Risk, security and technology: governing football supporters in the twenty-first century

Ramón Spaaij*

School of Social Sciences, La Trobe University, Australia; Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Abstract

This paper critically examines the security and risk management technologies that are being used to conduct and pre-empt the behaviour of football supporters. It is shown how, in the Netherlands, pre-emptive risk management in the governing of football supporters involves a dispersed and fragmented set of state and non-state actors that engage in the process of identifying, registering, classifying, monitoring, profiling and punishing ‘risky’ supporters, with important implications for supporters’ civil liberties. The paper concludes by proposing two broad avenues for future research drawing on the work of Michel Foucault: the interaction between technologies of domination and technologies of the self, and the modes of resistance or ‘counter-conduct’ in the everyday practices of football supporters.

Introduction

In July 2008, the then Minister of Justice of the Netherlands, Ernst Hirsch Ballin, announced a set of new and expanded measures, such as mobile telephone taps and comprehensive banning orders, to combat football (soccer) hooliganism. The new measures introduced by the Dutch government hardly came as a surprise. Indeed, they constituted the next incremental step in a process that spans more than three decades.\(^1\) At the root of this process is the ‘dispositif of precautionary risk’, a

* Email: r.spaaij@latrobe.edu.au
dominant risk logic in late modern society. The security techniques of risk developed and used in the football context seek to pre-empt and minimize the probability of any undesirable conduct by football spectators in the future. As will be shown in this paper, pre-emptive risk management in the governing of spectator behaviour at football matches implies the identification, classification and close monitoring of risk and ‘risky’ populations, and involves a dispersed and fragmented set of public and private actors. Any potential or actual transgressive behaviour by football supporters is typically constructed as a social threat, the prevention and control of which requires the imposition of extra punishments, far-reaching surveillance and the expansion of legal powers.

A key aspect of the dispositif of precautionary risk in the governing of football supporters is the continued expansion of the possibilities (both legal and technical) for the collection, storage, analysis and dissemination of data on spectators. Under the banner of ‘intelligence-led’ or ‘knowledge-based’ policing, there is a growing emphasis on prediction, anticipation and preventive action. This trend signals a mode of surveillance that can be termed anticipatory surveillance or ‘systematic predetection’, the objective of which is ‘not to confront a concrete dangerous situation, but to anticipate all the possible forms of irruption of danger’, in order to reduce uncertainty and to control outcomes.

This ‘new penology’ seeks techniques for identifying, classifying and managing groups sorted by levels of dangerousness and risk. As Castel notes, this mode of surveillance ‘dispenses with actual presence, contract, the reciprocal relationship of watcher and watched’. Instead, it ‘can be practiced without any contact with, or even any immediate representation of, the subjects under scrutiny’.

The aim of this paper, then, is to critically examine the security and risk management technologies that are being used to conduct and pre-empt the behaviour of football supporters. I use the term ‘technologies’ to focus attention on the actual mechanisms through which authorities have sought to shape, normalize and instrumentalize the conduct of football spectators in order to achieve the objective they consider desirable. Although the analysis will focus primarily on the Netherlands, I argue that the technologies of government in this specific context are part of, and reflect, a dispositif of precautionary risk that transcends this particular society and can be found in a number of European countries and at a European level. Evidence has been presented for this argument in recent analyses of security
and sport events, such as the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany. Moreover, I argue that the security assemblage that seeks to control football spectator behaviour transcends this particular security environment. The boundaries between different security environments are increasingly blurred. As will be seen, some of the risk management techniques that were initially developed and applied at football matches have come to be used in different environments, usually without proper evaluation of their actual effectiveness and proportionality.

Drawing on Michel Foucault's notion of governmentality, which views government as the 'conduct of conduct', I will show how the governing of football supporters features not only direct intervention by means of specialized state and non-state apparatuses, but also more indirect and dispersed techniques for directing and controlling spectator behaviour. Government is understood here in a broad sense as

any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes.

For Foucault, the finality of government 'resides in the things it manages and in the pursuit of the perfection and intensification of the processes which it directs; and the instruments of government, instead of being laws, now come to be a range of multiform tactics'.

My approach aligns with that of Bale, who argues that the collective experience of sports spectators has increasingly become one of 'segmented and panopticised confinement' characterized by seemingly indispensable technologies and geographies of rationalized order and surveillance (e.g. CCTV, surveillance, security personnel, assigned entrances and seating, and directed spectator traffic flows). These technologies, it can be argued, are disciplinary matrices that create 'docile bodies' (controlled, regulated bodies) which are easy to control by people in authority. As such, they seek to reshape the ways in which each individual, at some future point, will conduct him- or herself in a space of regulated freedom. The football stadium and its surroundings can be seen to function as a laboratory in that
they have come to constitute a site for the production of knowledge about those under observation, and a place for experimentation and training. This metaphor of the football stadium as a laboratory is discussed in the next section, which examines the evolution of security and risk management technologies at football matches in the Netherlands.

**From electronic identity card to biometric identification: the football stadium as technological laboratory**

Technology plays a major role in the *dispositif* of precautionary risk at professional football matches in the Netherlands. Until the late 1980s entrance controls at Dutch football stadia were fairly straightforward: stewards checked paper tickets by hand and spectators who possessed a valid ticket were allowed to stand or sit wherever they pleased on the designated terrace. This began to change in the 1990s, when football stadia became increasingly segmented into different sectors and sections, automatic entrance controls and numbered seats were introduced, CCTV systems and central command posts were set up, and spectators were searched at the entrance. By now, the security gaze was firmly in place.

This development took a new turn with the introduction of a compulsory membership scheme known as the ‘club card’. A first experiment with the scheme was conducted as early as 1989 at five football clubs whose supporters were classified as being ‘high risk’. Match tickets were sold only to those supporters holding an electronic identity card issued by their club. On the first day of the pilot many supporters successfully circumvented the new scheme, which led to its postponement. However, due to renewed fears of escalating violence at football matches and further attempts to commercialize the game, a comparable identity card scheme was introduced at all Eredivisie (Premier League) clubs during the 1996/97 season. The club card was marketed as a service card designed to improve the club’s service to its customers, but was viewed by many football supporters as yet another attempt to regulate the behaviour of a ‘violent minority’ at the expense of non-violent football supporters.

The controversy surrounding the compulsory membership scheme entered a new phase with the proposed introduction of a club card with photo identification. A number of football clubs opposed this new measure from the outset, arguing that it
would decrease the clubs’ revenue from ticket sales as spectators would no longer be allowed to purchase match tickets without a registered electronic identity card. As a result of the resistance of both clubs and supporter associations, the identity card scheme was eventually given a non-compulsory status. Clubs were left to decide whether to issue club cards and, consequently, most clubs only utilized the card scheme to manage ticket sales at fixtures they deemed ‘high risk’. However, five football clubs obliged their supporters to submit their personal details and a photograph to the Koninklijke Nederlandse Voetbalbond (KNVB; Royal Netherlands Football Association), either for away matches or for both home and away matches.

Although the identity card is often viewed as a customer service tool, it should be considered, first and foremost, a security measure. The Centraal Informatiepunt Voetbalvandalisme (CIV; Dutch National Football Information Point) describes its uses as follows: ‘In the longer term the plan was that security aspects could be built into [the card scheme]. An important final phase of the entire policy chain is controlled access control, the aim of which is to enable us to keep undesirable individuals out of the stadium’.18 Today, supporters at all professional football clubs in the Netherlands are required to have a club card for ‘high risk’ fixtures. For such fixtures, supporters are only allowed to buy one ticket per club card, while no tickets are sold on match day. In addition, some football clubs have established a separate electronic identity card scheme for away matches, with the aim of closely monitoring the behaviour of their traveling contingent.

The recognition that the new regulatory regime was not waterproof led to the introduction of new techniques.19 A novel instrument in the governing of football supporters in the Netherlands is the use of biometric identification such as fingerprints and iris scans. This approach signals how pre-emptive risk management, obsessed with accurate information and systematic predetection, ‘now sends its surveillance probes under the skin’.20 In the 2005/06 season the KNVB initiated a pilot in which banning orders were policed using biometric identification in combination with electronic entrance controls. The pilot also tested the feasibility of the use of iris scanner and facial recognition technologies to identify banned individuals inside the stadium. Iris scanner and fingerprint technologies were considered viable methods of biometric identification. In 2007 three football clubs, Ajax, Feyenoord and Vitesse Arnhem, began to experiment with the use of fingerprint technology at the stadium entrances in order to keep out banned
Also in 2007, ADO The Hague Football Club was the first Dutch football club to introduce iris scanner technology to keep out banned supporters. All its supporters are required to purchase a club card which includes a long range RFID (radio-frequency identification) chip, which is also used in the new Dutch passport and in the public transport chip card (as well as, for example, in tickets to the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany). During the application process a biometric passport photograph is produced. On matchdays, spectators enter the stadium through a sluice system. The antennas at the gates of the stadium detect the club card and check its validity. In the tunnel a facial photograph is produced, which is compared to the biometric data recorded during the application process. If the authentication process determines that it is the same person, the gate opens automatically. In case the photographs do not match, the gates remain closed and the spectator is forced to go back.

The biometric identification scheme at ADO The Hague FC, which integrates biometrics with existing ticketing and CCTV systems, was designed by a private business, Happy Crowd Control (HCC). HCC describes itself as a world-leader in safety and security for any crowd at any ground, event centre or high security location. Happy Crowd Control is an innovative system, allowing user-friendly and fast access. Particularly for those locations where large numbers of people have daily access, such as stadium grounds, music centres, airports, high security offices or locations, schools, payment locations, casinos, prisons and so on. HCC prides itself on providing ‘safety and security from entrance to exit’, arguing that ‘the certainty that known troublemakers, or those who misbehave, will be apprehended or prevented from entering the stadium at all, gives a sense of security. ... In case of problems with misbehaviour, troublemakers can easily be recognised and banned’. The Happy Crowd Control system is believed to ‘reduce risk to a minimum, making it almost impossible to get away with undesirable conduct’.

The use of biometric identification at football matches highlights how the
bodies of spectators are becoming redefined in terms of information; that is, they become informatized.\textsuperscript{25} Van der Ploeg demonstrates how bodily characteristics, once they have been translated into electronically processable data, are amenable to forms of analysis and classification.\textsuperscript{26} First, as the above example shows, authentication classifies spectators as either legitimate or illegitimate, wanted or unwanted, low risk or high risk. On a next level, identification categorizes spectators according to the type and purpose of the database against which the biometric signal is checked. Spectators may be identified as someone with a banning order or a criminal record, or as being ‘associated’ with a high-risk supporter group. A third level of analysis and categorization consists of the bringing together of biometric information with other types of data, such as that recorded in police and club databases, on an aggregate level to generate profiles that subsequently will be used to assess risk and pre-empt behaviour. This profiling process will be further examined later on in the paper. First, however, I will address the issue of dataveillance: the systematic use and linking of personal data systems in the monitoring and investigation of football spectator behaviour.

**Dataveillance: centralizing and decentralizing tendencies**

In *The Information Age* trilogy, Manuel Castells dismisses the Orwellian Big Brother scenario in which the state has almost total control over the population.\textsuperscript{27} Instead, Castells argues that the capacity for surveillance is diffused in society: beyond the boundaries of the state, beyond the public/private divide, and beyond national borders.\textsuperscript{28} Although new information technologies might be put to the service of surveillance, control and repression by state institutions, they might also be used for citizens to enhance their control over the state and to access information.\textsuperscript{29} New information technologies also create opportunities for criminal and terrorist networks to evade or confront state institutions, for example through developing new modes of organization and communication. For Castells, the most important aspect of this development is in the gathering of information on individuals by business firms, and organizations of all kinds, and in the creation of a market for this information. He notes: ‘Rather than an oppressive “Big Brother,” it is a myriad of well-wishing “little sisters,” relating to each one of us on a personal basis because they know who we are, who have invaded all realms of life’.\textsuperscript{30} The extension of
surveillance beyond the boundaries of the state is most clearly captured in the notion of ‘surveillance society’, which indicates that surveillance activities have long since spilled over the edges of governmental bureaucracies to flood every conceivable social conduit. While the state still accounts for much monitoring of everyday life, such government activities are just one of many areas within which surveillance data now flows.\(^{31}\)

New opportunities for surveillance show both centralizing and decentralizing tendencies. On the one hand, the opportunities for governments to access and integrate the data that is available from a range of state and non-state actors are increasing. On the other hand, new opportunities for observation and analysis are now within the reach of a growing number of actors, including businesses and individual citizens.\(^{32}\)

These general tendencies can also be observed in Dutch professional football. The government has a leading role in security policy, but at the same time other parties have become more prominent: KNVB, football clubs, private security companies, organizations that specialize in data recording and provision (such as Cotass in the case of the club card and Happy Crowd Control and Tebrona in relation to iris scanner technology)\(^ {33}\), and supporter associations. For example, football clubs play an important part in the application of new technologies and in the collection and exchange of general and personal information on supporters. As the organizers of football matches, they are required to do everything in their powers to ensure safety and effective crowd management at the stadium, before, during and after the match. This includes keeping ‘unwanted’ spectators out of the stadium and preventing spectators from bringing prohibited items such as weapons, fireworks or bottles into the stadium. Depending on the severity of the offense, clubs can also impose banning orders on individual spectators.

**Databases**

A central component of Dutch policy in the area of football and security is the development and integration of data systems that contain general and personal information on football supporters and groups. The first national database in this
field dates back to the mid 1980s. During this period football hooliganism became a more prominent subject on the Dutch political agenda due to a number of high-profile spectator incidents both in the Netherlands and internationally. The 1985 Heysel stadium disaster in Belgium further heightened concerns about the potential lethality of football hooliganism and resulted in the introduction of a series of internationally agreed countermeasures, which were also adopted in the Netherlands. The CIV was established in 1986 with the aim to collect, analyze and disseminate information on spectator behaviour. A new data system was created to facilitate this process. Some European countries have developed a similar centralized data management system, for example the Striker database in the United Kingdom.

The national database now contains a module in which police can enter personal information on so-called ‘high-risk’ supporters. This module includes an overview of what are deemed to be the top 500 high-risk supporters in the Netherlands as well as of the top 10 ‘hooligans’ or ‘ringleaders’ in individual police districts. These lists are composed on the basis of registered offenses and specific intelligence provided by police and security officials. The objective is for all police forces to be aware who these supporters are in order to enable accurate risk assessment and to anticipate any potential misbehaviour. On previous occasions, such as during the European Championships held in the Netherlands and Belgium in 2000, individuals on the top 500 list received letters warning them that they would be closely monitored during the tournament. Although police continue to play a leading role in data surveillance in the area of football and security, inter-agency cooperation has increased significantly over time. Football clubs are now able to use and enter their own data into the system, such as information on spectator incidents, ‘problematic’ individuals or groups, expected spectator flows, and safety and security arrangements.

More recently, police and public prosecutors have appealed to the general public using the internet and television in an attempt to identify and arrest suspected supporters. In the aftermath of an incident at a match between Feyenoord and Ajax in 2005, during which 42 police officers were injured, police were able to use information provided by the television audience to identify some of the suspects. In December 2011 police used a similar approach in their search for dozens of supporters of FC Utrecht who were allegedly involved in the incidents after FC Utrecht’s home game against FC Twente, which included violent conduct and missile
throwing. The police displayed photographs of suspects on the internet and showed them on national television. The photographs were derived from CCTV footage recorded during and after the match. The program *Opsporing Verzocht* called on the public to provide information that could lead to the arrest of six suspected spectators who had not yet been arrested in relation to the incidents.

Similar police investigations have been undertaken in the United Kingdom. Football clubs and associations sometimes play an active role in this process, for example in the aftermath of the London derby between Fulham and Chelsea in March 2006. After the final whistle home supporters invaded the pitch to celebrate the historic victory over their archrivals. Some of the supporters charged towards the away supporters, and a number of short fights between rival supporters broke out on the pitch. Fulham opened a large-scale investigation into the incidents and placed photographs of suspected spectators on its official website, urging fellow supporters to come forward and provide information.

As noted earlier, one form of analysis and classification in anticipatory surveillance consists of the bringing together of different types of information on an aggregate level to generate profiles that subsequently will be used to assess risk and pre-empt behaviour. With regard to the databases discussed above, a key point here is that to be suspected of being a ‘potential troublemaker’, it is no longer necessary to exhibit manifest symptoms of dangerousness; instead, it is sufficient to display whatever characteristics police and other specialists have constituted as risk factors.37 Put differently, it is enough to have the characteristics or profile of a ‘hooligan’ to be treated as if one had committed a football-related crime. Once one is registered as such, there tends to be little escape. The implications for football supporters’ civil liberties are profound, yet arguably more so in the United Kingdom, where the 2000 Football (Disorder) Act gives police officers the power to detain and ban those seeking to travel abroad if it is suspected that they will become involved in disorder. These football banning orders ‘on complaint’ have been criticized for infringing the fundamental rights of supporters who have not been convicted of any offence, and their proportionality and legitimacy has been seriously questioned.38

However, the Dutch case also highlights some of the problematic consequences of anticipatory surveillance. To give one example, encountered during my own research, a Dutch football supporter was arrested during a preventive group arrest aimed at preventing a confrontation between rival supporters outside the
stadium after a football match. Although the charges against the individual were subsequently dropped, the five-year banning order that was initially imposed was never revoked. The individual’s personal data and alleged ‘association’ with a group of ‘high-risk’ supporters, which appeared to be entirely coincidental, were never removed from the national data system. As a consequence, he continues to be blacklisted as an unwanted supporter and has not been allowed to attend football matches in the Netherlands. Below the issue of risk profiling is further discussed in relation to the risk analysis matrices that are now used in the Netherlands to categorize and profile football matches and supporter groups.

**Risk assessment and classification**

Prior to every professional football match in the Netherlands, the municipality, police force and football clubs involved draw on the available information to assess the safety and security risks associated with the match. Based on this risk assessment the match is categorized in terms of the level of risk, and risk minimization strategies are put in place. The risk assessment takes into account, among other factors:

- the presence of supporters who are known to be violent and the threat of confrontations between rival supporter groups;
- the underlying culture of the supporter groups to be policed (e.g. behaviour, motivations and intentions);
- any factors likely to impact on risk, such as the activities of other groups (e.g. opposition supporters and/or local communities), sensitivities, history, etc.;
- any circumstances likely to impact on the behaviour of, or risk posed by, football supporters or groups.39

In the 2005/06 season the CIV, in cooperation with the KNVB and representatives of clubs and regional police forces, introduced a ‘risk analysis matrix’ and attendant checklist to enable an improved and more systematic assessment of the security risks of football matches. Both police and clubs enter a part of the matrix with information on risk factors and planned security and safety arrangements. Clubs collect a range of information on supporters through data systems (season ticket holders, club card holders, biometric identification) and through their safety and security organization...
(security coordinator, fan coordinator, stewards, etc.). This information is shared with police and local government.

The grading of football matches into risk levels (A, B or C), as summarized in Table 1, is based on the information recorded in the risk analysis matrix. A football match is labeled a ‘risk match’ (Category B or C) if the analysis of the available information and experiences suggests the need for extra attention for public order disturbances. Comparable classifications are used in a number of European countries, albeit with some variation. During the 2010-2011 season, 48% of matches were classified as A, 47% as B, and 5% as C. The risk analysis matrix is used by police to advise the mayor of the municipality where the game is to be played on the appropriate security arrangements, such as the deployment of police officers, ticketing and travel restrictions, and restrictions on the sale of alcohol at the stadium. The football clubs involved use the matrix to determine the deployment of security personnel. Information recorded in the matrix is also used to develop more or less specific and detailed profiles of the supporter groups involved.

Table 1: Risk classification of football matches in the Netherlands

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<tr>
<th>Risk level</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Low risk</td>
<td>No extra risk of damage to persons or property compared to non-football events of a similar scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Medium risk</td>
<td>Elevated risk of damage to persons or property due to poor spectator behaviour or other circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>High risk</td>
<td>Potential danger to public order due to collective supporter behaviour and/or extra risk due to special circumstances</td>
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One significant restriction that can be imposed on football supporters attending matches that are classified as medium or high risk is the so-called 'combiregeling', a compulsory travel arrangement. This policy instrument was first introduced nationwide in 1984, and obliges away supporters to travel collectively to away matches by train, coach or car under close surveillance. Match tickets are sold only to those away supporters who comply with the travel arrangement. The CIV describes this travel restriction as an important measure to control and plan the flow of away supporters to and from the stadium. However, as I have shown elsewhere, most
supporters perceive this measure as negatively influencing their match-day experience since it obstructs their freedom of movement. The combiregeling is now a standard travel restriction for Category C matches, and can also be imposed for category B matches if deemed appropriate by the authorities. The restriction is not used for Category A matches owing to their perceived low risk. The number of compulsory travel arrangements has remained fairly stable in recent years: from 354 in the 2007-2008 season and 372 in the 2008-2009 season, to 357 and 354 in the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 seasons, respectively.

The categories A/B/C are also used in the Netherlands and in countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom to classify or profile supporter groups and even individual supporters. Category C supporters are typically considered organized hooligans or violence-seeking supporters, while Category B supporters are classified as those liable to become involved in disturbances should they occur. In contrast, Category A supporters are considered non-violent or friendly supporters. At a European level, these categories have been replaced by a simple, dichotomous categorization of football supporters: risk versus non-risk supporters. A risk supporter is defined as ‘a person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing a possible risk to public order or anti-social behaviour, whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event’. In contrast, a non-risk supporter is a person who does not pose a risk to public order at or in connection with a football event.

As noted earlier, being classified as a Category C or ‘risk’ supporter can have very real and practical consequences for individual supporters despite research showing the fallacies of this approach to policing football supporters. The EU Handbook definition’s reference to persons who pose a possible risk, as opposed to an actual, ‘known’ risk, is problematic because of the serious infringement of the targeted individual’s civil rights and liberties. Again, we see here that central to preemptive risk management is the minimization of an undesirable event happening in the future, and that within this dispositif of precautionary risk any level of risk is considered unacceptable, or should at the very least be pre-empted and closely monitored. As part of this drive to pre-empt the undesirable event, there have been ongoing efforts to improve and fine-tune the existing risk analysis and classification instruments to ensure that all possible risk factors are accounted for and adequately weighed. It has been argued, for instance, that there is a need for new risk...
assessment instruments that are more ‘objective’, flexible and locally adaptable. The recently devised risk assessment instrument that draws on an ‘objective ranking tool’ to determine risk factors and risk locations is a case in point.  

**Perpetrator and group profiling**

In recent years, a significant development in the policing of football crowds in the Netherlands has been the application of a perpetrator-orientated approach. The *Hooligans in Beeld* (‘Focus on Hooligans’) approach was first developed within the Gelderland-Midden district police corps in relation to supporters of Vitesse Arnhem, and has since been applied nationwide by both the police and the KNVB. This method uses targeted intelligence to closely monitor and control the behaviour of supporters who are considered (potentially) violent. The methodology consists of mapping problematic groups and supporters at individual football clubs, and to link the information obtained from different data systems. The collection of information focuses on the identity, role and behaviour of individuals within supporter groups, as well as on the linkages (if any) between different groups. Attention is paid not only to their behaviour on match days, but also to possible offenses and disorderly behaviour at other moments and locations. The collected information is analyzed and cross-checked using existing police data systems, enabling police to enhance their insight into the behavioural patterns and social networks of suspected supporters. The information from the different sources is integrated and recorded in public order dossiers, which can be accessed by the municipality and public prosecutor. Regional police corps use the dossiers to develop a profile of the top 10 ‘hooligans’ and other ‘ringleaders’ in their district. The most significant benefit of the method is believed to be the improved knowledge and information position of the police and relevant partners, enabling early, targeted intervention. For example, police visit ‘high-risk’ supporters at home or at work, communicating to them that their every move is being closely watched. Police can also impose football and area banning orders on these individuals.

The perpetrator-orientated approach has important consequences for the autonomy and privacy of those supporters who are labelled ‘ringleaders’ or ‘high-risk’. These can be individuals with a significant record of convictions for football-related offenses, or supporters who are deemed ‘members’ of a known hooligan
formation that engages in violent confrontations at football matches or in criminal activities outside of the football context. Some of these individuals have developed counter-strategies in reaction to their being targeted by police. For example, in some localities an unanticipated consequence of the perpetrator-orientated approach has been the deterioration of the relations between supporters and police, to the point where individual police officers have been intimidated or assaulted. On a few occasions supporters have vandalized the homes of police officers in retaliation for being targeted by these officers.\textsuperscript{51}

\textbf{International and European dimensions}

Security and risk management technologies at football matches are characterized by a high degree of internationalization and Europeanization. Counter-hooliganism police cooperation networks have been on the increase ever since the 1985 European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events.\textsuperscript{52} International police cooperation in this area operates primarily on the meso and micro levels. The meso level consists of ‘the formal structures within which day-to-day operational police work occurs’, such as the organizational structures of police units, practices and procedures, and bilateral and multilateral agreements that exist to promote cooperation in this area.\textsuperscript{53} The micro level, on the other hand, is concerned with the specific arrangements made for the prevention, control and investigation of football-related offenses.

National Football Information Points and other police units in different European countries cooperate in the collection, analysis and dissemination of information in relation to European Cup matches and international football tournaments, for example through the pan-European network of National Football Information Points. Via these information points, as well as through bilateral communication between individual football clubs and police forces, countries exchange information on the composition, behaviour and travel flows of supporters prior to, during and after international football matches. The CIV and other Dutch police organizations play an important role in this process, for example through updating the EU Handbook of international police cooperation with respect to football matches with an international dimension (EU Handbook), which regulates international information exchange in relation to football matches within the
European Union. The EU Handbook recognizes that the ‘timely exchange of accurate information is of the utmost importance in enhancing safety and security and preventing football-related violence and disorder’.54

To enhance the transnational flow of information, the CIV and other National Football Information Points have developed standardized electronic forms for online information exchange. Countries such as the Netherlands, England, Ireland and Denmark are directly connected to these electronic forms, allowing them to access the information online on a 24/7 basis. There is also a website for international information exchange which includes a knowledge base where countries that are connected to the system can upload and access relevant documents. This website functions as a hub for the international exchange of documentation and information with regard to football spectator behaviour.55

In 2011, the Council of the European Union called on the Member States to also strengthen police cooperation with non-EU countries in the area of sports events safety and security, and to take a number of actions in this area. The proposed actions are, inter alia, analysis of the existing possibilities of personal data exchange with non-EU countries, including the use of Europol and Interpol channels in line with their mandate, and examination of the possibilities for making the exchange of information with Interpol more efficient in relation to information exchange with non-EU countries where National Football Information Points or similar police contact points responsible for the exchange of information regarding the safety and security of sports events do not yet exist.56

The CIV and its equivalents in other European countries have used major sport events such as the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany to build experience and engender good practice in international information exchange. During the World Cup the CIV collaborated with its German counterpart, Zentrale Informationsstelle Sporteinsätze (ZIS), using an electronic system, which enabled the rapid exchange of information on issues such as the number, nature and movements of Dutch supporters travelling to and within Germany. The German partners used a secured internet connection to instantly access any new intelligence that became available. During the World Cup the transport police and customs were also connected to the system.57 Although these examples indicate the increased Europeanization of intelligence-led policing at football matches, international cooperation in this area is work in progress, with regular attempts being made by national and international
authorities to improve cooperation. Major differences continue to exist between different countries in terms of both the actual implementation of arrangements and the quality of information provided.\textsuperscript{58}

International police cooperation in the area of football and security at the micro and meso levels is driven and controlled by the macro level, that is, international law and what Ericson calls ‘counter-law’.\textsuperscript{59} We have seen the extension of the legal powers available to law enforcement and intelligence agencies to cooperate across national borders. At the same time, there have been cases in which laws undermine existing law and are, in a sense, ‘laws against law’.\textsuperscript{60} The international nature of football fandom and football hooliganism has led to momentary reversals of European integration, such as the closure of borders. The Schengen agreement, which abolished checks at common borders between most European countries, is a case in point. Under the current rules, a Schengen state is permitted to reinstate border controls on a temporary basis if deemed in the interest of national security or public order, for example to prevent violent supporters from attending international football events.\textsuperscript{61} This occurred in Portugal and Austria during the 2004 and 2008 European Football Championships, respectively. Both countries imposed pre-Schengen border controls for the tournaments as part of their security operation, with the aim of ‘stopping troublemakers’ at the border.\textsuperscript{62}

The temporary suspension of the Schengen agreement, as well as the other security techniques discussed in this paper, raise an important issue: that of the normalization of extraordinary security and risk management technologies. This process involves a shift from a classical ‘state of exception’ - where temporary security measures that involve the suspension or curtailment of fundamental liberties and rights are introduced to prevent a ‘catastrophic event’ - to ‘an unprecedented generalization of the paradigm of security as the normal technique of government’.\textsuperscript{63} The conditions of emergency create a ‘new normal’. In the \textit{dispositif} of precautionary risk, any level of risk is considered unacceptable; risk must be avoided at all cost. Thus, Dean argues, ‘the existence of the exception reframes the very idea of normality’.\textsuperscript{64}

In this paper I have shown how, in relation to Dutch football, an advanced security assemblage is now at the permanent disposal of authorities in their quest to pre-empt and minimize risk. Although security and risk management technologies play out differently in different places, there are also major patterns of convergence.
International football matches and especially sport mega events are a key platform for the diffusion of new surveillance and security technologies. For example, the security assemblage for the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany has been transferred to subsequent events such as the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. Furthermore, as Eick rightly notes, ‘policy transfer systems emerge aiming at the development of an encompassing framework, or blueprint, that is to work in different settings far beyond sports mega events’. The issue of policy transfer is discussed below.

**Beyond football: the football supporter as a guinea-pig for pre-emptive risk management techniques**

It can be argued that the football supporter functions as a guinea-pig for surveillance techniques which in the future may come to be used to conduct conduct in other settings (and vice versa, as in the case of counterterrorism measures). Control measures from the football environment have been applied, for example, to the protest gatherings of transnational social movements. Alterglobalists have been submitted to similar modes of surveillance, classification and repressive treatment. Transnational activists have been on the receiving end of increasingly harsh police strategies adapted from those applied in preceding decades against football hooliganism. As Della Porta et al. note, ‘zero-tolerance doctrines, as well as militaristic training and equipment, are imported into the field of protest policing from other forms of public order control addressing micro-criminality or football hooliganism’.

Authorities also cooperate internationally to impose travel bans on activists who allegedly pose a risk. Protesters classified as (potential) ‘troublemakers’ or ‘summit hooligans’ can be blacklisted and refused entry at the border. This measure was previously applied to football supporters during international football tournaments. Banning orders ‘on complaint’ are used in the policing of protest ‘to restrict movement and to extend the spatial regime of no-go and no-protest zones’. At the G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, in 2005, Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, originally intended to prevent football-related disorder, was invoked to enforce banning orders which covered the entire region surrounding the summit’s venue. Two years later, at the G8 summit in Heiligendamm, German
police banned certain activists who participated in actions in the region of the summit’s venue in order to incapacitate their participation even before the actual summit protests started.\textsuperscript{69} In sum, international cooperation in the policing of football matches appears to serve as an example of, or precursor to, other forms of police cooperation within Europe.\textsuperscript{70}

**Discussion and conclusion**

This paper has analyzed the security and risk management technologies that are being used to conduct the behaviour of football supporters in the Netherlands. These technologies, it was shown, seek to pre-empt and minimize the probability of any undesirable conduct by football spectators in the future. Risk is calculated via a multi-layered system that links diverse surveillance techniques ranging from CCTV and human intelligence to electronic dossiers and biometric identification. Pre-emptive risk management in the governing of football supporters involves a dispersed and fragmented set of state and non-state actors that engage in the process of identifying, registering, classifying, monitoring, profiling and punishing ‘risky’ supporters. Although the government, and particularly police, continue to play a central role in the networked approach to preventing and controlling football hooliganism, new actors have become decidedly more prominent in this process, most notably football clubs, the KNVB and private businesses.

The techniques of risk calculation and risk management discussed in this paper penetrate the life world of football supporters, with important implications for supporters’ civil liberties and basic rights. The autonomy and civil liberties of football supporters have clearly diminished. Supporters are more and more controlled and disciplined, and have less freedom to set their own behavioural tolerance levels. If we take into consideration the recent trends in other social contexts in which pre-emptive risk management and anticipatory surveillance have become the norm,\textsuperscript{71} we can conclude that situations in which football supporters will be confronted with precautionary measures against them, without their having actively contributed to this process and without there being any manifest signs of ‘dangerousness’, will probably proliferate.

One ought to be cautious, however, not to over-state processes of discipline. Individuals are far from passive victims of the system. In his later work, Michel
Foucault recognized that he had too strongly stressed processes of discipline.\textsuperscript{72} Instead, he now sought to investigate the interaction between technologies of domination and ‘technologies of the self’.\textsuperscript{73} Foucault argues: ‘[G]overning people, in the broad meaning of the word, governing people is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed of modified by himself’.\textsuperscript{74} In this context, Schinkel signals the harnessing of a new form of surveillance: selfveillance, a technology of self-control in which the body is both the controlling and controlled agency.\textsuperscript{75} The biometric identifiers (iris scan; fingerprints) used to regulate access at some football stadia in the Netherlands are a clear example of this. The good behaviour contracts for football supporters that have been used at clubs such as FC Utrecht and Feyenoord are another example of attempts to make supporters into ‘morally responsible subjects’ that bear the responsibility for self-managing their own conduct. In short, the interaction between technologies of the self and technologies of domination in the area of football and security deserve far greater research attention.

Another important (and closely related) avenue for future research can be gleaned from the work of Foucault: the modes of resistance or ‘counter-conduct’ in the everyday practices of football supporters, especially those used to strategically countervail, weaken or subvert disciplinary matrices.\textsuperscript{76} Foucault argues that ‘where there is power there is resistance’.\textsuperscript{77} The history of government as the conduct of conduct is interwoven with the history of dissenting ‘counter-conducts’.\textsuperscript{78} For Foucault, resistance is present everywhere power is exercised; the network of power relations is paralleled by (and, in fact, depends for its existence on) a multiplicity of forms of resistance.\textsuperscript{79} To fully grasp the practical workings and the unanticipated consequences of the risk logics discussed in this paper, then, it is necessary to also take into account the ways in which football supporters respond to and anticipate the security and risk management technologies that are being used to conduct their behaviour. Herein lies an important task for researchers in the field of security and sport events.
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Notes

1 The current legal powers available to law enforcers are discussed in Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Affairs, *Handreiking Wet maatregelen bestrijding voetbalvandalisme en ernstige overlast*; Ministry of Security and Justice, *Kader voor beleid: Voetbal en veiligheid*.

2 Aradau and Van Munster, ‘Taming the Future: The Dispositif of Risk in the War on Terror’. See also Aradau and Van Munster, ‘Governing Terrorism Through Risk’; Dean, ‘Power at the Heart of the Present’. A dispositif is a more or less organized assemblage of practices, techniques and rationalities. For Michel Foucault, a dispositif constitutes ‘a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions’. Foucault, ‘The Confession of the Flesh’, 194.

3 Armstrong and Young, ‘Legislators and Interpreters’; Tsoukala, *Football Hooliganism in Europe*.

4 Castel, ‘From Dangerousness to Risk’, 288.


7 Miller and Rose, *Governing the Present*, 32.

8 See also the papers by Tsoukala, Mastrogiannakis and Testa in this issue.


10 Foucault, ‘The Subject and the Power’.


12 Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, 95.

13 Bale, *Landscapes of Modern Sport*, 84. See also Armstrong and Giulianotti, ‘From another angle’.

14 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.


16 Cotass, *Persconferentie Stichting Cotass*.


20 Lyon, Surveillance Society, 86.
22 Happy Crowd Control, ‘Happy Crowd Control: Safety and Security from Entrance to Exit’.
23 Happy Crowd Control, ‘Happy Crowd Control: Safety and Security from Entrance to Exit’.
24 Happy Crowd Control, ‘Happy Crowd Control: Safety and Security from Entrance to Exit’.
25 Van der Ploeg, ‘Biometrics and the Body as Information’.
27 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four.
31 Lyon, Surveillance Society, 33.
32 Vedder, ‘Convergerende technologieën, verschuivende verantwoordelijkheden’.
33 Cotass stands for Club Orientated Access and Autorization System.
34 See Spaaij, Understanding Football Hooliganism and ‘Football Hooliganism in the Netherlands’.
35 Council of Europe, European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events.
37 Castel, ‘From Dangerousness to Risk’.
38 Pearson, ‘Qualifying for Europe?’.
39 Centraal Informatiepunt Voetbalvandalisme (CIV), Jaaroverzicht seizoen 2010-2011; Ministry of Security and Justice, Kader voor beleid: Voetbal en veiligheid. See also Council of the European Union, ‘Council Resolution of 3 June 2010 concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation
and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved.


42 Spaaij, *Understanding Football Hooliganism.*


44 Based on classifications by the Zentrale Informationsstelle Sporteneinsätze (ZIS) and the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS).

45 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Resolution of 3 June 2010 concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved’, 21.

46 Garland and Rowe, ‘The “English Disease”: Cured or in Remission?;’ Stott and Pearson, *Football Hooliganism.*

47 Tsoukala, ‘Combating Football Crowd Disorder at the European level’.


49 Ferwerda and Adang, *Hooligans in beeld.*

50 Ferwerda and Adang, *Hooligans in beeld.*

51 Author interviews with senior police officers, 2006-2007.

52 Tsoukala, ‘Combating Football Crowd Disorder at the European level’; Adang and Brown, *Policing football in Europe.*


54 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Resolution of 3 June 2010 concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved’, 3.
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See also: Groenevelt, ‘Internationale samenwerking bestrijding voetbalvandalisme’.


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