Looking for a way out:

Skills development and training and its impact on aid practices and their development outcomes, with particular reference to Indonesia and Timor-Leste.

A thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

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August 2017
Doctor of Philosophy Declaration

1, Brian Fairman, declare that the PhD thesis entitled ‘An examination of the role of skills development and training and its impact on aid practices and their development outcomes, with particular reference to Indonesia and Timor-Leste’ is no more than 100,000 words in length including quotes and exclusive of tables, figures, appendices, bibliography, references and footnotes. This thesis contains no material that has been submitted previously, in whole or in part, for the award of any other academic degree or diploma.

Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own work.

Signature  Date: 25/08/2017
ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on the emerging problem of education and training interventions in the overseas aid context, and focuses particularly on the current effectiveness of development assistance from the perspective of aid recipients. In particular, whilst significant efforts to measure and evaluate these training interventions have occurred in Indonesia and Timor-Leste, they have met with mixed success, and this is causing some concern in that local needs appear to be overlooked. In this investigation, a careful evaluation of existing training approaches, methodologies and evaluation frameworks has been made, through the eyes of respondents who are intimately concerned with overseas aid programs, in an attempt to suggest explicit improvements that could have significant impacts on training interventions in terms of sustainable skills development in recipient countries, and for improved donor engagement and benefit.

Perspectives on vocational education and training, together with insights regarding the engagement of international agencies and advisors on systems development, have been accessed. To assist this work, an interpretivist approach was used in order to examine the cultural nuances at play, and to uncover the ‘stories’ around this engagement as told by the seventeen Indonesian and seventeen Timor-Leste respondents, who largely consisted of senior managers, trainers and administrators of development programs. The respondents were between the ages of 25-70, with a reasonable balance of women (1/3) and men (2/3). By taking a semiotic approach to the examination of the elements of development assistance, it was possible to take the stance of asking ‘its not what is included but what is not included’, which, it is asserted, has revealed more about the interventions and approaches than through more conventional evaluation approaches.

The intent of this study was to more clearly inform practitioners of a range of meaningful approaches and policy directions for training program design and for monitoring and evaluation techniques, and in this respect the results have indicated that encouraging recipient country ownership ensures engagement and this can be achieved through piloting training interventions which have ‘shared ownership models’ of delivery. Providing information on, and sharing information around, evaluation practice and conducting evaluations based upon designed intent would improve development practice.

In addition, the study has designed and presented a ‘model of meaningful intervention practice’, intended to guide future practice, which includes suggestions and approaches to give voice to the recipients of aid, and to avoid the growing charge of ‘outsider’ perceptions which are proving to be of questionable. The findings of this study would provide valuable insights for policy makers, administrators, and trainers in both donor and recipient countries.
Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge the support I have received from the University, where I worked for nearly a decade, and the same University that allowed me to complete this PhD in almost the exact amount of time.

Helen Hill for getting me started, over a beer and nibbles, and daring to suggest that this journey was my next one, this is apart from her valuable insights into Timor-Leste issues.

Hurriyet Babacan for her support in the early stages, and for getting me through the tangled web of university bureaucracy, and being there at the beginning while I tried to work out whether I had anything to contribute.

There is no doubt persistence pays off, and I owe much to my principal supervisor Margaret Malloch, in keeping me engaged and on the task. I have known Marg for more than a couple of decades, and her perseverance and persistence with me was commendable.

My co-supervisor James Sillitoe, is an institutional stalwart, he has led many PhD candidates through these turbulent thought processes, and he does this with such humility, that the journey is made all that more bearable. I am honoured to have had this experience with Jim.

To my formative teachers and gurus along the way, thank you.

I would like to thank my Indonesian and Timor-Leste colleagues who provided me with some wonderful insights into their worlds, for their openness and honesty in their considered responses to my questioning. I would particularly like to thank Dr Joao Cancio Freitas who not only gave his time, and encouraged me to carry out this research, he also consented for me to use his ‘insights and experiences’ as the Minister of Education Timor-Leste, in an open and transparent way.

My dear friend David, of many decades, who kept asking, pushing, and providing ideas, thoughts about directions and friendly critique, many thanks.

Finally to my family, particular my wife Valoura, who supported me in those difficult times, when I could have gone off the rails. Many many thanks.
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Glossary:

Bule Indonesian for ‘foreigner’
Busan Venue for the 5th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness
CIV TAA Certificate IV Training and Assessment
Developmentalist Aid and development practitioner
Mulae (Malae) Tetum for ‘foreigner’
Tibar National Centre for Vocational Training in Tibar
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<td>ALP</td>
<td>Adult Learning Principals</td>
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<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBT</td>
<td>Competency Based Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
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<td>ESSP</td>
<td>Education Sector Support Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>FretiLin</td>
<td>Frente Revolucionária do Timor- Leste Independente</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoI</td>
<td>Government of Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRD</td>
<td>Human Resource Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IASTP</td>
<td>Indonesia Australia Specialized Training Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICR</td>
<td>Independent Completion Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organisation</td>
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<td>INDMO</td>
<td>National Labour Force Development Institute, Timor-Leste</td>
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<td>IPR</td>
<td>Independent Progress Report</td>
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<td>KKN</td>
<td>Corruption Collusion and Nepotism</td>
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<td>LAN</td>
<td>Institute of Public Administration-Lembaga Administrasi Negara</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>MoE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education Timor-Leste</td>
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<td>MOEC</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Culture Indonesia</td>
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<td>NQF</td>
<td>National Qualifications Framework</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Most Significant Change</td>
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<td>MTR</td>
<td>Mid Term Review</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Government Organisation</td>
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<td>NTT</td>
<td>Nusa Tengarah Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>SETNEG</td>
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<td>TVET</td>
<td>Technical Vocational and Training</td>
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<td>TVSD</td>
<td>Technical Vocational Skills Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNTAET</td>
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Prologue

This research study originates from my-decade long experience as a manager of aid and development programs at a University in Melbourne, Australia. During this time, I became aware of the apparent ease with which systems and processes dictated the manner and performance of individuals and institutions. These processes, it appeared, were sacrosanct; seldom if ever questioned, poorly understood by those involved yet adhered to unquestionably. But I began to feel that something was not quite right, and I began to reflect on my unease with this situation by recalling my various experiences in this position.

My journey began with a fascination with Indonesia and Timor-Leste some 40 years ago as I travelled through Indonesia on my ‘gap year’, as we have now come to know it. I took an interest in journalism and media analysis, and as a young and very naive photographer I saw before me at the Kupang airport a very large collection of Indonesian warplanes on the tarmac with an associated high level on military activity taking place. As I proceeded to board my plane back to Darwin, I was halted by at least three Indonesian TNI soldiers, with guns raised, demanding my camera. Obviously, I handed over the camera, and as they ripped the film from inside, my career as a budding photojournalist was over, but my life was intact. The day was Saturday December 6 1975, the evening before the Indonesian invasion of Timor-Leste. I was lucky, whereas many Timorese were not.

The impact of this event on me, and the world, was quite profound. Timor-Leste suffered through those dark years as they tried to get their message of the genocide of their people, at the hands of the Indonesian invaders, to the outside world (Chomsky & Herman, 1980). The media played a significant role in this difficulty by turning a blind eye to the events. At this time, as I worked as a media teacher, questions around what is included and what is not included in our media became a personal and professional narrative. I would

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1 Kupang is the Indonesian owned part of the Greater Timor Island.
2 TNI is the Tentara Nationional Indonesia, the Indonesian Armed forces.
regularly invite alternative voices to be heard in my media classes, in order for my students to discover that the media is a construction of a certain reality. This approach to media analysis, particularly following the work of Stuart Hall from the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies, was critical in forming my own healthy skepticism toward what an image creates, what a text includes, what a program is or is not, and what makes an ‘expert’ or not (Hall, 1983).

Some 20 years after Indonesia’s invasion of Timor-Leste (1995), I was involved in an action meeting called at the Australian Volunteers’ International Office in Fitzroy on a cold wintery Melbourne night. The meeting was called to discuss what actions we could take to help Timor’s cause. Gathered around a white board, the expert facilitator began to write up suggestions from the committed ten or so people who had gathered. The ideas flew around the room; a trivia night, an information stall at the market, a raffle, a book-stall, until a determined and vocal member of the group demanded that we get the Australian military to invade East Timor and rid the Timorese of the Indonesians. This call to arms shocked the facilitator, who refused to put this idea on the whiteboard. This refusal bought cries of discrimination from the forward-thinking disgruntled group member, who then left the room agitated that his ideas weren’t being considered. The ‘think tank’ settled on an information stall outside a local supermarket³.

Sometime later, while I was working in an International Office of a university in Melbourne, I was struck by the many different interpretations being placed upon Aid and Development activities within the University. I became increasingly critical of what I have termed the ‘blind developmentalist’, a person who goes about his/her highly paid work providing ‘expert’ advice to nascent government ministers and development donors, and giving their critique of the lack of ‘professionalism’ in their local counterparts. I listened to, and observed many of these conversations, and indeed may have partaken in a few of these less-than-convivial evenings.

³Four years later (1999), the Australian Armed forces took UN-sanctioned military action to stop the bloodshed in Timor-Leste, and, as they say, the rest is history. This experience told me much about notions of ‘expert’ and ‘crackpot’, and has certainly contributed to the development of this thesis. No person enters a room unaware of the environment, audience or circumstance, however consciously or unconsciously this greets them. A person, walking around with the title ‘expert’ expects that they should be listened to; I contend that this is a completely indefensible proposition.
Rarely, and only once in my working life at the University, did I hear a voice articulating a humanistic and compassionate rationale to engage in development, and this came from the then Chancellor, at a strategic planning conference at the University in 2002. He stated:

If we are not involved in activities such as Timor, then we as a University must question what our purpose is.

I think that this was a key moment in my reflections on the nature and circumstances of the work with which I had become involved. I also drew inspiration from Etherington’s *Becoming a Reflexive Researcher*, which helped me draw strength from taking a reflexive approach (Etherington, 2004). I consequently came to this research with the view that alternative stories needed to be told, and that not enough was being done to expose the nature and extent of power, corruption, nepotism, and structural flaws in program design, which lead inexorably to a sheer waste of donor money.

Whilst this was the subtext for my working life, it did not always drive my own personal intentions. I concentrated my interest toward the Indonesian and Timor-Leste development activity, as I had direct experience of the development context-poverty and circumstances in these countries. This bias toward these two countries happened to suit my University, and gave me the opportunity to advance my personal interests along with meeting my employer’s expectations. I would argue that this personal experience has influenced my views, impacted upon my understanding, and allowed me to confront my own prejudices.
The rationale for engaging in this research was to help uncover, in the field of International Aid and Development, the choices that are being made either explicitly or implicitly. Key questions which began to form, were, in the course of an Aid Program:

- Who decides on the nature of the program?
- Who is included and involved in the program?
- What are the chosen outcomes of the program?
- What are the benefits of the work?
- How can we measure these benefits?
- How have circumstances changed as a result of our engagement?

Finally, I explicitly recognise that my gender, social class, ethnicity, educational background, culture and ideological influences, have significantly positioned me in relation to this discussion and research. I acknowledge the existence of these influences, even if I am the last to know and recognise what and how these biases and prejudices might manifest in my thinking. This is a position, I argue in this research, is known as our ‘common sense truths’ about the world.

I have applied structuralist narrative in this work, borrowing heavily from cultural theorists, particularly those involved in media and text analysis (Fiske & Hartley, 2003; Hall, 1983; Williamson, 1978). Embedded in this approach is the notion that we can learn more from what is missing in a development context than we can from what is included. As a consequence, programs, project design documents, completion reports and reviews are examined from the perspective of ‘what is not included’, and I believe that this leads to a more thorough exploration of intent. It is also important to note that, in this approach, a first step in the process of detecting social control and dominant ideology sits with the auteur (in this case the Researcher), and thus the auteur is required to examine and confront his or her own biases. Therefore, I have entered this thesis with the intent to examine the status of ‘Self as a Researcher’, and this resonates with the use of the process of reflection as a research method, which allows for a far more personal account of the research conversation and positions me in the centre of the study.
Chapter One: Introduction

The thesis will be structured as follows, beginning with an introduction to the research context including articulating the research aim, followed by a literature review of current development practice focusing on evaluation and training interventions. The thesis then provides an explanation of the conceptual framework and methodology applied in the study. The findings are defined according to the themes emanating from the Indonesian and Timor-Leste context. The analysis section of the study seeks to clarify the problem, with a view toward moving to a solution, concluding with an approach to development intervention that proposes appropriate and meaningful practice.

Research Context

The debate around aid effectiveness to recipient countries has increased considerably over the past decade (Copestake & Williams, 2014). It has certainly been catalyzed by events surrounding the World Financial Crisis, but is also due, in part, to a growing criticism coming from within the corridors of the World Bank and other donors (Cooper & Walters, 2009; Easterly, 2014). In addition, there has been an equally loud, and more obvious criticism, from aid workers on the front-line, accompanied by voices from recipient countries demanding a greater donor effort regarding harmonization of international donor activities (Boupha, 2007; Fredriksen, 2009; Yumiko, 2009).

In ‘White Mans’ Burden’ (Easterly, 2007), an approach to capacity building has been articulated, which encourages involvement of frontline workers and institutes develop and construct aid programs that meet the needs identified at the grassroots level. This is described as ‘development from the ‘Searchers‘ perspective’. In contrast to this view, is an understanding of development from the ‘Planners‘ perspective’, who are often individuals sitting in distant donor countries, planning approaches to development which have little relationship to activities ‘on the ground’ in recipient countries. This critical assessment of the opposing internal tensions within attempts at capacity building is a central theme in many recent reviews and assessments of
development activity (Copestake & Williams, 2014; Easterly & Pufitze, 2008; Hughes, 2009; Riddell, 2012).

In addition, Dambisa Moyo’s ‘Dead Aid’ (2009), has clarified aspects of the debate considerably with her critical analysis of the dependence of African countries on aid, including an argument that there is no direct correlation between donor aid contributions and economic growth. Indeed, it has been suggested that the aid contribution may simply be one mechanism for opening up the African continent to globalization (Ahluwalia, 2001). At the core of this important debate lies the issue of the donor’s ability to improve the impact of development assistance, and Moyo’s account of development assistance provided by the West in Africa is scathing. However others, including Hoebink, Watkins, and King (2009), writing in NORRAG Edition 42 on Aid Effectiveness, disagree with this analysis, and suggest that the ‘evidence’ presented by Moyo to support these claims is seriously wanting.

Governments (both donor and recipient) who are concerned about the ‘effectiveness’ of development assistance, have put in place efforts to measure the effectiveness of aid by creating high level conferences resulting in, for example, the Busan Partnership for Effective Development (OECD, 2011), the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2005) and the Accra Agenda (OECD, 2008). These conferences, orchestrated by the Development Cooperation Directorate of OECD, articulate the need to measure and review aid practices in order to improve efficiencies and to facilitate harmonization of donor practice. In addition, they are attempting to encourage ownership of aid practices by recipient countries, and develop partnerships with all sectors in civil society. An important aim of these movements is to ensure that positive inroads can be made into meeting Millennium Development Goals and the newer Sustainable Development Goals appropriate to the aid context (Copestake & Williams, 2014; Dietrich, 2016; Wilks, 2010).

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4 NORRAG is the Network for International policies and cooperation in education and training at http://www.norrag.org
It is anticipated that this research will add to the body of knowledge in this important area. Contributions will be made to the academic critiques of development practice, including the perspectives on the monitoring and evaluation of aid frameworks, and to the donor institutions’ reflections on current development practices. The intent of this work is to more clearly inform practitioners of a range of meaningful practice approaches and policy directions for training program design and for monitoring and evaluation techniques. It is further anticipated that this research may uncover a model for more appropriate methods of designing and developing capacity building programs, particularly in Indonesia and Timor-Leste. It has been commented that, too often, training approaches and capacity building programs used by coordinating donor institutions such as World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, have fallen significantly short of their expected goals (Canagarajah, Dar, Nording, & Raju, 2002).

Currently, it is claimed that political economic analysis of the aid sector is underdeveloped (Cooper & Walters, 2009; Copestake & Williams, 2014; Easterly & Pfutze, 2008). In this respect, recent studies suggest that some of the donor interventions, particularly International Monetary Fund and The World Bank’s structural adjustment programs, are in themselves driven by the desire to open up markets (Perkins, 2004). This is done in order to suit the needs of globalization, and, as a result, ‘aid’ has little to do with assisting the recipient population’s needs, and are more to do with stimulating economic development (Ahluwalia, 2001). In addition, there are several studies reporting that tensions exist between the introduction of development programs from multilateral donors and the relatively fragile National Governments, who are attempting to assert their own version of adult education and training. The circumstance of Timor-Leste is an intriguing example of this situation, and it is well described by Boughton in Challenging Donor Agendas in Adult and Workplace Education in Timor-Leste (Cooper & Walters, 2009).

It is felt here that it is important to draw on the stance provided by a ‘postcolonial lens’ in order to question the role of current development
initiatives and to foreground the dominant cultural representations or representations of institutional practices (Johnson, 2004). Further, it is hoped that this perspective will enable the possibility for the introduction of transformatory practices in this area. Kapoor (2008) has examined the postcolonial politics of development in key areas such as ‘governance,’ ‘human rights’ and ‘participation’ to better understand and contest the production of knowledge in developmental activities. In particular, issues such as cultural assumptions, power implications and hegemonic politics have been highlighted (Kapoor, 2008). Further, Kapoor points out how development practitioners and westernized elites and intellectuals are often complicit in this process of neo-colonial knowledge production. He posits that by giving foreign aid or promoting participation and democracy, this act frequently masks institutional biases, together with their underlying economic and geopolitical interests.

Equally, the impact of introducing adult learning principles and frameworks from well-developed international and foreign sources, imposes hegemonic institutional structures on aid recipients, and recently, adult education theorists and writers have explicitly commented on this imposition (Foley, 2004; Griffin, 2011). Hegemonic control, in this context, emerges in the form of shaping the general populace’s consent as being ‘common sense’ (Thwaites, Davis, & Mules, 1994), and this outcome is detected in the ‘common sense truths’ that oppressors and the oppressed take for granted. Further insightful discussion and explanation of the implicit nature of this stance has been persuasively made in Representation (Hall, 1997). The results of this process are that a group of people who are in the ‘developmental care’ of an aid organization, accept as normal, natural and as needing no explanation, certain conditions and understandings that are actually catering to the interests of a separate group. To make this issue more complex, in this international area, development assistance comes in many guises. It has been suggested that the Organization for Economic Development’s [OECD] Assessment of Higher Education Learning Outcomes

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5The term Development Care, in this context, can be taken to mean ‘to be employed by’. 
initiative, in fact positions ‘students’ as represented objects through the approach of classifying and marking texts (Shahjahan, Morgan, & Nguyen, 2015) as a means to justify OECD intervention, and also to standardize testing. Although this research has been carried out using a small sample, the intention of this study is to be illustrative of Stuart Hall’s concept of ‘representation’, where he said:

Language does not work like a mirror. Meaning is produced within language, in and through various representational systems which, for convenience, we call ‘languages’. Meaning is produced by the practice, the ‘work’, of representation. It is constructed through signifying- i.e. meaning-producing-practices (Hall, 1997, p. 28).

These ‘common sense truths’ are the modus operandi of the development practitioner, which means that these international development specialists carry their understandings, knowledge and practice from abroad to the site of aid practice without question, and thus begin to impose their ‘ways of seeing’ (Berger, 1972) or ‘way of life’ (Johnson, 2004) onto their recipient counterparts. It is clear that this phenomenon is a worthy discussion in itself, and has been explored in Kenneth King’s writings on Aid and Education in the Developing World (King, 1991). This methodological framework is at the core of cultural studies, and is what Stuart Hall describes as ‘ideology at work’ (Hall, 1983) or, in the lexicon of Johnson, a ‘way of life’, as is described here:

It (a way of life) includes the meaning-making agency of a social group or an individual, [which is] its self-production. It also includes the cultural forms-discourses, narratives, styles, values -by which a group makes itself culturally, including its ethical preferences. It includes the group’s work around self and others-its psycho-social identifications, disidentifications, aspirations and fantasies. ‘Way of Life’ also includes the means of subsistence, the world of objects and everyday practices that reproduce material life (Johnson, 2004, p. 211).

‘Way of life’ expresses the meaning-making of other common sense truths, which also may be racial in nature. Ideas of ‘race’ have shaped social and political relations all over the world for centuries. However over the past several decades, global manifestations of racism have undergone significant transformations. Ideologies of racism are now inextricably linked to the ongoing process of globalization and neo-globalization. As Thompson (1990) explains:
Relations of domination may be established and sustained by constructing, at the symbolic level, a form of unity which embraces individuals in a collective identity, irrespective of the differences and divisions that may separate them (Thompson, 1990, p. 64).

In this respect, the intensifying flows of money, people, ideas, images, values, and technology across the world, meet with varying and sometimes conflicting responses, and the reality of the twenty-first century is of increased interaction, conflict and struggles over power and resources. Indeed, the processes of globalization create new and complex forms of racism, while perpetuating older forms of racism, dispossession and discrimination. Whilst these processes of globalization may not appear to be racialized in themselves, they do, however, promote and build on colonial structures that have already created racialized and unequal distributions of wealth and power (B. Jones, 2008; Sivanandan, 2006; Winant, 2006). The United Nations (2001) identified five key areas of concern in which racism is manifested in the 21st century:

- Trafficking in women and children - often referred to as the "new slave trade";
- Migration and discrimination;
- Gender and racial discrimination;
- Racism against Indigenous peoples;
- Protection of minority rights.

Racialized global hierarchies operate at both the personal and the institutional and structural levels, and are directly relevant to aid practice. Commenting on global international relations, Jones (2008) asserts that the current world order is characterised by profound global inequality, depicted through reference to the developed and developing world. She notes, however, that the racialized character of global inequalities in power is rarely acknowledged, as explicit racial discourse has been removed from the institutional form of the modern world order. This apparent transcendence of race is mirrored in the lack of attention given to this notion in debates. Global interventions, in relation to many development issues, are also determined within racialized international power plays (Babacan, Babacan, & Gopalkrishnan, 2009).
We suggest that an examination of the cross-cultural issues in training interventions may reveal the underpinning racial and cultural biases of the donor practices. The working title of this current research is “Looking for a Way Out”, and whilst this may seem like a rhetorical statement, it is meant to be one of altered perception. How one views the nature of a problem depends upon the position you hold, and whilst some practitioners may be clear about their ideological positions and rationale for engaging in development practice, others are patently less so. In 1983, Stuart Hall in a public address on ‘Ideology in the Modern World’ at Latrobe University, reminded us that when we declare ‘of course’ in our common everyday speech, we are being our most ideological:

The moment you say ‘of course’ to an ideology, you are in the most ideological bit of it, and the only way of coming out of it is to say not ‘of course’ at all but ‘why of course’ (Hall, 1983).

Hall posited that what is seemingly obvious and ‘common sense’ to us connects directly with our interpretation of the world, because we share with our close acquaintances, common understandings of the way things ‘ought to be’. Thus, in our own cultures, with our own ideologies, things naturally make sense. This approach to making meaning from the world around us, is imbedded in theoretical discourses of cultural studies, and pays homage to writers such as Raymond Williams (1961), Stuart Hall (1983), Roland Barthes (1973) and, more recently, Richard Johnson (2004) and Meaghan Morris (2006).

By applying a theoretical discourse such as that of cultural studies onto the aid lexicon, it is possible to gain a deeper understanding of the language of development assistance. This can be illustrated when we juxtapose these ‘ways of thinking’ and ‘ways of seeing’ about our world, onto, (i) other circumstances, (ii) other countries and (iii) foreign environments. It becomes clear that there is a mismatch or incongruity between, on the one hand, our common sense version of ‘what to do’ versus the localized version of ‘what is needed’. Knowledge, in relation to development assistance, is constructed and firmly entrenched in our western dominant donor cultural/ideological
background. This notion is illustrated in the ‘common sense’ statements which follow:

- Of course, Africa needs development assistance from the West;
- Of course, capacity building requires technical ‘know how’ from the West;
- Of course, international training requires an international expert;
- Of course, competency-based training meets industry requirements;
- Of course, CBT is required in an Indonesian and Timor-Leste context;
- Of course, vocational skills training leads to employment.

Studies have confirmed that there is no causal connection in these above statements (Cooper & Walters, 2009; Easterly, 2014; Moyo, 2011). However, these statements continue to resonate with development practitioners, and are explicitly endorsed by donor institutions (Chowdhury, 2005; The World Bank, 2010). We posit that acknowledging the ideological ‘frames of reference’ used when examining skills development and training and its impact on aid practices, is an essential first step to understanding the complexity of the aid problem. This study will look at a number of examples of aid situations where these ‘frames of reference’ are not made explicit by the writers or authors of monitoring and evaluation reports, and, as such, we will challenge the validity of those reports. This research will further critically examine ‘closed’ evaluation systems, which seem to operate in order to perpetuate their own existence. In addition, we suspect some of the donors’ training programs fall into this category, indicating that there may be little need, nor desire, to change on the part of the donor organisation. If this is so, it implies the existence of a system that benefits those that are fully occupied, employed and engaged in it.

As a result, this study has focused on an exploration of the benefits of applying a more ‘open’ evaluation system which: (i) examines the impact of such an open approach, (ii) reviews the system of inputs and outcomes to the evaluation, (iii) encourages debate and discussion around the value of the aid
program, and (iv) accepts the need to change and alter practice according to the original design intentions of the aid program. In summary, we assert that attempting to identify a model of meaningful practice with appropriate changes in evaluation and training interventions, will produce an ‘open’ evaluation system, and this is worthy of further examination.

**Research Aims**

The present study was undertaken to (i) define skills development in an aid and development context, (ii) to evaluate the effectiveness of training interventions, and (iii) to investigate the monitoring and evaluation instruments applied in these training contexts. In essence, the research aimed to:

Define skills development in the context of existing aid practices, the target audiences and the method of delivery, by interviewing Indonesian and Timor-Leste nationals;
Document and critique existing training approaches used in the aid community;
Examine the measures used to determine the success or otherwise of existing training practices;
Explore the methodologies used in both the ‘aid’ and ‘training’ approaches;
Provide an analysis to inform the aid donor community of ‘best practice’ in training and capacity building approaches;
Inform the aid community of possible options for increased effectiveness of aid funding.

In the light of such significant investment amounts by The World Bank and other multi-lateral and bi-lateral organisations, for example the Australian Aid programs, which have been provided for the development of resources within client/recipient countries, there is a reasonable expectation (Chowdhury, 2005; Farmer, Denton, Hollway, Reid, & Howes, 2011), that aid donors should be making in-roads into building strong institutional capacities in client countries. However, reviews of 212 USAID educational projects revealed that 90% were unsustainable (Kean, 1998) and The World Bank’s own study of
550 education projects declared that only half were sustainable (The World Bank, 1990).

Given that training is a significant part of donor engagement in client/recipient countries (The World Bank, 2008), this research seeks to determine what changes could be made to training, including evaluations of training, which could improve the impact of donor interventions in skills development and capacity building in Indonesia and Timor-Leste\(^6\). These two countries were chosen for this study because they are two of the biggest recipient countries supported by the Australian Government foreign aid programs; Indonesia accounting for 44.8%, and Timor-Leste accounting for a further 7.1% of the Australian aid commitments to East Asia in 2014 and 2015. Combined, this aid represents more than half the total Australian aid commitment to East Asia of $701 million (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2015).

It is pertinent to note that these aid and development activities represent an annual $100 billion dollar business, based on developing programs which seek to help the poor around the world (Easterly & Pfullze, 2008). A considerable amount of this money is invested in training interventions in an effort to provide sustainable development. However, we are aware that the measures used to assess the value of these training interventions are open to question, as has been noted by The World Bank’s own Independent Evaluation Group (Carden, 2013; Nelson, 2006; The World Bank, 2008). In this respect, programs to help training recipient communities to manage, develop and ‘own’ the skills development process, may prove to be the most beneficial international aid response by donor governments and multi and bilateral institutions (White, 2005). Through an evaluation of existing training approaches and the methodologies employed in the aid and development sector, (particularly as these relate to Indonesia and Timor-Leste), this research will aim to contribute to a possible way forward for improving donor training and evaluation interventions.

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\(^6\)Timor-Leste is the Portuguese word for East Timor.
This research adopts, as a conceptual framework, paradigms of learning that are based on the development of capacities that go far beyond the cognitive. Thus knowledge and learning is taken as a change agent that enables ‘know how’ of various kinds and allows the learner to act on that knowledge, as well as to develop ‘awareness of self’ as an agent of change (Foley, 2004; Freire, 1993). Long-term sustainable development outcomes require that capacity be built into the recipient community for ongoing benefits, thus training local communities to manage, develop and own the skills development process, may prove to be the most beneficial international aid response for the recipient countries (Powell, 2001).

We suggest that through a careful evaluation of existing training approaches, methodologies and evaluation frameworks which are currently employed in the aid and development sector, subtle improvements might be found that could have significant impacts on training interventions in terms of sustainable skills development in recipient countries and for improved donor engagement.

**The Research Questions**

The research aims can be achieved by seeking to make contributions to the understanding of two key questions. These are:

- What is the impact of skills development and training on aid practices?
- What improvements can be made to the evaluation of these practices in order to ensure appropriate and responsive development outcomes?

In order to provide systematic and reasoned bases for these contributions, this research explores methods and approaches in training and development programs to uncover what might be some of the underlying impediments to capacity building. Further, it aims to reveal a number of impacts that are worthy of analysis including: (i) dependence upon international advisors (Powell, 2001), (ii) failure to use local capacity (Carden, 2013; Neves), and (iii) the lack of skills transference to local staff (Pilar, 2010). In addition, the research will look at the political, economic and regional agendas of donor policies and donor-led agenda, related to the tying of aid to specific issues, such as conditionality (Powell, 2001), the dependence of aid upon technical
assistance (Easterly & Pfutze, 2008), the concepts of TVET policy impositions (including Demand-Driven TVET, National Quality Frameworks, and Adult Learning Principles (Allais, 2014; Coles, Keevy, Bateman, & Keating, 2014)), as well as the more generic cross-cultural issues (particularly gender and governance).

Finally, in order to respond to the key research question of ensuring improvements to evaluation practice the research will develop appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems based upon these three basic questions;

- Where are we?
- Where do we want to go?
- What progress is being made? (Powell, 2012, p. 24)

This approach is designed to be different to those that develop and employ monitoring and evaluation systems to justify and mask the impact of donor engagement. These latter approaches are based upon short time lines and narrow definitions of donor success, and look at singular projects rather than system development (Carden, 2013).

The next Chapter, Literature Review, will examine the emerging issues in development practice and provide parameters around the skills debate in vocational training. The literature review will also examine ‘governance and ethical practice’ as this relates to the management and evaluation of training interventions; exploring the academic literature along with commissioned reports to identifying existing practice and possible improvements.
Chapter Two: Literature Review

In Chapter One, it was noted that a significant amount of Australian aid money has been provided for developing countries, in particular Indonesia and Timor-Leste, but that there have been some critical questions emerging about the actual impact of the related development and training practices. In consequence, it was considered that a focus on these practices, and their evaluation, might assist aid agencies to provide more culturally sensitive approaches. This task has been encapsulated in the two research questions which were introduced in Chapter One. These were:

What is the impact of skills development and training on aid practices?
What improvements can be made to the evaluation of these practices in order to ensure appropriate and responsive development outcomes?

This review of literature has been provided to assess the scholarly response, to date, of attempts to understand the importance of these issues to development aid, and to consider the strengths and weaknesses of current programs and evaluations in the Indonesian and Timor-Leste areas.

The recognition of this issue of misconstrued development aid has been raised in high profile forums on development effectiveness and assistance held in Rome, Paris, Accra and Busan in 2003, 2005, 2008 and 2011 respectively. These fora have attempted to focus the world's attention on development issues, both good and bad, and the resolutions of the “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness” (OECD, 2005) highlight this work.

An appreciation of the magnitude of the concern that is felt, world-wide, for this issue, is reflected in (i) the amount of aid that is provided annually for these programs, and (ii) the increasing number of donor nations and organisations that are contributing to the area. Indeed, the range of Western donors, through the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), coupled with the emergence of other multilateral banks, emerging nations

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OECD’s Development Cooperation Directorate administers the DAC
and philanthropic donors, which was the focus of the Busan Partnership agreement, illustrates that international development assistance, as a business enterprise, is yet to reach its zenith (Deutscher, 2009).

It has also been observed that:

The total volume of aid has grown dramatically, driven by: large increases in aid from traditional donors (basically the Western industrialised countries); the emergence of new non–government donors (such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) and global funds (for example the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria); and the rapid growth in aid from non–traditional donors such as China and Brazil (Farmer et al., 2011, p. 10).

**Part I Emerging issues**

It has been further noted that any meaningful analysis of skills development and training in a developmental context, needs to include an understanding and acceptance of the enterprise activity and the vested interests by donor and business entities. This first component of Part I Emerging issues ensures the maintenance of their ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ interests (Development Assistance Research Associates, 2009; Easterly, 2008; Perkins, 2004). Following this discussion is a breakdown of the case of Indonesia and Timor-Leste and donor expectations and the impact of the National Quality Frameworks along with issues of development practice including a ‘rights based’ perspective and the impact of new players and partners in development. The final component addresses cultural representations in a development context.

In addition to the overwhelming importance of this business perspective and the associated financial drivers of profit-making business, development assistance is also unavoidably embedded in political, moral, ideological, social and religious contexts (Balthasar, 2000; Cooper & Walters, 2009; National Human Development Report Unit, 2005). Further, Dietrich (2016) has recently mentioned the significant relationships between the political economies of the donors and the impact that this has had on aid policies. It has been identified that each of these ‘value positions’ impact on skills development and training

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8 The emerging nations of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are commonly referred to as BRICS. Other definitions have included; BASIC Brazil, Africa, South India and China; and IBSA – India, Brazil and South Africa. [Dialogue Forum].
in specific and identifiable ways (Boughton & Durnan, 2004; R. Shah & Quinn, 2016; Von Kotze).

As a response, this thesis is examining the impact of skills development and training on aid practices with particular reference to Indonesia and Timor-Leste and will do so in the context of these embedded value positions. In this respect, whilst it is true that existing literature indicates that there were some points of difference between Indonesian and Timor-Leste development practices, it has nevertheless been recognized that comparisons between these situations can be made in a skills development context (Alto, 2000; Kingsbury & Leach, 2007).

The cases of Indonesia and Timor-Leste

In recent years, there has been increasing interest in skills development, education and training in a development context, noting that Timor-Leste particularly, and Indonesia to a lesser extent, are countries in the formative years of developing appropriate and relevant systems for managing vocational education and training. These systems are likely to take decades to mature, as was the case in advanced western countries (Hopkins & Maglen, 2000) and the expectation that Timor-Leste can achieve this in a few years is challenging to say the least (The World Bank, 2004).

There have been several studies in the literature reporting that the Timorese context of skills development is nascent and open to, or exposed to, western intervention (Boughton; Cooper & Walters, 2009; Shepherd, 2013). A newly recognized independent nation recovering from 24 years of oppression under Indonesian occupation, the impact of which is noted by Helen Hill in The contribution of education to development (Hill, 2005), left the ‘education sector devoid’ of any qualified and experienced education staff and administrators (Nicolai, 2004). Indonesians largely staffed the schools and institutions, in particular the Ministry of Education, as this was seen as a way of controlling the populace during occupation times. When independence came to Timor-Leste, and these Indonesian officials returned home, there was a consequent skills hiatus (Wigglesworth, 2010) which required urgent and major attention.
Other studies indicate that, at the same time, skills development in a vocational education and training context in Indonesia, have developed rapidly since the late 70s (Alto, 2000; Helmy, 2014; Robinson, 1999). It is claimed that:

There has been massive development of the formal education and training sector in Indonesia over the past 30 years or so. This has seen the number of students rise by 300% from just over 15 million at the beginning of the 1970s, to approaching 50 million students today (Robinson, 1999, p. 13).

Robinson goes on to state that much of this increase in education and training has taken place in the vocational training in secondary schools:

The total number of vocational secondary students in Indonesia grew by more than 60% from the early 1980s to the present time (1997) ...this figure had reached 1.6 million by 1995-6. This represents some 35% of all secondary students in Indonesia, or some 13.6% of the 16-18 year old population (Robinson, 1999, p. 17).

As has been noted in the National Taskforce Report into the development of vocational education and training in Indonesia (MOEC, 1997), in order to improve the development of the TVET system there have been a number of approaches and contributions made. There has been attention given to standards and certification, there has been the engagement of key industries in the training and development arena, and there has been considerable donor assistance provided to support these plans, including that from Australian donor activity in manufacturing and automotive skills development\(^9\).

In Indonesia in the mid-1990s, there was an emphasis on the production of high quality teaching and learning materials, which were specifically designed for Indonesia (MOEC, 1997). In addition, early versions of manpower planning (and & National Service, 1966) were re-articulated to determine where the Government of Indonesia should ‘plan’ its vocational educational and training interventions. However, some literature suggests that this approach was about ‘picking winners’, in that it placed emphasis on industries that a

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\(^9\) The Indonesia Australian Partnership for Skills Development (IAPSD) (Hunt, 2012).
Government bureaucracy deemed to be relevant and desirable. Later criticism suggests that this is a ‘planned intervention approach’, and recipient countries should be wary of a development approaches that are supply-driven (Wade, 2009).

The National Quality Frameworks

In respect of the issue of standards and certification, studies which were made of the literature (Allais, 2014; Blackmur, 2015) have revealed that international donors have played a significant role in the development of TVET National Qualifications Frameworks [NQF]. However, the impact of these contributions have not been thoroughly investigated (Keating, 2011; Powell, 2001), and it appears that the Ministry of Education and Culture in Indonesia, with assistance from the German government, supported the development and implementation of a market oriented training system (MOEC, 1997). Stolte (2006) noted that this introduction improved the quality and efficiency of the labour force, and also the competitiveness of companies, the economic sector and industrial regions (Bunning & Zhao, 2006). In a parallel development, the Secretary of State for Policy Vocational Training and Employment [SEPFOPE] in Timor-Leste, with development assistance from the ILO, have developed a particularly ‘Australian version’ of a Timor-Leste National Qualifications Framework\textsuperscript{10}. However, subsequent studies that have examined these donor interventions in setting national frameworks have been somewhat critical of these approaches (Coles et al., 2014; Wade, 2009).

Despite the proliferation of NQFs around the globe, it is claimed that they are becoming increasingly regionalized (Chisholm & Leyendecker, 2008; Coles et al., 2014; Ozga & Jones, 2006). Lugg, writing in Cooper and Walters Learning/Work titled Making Different Equal?, she noted that the more ‘localised’ the nature of an NQF, the greater is its impact and significance:

Local concerns remain significant as borrowed policies become embedded in local contexts… NQFs link the national and the global, weakening boundaries between them, and offering points at which global pressures may be bought to bear in the restructuring of national states. (Cooper & Walters, 2009, p. 55)

\textsuperscript{10} A cursory examination of the TL NQF against the Australian NQF would reveal the similarities.
Many studies reveal that, in general, industry needs to be involved in the
development of education system design and integration with workforce
development, standards and certification. If this is not the case, TVET training
becomes supply-driven rather than demand-driven (Chowdhury, 2005;
Comyn, 2007) which may lead to building physical institutions with little
connection with industry needs (Berryman & Coxon, 2010). Others argue that
in countries where there is little or no industry, then skills development needs
to lean toward civil and community needs, particularly in the case of self-
employment (Grierson, 1997), and assist communities to move from
sustainable development to sustainable livelihoods (Tikly et al., 2003 ; Von
Kotze, 2009).

The development practices

Many commentators have asserted that it is beholden upon the donor
community and governments to improve development practices. They argue
that the entire aid-effectiveness dialogue should focus on improved
development outcomes, predominantly in skills development. In particular, the
development practices that require special focus, include flaws in program
design, lack of monitoring and evaluation frameworks, the process of
measuring outcomes and understanding the meaning of capacity building
(Carden, 2013; Fraser, 2008; Nelson, 2006).

Further to this, it has been widely acknowledged in the literature that flaws in
development assistance occur, for the most part, around the program design
phase and the planned monitoring and evaluation and assessment measures.
This was certainly noted by Tapp (2011) in the Study of Australia's approach
to aid in Indonesia for the Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness. He
commented that:

AusAID Indonesia is good at ensuring evaluations and reviews occur and the
quality of some of them is high, though many suffer from a lack of evidence to
support findings and recommendations. There is little consistency in their
terms of reference, objectives and even in clarifying what they are for and for
whom (Tapp, 2011, p. 10).
Although the above review examined the lack of consistency between Terms of Reference and objectives, it has been noted that there are very few studies of the evaluation processes and standards applied in international development (Rutkowski & Sparks, 2014). An analysis of models of evaluation is required to examine the nexus between program design, objectives, outcomes and monitoring and evaluation frameworks, and this lack is one of the key motivations behind the present research.

There is pertinent literature which describes development assistance in terms of the language of ‘capacity building’ (Lockheed, 2009), which is open to criticism in that it delivers training related to direct project implementation, but does not build and strengthen institutional capacity. This leaves a gap when these donors leave the program, particularly when donors have not partnered with local organizations (Wigglesworth, 2016). It is consequently thought that the move away from capacity building to capacity development, and the positioning of the ‘recipients’ in the development process as ‘actors’ reflecting upon their practice and not taking as given western notions of best practice (Saunders, 2006), might provide a more positive and lasting model of aid development.

Rights-based development

Eyben (2013) describes the challenges faced over many decades by major western donors who are concerned about the notion of rights-based development, and the accompanying waste and duplication found in the development sector. This concern has led to the establishment of protocols and procedures for improving ‘aid effectiveness’, and, as a result, the four-yearly UN High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness from Rome, Paris, Accra and Busan11 were established to correct, or at least harmonize, the aid agenda. The most recent of these forums in Busan, opened up ways to partner with the new and emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and large multi-country philanthropic donors, and not be so ‘western-centric’. As such, these new development partners are

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11 For a detailed examination of these high level forum see OECD website: accessed 15 March 2016. [http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/thehighlevelforonaideffectivenessahistory.htm](http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/thehighlevelforonaideffectivenessahistory.htm)
challenging existing donors’ involvement and engagement (Mawdsley, Savage, & Kim, 2014).

Over the decades since the introduction of these High Level Forums, there has been a notable shift in the language of development. Eyben (2013) provides an in-depth assessment of the shift in language and emphasis from the Euro-centric Development Assistance Committee’s origin 50 years ago. This group continued to place ‘conditions’ on development assistance whereas the newer and emerging development assistance players ensure development aid concentrate on economic growth as the purpose of development assistance (Eyben, 2013; Zimmermann & Smith, 2011). It has been commented that these latter models of development assistance, which position ‘economic growth’, ‘infrastructure development’ and ‘access to markets’ as the key to improving the lot of the poor, were very similar to the support given by OECD donors to rising powers (Gore, 2014; Kragelund, 2011).

**The new players and partners**

The Busan Partnership recognizes the role to be played by new and emerging countries [BRICS] and significant philanthropic donor groups such as the Gates Foundation. Eun Mee and Jae Eun (2013) propose that the Busan partnership acknowledges that these new players, particularly the ASEAN countries, are having a significant impact on development agenda, but the results of this are yet to be measured:

> Global development cooperation discourse and activities that had been led by traditional Western donors need to find more effective ways of incorporating new actors and different modalities of development cooperation because the global challenges we face are grave. New development partners can bring to the table lessons, energies and capacities deriving from their own dramatic success in alleviating poverty and attaining development and their visibility as global development actors (Eun Mee & Jae Eun, p. 787).

Eyben (2013) has noted that as the Development Assistance Committee loses its influence over the development debate, economic growth has become the dominant meaning of development assistance within the new ‘Global Partnership’. The result of this paradigm shift is that the ‘cross-cutting’
issues of environment, human rights and gender, lose their traction with recipient governments, a position that is not entirely acceptable to all participants in Busan.

The movement away from ‘aid effectiveness’ to ‘development effectiveness’ heightens the need to examine the notions of ‘transfer’ of skills and ‘knowledge’ to recipient countries and counterparts, with the view and belief that these recipients will (one day) stand-alone (Powell, 2001). Whilst being transparently honorable, sadly the rhetoric does not match the reality on the ground. It is suggested that the first steps in any critical analysis of skills development and training in the form of transference, should begin with questioning and decoding the assumptions that underpin the intentions of the providers. It is further suggested that this line of questioning should begin with questions such as: ‘Whose management systems are involved?’, ‘Whose outcomes are central?’, ‘For what purpose are they sought?’, ‘Whose standards are to be attained, and why have these been chosen, what works and what have we learnt from past success?’, ‘What type of service delivery is to be introduced, and to whom, how and in what context?’, and ‘What incentives exist to ensure success and make donors accountable?’ (Easterly, 2007).

A focus on aid agencies

Easterly (2007) argues that what we may discover, in attempting to answer questions such as these, is that we need to conduct ‘truly independent scientific evaluation of specific aid efforts; not overall sweeping evaluations of particular interventions from which agencies can learn’ (Easterly, 2007, p. 194). Indeed, much of this current research concentrates on the evaluation questions and practices that are employed in a development context with respect to training projects. Expectations of designing appropriate skills development and vocational training programs to meet ‘international standards’ and determining evaluation methods that measure their success, may prove to be equally difficult for Timor-Leste’s Ministry of Education and local training institutes as has been already found in Indonesia.
King (1991) notes that behind the implementation of educational policies of the ‘North’, different conceptions of education and the role of citizen are at work in the ‘South’. Political, moral, social and development approaches, both institutional and economic, broaden this complexity and consequently make skills development and training and the impact on aid practices and development outcomes more complex and difficult to deconstruct.

It is unarguable that donor contributions to vocational development assistance are significant, particularly for skilled workers and technicians, and are central to The World Bank’s support for national programs of human resource development (Middleton, Ziderman, & Adams, 1993). In the case of Timor-Leste’s Ministry of Education, donor offerings managed by The World Bank in the Education Sector Support Program (ESSP) amount to 20% of the Government of Timor-Leste’s budget allocation in education (RDTL, 2011a). The World Bank has a significant investment in the direction of development assistance to the Government of Timor-Leste, it would seem that how this investment is implemented requires further analysis.

In addition to the specific and detailed questions above, in his seminal text on the economics of development, William Easterly in *The White Mans’ Burden*, posits a rationale for the failings of donor assistance as being related to planning. He claims that big plans and planning from afar, do not address, and cannot address, the issues faced by the poor. Indeed:

> Sixty years of countless reform schemes to aid agencies and dozens of different plans, and $2.3 trillion dollars later, the aid industry is still failing to reach the beautiful goal. The evidence points to an unpopular conclusion: Big Plans will always fail to reach the beautiful goal (Easterly, 2007, p. 11).

Too often, planners from some ‘far flung’ donor nation, enter the recipient country of ‘need’ bearing gifts of significant proportions. This was observed most clearly during the World War II theatre in Papua and the South Pacific. In a phenomenon described as the ‘Cargo Cult’, Melanesians cut forests down and created landing strips for the ‘big birds’ that never came after the end of allied operations in the Pacific (Jebens, 2004).
Easterly (2007) argued that, if the donor offerings were located in the actual ‘on the ground’ country activity, and identified by ‘searchers’ on the ground, (that is, by affected individuals and organizations), then the development outcomes would match the needs of the indigenous people. Invariably, the development outcomes would therefore be responsive and appropriate:

A Planner thinks he already knows the answers; he thinks of poverty as a technical problem that his answers will solve. A Searcher admits he doesn’t know the answers in advance; he believes that poverty is a complicated tangle of political, social, historical, institutional and technological factors… a Planner believes outsiders know enough to impose solutions. A Searcher believes only insiders have enough knowledge to find solutions, and that most solutions must be home grown (Easterly, 2007, p. 6).

Easterly further argues that much of current donor assistance is ill-directed and lost in the grandiose ideas of the ‘planners’ who sit in their distant positions and develop ‘big plan’ interventions. There is considerable weight to this argument in the Timorese context where players are big (The World Bank) and the bureaucratic structure is small (Ministry of Education).

Even with the presence of significant donor activity, there is a cogent argument put by Dambisa Moyo (2009) that suggests that no amount of development assistance has improved the lives of people on the African continent. Moyo argues that after more than 50 years of aid to Africa, some countries have not changed and indeed some have gone backwards on development indicators. Whilst this is a somewhat contentious and provocative argument, Ms Moyo supports this position with cogent figures and real-life development outcomes:

But has more than $1 trillion in development assistance over the last several decades made African people better off? No. In fact, across the globe the recipients of this aid are worse off, much worse off. Aid has helped make the poor poorer, and growth slower. Yet aid remains a centerpiece of today’s development policy and one of the biggest ideas of our time (Moyo, 2009, p. 14).

Both Moyo and Easterly are not lone voices in this current and uncomfortable expression of aid ineffectiveness (Development Assistance Research Associates, 2009; Shirley, 2005). Academics and practitioners alike are

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12 ‘Searchers’ is a term Easterly uses to describe local input into solving development problems as agents for change.
questioning and confronting the effectiveness of interventions (Copestake & Williams, 2014; Yumiko, 2009), and it appears that VET development in both Indonesia and Timor-Leste warrant the same level of analysis and introspection.

**Ideology at work**

Tansey (2014) evaluates the legacies of state building, together with its failures and successes, with respect to United Nations interventions in Timor-Leste. He notes the critical role that domestic actors play, which is a reality missed by some in The World Bank but not by others in the Timorese Constitutional IV government. This is partly due to an idea that Western media audiences have grown up on an ideological diet of the West’s role in assisting the poor (Mason, 2011). This has primarily been due to the Western media presentations and representations of the poor, and such a discourse fuels our (western) perceptions and affirms our ideological positions, thus shaping and reinforcing our views of ‘others’. We strongly feel that the ‘language’ of development and how it is ‘packaged’ for donor country audiences, requires further, and more respectful, exploration.

Hall and other cultural theorists (Hall, 1997; Shahjahan et al., 2015) provide a comprehensive way of interpreting and decoding the messages of ‘aid effectiveness’ and ‘skills development’. Whilst cultural theorists have predominantly provided frameworks for interpreting media and media messages in advertising (Williamson, 1978), Roland Barthes (1957) in *Mythologies* uses:

> Collective representations as sign systems, [and] one might hope to go further than the pious show of unmasking them and account in detail for the mystification which transforms petit-bourgeois culture into a universal nature (Barthes, 1973, p. 9).

Barthes then applies this sign system to deconstruct some of the basic and everyday messages in our society in order to peel back the ideological meaning between ‘Wine and Milk’, ‘Soap Powders and Detergents’ and a plate of ‘Steak and Chips’, amongst others. This framework of analysis (semiotics), in many ways is equally applicable for deconstructing aid and
development practice, and this approach could include the fads in language in development assistance (capacity building), the constructed meaning in development projects (poverty reduction, growth and economic development), and concepts of technical experts and expertise (international know-how). It could also, on the positive side, introduce engagement of local input, an idea pioneered by Clifford Geertz (Geertz, 1973).

Applying Barthes’ analysis to the term ‘expert’, suggests that at the first level of meaning, the word denotes a person of experience in a particular field, one who is knowledgeable and skilled. At the second level of meaning, ‘expert’ connotes a highly valued, important, and respected member of a trade or profession. The mythological frame of reference, the third level of meaning, begins to take shape when the community/society ‘accepts’ without question the value, intrinsic or otherwise, of the role of the expert and the dominant views of the experts’ frame of reference. In such a position, an expert imparts their dominant cultural views as though these were the natural order of things. We hold that aid operates at this ideological/mythological level, and is manifested in ideas such as Growth equals Development (previously noted by Moyo) or that Poverty is tangled up in political, social, historical and technical factors (as advanced by Easterly).

In a more specific reference to skills development in the non-formal education milieu in Timor-Leste, Boughton (2009) in Cooper and Walter’s Learning/Work (2009), argues that international experts and advisors, whilst expert in their respective fields, come from, or operate in, an ideological/mythological framework:

While the advice may appear to come from neutral well-qualified ‘experts’, it also appears to reflect the dominant thinking in many countries about the connection between training and employment, including the highly-contestable view that training of itself leads to lower unemployment (Cooper & Walters, 2009, p. 80).

Part II The skills debate in vocational training

It is appropriate to explore and challenge the impact of externally imposed views on the process of vocational training and this section highlights this
debate. A significant focus of TVET in Timor-Leste has centered on ‘skills development’ related to specific and narrow fields of learning. These are associated with key industries such as Tourism and Construction skills in Timor-Leste. The Irish Aid-funded, and ILO-coordinated, *Skills Training for Gainful Employment* program regularly highlights the key labour market indicators and their associated employment rates (Walsh, 2007). Whilst the information collected and supplied by the ILO gives a ‘picture’ of the skills gaps and the employment market, this picture is, however, primarily directed toward those key industries selected (targeted) for development and, as such, focuses on the skills training needs for these chosen industries.

This debate between the ‘narrow’ industry-based skills training and the need to prepare for ‘lifelong learning and/or global citizenship’ is a discourse that is in its infancy, particularly in Timor-Leste. Miller (2012) has proposed an engaging and relevant approach to learning in Timor-Leste based upon an experiential learning pedagogy, and the applications of this approach has confronted the providers of ‘hard technical industry specific skills training’. This debate and discussion around approaches to learning is needed in a Timor-Leste context. In fact, many developed countries have explored these approaches to learning, and in Australia’s case, this debate occurred in the early 90s around the ‘employability skills’ vs ‘key competencies for work’ (Mayer, 1992).

Powell (2001) notes that in a study of 19 TVET projects in Jamaica and Gambia, attempts by donors to replicate conditions in the First World failed to achieve their stated objectives. Similar attempts to implement ‘First World’ systems in Timor-Leste may invariably also fail, as debates between ‘employability vs key competencies’, particularly within the vocational education and training sector, are largely unresolved. In addition, the relevance of ‘global citizenship’ and of ‘life-long learning’ needs to be reincorporated into the development agenda for Timor-Leste (K. Miller, 2012). The Indonesian vocational training sector is similarly undergoing examination and reflection on the competencies needed for work, and a recent study undertaken by Hadi and Hassan et al. (2015) of engineering students, the
relationship between the application of thinking skills (generic) versus engineering skills (functional) was explored.

Boughton (2009) provides an even more comprehensive critique of workforce development strategies, suggesting that they are ones that position newly independent countries, such as Timor-Leste, close to the orthodox economic path and not the path of the revolutionary leadership of the first independent government of Timor-Leste (Cooper & Walters, 2009). This development conundrum has been played out in other development sectors, as ‘donors’ attempted to work with the FRETILIN government led by the first Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri (Berlie, 2010; Borgerhoff, 2006).

The World Bank Report on Education Training and the Labor Market identifies a suite of desired 'generic' and 'life' skills needed for work. They have identified ‘soft’ skills:

... such as problem solving, effective communication or ability to work in teams. These also start early in life, are completely transferable between jobs, but are not directly related to subject matter and depend partly on factors sometimes external to the school system (The World Bank, 2010, p. 29).

In this debate, it is essential that we explore the nexus between industry-focused and narrowly-directed skills training. The latter often misses the importance of teaching broader pillars of learning ‘skills for life’, which includes ‘learning to do’, ‘learning to be’, ‘learning to know’ and ‘learning to live together’. TVET education needs to be posited in, and grounded in, lifelong learning pedagogy, citizenship and generic skills development. It has been claimed that:

It is clear that technical and vocational education and training needs to encompass all four pillars of learning in order to prepare the individual with the knowledge, skills, qualities, values attitudes and abilities to communicate effectively and work together productively with others (Quisumbing & Apnieve, 2005, p. 4).

It is significant that UNESCO, working with the Asia-Pacific Network for International Education and Values Education, has produced a formidable work book for the teaching the values for learning and working in a global
There nevertheless remains a difficulty incorporating lifelong learning into the vocational training experience. In one Timor-Leste response, TVET practitioners have attempted to incorporate ‘industry experience’ into their training programs, and the governing body in Timor-Leste (SEPFOPE) is seeking ways to incorporate ‘work placement’ into vocational training. Beginning from a very low base, this initiative remains as a significant challenge, and the mere experience of work placement alone may not solve the basic problem (Curtain, 2009). Another example of this approach is the Indonesia-Australia Specialised Training Projects (IASTP), where industry experience has been woven into the fabric of skills development and training. While the logic of this approach has never been questioned, it has been assumed that: (i) of course, industry placement makes the learning real, (ii) of course, what is relevant in Indonesia and Australia must be relevant in Timor-Leste, and (iii) of course, engaging in an ‘industry placement’ prepares a student for the world of work.

However, there is a related and important issue that emerges here. It is suggested that donors who narrow the definition of training success to measures such as “How many students gain the skills or qualifications in ‘Tourism and Hospitality’ or “What amount of training occurred in the workplace” (Berryman & Coxon, 2010), are not placing the necessary and required emphasis on indigenous skills development and participatory skills development needed by the poor. More participatory approaches to educational pedagogy are exemplified by Paulo Freire (Freire, 1993) in his articulation of the ‘Banking Model of Education’, which illustrated that the poor were ‘topped up’ by a conservative elitist educational pedagogy (Boughton 2011). Indeed, it has been made clear that this approach does not serve the interests of oppressed people, and appropriate literacy and vocational training programs for these people should provide explicit consciousness raising and emancipation opportunities. Freire’s contribution to raising the consciousness of the poor and promoting participatory and indigenous skill development, impacts in many ways in the vocational training sector, in designing and managing skills training, and supplying resources for the poor rather than providing ‘outside’ knowledge experts (Bennell, 1999; Foley, 2004).
Part III Adult learning and vocational training programs

This section addresses the conundrum of skills development in the context of development assistance, whilst raising the issues of good governance and ethical practice. In concert with these concerns, this research includes a discourse around employer requirements for training in a Timor-Leste context, suggesting that employers do indeed want broader 'life skills' such as 'preparedness and regularity to work’, ‘ability to communicate in the workplace’, ‘showing initiative’ and ‘language skills’ rather than the narrower industry specific skills training, for example in the hospitality and the construction industries (Curtain, 2009).

In this respect, Andrew Gonczi (2004) notes in *The New Professionalism and Vocational Education in Dimensions of Adult Learning*, that people are complex beings, and how people ‘learn’ is equally as complex:

We need to accept that much of what makes people competent, resourceful, adroit (that is what makes them knowledgeable) is largely tacit, instinctive, difficult to pin down and certainly can’t be located in objects stored in the mind. Such things as number sense, taste, artistic appreciation, sensitivity, communication and creativity are not dealt with satisfactorily in educational organizations or programs. But they need to be bought into the mainstream (Gonczi, 2004, p. 30).

Measuring these ‘intangibles’ of a vocational education and training program is a far more difficult process. It is easy to see why, in the context of this analysis, that TVET providers, and development partners use simpler measures of success such as the number of training programs, counting how many and how often, and describing details of what constituted the course and who was involved as illustrated in the IASTP II and III completion reports. The author sought access to both of these IASTP reports from DFAT for the purpose of examining these publications for this study (see Appendix Seven).

The Kirkpatrick models (Kirkpatrick, 1994) of monitoring and evaluating training programs, were employed across all Indonesian/Australian IASTP training programs. Whilst generally accepted as the dominant model of program evaluation for adult learning (Lockheed, 2009), they were used to gather considerable data from training program evaluations, but certainly did
not address the more critical issues described by Gonczi (2004). As highlighted by Gonczi, while the workplace is a learning resource and an important site for learning, managing learning contracts and work-related projects require the input of a skilled educationalist. Careful consideration and management of these learning outcomes, within the construction of training programs, will determine the success of this aspect of training programs, along with transfer of learning to practices ‘on the job’, which impacts on corporate outcomes and learning gains (Lockheed, 2009).

**Tensions in, and reflections on, practice - what lessons are learnt?**

The Australian Government commissioned a Review of Aid Effectiveness in 2011 (Farmer et al., 2011), which at one level was to improve aid delivery and measure outcomes in addition to helping to meet international obligations for aid targets and program provision, which are the DAC\(^{13}\) targets of 0.05% of GNI to aid. This review sought to improve the management of the Australian Aid programs and uncovered a number of deficiencies in existing practices, and, in the context of this research, these outcomes are worthy of examination.

For example, Ellermen (2007 p.17) raised a salient concern regarding the donors’ ability\(^{14}\) to examine the mistakes of the past. He asked rhetorically in this context, ‘Who has time or inclination to dwell on possible mistakes of the past? Children are dying now!’ It would seem that mistakes pass down the organizational memory hole, and ‘institutional amnesia’ or ‘institutional memory loss’ occurs when there is a uniform and structured loss of information, partly due to continual staff turnover and/or a reluctance to examine the past mistakes – institutions are therefore destined to repeat the same errors (Ellerman, 2007).

Ellerman also points directly at the multi-laterals such as World Bank and IMF, but these multi-laterals are not alone in making serious errors. The AusAID practices in Indonesia and Timor-Leste stand condemned in a similar way.

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\(^{13}\) Development Assistance Committee of the OECD

\(^{14}\) The donors were the World Bank and the IMF.
We suggest that this notion of institutional amnesia is a significant cause for concern, as it strikes at the issues of ‘continuity’ and ‘value for money’. It also affects capacity building within local staff, but it is clear that not all reviewers come to the same conclusion about training within the World Bank. Lockheed (2009) for example, argues that, in this regard, the World Bank is an ‘exemplar’ for other donors. Furthermore, the Review of Aid Effectiveness (2011) Recommendation 31, expressly addressed the issue of corporate reform and the need to ‘reduce staff turnover’, and it has been commented that:

Corporate reform efforts within AusAID should be accelerated to promote a culture geared towards delivering results and enhancing productivity, especially by reducing staff turnover, building the workforce with the requisite skills, streamlining business processes and reducing paperwork (Farmer et al., 2011, p. 33).

The Review of Aid Effectiveness recommended a number of reforms, but did not, or failed to seriously address, the importance of maintaining information and avoiding mistakes of the past going down the organisational ‘memory hole’. Donors and organizations in development should have ‘institutional’ frameworks established to ensure that the collective history of their engagement in any particular country can be accessed, examined and evaluated. Indeed, as Pollitt (2000) notes, it remains a paradox that, with all the modern technologies currently available to collect, store and evaluate data, public institutions as well as independent evaluators of these institutes, seem to be losing their memories (Pollitt, 2000). It would seem relevant and appropriate for external parties to have access to donor information about ‘lessons learnt’. This could form the basis of the institutional framework required to counter ‘institutional amnesia’. However, as noted in the Review of Aid Effectiveness, no such level of transparency exists and the release of documents and data is not yet always standard practice (Farmer et al., 2011).

Notwithstanding the clear advantages embedded in this approach, what an ‘institutional framework’ might look like is another thing. The Review of Aid Effectiveness (Farmer et al., 2011) recognized the need to reform many aspects of the current aid platforms, especially in the context of the suggested significant increase in ‘aid activity’. Also, given that the Review has a detailed
list of 39 recommendations, the general thrust of the reforms seems to target the need for improvements in governance. It has been noted that:

They [the reforms] range from lack of a unified sense of strategic purpose across government, through the need to reform the government’s budget processes, to the dangers of fragmentation and stretching the program too thin, to the need for greater public involvement and transparency (Farmer et al., 2011, p. 9).

However, any serious review of Australia’s development assistance should have addressed this issue of institutional amnesia, and it is suggested (Wilks, 2010) that this could have been achieved by reviewing AusAID staff practices and human resource development issues such as: (i) examining reasons why there is significant staff turnover, (ii) establishing reporting responsibilities related to staff backgrounds, (iii) accepting ‘development experience’ over ‘technical experience’, (iv) induction and resourcing of new staff, and (v) creating an information system on program activities and related evaluations. Of particular interest here is that Patch and Shah (2011) have undertaken a rigorous assessment and meta-review of AusAID Education sector evaluations in Indonesia during 2006-2010, with the purpose to improve aid effectiveness in education, and some of these issues are addressed in their review.

**Good governance and ethical practices**

It has been observed that transparency and sharing of information is not common amongst donors. Chilufya’s article *Development Aid: Is there space for the poor to participate in Zambia in Aid and Development Effectiveness* (Wilks, 2010), describes the disastrous circumstances observed in Zambia when donors withdraw services without consultation and coordination. Information about donor activities is ‘internalised’ within bureaucratic structures but is not shared amongst other donors, rightly or wrongly. Notwithstanding this internalization, it is claimed that, in this area, ‘transparency’ of action or intention is not fully understood or articulated internally (Farmer et al., 2011). This is despite the fact that good governance is one of the key ‘conditions’ placed upon AusAID activity by the Australian Government, and it is assumed that it should naturally be part of its own transparency practices. Scott (2007) notes that, during a Rapid Training
Needs Analysis of the entire donor activity in Papua, for Nusa Tenggara Timur Indonesia, in the years 2006-07 (Scott 2007), more than 16 multi-lateral and bi-lateral donors were involved in excess of 41 activities of a similar nature on this tiny but significant island.

Program outcomes and activities, as well as 'lessons learnt', should form the basis of ongoing donor engagement, and as a consequence this research examines the subtext of these reports. For example, improving ‘harmonization’ in donor engagement may help to stem duplication of programs across donor countries (OECD, 2009), and there is a ‘value for money’ impact if we affect change in the practices of even one donor, particularly if that donor is AusAID.

Wilks’ (2010) detailed assessment of the aid architecture in the Reality of Aid 2010 Report, shows that there are many instances within donor procurement practices where ‘internationals’ are required to monitor the donor activity to ensure conditions placed on aid are being ‘untied’. However, often these internationals originate from the donor country, and whilst generally condemning this approach, many donor governments continue with this practice. It has been observed that:

The Danish Institute for International Studies recently analysed hundreds of aid contracts tendered by different donors, and they found that over 60% went to companies from the donor country concerned. Another study of UK aid found that 88% went to UK companies despite the UK’s formal policy of 100% ‘untying’ of its aid (Wilks, 2010, p. 14).

In the Timor-Leste context, Neves (2006) describes how so little of the donor aid going into Timor-Leste has filtered into the local economy:

Even though the international community has spent four billion dollars in Timor-Leste, the money has had very little spin off effect into our local economy. Most of the money went to pay international staff and buy equipment from donor countries (Neves, 2006, p. 18).

Neves further argues that where Timor-Leste does require international support, this support needs to be based upon Timorese need, not on the donors’ interests. In the early days of Timor-Leste’s nation building, 300 international advisors were placed in state institutions to create institutions
and build capacity. However, it appears that the decisions about which institutions received advisors depended on the donors’ interests, rather than on which institutions were weak and needed this support (Neves, 2006).

In the Indonesian context, the Australian Contracting Manager for AusAID involved with the IASTP Phases 11 and 111, demanded and required tendering parties to have an ‘international’ consultant (preferably from Australia) involved in the training\(^{15}\), highlighting one of many concerns from an ethical development perspective. Firstly, if a significant proportion of publicly offered aid actually returns to the country of origin, there is a clear tension in the ethics of aid provision. Secondly, demanding ‘international presence’ in training activities, devalues the role played by locally skilled trainers. Thirdly, not all international trainers are culturally sensitive to the conditions that prevail on the ground in the local circumstance. Finally, insisting on a key role for an international consultant implies a cultural value position which can perpetuate the understanding that ‘foreign’ knowledge is better than ‘indigenous’ knowledge Hill (2005).

**Part IV Evaluation practice - is what you want it to be**

This section addresses evaluation practice and begins with examining the duplicity in these practices in Indonesia and Timor-Leste, whilst providing a detailed examination of the implementation of monitoring and evaluation reviews and the introduction of new approaches in evaluation frameworks.

Measuring the effectiveness of training in a development context remains a vexed issue for many donors (Lockheed, 2009; The World Bank, 2008). In this discussion, we are taking the position that ‘effectiveness of training’ implies that the ultimate beneficiaries of the international aid are applying their learning from the training room into their respective workplaces (Griffin, 2011). However, there are fears that this is not always the case, but demonstrating this practice is not a straightforward task.

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\(^{15}\) The author has personally experienced this practice during contract negotiations with Australian Contracting Managers.
The IASTP Phase III’s Independent Completion Report evaluation (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008) measured the success of the IASTP training program in terms of the delivery of 22,000 training hours with approximately 153,000 participant training days. An important issue here is that the ‘total number of training hours completed’ is a far easier measure of outcome than the ‘actual impact of training on the participants’. This situation arises because the examination of the training impact upon ultimate beneficiaries requires a far more detailed and sophisticated evaluation process. There are several immediate issues that arise in this context: (i) How will the measure of program impact into the workplace be determined? This requires a transparent description of the evaluation tools which will be applied, (ii) If a Most Significant Change [MSC] framework is applied to the evaluation, how many ultimate beneficiaries will be interviewed in the course of the evaluation? (iii) What existing reports and evaluations will be examined to determine the impact upon beneficiaries, and (iv) What evaluation framework will be applied, and will the evaluation process be based upon the original program design (intentions) or the potential impact for future training (future impact)?

In considering this issue, Carden (2013) notes that evaluation of development programs should be looked at in terms of how it contributes to improvements in society in general, and not be based upon narrow definitions of project objectives. This comment implies a move away from ‘projects’ to ‘systems’ (Carden, 2013), and this suggested approach sits comfortably with the task of examining the actual impact of training in workplaces, and this is the ultimate focus of this research.

Indeed, it is widely held that having a suitable monitoring and evaluation framework in place before beginning a training program, is a base requirement for quality and ethical aid provision. In the Indonesian example investigated in this research, the IASTP program, which was implemented on the basis of the Kirkpatrick model (Kirkpatrick, 1994), examined expectations prior to beginning of the training. However, the Timorese Skills Training Partnership program did not have any means of measuring outcome
expectations or likely outcomes, leaving evaluations to loose and ambiguous statements such as; ‘It is not clear how tutors’ performance will be judged’ (Berryman & Coxon, 2010). However, the donor contribution to skills development and evaluation nonetheless needs to be exemplary in the sense of leaving a clear ‘foot print’ of best practice on the ground so that others can follow. The practice of not having a means of determining success is hardly exemplary, and it has been commented that lack of internal or external evaluations is poor practice (Boupha, 2007).

**The underlying education strategies**

Education aid has largely been focused upon the principles of *Education for All* (Hunt, 2012), and this has been chosen in order to meet the Millennium Development Goal Number 2, of achieving universal primary education. However, Easterly (2007) argues that the MDGs are doomed to fail because no one country or institute is being held accountable. He claims:

> All the rich-country governments and international aid agencies are supposed to work together to achieve the MDGs. So when the goals are not attained, no one agent can be held accountable (Easterly, 2007, p. 127).

The *Education for All* goal, or ‘big plan’, focuses attention on primary education, but does not incorporate system-wide approaches to educational development including vocational education and training, technical and higher education and non-formal education. Governments have, too often, left these sectors for international donors to develop, and this is certainly the case for the Ministry of Education in Timor-Leste. In the post-2015 aid environment, technical and vocational skills development (TVSD) is not getting as much attention and traction as general education (Palmer, 2014). TVSD has, at times, been the afterthought of educational planning, and left to international donors to fund from left-over funds or ‘basket’ funds (Duke & Hinzen, 2011).

Boughton and Durnan (2004) suggest that Indonesia’s occupation of, and subsequent withdrawal from, Timor-Leste, left a void in the educational infrastructure. This explains, in part, why there is a shortage of ‘leadership’ within the Ministry of Education in Timor-Leste, and this shortage has created
a dependency upon overseas aid and professional expertise, particularly around issues relevant to TVSD (Kingsbury & Leach, 2007).

Hill (2007) argues that the introduction of Indonesian mass education in Timor-Leste was a deliberate act of re-colonisation in order to skill the Timorese people into how to operate in Indonesia without questioning the system. This strategy, in turn, led to a leadership shortage when Indonesians departed. It has been claimed, in this respect, that:

The Indonesian education system had its own version of elitism, racism, arrogance and hostility to East Timorese culture; the massive access to education was also an act of re-colonisation, particularly as it was carefully designed not to open the minds of students to the rest of the world or to neighbouring countries, but to school them in how to operate within Indonesia itself without question, and to take on the values that the regime promoted (Kingsbury & Leach, 2007, p. 226).

Further, the educational approach used under Indonesian occupation is described by Hill (2007) as the Paulo Friere ‘banking model’, as noted earlier, which defines education as depositing selected bits of knowledge pertinent to controlling the populace. At the end of this tuition, students simply engage in regurgitating this information at examination times. This approach to education produces what Boughton and Durnan (2007) describe as ‘a lack of specifically-Timorese culture of learner-centred pedagogy’ (Kingsbury & Leach, 2007). To avoid this situation, we suggest that skills development and training, in an Indonesian and Timorese context, needs to examine and explore the ‘ideology’ and ‘political’ frameworks that impact on learning. Shah and Quinn noted how educational policy has been appropriated from the ‘outside’ in the context of Timor-Leste, and how the agenda of learner-centred pedagogy has been interpreted and translated into the Timorese context (R. Shah & Quinn, 2016).

**The critiques of evaluation performance**

In Indonesia, where the Australian Aid budget is expected to increase significantly over the coming years in line with Australia Government commitments to reaching 0.5% of GNI (Tapp, 2011), there are many concerns being raised about the ability to design, develop then implement such a large
increase in donor funding. In the Australian Government’s commissioned report on Australian aid to Indonesia for the Independent Review of Aid, Tapp (2011) writes that the ‘performance of UN agencies in the health sector has been particularly bad’ and there is considerable lack of confidence in the World Bank’s ability to manage funds. In this respect he claims that:

Interestingly, the Government of Indonesia expressed significant frustration over the bureaucratic and slow performance of the World Bank trust funds (Tapp, 2011, p. 12).

The Australian government not only funds bilateral health projects in Indonesia, but also funds multi-laterals to undertake joint activities. It is within these activities that Australian aid money requires an equally stringent aid governance. The commissioned report is critical of AusAID’s design missions, particularly aspects which are important in developing the project and measuring the outcomes. It is noted that they are scant across all sectors, but as noted below, they are particularly poor in the health sector:

The lengthy, inefficient health sector support program design is unacceptable. The design has cost close to $2m over more than four years and is yet to be peer reviewed. It is heavily focused on capacity building at a central level and seems to be short on ideas for seeing clear improvements in service delivery on the ground (Tapp, 2011, p. 17).

When applying a critical theorist approach to the deconstruction of aid activity, it is often not what IS included, but what is NOT included in the development context, that provides us with a greater understanding of, and clarity into, what is being offered and implemented (Shahjahan et al., 2015). Thus what is NOT included in any report, evaluation or activity is likely to tell us more about our development paradigm than what IS included. This approach is, however, not straightforward and posing questions about content and the absence of content illustrates this dilemma. We could ask for example: What is best practice?; How does one leave a ‘footprint’ on the ground for others to follow?; Where are advisors placed and for what reasons?; How is capacity building achieved in an Indonesian and Timorese context?; What is a good program design?; What goals are being addressed?; and What sectors are being targeted, and why?
Many of these issues will be examined, described and critiqued as part of this research. The purpose of this work is to illustrate the somewhat subjective nature of development practices and their subsequent impact on education and training and skills development. The major focus of this thesis is on examining sector-wide approaches to skills development, and this will include: (i) examining the role of training and its implementation and impact upon ultimate beneficiaries, (ii) noting the technical and vocational skills training used in meeting development goals and (iii) assessing the monitoring and evaluation practices that would improve development outcomes.

Professor Leo Maglen in his economic analysis of the role of VET in Timor-Leste, posits the view that:

The economic benefits of a system wide approach to developing a vocational education and training system will yield to the Government of Timor-Leste significant returns on investment for developing such a system (Maglen, 2008, p. 16).

This economic analysis is based upon long-term future planning, and represents an examination of the return on investments over a 30-year period. It seems, in this respect though, that Governments, and donors for that matter, are equally reluctant to amortize large investments in educational infrastructure over three decades. This falls outside the usual length of political engagement and, indeed, often outside the life of the planning process. In the main, donors have not embraced any intentions of planning for this period of time, but whilst there continues to be no long term planning associated with donor engagement, it does not mean that donors are not there, as Dambisa Moyo indicates:

Despite five decades of donor engagement in Africa, little is left on the ground (Moyo, 2009, p. 14).

Timor-Leste’s Ministry of Education, like many education ministries worldwide, will take time to build the necessary capacity to manage the education sector, formulate policies, and expand and improve educational services (Bracks, 2007)\(^\text{16}\). The dependence upon foreign support to achieve these goals will

\(^{16}\) Steve Bracks, ex-Premier of Victoria, made these comments to the Civil Service Commission TL upon funding the Public Service Commission in (2007).
continue, and capacity development will be critical - however the nature of this dependence is worthy of some exploration.

Management and monitoring and evaluation reviews

The World Bank managed the Education Sector Support Program in the Ministry of Education of Timor-Leste (2006-2013), and this was funded by a number of international donors, including AusAID (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014a). It has been suggested that one small, yet significant initiative, titled The Skills Training Partnership (STP) program, could have been a significant project in developing an appropriate capacity building activity in the technical vocational education and training sector. This project incorporated a number of critical interventions, which if successful would have resulted in an important capacity-building program. These interventions were:

- Local Training Providers were invited to bid to deliver training outcomes;
- International institutes were enlisted to support local Training Providers;
- Systems were specifically designed to replicate this activity;
- Management of this program remained with the Ministry of Education.

Whilst these were desirable objectives and intentions by The World Bank, a more detailed review by this thesis’ author (Fairman, 2011), indicates that this program did not eventually meet its expectations. In the context of the debate around designing and implementing real and sustainable capacity building programs, this World Bank project began with good intentions but failed to achieve them during the implementation process. Too often, good intentions and well-developed program designs fail, because of poor practice and management. This was certainly one of the key findings into a review of Australia’s management practices by the Australian Government-Industry Task Force’s report on Leadership and management; Enterprising Nation: Australian Management in the age of the Asia Pacific Report (Karpin, 1995)

The Karpin report described how Australian management needs a new set of management skills (a new paradigm of management) to meet the demands

17 As described in the World Bank's Expression of Interest for Hospitality Tourism (World Bank 2011). See Appendix Six.
that will be faced into the 21st Century, and that our existing poor management skills have ill-equipped us for the future. He stated:

Most developments mark a move away from a structured model of organizations towards ones that emphasizes more behavioural and interpersonal aspects of strategy, especially in the case of large organizations. A new type of small-to-medium sized enterprises has developed, which proved to be more agile and creative than larger companies. These new enterprises compete by using flexibility, speed and innovation and their managers require excellent technical expertise as well as all round management ability. Task force research and consultation demonstrate, in response to these shifts, that the whole paradigm of management has already changed, bringing with it a new set of organizational requirements (Karpin, 1995, p. 7).

This broad analysis of management in Australia can be, and is, replicated in donor activities internationally as well as in Australian donor funded-activities. The World Bank’s approach to implementing, then managing, these desirable sustainable outcomes through to completion, too often fail. As Phonephet Bouphra concludes in a review of the World Bank’s Skills Development activities in Lao:

Weaknesses of donor involvement in skills development include: terms of reference for consultants was not clearly defined; management of activities is weak; language proficiency of some local partners is lacking; the process to disperse funding is inadequate; statistics are not reliable or accurate; the report didn’t state the expenditures of each planned budget envelope; and there is sometimes a lack of regular internal and external evaluation (Boupha, 2007, p. 47).

These criticisms of The World Bank’s skills development programs in Lao have a similar resonance in Timor-Leste, particularly in relation to the Skills Training Partnership program. Lao PDR was undergoing a similar examination of the technical and vocational education sector, and was importing approaches to skills development from a number of countries and donors. Therefore the ‘skills development approaches’ employed are worthy of examination, comparison and critique.

Whilst these lessons may relate to Timor-Leste, they are just as relevant to Indonesia and other countries importing western ‘know how’ and technical expertise. Feinstein and Beck’s (2006) article Evaluation of Development Interventions and humanitarian action in The Sage Handbook of Evaluation,
distinguishes between developmental evaluation practices, which shift between ‘objective-based evaluations’ and ‘theory-based evaluation’, and they suggest that the purpose of the evaluation depends upon the donors’ requirements for change. Both approaches necessitate that incorporating monitoring and evaluation approaches into program design and implementation is critical, but in some cases is sadly overlooked (Shaw, Mark, & Greene, 2006) In the Timor-Leste Skills Training Partnership program, it was considered as an afterthought and indeed was not designed nor established at the incorporation of the program.

Any framework is better than none at all

It has been claimed that the World Bank’s own Mid-Term Evaluation Report of the Timor-Leste Skills Training Partnership (Berryman & Coxon, 2010), did not have the means, nor was one developed, to assess the success or otherwise of the Skills Training Partnership. In fact, the World Bank’s Mid Term Review determined that the success and effectiveness of the Skills Training Partnership program could only be measured after the participants engaged in ‘teaching’ in polytechnics. It stated:

Effectiveness: not yet known. This activity has just started, and it is too early to judge effectiveness. This is a financing mechanism that works through Training Providers that will train the tutors. Despite the indirect nature of the capacity building dimension of this activity, ESSP should be held accountable for reaching certain numeric targets (number trained) and performance targets for those trained. It is not clear how tutors’ performance will be judged. Presumably the NQF should be used to identify performance measures (Berryman & Coxon, 2010, p. 50).

Feinstein and Beck’s (2006) article also noted there is a constraint in conducting joint evaluations at the country level due to the limited country evaluation capacity (Shaw et al., 2006), which is a common flaw in the practice of development evaluation. This leads to a significant and critical lack of local input into development evaluations. At the same time, it is very difficult to ‘measure’ the performance of a vocational teacher training project unless a clear ‘base line’ of participants was conducted prior to commencement of the program (Singh, 2013). Without a clear pre-evaluation strategy, training participants could have entered the program with the teaching/training skills already developed (Moldovan, 2016), and the success of the program would
be overrated. This is why a monitoring and evaluation framework is required prior to any skills development program, and it is equally why a ‘training needs analysis’ and a ‘recognition of prior competence’ are required prior to program commencement for all participants. The rapid Training Needs Analysis of the IASTP in Indonesia program, highlights the concerns regarding these activities (Scott, 2007, p. 47).

The World Bank’s own review of ‘Effectiveness of Lending for Vocational Education and Training: Lessons from World Bank Experience’, indicates that there is a need to develop guidelines for the analysis of the economic context of VET programs, which includes analyzing the incentives and constraints on the development of private training markets. Two of the lessons learned from the Sub-Saharan study included:

Encourage future projects to include impact surveys on outcomes and benefits of training, but extend the scope to include the costs and sustainability of such training and greatly strengthen monitoring and evaluation systems to provide information systematically on the cost effectiveness of alternative training interventions (Canagarajah et al., 2002, p. 44).

In Indonesia, during the IASTP Phases II and III program design and implementation, a considerable level of monitoring and evaluation was implemented throughout two projects. These monitoring and evaluation activities applied Kirkpatrick’s evaluation models, and measured and assessed training from expectation, training, and performance through to implementation. The Kirkpatrick model states that:

Trainers must begin with desired results and then determine what behavior is needed to accomplish them. Then trainers must determine the attitudes, knowledge, and skills that are necessary to bring about the desired behavior(s). The final challenge is to present the training program in a way that enables the participants not only to learn what they need to know but also to react favourably to the program (Kirkpatrick, 1994, p. 26).

This evaluation approach was incorporated into program design, execution and measurement of all Indonesian IASTP Phases II and III. However, the expectations and local input failed considerably in the IASTP context (Scott, 2007). It was commented that considerably more input from local agencies and ‘on the ground’ institutes could have created a more targeted and
specialized Indonesia training programs, as highlighted in the Rapid Training Needs Analysis of IASTP:

To support IASTP develop 'targeted and specialised' training there exists a networking agency, Sofei, which can assist IASTP develop 'targeted and specialised' training, by providing access to provincial reformist 'think tanks' and agencies working in the technical areas targeted by IASTP. The RTNAT uncovered many agencies in the provinces that indicted a keen desire to be involved in training, by providing trainers with 'specialised' and 'local' knowledge. This involvement is a contribution by provincial agencies and should be seen as a valued 'counterpart' contribution (Scott, 2007, p. 16).

Scott further notes that significant improvements in targeted and specialized training would mean that detailing the training plan, in advance of 'tendering' the program, and would result in clearer expectations and understanding of the training program outcomes for all concerned, (viz. training providers, managing administrators, contractors, and clients).

It is felt that in the Timor-Leste Skills Training Partnership, adopting these Kirkpatrick evaluation models would have grounded the program design aspects of the training program in the context of a recognized training and evaluation methodology (Fairman, 2011). In the current context, a 'monitoring and evaluation' framework was set up for the Skills Training Partnership, but only as an afterthought.

The Indonesian IASTP programs widely employed quantitative monitoring and evaluation tools, (in the form of Likert scales), to gather data on training effectiveness, and these were used to compare effectiveness of training and industry placement over time (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008). We note that whilst gathering information on specific individual training programs is an important first step in the monitoring process, analyzing and responding to the information is a more critical next step in evaluation, and needs to be incorporated into the overall approach to evaluation. This study shows that not enough attention was given to the information collected by all the training providers throughout the IASTP program, and that with suitable critical analysis, this information could have provided valuable insights into the overall final evaluation report.
Throughout the entire IASTP programs covering a period of 12 years of AusAID funding in Indonesia, whilst a monitoring and evaluation framework examined the management and administration of the program, the program evaluation and assessment of training was left to the implementing agencies and partnering ministries, notably the ‘mentors’. This had the effect of setting up ‘donor driven systems’ rather than facilitating agency-ownership of training. Scott’s review of the IASTP 111 program, criticizes this lost opportunity to establish capacity building in implementing agencies. She said:

It is important that IASTP makes every effort to work with agencies at all levels capitalizing on whatever efforts and offers made to support their own training, development, design and delivery. These efforts should be the primary focus beyond the implementation and strengthening of parallel systems, such as Mentor roles and activities. There is a risk that “donor driven systems” like Mentors could negate internal efforts agencies are making resulting in a reduction or worse still cessation of efforts to develop “agency owned” HRD systems. Similarly capacity building should be primarily focused on working with existing and emerging infrastructure owned by, and situated in, the agencies own systems and structures (Scott, 2007, p. 12).

A new approach to evaluation

A final note on current evaluation practice, is the growing use of a relatively new evaluation framework (Shaw et al., 2006) called the ‘most significant change’ (MSC), where sharing the stories of the lived experiences of representative selected individuals becomes the narrative of the program. This is most commonly used in a training context, but was, however, universally applied in the IASTP program evaluation. The most significant change was developed by Dart and Davies (2003), and this modification leans significantly on the early pioneering work of Clifford Geertz (Geertz, 1973) using definitions of ‘thick descriptions’ of events, textured accounts and local content. In this approach, the roles of the observer and their innate subjectivity is visible or made visible (Davies, 1998).

The most significant change method, whilst gathering stories in order to enrich evaluation practices, introduces steps that must be applied when constituting the groups for story-telling. At this time, these steps are being reworked by practitioners and academics alike (Wilson, 2014). In addition, the MSC evaluation method requires specific knowledge of participants, and asks
questions including: Who is to be involved and how?; Who will be asked to share stories?; Who will help to identify the domains of change?; To whom will information be communicated?; What domains of change will be discussed? What will be the frequency with which the stories will be shared and how will the most significant one be selected?; What feedback is to be given, and to whom?; and Which stories will be selected and how will these be documented? In this approach, the shared stories use a simple question for each type of change (Davies, 1998).

There are, nevertheless, some noted criticisms of this evaluation approach. Whitmore et al. (2006) writing in the *Sage Handbook of Evaluation* in an article titled ‘Embedding Improvements, lived experience, and social justice in evaluation practice’, noted that there are four obvious criticisms of this method. These are: (i) the stories can be both positive and negative yet there is a tendency toward positive stories in a development context, (ii) learning from lived experience requires the generalization of knowledge and lessons learnt, then using these lessons to improve development practice, (iii) there remains a question on who specifies the domains for evaluation and how is this undertaken, and (iv) MSC stories do not lend themselves well to assessing the full breath of impact of a program or generalizing from it (Shaw et al., 2006).

Currently, this most significant change method as an evaluation tool, tends to ask more questions of a program than providing answers regarding its efficacy. Added areas of interest include: How many participants are included in the report? How representative are these participants of the population of trainees? How many stories are told in this context? and Who is telling the stories and why?

In conclusion, and returning once again to the language of the cultural theorists Stuart Hall and others, it is possible that this study may only serve to develop more questions about the processes rather than provide quick answers about them. This study examined the application of the ‘most significant change’ evaluation method within the program under review, and
noted the limitations of this method. A cultural theorist approach involves enquiring into the ‘absence’ of program activity provides a more detailed and critical account of development assistance programs, and as such this is not a futile by any means, but a necessary activity in order to develop meaningful practice, and one seldom engaged in, in the development sector.

The next Chapter, Conceptual Framework, will describe the philosophical approach, whilst at the same time exposing the ideological positions impacting on this study. In essence this framework applies a semiotic analysis approach to development interventions.
Chapter Three: Conceptual Framework

This Chapter outlines why ethnography was chosen as the methodological approach for this study. Primarily, it was chosen because this study is examining individual responses to the provision of educational aid in the cultural environment of Timor-Leste and Indonesia, and an ethnographic approach allows us to investigate cultural as well as perceived reasons for respondents’ views. This Chapter leads us into a fuller explanation of the conceptual framework applied in this research, and begins by declaring in advance, the philosophical stance of the author and some of the ideological positions impacting upon this study.

A statement of philosophical background

In acknowledging that both 'cultural heritage' and 'cultural baggage' always exist within a study of this nature, the background of the author has been framed against the cultural, historical, political and ideological circumstances of his time. Also acknowledging the interpretive nature of this philosophical position, there is no possible claim of uncovering 'objective' knowledge of the world, since we all have different, and thus equally valid, experiences of it. Hence the author’s background impacts upon the framing of this research, and whilst all attempts have been made to explicitly declare not only the 'assumptions' of the author and the 'assumptions' behind the methodological approach, it is recognized that, even as we attempt to openly declare this background, it is acknowledged that we cannot always 'know' when we are being at our most ideological (Hall, 1983).

This research originates from a decade-long experience as a manager of aid and development programs for an Australian University. This experience alerted me to a range of issues and challenges in this field that were worthy of examination and central to the approach to the research was the goal to enable multiple voices to be heard.
**Methodological approach**

The qualitative nature of this investigation has meant that this study has employed an ‘inductive’ research approach to explore and examine the personal responses of the participants who were interviewed (Neuman, 1997). As Gray has pointed out:

> The choice of research methodology is determined by a combination of factors - whether the researcher believes that there is a truth out there that needs discovering, or whether the task of the research is to explore and unpick people’s multiple perspectives in natural, field settings (Gray, 2009, p. 27)

This study was constructed to explore the personal experiences of the selected interviewees as they engaged with the ‘developmentalist’ and ‘donor agencies’ that represented developmental projects in their country. Inductive research was chosen because it, (i) examines closely the data set collected in response to the research questions, (ii) it looks for repeated responses across the data obtained from all respondents, and (iii) attempts to develop meaningful understandings related to the research question through emerging patterns and themes arising from these repeated responses.

As indicated in Chapter Two, key concerns have been related to questions of: Why has one particular approach been employed rather than taking an alternative approach?; What IS included in the programs; What is NOT included in the programs?; Who IS sourced, cited or involved in the program?; and Who is NOT involved in the program?

Consistent with this inductivist approach, principles consistent with an interpretivist epistemology have been widely used in the examination of cultural issues within texts and data which have been collected using qualitative methods (Gray, 2009). Thus the author believes that this approach is well-suited to build a sound understanding of aid development activities, which is the territory that this research study will traverse. In addition, during

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18 The researcher has introduced the word ‘developmentalist’ to describe, and abbreviate the concept of an ‘aid development practitioner’.
this analysis, semiotic analysis will greatly assist in deconstructing meaning from text (as defined in the most general way), as has been amply illustrated by the work of Barthes (1973) and Hall (1983).

An important justification for using this inductive research approach stems from the desire to engage in the examination of a data set taken from respondents having one cultural perspective by a researcher having a different cultural perspective. This study is exploring the impact of development partners (from a powerful donor culture which is [partly] shared by the researcher) on aid-development practitioners (developmentalists) in the culturally specific environment of Indonesia and Timor-Leste. Thus the participant responses, obtained from senior officials in education and training, managers of training and human resource development, trainers and donor administrators, will be culturally specific, and their responses to the research questions will be naturally personal (subjective) in nature. Therefore sensitivity in collating and exploring consistencies and patterns to understand developed shared perspectives within the examined culture, is central to forming any possible conclusions, which will be evidentially (and morally) defensible.

Gray (2009) argues in *Doing Research in The Real World*, that having a clear understanding of the distinction between ‘being’ and ‘becoming’, or alternatively between ‘what is’ or ‘what it means’, creates a distinction between the ‘ontological’ and the ‘epistemological’. In our situation, existing within a relativist ontology space, which is consistent with applying an interpretivist epistemology (see later), means that we take the meaning of the world surrounding this project as being dependent on the overlap of the many subjective experiences of the respondents’ experienced world. There does not exist, related to this issue, a reality independent of multiple experiences, which denies the possibility of using a positivist epistemology, since there is no question of the existence of ‘objective’ knowledge of this world. All we have to go on are a set of different subjective experiences (Lewis, Saunders, & Thornhill, 2012) which are working, more or less, in the same context.
At the level of transformational synthesis of data, semiotic analysis provides a powerful and well-tested approach to examine and deconstruct the ontological concept of ‘What is?’ at a deeper level. Clearly, this question of ‘What is?’ can be juxtaposed by an equivalent interest in ‘What is not?’, and this type of analysis brings us closer to generated meanings and ideology within our study area. Hall (1983) argues that developing a notion of ‘What is?’ is when we are being at our most 'ideological'. Of key relevance here is that this simple question of ‘What is?’ can be, and often is, misinterpreted across cultures. Thus, we are warned that when researching across cultures, as in this project, 'What is?' is not at all a clear or useful single position to adopt (Hall 1983).

It has been decided that, for this study, the task of focusing upon 'What it means' [epistemology] will provide greater assistance to inform our discussions, as well as to establish positions from which this research can begin to discover how meanings are produced and what these meanings tell us about ourselves. It has been advised that, for such work:

The focus becomes not one of how these texts describe the reality of the world, but how the social world is represented, and how meanings are produced. Texts are therefore seen as social practices, embedded with multiple values and vested interests, not the reporting of independent, objective judgments (Gray, 2009, p. 26).

Because it is common for inductive research to use one of a number of theoretical perspectives, it is important to note that this study has leaned heavily upon interpretivism, where there is no, direct, one-to-one relationship between ourselves (subjects) and the world (object) (Gray, 2009). However, interpretivism, according to Gray, can be divided into a number of parallel representations including, symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, realism, hermeneutics, and naturalistic inquiry. It is considered that this study lends itself most favorably toward the symbolic interactionalist approach. Following Gray (2009), the essential tenets of symbolic interactionism are that: (i) people interpret the meaning of objects and actions in the world and then act upon those interpretations, (ii) meanings arise from the process of social interaction, and (iii) meanings are handled by using, and are modified by, an interactive process used by people in dealing with the phenomena that are
encountered. Meanings, in this world, are not fixed or stable, but are revised on the basis of experience. This includes the definition of 'self' and of who we are (Gray, 2009).

**Developing a critical framework**

The study examines perspectives of vocational education and training and engagement of international agencies and advisors on systems development. The purpose of this examination was to uncover the impact of international perspectives and their 'wholesale import' into foreign educational systems (Allais, 2014; Coles et al., 2014). As a consequence, critical inquiry and a post-modernist stance fit comfortably with this aim as a research methodology, as they challenge the researcher to make clear and openly explicate their ideological background. The critical inquiry perspective is not content to merely interpret the world, but it also seeks to change it. The assumptions and understandings that lie beneath critical inquiry have been claimed to be that:

Ideas are mediated by power relations in society, certain groups in society are privileged over others and exert an oppressive force on subordinate groups. What are presented as facts cannot be disentangled from ideology and the self-interest of dominant groups. Mainstream research practices are implicated, even if unconsciously, in the reproduction of the systems of class, race and gender oppression (Gray, 2009, p. 25).

The critical inquiry perspective extends the reach of interpretivism analysis by not just describing ‘What is?’, but by opening up appropriate questions to examine the (hidden) dominant positions (ideological positions) of development practice. Therefore, the theoretical frameworks that impacted upon this research include, in one way or another; post structuralism, critical theory, adult learning theory and comparative education. It must be noted, though, that these frameworks are not mutually exclusive.

**Contribution of educational pedagogy to development**

The adult education sector has a background in critical thinking and critical reflection on practice (Foley, 2004), due in part to the reflective nature of educational pedagogy. This is opposed to the 'results-oriented' focus of development work where critical reflection is wanting. It is proposed that this
critical reflection in adult education, if applied in a development context, would assist the production of more reflective development projects. In addition, using a critical framework would help explore the core ideas of what 'development' hopes to achieve, and whose development we are talking about. We propose further that development work therefore needs to be applied using a critical approach. This could begin, as signposted earlier, by posing the following presumption: What is NOT included is as equally valid as what IS included. In this way, a critical analysis of: program designs, lessons learnt, development reports, stakeholder involvement and engagement, and indeed the entire plethora of conceived development work, would benefit by posing more generalised statements and questions such as:

- It is not what is in the program that matters, it is what is NOT in the program;
- It is not what is in the policy that matters, it is what is NOT in the policy that matters;
- It is not who is in the activity that matters, it is who is NOT included that matters;
- It is not what is in the structure/review that matters, it is what is NOT included in the structure/review that matters;
- It is not which participants are included, so much as which ones are NOT included;
- It is not what IS, as much as it is what is NOT.

This study acknowledges Stuart Hall for his critique of media, media imagery, and visual iconography for this critical framework, and its potential application into the world of development and education and training (Hall, 1997). Hall argues that it is not what IS in an image so much as what is NOT in the image that tells 'us' more about ourselves. This includes our notions of our constructed world or our 'common sense truths' about ourselves (Hall, 1983). Hall goes on to describe the impact of this 'constructed world' as 'ideology at work', which is a rich metaphor that will continually inform this study.
Griff Foley (2004) uses a similar critical framework in education, and suggests that applying critical theory takes us beyond the 'interpretive' world into the 'socially constructed' world. This approach could help the development sector explore the many falsehoods and beliefs around development work. Foley explains that:

The critical paradigm emphasises the social context of knowledge and education. Critical theory focuses on the relationship of knowledge power and ideology. Critical theory takes us beyond the relativism of the interpretive framework, which simply helps us understand that different people see things differently, and helps us realise that our understandings are socially constructed, often in distorted ways. Such distorted understandings, critical theorists argue, can be systematically exposed, explained and eliminated. In a process called ideological critique, the notion of critical and emancipatory theory and practice has been influential in adult education over the past century (Foley, 2004, p. 14).

In this study, we have applied this critical framework in examining the Independent Completion Report into IASTP in the following Chapter. In summary, this critical analysis included: (i) examining the inclusion and use of the Most Significant Change (MSC) evaluation framework as opposed to an alternative framework, (ii) the number and selection of ultimate beneficiaries cited in the final report, (iii) the effectiveness of measuring the benefits, and (iv) the narrow nature of the 'scope' of evaluation guidelines (de Moura Castro & Alftan, 1992). A similar critical review of a substantial development project in Timor-Leste reveals very clear examples of confusion, misdirection and reluctant support by a major donor, in this case The World Bank, to trial locally-based management activities.

Jesson and Newman (2004), writing in Foley's Dimensions of Adult Education: Radical Adult Education and Learning (Foley, 2004), give significant weight to Gramsci’s description of ‘hegemonic control’. They claim that 'social control' and 'common sense truths' which are voiced by the oppressors and oppressed alike, maintain things as 'the way things are' (cited in (Foley, 2004)). Indeed, detecting this act of social control is problematic in both the development sector and the educational and training sector. In the development sector, peasants working the land and being forced by circumstances to generate an 'export crop' is very much the lived reality in
Timor-Leste (Mats & Fredrik, 2013). In the Indonesian Kalimantan forest, dependent communities are being forced off their land to make way for an AusAID funded dam (Wilks, 2010). These development projects are justified under the notion that they are natural ‘common sense’ truths.

Many other ‘common sense truths’ are analysed in this study, and some which are included here are: (i) the proliferation of, and de-contextualisation of quality frameworks around the world, presented as ‘Timor-Leste needs a National Qualifications Framework’ (Allais, 2014; Coles et al., 2014), (ii) Timor-Leste needs competency based training and demand driven Technical Vocational Education and Training (Cooper & Walters, 2009), (iii) university education is more valued in Timor-Leste (Hill, 2005), and (iv) Timor-Leste needs a Technical Vocational Education and Training system focussed on construction and tourism (Curtain, 2009). We assert here that deconstructing these ‘common sense truths’ in the development context, is critical to gaining an understanding of the nature, extent and depth of social control. A process of semiotic analysis is applied in this study for the process of deconstruction. Too often, there is a reliance upon, and acceptance of, the language and construction of development programs, and this manifests itself in the unequivocal support for the existing (i) Terms of Reference (de Moura Castro & Alifthan, 1992) (ii) Training Needs Assessments and (iii) Program Design Objectives as well as every other 'Considered' and 'Expert Evaluation' of program provision.

The ‘developmentalists' know this language as they are inculcated with certain attitudes and beliefs, and they inhabit these constructed worlds. In this world, they speak a common language, without having any intention to critically examine and confront this development culture. However, semiotic analysis, when applied to this language, uncovers (or strips bare) certain attitudes and beliefs that occupy these constructed worlds, allowing us to critically examine and confront the tensions in this aid-development culture. Having conceptualized the study in this manner, the following Chapter on methodology develops the means used to uncover these common sense truths.
Chapter Four: Methodology

This chapter outlines how the individuals were selected as respondents for the study and how the collected data has been analyzed to reveal patterns and structures consistent with the literature and the key research questions of donor engagement in training. This methodological approach includes: detailing the interview techniques (for the individual and focus group interviews); how the ethical issues were handled (noting the social risks, aspects of confidentiality and anonymity); methods employed for data collection and secure data storage; and, finally, how aspects of reliability and validity were ensured. The demographic data included respondents’ nationality, years in the workforce, current employment and educational background, this information being collected in order to allow cross-referencing of participants’ perceptions.

Methodology and Methods

This research intends to add to the body of knowledge by providing academic critiques of various aspects of development practice, including monitoring and evaluation frameworks together with the donor institutions’ reflections on development practices. It has the objective of informing aid-development practitioners of the outcomes of various approaches and policy directions for training program design and monitoring, including selected evaluation techniques, using the perceptions of respondents intimately involved with previous programs. This research uncovered more appropriate methods of designing and developing capacity and institutional building programs, particularly in Indonesia and Timor-Leste, which met local requirements. Too often, training approaches and capacity building programs used by coordinating donor institutions such as The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, have fallen significantly short of the expected goals (Canagarajah et al., 2002).
This research seeks to answer the questions: (i) What is the impact of skills development and training on aid practices?, and (ii) What improvements can be made to the evaluation of these practices in order to ensure appropriate and responsive development outcomes?

In attempting to answer these questions, this investigation explored current methods and approaches in overseas aid-training and development programs, to uncover what might be some of the underlying impediments to capacity building. It examined a number of potential impacts that might be worthy of analysis, including: dependence upon international advisors (Powell, 2001); failure to use local capacity (Carden, 2013; Neves, 2006); and the lack of skills transference to local staff. In addition, there are important issues arising from the impact of a false donor economy on recipient workforce, political economic and regional agendas of donor policies, donor-led agendas in conditionality (Powell, 2001), dependence upon technical assistance (Easterly & Pfutze, 2008), Demand Driven TVET, Adult Learning Principles, Cross Cutting Issues (particularly gender and governance) (Kragelund, 2011) and finally developing appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems (Lockheed, 2009).

To assist in the investigation of the two questions detailed above, the conduct of the research kept in mind three basic process questions; (i) Where are we? (ii) Where do we want to go? and (iii) What progress is being made? (Powell, 2012). In addition, there was a specific examination of the impact of donor engagement based upon short time lines and narrow definitions of donor success often used to mask donor engagement, which highlighted the common tendency to represent outcomes of singular projects rather than reflections upon system development (Carden, 2013).

This research will develop concepts of training and evaluations across cultures, and examine the application of these activities within different contexts. It particularly looked at the benchmarks used to determine success of training projects. This allowed the research to adopt an interpretive research process, and thereby introduced the subjective meanings inherent in
various social interactions, giving them form and substance across the diverse work and life cultures of the participants. We suggest that this will give a ‘voice’ to the participants’ experiences, which is hitherto missing. Indeed, ethnography was used because the author wished to acknowledge this perspective of the participants, as they reflected on their experience of learning, and also to uncover the interplay between the participants’ and the developmentalists’ perceptions. The designed research questions focused on the impact of, and effectiveness of, donors’ and developmentalists’ contributions to the well-being of the ultimate beneficiaries, as perceived by these beneficiaries.

This research critically examined the current monitoring and evaluation frameworks applied in a development context. By examining the inclusion and use of the Most Significant Change (MSC) evaluation framework, it is anticipated that the critique will extend to the appropriateness of this evaluation framework as a monitoring and evaluation tool. This critique may be in terms of: (i) the number of ultimate beneficiaries cited in the final report, (ii) the effectiveness of measuring the benefits, and (iii) in particular an examination of the narrow nature of the 'scope' of current evaluation guidelines. In this respect, it should be mentioned that a similar critical review of The World Bank training and evaluation activities in Timor-Leste has already uncovered a plethora of concerns related to evaluation practices (Berryman & Coxon, 2010).

It is claimed that ethnographic methodologies will enable the researcher to generate insights into the methods used in the social and cultural contexts for training (Brewer, 2000), and indeed these methodologies are accepted techniques of cross-cultural research that enable the study of phenomena across societies, communities and cultures. The 34 individuals who were interviewed, were purposely chosen for the project since they were identified as being critical to the training sectors in both Indonesia and Timor-Leste. These informants included government ministers, senior education and training staff, managers of training centres, trainers and facilitators of training. A balance of men and women was built into the sample, and a snowballing
technique (Bowser & Benjamin, 1995) was used to identify and access further suitable interviewees, the inherent problem with this approach is that some interviewees may suggest people of 'like mind'. Another limitation of this approach is that the sub-group, and the selection of the sample, may not be typical of the population as a whole (D. C. Miller, 1991). Notwithstanding this critique, the sampling technique applied was a nonprobability 'judgment' selection of respondents to create a cross-section of individuals from these organisations in terms of gender, age, position in the organization, experience in the field, role and professional activities and environments.

Qualitative techniques were applied to this data (Neuman, 1997). Data was coded to help the study to conceptualise the research variables, then they were organized around certain key themes of the research which included: relationship between the international advisors, workplace learning and skills transference; forms of training effective in the Indonesian and Timorese cultural environment; measures of success in training activities; capacity building within organizations following training interventions; and changes [positive or negative] which were evident from donor activity.

**The study context**

Whilst any number of similar developing countries could have been chosen for this type of research, Indonesia and Timor-Leste were selected as the countries for study because, taken together, both countries represent a significant proportion (half) of the Australian aid budget (Farmer et al., 2011), and a key intention of the research was based on the donor engagement related to Australian aid activities. In addition, the research institute and the researcher are Australian, and the researcher was familiar with the donor activity in both of these countries, having conducted numerous donor-funded aid projects for each of the target countries. Finally, it is worth noting that Timor-Leste was in a ‘post-conflict’ situation when this study was undertaken, and there was a need to quickly develop the human resource requirements within the country. This pressure presented ‘donors’ and ‘governments’ with challenges in their approaches to human resource development (Tansey, 2014). In comparison, Indonesia could be regarded as having a more
established engagement with the donor community in the education and training sector (Tapp, 2011).

As indicated earlier, trainers, facilitators and training managers from the government and non-government sectors were included in the study. In Indonesia, the government sector trainers came from the Institute of Public Administration (LAN), Ministry of Education, Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Finance and Taxation. The selection of LAN was driven primarily by the impact these trainers have across a diverse array of ministries. In Indonesia, LAN is responsible for the training of all government public servants. The Ministries of Finance and Taxation were selected because of the advancements these ministries had made in relation to human resource development activity, as well as their involvement in significant donor-funded training activities.

In Timor-Leste, the trainers came from the Secretary of State for Vocational and Professional Training (SEFOPE) and the Ministry of Education. SEFOPE\textsuperscript{19} has established close links with the International Labor Office (Pamphilon, Mikhailovich, & Chambers), whilst the Ministry of Education had responsibility significant for programs from The World Bank, primarily the Education Sector Support Program (ESSP). The training activities under examination in this study were diverse, and issues arising included program outcomes and evaluation techniques, ministries involved and the donor agencies engaged. However, the content and approaches were static and uniform, which allowed for some broad generalisations across sectors.

More participants from the non-government and private training sector were interviewed in Timor-Leste compared to Indonesia, since this was a reflection of the state of development and requirements for development in Timor-Leste. Non-government Indonesian participants were drawn from the donor community and academia. The technique of collecting views of participants

\textsuperscript{19} SEFOPE was the precursor organization to SEFOPE - in 2010, responsibilities for Policy were added to its commission.
from ‘outside’ government instrumentalities provided a richness and diversity of perspectives, which gave balance to the analysis.

Focus groups

Two focus groups were conducted with between 7-10 people selected from those who had originally taken part in the interviews (Timor-Leste and Indonesia). The focus groups followed a format similar to the interview questions, however as these questions were open-ended questions, the participants largely determined the nature of the discussion that followed. The focus groups explored the key themes of the research and this enabled participants to explore their ideas and thoughts with the assistance and support of their colleagues. The purpose of this method was to draw out further comments and cross-check these with comments previously made in the individual interviews; in social research this is known as triangulation, where a another method or approach is used to collect data to enhance the authenticity of the earlier information (Gray, 2009).

The participants were asked for their willingness to be involved in the focus groups and an appropriate and accessible venue was selected. The author facilitated the discussion, and the focus groups were audio taped with participant consent. All participation was voluntary, and participants were able to withdraw at any time during the process. All participants were within the age range of 25-65, working in Indonesia or Timor-Leste and nominated their nationality as either Indonesian or Timor-Leste. Some Timorese citizens hold dual citizenship, particularly Australian passports, having returned to Timor-Leste post the Indonesian withdrawal.

All interviews and focus groups were conducted in English20, as the participants (trainers and managers) all speak English and have been funded, or work for, international aid agencies. The Indonesian focus group at times discussed some issues in Bahasa Indonesian; however this was only

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20 Interviews were conducted in English, whilst the group interviews were with participants from IASTP programs, these limitations would have restricted broader participation.
occasionally the case, and it appeared to assist participants to more confidently articulate their own perspectives.

**Collection of data**

Ethics approval was granted in April 2008 (see Appendix Two), with data collection undertaken shortly thereafter—in early 2008, and completed 18 months later, in October 2009. Participants were interviewed at times convenient to them. In the case of the Minister, this was in a car travelling to regional Timor-Leste. For many of the participants, the interviews were conducted after formal training sessions were completed, since many of these participants were either formal trainees-in-training, or facilitators of formal training. After the formal training concluded, the participants remained at the training centres until training recommenced. Often, this included overnight stays, and, given these circumstances, the participants involved were far more relaxed, reflective and responsive to the lines of enquiry.

The interviews conducted in the workplaces were less than favorable in terms of data collection and openness, and this was avoided wherever possible in later interviews. In one incident, where a participant was interviewed in his workplace, his superior (an expat) was present for the second half of the interview, and this person actually offered his opinion to a question. This opinion was not included in the transcription, and given the nature of the comments made it would be fair to conclude that his presence did impact upon this participants’ response. Another interview conducted in a workplace, caused the participant to close the door, and check for any ‘listeners’ to his comments. Rightly or wrongly, he was concerned about who would discover his involvement in the research.

An opportunity for a longitudinal perspective on this research arose some six years into the research (2015). The researcher was able to interview two additional Timorese informants whilst conducting a workshop on the research outcomes for a visiting Timorese delegation in Melbourne. Two of the

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21 This delegation of four Timorese were all workers and trainers in SEFOPE and Ministry of Education. The workshop outlined this research focused on outcomes and discussed current TVET activities.
Timorese delegates had been interviewed originally for this study, and these interviews and workshops helped position earlier research against current development activities. It became very clear during these discussions that many of the ideas and concerns regarding training interventions were still current in Timor-Leste.

The transcribing and analysis of the interviews did not occur until four years after conducting the interviews. This provided the researcher with the opportunity to be more reflective and detached from the content expressed at the time of the interview. Whilst not planned, in hindsight it was a desirable outcome.

There has been a considerable body of research and literature undertaken between 2007 and 2016 in the development context. The development sector has undergone some significant changes during the period of this research. For example, (Gore, 2014) has reflected on activities in two high level forums on development activity. One of these included a more diverse array of ‘partners’, and it appears that these new partners are bringing significant changes to the dynamics of development responses (Mawdsley et al., 2014; Zimmermann & Smith, 2011). In addition, recent literature has begun to examine the value of exporting ‘quality frameworks’ from the developed world to regions needing aid (Allais, 2014; Coles et al., 2014).

**Data storage and security**

A dropbox was established to store all electronic data. This dropbox was shared with both supervisors and included; consent forms, interviews, ethics approval and research documents. Every participant signed a consent form prior to any interview, and this was a standard consent form ratified by the University. Initially these consent forms were to be filed away in the Institute for Community Engagement and Policy Alternatives, but this institute was closed by the university during the thesis period, and the signed consent forms were securely housed at the researcher’s residence. Scanned copies of these consent forms were placed in a dropbox, and all audio recordings were filed into a number of disc storage devices as well as placed in the
shared dropbox. Also, a planned ‘questionnaire’ was included in the ethics application as a method of data collection, but this did not take place because there was a difficulty in sending and collating data in the info-tech poor region of Timor-Leste. The researcher informed the ethics committee about this change and sought approval for this alteration to occur on the ethics submission.

The researcher lived and worked in Indonesia and Timor-Leste for a period of six years, which facilitated the conduct of the interviews in both countries. As previously noted, occasionally during the Indonesian group interview, the participants answered the questions in Bahasa Indonesian. This certainly provided a richness of context and a comfort with the proceedings for the participants, and this allowed them to be more expressive. The researcher understands Bahasa Indonesian, so that when this reversion to Bahasa Indonesian happened, some participants felt more comfortable in expressing their points of view. Other participants often assisted by providing explanations in English. In a couple of instances in the Indonesian individual interviews, the English levels of the participants were such that they actually preferred to answer all of the questions in *Bahasa* Indonesia\(^{22}\), however these three interviews were excluded from the study in order to avoid translation misunderstandings. The researcher believes that these interviews would not have had any significant impact on the study’s outcomes. There were no language issues with the Timorese individual interviews as English is one of the working languages of Timor-Leste, and within the cohort chosen for this study, their English levels were quite advanced.

Because judgment sampling techniques were applied to select the cohort, the application of statistical analysis of the responses cannot be used as a basis for developing generalisations (D. C. Miller, 1991). The actual choice of participants was carried out in an effort to represent important subgroups that are typical of the whole group of interest, for example trainers from Lembaga Administrasi Negara-LAN (Indonesia) and trainers from SEPFOPE Timor-

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\(^{22}\) Bahasa Indonesia is the Indonesian Language.
Leste were specifically involved. The researcher had managed and conducted a number of education and training projects in both Indonesia and Timor-Leste, and this experience had provided an opportunity to network widely with the alumni of training and donors involved in training. It also assisted in the organization of interviews with people known to have an ongoing commitment to education and training in their communities.

**Demography**

The data gathered from the participants included some demographic information concerning; gender, nationality, job title, level of education, years in the workforce, years in education and training.

**Table I. Gender/Ethnic breakdown**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender/Ethnicity</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total transcriptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a predominance of men in roles of management and education and training, thus this breakdown provided a good representative gender balance for the research data collection.

**Table 2. Length of working experience in education and training**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years in Education-Training/Ethnicity</th>
<th>0-5</th>
<th>5-10</th>
<th>10-15</th>
<th>15-20</th>
<th>20+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many of the participants (particularly those from Indonesia), had significant experience of education and training, more than half of them having over ten years contribution to the area.
Table 3. Educational background according to country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Background/Ethnicity</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Bachelor/Diploma</th>
<th>Masters</th>
<th>PhD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Timorese educational background is quite naturally low, as explained in detail in the research, due to a disrupted education associated with the Indonesian occupation of that country.

Table 4. Job Title and working background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Classification/Ethnicity</th>
<th>Trainer</th>
<th>Senior Trainer</th>
<th>Donor Program Administrator</th>
<th>Training Manager</th>
<th>Senior Government Official</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The job classifications were given according to their current roles, which were somewhat inflated to present a particular level of importance. This is not uncommon in many East Asian cultures, and is particularly common in Indonesia where it is called 'saving face' (Minkov & Hofstede, 2012). Whilst the number of participants indicating that they were 'training staff' was low, many of the other categories (training managers and donor managers) have a background in training.

The questions asked during this research are attached in Appendix One. At the beginning of the individual interviews, an ‘open ended’ question was included to encourage and establish a rapport with the researcher. This question involved describing what the respondent thought makes a 'good' trainer, and it was found that most trainers, or participants in training, have a view on this issue. Therefore, it was a good opening question to begin the interviews.
The questions were divided into major and minor questions, so that if the major question did not elicit a response, further probing and clarification could be sought using the minor question. During the interviews conducted early in the research, it became apparent that ‘selecting participants for training’ was similar to asking about ‘approaches to training needs assessments (TNA)’. The issue of TNA was seldom addressed in the participant’s organisations, therefore this question was removed from later interviews in favor of the question of selecting participants for training. The researcher does not believe this impacted upon the research outcomes, because asking a question where the participants have a limited understanding of the application makes this line of questioning unhelpful.

All other questions were easily understood by the participants, with little consequent requirement on the researcher to explain or justify any issues which were detailed in the Plain Language Statement of the Research (see Appendix Four).

**Analysis**

This phase involved data coding and data analysis from the literature review, interviews and focus groups. Certain themes began to emerge inductively from the data collection, and were categorized and given titles to assist the analysis. These themes included, but were not limited to; evaluation methodologies applied, original design concepts applied, international intervention approaches, particular forms of training interventions relevant to Indonesia and Timor-Leste, impact of international advisor assistance, monitoring and evaluation frameworks used to measure training interventions and successes, strategies used to build local capacity, technical assistance and its provision, and impact of cross cultural issues.

The interview questions targeted training needs analysis, capacity building and international contributions as well as allowing the respondents to identify contributions from donors on training projects and change within their
institutions as a result of training. The last question was open-ended, requesting ‘any comments’ to this study. These open interview questions allowed respondents to describe and articulate their individual response to donor activities, and this was fertile ground for collecting data related to the aim of this study.

During the coding and analysis, it became apparent that there were identifiable ‘relationships’ between the literature review and participants’ responses. This relationship forms the basis of this study. Equally evident during the coding of the responses and the study, was that management responses revealed a greater understanding of ‘donor’ interventions. They were more critical of these interventions than the trainers and facilitators and differences between Indonesia and Timor-Leste were apparent in the following ways; Timorese were more ‘critical’ of donor interventions and Indonesian responses were more ‘accepting’ of the donor interventions.

The researcher had a ‘close’ connection to the implementation of the Certificate IV in Training and Assessment across Indonesia and Timor-Leste, having conducted and managed these donor programs for several years. During coding and collating responses, it became apparent that this ‘donor program’ had a significant impact in terms of capacity building, and that the responses needed to be highlighted. The researcher has declared this close engagement in advance, in order to allow the data to speak for itself during the analysis phase.

**Social Risks and Confidentiality**

The social risks identified for this research included the interviewing of Muslim women. The researcher is a male, white person from a developed country context bringing with him varied and diverse power and gender perceptions. This may have had a significant impact in Indonesia when interviewing Indonesian Muslim women. Whilst noting this background, it is also the case that the researcher applied some cultural sensitivity to these issues, having lived and worked in the country for over a decade. All Muslim women interviewed were accepting of the interview process, given that all were
known to the researcher in some training-related capacity. However, as a precaution, doors remained open, and in one case a participant asked her husband for approval, which was freely given.

Alternative arrangements would have been put in place if interviewing Muslim women became an issue; the solution would have been to ask the female principal supervisor (at the time) of this research to conduct these interviews, however this was not required nor undertaken.

There were social risks to some participants if they disclosed information that may have prejudiced their own career, for example by disclosing opinions critical of their management. All interviews were coded so that the names of the participants were not identified in the final study. There were no identifying materials on literature review documents and a detachment of identifiers from either the interview sheets or other research documents was scrupulously adhered to. Any identifying characteristics, such as job title and Ministry location, were not included in the final research. However where this has inadvertently occurred, permission was sought and granted for data to be used by those identified (Appendix Five).

Participants signed consent forms (Appendix Three) and were given verbal assurances that their responses would not be made public or expose their responses. All participants in the interviews were volunteers, and therefore they could reveal as little or as much as they deemed appropriate.

Reliability and Validity

The study uncovered much of what it set out to achieve, in that a broad range of views were expressed around development training interventions. These views need to be examined and evaluated further, in order to provide some coherence, and possible direction for future development interventions. Examination of the literature and donor reports of donor assistance confirmed what interview participants expressed about the need to improve donor engagement.
The problematic nature of literature regarding skills development in countries such as those involved in this research, remains as valid today as ever. Determining the skills that are needed in a developing country context is a critical issue for practitioners and governments alike. Governments and philanthropic trusts have, for many years, provided internationally selected communities with ‘specialised’ skills from the donor country. This approach has had mixed success in its application, and growing condemnation from the recipient countries about the effectiveness of such interventions (Wilks, 2010) due in part to the lack of critical reflection and examination of the impost of these foreign and alien educational frameworks (Allais, 2014; Coles et al., 2014).

Empowering communities and developing democratic communities, particularly in countries that are in post-conflict situations such as Timor-Leste, will prove to be the lasting contributions of donor assistance (Joseph & Hamaguchi, 2014). Focusing on narrow definitions of what constitutes skills development, as is sometimes the case with donor driven employment programs (commonly referred to as demand-driven TVET), as well as measuring success in terms of donor dollar contributions and scaled international advisor outcomes, misses the critical role that could be played by donors in nation-building in war-torn post conflict situations.

Knowledge and learning should be taken to be ‘change agents’ that enable ‘know how’ of various kinds to be utilized, and also to allow the learner, when acting on this knowledge, to develop awareness of self as an agent of change. Long-term sustainable development outcomes require that capacity be built into the recipient country for ongoing benefits to those communities (Wilks, 2010), and therefore questions arise as to how effective these capacity building approaches have been, a key issue with which this study attempts to grapple. Training recipient communities to manage, develop and ‘own’ the skills development process, may prove, in the long run, to be the most beneficial international aid response by donor governments and multi and bilateral institutions (Wilks, 2010). This presumes that the ownership is taken by the recipient community.
This research provided an opportunity to focus on the specifics of the current skills development methodologies and underlying assumptions, which underpin adult learning methodologies. A particular focus is on those processes employed in the training programs in Indonesia and Timor-Leste, in order to allow us to contribute to the debate on aid effectiveness and to discover a possible better way forward. The next Chapter, Findings, will provide an outline of the findings from the study, arranged in relation to the emerging and dominant themes of concern to this area.
Chapter Five: Findings

Introduction: Emergent themes

This chapter documents the findings of this study, based on material gathered across Indonesia and Timor-Leste, beginning with an examination of the Indonesian findings. Applying a purposive approach to the selection of the initial respondents, and a Grounded Theory-informed analysis of the data (Currie, 2009), it was found that the responses were clustered, and were connected through some major themes emanating from the literature review. These themes that emerged from both countries were able to be conveniently categorized, and were reflective of their own country’s development circumstance. These themes were:

- Development assistance approaches in vocational training;
- Skills development;
- Learning styles particular to each country;
- Management and planning responses to training;
- Evaluation approaches employed;
- Reflections on culture and ideology, and their impact.

In summary, these categories can be understood as: (i) Development assistance approaches in vocational training issues covered training approaches, individual development vis-a-vis institutional strengthening, notions of sustainability and international contributions; (ii) Skills development, together with skills debate, covers the issues surrounding application of technical assistance and the impact of ‘Bule’ dependence along with identifying the appropriate skills required in a Timor-Leste context; (iii) Learning styles covered notions of participatory learning, and student centered training approaches, training and workplace competencies, the introduction and impact of the Certificate IV in Training and Assessment, ‘technical verses soft’ skills development, and reflections upon cultural differences in learning; (iv) Monitoring and planning responses included issues as working with donors, responding to institutional requirements and environment, linking training to human resource planning and the ability to introduce change; (v) Evaluation approaches covered the extent to which
evaluation practices were implemented, critiques of donor monitoring and evaluation approaches, the application of workplace learning, IASTP evaluation models and ethical practice; and (vi) Imposition of cultural values expressed views around policy borrowings in; training and assessment, demand driven TVET, agenda setting in inclusivity, gender, governance and cultural diversity.

At this juncture, we assert that such themes are a reasonable reflection of the main contributions of the respondents, and as Currie (2009) notes, it is possible only to determine the size and nature of the sample retrospectively. This is a potential limitation of grounded theory, as the researcher is reliant on the ability of the early participants to identify relevant aspects of the area under investigation (Currie, 2009).

The themes that have emerged, are reflected in the structured interview questions and are illuminated the designed research questions. At some point, critical decisions around selection and inclusion of certain responses, as opposed to other responses, was required. Not all responses were coherently expressed, nor for that matter clearly understood, therefore some inclusions either supported or contradicted the views of others and these issues were explored during the focus group, a process known as triangulation (Gray, 2009). In Indonesia, 14 of the 17 interviewee responses were included, as well as four of the seven interviewee responses from the group interview. In Timor-Leste, 13 respondents of the 17 interviewed were included, with four of the nine-group interviewee comments included in the presentation of the Timorese findings.

The author acknowledges that this process is open to interpretation, and raises questions such as: (i) What comments are included? and (ii) What comments are not included, and (iii) What has informed this selection of comments? While many of these issues are addressed in the literature review, this ‘selectivity’, however, is very much embedded in the nature of the qualitative research methodology applied in this study.
The respondents' comments, in both the Indonesian and Timor-Leste interviews, have been assigned the same nomenclature: (1) Senior Government Official (2) Training Manager (including HRD Managers) (3) Donor Program Administrator (4) Senior Trainer and (5) Trainer. This was done for the purpose of giving some structure and coherence to the respective comments, since managers and administrators mainly focused on planning and management concerns, whilst trainers tended to focus on teaching pedagogy.

While there were many other issues that could have been included in these findings, these were the salient issues that corresponded to the themes identified in the literature review. The analysis and discussion of knowledge outcomes from these interviews will feature in the analysis chapter to follow, and the task at hand is to outline the structure of the responses given.

**Section One: INDONESIAN FINDINGS**

The Indonesian interviews were conducted when the researcher was involved in conducting IASTP training across Indonesia. This training provided access to trainers, training managers and administrators of internationally funded donor aid training programs, and as such, were the key target groups to invite to participate in this research.

The Indonesian interviews revealed some thought-provoking insights into the way development assistance impacts upon notions of capacity building and management of human resource planning, including evaluations of training practices. Received responses were frank and honest personal accounts of both the ‘nature’ of training and possible suggestions for improvements in donor training programs. Whilst the responses elicited were apparently jovial in nature, they were poignant in criticism, at the individual and institutional levels, and provided valuable insights towards answering the designed research questions:

What is the impact of skills development and training on aid practices?

What improvements can be made to the evaluation of these practices in order to ensure appropriate and responsive development outcomes?
Development assistance approaches

Individual vs Institutional enhancement

The dilemma in the development-training sector arises from the fact that donors plan for ‘institutional capacity building’, but invariably end up with ‘individual capacity enhancement’. This was clearly noted in the Indonesian interviews and reported in the Independent Completion Report for IASTPIII (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008). Indeed, it appears that the institutional structure, at times, prevents capacity building of the organisation, while individuals gain some benefits at a personal level from donor-funded aid projects. As a consequence, what flows back to the organisation is contestable, and this is illustrated by the comments from this respondent:

After they have any aid from overseas, its always a problem, like IASTP 11, sustainability is always at the front. It's always when the project finishes then the capacity development also finishes; it doesn't mean that the project doesn't have any impact. Individually yes it is very strong, but institutionally there is no point. It's great to have overseas contributions, building capacity of the organisations, but you also have to deal with the policies within the institutions, together with the management itself. (Senior Trainer)

The Independent Completion Report for IASTPIII, comments that there was some anecdotal evidence regarding the impact on the ultimate beneficiaries of the IASTP III program, but it seems that the impact upon beneficiaries differs significantly to organisational change within institutes. Building the capacity of individuals (a topic covered in the Timorese interviews as well) fails to achieve the objective of meeting the Government of Indonesia’s human resource development needs. Both a combination of individual enhancement and structural strengthening is required, as advocated by this particular respondents’ comment:

Capacity building is a general concept that says that you are not only improving human resources, but also the institution, and if you talk about institutions it's both the people and the structure. These two things need to be strengthened equally, if you have good human resources, but they're not supported by a good structure it falls down and vice versa. (Trainer)

The respondents offered a number of propositions regarding the purpose of training, and these ranged from; ‘a culture of serial trainee’, ‘filling in numbers’, ‘paid activity’, and ‘staff advancement’. While many of these will be
covered in this chapter, this particular respondent echoed a common theme that training in Indonesia is often used to advance through the Indonesian bureaucratic ranks:

I think generally all of this training is just for getting a higher rank, as opposed to learning, really learning to get a staff development. Maybe it was intended so in a way, but in practice the staff don't see or apply it that way. It's just a means, an instrument or mechanism, it's like you have to do it, it's a must. It's not something that is needs-base. *(Trainer)*

**Sustainability of international contributions**

Building sustainability or capacity in an Indonesia training context elicited a number of critical observations from respondents about donor training programs. These were particularly focused on the IASTP programs, where issues such as; continuity of donor programs, shared expectations, dependence to independence, foreign dependence and localization, were mentioned. Given that sustainability requires that capacity is built up over time, the ‘stop-start’ nature of donor activities means that learning between activities is limited, as illustrated by this observation:

If we are looking for the sustainability, maybe the government needs to have some intervention on each of the aid organisations or the Australian Managing Companies, so that the process can be from one step to the next step, and not be cut-off from the learning between each project. *(Training Manager)*

Having a clear understanding or shared vision of expectations, seems to assist in the success and sustainability of aid activities. Nonetheless, achieving a common vision around capacity building in education and training is problematic for both the donor and recipient alike, and this notion was colourfully articulated by one respondent as the difference between a bullet’s projection and the graceful movement of a butterfly:

When you are talking about capacity building in education and training to me it’s not like a bullet, straight forward like this, it’s sometimes like a butterfly, it stops here and there, but again we should get a clear direction for both parties. Not only from the donors’ point of view, but it may be suitable for what the institution likes or it may not. I think there should be a share of vision, of what the donor wishes and what the institutions expect. *(Senior Trainer from group interview)*
These two examples illustrate the complex relationship between a local recipient’s perspective and the external donor expectations; they come together on some occasions and drift apart in others, as described in the ‘butterfly’ analogy. This symbiotic relationship is explained here this way:

We start from dependence, but people think we are makers when we are dependent. That's what institutions realize but I think dependence here is not enough, it should be more like inter-dependence. The institution would be nothing without the individual (also no-one is an island). Donors wouldn’t be donors without any recipients. How can we develop if we have this inter-dependency? Contributing, receiving and giving, there shouldn’t be any levelling here. You may be better in one way, and in the others you may be worst, or not. (Senior Trainer from group interview)

Bule dependence

The respect assigned to the ‘Foreigner in our midst’, or in the Indonesian vernacular, a ‘Bule’, cannot be undervalued. The following accounts of a Bule in the training room illustrate that Indonesians favor having foreign involvement as a necessary ingredient for learning to be regarded as modern training, and thus to be more effective. Nevertheless, this attitude or ‘mentality’ (described below) comes with some hint of tension, as noted in the following set of comments:

The first key actually is we love to have modern training. But the second key actually is that if the training is led by foreigners, the training would be more efficient and effective. Most attendants like the provider from AusAID, not from internal training provider, so it means that if the Australian train the session the participants will be happy and expect to have a lot of knowledge from the Australian trainers. (Donor Program Administrator)

In the Indonesian context, this means that a Bule (Foreigner) conducting training programs implies international quality and standards, efficiency and effectiveness, honor and respectfulness. The Bule is positioned as a universal sign for status and respect, and this authority is never ‘questioned’ by Indonesians. This aspect is illustrated by this comment:

The international expertise or knowledge or experience is very important as the model for development for us, because you know that in our training, we require that the combination between Indonesian expert and an international expert. Sometimes we know that the international contribution is not as much as we want but the value is still high. For example, if I run the training by myself, even if the content is exactly the same, but when I run with my colleague or partner from Australia for example like that the seriousness of the partnership is better. I don't know maybe it's the mentality of Indonesia we
are still looking for the Bule, or something, have a highly respect. (Donor Program Administrator)

This respect and acknowledgement of the Bule in the training room, does not extend to non-European Bule. The author has experienced this form of racial prejudice when an Australian Contracting Manager requested that European expertise was desirable. This is captured by these openly racist comments of one respondent in the group interview, which drew laughter and acknowledgement from other respondents:

In Indonesia, culturally if we especially having English speaker, International Bule is very very highly respected in training…even if sometimes the Bule is not competent [laughter] yeah this is true, this is my experience in the ten provinces and I have observed all trainers. The graduate Bule is very highly valued, and highly respected by the Indonesians even if the Bule is black [Incomprehensible laughter]. (Donor Program Administrator from group interview)

This Indonesian requirement to have an international 'expert' in the training room, however 'competent', will be examined further in the analysis chapter to follow.

Sustainability

The relationships and practices of donor organisations can sometimes impede the smooth flow of knowledge and learning from one project to another. An example here is the competitive tendering process, which inhibits the information exchange between previous contract managers and successful new contractors, as indicated by this comment:

The Aid from AusAID that is; IASTP-1, IASTP-11 and IASTP-111, each of these phases it is like cut, it is not connected. For example, when an ACM (Australian Managing Company) wins (a bid) the previous company is not willing to transfer the knowledge, so the link is broken. My project is too long to learn, it has taken two and a half years to learn, and we have got it right just now. Then the project ends, and then maybe the next project will happen, the same thing like that. (Donor Program Administrator)

The ability to share the ‘lessons learnt’ and to use key resources is essential if mistakes of past practices are to be learnt from. This was a noted concern of donor practices during the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2005) and bought about

\[23\] The author had placed an Indian-born Australian on an aid project and the ACM manager challenged this action.
clearer requirements for ‘harmonization’. It is common for new projects, with
new teams of people, to be engaged in similar donor driven practices, as
illustrated by this comment:

I think every project or activity, once it's done, there has to be an evaluation
or lessons learned from that; How we can do it better? From the Indonesian
side, I think the government really tried, and tried, they shouldn't stop,
emphasizing the importance developing the human resources. How can they
utilize every opportunity to cooperate and work together with the donors so
that it's not a waste? (Trainer)

There may be sound reasons (commercial or otherwise) for the lack of
sharing of information about lessons learnt; from project to project, company
to company, between governments and donors, from central administrators
and local organisations. Equally, examining the issues surrounding
sustainability and the motives behind aid, including the impact of any
particular program, requires contextualization in respect of the institution that
receives that support. Summing up this sustainability perspective, a
respondent hypothesized that when the project ENDS, the work ENDS:

The donors should build the capacity of the local people, your training
institution should invite more local people, rather than what the city offers and
provides. Only then the local people will grow through this capacity. The
donors always want to raise the sustainability, they don't realize the
[importance of] capacity of this kind of thing. Definitely it has very much
impact individually but institutionally NO (impact). When the project ENDS the
work ends; the reason, No Money. (Senior Trainer from group interview)

Attempts to introduce local input fails because of the very nature of foreign aid
being ‘tied’ to, or returning to, the country of origin discussed below in
conditionality of aid. Though, as the following respondent declares, the
importance of working together builds capacity, or at least ‘some capacity is
left in the country’, as noted below:

The last time we had some success in pushing AusAID, that is; the training to
be undertaken by Foreigner and Indonesian, you don't want to have purely
from one. That made me happy because I could successfully improve the
local training and because my suspicion it was very clear Australia money
was being returned to Australia, but by invoking the local training, some
capacity is left in the country. (Donor Program Administrator)
Skills development and learning styles

A number of interviewees commented on the selectivity of donor engagement in Indonesia, and noted that the 'motives' for this engagement was dubious. Greater intervention by the recipient country is needed to counter the donor push, an issue to be examined further under the inclusion of local voices in Chapter Six: Recognition of stakeholder requirements. The wholesale exportation of the Australian training system is of little value in a country as complex as Indonesia, which has its own (mix of) social, economic and cultural requirements in vocational education and training (Robinson, 1999, p. 59). This respondent noted that what might be good in Australia may not be good for Indonesia:

[International contributions] have to be very selective, I understand depends on the local country, domestic country. Take what is the best, if you find something that is not really applicable to your country you have to make the adjustments. For example we can learn from TAFE Institutes, we can look at what is good, even though it is good in Australia but maybe it's not good to our culture, to our conditions in Indonesia. So it depends on Indonesia to select what would be most applicable. (Senior Government Official)

Partnering countries with a similar level of development may prove to be the appropriate response, rather than just accepting Australian donor offerings in vocational training. This point was articulated by one respondent drawing an analogy between a child’s development and a country’s development needs, where choosing a ‘like for like’ approach through partnering a country at the same level. This concept is explained in this comment:

It is like training the baby from the cradle to walking and running, I think there are times where we don’t need them, the international aid. But I think with the economic, social and political things right now, we still need them. We are in the right level where we can do partnerships with the same level like Korea and Thailand. (Senior Training from group interview)

It was observed by some respondents that certain parts of Indonesia gained greater international attention, and this is particularly noted by AusAID’s interest in Nusa Tenggarah Tengah (NTT) and the number of donors operating in Papua. The respondents queried the motivations behind this, and as one respondent mentioned the case of Papua, where Papua had up to 27 programs with many duplicated and repeated programs by a number of
countries (Scott, 2007), it led him to muse about the actual impact of donor activity:

When I went to Papua for example, there were so many donors there, for the TNA, I noticed 27 activities for donors there, they have done this for a long time but it seems like nothing changes, no significant changes. It is because of the political interests there, Papua is so rich and they keep donors, in order to maintain the relationship. For example the state of aid is not being reduced, in terms of number, despite a lot of donors dealing with that. But the number of aid programs still increases so; What's the impact? (Senior Trainer from group interview)

Equally, partnering at an ‘individual’ level has a similar context; the technical assistance from a technical advisor has to be matched with the technical needs of the recipient individual. In concert with the Timor-Leste interviews, the issue of working with partners and sharing skills and knowledge was foremost in the minds of some of the Indonesian interviewees, as illustrated by this comment:

So it depends on their partners; if the partner has almost the same ideas same capacity, even if they’re not really the same but at least the partner can learn, in order to get the transfer of knowledge or transfer of capacity or something like that. But the others are like the bureaucratic organization; every day doing the meeting, just talking talking-there is no communication just giving advice, giving the assignment, there is no transfer before they go back, they already finished their contract, there is no [skills and knowledge transfer], that is a problem. (Senior Government Official)

Understanding the Indonesian context and applying appropriate and responsive measures to deal with this situation is critical to the success of donor projects (Pruetipibultham, 2012). Engaging local partners, as illustrated above, and involving experienced and/or qualified locals in the process, will ‘close the gap’ and prove more sustainable into the future. As noted by this respondent:

In the past probably, the donors come with a high expectation, I am sure they have certain targets to achieve, but they probably don’t even realize that Indonesia is still way behind. In order for things to happen, you have to at least close the gap. That’s what happened in the past, and now what’s changing is there is more and more experienced or qualified locals involved in that process. These people can be the conduit, can be the mediator, so that each of the key players here can ensure that it is happening. (Trainer)
There is no panacea for sustainability in a development context, and it was commented that technical assistance from abroad comes with a number of conditions:

Some organisations (donor) only think about how to spend their money, how to do the training on how to spend the budget...It is not thinking about what is the real benefit from their training, and for our country. (Senior Trainer)

The issues mentioned by this respondent are worthy of further analysis, and in particular, one of these caveats which was the matter of the Indonesian learning style, requires a great deal of more considered reflection and deconstruction.

**Indonesian Learning Styles**

Numerous interviewees commented upon the ‘passive’ nature of the Indonesian learning experience, the notion of ‘sitting and listening’ and not ‘questioning and enquiring’. This was highlighted in the Timorese interviews as well, and requires some further deconstruction in the examination of learning styles in the analysis Chapter Six: *Articulation of recipient expectation-Learning styles and the skills conundrum*. These following comments illustrate that in the vocational and tertiary sectors of learning, in Indonesia, the pursuit of ‘active learning’ is yet to be achieved. This is clearly illustrated by the following comment:

You will be considered a good student when you listen attentively, silently and obey what the teacher says. I think active learning and discussing and learning is not really promoted or fostered yet, even in their university level. (Senior Trainer)

This passivity in learning, poses issues for trainers, because without feedback from participants, trainers are unsure of culturally acceptable approaches. The comment by the following respondent underlines this issue:

I put everything in, try everything, excitedly, without understanding the impact or reactions from the training participants. Sometimes Indonesian people are very nice and they don't say anything about what we are doing so we don't know whether this is okay or not. (Senior Trainer)
When compared with the Australian vocational training system, Indonesian training should provide more practice and engagement. It was explained by this respondent in the following manner:

The Australian trainer introduces the modern training system, management of time, the way they manage the strategy and the training for example; in training in IT, Australia is providing a very, very good system, a lot of centres and a lot of practice, not just sitting and listening, that’s why it’s very efficient for me. (Donor Program Administrator)

One respondent, who was responsible for vocational education and training development and reform in Indonesia as a manager in a number of very large TVET institutes over his forty years of employment in the Ministry of Education, noted that learning for Indonesians has to be ‘face-to-face’. He offers this assessment of Indonesian learning:

It’s what you call ‘face-to-face’ guidance; this is Indonesia. For example, you build a Polytechnic or Vocational Training Centre or you make apprenticeships or internships for the company you cannot just leave them [students] and give the manual. We have not been trained enough, it has to be customized, it has to be ‘face-to-face’ management, ‘face-to-face’ instruction. (Senior Government Official)

A more detailed analysis of the impact of importing training frameworks from abroad, and their impact of imposing particular cultural representations, are featured in the next chapter. Nevertheless, some respondents claimed that certain ‘approaches’ have improved the quality of vocational training in Indonesia, such as; implementation of adult learning principles, trainer as facilitator, competency based training and learner-centered training. A sample of these comments include:

I think it's the adult learning principles-the equality, every participant is involved in the process of training. So we can make the people come to training with respect. So the trainer is not a trainer but a facilitator. What is common in Indonesia is a lecture, one-way traffic, this is common in Indonesia. (Senior Trainer)

A similar comment reinforces this idea:

Before that we do that ‘presentation and lecturing’ style and now after we have this new knowledge, this competency-based, it has the option of individual or group based learning. We have been conducting the Certificate Four, this is more learner centred, and the result of the training if we use this style of learner centred and adult principles it's more effective… from the participant’s point of view, there are a lot of activities, which can be done by
them, not by facilitator, and it's good for their workplace, when they are back in the workplace they can practice directly and easily because they have already been trained with this learner-centred style. *(Training Manager)*

Finally, the more realistic the role play, the more engaging the training becomes, and this is the recommended approach for gaining a fuller understanding of Indonesian learning *(Pruetipibultham, 2012)*. One respondent detailed how in a human rights training program, as part of a role-play, the participants (who were civil police) were woken by the ‘police in role’ in the middle of the night and taken away for questioning. This role-play illustrated the behavior of the civil police towards street sellers, and their indignation was noted accordingly:

> In the night when the participant is sleeping, they were kidnapped they were treated as a prisoner they wake up in the night, went outside they felt so bad and they protested; Why am I? I'm only sleeping? Somebody kidnap me and I'm treated like this! *(Donor Program Administrator)*

**Training and workplace competencies**

A central theme that emerged around training, involved creating links between education and training and the workplace. This was particularly in respect of lifelong learning and making training relevant to the world of work. Many respondents commented on the changes that they had witnessed recently with the introduction of learner-centered learning styles, as opposed to 'lecture and talk' approaches. As noted in the Ministry of Education Report 1997 *(Education Development in Indonesia)*, cited in Robinson *(1999)*, the report argued that:

> The development of worker's ability to be able to contribute to and participate in work decision-making will be more important into the future...these factors mean that there will be a corresponding shift of emphasis towards lifelong learning and re-skilling in Indonesia TVET system *(Robinson, 1999, p. 49)*.

Attempts to link training and the workplace are not that easy to achieve, as illustrated by this comment:

> The problem in Indonesia is how to link and match training and workplace. This is the problem for a supervisor, a partner. If we can link about training and workplace, I think everybody will be okay, good training, something like that. *(Senior Trainer)*
An account by one interviewee explains a process for achieving links between training and the workplace though the use of training needs analysis [TNA]. In saying this, he also highlights the central concern in Indonesia around the selection of participants for training. He describes some participants as ‘training specialists’; that is people who always show up for training irrespective of the relevance to their workplace, a concern he rightfully notes here:

Where you bring the workplace closer to the training and the training closer to the workplace, this is quite effective. This is initiated by the TNA and we can monitor the practice that they do in their workplace after the application of the training, and this can be monitored in the different blocks, which I think is quite good. I think that this will make the training more effective. Instead of the fragmented choice [selection] of participants. Like the ‘training specialist’ who came again and again to training there is no relation between what he does in the workplace, the training is good but it has no relevance to the workplace. It’s not effective at all, it’s a waste of time. (Senior Trainer from group interview)

Whilst acknowledging that the selection of participants for training was problematic throughout IASTP III, attempts were made to improve this selection process:

Currently we improve the selection of participants, we used to depend upon the coordinating agency. IASTP III is working with a coordinating agency, we depend upon the coordinating agency and we trust them that they will select a good, and most appropriate participants for the training but sometimes it’s ended up not the right person. (Donor Program Administrator)

Whilst deemed to be desirable, many respondents believe lifelong learning in the workplace is a problematic educational paradigm shift, and bridging that gap using training is still fraught with problems. Training alone may not produce the results that will be needed in the Indonesian context, which is explained in some detail here:

You see one thing about the quality of our formal education, it’s very much more on the basic and what you call essays and theory, so it’s very far away from the reality. So that is why, even though you are smart in the university and got good grades etc., but once you see the reality in the factory or the company it’s far away from your (study) because it’s a quite wide gap between the ‘schools’ and the ‘world of work’ so there must be a transition here, to bridge that is what we call- training. (Senior Government Official)

Lifelong learning and mentoring in the workplace is far from effective within government bureaucracies because of the structures that currently exist,
hierarchical management styles, reluctance to change practices, willingness to embrace a learning culture and no clear definitions of work competencies. Whilst mentoring may work in the ‘private sector’, it is less effective in the ‘public sector’, as is explained here:

There is a hierarchy, so we have to take that into account, so people, maybe in every government, in every bureaucracy you have to follow that structure, you can try to encourage that (mentoring) to happen but you will find a lot of challenges along the way. In other contexts maybe education in the universities or whatever, mentoring is an effective way because it allows you to take into account the different positions. There is no one single way of training. It's not like one size fits all; you have to see different needs and different contexts of how you deliver effective training. *(Trainer)*

**Management and planning**

It has been claimed that a well-developed, articulated and researched human resource development plan managed across all government ministries and organisations, will achieve positive measurable outcomes *(Mercadal, 2015)*. However if these plans are poorly understood and poorly managed, this gives rise to a mismatch between the plans and actual practice. The Indonesian respondents’ perspectives were critical of the Indonesian human resource development [HRD] planning effort, indicating that planning should come before training, not the other way around. This is quite contrary to the Indonesian private company’s approach to HRD planning, as explained by this respondents comments:

> I heard that only a few government organizations already done this [evaluation then training]. The person who is dealing with the human resources is the ‘second’ or ‘third’ class citizen in the government organization, not like in the private company, it is quite a strategic position. *(Senior Government Official)*

This view of the role of the human resource development department, within the public civil service, is contrasted with the commercial arms of businesses. It rightly posits that human resource development plans have a critical development role in any organization. Good planning requires implementing good practices, investing in individual people and developing consultative processes to ensure, as this respondent comments, being on the right track:

> Getting the right sections, getting the right people that you can work together, is always an advantage. If you have a plan in hand and then you can discuss
that with your partner and then have a consultative or regular process to
eNSURE THAT YOU ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK. (Trainer)

The Government of Indonesia [GoI] seeks help and assistance from many
donors, particularly Australia, to play a role in this planning process (Tapp, 2011). Nonetheless, the Government of Indonesia ministries need to plan
their training needs and match them with the donor offerings to make best use
of these offerings, as this interviewee reflects:

Sometimes, for instance, we need people who are dealing with the ‘public
policy’ and then dealing with ‘international trade’ so they [donors] offer us [a
program], and then we send people, we don't have any plan to fulfill the
offering from the donor. Only certain staff can do this, but we just offer to
anyone. Please send your staff! Please send your staff! (Senior Government
Official)

Similarly, a respondent from the training area stated:

The participants come but they are different from our expectations, his boss
decide you have to go come to the training, even though this person is not
competent to attend a training, this is ridiculous. We had the same condition
in the IASTP project, like some people come to the training, but actually we
don't expect him to attend this training, because he doesn't have like
competency, in his organisation there is not a relationship between his
current job and training. (Senior Trainer)

The selection of participants for training was an issue frequently commented
on by respondents, often with negative connotations. The respondents’
comments were critical of the existing systems and processes, and proffered
a number of possible causes ranging from ‘dysfunctional management’ to
outright ‘nepotism’. However the expectation of having the enabling
organisational environment to achieve change is desirable, and the role of
planning is critical as illustrated by this comment:

I think that training is not the only part to encourage organisational change. If
we are trying to do some reform, or conduct some change within an
organisation, then the organisation needs to have at least some capacity
within the organisation to transfer the information internally. Then capacity
building its not talking about investing in people, but also thinking about the
whole business process. We can have a number of people as change
agents, but if there is no informational description about what the organisation
wants to achieve for the future, it would be very difficult for them. (Donor
Program Administrator)
This comment highlights the lack of an ‘organizational environment’ positively disposed toward implementation of change and applying learning from training into existing Indonesian bureaucratic structures. The comment highlights the ‘choice’ of participants into training to become ‘change agents’; an approach to capacity building that is questionable as it concentrates upon ‘individuals’ rather than ‘institutions’. An example of this issue is described in detail in the next Chapter: Clarifying the problem, which examines the Independent Completion Report for IASTP111.

Governance

Respondents to this study identified a number of ‘dysfunctional management approaches’ that includes; inappropriate selection of participants for training, the nature of the training programs delivered, program choices based upon meeting budgetary timelines and constraints, poor preparedness and poor planning leading to 'soliciting' trainees into the training room, in order to 'fill' the training room and meet budgeted training allocations. This subject is described in detail by these responses:

I know that and there are weaknesses in training system over here and we don't run training based on the needs of participants. Sometimes when we are running training and there is a lack of participants, sometimes my boss calls out: Can you come and join this training? Because of the lack of participants; 'What training is that?' (Senior Trainer from group interview)

Another illustration of this is:

My institution [LAN] uses the budget absorption as the key indicator that the training is successful [laughter]. Meaning this, when you have a training program, one training program, this training program should cost around let’s say 100 million rupiah, and then there should be 40 participants in it and all the administrative things are fulfilled, like the number of 40, and then finish on time, all the attendance was full, all asleep in training [laughter] they finished on time and all the budget was full all the attendance is recorded. Then the organisation can say statistically we have attended training for example 2000 participants this year. (Senior Trainer from the group interview)

These issues identified by this senior and long-term employee of the National Public Administration Institute [Lembaga Administrasi Negara-LAN] in Indonesia is as revealing as it is honest. The National Public Administration Institute [LAN] is the body assigned to provide training and accreditation to all the civil servants across Indonesia whether this be at the junior level through
to senior ranks [Echelon 1, 2, 3 or 4]\textsuperscript{24}. This respondent’s description of ‘budget absorption’ as the key measure of success of training illustrates the degree of dysfunctional management. Other management-related issues identified by respondents included poor organisational skills, poor planning, and ineffective ‘incentivizing’ of training [rewards not enough]. In addition to these management issues, another dilemma exists when providing incentives (payments) for training participants, and this is discussed in detail below. This practice is widely used in government funded aid projects, for example in all IASTP projects, but this does not encourage the best selection of training participants\textsuperscript{25} and only serves to promote a culture of ‘recidivism’ as explained here:

Everyone in the institution wants to attend this [LAN] training - you know why? Because they get paid. After the training they try to get promotion. This is one thing but for others, other training right, some people just get assigned by their superiors, you attend this. Some people are say ‘training specialists’ meaning they are training specialists inside the training because they keep on attending different types of training. There is a joke actually, those people just go to the training because they dislike their institution. (Senior Trainer)

In addition to participants getting ‘paid’ for training, which was a practice that the AusAID-funded IASTP continued throughout their iteration of specialized training for Indonesia, they were conducting the same training ‘year in year out’ to meet budget execution, which allows little opportunities to reflect and examine process and reasons for any training regime:

What usually happens in the government it is usually ‘budget test’ training. We have budget and we have to spend this budget. Every [government] institution comes to LAN asking; What training do you have in this and that, they find what the previous years’ training was conducted and they consider and what was easily conducted they repeat the same training for many, many years. Yes it is like this. (Senior Trainer)

This view of ‘rolling out’ previous training, noted here as a common practice in Indonesia, would be an issue for donors to avoid, however the evidence and the final completion report of IASTP III training in Indonesia, suggests that this was indeed the common practice of IASTP III training (Scott, 2007). A review of the training needs based upon HRD strategic plans or a formally conducted

\textsuperscript{24} The Indonesian public service has administrative structures identifying four levels across the entire public service and these are titled ‘Echelon 1-4’.

\textsuperscript{25} It was a ‘contracted’ requirement for IASTP training to pay each participant to attend training.
training needs assessment, may prove to identify the skills required to meet the organisation's strategic plan - but with some qualifications, as described here:

I think a good organisation is able to identify for itself what the training needs are and I think that's where it falls. Because there are some government organisations that don't see it as an important thing. But there may be one that says YES it is an important thing and include it in everything that they do. *(Trainer)*

The need to conduct a training needs assessment might be the first question for government organisations, indeed these questions remain: WHO conducts the TNA? and for WHAT purpose? These comments by the Director of the Training Unit in the Ministry of Home Affairs illustrates the importance of conducting training needs assessments before planning training:

*The training need assessment in an education and training agency, is done by Planning Division not under OUR (Training Centre) Sub-Division. We have a program to do training need assessment every year, we go to the region to ask them; What you want? What is the gap between the skill in the organisational need, and the employees skill? The gap between the organisational need and the employees' skill it is best to do this type of training need assessment.* *(Training Manager)*

When this approach is used, then you could see the real benefits associated with developing training plans. Nonetheless, as already illustrated, the theory and the practice are, at times, distant cousins. The position put by this respondent is that the value of training will remain dubious until training is linked to human resource development planning, and staff are seen as an asset as he explains here:

*I think one important step to do is to get the right section that manages the training, or its human resources, and that is a challenge because it's only probably the last few years, that this government have realized that they need to strengthen it, I think in the past, it's what they call personnel, administrative role, it doesn't have a role to see its staff as an asset, which is what the training is all about.* *(Trainer)*

Practices in the past of just accepting ‘donor driven’ aid packages, are beginning to break down, and more emphasis is placed upon recipient countries to engage, involve, direct, cooperate and partner with donors. These respondent comments reflect both a change in donor engagement, and a continuing concern about who is in the driver seat:
The government has already stated that it can't stand on their own, in this global world, countries are inter-dependent to each other, so in the development context and also in the training context that is what the public sector needs, there should be a move toward not just 'donor driven' - it is more to the 'government driven' and they have to have ownership of that. In the past the internationals just come and say okay well this is our design and they want to implement it, but now [I think] there is a level of cooperation, of partnerships, developing and that's how it should work. (*Trainer*)

There was a similar view from the Government position:

At the beginning level, thanks to the donor AusAID, they helped us to make the TNA, make a training plan and integrate a training plan, and then we see the donor country’s offer to us, in order to give an opportunity to send our staff to go to the universities. Still under the donor, it’s not demand driven, it’s like supply-driven from the donor. (*Senior Government Official*)

**Ability to impact on change**

The Indonesian bureaucratic structure with respect to, the size of the ministries and the culture within particular ministries, impact on the ability to make any significant inroads into human resources development. In many ways, to make the best of the limited funds available for training and human resource development, it was considered appropriate to have policies of 'picking winners'. This issue is discussed below and has some resonance in the Timor-Leste context.

The 'mentor' program that was structured around having a ‘senior’ bureaucratic civil servant officer ‘mentor’ incorporated with a more ‘junior’ civil servant, was deemed to be quite successful (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008). The approach of the IASTP III training program was to identify the 'leaders' at the Echelon 2 and 3 levels of the Indonesian bureaucracy who were middle-level civil servants, who would make changes in their organisations upon return from targeted training. Nonetheless, as described below, this approach foundered when hitting the hard ‘institutional’ rock, and the respondent suggests identifying 'structural positions' (senior managers) the people with real power and nominating them to undergo the training may bring about real change in the bureaucracy:

The problem is that no matter how you develop your capacity in this foreign aid program, when you come back and you don't comply with your boss then you cannot really develop your institution. It's kind of like hitting a very hard
rock, I think the way changes could be initiated and promoted from people who have power and looking at the bureaucracy system, change comes from the top down rather than bottom-up approach. *(Senior Trainer)*

Similarly this interviewee notes the concerns of introducing change as a threat to others in the organizational structure:

> When the boss, or the people in the position of power, are not aware of the importance of innovation they will just continue what they have done in the past. For example my boss now when he sees somebody who is innovative his reaction is; He sees this as a personal threat to his position, you are lucky to have a boss who supports change. *(Senior Trainer from group interview)*

Picking winners, which is a process of selecting individuals who are considered to be ‘change agents’ and ‘people with real power’ as illustrated above, is not limited to picking individuals. This process also extends to picking successful ‘institutions’, as described here:

> The Ministry of Finance has been employed by the government as one of the ministries to, and mandated for, reform. We are fortunate that this Ministry has very strong leadership. IASTP comes to the Minister of Finance when the whole organisation has already identified their needs. So IASTP is supporting the organisation to speed up the whole process, so that is also part of the link that the training, supported by IASTP, as a very strong impact on the organization. *(Donor Program Administrator)*

The issue of institutional change, and how it is realized, threaded its way through many of the individual interviewee conversations as well as the focus group discussion. The responses included; ‘fear of change’, ‘threats to position of power’, ‘human resource development’, ‘intransigence of change within institutions’ and lack of ‘innovation’, as illustrated by this comment:

> When you introduce changes to the institutional approach the impact is minimal, because they have the same attitude, strategy, and framework. When you start introducing a system of training approach to the people, which is new, because only people can make changes, not the institution. No matter how good the system is, when the human resources are not ready it won't change. *(Senior Trainer from group interview)*

This encapsulates the dilemmas of ‘individual’ or ‘institutional’ ‘capacity building approaches’ as articulated by the interviewees. Examining these dilemmas and paradoxes occurs in the analysis Chapter Six: *Defining the problem.*
Impediments to Change

Many of the Indonesian respondents commented, often critically, on the capacity of the Indonesian bureaucracy’s ability to reform itself. This situation is perhaps due in part, to the timing of the interviews (2008-09) and the concurrence with a decade-long reform of the Indonesian civil service. Throughout the Susilo Bambang Yudhono Presidency [SBY] [2004-14], the major feature of the SBY terms in government was the bureaucratic reform agenda as described here by someone from the training area:

The selection of participants becomes an important part, I'm sure you've heard that Indonesia has come a long way to eradicate KKN (corruption and nepotism) and this has been the case for the last two (SBY) administrations. It's one, if not the most highest agenda in the government…It's not an easy process, but I think it's one that we had to acknowledge, it is something that needs to be followed up. *(Trainer)*

The Indonesian civil servants interviewed for this study questioned the impact of this reform in their respective workplaces, particularly around measuring work performance, as is illustrated by the following two comments:

The organization is very weak, also the capacity of the government servant is very weak, so under bureaucratic reform we will improve on the re-structuring the organisation, the business process. There is no standard operating procedure in any organisation in any government office, there is no SOP. So you can imagine that the people who work in their daily activities and their day to day activities, where there is no SOP, no measure, no key performance indicators. Now we have introduced the key performance indicator, we hope that next year we started and we hope to implement. We hope to be implemented in 2011. We start. *(Senior Government Official)*

Similarly:

I think we all agree that training should be needs-based. You have an objective, you design it, and follow it, to ensure is that you achieve the objective. To put it in the public context that is still long way to go. Maybe there are certain people that want to see training happening as it is, they have to face challenges by the public policymakers, they want to stick to that bureaucracy and maybe they don't necessarily want change. This relates to change management, there are a lot of issues, a lot of aspects to cover; it's such a complex thing. *(Trainer)*

These comments highlight the need for ‘organisational change’ and ‘change management’, whether this change comes from the top (bureaucratic reform) or permeates from below (assimilation). Opportunities present themselves for some enterprising bureaucratic sectors/individuals to respond flexibly and
organize ‘our own kitchen’ whilst not needing government assistance. Articulated by this respondent as:

Nowadays, in the government, in the Ministry of Education, Directorate of Vocational Education which supports the Polytechnics, is very dynamic. So we are much more flexible, which means we can organize our own kitchen, so we don’t need to run with the ‘cupcake’ from government, this is what I call it, we don’t need the help from the government, much flexibility now. Training (Manager from group interview)

Notwithstanding these comments of ‘going it alone’, having a conducive environment for ‘organisational change’ was deemed important for some interviewees. Individual acceptance of new processes and practices need to be embedded in their individual behavior as well as their organizations, otherwise a ‘return to old practices’ is inevitable. No amount of aid funding will change practices and individuals, and thus institutions will fall back on ‘existing practices’. Helping people to help themselves is the desirable and sustainable end to good practice, but good practice ends when the donor project ends, as expressed by this comment:

When I joined the SDSS project, there were five Language Centres under the donor project and soon after the project ended, the activities came to a stop. The willingness of our people to continue the good practice which has already been transferred was very low, because the motivation was on something else, like the financial support from the donors was bigger and they can earn more, they just don't care, but we should change those kinds of views. How could we maintain this by giving rewards to those who achieve something, this does not exist in our system, and everyone goes back to the old practice again. No matter how ‘big’ or ‘well’ or ‘good’ the donor aid is to our country, but if we don’t change the internal system, then we will go back to the old practices again. (Senior Trainer from group interview)

This response highlights the difficulty of changing practice, when the motivation is ‘financial’ as opposed to desiring ‘good practice’. These issues are further examined in the following chapter. Many times during the interviews, individual references were made to KKN [Corruption], and this is well noted by the Ombudsmen of Indonesian in his Public Sector Reform media release:

There is a problem on the input of the public service in Indonesia. The state of manpower at the range of education and training to deliver the quality of public service. This can be seen from the number of practices of corruption,

26 KKN is Indonesian for Korupsi, Kolusi and Nepotisme (Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism)
and nepotism at the planning of public policy which seemed abuse the importance of interests of society at large (Girindrawardana, p. 2).

The examples given by respondents on corruption/nepotism often occurred around selecting participants for training; offers of an ‘all expenses paid’ training experience in Australia is quite a valuable offer in Indonesian terms, therefore checks and balances need to be in place to curtail any forms of corruption, as this respondent indicates:

The mentor, he was like fresh, he sent his son to get the training to Australia, but we clarify who he (participant) selected from training. *(Donor Program Administrator)*

The mentors in the IASTP program were chosen to guide the implementation of IASTP training into the Indonesian bureaucracy, and as such they wielded some considerable ‘power’ over training participants through their responsibility for the implementation of the action plans. This power included soliciting direct payments from participants for being their Mentor.27

**Evaluation approaches**

AusAID conducts independent completion reports of all of their major projects. The purpose of these completion reports is to monitor and evaluate against designed objectives to ensure the aid is effective and provide an opportunity to examine the execution of the project, as well as to document the lessons learnt.

Throughout this study, many of the respondents referenced IASTP training in Indonesia as a significant donor-funded training project, and given the timing of this study, this was understandable. This study therefore examines in detail the interviewee’s responses to IASTP, framed against formal evaluations of the entire program (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008), and this examination is undertaken in the analysis presented in Chapter Seven: Moving toward a solution. The issues identified can be summarized as follows; impact of the mentors, action planning as a success factor, impact on ultimate beneficiaries,

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27 The author managed the ‘fall-out’ on an IASTP program when the Indonesian Army, Navy and Air force officers on training solicited money for a Brigadier-General (mentor).
bias toward two provinces (NTT and Aceh), voices in the evaluation process, and specific targeted training and ownership by counterparts.

Many comments were made about the monitoring and evaluation process of donor projects, particularly the IASTP program, in both the ‘individual’ and ‘group’ interviews. Some respondents critically examined the monitoring and evaluation approach asking probing questions such as; (i) Was AusAID going to conduct a review of their own program? (ii) Was AusAID going to include ‘lessons learnt’ into new programs? (iii) How were these evaluations going to impact upon future programs? (iv) What are the coordinating agencies training needs? These concerns were illustrated by this respondent in the Indonesian group interview, and the ideas were universally endorsed by others:

The action plan in IASTP is a good approach, but there is no risk management, just the challenges. Give this country some more skills, see how institutions in this country manage the challenges and not be dependent on other sources. What can we learn from this? Otherwise we will be dependent all the time. When the donors are there, we are committed, when the donors are not there we are not committed. [Laughter and Agreement] 100% returned to the donor’. That’s what I mean, monitoring and evaluation for the donors. The project ends, the donors allocated a budget to the monitoring and evaluation of the work that they have done to the project to find out whether the project actually works. For example when the IASTP ends: Will there be any monitoring and evaluation of the work of the IASTP has done? Instead of just building another project and things like that. (Senior Trainer from group interview)

Apart from examining and reviewing singular projects within the IASTP programs, it would be valuable to see what monitoring and evaluation frameworks are employed to examine links between phases, as noted by this respondent who had to manage the change between IASTP Phases II and III:

The main responsibility [for follow up] is the aid donor, because for example the experience of IASTP II, it was cut between IASTP II and III. The Australian Managing Company between IASTP II and III they were not communicating. So the IASTP III will be started from the beginning, so the learning curve will take maybe two years of the five years, maybe two or three years just for learning. For example, IASTP III is just right, to do our business now, the project is nearly finished in two years. So we have to learn from the beginning, so that is the responsibility of the aid donors. (Donor Program Official from group interview)
These statements from skilled and qualified practitioners in IASTP (II and III), as well as the many documented and reviewed on individual IASTP programs\textsuperscript{28}, will form the basis of further examination in Chapter Seven: Moving toward a solution.

**Measuring training**

The predominate measure of training effectiveness, in IASTP programs, has been the application of the Kirkpatrick model (Kirkpatrick, 1994). This model examines training room engagement and develops an approach for implementing learning into the workforce. Respondents’ impressions of this model are perceptive as illustrated here by these comments:

> We use the Kirkpatrick model in the beginning; the reaction comes from the participant we are okay no problem, second about understanding the material, we got this from pre-test and post-test, nah\textsuperscript{29}. The third implement, so we involved the head of office, the superior in the office is involved about how the participant make a different before they go to training. How the participant make a change in their culture, service or view, this comes from the subordinate or partner or maybe superior we make this. So at the finish of training we give a letter, you must give the letter to do your supervisor. (Senior Trainer)

Whilst the key to the Kirkpatrick Model in the IASTP program, is the implementation of action plans, these post-training measurements (action plans) were, however, difficult to follow up. It seems that once the training has concluded, the participating agencies are expected to review action plans in their respective work places. Regrettably, this practice is not sufficiently carried out due to short time frames as well as very little training-provider follow up, as is illustrated here by this comment from a respondent:

> We can say that: One, training can be a success when the reaction is good. Second, in the pre-and post-test and the report from the training provider there is no contradiction, that is enough. We can say to the training provider from that, but then we need to go deeply again into the action plan content. Three, we survey of the action plans because we not only measure the output but also outcome about the impact, but unfortunately in our system of determining the impact is not too accurate, because it’s only done in a very short time, you cannot get the whole picture, about the impact of the training. (Donor Program Administrator)

\textsuperscript{28} IASTP III conducted 153,236 actual participant training days. See ICR IASTP II, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{29} ‘nah’ is an Indonesian expression, equivalent in English as ‘I understand’.
The processes for assessing training and its impact were clearly articulated by these IASTP respondents familiar with the Kirkpatrick evaluation models and mostly covered issues of numbers of participants completing training and action plans. One Indonesian respondent, a program administrator, raised the issue of developing a more comprehensive evaluation mechanism, including qualitative data collection from participants and ultimate beneficiaries. This involved piloting the ‘most significant change’ evaluation methodology according to this description:

We use only the quantitative data such as the percentage of the action plans implemented. Our model of training is different from others because they have to implement the action plans. Every participant entering the training has to complete an action plan, and implement an action plan, and every six months we monitor the action plan at what stage is the action plan being implemented. I think currently we try to back up with qualitative data, we are using the most significant change story. (Donor Program Administrator)

The most significant change evaluation methodologies are examined further in Chapter Seven; however these evaluation approaches were not employed in the training conducted by Lembaga Administrasi Negara (LAN). As noted here, by this LAN trainer, the evaluations were individual and personal in nature:

The impact or the quality of the graduates or whatever, they never measure them we don't have the tools. There is only for the training evaluation for the participants for the institution, usually it covers the material for the lesson, and the trainer capacity and the service from the institution; accommodation like that. (Senior Trainer)

The lack of assessment tools, the absence of monitoring and evaluation frameworks, and the ‘individual’ rather than ‘ organisational’ measures and impact of training, suggests that the objective of achieving some 'change management' within the Indonesian bureaucracy is a desirable target but, clearly, one which will be difficult to achieve.
Imposition of cultural values

The impact of culture on learning was referenced a number of times during the Indonesian interviews as well as being explicitly stated in IASTP training packages\(^{30}\). Whilst Indonesians prefer a 'participative, interactive style', the vast majority of IASTP training was group-based lecture style, and this was a cause for concern noted in the ICR review (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008). Internationally recognized and globalized training can lead to 'imposts', unless there is an appreciation of the cultural nuances, in this instance within Indonesian society. The onus is on all trainers, 'local' and 'international', to familiarize themselves with the local cultural nuances, as articulately described here:

> Not only qualifications, knowledge and experience but also one [trainer] has the ability to understand the diversity and complexity and different needs of the people. That's how I see a trainer should be in this country. In this country as you know and I don't know which country to compare it with, it's such a huge country with multi-ethnicities, multi-languages, so hence culturally. I think this country faces problems and challenges in keeping to, or retain its diversity, at the same time it needs to be in the international community. I think it's hard to say in the snapshot survey of what stages we are in; it's still developing and there are some common themes shared but there are also differences in other places and even within this country alone. (Trainer)

Keeping or retaining Indonesian cultural diversity in the pervading presence of the international community is an astute observation by this interviewee. Another Indonesian respondent describes her ambivalence toward western cultural values, particularly human rights, and the impact this is having upon her culture:

> When human rights came, and the participative methods and community, it's not our culture, it's like the western culture. Sometimes this makes conflict in our community and between the community, sometimes without proper empowerment to the community. What is this participative culture, how does a democracy system work? The community is straightaway using this as a tool to attack the government. I think that this is sometimes an attack on our community and government. I think I have learnt in this area. The important thing here isn't empowering the community, when it's not the community culture. (Donor Program Administrator)

Examining the impact of internationally sanctioned training in the context of the multi-ethnic, multi-lingual diverse culture of Indonesia, is examined further

\(^{30}\) see IASTPIII Training Provider Information Pack
in the following chapter. There were references to the ‘mother tongue’
language and its relationship to the more dominant Javanese cultural
understanding, referred to in these contexts as Java vis-a-vis the Outer
Islands. One respondent describes this cultural difference in terms of manner
and behavior, and uses the Javanese cultural understandings as a reference
point for her engagement:

Indonesia has got a lot of culture. A Sumatran like me, we move a lot, we talk
a lot, we not only talk a lot, but we talk loud. At first it is really frightening
process from me but in the end this is really good, the learners [especially the
Javanese people] they get a new environment for them. It seems to me that
they really want to get out of their common or their usual environment. We
have to be open about who we are, and who they are, because for a
Sumatran we like to, we want to, respect people first, very equal, even though
they are kids or elderly we pay the same respect for them....EQUAL....that’s
really interesting, so for Sumatran people that’s not a problem who teach you.
The most important thing is we acknowledge them, their status, and we speak
straightforward that is more important. (Senior Trainer)

How to engage within Indonesian cultures abounds in this description
loudness of speech, respect for people, treating people as equals when
Javanese culture formalizes the communication process\textsuperscript{31}. Javanese society
is highly patriarchal and hierarchical, with what appears to be great power
distances between levels of the social structure. Showing proper respect, in
speech and behavior, is an essential aspect of the Javanese culture
(Pruetipibultham, 2012). How these issues manifest themselves in the training
room and the impact they have with ‘international trainers’ is a subject
explored further in the Chapter Six: Defining the problem. Suffice to say at this
point, that a ‘one size fits all’ approach is not appropriate in the Indonesian
context as there are numerous cultures, each with their own mores, which
need to be understood and respected, if aid is going to meet local needs.

\textsuperscript{31} Javanese culture has two languages High Kromo and Low Kromo and depending upon your position/status with
respect to the other person will determine which language will be used.
Conditionality of aid

Donor governments, or the country supplying aid, often place ‘conditions’ upon the recipients. There is a considerable body of academic work which suggests that aid is not freely given, but strategically posited into countries of interest by donors (Berlinschi, 2010; King, 1991; Moyo, 2009). Much of the aid work overseas ends up being payments to, and income flowing back into, the donor country (Wilks, 2010), either directly by employing technical advisors from these countries or managing contracts from the donor countries. This concept is often described as ‘conditionality of aid’ or ‘tied aid’. Many respondents articulately described how this process manifests itself in Indonesia, and one such comment was:

The developing countries offer us (recipient) training: in the first one they try to promote their country then promoting the way of thinking, the way of life and then the second one in order to they can communicate when doing in the international fora negotiations and then the third one sometimes they try to bring their own ideas to beneficial country in order that sometimes they can follow but sometimes they can’t (laughter). Senior Government Official

Indonesia itself needs to develop frameworks for accepting aid, otherwise it will be inculcated with practices that will have little 'use value' in the country. Some respondents were able to articulate the ‘reasons’ and ‘rationale’ for donor behavior, and to place their behavior in a critical framework, as is illustrated here by these comments from the Government sector:

Not all the training offered by the donors is based on the beneficial country needs, it's not that useful for the beneficial countries. Based on the strategy of the donor country, for instance like China right now, try to promote their own country, our emerging country becoming a developing country for the next 20 years, and we start with development depends on the strategy of the country, if the country is just promoting the country like Japan, for instance in the 1980s and early 1990s, the training that they offered to us is just promoting Japan because at the time Japan is quite a big money, and then afterward they try to make a good program very strict only certain people can enter the program they offer. Rather China has followed the Japan programs of the 1980's so it depends on the strategy of the (donor) country when the WTO started to become familiar with the developing countries [late 1980s] then the big countries like the Europeans, US and Australia they tried to get to the different countries capacity in order to get to know the rules of the country. So the European countries, the US and then Japan were very eager to train the developing countries people, in order to know about that [WTO] rule. (Senior Government Official)
This response articulates a very candid reflection upon aid over decades in Indonesia, recognizing the centrality of ‘trade’ versus ‘aid’ no matter which country is involved. Whilst this view reflects upon the strategic interests of donors, other respondents commented upon the ‘specific’ and ‘targeted’ nature of ‘imposing values’ and meeting donor agendas with aid, for example; the selection for training should be based upon ‘competence’ not ‘political reasons’, as illustrated by the following comments:

We are selecting participants not based on their competencies but on ‘gender’ ‘fieldwork’ or ‘anything’ many times its political reasons. (If) one based on competencies, he or she deserves more than the others to attend the training or go overseas (but) because this person comes from this region the donors they will pay right (murmurs of agreement). (Senior Trainer from group interview)

The Indonesia-Australia Specialised Training Project (IASTP) covered three incarnations of five years duration each, from its inception in the late 90s, with IASTP Phase I continuing until the end of Phase III in 2008. Each of these IASTP Phases required training to have ‘cross-cutting issues’. In each of these phases these issues varied slightly, nevertheless the main issues that were covered included; gender, good governance, change management and disability inclusion. The application of these cross-cutting issues caused some alarm from some respondents. These Indonesian respondents declared that the inclusion of ‘cross-cutting issues’ in IASTP training was not just ‘political’ but ‘offensive’, as it reveals that ‘competence’ was not the only criteria for selecting participants for training. However, not all respondents shared this view, as illustrated by the AusAID Manager of Human Resources and Training, who declared that the IASTP III training was ineffective because it didn’t cover these cross-cutting issues enough. This manager said:

One of the good things from IASTP is we have generic terms in training: gender and good governance, and others. That is one of the good things and I think also that's something that all should be considered if we want to have other programs and include trainings we should have these cross-cutting issues like gender, partnerships, anticorruption or something like that. It would be best transferred through mainstreaming and generic models through training. (Donor Program Administrator)
This covers the salient features of the Indonesian interviews. The next section reviews the Timorese comments and findings, and highlights the difference between the Indonesian and Timorese findings. The format and structure of the Indonesian Findings are replicated in the next section on Timorese Findings, and follows these themes; capacity building, structure of programs, training, international contributions, technical assistance to respective government bureaucracies each of these themes provided valuable insights into answering the research question.

Section Two: TIMOR-LESTE FINDINGS

As stated earlier in the Methodology Chapter, the selection of participants for interview evolved in two ways. Firstly, using a purposive ‘snow balling technique’ (Neuman, 1997), the researcher asked interviewees ‘who else might be a suitable’ to interview, and whilst not all suggestions were followed up, a number of useful contacts were made. Secondly, the researcher through his work in Timor-Leste in the vocational education and training sector, knew personally many of the interviewees, and was aware that these interviewees had an active interest in the research content. The respondents represented a wide cross-section of trainers, administrators and managers of training in vocational education and training in Timor-Leste.

'Guru' to 'Participatory' learning

The Timor-Leste experience of Indonesian education perpetuated and inculcated the role of the 'Guru' into the Timorese educational landscape. The word 'Guru' is used quite uniformly inside Indonesia and Timor to indicate a person who is respected and honoured, and this is a similar connotation to that which exists in Australia. One respondent gave this typical response:

I don't think there's any difference between Timor and elsewhere when I was taught here in Timor back in the 60s and 70s you have a teacher; When the teacher says, Jump!...All you have to do is say, how high? (Senior Trainer)

However, whilst the movement away from ‘Teacher as Guru’ may have begun early in the 70s in Australia, and indeed somewhat later in Indonesia, it was still quite pronounced in the 2000s in Timor-Leste. Noel Jones articulates this
movement away from lecturer/guru style of learning in his article on educational philosophy called *From Sage on Stage to Guide on the Side* where he describes this approach as teachers becoming mentors, coaches and guides for students, which is very much a return to the Socratic method of instruction (N. Jones, 2006). This is illustrated by a respondent in this investigation, who made the comment:

> We designed the training to be very participative...so we introduced a subject that we created here called citizenship and in this subject the students are encouraged to ask questions. If you don't understand you ask questions, it doesn't matter how silly it is you ask...if you don't like the answer you just keep on asking that is the only way you can involve them...Before they [students] would just sit there and they would take orders, now they query they ask questions. *(Senior Trainer)*

Equally, some old teaching practices are hard to change. One respondent stated that:

> We [Timorese] have been colonised by the Portuguese for 400 years, and of course, this education system is still alive here. The Portuguese system is really alive in East Timor. The way they teach their students, they like to say; You have to do this ... Now it's not appropriate, it's not relevant to use this method. The way they use in the class is not relevant now, so we have to change it. The good way is to let the students think by themselves, you just give, and let the people select and to choose which ones they want to learn. Please memorize this, no we cannot use that any more. We give them and get them [students] to think by themselves. I believe that ‘step by step’ things will change, but the important thing is to say if this is not good what is the good one. We have to show them what is the good one ... I hope that the new generation, coming generation, will learn the practices of doing things by themselves. *(Trainer)*

In addition to the students’ requirement to be a participant in the learning process, the expectation is that the trainers have to develop facilitation skills. No longer are mere technical skills enough; unless you can pass on these skills then you are of little value in the training room and learning environment. This critique of trainers is not limited to local trainers, but includes international advisors as well, as is indicated in this comment:

> The important thing is that they are an [international] advisor, they have to transfer the skills, appropriate to the local man, and also to be like an adviser. So the international advisor has to work out how to transfer their work skills to the local people, this is the benefit of the advisors. *(Donor Program Administrator from group interview)*
This was repeated many times over by the Timorese respondents interviewed for this study. Whilst it is one thing to identify what the problem is (that is ‘How to transfer skills’), it is quite another thing to discover the method and approach that may work in this particular country. Using and applying educational methods and training approaches from abroad, risks the criticism of imposing educational agendas and inappropriate policy borrowings onto the burgeoning Timorese training system, described by this respondent as:

We (Timorese) have been colonised by the Portuguese for 400 years, and of course, this education system is still alive here...The way they teach their students, they like to say; You have to do this and you have to do these! Now it's not appropriate, it's not relevant to use this method so we have to change it. (Trainer)

During the Timorese interviews, it was noted, on a number of occasions, that the introduction of the Certificate IV in Training and Assessment Systems provided the Timorese with some of the necessary skills to make the training room more participatory and engaging. Whilst this is a clear movement away from past training practices, this course is, however, still packaged with embedded pedagogy and policy borrowings, such as; Adult Learning Principles, Competency-Based Training, and Assessment and Qualifications Frameworks. This respondent shares his anguish in trying to ‘unpack’ these packaging issues:

But for me, I cannot understand what is competency standard. So I need the skills of what is required from my institution. I need like a sign that says what is a TVET system, what is the qualification, what is competency. I must understand what is the accreditation system. So the skills development for myself I need all of that! The skills that I need are related to my organizational needs and their vision etc. (Donor Program Administrator during group interview)

**Policy Borrowings-Impact of Training and Assessment**

In the Timor-Leste context, the conduct, methodology and approach applied in training, impacts upon the individuals and their learning styles. In such a situation, the effect of the delivery of the Certificate IV in Training and Assessment for vocational trainers, managers and administrators in vocational education and training could not be underestimated. Indeed, many interviewees commented favorably on this certificate course, because it
illustrates the way forward for a new generation of Timorese learners. These learners are concerned about: practical skills-based activities related to work environment or employment, learner-centered tasks and learning outcomes tailored to the individual’s needs, skills training to pass onto others, mentoring, and contextualization of training materials. A respondent described his personal view of the competency based training approach as it impacted in his training as:

This is what we've practiced. The trainer does it any class. We strongly believe that this is the best way; We do it, they do it, then we do it together. We keep doing it together until they know it. I am personally very supportive of the Certificate IV TAE approach. (Trainer)

The Certificate IV in Training and Assessment (CIV TAA) was delivered to a Dili Institute of Technology cohort in 2002. However a significant change occurred when the Certificate IV in Training and Assessment was delivered in Timor-Leste during June 2005-September 2005, as this was the first time this training was conducted in Timor-Leste by a ‘foreign’ University, (Victoria University in association with Lembaga Adminisrasi Negara and Brawijaya University Malang).

The success of this course related to the use of skilled and Australian qualified Indonesian trainers conducting an accredited Australian curriculum through Victoria University, and applying the Australian Qualifications Training Framework\textsuperscript{32}. The initial Timorese student cohort came from training centres and government departments involved in vocational education and training. Following the success of this course and others, Secretary of State for Vocational and Professional Training (SEFOPE)\textsuperscript{33}, through National Labour Force Development Institute (INDMO) responsible for accreditation, began to develop a Timorese version of this Australian curriculum. This is now a part of a suite of courses now accredited by INDMO, and conducted across Timor-Leste (RDTL, 2011b).

\textsuperscript{32} Whilst this course may have provided some benefits in 2005, this may not be so relevant a decade later.

\textsuperscript{33} SEFOPE added policy to its custodianship in 2012 and became SEPFOPE
There have been many examples of the successful skills transference of this certificate to organizations and individuals. The Director for Vocational Training-SEFOPE\(^{34}\) describes the way a National Training Centre trainer comes back from training and 'showcases' his newly acquired skills to other staff. This respondent acknowledged the benefits of skills transference to his training staff, whilst at the same time highlighted the problems associated with skills transference at a senior level:

Cert IV TAA has been helpful, it is the first step in how you can evaluate your staff, you can identify their needs. This is the theory. My big problem for SEFOPE is the link with the big men (the directors and the coordinators) if my Secretary of State (minister) does not understand the issues we still have a big problem. (Senior Government Official)

During the first ‘in-country’ delivery of the CIV TAA course in 2005, an international advisor\(^{35}\) commented to the researcher that the course had delivered more change in the Institute of Public Administration trainers, in the three weeks of training program, than any of his previous 12 months capacity-building activities with the same trainers. This respondent best describes the benefits of the CIV TAA:

I do, you do, then we do it together, then you do it too…. we can give also to other people [this sort of CIVTAA training] even teachers in primary system. We can combine this with teacher competency this system we use we can also apply that. (Trainer)

During the Timorese interviews a number of 'unique' ways of measuring the success of this training were identified and included: ability impact within the work environment, performance on the job, technical and generic skills development, impact on planning training interventions, and assisting with monitoring and evaluation. All of these identified contributions are worthy of a more detailed examination, and will form the basis of the analysis chapter to follow. The selection of participants for training is worth highlighting here, as many respondents commented that training participation and selection should be based upon their work requirements and activities, a sample of these comments included:

\(^{34}\) Comments by Albano Salem Director of Vocational Training SEFOPE.
\(^{35}\) Comments noted and given to the researcher at the conclusion of the course by Stephen Morris Advisor INAP
Performance in the job. *(Training Manager)*

We want to enhance the capacity of the staff based on the job and we want to enhance the quality of their work. *(Senior Government Official)*

But more importantly you need to allow timing for them [Trainees] to go back and implement that, then get back to what extent the training was actually effective. In the sense that the training helped them to put into practice what was in the training. *(Senior Government Official)*

These comments were typical of managers and administrators of training, and came from within management in the Ministry of Education and SEFOPE. During the Timorese interviews, one critical comment about training suggested that the success of training related directly to the quality of the Hotel room, the salary of the participant and the amount of time off work, with one respondent claiming that:

> You know some people are going to attend training they're not really interested in the skill improvement. They are interested in something else - maybe they eat sleep well at the hotel. I do know they get some money [but] they don't care about the training. *(Training Manager)*

While this may be seen as being a single voice of discontent from one Timorese interviewee, it is interesting to note that in relation to the Indonesian interviews, this view was widely expressed and universally acknowledged within the cohort.

**Reflections on Practice- Planning**

Timorese respondents were of the view that ‘good planning was the key to success in training and this was not always the case in Timor-Leste’. According to these respondents, of the many impediments that got in the way of these best-laid plans were issues such as; defining the training needs, designing training strategies, resourcing and implementing training to meet local needs. A senior respondent mused that:

> What are the problems that need to be resolved in order to achieve the objectives. How you are going to overcome these problems, Who are there now, What kind of resources are available, What are the people, What kind of timing that you think will be required. Are there any other donors that are willing to support. Once you have identified all of this then you start to build up your plan. So if you come to a decision to implement some kind of training, before that there are a number of steps to go through. Once you implement that (sic training) you need to do the evaluation, to determine whether the training that you did actually shift and changes...what came out were actually as a result of the training. Then this would be another input for the next
The comments above by the (then) Minister of Education\textsuperscript{36} presents a good process for planning, training and evaluation, but it does not tackle the question of 'content' and what training should be considered. In the Timor-Leste context, there were many references to the importance of training for employment, and it was observed that training does include the specific and measurable job-related skills such as carpentry, plumbing and automotive repairs (Curtain, 2009; Ware, 2007). There were also many references to learning the 'soft' skills such as communication skills, attendance and arriving on time, presentation and behavior on the job. Tikly et al. defined these skills as the ‘Generic and Transferable Skills’ needed in agrarian cultures, to prepare these cultures for globalisation and skills development (Tikly et al., 2003, p. 92), and these will be examined further in Chapter Six: Learning styles and the skills dilemma.

There have been some concerns expressed by respondents regarding the lack of ‘follow-up’ after training, and the lack of continuity of training, particularly as this is seen as a necessary ingredient for vocational education and training development (Cook-Tonkin, 2015). The human resource planning needs of Timor-Leste, and the importance of linking HRD needs to training activities, are integral to TVET development, these issues are explored further in Chapter Six: Agreement with planning and management outcomes in training.

**Content: Generic and specific training**

In the Tibar Training Centre\textsuperscript{37}, the vocational training focused upon carpentry, plumbing and masonry. These were skills that were previously imported during the colonial periods by the Portuguese and Indonesians alike (Wigglesworth, 2010). The new curriculum was designed to help Timorese with citizenry skills, which are those skills needed by the population to

\textsuperscript{36} The former Minister of Education has consented the use of his comments for academic use, as emailed to the author, August 05, 2016. See Appendix Five.

\textsuperscript{37} Tibar a vocational training centre set up with significant funding from the Portuguese and just outside the capital Dili, is known for its location in Tibar.
become good citizens of the country, and also the ‘soft’ skills needed to engage meaningfully in the world of work. The World Bank Report on Education Training and the Labor Market, identified these desired ‘generic’ and ‘life’ skills needed for work:

(Asian and Pacific Skills Development Information Network) such as problem solving, effective communication or ability to work in teams. These also start early in life, are completely transferable between jobs but are not directly related to subject matter and depend partly on factors sometimes external to the school system (The World Bank, 2010, p. 29).

In Australia, we refer these as the ‘Key Competencies’ for work and engagement in society, and they are usually taken to be (i) collecting, analysing and organising information, (ii) communicating ideas and information, (iii) planning and organising activities, (iv) solving problems, (v) attainment of work skills, (vi) familiarity with using technology, (vii) using mathematical ideas and techniques, and (viii) working with others and in teams. These are known as the Mayer ‘Key Competencies’ (Mayer, 1992). In a Timor-Leste context, issues such as punctuality, personal and professional presentation skills, behavior at work/school are critical for employment, and it has been commented that:

They (students at Tibar) gained employment because of the training they received...in terms of how to become a citizen of this country, with their behavior, their punctuality, all of these things that are important to the employers. and it's implemented in Tibar very VERY strictly...They (Tibar) even trained them (students) on: how to sit through an interview, how to apply for a job, how to conduct an interview, how to sell yourself. (Senior Trainer)

and similarly,

We can transfer knowledge and skills but soft capacity is very hard to identify, discipline or loyalty, attitude to work, these are hard skills to transfer. (Training Manager)

We found that the issues around the question of What to train? (i.e. content), are as significant and as perplexing as questions about How to train? (i.e. method). A study of employers in Timor-Leste (Curtain, 2009) noted that employers often call for a young person to have good social skills and a preparedness to learn, while other skills, such as technical skills, can be learnt whilst on the job. According to this respondent, the Government of the
Republic of Timor-Leste has focused attention upon the perceived needs of 'industry', as opposed to the development of specific cultural needs:

> The government is not providing the people with the (agricultural) training, and the same with rice, corn, coconuts and bananas sectors. This is a big sector, fishing, and many people concentrated in it, they (government) think of the industry, but they don't think of the specific culture, Timor culture. (Training Manager)

This insightful comment suggesting that it is time to examine what this specific culture, the Timor culture, requires in the form of training. In a similar comment, another respondent noted that training should engage and support local conditions, as this was the way to achieve sustainability:

> We (Timorese) try to use sophisticated training models like we use computers and target those in industry, but the fact is many villages they wanted training in local conditions, using local materials using local equipment, using local knowledge…so that they can use it to enhance their capacity so they can operate and (be) sustainable. (Training Manager)

Engaging local people in determining the skill requirements in a Timor-Leste context was a common theme from respondents. This particular respondent raised questions of competence within the senior bureaucratic staff and the Government of Timor-Leste in relation to managing and administering a vocational reform in ‘formal and informal’ education:

> Where does vocational training fit, in terms of its role in Education and for the Secretary of State? I think one is stepping into the other quite often, and undermines the others work. They (RTDL) have to clarify the Polytechnic…Cert 1, 2. 3. 4 is in SEFOPE, then they go to a Polytechnic, and then this becomes a Ministry of Education, and this is not clear-cut like that. It needs to be discussed, and talked about, and most of the people in that area, managing and directing that area, still have a bit of confusion about what they call ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ education, they don’t know what is one, and what is the other one. (Senior Trainer)

Similarly, this respondent suggested that Timorese should be involved in training other Timorese as a way of helping themselves:

> In Timor it's important to have Timorese training people, it's not just in the educational area. The Timorese have to believe that this is important. They have to know that to help other people is important. (Trainer)

In addition to the identified concerns around issues such as (i) ‘generic vs specific’ skills, (ii) ‘industry vs agricultural’ skills, (iii) management and
administration of vocational training, further investigation and analysis and will be undertaken in the following analysis chapter.

**Critiques of evaluation performance-working with internationals**

The models of international practice varied considerably across Timor-Leste, and invariably depended upon the ‘organization’ or ‘institution’ offering technical support. Certain donors came in for some considerable criticism because of the approach and manner of their engagement. The criticism varied from some donors wanting to maintain their ‘interests’, to others willing to work with local providers to build capacity of those providers. The following observations were pertinent to this issue:

Sometimes when they come in here, they identify an area that they think this guy needs. An international comes in here, and says the Timorese they need these, without talking to anyone, they just use their money, and that person who is offering this might have a vested interest in that area, so it benefits himself. *Senior Trainer*

When the donors come, they want to do their own [thing]...and they have limited local content knowledge so that in the end no sustainability...[It’s] better to facilitate and work together the local people rather than they deliver their own...in many cases donors come and they have already set up their own objectives, their own strategies, and they already set up their outputs...So they come and deliver their own and they might have just one or two Timorese together with them then deliver and Timorese also in the end not gain something and those people not get a donation or something...the project is just a formalisation...we don't want that, we want to deliver together.  
*(Training Manager)*

Indeed, this critique of donor practice comes with a preferred model of operating which was about the engagement and involvement of local Timorese. The Portuguese trainers that assisted Tibar in the early years, escaped much of this criticism about local intervention, because of the approach used by the Tibar management and the RDTL secretariat administering this program\(^{38}\). Tibar initially allowed the Portuguese to 'import' vocational curriculum from their experiences in Cape Verde, Mozambique and Angola, where they had set up schools and vocational training centres, but after the initial delivery the management of Tibar contextualised the vocational training to suit the conditions of Timor. It was claimed that:

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\(^{38}\) The Ministry of Labour, Solidarity and Community Re-Insertion RDTL.
They (Portuguese trainers) set up schools in Mozambique and Angola...they brought the curriculum and what we did here...when they bought this curriculum, after the first term of training then we went through this curriculum and we start to change and adapt to the reality of East Timor, this is not applicable here the industry didn't want to use it here...we cut and we added up things we put them in contact with employers and in meetings with them we invited employers to the school...they learnt a lot of our reality here and what they could teach. *(Senior Trainer)*

The responsibility for knowing what to offer falls somewhere between, international advisors knowing what they can offer, and Timorese discovering their ability to value these international contributions. A comment on this issue indicated that:

> I hope for the future that the international advisor knows exactly what he can give, and the Timorese that work with them can know what value they can get from that international presence. *(Training Manager from group interview)*

The challenge is some of these international institutions have no experience in how to lead this country, many of these international institutions come and they have a plan, they bring resources, and funding. If I don't know clearly how to use this support and facilities we can lose. Its a waste of time, money and opportunity. *(Training Manager)*

There was some criticism of the selection process for internationals and indeed the competence that they bring to the country. It is one thing to have the technical skills that may be required in the country, but it is certainly another skill to impart those technical skills to their counterparts. In the early days of the UN Administration during 1999-2002 *(Brock & Symaco, 2011)*, the technical advisers employed belonged to a ‘club’ according to one respondent, that travelled to the world’s hot spots offering their services to renew and revitalize the burgeoning new nations. In those early days, technical advisers cared little about capacity building, and Timor-Leste was awash with stories of technical advisers doing what they wanted. This historical resonance is illustrated by the following two comments:

> It is quite interesting because when you see them they actually seem to be part of a wall...they have gone through all the other missions and Timor is another one.. ahhh yeah yeah...They know each other, they just rotate from missions to missions, they're bureaucrats and some just see it as their jobs. Its not for them to make their positions redundant...and if that is the case why should they teach or leave anything behind. *(Senior Government Official)*

> Some advisers are naughty but they don't care about you they hurry you up in the work, they leave the counterpart without learning. *(Training Manager)*
Many interviewees indicated that language competency in Portuguese and Tetum was an important criteria for selecting a technical adviser, because without the Portuguese and/or Tetum language skills how could these technical advisors possibly pass on advice, knowledge and skills? While the assumption here was that the technical advisors want to ‘transfer their skills’ to the locals, as was subtly and adroitly noted, advisors have an interest in maintaining their ‘technical expertise’ and therefore maintaining their job. In this respect, a further comment noted:

You can also see the weakness, but you don’t want to help that person to grow because if he grows you don’t have a job, because you already know that. (Trainer)

Equally, the language skills as a selection criteria became a source of concern in itself, particularly because the process for selecting UN staff into UN programs lacked transparency. One respondent described how some people walked the streets of Dili and were picked up by NGOs, and soon after found themselves in UN positions simply because they have the Portuguese language skills, and not necessarily because of their technical competence:

I saw some people they came over as volunteers they work for a small organization they might come back there working for the UN and earning a big salary...and what the hell...why is this person working for the UN....he has no idea what this on about...why did he have this job is it just because of the language?...it’s just ridiculous...I can understand it from NGO point of view they find this person in the street and say can you come and help us but I would’ve thought the UN had a process and a selection and I say how is this possible?...it should be more transparent they should weigh more criteria it should be clear. (Donor Program Administrator)

Even when some interviewees claimed some reasonable success with international intervention, they were still particularly critical of the remaining contribution to Timor-Leste:

In the construction area you get four of five donors funding the same thing, and then all claiming successes and these guys are flooding the market these causes are not uniform, the Portuguese have one, the English have another. INIDMO are trying to sort this out, aid can be a problem, if not managed and centralized. (Senior Trainer)

Just to get the technical assistance is a hazard too, I'm the one who knows best what technical assistance we need.... so that itself is a struggle, with donors they say why don't you have this... I say I don't need that, I need this because that's what our program is about. (Training Manager)
Evaluation practice-A possible sustainable approach

Whilst many of the Timorese interviewees were critical of the nature and form of the international advisors, there was recognition, and even a suggestion of, 'best practice', which included the international advisers having an exit strategy. This is not the 'norm' for development practitioners, and will discussed further in Chapter Six, Articulation of intention and objectives in aid.

A common reflection was that:

The good thing about my adviser is that he has an exit strategy (he says) My contribution is for two years so I will make sure I prepare the local staff to replace myself in the next two years...We like the kind of advisor like that. The first time he arrives he knows how to get out of that work. I will lead the program for the first year and then you will lead it from then on. (Donor Program Administrator from group interview).

Although somewhat clumsily articulated and reported, the following plea from the (then) Director of Dili Institute of Technology, was to identify a way of working together to create sustainability:

So what I'm looking for … together with them [internationals] identify what limitation there are, what of the objectives that need to be received, in the short term and long term, and how can we reach that objective and what strategy we need in place and what resources we need in place and then together we identified that and where we can have the opportunity to get the resources so that we can secure sustainability. (Training Manager)

Rather than the approach of building competing organizations with local entities as described by the Director of the East Timor Development Agency:

What's missing are initiatives that are with the local institutions. Go into the local institutions and help them...why create another one alongside of a local institute and then have a Mulae running it…The donors say: When it's finished we're going to do an 'exit strategy' with the local. (Training Manager)

This approach was trialed during the delivery of the World Bank's-Skills Training Partnership in Education, in an attempt by the World Bank to change its practice of having outside/external contract managers, and replacing these with Timorese contract managers. A detailed examination of this program is contained in the Chapter Seven: Moving toward a solution.
Critiques of performance-International support

The Timorese comments regarding international ‘contributions and support’ correlated to the status and position of the respective interviewees. At the management, ministerial and senior bureaucratic levels, the comments were, at times, extremely critical of international support. By contrast, the interviewees who had less direct engagement with international assistance reflected somewhat more positively upon this support. The interview with the (then) Minister of Education for Timor-Leste revealed a particularly jaded view of donor assistance, and extends beyond his ministry to other ministries, the questions asked and the responses given have been included for detail and depth. This was a view by a senior Government official of the contribution of technical advisors in achieving successful outcomes that was worthy of deconstructing:

That’s why my experience in Timor suggests not all the technical advisors or advisory role that is being played by the United Nations and other institutions bring successful outcomes. Because of the lack of understanding of the circumstances that need to be put in place before you start the capacity building.

Q The responsibility for that lies with who?
A: The responsibility lies with the donor that provides the funding and the consequent human resources.

Q What is the success rate of the technical advice you get in your ministry or from your experience? Where would you put it in percentage as a success rate?
A: To be honest in the last five years, I have to be very honest there is no question. There is NO capacity in the first five years.

Q. Would you say this is common across other ministries?
Yeah, but there might be some, but compared to the resources that are allocated to that it’s almost nothing. That doesn’t mean that no Timorese got the capacity but again if you compare the resources that are allocated you can’t even talk about! Based upon the lessons learnt over the last five years we changed the approach. (Senior Government Official)

This response opens up the dilemma faced by ‘donors’ and ‘recipients’ alike in relation to capacity building, that is; according to this Minister in the Government of Timor-Leste, there has been no capacity building in the first five years (2002-2007), however donor efforts to harmonize aid efforts are beginning to have an impact in Timor-Leste, as noted by this respondent:
There is now a more concerted effort to manage donor activity, it's more organized now, it is not as much as before where everyone talked about AusAID. It seems they (AusAID) are talking to USAid and the other donors, Brazilians, New Zealanders etc., and so when the Minister calls a meeting they all want to get involved. *(Senior Trainer)*

Chapter Six: Clarifying the problem, examines the ‘articulation of intention and objectives in aid and program development approaches’ including the nature of the development industry and puts a context around development activity and donor assistance in Timor-Leste.

**Management and monitoring and evaluation**

Measuring and evaluating capacity building within a Timorese context was quite problematic. The first phase of donor assistance involved ‘infrastructure building’, which was getting the systems ‘up and running’ post the Indonesian 'slash and burn' approach to destroying the Timorese infrastructure *(Borgerhoff, 2006)*. Later phases involved employing 100 Technical Advisors to act as counterparts for the local Timorese, and as such these advisors were employed to transfer skills and knowledge in their areas of expertise. This process of 'pairing' had a mixed measure of success, as noted cogently by these responses:

>You never had anyone monitoring the skills transfer, no monitoring processes at all...the thing is the international advisers were left to their own devices to produce reports to determine their work progress and in some instances the Timorese didn't even know who their counterparts were...or they (TA’s) would create an operating system and there was no follow-up on how to implement it...that operational system was created and that was it....there was no concern of actually telling the Timorese this is how we are going to implement it.....but then again I think it's a very difficult issue...if you don't have monitoring processes you cannot determine what was happening...but the problem with the Timorese is that we are in constant, constant capacity building but where are the results really. I don't know. *(Senior Government Official)*

Equally,

>The way technical advisers are being used does not generate the kind of benefits that one would expect. One is because those kind of technical advisers, are not prepared to build the capacity in the new environment or that the capacity was not there in the new environment so that they (TA) were forced to jump into the 'line work’….when it comes to that you are compromising the capacity building. *(Senior Government Official)*
These comments highlight the concern regarding the monitoring and evaluation of technical advisors. Not having a monitoring system for technical advisors invariably creates a dilemma for measuring and evaluating their work. Indeed, if Timorese counterparts do not know whom they were working with, this then posits a far more complex issue for skills transference. The notion of ‘No counter-part - No transference’ is a reasonable argument from a Timorese perspective, and one that justified the claim that, for the Timorese, there was ‘no transference’. This is a theme examined in some detail later in this study.

**Aid contributions from a Timorese perspective**

From the Timorese perspective, donor coordination is like a ‘fishing trip’. The Timorese have to ‘predict’ the donor agendas and/or offerings. Donor offerings come with ‘strings attached’ (Kragelund, 2011), therefore the Timorese have to work out ‘how to catch’ this opportunity, whether this be in the form of meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) or recognizing the targeted sectors such as; Governance, Gender, Inclusiveness, Youth and Disadvantaged. An analysis of the imposition of donor issues, described as ‘conditionality’ (Berlinschi, 2010) is addressed in Chapter Seven, *Cross-cultural communication*. However, one respondent describes the complexity, from a Timorese perspective, of responding to these changing foci:

Donors each year focus on one issue, this year its training providers, because the unemployment in Timor is quite high. Or like three years ago it was ‘gender’ and the donors focused on gender...So the issue for Timor is how to integrate this moment or direction, if the donor comes with this (direction) who is the correct person to contact about this, who is making this, we need to be linked, this is just one step, and if you miss that then you miss everything, but we need to be ready and prepared to link the right student, organization, the right place for the right people, it might be just small but it might be useful for everyone here in Timor. *(Training Manager from group interview)*

As is illustrated by this account, the burden of responding to these donor conditions falls heavily on the recipient, and the recipients have to be prepared for the donor conditions, expectations, and requirements; truly a fishing trip from the recipients’ perspective. In addition to making donor offerings explicit for recipients, ‘donor offerings’ should be linked to the
nation’s human resource planning as expressed by their individual ministry plans, as illustrated below:

The Ministry [of Education] should determine their own capacity building...their own training programs. They identify their program, and they do this because of the limitation of resources. We need to prioritize, some we do, the rest of training that the government can't do, we can respond to the offer from the other institutions, international institutions...this will help us. If there’s an invitation we go, and this is not the right way, it should be based on the planning. *(Training Manager)*

Some Timorese in this study, as illustrated by the comments below, acknowledged that part of this planning process is for the Timorese to articulate what Timorese need for development, and not leave it up to the ‘supply’ driven offerings from donors:

*For us, as Timorese, the presence of advisors [TA] should complement what we don’t have here. Not to duplicate. Not to duplicate what we can do here. So that’s important. And providing advisors [TA] should be demand driven not supply driven. For us [Timorese] we need to identify what we don’t have here, and what we need to learn more from international advisors. If we can fill the gap by using us as Timorese as development staff we don’t need to have advisors, it’s a waste of money and a waste of time. *(Donor Program Administrator from group interview)**

Whilst the need for planning was acknowledged, putting planning into practice was not an easy task in a Timorese context. The process of developing annual action plans, which contained detailed training plans targeting human resource requirements, were criticized by respondents. This criticism was articulated as ‘without good planning we will never have a good program’. This was illustrated by these comments:

*We don't have a good plan so far, I myself am not happy with this, because planning, sometimes [the] Minister knows the planning process, regional planning very urgently, they press people to make something ready. So [this is] planning without good planning...we develop our annual action plan without good planning...so without good planning we will never have a good program. So this has happened. *(Training Manager)**

For organisations you've got to have a plan so that you can tell the advisers this is where we going to go, this is what we’re going to do. This gives them support, we had advisers that were supposed to train my trainers so that my trainers could be trainers, then they step back. We had one adviser who did not want to step back. *(Training Manager)*
An illustration of poor planning related to the selection of staff for training, and in some instances this has certainly been less than perfect, despite donor attempts to design and target specific individuals for training. For example, a manager and leadership program within the Ministry of Education, initially devised for senior managers and directors, became a ministerial selection process, which then included sending the personal assistant of the Minister for Education to Australia. Having a due process for the selection of participants for training circumvents any sense of corruption and collusion, as expressed here by this senior ministry staffer:

The ministry selects the participants for the training and sometimes they make the wrong selection, sometimes the Minister himself designates some person but that is not appropriate...because this ministry we have now a directorate for professional training, but it doesn't work yet, we should have a division or section who really works on the needs, the training needs, not the Minister decide, the Minister doesn't know everyone everything. Here what is happened is the Minister decide or vice Minister decide or the director-general decide. *(Training Manager)*

Whilst there is no imputation that this example illustrates corruption and nepotism, it does however illustrate the importance of having systems and structures in place to ensure good governance and ethical practice, otherwise projects continue without proper evaluations. This issue was noted by one respondent:

It is 10 years after (the project) and we still keep training, and we keep training with the same people, something is not right, training the same Timorese people...someway you have to stop and actually evaluate; (1) Was the training good enough? or (2) Was it something with the trainers? (3) Was it something with the participants? (4) Where is the problem? If it is 10 years after, and you still have the same problem, it's not realistic is it? *(Senior Government Official)*

**Reflections on practice-Ethical issues**

The impact of donor-funded programs in Timor-Leste raised many ethical issues for both individuals and institutions around the concepts of national sustainability. The responses from the interviewees varied in relation to their individual and organizational role, depending on whether (a) they were a recipient themselves of donor programs, (b) they were a manager of an...
institute trying to compete in the market place, or (c) they were members of
the RDTL Government, attempting to build national capacity. This particular
respondent expressed concerns regarding the ‘expectations’ imposed upon
her as a manager of a training institutions seeking donor support for her
program:

Another donor based in Timor wanted to know how many ‘nails’ are in the
building and wanted me to count them. Count the number of nails you need
to do a building (exclamation). I mean tiles on the roof, I could do that, but
nails???? You see this was an ‘in-kind’ contribution and we had to know what
we are contributing. After all that work (counting), they didn’t even have the
decency to tell me directly ‘No’ your project is not approved. (Training
Manager)

At the individual level, the salary disparity between foreigners and locals was
often a source of discussion and discontent, both from an individual and an
institutional perspective. The Timorese respondents questioned, in many
different ways, the impacts that international salaries had in Timor-Leste, and
also, in particular, how much of the money actually stayed in Timor-Leste, as
noted here:

Now many people from many countries stay in East Timor, and many donors
provide us with funding to help this country, but if we start to evaluate how
many, how much money they spend in East Timor and how much money they
send to this country, their country, their pocket. (Training Manager from group
interview)

This particular comment was stated in the group interview, and was greeted
with overwhelming endorsement from the other group participants. Donors
and large international companies ‘raided’ staff within organizations,
sometimes paying for a week’s work, which was equivalent to the Timorese
salary for a year. Equally, some Timorese saw the opportunities to respond to
donor demands, and establish ‘training centres’ to take advantage of the
donor money opportunities, as noted here:

Also one nature we have in Timor, once a lot of donors there is a lot of money
there, the tendency is to recommend the Timorese set up a training centre
even though they have very limited knowledge and so on. Very limited
knowledge, very limited capacity and skills to ensure sustainability, but just
because they [Timorese] see money then they want to get that money but
once that money is no more there the institution collapses. (Training
Manager)
This response highlights the enormity of the problem, and the impact of large flows of donor money into the Timorese training sector, presenting its own ethical dilemma for the Timorese. At the individual level, this was about responding to lucrative employment opportunities. At the institutional level, donors were encouraging the establishment of ‘training centres’ to meet their own organizational training needs. However, at the national state-building level, there was a concern about sustainability as described by the (then) Director of the Dili Institute of Technology:

Donors need to see which institutions are seriously running a training centre and see which training centres are sustainable enough and then donors should jump in and reinforce them and then we’ll see quality and sustainability. (Training Manager)

Whilst this view expressed by a Director of a Training Centre could be considered somewhat parochial, in that his concerns were for the sustainability of his Institute, other responses from interviewees were slightly more open to concepts of capacity building for the country, rather than just individual and institutional capacity building. This relevant comment was from the (then) Minister of Education:

When you look at capacity building you have to look at the institutional base, you cannot just go to the individual. The individual capacity building has to be based upon the institutional capacity building ... so that even if the individual that you’ve trained goes the institution capacity is built. So this is really the challenge for organisations in a country like ours. (Senior Government Official)

Institutional capacity building here refers to ‘organisations in a country like ours’, not specific ‘institutions’ but nation-wide capacity building. This respondent clearly identified that it was the Timorese who have to articulate their human resource development needs, and not be so readily dependent upon donor offerings:

Sometimes in the government, they identify more and more advisors but within the organization they don’t identify ‘what are the organizational needs’, its part of us (our problem), not the fault of the advisors. (Donor Program Administrator)
**Imposition of cultural values**

In many meaningful ways, the respondents reflected upon 'culture' as being a significant issue, particularly with respect to their own educational and training backgrounds. The issue of occupation by the Portuguese, then the impost of the Indonesian education system and its impact upon Timorese, included introducing rote learning systems, memorization, accepting Pancasila\(^{40}\) as a moral code, treating teachers as gods and gurus (as previously mentioned) and being respectful, amongst other pertinent issues. One interviewee, from a non-government organization, reflected that the implantation of ideology, and the moral code of the Indonesian Pancasila were unacceptable, even though in his words, teaching of moral codes was good:

> Indonesia are really focused on how you can understand the moral point and that is good but it's not the moral that is good in general life but the moral of Pancasila. In Indonesian times you have to memorize this. I am not saying that this is not good but it's not the only thing it does not help us to see from the other side. Indonesia, like the Portuguese, tried to implement the education system that they want. They want to form us according to their ideology. *(Trainer)*

All these derived and imposed learning styles, are not acceptable today. Many of the interviewees reflected that the education system in Timor-Leste should be more student-led, enquiring, negotiated learning outcomes, based in the real world, and that vocational training should have vocational experience, as illustrated by this comment:

> The good way is to let the students think by themselves, you just give, and let the people select and to choose which ones they want to learn. *(Trainer)*

The significant challenge to change or adapt to new learning styles, or to introduce paradigm shifts in pedagogy, was equally apparent in Timor-Leste, as it is elsewhere. This was especially seen when young Timorese, having travelled abroad, return to pass on these newly acquired skills, only to have them rejected. One interviewee articulately described the Timorese learning culture as arrogant:

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\(^{40}\) Pancasila is an Indonesian word to describe Indonesian belief in; One God, One nation, Just and Civilization Nation, Democracy and Unity.
One is about arrogancy of the Timorese people, for example, I have the knowledge and I want to train this person. I want to tell this person, I want to share my knowledge, but the question is; Does this person want to take this knowledge or not? From me or not? They think that because I've been in the field for a while I know everything, you can't just go to training and come back and tell me what to do. We as Timorese, know exactly how we can deal with these people, they won't show it to the foreigners to the Mulae\textsuperscript{41}, they'll be quiet so as the foreigner you don't really know if this person wants to sit in training or not, especially if you know how people react, as a Timorese we notice this. \textit{(Donor Program Administrator)}

There was a perception in Timor-Leste that being successful means having a child undertake university study, therefore efforts and sacrifices are made to achieve this result, irrespective of the nature and quality of the university outcome. This perception perpetuated a negative attitude toward vocational training, as this is deemed less desirable, and we suggest that this is ideology at work and worthy of a more detailed analysis in the preceding chapter. One particular Timorese articulated this position as:

So a parent thinks they are very successful when they have all the kids graduating from university. But they don't think that this situation has changed. Parents should be successful if they see that all their kids can survive can make a living for their own. We have to change this in their life...This is the culture so people still stick on what happened in the past. They just want to send their kids off to become people with a university degree.\textsuperscript{42}

\textbf{Impact of the 2006 riots}

The tension between the ‘East and West’ manifested into the riots of 2006 which displaced a large number of people in Timor-Leste and created a number of internally displaced person camps across Dili. These riots and the subsequent disruption to civil society is well documented (Shepherd, 2013; Wigglesworth, 2010) and described by Chick (2006) in \textit{How to use Australian Aid to build peace in Timor-Leste} as:

Prior to the crisis, the distinction between those from the east and west of the country was rarely mentioned. However, by early 2006, it was clear that western-born members of the military felt discriminated against by officers from the east. President Gusmao even directly addressed this issue in a speech in March 2006. The split has two sources. First, some easterners view themselves as more responsible for the resistance movement and the

\\textsuperscript{41} Mulae is the Timorese description of ‘foreigner’.
\textsuperscript{42} Comments made in a conversation conducted by the researcher [2015] with a visiting Timorese to Australia around TVET development in Timor-Leste.
ultimate liberation of Timor-Leste. They view western Timorese as closely associated with the Indonesian occupying forces during the colonial period. Second, a commercial rivalry has traditionally existed between those of the east and west (p. 5).

The impact of the 2006 riots on existing training institutes was not widely known nor acknowledged. Many of the training institutes survived the 'ransacking' because of the support harnessed within the local communities, this was certainly the case for the Dili Institute of Technology and Tibar Training Centre and was reflected in these comments by a respondent:

> It (Tibar) was in the middle of the conflict of all the shootings in 2006 it was about 300 metres from there (Tibar) all the people were killed...the community itself looked after this place it didn't allow the place to be ransacked. Right next door (Tibar) there was a (commercial) aviary owned by a Timorese and an Australian Timorese and it was completely ransacked. But the community they looked after the school it was theirs, and it brings a lot of benefits to the community. A lot of people in the community have been trained from Tibar, or had a job at the centre, and as well it provided some income because it generated some commercial activities, kiosk etc. *(Senior Trainer)*

TIBAR was forced to close during the turmoil created during the 2006 riots, and opened only after the centre could guarantee safe passage for their students and staff to attend classes. Chick (2006) has noted the tensions between the ‘east and west’ and that the 2006 riots had a decisive impact on Timorese development. The cultural divide that existed in Timor-Leste and was as profound, as it was racist, as is illustrated by this comment from a respondent:

> In Timor we have an eastern and a western type culture even though we are Timor. The eastern parts of the country Bacua, Lospalos Viquque are very straightforward people when we don't like something we say it. But it is the very opposite in the western part of the country they won't say anything it's also a personality thing as well they like to whisper things behind their back. The easterners will tell you straight away, often in front of you. *(Donor Program Administrator)*

Whilst this study did not explore or examine the differences within Timorese culture that bought about the riots of 2006, it was referenced by a couple of interviewees in this study. This could be explained by the fact that this tumultuous event was very recent in Timor-Leste history, and thus it was quite understandable that this cultural division featured in some of the responses.
This chapter has presented the salient issues from an Indonesian and Timor-Leste perspective, in relation to answering the research questions:

- What is the impact of skills development and training on aid practices?
- What improvements can be made to the evaluation of these practices in order to ensure appropriate and responsive development outcomes?

The next Chapter, Defining the Problem, will provide an analysis of the relationship between the emerging themes and the research questions, identified throughout this chapter. A model of meaningful practice based upon these findings is emerging around the following themes; intention and objectives of donor aid, recipient expectations of learning styles and the Timor-Leste’s skills conundrum, management and planning issues impacting on human resource development, cross-cultural communication and finally evaluation practices and their impact. The next chapter analyses these themes with the view to uncover a model of practice that will assist donors and recipients improve development outcomes.
Chapter Six: Clarifying the problem

This chapter delves into the complexities of education and training interventions and their ‘use-value’ in a development context. The analysis embeds the rich contributions of the respondents' comments within an academic narrative of ‘development effectiveness’, allowing the drawing of conclusions that will provide some pragmatic directions for improvements in education and training approaches in a development context.

Aid and development activity, at the macro-level, sets out to contribute to people’s engagement in the world and to different societies’ understanding of each other. At the micro-level, this development involves facilitating individual and institutional capacity building with some important aid 'caveats'. Aid is unavoidably packaged in political, social and dominant cultural representations, therefore it should be incumbent upon those engaged in this activity to examine, deconstruct and review their personal and institutional raison d’être.

In this study, the author draws heavily upon the comments made by the respondents, published academic scholarship, and other research around development practice, as well as from personal insights gained from a decade-long engagement in international development. The analysis draws together some of the discourses within the study, and is by no means a ‘treatise’ on the political and social contexts of development. It is best viewed as reflections upon the ‘errors of judgment’ identified by the respondents, and documented in cited donor reports and evaluations.

The analysis begins by examining the themes that emanate from the respondents’ comments, as detailed in the Findings discussed in the previous chapter. These themes are divided into two sections for analysis. One section involves clarifying the problem, and details (a) the articulation of donor intentions and the international context of assistance, (b) recognition of stakeholder requirements and local input (c) the articulation of recipient
expectation in learning styles and the skills conundrum facing Timor-Leste, and (d) the agreement with planning and management outcomes for training interventions. The second section examines the possibilities for moving toward a solution, and analyses the implementation of training methods and evaluation practice along with cross-cultural implications of existing practice. It concludes with a meaningful sharing model for program practice.

**Articulation of intention and objectives in aid**

Respondents in this study have been somewhat critical of the conventions and practices of development work, citing a high degree of ‘self-interest’ and ‘donor control’ over program design, implementation and practice. This was expressed in a Timorese way by a training manager who said, ‘in many cases donors come and they have already set up their own objectives, their own strategies, and they already set up their outputs’. In a similar vein, many respondents have articulated how they feel like ‘recipients’ and not ‘actors’ in the development process, and this was thought that this was worthy of further examination.

Easterly (2007), provides a framework for interpreting the behaviour of development planners. The issue of inappropriate behaviour was reinforced during many of the comments made by respondents, and as such were deemed worthy of more detailed examination. In this respect, Easterly makes the following observations regarding development planners’ behavior: (i) Planners announce good intentions but don’t motivate anyone to carry them out; (ii) Planners raise expectations but take no responsibility for meeting them; (iii) Planners determine what to supply; (iv) Planners at the top lack of knowledge of the bottom; (v) Planners never hear whether the planned got what it needed; (vi) A planner thinks he already knows the answers; and (vii) A Planner believes outsiders know enough to impose solutions (Easterly, 2007, p. 6). Clearly Easterly is somewhat critical of current development interventions, and the themes from Easterly’s framework are employed here to ‘peel’ back the layers of engagement within an Indonesian and Timor-Leste context.
One senior government official in this study, openly expressed the view that they felt like ‘passive players’ in a donor world, reflected by this comment, ‘…the problem with the Timorese is that we are in constant, constant capacity building but where are the results really. I don't know’. In the light of such comments, a reasonable question to be asked of all donor-funded training activities is ‘Where are the results?’ A question that this study explored, and it was found that Easterly’s framework provided a valuable tool for examining why recipients may feel under ‘constant, constant capacity building’.

It appears, from this study, that the interventions and approaches used by the donor community are in some ways driven by the desire to ‘open up’ markets to suit the needs of globalization, whilst, at the same time, they are justified as ‘assisting the poor’. One senior government official in the Ministry of Trade-Indonesia openly critiqued donor interest in Indonesia as ‘getting to know the rules of the country’ merely in order to engage in trade agreements and open up ‘resource rich’ Indonesia to trade, thus advancing globalization. This is a view supported by much of the academic literature underpinning this study (Ahluwalia, 2001; Kapoor, 2008; Perkins, 2004).

The perception, as well as the intent, of policy interventions from abroad, requires considerable analysis and deconstruction. Indeed, the exportation of policy initiatives, perhaps relevant in some foreign countries (for example, Australia), into the cultural context of Timor-Leste and Indonesia, can be seen as a form of hegemony. The Timorese respondents were quite critical of some of these policy impositions, whilst at the same time reflecting that they felt ‘powerless’, in respect of their money and vested interests, to stop them. A senior trainer lamented that:

An international comes in here, and says the Timorese they need these, without talking to anyone, they just use their money, and that person who is offering this might have a vested interest in that area, so it benefits himself.

The respondents have articulated in many ways that, by listening to the voices on the ground, this would establish a means to ‘understand’ the local circumstances and seek solutions to local problems, rather than impose them
from abroad. Indeed, whilst current development practice emphasizes the importance of engaging communities (Wigglesworth, 2010), the traditional customs and social structures have not been present in the visible national development processes established by the UN, The World Bank and others in Timor-Leste (Wigglesworth, 2010).

**Types of development assistance approaches**

**Aid as an Industry**

The international convention on overseas development assistance (ODA), agreed at the United Nations (UN) Millennium Summit in 2000, that a fixed percentage (0.7%) of Gross National Income (GNI) of all developed countries should be allocated to international aid activity (Wilks, 2010, p. 151). To contextualize this, Australia was projected to reach 0.22% of GNI during 2016-17\(^3\), but the highest level we have reached in recent years was actually 0.35% in 2012-13, which reflects a step backwards in attempting to reach the interim Australian target of 0.5% GNI. It appears moreover, that Australian pledges to achieve these international targets are running well below expectation (Wilks, 2010, p. 187).

Whilst discussions regarding the 'percentage of GNI' are significant in themselves, it must be noted that development assistance now includes significant contributions from new players including emerging economies of China and India, as well as the philanthropic sector. Indeed, the aid sector is now composed of significant contributions from businesses, international NGOs and philanthropic trusts that have their own means and approaches to development assistance. The most obvious one is the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation\(^4\), where their pledges of millions of dollars to ‘eradicate malaria around the world’, brings with it the accolades of support and has catalysed other business organisations to see the value of 'philanthropy'. Whilst governments, and large international NGO's, proudly proclaim their

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\(^4\) For a detailed up to date examination of the Gates Foundation see [www.gatesfoundation.org](http://www.gatesfoundation.org)
'significant' contributions to humanity, little was known or expressed about how this industry operates, functions and disperses these 'significant' contributions.

At the outset, it is worth noting the amount of donor contributions that return to the country of origin, despite attempts and pledges by some governments to curtail the practice of ‘boomerang aid’- that is donor aid money making its way back into the donor country companies. Untying aid was a policy position of successive UK governments, but nevertheless the practice of UK companies benefiting financially from aid was pervasive (Wilks, 2010, p. 14). Articulated by a Timorese training manager in the following manner, ‘...donors provide funding to Timor-Leste but when you evaluate this spending much of it returns to their country, their pockets’ and by a senior Indonesian donor program administrator involved in managing multi-lateral and bi-lateral aid training projects as, ‘...my suspicions were confirmed Australian money was being returned to Australia’.

Market driven practices establish processes whereby ‘governments’ are likely to source ‘goods and services’ from their own indigenous providers. Donors employ western knowhow, they search for western ways of achieving development, and then impose western technologies to solve local development problems, invariably sourcing development solutions from international western agencies, thus creating a self-fulfilling cycle of western-centric development. From the recipient country perspective, and particularly from some respondents, this cycle becomes obvious and apparent and needs reforming.

Promoting a western-centric ‘way of looking at the world’ not only creates dependence, but misses the opportunities to develop locally based responses to development problems. Many respondents in both Indonesia and Timor-Leste expressed dismay at the missed opportunities to create sustainable solutions and in building the capacity of local people and local institutions. This comment from an Indonesian government trainer encapsulates these views; ‘The donors should build the capacity of the local people...’ ‘The
donors always want to raise the sustainability, they don’t realize the [importance of] capacity of this kind’ and equally ‘When the project finishes then the capacity development also finishes’. Similarly a Timorese training manager expressed the view that, ‘when the donors come, they want to do their own [thing].... and they have limited local content knowledge so that in the end no sustainability’. When the ‘project finishes the development finishes’ was understandably a confronting and concerning statement, because it illustrated a lack of ‘systemic’ change in donor program provision.

The concept of having ‘shared’ views on the way forward featured in many ways in this study and is described here by this Indonesian senior trainer as, ‘I think there should be a share of vision, of what the donor wishes and what the institutions expect’. How to move beyond these pleas for commonality and shared purposes, and discover models and approaches that will achieve local engagement and input is at the core of developing a meaningful practice for donors and recipients.

**Aid as a Blank Slate (Tabula Rasa)**

Learning from the history of ‘engagement and development’ is central to achieving sustainable outcomes and developing a culture of reflective practice. Learning from history, was not particularly prevalent in the education sector in Timor-Leste, where international advisors viewed Timor-Leste as a ‘*tabula rasa*’ (Latin for blank slate) and that educational interventions start post 1999-UNTAET. Boughton (2016) suggests that Timor-Leste has a rich history of adult and popular education and that this tradition needs to be factored into education and training interventions (Boughton, 2009, p. 256).

In the conceptualizing of Timor-Leste as being a ‘blank slate’, policy initiatives from abroad were readily provided in Timor-Leste on issues such as, ‘demand led’ vocational training systems, inclusion of ‘training and assessment’ courses incorporating competency based training, promotion of adult learning principles, and notions of ‘solving’ the unemployment problem through vocational counseling. These aid agendas are established without appropriate input from local training institutions and consultations with local recipients...
based on their needs. This Timorese training centre manager acknowledged and recognized that the donors were requiring her training centre to adopt an approach she strongly opposed, ‘with donors they say why don't you have this... I say I don't need that, I need this because that's what our program is about' this was neither a ‘blank slate’ mentality, nor a person without a view of her training centre’s vision and intent.

In this context, the author witnessed examples of policy impositions in Timor-Leste based upon a ‘blank slate’ mentality. The Australian Government’s launch and funding of the 'Vocational Guidance Referral Centres' across Timor-Leste, known as the Youth Employment Promotion Program (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014a), was one such policy. The assumption behind this AusAID initiative was to provide referral centres for young people ‘out of work’ and assist them in 'preparing themselves' for work (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014a). However, this policy approach would have benefited considerably by reviewing the ‘nature and existence’ of work and the skills required in a Timor-Leste context, and, in addition, to reviewing the type of service (vocational counseling) that should be developed with some consideration toward those receiving that service. Any review would have discovered that there were no ‘jobs’, as such, for rural Timorese (Berlie, 2010; Joseph & Hamaguchi, 2014) and that these types of programs served to further alienate Timorese youth, building expectations without fulfilling them, particularly those youth involved in the clandestine struggle for independence (Wigglesworth, 2016, p. 80). This particular policy initiative from Australia would have benefited significantly from a more thorough consultation with local communities.

Indonesian and Timorese respondents commented that involving more experienced and qualified locals as ‘mediators’ improves development outcomes by getting to know the ‘local content and knowledge’ as well as helping to build local capacity in the country. An Indonesian human resource and training manager commented that ‘…there is more and more experienced or qualified locals involved in that process, these people can be a conduit, can be mediators’, which echoes this Timorese training manager ‘…[It’s] better to
facilitate and work together with the local people rather than they (donors) deliver on their own’. Facilitating and working together with local people was a common refrain from many respondents. The lack of connection between western models of development and the lived experiences of the rural Timorese, led one Timorese to describe western development projects as ‘flying in the air but never landing’ (Wigglesworth, 2016, p. 132), and led another Timorese training manager to question the donor commitment toward ‘sustainability’ and rued the missed opportunities to engage ‘local’ knowhow and build sustainability:

Many villages they wanted training in local conditions, using local materials using local equipment, using local knowledge…so that they can use it to enhance their capacity so they can operate and (be) sustainable.

Indonesian respondents were generally positive in their comments about the acceptance and application of ‘new learning’ from abroad, illustrated by these comments from; firstly a training manager who declared that ‘….if we use this style of learner-centered, and adult principles it's more effective from the participant’s point of view’ and this comment from a senior trainer stating that ‘The adult learning principles-the equality, every participant is involved in the process of training’. It was apparent that the Indonesian acceptance of ‘new learning’ from abroad was in contrast to the Timorese view of donor contributions as ‘impositions’. Language is a powerful symbolic indicator of representation, and these comments reflect this position.

**Aid as Technical Advice**

Indonesian and Timorese respondents were highly critical of the ‘technical advisor’ model of development, a tendency in development practice to bring ‘expertise’ from abroad to fill roles in the recipient country. Criticism included technical advisors having poor communication and language skills, having inexperienced training techniques (mentoring) and having a lack of concern for the skill levels of the local learner. This is illustrated by this donor program administrator’s comment that what are sorely needed are technical advisors able to recognize the ‘skills appropriate to the local man’, and having ‘knowledge of local conditions’ as opposed to importing pre-determined donor intentions. Indeed, this comment from the ex-Minister of Education Timor-
Leste highlights, for many respondents, the concerns around technical advisor practice, ‘The way technical advisers are being used does not generate the kind of benefits that one would expect’ and that there are ‘those kind of technical advisers, that are not prepared to build the capacity in the new environment’. This is a particularly pertinent and revealing comment from a Minister in the Government of Timor-Leste.

The language of ‘demand driven’ not ‘supply driven’ donor practice resonated with many Timorese respondents. A donor program administrator, responsible for implementing donor-funded training, remonstrated that this ‘should be’ the rationale for training interventions, which it clearly was not, stating ‘Providing advisors [TA] should be demand driven not supply driven’. Timorese participants in the research argued that many jobs and activities carried out by technical advisors could have been carried out by local Timorese, which highlighted the duplicity of this model, as this donor program administrator frustratingly declared:

Why is this person working for the UN...he has no idea what he is on about...why did he have this job; is it just because of the language?...it's just ridiculous’.

The language of another Timorese donor program administrator was more thoughtful and reflective in her criticism of technical advice, ‘If we can fill the gap by using us as Timorese as development staff we don't need to have advisors, it's a waste of money and a waste of time’. This suggests that the Timorese need to identify the gap between what the Timorese have, in terms of skills, and what the donors offer.

Easterly (2014), argued that it was as though the planners from abroad ‘know what is best’ for the recipient country, and they can manipulate the circumstances without the 'manipulated' being aware (Easterly, 2007, 2014). Some respondents echoed these observations, in respect of being manipulated, in clear and unambiguous terms. For example, one Indonesian Ministry of Trade senior government official witnessed to the negotiations around the ‘Free Trade Agreements’ and international forum negotiations, and
he expressed the view that Indonesia was being ‘opened up’ to the international market.

Another Indonesian senior trainer reflected that this donor interest in concepts of ‘security’ disguises their more obvious economic and political interests, saying ‘donor activity in Papua is increasing because Papua is so rich…it is because of political interests there, Papua is so rich they keep the donors’. The altruism bestowed upon ‘development work’ masks the pragmatic reasons for western engagement in this work. Some respondents articulated the duplicity in donor activities in Nusa Tenggara Timor, particularly the Papuan region of Indonesia, questioning Australian government ‘interest’ in this sensitive region of Indonesia, and making comparisons with Australia’s actions in Timor-Leste45.

Technical assistance models of development were favourably viewed by Timorese respondents when the ‘technical advisor’ or ‘donor’ declared in advance, and developed, an ‘exit strategy’ for the project. The technical advisor who had a planned ‘exit’ strategy and who equally saw their role as capacity building the local counterpart to take over the project, was valued and admired, as noted by this Timorese donor program administrator. She said that her technical advisor’s approach to the project was; ‘I will lead the program for the first year and then you will lead it from then on’. This was the kind of technical advisor that the Timorese respondents valued, but unfortunately they had limited experiences of them. A senior training manager mused that concepts of an ‘exit strategy’ were used by some donors to explain away their behavior, whilst at the same time, maintaining their planned approach, ‘The donors say; when it's finished we’re going to do an ‘exit strategy’ with the locals’. Timorese viewed comments like this as ‘placating’ the Timorese and was the explanation given by donors for not engaging local Timorese.

45 Australia led the UN forces following the popular vote for independence in 1999, which was viewed in Indonesia at the time as Australia meddling in Indonesian affairs.
Recognition of stakeholder requirements

In response to growing criticism of ‘aid mismanagement’ by civil society, international non-government organisations, development partners, academics, as well as recipient governments, the UN established a set of ‘accords’ to improve development practice. Entitled the UN High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness, declarations were issued from Rome, Paris, Accra and Busan, and established benchmarks for ‘aid effectiveness’.

On a number of levels, these attempts at donor alignment and recognition of stakeholder requirements have produced ‘grand visions’ with some ‘practical outcomes’. Observations by Shah around the impact of programs in Timor-Leste, where donors moved from ‘shadowing’ to ‘supporting’ indigenous systems and budgets, provided the challenges of ‘will’ not equaling ‘competence’ (R Shah, 2011, p. 77). A Timorese senior government official suggested that the motives behind assistance has little to do with capacity building, but more to do with self preservation:

‘…you don’t want to help the person to grow because if he grows you [international] don’t have a job’ [trainer] or similarly ‘Its not for them to make their positions redundant....and if that is the case why should they teach or leave anything behind’

Another Timorese training manager with responsibility for human resource development within the Ministry of Education, commented that the international advisers ‘hurry you up in the work, they leave the counterpart without learning’. This criticism of the mentoring approach used by technical advisors played out across a number of UN technical advisor positions, and led senior government officials to question the outcomes of this approach. In the words of the ex-Minister of Education Timor-Leste:

My experience in Timor suggests not all the technical advisors or advisory role that is being played by the United Nations and other institutions bring successful outcomes.

Whilst the UN conventions and accords may have assisted the donors to become more aligned and focused (Tansey, 2014), this still remains a contentious issue, as this Indonesian senior trainer was moved to comment.
He said donors are saying they are more aligned yet despite this ‘alignment’ the number of aid programs in Papua continued to increase:

‘...the state of aid not being reduced, in terms of number, despite a lot of donors dealing with that. But the number of aid programs still increases so, what's the impact?’

An Indonesian respondent rightfully posed the obvious question, ‘What was the impact?’ Donor alignment was introduced to reduce duplication of donor projects and thus improve efficiencies in the remaining cohort. However, this respondent challenged that belief, and suggested that ‘political interests’ were involved; his implied suggestion was that donors have an interest in the economic and strategic value of the rich resources of Papua.

Donor interest in, and compliance with, program reporting was a source of annoyance from this recipient’s perspective. There was significant pressure exerted on the ‘line’ ministries responsible for implementing ‘each and every’ donor-required funding outcome. Spending time filling in data for donors, where the purpose was unclear and seemingly ridiculous, was illustrated by this donor’s request of a training manager:

Another donor based in Timor wanted to know how many ‘nails’ are in the building and wanted me to count them. Count the number of nails you need to do a building!!

The author had observed in the Timor-Leste the planning department bureaucrats in the Ministry of Education Timor-Leste collecting ‘data’ ‘numbers’ and ‘comments’ to satisfy donor-reporting requirements, and this invariably puts pressure on the recipient country's human resource capacity and infrastructure. An example of this was the focus on the number of school enrolments and their levels of attainment rather than measuring learning outcomes (Riddell, 2012, p. 3). The author witnessed, during his working life within the Ministry of Education of Timor-Leste (2007-2010), that the Ministry of Education was trying to provide running water into the school toilets, filling classrooms with chairs and desks, and providing the basics of stationary needs, which means that ‘collecting’ data for development partners was at the lower end of the ‘priority scale’ and a distraction for the recipients.
Meeting international expectations

Easterly (2014), argues that mistakes are made when assuming that the recipient countries are unaware of the donor’s role in pushing agendas, and this asserts that learning from our history of engagement and development does indeed matter. This parallels the fact that just as it was also known and articulated by recipient country negotiators promoting their own country, then promoting (their) way of thinking, (their) way of life, (their) ideas to benefit their country, it was equally apparent to those on the ground (Easterly, 2014, p. 22).

Timor-Leste was a unique example where it was incumbent on the donors to establish ‘line responsibility’; that is supporting indigenous structures within key Ministries during the Constituent IV Government of RDTL. The donors were required to work within the Timorese systems, and government ministers found the process confronting, illustrated by this poignant comment from the ex-Minister of Education RDTL:

Timor-Leste has three Ministers of Education, One for the government of RDTL, one from UNICEF and the other from The World Bank. (Joao Cancio Freitas)

The then Minister of Education RDTL lamented to the author that there were supposedly ‘three’ bosses within his ministry, and that the other ‘two’ had to be placated. This was not an ideal situation, and as a result, ‘standoffs’ did occur. One memorable incident included a refusal by the Minister to remain in a ‘planning meeting’ with The World Bank nominated senior education advisor, this Minister declaring that unless he was ‘removed from his position’, the Minister would not engage with The World Bank. And of course, the person was discreetly removed and posted elsewhere.

Circumstances such as these are difficult to manage from a recipient country’s perspective. The nation state has to manage the expectations of their own people and set their own ‘agendas’ and ‘pathways’ for their own

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46 Constitute IV RDTL, 2007-10 Prime Minister Xanana
47 The Author sought permission from Dr Joao Cancio Freitas to include these comments for the sole use in scholarship. See Appendix Five for this detail.
people, but these directions are not always aligned with the donor’s expectations. The dilemma of expectations was clearly articulated by the Timorese Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri in his keynote address at the Co-Operating with East Timor Conference 2005:

We are working between two big expectations. One is the expectations of the people – always looking to have everything yesterday and not tomorrow, and second, the expectation of the international community that is always considering Timor-Leste a success story. It is not easy governing the country having these two expectations (Thomas & Hill, 2005, p. 2).

The concern around development practice, was the lack of introspection (reflection) on donor behaviour. Donors wield significant ‘purchasing power’; they come with their own ‘ideas’ and the ‘resources’ to implement them. Donors’ behavior does not necessarily mean that these ideas were welcomed, illustrated by the comment previously noted, from a senior Indonesian government official as, ‘they try to promote their country, then promote their way of thinking, their way of life’.

One Indonesian trainer working within the Ministry of Trade reflected that the Government of Indonesia should articulate their ‘expectation’ on the direction of human resources within Indonesia. If this is not articulated, then a consequence of this policy is a ‘vacuum’ in HRD planning, leaving recipients exposed to donor-driven programs. He suggested that ‘There should be a move toward not just ‘donor driven’ it is more to the ‘government driven’ and they have ownership of that’. A senior government official reflected that there was little choice available, but to ‘accept’ donor offerings even though they acknowledged that the donor offering was not based upon their country’s needs:

Not all training offered by the donors is based upon the beneficial [recipient] country needs it’s not all that useful for the beneficial [recipient] country.

This was a comment that reflected the need for donor projects and programs to be linked to recipient country’s human resource development planning. Some respondents commented that these plans were ‘non-existent’ or
‘unknown’ to them, an issue that reflected poorly on the management and planning practices in the recipient country.

Lack of planning produced a tendency toward donor crowding in some ‘geographic’ and ‘industry sectors’ across Indonesia and Timor-Leste. This donor crowding was noted in the description of donor activity in Papua where it was revealed that there were around 27 donor activities tackling similar training needs. In Timor-Leste, donors targeted particular industry sectors to achieve ‘success’, as this experienced Timorese senior trainer commented: ‘In the construction areas you get four out of five donors funding the same thing, and then all claiming successes, and these guys are flooding the market’. Claiming successes was a particularly poignant point, as each donor has to show evidence of ‘outcomes’ and some activities, such as the rebuilding of burnt-out infrastructure ‘construction’, was accepted as a tangible outcome.

The expectations of the ‘international community’, as articulated by the Timorese Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri in comments above, highlight the awkward and uncomfortable situation placed upon, not just the recipient government, but also the constituents. This study can cite an example of where an RDTL IV government minister rejected a proposed donor offering in vocational training because of the ‘conditions’ placed upon the acceptance of that donor offering. It was therefore no surprise to hear that respondents expressed the view that they felt they were passive players in this somewhat complex aid scenario, where the expectations of the international community are powerful and the needs of the people pervasive. Governing under these circumstances was indeed ‘not easy’.

Possessing limited ‘local knowledge’ does not stop donors from implementing their own plans. As previously noted by a Timorese government minister, there was a considerable ‘lack of understanding of the local circumstances by donors’, and a Timorese training manager described the ‘engagement’ with

48 The author observed these conversations between the Minister of Education and the ADB.
donors as, ‘when the donors come they want to do their own thing, they have limited local content knowledge’. In light of the UN High Level Forum in Aid in Busan (OECD, 2011), which declared that donors, governments and developmentalists are required to engage with ‘local’ beneficiaries and negotiate outcomes, this Timorese respondent was disappointed with ‘donors doing their own thing’ and imposing their solutions on their country.

The process of negotiating the solutions must include all parties, not just allow the top-down planners from afar to drive the agenda (Easterly, 2007), but also encourage the local farmers and communities affected by imported foreign policies and practices to have a say. This is an approach to development practice advocated by The Reality of Aid Network. Donors find this consultative approach time consuming, and it falls outside the timeframe for ‘results’ and ‘outcomes’. This was expressed earlier by the Timorese training manager, who indicated donors come with their own objectives, plans and intentions, with their own view of how to achieve these, including when to complete them.

**Lack of ownership and control**

The Timor-Leste development context illustrated that there was much evidence for the need for more inclusive practice (Wigglesworth, 2016) including encouraging Timorese to identify their own training needs, and not simply be assigned technical assistance from donors. A couple of Timor-Leste training centre managers criticized donors that encouraged Timorese to set up their own ‘training centres’ because these were seen as ‘duplicating’ existing structures and thus were undermining the existing training centres and their operations. According to this particular Timorese training centre manager:

> Donors need to see which institutions are seriously running a training centre and see which training centres are sustainable enough and then donors should jump in and reinforce them and then we'll see quality and sustainability

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49 see Independent review of poverty reduction and development assistance website: accessed Jan 04
http://www.realityofaid.org
Whilst this view may be understandable from a training centre managers’ perspective, which includes their concern for their own self-preservation, this donor behaviour actually illustrated that ‘localisation’ and ‘supporting local structures’ and developing inclusive practices were not a feature of their development approach.

Powell (2012) argues that when determining the progress of development interventions, collecting input from key stakeholders and local participants, helps structure the evaluation intervention, and identifies and addresses difficulties where and when they occur (Powell, 2012, p. 24). In order for the recipient communities to ‘own’ the development programs and processes, these communities, in some form or another, need to be heard. This was a common reflection by a number of donor agencies, and was supported by a number of reviews of development programs (Lockheed, 2009; Wilks, 2010).

Current development approaches, supported by the Busan High Level Form on Aid Effectiveness, have requested that donors and recipients alike, should be accountable to the citizens of the recipient state, and aid relations should be based upon democratic decision-making processes by local institutions (Wilks, 2010, p. 14). Poverty on the ground requires sustainable long-term responses that the citizens of the country know, feel and need to manage, in their own way. Disenfranchising the local citizens can only lead to failure (Wilks, 2010, p. 10). Working together with local people, rather than donors delivering on their own, was recommended by numerous Timorese respondent comments, and is reiterated here by this Timorese training manager's expression of ‘disenfranchisement’ in the following manner:

What's missing are initiatives that are with the local institutions. Go into the local institutions and help them.
This is a revealing and insightful comment that asserts that ‘donors’ should be working with locals, and that this was not the case because ‘its missing’. Her plea to donors to create ‘initiatives’ to help local institutions would seem to be a reasonable request, and this study calls upon the development community to examine ways to respond to local conditions and local input, by recognizing stakeholders requirements.

In contrast to this situation, in the Indonesian context, as noted by this senior trainer, there are increasing signs of partnerships and cooperation developing in current development practice, a welcomed sign of change:

In the past the internationals just come and say, this is our design and they want to implement it, but now there is a level of cooperation, of partnerships, developing and that's how it should work.

Development programs are turning their attention to notions of ‘inclusivity’ and examining ways to improve local input into program development and implementation (Carden, 2013; Wilks, 2010). Indeed, successful intervention requires considerable contextualization, ownership and direction by nationals as opposed to imported technical assistance (Riddell, 2012, p. 18). This perspective was endorsed and supported by this senior Indonesian trainer:

The donors should build the capacity of the local people, your training institution should invite more local people, rather than what the city offers and provides. Only then the local people will grow through this capacity

Policy and programs may be articulated, then exported, from multi- and bilateral donors (Easterly, 2007), but this process does not make them any more significant than the ‘voice’ articulated by the people on the ground. Policy requires dialogue, therefore cultivating and encouraging critical and reflective practice in the development sector, similar to educational practice, would be a desirable goal for development engagement. This study articulates a ‘model’ of reflective practice that moves toward seeking a solution to these types of development problems, and this model will be developed further in Chapter Seven- Sharing Program Practice.
Whilst there exists networks of practitioners who share their experiences of vocational training in a development context, and this occurs particularly in NORRAG\(^{50}\), in general the uniformity around training evaluations was wanting (Department Of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014b). Sharing information and lessons learnt around development practice should be a ‘benchmark’ for reflective practice. In the Timor development context, a major NGO (La'o Hamutuk) operating for many years by Timorese\(^{51}\), has, over the past decade, become a 'voice of critique' of not only development assistance, but also government and business planning. A brief examination of their newsletter illustrates how engaged this local NGO is in: (i) vocational education in Timor-Leste, (ii) monitoring how much money international donors have spent on and in Timor-Leste (La'o Hamutuk, 2007), (iii) noting what donor funds, oil revenue and other money has been expended in Timor-Leste since 1999, (iv) observing the level of Public Consultation on Law (La'o Hamutuk, 2009), and (v) making their focus Analyzing Australian Assistance to East Timor (La'o Hamutuk, 2002).

Donors and organizations in development require mechanisms and ‘institutional’ structures to ensure that the ‘collective history of their engagement’ in any particular country can be accessed, examined and evaluated. This is especially so in the light of new information technologies which are readily available which can store, retrieve and communicate data (Pollitt, 2000, p. 12). In this technological age of access to information, it would seem relevant and appropriate for external parties to have access to donor information to be able to evaluate the information about ‘lessons learnt’. As reported in the Review of Aid Effectiveness, the release of documents and data was not always standard practice (Farmer et al., 2011, p. 58).

Capacity-building by local people and creating ‘sustainable’ institutions within a community are featured prominently in this study. Identifying improvements in aid practices to bring about ‘sustainability’ was critical, and some of the

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\(^{50}\) NORRAG is the Network for International policies and cooperation in education and training at [http://www.norrag.org](http://www.norrag.org)

\(^{51}\) See La'o Hamutuk website for more detail at [http://www.laohamutuk.org](http://www.laohamutuk.org)
respondents have specifically provided that insight. Ensuring a development activity was inclusive of the recipients, irrespective of the ‘donors intent’, was one important suggested change in donor practice. It was described here by a senior Indonesian trainer as, ‘the donors always want to raise sustainability, however they don’t realize the importance of building local capacity’. This plea for ‘localisation’ requires that donors examine the ways of engaging ‘locals’ through: (a) involving locals in project planning and implementation (as opposed to setting-up alternate institutions running alongside existing institutions), (b) responding to local need and training requirements, and (c) using local resources in training and planning and sharing visions with local institutions, whilst at the same time expecting training interventions to take time to impact communities.

A cautionary note on ‘local voices’ was provided by Shepherd (2013), who explained that, in the Timor-Leste context, little attention was given to notions of what constitutes the ‘recipient need’ at a local level. Local input was not homogeneous, as there existed power imbalances and unequal sharing of resources and donors (Shepherd, 2013). Not knowing the local circumstances or not being concerned about local perceptions, impacts upon these ‘donor-recipient’ relationships. Timorese perceptions of donor intentions, was highlighted by the Timorese training manager, who found offence in existing donor practices of setting up their own objectives and strategies. Developing a means to include ‘all’ voices in framing and designing the development activity was critical to the success of development programs, even when these ‘voices’ were critical of the planned interventions. Examining ways of incorporating ‘local’ input and engagement into the management and administration of education and training programs would be an appropriate development practice response. Localization could also include engaging Timorese institutions as partners and making these partners equal partners, if not lead partners, as was the case for the Skills Training Partnership program. This was an attempt to move away from token representation with unfair power imbalances.
The ‘technical advisor’ model of development, described earlier and employed in Timor-Leste, whilst arguably necessary and desirable in the beginning of the UNTAET state building activity (Joseph & Hamaguchi, 2014; Tansey, 2014), was less than ‘sustainable’ in the end, and over time highlighted the need to develop ‘institutional building approaches’. The challenges of ‘institution’ building necessitated that donors familiarize themselves with the changing political landscape, and the challenges of building ‘state capacity’. These are challenges that are complex, in post-conflict countries, but ones which desperately need attention (Keogh & Porter, 2008, p. 3).

A Timorese Senior Government Official described the dilemma facing his country as ‘…there is a lack of understanding of the circumstances that need to be put in place before you start the capacity building’. These circumstances challenge all stakeholders, recipients and donors alike, as Timorese cultural values are based upon social harmony, which are in stark contrast to western values based upon individual rights (Wigglesworth, 2016, p. 134). Indeed, as complex the circumstances in Timor-Leste are, donors have to work through these issues and develop appropriate responses.

The Timorese were at times quite direct and forthcoming with suggestions for donor programs, as this training manager remonstrated:

I'm the one who knows best what technical assistance we need. I say I don't need that I need this, because that's what our program is about.

Timorese training managers expected the donors to listen to the local needs and respond accordingly. Another Timorese senior government official articulated what they wanted from donors, but these messages were not being responded to. Instead, they were told what to do, and ‘there was no concern of actually telling the Timorese this is how we (donors) are going to implement it’. Examining the ‘local’ needs and developing responses to these needs was a mandatory requirement for successful intervention, and many Timorese respondents articulated the flaws in the technical models applied in Timor-Leste.
Articulation of recipient expectation-learning styles and the skills dilemma

This articulation of recipient expectation examines the respondents’ comments regarding the learning styles applicable to each country. The respondents expressed their concerns regarding developing ‘generic versus specific’ skills training, and commented on the application of the Certificate IV in Training and Assessment (Cert IV TAA) and the implications of implementing this approach to training in Indonesia and Timor-Leste. There was, in particular, emphasis on the impact of ‘learning by doing’ methodologies.

The skills dilemma examined the issues confronting Timor-Leste’s human resource development needs, including the identification of skills and the impact of engaging ‘locals’, and it is clear that engagement with local communities and building local capacity, was a critical concern for respondents in both countries. In addition, the role of government and planning to achieve these goals was of particular concern for many respondents, along with the cultural implications of learner-centered training approaches and partnering issues with ‘locals’.

Implications of ‘generic versus specific’ training

The learning styles and training approaches used in Indonesia and Timor-Leste featured prominently in discussions with respondents. The comments provided a level of critique and analysis of learning approaches in both cultures, and provided a means of assessing and evaluating training approaches and management practices in education and training settings. Comments were honestly and openly expressed regarding the ‘skills dilemma’ and the exasperation of creating training systems were palpable, as illustrated by this Timorese training manager’s comments:

We have to be honest about this, we can transfer knowledge and skills but soft capacity is very hard to identify, discipline or loyalty, attitude to work, these are hard skills to transfer.
The Timorese respondents identified the following skills of: communication skills; attendance and arriving on time; and presentation and behaviour on the job, as the most relevant skills for employment. These skills are described as the ‘soft’ skills needed for work while the job-related specific skills such as, carpentry, plumbing and automotive repairs are the technical skills. According to the respondents, these ‘technical’ skills are relevant skills, as long as the ‘soft’ skills are included in skill development regime. ‘Attitude to work’ was a common theme, across many Timorese respondents’ comments, and was variably described in this study as: behavior; taking orders; discipline; loyalty; motivation; and punctuality. Finding ways of developing these skills in Timor was difficult for training managers, and it was noted that ‘these are hard skills to transfer’ they are not alone in a search for an answer, as the academic literature and studies in other countries reveal similarly challenging problems (Foley, 2004; Hadi, Hassan, Razzaq, & Mustafa, 2015; Keating, 2009).

In the Indonesian training context, being ‘proud’ and ‘motivated for work’ were considered additional and important competencies. Indeed, it was specifically claimed that ‘how to make people proud in their work, like motivation, this is what we call soft competencies’. A World Bank study into education and training for youth in Indonesia, noted that such things as problem solving, communication and team work, were important preparation skills for work, and were skills increasingly in demand (The World Bank, 2010).

In the Vocational Training Centre in Tibar\footnote{This centre is described as Tibar because of its location in the area of Tibar outside Dili.}, Timor-Leste, the vocational training programs focused on carpentry, plumbing and masonry, since these technical skills were deemed necessary to rebuild a physically destroyed Timor-Leste. The newer curriculum in Tibar was designed to help Timorese to develop ‘citizenship’, in addition to learning the skills to prepare for work. According to a senior trainer, to become a good citizen of the country, as well as learning the soft skills needed to engage in the world of work, were important and essential skills:

how to become a citizen of this country, with their behaviour, their punctuality, all of these things that are important to the employers.
The notion of citizenship was deemed important in the post-independent state of Timor-Leste, and was described by Timorese respondents in a number of ways as building notions of ‘inclusion’ and ‘responding to the needs of the Timorese culture’ creating sustainability and a common unified country. These concepts of ‘citizenship’, described by the respondents, were supported by the academic literature. Tikly (2003) notes the central importance of ‘citizenship’ skills in an agrarian society going through social and political reconstruction (Tikly et al., 2003) and, in addition, Allais (2012) argued that, they are doubly important in a developing country context, for aiding a vocational education system to encourage and promote an expanded vision of citizenship (Allais, 2012, p. 640).

In Australia, we refer to these skills as the ‘Key Competencies’ for work and engagement in society, and as mentioned earlier they are communicating ideas and information, collecting, analyzing and organizing information, planning and organizing activities, working with others and in teams, using mathematical ideas and techniques, solving problems, and using technology (Mayer, 1992). In the Australian context, these skills were discussed and debated in educational institutes, unions and workplace settings, as well as across the community. A public consultation around skill requirements for work is arguably necessary as a starting point for any policy development on ‘skills and training’. However, this discussion and debate has not occurred in any great detail in Timor-Leste. Consequently, a Timorese policy position on the types of skills required to lead, and engage in a fulfilling life, was a base requirement for preparing youth for employment (RDTL, 2011a), and was one requiring the engagement of all stakeholders in Timorese civil society.

The discussion around the ‘narrow’ industry based skills training, and the need to prepare for ‘lifelong learning’ has occurred in developed countries around the world. The actions of the donor-led training interventions, such as the ADB’s mid-level skills training project, focused attention on the narrow technical skills of ‘automotive and construction’ and as such precluded the opportunity to examine the types of skills (soft and technical) needed in Timor-
Leste. It was beholden upon the international donors to ‘share the responsibility’ of ensuring that ‘civil society’ was engaged in the skills development discussion. Boughton (2009) points out that this discussion, for the Timorese, was largely unresolved, and the relevance of ‘lifelong learning’ requires further examination and incorporation into the development agenda for Timor-Leste (Cooper & Walters, 2009, p. 81).

As previously noted in Chapter 2, Quisumbing & Apnieve (2005) were critical of the ‘industry focused’ and technical skills training, which, they opined, often missed the importance of teaching broader pillars of learning ‘skills for life’ (learning to do) (learning to be) (learning to know) and (learning to live together). Vocational education needs to be posited in, and grounded in, lifelong learning pedagogy (Quisumbing & Apnieve, 2005, p. 226). The reality in terms of the implementation of these critical skills falls considerably short of the mark in Timor-Leste, as illustrated by the lack of any comprehensive dialogue around skills development. A Timorese training manager’s view was that the ‘soft skills’ would contribute significantly to employability, but these are difficult to teach:

Soft skills; communication skills, discipline, responsibility and loyalty, that is hard, we cannot prepare someone to have these criteria. It’s hard to prepare someone for the soft skills.

In many cases, these ‘pillars’ of learning are not even considered, nor measured, by donor funded vocational skills training projects (Quisumbing & Apnieve, 2005). Outcome-based (quantitative) measures are more commonly used, such as ‘How many students gain the skills or qualifications in ‘tourism and hospitality?’ or ‘What is the amount of training (participant training days) that occurred in the workplace?’ or the ‘What is the number of participants involved in training?’. The evidence gathered during this study suggests that, according to the respondents, employers do indeed want broader ‘life skills’ such as; ‘preparedness to work’, ‘ability to communicate in the workplace’, ‘showing initiative’ and ‘language skills’ rather than the narrowly defined vocational specific ‘technical skills’ training. Establishing a ‘conversation’
around skills development in Timor-Leste would provide a ‘voice’ for locals to express their views on this training dilemma.

**Certificate IV in Training and Assessment** and its impact

The majority (20 out of 34) respondents to this study were trainers, managers or participants in the Certificate IV in Training and Assessment (Certificate IV TAA), and they provided some thoughtful insights into the conduct of this training. Funded by bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors in collaboration with Australian, International and local training providers, they were alumni of this training course in Indonesia and Timor-Leste.

The introduction of the Certificate IV in Workplace Training and Assessment provided the Timorese with some of the necessary skills to make the training room more ‘participatory and engaging’ for Timorese learners. This involved a clear movement away from past practices, and it appeared that an approach to learning that respondents valued and appreciated, had begun. This trainer explained his experience of the course as, ‘The good way is to let the students think by themselves, you just give, and let the people select and choose which ones they want to learn’.

However, according to this Indonesian senior government official, the Indonesian school system was not responding to the needs of the ‘world of work’. He noted that, ‘It’s a quite wide gap between the ‘schools’ and the ‘world of work’ so there must be a transition here; a bridge, that is what we call training’. He was emphasizing the important role of training in bridging the gap between ‘school’ and ‘work’. The bridge required ‘form and structure’, and this was the contribution of the Certificate IV TAA according to him and, indeed, many other respondents. The course was designed to encourage the application of skills, modeled in the training room, to be employed in respective workplaces. Certificate IV TAA emphasized workplace learning and designing training relative to workplace competencies.

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53 The Certificate IV in Training and Assessment followed on from earlier versions of the Certificate IV in Assessment and Workplace Training
54 This course in Australia was later superseded by the Certificate IV in Training and Assessment.
Carolan (2005) conducted a study of one of these Certificate IV TAA courses delivered in 2005 in Timor-Leste, and she reported that many interviewees commented favourably on this course because it (a) developed practical skills based activities related to work environment, (b) provided learner centered methods, tasks and learning outcomes tailored to the individual needs, (c) provided skills to pass onto others in their respective workplaces, and (d) provided mentoring and contextualization of training materials (Carolan, 2005). These views were, in the main, echoed by the Timorese respondents.

Many of these participants reported that experience with the participatory and learner-centred methodologies showed them that this was the most effective way for people to learn, as described here by the training manager responsible for implementing the course in Timor-Leste:

The result of the training if we use this style of learner-centred and adult principles it's more effective… from the participant's point of view, there are a lot of activities, which can be done by them, not by facilitator, and it's good for their workplace.

Many participants were surprised to discover that, as trainee students in the course, their ideas and opinions were valued, and they were encouraged to share them. The participants had never experienced this ‘learner-centred’ approach in their previous schooling, where students had to ‘sit and listen’ ‘duduk, dengar’ (Carolan, 2005, p. 5). In this latter context, teachers had all the knowledge, and in stark contrast to this philosophy, the new engaging approach which the Timorese trainers were trying to achieve was very different when they said ‘…we designed the training to be very participative’.

The Certificate IV TAA, had a considerable impact in both Indonesia and Timor-Leste in significant, but different ways. In Indonesia, the adult learning principles were promoted and encouraged across current and previous DFAT programs without a detailed examination of the impost of these ‘values’ in this cultural context. The introduction of the Certificate IV TAA, with its Australian content packaged and designed for Australian workplaces, was

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55 See current Australia Awards Indonesia guidelines;
transposed into an Indonesian context highlighting the dilemmas involved in policy borrowings of this manner (Malloch, 2005).

In Timor-Leste, a number of Certificate IV TAA programs have been conducted, and the course has been customized to Timor-Leste training conditions, and is now accredited by Timor-Leste’s own national accreditation body (INDMO). The course provided some direction in ‘facilitating learning’ and developing skills for trainers to assess ‘competencies in the workplace’. The study respondents valued these training approaches highly enough to recommend them to be introduced into the teacher training programs within the Ministry of Education, as suggested by this trainer; ‘even teachers in primary system, we can combine this with teacher competency this system we use we can also apply that.’ Timor-Leste continues to grapple with the needs to significantly improve the ‘teacher’ facilitation skills in the classrooms across the primary, secondary and vocational education sector. The Certificate IV in Training and Assessment, may prove to be an appropriate training response for meeting this professional development requirement for teachers in Timor-Leste, even with the caveat that it may require some caution.

**Learning by doing-providing opportunities for change**

Respondents commented on the ‘learning by doing’ approaches of donor programs, many indicating that ‘learn by doing’ was a desirable training approach. Jones (2006) argues that this approach to learning was successful when we ‘do’ or perform the task then we truly ‘know’ the task and many western cultures apply this practice (N. Jones, 2006, p. 2). A Timorese trainer described the approach as, ‘I do, you do, then we do it together, then you can do it too’. Equally, this approach carries with it the potential to learn ‘flawed’ practices, and can therefore perpetuate mistakes. Nevertheless, individuals who are not given the ‘opportunity’ to learn by doing (and inevitably make mistakes in the course of doing so) will have their learning restricted, and therefore the best intentions of skills development will not be realized (Quisumbing & Apnieve, 2005). Many individuals will return to the

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56 INDMO is the National Labour Force Development Institute Timor-Leste
‘dependence’ and reliance on others, denying them opportunities to advance their individual and/or corporate learning. One Timorese donor program administrator applauded the actions of her international advisor for ‘encouraging them to make their own management decisions’, whilst, at the same time, she acknowledged that this was a rare trait amongst many other international advisors.

Opportunities exist with international donor assistance programs to ‘explore’ and ‘examine’ western models of vocational training and workplace learning relevant to the local circumstances. The respondents indicated that ‘selecting’ an offering from abroad had to coincide with their country’s development circumstances, drawing analogies from a child’s growth, ‘from the cradle to walking to running’. This senior trainer suggested that the ‘learning’ offered from abroad needs to match the development circumstances that are present in Indonesia, saying ‘we are in the right level where we can do partnerships with [countries of] the same level like Korea and Thailand.’ Sharing developmental experiences, with countries at similar development stages, had some resonance for respondents. Therefore, selecting the most relevant and culturally appropriate vocational training system was a critical choice required of Indonesian policy makers, as noted here by this senior Indonesian government official with forty years’ experience examining training interventions:

We can learn from TAFE Institutes, we can look at what is good, even though it is good in Australia but maybe it's not good to our culture, to our conditions in Indonesia. So it depends on Indonesia to select what would be most applicable.

As this official described, there are many Australian training approaches that work well in Australia, however the task for Indonesia was to select wisely for the circumstances of Indonesia, and not just accept the wholesale import of foreign, in this case Australian, approach.

Timor-Leste’s developmental circumstances were unique for a post-conflict country under transition. Post the Indonesian withdrawal, an educational management vacuum existed in the newly independent state of Timor-Leste,
and this the vacuum included approaches to skills development and skills transfer. This became manifest in problems such as: (a) Timorese were not provided with sufficient opportunities to make decisions, they had a lack of background in management, and lacked opportunities primarily because during Indonesian occupation managerial skills were denied (Kingsbury & Leach, 2007, p. 227), (b) International advisors viewed getting the ‘job done’ as their primary responsibility, and were not interested in wasting time building local capacity, illustrated by this senior government official’s comment, ‘It’s not in the interests of international advisors to make themselves redundant, so why should they teach or leave anything behind’, (c) International advisors were not skilled in the area of transferring ‘knowledge and skills’ to others. Advisors may have technical expertise however unless they have good communication skills, transferring those skills remained problematic, noted in this training manager’s comments, ‘they don’t care about you they hurry you up in the work, they leave the counterpart without learning’ and finally (d) A ‘cultural’ issue around ‘deference to authority’ was widely prevalent in Timorese institutions.

Timorese respondents commented that making mistakes was generally ‘frowned upon’, therefore acquiescing to a higher authority absolves them of taking on that responsibility, resulting in restricted opportunities to learn and develop skills. The tendency for Timorese to ‘defer’ to a more senior person in their institution for a ‘decision’, also takes place at the highest of levels of government. The author observed many examples of this ‘deference’ to a higher authority, the starkest example being when the Minister for Education was taking telephone calls explaining why the Ministry of Education didn’t have paper for students attending nationally organised examinations57. This is attention to miniscule administrative detail that, in most countries, was usually the domain of a lowly ranked bureaucrat or ministry staffer, not a Minister of Government.

57 A conversation which occurred during a ‘briefing’ with the Minister of Education and the author.
Working within the Ministry of Education, the author witnessed many situations where Timorese counterparts advised the author to ‘seek’ ministerial approval for the simplest of decisions. Whilst this may have been the ‘preferred’ and ‘general’ practice for most Timorese, this level of micromanagement was a source of annoyance for at least one Timorese senior government official respondent. This respondent, who had studied and worked in New Zealand, took a contrasting point of view to his Timorese colleagues, illustrated by the time he questioned ‘Why’ the Minister and the management team needed to be so involved in the ‘day-to-day’ operations of his portfolio—the human resource directorate.

Hill (2007), writing in *East Timor-Beyond Independence*, suggests that Timorese were never skilled at management, or decision-making, and that this was the legacy of the Indonesian educational experience for the Timorese during the 24 years of Indonesian occupation. Indonesia brought in their own people to occupy managerial positions, and this was the case in the education sector (Kingsbury & Leach, 2007, p. 226). The lack of Timorese skills in managing the key institutions of finance and budgeting, education and health during the initial UNTAET period was palpable (Tansey, 2014, p. 179). Initially under UNTAET, the advisors main interest or concern was to get the ‘job’ done, the corollary of which was ‘to leave nothing behind, learning or resources’ as previously noted.

The UNTAET state building of Timor-Leste, as some respondents described, was yet another layer of lost opportunities for Timorese to gain the necessary management skills. The United Nations, as the leading proponent of ‘governance’ and ‘development’ would have had measures in place to ensure ‘opportunities’ for Timorese to develop these much needed management skills. That would have been the expectation, but as one donor program administrator observed, the UN had employed international volunteers from the non-government sector without applying a ‘selection’ process based upon their own predetermined criteria. It was observed that, ‘the UN had a process and a selection…it should be more transparent they should weigh more criteria it should be clear’. Where it was possible to give an opportunity to a
Timorese to perform an advisor role, this should have occurred, according to this donor program administrator:

If we can fill a gap by using Timorese as development staff, then we don’t need to have international advisors.

The unique development circumstances of Timor-Leste were to get the country ‘up and running’, therefore the UN advisors were positioned in the key ministries of health, education and finance. As previously noted, the lack of engagement became a source of disquiet with some Timorese respondents, who felt that ‘locals’ with the skills were overlooked. The international advisors were challenged on their ability to ‘work with’, ‘alongside’, and ‘communicate with’ their Timorese counterparts, as this donor program administrator explains, ‘So the international advisor has to work out how to transfer their work skills to the local people’.

Whilst the most common issue identified by the Timorese were the ‘language barriers’, some Timorese described the ‘attitude’ of some advisors as ‘condescending’, ‘arrogant’ and just plain ‘naughty’ while others were simply unaware of who their opposite numbers were. One senior government official explained, ‘in some instances the Timorese didn't even know who their counterparts were’.

**The Timor-Leste Skills dilemma**

The skills development dilemma refers to the challenges faced by the Timorese to design and respond to the human resource development needs of their country, and involves identifying, and planning for, training interventions that meet their particular development needs. This study examined the contributions of donors and contractors in the development of vocational education and training. A World Bank report on *The role of Youth Skills Development in the transition to Work: A global review* expressed the view that:

‘without the employability skills young people won’t get employment, and schools are not preparing young people for the world of work’ (Adams, 2007).
The employability skills required by young people in Timor-Leste would require an understanding of: (a) What knowledge of skills, and vocational occupations, are required? How will this knowledge be produced, understood and valued? (b) What are the relationships that exist within different occupational divisions of labour? (c) What are the relationships between the ‘structure and content’ of existing and planned human resource development provision and the links to labour market? and (d) What contribution will donors have in the skills development in a Timor-Leste context?

The direction for skills development requires an understanding of the unique Timorese circumstances. Timor-Leste has a very young population, where approximately 53% of the population was below the age of 19 (RDTL, 2011b). Every year, and over the next twenty years, a disproportionately higher number of young people will be looking for work, relative to a small labour force and a limited capacity to expand (RDTL, 2011b, p. 40). Many of the new entrants to the labour market, variously estimated at between 15,000-20,000, (Mats & Fredrik, 2013, p. 5; Wheelahan, 2009, p. 7) will not find employment in the private sector. The youth unemployment rate is already at 43%, and this was compounded by the fact that there was a very high general under-employment rate (Das & O'Keefe, 2007; Mats & Fredrik, 2013). There were only 400 to 500 private sector jobs produced annually in Timor-Leste (Joseph & Hamaguchi, 2014; RDTL, 2011a), which was hardly enough to cover the annual number of new entrants into the labour market.

Timor-Leste would benefit from a dialogue and discussion around the nature, type and extent of the ‘employability skills’ required. Such a discussion would include confronting the issue of what constitutes a ‘livelihood’, and how Timorese may view this conception from their perspective. It was commented that ‘Parents should be successful if they see that all their kids can survive can make a living for their own’58. There was a widely held view in Timor-Leste that ‘parents’ saw a university education as being a success, these parents just wanted their children to be ‘university’ educated. Making a living

58 A comment made to the author in a private conversation with a Timorese PhD student in Melbourne in 2015.
of their own and learning vocational skills was apparently less desirable, and according to a Timorese respondent, ‘We have to change this (attitude) in their life’.

The lack of employment opportunities, limited access to higher education, and limited skills for the job market, was a very real concern for young Timorese. In many countries there exists a training system, which formally develops the vocational skills of the population to prepare them for meaningful employment. In Timor-Leste there was no structured vocational educational and training system (Maglen, 2008, p. 1). The Government of Timor-Leste (RDTL, 2011a) recognizes and acknowledges that this was a major human resource issue:

Education and training are the keys to improving the life opportunities of our people and enabling them to reach their full potential (2011a, p. 14).

The market, the state and civil society are the ‘drivers’ of skills development in Timor-Leste, and according to a training manager the government of Timor-Leste, these areas have a responsibility to meet the expectations of these divergent groups. His view was that they were not being realized:

The government is not providing the people with the (agricultural) training, and the same with rice, corn, coconuts and bananas sectors. This is a big sector, fishing, and many people concentrated in it, they (government) think of the industry, but they don’t think of the specific culture, Timor culture.

This represents a thoughtful and reflective comment on the ‘training’ needs required in the newly independent Timor-Leste, as well as a heartfelt ‘plea’ to focus attention upon the uniqueness of this specific culture, and not the ‘market driven’ and ‘industry needs’ that do not exist. He argued that Timor’s culture was a ‘farming and fishing culture’ and training people to be efficient in these sectors would considerably improve Timorese livelihoods. This respondent challenged these immediate short-term needs of employers, and their narrowly defined market focus of skill requirements. Another training manager supported this view stating that the training focus should be away from industry and based locally:

We try to use sophisticated training models like we use computers and target those in industry, but the fact is many villages they wanted training in local conditions.
Getting the ‘industry’ versus ‘agricultural’ skills development mix correct was significant for many Timorese respondents. These views were supported by data from the Timor-Leste Labour Force Survey 2013 (LFS), which provided a reasonable ‘picture’ of the existing labour force indicators. This survey provided an assessment of those in employment and the occupational types, economic activity sectors, training requirements and education (RDTL, 2015), and in parallel, the Timor-Leste LFS showed that the service sector employed most people (45.1%) whilst the agriculture sector employed (41%) and only (13%) in industry (RDTL, 2015, p. IV). Successive Governments of Timor-Leste have recognized the need to address the human resource development needs, and vocational and technical skills required to achieve the development needs of the nation:

Vocational training will focus on training a skilled workforce that can respond to the employment and development needs of our nation (2011a, p. 26).

The Timor-Leste Labour Force Survey clearly stated that there was a ‘skills mismatch’ between educational attainment and skills required for the job in Timor-Leste (RDTL, 2015, p. 19). This ‘skills mismatch’ is an acknowledgment that the recognition, attention, and action required to resolve the Timor-Leste ‘skills dilemma’ are at opposite ends of the skills development scale.

**Acceptance of training methods and evaluations: local input**

In the Timor-Leste context, according to one respondent, there were many donor programs that ‘resourced’ and ‘staffed’ training programs from newly established ‘training organisations’ funded by donors. However, Timor-Leste did not have the necessary ‘human resource’ capabilities to undertake many of the donor training projects, and local training institutes were in their formative development stage, and were not able to meet these donor requirements for training. Such a situation was somewhat problematic for local training institutes, as they were not given the opportunity to develop the necessary ‘expertise’. Engaging local institutes in training ensures that local materials, equipment and knowledge were utilized. Expressed earlier in this
study and re-iterated here, sustainability is created by building local capacity to operate, manage and train the local people:

So that they can use it to enhance their capacity so they can operate and (be) sustainable... (It's) better to facilitate and work together the local people rather than they deliver their own.

Donors who delivered training programs on their own were viewed critically by a number of Timorese respondents, who commented that ‘competing’ with existing training institutes leads to disharmony and fragmentation. One aspect of establishing competing institutions was that local staff were ‘pilfered’ from existing training institutes for short-term monetary gain, leading to pleas from existing training managers to, ‘go into the local institutions and help them...why create another one alongside of a local institute’. Or similarly:

Donors need to see which institutions are seriously running a training centre, which training centres are sustainable enough and then donors should jump in and reinforce them.

Reinforcing local training institutes would be one approach that was achievable and manageable, however greater support was required to achieve these approaches. In the Indonesian context, there were numerous calls from respondents to examine the engagement with ‘locals’, as these respondents believed that local capacity would grow through this approach. They argued that the donors should encourage and implement training activities that build the capacity of local people, as this senior trainer explained:

The donors should build the capacity of the local people, your training institution should invite more local people, rather than what the city offers and provides. Only then the local people will grow through this capacity.

Engaging local people, from an Indonesian perspective was seen as a significant issue, as this allowed trainers (local and international) to gain an appreciation of the cultural diversity, complexity and needs of the local Indonesian people. Building an understanding of the local people’s perspective strengthened the engagement and provided opportunities for trainers to share experiences. Engaging locals provided mutual benefits to both parties, as this trainer explained:
Not only qualifications, knowledge and experience but also one [trainer] has the ability to understand the diversity and complexity and different needs of the people.

A change in Indonesian society, due in part to the growing and educated middle-class who have gained overseas qualifications, means that there are experienced and qualified Indonesian personnel able to perform management and training roles, instead of international advisors. This trainer’s comments were made, relative to his particular role as a human resource manager, ‘now what’s changing is there is more and more experienced or qualified locals involved in that process’.

**Strategic development planning and relationship to skills development**

Vocational training reform in Timor-Leste, particularly with regard to the ‘polytechnic development’, highlighted the need for more formal ‘planning’ and a more ‘coordinated’ response, particularly from the two ‘ministries’ involved in this development (Ministry of Education and SEPFOPE). In the words of one Timorese manager, the formal planning response overlapped with and undermined, the work of each ministry:

> Where does vocational training fit, in terms of its role in Education and for the Secretary of State (SEPFOPE)? I think one is stepping into the other quite often, and undermines the others work.

The polytechnic development was designed to cover the ‘technical and vocational’ needs of Timor-Leste as defined by the Strategic Development Plan and the RDTL government’s interpretation of these planning needs:

> We will invest in education and training to ensure that by 2030, the people of Timor-Leste are living in a nation where people are educated and knowledgeable, able to live long and productive lives, and have opportunities to access a quality education that will allow them to participate in the economic, social and political development of our nation (RDTL, 2011a, p. 18).

The coordination between the two ministries involved in vocational education and training was weak, as already noted by the above respondent’s comments. There existed (since 2008) an inter-ministerial working group on vocational education, tasked with bringing together all ministries involved in
workforce development. Costa (2013) noted that this was a ‘working group’ that acted in a somewhat \textit{ad hoc} manner, with little coordination, and no clear terms of reference (Costa, 2013). The intention of this ‘working group’ was to support the RDTL’s multi-sector approach and this was not meeting RDTL’s expectation (RDTL, 2011a).

The ‘working group’ was engaged in coordinating the RTDL’s response to vocational skills development, and this required an understanding the language of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ education. A senior Timorese trainer noted that the language of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ education was somewhat confusing for senior management in the Ministry of Education and SEPFOPE, and it was also confusing for policy makers within the two respective responsible institutes as well as civil society:

> It needs to be discussed, and talked about, and most of the people in that area, managing and directing that area (MoE and SEPFOPE), still have a bit of confusion about what they call ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ education, they don’t know what is one, and what is the other.

These comments have currency in Timor-Leste, especially coming from a senior trainer, who was engaged for many years assisting both ministries develop vocational training. Indeed these attitudes highlighted the need for a more thorough dialogue around vocational training reform and skills development across RDTL’s ministries and across Timor-Leste civil society.

\textbf{Adopting learner-centered approaches and their implications}

Amongst many of the comments from the Indonesian and Timorese trainers interviewed, there has been a discernable shift toward learner-centred approaches. The trainer (now facilitator) presents information allowing individuals to choose what they want to learn, which encourages ownership, equality, engagement and respect in the learning process, as this Indonesian senior trainer explains:

> I think it's the adult learning principles-the equality, every participant is involved in the process of training. So we can make the people come to training with respect. So the trainer is not a trainer but a facilitator.
Memorizing and repeating the teacher’s words was the old way, now a thing of the past, as previously noted by a Timorese trainer, ‘The good way is to let the students think by themselves’. These practices are formative in Timor-Leste, as many respondents commented on the educational practices of the Portuguese and Indonesian systems as ‘command’ education and ‘imposing their ideologies’. It was the hope from a trainer, previously noted, that future generations would learn the practices of doing things for themselves.

A shift from an ‘instructional-command’ system of education to a ‘participatory-learning by doing’ may produce a more interactive learning environment, leading to a critical and questioning cultural shift in future generations, the implications of which are uncertain and unknown. The shift toward ‘student-led’ instruction was ‘qualified’ by a senior government official commenting that Indonesians are not yet ready for training without ‘face to face’ instruction and ‘manuals’ in his words:

> You make apprenticeships or internships for the company you cannot just leave them [students] and give the manual. We have not been trained enough, it has to be customized, it has to be ‘face-to-face’ management, ‘face-to-face’ instruction.

Another senior trainer agreed that the Indonesian education system was not prepared for an ‘active’ learning culture:

> You will be considered a good student when you listen attentively, silently and obey what the teacher says. I think active learning and discussing and learning is not really promoted or fostered yet, even at the university level.

These reflections, and observations, suggest that the ‘culture’ of learning in Indonesia was difficult to change and that new teaching and learning practices may take time to have an impact in Indonesian society. Others trainers commented that adopting the more efficient and effective training approaches from Australia would be an appropriate ‘modern’ advancement on current Indonesian training practice, ‘Australia is providing a very, very good training system… a lot of practice, not just sitting and listening, that’s why it’s very efficient for me’. The same trainer observed that the ‘newer’ training approaches are visible in non-government training providers, but are less
prevalent in the Indonesian government training bureaucracies. From these respondent perspectives, it would appear that Indonesian trainers were being challenged by the introduction of these newer ‘learner-centred’ training methodologies.

**Implications of partnering with locals**

A number of Timorese respondents commented on the importance of ‘getting behind’ locals and ‘partnering’ with Timor-Leste institutions to bring about sustainable development. The approach used in ‘partnering’ should reflect a ‘broad cross-section’ of Timorese civil society, opening up the dialogue rather than closing off the available options. Shah (2011) comments that a false consensus about aid direction shuts down or stifles debate:

> How funds get used may do more harm than good, because these donor intentions often shut down or stifle debate and discussion around alternative points of view (R Shah, 2011, p. 73).

The author has witnessed a number of education and training programs conducted for the Ministry of Education-RDTL which illustrated a lack of diversity of views. These initiatives included: (a) The nominated polytechnic campuses across Timor-Leste, (b) Australian models of education masked by ‘third party providers’ (tourism skills development), (c) Local management of ‘foreign’ training providers-STP, (d) The human resource development fund scholarships targeting ‘selected fields of learning’ and finally (e) The ‘selection of staff’ involved in training as previously noted.

Not all the allocated resources for training met, or achieved, their intended objective, and invariably failed because of mismanagement in a crowded field of donors. In teacher-training activities in Timor-Leste, Shah (2011) noted that four training providers vied for the teacher training activities, and this resulted in an uneven provision across the country, as well as not meeting the human resource requirements in teacher-training (R Shah, 2011, p. 76). A dialogue was required across all sections of the Timorese civil society around skills development, involving all stakeholders including local voices, and not just donors and government policy makers. In order to better inform this dialogue,
and develop a meaningful and responsive approach, it would be necessary to gain a more detailed understanding of the Timor-Leste local conditions.

Research into the local conditions could cover some of the missing elements of skills development in Timor-Leste, and these could include addressing some of the following issues: (a) What current literature exists that could inform policy makers and advisors in RDTL ministries, of the structures, operations, impacts of vocational development in Timor-Leste? (b) What donor-funded activities in vocational training in Timor-Leste, has occurred, or is planned? What has been written and reported on, in these skills development activities? How much of this ‘training’ has been accredited, nationally or internationally? (c) What training across levels 3-6 of the Timor-Leste National Qualifications Framework has been carried out, or is planned in all RDTL ministries? (d) What RDTL scholarships have been allocated, and are planned including; Which ‘academic’ streams and at What levels? (e) How do the RDTL scholarships relate to the HRD plans and vocational skills training development? and (f) What skills, knowledge and qualifications are required by the industry sectors operating in Timor-Leste?

**Agreement with planning and management outcomes in training**

Establishing an agreement on planning and management outcomes featured prominently with respondents in both Indonesia and Timor-Leste. This was particularly so in regard to how each respective government was managing and planning bureaucratic reform, and introducing change within their respective ministries. These comments came from their own ‘personal’ and ‘professional’ experience of managing and planning reform strategies. Respondents recognized that each country was at different stages on the development scale, and therefore the plans and approaches were context-bound. Strategic plans existed in both countries, however according to many respondents, these directions were not widely shared, and the management systems and human resource development plans were not linked to these common aims. As a consequence, training interventions were, at times, inappropriate, and we see that reaching an agreement on the management
and planning issues provides an opportunity for meaningful implementation of training methods and evaluations.

Timor-Leste was clearly at an early stage of developing the objectives, resources and support required to build an ‘education and training system’ during this investigation, and this led to particular focus on leadership and management issues. The Minister of Education identified some of the human resource development issues confronting Timor-Leste, in terms of ‘identifying objectives of a new ministry’, ‘identifying problems that impact on achieving these objectives’, ‘identifying resources available and needed’, ‘identifying support needed to achieve objectives’. This problem was described by the ex-Minister of Education as:

> What are the problems that need to be resolved in order to achieve the objectives. How you are going to overcome these problems, Who are there now, What kind of resources are available, What are the people, What kind of timing that you think will be required. Are there any other donors that are willing to support. Once you have identified all of this, then you start to build up your plan.

The ex-Minister of Education RDTL viewed these processes as a prerequisite before planning begins. Indeed, a plan emerged from asking these questions which helped in identifying a possible way forward, and he consequently instigated a ‘public consultation’\(^{59}\) engaging civil society in the design phase of an education and training system. This was a beginning of a dialogue, yet one requiring considerably more input from all stakeholders, as noted in the further research issues identified above.

Invariably, as a result of the Timor-Leste development situation, it was quite understandable that there would be some ‘management and planning’ concerns around delegated responsibility. According to a respondent whose role involved ‘professional development’ of staff within the Timor-Leste Ministry of Education, the planning itself suffered from ministerial interference at the selection and design of training programs:

This ministry we have now a directorate for professional training, but it doesn't work yet, we should have a division or section who really works on the needs, the training needs, not the Minister decide, the Minister doesn't know everyone everything.

The Government of Indonesia’s (GoI) focus throughout the SBY years has been on introducing government reforms in the bureaucracy (the Bureaucratic Reform Agenda). The respondents described this reform as it impacted upon their respective Ministries of Finance, Tax, Trade, Education, Home Affairs and Health. These respondents identified Indonesian planning and management issues as (i) difficulty in complying with GoI reform requirements, (ii) no clear rationale for selecting participants for training, and (iii) training low-level bureaucrats with little power to implement change. Commenting on the structural issues that created these management impasses, the respondents observed that there were some government of Indonesia ministries were responsive to change, whilst many others were not. In the same way, some individuals were reluctant to implement change, and, in addition, ‘change agents’ were too few in this very large organisational structure.

There was a consistent and pervasive argument put by some of the Indonesian respondents, that training and human resource development have to be based upon articulated plans and training needs assessments of the institutional or organizational requirements. Some respondents commented that Indonesian institutes and government organisations did not have clear HRD plans, making it difficult to conduct training. Others argued that training should come from an assessment of the training needs, and linked to a person’s job requirement. The Indonesian respondents’ perspectives were critical of the Indonesian human resource development planning effort, indicating that planning should come before training, not the other way around. One respondent commented that the ‘public’ government HRD planning was not strategic, when compared with Indonesian private company’s approach to HRD planning.
It would be difficult for donors to ‘coordinate’ training offerings without clearly identified government strategic plans, according to this donor program administrator, she indicated that the Government of Indonesia does not have a clearly identifiable strategic plan articulating that, ‘no informational description, no strategic direction’ exists.

**Current state of management and planning**

In the two countries under investigation in this study, the strategic plans were supplemented with ‘additional’ government planning requirements. In the case of Timor-Leste, the Strategic Development Plan (RDTL, 2011a) these were supplemented by a government requirement to ‘de-centralize’ program delivery. In the case of Indonesia, the significant development planning strategy was the Bureaucratic Reform Agenda. This study explored the participants’ understanding of, and engagement with, government-planning processes. Respondents seldom questioned the actual strategic plans, however they did question the various ministries’ engagement with this planning. Respondents felt that these issues required investigation, because of the Ministry’s inability to implement plans, the observation that human resource development was not linked to training assessments, organizational needs were not identified, there was inappropriate selection of participants for training, and capacity building produced individual enhancement rather than institutional strengthening.

Whilst in the Indonesian context, strategic development plans were well entrenched, under the SBY era there was a ‘push’ for bureaucratic reform. There was an acknowledgment that bureaucratic reform would improve the ‘operational and service’ environment within the public service, similar to external business practices. According to this very senior retired Indonesian senior trainer and donor program administrator:

> The government servant is very weak, so under bureaucratic reform we will improve on the re-structuring the organisation, the business process. There is no standard operating procedure in any organisation in any government office...the people who work in their daily activities and their day-to-day activities, where there is no SOP, no measure, no key performance indicators.
This lack of planning led to ‘no measurement’ of public service work, whilst other respondents declared similar difficulties with ‘ministry’ staff and their ‘performance on the job’. Respondents commented that outside the ‘government institutes’ the practical aspects of strategic planning were well understood. Some non-government organizations and training institutions articulated sound business reasons for their strategic planning. In Timor-Leste this training manager explained why it was important to have plans, ‘…for organisations you’ve got to have a plan so that you can tell the advisers, this is where we are going to go, and this is what we’re going to do.’ Planning coordinates the engagement with donors, a situation which is necessary for Timor-Leste institutes.

In Indonesia, private companies and independent government organisations see human resource management as strategic for improving their competitive edge, whereas government organisations viewed human resource management and planning in a less than significant or strategic way. In the words of this Indonesian training manager, the HRD personnel were ‘second or third class’ citizens within the organization:

The person who is dealing with the human resources is the second or third class citizen in the government organization...in the private company it is quite a strategic position.

These notions of ‘class’ were used to portray the apparent lack of importance and relevance with which the human resource personnel were viewed in government organisations. This was in stark contrast to the private companies and the private sector views of these personnel. In contrast to this, another training manager articulated his concern about the ‘dysfunctional organization’ of training, and training needs, within the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs. He pointed out that the human resource personnel department were responsible for determining training needs rather than his training centre, and that was difficult for him to comprehend. These varying and alternate views of the role of human resource personnel illustrated, that amongst the respondents, there was no uniformity with respect to human resource development planning.
Planning and the relationship between training and managing change

The Indonesian and Timorese respondents described the relationship between training and planning as critical to implementing change within their respective organisations. Both respondent groups described the need for clearly articulated strategic plans to systematise corresponding human resource plans, as these plans provide the framework for the training requirements. With this understanding, Institutes and organisations would then be able to identify their training needs based upon agreed institutional and government planning requirements.

The training needs analysis assists organisations to determine both their institutional needs as well as the personal training needs. The organizational training should be based upon the planning needs of the organization, and be closely linked to the individual’s work requirements. The following model describes the relationship between planning and training from the perspective of this study’s respondents (Fig 1).

Figure 1. Planning and Training cycle

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60 As illustrated by some of the study’s respondents there are many subcomponents including; how TNAs are conducted, who is consulted and why, the lack of detail regarding the institutional plans, who is consulted in the planning process, how the training is determined and its relationship to particular work environments etc.
The respondents were critical of some of the actions of ‘management’ in the implementation of this type of approach. The respondents identified issues such as (i) ministries did not know their plans for training, training and work requirements, which implied little inter-connectedness, (ii) only a few ministries were able to identify their organisational and training needs, and (iii) there was limited ability to identify training gaps.

Many respondents identified that having an understanding of the organizational planning and training needs were critical for good management, and in many instances this was not the case. One exception which was identified was in the Ministry of Finance in Indonesia, where, according to one donor program administrator, the ‘whole organisation has already identified their training needs’. Consequently, this clarity made donor engagement, acceptance, and agreements with this ministry less onerous.

Some government organizations did not conduct training needs assessments based upon their strategic and human resource development needs, since training was not considered to be an important activity. As noted by this trainer, ‘some (government) organisations don’t see it (training needs) as an important thing’. There was also a similar statement from a person who worked across a number of Indonesian government ministries to assist them in identifying their training needs, who said ‘It is very rare to find an organisation that conducts training needs analysis to help the organization’. Indeed, if these comments prove to be the case, this would cast some serious doubts around management practice and the planning of training interventions. However, not all respondents concurred with these views, and as one Indonesian trainer suggested, that when their organisation conducted their training needs assessments, this made it easier to engage with donors:

   Every donor that comes to us, they can look at our training needs analysis, and see what our priority for training is this year.

Another respondent explained that good organisations are able to identify their respective training needs, based upon their own institutional goals. Indeed, in a highly inter-dependent global world; ‘that is what the public sector needs’.
The Timor-Leste perspective was similar in respect of articulating their training needs, and as explained by a training manager, there can be little ‘blame’ placed elsewhere for this lack of planning, because ‘within the organization they don’t identify ‘what are the organizational needs’, it’s part of us (our problem), not the fault of the advisors’. It was thought by some respondents that Ministries should determine their own capacity-building requirements and their own training programs. Unfortunately, this was not always the case, as shown by this Timorese training manager, who stated; ‘we need to prioritize, some we do, the rest of the training that the government can't do, we can respond to the (donor) offer.’

With the existence of government strategic and human resource development plans, appropriate institutional responses can be made to select the right people for the right training, or at least this was the view of planning from one Indonesian trainer who claimed that ‘If you have a plan, right sections right people’, then the right people are chosen for training because these people match the planned requirements for the organization’. How well these plans are ‘known’ and how well these plans are ‘followed’ relate to the success of this approach. There were a few concerns expressed about the competencies of individuals selected for training, together with questions about the relationship between the training offered and the individual’s current position. This was described here by this training manager in a hospital training setting, where he stated in a very direct and explicit way that there was, ‘no relationship between current job and training’.

There was a uniform acceptance from respondents that donor engagement works best when government and ministry plans were well established. A ministry that has ‘strong leadership’ and clearly articulated HRD plans, coupled with training needs assessed against these plans, invariably made it easier for donors to support meaningful engagement. Such an experience was noted by this donor program administrator working within the IASTP III program, who declared that, ‘Donor interventions work best when the ministry has identified needs’ and had ‘strong leadership’ which helped the donor
engage with that ministry and ‘speed up’ the whole reform process. In addition he said ‘that is also part of the link [and it appeared] that the training, supported by IASTP, had a very strong impact on the organization.’

**Training interventions: individual or institutional**

Timor-Leste, in the earlier years of its development, faced many challenges in managing the capacity building needs of the ‘institute’ versus the ‘individual’. Training institutes would identify their ‘human resource requirements’ and then identify staff to undertake ‘training’ (both local and international) to build the institute’s capacity. However, these newly ‘trained and skilled’ staff often did not return to their ‘home’ institution, choosing to take up employment with donor-funded agencies. A senior government official described managing in these circumstances as ‘challenging’:

> When you look at capacity building you have to look at the institutional base, you cannot just go to the individual. The individual capacity building has to be based upon the institutional capacity building.

In a country such as Timor-Leste, where there was a ‘lack of’ skilled human resources across many sectors of civil society, this meant that identifying the institutional capacity requirements ultimately led to individual capacity building. This dilemma, raised here by the ex-Minister, was shared amongst other training managers who sent their staff oversees for training, only to have these staff take up positions in ‘donor funded’ programs. One training manager commented that ‘donors are only here for a short while, whereas training institutes are here to stay’. The training manager further argued that Timorese were forgoing long-term employment in her training centre, for short-term economic gain in the form of higher salaries with donors.

The circumstances were similar in Indonesia, as it was agreed that attempts to improve and change organisations should not just focus on human resources (individuals) but should focus on improving institutions. An Indonesian training manager mused that training should be about ‘not only improving human resources but institutions as well’. The conclusions of this
The selection of participants for training was a contentious issue for management and participants alike, and Timorese and Indonesian respondents expressed this in many ways. Often, the issue was ‘Not who is selected for training, but who misses out’. Respondents expressed views that training selection and participation should be based upon: (a) Work requirements and activities, (b) Individual performance on the job, and (c) Enhancing quality of work and implementing new work practice. According to the respondents, the participants’ motivation for training was not based on institutional needs, but was reflective of personal motivations such as; (a) wanting payment or promotion (b) they didn’t like to go to their work, and (c) corruption.

In a couple of instances, respondents identified that where there was no planning with respect to training, and the Ministry concerned tended to be ‘open to suggestions’ coming from donors in regard to training approaches. A senior training manager in the human resources division within the Ministry of Trade declared that, because they don’t have a plan they send ‘anyone’, or perhaps participants that do not meet the donor expectation and criteria for training. It was noted that, ‘only certain staff can do this, but we just offer to anyone’, and this was their way of responding to the pleas of the donors, ‘Please send your staff!’

The author’s university conducted an important capacity building project in Indonesia for 'mentors' of the Diploma of Training and Assessment (2007). During the program implementation, the nomination of the mentors was highly 'contentious'. As the nominated training provider, the university was required to select appropriate 'mentors' based upon an agreed 'criteria' with the contracting manager. The criteria was adhered to, and participants were selected. The outcome (unknown to the training provider) required a representation of ‘two people per province’ rather than the pre-determined
selection criteria, which was an outcome that caused grief for a number of the respondents, and was acknowledged in the Indonesian group interview:

When training selection is based on competencies, he or she deserves it more than the others to attend training or go overseas but because this person comes from this region (NTT), the donors will pay.

The IASTP III training model created situations where lesser-qualified candidates and training participants were selected because they came from the donor’s targeted eastern provinces of Indonesia. In a similar way ‘competency’ was not considered a hindrance for training selection as this training manager identified:

We had the same condition in the IASTP project, like some people come to the training, but actually we don’t expect him to attend this training, because he doesn’t have like competency

The IASTP Phases (II & III) were involved with designing and conducting specialised training for 'selected' ministries of the government of Indonesia. In targeting selected ministries, the processes were open to notions of 'selectivity' and/or 'corruption'. Practices of transparency are at the core of donor interventions on improving ‘governance’, and require transparent responses from recipients and donors alike. The IASTP training model consisted of ‘in-Indonesia’ and ‘in-Australia’ training components. Programs selected for in-Australia training provided a ‘payment’ for training and travel to Australia for two or three months (this was generally considered a sought-after proposition for trainees). The Indonesian approach of ‘paying’ the trainees to attend training, did not always provide for the most appropriate training participant. The Indonesian respondents in the group interview drew ‘laughter’ and mused about the examples of the ‘serial trainees’, variously describing them as ‘training specialists’ who were always attended training.

In Indonesia, the Bureaucratic Reform Agenda was intended to make the government apparatus more democratic, and applying principles of good

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61 See references to Australian aid projects which targeted Nusa Tenggara Timor.
62 The respondents saw these participants as 'regulars' and cast aspersions as to why this was the case. These comments were often disparaging and included comments like; wanting the ‘payment’ for attending training, not liking their boss or institution so they chose to attend training, or simply enjoyed the experience of a 'comfortable hotel' room.
governance, but, as the Chief Ombudsman of Indonesia explains, this was not always the case:

Before the reform, the state executives and legislative tend to possess the practices of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN) of its performance. These conditions then become the main cause of public distrust to the Government apparatus. Therefore, to improve the performance of the Government, it is necessary to have good and clean governance through the principles of good governance and the rule of law (Girindrawardana, p. 1).

Selecting participants for training was not just a ‘potential area for corruption’, because it seems that there were systematic flaws in the planning and management approaches to participant selection. The Indonesian respondents in the Indonesian group interview described the notion of, ‘seat warmers’. These were ‘trainees who were topping up the numbers from the requesting institutes’. One respondent was asked by his boss to fill the numbers in a training program, to justify and legitimize the training. Another respondent described how some trainees attend training when ‘the training has no relation to what he does in the workplace’. There was also this comment, meant as a joke, but which had some resonance within the group: ‘these people go to training because they dislike their institution’. The training providers occasionally noted some ‘questionable inclusions’ in the IASTP II and III programs, and commented on these in the reporting process, with recommendations to improve the selection process.

The IASTP III training, whether in Australia or in Indonesia, paid participants to be part of training, which was a ‘common’ practice across other Indonesian government ministries. One donor program administrator described how a person involved in selecting participants chose his ‘son’ for training. This was an action that was unacceptable and challenged, when one respondent said ‘the mentor, he was like fresh, he sent his son to get the training to Australia’. The selection of participants for training was identified as a challenge, and not an easy process to deal with, according to this senior trainer:

The selection of participants becomes an important part, I'm sure you've heard that Indonesia has come a long way to eradicate KKN (corruption and nepotism) and this has been the case for the last two (SBY) administrations.

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63 See Victoria University Completion Reports for IASTP II and III training, archived at VU International.
It's one, if not the most highest agenda in the government... It's not an easy process, but I think it's one that we had to acknowledge, it is something that needs to be followed up.

According to this respondent, the Government of Indonesia set a high priority on removing ‘corruption and nepotism’ from within the bureaucracy, and that according to this person, the selection of participants for training was open to corruption. His view was to challenge these selection practices, irrespective of how difficult and confronting it was to acknowledge.

One Indonesian respondent commented that the process for selecting participants for training required a more rigorous application of appropriate training needs assessments, rather than the current ‘fragmented choice of participants’. Similarly, a donor program administrator described ‘participant selection’ as an issue of ‘trust’ and this does not always work out appropriately:

We depend upon the coordinating agency and we trust them that they will select a good, and most appropriate participants for the training, but sometimes it's ended up [with] not the right person.

Many Indonesian respondents commented that the participants from IASTP III training gained ‘individually and personally’, by endowing themselves with new skills and knowledge from abroad, whilst adding that the ‘institutes’ gained very little in terms of institutional strengthening. One criticism was that this training was appended to the ministries, and, as such, these ministries did not place too many demands on, or expectations for, this training. Another respondent commented that, if you are not paying for the training, you are not likely to ‘integrate that training into the ministry’s human resource development plans’. This concern was noted by The World Bank in their own evaluations of training (The World Bank, 2008), and this report recognized that linking of ‘counterpart funding’ to ‘foreign training offerings’ could have been more successful. Adopting this model for the IASTP programs would have encouraged ministry ownership of the training, an approach that would improve development practice.
In the Indonesian context, most of the respondents agreed that they could see ‘individual’ improvement and change after training, whilst they could see little change within their ‘institutions’. As this senior trainer revealed, ‘Individually yes it is very strong, but institutionally there is no point’. A donor program administrator of IASTP III indicated that the success of that model was capacity building ‘individuals’:

> It really depends on the individual because that's the whole idea, the initiative will come from that person, this lady transferred her knowledge to her staff and her organization.

Whilst this was deemed to be admirable, the purpose of IASTP was to build capacity of the middle level Indonesian bureaucracy, not individuals *per se*. Capacity building in institutions required a more detailed examination of the local circumstances and existing institutional impediments to change. It was commented that ‘the donors always want to raise the sustainability and capacity this has very much impact individually….but institutionally no (impact)’, and this was a revealing statement from a senior trainer within the Institute of Public Administration (LAN) which trains all Indonesian public servants. He also described many of the impediments to change within his institution such as; bosses are reluctant to change because of loss of power, inappropriate staff sent to training, training was to get a promotion. Another Indonesian trainer reflected that institutions are made up of both people and structures:

> These two things need to be strengthened equally, if you have good human resources, but they're not supported by a good structure it falls down.

In Timor-Leste, similar accounts of ‘preference’ and ‘selectivity’ occurred around sending participants to training. One training program manager identified that the senior ministerial staff should not be the people selecting staff for oversees training. He argued that it should be the planners and administrators of training within the ministry, based upon organizational training needs, noting that ‘…here what is happening is the Minister decides or Vice-Minister decides or the Director-General decides’. This respondent was eluding to ‘poor management decision making’ at the most senior levels
of government, and he did not want to reveal too much about the ‘process’ suggesting that in his view, as this was not appropriate:

We don’t discuss what the ministry do, what they want to do, it is difficult to discuss with others because this is very confidential… sometimes the Minister himself designates some person but that is not appropriate.

As previously noted, the motivation for training was sometimes about being paid, and in the case of Institute for Public Administration (LAN) training, gaining a promotion. As explained by a senior trainer, ‘everyone in the institution wants to attend this [LAN] training because they get paid and after the training they try to get a promotion’. Whilst the promotion doesn’t come automatically, the payment for attendance does, and this raised concerns for those who conducted this training, as the training was not about ‘learning’. A similar series of comments were made about the motivations and reasons Timorese attended training, comments such as; ‘they get paid’, ‘they eat well’, ‘they sleep well at a hotel’. A Timorese training manager observed that:

You know some people are going to attend training they’re not really interested in the skill improvement.

In an Australian training context, when participants are ‘instructed’ to attend training by their superiors, this makes the training extremely difficult for the trainers, motivation to learn can be significantly impaired, and participants tended to engage in a superficial way. The author experienced this when involved in training human services workers in ‘de-institutionalisation’ in the mid to late 1980’s. The Indonesian training in LAN tended to fill training rooms with these recalcitrant ‘learners’ evidenced by these comments from LAN senior trainers:

Some people just get assigned by their superiors, you attend this’ or ‘we are running training and there is a lack of participants, sometimes my boss calls out: Can you come and join this training?

Filling training rooms with inappropriate ‘participants’ and failing to provide training that meets the needs of the targeted client group, would illustrate poor management. Continuing to conduct training to meet annual budgets leads to

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64 Human Service workers of thirty years’ experience were sent to ‘training’ by DHS, and unless they ‘passed’ the training they would lose their jobs.
similar concerns regarding poor management as illustrated by this senior trainer:

My institution [LAN] uses the budget absorption as the key indicator that the training was successful.

This position was endorsed by other respondents in the Indonesian group interview, and they agreed that this was how success was measured in LAN training. Each and every public institute in Indonesia had to reach certain targets of annual training hours, therefore success was measured by attendance:

Finish on time, all the attendance was full, all asleep in training [laughter] they finished on time and all the budget was full all the attendance is recorded'.

**Structural issues impacting upon planning and training**

The respondents expressed a level of concern regarding the ability of the formal structures, of their respective institutes, to undertake any serious reform or change, particularly around the introduction of new training methods and training practice. The concerns included comments such as, ‘having a fear of change’ and ‘causing no waves but following existing processes’, and also feeling unable to change and being ‘fossilized’ in their own institution.

Respondents commented that attempting to introduce change had consequences for those involved. Described by one Indonesian respondent who indicated that, within his ministry, when people returned from training with innovation, either new ideas or new training approaches, these innovations were often considered a ‘personal threat’ to those more senior in his ministry. Attempts were made to suppress any organisational ‘change’ or improvements to training ‘practice’, particularly if these changes impacted on the ‘bosses’ control or power. This was illustrated by this comment:

My boss now when he sees somebody who is innovative his reaction is; He sees this as a personal threat to his position.

This was a reflection that was not isolated within the Indonesian experience. It has indeed been noted in many reviews of ‘management practice’ around the
world. In Australia, the Karpin Report on Australian management practice cited similar behaviour from managers when change was introduced (Karpin, 1995). The Timorese respondents commented similarly on the intransience of their fellow colleagues when they tried to introduce a change in practice. They were met with ‘others’ who felt under attack from the attempts to change, which was reflected by this donor program administrator’s comments:

They [other staff] think that I've been in the field for a while I know everything, you can't just go to training and come and tell me what to do.

Many Indonesian respondents commented on the difficulties associated with organizational and institutional change, and changing the ‘mindset’ of people toward improving practice was mentioned on a number of occasions. Some people felt comfortable with the ‘business as usual’ approach, maintaining the current way of thinking, but one respondent commented that he had negotiated with some existing staff to introduce new training practices, which were subsequently agreed upon, but when the ‘supervisor’ changed, their point of view changed. This senior trainer was annoyed by this lack of action, declaring them ‘fossils’ in their existing state:

This is what has been called ‘fossilised’, and yes it's been the culture of the organisation, mostly everywhere I think, it's very difficult to change.

Institutional complacency, described here as ‘fossilisation’, could be addressed by ‘training’ according to other respondents. Moving people from their current ‘mindset’ into some new ways of thinking. These respondents argued that it was the people who can make changes, because institutes are structures where change is difficult: ‘when you introduce changes to the institutional approach the impact is minimal’. These respondents argued that if you change the attitude of the people in these institutes, then you would see change within the institute, suggesting that ‘when you start introducing a system of training approach to the people, which is new, because only people can make changes, not the institution’. The Certificate IV Training and Assessment was considered a means of achieving this change. As a senior trainer, responsible for training staff in a major hospital explained:
I apply this [IASTP Certificate IV TAA] in my organization; How to change the mindset, How to change the behaviour, How to change the service, this is good for me, and a new one for us.

**Institutional structures are not conducive to change**

The ability to employ new training practices within organisations are challenging, because the institutional structures that exist are not conducive to implementing change. This is because these structures are so pervasive, and this situation led one respondent to claim that ‘institutionally there is no point of attempting change’. Whichever department or government instrumentality was involved, the structures within these organisations provide challenges. An Indonesian trainer expressed the view that, ‘there is a hierarchy, so we have to take that into account’. The structural issues ranging from, people targeted for training are ‘lower level’ participants, and structures are not in place to employ new training practices.

A senior trainer colourfully described the hierarchical structures impacting on attempts to introduce change as, ‘It’s like hitting a hard rock’. Institutional change was difficult because of the attitude, structure and framework of the ministries of the government of Indonesia. The attitude toward institutional change has been addressed in many different ways in this analysis such as; sticking to the system, not willing to change practice, benefitting from perpetuating the existing system. Respondents have indicated that management was ‘poor’ because the existing structures were allowed to perpetuate structures such as, inappropriate selection of trainees to training, no clearly defined plans for training, and no training needs assessments of organizational requirements.

There was an argument offered by a couple of respondents that organizational change could be achieved, when the training participants selected were ‘structural’ trainees. Structural trainees would be those people in positions of ‘power’ within the Indonesian public service, usually holding a rank of Echelon 1 or 2. Unfortunately, these people were seldom available for training. A donor program administrator indicated that current practice means
that only lower-ranked personnel attend training, these being ‘middle to low level staff on training’.

There were exceptions to this practice, and one Indonesian senior trainer indicated that a participant in training, even though he was an Echelon 3 (lower level), was able to introduce some significant reforms in Nusa Tenggara Timur. He noted ‘there are some good examples but they are very few, the introduction of changes should be at the top level’. It was generally argued by respondents that training the ‘people at the top level’ was more beneficial in the long term because they were the ones that could introduce change and reform.

**Training outcomes, options for change**

It was recognized that training was only one ingredient for ‘institutional change’, and other ingredients are required changes in structure and form. Training will have a minimal impact while these identified structures remain, therefore donor contributions need to be assessed against the ability of the ‘organisation’ to determine their organizational requirements.

The international donors can make a significant contribution to human resource development when the institutional structure was responsive to training. One particular Indonesian senior trainer suggested that training would be effective when we, ‘deal with the policies and management of institutions’. Donors should support training interventions that have the backing and support of management. A good example of this came from a senior trainer in the Director General of Taxation, where the training needs assessments of taxation staff were linked to the organisations plans, therefore ‘donors can see the training requirements and get behind these’.

Donors need to offer training programs based upon the recipient country’s needs, and this senior trainer remonstrated that, ‘training was not based on needs of participants’. Unless, and until, this approach changes, little impact can be expected. Some donor training interventions, such as IASTP targeted ‘change agents’ within organizations, and this was highly contested by the
Indonesian respondents. The donors are only able to make contributions to capacity building when the government has defined their training requirements through thorough planning processes. This donor program administrator suggests that it was not the fault of the donors when these plans were not known, ‘the government… they don’t identify ‘what are the organizational needs’.

No change

If it is unlikely that there will be any significant changes in management practices, it is suspected that training interventions will have little impact. Of relevance here is that one respondent suggested that maybe people do not want to change, stating that the climate is, ‘business as usual, [and] maybe they don’t want to necessarily change’.

Expect little change

Another respondent provided a slightly more optimistic view of training interventions, suggesting ‘if you want to change the mindset, if we want to change the people, we change how we train them’. This perspective suggests that training may provide opportunities to start to change this instituted mindset. Donor training interventions that target ‘individuals’ as ‘change agents’ are unlikely to succeed, as this approach was deemed to be overly ambitious. In the words of another senior trainer commenting on this approach, ‘Donor impact was peripheral’. Donor training interventions would be more effective if they targeted the recipient country needs, as long as these ‘needs’ were clearly identified.

Options for change

The Indonesian bureaucracy, as articulated by the respondents, tends to stifle growth and change. Amongst the many criticisms of this system, one Indonesian senior trainer indicated that there could be improvement if the ‘innovators were rewarded’. This person witnessed evidence, whilst studying and working in England, that this may be an answer to the oppressive Indonesian management practices he had observed, ‘we could maintain this
by giving rewards to those who achieve something, this does not exist in our system’.

Strategic plans, and bureaucratic reform agendas require greater ‘socialisation’ across all agencies of government. The training needs assessments conducted within government institutes need to be linked to the human resource and institutional plans. Therefore the designed training interventions can be linked to the training needs assessments of these organisations thus creating the opportunities for donors to ‘get behind’ these strategies. Improving, or increasing, government ownership of training interventions, would occur if training were supported by recipient government budget allocations. There was often no expectation by donors to receive recipient contributions other than those in the form of ‘in kind’ contributions.

The next Chapter, Moving toward a solution, will examine two significant training interventions in Indonesia and Timor-Leste with the view to identifying possible approaches that could be employed to improve monitoring and evaluation, and ultimately apply a more meaningful training intervention practice.
Chapter Seven: Moving toward a solution

This section of the analysis acknowledges, and gives gravitas to, an issue raised by an Indonesian senior trainer during the focus group interview. This person’s awareness and insight into the evaluation practices of donor-funded training programs, including the inevitable responses of donors to these evaluations, highlights the lack of learning in donor practice, and that the donors’ review of their own programs would prove enlightening. Posing this question somewhat flippantly in the focus group interview, this senior trainer asks:

Will there be any monitoring and evaluation of the work of the IASTP? Instead of just building another project and things like that.

This was a question that was greeted enthusiastically by other group participants, as they also wanted to know how were the donors were going to evaluate their own training programs, and ‘what’ would the donors reveal about their own program implementation. These evaluations would measure the donors’ commitment to quality improvement and transparency. Some of these respondents expressed the view that the evaluators would ‘smooth over’ some of the more contentious issues, and provide a report to the donors that would indicate, in the words of this senior trainer, ‘the monitoring and evaluation is completed, not whether the project actually works’. These were extraordinarily astute observations, and warrant the level of examination and rigor they so wisely requested.

Implementation of training methods and evaluations

The focus of this analysis was on the implementation of training methods and evaluation frameworks applied in; (i) the Indonesia-Australia Specialised Training Project Phase III (IASTP III), and (ii) the Timor-Leste’s Skills Training Partnership (STP). These two programs were chosen because of the author’s long-term engagement with both programs, as well as the fact that most of the respondents to this study were managers, administrators or trainers in both of these programs. In the case of Timor-Leste, the STP program was considered
a ‘pilot’ for donor engagement in training. In Indonesia, the IASTP program was a full ‘three-phase’ specialized training program conducted over a 12-year period, and this analysis covers the last five-year phase (Phase III).

A compelling reason for examining the ‘monitoring and evaluation’ (M&E) approach was to determine the effectiveness of donor engagement in training. Given the sheer size of the overall outlay, this was a particularly salient and relevant issue. In education in Indonesia since 1969, a total of $1.5 billion of World Bank funding has been spent in 25 projects\textsuperscript{66}. The World Bank itself has questioned the rigor of the monitoring and evaluation approaches used to evaluate the success of these initiatives, and The World Bank has concluded that the M&E in these projects have not been pursued with enough determination\textsuperscript{66}. Similarly, a quarter of Australia's aid budget ($1158 million in 2013-14) was spent on education and training interventions, and DFAT-AusAID stated that little information was known about how these ‘investments’ work, and how effective these programs were (Office of Development Effectiveness, 2015, p. 8).

Independent Completion Reports (ICRs) and Independent Progress Reports (IPRs) are the 'standard' monitoring and evaluation tools used in the development context, to measure the effectiveness of program implementation. These reports are intended to link the program objectives with the program outcomes and provide detail regarding the success or failure of program implementation. The following analysis will draw heavily on the ‘reports’ conducted on the Indonesian IASTP III program, and the Timor-Leste STP program.

\textsuperscript{66} See Independent Evaluation Group World Bank assessments.
Impact of setting parameters

Donors set the parameters of the evaluation, focusing on issues such as: (a) What will be evaluated?, (b) How will the program be evaluated?, and (c) What timeframe will be applied? This approach measures projects through the ‘development lens’, and was seen by some respondents as carried out to ‘finalize and complete budget allocation (absorption)’, and according to one senior trainer ‘allowing the team to move onto the next activity’. Monitoring and evaluation, with a narrow focus on the project outcomes, misses opportunities to examine systemic issues that impact on communities, focusing on project success rather than impact and change in communities (Carden, 2013, p. 577). One senior trainer with many years’ experience and engagement with a variety of donor-funded programs, viewed evaluation as a ‘formality’, that is, the evaluation was completed with little assessment of whether the project was successful.

Narrowly-focused evaluation practices provided many opportunities for recipients and respondents to criticise the development activity. Development projects, particularly in education, are invariably given a lifespan of around 5-7 years (Patch & Shah, 2011). However, when ‘capacity building’ and ‘governance’ objectives are added to these types of programs, a more reasonable amount of time is required to achieve these types of objectives. It was apparent that short-term timelines may not produce achievable results, and donor programs are invariably of this duration.

The Australian Government, through the Education Resource Facility, undertook an independent examination of 34 education sector (ICRs and IPRs) evaluations over a five-year period between 2006 and 2010. This meta-review of the ‘lessons learnt’ from all education sector evaluation activity in DFAT, was viewed as an ‘evaluation of the evaluators’. The recommendations included a thorough examination of the evaluation process, as there was no uniform and clear process for ‘monitoring and evaluating’ completion reports. The meta-review concluded that not much could be 'compared', because the reports themselves lacked any objective criteria upon which to make
assessments and comparisons (Patch & Shah, 2011, p. 21). A conclusion that would suggest a more appropriate means was needed to ‘monitor the evaluations’.

The IASTP Phase III, which is under examination in this study, was operating during the conduct of this ‘meta-review’, and should have been included in that review, particularly in view of the size and nature of the IASTP programs. The omission of the IASTP III from AusAID’s meta-review of education evaluations, does raise questions as to how this project was perceived by DFAT-AusAID (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008). The lack of an ‘external’ evaluation of IASTP III was not the only concern, as the ‘internal’ evaluation, (IASTP III Independent Completion Report) highlighted the lack of coordination between the phases (IASTP II and IASTP III). Significant information, and knowledge gained about the monitoring and evaluation systems, were not shared between phases (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008, p. 14). A $61 million training project over five years (IASTP II) should have ‘shared’ a monitoring and evaluation strategy into the next $51 million training project (IASTP III). One Indonesian donor program administrator described these concerns as:

‘the Australian Managing company between IASTPII and IASTP III were not communicating, so the learning curve for the IASTP III project took three of the five years of the project, this is the responsibility of the aid donors’.

DFAT-AusAID recognizes that there should be a ‘uniform and clear process’ for monitoring and evaluating reports. According to this senior trainer, IASTP illustrated the lack of uniformity in evaluation procedures. He identified the importance of sharing monitoring and evaluation frameworks across IASTP phases, and he witnessed and acknowledged the ‘learning curve’ required during the conduct of his program, particularly the loss of ‘time’ and ‘resources’ associated with poor ‘hand-over’ and ‘communication’. As a result of all this, he rightly posits blame for this poor management solely with the aid donors.
The language of ‘independent’

The use of the term 'independent' connotes that these independent reviewers are not ‘connected’ to a particular project, or to each other, and therefore the reviewers and reviews are ‘objective’. Hall (1996) argues that:

The very language we use to describe the so called facts interferes in the process of finally deciding what is true and what is false (Hall, 1996, p. 203).

The word 'independent' in this context is an articulation, or re-articulation of an idea imbedded in a culturally dominant discourse, making ‘representation’ a political act (Shahjahan et al., 2015, p. 701). This discourse involves the personnel engaged to undertake these reviews, and implies that they have to satisfy ‘specific’ guidelines for undertaking these evaluations, often contained within the terms of reference (de Moura Castro & Alfthan, 1992). These attributes include some, and exclude others, creating a dominant discourse in their wake, such as: (a) Experience in producing M&E reports, (b) Knowledge of the evaluation methodology through direct experience, and (c) Independent of any particular donor under review. These attributes and criteria position certain individuals in relation to the work. Indeed, within this framework ‘critical reflection upon practice’ was difficult as these evaluators are invariably reliant upon the donor sector for future monitoring and evaluation activity. In this context, the language of ‘independent’ was not a word devoid of meaning, but one organized, arranged, classified and linked to representational practices that fix the meaning. Creating a self-fulfilling cycle that produces the same evaluation outcomes, and these processes were criticized by the AusAID meta-review of education sector evaluations (Patch & Shah, 2011).

The intention behind this study was to shed some ‘light’ on the ‘critical practice’ in monitoring and evaluation processes, with the view to proposing a meaningful practice intervention approach. In today’s ‘interconnected world’, these approaches may prove to be not just cost effective, but also rigorous in their application of monitoring and evaluation tools. We proceed with the evaluation of the AusAID-IASTP III program to discover what changes could be applied, and then move into a detailed examination of The World Bank’s Skills Training Partnership experiment in Timor-Leste.
The Indonesia Australia Specialised Training Projects re-evaluated

The Indonesia Australia Specialised Training Projects (IASTP) programs in Indonesia had three iterations. IASTP Phase I began September 1995 with a budget of $15 million, followed by IASTP Phase II which began in August 1998 with a budget of $41 million, and ending with an actual budget of $61 million\(^{67}\), then the final IASTP Phase III which commenced in April 2004 and ended in December 2008, with an estimated budget of AUD$51 million\(^{68}\). IASTP Phase II and III were designed to achieve support for bureaucratic reform, with some heightened levels of expectation, as illustrated by these comments from Wendy Bell, the IASTP II Australian Team Leader:

> The impact of IASTP II should be thought of not as the ripples caused when a stone is thrown into a pond but of those created by rain on the pond, conjuring the image of hundreds of splashes spreading in all directions as a result of each training course and the ensuing action plan activities which occurred throughout Indonesia six months after each course was completed, and which reached many beneficiaries beyond the trainees selected for training (Massaro, 2004, p. VII).

During the implementation of IASTP III, there was a considerable ‘devolution of control’ from central government agencies to provincial government agencies in Indonesia, as noted in Independent Completion Report. (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008, p. 3) The changing nature of the context, will account for many variations of the intent of IASTP III, as the contracted managing agent and DFAT (AusAID) sought to make relevant, a program that was conceived in a different era. Notwithstanding these changing circumstances, a $51 million Australian aid investment in education and training required a ‘reasonable level’ of scrutiny and examination, which the IASTP III Independent Competition Report was commissioned to provide.

This analysis explored the reasons why this ‘reasonable level’ of scrutiny was not applied, and explores what improvements can be made to ensure that this omission does not occur in the future. The Independent Competition Report for IASTP III produced and identified a number of ‘key success factors’, and

\(^{67}\) see Executive Summary Project Completion Report IASTP II

\(^{68}\) see Executive Summary Independent Completion Report IASTP III.
recommended that these ‘factors’ be part of future DFAT training programs. The 2016 Australian Award-Indonesia programs\(^{69}\) appear to have duplicated some of the practices of IASTP programs, as was predicted in the IASTP III monitoring and evaluation review (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008).

The study will take the view that examining and reviewing the rationale behind these ‘key success factors’ would be prudent, as applying these factors would have a significant impact on future Australian Government education and training aid activities. These ‘key success factors’ included: (a) applying the concepts of Adult Learning Principles (ALP); (b) defining scope of examination; (c) determining the relevance of mentors and action plans and finally; and (d) examining the impact on ultimate beneficiaries using the ‘most significant change’ evaluation method.

The Indonesian respondents were keen to explore the issue of ‘sustainability’ and how this could be achieved. The respondents commented that IASTP III was not part of the Government of Indonesia’s HRD plans, as it sat alongside the ‘organisational structure’ and therefore was quite peripheral to the implementing agencies’ human resource learning and development needs. One senior trainer mused that, ‘when the project finishes the capacity development also finishes’, and another training manager who stated training should be ‘from one step to the next step, and not be cut off from the learning between each project’. The AusAID meta-review of education evaluations supported these perspectives of IASTP programs (Patch & Shah, 2011, p. 17). The following analysis of the ‘key success factors’ begins with the impact of adult learning principles (ALP).

\(^{69}\) see Australian Awards 2016 program guidelines
Impact of the adult learning principles

The IASTP III independent completion report emphasized the relevance, and importance, of implementing these ‘adult learning principles’. In this respect, the report cites adult learning principles as developed by Malcolm Knowles, an American practitioner and early theorist of adult education (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008, p. iv). Describing Knowles’ version of andragogy as the ‘art and science of helping adults learn’, these propositions were never ‘questioned’ or ‘reviewed’ in the Independent Completion Report for IASTP III. They were stated, and given as ‘truths’, with the outcome that this significant aid program cast its foundations on them, as noted in the Independent Completion Report:

- Knowles identified the following six principles of adult learning:
  - Adults are internally motivated and self-directed;
  - Adults bring life experiences and knowledge to learning experiences;
  - Adults are goal orientated;
  - Adults are relevancy orientated;
  - Adults are practical;
  - Adult Learners like to be respected (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008, p. iv)

At ‘face value’, these principles seem perfectly reasonable and appropriate for such a training project, however they do depend upon a cultural perspective of adult learning. The first level of critique of this approach was that these statements were de-contextualised, relying heavily upon the psychology of the individual learner (Foley, 2004, p. 17). Within a ‘western’ cultural framework, adults are individualist and goal orientated, however this might not be as prevalent in an Indonesian cultural context where ‘process’ and 'social interaction', particularly social norms and mores of inclusion, as well as deference to ‘older male authority’, were highly valued. The respondents detailed a number of circumstances where there existed deference to ‘social status’, in an earlier section of this study.

The Indonesian training context promotes a culture of ‘inclusion’, where trainees are given a ‘lanyard’ upon entering training signifying that the person was ‘in training’, and this was only removed on completion of training. The
wearing of the lanyard created an environment where trainees were 'free to explore' ideas within the training room, irrespective of their 'job title' and 'external status'. This is a notion that highlights the distinction between 'individualist and goal oriented' versus 'respectfulness and inclusion', which impacts upon the learning process and challenges western concepts of adult learning.

**Defining the scope of examination and its impact**

Measuring outcomes of development work focuses attention on the stated goals, and this comes across as sound management and justifies the activity in the 'public's eye' in the sense of 'seeing value' in an activity. Whilst we focus on the measurable outcomes, we are highly likely to miss other development opportunities, illustrating the importance of examining 'what is missing' in program implementation. Easterly muses that, 'If you measure carefully what you care about, you are also careless about measuring what you don't care about' (Easterly, 2014, p. 177).

Measuring and evaluating carefully has a particular resonance in development evaluations, as the terms of reference are designed to 'suit the prevailing conditions' whether because of political, social or environmental circumstances. The Independent Completion Report (ICR) evaluation for IASTP III 'terms of reference', narrowed the focus of the 'lens' of observation and investigation, to the 'potential impact for future AusAID projects' (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008, p. 28). The ICR evaluation no longer looked at the implementation of the 'outcomes' of the program, but looked at the 'approach used' and what could be 'applied' in future projects. Whilst this evaluation approach may meet the expectation of looking at the ‘strategic’ issues for program planning and design, the approach fails to provide any detailed examination of the ‘value for money’ as described in the original program design objectives (Patch & Shah, 2011, p. 16), or for that matter, answer the senior government official’s question, ‘To what extent was the training actually effective?’
The ICR for the IASTP III could have validated training program outcomes through a more detailed examination of a range of sources including the training providers’ own program evaluations, along with the rapid Training Needs Analysis (TNA) that took place in 2007 (Scott, 2007). A rapid TNA was conducted to determine ‘what’ the implementing agencies required from IASTP III, in the form of their training needs. The issues identified in this rapid TNA included: (a) What training was desired?, (b) What training was requested?, and (c) What training would be effective?

Recipient institutions highlighted their concerns around IASTP III program implementation, and requested reviews of that training. The rapid TNA report was not included in the IASTP III completion report, and by its omission, the reviewers 'saw only what they wanted to see'. Indeed a ‘common’ issue when addressing monitoring and evaluation approaches, as the AusAID study of Independent Completion Reports Review noted, was that monitoring and evaluation approaches generally scored ‘badly’, with over 60% being rated as less than satisfactory, and a further 20% rated ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’ (Bazeley, 2011, p. 31). These figures highlight the questionable, and contestable, nature of development education evaluations.

With so much time, energy and resources allocated to ‘capacity building’ using training interventions, which produce ‘individual participant learning’ with little ‘sustainability’ in the workplace, signals a need to examine the fundamental principles of these types of programs. Workplace learning was introduced in IASTP II and III as a result of the inability of IASTP I to ‘impact’ on the workplace (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008). In response to this program reform, mentors were assigned the role of introducing workplace learning through the application of ‘action plans’. How successful these strategies were is worthy of further examination.
Role of Mentors and Action Plans

The roles of 'mentor' and 'action plans' were used extensively in both IASTP Phases II and III, and their purpose was to contribute to the development of the workplace within the participating line ministries (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008, p. 2). An Indonesian donor program administrator and manager of large multi-lateral and bi-lateral aid projects, described the role of action plans in this manner:

Almost all of the IASTP training is linked to the participants’ role and function... The action plan should be linked to their position in their office, and then after that we evaluate the action plan, we monitor the action plan and also measure the achievement of the action plan.

Mentors were highly regarded by the training participants, as their respective 'action plans' depended upon mentor approval. These mentors were selected on the basis of their ability to support change within the recipient ministry, and they required an understanding of the organizational learning and training needs, in order to become effective change agents. However, as this donor program administrator explained:

We can have a number of people as change agents, but if there is no informational description about what the organisation wants to achieve for the future, it would be very difficult for them.

According to this respondent, in many ministries targeted for IASTP III training there was a lack of an ‘information description’ (strategic plan) to implement change:

The organisation needs to have at least some capacity within the organisation to transfer the information internally... then capacity building its not talking about investing in just people but also thinking about the whole business process.

This comment from an IASTP donor program administrator is worthy of attention because these comments identify the key ingredients of an ‘organisational environment’ and a ‘strategic plan’. As stated earlier, the success of the IASTP model targeted individuals in recipient ministries as ‘change agents’, a concept worthy of scrutiny because this was about
investing in ‘individuals’ rather than acting ‘strategically’ and considering the whole ‘institutional’ business process.

Mentors were given ‘increased attention’ and ‘professional development’ as a way of strengthening IASTP’s contribution to organisational change in Indonesian bureaucracies (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008, p. 3). This was a rather simplistic view of institutional ‘strengthening’, as the mentors’ ability to be ‘change agents’, within their respective organisations, was hampered by their ‘Title’; that is whether they were ‘functional or structural trainers’. This was a view expressed by the independent completion report (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008), and as noted by this senior trainer:

Changes could be initiated and promoted from people who have power and looking at the bureaucracy system.

According to this respondent, structural trainers have more impact in the bureaucracy than do functional trainers, and mentors were drawn from this ‘functional’ category. Other respondents commented that the ‘mentors’ felt isolated from the formal structures, and as a result ‘training and action plan implementation’ fell outside the formal human resource planning of the government of Indonesia.

Mentors of the IASTP training required the support of their ‘supervisors’ to implement the action plans, and this support was not always apparent. As a result IASTP alumni were seldom able to implement their newly acquired skills in their respective workplaces, and the IASTP III ICR noted that this was certainly a reason for the failure of workplace implementation (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008, p. 6). The IASTP III ICR placed a great deal of emphasis on the success of the development, then implementation, of the ‘action plans’ and ‘mentors’, noting that:

The concept of action plans and mentors, which form core features of the IASTP III Training Model, have been well understood, readily accepted, found useful and adopted quite widely in training in Indonesia. Other donor funded training should be consistent with, and build on these well established, good training practices (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008, p. X).

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70 Structural positions in the GoI ministries were senior bureaucratic staff, whilst functional position were trainers.
The language of 'well understood', 'readily accepted', and 'widely used', all require further analysis. What aspects of these 'core features' were widely known? Mentors did receive 'payments' for their contributions, and this was in the form of 'ex-gratia' collections from training participants. Mentors did travel to Australia on short trips, to conduct assessments of 'In-Australia IASTP' training. These mentors were paid a ‘special’ per diem and given ‘special’ accommodation and that was apart from money ‘collected’ by the training participants.\(^{71}\)

Although the selection of mentors was determined against ‘clearly defined criterion’ of objectivity (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008, p. 76), the selection at times was ‘political’, and not based on ‘competence’. The author noted, in discussions with the IASTP Phase II Team Leader, that certain mentors were chosen for their 'structural status' within the recipient government line ministry, rather than for their acumen\(^{72}\). In one case, a certain 'older' and retired Brigadier General was selected because of his 'potential' influence rather than his 'actual' influence. The deference by the IASTP Drug Information training participants toward this particular mentor, was palpable. It was common for Indonesian military staff to receive payments for assisting training, and a monetary 'collection' from these training participants took place during this particular program. One participant from the Office of The Vice President-Government of Indonesia objected to this collection process, naming it as a 'corrupt practice' from the past, and this caused quite a kerfuffle within the ranks of this group during their visit to Australia\(^{73}\).

In practice, 'readily accepted' behavior was not always uniformly known, as this Indonesian training manager from the training centre of a large public hospital noted:

> An action plan is really good for following up on training, but we never do this. It is very very difficult, we have to be strict not flexible, but Indonesian culture is not like that.

\(^{71}\) The author, in his role as Manager Aid and Development, organized these 'trips'.

\(^{72}\) A private conversation with Dr Wendy Bell Team Leader IASTP II, about the role of mentor Brigadier General Pak Joko from the National Narcotics Bureau (BNN).

\(^{73}\) The author witnessed this process, and had to manage the circumstances.
She was describing the Indonesian ‘behavior’ toward ‘flexible’ timelines and approaches. Indonesian culture is not like this; her plea was for stricter guidelines otherwise Indonesians would not comply. In Indonesia, there is a colloquial expression termed ‘jam karet’ (rubber time), and this applied in many circumstances where ‘structure’ was imposed. A senior trainer described the understanding of the structure and commitment as:

> When the donors are there, we are committed, when the donors are not there we are not committed.

The desire to have ‘structure’ rather than ‘flexibility’, according to these respondents, ensured that commitment and learning would take place on training. The action plans were an important, and critical, part of the IASTP training model as they were designed to ensure that the training had an impact within respective recipient ministries. The success in achieving this was contested by a number of respondents. The IASTP trainees were tasked to implement their newly acquired knowledge and skills in their respective workplaces. In order to implement these action plans, the trainees’ supervisors would need to approve, agree, and support them. However, with only 33% of the IASTP trainees briefing their respective supervisors, the ‘effectiveness and success’ of the action plans were limited, as this donor administrator explained:

> Unfortunately in our system of determining the impact is not too accurate, because it’s only done in a very short time, you cannot get the whole picture, about the impact of the training.

Implementing change does take time in any organization, and change also requires that the management and supervisors are 'on board' (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008, p. 11). The poor results associated with action plan implementation, corresponded with the critical comments from the Indonesian respondents, and reflected The World Bank’s review of their own training (The World Bank, 2008, p. 25).

The action plan was a 'learning by doing' approach with success rates and implementation not meeting expectations. The 'doing' part of this approach
was not witnessed, not recorded and not implemented. Training providers were not involved in the ‘follow up’ of these action plans, even though training providers understood the ‘action plans’ were central to the designed training. The program design meant that the training providers were not responsible for the implementation of these plans. This flaw in program design was commented upon by the IASTP II donor program administer in this manner:

So these people had to adopt the system in their workplace, back to the classical training, not all were providing support after the training. The program was like just kicking a ball, and then leaving it, there is no goal actually... (laughter).

In an Australian training context, the responsibility for 'follow up' with the implementation of training outcomes would rest with the training providers, not the ‘participants’ and not the ‘mentors’. This lack of follow-up was aptly described here as ‘Kicking a ball and then leaving it, there is no goal actually’.

Action plans were considered a measure of the success of IASTP III training, as well as a critical component of the monitoring and evaluation framework. The success of the program, measured against action plan implementation revealed that that there were: (a) low levels of implementation, (b) little follow up with training providers or assigned mentors, (c) poor supervision or agreements with supervisors, and (d) a lack of organisational and structural engagement with implementers. These issues were identified by respondents, and were contained in training provider reports to IASTP III managing agents, through the formal reviews of training under the titles of ‘Lessons learnt and Recommendations’ in the training provider final completion reports. In addition to this, they were confirmed by the AusAID’s meta review of education in Indonesia, indicating the lack of impact in the workplace (Patch & Shah, 2011).

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74 The author's university (as an IASTP provider of eleven projects) noted these concerns in the completion reports.
Most Significant Change evaluation methodology examined

The IASTP III delivered programs to over 2,000 Indonesian participating agencies, who collectively received 153,236 participant training days in 80 courses (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008, p. 4). With these numbers of agencies and individuals involved, it would be reasonable to expect some impact upon the ‘ultimate beneficiaries’. However, the IASTP III ICR reports only a few (five) exceptional individual examples that have impacted on ultimate beneficiaries (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008, p. 9). This poor return rate certainly was not meeting the expectations previously described by Bell in the Final Activity Completion Report IASTP Phase II (Massaro, 2004) as, ‘splashes spreading in all directions as a result of each training course’.

The effectiveness of the IASTP III program was measured in participant training days. These represent readily available quantitative measures for monitoring and evaluation reporting, but the qualitative measures of the ‘impact on ultimate beneficiaries’ are more difficult to measure. While the IASTP ICR did report on the impact on ultimate beneficiaries, the numbers of responses (five), for evaluation purposes, were extraordinarily low. Measuring participant training days overlooks, and denies opportunities, to measure what we should care about, including qualitative data such as: (a) What was the impact on individuals, institutions and the ultimate beneficiaries?, (b) What change in attitude was achieved?, (c) What improvements to work practice have resulted from training?, (d) What form of training was localised for country, style and approach?, and finally (e) What baseline were we measuring from?

Upon further examination of these ‘qualitative’ measures coming from the five participant responses, the Independent Completion Report measured the success of the IASTP III program in terms of the ‘impact’ it had on these selected individuals. However, it would seem clear that the responses of only five IASTP alumni, amongst 153,236 participant training days, would suggest a lack of intellectual and evaluation rigor in the evaluation. One of the five examples used in the ICR report to describe the successful impact on ultimate
beneficiaries, was the implementation of women’s empowerment training. In this instance, a particular training participant was able to implement this gender awareness training, primarily because ‘her brother’ was the Head of the Sub-District (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008, p. 10). The fact that this example was included in the evaluation report, suggested that the ‘validity’ of representation was circumspect. We were here looking at a $51 million dollar aid project carried out over 5 years, and the measurement of the success of its impact based upon anecdotal evidence, would seem a deficient justification for sensible evaluation purposes.

The Most Significant Change (MSC) evaluation methodology was applied to the review of IASTP III, in order to determine the impact that this training had on beneficiaries, and to support the quantitative data, as this donor program administrator explained:

> Currently we try to back up with qualitative data, we are using the most significant change story.

The MSC evaluation methodology examines the ‘qualitative aspects’ of training implementation, by providing ‘examples’ of the participant’s stories. This evaluation methodology was intended to ‘collect’ stories during the training project, and these stories were to be assigned ‘domains’ of change, and panels of training participants would then be assigned the task of ‘selecting’ the most significant stories. The goal was to develop a representative sample of project activities (Kraft & Prytherch, 2016, p. 29). That said, the way the MSC evaluation methodology is actually applied became critical to its success as an evaluation approach. Indeed the process of collecting, collating and interpreting the stories was as important to the veracity of the exercise as the content of the stories themselves.

The notion of presenting the ‘story’ that best describes the ‘experience’ of the participants, ought to come from the participants themselves, and not as ‘selected’ externally by ‘independent’ evaluators. The number of ‘stories’ told, and the ‘quality’ of these experiences, were supposed to be representative of the group being investigated, and able to provide ‘depth’ and insight into
development program evaluations (Wilson, 2014, p. 122). Nonetheless, any extrapolation and interpretation from these stories toward project effectiveness, should be cautioned (Willetts & Crawford, 2007). This evaluation methodology was a relatively new evaluation tool, and was designed to give a ‘voice’ to the people impacted in aid programs (Dart & Davies, 2003). The assumption of unbiased selection of the stories sits at the core of this approach, and it is anticipated that these stories will open up dialogue about conflicting viewpoints, and the work is therefore founded in democratic evaluative traditions (R Shah, 2014, p. 274). In this particular instance, it was thought that further analysis was required to determine the ‘qualitative’ nature of these stories, and also to assess the truly ‘representative’ nature their impact.

The success of the MSC evaluation methodology lies in the engagement of training participants in the process of ‘telling stories’ to each other. There was no evidence provided in the IASTPIII ICR that this was indeed the case, and also no indication that IASTP training providers applied this methodology across their programs. At best, the ICR refers to ‘stories’ collected from alumni after training, therefore no engagement with other participants occurred allowing evaluators to ‘verify’ and ‘select’ the most significant stories.

Of the five cited examples in the ICR related to the impact of the project on the ultimate beneficiaries, the author noted that in one of the MSC stories, there was one reference to the Government of Indonesia-Ministry-DG Tax, which had ‘mainstreamed’ IASTP training throughout their offices. A donor program administrator described this process as:

> We are fortunate that this Ministry has very strong leadership. IASTP comes to the Minister of Finance when the whole organisation has already identified their needs.

This was one ministry amongst many and one story amongst thousands of participants, which makes it very difficult to justify the conclusion that this was a ‘successful and sustainable application’ of a training evaluation

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75 Each IASTP training provider supplied a final report on training and there was no evidence reported that this process occurred.
methodology. Nevertheless, the recommendation from the ICR report was that this training approach should be replicated across other DFAT programs in Recommendation 2 (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008, p. 22). IASTP III ICR was not the only education project in Indonesia that cites ‘weak evidence’ to support evaluation claims. In this respect, the meta-review of education evaluation noted that, amongst some cases, the evidence base was weak, indicating that one piece of evidence was cited with a further criticism that the ratings given were not linked to the narrative assessment (Patch & Shah, 2011, p. 20).

Against the background of all the evaluation irregularities detailed above, which include: numbers of individuals cited in the final evaluation; the inappropriate application of the ‘most significant change’ evaluation approach; the lack of reference to the rapid training needs analysis; and the minimal impact on ultimate beneficiaries, the IASTP reviewers rated this program and monitoring and evaluation framework as ‘satisfactory’ (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008, p. 15), this supports Easterly’s view that ‘planners never hear whether the planned got what it needed’. Similarly, the monitoring and evaluation assessment of the Timor-Leste ESSP program received a ‘moderately satisfactory’ rating (The World Bank, 2014) from The World Bank. Notwithstanding these outcomes, when this program is examined in some detail (similar to the IASTP III), the ‘assessment’ of ‘success’ was equally contestable.

**The Timor-Leste Skills Training Partnership experiment reviewed**

The World Bank in 2010, trialed a program designed to assist local Timorese institutions ‘meet then deliver’ The World Bank requirements for training in the tourism and hospitality sector in Timor-Leste (see Appendix Six). This World Bank program was created as a framework that would allow The World Bank to assess whether attempts at ‘localizing training’ could work in other development settings, and whether they could be duplicated for other World
Bank programs\textsuperscript{76}. The project was called the Timor-Leste Skill Training Partnership program (STP).

The Skills Training Partnership (STP) was located within the Timor-Leste Ministry of Education, under the Education Sector Support Program (ESSP). The designed outcomes of this program involved assisting local training institutes tender for training projects, by establishing a procurement process that assisted Timor-Leste training institutions tendering for a designated $1.2 million training program. Prior to this program, the existing donor practice was that 'international training organisations' would partner with the 'local training organisations' and invariably the international organisation would be the 'contract manager' and lead agent. This ‘trial’ was to select a local training organisation that could 'lead' the tender, implement the program, and have the 'international organisations' follow their designed program. The ‘principle’ and the ‘intention’ were desirable, as this would have given opportunities for local institutes to 'bid' and 'manage' other World Bank activities, a welcome change from the past donor practices. This approach that was applauded by this particular training manager:

Donors need to see which institutions are seriously running a training centre, and see which training centres are sustainable enough and then donors should jump in and reinforce them and then we'll see quality and sustainability.

The World Bank, as a major multi-lateral institution in Timor-Leste, had coordinated donor investment in excess of $20.3 million dollars over a 6-year period under the Education Sector Support Program (The World Bank, 2014). A trial 'pilot' underwritten by $1.2 million funding was seen as a 'project' where money was 'thrown at the idea to see if it works'\textsuperscript{77}. Although conceived of as a pilot, the designed approach was not reported on (The World Bank, 2014, p. 44), which did raise some conjecture from this training manager around the seriousness of their designed intentions of 'jumping in and reinforcing training institutions'.

\textsuperscript{76}The author was commissioned to develop this framework  
\textsuperscript{77}Comments made to the author in conversation with the Task Team Leader World Bank in TL.
The practical aspects of implementing a ‘local engagement’ approach are cumbersome, and in these circumstances ‘local institutes’ are vulnerable to the donor expectations of meeting ‘international standards’. In the Timor-Leste context, this meant that the local institutes were exposed to program implementation without the designed monitoring and evaluation framework in terms of: (a) conduct of the program, (b) response to the implementation issues, (c) ability to manage the process and explain the ‘fairness’ of the process, (d) ability to change the approach as necessary, including costs or inputs, and (e) dealing with the circumstances as they arose, including paying attention to ‘transparency’ and ‘openness’ in practice.

The lack of ownership by The World Bank and the corresponding ‘laissez-faire’ approach, coupled with the direction coming from the Ministry of Education Timor-Leste management, inevitably led to an ‘implementation impasse’ between the Ministry of Education and The World Bank around this program’s direction (The World Bank, 2014, p. 44). Imposing ‘concept ideas’ such as enforcing ‘international’ relationship engagement on the project, could be seen as created ‘relationships’ where none may have existed. Local institutes had to find ‘partners’ to conduct the program, and these partnerships were tenuous, to the point where the local ‘contracting manager’ had to find another ‘international partner’ at the eleventh hour of contract negotiations. Shah argues that in fragile states, such as Timor-Leste, the most important objective was to ‘do no harm’, and in the area of teacher development, the notion that being ‘willing partners’ led to situations where there was little scope to challenge, discuss or question the best possible support required (R Shah, 2011).

In addition to the partnering problems, the ‘unquestioned’ competence believed to come from these international partners was exposed. It was not always the case that international partners were able to conduct the same ‘quality assurance’ processes in international projects, particularly in places such as Timor-Leste, where the resources for these processes are not

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78 The author assisted this local training provider reach agreement with an international provider, very late in contract discussions.
available. The Australian Qualifications Training Framework (AQTF) provides guidelines for delivering training in an Australian training context. Overseas delivery by the same Australian training providers, occasionally do not meet these standards, which brings into question the quality assurance aspects of these ‘qualifications’ delivered abroad. This was highlighted in the delivery of Certificate IV in Assessment and Workplace Training, where the standards required in an Australian context were not being met overseas (Malloch, 2005).

In fragile states, such as Timor-Leste where donors are contributing to ‘capacity building’, the designed intervention was not only significant, but needs to be exemplary, in the sense of leaving a ‘footprint’ of best practice on the ground, so that others can follow. We suggest that the Skills Training Partnership (STP) pilot could have been that ‘footprint’ in the technical and vocational training sector in Timor-Leste79, but as a ‘pilot and experiment’, the STP began without a monitoring and evaluation framework, although one was introduced after the program began80. At the program design phase, The World Banks’ own mid-term evaluation report (MTR) did not have a means to assess the success or otherwise of the Skills Training Partnership (Berryman & Coxon, 2010, p. 50). A Timorese government official noted his concerns regarding conducting programs without clear guidelines, and suggested this responsibility falls more heavily upon large international donors to provide that guidance, and to a lesser extent the recipients:

The lack of understanding of the circumstances that need to be put in place before you start the capacity building…the responsibility lies with the donor that provides the funding and the consequent human resources.

The World Bank’s Mid-Term Review determined that the success and effectiveness of the STP program could only be measured after a number of STP participants had engaged in ‘training’ in polytechnics, but noted that their performance as ‘tutors’ was not clear (Berryman & Coxon, 2010, p. 50). The focus of the final World Bank evaluation report regarding the vocational education outputs of the STP pilot, counted the number of training

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79 See Appendix Six Expression of Interest for Hospitality Tourism.
80 The author was employed by The World Bank to introduce an M&E framework after the program had begun.
participants, and noted their employment outcomes (The World Bank, 2014). The report counted 20 participants and their journey to competence as trainers, but does not detail the role played by local providers in achieving that success. The report also does not highlight the pilot nature of this capacity-building project for local institutes (The World Bank, 2014, p. 45).

The development sector’s reliance upon counting ‘completions and training numbers’, as discussed earlier and throughout this study, was a poor measure of success, particularly in teacher-training programs such as the STP program. A pilot without a baseline on ‘training competence’, could allow training participants to enter the program with the training skills already well-developed, and in this case no ‘teacher competence’ was conducted on the STP training participants prior to the commencement of the ‘training programs’.\(^\text{81}\)

**Identifying and examining the impact of evaluation approaches**

A Timorese training manager, with many years' experience in vocational training projects, articulated why it was absolutely necessary to identify and examine the impact of training and evaluation approaches:

> It is 10 years after (the project) and we still keep training, and we keep training with the same people, something is not right, training the same Timorese people... someway you have to stop and actually evaluate: Was the training good enough? Was it something with the trainers? Was it something with the participants? Where is the problem? It is 10 years after, and you still have the same problem, it's not realistic is it?

This study applied a ‘conceptual framework’ that reflected on the ‘absence’ rather than the ‘presence’ of content in training and evaluation. It is based on the idea that is not what is included, but what is not included, that reveals more about a program. The missing elements in the evaluation framework of this World Bank experiment included; (a) no designed pilot, (b) lack of a skills framework and operational plan, (c) no monitoring and evaluation framework for ‘management’ of the program and (d) no mutually acceptable agreements in place prior to beginning the project. The World Bank’s own review cites

\(^{81}\) Evidenced by the ‘selection process’ for participants in the Monitoring Implementation Plan for the Skills Training Partnership
evidence that the RDTL Ministry of Education’s management did not follow previous ‘administration and World Bank agreements’ (The World Bank, 2014, p. 44). There may be ‘sound’ reasons for these missing elements, however unless these issues are examined, we assert that the full story remains untold.

This Timor-Leste training manager’s reflection on donor-funded training projects is that ‘If after ten years you still have the same problem, it’s not realistic is it?’ This suggests that there were indeed systemic problems in Timor-Leste vocational training capacity building activities. Boupha (2007) argues that greater donor attention needs to be assigned to measuring and assessing ‘skills development’ and ‘capacity building’ in training contexts, suggesting that there are common themes that require this attention and review. These issues might include: (a) terms of reference for consultants being not clearly defined, (b) management of various activities were weak, (c) language proficiency of some local partners was clearly lacking, and (d) there was a lack of regular internal and external evaluation (Boupha, 2007). These themes, identified by Boupha, were examined in the implementation of the Skills Training Partnership, and it was shown that they contained remarkably similar implementation problems, thus generating similarly poor qualitative outcomes in Timor-Leste (Fairman, 2011).

We believe that a properly designed evaluation process provides a unique opportunity to ‘learn from implementation’. Unfortunately, in the two projects investigated in this study, respondents identified some fundamental flaws in the evaluation approaches. The respondents were critical of the implementation of the evaluation citing ‘same people, same training’, and ‘no evaluation and same new project’. An innovative program was attempted with the Skills Training Partnership in Timor-Leste, yet the opportunity to develop a ‘model’ failed due to the lack of detail, in relation to the program implementation and evaluation.

Our analysis has revealed that some practical measures could be introduced to improve evaluation practice. These measures are: (a) collecting data from
existing and all sources for evaluation including training participants, training provider reports and all training needs assessments, (b) applying new technologies to examine existing evaluations of training, (c) conducting evaluations based upon program design outcomes rather than future impact, (d) building evaluation methodologies early in training implementation, (e) where qualitative measures are used to ‘tell stories’ around successes, ensuring that these are applied throughout the training interventions, and that the current training participants are involved in telling these stories, and (f) ensuring that locals are involved and engaged in program design and development, monitoring and evaluation design, creating opportunities for training institutes to build capacity and sustainability, as well as generating innovation.

Cross-cultural communication

Ambivalence toward the Bule and its impact

It was found that particularly in the Indonesian training context, although less so in the Timorese context, that international training was not considered to be ‘international training’ unless there was a Bule $^2$ personally involved in the process. This attitude has many consequences, and impacts on the conduct of international training in areas such as; training design and delivery, the value placed upon individual international trainers, the extended notion of respect and honour, and the impact upon ‘local’ trainers. The purpose behind having a Bule involved in training was to ‘enforce’ or ‘support’ the view that international training was from abroad, discriminating between the ‘lesser valued’ locally conducted training, typified by a comment from an Indonesian donor program administrator who claimed, ‘It’s not international training if there is no foreigner’.

The Australian Government aid training projects in Indonesia, particularly IASTP II and III, demanded an international trainer be present during training. This requirement placed training providers in paradoxical situations,

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$^2$ Bule is the Indonesian word used describe a ‘foreigner’ and comes with Indonesian specific cultural connotations.
particularly when the international trainer’s ethnicity was questioned\textsuperscript{83}. It was found that acquiescing to this Indonesian value was mandatory, whilst at the same time it ensured that, as previously highlighted by an Indonesian donor program administrator: ‘Australian aid money flowed back into Australia’.

This study has highlighted the need to challenge the representation and status of \textit{Bule} in its current cultural form, as this promotes an unwarranted respect toward ‘foreigners’, and impacts negatively on capacity building. While Indonesians continue to place a ‘higher value’ on the presence of an international trainer, Indonesian trainers do not get the opportunity to develop the necessary training and management skills, and it also devalues the knowledge of local trainers, and indeed the author has witnessed competent and skilled Indonesian trainers deliver impressive ‘quality’ training in many aid programs. Opportunities are foregone if ‘foreigners’ remain, and this situation has been described by an Indonesian senior trainer as, ‘it’s the mentality of Indonesia, we are still looking for the \textit{Bule}, or something highly respected’ thus completing a self-fulfilling cycle of \textit{Bule} dependence (Fig 2).

\textbf{Figure 2. Self-Fulfilling Prophesy of ‘Bule’ Dependence}

\textsuperscript{83} Comments made to the author, as an international program manager, about two ‘South Asia’ employees employed on development programs, by the ACM.
It is apparent that international donors perpetuate these dominant Indonesian cultural values by not promoting and engaging ‘locally’ skilled and qualified Indonesian trainers in their donor projects. Indonesians place a high priority on having a *Bule* in the training room, often at the expense of these skilled and qualified locals. An AusAID managing contractor emphasized that an international trainer must be present at every stage of the training delivery. The issue of nominating 'international trainers' in tenders was seldom challenged or questioned during the period of IASTP Phase II in Indonesia, and this remained as a prevalent and pervasive concept during IASTP Phase III. Australian Contracting Managers (ACM) perpetuated these values by not confronting them, and we believe that this ‘cultural value’ must be questioned, and challenged, for sustainability to be achieved.

When the Indonesian cultural value says that ‘International training requires international trainers’, this becomes mandated, and is presented as the mantra for program implementation. This view was articulated by a donor program administrator of IASTP II as, ‘…if the training is led by foreigners, the training would be more effective and efficient’. From the Australian contract management perspective, shifting a ‘cultural value’ would be much harder than meeting total number of training hours. The Indonesian perspective was that having an ‘international’ was more desirable, efficient and effective, and this was imbedded in the way Indonesians viewed ‘western’ values. Described by the donor program administrator, ‘it's the mentality of Indonesia we are still looking for the *Bule*, or something, have a high respect' this high level of respect however comes with some degree of ambivalence.

Notwithstanding these apparently fixed views, the value and contribution of the *Bule* in training has been questioned, challenged and rebuked in a number of ways. The comments made by the following donor program administrator have significantly more currency, not just because of his position as a trainer of mentors in the IASTP III program, but also because these comments were made in the group interview and drew considerable laughter.

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84 The author has had these conversations with ACM’s at ‘tendering’ and ‘implementation’ meetings.
and acknowledgement from other participants. Stuart Hall refers to this as an ‘aha’ moment, where individuals embrace their own cultural identity. These comments were:

International *Bule* is very, very highly respected in training…even if sometimes the *Bule* is not competent’ and ‘the graduate *Bule* is very highly valued, and highly respected by the Indonesians even if the *Bule* is black.

This perspective of the ‘value’ of the *Bule* highlights the ambivalence of, on the one hand ‘respect and value’, and on the other hand ‘incompetence and racial vilification’. Other Indonesian respondents commented that they had much to learn from foreigners, as shown by this experienced donor program administrator who suggested that: ‘The international trainer or *Bule*, we still need that, we realize our country Indonesia, has not developed as yet’. There was an acceptance of the ‘Bule’ as a necessary pre-condition for development, and whilst this remains, the very imposition of a *Bule* limits or restricts opportunities to encourage skilled and local trainers. Removing the requirement to have ‘foreigners’ named on donor projects may encourage indigenous staff to develop the skills required to implement donor projects. This would be a significant contribution toward developing more appropriate and responsive development outcomes, and creating more meaningful practice interventions.

**Racism knows no boundaries**

Racism in the twenty-first century needs to be considered in the charged atmosphere of global power politics. The intensifying flows of money, people, ideas, images, values, and technology across the world, meet with varying, and sometimes conflicting responses, and the reality of the twenty-first century is of increased interaction, conflict and struggles over power and resources.

Globalization processes create new and complex forms of racism, while perpetuating older forms of racism, dispossession and discrimination. The issue of racism occurs across many areas of this study illustrated by these Indonesian and Timorese respondent comments of: (a) *Bule* is Black, (b)
Easterners are lazy, (c) Javanese are shy, and (d) Westerners like to whisper things behind their back.

The connotation of being a ‘Bule’, from an Indonesian perspective, was about associations with a western lifestyle, including all the cultural connotations of western values, especially European. Indeed, as European and western cultures move increasingly toward a ‘multi-ethnic’ and ‘multi-cultural’ mix, this one-dimensional Indonesian version of ‘foreigner’ was exposed. A ‘Bule is Black’ comment represented an anathema from an Indonesian perspective.

Racism manifested itself within the cultural contexts of Timor-Leste and Indonesia in a purposeful and internally robust way. Whilst the ‘Bule is Black’ was explicit in its racial connotations, other racially 'loaded' statements were expressed in this study. During the interviews there were comments by Timorese about Timorese, and equally by Indonesians about Indonesians such as; arrogant, lazy, gossipy, timid and shy. As Thompson (1990) described, this was a form of unity, which embraces individuals in a collective identity. This language may seem timid and passive nonetheless, but it is the creation of a collective identity that masks the racism within (Thompson, 1990). These comments pale into insignificance when you begin to deconstruct the level of ‘distrust’ ‘hurt’ and ‘abuse’ faced by Timorese following the 24-year Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste. This is a worthy research area, but not one under examination in this study.

In Timor-Leste, a schism has occurred between the ‘East and West’ of the country, which has resulted in the most intense level of violence and destruction, faced in this newly independent state. For most of the year 2006, significant numbers of Timorese lived in ‘internally displaced persons camps’ in fear for their lives. Wigglesworth (2010) noted that, beneath the veneer of a unified Timor-Leste, emerged relations of domination between, and within, the Timorese society over increased interaction, conflict and struggles over power and resources (Wigglesworth, 2010).
One Timorese donor program administrator openly criticized as ‘lazy’ those Timorese from the ‘west’. This was not just friendly rivalry, but deep-seeded resentment towards the Timorese who acquiesced to Indonesian rule (Chick, 2006). Collaborators were able to ‘negotiate the terms of development’ whilst non-collaborators were subjected to discrimination, forced labour, disadvantageous markets, intimidation and death (Chick, 2006). These tensions between the ‘East and West’ boiled over into the violence of the 2006 riots (Shepherd, 2013). As noted in the findings of this study, the violence of 2006 impacted on training institutes in unique ways, as these institutes escaped the destruction from these major disturbances. As one senior trainer commented, their training centre provided support to the local community, and was helping their young learn skills, so they were not targeted during the violence.

**Cross-cutting issues as cultural impositions**

Under Indonesian rule, Timor-Leste was provided with a distinctive and overt moral code in education. According to this Timorese trainer, teaching a moral value was considered 'good', but not some foreign ‘imported’ moral value such as ‘Pancasila’:

> Indonesia are really focused on how you can understand the moral point and that is good but it's not the moral that is good in general life but the moral of Pancasila translates as?

The concern was not so much about expressing a moral value in education and training, but about ‘whose’ moral value was being transmitted, and what was the ‘purpose and intent’ of that moral value. Overt cultural impositions of a moral code such as ‘Pancasila’ were considered as being not the appropriate moral value for Timor-Leste. Pancasila was a moral code, an ideology, imposed on Timorese during the Indonesian occupation of their country. Overt codes such as these were considered inappropriate for education and training institutes, as they perpetuated the ‘oneness’ of Indonesian domination, expressed by this Timor-Leste trainer as ‘they want to form us according to their ideology’. Interestingly, the imposition of Pancasila helped some Timorese identify that their country was under subjugation by a
foreign power, and made it easier for them to deconstruct how that ideology operated.

It was important to note that covert codes such as ‘conditionality’ were more difficult to deconstruct, whilst, at the same time, they were just as pervasive and imposing. These codes and cultural impositions from the international community came in the form of ‘cross-cutting issues’, where development assistance was given, subject to the compliance by recipients to achieve donor-defined outcomes, in the areas of gender mainstreaming, environment degradation, community engagement, disability and inclusiveness and good governance (Wilks, 2010, p. 23). This aspect of control was interpreted by one Timorese training manager as:

In many cases the donors come and they have already set up their own objectives, their own strategies, and they already set up their outputs.

Defining the ‘agenda’ and inserting ‘western values’ in the form of these cross-cutting issues was both control and a form of social construction of reality, recognized by some study respondents and therefore worthy of deconstruction. One Indonesian donor administrator described her chagrin toward the western cultural values of ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’, and was disturbed about the impact that this was having on her culture. She argued that Indonesia was not ready for the empowerment of local communities, as these communities then learn ways of ‘attacking’ the government, a situation deemed undesirable from this donor program administrator’s perspective:

When human rights came, with the participative methods and community, it’s not our culture, it’s like the western culture. Sometimes this makes conflict in our community, and between the community, sometimes without proper empowerment to the community.

These donor-funded training programs were seen to promote certain ‘values’, and this person believed these to be ‘counter’ to her view of her culture. Most Australian government aid funding has ‘cross cutting issues’ allocated to the performance of aid. In the case of all IASTP training, the cross-cutting

85 DFAT tender guidelines contain references to ‘gender equity’ and other references to ‘cross cultural issues’ as detailed in many Request for Tender documents see DFAT strategy for Aid Investment in Economic Infrastructure; see http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/economic-infrastructure-development-strategy.docx
generic modules included such culturally specific sub themes as; good governance, gender awareness, change management. These cross-cutting modules varied over time, and across IASTP phases, implying that some ‘values’ were more ‘worthy’ than others, making the selection of these modules contentious. A good example here was that in the previous IASTP II program, disability and inclusiveness were introduced as generic modules (Massaro, 2004).

The imposition of the ‘cross cutting’ issues raised important questions, which required explicit examination. In the Timor-Leste example, AusAID programs such as the Public Sector Linkage Programs (PSLP) and Australian Awards program for Timor-Leste, contained a requirement for program participants to ‘Explain how the concept addresses gender equity’\textsuperscript{86}. This is not an argument against references to ‘gender equity’ \textit{per se}, but merely a reflection on the ‘structural processes’ that entrench an unquestioning attitude to culturally dominant values. We believe that developing a meaningful training intervention requires this level of deep reflection and introspection.

These ‘cross-cutting’ issues also require some form of evaluation or measurement. How are these measures being assessed and reviewed? In a significant portion of the Australian government development assistance activities, where education plays a central role in aid programs, a ‘meta-review’ of completion reports commented that the results were alarming. It was not just that the aid programs failed to implement these ‘cross-cutting’ issues which were deemed critical to the success of donor activity (Department Of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014b), but that this raised the question of ‘what’ cross-cutting issues should be included (Patch & Shah, 2011). One Indonesian senior trainer described the inappropriate selection process as:

\begin{quote}
We are selecting participants for training based upon, gender, fieldwork, or anything mostly for political reasons
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{86} see PSLP and Australian Awards guidelines.
Viewed from this senior trainer’s perspective, donor projects were funded according to some undefined ‘political perspective’, a position he found repugnant. This person was applying ‘known’ criteria for selection of participants, only to have these overturned for ‘political’ reasons, which were difficult for him to fathom.

The donors’ agendas were not always immediately apparent to the recipients. The local training institutes were making educated ‘guesses’ on which cross-cutting issues were ‘relevant’ in order to secure donor support, as this Timorese training manager explains:

Donors each year focus on one issue, this year its training providers, because the unemployment in Timor is quite high. Three years ago it was ‘gender’ and the donors focused on gender.

These examples illustrated the ‘unequal’ nature of the relationship between recipients and donors, and gives voice to the argument that recipients feel like passive players in the development market.

The right to impose notions of gender, human rights, equity and sustainability, which are based upon donor perceptions of development ‘good practice’, illustrates how dominant cultural representations prevail in development work. New players in the development market, particularly China, are challenging these donor paradigms, and this may lead to significant changes in development interventions (Eyben, 2013, p. 138; Mawdsley et al., 2014). The improvements that can be made to training and evaluation practices could be as simple as having the recipients and locals involved in determining the appropriate and responsive ‘cross-cutting’ issues, pertinent to their country’s development challenges, a position that would improve development outcomes.
Valuing local cultural nuances

Throughout the study, respondents commented on the importance of valuing local cultural contributions. These local nuances were difficult for trainers, whether they were ‘foreign’ or ‘local’ trainers, to interpret. It was noted that Indonesians do not always express their thoughts and views, about what was taking place in training. They kept their views to themselves, as described by this senior trainer:

Sometimes Indonesian people are very nice and they don't say anything about what we are doing so we don't know whether this is okay or not.

In the Timor-Leste situation, a similar pattern emerged around revealing their views and perspectives, and this was only noticeable to Timorese themselves, as noted by this donor program administrator’s comment:

They won't show it to the foreigners to the Mulae, they'll be quiet so as the foreigner you don’t really know if this person wants to sit in training or not, especially if you know how people react, as a Timorese we notice this.

In Indonesia, deference toward age, position, status and gender (particularly male) existed, including the already noted, paradoxical ‘respect’ for the Bule. Age was a deeply imbedded cultural value, which was reflected in the use of ‘language and tone’ particularly when talking to an ‘older male authority’ figure, which was widely prevalent in the Javanese culture. The impact of this ‘deference’ in a training situation was that trainers were mindful and respectful of the diversity of the ‘Indonesian culture’. Trainers attempted alternate ways of communicating ‘equality and openness’ whilst showing ‘respect’ and honouring ‘status’. This was described by one Indonesian senior trainer with many years of training experience, as a ‘frightening process’, and one the Javanese people found confronting because they were exposed to an ‘unfamiliar’ cultural environment. Showing proper respect, in speech and behavior, was an essential aspect of the Javanese culture (Pruetipibultham, 2012, p. 110).

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87 Mulae is the Timorese description of ‘foreigner’
The importance of treating every one ‘equally’, was not a problem for the Sumatran people, but was challenging for the Javanese. Indonesia is a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual culture, and the onus was on all trainers (local and international) to familiarize themselves with the local cultural nuances in; diversity, complexity and different learning styles. This Sumatran trainer who considered Indonesian training a ‘frightening process’ was highlighting the difficulty that international trainers must face in these same circumstances.

Keeping or retaining Indonesian cultural diversity, in the pervading presence of globalization and the international donor community, was an astute observation by one Indonesian senior trainer:

I think this country faces problems and challenges in keeping to, or retaining its diversity, at the same time it needs to be in the international community.

This comment implied that the Indonesian cultural diversity was valued, and that maintaining its cultural diversity was being 'challenged' by international engagement, and the introduction of ‘western’ ways of learning. As mentioned earlier, the ‘engagement’ between trainers and participants revealed that the interaction has ‘mutual benefits’ for both parties:

Not only qualifications, knowledge and experience but also one [trainer] has the ability to understand the diversity and complexity and different needs of the people.

Developing an understanding of the different needs of the training participants was critical to being able to make training relevant, whilst at the same time respecting their culture and the diversity. In Timor-Leste, some respondents noted and accepted this issue, and whilst ‘deference’ existed, there were encouraging alternative ‘points of view’ being expressed by younger Timorese toward their trainers (local and international). This meant that the training room was a place of learning and engagement. These younger Timorese openly challenged their trainers to justify and explain their answers, and this was viewed as a ‘healthy’ learning process for these Timorese. As described by this senior trainer, ‘if you don't like the answer you just keep on asking - that is the only way you can involve them’.
Sharing program practice

Throughout this study of donor approaches in training interventions, a number of salient issues were highlighted around; evaluation and measurement, intentions and perspectives, and choices and decisions. Practitioners seldom questioned the values behind these approaches, whilst recipients and respondents were consistently critical of some of these donor interventions.

In order to develop a culture of reflective practice, it is necessary to ask difficult and challenging questions of donors, recipients and individuals. Developing a culture of critical practice may prove helpful for administrators and managers of donor-funded activities, as they precede though the ‘minefield’ of decision-making in a development context. This study has purposefully examined the preconditions for donor interventions asking questions of inclusion and exclusion, which has led to the development of a culture of meaningful and reflective practice in donor training interventions. A meaningful and reflective practice approach would include examining six key ideas: (a) ethical behaviour, (b) intentions, (c) recipient country consideration, (d) local consideration, (e) evaluation practice, and (f) sharing. These features are a necessary pre-requisite for the development of a ‘meaningful practice intervention model’ see (Fig 3). This model creates a framework for designing responsive and appropriate training interventions, as well as examining the impact of these interventions.
We suggest that application of this ‘Meaningful Practice Intervention Model’ requires examining motivations, reviewing choices and options for implementation, stating criteria for decision-making and providing a rationale for the selected intervention strategy. This model covers some, but not all, of the issues surrounding the design of training interventions and evaluation practice. The purpose is to provide donors and practitioners with a framework for examining program design, implementation and evaluation in line with the six key ideas mentioned above and detailed in the following passages.

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This model attempts to cover the salient aspects of meaningful practice, as the thesis illuminated there may be other social, political and economic aspects particularly in relation to ‘greed and corruption’ at an individual or institutional level which could be subsumed under ‘articulation of donor intentions’ as highlighted in Easterly, Boughton, Moyo and Wilks.
Ethical Behavior

Meaningful practice requires an examination of the ethics of behavior associated with motivations behind actions, the choices, the decisions and the rationale behind the designed intervention. Ethical behavior begins by reviewing the motivations behind the actions, Why this and not that? The choices involved in determining the approach could best be examined by asking; What was the justification for the approach? What alternatives exist for achieving the same outcomes? How were the decisions made to determine the planned intervention? Who was involved in determining the planned intervention? What were the planned outcomes? How were these outcomes described and determined? What rationale exists for determining the ‘partners’ in the activity? And how was this rationale determined?

Intentions and objectives

The intentions of a donor training intervention can be sourced by interrogating the originally designed intervention. It is important that the particular intervention will have covered aspects of ‘ethical behavior’ and have responded clearly to these questions. Describing and detailing the ‘objectives’ will allow program implementers to measure the progress toward these goals, and determining these objectives will make the task of meeting and measuring the expectations more tangible. Establishing monitoring and evaluation frameworks at the beginning of projects, against the background of designed objectives, leads to the ensuring of accurate measures of these objectives.

Recipient country consideration

Donor training programs need to be linked to strategic development plans, in whatever form these exist. Recipient countries that develop these plans are able to identify training priorities through these plans, and this will assist donors to match their training offerings with these plans. In instances where these strategic development plans are non-existent, donors are required to seek recipient country ownership and engagement, and this can be best achieved by conducting training needs assessments of recipient country’s
training needs. When donors are working with Ministries, this requires detailed examinations of a recipient country’s expectations for each Ministry. Equally, when governments alter their ‘long-term’ priorities, these changes need to be incorporated into the planned donor interventions, and the training needs assessments will provide the opportunity to adjust the program to these changed circumstances.

**Consideration of stakeholders and local input**

Donor training projects are sustainable when local training institutes are ‘partnered’ with donor-funded agencies. In certain situations this may be a difficult process, as was the case in Timor-Leste. Adopting an ‘in-principle’ position of seeking ‘local’ training institution input, places a priority on working with locals. Establishing ‘training institutes’ in direct competition with locally based training institutes, clearly does not produce sustainability. Working with local ‘institutes’ creates situations, where the ‘ultimate beneficiaries’ of donor training projects are easily identified.

**Acceptance of training methods and evaluation practice**

Identifying a means of collecting data on training programs for the purpose of evaluation, was critical to measuring outcomes. The data can be readily available through training provider reports on training provision, and standard means of collecting this data can be instituted. The data will provide a rich source of content for evaluation purposes, and needs to be included in any form of evaluation of overall training program provision.

**Sharing program outcomes**

The means are currently available to share knowledge around program implementation. The technical software was readily available and, when applied, allows access to program implementation for key stakeholders, recipients, researchers, donor administrators and program evaluators. Sharing ‘evaluation’ methodologies provides a means of improving ‘value for money’ and program implementation.
The next Chapter, Conclusion, draws together the study's literature, findings, and analysis, in order to identify improvements to training and evaluation practice. The conclusion identifies three themes emanating from the study: (a) development practice findings; (b) training Intervention findings, and (c) evaluation findings. The conclusion makes recommendations around development practice and the application of a 'meaningful training intervention model' to ensure more appropriate and responsive development outcomes.
Chapter Eight: Conclusion

The study set out to make contributions to the understanding of two key questions and the responses are provided in the following manner. These were:

1. What is the impact of skills development and training on aid practices?
   - Bule (Mulae) value is contentious
   - Capacity building is individual not institutional
   - Skill development dilemma

2. What improvements can be made to the evaluation of these practices in order to ensure appropriate and responsive development outcomes?
   - Respond to local conditions, not imposed conditions
   - Refine training evaluation procedures
   - Encourage a culture of reflective practice

In the process of investigating these questions, it was found that the conclusions could be categorised under three themes: (1) ‘Development Practice findings’ incorporating the notions that the value of Bule [or Mulae] in training was contentious, and that recipients feel they are nothing but passive players in an active donor process, highlighting the need for donors to respond to local conditions; (2) ‘Training Intervention findings’ emphasizing the position that capacity building is individual rather than institutional, and that there was a Timor-Leste skills development dilemma; (3) ‘Evaluation findings’ encompassing the participants’ strong agreement that the development sector should be encouraging a ‘culture of reflective practice’, and as a corollary, there is a need for refining training evaluation procedures. The recommendations that we see follow directly from these findings, and relate to concepts of ‘improvement’ to development practice, and as such, they make a contribution to ‘scholarship’ as well as providing a model for improved ‘value for money’ in development training projects.
Development Practice Findings

Respond to local conditions

This study, in essence, examined the impact of conditionality in aid. Aid is not given without conditions, and given this situation, donors need to be inclusive and respectful of the ‘local conditions’ and local personnel. This study examined the perceived lack of dialogue put forward by the participants, which they saw occurring in Timor-Leste around ‘technical’ skills versus ‘soft’ skills. This debate was in parallel with the donors’ objectives, which were promoting particular training interventions. It was found that conditionality imposed on aid creates an unequal relationship between the donors and recipients, and as a result, recipients feel that aid is being ‘done to them’. An important example was the UNTAET mission, which was the United Nation’s most authoritative state-building mission in recent history (Tansey, 2014, p. 179), and this activity imposed itself on Timor-Leste shortly after the 1999 referendum, taking over all legislative and executive authority. However, how the broader international community, academics, and the Timorese themselves perceived this UN mission, remains a subject which is under considerable scrutiny (Tansey, 2014, p. 179). One Timorese senior government official in this study commented, that ‘...this ‘UN Club’ travels the world imposing their solutions on us; we could be any post-conflict country, and the solution is the same’.

This study has focused attention on some of the ‘conditions’ imposed upon recipients. Donor behavior stems from their own ‘perspective’ of development and ‘state building’, and are manifested in the use of cross-cutting issues of ‘gender’, ‘governance’ ‘inclusion’ ‘environment’, ‘trade’ and ‘national interest’. It is quite natural for recipients to see these cross cutting issues as ‘impositions’, because unless these outcomes are included, and measured in donor-funded ‘programs’, the programs will not be offered.

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89 It is noted that ‘national interest’ is specifically included in this study because of the explicit and stated rationale for Australia’s approach to aid, and because of the considerable sums of money invested in these activities.
This study found that the cross cutting issues mentioned above are not all equal, because some are valued more highly than others, and the fact that one issue, could be more ‘valued’ than another, is appropriating and perpetuating a particular dominant cultural value. Raising ‘gender’ as a development issue seems to be quite understandable and acceptable from our western view of acceptable practice, and the outcry from some quarters would be intense if this was excluded. Of course, there is excellent modeling to suggest that improving the lives of ‘women’ in development practice improves the outcomes in whole communities (Pamphilon et al., 2014), but, nonetheless, it is necessary to stand back from this ‘politically correct’ language, and ask specific and detailed questions around ‘impact’. This study found that a review of a major Australian aid project over a period of five years drew conclusions, albeit from a small number of ‘participants’, constructing a ‘story’ around impact upon ‘ultimate beneficiaries’, citing the notion that gender mainstreaming was working effectively. However, this outcome has been considered to be somewhat spurious because the perspective arose mainly as a result of one participant’s family connections.

Equally, good governance is high on many donor development agendas, and the themes of corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) clearly underpinned a number of the Indonesian respondents’ comments in this study. But a more subtle concern, at least from this study’s perspective, rises in the posing of the question; Why is governance high on the donors’ agendas? This highly valued western agenda of creating a ‘fair and level playing field’, which is a basic proposition of free enterprise in a globalized world, actually brings with it value propositions that, in a non-western context, may be questionable.

Nevertheless, even though these ‘concepts’ are contestable, they are seen to be required, and therefore are inevitably implemented in development project evaluations. Whether or not other socially constructed divisions exist in non-western societies, these western values are seen by donors to be central to aid programs and are thus deemed necessary. It is interesting to note that newer players in the international aid area, particularly China, place little regard for imposing ‘conditions’ during aid provision programs, opting instead
for building ‘markets’ to achieve economic and social development for all (Gore, 2014; King, 2014). This study engages in this conversation, and has questioned the ethical basis of some donor’s intent to place conditions on ‘aid’.

In the two countries examined for this research, the issue of human resource development and strategic development planning were found to be ill conceived and not clearly understood, by the implementing agencies. This was a point of view openly expressed by Indonesian and Timor-Leste respondents, and was explicitly noted in the literature (Griffin, 2011; Pilar, 2010). Linking training interventions to strategic development plans, considered desirable and necessary by respondents in this study, would be a way of achieving suitable workforce development improvements. However, with a planning ‘void’ existing, particularly in Timor-Leste, the aim of capacity building through training remains a desirable, but not yet achievable, goal.

**Bule (Mulae) value is contentious**

In the Indonesian cultural context (and to a similar extent the Timor-Leste cultural context), *Bule* is a respected, honoured and highly valued cultural feature. This study uncovered that whilst this may be the ‘accepted’ view across the broader community, the deference to a *Bule* is somewhat inconsistent and ambivalent. Some respondents (mostly younger) interpreted the ‘*Bule* as adding ‘value’ into their training, but other respondents (mostly older) interpreted the value of *Bule* in quite contradictory ways. Some issues that arose included (i) negative references to the racial profile of the *Bule*, (ii) the notion of developing independence from foreigners gained traction, (iii) the *Bules’* authority when dealing with local concerns was examined and (iv) the use value of foreigners and their perspectives was questioned.

This study found that this somewhat ambivalent attitude toward the *Bule*, begins to suggest that the notion of ‘foreign value’ is under examination and de-construction, from within both communities. Even if this trend was seemingly paradoxical, Timorese respondents were nevertheless highly
critical of the ‘foreigners’ displacing ‘competent locals’ in roles simply because of their ‘language skills’. Indonesian respondents noted that ‘incompetent’ foreigners were more highly valued than competent locals. The paradox arose when some Indonesian respondents questioned the value and meaning of ‘international’ training, if it did not contain a ‘foreigner’ in the training room.

The study found that the best way of examining these issues was to apply a ‘de-constructionist’ view of training, using the lens of it is not ‘what’ is presented, but ‘what’ is not, and it is not ‘who’ is presenting, but ‘who’ is not. By deconstructing the training methodology in this way, we can see that these questions begin to open up the debate around training approach. This study has found that training approaches that placed an ‘over-reliance’ upon ‘foreign’ trainers, were starting to be seen as dubious. Many of the respondents have worked closely with these international trainers and have thus been able to observe their behavior at close range. They subsequently have made distinctions between those foreigners that wanted to help (in terms of trying to build capacity and then leaving locals to manage), with those foreigners that treated their work as a ‘job’, and therefore wanted to remain in constant employment.

The process of employing overseas trained and competent local individuals to provide donor-funded training, has been claimed to improve the training outcome, and certainly confronts the notion of dependency on the ‘Bule’. Removing the tender requirements to have ‘international’ trainers on tender documents will be a significant change in confronting this issue, and will significantly stimulate local engagement. Models of shared ownership, similar to the planned Skills Training Partnership in Timor-Leste (examined in some detail in this study), could be a desirable model for local engagement, and would ensure appropriate capacity building models.
Training Intervention Findings

Capacity building is Individual, not Institutional

In both countries researched during this study, many study respondents commented on the importance of capacity building from international contributions, highlighting the positive and negative aspects of these contributions. Invariably, some comments revolved around either, 'corruption and nepotism', and 'benefitting persons and individuals' reflected by respondents indicating that 'trips to Australia' are desirable and sought after. How individuals were selected for training, and the issues surrounding 'fairness' and 'openness' of selection criteria, featured in many respondent conversations.

Donor programs promote ‘good governance’ and ‘openness and transparency’, and these are important ‘cross cutting issues’ imposed by donor-funded programs. Having set the ‘bar’ high, it is imperative that these standards are actually maintained across donor-funded programs. In the case of IASTP Phase III, the anguish expressed by Indonesian respondents regarding the ‘selection process’ for ‘mentors’ on the Diploma of Training and Assessment program to Australia was palpable. The ‘bar’ came crashing down; it is imperative that donors are seen to be maintaining these standards, and not subverting them.

Other study respondents commented that little ‘institutional change’ had occurred as a result of training, and that training participants had benefited ‘individually’ but not ‘institutionally’. This highlights a great concern around the intention of donor training projects, in that the IASTP Phase III sought to introduce change by impacting institutions, and training was designed to provide outcomes in respective workplaces. Sadly, the recipient agencies (ministries targeted), did not contribute funds to support IASTP III training, and as a result poor levels of implementation were recorded (Murphy & Dharmawan, 2008). Thus, in order to link donor-training programs, such as IASTP III, to the workplace, it would be desirable to ensure that the recipient agencies ‘contribute’ to this training, not as ‘In-Kind’ contributions but ‘In-
Reality’. This would encourage the recipient agencies to design training around their workforce development needs, bringing them in line with their own strategic and human resource development plans, and we feel that this would go some way toward capacity building in institutional systems, and also to ensure appropriate and responsive development outcomes.

**Skills development dilemma**

This study found that a national dialogue around the direction of vocational training and workforce development, and the skills required in Timor-Leste, has not taken place. Powell (2012) argues that in order for AusAID to develop sustainable programs in skills development, AusAID programs should begin examining and reviewing existing reform activities across all TVET programs (Powell, 2012, p. 38). This study reveals that the role of skills development in a developing country context needs to include a dialogue and debate around the local training ‘needs’. For some of the respondents to this study, this conversation concentrated on the need for teaching ‘soft skills’, in particular communication, citizenship, preparation for employment, and attitude to work.

This dialogue requires contributions from all stakeholders in civil society, based upon ‘credible’ assessments of the demand for skills, in light of the country’s economic prospects (Costa, 2013; Powell, 2012). The discussion around ‘credible’ skills has not taken place. Those involved in determining these notions of ‘credible’ skills, who are employers, students, government and training providers, require more information and data on skills, including detailed surveys and studies. Providing this information would be a considerable investment, but one needed to strengthen the vocational system and ensure civil society is involved and well informed (Costa, 2013, p. 10).

In the absence of a ‘strong’ private sector and a significant lack of information around skills required (Costa, 2013), donors are providing strengthening projects that are described as ‘demand-led’ interventions in areas of skills deficiencies (such as in the automotive and construction areas in Timor-Leste). Whilst these interventions may be immediately provided and can be seen to be required, it remains questionable as to whether they are in the
‘long term’ interest of Timor-Leste. In addition to this, there is a scarcity of research related to vocational training and workforce development needs in Timor-Leste. Questions remain as to issues surrounding what training is required, what industries are involved, what direction should Timor-Leste pursue? Powell’s (2012) suggestions for creating sustainability in TVET programs, includes determining the nature and extent of the demand for skills as a necessary requirement, and this is particularly so in the context of Timor-Leste (Powell, 2012, p. 23).

This study has identified the broad parameters surrounding the type of further research required in Timor-Leste to promote a dialogue around skills development. It was suggested that the research could include; (i) determining the relationship between skills development and human resource development needs for Timor-Leste, (ii) establishing the government of RDTL’s plans for vocational training, (iii) contextualization of various communities’ perceptions of ‘vocational training’ in relation to ‘higher education’; (iv) pinpointing those jobs and industry sectors which are relevant now, and extrapolating these into the future, (v) identifying Timor-Leste’s development requirements, in the context of a largely ‘agrarian’ society, which is inclusive of all sectors of civil society. It is asserted that, when addressed, knowledge of these issues would lead to more appropriate donor training interventions and responsive development outcomes.

**Evaluation Findings**

**Refinement of training evaluation procedures**

The study focused on the political, social and dominant representations of donor policies, and donor-led agendas, in training and evaluation practices. In doing so, it revealed some perplexing and salient characteristics, including (i) over-dependence upon international advisors, (ii) the lack of skills transference to local staff, (iii) the tying of aid to specific issues, (iv) policy impositions such as demand-driven TVET and Adult Learning Principles. The study identified some improvements that could be made to training evaluation programs, based upon three basic questions:
Where are we?
Where do we want to go?
What progress is being made? (Powell, 2012, p. 24)

Identifying where we are is an important beginning, and would be a natural first step in any evaluation process in order to create a baseline. Following on from this step, a careful consideration of what the program intervention intends to target, will give indications of where we want to go. Finally, identifying and addressing the progress being made, necessitates the need to engage ‘local input’ and discover what progress is being made. The present study reveals that the monitoring and evaluation systems used to evaluate training programs, primarily tend to fulfill a ‘compliance and auditing role’ for donors, which include measures of ‘conditionality’ achieved. However the primary objective of sustainability and local engagement remains elusive, if not forgotten.

Australian aid programs devote approximately a quarter of their aid budget to education and training interventions. These programs were intended to be evaluated against designed ‘terms of reference’, however this study has revealed that in some circumstances, evaluations were not related to the program design objectives, but related to the ‘impact upon’ future training interventions. With so much aid linked to education and training interventions, this raises the issue regarding the extent to which these interventions are achieving their designed objectives.

As noted in this study, the Indonesian respondents raised a number of concerns regarding the ‘selection of participants’ for training, suggesting that some of the participants were inappropriate for some training activities. This highlights the importance of carefully constructing a ‘baseline’ for the evaluation of training. Equally, conducting a ‘training needs assessment’ related to training program implementation is critical in determining any ‘baseline’ for ‘upgrading skills and knowledge’. This study identified that the Rapid Training Needs Analysis was not included in the evaluation of the IASTPIII Independent Completion Report, which we see as a critical omission.
This study also identified that a vast amount of data provided in many training programs, particularly those conducted in Indonesia, remained untapped. The information and evaluations from IASTP III training providers was available for analysis by the reviewers of IASTP III, and this information could have formed a basis for more carefully examining and evaluating IASTP III training provisions. If this rich source of data could have been accessed and used for evaluation purposes, this would have met Powell’s requirement for including key stakeholders in program evaluations (Powell, 2012). There are software technologies available to explore the data gathered from previously conducted training programs, by using current meta-analysis information technology software solutions (for example Survey Monkey and Smartygrants), and these systems would yield a more detailed analysis of training effectiveness. Such technology could be used to gather training participants’ perceptions of training, and this information could be used to ‘support’ or ‘counter’ other evaluation techniques employed in training programs. Revealing overall trends on the impact upon ultimate beneficiaries, key stakeholders, and donor communities, would lead to a more detailed understanding of the impact of skills development and training on aid practices.

The proliferation of ‘on-line’ courses around the world has provided an insight into examining more appropriate monitoring and evaluating tools to measure successes in training courses. Chapman et al. [2016] argue that very uniform and systemic approaches are required to judge the merits of these programs (Chapman, Goodman, Jawitz, & Deacon, 2016). The challenge is to develop these systemic approaches to measure training courses and evaluate their effectiveness, and this study found that alternate means of examining data could be employed using the available reports and data already collected.

A striking result to emerge from the analysis of monitoring and evaluation reports by this study, was that projects and programs were not based upon the planned program design documents. A considerable amount of literature

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90 All IASTP III training providers were expected to ‘store’ IASTP reports for 7 years post training delivery, as an AusAID prerequisite and requirement, these reports were not accessed as part of the ‘evaluation’ of the program.
91 An example here is the analyzing and synthesizing the IASTP Training Provider Reports.
has been published on the application of monitoring and evaluation instruments (Bamberger, Tarsilla, & Hesse-Biber, 2016; Griffin, 2011; Guerci & Vinante, 2011; Patton, 2011; White, 2005), but this study concluded that monitoring and evaluation instruments should examine the original designed objectives, and aid program intentions. Whilst a seemingly obvious conclusion, this it is not always standard practice in aid evaluations (Patch & Shah, 2011). Improving evaluation practice by identifying, where do we want to go? and what do we want to achieve?, requires clearly defined targets. That said, the measures taken to achieve these results are paramount to program evaluation.

Another equally striking observation to emerge from this study, was that in some cases ‘evaluations’ were an afterthought in program implementation, and were clearly an appendage to program design, and were not seen as a strategic contribution to program implementation (Department Of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014b). This is not making best use of development evaluations. Patton (2011) argues that governments, and international non-government organizations, can use development evaluations for ongoing program development, adapting effective principles of practice to local contexts, as well as generating innovations and scaling them into full programs (Patton, 2011). Whilst evaluations could make a strategic contribution to program development and to generating innovations, they need, however, to be conceived as part of the architecture of the original design, not just an ‘afterthought’. The evaluations under review in this study fell well short of these ‘principles’ of local engagement, program development, and generating innovation.

In the Timor-Leste context, the monitoring and evaluation framework for the Skills Training Partnership in Timor-Leste was conceived after the project began, therefore measuring instruments were applied retrospectively92. In the Indonesian context, the IASTP Phase III Independent Completion Report applied a ‘futures’ perspective on program implementation, rather than an

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92 The Author was employed as the ‘monitoring and evaluation’ specialist after the program was operational, and therefore had to design an M&E to suit.
actual analysis of program implementation. This study identified these concerns, particularly on the part of the respondents, and recommends some improvements to evaluation practices in order to ensure appropriate and responsive development outcomes.

**Encourage a ‘culture of reflective practice’**

The development sector has not had the rich history of critique and examination, drawn from engagement over many years, which is a situation that generally positions educational pedagogy. The traditions of review and introspection are not part of the fabric of the development community, and this lack, coupled with the limited scope for analysis, leads to a critical absence of reflective practice.

In this study, a semiotic approach to inquiry has helped examine and explore questions of approach, and consistency, in education and training programs, particularly the IASTP in Indonesia and STP in Timor-Leste. This study argues that a critical theorist approach to the deconstruction of aid activity provides greater insight, and improvements, into development practice, by declaring that it is often not what is included, but what is not included in the development context, that provides us with a greater understanding of, and clarity into, what is being offered and implemented (Shahjahan et al., 2015).

This study argues that by applying this approach, alternate questions are posed, and we suggest that such a critical theorist approach is made easier when an environment exists which allows the posing of questions and the seeking of answers. Unfortunately this environment currently does not exist, as donors and ‘developmentalists’ have vested interests in continuing to engage with these communities without reflecting upon practice. It has been observed that donor reports on development often detail ‘lessons learnt’ but little ‘reflection’ takes place (Department Of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014b).

A meaningful practice intervention model would assist donors, recipients and developmentalists to explore the rationale and approach applied in individual
donor projects, particularly in relation to the design phase and the evaluation phase. This model reviews the critical phases covering key issues of ethical behavior, intentions, recipient country consideration, local consideration, evaluation practice and sharing. The analysis chapter has identified that these important issues require careful investigation before undertaking donor projects. This model guides the observer toward a meaningful practice outcome, and requires the ‘practitioner’ to apply this framework to future design interventions.

**Meaningful Practice Intervention Model**

- Articulation of donor intentions and objectives
- Implementation of training methods and evaluations
- Recognition of stakeholder requirements
- Articulation of recipient expectations
- Acceptance of training methods and evaluations
- Agreement with training outcomes
- Evidence of cross-cultural communication
- Evidence of sharing on program outcomes

**Meaningful Donor Practice**

**Meaningful Recipient Outcomes**

- Evidence of recognition of shared needs

**Meaningful Practice Intervention Model**

**Fairman, 2017**

This model covers some, but not all, of the issues surrounding the design of training interventions. The purpose is to provide donors with a framework for examining their program design, implementation and evaluation.
This study has shown that constraints already exist in the development context, which limits the ability of the area to change. These constraints include the observation that development programs are ‘short’ in duration, and post-conflict nation building may require immediate action but is actually a ‘long term’ undertaking. Also, donor governments have to meet their own ‘national interests’ such as placating to their constituents, which, in turn, impacts on the quality and length of engagement with the aid program. This is often described as ‘donor burnout’. A complex interdependency arises between consultants, contractors, and governments, and this often ensures that the vested interests are maintained and serviced. In this context it is difficult to see how a culture of reflection and introspection would easily develop. Indeed, this study found that an important consideration for the development of a culture of reflective practice was access to information, including the reporting processes of development programs, followed by open and frank dialogue between stakeholders.

**Findings and Recommendations**

The following section presents the findings and recommendations emanating from this study, and is provided to highlight the important changes that could be implemented to achieve more responsive and appropriate development outcomes.

**Finding A**

This study found that developing a means of encouraging recipient country ownership of donor programs would ensure meaningful engagement with training. Also, by linking training interventions to strategic development plans, and mandating financial contributions from recipient countries, will ensure both strategic and economic ownership of results by the recipient country.

**Recommendation**

For the purpose of encouraging local engagement and ownership, it is recommended that donor-funded training interventions should be based upon
recipient countries’ strategic development plans, and recipient countries should contribute ‘financially’ to these donor-funded training interventions.

Finding B

This study found that an important consideration for the development of a culture of reflective practice, was to provide access to information, including the evaluation and reporting processes of development programs. This study discovered that some information was difficult to access, and this leads to limited opportunities to learn from past program implementation.

Recommendation

In order to provide opportunities for analysis and reflection upon donor training interventions, it is recommended that the “Meaningful Practice Intervention Model” be applied to all designed training interventions. A universal web portal should be developed, as this would provide public access to donor reports on programs, and this would be of significant value for; recipients, developmentalists, ultimate beneficiaries, academics and future researchers and would ultimately provide a means of reflecting upon aid practice.

Finding C

This study found that conducting and piloting management and training models that have ‘local ownership’ built into the program, improves engagement and ownership of these donor interventions, as well as allowing opportunities for ‘shared ownership models’ to develop, which would ultimately prove beneficial to recipient communities.

Recommendation

In order to build capacity and facilitate ‘local ownership’ in recipient communities, it is recommended that ‘shared ownership models’ of
management and training interventions be developed. It is also recommended that removing any obstacles to these shared ownership models, such as the requirement to have ‘internationals’ lead and manage development programs, would assist this development and implementation.

Finding D

This study found that conducting research into human resources and skills development need, would prove beneficial in defining the human resource development and skill requirements in a Timor-Leste context, which would have the impact of reducing dependence upon donor-directed training interventions.

Recommendation

In order to facilitate and inform the Timor-Leste civil society of the possible skills development and directions for vocational training, it is recommended that a nation-wide consultation on skills development be undertaken, as this would provide input into human resource planning and vocational training needs.

Finding E

This study found that completion reports and final evaluations of training projects in Indonesia and Timor-Leste were based upon criteria other than those originally specified in program design documents. The study found that when applying the original designed program outcomes, the evaluations conducted, measure the intent of program and the planned targeted training interventions, which ultimately improves development practice.

Recommendation

In order to guarantee that designed training and evaluation interventions are measured according to a planned intervention, it is recommended that
monitoring and evaluation instruments need to reflect the designed criteria and be implemented from the beginning of a project, with an appropriate level of resources and time allocated.

Finding F

This study found that applying more appropriate data collection infrastructure to training participants’ evaluations, and examining this data during program evaluations, would broaden the impact upon ultimate beneficiaries and improve development evaluations.

Recommendation

In order to broaden the impact of training upon the ultimate beneficiaries, it is recommended that program evaluators apply more appropriate data collection infrastructure to training participants’ evaluations, and to use this data during critical program evaluations. We note that readily available infrastructure can provide a tested means of synthesizing data from all training provider reports, making this data available for meaningful reviews and completion reports.

Closing Remarks

The study set out to make contributions to the understanding of two key questions. These were:

What is the impact of skills development and training on aid practices?

What improvements can be made to the evaluation of these practices in order to ensure appropriate and responsive development outcomes?

The study has shown that, with some re-working of our current skills development and training practices, and with some critical examination of our ‘perceived’ interests, our donor projects could provide a more formative engagement with recipient communities. The critical assessment by respondents and recipients alike of our donor practices reveals that we have
much to learn about meaningfully ‘engaging’ with others in capacity building. An important change would be to actually ‘show’ what good practice is, not just impose ‘values’ that are not present in our actions and behaviors.

The study has identified a number of rather simple changes to existing programs that would both improve our evaluations of our training programs, as well as draw greater engagement with recipient communities. Measures such as providing a ‘clearing house’ or ‘web portal’ for Independent Completion Reports, Independent Project Reviews and Mid-Term Reviews would contribute to further research and impact upon training project evaluations and development. The onus is upon the ‘actors’ to bring about changes in their own practice, and the recommendations go some way toward achieving this.

This study has contributed to identifying the improvements into development practice highlighting the need to improve evaluation practices in education and training projects. Further research is required to assist Timor-Leste civil society develop their vocational training and workforce development needs. Some of the issues for further research have been identified in this study and there may be many more, nonetheless this is a beginning, and a first step toward designing more appropriate capacity building interventions.

The limitations of this study relate to the small number of training program ‘evaluations’ examined in both Indonesia and Timor-Leste. Although small in number, these programs were significant moments for both countries. A further limitation of this study relates to the length of time that elapsed between data collection and final analysis; however, we are confident that the findings and recommendations would not be too dissimilar if this delay had not occurred.

Further research examining the impact of donor ‘conditions’ for aid would provide some meaningful ‘introspection’ around dominant cultural representations, and the impost of these representations on recipient communities. In addition conducting more detailed research into the benefits
of ‘engaging locals’ in evaluations would prove beneficial to the development community as well as recipient communities. In the end, it is beholden upon all involved in development work to reflect meaningfully upon their practice, donors and recipients alike.
References


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Pruetipibultham, O. (2012). Developing human resource development interventions to aid expatriates' cultural adaptation: insights to the


Chapter Nine: Appendices

Appendix One-Interview Questions

Looking for a way out!

1. In your own view what characteristics makes a ‘good’ trainer?

2. In the context of your cultural environment what forms of training are effective?
   - Give examples if required; Group, Individual, Self-paced, Interactive, Didactic On the job, mentoring

3. What instruments are used in your organisation to determine the success of training? What assessment/evaluation is conducted into training activities?

4. How has the capacity of your organisation changed as a result of training and/or skills development.

5. How are participants selected for training and skills development, are they based upon:
   - Position in the organisation
   - Length of employment
   - Educational level
   - Organisational requirements Other, please specify

6. Describe the approach to conducting training needs in your organisation.
   - Who in your organisation identifies the training needs?
   - How are the decisions to conduct training arrived at?
   - How are topics/areas of training determined?

7. Is there any link between ‘training’ and ‘capacity building’. Can you describe this?
   - How is this link evident in your organisation?

8. In what circumstances is it important/appropriate to have international contributions?
   - Describe the circumstances where it is important to have international (contributors/input) in training.
   - Describe the circumstances where it is not appropriate to have international (contributions/input) in training.

9. Can you identify any ‘improvements’ and ‘change’ in practice following formal or informal training activities?

10. Is there anything else you would like to say?
Appendix Two - Ethics Approval

MEMO

TO     Prof. Hurriyet Babacan
       Institute for Community Engagement and Policy Alternatives
       Footscray Park Campus

FROM    Dr. Harriet Speed
        Acting Chair
        Arts, Education & Human Development Human Research Ethics Subcommittee

DATE    02/04/2008

SUBJECT Ethics Application – HRETH 07/216

Dear Prof. Babacan

Thank you for submitting this application for ethical approval of the project:

HRETH 07/216  An examination of the role of skills development and training and its impact on aid practices and their development outcomes, with particular reference to Indonesia and Timor-Leste.

The proposed research project has been accepted and deemed to meet the requirements of the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) ‘National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007)’, by the Acting Chair, Faculty of Arts, Education & Human Development Human Research Ethics Subcommittee. Approval has been granted from 2 April 2008 to 2 April 2010.

Please note that the Human Research Ethics Committee must be informed of the following: any changes to the approved research protocol, project timelines, any serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants, and unforeseen events that may effect continued ethical acceptability of the project. In these unlikely events, researchers must immediately cease all data collection until the Committee has approved the changes.

Continued approval of this research project by the Victoria University Human Research Ethics Committee (VUHREC) is conditional upon the provision of a report within 12 months of the above approval date (by 2 April 2009) or upon the completion of the project (if earlier). A report proforma may be downloaded from the VUHREC web site at: http://research.vu.edu.au/hrec.php

If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me on 9919 5412.

On behalf of the Committee, I wish you all the best for the conduct of the project

Dr. Harriet Speed
Acting Chair
Faculty of Arts, Education & Human Development Human Research Ethics Subcommittee
Appendix Three- Consent Form

CONSENT FORM
FOR PARTICIPANTS INVOLVED IN RESEARCH

INFORMATION TO PARTICIPANTS FOR INTERVIEW:
We would like to invite you to be a part of a study into...

The aim of this research is to identify existing aid practices and the appropriate education and training approaches that might assist in delivering improvements in developmental outcomes. The information collected through this interview will respect the participants’ needs and acknowledge any social, physical and confidentiality risks and will be handled sensitively as detailed below.

CERTIFICATION BY SUBJECT
I, of...
certify that I am at least 18 years old* and that I am voluntarily giving my consent to participate in the study:

Looking for a way out!
“An examination of the role of skills development and training and its impact on aid practices and their development outcomes, with particular reference to Indonesia and Timor Leste” being conducted at Victoria University by: Prof Hurriyet Babacan

I certify that the objectives of the study, together with the risks and safeguards associated with the procedures listed below:
  - Physical risks, safety of the participants will be paramount, participants will be asked to nominate suitable interview places.
  - Social risks, disclosure of information about workplaces will be coded ensuring anonymity and participants will be given the option of having the interview conducted by a Muslim woman (who is also the Principal investigator), if they so wish.
  - Confidentiality issues, all identifying organisational and personal information will be removed from the research instruments.

have been fully explained to me by: Mr Brian Fairman and that I freely consent to participation involving the use on me of these procedures: Interview

I certify that I have had the opportunity to have any questions answered and that I understand that I can withdraw from this study at any time and that this withdrawal will not jeopardise me in any way.
I have been informed that the information I provide will be kept confidential.

Signed:

Witness other than the researcher:

Date:

Any queries about your participation in this project may be directed to the researcher Prof Hurriyet Babacan +613 9919 5485.

If you have any queries or complaints about the way you have been treated, you may contact the Secretary, Victoria University Human Research Ethics Committee, Victoria University, PO Box 14428, Melbourne, VIC, 8001 phone +6139919 4781
Appendix Four- Plain Language Statement of Research

Plain language statement of project

Tikkly et al, (2003) from recent research, devise a typology for the types of skills needed in a predominantly agrarian society attempting to diversify its economic base and democratise its political structure. They note that there is a need for basic skills; generic and transferable skills; private sector/business skills; public sector skills; vocational skills; agricultural skills; high skills (technological); service sector skills and political and citizenship skills. This is the gamut of skills that a developing country requires in the context of a globalised world. Governments and philanthropic trusts have, for many years, provided internationally selected communities with 'specialised' skills from the donor country. This approach has had a mixed success in its application. It may be the case that the only real benefits to the recipient community is the appearance of a 'foreigner' in there midst.

Drawing on from Aid and Development and Vocational Educational theories (Freire 1993, Foster 2002, Gonczi 2004, Hager 2006) this research is built on the conceptual framework that paradigms of learning is based on the development of capacities that go far beyond the cognitive. Thus knowledge and learning is taken as a change agent that enables know how of various kinds and allows the learner to act on the knowledge as well as develop awareness of self as an agent of change. Long-term sustainable development outcomes require that capacity be built into the recipient community for ongoing benefits. Training communities to manage, develop and own the skills development process may prove to be the most beneficial international aid response for the recipient countries.

Through an evaluation of existing training approaches and methodologies employed in the Aid and Development sector we will be able to generalise to other forms of training interventions in the public and private sector which are effective in terms of sustainable skills development.
Appendix Five-Confidentiality exemption- JC Freitas

JCanio Freitas <jcanio.freitas@gmail.com>  
To: Brian Fairman  

Aug 5 at 10:05 AM

Dear Brian,

Greetings from Dili. Sorry for getting back to you just now. I was so full that I did not even have time to reply to you.
The reaccreditation process in underway, all the directors of the departments and faculties are working on the details as required as attachments. By the end of the month I and some colleagues will put them all together in the final document. Luckily, DIT we are working on one course only to be assessed which is Finance Management Course. Other courses will wait for the next government that comes after the 2017 general elections.

By the way, with regard to your request I confirm my agreement for you to use my statements as the then minister for education for the purpose of your Ph.D research.

Hope all the best for your studies
regards

João Câncio Freitas
Appendix Six - EOI for Hospitality Tourism under ESSP

Request for Expressions of Interest (EOI)

to provide
Instructor Training and Hospitality Training in Food Preparation and Kitchen Operations in Timor Leste

EOI No: 04-01/08

Background:
The Education Sector Support Project (ESSP) comprises a program of support to the Government of Timor Leste, financed by the World Bank and AusAID, to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Education (MoE) for effective policy development, resource management, and innovation. ESSP commenced in early 2008 with a projected conclusion in 2012.

ESSP is being implemented under four (4) Components – Component 1: Capacity Building for Policy, Planning and Program Development; Component 2: Learning Materials Development; Component 3: Construction/Rehabilitation Design and Quality Assurance; and Component 4: Vocational Education and Training System Development.

This EOI is being issued under Component 4.

The centre-piece of the approach adopted by MoE to the design and implementation of Component 4 is a series of vocational education and training (VET) instructor training pilots integrated with the actual training of a number of students or trainees in a selection of priority economic sectors. One of those sectors will be the hospitality and tourism sector, and specifically the food preparation and kitchen operation stream. These pilots and a subsequent evaluation of them will inform the development of some key aspects of a national VET system currently being established in Timor Leste.

Selection Process:
The MoE will employ a Quality and Cost-Based Selection (QCBS) process in accordance with World Bank Guidelines for Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers, May 2004. This process utilises a competitive process among short-listed firms that takes account of the quality of the proposal and the cost of the required services in the selection of the successful firm. The relative weight to be attributed to quality and cost will be determined later and informed to those firms that have been shortlisted.

At this stage the MoE is seeking an EOI from suitably experienced and recognised training providers that clearly and unambiguously address the key criteria in the following section.

Following receipt of the EOI the MoE will produce a shortlist of qualified training providers who will be invited formally by means of a Request for Proposal (RFP) to prepare a full, detailed submission.

Essential Criteria for Shortlisting:
Firms seeking shortlisting must be able to demonstrate that –

• They are a registered, accredited or certified training provider in their country of origin or incorporation and have been in continuous operation for a minimum of 5 years;

• They have verifiable evidence that the scope of their registration, accreditation or certification permits them to provide training to all levels of formal vocational qualification in the national training system of their country of origin or incorporation in the hospitality and tourism sector, and specifically the food
preparation and kitchen operations stream of that sector; and can produce evidence of having provided such training:

- They have verifiable evidence that the scope of their registration, accreditation or certification permits them to provide training to all levels of formal vocational qualification in the national training system of their country of origin or incorporation in the HRD and training sector, and specifically the workplace training and assessment stream of that sector; and can produce evidence of having provided such training;

- They can provide evidence of already having access to commercial scale kitchens in Timor Leste, preferably Dili, for a period of no less than two (2) years commencing no later than May 2009, or an alternative plan for providing commercial scale kitchens within the same timeframe to train at least 20 polytechnic instructors in both food preparation and kitchen operations, and in workplace training delivery and assessment, and up to 50 student trainees in food preparation and kitchen operations;

- They can provide evidence of experience in “packaging” industry relevant competencies and standards into vocational qualifications, and can demonstrate understanding of the processes involved in registering and positioning those qualifications within a National Qualifications Framework (NQF); and,

- They can deliver the required training and technical assistance in one of the following languages – Tetun, English or Bahasa Indonesia.

Desirable but Not Essential Criteria:

- Experience in a training environment in Timor Leste or a similarly sized developing country with a similar economic context

Lodgment Details:

Expressions of interest should consist of no more than three (3) A4 pages (excluding evidentiary attachments) indicating the EOI title and number (see below) and a response to the six (6) essential selection criteria above.

Expressions of interest should be enclosed in an envelope and clearly marked in the top left hand corner:

Instructor and Hospitality Training Provision – EOI No: 04-01/08

and addressed to:

The Project Procurement Officer,
Education Sector Support Project,
Ministry of Education,
Villa Verde St, Villa Verde, Dili, Timor Leste

or lodged electronically through
trevorp@essp-moe.org

Expressions of interest must be received no later than 5.00pm, 19 December 2008.
Appendix Seven-DFAT release of IASTP II and III reports

DFAT release of IASTP III Independent Completion Report

Dear Brian

Thank you for your correspondence relating to the Indonesia Australia Specialised Training Project Phase III (IASTP III). Your request for documents has been forwarded to the Indonesia and Timor Leste Branch for response.

We are able to release a copy of the Independent Completion Report for IASTP III, which was completed in December 2008 at the closure of the project. Please note, consistent with Freedom of Information Act principles, we have removed individuals’ names and commercially sensitive budget information.

I hope this fulfills your request, and thank you for your query.

Elly

Elly Lawson
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Assistant Secretary
Indonesia Program Delivery and Timor Leste Branch
South-East Asia Maritime Division

E | elly.lawson@dfat.gov.au
M | 0421 588 462
T | +61 2 6261 1428
Dear Brian

Thanks for your email below. We have looked into your additional query and are happy to be able to release a copy of the Activity Completion Report for IASTP II. Again, consistent with Freedom of Information Act principles, we have removed detailed, commercially-sensitive budget information.

For your background, two reviews were combined together in order to efficiently meet corporate requirements – an Independent Completion Review and an Activity Completion Review. The findings are combined in the attached report.

I hope this additional report meets your requirements.

With kind regards

Elly