‘A Divided Soul’? The Cold War Odyssey of O. John Rogge

Phillip Deery

In 1948 O. John Rogge, a prominent American liberal, was a contender for the Progressive Party’s vice-presidential nomination. He was then a man of the Left: an activist in the international peace movement, a champion of radical causes and a defender of organisations deemed subversive by the Department of Justice. In 1951 he persuaded his client to turn government witness in the Rosenberg espionage trial and was converted into ‘Rogge the Rat’ by his former allies. In tracing this transformation, this paper will argue that Rogge was neither a typical Cold War apostate nor a typical anti-Stalinist intellectual. Instead, his political trajectory was the outcome of a failed attempt to steer global politics away from Cold War dichotomies. The paper will therefore throw new light both on the movement to find a ‘third way’ between East and West, and on the phenomenon of non-communist Left activism during the early Cold War.

An American historian recently remarked of Left liberal intellectuals that ‘because they were the sparkplugs of reform, the heart and soul of liberalism in America, the choices that activist intellectuals made during the early years of the Cold War were crucial to the history of postwar America’.¹ Frequently, one of the important choices made by American intellectuals was to join the anti-communist crusade. Despite their inchoate character and their propensity for in-fighting, most non-Stalinist intellectuals normally formed or joined anti-communist organisations such as American Intellectuals for Freedom, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCL), or mobilised around core ideas such as Schlesinger’s ‘vital center’ and publications such as The New Leader, Partisan Review or Daily Compass. The historical scholarship on such intellectuals is invariably framed by this feature. They are discussed in relation to their contribution to or role in these organisations and activities.² Thus, the part played by individual activists in the anti-communist politics of the early Cold War has generally been overlooked.³ This article seeks to fill, partially, that gap. The article also aims to contribute to an emerging Cold War literature that focuses not on the United States government and its agents but on non-governmental forces and private citizens groups that sought to influence the culture of the Cold War.⁴ With its emphasis on semi-autonomous
actions by an anti-Stalinist intellectual, the article extends that historiography. The individual concerned is Oetje John Rogge.

Rogge was a New York lawyer with a high profile and an established record of activism in both legal and political circles. Despite the Rosenberg case, in which he defended Ethel Rosenberg’s brother, David Greenglass, and which assured him of celebrity status; despite W.E.B. Du Bois judging him to be a ‘national figure’; and despite two historians’ assessment that he was ‘one of the country’s most prominent radical lawyers’, Rogge has been completely overlooked by biographers and escaped the attention of most Cold War scholars. Today he remains a forgotten figure in American history. An aim of this paper, therefore, is to rectify a significant historiographical deficiency. But there is a more compelling reason for focusing on Rogge: he provides us with an illuminating case study of American liberalism in the Cold War. Through him, we can begin to answer an important question: what political space could be occupied by liberal activists, such as Rogge, who chose neither Moscow nor Washington? This paper will argue that the experience of O. John Rogge reveals that, when McCarthyism was beginning to gouge the political landscape, there was in effect no room for manoeuvre permitted to those seeking dialogue between East and West. Notwithstanding the vast American literature on the Cold War, this issue has rarely been addressed and, even then, only in relation to Henry Wallace. Certainly, there have been important studies, covering the Cold War period, of individual American liberal intellectuals, including scientists such as J. Robert Oppenheimer and E. U. Condon, and scholars such as Sidney Hook and Lionel Trilling. However, none has emphasised or explicitly addressed how their subjects, like Rogge, attempted to uphold both political Leftism and Cold War anticomunism.

Rogge also warrants scholarly attention for the same reasons that Orwell continues to attract biographers: both repudiated totalitarianism from the Left as well as the Right; both condemned Soviet as well as American imperialism; both remained committed social democrats working within but critical of the capitalist system; both attempted to find an independent path, a third way, through the geo-political and ideological minefields of the Cold War; and both became so disillusioned with, hostile to, or anxious about Stalinism that each was prepared to assist the State: in Rogge’s case, the US State Department; in Orwell’s case, the clandestine Information Research Department (IRD) within the British Foreign Office. And as with Orwell,
who remained on the Left but was applauded by the Right, we can ask of Rogge:
where can such an individual be pinned on an ideological spectrum that was rapidly
being re-drawn by Cold War imperatives?

Rogge presents us with a conundrum. If we examine the years before 1951, we
discover Rogge’s long record of activity in or for the progressive Left. In 1947 Rogge
became the defending attorney for the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
(JAFRC) when it was deemed a subversive organization and charged with contempt
of Congress by the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). He
represented the labor leader Harold Christoffel through a series of trials also from
1947 through to 1950. In 1948 Rogge served as defence counsel in the Smith Act
prosecutions that eventually decapitated the Communist Party. In 1949 he
represented the National Federal Employees’ Defence Committee in its legal assault
on Truman’s Executive Order 9835 - the loyalty-security program. Rogge’s political
commitment in the late 1940s ran far deeper than his choice of legal briefs. In late
1947, he joined the increasingly communist-dominated American Labor Party (ALP)
led by the charismatic East Harlem congressman Vito Marcantonio. Rogge ran on its
judicial slate in the 1948 elections and won sufficient votes (97,418) to split the
Democratic vote which permitted the narrow election of the Republican candidate,
George Frankenthaler. He was a leading candidate for nomination as Henry
Wallace’s running mate in the latter’s bid for presidency. By 1949, he was both the
New York State chairman of the Wallace for President Committee and a National
Executive member of the Progressive Party that was formed in the summer of 1948. It
is likely that the Wallace Progressive Party became communist-influenced, but not
until its demise was it communist-dominated. Yet the label of the latter was fixed
early by the Truman administration and it stuck. But O. John Rogge deserted neither
the Progressive Party nor Wallace, even when propaganda about its pro-communist
leanings and about Wallace being a communist dupe, became insidious, systematic
and effective.

Significantly, Rogge assumed leading roles in three organisations that were
clearly left-leaning or communist-dominated: the World Committee of Partisans for
Peace (vice-president), the National Lawyers’ Guild (vice-president) and the Civil
Rights Congress, the legal arm of the Communist Party in racial equality cases. The
latter picked up Rogge’s phrase, ‘Scottsboro – 1948’ in its championing of the
‘Trenton Six’. He regularly attacked conspiracy indictments, the operation of the
loyalty boards, the Subversive Activities Control Board, J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI, the serious erosion of civil liberties and the unconstitutionality of HUAC, which was ‘consistently pushing us in the direction of a fascist police state’. xxvi He even alleged that Middle Eastern oil, more than anti-communist ideology, was the main motivation for the Truman Doctrine. xxvii And he continually alleged that the communist threat was a communist bogey:

The Communist scare is a tremendous hoax which looms the threat of the American police state and the third world war…Insidiously, step by step, the enemies of our civil liberties have advanced behind [this] poisonous smoke-screen. xxviii

He was also in constant demand as a public speaker for Left causes. In early 1950, for example, Rogge spoke at a peace rally organised by the Joint Committee for Aid to Anti-Fascist Emigrants in New York. xxix And communists took note of Rogge’s words. His prediction of a ‘dramatic round-up of dozens of Communist leaders and alleged fellow-travellers’ xxx by the Justice Department - similar to the Palmer Raids in 1919-20 - was the foundation for the Communist Party’s fateful decision to go underground in 1950. xxxi

However, if we take 1951 as our reference point, Rogge can firmly attached to the Right. On 5 April 1951 Judge Irving R. Kaufman sentenced Julius and Ethel Rosenberg to death. Crucial to their conviction was the testimony of Ethel’s brother, David Greenglass. Unlike the Rosenbergs, Greenglass confessed to espionage at Los Alamos, turned prosecution witness and was spared the electric chair. Representing Greenglass – and who, significantly, persuaded him to implicate the Rosenbergs – was Rogge. According to one prosecutor, ‘most’ of the credit for the convictions rests with Rogge: ‘Without John Rogge there might not have been a successful prosecution. Indeed, it is not too much to say that Mr. Rogge broke the Rosenberg case.’ xxxii Not only did he assist with the conviction of the Rosenbergs but also was himself a key prosecution witness. The occasion was the Truman government’s attempt in 1951 to prosecute W.E.B. Du Bois, America’s most prominent black intellectual, and his Communist Party associates in the Peace Information Center for failing to register as agents of a foreign power. Accordingly, Rogge was excoriated by the far Left. The journalist, I.F. Stone, accused him of ‘betrayal’ xxxiii while the Daily
Worker journalist, Abner Berry, saw him as a ‘stool pigeon’ and a ‘renegade’. To Charles Howard, a black lawyer from Iowa and a member of the communist faction within the Progressive Party, Rogge was ‘the advocate of the slaveholder, Jefferson Davis, yes, and even of King George III’. Du Bois devoted an entire chapter to Rogge in his autobiographical work. The chapter title – ‘Oh! John Rogge’ – expressed its tone. He alleged that Rogge ‘hated Negroes’, was ‘an ambitious man…overborne by his sudden rise to notoriety’ and ‘like so many Americans, wanted money and a great deal of it’. He saved his most stinging epithet for the final sentence: ‘to Wallace the Weasel I now add, Rogge the Rat’. Equally damning was the assessment of Rogge by his former friend, Albert Kahn, for whom Rogge wrote the Introduction in his polemical Treason in Congress. Kahn wrote: ‘The case of Rogge may be of interest as a study in character degeneration. But its chief significance is not a matter of personality but of politics. Rogge demonstrates the development of a renegade’. Kahn approvingly cited ‘a Negro woman’ who said of Rogge: ‘There walks a Judas, and a Judas walks alone’. Rogge, then, was the quintessential apostate – a man who not only lost his way but who supped with the devil. He was to be condemned, not pitied. Condemnation continued for another thirty years: to Gus Hall, Rogge was ‘the provocateur and informer’ who was found beneath ‘slimy rocks’ from which he was ‘shovelled up’. Most recently, a senior KGB officer, to whom Julius Rosenberg and Klaus Fuchs reported, alleged that Rogge was a ‘CIA penetration agent in the special section for international organizations’.

It is through this contradiction of, on the one hand, Rogge speaking and acting on behalf of radical causes and, on the other, being fiercely attacked by the Left, that the major preoccupation of this paper emerges: the position of the non-doctrinaire, independent-minded progressive during the early Cold War. Rogge embodied this position. He believed he could carve out some middle ground for himself - and others - to occupy. But the polarities of the Cold War proved too extreme and all that remained was a desolate territory marked by political isolation and impotence. So Rogge’s case serves to highlight the dilemma confronting many American liberals from the late 1940s: either risk being tarred with the communist brush or embrace the anti-communist crusade. Rogge did neither. His experience thus provides us with a strong litmus test of the consequences of attempting to circumvent the Manichean framework of the Cold War.
But first, who was O. John Rogge and what was his pre-Cold War background? This background provides a distinct pointer to his later trajectory. Oetje John Rogge was born on a farm in Illinois on 12 October 1903 to German immigrants. Until he entered school he spoke only ‘Low’ German. In 1922, this young man of nineteen, now six foot three inches tall, graduated from the University of Illinois. From there he began an exceptional academic career at Harvard Law School where he earned an LL.B in 1925 and edited the *Harvard Law Review*. He returned to Harvard during the Great Depression, completed a doctor of laws degree and, inspired by Felix Frankfurter, moved to Washington and became special counsel to a New Deal relief agency, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. After a series of successful cases he was promoted to assistant Attorney-General in the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. In 1939, he opened a wide-ranging probe into political corruption directed at the remnants of Huey Long’s Louisiana machine. Rogge won indictments and - according to an historian of Louisiana politics, Harnett Kane - ‘became a Paul Bunyan of the grand-jury system and the courtrooms of Louisiana’ cracking apart ‘more fortunes than the genius Huey himself’.

In 1940, Rogge gave two addresses – the first to a New England seminar on civil liberties; the second to the New Jersey Civil Liberties Union – that captured the essence of Rogge’s philosophical position. It needs to be noted that, although the United States had not yet entered World War II, this was the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact, when Western communist parties vehemently opposed any Allied involvement in the war and their legal proscription was either being mooted (as in the US and Great Britain) or had occurred (as in Australia)

We can’t start suppressing doctrines we despise without suppressing legitimate protest…[I]n dealing with even confessedly subversive elements such as the Reds and militant fascists, as long as I have anything to say about criminal law policy there, the Department is not going to stretch the existing sedition statutes to fit cases that do not meet the legal test of clear and present danger of revolutionary violence. For the same reason I oppose any proposal for new sedition legislation which does not meet that test.
It is little wonder that the Left embraced Rogge. He also stated that insofar as the Justice Department’s Criminal Division had the power to prevent it, ‘we will not allow the alien or the radical to become victim of persecution; but we will not let such emotionally charged epithets as “witch hunters”, “red baiters”, or “persecutors” to deter us in our efforts to punish communists, fascists and aliens who flout our criminal laws’. xl

In 1943, Rogge became special assistant to Attorney-General Francis Biddle and assumed direction of the government’s wartime sedition case against thirty American pro-Nazis. This case ended in a mistrial when the presiding judge died. It also culminated in Rogge’s controversial dismissal, in October 1946, from the Justice Department by the new United States Attorney-General, Tom Clark, and apparently on orders from President Truman, when he publicised evidence he uncovered in Germany that linked the American Nazis with twenty four United States Congressmen. xli Rogge’s dedication to anti-fascism stretched back to 1940 when members of the Dies Committee judged his anti-Nazi remarks to be ‘Commy in tenor’. xlii After World War II, it did not waver. He repeatedly and publicly emphasised the dangers of fascism in America: ‘I am more afraid of fascism than communism in America’; ‘fascism in America is masquerading under the name of nationalism’; ‘fascism is not dead in the United States, it is simply reconverting’; and ‘the fascist threat to democracy is greater now than at any time since 1932’. xliii Soon, he perceived Cold War attacks on the Hollywood Ten and American radicals generally as ‘incipient fascism’. xliv In 1949, he went as far as claiming that with the Truman administration, ‘we are getting fascism American style’. xlv

Disillusioned with Truman’s administration, Rogge left Washington, dropped his Democratic Party affiliation, joined Marcantonio’s American Labor Party and entered private practice in New York. xlv This last move prompted the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee to request that he conduct its legal defence – a case that continued until 1950, when after numerous appeals conducted by Rogge, the entire Executive Committee was jailed for contempt of Congress. xlvii

Thus, before the Cold War commenced, it would appear that Rogge had developed some recognisable characteristics: he was strong-willed, even stubborn; he was forthright and ready to speak his mind without fear; his highly successful career was meteoric but there were setbacks; he had strongly-held principles regarding civil rights and the rule of law; and whilst politically opposed to both ‘the Reds’ (as he
termed them) and the extreme Right he remained committed to their right of free speech if the law were not transgressed. The abiding impression he gave one interviewer in 1978 was that he was ‘a strong and independent thinker, a very determined man’. These traits must be recognised if we are to understand his apparent apostasy during the Cold War, especially in regard to the international peace movement in the early 1950s.

When an historian of the American Communist Party commented that the speech given by O. John Rogge to the Second World Peace Congress in Warsaw in November 1950 ‘caused a scene of memorable proportions’, he was probably underestimating the impact. For Rogge it was his crossing of the Rubicon. For communists and most ‘fellow-travellers’ within the peace movement, it was heresy. For anti-Soviet officials within the Foreign Office and State Department, it was a watershed. Before we examine his speech, its genesis needs to be traced. According to a highly detailed, HUAC-sponsored Report on the Communist “Peace” Offensive, there was neither warning nor reason: Rogge ‘regularly attended and supported international Communist “peace” gatherings’ and until November 1950 (when he was not re-elected) was a vice-chairman of the Permanent Committee of the World Congress of Partisans for Peace. Thus, the Report noted, ‘for some unexplained reason, Rogge delivered a speech to this “peace” congress on November 19 in which he made a major break with the Communist Party “peace” line’. The Information Research Department was more sensitive than HUAC to ideological nuances, and it was less surprised. It noted that ‘Rogge is an American citizen …[who] has at times taken an independent line and has criticised Moscow.’

The IRD was right. Rogge had steadily been moving towards the position he took in Warsaw since, at least, April 1949. Then, he attended a meeting of the World Congress of Partisans for Peace in Paris. According to a New York Herald Tribune correspondent present, delegates were ‘rudely awakened’ from their somnolence on the fourth day by O. John Rogge. He drew hisses and boos when he stated that the Soviet Union shared responsibility with the United States for the present state of world tension. True to his bi-partisanship, but uncharacteristic of the Soviet-dominated peace movement since the Cominform’s ‘two-camp’ thesis was enunciated in late 1947, Rogge told the hostile audience that the communist countries ‘must learn
to live with the capitalist countries for each has its virtues and defects and each can
learn from the other’. Moreover, ‘injustices and restrictions on the one side are
matched by injustices and restrictions on the other’. Rogge told the newspaper
 correspondent that this was the third such congress he had attended. liii
Overwhelmingly, Rogge stated, each attacked the United States and ‘I don’t think
that’s the way to peace’. He had shown the text of his speech to another member of
the American delegation who advised him not to deliver it. But Rogge, being either
stubborn or defiant, was undaunted: he knew what position he would take before the
Congress opened and ‘[he] knew they wouldn’t like it’. liii

Nevertheless, Rogge continued to use the peace platform to broadcast
iconoclastic ideas. First, at the Continental Congress for Peace in Mexico City on 9
September 1949, he again was critical of the Soviet Union. However, he also
emphasised the suppression of civil liberty by the Truman administration and the path
towards fascism that the United States was taking – evidenced, he said, by the fierce
physical violence displayed by vigilantes at an outdoor concert at Peekskill, N.Y., the
preceding week. lv Apparent Rogge had been bypassed by the organisers for the first
three days of the Congress and then ‘allowed’ to speak. lv Second, Rogge travelled to
the Kremlin and addressed the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on 8 March 1950. In
his ‘personal plan for peace’, he proposed the establishment of a United Nations (UN)
‘watchdog’ body that would have the power to conduct unlimited inspection of all
atomic energy installations as well as all armed forces and military bases. This body
would publish its findings regularly and thereby relieve all nations of the necessity for
military intelligence and counterintelligence. This, in turn, would immediately end
war tension and pave the way for general reduction of armaments and the turning of
the world to peacetime pursuits. lvvi There is no report of the Soviet reaction to this
unique proposal but judging from the vitriolic anti-American rhetoric of the other
American delegate, artist Rockwell Kent, it is likely to have fallen on deaf ears. lvii In
the same speech, grandiosely entitled ‘Moving the Mountains of Fear’, he again called
for less denunciation and recrimination from both sides.

The Permanent Committee of the World Peace Congress met in Stockholm ten
days later and, as a vice-president, Rogge attended. The ‘two-camp’ line of the
Cominform had recently been replaced by the ‘peace offensive’ and in this context
the Stockholm Appeal, which called for the outlawing of atomic weapons, was
launched. lviii Rogge became one of the original sponsors in what proved to be a major
initiative of the peace movement: an astonishing 473 million signatures were collected internationally within five months. Stockholm was Rogge’s third opportunity to remain the bone in the throat of the Partisans for Peace. He developed his now-familiar refrain: that America and Russia must cease blaming each other for the ills of the world; that East and West must become trading partners; and that the UN must provide the framework for international cooperation. ‘Then’, he concluded with a rhetorical, if not naïve, flourish, ‘it will be possible for us to transform the face of the world, see our meadows in flower, reach new summits, discover undreamed of horizons and, while still alive, explore paradise as well as the earth’. A clear harbinger of the direction Rogge was heading, as well as indicative of his fearlessness, was his open dissension at Stockholm with the president of the World Peace Congress, Professor Frederic Joliot-Curie. The latter alleged that the rulers of the United States wanted to wage war; Rogge challenged this and repudiated Joliot-Curie’s use of ‘warmongers’ and ‘bloodthirsty imperialists’ to describe American leaders.

The final occasion before the Warsaw Peace Congress at which Rogge contradicted the ‘party line’ was a Bureau meeting of the Partisans of Peace, held in Prague in mid-August 1950. He submitted three resolutions. The first proposed that the Stockholm Peace Appeal be significantly amended to outlaw ‘all aggression from whatever source and by whatever country’; with the United States in its sights, the existing Appeal condemned as ‘war criminals’ any country that made first use of the atom bomb. The second resolution called on the committee to readmit the Yugoslav delegation, expelled in October 1949 for allegedly preparing for aggression against its communist neighbours; and the third, that a commission be established that reported to the UN Security Council, and which mediated between both sides in the Korean war, now two months old. However, none of these resolutions was presented to the executive committee for consideration despite Joliot-Curie being given them by Rogge two days previously. Rogge was being frozen out. Although not evident to anyone then or since, or even necessarily from these resolutions, Korea and Yugoslavia were the primary catalysts for Rogge’s apparent ‘metamorphosis’ at Warsaw.

After the 1948 dispute between Stalin and Tito and the consequent expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform, the ejection of its representatives from the World Peace Congress Permanent Committee and the imposition of an economic and
diplomatic boycott, the Tito government was subjected to a barrage of toxic propaganda from the Soviet Union and its supporters. The Yugoslav government became a fascist conspiracy masterminded by imperialists to disrupt the socialist world. The term ‘fascist Tito clique’ entered the lexicon of all Western communist parties. A British Communist Party publication, for example, implausibly titled *Tito’s Plot Against Europe*, alleged that the ‘Tito clique’ were both ‘fascist’ and ‘agents of Anglo-American imperialism’, while the general secretary of the Spanish Communist Party, Dolores Ibarruri, argued that ‘Tito-ite agents – former Gestapo agents’ were assisting preparations ‘for a new aggressive war against the Soviet Union’. The Cominform’s publication, echoing the epithets of the 1930s Stalinist purges, referred to Titoists as ‘jackals’ and a ‘contemptible gang of spies and assassins’.\textsuperscript{lxvi} To independent thinkers on the Left, like Rogge, Jean Cassou and Konni Zilliacus, such invective – quite apart from its disingenuousness - was anathema.\textsuperscript{lxvii} The three wrote a remarkably lucid and cogent twelve-page statement in which they defended the right of Yugoslavia to pursue its path of self-determination outside both the Soviet bloc and West.

We have all three independently visited Yugoslavia since the outbreak of the conflict with the Soviet Union and have seen and heard enough while in that country to enable us to make up our minds on the situation. We have all three independently come to the conclusion that the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict raises issues of principle that go the heart of the controversy about the cold war and that cannot be neglected in making the case for peace.\textsuperscript{lxviii}

They argued that the case of Yugoslavia was of ‘transcendent importance’ to the peace movement because it raised the fundamental issue of interference by a foreign power – in this case, ‘the power of the Soviet State...to coerce Yugoslavia into submission’. Just as they were opposed to the American policy of undermining communist parties through interference in the internal affairs of their respective countries, so Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia must be resisted. Without a ‘live-and-let-live agreement’ between East and West, which the Yugoslavia situation epitomised, world peace would be impossible. They described Cominform propaganda - that Yugoslavia had become a military base of Anglo-American imperialism and was receiving arms and officers from the West - as ‘monstrous
inventions’ and ‘sinister’ in character. On the other hand, they judged Yugoslavia’s stand as ‘courageous’ and ‘praiseworthy’. Conveniently overlooking its role within the Cominform prior to its ex-communication, when it set the pace (with Soviet blessing) for intolerance and intransigence, Rogge, Cassou and Zilliacus stated:

In international affairs the Yugoslavia Government are opposed to blocs and alliances and take their stand on the U.N. Charter, particularly on the fundamental principles of equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and peaceful settlement of all differences. They have not entered into any political or military commitments...[and] have pursued an independent policy at the United Nations, frequently making proposals of their own.

These were precisely the principles that Rogge stood for. It is not surprising, therefore, that he should embrace Yugoslavia. Nor was it surprising that, when he did, the full, unqualified spleen of the pro-Soviet Left would be aimed at him. There was, for example, ‘a lively scene’, according to a MI6 report, when, in London on 1 June 1950, Paul Robeson became ‘embroiled’ with a Yugoslav press representative. Rogge intervened on behalf of the Yugoslav, whereupon Robeson, ‘in great anger’ declared both to be the ‘tools of fascist aggressors’. Such wrath confirmed Rogge in the righteousness of his judgement and propelled him towards a harder, more anti-Soviet position. His close relationship with Yugoslavia was variously exemplified. First, he agreed to serve as legal counsel for Yugoslavia in the United States – hence the epithet, ‘Tito’s paid agent’. Second, when he visited the country and met with Tito in April 1950, he was awarded an honorary degree of Doctor of Law. Third, on 1 November prior to the Second World Peace Congress, he visited his confidante in the State Department, Jesse MacKnight, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. The basis of their friendship – correspondence was addressed ‘Dear Mac’ and ‘Dear John’ - remains obscure, but given Rogge’s increasing isolation and the Truman administration’s ‘growing anxiety’ in late 1950 about ‘a dangerous escalation of the Cold War’, it is perhaps not surprising that, as we shall see, each was willing to assist the other. It also must be remembered, that in the United States as in Great Britain, as Wilford has suggested, ‘the lines between the worlds of government officials and private citizens – the state apparatus and civil society - were extremely blurred’, in the early Cold War. So MacKnight met Rogge unofficially but made a
memorandum of their conversation. According to that memo, Rogge told MacKnight that the Yugoslavs had ‘urged him to attend the Sheffield meeting and speak out on the National independence line….Mr. Rogge said that this what Tito wanted’.\lxxv

The other catalyst was Korea. In Rogge’s view, the invasion of South Korea by North Korean and Chinese troops in June 1950 was wrong and the response by the US and the UN was right. But if the conflict were not to escalate into a third world war, it ‘must be settled through the United Nations, with the active participation of the Soviet Union and China as well as the Western powers’. Indeed, it seems highly plausible – given Rogge’s strong faith in the UN – that he was far more ready to proclaim the virtue of Western intervention in the Korean conflict because it occurred under the aegis of the UN. He also believed that Korea could become ‘the beginning of the end of the cold war by negotiations for a general settlement’.\lxxvi He was therefore dismayed when the Soviet press, the CPUSA, the communist factions in both the Progressive Party and the American Labor Party, and – significantly – his own Permanent Committee of the Partisans of Peace, all condemned one side only: the United States. It was also frequently implied that the South invaded the North, not vice-versa and that North Korea bore no responsibility for the invasion. In all of Rogge’s numerous writings in 1949-50, which analysed the sources of Cold War tension and/or provided a variety of solutions to conflict, whether in Yugoslavia, Korea or between East and West generally, he always strove to be balanced and critical of both America and the Soviet Union. For instance, in his ‘Appeal to Moderates’, he stated: ‘The present power struggle is further complicated by a new wave of authoritarianism which is sweeping the earth. There is considerably more of it in the East than in the West, but under the influence of our own McCarthys and McCarrans we have started to develop our own brand of it’.\lxxvii Thus, to Rogge the moral myopia of Stalin’s supporters, in which one side is absolved, the other condemned, was abhorrent.

In addition to the role of Yugoslavia and Korea in Rogge embracing anti-Stalinism, there was also the alarming issue of atomic espionage. Given Rogge’s intense interest in the atom bomb since 1945,\lxxviii as well as his defence of David Greenglass since June 1950, Rogge would not have been immune from this issue. There had already been several episodes in this interlocking story of actual or suspected espionage: the defection and sensational revelations of Igor Gouzenko in 1945, the arrest of Allen Nunn May in 1946, HUAC and the Condon case in 1947-48,
and Congressional investigation of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1949. These alerted an increasingly nervous public to the possibility of scientists’ disloyalty and atomic espionage. But it was not until the Soviets’ successful nuclear detonation in September 1949 that anxiety became alarm. America may have possessed ideological righteousness, but it no longer had technological superiority: it had lost its atomic monopoly. Worse, some American and British scientists working on the Manhattan Project knowingly assisted this development. Incontrovertible evidence of a successful Soviet atomic spy ring at Los Alamos became apparent with the confession and arrest of Klaus Fuchs on 2 February 1950. As is well known, Fuchs’ confession led to the arrest of his American courier, Harry Gold, who, in turn, implicated David Greenglass. After a lengthy interrogation by the FBI, Greenglass confessed to espionage and was arrested on 16 June 1950. As his attorney, Rogge persuaded Greenglass to turn prosecution witness against his sister and brother-in-law, Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. Thus Rogge was very familiar with that defining landmark of the early Cold War, espionage, that contributed so heavily to the rising tide of domestic anti-communism. Although there is no extant record of Rogge’s views on the headline-grabbing Hiss case, the fact that Hiss was convicted on two counts of perjury in January 1950 (the statute of limitations had expired on espionage charges) may also have fuelled Rogge’s increasingly anti-Soviet posture at this time.

These, then, were the influences and events that shaped Rogge’s thinking as he crossed the Atlantic in November 1950. There were clear signs, already, that he was a maverick within the peace movement and, with his defence of Yugoslavia, his position on Korea, and his belief in the existence of Soviet spy rings, it was becoming apparent that his address to delegates in Warsaw would be certain to cause offence. As a State Department official later commented on this pre-Warsaw period, ‘Mr. Rogge conducted a one-man campaign inside the Partisans of Peace movement’. Soon, however, he became disillusioned. On 1 November he commented: ‘it was a pretty hopeless situation since the organisation [Partisans of Peace] had become…a hard-core Stalinist enterprise’.

The Second World Peace Congress scheduled for 13-19 November 1950 was originally to be held in London before the British Peace Committee, unable to secure
a suitable venue, switched it to Sheffield.\textsuperscript{lxxi} It needs to be emphasised that this congress, far more than the first (held in Paris in April 1949), was of immense political significance in the developing Cold War. In order to appreciate why the Attlee Labour government subverted the Congress, we must understand how it was perceived – a perception that, increasingly, Rogge shared.

Hostility to the Congress hinged on the connection that existed between it, the Partisans of Peace and the Cominform. This link had been extensively researched and documented by the Foreign Office (and, in particular, by the IRD) with much of the \textit{prima facie} evidence being provided by documents emanating from the Cominform itself.\textsuperscript{lxxxii}

Frankly the position from the Foreign Office is this. The World Peace Campaign is nothing more than a Communist stunt, an instrument of Soviet foreign policy designed to stir up resistance to the Western defence programme and to the Atlantic Pact. It is run by Communists under direction from Moscow and is not to be regarded as a genuinely international peace movement of a democratic kind.\textsuperscript{lxxxiii}

That the early post-war peace movement was a creature of the Cominform was regarded as axiomatic; it was ‘a fact not needing further proof’.\textsuperscript{lxxxiv} This view, when stripped of some of its Cold War clothing, is essentially correct: with the exception of Rogge, the Partisans of Peace (later reformulated as the World Peace Council) \textit{did} desire peace but on Soviet terms. And it is a view shared by the pre-eminent historian of the peace movement of this period.\textsuperscript{lxxxv} The claim of the British Peace Committee that it sought ‘solely to aid in the discovery of means whereby the present international tension may be reduced’ was therefore disingenuous.\textsuperscript{lxxxvi} It certainly contrasts with the more bluntly expressed view of its mentor, the British Communist Party, on the centrality of peace activity to the political struggle.\textsuperscript{lxxxvii}

The British government regarded the staging of the Peace Congress as a crucial dimension of the Soviet-sponsored ‘peace offensive’ that, thanks to the Stockholm Petition, the debate over German re-armament and the war in Korea, was burgeoning. The Soviets’ peace campaign was ‘a propagandist weapon of war’,\textsuperscript{lxxxviii} and the World Peace Congress a means of ‘weakening the determination of the Western powers to build up their defences against Soviet pressure’.\textsuperscript{lxxix} In short, it
was ‘a Trojan Dove’. 

Because the peace offensive was ‘now regarded by the Soviet leaders as the most important and active task of World Communism, embracing all the main objectives of Soviet foreign policy’, it must be confronted aggressively by the West.

Such a response from the West would combat the projection of the World Peace Council as an effective rival, a political alternative, to the UN. With the outbreak of the Korean war, to which the UN was militarily committed, such a projection assumed immense significance. The fact that the timing of the Congress coincided (deliberately, in the view of the Foreign Office) with the meeting of the General Assembly of the UN, and that Congress resolutions were expected to synchronise with proposals put forward by the Soviet delegation to the UN on atomic disarmament, was a source of particular concern. This concern cannot be underestimated, for that vexed question - with whom should the responsibility for preventing war and preserving peace reside: the fledgling United Nations or the embryonic World Peace Council? – then went to the core of Cold War geo-strategic politics. This question would be raised and answered by several speakers at the Warsaw Congress; Rogge, an ardent believer in the UN, had an opposite answer. From both sides of the ideological divide, therefore, the Congress was full of propaganda potential and political significance. In an important sense it was a crucible of what the Cold War was primarily about: the control and mobilisation of public opinion, at home and abroad.

In this context the Labour government decided to cripple the Congress. As Prime Minister Attlee stated in a live BBC broadcast on the evening of 1 November,

We are not willing to throw wide our doors to those who seek to come here to subvert our institutions, to seduce our fellow citizens from their natural allegiance and their daily duties and to make propaganda for those who call us ‘cannibals and warmongers’.

So Britain closed its doors. Through an enlarged definition of *persona non grata*, which provided the quasi-legal basis for withholding visas, over two thirds of the foreign delegates and almost the entire foreign leadership of the Partisans for Peace were excluded. The Congress was decapitated. This was accomplished through duplicity, shrewd timing and effective execution. It meant that at the last minute, the
British Peace Committee was forced to cancel the Congress. The dove of peace flew east, to Warsaw. However, there was one desultory meeting, on the first scheduled day, 12 November, attended by a rump of local delegates and the small number of foreign delegates permitted entry. Rogge was one of these and he addressed that meeting.

The only report of his speech was in the *Sheffield Telegraph* whose ‘special correspondent’ noted that ‘delegates shuffled in their seats’ when Rogge claimed that all the threats to world peace stemmed from two concentrations of power – a political concentration in the Soviet Union and an economic concentration in the United States. When he stated that he was ‘more disturbed’ by the former than the latter, the audience was ‘shocked’ but ‘decided to treat it as a lapse which was best overlooked’. No such forbearance was extended in Warsaw. In fact, Rogge went much further at Sheffield. We know this only because the text of his speech was cabled to the Voice Of America in New York. A copy of that cable is now located in State Department files. Part of it read:

A second difficulty which flows from the fanatical zeal of Communists is that it tempts the Soviet Union, by equating progress with its policies, to seek to control progressive movements in other parts of the world with the result that progressive forces everywhere are being divided and destroyed…

The Progressive Party in the United States, to which I still belong and which I tried to help build, has been committing political suicide because progressives do not feel as free to criticize relevant mistakes of the Soviet Union as those of their own country.

It is little wonder that delegates, most of whom would have been more sympathetic to the communist position, should shuffle in their seats. Discomfort was eased by acerbic mirth when a Soviet delegate, Boris Polevoy, stated that ‘everyone knows the Soviet people want peace. Anyone who doesn’t ought to be locked in a lunatic asylum’. According to the local press correspondent, he looked along the row towards Rogge with the result that ‘laughter and applause swept the hall’. The next day delegates left for Warsaw.

For Mrs Nan Green, an organising secretary of the Sheffield Congress, going to Warsaw was ‘like changing worlds, like stepping into the sun after being in the
Flags, streamers and multi-coloured posters displaying Picasso’s peace dove decorated streets, shops, ports and railway stations. Large welcoming committees greeted the arriving delegates in Warsaw where, according to one report, ‘tremendous enthusiasm reigns’. According to the British Daily Worker, ‘the Attlee ban has put a spotlight on the big British delegation, whose members have been warmly welcomed everywhere’. At one welcome, at the Warsaw railway station, speakers attacked ‘the London lackeys of Wall Street’ for preventing the Sheffield Congress. The New York Times correspondent described how ‘girls of 18 to 25 swarmed onto the platform as each train pulled in and handed bouquets to the delegates whilst army bands played.’ The warm welcome would not be the only reason for delegates’ gratitude: they each received 500 złoty pocket money (and cigarettes by their bedside every night) in addition to all travel, dining, entertainment and accommodation costs being met by the Polish government. Whether this was beneficence or bribery is difficult to tell but, to the British Foreign Office, ‘it made clear for all the world to see that the thing was a Cominform racket’. The Congress was opened by Joliot-Curie at 7pm on 16 November in front of 1756 delegates representing eighty one countries and 309 guests and observers. All the luminaries barred by the Attlee government – Pietro Nenni, Dimitri Shostakovich, Ilya Ehrenburg – were there. None of the Yugoslav delegates was credentialed. The venue was the unoccupied vast hall of the State printing works which had been transformed by the prodigious, round-the-clock efforts over four days by hundreds of Polish workmen. Huge pictures of Stalin, Beirut (the Polish President), Joliot-Curie and the now-ubiquitous white dove adorned the low hall. The slogan ‘Stalin is with us’ was displayed but, diplomatically perhaps, only in Polish. To those delegates from Western countries who were for the first time ‘experience[ing] a real people’s democracy’, the rituals, quite different from what could be expected in Sheffield, would be a surprise. Between speeches, the Congress organisers regularly brought into the hall groups of dancing boys and girls dressed in peasant costumes who showered the delegates with posies of flowers. Members of the Polish communist youth organisation gave leading speakers gifts such as the head of Stalin in coal. After certain speeches, ‘Pokoj’, the Polish word for peace, was repeated rhythmically to clapping for many minutes. When Pak Den-Ai, the North Korean delegate, spoke – in Russian – delegates ‘rose as one man’ and cheered for a full ten minutes; when Mao
and Kim Il Sung were toasted, ‘again they rose to cheer until they could cheer no more’. All this, for one young Australian delegate, was ‘intensely inspiring’, ‘exhilarating’ and its lasting impression ‘indelible’.

This, then, was the semi-revivalist, triumphalist atmosphere which Rogge faced when he took the lectern. In contrast to the ecumenical spirit of the first major peace meeting he attended – at Wroclaw in August 1948, where ‘the representation was wide and there was much good will’ – here, he was about to experience narrowness and intolerance. In large part, this reflected the rigidities of an increasingly chilly Cold War, but Rogge, as we have seen, had also changed. But what had not altered was his refusal to accept the ‘party line’, his single-minded determination to speak, as he saw it, the truth, no matter how unpalatable, no matter how hostile the audience. An assessment of Rogge ten years earlier as ‘forthright [and] frequently naïve’ remains apposite.

Rogge was scheduled to speak on the third day of the Congress, in the morning session of 19 November. There had already been innumerable rousing speeches denouncing the American and British warmongers and the aggressive role of the UN – the ‘tool of the imperialists’ - in Korea. The perspectives, policies and peace initiatives of the ‘mighty bastion of peace’, the Soviet Union, were applauded. Nearly all received standing ovations. These speeches were widely reported and reprinted and will not be summarised here. The concern expressed by one delegate, Elinor Burns, that ‘this was meant to be a peace conference not a communist conference’, would be voiced later, well after the Congress had concluded. So Rogge was the first and only dissentient at Warsaw. Unlike his Sheffield speech, a copy of the full text of his Warsaw speech cannot be located. The following, therefore, is constructed from various press reports.

After accusing communists of ‘displaying a fanatical missionary zeal,’ he declared: ‘Today I would not sign the Stockholm appeal’. He elaborated the policy of the Yugoslav government in refusing to join either the Western or Soviet power blocs. He directly addressed the Chinese delegates to whom he expressed his ‘earnest’ hope that Communist China would follow Yugoslavia’s example of independence. It is not clear whether he reiterated his Sheffield statement that the ‘New China’ should be recognised and become a member of the UN Security Council. However, he did refer to the enduring ‘traditional American-Chinese friendship’, which produced ‘merriment in the hall’. He claimed that the communist belief in the use of force was
‘a roadblock in the path of human progress’. Cominform communists had already resorted to violence to convert the world to their point of view. In this context he referred not only to Korea but also the invasion of Tibet, the only speaker to do so. This invasion, he stated, called into question the sincerity of the principal supporters of the peace campaign. He denounced North Korean aggression and denied that the US desired war. He also argued that the communist domination of the peace movement would lead in its complete failure. ‘If we are truly partisans of peace, we cannot be the partisans of one nation alone’. He would not accept the Cominform position that progress must be identified with the policies of the Soviet Union. He attributed the decline of the American Progressive Party to its unwillingness to criticise mistakes of the Soviet Union as freely as those of the United States. Finally, he urged the Congress to incorporate in its final recommendations a policy of broad exchange of ideas between the Russians and the Americans.

Although, according to a *New York Times* journalist present, Rogge ‘spoke with restraint in language that bore little resemblance to that used by the fiery Russian speakers to the congress’, his address struck the audience like a thunderbolt. Many of the 2000 delegates loudly booed, jeered, mocked and interrupted throughout his forty minutes on the platform. The Czech chairperson, Mme. Hodinova-Spurna, was obliged to ‘shush the delegates to silence several times’. When Rogge finished, he received only a subdued ‘smattering of applause’. Such antipathy was quickly echoed by *Pravda*, which denounced him as a ‘tool of Titoism’. Moscow radio judged his speech to be ‘provocative’, and described Rogge as a money seeker with a ‘divided soul’.

After Rogge returned to the United States, he met MacKnight in Washington. The consequent memorandum of conversation, stamped ‘restricted’, reveals Rogge’s own assessment of reactions to his Sheffield and Warsaw speeches. On the one hand, he judged his contributions as ‘useful’. He believed ‘the news about what he had to say got around Warsaw and described various indications of its content being known’. On the other hand, security precautions at Warsaw were ‘extremely strict’, which acted as a deterrent to potential supporters of his independent position: he had ‘no chance to talk with any of the Chinese delegates’ who were ‘instructed to stay away from him’. As noted earlier, Rogge hoped especially to steer them towards Yugoslavia and away from the Soviet Union. He noted that he had ‘no support’ from members of the American delegation, Dimitri Shostakowitch ‘avoided him
completely’, Ilya Ehrenburg was ‘very unfriendly’, and he was ‘very heavily attacked’ for his support of Tito. The extent of Rogge’s isolation was underscored by MacKnight asking Rogge whether he intended to participate in a report-back meeting in New York by American delegates from Warsaw. Rogge answered that ‘he had heard nothing about the meeting’. Such deliberate marginalisation also had an administrative dimension. After the Warsaw Congress, the new Bureau (formerly Permanent Committee) of the World Peace Council (formerly Partisans of Peace) was elected. Rogge was not ‘elected’ – the outcomes of such elections were largely pre-determined - either as a vice-president or as a member. Embittered and disillusioned with Soviet dominance, it appeared that – to use his own words – he had reached ‘the end of the road’.

But not yet. Freezing out O. John Rogge from the ‘official’ peace movement did little to dampen his quest for alternative paths. He informed MacKnight that he intended writing an article on Warsaw for the New York Times Sunday Magazine. He sought MacKnight’s advice and, again, the importance of communist China can be discerned. MacKnight told Rogge that

he might stress the long record of friendship by American so far as the Chinese people were concerned. I thought it might be useful if he spent some time on this and raised the question as to how much the new masters of China and their Kremlin friends were doing and had done for the Chinese people. I agreed to see if I could get a round-up of U.S. activity in assisting and sending it along to him.

Unfortunately for Rogge the New York Times rejected his article on the grounds that ‘it contained nothing new’. The other plausible explanation is that the date of its rejection - early January 1951 - coincided with a pivotal event in the Cold War: the massive, renewed offensive launched by communist Chinese troops in Korea. By the second week of January this military thrust was so successful that the possibility of UN and US forces being evacuated was canvassed. An article extolling US friendship with the Chinese people was simply not timely. However, an abbreviated version of Rogge’s article, without reference to China, was printed by The New Leader under the title ‘My New Plan For Peace’. He proposed a new, non-communist, inclusive and broad-ranging peace organisation, Independent Americans
for Peace, which would organise peace meetings free from invective. He also proposed cultural exchange ‘of people, ideas and news’ between the Soviet bloc and the United States: a series of bridges that would straddle East and West. The article featured a photo of Rogge conferring with Tito and captioned ‘can there really be a middle ground?’ *The New Leader* seems a curious outlet for Rogge. Aligned with the small Social Democratic Federation after the 1936 split in the American Socialist Party, it drifted to the Right in the 1940s under the influence of its executive editor, ex-Menshevik Samuel M. (Sol) Levitas. Ex-Trotskyists, such as Melvyn J. Lasky, who became active in the launch of the Congress for Cultural Freedom in Berlin in 1950, joined its ranks and it served as ‘campaign headquarters’ for various anti-communist intellectuals. Whilst Albert Kahn’s assessment of *The New Leader* as a ‘red-baiting journal’, may have under-estimated its social-democratic (but not anti-Stalinist) credentials, the fact that Rogge sent his piece to a relatively obscure paper whose editor distanced himself from Rogge, highlighted how limited his choices were. After no fewer than six iterations, Rogge’s short article was eventually transformed into a major twenty-six page document entitled ‘An Appeal to Moderates’. However, within the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, the reception was not favourable and it was never published. By attempting to occupy ‘the middle ground’ between Left and Right, East and West, in the early 1950s Rogge stood in an ideological no-man’s land: isolated, lonely and vulnerable. The paucity of allies had to be matched by an abundance of resilience.

Absence of self-doubt, as well resilience, were necessary for Rogge’s final foray into the politics of the peace movement. On 7 February 1951, the venerable eighty-two year old W.E.B. Du Bois - who had moved steadily to the extreme Left, partly under the influence of his Communist Party lover, Shirley Graham - was indicted and arraigned for ‘failure to register as agent of a foreign principle’. In other words, the Department of Justice sought to link the Peace Information Center (PIC), of which Bu Bois had been the chairman until it was dissolved in October 1950, with the World Peace Council and thereby with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Du Bois and four white co-defendants faced a possible fine of $10,000 each and a five year jail term. The PIC had been responsible for circulating the Stockholm Petition in 1950 and O. John Rogge was a foundation member and driving force. Now, controversially, he was to be prosecution’s star witness (or, less charitably, the ‘Star Stoolie’).
In the interregnum between indictment and trial of W.E.B. Du Bois and the PIC, Rogge was characteristically busy. He was still representing his client, David Greenglass, in appeals against Judge Kaufman’s fifteen year jail sentence in April; he addressed the International Association of Democratic Lawyers - inside which Rogge was ‘conducting a Tito operation against its Moscow line’ - in East Berlin in September; he attended the Yugoslav Peace Congress in Zagreb in October; and commenced negotiations to represent Dr Elsie Field whose brothers, Noel and Hermann Field, had mysteriously disappeared in Eastern Europe in 1949. He also worked on two lengthy manuscripts: ‘In the Courts and in the Streets’, a copy of which he later sent Ruth Greenglass, and ‘The Accusatorial Versus the Inquisitional Method’, which was primarily a 220-page study of show trials in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe from 1933 until 1951. Neither was published.

The trial, which commenced in November after several protest demonstrations, was a heated affair. Rogge and ex-Congressman Vito Marcantonio, whom Rogge has been closely associated in the American Labor Party and who worked without fee as defence attorney for Du Bois, clashed frequently. At one point, Rogge shouted over one of Marcantonio’s objections: ‘Its stated objective was to work for world peace …actually it was an agency of a foreign power’. Marcantonio replied that ‘Two people may have parallel views…That does not establish agency’. Ultimately, the District Judge, Matthew F. McGuire, dismissed the indictment: he told jurors that ‘we are not trying the foreign policy of the Soviet Union’. Rogge’s detractors were triumphant. The outcome of the trial was hailed as a ‘break-through victory for peace and civil liberties’ – precisely those causes that Rogge had previously championed - and, in the words of I.F. Stone, the first ‘stunning defeat’ for the Truman government since it commenced ‘the greatest witch-hunt in modern times’ in 1947. It was now open season for spraying venom towards Rogge. In the Left press, he was labelled a stoolpigeon, a paid agent, a provocateur, a renegade and a traitor. As we saw earlier, Du Bois called him ‘Rogge the Rat’. In terms of activity in, on behalf of, or working against, the peace movement Rogge had finally reached ‘the end of the road’.

By 1952, Rogge had ceased being the lone ranger conducting his ‘one-man campaign’, as MacKnight put it, against communist domination of the international peace movement. Along with his New York legal partner, Hebert J. Fabricant, he immersed himself in a plethora of lawsuits, many concerned with defending freedom
of expression against impositions of censorship. During the 1960s and 1970s Rogge filed numerous legal briefs on behalf of the poor and minority groups. He campaigned for equal rights for women and argued passionately in favour of the absolute right to freedom of speech. And he kept writing: *Why Men Confess* (in which his most famous client, Greenglass, was not mentioned) appeared in 1959; *The First and the Fifth: With Some Excursions into Others* in 1960; *The Official German Report: Nazi Penetration, 1924-1942* in 1961; and *Obscenity Litigation in Ten American Jurisprudence Trials* in 1965. He was also a prolific contributor to edited books and to law journals. And he continued adhering to the main tenets of his most significant work, *Our Vanishing Civil Liberties*.

Those tempestuous, intensely polarised three years, from 1949 to 1951, provide a stark historical reminder of the difficulties, for individuals such as Rogge, in identifying with an independent ideological position. Despite becoming gradually embittered by the Soviets’ role in the peace movement, Rogge was not an archetypal liberal anti-communist. He did not follow the route of those New York intellectuals such as Lasky or Sidney Hook in the CCF, or any other formal anti-Stalinist grouping. He never supported the ‘pit-bull brand of political activism’ of the ADA. He did not fit either category of Hook’s typologising of the non-communist New York intellectual. He did not subscribe to the liberals’ core beliefs on Cold War internal security, despite their origins in the anti-Nazi procedures instituted by Roosevelt. And nor was he tempted to emulate the full-blown ‘conversions’ of Louis Budenz or Whittaker Chambers, although his testimony against the PIC carried some traces of the apostate.

Yet he was not entirely alone. In attempting to locate Rogge within an international framework, his support for the independent line of Yugoslavia after 1948 places him alongside Aldo Cucchi and Valdo Magnani, both of whom clashed with the Italian Communist Party for defending Tito. It also allied him with the pro-Yugoslav British MP expelled from the Labour Party, Konni Zilliacus. Rogge was expelled from the World Peace Council but not from the American Progressive Party whose increasingly marginalised figurehead, Henry Wallace, he continued to support. Within a domestic context, it is initially tempting to locate Rogge within that ideological consensus which, by 1949, had been built around ideas brought together in *The Vital Center* by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. The term ‘vital center’ became shorthand for the liberal anti-communism that emerged in the late 1940s. In large measure
Rogge subscribed to its central tenets. They politically they took root within the Democratic Party. Rogge stayed with the Progressives, who continued to believe in co-existence over containment and whose descent into oblivion had been accelerated by the dominance of vital center thinking. Rogge’s answer to this dilemma was to strike out alone. Like the individualistic Orwell, he was not willing to soil his hands in the minutiae of grass-roots political activity in order to mobilise support. He thought his words would suffice. Other than MacKnight from the State Department he developed few political allies, local or international, and built no support base within the Partisans of Peace that would have given his ‘one man campaign’ greater influence. So, on the world stage, his imaginative proposals for resolving Cold War conflict and, within the United States, his potentially appealing Independent Americans for Peace, remained stillborn. But for all Rogge’s naivety or hubris, his political impotence remains a striking testimony to the hegemony of bi-polar assumptions that strangled all attempts to find a third way. His isolation, in short, was indicative of the triumph of vital center liberalism over Progressive liberalism. The decisiveness of that victory contributed to the inability of the Left, until the Vietnam war, to mount an effective challenge to the Cold War anti-communist consensus.

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3 Schrecker examines the private networks of anti-communist activists between the wars but not during the Cold War. Schrecker, *Many Are The Crimes*, 42-85. An exception to this historiographical oversight of individual activists – at least in regard to foreign policy, with chapters on James Warburg, Henry Wallace, Claude Pepper and Glen Taylor - is Paterson, *Cold War Critics*.
7 See, for example, White & Maze, *Wallace*, ch. 8.
Journey, which examined a liberal’s crisis of conscience in an increasingly polarised world, presciently foreshadowed the deepening crisis of the Left brought on by the Cold War.


x This landmark case has largely escaped the attention of historians and it is outside the scope of this paper to analyse it here; however, the records of the JAFRC can be found in the papers of one of its Executive Board members, jailed with the rest of the Board in 1950. See Tamiment Library, New York, Charlotte Stern papers, Collection 070, Box 2, Folders 1-6.

xi See Rogge, Why Men Confess, 146-7.

xii Ribuffo, Old Christian Right, 228

xiii Current Biography, 534. According to one historian, Rogge later revealed that he had been approached by Paul O’Dwyer, brother of the New York City Mayor, who asked him to withdraw as ALP candidate and accept a Democratic-ALP nomination for the State Supreme Court in order to ensure the election of the Democratic nominee for surrogate. Marcantonio rejected the deal and Rogge refused. Carter, ‘Pressure from the Left’, 351. See also Schaffer, Vito Marcantonio, 186.

xiv This quest failed because he was too little known outside the East Coast.

xv Current Biography, 534; Walton, Wallace, Harry Truman and the Cold War, 42, 193. Rogge strongly endorsed Wallace’s call for rapprochement with the Soviet Union, which drew much support from the American Communist Party.

xvi Schmidt, Henry A. Wallace, 278.

xvii See White & Maze, Wallace, 276-7, 282; Lieberman, The Strangest Dream, ch. 2 (“Friendly Henry Wallace”). It was not until early 1951 that Rogge, like Wallace, warned against that earlier, more tolerant attitude that embraced communist support; see New Leader, 29 January 1951, 2.


xix The rhetoric in Liberator, the eight-page monthly organ of the Civil Rights Congress, is identical to most Communist Party publications in this period. On the other hand, the evidence is less compelling for the National Lawyers’ Guild being a communist front, as alleged by HUAC. See Salmond’s study of Clifford J. Durr, the president of the Guild in 1948-49, Conscience of a Lawyer, 136-9.

xx Liberator 1, no. 1 (January 1949), 2. Like the infamous rape trials of the ‘Scottsboro boys’ (1931-37), the Trenton Six trials (1948-52) involved racism. Initially, Rogge and Emmanuel (‘Manny’) Block - soon to cross swords during the Rosenberg trial - represented the six black defendants but, controversially, were barred from the case by the presiding judge; see New York Times, 18 December 1949, 6.

xxi Rogge, Our Vanishing Civil Liberties, 37. For the text of one of his many attacks on HUAC, or the ‘US Gestapo’ as he termed it, see New York Times, 31 October 1947, 3.

xxii New York Times, 17 April 1947, 12. For his attacks on the Justice Department’s internal security policies, see Dorin, ‘Truman’s ‘Biggest Mistake’”, 331-2.

xxiii Rogge, Our Vanishing Civil Liberties, 274-5.
For a Lasting Peace, for a People’s Democracy!, no. 5, (65), 3 February 1950, 1 (official publication of the Cominform).

New York Times, 8 November 1947, 10. The purpose of this manoeuvre, he stated (in language that would have been at home in the Daily Worker), was to ‘whip up a new wave of anti-Soviet hysteria to divert public attention from the wave of reaction into the Truman administration had plunged because of Wall Street influence’.

See Starobin, American Communism in Crisis, 173 and note 32, 292.

Zion, Autobiography of Roy Cohn, 71. See also Schneir, Invitation to an Inquest, 455-7. Philipson, Ethel Rosenberg, 235-7.


Daily Worker, 14 November 1951, 6; 15 November 1951, 1.

Du Bois, In Battle for Peace, 115, 118.

See Kahn, Treason in Congress.


Ibid., 21.

Hall, Basics for Peace, 164-5.

Feklisov & Kostin, Man Behind the Rosenbergs, 296. Equally astonishing was Feklisov’s suggestion that Rogge was also working with the FBI ‘as is customary for agents of influence’. In contrast, Roberts maintains that the FBI, and especially J. Edgar Hoover, remained suspicious and distrustful of Rogge: they ‘looked at Rogge and saw only Red’. Roberts, The Brother, 257.

The following is drawn from World Biography, 4058; Current Biography 1948, 533-5; The Annual Obituary 1981, 197-8; New York Times, 22 March 1981, obituary.

Hall, Louisana Hayride, 315.

Rogge, O. John. ‘Witch Hunting’, transcript of address delivered at City Club, Boston, Massachusetts, 27 January 1940, p16-17 (NYPL).


Cited in Morgan, Reds, 214.

New York Times, 4 February 1946, 10; 14 October 1946, 44; 5 December 1947, 4; 4 April 1947, 13. For an extended discussion of the ‘Brown Scare’ and Rogge’s role in prosecuting thirty pro-Nazi conspirators in 1944, see Ribuffo, The Old Christian Right, 198-213; Gray, The Nervous Liberals, ch. 6, esp. 224-7 and 236-41. See also Rogge, Official German Report.


One of those jailed was Lyman Bradley, a New York University professor of modern language; see Schrecker, No Ivory Tower, 128. Rogge wrote a scathing article about HUAC in relation to this case.
for the American Federation of Labor Local of which Charlotte Stern (another JAFRC member imprisoned) was Education Director. See Rogge, O. John. ‘Our Vanishing Civil Liberties’. *Hotel and Club Voice*, 26 February 1948 (Tamiment Library, New York, Charlotte Stern papers, Collection 070, Box 2, Folder 5).


xlix Shannon, *Decline of American Communism*, 205.


li NA FO 1110/346, Annexe ‘A’ to Secret memorandum, C.F.A. Warner to Sir William Strang, 25 May 1950. The IRD was a clandestine anti-Soviet propaganda unit established in 1948. It was the brainchild of Christopher Mayhew, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary to Ernest Bevin. In 1950, as an executive committee member of the United Nations Association, Mayhew wrote a long article for the *Sheffield Telegraph* (13 November 1950), ‘Democratic Solution Exists Already If You Really Want Peace’. Presumably the timing - the opening day of the Warsaw Congress – was deliberate. On the IRD, see Lashmar & Oliver, *Britain’s Secret Propaganda War*.

lii New York Herald Tribune, 25 April 1949, p1, 3. The first congress was the ‘World Congress of Intellectuals’, at Wroclaw, Poland, in August 1948; the second was a ‘Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace’ at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York in March 1949. For an interesting ‘behind-the-scenes’ discussion of the latter, see Lucas, *Freedom’s War*, 94-6. See also Tuck, *The Liberal Civil War*, 209-14.


lvii New York Times, 9 March 1950, 9. On the other hand, Rogge subsequently noted that ‘Ever since my Kremlin speech I have received requests from all over the [United] States to address meetings…I will accept these invitations’. Committee of the World Peace Congress. *In Defence of Peace*. No. 9, April 1950, 57.


lix According to Julius Rosenberg’s KGB ‘handler’, in 1950 a leading Soviet member of the Partisans of Peace, the writer, Ilya Ehrenburg, had been ‘very much concerned’ by Rogge who, allegedly, was
‘constantly obstructing every decision made by the [peace] movement’. Feklisov & Kostin, Man Behind the Rosenbergs, 296.

lxii In Defence of Peace, No. 9, April 1950, 55-8. This publication contained all the addresses given to the Stockholm Congress; none echoed Rogge’s.

lxiii From January 1946 until 29 April 1950, when he was dismissed, Joliot-Curie was the French High Commissioner for Atomic Energy; he was also a prominent member of the French Communist Party and president of the World Federation of Scientific Workers. Within the communist-dominated peace movement he was revered and to attack him from ‘within’, as Rogge did, was a major step.


lxvii Kartun, Tito’s Plot Against Europe; For a Lasting Peace, for a People’s Democracy!, no. 6 (66), 10 February 1950, 4; no. 5 (65), 3 February 1950, 1; no. 47 (107), 19 November 1950, 2.

lxviii Zilliucus, an independent-minded British Labour MP for Gateshead from 1945 to 1950 was, like Rogge, a supporter of Tito, wrote Tito of Yugoslavia and was similarly vilified in the Communist Party press. See, for example, Klugmann, From Trotsky to Tito, 201-2. Zilliucus and Rogge first met at the first World Peace Congress in Paris; see Potts, Zilliucus, 132. The best study of Zilliucus, not referred to by Potts, remains Watson, ‘From “Fellow Traveller” to “Fascist Spy”’, 59-87. Cassou was a French intellectual and writer and a former leader of the French resistance; see Georgel, Jean Cassou.

lxix Rogge, O. John, Jean Cassou and Konni Zilliucus, ‘Korea, Yugoslavia and World Peace: Where We Stand’, August 1950, 5. This joint statement was never published but Rogge sent a copy to Jesse M. MacKnight, in the State Department. See National Archives and Records Administration, Washington RG: 59, Misc. Records of the Bureau of Public Affairs, Lot File 61D53, Stack 252/62/14/05/03, Box 72 [henceforth NARA RG 59, Lot file 61D53, Box 72].

lx See Zubok & Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, 125-137.

lx Rogge, Cassou & Zilliucus, ‘Korea, Yugoslavia and World Peace’, 4, 6, 7-8, 10.

lxii See editorial, Daily Worker, 21 November 1950, 1; transcript of speeches by Charles Howard and Pero Popivoda to the Warsaw Congress, Second World Congress, Warsaw November 16-22 1950 [n.1951], p58, 67; Du Bois, In Battle for Peace, 112; Kahn, ‘The Case of O. John Rogge’, 19-20; For a Lasting Peace, for a People’s Democracy!, no. 47 (107), 19 November 1950, 2. Two other prominent American leftists, William Gailmor and Louis Adamic, were also marginalised for writing about the Yugoslavs sympathetically; see Starobin, American Communism in Crisis, 299, n. 7.


lxv Wilford, CIA, British Left and the Cold War, 62.

lxvi NARA RG 59, Lot file 61D53, Box 72, Memorandum of Conversation, Confidential, 1 November 1950.


An indicator of this interest are the voluminous notes and clippings on this subject that can be found in his papers; see O. John Rogge papers 1945-56, Library of Congress, MMC 3504.

NARA RG 59, Lot file 61D53, Box 72, Memorandum (classified ‘Restricted’), MacKnight to Phillips, 19 June 1951.

NARA RG 59, Misc. Records of the Bureau of Public Affairs, Lot File 61D53, Stack 252/62/14/05/03, Box 72, Memorandum of Conversation, I November 1950.

According to a security report, the British Peace Committee had attempted to obtain the Empress Hall in Earl’s Court, London, but that it had been refused on political grounds. NA: FO 1110/375, MI5 paper ‘Second World Peace Congress Sheffield/Warsaw 1950’, 3 attached to correspondence from MI5 to J.H. Peck (IRD), 30 January 1951.

In 1950-51 a range of lengthy papers were prepared; see NA FO 975/50, ‘Peace and Soviet Foreign Policy’; FO 975/54, ‘The Record of the World Peace Council’, FO 975/64, ‘Aspects of Peace. A Study in Soviet Tactics’; FO 371/84825, ‘Russian Strategic Intentions and the Threat to Peace’; PREM 8/1150, ‘Disarmament and the Soviet Peace Campaign’ (ten-page brief for the UK delegation to the UN General Assembly). Briefer documents on communist-organised peace congresses can also be found in PREM 8/966 and 8/1103. All these testify strongly to the importance placed by the British government on this activity.

NA FO 1110/371, K.G. Younger to J. Chuter Ede, 5 June 1951. This view was shared by Vincent Tewson, the general secretary of the powerful Trades Union Congress, who alleged the peace campaign was ‘fraudulent’ and a ‘tactic in the strategy of international communism’. Manchester Guardian, 7 September 1950, 6.


See Wittner, One World or None, 177-86.

Manchester Guardian, 28 September 1950, 8.

See, for example, successive issues of its weekly World News and Views throughout October and November 1950 (copies located in Marx Memorial Library, London).


Phrase coined by Denis Healey. See his ‘The Trojan Dove’ in NA FO 1110/349 and his autobiographical The Time of My Life, 106-7.

NA FO 1110/349, Information Research Department minute, 7 December 1950.

NA FO 1110/349, J. Nicholls (British Embassy, Moscow) to Bevin, 4 December 1950; FO 1110/370, Nicholls to Murray, 27 December 1950.

Cited in Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), Vol.480, 14 November 1950, p.1561. This speech was judged ‘a great success’ by Downing Street (NA FO 1110/349, Paper by Jordan, 29 November 1950).

The Times (London), 13 November 1950, 5.

Rogge was questioned for nearly one hour at Heathrow. Presumably his non-communist credentials were established. The British Foreign Office had already decided that ‘it would be inadvisable to...

\(^{xcvi}\) Sheffield Telegraph, 14 November 1950, 1.

\(^{xcvii}\) NARA RG 59, Lot file 61D53, Box 72, cable, USIS London to VOA Kaufman New York [nd].

\(^{xcviii}\) Sheffield Telegraph, 14 November 1950, 1.

\(^{xcix}\) Ibid., 19 November 1950, 2.

\(^{ci}\) Daily Worker, 16 November 1950, 1.

\(^{cii}\) The Times, 18 November 1950, 5.

\(^{ciii}\) New York Times, 17 November 1950, extracted in NAA A1838/283, Item 69/1/1/16/1 Pt.2.

\(^{civ}\) NA FO 1110/349, J.H. Peck to Jordan (PM’s office) 1 December 1950.

\(^{cv}\) The following is based on reports in Daily Worker, Challenge, Manchester Guardian, The Times and an interview with one Australian delegate, Roger Wilson.

\(^{cv}\) Stakhanovite-like propaganda was evident: according to the Polish press, the Congress was ‘inspiring the Polish workers to a spontaneous increase of output’. The Times, 17 November 1950, 3. Similarly: ‘Polish factory workers joined “Peace Shifts” in honour of the Congress and ran their machines at a still faster pace’. Congress of Peace, Warsaw 1950. Listopad, 1950, 14.


\(^{cvii}\) Daily Worker, 21 November 1950, p.3.

\(^{cviii}\) Interview with Roger Wilson, Melbourne, 14 February 2005. Wilson, then an activist and later an official in the Seamen’s Union of Australia, remained a communist until 1984.


\(^{cx}\) Kane, Louisiana Hayride, 314.

\(^{cxi}\) See We Can Save Peace. The Story of the Second World Peace Congress Warsaw 1950, London [1951], 46pp; Peace: A World Review, no. 21, Special Number: Second World Peace Congress, November 16-22 1950 (144pp); Congress of Peace, Warsaw 1950, Listopad, 1950 (160pp); New Times (Special Supplement, Reports and Documents), no.49, 6 December 1950. All are located in the J.D. Bernal papers, Marx Memorial Library, London.


\(^{cxiv}\) This position was consistent with that of the Attlee, but not Truman, administration.


\(^{cxviii}\) NAA A1838/283, Item 69/1/1/16/1 Pt. 2, Department of External Affairs Press Cuttings [1950].
This appears confirmed by a Foreign Office report, which noted that ‘although his speech was distorted in the Polish press, its real content spread through Warsaw like wildfire…’. NA FO 1110/349, C.H. Bateman to Ernest Bevin, ‘Second World Peace Congress at Warsaw, 16th November 1950’, PR 87/454, 3.

NARA RG 59, Lot file 61D53, Box 72, Memorandum of Conversation, Restricted, 12 December 1950.

National Guardian, 29 November 1950, 6. The fifteen Americans elected to the Bureau included Howard Fast, whom - as an executive member of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee - Rogge had earlier defended.

New York Times, 23 November 1950, 4. He stated that at Warsaw the two things he found were ‘hate and violence. They want peace by force’.

The following day, 13 December, he sent to Rogge’s New York office the State Department’s so-called White Book on China, entitled U.S. Relations with China and referred him to particular sections

The New Leader, 29 January 1951, 2-4.

Buhle, Encyclopaedia of the American Left, 771-2.


Wilford, CIA, British Left and the Cold War, 125.


See accompanying editorial, ‘What Does Mr. Rogge Offer?’, The New Leader, 29 January 1951, 4-5. However, it also justified The New Leader’s decision to publish Rogge’s ‘exclusive statement’: because the paper ‘welcome[d] any cleavage in the Soviet front’, and because the article may ‘encourage others to follow [Rogge] out of the pro-Communist movement’.

NARA RG 59, Lot file 61D53, Box 72, handwritten statements on memo from MacKnight requesting review and comments, 24 April 1951 (‘WRS says he has already told JMM [Macknight] he does not think this is good’ and ‘PHB doesn’t like it at all’).

Wolters, Du Bois and his Rivals, 250. They married one week later, on 14 February.

According to an over-heated New York Herald Tribune editorial (11 February 1950), the PIC represented ‘an attempt to disarm America and yet ignore every from of Communist aggression’.

Daily Worker, 14 November 1951, 1.

NARA RG 59, Lot file 61D53, Box 72, Memorandum, MacKnight to Phillips, 19 June 1951. Macknight added that Rogge ‘might be extremely useful, for propaganda purposes, if he gets some help to operate at Berlin’.

Unknown to anyone in the United States, in 1951 Hermann Field, an unusual victim of the Slanksy and Rajk show trials in Prague and Budapest, was incarcerated in a Hungarian jail, while Noel spent five years in a secret Polish prison cell for political prisoners. See Field & Field’s astonishing Trapped in the Cold War.

NARA RG 59, Lot file 61D53, Box 72, attachment to correspondence, Rogge to MacKnight, 19 December 1951; correspondence MacKnight to Rogge, 5 January 1952.

See, for example, New York Times, 22 February 1951, 37 (‘Rally Backs Du Bois’).

Meyer, Vito Marcantonio, 84-5. Marcantonio represented the ALP in Congress from 1938 to 1950, when he lost his seat.

For accounts of the trial, on which the above is based, see Daily Worker, 14 November 1951, p1,6; 15 November 1951, p1,6; New York Times, 14 November 1951, 19; National Guardian, 21 November 1951, 5; Horne, Black and Red, 176-9.

Daily Compass, 22 November 1951, 3.

National Guardian, 28 November 1951, 1

See Kramer, The Twilight of the Intellectuals, ch. 2.

Tuck, The Liberal Civil War, 122.

Hook, Political Power, 217.

See Keller, Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover, ch. 2.

Horne therefore seriously underestimates the complexities of Rogge’s position when he contends that, by 1952, he was ‘thoroughly an apostate’. Horne, Communist Front?, 163.

These were a distrust of both left and right-wing totalitarianism, a conviction that communism was the greatest threat to true liberalism, and that totalitarianism and democracy could not co-exist.