Moral Description: Overcoming the Fact-Value Dichotomy in Social Research
Doughney, James (2004) Moral Description: Overcoming the Fact-Value Dichotomy in Social Research. International Journal of Mental Health and Addiction, 2 (2). pp. 6-12. ISSN 1557-1874 (Print) 1557-1882 (Online)Full text for this resource is not available from the Research Repository.
Values in social research are a vexed question. However, they cannot and should not be avoided. This article argues against the familiar fact-value dichotomy and presents a cognitive approach to values based inter alia on the views of the philosophers JuEus Kovesi (1967) and Hilary Putnam (1990, 2(02) and the economist philosopher Amartya Sen (1982, 1(87). The article concludes that rejecting the fact-value dichotomy does not mean that "anything goes." On the contrary, it proposes reuniting facts and values in a common, factually-grounded and rational cognitive enterprise.
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||values, fact-value dichotomy, social research|
|Subjects:||RFCD Classification > 220000 Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts-General
Faculty/School/Research Centre/Department > School of Social Sciences and Psychology
|Depositing User:||Mr Angeera Sidaya|
|Date Deposited:||23 Oct 2006|
|Last Modified:||07 Jun 2012 05:22|
|ePrint Statistics:||View download statistics for this item|
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