The process involves advice travelling upwards from the Secretaries’ Committee and Inter-Departmental Heads [SCONES] through to a working level of IDCs [Inter Departmental Committees] giving advice on particular issues, through to the Secretaries’ Committee on National Security Meeting and lastly to the National Security Committee [of Cabinet], which the PM chairs, in making decisions. In order to
see this process it is possible to run an Internet search engine on the National Security Committee [of Cabinet]. (Author interview Shearer, 2007)

Edwards (2007), too, has argued that the NSC constituted a highly effective organisational structure, and suggested that Howard’s organisational capacity was reflected in this structure:

Australia has a better political framework than that in the US in coming to terms with decision-making through the National Security Committee of Cabinet. But it’s not national security, its counter terrorism. It was this constant toing and froing between different bits of the Australian bureaucracy when I was there about what it was and what it did, which clearly shows you that its leadership is going to be limited in that sense. (Author interview Edwards, 2007)

Shearer also argued that Howard had demonstrated his political skill through his building of better international relationships:

Australia on the issue of global and regional change has strengthened these relationships and developed enhanced cooperative networks including security frameworks with countries during the Howard years. This includes putting together better security frameworks and better ties with individual countries. Australia has overall developed better relations, partnerships and closer ties. Australia has strengthened relations with the US. The US alliance is now undeniably stronger. With China, good relationships have been formed. Strong relationships have broadened with Japan and they have started together with India. There are strong and robust hard headed relationships with Indonesia. (Author interview Shearer, 2007)

For Shearer, the creation of these relationships evidenced Howard’s political skill.

A final point worth noting here is that, as was noted by Howard’s peers, the organisational capacity that Howard demonstrated in the foreign policy realm prior to 9/11 did not really translate into the sector of anti-terrorism. The Sydney Olympics remained an isolated case in which anti-terrorism was taken seriously in Australia. However, the focus of Australian security policy under Howard was focused on related
matters, particularly with regard to the potential for instability within the Southeast Asian region. Grono noted this point:

It was a much more defensive Australia. I mean, if you look at the White Paper that came out in 2000 it wasn’t overwhelmingly in defence of Australia. It was pretty much concentric circles. It was very focused on the arc of instability. And that was the kind of framework on which the 2000 White Paper was structured. (Author interview Grono, 2007)

It is interesting, therefore, to see how the organisation of Australia in terms of national security policy operated in the period following 9/11, as this offers insight into Howard’s capacity for organisational design.

5.5 The views of the individual leader after 2001

Having built a strong national security apparatus, Howard faced an immediate challenge following the attacks of 9/11: that apparatus was effectively out of reach as he was in Washington and unable, at least initially, to head home to Australia:

I don’t know that the fact I couldn’t have a NSC [National Security Committee of Cabinet] meeting was in my mind. But I knew that hopefully, I’d be back in Australia soon. But in a situation like that you react in the way you can and with the tools that are available. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Howard’s reference to ‘tools’ here is quite revealing, as he constantly wished during his Prime Ministership to convey the impression to the Australian electorate that he was, above all else, a highly competent ‘manager’, that is, a person who valued the application of techniques of governing above ideology or other considerations. This is the hallmark of a true conservative. Of course he was a deeply ideological Prime Minister, but, like most conservatives, he saw himself as a person who merely operated the machinery of government. The verb ‘drive’ that he had already used in the interview now makes more sense as it conveys this idea of mere technique. ‘Driving’ a government, operating the ‘tools’ of government: these seemingly neutral terms connote purpose,
direction and expertise. Among these tools, the National Security Committee of Cabinet was to prove critical to Howard’s strategy.

Howard declared that he had confidence in himself in the post-9/11 era, confidence enough to state that many could learn from the centralised security policy decision-making structures that Australia had, under Howard, built:

[Other countries] would be well advised to copy us rather than the other way round. And there was a very simple reason for that is that we have all of the major players, both political and bureaucratic, in the same room taking the decisions. And that is why it worked. It gave us a whole of government coherence. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Howard also argued that this overarching structure allowed the different bureaucratic departments to operate effectively:

Well you asked me what how do I think that the Australian bureaucracy changed? Well look I think the Australian bureaucracy responded quite well to 9/11. I think that I was not unhappy with the advice and cooperation I got. In any of these things I found the bureaucracy in my own department, DFAT, Defence, very good. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

However, there is no escaping the confidence that Howard expressed in himself as the central player in the post-9/11 response, thus suggesting his deep belief in the power of his political skill:

Now was I more personally involved? Look, I think, I think probably the fact was that I was. I was in Washington - that meant that I was always going to be very directly involved. Well and you ask, what did I say to motivate Cabinet? Well, I don’t think they needed any motivation. I mean it was a raise hips and lock situation. And the facts spoke for themselves. (Author interview Howard, 2010)
5.6 The views of peers after 2001

If the quality of Howard’s organisational capacity was recognised by others prior to 9/11, how well did those organisations operate in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington? In general, Howard’s peers argued that, whilst those organisational structures continued to operate effectively, 9/11 did provoke some changes. However, those changes that did occur tended to affect the relative importance of terrorism in the context of the general decision-making structures and the level of funding and institutional support for anti-terrorism policy within departmental structures. This confirms the support that existed amongst Howard and his colleagues regarding the basic quality of the key national security structures within government.

One of the first and most obvious impacts of 9/11 on Australian national security policy was that it placed terrorism at the top of the agenda. However, as Alexander Downer explained, this was not to say that the Australian government had been unaware of this problem prior to 9/11:

Before 9/11… it was clearly an issue…And it was often on the agenda of regional and international meetings. You know coming out the USS Cole incident [the ship was attacked by terrorists on 12 October 2000 whilst refuelling in a Yemeni port] and the attack on the American Embassy in Nairobi [7 August 1998] and so on. Various sorts of ad hoc terrorist incidents. And it is true to say that in Southeast Asia we were conscious of but not particularly focused on Jemaah Islamiah. There was the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MLNF). You know the Abu Sayyaf Group and so on. All of these people existed. But I don’t think there was a strong sense that it was going to touch any of us really. This was something that happened in particular in the Middle East. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

Furthermore, Downer claimed that he did not need 9/11 to understand the significance of Islamic fundamentalism:

And were we focused on the causes of it? Well yeah, we probably thought, pretty much if you’d asked me on the 10th of September. On Monday 10th of September 2001,
what I thought the causes of terrorism were I’d probably have to give you the same answer as I would give you today. But we were . . . It wasn’t a . . . It was an issue. It wasn’t a front of the mind issue until 9/11, when obviously it overwhelmingly became a front of the mind issue for the international community. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

Downer went on to describe this shift in priorities in further detail:

[T]he issue of terrorism was on the agenda…at international meetings and so on. But it was not given a great deal of thought, to be honest with you. I mean there were people who worked in that area in the bureaucracies. But the great decision-makers were not thinking much about it. And so we all started thinking, ‘God we ought to do something about this’, we haven’t done enough about it. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

As the 9/11 crisis horrors appeared, the Cabinet conducted some preliminary discussions about possible responses. However, such discussions had to occur without Howard as he remained grounded in Washington. Daryl Williams described those meetings:

I don’t remember there being any confusion. My memory, as I said, was that we had a makeshift Cabinet Meeting the following day. Or if it wasn’t the following day, it was very soon after, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister John Anderson, who had spoken to the Prime Minister. And I think at that point we were looking for advice from, in particular, the security agencies ASIO and the AFP in particular. I don’t remember any significant decisions being taken immediately. The events occurred in the US and it was a major event there. Well, it was a major world event. It seems like New York could be subjected to such an attack, but I don’t remember there being any significant risk to Australia…at that time. (Author interview Williams, 2008)

In this sense, it may be that the global implications of the 9/11 attacks were not immediately apparent to members of the Australian government.
At the same time, however, other elements of the Australian government – in particular, DFAT – did have to respond to the immediate impact of 9/11 on those Australians living and travelling in the United States. Downer explained this point:

I mean the Department instantly responded because there was a consular issue. That is Australians in New York and Washington and may be on the planes and so on who could be affected. So our first response was what about all the Australians who might be affected, directly affected by this. The millions of people or thousands of people who want to ring the Department and find out what’s happened to their nearest and dearest in New York or having breakfast in the World Trade Center at that time. I can’t emphasise to you enough how this was our initial response. Not my God we have got to fight al-Qaeda to the death. How it would be handled was a subsequent issue. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

This highlights that one of the key impacts of 9/11 was on the priority given to the issue of terrorism. It also preludes some of the changes that were to occur within the bureaucracy in Australia.

But 9/11 also affected the overall structure of national security decision-making, though only to a degree. Williams noted that while there was no fundamental change to the structure of government, there were shifts in how terrorism was discussed:

Well, in the Prime Minister’s Department in the bureaucracy the national security became a much more significant issue. And I can’t recall how national security was dealt with in the Prime Minister’s office as distinct from the Department prior to 9/11. But certainly afterwards he had a Senior Advisor very closely involved in liaising with the departments and the agencies…A lot of things in bureaucracy and in Ministers’ offices change slowly. They’re not, necessarily, dramatically changed. But there were quite a few changes in the PM and overseeing the Attorney-General’s Department, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Attorney-General’s Office. (Author interview Williams, 2008)

The key effect of these changes was to increase the capacity of the Prime Minister to manage the security policy process. Key to this process was the NSC.
According to Howard’s peers, in the aftermath of 9/11 the NSC proved its importance and its effectiveness. The NSC introduced, formulated and managed Howard’s policy direction. Williams (Author interview, 2008) saw this outcome in positive terms, arguing that the impact of the NSC ‘has been a positive one. It’s expanded the resources available to the protection of the community from terrorism and it’s brought it into a greater focus.’ He went on to contend that:

[T]he National Security Committee…performed very well because there was input from all the relevant Ministers and from time to time people were co-opted, like the Minister for Finance or the Minister for Immigration. But the National Security Committee [of Cabinet] usually met, not just as Ministers but with for example…the heads of relevant agencies like ASIO, ASIS, AFP, Defence, the Secretary of the Department and CDF. They were regular attendants and so you got a range of views from a range of different agencies on issues, and it functioned well. The Prime Minister was the chair and exercised significant influence in that capacity. But he didn’t operate it as a one-man band. (Author interview Williams, 2008)

Downer confirmed this view of the NSC, arguing that it was very effective in part because it allowed the generation of collective decisions:

For example, when I was in London from time to time I would go to call on the Head of MI5, which is a domestic agency, the equivalent of ASIO, and talk with her about…home-grown terrorism and how they are dealing with it and what structure they have. I knew what we did because I am part of the National Security Committee and…these decisions are all collective decisions. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

This decision-making structure is particularly important, for Downer, because it allows government to take an overarching view of a policy issue and then implement a response coherently across different departments. This latter point was necessary, according to Downer, because of the nature of the bureaucratic institutions through which policy is implemented. Thus, in addressing terrorism after 9/11, Downer notes that:

DFAT obviously was highly energised in so far as the government tells them to be highly energised to do it. They are not a bureaucracy, contrary to popular belief, that is
replete with self-starters. You have to tell them what to do. They are very good at implementing but they are not very good at coming up with ideas. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

The significance of the impact of 9/11 should not be overstated, however. Again, the key shift following 9/11 was the balance of attention paid to different issues and the relative concentration of power and resources granted to different institutional parts. More generally, as Downer explains, there was some consistency in both Australia’s security policy and in the structures that oversaw that policy:

Well I don’t think…that we substantially changed our foreign policy, that is the structure of our policy and the objectives of our policy. We changed the balance of policy. And of course there were specific things that were done. But we didn’t fundamentally change our foreign policy. We didn’t decide to go and establish an alliance with America. Or say, as Le Monde [the French newspaper] famously said, ‘We are all Americans now after 9/11’. We had obviously been close to America. And we are enthusiastic about the Bush administration’s priority that they gave to alliance relationships which of course has been reversed by the Obama Administration. But that was not changed by 9/11. It was, if you like, reinforced by 9/11. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

Over the coming months and years, however, some significant policy choices and events continued to shape Australian security policy. With the Afghanistan War, the War on Terror gathered intensity and escalated the chance of further terrorist attacks. Following 9/11, Australia rapidly committed to joining the United States-led coalition against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Peter Costello highlighted the significance of this decision:

Well I think the most obvious response was Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan, where we still have quite a substantial military engagement. With Special Forces and supporting military units in the aftermath of September the 11th as you, know. The coalition of nations sent forces to Afghanistan to close terror-training camps and bring about the downfall of the Taliban. Which was successful, but that military action is still
going on and the Australian government actually for the first time invoked the ANZUS Alliance in the aftermath of September the 11th . . . (Author interview Costello, 2007)

Beyond Afghanistan, however, two further events impacted on Australian policy; the Bali and London terrorist attacks. Williams remembers Australian planning for a warning received just the day before the Bali bombing went off:

The day before…I had been receiving through the Senior Advisor, advising on National Security, information that there was, what is referred to as chatter on the wires, which suggested to the US security agencies that something was about to happen and they identified it as something to do with resources. And so in consultation with the PM on that Friday night I issued a media statement warning that security agencies believe that something was imminent. And they thought it would be likely to be focused on resources and on that basis suggested that there should be particular vigilance around places like oil refineries. The chatter proved to be only partially correct. Because it was the following morning, early on Saturday morning, that the first Bali bomb went off. (Author interview Williams, 2008)

Downer sought to explain why Bali, even more so than 9/11, brought home to Australians the threat posed by terrorism: ‘[R]emember [terrorism] didn’t touch us in a major way until October 2002, until the Bali bombing occurred’ (Author interview Downer, 2010). For Downer, the effects of Bali were dramatic:

That drew us much closer to Indonesia. It completely reframed the relationship with Indonesia. And in a number of different ways. I mean first of all, something terrible happened to our people in Indonesia and the Indonesians reached out to us. And so we had been doing and having a fair squabble with them over the Timor intervention in 1999. And this is two years later. It’s exactly two years later that this happened. So the relationship of course had cooled down with many elements of Indonesian society. The Bali bombing led Australia to be able to say we have police resources. We have intelligence resources. We have money. These things can all be brought to bear to help you deal with the problem of terrorism. And they said, thanks very much we will accept that offer. So it reframed the relationship with Indonesia – terrorism. And actually I have not really thought of it like that. But you asked a question and I think that’s important to remember. (Author interview Downer, 2010)
The events of 9/11 flowed into the decision-making after the Bali bombing and helped the decision-makers join the security dots. For Costello, the linking of 9/11, Bali, and later the London terror attacks, helped set the framework in which Australian anti-terrorism policy would consequently be set:

While I think, I think, yeah, well in the gap from the Australian Government I think there was general shock and outrage about September the 11th. And I think the most immediate consequence of that was, as I said to you, Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan. And additional measures to secure aeroplanes and airports as you would expect. I think the Bali bombings, shocked us a lot more because they were in our neighbourhood. And they led to additional measures, in particular, regional measures, policing measures, increased capacity against domestic terrorism. And I think the London bombings, yes; I think they did introduce a new concern. The fact that what shocked people about the London bombings was that they were, the people who were responsible were home grown, had been born and many of them born and all of them educated, grown up in London. And I think that brought home the fact that you could have terrorists within your midst, and it need not come in from other countries, but within your midst. (Author interview Costello, 2007)

What we can see, therefore, is that Howard’s peers were largely supportive of the organisations that he had constructed even in the aftermath of 9/11. While recognising that those structures might need to operate somewhat differently in order to better respond to the challenge of global terrorism, the events of 9/11 did not lead to a radical shift in Australian foreign policy structures.

5.7 The views of observers after 2001

The views of observers regarding Howard’s organisational capacity and political skill align closely with those of Howards’ peers. The key features of these views include the recognition of the shocking nature of the 9/11 attacks, the belief that those attacks produced a change in the outlook of Australian foreign policy, the recognition of the
quality of Howard’s organisational capacity in the aftermath of 9/11, and a sense that the Bali bombings reinforced many of the changes that 9/11 had itself encouraged.

The significance of the 9/11 attacks was recognised, though not immediately, by Dupont who acknowledged that ‘many analysts, be they academics or in government, were blindsided by 9/11 and I include myself in that. I was initially sceptical that [September 11] was a game-changing kind of event. And I have come to believe subsequently looking back on it that it has been’ (Author interview Dupont, 2010).

For Grono, too, Howard’s presence in Washington mattered. He noted that ‘it helps to have had a very close experience of it. To see thousands upon thousands of flags that were out the next day. To see the armoured troop carriers on the streets in D. C. the next day, rammed that home in a way that wasn’t apparent in Australia’ (Author interview Grono, 2007). Other observers also noted how big an impact 9/11 had on Howard personally:

[Howard] took the September 11 actions a lot more personally then he would have had he been based in Australia then. To what extent it would have changed his approach - I don’t know that it would have. I think he still has such a view of the US alliance that he would have followed the US in the way that he did anyway. But it certainly intensified his resolve. And it perhaps removes some of the politico element of Howard. The pragmatist, that would know when is the time to cut and run and when isn’t. And perhaps that was gone as a result of having experienced it so personally. He was always going to stick…with the alliance and stick with the US, with subsequent aspects of the war on terror, as they call it. (Author interview Van Onselen, 2008)

This personal impact also translated into a change in Australian foreign policy. As Edwards noted:

It changed the approach…of Australian foreign policy from being quite insular and Asian oriented to being robust and pro-active. I think you can see that in the slight increase in the defence budget. And certainly from the military point of leadership from continental to the manoeuvrable, which is exactly what is happening in the UK and the US as well. (Author interview Edwards, 2006)
Other key shifts in Australian security policy also occurred in the wake of 9/11. As Edwards noted, while the ANZUS alliance remained a cornerstone of Australian foreign policy, ‘9/11] brought about a change in Australia’s military strategy in its procurement of its training and how it used its Special Forces’ (Author interview Edwards, 2006). Another shift involved the need to find a balance between the domestic, regional and global efforts needed to combat terrorism. Here, Edwards suggested that it was ‘striking that… Howard, whether we like him or hate him, is trying to balance this regional and global approach. There are obvious tensions I think between them’ (Author interview Edwards, 2006). One of the key choices that 9/11 raised for Australia, therefore, was:

...whether it should focus on regional stability in the Southeast Asia and South-West Pacific, or whether it should try to start playing out that global role. It clearly is in Afghanistan, and Iraq. It clearly has shown its interventionist qualities in East Timor and the Solomon Islands and elsewhere. (Author interview Edwards, 2006)

Grono, too, focused on the importance of the choices available to Howard following 9/11. Grono (Author interview, 2007) also focused on the issue of Australia’s role in the region: ‘do you spend vast resources on preparing for this particular threat? Or do you spend it on building capacity in the region, or whatever else?’

Crucially, Grono in particular argued that the choices that were made were shaped by debates that had been ongoing in Australia, and the consequences of those choices have been long-lasting:

Well I think there has always been a debate in Australia, and I’ve not been intimately involved. I mean I know Hugh White well. I had lunch with him just last week. And so the kind of classic structure by which this was all put together was defence of Australia in concentric circles. There was a pretty vibrant debate even then with Alan Dupont focussing much more on transnational threats spanning not just terrorism but also crime, people smuggling, drug smuggling etcetera. The response he wanted to add to that was project force outside the immediate region and so on. And that gained a lot more currency post-September 11, but almost squarely based on the extremism,
responding to the extremism debate. If you look at the way we have structured our armed forces and the way we have made decisions since then and the way we have made huge deployments very far from home - very significant deployments in Afghanistan which would not have been on the cards at all back in 2000. You know the structure then was East Timor. It was Papua New Guinea. It was responding to coups in Fiji and was focused on potential threats from the region, Indonesia or elsewhere. It was [post-2001] an ability to project force to Iraq or Afghanistan. So I think there’s been a strong shift in that debate. (Author interview Grono, 2007)

Despite the expectation that most observers had – that is, that the Australian and American relationship would be strengthened in the post-9/11 era regardless of who was in charge in each state – some were keen to note that Howard’s personal political outlook and skills led to that relationship being particularly close:

Where you get the difference on the margins is that Howard is a strong conservative in the true sense of the word. And someone in whom I think you are also seeing personal politics, you know. I suspect the response would have been different if it was a Democratic Administration. The kind of relationship between Howard and Bush is very different from the relationship between Bush and Clinton. As though it’s a kind of like-mindedness there and so that’s fed into Australia’s response and its willingness to stand by Bush every step of the way. And so yeah, that’s a Conservative thing. And then when it comes to party politics, what you see in Australia is very similar to what you’ve seen in the US. There’s the perception that strength in the face of adversity is a political winner. And you saw in that in 2001. And you saw that in 2004. So when it comes to party politics it’s been fed into that and used. I think it’s genuine in the sense of it’s a genuine belief but it’s also been used to portray the Coalition as a strong, you know, national security-minded, focused government. (Author interview Grono, 2007)

Van Onselen, however, suggested that Howard’s strengthening of this relationship was not merely a product of ideological alignment; it was a demonstration of his political skill in pursuit of Australia’s national interests:

I think [Howard] liked the idea of Australia being more than just a bit player and he felt the closeness of the relationship to the US could help avoid us being seen as a big player. So he did have a bit of that grand internationalism in approach to what he was
doing. But at the end of the day I think for him he felt that was mostly dictated by
desire from his perspective to do what he thought was in Australia’s best interests
going forward, and he was always equally conscious of the politics behind it. (Author
interview Van Onselen, 2008)

The key consequence of this increasingly close relationship with the US was recognised
by all: a serious and sustained engagement in the US war in Afghanistan. However, this
also led to other sustained changes in Australia’s security outlook. Howard’s first moves
following 9/11 seemed to expand the defence forces even further as part of a strategy of
urging the United States to become a bigger player in the Asia Pacific region. Here is
Van Onselen’s summary:

Howard when he had his first Budget in ’96 cut most areas, except he actually
increased spending on defence. So he already had a preconceived view that there was
an underutilisation in Australia of its defence capabilities and so on. So, that was a
position he already took. However, September 11 allowed him to expand it further. I
think anyone would have. But he happily did so already having re-prioritised defence a
little bit more than the previous Prime Minister would have. (Author interview Van
Onselen, 2008)

Howard may have exercised political skill in bolstering Australia’s relationship
with the US, but he was not acting alone. Instead, he operated amidst an organisational
structure that he had, himself, shaped. Observers were largely supportive of the claim that
Howard used organisational structures and the advice that they produced in an effective
manner:

Oh look Howard definitely takes advice from the foreign policy advisors of the day or
from the relevant Department and both his own Department, so [Peter] Shergold or
whoever it was previous to that. I can’t remember the bloke’s name now, as well as the
Head of the Foreign Affairs Department. So yes he takes advice on board but the close
people around him that he takes the advice from are Sinodinos and Nutt as his two
staff. And in the case of foreign affairs it would be Alexander Downer because he is a
Minister that he is particularly close to. (Author interview Van Onselen, 2008)
And bureaucratic advice was very important as it performed part of the full process of decision-making leading to outcomes. Howard also followed up outcomes through taking further assessments:

Well I think that process is obviously crucial. But I think he then leaves that process and has the discussion with the Nutts and the Sinodinoses and the Downers and the Defence Minister of the day as well about where to go from there. So those crucial meetings, just as meetings with the bureaucrats are, I’d say, he probably put more stock on the Military Heads that he would on the Heads of Department. I think that would be a fair comment. But at the end of that process they are the outsiders when he moves away from them. The insiders are the political staff, his trusted circle of advisors, who then discuss the implications in the decision that they choose to take. (Author interview Van Onselen, 2008)

As well as using his personal advisers, Howard also relied heavily on the key decision-making structures within his government, Cabinet and the NSC. Dupont singled out the importance of the NSC, and of Howard’s political skills:

Well I credit Howard, Howard personally and certainly the NSC in really setting the foundations for our current counter-terrorism responses. And again I think that you know that it is still a work in progress but they really made some early scene setting decisions. The one, the fact that Howard was in Washington when it happened profoundly affected him, and obviously made it the high priority for the government since he chairs the National Security Committee of Cabinet. So I think making it a high priority item in their policy agenda. And not just in national security but in policy more generally. (Author interview Dupont, 2010)

The NSC played this critical role after 9/11, recalled Dupont, because Howard’s organisational capacity and political skills made it so:

And Howard had a major role to play in ensuring that happened, and secondly in ensuring that the government continued to focus upon it and put resources, real financial resources into it and think through the implications for Australia and for our national security effort and structures. And the decision was made through our National Security Committee of Cabinet that we needed to beef up our counter-terrorism
domestic arrangements and increase cooperation with countries overseas. And Indonesia of course is often held up as a success or story of international cooperation. And to change the structure of the international security community to reflect the new priorities. So all the agencies were told to elevate that topic to top priority and work more closely together, and funding was provided to do that. The AFP was one of the major beneficiaries. But you know most of the intelligence security agencies got significant increases in budget. It was largely because of terrorism. Not for any other reason. So you know I would say these are the sorts of credits that our government or Howard claimed in terms of dealing with the issue. I think probably one area where they haven’t done enough work was focusing on community responses on the kind outlined here (British Counter-terrorism Strategy). They sought more classical counter-terrorism responses. There was quite a conventional response. Even though they do a lot of good things I think in the beginning the government didn’t quite understand the nature of the problem. (Author interview Dupont, 2010)

Van Onselen, too, noted that the NSC played a serious role in shaping Australia’s foreign policy after 9/11, and offered further detail on the relationship between Howard and the NSC:

I don’t think Howard does things that he doesn’t believe in. But I think that there are lots of things he doesn’t do that he does believe in, if that makes sense. So I don’t think he will follow a course of action that is against his worldview or his position on things, or certainly not easily. It would take a lot for example, Cabinet taking a vastly different view to him. But as a pragmatist he will forego a range of things that he believes strongly in because he doesn’t think that they’re politically achievable or they are too difficult or whatever the case might be. (Author interview Van Onselen, 2008)

This is important, as it suggests that Howard’s leadership ability was strengthened by his willingness to act as a part of a team, even if he expected others to obey decisions made within that team:

I think Howard always had a very good relationship with Downer. So he wouldn’t have any problem, circumstances allowing it, to have Downer very much in the loop with his decision-making. Downer even more than most Cabinet Ministers. However September 11, I just think was a different moment for Howard, because he was isolated. His chief
of staff wasn’t with him. [Arthur] Sinodinos didn’t go to Washington for that particular trip. So he didn’t have his advisor there with him. He saw it firsthand. You know he met with the senior players in the US Government and was on the plane with the US ambassador. (Author interview Van Onselen, 2008)

A final point that observers noted regarding Australia’s foreign policy after 9/11 (and before the 2003 invasion of Iraq) was the importance of the Bali bombings in shaping Australian security policy. Edwards, for example, made exactly this point:

Well certainly 9/11 was the first phase. And then, I guess actually yes, I think probably Bali and London as well, although with Bali I would also put Turkey. I also would put any other destination that a UK National was in, because what it meant that in the case of Indonesia, it was a particular group, fighting for a particular cause, which has very tenuous links with Al Qaeda, although the fact is that they are a network of different groups. They clearly demonstrated certainly with the Bali bombing, that Australians were a part of it – one - that also they could clearly reference themselves altogether with a new ideology, which was Al Qaeda. And that’s the same that happened in India. (Author interview Edwards, 2006)

Dupont, too, saw Bali leave a lasting impact on Australia:

But I think in terms of a particular focus on Australia’s own security, Bali was arguably as important as 9/11. So I see 9/11 is being having a global impact on the profession and changing the way people thought. But Bali brought this back to us as a country and our own immediate neighbourhood and the fact that this is a real issue for us as for the Americans. (Author interview Dupont, 2010)

However, there was no doubt that Bali, whilst having a major impact in Australia, served to reinforce the threat of terrorism that 9/11 had so obviously presented:

Bali was less surprising and confirmed the global patterns. The case of Singapore alerted the Australian government through intelligence received over December 2002 and 2003 and that information came from Afghanistan. It was then resolved that global terrorism had spread into Southeast Asia, and this became apparent with Bali.
Therefore, regionally South-East Asian terrorism was genuinely a global threat to Australia. (Author interview Shearer, 2007)

For observers like Grono, the Bali bombing produced a growing change in the way terrorism was seen and reacted to, in Australia:

And until September 11 there wasn’t an overwhelming focus on the prevention of terrorism. There was a strong focus but not an overwhelming one. Since then there has been a much more overwhelming focus. And the Australian context is always a little different. Because it’s not just September 11, it’s also the Bali bombings. I mean I usually look at the two because it was the terrorists’ acts very close to home that made it very, very real for Australia. (Author interview Grono, 2007)

This is of great importance – 9/11 had a global impact, but there can be no doubting that the continued support of the US, and the globalisation of the US-led war on terror was shaped heavily by the fact that key US partners, including the UK and Australia, experienced ‘local’ attacks in the aftermath of 9/11.

Bali remained etched in the Howard landscape as an important event, one that reinforced the vulnerability of countries such as Australia and, in addition, the unity of the countries cooperating against terrorism:

This is why the Bali attack was so important. I think there was a mood post Bali of a real threat to Australia in a way that September 11 was a diffuse threat. You know a distant threat and awareness that the US in particular was at risk and maybe the West more generally. But Bali was something that was quite visceral. So many Australians have a connection because Australians were targeted. So I think it feeds into a very strong support overall in Australian society, not a uniform one but support for Australia to take, the Australian government to take very strong responses including Iraq. And Afghanistan already would have been happening then. But because I think what the government was able to do was to say this is the threat to Australia. These are the actions we may need to take in response to these threats and we need to stand by the US. And it meant that I always explain it that Iraq hasn’t been the divisive issue in Australia on the same scale has had been in the UK, partly because of the threats that
were perceived following the Bali bombings and so on. So I do think it had acquired strong impact within Australia 'societally', on Australian society which is fed into an ability for the government to respond in ways it might not have otherwise been able to do. (Author interview Grono, 2007)

Bali also then taught us about developing the diverse capabilities needed to counter terrorism, including military, intelligence, and policing, just as Grono notes above.

Bali did more than merely reinforce the threat of terrorism to the Australian people, it also impacted on the security policy of the Australian government. According to Leaver, the whole pattern and picture after Bali changed, as did the size of bureaucracy:

It’s not been Australia’s strong suit. That’s true. But with Howard, in particular, I think I remember that one of the first things that Downer did when he became Foreign Minister was to knock out about 30% of the staff out of foreign affairs. They were sacked within about 18 months. The intelligence arm, ASIO and ASIS particularly ASIO was very seriously run down. And since Bali, they have been very seriously built-up, I must say. But if you’re looking for evidence of efficiency it certainly was not there at the beginning of the war on terror. I suppose we tended to think that’s possibly related to the fact that we tend to accept as a given, without any question, the intelligence that the Americans give us. That’s not always true. We have specific intelligence collection responsibilities in regard to the Western alliance system, and they cover Southeast Asia and even up to southern China. But yeah, but by and large, we kind of tend to underperform in our regional responsibilities as intelligence collection relies far too much upon other people. That’s my belief anyway. However, Howard has built up the intelligence arm of the Australian state. I would be surprised if it is not three to four times bigger than it was at the time of the Bali bombing. (Author interview Leaver, 2007)

For Adams, the Bali bombings taught Australia something about their region and how to respond to instability. ‘I think the primary focus of a government in terms of the foreign policy in relation to the war on terror is a region. The instability as they call it, is a particular fear of course of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia’ (Author interview
Adams, 2007). Overall, public opinion in Australia shifted very solidly behind the Howard Government between the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and the Bali bombings of October 2002 largely through the defining role of Howard as leader.

5.8 The views of the individual leader after 2003

By sheer coincidence, just the night before taking part in our interview in 2010, Howard had been engaged in an organised special debate with Bob Hawke on the future of the global economy. Before we began our interview in his office Howard wanted me to watch a replay of it with him. The debate had occupied Howard’s attention and he invited me to watch the relevant parts on his television in his Sydney office just before we commenced the formal interview and got down to questions. Obviously the debate had raised the issue of Howard’s reputation as a statesman. Howard was aware that any comments he made about the Iraq war were likely to become controversial and he wanted his intentions to be understood as clearly as possible before we began the interview. Howard said that his debate would help centre my own argument for me to better understand and situate my impressions of his role for having entered the Iraq war.

Howard stressed that the debate with Hawke was an important event in his calendar in putting forward his own viewpoint against his critics. The thoroughness of his Prime Ministership was put on show as together we watched the video of the debate and reviewed how the Iraq war was a major impact on him. The debate took on an even greater significance for Howard in that his opponent was one of the Australian Labor Party’s long-term leaders. Both had earned distinction of being long-serving Prime Ministers from opposing sides of Australian politics.

The debate was made even more relevant to this research in that it revealed how Howard felt before our interview. The circumstances surrounding the positive reasons and legal justification for instigating the Iraq War were also legitimised by his convictions and actions in the debate. In 2010 the seven-year-old Iraq War was still an ongoing reality and had become part of a larger and complex controversial discussion for
and against. The dialogue of Hawke is included here to demonstrate that there was also much popular opposition to the Iraq War that the Howard leadership overcame.

During the two-hour debate, Hawke had advanced in strong terms his argument for not supporting a war in Iraq. Howard gave supporting reasons to refute the entire opposition case. Hawke said that his main point was that the Iraq war had made the world an irrefutably more dangerous place to live in as a result of the United States invasion. Iraq was seen by Hawke and others as forming part of creating a sense of further terrorism in a War on Terror that only made matters worse for the future:

Why I believe that if you are going to be objective, non panicky about it, just look at it objectively. We do live in a potentially more dangerous situation now than we did before. (Hawke quoted in Fifth Annual Oxford Business Alumni Forum 2010)

This provoked Howard to provide the clear reasons behind his total conviction to lead Australia into a United States-led coalition war in Iraq. This would be something that Howard elaborated, both in this televised dialogue and in our full interview commencing a few minutes later. It was through the interviewer was there to be kept in suspense to find out the exact reasons why Howard went to war, and the import of this major decision. Howard was still fully aware there was much controversy in the reasoning behind his decisions. Howard adhered to the same story in his concise reasoning, albeit without much real depth, to explain his actions even after his retirement from politics. He appeared to place a great deal of store in the view that 9/11 gave sufficient warrant for going to war alongside the United States. His style of argument was the now all-too-familiar one of finding common ground with his interlocutor and then taking the argument in an altogether different direction:

Can I just add one or two points, without wanting to open up a debate on Iraq. I do not want to do that because we will be here all night. But that point that has just been made by both of us. Can I just say in defence of what the Americans did, the mindset of the United States after September 11 was precisely conditioned by these sort of considerations. That we had entered into an entirely new world – an entirely new world, and you were dealing with a borderless world. You were dealing with enemies
you couldn't identify. And this terrible fear that weapons of mass destruction would get into the hands of crazy people, certainly very heavily influenced our thinking. Now you can debate whether the right thing was done in my position or Bob's position. But let's not do that but you have to understand that many of the things that both of us have spoken of were very much in the minds of the Administration in the days and weeks that followed. And this fear was that you could, you know, find weapons that people believed existed, in the hands of evil people being handed to terrorists and used in some other kind of attack. (Howard quoted in Fifth Annual Oxford Business Alumni Forum 2010)

As if to recover common ground, Howard then immediately changed back to a safer argument:

I agree with what Bob said about Pakistan. Pakistan is a scarilly unstable country and with its nuclear capacity I can only hope, you know, that things don't deteriorate and the capacity of those who have the capacity to somehow or other to neutralise those weapons is exercised. Because I agree with you, I mean I agree with you, that is very scary. (Howard quoted in Fifth Annual Oxford Business Alumni Forum 2010)

His attempt to make common cause with Hawke, however, fell on deaf ears. Hawke wanted to re-open the old wounds:

I must respond to John's sort of, as I understand it, somewhat [unusual] justification of what the Americans under George Bush did after. (Hawke quoted in Fifth Annual Oxford Business Alumni Forum 2010)

Realising he had failed to establish common cause, Howard was drawn back into the debate:

I just might have to respond too. (Howard quoted in Fifth Annual Oxford Business Alumni Forum 2010)

Hawke put his case vigorously, relying on some notes he had at hand. He explained his opposition to any Western incursion in Iraq:
After September 2001, I am in the position where I can be not as wise after the event. A couple of weeks before the invasion of Iraq I wrote a lengthy letter to The Australian newspaper in which I pointed out the absolute irrationality of the proposal to invade and bombard Iraq. And in the course of a long letter I said that the images and facts of that invasion and the deaths of civilians of men and women would be projected around the world and that Osama bin Laden would be on his knees praying to Allah morning and night. That Bush would invade, and surely people should understand that the thing in terms of military strategy is you don't do the thing that your enemy most wants you to do. (Hawke quoted in Fifth Annual Oxford Business Alumni Forum 2010)

In 2010, Osama bin Laden was still presumed to be alive, but in hiding. Invoking his name still had some resonance in Australian political debate:

So as I say I don't speak from the point of view of hindsight but I didn't write about it before then. But very interestingly John, I don't know if you've seen this, but just in the last couple of weeks, a report and study has been completed, not by some left liberal … think tank in the United States, but a study has been done by the Rand Corporation. (Hawke quoted in Fifth Annual Oxford Business Alumni Forum 2010)

Hawke elaborated this point in detail:

A right-wing organisation commissioned by the United States Air Force about the Iraqi invasion. And this is what they found. And they said here, according to Rand, is what we got for our trillion and still rising. That's a trillion dollars that the whole exercise involved. This is Rand to the United States Air Force. One, the regional balance of power is tilted in favour of Iran, creating the impression among the Arab Republics, that Iran and by extension …them, was now the winning side. Two, with the series of blunders having raised doubts about US competence and capabilities Arab nations are increasingly looking to Russia and China for patronage, protection and support. Three, rather than advancing the cause of democracy, quote, ‘the war has stalled or reversed the momentum of Arab political reform in countries throughout the Middle East. Counter-terrorism has provided a pretext to suppress movements supporting liberalism in the adherence to the rule of law’. Four, the two million Iraqis who fled their country to escape war, according to Rand, the largest refugee crisis in the Middle East since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, threatens to destabilise the neighbouring countries such as
Syria and Jordan. Five, [the] tactics and techniques that have been developed to fight America in Iraq have found their way to groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, so that the long conflict in Iraq has enhanced insurgent capabilities across the region.

That finding by the Rand Corporation to the United States Air Force simply reinforces what the combined intelligence agencies in the United States in their annual reports over the last few years have said and that is the Iraq invasion has increased the strength of terrorist forces around the world. (Hawke quoted in Fifth Annual Oxford Business Alumni Forum 2010)

Howard was, naturally enough, dismissive of this evidence. He began with a scornful remark:

Well I can’t leave that. If we are going to have a serious debate about Iraq, then let’s have it. And not just a bitsy – an itsy bitsy [point]. The point I make is that you know the first responsibility of Head of Government or Head of State is the protection of his or her homeland. And what happened on the 9/11 was that it was the most serious assault on the American homeland since Pearl Harbor, and the impact of that on the American people and the rest of the world was enormous and the calculation made by the Administration, you can criticise it, and many have a go on doing it. The calculation was that their responsibility was to identify and if possible cauterise countries and areas that could be the source of future facilitation of terrorist attacks on the United States.

And Bob quotes the intelligence agencies. The overwhelming view of the intelligence agencies and not just the Americans but British MI6 and the others was that Iraq did have weapons of mass destruction. Okay, that’s been proven to be wrong. But with intelligence you never wait. In the intelligence world you never wait for plu-perfect proof otherwise you end up with another Pearl Harbor. And what the Americans did in my view was to act on the reasonably entertained belief that Iraq did have weapons of mass destruction and that weapons of mass destruction could be passed on to terrorist groups and could be part of on a future attack on the United States. And the American Government and George Bush at the time made the calculation that part of the
responsibility that he had in defending and preventing and pre-empting a future attack would be to take out Saddam. And now that I think was a proper calculation and defensible one. I think it’s too early think, and I will invoke the Zhou Enlai analogy [about the French Revolution] and say it’s too early to make the settled judgement on the future of Iraq. And we talked a lot about five or twenty years. I mean you could well have a tolerably functioning democracy in Iraq in a few years’ time. I mean the Iraqis have endured a lot more to defend and protect their democracy than we have. We have always taken it for granted. The Iraqis have now had four or five elections and more people voted in the last Iraqi election than voted in the election that returned Barak Obama to the White House. And they voted in the face of fearful intimidation, murder, threats, bombs and mayhem. That must mean something, it means that there is a hunger inside that country for a democratic future. So I think before we too readily dismiss what Bush did want we keep those things in mind as well. (Howard quoted in Fifth Annual Oxford Business Alumni Forum 2010)

This was a powerful context for our discussion. Our own interview commenced when we moved from Howard’s desk to sit on a sofa, and talked further. After our main interview was underway it was clear that Howard, when he referred to Iraq, had wanted to build upon his case for Iraq from the previous night and stated that he was adding this to his autobiographical account, Lazarus Rising:

I mean Iraq really. I was endeavouring to say in that last segment in the debate. The real reason why the Americans decided to take out Saddam is they generally thought he did have weapons of mass destruction and he’d hand it to some crazy terrorist. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

The major points from the previous night reoccurred in our interview. There was the major threat of the spread of weapons of mass destruction:

And everybody now agrees that is the biggest threat that the world has. (Author interview Howard, 2010)
Then Howard felt the need to recall the prerequisites of support for the United States alliance not just as a consequence of 9/11 but for the defeat of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq:

But I believe in it for the reasons I have outlined. Plus of course the significance I attach to the American alliance. I think it is a very important part of Australia’s past and present and future. And therefore any significant conflict in which America is involved; if our assistance is sought I think we should always give careful consideration to providing it. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Howard also realised his decisions on Iraq and committing Australian troops in his Prime Ministership at any time was not going to be popular. He did not describe them as ‘controversial’ but merely the sensible thing to do:

Well my position on Iraq is not popular with the public. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

The lack of legal justification for the 2003 invasion was brusquely cast aside:

The reason people didn’t support Iraq to start with, was the fact that there wasn’t another United Nations Resolution and whatever. I, you know, was never convinced of the legal necessity for that. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

In the televised debate conducted the night before our interview in 2010, Howard exulted in the new-found tolerance he saw as dominant in the new Australia over which he had presided. He mixed together a consideration of Australia’s place in the world in the aftermath of September 11 with an appreciation of its demographic diversity:

Well, I can answer that very directly by saying I think that I felt most pleased about that when I ceased being Prime Minister. I think that particular night I wasn't feeling particularly pleased about anything. But having gone out and looked back, I think Australia had a level of confidence and self-belief and optimism and we can deal with anybody in the world. Not in a belligerent fashion but in a very confident fashion. I mean, I want all the things that most Australians want. They want our country to be strong. They want it to be stable, peaceful; they want it to be tolerant. They wanted to
be proud of its traditions in its history, and what it stood for. But be sufficiently receptive to change to preserve the best of that history and that culture. I mean, I'm a conservative in relationship to a lot of things. I conserve what is good from the past, while it continues to work, don't change it, because it has passed the test of time. But you have got to have a sufficiently enlightened view of the world, to understand that you do have to adapt and change. And I think this country has done wonders in the last 25 years in adjusting. I mean, we are more tolerant. We are more outward looking. We don't think the world owes us a living. All the old epithets said about Australia, you know, that 'we are the poor white trash of Asia' and those sorts of things . . . are just so irrelevant and unsustainable now, compared perhaps with attitudes that people had a generation ago. And you know I think that's one of the great things. (Howard quoted in Fifth Annual Oxford Business Alumni Forum 2010)

Again, Howard is here playing his conventional game of political skill by looking for a point on which he and his interlocutors can agree before delivering his own usually out-of-left-field assessment:

And if we can, if we can continue that, I mean it's always hard to say you know what you want to do in 50 years’ time. I mean I am not going to be here in 50 years’ time: I am an optimist, but not that big an optimist! And I do hope for my children that they live in a country which is as good as what I live in. You know, I hope, God willing, they will be here in 50 years’ time and if they are living in the country that I am living in now, they will be the most fortunate people in the world. And that's what I hope for the continuation of what we now have. Because I think we have something very special in this country. We do things in a way that other countries, I mean, I think about social security systems. We avoid the harsh excesses of the Americans, where I think the social security system can contribute to the jail population and on the other hand, we avoid the excessive paternalism of the Europeans, which you know stifle the initiative of a lot of small businesses and so forth. So I think that we have a lot of things right in this country. And I get a bit cranky. You know I have this as a view that I had in government. And I have the same view out of government. I get a bit cranky. When you know we tend to run down everything that this country does. I mean, we are stupid to do that, because we are much better at doing things than most others. (Howard quoted in Fifth Annual Oxford Business Alumni Forum 2010)
Howard had practised legal skills to support a political argument but did not remain above the constitutional law as it stood. Australia’s federal system of government required Howard to operate with the consent and support of the States and Territories. A tightly-knit plan for the security and defence of Australia, with Howard in better control overall, was now in place. This brought the States into greater alignment with the Federal government in the event of a crisis:

Well, what happened was, I got advice from the agencies about what was happening and I responded to it immediately. I needed the cooperation of the State Premiers in order to bring it about, because under our Constitutional arrangements so much of the criminal law is in the hands of the States. And they were very cooperative. They responded immediately. And the system worked. And you’ve got a Federal system and when it is put under pressure like that it can work. Because people see the national interest and they were quite cooperative. And so it works, but it was a good example of how the changes in the laws were needed. The reason that you needed different laws was that this was a different threat. You’re not dealing with a conventional military threat. You were dealing with a terrorist threat. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

Howard believed that as a result of 9/11 these new anti-terrorism laws were needed and proved to work effectively:

Do you think the new laws introduced dramatically changed [Australia]? Well I think the laws that we introduced were very effective and they were necessary. I mean we have just had people convicted – that large trial that was conducted in Sydney. Well, they would never have been charged in the first place without the introduction of certain changes to the terrorism laws. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

(The trial to which Howard was referring in April 2010 was the 2005 Sydney terrorism plot. Five men were arrested and put on trial, found guilty in October 2009 and sentenced in February 2010.) Howard recognized that the 7/7 (7 July 2005) coordinated terrorist attacks across London held consequences for his own decision-making policy.

Howard’s building of knowledge comes to the fore in describing his political skill:
Well the home grown terrorism thing was very prominent in relation to London.  
(Author interview Howard, 2010)

And,

Because the people who carried it out were British-born. Most of them I think. Three out of the four, I am pretty sure. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

And,

Well, well you can’t. I mean, they have had the one attack. And they have aborted a lot more. We had this too you know. We’ve exposed and prosecuted and jailed convicted people who were planning attacks in Australia. So we have been fortunate so far, but we can’t be too confident. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

And Howard agreed that the State and Federal balance plays an important role too. Contesting knowledge Howard continued: ‘Yeah I mean, I mean Federalism, where health and education are shared, where you have divided responsibilities’  (Author interview Howard, 2010). And, furthermore, Howard recognised that such a system of distributed powers and responsibilities could work:

Things like the national security and defence and terrorism and that, that’s an acknowledged Commonwealth Government responsibility. But the States come into it through the police and law enforcement. And the ordinary criminal law is still overwhelmingly a State responsibility. So in order to have effective counter-terrorism legislation in a Federation you need the consent and the involvement of States and that’s why they came into it. But my recollection is that they were quite cooperative. I didn’t have any real complaints with them. (Author interview Howard, 2010)

5.9 The views of peers after 2003

In addition to the NSC, Howard’s Cabinet continued to play its important role supporting Howard. Downer talked in our interview about the more open Cabinet process in which the Howard views were formed:
They are ultimately, they are collective decisions made by the Cabinet. He can express his view, and there is much discussion about it. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

According to Downer, Howard was always kept in the information loop with Downer and his Department on policy-making. By the same token, the process worked the other way as well. Downer or his office was directly consulted by Howard (Author interview Downer, 2010). And of course the option existed for Downer to contact Howard for one-to-one policy-making:

And if I had thought of doing something that I thought would really focus the Prime Minister’s attention, then I’d ring him or go and see him. But it is becoming quite a belief here in Australia even in the academic community that we have a presidential system of government. We don’t, and you don’t want to underestimate the role of the Ministers, as distinct from the Prime Minister. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

The Attorney-General Williams knew his own clear line of responsibilities:

Well look one of the responsibilities of the portfolio is national security or domestic national security. The key agencies are ASIO and AFP. But the Department also has a division that has responsibility in the area as well. (Author interview Williams, 2008)

Williams knew along with other indirect key players how these responsibilities fitted into the total worldview of Howard and his government overall:

Well sometimes you’re looking at national security in a discreet way in the sense that you’ve got legislation relating to ASIO’s powers. And then it’s a portfolio issue. But for the most part you know the National Security Committee is looking at issues globally so that it you take into account the foreign policy, foreign affairs point of view, the defence point of view, as well as the Attorney-General’s point of view. (Author interview Williams, 2008)

Sometimes there were hiccups in introducing a stronger set of principles and laws to fight terrorism than those the Australian Labor Party Opposition or the Greens Party might have conceded:
It wasn’t dealt with as a specific crime. It was . . . it was just dealt with by the general criminal law. But general criminal law we didn’t regard as an adequate tool to deal with terrorism. (Author interview Williams, 2008)

As terrorism progressed a common mindset was foremost: A strong mindset existed in the government about what kind of terrorism caused 9/11 and what was required to centre the fight from a government perspective. Making sense of Howard’s positioning and dominance over policy-making within the rest of government indicated forming common goals for the approach. Having a shared understanding for the reasons for others to use terrorism was one of these:

And it depends also on looking at different countries and different environments. But it seems largely to be Islamic. I probably should say Islamist and it’s phenomena of the current time. And it is a complex set of factors that have created the environment where people resort to terrorism in a range of different countries. (Author interview Williams, 2008)

For Costello the policy objective caused a serious of responses for Australia. In our interview, Costello avoided the question of what happened between the Afghanistan intervention, immediately after 9/11, and the Iraqi invasion. Costello was adamant that external factors influenced domestic terrorist behaviour and that it still needed to planned for:

No I don’t. I don’t think there is any evidence at all. If you are talking about Islamic terrorism like the groups that are currently on trial in Melbourne and Sydney or Jack Roach, who has been convicted or, Jack Thomas, whose case is still before the courts, I don’t think there are any domestic factors that influence that. (Author interview Costello, 2007)

Howard had already displayed his leadership characteristics to others inside his Ministry in the context of the War on Terror. This had its basis in his desire to highlight the strength of the relationship with the United States and the potential further threat from 9/11. This was well understood by Williams, as he put Howard’s case:
Well, Howard was a very accomplished politician. He has political antennae that very few people actually share. And he can sum up situations very quickly and the political implications of them. And I think that the country benefited from him being in his – in office at the time these events occurred. (Author interview Williams, 2008)

His peers naturally supported Howard and believed in his response despite the pressure of normal political conditions, including strong opposition:

They are not the politics so much. I mean it’s just what he and the key figures in the government want us in. It’s not just him. We thought it was a natural enough response and what we should do. And the politics would find their own level. And what would the politics be of that? Do people agree or not agree? I mean they agreed with some of the things we did and they didn’t agree with others. They were happy enough for us to send some troops to Afghanistan. You know I don’t think it’s a front of the mind issue for the public. But they were happy enough that we increased spending on counter-terrorism activities. But I don’t think a lot of that interests the public as details. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

As one of the main peers of any influence, Downer supported the efforts taken on 9/11, adding to the existing framework of organising Howard’s foreign policy:

I mean the war on terror, as it became known, and the Bali bombing and all of that. It simply reinforced all of those things. It didn’t create a new policy paradigm. We didn’t suddenly decide that we needed to work on particular types of relationships in particular types of certain ways. Or important relationships in particular types of ways that we had not worked on before. So you know it was the most natural thing in the world for us to make a contribution to the war in Afghanistan given that the foreign policy we pursued, which includes working with America, and the perception we have had of the importance of the relationship of America to our own national security and so on. So making sure we had a sort of a profile in the firmament of American alliances. None of that changed.

So I actually think this sort of notion that – I mean the issue changed and so the priorities changed in the things we did that were new, like Afghanistan. And we
certainly invested a lot more resources, massively more resources in counter-terrorism activities, domestically naturally, but also internationally. But this was . . . this wasn’t so much a completely new policy, a completely new fresh positioning of Australia. We did not reposition ourselves as a country. Not at all! (Author interview Downer, 2010)

Howard’s 9/11 responses had been carefully justified. Downer, the Howard government’s foreign policy expert, understood that fighting world terrorism did not win many votes in and of itself:

Doesn’t shift votes much, no. Doesn’t shift votes. Not really. Domestic economy, interest rates, unemployment, these are things that shift votes, move elections. Not foreign policy relations with China or Indonesia or something. I mean look at the East Timor issue in 1999. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

Downer saw the additions as a result of 9/11 to the framework of foreign policy and Australia’s relations as positive:

Well I have explained that my thesis is that it didn’t exactly change Australian foreign policy. It might on the other hand have reinforced the fundamental perceptions and policies that Howard and I had anyway. I guess in a way it must have made us think that we couldn’t have thought of it this way at the time but it must have made us think we were right all along. And I don’t think it has. I mean I think you know that when Kevin Rudd was Leader of the Opposition he had three legs to Australian foreign policy – the US alliance, the UN and Asia or something. Yes, I think that’s it. I don’t think if it hadn’t been for 9/11 that would have still been the case. (Author interview Downer, 2010)

Costello summarised Howard’s benefits for Australia as a result of 9/11, including the example of better cooperation and stronger ties with Indonesia, Costello depicting the loyal Howard government peers shared view of the reasons for Australia’s response:

I think September the 11th fundamentally changed the nature of the US government and US foreign policy. I don’t think there is any doubt about that. I was in the United States, both before and after September 11th, and I think it was a different place. I think it fundamentally changed Australia too. There were lots of things that we used to do in
Australia, which we will never do again. You know the level of search at airports has irrevocably gone up. The level of security on government buildings has irrevocably changed. Some parts of official buildings which used to be accessible to the public never will be again. If you want to have a look at this Parliament House once upon a time, you could walk right over the top of Parliament House. You will never be able to do that again. This building now has tank barriers right around it... (Author interview Costello, 2007)

5.10 The views of observers after 2003

For many observers, 9/11 became front and centre to the way this Government operated ever after; issues of security were more serious than other factors in determining how the Howard Government went about its business:

I think I can make a reasonably persuasive argument if you just look at that the declaratory policies of the Howard government from after 9/11. Everything from the Prime Minister’s and Foreign Minister’s speeches through to the Defence White papers, Foreign Affairs White Papers and the new counter terrorism White Paper is something you have never had before. All of that is, I think, pretty definitive evidence that the Government took it extremely seriously. (Author interview Dupont, 2010)

Indeed, Dupont saw that anti-terrorism entrenched itself as the No. 1 priority of Australia’s view of its own security reasoning post-9/11:

Well I think what happened changed the game in Australia. I mean terrorism became the number one security concern for the Howard government. I think there is no question about that. And there are all kinds of evidence, objective evidence, to support that. (Author interview Dupont, 2010)

Spending on security that was outside the remit of the Australian Defence Department rose dramatically under Howard:

The second evidence I suppose, is the fact, if you like, is that the spending on non-defence related security, which is primarily related to counter-terrorism, went up astronomically in that period of time. I think something like off the top of my head 14
per cent real growth in spending on national security from 9/11, almost entirely because of the perception that terrorism was a real threat. So if you look at the spending, that is another demonstration of that. And in talking to senior policymakers in the Howard government, as you are doing, and I have as well, they’d make it perfectly clear that had become the dominant issue for them for a whole lot of reasons. So I think it had a pretty profound effect on thinking in Australia. I don’t know if you’re interested in the Rudd Government, but I just make the one point that I think the Rudd Government has slightly de-emphasised terrorism and slightly redefined it and located it within a broader taxonomy of security challenges to Australia, so that it’s not quite as dominant as it was during the Howard period, but nevertheless it still would definitely be in the top three. The Rudd Government would say that. (Author interview Dupont, 2010)

In particular, Howard’s responses ensured increased resources for and influence of Australia’s intelligence services:

So by nature governments always go to definitions and then develop responses according to their definitions. Now I think that the responses have been reasonably effective. And you could say one objective measure of that is we haven’t had a major terrorist incident in Australia, nearly a decade after 9/11. I don’t want to sound complacent but you have to give the counter-terrorist organisations some credit. That’s not just by chance, you know. Yes, we are not a high priority target for the al Qaeda’s of this world. But I think if they could’ve carried out an attack easily they would have done so. So it hasn’t happened and I think it has to do with a lot of things including very effective measures put in place over time. So we’ve got to give our governments and our intelligence and our security agencies some credit for responding effectively. (Author interview Dupont, 2010)

However, observers such as Dupont haven’t been wholly satisfied with the political leadership shown by Howard:

There are areas where I think we could do better, as I have said. I think the Brits have got a much better approach to developing and integrating domestic responses. And that while we have had success with Indonesia in counter-terrorism, I think that we could have probably done more on the regional cooperation front than we have done. I can
elaborate on that if you want. So I would give us a credit plus for our response. (Author interview Dupont, 2010)

In particular, Dupont notes the issues that Australia has had in building partnerships beyond those that are driven by the immediate impact of terrorism:

We’ve used the existing security ties as we have with most of the countries of the region to advance a common agenda. And we have done that reasonably well. But I don’t think we have replicated our successes. The successes we’ve had with Indonesia haven’t been replicated elsewhere to the same degree. And you could argue that, because we haven’t had a terrorist threat, we haven’t had Jemaah Islamiah trying to blow people up in other parts of the world. Thank God. But I think we could do a little bit more than we could have done there. Counter-terrorism responses are, I think, the other problem. We have had too many jurisdictions involved, not enough clarity about who does what, not enough emphasis on how we communicate with all the other agencies, particularly between the Commonwealth and the States. There have been some issues there. It’s getting better. But again it’s still a bit clunky. If we did have a major threat in Sydney tomorrow I am not sure whether it would work as effectively as we would like because there is still a whole lot of things that are probably only going to be fixed after the crisis has happened, I suspect. You know everything from sufficient triaging - the hospitals in Sydney, would they work effectively? You know, all of that sort of stuff. You just don’t know whether that’s going to work until something happens. And the system hasn’t been tested. So it looks impressive on paper or the line diagrams and so on. Would it work in practice? I’ve got some concerns in some areas there. (Author interview Dupont, 2010)

As an observer, Edwards (2006) talked about Howard having certain difficulties in drawing together views into a distinctive way of making policy:

Well, of course, government departments across academic research institutes and with NGOs and charities etc. When we come to be talking about any subject, terrorism, for example, we try and get as broad a spectrum of viewpoints as possible. So, I mean in all government departments including our secret services including those charities like the Red Cross that have worked out in Iraq we try to get a good spectrum of views. (Author interview Edwards, 2006)
Edwards thinks Howard was astute and forward thinking in placing 9/11 at the centre of his Government’s concerns:

But I think Howard has been extremely pragmatic, No. 1. I mean he has clearly aligned himself with the world's superpower. I mean he has got a Free Trade deal out of it, which has sort of cemented that relationship. (Author interview Edwards, 2006)

Edwards also contends that Bush, Blair and Howard made a formidable world team in their respective collaboration as allies post-9/11:

I think they’re working colleagues and I think now this is why I think you need to read The Right Nation because, how they look at Bush is say fundamentally Bush is a businessmen, and that is how he deals with government elites. It’s from a very business point of view. If you take that analogy further and you look at the US allies. He knows he can do business with Blair. He knows he can do business with Howard. But as it were Howard and Blair are sort of like the chief financial officer and the operations officer you know, they sort of get on together. (Author interview Edwards, 2006)

5.11 Conclusion

Howard was in power, running Australia, for twelve years. As the leader Howard organisational capacity and political skill were apparent in large measures across a longer political career. It was Howard’s intention to have developed elements of political style to be successful and he was for twelve years able to capitalise on these attributes for success. Howard produced a strong capacity for using organisational capacity to revolutionise Australian leadership. Howard always learned political lessons quickly and developed the core political skills and the need for a strong organisational capacity to succeed as a career politician. It was in Howard’s nature to succeed from failure. In leadership Howard created the organisational capacity that revolutionised the control ‘front and centre’ of prime ministership in Australia. The continuing search for the most effective elements of organisational capacity and political style flowed directly into arranging a political apparatus to situate all the other elements of style that made Howard
as an individual; want to be leader and successful as one. Howard was more than able to turn his philosophy and knowledge for politics through strong organisational capacity and political skill into a framework for governing Australia using his unique qualities that made him popular. Howard was able to take the events of 9/11 and through organisational capacity and political skill turn these to protect his country through national security and counter-terrorism.
Conclusion

This study began as a deceptively simple question: how influential was John Howard, Australia's Prime Minister at the time of September 11, in charting his nation's foreign policy in the aftermath of that epochal event? The twentieth century was a period dominated by some of the Great Men of history – if we think of FDR, Stalin and Churchill – but there is very little written by scholars on the role played by powerful leaders in the conduct of international relations. This case study of one leader’s role in steering a medium-sized power through the stormy waters of the first years of the twenty-first century is intended in part to help close that gap, to link a classic ‘leadership’ discussion to the broad area of International Relations.

The case study begins with Howard’s assumption of the Prime Ministership in 1996, and ends with his losing it in 2007, a remarkable record of electoral achievement for a politician who was previously regarded by the Australian voters as a second-rate Treasurer at best. Howard strode the world stage during his term as the Australian PM, feted by other leaders of the West, joining with Bush Jr and Blair in the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, and restoring the Conservative party in Australia to a position it had not enjoyed since the halcyon years of Sir Robert Menzies (1949-1966). Much of this success turned on a single moment in Australia’s foreign policy history, namely, how to respond to the September 11 attack on America. Coming midway through Howard’s period as leader, 9/11 sharpened Howard’s capacity to perform as PM. We measure this with the help of Fred Greenstein’s framework for assessing the work of US Presidents, using data disclosed to us in elite interviews with 15 participants and observers of the Howard Government. Elite interviewing, as a branch of oral history, affords us a close-up view of Howard in the performance of his leadership. Partly because the interviews were conducted in 2006-2010, a period when the Howard years were still in vivid memory, these 15 interviewees give us valuable testimony of the PM’s key attributes and skills. The 15 informants reported to us what they understood of Howard’s capacities in each of the six Greenstein variables: cognitive style, emotional intelligence, vision, public communication, organisational capacity, and political skill.
Greenstein’s approach complements and, arguably, supersedes the older approach developed by James Rosenau in assessing the role of leaders and other factors in the formation of any particular state’s place in the international order. Although Greenstein is concerned only with US Presidents (he has studied most of them, up to president-elect Donald Trump), and his ambit of research includes the domestic role of each President, his approach has worked well in our study of the leader of a medium power. Each of the attributes in the Greenstein schema sits easily enough with the factors emphasised by Rosenau, and can also take account of critical turning points in history epitomised by 9/11. We also had the advantage that is usually not available to Greenstein of being to conduct elite interviews with a leader, his closest political associates, contemporary commentators, and academic specialists. We undertook these interviews close enough to the events in question (from 2006 to 2010) that the memories of our informants were still and were not yet tinged with reconsiderations and rationalisations based on the slippery wisdom of hindsight.

We have found Greenstein's well-known sextet of personal characteristics for judging leadership of great and proven value in assessing the work of Howard in re-shaping Australian foreign policy in the wake of September 11. We also identified methods for recognising references to Greenstein’s skills and attributes in the transcripts of our interviews. Typically our ‘research’ questions remained latent rather than obvious in our ‘threshold’ questions. This should make our thesis methodologically valuable for others pursuing similar research questions.

Howard grew up in the Menziad age, a period of Australian political history that came to a crashing end in 1967, when Harold Holt disappeared off Cheviot Beach. It was an age of certitudes that were increasingly subject to question in the years that followed. By 1983, almost a decade from Howard’s election to the safe inner-northern Sydney seat of Bennelong, Labor had seized power and was not to be easily dislodged. Howard’s motivations in entering politics on the Conservative side were clear. What was not so obvious was whether he possessed the skills and attributes necessary to achieve
prominence in the Australian political scene. His early years in politics were not propitious.

Our method of elite interviews arguably produced a richer and more complex of Howard's leadership qualities than other research strategies. Greenstein's schema requires that leaders be assessed from different angles and at different distances from the person themselves. For instance, the capacity for what Greenstein calls ‘vision’ is easier to evaluate from the relatively distant view of the external commentators; after all, to be adjudged successful ‘vision’ must make sense from a public viewpoint, while other leadership qualities, such as cognitive style, are more obvious in the closer quarters of a Cabinet meeting or a debate within the National Security Committee (the NSC).

Howard’s ‘cognitive style’ ensured that he could rework his initial feelings of shock, outrage and horror at what had happened in New York and Washington on September 11 into a resolute re-writing of the campaign strategy required to defeat Beazley in the 2001 election. He had sufficient emotional intelligence to know how this refashioned campaign would play out in the Australian electorate. His EQ lay not so much in the interpersonal sphere, where he still struggled to understand fully what those close to him might have been feeling, but in the broader body politic, where he read the mood more assuredly than others, including those in his own camp. In the 2001 election Beazley did not win the popular vote as was the case versus Howard in 1998. Instead Howard won a greater number of seats where the 9/11 tragedy had its most severe impact on the Australian consciousness.

Those close to him in the inner sanctum watched with surprise, and then approbation, as Howard returned to Canberra from Washington and began to weave a new narrative based on his reading of Australian history and the experience of earlier generations of Australians. He did not refer in any doctrinal sense to larger forces outside his world. Blair talked about ‘feeling the hand of God on his shoulder’. Bush talked about ‘mission’ and ‘destiny’ in his dealings with radical Islam. But Howard spoke to deeply-rooted fears and anxieties in the Australian body politic. He managed with the *Tampa*
crisis to relate 9/11 to ancient fears of invasion by ‘people not like us’. Downer and Costello learned nothing new from September 11. Downer said it was part of a longer story about the emergence of radical Islam, going back at least to the success of political Islam in the Iranian Revolution, and (he was the first to say this in Australia) it was the beginning of a ‘War on Terror’. Costello remained more firmly fixed on Australia’s economic performance rather than its foreign relations. Daryl Williams was focused on the ramifications for Australia’s legal system and conventions of such a traumatic event.

Howard, on the other hand, had already shown in his comeback in 1996 from a less-than-illustrious political career that he was paying attention to the political world around him, in the electoral heartlands of Australia where the marginal seats were to be won or lost. This was partly his cognitive style, his appreciation of the number-crunching done by his expert pollsters, where he took nothing for granted and looked beyond ideological considerations. It was also his emotional intelligence, based again on years of political ups and downs since the death of Holt in 1967. His emotional resilience had its roots in his teenage years, losing his father when he was young. His learning was always pragmatic – for him, life’s failures were object lessons, not moments of being crushed. He took to heart the maxim, ‘A smooth sea never made a skilful sailor’. He struggled to ‘read’ people around him, as evidenced in the ambiguous remarks made about him as a person in the immediate intimacy of Cabinet and the NSC. But he had been paying attention throughout his career to the thoughts, aspirations and fears of mainstream voters, especially in those parts of Australia he knew best. He was uncomfortable in the company of Aboriginal Australians, inner-city Greens, children of the Sixties, and some ethnic minorities. But the majority of Australians he understood, or at least was prepared to try to understand.

In the matter of ‘vision’, Howard never lacked a clear sense of where Australia should be headed. He wanted an Australia that gave opportunity to the individual and also protected the vulnerable, an interesting combination of the conservative and liberal political traditions emerging from nineteenth-century Britain. 9/11 came as a political gift. He was able to use September 11 as a statement about defending Australia from its
radical Islamic critics, to say that Osama bin Laden espoused a contrary view of human society. What might have been a rather pallid view of Australia’s future – more of what Australians already had – became something else: a dynamic, forward-looking appeal to the rest of the world that what the West had to offer was worth fighting for. The invasion of Iraq less than four years later, in March 2003, was to be couched in these terms, that the Iraqi people would immediately understand why Saddam had been toppled and would rush to fill the civic space he had left unfilled during his barbarous reign. An improvement in Howard’s capacity for ‘public communication’ soon followed. He even turned one aspect of his ‘daggy’ persona to advantage, allowing the cameras to film him during his early-morning walks in highly unfashionable track-suits. This gave him a patina of hard-working, down-to-earth personality. Not for him the professional politician’s beer in a pub, or Tony Abbott’s red ‘budgie smugglers’ – Howard’s morning on-camera performance made a virtue of his suburban ordinariness. (One of his few failures was his hospital bedside interview with Louise Barry, an Australian victim of the London bombings – if Howard had hoped for a publicity lift from this media opportunity he was sorely mistaken.)

Importantly, Howard was Australia’s first ‘24/7’ Prime Minister. Being filmed on the morning walks was only one part of being available throughout the course of the day to the media. The Menzies generation of politicians made their pronouncements in the evening news, while the imagined families were sitting around their dinner tables, sharing the news of the day and listening for the counsel of their Prime Minister. Howard seized on the new 24/7 news-cycle, seeing it as a way of communicating his vision not through set speeches (at which he originally did not excel), but through the short grabs favoured by the electronic media. The sociolinguist Tim Moore (2006) spotted this trend in his analysis of Howard’s style, beginning with an uncontroversial ‘truth’, followed quickly by a ‘but’. The famous example (which some attribute to the Fraser Government Minister Michael MacKellar) ran as follows:

It’s about this nation saying to the world ‘we are a generous open-hearted people taking more refugees on a per capita basis than any nation except Canada. We have a proud record of welcoming people from 40 different nations’. (Moore 2006, p. 15)
and then:

But we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come. (Moore 2006, p. 15)

This syllogistic device, no doubt born of Howard’s legal training, perfectly suited the new 24/7 style of reporting, and Howard made an art form of it. By his own admission the Press treated Howard kindly, and contributed with each new terrorist-related crisis (‘If it bleeds, it leads…’) to the deepening of his vision.

As he grew in confidence, Howard also became a better debater, as evidenced in his 2010 debate over Iraq with Hawke, himself a super debater.

So why did Howard suddenly improve in areas where he had been deficient? Felix Patrikeeff offered a provocative suggestion in his commentary on the dramatic acceleration in Howard’s political performance as a result of September 11. For a man with a relatively limited experience of the world – lacking military experience, participation in the heady days of the Sixties, or study abroad at a foreign university – the accident of being in Washington on official business at the time of this critical moment in American history was a Boy’s Own adventure of doubtless significance. Not only could Howard claim to ‘own’ 9/11; in a more profound sense, September 11 can be seen to ‘own’ him. Bustled by Secret Service agents to safety, welcomed into the American legislative chamber to hear speeches that included a reference to him as a visiting ally, and to see himself written into history with a capital H, this eventful day in the world’s most powerful city could not be rivalled.

Finally there is the matter of Howard’s ‘organisational capacity’ and ‘political skill’. His political skill was never in question – after all, he had grown up in a political party where one’s skill was a sine qua non for survival. But he had limited experience of organisations and how they might be run. In responding to 9/11 he did not create a new bureaucracy, such as a US-style department of Homeland Security. Instead he upgraded
the role of the NSC. His reshaping of the Australian state derived from the new power of the NSC and the radiating of power from the Office of the Prime minister through certain departmental heads to key areas of the Canberra bureaucracy. Lifts in expenditure were not coordinated but the happenstance of individual manoeuvrings by individual players in the national capital.

Howard’s organisational skill was evident in several domains. In the Liberal Party he showed an uncanny ability to control what had for decades been a highly decentralised and somewhat anarchistic organisation. His work with the US administration also showed his skills in coordinating the work of others. And, of course, he was a technically good ‘manager’ inside Canberra. He used terms like ‘tools’ of government, and the need to ‘drive’ the Australian government – these suggest a mechanically proficient operator of some very complex machinery.

The general conclusion we reached in considering what these interviewees told us about the Howard years is that Greenstein’s categories work in practice, and certainly sum up a leader like Howard well, but that they are processes, not fixed categories of political assessment. As a younger politician Howard was clearly deficient in several areas – notably ‘emotional intelligence’, ‘public communication’ and ‘organisational capacity’ – but the effect of September 11 was to propel him forward in these aspects of his growing and formidable armoury.

In the long-standing debate about the value of individuals in shaping the foreign policy of their nation, this thesis has concluded firmly on the side of the ledger that sees certain leaders as strongly determinant of foreign policy. Howard was significant because he showed how a Conservative leader could develop and enunciate a vision for Australian foreign policy that was arguably unconventional, at times unpopular, and yet electorally successful. In his reshaping of the Australian state in the aftermath of September 11 Howard did not blindly imitate the new US model, but, rather, worked to build a distinctly Australian response to the international challenges of the early twenty-first century.
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