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British Campaign for the Defence

of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

Special Supplement
on East Timor pages 7-18

TAPOL Bulletin No. 68

March 1985

Mrs Thatcher visits Indonesia

The British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is to visit Indonesia in April during a tour of South East Asia and the Indian sub-continent that will last from 5-14 April. Her chief engagement in Indonesia apart from discussions with government leaders which will undoubtedly include the president, General Suharto, and General Benny Murdani, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, will be a visit to PT Nurtanio Aircraft Industry, the fast-growing centrepiece of Indonesia's military-industrial complex and the only aircraft manufacturer in the ASEAN region.

Mrs Thatcher's visit comes at the climax of a sales drive by British arms manufacturers, promoted and coordinated by the British government, to win a major share of the market for aircraft, naval vessels and weapons systems for the Indonesian Armed Forces, now undergoing major reorganisation and modernisation.

The sales drive had its first big boost in April 1978, when British Aerospace won a contract for 8 advanced trainer/combat Hawk ground-attack aircraft, a deal that was concluded under the Labour government at a time when Indonesia's aerial bombardment of the East Timor population was at its height. Since then there has been a steady stream of British arms sales missions starting with a visit by Trade Minister, Sir John Nott prior to his appointment as Defence Minister in 1981. (The announcement of his appointment as Secretary of State for Defence came while he was visiting Indonesia.) In 1982, Foreign Minister Lord Carrington headed a high-powered trade mission which included the Managing Director of British Aerospace, the two top executives of the Hawker-Siddeley Company and the President Director of Racal Electronics, a company specialising in arms-related equipment such as avionics, electronic communications and radio surveillance. British Aerospace have followed their 1978 deal with several more Hawk aircraft deals; so far a total of 17 have been supplied. In 1984, Vosper-Thornycroft won a contract for the supply of three refitted naval frigates, and in December 1984 came the biggest deal of them all, a £100 million contract for the British Aerospace Rapier missile system. During the latter part of 1984, Indonesia received two visits from John Lee, parliamentary under-secretary for defence procurement at the Ministry of Defence and in November, General Sir Edwin Bramall, Chief of Defence Staff, paid an extended visit to General Murdani. In January this year, Air Chief Marshall Sir Keith Williamson, Chief-of-Staff of the Royal Air Force, also visited Indonesia.

Collaboration with Indonesia's military-industrial complex

In the light of British Aerospace's prominence in the UK's sales drive, it comes as no surprise that Mrs Thatcher will be visiting PT Nurtanio. State-owned Nurtanio was set up in 1976 initially with a work force of 500 but by early 1984 was already employing 11,800, of whom 90% were described as skilled technicians and aircraft engineers and designers (Mutiara, 26 March-10 April 1984). It was launched under the direction of B.J. Habibie, who had spent years with West Germany's Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB) aircraft manufacturers. The company is now capable of producing both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters and has established close contact with the Spanish aircraft firm, CASA, MBB of West Germany and Aerospatiale of France. In early 1983, Nurtanio had no fewer than 419 orders for aircraft and helicopters, not only from the Indonesian Air Force, Navy and Army but also from the armed forces in Thailand, Bangladesh, Burma, Pakistan and Argentina. Nurtanio also has a weapons systems division named *Menang* (Victory) and plans in future to manufacture fighter aircraft and Boeing jets. (*Asian Defence Journal* 3/1983)

Under its co-production licensing agreements with western aircraft manufacturers, Nurtanio produces CN-212 and CN-235 light aircraft with CASA of Spain, NBO-105 aircraft with MBB and Super-Puma AS-332 with Aerospatiale of France. Nurtanio is the only company outside Aerospatiale itself to be producing the AS-332 helicopter. Early in 1984, the French aircraft manufacturer, Dassault-Breguet was negotiating for the licensed production by Nurtanio of its Mirage 2000, a multirole fighter jet equipped with AM39 Exocet missiles (*Asian Defence Journal*, 5/1984). This deal has apparently not yet gone ahead, and it may well be that British Aerospace is competing hard with the French bid to develop new co-production arrangements with Nurtanio.

At the time of the Rapier deal, it was stressed that the offer of training and transfer of technology was vital to British Aerospace's success in winning the contract (*Financial Times*, 3 January 1985). BAe personnel will be involved in back-up and other services in Indonesia, and with some assembling of the missiles locally, at Nurtanio, there will be close collaboration between the local manufacturer and British electronics contractors. The Thatcher visit is thus not only the climax of a sales drive under way since 1978. It is also intended to be the opening phase for a big expansion in collaboration between Indonesia's own military-industrial complex and the British arms industry.

Courts try crippled survivors of Tanjung Priok Massacre

In yet another gross miscarriage of justice, 36 people who are alleged to have taken part in the demonstration in Tanjung Priok that was fired on by troops last September are now on trial on a variety of rioting charges such as "causing public disorder", "attempting to attack military or police offices", "throwing stones at houses and breaking windows" or "distributing leaflets contradicting General Murdani's account of the affair".

Many of those on trial were seriously wounded in the armed attack and were later arrested at random from among the many casualties taken to hospital for treatment. Virtually all the evidence against them comes from soldiers who fired on the crowd.

All the lawyers defending these cases are members of the Team to Defend the Mubaligh/Political Cases. The documents they submit to court are printed on the headed notepaper of the Team. The prosecutors and judges use every occasion to object to this practice, insisting that the trials have nothing to do with politics.

The 36 defendants are being tried simultaneously in 4 separate groups:

The "28"

The largest group consists of 28 men, almost all of whom are casualties of the massacre. Some are still invalids, unable to move without crutches or a walking stick or unable to sit through a hearing in an upright position. At the commencement of the trial, the defence lawyers urged the court unsuccessfully to make the necessary arrangements for the defendants to be given proper medical treatment. It is not clear how many of the defendants are still in hospital and how many have been transferred from hospital to prison cells. But the lawyers told the court that many were in desperate need of intensive care. Some still have bullets embedded in their bodies (nearly six months after the incident!) "Most of my clients," said lawyer Nursyamsi, "have been disabled as a result of the measures taken by the government." *Kompas* (5 February) reports that many in the public gallery of the overcrowded courtroom wept as he spoke.

It also became clear during the course of the trial that the casualties of the Tanjung Priok massacre may only be hospitalised at the Police Hospital in Kramat Jati. Other



The 28 survivors on trial in court. *Tempo*, 2 February, 1985.

hospitals have been instructed not to accept any Tanjung Priok casualties. (Illegal documents circulating in Indonesia since the incident already drew attention to this. See *TAPOL Bulletin* No 67, January 1985, page 9.) Thus, at a later hearing, the defence counsel failed to get court permission for one of his clients, **Mach bin Ir** 22, to be transferred to a hospital that would be willing to operate to remove a bullet from his chest, because the Police Hospital has provided only superficial treatment. In order to be taken in elsewhere, the receiving hospital would need special permission from the court to accept him as a patient. (*Kompas* 1 March.) This permission was not granted. A week later, another defendant, identified only as **DZ**, aged 19, collapsed in the courtroom and was rushed back to hospital. He too still has a bullet in his chest.

The defendants are accused of taking part in political activities such as listening to lectures and going on a demonstration. ("Political activities" are apparently regarded as "criminal" not "political" offences.) They are also collectively accused of "waging resistance" (*melakukan perlawanan*) against the army and the police by going on a demonstration to army and police offices with the purpose of releasing some detainees. Two of the prosecution witnesses testified that they saw people in the crowd throwing things at houses and burning cars but said they could not identify any of the 28 defendants as being part of the crowd. They only came to know 8 of the defendants when they were arrested in hospital where they were being treated for injuries.

As for the trial itself, soldiers appearing on the witness stand went into detail to explain why and how they fired on the crowd. "At first we fired over their heads," several of them told the court, "then when they refused to go back, we fired downwards at their feet."

"Why did you do that?" asked the judge. "It's normal procedure," was the reply.

Although they gave evidence about the "menacing" slogans and attitudes of the crowd, the soldiers appear to have been under orders not to give evidence about the casualties inflicted. Second Lieutenant Mouchson for instance said that after firing "at their feet", he immediately left the scene to go on patrol elsewhere and didn't know anything about casualties. One police officer who was not there at the time of the shooting but was

Witnesses of the Massacre

Although Indonesian press reports have generally avoided reporting the testimony of the 28 men on trial for participating in the Tanjung Priok demonstration, some foreign agencies have been more forthcoming. The following is taken from an AFP report on 2 March:

One defendant named Yusron, 24, told the court that before the troops opened fire, the marchers had obeyed their orders to halt.

He said the military trucks quickly arrived to take the casualties to the Army Hospital in Central Jakarta. He was thrown into one truck which he said was already filled with some 50 people. Yusron said he was in the front ranks of the marchers and was able to see everything clearly. He was hit by several bullets, one piercing his body right through and another still lodged inside his body. Another bullet was still in his arm, he told the court, opening his shirt to show the scars.

Another defendant, Marwoto, told the court the military trucks drove into the crowd, heedless of people lying on the pavement. He said he was arrested and taken to the local military command post where he was beaten.

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summoned immediately afterwards, simply said the place was strewn with bodies, the dead and the injured, and he went off to get a company of men "to *mengamankan lokasi*" (did he mean "clear up", "clean up" or "restore order to" the location?)

The court has accepted as evidence against the accused a "truckload" of weapons which the troops claim to have confiscated at the scene of the massacre — knives, sickles, sharpened bamboo sticks, pieces of wood and iron bars. Defence attempts to question the origin of these implements have gone unheeded, as well as their protest that such items of evidence cannot be identified as belonging to any of the accused, many of whom in any case were arrested some time later in hospital.

From the testimony given by the defendants, it is clear that some were not even at the demonstration. **Hendri bin Syafei** was playing cards with friends some distance away, and was not arrested until he went to Lampung a few days later where he gave a talk. Another identified as **Was** told the court he was walking in the vicinity, stopped to listen to a speech, then made his way to a bus-stop to go home. While waiting there, a crowd came past. He heard firing, then put his hand to his head which was bleeding profusely. He fell into the road, was carried away by taxi and only realised later in hospital that he had been hit by a bullet.

One of the accused told the court that he signed the interrogation report being submitted as evidence against him without being allowed to read it; he still did not know what the contents were.


If these hearings were part of a public inquiry into the cause of the massacre, there would be some logic to it all. But many Indonesians reading the press reports will have little difficulty drawing their own conclusions. The military regime may still live to regret that they decided to stage such trials which only confirm the account of the Tanjung Priok massacre given in many illegal documents that have circulated in the past few months.

The "5"

Five teenagers are being tried together for causing damage to property. They are accused of setting fire to a house which resulted in the deaths of 9 people. The charge sheet also accuses them of attending lectures where anti-government views were expounded.

This trial is being held in camera because some of the defendants are under age.

Late news: The five defendants were each given sentences of 20 months on 18 March.



Former minister, Ir H. M. Sanusi on his way to court, on trial in connection with the 4 October bombing incidents. (Jakarta Post, 14 January.) A report of the bombing trials will be published in the next issue.

The "1" gets 2 years

Kusnoto bin Kasan, 32, a chauffeur who formerly worked at the Bogasari Flour Factory was the first of the "36" to be found guilty. He was arrested some days after the Tanjung Priok massacre and found to be in possession of ten copies of a pamphlet which contradicted the press statement made by General Benny Murdani on the morning after the incident. The pamphlet among others contradicted his figure about the number of casualties. He was accused of reproducing and disseminating this pamphlet even though he knew that the information contained in it was all or in part false. Moreover, it was said in court, even before reading the contents of the pamphlet, he gave a friend Rp 1,000 to pay for it to be photocopied. During cross-examination and the questioning of witnesses, the prosecution was out to prove that Kusnoto also attended lectures which were critical of the government's "Pancasila-as-the-sole-principle" doctrine and of the government's family planning programme.

His defence lawyers reminded the court that it is not a criminal offence to reproduce or disseminate a pamphlet and that the charges should be withdrawn. Nevertheless, Kusnoto was found guilty and given a two-year sentence.

The "2" get 18 months each

Another of these "sub-trials" involved two defendants, **Irnanda bin Jamuir**, 23, and **Abdul Latif bin Paco**, 18, who were both found guilty and sentenced to 18 months each for allegedly throwing stones at a house and breaking some windows, the day after the Tanjung Priok massacre. During the trial, they withdrew statements attributed to them in the interrogation report submitted as evidence by the police. They told the court they had been forced to sign the report because they were afraid of being tortured by their interrogators, and asked that the interrogation report be excluded as evidence. Only their statements in court were true, they said, though the press reveals little of what they said in court.

According to **Kompas** (17 February), the lawyers defending these two defendants focussed attention on the circumstances in which they were forced to sign this interrogation report. It is typical of press coverage in general however that nothing further was reported about the content of these exchanges, by contrast with the full reporting of cross-examination by the prosecution and the judges.

Other "pamphlet trials"

The Tanjung Priok massacre and the one-sided version of what happened as presented in General Murdani's statement to the press the day after, caused a great many people to do what they could to disseminate an accurate account of the incident and the very high death toll. The extent to which pamphlets were distributed is now being made evident by the number of trials of people charged with "pamphlet" offences.

Thus for instance, four men are being tried in several towns of West Java. In these cases, the anti-subversion law is being used for "trying to win over public opinion" by distributing "illegal" pamphlets and brochures challenging government policy, sowing discord in the community and trying to cause public dissatisfaction. In fact, in Bandung, one of the accused is charged with "pamphleteering" that dates back to June 1984 (which is when the Societies Law first became a public issue in Indonesia). Another is accused in Bogor of distributing "false" pamphlets about the Tanjung Priok incident. A third to be tried in Cirebon is said to have distributed "illegal" pamphlets in a village in Tasikmalaya "distorting the facts about the Tanjung Priok incident" while the fourth is accused of spreading "illegal" pamphlets and cassettes of lectures that were delivered in Tanjung Priok before the 12 September demonstration. Moreover, all four of the accused are said to have "actively attended" (*aktif mengikuti*) lectures delivered by Amir Biki (who was shot dead in Tanjung Priok) and other "extremist" lecturers. (Sinar Harapan, 19 February.)

The Tanjung Priok Four get heavy sentences

All four defendants in the Tanjung Priok As Sa'adah prayerhouse trial (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 67, January 1985) have been found guilty and given sentences of between 18 months and 2½ years. The evidence against them was flimsy and based only on testimony from members of the security forces; moreover, the prosecution withdrew the main charges. The defence lawyers were prevented from calling witnesses, and encountered other obstructions from the court. Yet, guilty verdicts were a foregone conclusion. These were the four men arrested a couple of days before the Tanjung Priok massacre of over 60 people, the men whose release was being demanded by the crowds who were fired on by troops. To have acquitted them would have implied that the crowd's complaint that they had been unjustifiably detained was right. An acquittal would have

exercised their right not to reply so as not to incriminate themselves. This complaint, like all the other complaints made by the defence, was dismissed by the court.

The charges against Syarifuddin Rambe, a watch-repairer, and Syafwan Sulaiman, a labourer, were that they spread false reports, stirring up public consternation about the local army officer (*babinsa*) visiting and desecrating the As Sa'adah prayerhouse (this charge was later dropped); that they used physical violence against the officer and that they interfered with the performance of his duties by "forcing him" to go to the local administrator to apologise for his behaviour at the prayerhouse. Achmad Sahi, chairman of the prayerhouse and a casual clerk at Bulog, the National Logistics Agency, was accused of being the one who first conveyed the information about the *babinsa's* visit



The four convicted men leaving court. Their wives were there to see them off. (*Jakarta Post*, 14 January)

shattered the credibility of General Benny Murdani's version of the events in Tanjung Priok on 12 September.

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The four men tried were **Syarifuddin Rambe** and **Syafwan Sulaiman** who were tried together and both sentenced to 2½ years, **Achmad Sahi** who got 22 months, and **Mohammad Nur** who got 18 months. The men were tried in three separate series of hearings held one after the other each day and before the same panel of judges. Defence counsel registered a complaint about this procedure, in particular because the defendants were summoned to appear as prosecution witnesses in each other's trials which placed them in conflicting roles. As witnesses, they are obliged to answer questions, while as defendants they may

to Sjarifuddin and Syafwan (this charge was later dropped) and of spreading "exaggerated and incomplete" reports, "partly true and partly false". The fourth defendant, Muhammad Nur, an unemployed high school graduate, was charged with throwing a stone at the *babinsa's* motorbike and, with the others (who have not been arrested), of setting the motorbike alight. He was also charged with resisting arrest so as to enable his companions to escape, a charge that was also later dropped.

Security Forces testify

Apart from the defendants themselves who were required by the prosecution to testify at each other's trials, the only witnesses were members of the Army, active or retired. The *babinsa*, Sergeant Hermanu was the chief witness, together with two subordinates who are members of the *Wanra corps* (*perlawanan*

“Don’t let them butcher us” says Buyung Nasution

Indonesian lawyers today face efforts to butcher their profession, warned human rights lawyer Adnan Buyung Nasution, at the funeral of the well-known Surabaya lawyer, Pamoedji who died of a heart attack and high blood pressure in February, two months after being suspended from duties by the Soejoedi Wiroatmodjo, the chairman of the Surabaya District Court.

The decision to suspend Pamoedji last December aroused widespread condemnation from lawyers and from their professional organisation, Peradin. It was condemned as being quite without precedent, a decision that it was not in the competence of a District Court chairman to take.

Buyung said in his funeral peroration that he had no doubt that Pamoedji’s sudden and unexpected death had been hastened by the suspension because it had deeply wounded him, a lawyer with 20 years experience at the bar, and had had a crushing effect on his morale. Soejoedi’s action was not an isolated event. Not long after the suspension order against Pamoedji, Syafar Luthan, chairman of the Surabaya High Court issued an order obliging all lawyers in Surabaya to apply to him for licence to practise. Such a decision is totally unwarranted, said Buyung. Syafar Luthan also announced that the practice licences would be issued for only two years.

At the time his decision was made public, the High Court chairman announced that the main purpose was to exercise supervision over the legal profession. This would give him powers, he said, to withhold practice licences and prevent lawyers of “the red or black groups” from engaging in their professional duties. Syafar Luthan did not explain what he meant by “red” and “black” groups. (*Tempo*, 16 February 1985)

When asked after Pamoedji’s death what was the regulation used for the suspension, Soejoedi said there wasn’t any regulation. “Why am I not allowed to regulate something just because no regulation exists?” he asked. He was acting “creatively” on the basis of a decision taken at a national conference of District Court chairmen in 1982 which said that the courts should exercise control over advocates.

With leading members of the judiciary making such open threats against the legal profession, Buyung called on other lawyers to conduct a special action, and take the issue to Parliament. People in other professions, such as doctors and journalists should join us to prevent our profession being butchered. “If necessary, I shall take the issue to the international forum,” he said.

The issue which apparently led to Soejoedi’s suspension order was a public statement by four Surabaya lawyers, including Pamoedji, last December, protesting against the refusal of the District Court chairman to re-open cross-examination during a trial in progress even though the defence lawyer had announced that new evidence was available.

Pamoedji’s efforts to free a PKI prisoner

However at the time of his suspension, Pamoedji was also working hard to reverse a gross injustice that has been carried out against a tried political prisoner found guilty on charges connected with so-called PKI involvement in the 1965 G30S affair. This was the case of a prisoner named Soewarno Manoeck who is still being held in Pamekasan Prison, on the island of Madura. Soewarno was tried in 1977 and given a 12-year sentence for attempting to revive the PKI. His 12-year sentence was, according to the court verdict, to run from the date of the decision, without deduction for time already served although Soewarno had been in detention since 1968.

After the verdict was passed down, Soewarno decided not to appeal, but in March 1981, he made an appeal for clemency for

deduction to the President. Two years later, on 6 October 1983, a presidential decision was taken, deducting the years served before the court verdict from his sentence. This should have meant his immediate release from prison. Yet, things have not gone smoothly for Soewarno.

In the first place, the clemency decision was not delivered to Soewarno until November 1984, a delay of 13 months. Nor did any official from the public prosecutor’s office appear at the prison to release him. Soewarno therefore asked his family in Surabaya to seek the services of Pamoedji to speed up his release. It was not long before Pamoedji received an undertaking from the public prosecutor’s office in Surabaya that Soewarno would be released on 1 December, but when the family turned up at the prison to welcome him on that day, nothing happened. Prison officials had no explanation for the delay, except to say that perhaps the regional military commander in his capacity as Executive Officer (*Laksusda*) of KOPKAMTIB (Operations Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) had intervened to prevent the release. Formally speaking, Soewarno’s release has nothing whatsoever to do with the *Laksusda*, but then, said one official, maybe they have another case against him and are not going to let him go.

Efforts by Pamoedji and also by *Tempo* which published a story on the injustice to Soewarno failed to get any further, except for a remark by an official at the prosecutor’s office who said: “I am not empowered to make any statements about G30S/PKI prisoners. Such matters are the sole competence of the Attorney-General.”

With his lawyer now dead, Soewarno may still have to wait a long time before he is allowed to leave prison after nearly seventeen years inside.

Source: *Tempo*, 15 December 1984, 12 January, 16 February and 2 March 1985.



Pamoedji.
(*Tempo*, 16 February)

Anti-PKI purge in Education Department

Strange as it may seem, the Department of Education is still able to “discover” lurking PKI suspects within its staff, after nearly 20 years of purging and re-purging. No fewer than 38 such infiltrators were discovered and expelled during the course of 1984. This was part of a general annual “clean-up” in which no fewer than 223 found themselves being dismissed or given other duties.

There are “clean-ups” every year, and the Department is pleased to announce that the 1984 purge was more effective than in 1983 when “only” 132 people were dealt disciplinary measures. Apart from PKI suspects, the people affected in 1984 were guilty of a variety of misdemeanours such as dereliction of duty, immoral conduct, misuse of authority, falsification of certificate and other malfeasances.

Source: *Tempo* 28 January, 1985 and *Indonesia Reports Log for January, 1984*

TAPOL

British Campaign for the Defence

of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

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March 1985

Repression and resistance in East Timor since August 1983

In the last few months, many documents have been smuggled out of East Timor, reporting on military operations during 1984, on living conditions in the strategic villages always referred to by the Timorese as concentration camps, and on the atrocities perpetrated by the forces of occupation since General Benny Murdani launched his new offensive in August 1983.

In view of the importance of this information, TAPOL has decided to devote most of this supplement to a report on conditions in East Timor since the start of the offensive. Details from the different documents have been compiled into a single report so as to give a comprehensive picture of the situation in several parts of the country.

Some documents bear the signature of Xanana, President of the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance and Commander-in-Chief of Falintil, the armed wing of Fretilin. One is a letter to the former Bishop of Dili, Mgr da Costa Lopes, from Miguel dos Santos, commander of the First Autonomous Company of Falintil (in the eastern sector). Others bear no signature, but are thought to have been compiled by Fretilin. It is no mean achievement to have channelled this material abroad. As Mgr Filipe Ximenes Belo, head of the Catholic Church in East Timor, wrote in a letter to Catholic contacts in Europe on 5 December 1984: "All the mail in East Timor is censored. Thus it takes a lot [of] effort on our part to find suitable means to mail our letters out."

Introductory remarks

1 Piecing together the details, it is evident that a number of Timorese abandoned Indonesian-controlled territory or deserted from Indonesian army units on or around 8 August 1983 to join or rejoin Falintil. It is difficult to tell whether this was an

organised move or a spontaneous response to Indonesian military operations, but it did occur in a number of places.

2 Many of the victims of the atrocities inflicted on the population have been people in the "civil defence" (hansip or pertahanan sipil), the "trained people's corps" (ratih or rakyat terlatih), or low-level officials in the Indonesian administration. So much for General Murdani's "hearts and minds" policy!

3 Both elite troops – Kopassandha paracommandos – and territorial troops are involved in the terror. The paracommandos are now always identified as "Nanggala", soldiers with a reputation for extreme brutality. Different 'nanggala units' operate in different parts of the country. In the district of Baucau, they are referred to as 'Nanggala 2', while in the eastern sector, they are referred to as "Nanggala 4". A number of battalions are identified. These are the territorial troops who man the military posts in the districts (kodim) and in the sub-districts (koramil).



of **Roberto dos Santos**, 36, kampung deputy-head. He was tortured with electric shock on his genitals and heavily beaten because his daughter joined the resistance after having been persecuted by local troops.

* * *

Kakavei (Kakavem?)

This is a suco in the Lospalos region, 15kms west of the town on the Lospalos-Kakavei-Iliomar road. Since 1979, the inhabitants of this suco have been concentrated in camps located in the countryside around Lospalos. Although our map does not identify Kakavei, this would appear to be somewhere south of Leuro and Souro where, according to earlier information,³ camp inhabitants have frequently been ordered to leave their settlements without immediately being provided with alternative sites, and having to live in the open air. In 1983, such upheavals left the population without any food supplies, living only on wild coconuts and leaves.

On 18 October 17 people were arrested and taken to Lospalos kodim where they were all tortured. Some lost teeth, were subjected to electric shock, mostly on their sex organs, and were given only ten spoonfuls of food a day to force them to denounce others. Their names are: **Vato Lay**, 38, kampung head, from Txarano, **Orlando Fernandes**, 28, ratih member, **Filipe**

Fernandes, 25, secretary, **Asu Lalo**, 34, **Txai Txipi**, 29, **Pedro Fernandes**, 36, ratih member. **Antonio Oliveira**, 27, ratih member, **Susu Kasa**, 35, all of them natives of Txarano; **Lai Katy**, 56, kampung head from Paihira, **Jose da Costa**, 33, guard commander, **Soro Txai**, 35, all from Paihira, Kakavei; **Januario Monteiro**, 35, and **Acacio da Costa**, 22, both ratih members attached to the kodim, and **Poko Tau**, 46, of Solepara; and **Telo Lara**, 53, and **Fernando Mao Meta**, 35, both from Lai Ara, Kakavei.

On 24 November 1983, another ratih member, **Lourenco Fernandes**, 27, was arrested, taken to kodim and tortured, suspected of being a Fretilin sympathiser.

* * *

Leuro

This camp is located 5kms west of Lospalos, also in the heart of a region where camp inhabitants suffer severe food deprivation and cannot go more than 1/2km beyond camp boundaries. On 8 August 1983, 10 ratih members fled with their arms to join the guerrillas. The immediate impact of this is not described but on 27 and 28 November, many people, most with official positions in the administration, were arrested on suspicion of helping these ratihs to escape. They include **Armando da Silva**, 46,

Please turn to page eleven

Setback for East Timor at the UN Human Rights Commission

Despite the wealth of information that was submitted to Commission members on the widespread terror raging in East Timor since Indonesia launched its new offensive in August 1983, the 41st Session of the UN Human Rights Commission decided in a closed meeting in March to delete East Timor from its agenda. The voting was 11 to 9 with 20 abstentions.

This shocking setback for East Timor comes at a time when the UN Secretary General, Mr Perez de Cuellar is pushing hard for a diplomatic "solution" that continues to ignore the right of the people to be represented in negotiations about their fate. (See *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 67, January 1985). Far from showing any signs of respecting East Timor's right to self-determination or acknowledging the depth of suffering being inflicted on the people, Perez de Cuellar told the press in Jakarta (*Sinar Harapan*, 8 February 1985) that the atmosphere at the UN on the question of East Timor "is improving so much that I don't think it will come up any more. Or at least, that's what I hope."

This top UN official really needs to be asked whether he actually said the words attributed to him by the Indonesian press. What right has he so publicly to flout the UN Charter? His further remark that he was pleased that the Indonesian president, General Suharto, and Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja welcome his personal efforts to establish contact between


Indonesia and Portugal shows the extent to which the UN Secretariat is now serving the interests of a military regime that has annexed another country by force of arms.

The Human Rights Commission decision in Geneva was taken behind closed doors which has made it impossible so far to find out the terms of the resolution. It is known however that Ireland, Finland and Australia voted against the decision. Indonesia had a large delegation in Geneva with no fewer than three ambassadors in the team headed by Alex Alatas, the Indonesian ambassador to the UN. Portugal, on the other hand, whose task it should

be to uphold the rights of the East Timor people sent only two officials who apparently did nothing to inform the Commission of the desperate plight of the East Timor people.

As Gregory Mongi, delegate of the Melanesian Council of Churches said recently at a meeting of the UN Decolonisation Committee in Port Moresby:

If the UN should continue to accept Indonesia's conception that her newly acquired colonies of East Timor are 'Indonesian provinces', the UN henceforth commits hypocrisy when interfering with any colonial problems whatsoever. (Australian Financial Times, 11 March 1985.)



JUST OUT!

The War Against East Timor analyses Indonesia's military and political strategy to subjugate and integrate East Timor since General Suharto's invasion of this former Portuguese colony in 1975. The authors, Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, present for the first time a comprehensive account of the current resurgence of Fretilin, which is the national liberation movement of the people of East Timor, following its earlier defeat in 1977-78.

Nine secret Indonesian Army documents, captured by Fretilin guerrillas in December 1982, are here published in translation. They constitute an extraordinary manual of counter-insurgency operations, as well as demonstrating how real is Fretilin's renewed challenge to Indonesian annexation.

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Fretilin forces surround Soibada for three days

A Fretilin force of 400 armed guerrillas surrounded the town of Soibada in the central sector for three days from 9-12 December 1984 and carried out a similar action against the town of Barique, also in the central sector. An Indonesian officer in Barique, Lieutenant Soejipto, is said to have responded to the pressure from the guerrillas by calling on his troops to surrender: he was later dismissed.

News of these actions is contained in a letter from Fretilin leader, Xanana, to Mgr Martinhu da Costa Lopes, dated 7 January 1985. Soibada is situated 45kms due south of Manatuto.

Other actions reported by Xanana are:


A celebration in Lacluta, also in the central sector, on 28 November, the anniversary of the declaration of East Timor independence in 1975. Xanana writes that, after taking the necessary precautions, he was able to visit the town himself and deliver a speech on the importance of the date to the people of East Timor. The day was also commemorated by an armed attack on the town garrison when 17 enemy soldiers were killed and a number of weapons captured.

On 8 December, the guerrillas inflicted losses killing 13 men in the region of Matebian, a little farther to the east. The next day, guerrillas struck at Atsabe, right over in the western sector and not far from the border with West Timor, and managed to capture more weapons. Kelikai was also attacked, with losses on the enemy side of 7 men and 7 light firearms.

Just before Christmas Day, guerrillas launched attacks on Bobonaro, also in the western sector and on Vikeke, Cajalaran and Luca, all in the east. During these attacks, a number of houses were destroyed, though the schools, churches and the homes of teachers and the clergy were left standing. (Such actions seem to be part of a strategy to destroy the strategic villages set up by the Indonesian military.)

The extent of guerrilla actions in December help explain General Murdani's interview with Reuters on 18 December (see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 67, January 1985) when he made it clear that the Indonesian Armed Forces face a well-organised and well-supported resistance movement. By contrast with Murdani's gloomy view of Indonesia's prospects in East Timor, Xanana's letter to Mgr da Costa Lopes was full of confidence. He wrote:

"The present situation in East Timor is intense but in our favour. Our forces are on the offensive in all parts of the



Xanana Gusmao, with members of the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance. This photo was sent out during the 1983 ceasefire.

country, especially in the districts of Lospalos, Baucau, Vikeke, parts of Manatuto (Cribas, Soibada and Natar Bora), Same, Ainaro and Bobonaro. In these areas, the enemy only controls the towns. Inhabitants cannot go beyond a three to five kilometre radius and in some *postes* (the former Portuguese administrative centres) such as Iliomar, Lore and Tutualu, those who go beyond half a kilometre risk being shot by the enemy. People are going hungry.

"Increasingly demoralised by our guerrilla attacks, the enemy is searching for a military plan that encompasses economic and political strategies. Our policy of burning down houses is forcing the enemy to rebuild new ones in zinc and triplex. Our people who live under the military control of the enemy continue to resist despite arrests, physical and mental torture and political assassination. The people in the occupied areas support our efforts to extend and intensify our military offensive. The Central Hospital in Dili is full of wounded soldiers and all day helicopters transport the corpses of Indonesian soldiers to the military cemetery in Dili.

"There is no unity of purpose in enemy ranks. Already exhausted, some generals favour the immediate termination of the war; others want to carry on as their livelihood depends on war. Mutual suspicions between officers are growing, and to prevent any collaboration with Fretilin, soldiers in Lore Sae were transferred to Loro Mono, and vice versa. Ill-prepared for battle, the soldiers in Loro Mono died off like flies."



Continued from page nine

deputy raja, a native of Leuro, **Jose**, 34, and **Antonio**, 28, both RT chiefs, and **Salvador**, 20, all from Soru, and **Lourenco Monteiro** from Leuro. Also **Sebastiao Viegas**, 24, who worked at the Lospalos district office. They were all taken to the Lospalos kodim and brutally tortured because they refused to denounce others. Another man suspected of helping the ten ratihs to escape was **Raimundo da Costa**, 30, a kampung head.

Many more arrests occurred in December: **Verisa**, 48, **Lavanisa**, 49, **Leti Vata**, 37, **Lamberto**, 32, kampung head, **Luis Sousa**, 44, **Ze Txaranu**, 43, all from Suro; **Jose Moita**, RT chief, 30, **Ivao Castro**, 47, **Jose Lepe Moko**, 43, **Ze Leve**, 42, deputy kampung head, **Ernesto**, 29, kampung head, all natives from Laturula; **Duarte**, 38, **Oscar Lopes**, 29, RT, **Orlando**, kampung head, 30, **Ze Vatau**, 45, RT, **Kon Lua**, 38, **Joaquim**, 35, **Mateus**, 32, and **Mau Moto**, 49, kampung head and deputy, all from Leuro; **Tito**, 29, **Kei Loy**, 28, **Rosaline**, 26, **Kei Vara**, 18, **Rano Lavano**, 26, **Pua Fainu**, 29, and **Ka Punu**, 27. All were subjected to extreme torture, but worst of all, **Ze Txarano** and **Kei Loy** whose sufferings caused them to urinate as the torturers mocked them. **Luis da Sousa** was so badly beaten, kicked, punched and slashed, that he frequently fell to the ground.

On 30 December, another four people were arrested, and taken to kodim where they were tortured: **Ze Reci**, 35, **Chico**, 29, **Lua Moko**, 48, and his wife **Lua Lau**, all from Leuro.

On 10 March, **Sergio**, 18, and **Amelio**, 17, both of them ratihs, were arrested by soldiers from Battalion 315 stationed in Foe Ma. After two days of brutal torture, they made their escape and joined the guerrillas. Two days later, as reprisal, the battalion commander Pordon, ordered more arrests: **Jose Moita**, 32, **Mouzinho**, 45, both of them RTs, **Emilia**, 24, **Maria** and **Pua Moto**, both 15, all of them from Lutu Ruka, and **Duarte**, 35, from Txarano, Leuro. Major Pordon ordered them all to strip naked every day and kneel on the ground covered with sharp stones from 9am till 4pm. All this happened in public, to the amusement of battalion soldiers.

* * *

Lere Loho

This camp is situated near the mission-station of Fui-loro which lies north east of Lospalos. On 30 October, 1983, **Jaime**, 24, a mechanic was arrested by *nantala* 4 soldiers, taken to kodim and brutally tortured for two days to force him to denounce others.

* * *

Poros

This camp is located at the former location of the Loiquero suco, in the vicinity of Tutuala, on the eastern tip of East Timor. It lies on the Tutuala-Lospalos road, about 12kms out of Tutuala. Already in 1983, the region was described as one where conditions were appalling, with little land available to produce food, and the people relying mainly on cassava and fishing. At the end of 1984, food conditions had deteriorated; no corn at all had been harvested because planting was not allowed. Nor could the inhabitants go fishing any more because of the tighter restrictions on movement.

Most of the people who were arrested were killed or have disappeared. In October 1983, **Francisco Lopes**, 29, **Cristovao Lopes**, 30, **Constantino da Costa**, 29, a *jurituh*, and **Damiaio Lopes**, 24, a hansip member, **Loureiro**, 28, **Alvaro dos Santos**, 31, and **Antonio Soares**, 19, a student, were arrested by members of Battalion 100, and sent to kodim, in Lospalos. All were severely tortured before disappearing.

The next month, **Cristina do Ceu**, 18, **Raimundo da Costa**, 13, and **Lourenco dos Santos**, 29, all from Poros, were arrested by members of Battalion 521 and taken to kodim where they were beaten up. All are now in prison. Later that month, five more men from Poros, **Karasu Malay**, 50, **Francisco Cristovao**, 30, **Frederico**, 32, and **Gilberto**, 28, as well as **Manuel de Jesus**, 34, kampung head, were murdered by soldiers of Battalion 745 in the presence of the entire local population, "as an example."

Six others were arrested by koramil on 17 December, and disappeared less than a month later, on 11 January. They were:

Please turn to page fourteen



Waiting for relief from the International Red Cross. Since the August 1983 offensive, the International Red Cross has been prevented from conducting their much-needed relief programme throughout mainland East Timor.

East Timor church leader accuses Indonesians of massacre in Kraras

In an interview with Peter Millership of Reuters, Mgr Filipe Ximenes Belo, head of the Catholic Church in East Timor, accused the Indonesians of massacring villagers, men, women and children – in the village of Kraras, near Vikeke, during security sweeps in the area in August and September, 1983. He told Millership who was on a visit to East Timor:

I saw the graves, the places where those people were buried. In one place about 70 and in another place, 14.

He also said villagers had given him a list of the victims which includes the names of teenage boys.

Apart from this information, which was apparently based on a brief interview with Mgr Belo since nothing more emerges from the talk with him, the journalists had nothing to report from contacts with Timorese. All their information comes from Indonesian officials, Indonesian-appointed Timorese, aid workers (without saying which agencies) and diplomats in Jakarta. Most of all, Mario Carrascalao, the puppet governor, was their source, backed up by statistics from the Indonesian administration.

The three journalists allowed to visit East Timor were Peter Millership (Reuters), Steven Jones (Wall Street Journal) and Ghafur Fadyl (Associated Press). The trip was timed to coincide with the 41st Session of the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. Thus the Indonesian delegation could argue that foreign observers are again being allowed in.

The reports published by the journalists are revealing for how little they could glean about the living conditions of the Timorese today, or about the level of fighting still going on. Millership acknowledges that "the Jakarta government is still fighting guerrillas seeking independence" but provides no assessment at all, saying only that there were "no signs of conflict . . . in areas

where foreign visitors are permitted." (International Herald Tribune, 9/10 March)

The Reuters correspondent, in a special dispatch dated 6 March, said they were tailed by security men throughout their four-day visit, and made the point that no foreigners are allowed to visit the region without special permission, making an independent assessment of conditions very difficult. He also said Dili officials had told him that in the eastern part of the country "some labourers were unwilling to work in certain areas". The journalists, he said, found no sign of the army in the eastern sector.

When asked where the troops and their bases were, officials pointed up to the mountains but declined requests to fly there, saying the cloud base was too low.

The Wall Street Journal's Steve Jones is more cynical about the value of such a visit, saying, "We are here on this government-sponsored visit to see that peace has returned to the eastern end of the island and that prosperity lies on the horizon". The way the Indonesians stage-managed the trip, preventing the journalists from seeing anything of value comes through in the following:

Reporters flitting from place to place by helicopter are unable to gauge accurately the level of fighting. Although Indonesia says there are 7,000 soldiers in East Timor, few of them are visible. The armed police officers who meet us at every stop are said to be there to foil would-be kidnappers. And although the journalists are aware that there is a military air base near Baucau, our pilots fly us out to sea when we leave the town, precluding even a glimpse of the airfield. A priest in one village says that two armored troop carriers that usually rumble over village roads have been hidden from view. (Wall Street Journal (Europe), 20 March, 1985.)



Canberra Times (27 July, 1983) comments on the Australian parliamentary mission to East Timor.

Terror in Kraras and Vikeke

The revelation by Mgr Belo of the existence of two mass graves where victims of the Kraras massacre are buried, draws attention to the incident in August 1983 that led to the breakdown of the ceasefire reached between Fretilin and the Army command in East Timor in March 1983. Information contained in a report on atrocities sent out by Fretilin in the second half of 1984 makes it possible to piece together the events at Kraras. The Kraras incident is reminiscent of the Lakluta massacres of September 1981 which symbolised the brutality employed by the Indonesian forces of occupation at the height of the "fence of legs" operation conducted during that year.

Kraras is situated somewhere in the vicinity of the town of Vikeke, a few miles inland from the south coast, on the River Cuha. By all accounts, Kraras was a *daerah pemukiman* or "resettlement area", in effect, a strategic village set up by the Indonesians to accommodate a few thousand Timorese villagers who had been driven down from the mountainous interior during the encirclement and annihilation campaign of 1977-79. Among the inhabitants of Kraras were a number of former guerrillas, kept under special guard. Early in August 1983, an uprising took place in Kraras, following actions by Indonesian troops in the central region, when they captured and apparently liquidated a group of Fretilin fighters even though the ceasefire reached by Fretilin and the Indonesian Army Command in March 1983 was still in force. The revolt in Kraras was led by the ex-guerrillas who turned on their guards; they succeeded in killing 15 soldiers and injuring another 20, and fled to rejoin the guerrillas, taking with them weapons captured from the troops.

In retaliation, Indonesian troops conducted a massacre in Kraras during which some two hundred people were killed. According to the Fretilin report, the victims - men, women, children and sick people - were burnt in their homes. After this, hundreds of people fled from Kraras and took refuge on the slopes of the Bibileu mountain in the north, on the west bank of the river Be Tuku. This is the native region of many of those who had been "resettled" in Kraras. Indonesian troops then conducted an *operasi sapu bersih* ("clean sweep" operation) on and around mount Bibileu, combining bombardments from the air with encirclement tactics. During the course of this operation, according to Fretilin, some 500 people were rounded up and slaughtered on the banks of the Be Tuku. Eventually, the rest of the people were forced down from Bibileu and again resettled, this time in a place called Klaterek Mutiu (which we have not been able to identify on the map).

The living conditions in Klaterek Mutiu are particularly harsh because troops have deprived the population of knives and other implements, which makes it impossible for them to cut down and scoop out *sagu*, the only staple food available, or to cut down timber in order to build huts for themselves. Fretilin reports that had it not been for support of people in nearby Bikarin, the survivors of Kraras would have been decimated by hunger. The Fretilin account concludes:

All day and all night, men as well as women are put on "guard duty" while a platoon of *nanggalas* (troops of the Kopassandha regiment) is stationed there in the centre of the field warning that if Fretilin attacks, the people will be exterminated.

Arrests and disappearances

Fretilin leader Xanana has sent out the names of people arrested in Vikeke immediately after the Kraras massacre; some of these were killed or have disappeared. The list, sent out on 9 July 1984, only includes people "who are easily identifiable"; the majority, not on the list, have Maubere, that is to say, Timorese names.

Teresa do Anjos 40, from Kraras was imprisoned on 11 August by kodim troops and is now in prison in Vikeke. In the following weeks, troops from 745 Battalion in Vikeke, carried out many arrests: **Abilio** 31, born in Vikeke, on 20 August; **Marcelino Amaral** 30 and **Abilio Amaral** 26, both from Karau

Balu, on 21 August. All three are still in prison in Vikeke. Two others arrested a little later - **Adelino** 26 and **Alarico** 50, both from Karau Balu and arrested on 7 and 8 September—are also still in prison. Six others arrested around the same time are believed to have disappeared: **Domingos Salsinha** 33, from Uma Kik (arrested on 30 August), **Mario Pinto** 30, from Balara Uain (4 September), **Guilhermino** 30, from Karau Balu and **Jacinto** 35, from Balara Uain (both arrested on 13 September), **Duarte** 31, from Balara Uain (17 September), **Hermenegildo** 25, from Karau Balu (18 September) and **Leonardo** 27, from Karau Balu (23 September). A group of young people were also arrested (dates not specified): **Aida do Anjos** 16, **Maria Odeta** 16, **Mariana** 17, **Domingas** 17, **Cipriana** 19, and **Siza** 18. All were arrested in Vikeke and are still in detention.

In the first week of October, *nanggalas* troops in Ossu rounded up a large number of people and sent them to kodim, Vikeke: **Feliciano de Jesus** 29 (still in detention); **Paulino da Silva** 30, (disappeared); **Celstino da Costa** 38 who was badly beaten and punched; **Elias Guterres** 38, also badly beaten; **Francisco Xavier** 30, tortured with electricity; **Filomeno da Costa** 22, (disappeared); **Agostinho Sarmiento** 20, tortured in Vikeke, then disappeared; **Renugio da Silva** 26, beaten and punched; **Domingos Sina** 27, **Domingos** 40, (disappeared); **Acacio Guterres** 24 (disappeared); **Clementino da Silva** 29; **Feliciano do Anjos** 56 and **Luis Soares** 39, who are all still in detention. Also **Cipriano Freitas** 41, was beaten till covered with blood and remains in prison in Vikeke.

Four more, imprisoned on 13 and 14 October were **Armando Pinto** 27, **Salvador Belo** 30, **Anastacio Soares** and **Raimundo Pereira** 27, all of whom have since disappeared. Then on 10 November, **Mariano Menezes** 49, born in Uato Lon but then living in Vikeke, was savagely beaten in kodim, Vikeke and remains in prison. As a result of his arrest, other were caught later that month by the koramil in Beaso, and sent to Vikeke: **Afonso Monteiro** 20, **Manuel Soares** 27, **Jeremias da Costa** 30, **Miguel Nogueira** 29 and **Antonio de Carvalho** 53. These arrests then led to another 26 people being arrested, all living in Beaso, of whom ten are thought to have disappeared.

Others arrested in September and sent to Dili were **Francisco Ximenes**, a teacher at the Catholic mission school. **Joao Bosco** who used to work as a driver for a tourist office before 1974 and **Fernando Gonzaga**, a teacher during Portuguese times. Two others from Vikeke who were imprisoned then sent to Dili, released and rearrested several times are **Afonso da Costa Rangel** and **Domingos Pinto**. All five are now thought to have been transferred to prisons in Indonesia.

Some people suspected of being likely organisers of clandestine organisations are subjected to continual arrest, release and rearrest. An example of this kind of treatment is **Augusto Gusmao**, a male nurse, born in Vemasse who has been persecuted frequently since 1980. He was imprisoned, tortured and beaten then released several times in September 1983. After several weeks of this, he was freed and went back to work at a mission school in Fatumaca. But then, on 17 June 1984, he was summoned by kodim, Baucau and beaten, then freed on 19 June. Two days later, armed troops took him from his home at night. Since then, no-one knows what has become of him.

Continued from page eleven

Mateus Pedro, 23, hansip section commander, Raul dos Santos, hansip member, Amancio, 18, and Joaquim, 17, both students, with Olinda and Ermelinda, also 22. All were submitted to electric torture on genitals and other parts of the body by kodim officers before disappearing.

On 25 December, three more people were arrested, all natives of Poros. They were taken by Battalion 641 troops to kodim, where they were tortured with their hands and feet bound. On 7 January, they were handed over to Battalion 321 and then disappeared.

★ ★ ★ ★

Porlamano, Tutuala

This camp is situated 5kms from Tutuala, near the Tutuala-Lospalos road.

On 14 November 1983, two women, Elisa do Santos, 20, a student and Ercilia de Carvalho, 18, were arrested by members of Battalion 100 and taken to the battalion base in Mehara. They were both tortured. Benches were stood on their hands and soldiers sat on the benches, tormenting the two women. They were then raped by the soldiers. On 25 November, Gaspar Nunes, 37, was arrested by Battalion 100 and taken to Mehara. After persistent torture, with electricity and lit cigarettes, he was taken to Silary, 1km away and killed.

★ ★ ★ ★

Mehara, Tutuala

Mehara camp lies 6 kms west of Tutualu, on the road to Lospalos. Already in 1983, conditions were atrocious, mainly because inhabitants were not permitted to go more than 500 metres beyond the camp boundary, cutting them off from arable land which used to be used for rice-growing.⁴

On 14 November 1983, Angelina and Helena do Ceu, 22 and 30, of Mehara, were arrested by Battalion 100. They were stripped naked for interrogation, beaten up with rifle-butts, then raped. The next day, Mateus Gonzaga, 38, was arrested by Battalion 100. With hands and feet bound, he was tortured with cigarettes then shot dead in Silary. Two other men were also summarily executed in Silary after being arrested on 25 November by Battalion 100. They had first been burnt with cigarettes then left to lie in the blazing sun.

Many people in Mehara and Porlamano were particularly harshly treated in late November 1983 after guerrillas had destroyed an Indonesian vehicle on 6 November, capturing 15 weapons. Two weeks later, on 20 November they attacked a unit of nanggala troops, killing seven men. In retaliation, the nanggalas captured 200 people, among them old men and women, as well as children, and cooped them up in two school buildings in Mehara. All the people arrested were relatives of people who rejoined the resistance in August 1983. In addition to a great deal of torture, these prisoners were not allowed to go more than 5 metres from the buildings. No latrines were available, and the prisoners had no option but to relieve

themselves in public. After being held in these buildings for some time a number of these prisoners disappeared.

Meanwhile, Miguel dos Santos, in his letter to Mgr da Costa Lopes, draws attention to places in the eastern sector where conditions are particularly bad. He writes:

We ask you tell delegations which come to East Timor to travel by car through the districts and *postes*, particularly to the *poste* of Tutuala and see if they come back saying, "East Timor enjoys peace and progress". Let them take a look at the state of things in the villages of Pitileti, Iro-ro, Vero, Tobailoro, Porlamano, Mehara, Sori, Cepelata, Luarai, Missao, Tobauluturo, Irauno, Etepiti and Soikili Irralafai.



Building a shelter for food in a Fretilin-controlled area. The two photos on this page were sent out during the 1983 ceasefire.

Somotxa

This camp consists of people from the suco of Buiro, Lospalos, and is 15kms from Lospalos on the road to Tutualu. Tomas, 31, deputy kampung head, was arrested on 26 November 1983 by Nanggala 4 troops, taken to kodim and severely beaten, burnt with cigarettes and given electric shocks on the genitals.

★ ★ ★

Ira Lafai

This concentration camp is near the Fui-loro Mission, east of Lospalos. Acacio and Amancio Bernardhino, 20 and 22, from Ira Lafai, the latter a third-grade student at the Lospalos secondary school, were arrested on 24 November. After being tortured with bayonets, lit cigarettes and electric shock they were both transferred to the Lospalos "prison of death".

★ ★ ★

Raca

Raca camp lies 12kms north of Lospalos, on the road to More. At the beginning of November, Luis Silveiro, 36, a member of the East Timor assembly, from Raca, was arrested as a suspect, and then taken to kodim in Lospalos. He was brutally tortured throughout November, then taken to Lospalos Prison No. 1, where he disappeared on 4 December.

★ ★ ★

Sepelata

This camp is 12kms east of Lospalos. A series of arrests occurred on 24, 26 and 27 November, 1983. All the victims were taken to kodim in Lospalos and severely tortured. They were: Boaventura Santos, 29, catechist, Luis Pereira, 25, Aleixo Pereira, 29, and Armando, 39, all from Sepelata. After being tortured, they were transferred to Lospalos Prison No. 1. After them came Gilberto Soparatu, 29, Faustino, 32, Jose Figueiredo, 42, also from Sepelata. Then Cecilia Barreto, 20, and Claudinha, 18, were tortured at kodim, raped repeatedly and forced to sleep all night naked.



Resistance fighters on the move.

Please turn to page sixteen

East Timor political prisoners now in jail in Java

TAPOL recently received a list of 42 tried East Timor prisoners now being held at Cipinang Prison, Jakarta and in the women's prison in Tangerang. The list gave the prisoners' ages and length of sentence. Further information from Fretilin documents has been added under comments.

Name	Age	Sentence	Comment
✓ Marito Mario Nicolau Reis	38	17	Fretilin reports that he was one of 17 prisoners transported to Jakarta on 17 November 1984. They were handcuffed in pairs as they boarded the plane, raised clenched fists and sang: "United, the people will never be defeated".
✓ Albino de Lurdes	47	17	
✓ Mariano Bonaparte Soares	43	16	
✓ David Dies Ximenes	32	15	He has been in detention since the invasion. Fretilin reports he was transported to Indonesia in May 1984, with a group of 60 prisoners.
✓ Ze Roberto Seixas	29	12	
✓ Domingos Seixes	35	11	
✓ Januario Ximenes	41	10	
✓ Fernando Pinto Baptista	44	8	
✓ Miguel da Costa	45	8	
✓ Antonio Yore Eduardo	43	8	
✓ Yore Simoes	44	8	
✓ Manuel Victor	34	7	
✓ Venceslau de Conceicao	23	7	Amnesty International knew of his trial and told the UN Human Rights Commission he has been in detention since the invasion.
✓ Feliciano Tilman	23	7	
✓ Domingo Nunes	24	7	
✓ Eduardo da Costa	32	7	
✓ Mariano Moniz	53	7	
✓ Yoao Gomes	40	7	
✓ Fernando da Costa	25	7	
✓ Americo de Souza Jeroniwo	35	7	
✓ Abilio Tilman	33	7	
✓ Berilio Alves Freitas	30	7	
✓ Gasfar de Marijo	30	7	
✓ Luis Freitas	28	7	
✓ Antonio Ramos	26	7	Also a long-term prisoner in Dili. He was then detained for years in Atauro and returned home in 1984, but in May he was rearrested then tried by a Military Court in Dili.*
✓ Martino Cavinuro	53	6½	
✓ Francisco Carvalho	27	6½	The same as Antonio Ramos.
✓ Gaspar da Costa Loi	26	6	
✓ Eduardo Cavinuro	34	6	
✓ Antonio Mesquita	24	6	
✓ Caetano Guteves	35	6	
✓ Yoao Damaceno Santos	27	6	
✓ Agapito Zocha	29	6	The same as Antonio Ramos.
✓ Eurico de Jesus	32	6	
✓ Henrique Behnico	33	6	
✓ Thomas Roduques	35	5	
✓ Luis Fatima Carvalho	47	5	Possibly the same as Antonio Ramos.
✓ Artur Ximenes	33	5	
✓ Armindo Florindo	25	5	
✓ Ernesto Pinto	29	5	
✓ Martinho Rodrigues	26	4	
✓ Mariano da Costa	29	3 and 10 months	

* Apart from Antonio Ramos, Agapito da Rocha and Francisco Carvalho, Fretilin mentions five more who were long-term Dili prisoners then spent time in Atauro and were tried in May 1984. They are Alexandre da Rocha, Luis, Maria Imaculada (a woman with a small child), Imaculada (a woman with a new-born baby), and Beatriz Alberto (a woman with two small children). It has not been possible to identify these prisoners on the Jakarta/Tangerang list.

When an ICRC mission visited Cipinang prison last September, it was told of only 12 Fretilin prisoners there.

Muapitine

The population in this region were hit by forced upheavals in mid-1982 and moved north to Fui-loro.⁵ The former suco centre east of Lospalos has now been transformed into a concentration camp called Muapitine. Five men were arrested on 24 November as suspect Fretilin agents. After days of constant torture, they were all shot dead by firing squad in public. Everyone in Muapitine was ordered to watch the execution as a warning to others. The murdered men were: **Alberto**, 31, a deputy kampung head, native of Vailoro, **Lino**, 30, an RT from Penefeto, **Angelo da Costa**, 29, a jurituhs, from Muapitine, **Alvaro Freitas**, 30, ratih commander, and **Lionel Oliveira**, 36, also both of Muapitine.

* * *

Moro

This was the administrative *poste* of the county of Lautem in Portuguese times, and is situated on the north coast, due north of Lospalos.

The first recorded arrest was on 5 September, of **Nicolau Flores**, 34, a native of Kotxo and ratih commander in Home village. He was tortured, then shot dead a few days later by the kodim commander himself. On 10 December, **Celestina**, 56, a native of Punu, was summoned by koramil, beaten up and threatened with having an eye gouged out if he refused to denounce others. On 5 January, **Tiago Bandeira dos Dores**, 17, a ratih from Punu was arrested by koramil and punched so severely that he lost a great deal of blood. On 27 January,

another ratih from Punu, **Alfredo Coutinho**, 36, was arrested by kodim, tortured with electricity, and then disappeared on 2 April. That was the day his wife who regularly delivered food for him was told he had been "sent to Jakarta for study".

* * *

Luro

This too was an administrative *poste* in the county of Lautem. It lies inland, east of Lospalos, on the northern slopes of the Lequi-Mau mountain range. Luro was formerly the centre of a rice-growing area but food-shortage has become acute since the population was driven into the Luro camp. The town of Luro is now described as "one great big concentration camp".

A number of arrests occurred during March 1984 after a detachment of Nanggala 4 troops arrived. The victims were: **Duarte do Sato**s, 37, a deputy raja, and **Valente dos Reis**, 24, a policeman, both of Ouroma; **Doli Lay**, 26, a native of One Rada, and **Americo**, 42, from Alfoia. They were all beaten up with rifle-butts and kicked. Then came the turn of **Aco Ili**, 52, from Ama Hira, **Boukiau**, 48, native of Alfai-Nami, and **Jose Lemos**, 43, of One Raba. **Domingos Ornai**, 43, catechist from Alfai, was arrested on 4 March, tortured, then taken to Dili on 20 April and disappeared.

Other victims of the same nanggala unit were **Mateus Sabino**, 43, formerly liurai of Ama Hira, now a member of the East Timor provincial council; **Duarte Miranda**, 48, of Iutu, a 'monitor' at the Luro primary school and now raja of Wai Roke. After their arrest, all these men were taken straight to Dili.

Others arrested by the same nanggala unit include **Antonio Ornai**, 49, of Iutu, **Rui Manuel**, 19, a ratih member, **Americo Branco**, 28, **Victor**, 26, **Kote Lai**., 36, all from Ouroma; **Afonso dos Santos**, 50, and **Jorge Pinto**, 31, natives of Bua Nomon, Kota Mutu. After being tortured, they were taken away by helicopter on 20 March to an unknown destination. **Joao**, 28, native of Bua Nomon was so badly tortured that he died. His body was given back to his family and he was buried at a funeral attended by the entire population of Bua Noraoi.

* * *

VIKEKE REGION

Ossu


This town lies on the road from Vikeke to Venilale in the north. Ossu has been a large concentration camp since 1979 after the forces of Fretilin virtually collapsed during the 1977-79 encirclement and annihilation campaign. On 9 May 1984, **Sabaloi**, 40, was arrested in the Nai (Uai?) Bobo camp, about 15kms from Ossu, by nanggala 2 troops. They were acting on the orders of kodim intelligence in Vikeke. He was taken to Vikeke and severely beaten up and maltreated - suspected of Fretilin sympathies.

* * *

Naha-Reka

This camp is about 12kms east of Ossu. On 13 June 1984, **Rai Loi**, 28, and **Eugenio da Silva**, 25, both ratih members and from Darei Nan, were arrested by nanggala 2 troops and taken to kodim in Vikeke where they were beaten up. On 25 July, the following people were arrested on the orders of Vikeke kodim intelligence: **Virgilio Duarte**, 29, neighbourhood head (RK) from Dara because one of his brothers rejoined the resistance on 8 August 1983. **Roro Labi**, 34, RT from Dare Nan, now living in Naha-Reka, who also has a brother who rejoined the resistance on 8 August; **Jeremias**, 45, and **Antonio da Silva**, 33, both natives of Dare Nan. Until the day of his arrest, Antonio da Silva was secretary of the Naha Reka administration.

* * *



This valuable collection of documents has just been produced by the International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs (Denmark). 218 pages, with illustrations. Available from TAPOL.

Price: £1.50 plus postage: UK, Europe and surface worldwide: £1.00
Overseas airmail: £3.50

BAUCAU REGION

Kelikai

This camp lies south-east of Baucau and has been in existence since 1979. This was described by the Australian parliamentary mission to East Timor in July 1983, just before the Murdani offensive, as the poorest place they saw.⁶ At the end of 1984, Kelikai is described as a zone of permanent hunger. There is no corn or other staple because of the poor climate and sweet potato production is meagre. Restrictions on movement are tight so the population cannot go far to forage for wild leaves; they survive mainly on papaya leaves and green papayas.

An RT named **Jose Goulart**, 28, formerly of Maluro in the district of Kelikai, was arrested on the order of kodim, Baucau. After his arrest on 8 November 1983, he was moved to an Indonesian island. On 13 June 1984, **Carlos Alves**, 29, a teacher, originally from Ossu but now living in the Lai Soru Lai camp, Kelikai was arrested by kodim, Baucau. He is now a prisoner at Rai-Mean, on the outskirts of Baucau.

* * *

Uai-Lili

This camp is situated 10kms south of Baucau on the road to Vikeke. In July 1984, kodim intelligence, Baucau, arrested the following people accused of being agents of Fretilin: **Martinho Marques**, 42, RT from Uai Mano Boe, **Juhao Freitas**, 28, and **Jorge Xavier**, 30, both from Uai-Lili.

* * *

Bere-Koli

This camp is situated on the Baucau-Venilale road, about 2kms from Fatumaka College, and about 21kms from Baucau. Two men now at this camp, **Joao Cancio da Costa Belo**, 32, a native of Gari Uai, Baucau, and **Francisco do Rego**, 23, a native of Kai Hula, gave the following information:

They were subjected to constant persecution by 'intel' officers, and suspected of being Fretilin agents. Last July, they heard they were being sought by 'intel' and koramil so they decided to rejoin the resistance rather than fall into the hands of Indonesian torturers. Since the occupation forces forced the population into concentration camps in 1978 and 1979, people have been reduced to living like animals. Freedom of expression is a crime against the Pancasila. Camp dwellers are rarely allowed to venture beyond a 2km radius, and can only go out to tend small garden plots within 2kms of the camp boundary. Even for this they need permission which is often refused. Because of the desertions by armed Timorese to the resistance on 8 August, the population was prevented from going to their small garden plots. The result has been famine. Still worse, troops on their way to or from operations destroy the meagre crops growing in the gardens, claiming that they have to prevent guerrillas from taking the food.

Rape by soldiers is a daily occurrence. In February 1984, a soldier of Battalion 301 raped Labu Laku, a child of 12, in the Bere Koli concentration camp; the girl lost her balance of mind for two weeks. Anyone daring to protest about such atrocities is accused of being a Fretilin agent and is beaten up and tortured.

The two men decided to rejoin the resistance as the best way to fight the continued occupation of their country. They believe their families are being persecuted because they rejoined the resistance. Joao Cancio Belo also said that since going down from the mountains in November 1983, he was subjected to inhuman torture. On the day of his return he was badly beaten and given electric shocks. After 21 days of gruelling torture, when his body was covered with cigarette burns, he was ordered to strip naked and stay in a barrel of water for many hours. Later he had to go back into the barrel with his hands tied behind his back. He was given neither food nor clothing. After three days of this, he was taken to the locality of a Chinese school in Baucau where he was again interrogated, this time by native inhabitants. A few days later, he was given conditional release in Bere Koli, but has to report twice weekly to the forces of occupation.

* * *

Bukoli

This camp is 16kms west of Baucau, along the coastal road to Vemassee. Conditions for the population in the whole region west of Baucau from Seical to Gari Uai, and from Loilubo to Bukoli are heavily affected by restrictions on movement, making it very difficult for inhabitants to work in their vegetable gardens. In the latter part of 1984, there was no corn left and people were surviving on *mandioc*, with the possibility that things will further deteriorate.

In May 1984, 30 people in the Bukoli camp were arrested on the orders of kodim Baucau. All these people have since disappeared.

* * *

Saelari, Laga

Xanana describes the prison in Saelari which lies some 20kms due east of Baucau as being quite the most horrific and barbaric prison in the eastern part of the country. There is a shortage of food in the whole region of Laga where the rice fields under cultivation are controlled by privileged families only. People in the villages of Samalai, Saelari, Sagadate and Atebri, along the Laga-Baguaia road survive on breadfruit and a few vegetables from their gardens where crops have been meagre because villagers were not allowed to plant during the 1984 season.

* * *

Atauro

According to a letter from Fretilin to Mgr Martinhu da Costa Lopes, former Bishop of Dili, at the beginning of January this year 1,236 prisoners were still being held in Atauro. They come from Vikeke, Lospalos, Same and Manatuto. Just before the Papal Nuncio visited East Timor in October last year, 600 political prisoners in Atauro from the district of Ainaro were hastily moved away from Atauro to the district of Zumalai, and were forced to leave behind all their hard-earned possessions. Prisoners relocated from Atauro have subsequently been relocated, each time having to leave things behind, or abandon crops they have been able to grow. Atauro prisoners relocated to Cailaco in 1982 are suffering from hunger because their crops were destroyed by rats. At least on Atauro, Fretilin writes, they were getting supplies from the International Red Cross mission. Fretilin concludes that the relocation of prisoners from Atauro is designed to kill the prisoners off.

* * *

References


1. See Budiardjo and Liem, *The War Against East Timor*, Zed Books, London, 1984, page 94.
2. *nanggalas* the word used in Timor for paracommandos (Kopassandha). The Timorese regard them as being particularly vicious.
3. *ibid*, page 94.
4. *ibid*, page 93.
5. *ibid*, page 94.
6. *ibid*, page 89.

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Four NGOs complain to the UN Human Rights Commission

Four non-governmental organisations, Amnesty International, Pax Romana, Pax Christi International and the International League for the Rights and Liberation of the Peoples, submitted formal complaints on the continuing human rights violations in East Timor to the 1985 session of the Human Rights Commission. The submissions were made under Point 9 of the Commission's agenda on self-determination as the agenda did not include a separate item on East Timor.

Amnesty International's Submission

Amnesty which has made numerous submissions to UN Commissions, Sub-Commissions and Committees of the General Assembly, stressed there was "little evidence of improvement in the human rights situation over the past year". It complained specifically about:

- **Limitations on access**, including stringent restrictions on access by international observers and attempts to impose an embargo on information from East Timor. Timorese leaving to join relatives abroad are routinely warned not

to reveal anything that would discredit the Indonesian occupation forces at the risk of reprisals against relatives who remain behind in East Timor.

- **Detention and resettlement.** Hard facts on the number of detainees is not included, except for a figure of 1,500 still being held on Atauro island. (Last September, when an ICRC mission visited Atauro, the figure given was 2,100.) Amnesty disputes Indonesia's claims about Atauro prisoners returning to the main island, saying that "many persons sent back to the main island have not been allowed to return to their homes but have instead been placed in "resettlement villages", sometimes near their place of origin, sometimes far away, where they continue to face severe restrictions on freedom of movement".

- **Torture.** Amnesty reiterates its complaint about the extensive use of torture by Indonesian troops. Despite Indonesian attempts to cast doubt on the authenticity of military manuals issued by the Indonesian army (captured by Fretilin in 1982) which contain guidelines regarding

the use of torture, Amnesty reaffirms its conviction that the documents are genuine. This is reinforced by the receipt of first-hand evidence that torture has been persistently practised in East Timor. It lists three places in Dili where torture takes place and says that some people reported to have been held in these centres have since 'disappeared' and some are feared dead.

- **Extrajudicial executions.** The Amnesty submission refers to the massacre in Kraras village in 1983, shortly after the Indonesian offensive began, where as many as 200 people may have been killed. "Of those who fled to the mountains to escape the killings, several were reported to have been captured and executed." Other massacres recorded by Amnesty are:

- the massacre of some 100 men captured near the village of Hauba in the western sector, in March 1984;
- killings of a number of people near Ainaro in March 1984 and in Baucau in May 1984 of people suspected of being in contact with Fretilin.

W. German parliamentarians call for free access to East Timor

A West German parliamentarian, Hans-Ulrich Klose, has called on the Indonesian government to open up East Timor to the International Red Cross and to allow free access to the international community and the foreign press so as to enable people to assess the situation themselves.

He was one of a five-man delegation that visited East Timor in February, the first group of West European parliamentarians to visit the country. The group included two Social Democrats,

Hans Ulrich Klose and Volker Neumann, two Christian Democrats, Herbert Hupka and Otto Regenspurger and a Liberal, Detlef Kleinert.

Deputy Klose who is in charge of human rights affairs for the Social Democratic Party told the press he met prisoners on Atauro island who had been detained for five years without having access to any legal aid or to any state authority. The delegation called on the Indonesian government to dissolve the Atauro prison camp as quickly as possible and to allow all the detainees there to return to their places of origin without delay. (IPS, 1 March 1985)



With information pouring out of East Timor about the human rights violations since 1983, TAPOL decided to produce this supplement, to make the material available in a self-contained section. Extra copies of these pages have been printed. Readers wishing to have copies should send their order, with payment, to TAPOL. Price: £1.50 for batches of five, including postage. Please add 75 pence for overseas airmail orders.

TAPOL

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OPM leader on the military situation in Merauke


OPM strength in the district of Merauke consists of about 3,000 people, split up into some 60 independent patrols operating throughout the district. These figures were given by Gerard Thomy, OPM district commander, in an interview with Alan Smith, senior tutor in extension studies at the University of Papua New Guinea. (PNG Times, 10 February, 1985.)

Smith writes that he found Thomy "several hours down the Fly River from Kiunga" and remarked that his security arrangements were "impressive". Asked for his assessment of Indonesian military strength in the district, Thomy said that about 5,000 troops had been brought into the region just before Christmas 1984, including soldiers from the Pattimura Division (based in Maluku) and paracommandos of the Kopassandha regiment. The OPM leader had been informed too that ten new helicopter landing bases had been cleared in the region and that the new troops will be dispersed to these bases and used to reinforce the still fairly small garrisons in the major towns. He admitted, writes Smith,

the OPM had no modern weapons and so they had no answer to helicopter raids, except to hide. This means that the Indonesians are confident in the air and fairly confident in the towns. But on the ground and in the villages, they know they are not safe. "It is our land," says Thomy, "and it is our place. That is our strength."

Smith spent a day with Thomy who has been in the bush 17 years. He took command of the OPM in Merauke in 1980 when he recruited about 600 people; he operated then from his home town of Woropka. At the time Indonesia took over the administration of West Papua in 1963, Thomy fled to Papua New Guinea but returned to Tanah Merah in Merauke, and later went to Jayapura where he worked as a mechanic. He joined the OPM in 1968 and operated then in the northern sector of the border region, near Jayapura.

Thomy is very bitter about the UN and also disappointed about the neglect shown by governments in the region. He told



Gerard Thomy. (PNG Times, 10 February)

Smith he sent a packet of documents to the UN Secretary-General in late 1984, reporting on the level of fighting in Merauke, on the flight of thousands of refugees to Papua New Guinea and on Indonesian harassment of Papuans as they tried to cross the border. Copies were also sent to government leaders, including the Prime Ministers of PNG, Vanuatu and Australia. He had no way of knowing whether any of these documents had safely reached their destinations.

Refugees will not come back

Thomy's remarks about the thousands of refugees now living in camps in PNG's Western Province tally closely with an article published in the *Sydney Morning Herald* (11 February) by Peter Hastings who visited three of these camps at just around the time Alan Smith was interviewing Thomy. When Smith asked Thomy whether the refugees would be safe if they returned home, he was adamant:

They will not return home, and if an attempt is made to return them home, they will disappear into the bush. They know that their villages and gardens were destroyed after they left and they know that we are fighting a war of independence.

Hastings who visited the camps of Kungin, Trakbits and Atkumba found that everyone along the border, from north to south, government officials included, supported the refugees and that anti-Indonesian feelings were high. As for the refugees themselves, he wrote:

Not a single inhabitant of the three camps, or of any others, I suspect, will return voluntarily to Irian Jaya at this stage. Quite possibly never.

Australian Foreign Minister prevented from visiting refugees

For several weeks before Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden visited Papua New Guinea in February, conflicting reports appeared in the Australian press about his chances of visiting a refugee camp near PNG's border with Indonesia. The matter seemed to have been settled when PNG Prime Minister, Michael Somare said in Sydney (*The Australian*, 6 February) that he had no objection to the visit taking place. Only two weeks earlier, his Foreign Minister, John Giheno had said Hayden would "probably not" be allowed to inspect the camps.

In the event John Giheno was proved right, though the visiting Australian Foreign Minister did not find this out until he had actually flown into Kiunga, on his way to the Kungim camp. It was there that Paulius Matane, General Secretary of the PNG Department of Foreign Affairs announced at a hurriedly-convened press conference on the tarmac, that Hayden's trip to Kungim was off because OPM members armed with traditional weapons and a man with a pistol had been spotted in the area. He turned down a request from journalists accompanying Bill Hayden to be allowed to fly in to Kungim "at their own risk".

The sudden cancellation infuriated people in the district, among others, Warren Dutton, the local Member of Parliament, who said the real reason was concern about Indonesian reaction to the visit. Moreover, refugees at the camp were planning to make an appeal to Australia to use its influence at the UN on behalf of the West Papuan people. This would have drawn international attention to their plight.

The Bishop of Daru, Gerard Deschamps was also surprised that Hayden's visit did not go ahead. There was nothing unusual, he said, for men carrying traditional weapons to be seen in the region, because they have their families there.

A political trial to cover up a murder

A trial took place in Jayapura in January this year which appears to have been held in order to cover up the circumstances of the murder of Arnold Ap. Arnold Ap was a leading Papuan cultural activist and curator of the Jayapura museum of anthropology who was arrested in November 1983 and whose body turned up in a Jayapura mortuary on 27 April last year. In response to international outrage over Ap's murder, the Indonesian authorities claimed at the time that he was killed in a shoot-out at sea while trying to escape.

At the trial in January, four men were found guilty of helping Arnold Ap and four other Papuan political prisoners to escape. They were given sentences ranging from 2½ to 5½ years. A photocopy of the court verdict (No. 45/PID/Subv/1984/PN.JPR) is now in TAPOL's possession.

Pius Wanen, 24, a member of the Indonesian Police Force attached to the unit charged with guarding police detention centres, who was sentenced to 5½ years.

Jonas Rejauw, 26, a student at Cendrawasih University studying state administration, who was a member of Mambesak, the culture group set up by Arnold Ap. He was also sentenced to 5½ years.

Bob Souwela, 33, employed at a government office in Jayapura, recently graduated from Cendrawasih University, who was sentenced to 3½ years.

Izaak Arobaya, 42, a fisherman who was given 2½ years.

Ap's body was recognised by a nurse in the mortuary, with rope marks on the wrists, bullet wounds and bayonet stabs in the stomach, and bruises behind the right ear. News of the discovery quickly reached relatives who were then allowed to take the body away. Some 500 people attended the funeral. Ap's wife Cory and their children were already in the Vanimo refugee camp in PNG.

The Jakarta-based Legal Aid Institute (LBH) which had been pushing hard for Ap to be treated in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code, sent a team to Jayapura shortly after his death and then made a call for an independent public enquiry, a demand that was taken up overseas by many people in academic circles, particularly in Australia. The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja then gave the only official explanation ever to be made, that Ap had been killed in a shoot-out when the boat in which he was fleeing to Papua New Guinea was tracked down by a patrol boat. (*Sydney Morning*

Herald, 2 July 1984.) A month later, the *Sydney Morning Herald* Foreign Editor, Peter Hastings, published an account received from ex-patriates in Jayapura that Ap's escape was in fact a put-up job by para-commandos of the elite *Kopassandha* regiment who goaded a Papuan prison guard into organising an escape attempt by Ap and four other Papuan political prisoners, then monitored his every move until he was cornered and killed on 26 April. (*SMH*, 27 August 1984.) As a result of this story, Hastings, until then Jakarta's favourite Australian journalist, was banned from entering the country.

Kopassandha's interest in the Ap case is well known. He was first arrested by the paracommandos and held incommunicado by them for several weeks until pressure from the LBH in Jakarta led to his being transferred to the regional military command and then on 20 January 1984 to police headquarters KODAK XVII. On 25 February, his case and that of others with him was handed to the prosecutor's office, signalling that trial proceedings could be expected.

No shoot-out

The account of Ap's death in the court judgement which enters into great detail about the organisation of the escape claims that he was killed on the coast in an area called Pantai Pasir 6 where he was waiting with co-prisoners to be picked up by a vessel that was to take him by sea to Papua New Guinea. *Kopassandha* troops are mentioned several times in the judgement as being the ones who tracked the group of escapees down. For example, on page 17, the judgement says:

Their tracks were discovered by the authorities (*Kopassandha* troops), and in the chase, the prisoner named Arnold Ap was shot dead. The first accused and others of the accused fled in all directions because they had been taken unawares and were not able to face the assault.

That makes Mochtar's explanation of a shoot-out at sea unsupported on several counts, but the court document is silent on how *Kopassandha* troops tracked the fleeing group down. In fact the judgement itself is internally inconsistent because it related earlier (page 14) that the second, third and fourth accused men had left the group along the way which means that only the police guard, Pius Wanen, was still with Ap and the other prisoners at Pantai Pasir 6.

As described in the judgement, it was Pius Wanen, who was said to be armed with an UZI automatic rifle and 16 bullets, who unlocked the prisoners' cell at 11pm on 21 April, and led them out of the detention centre by a back exit to a waiting taxi that had been arranged by Jonas Rejauw. Bob Souwela was accused of making contact with the fisherman for the provision of a boat to take the prisoners from Base G, the point on the coast to which they were taken by taxi. Izaak Arobaya's boat then carried the men to Pantai Pasir 6 and left them there as pre-arranged, to await transportation by another vessel to PNG. Izaak Arobaya is said to have used his boat on a number of occasions to help Papuans flee to PNG (many people fled from Jayapura in February 1984), though strangely, no charges were brought against him for assisting these other escapes.

Four other political prisoners were with Ap in the group escaping with the help of Pius Wanen. They were Eddy Mofu, Agustinus Runtuboy, Calvin Romainum and Alex Mebri. After leaving the police cell, Mebri apparently went his own way and did not get into the waiting taxi. Eddy Mofu allegedly drowned at Base G because he was unable, due to high seas, to swim out to Arobaya's boat which was moored 30 metres from the beach. In fact, according to independent information at the time, Mofu's body was washed up at Base G, bloated with water,



Arnold Ap with a tribal leader shortly before his arrest in November, 1983.

heavily bruised and with his feet bound.

The court judgement is at pains to establish unequivocally that the initiative for the escape attempt came from Arnold Ap who, it claims, made the proposal separately to Wanen, as well as to Rejawu and Souwela, both of whom were close friends who used to visit him regularly in detention. The judgement also paraphrases evidence from witnesses who appeared in the trial, all of whom allegedly helped the escape attempt in some way or other and confirmed the court's version of how the escape was organised. If this is so, it is not clear why these witnesses were not themselves charged along with the four men in the dock.

Court judgements are notoriously unreliable accounts of what happens at any political trial, as we know only too well from analysing the Tanjung Priok trials. In these latter trials, press reports have helped, albeit inadequately, to explain the defence arguments and have given details of testimony by witnesses. In the case of the Jayapura Four, we have seen no press reports at all and know nothing about the lawyers who acted on behalf of the defendants.

All four defendants were said at the commencement of the judgement to be "members of the OPM" as well as "OPM sympathisers". The former would surely imply the latter! However, no evidence of "membership" is produced, but much effort is devoted to proving what "sympathy" means, even referring to a definition in the Oxford Dictionary, and then sets out to prove that taking action to help other (untried!) OPM members is in itself evidence of "sympathy" for the OPM. The impression that the trial was really held to prove something about Arnold Ap's death rather than punish those allegedly responsible for the escape is reinforced by the fact that the court judgement only bothers to go into detail about the charges

against Ap and has almost nothing to say about the other escapees.

Subversion charges

The four men were all charged with offences under Indonesia's draconian Anti-Subversion Law, which explains the severity of their sentences.

All the five detainees involved in the escape are referred to several times as "political prisoners", who were themselves being held on subversion charges because of alleged support for (membership of?) the OPM, the West Papuan movement opposed to Indonesian rule in West Papua. Arnold Ap, for instance, is said to have been responsible for the production and circulation of an underground news sheet called *The Dawn of Freedom (Fajar Merdeka)*. By their act to help these political prisoners escape, they are deemed to be "in sympathy" with the OPM, which is enough in itself to warrant anti-subversion charges.

Whereas in the current Jakarta trials, the judges and prosecution have gone to great lengths to deny that the trials are in any way political, the Jayapura judgement repeatedly uses the political nature of the trial to justify anti-subversion charges. Is this because the Jayapura verdict was never intended to become public? Indeed, it is not clear whether the sessions were open or closed. Or is it because the Jayapura trial touches on the question of West Papuan independence?

The trial was heard before the *Pengadilan Negeri Jayapura* (Jayapura District Court) whose stamp appears on every page of the 35-page judgement. One of the members of the three-man panel of judges is identified as an army officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Soemardjo SH. The chairman was Prajitno Hartoko SH and the other member was Soehardoko SH.

University team critical of transmigration programme

A team of social scientists from Jogjakarta's Institute for Village and Land Research has upset the Minister of Transmigration, Martono, by suggesting that the government's programme to transmigrate 137,000 families (an estimated 691,000 people) to the province of Irian Jaya (West Papua) in the current five-year plan due to end in 1989 is excessive and should be rescheduled to spread over ten years.

The team was sent to Irian Jaya in January at the request of the Minister to investigate the social and cultural impact of the programme and to give recommendations, but it has led to disagreement and even recriminations. When the team first publicised its findings at a press conference in Jogjakarta, (*Kompas*, 7 February), the chairman of the Institute who also led the team on its visit to Irian Jaya, Professor Mubyarto made it clear that the programme should be slowed down. A couple of weeks later, the Minister, just back from a trip to Tokyo to attend an inter-parliamentary union conference on population, responded by declaring that the government had no intention of slowing down the programme. On the contrary, it would be speeded up. (*Kompas*, 26 February 1985). While admitting that care was needed to avoid "social conflict" between the newcomers and the native population, Martono warned against creating social conflict that could be difficult to curb. He claimed that all the fuss now being made about transmigration to Irian Jaya was the result of the issue being "politicised" by groups sponsored by the OPM (Free Papua Organisation) "which is opposed to any development in Irian Jaya".

The threat contained in Martono's statement seems to have caused Mubyarto to retract, claiming that he was misquoted by the press. Raising his voice, *Tempo* reports (in anger, no doubt), he said: "I never suggested rescheduling the rate of transmigration. People are trying to sow discord between us and the Minister" (*Tempo*, 9 March 1985). Another member of the team, Gunawan Sumodiningrat, however, seemed undeterred

by the Minister's far from veiled threat. He repeated his call for a slowdown in *Kompas* the very next day (28 February) saying pointedly that there can be no justification for speeding up the programme. Quite apart from the question of social conflict raised by the Minister, he said, there were economic and technical reasons galore for the programme to be slowed down. There's no limit to the number of people that can be shipped out, as long as our fleet of aircraft can be kept going. What matters is what happens when people get to their destination . . . Some transmigration regions are water-logged and in places, salt affects water supplies 80 kilometres inland from the coast, making drinking-water unobtainable and land unsuitable for agriculture. He also said in some parts of Merauke, transmigrants had not yet harvested a crop of rice after two years because of the chronic lack of water.

"It's like visiting another country"

Mubyarto at the same time has been forced to admit that transmigration to Irian Jaya has become far more problematic than in any other region. It has aroused disquiet in Papua New Guinea and Australia and complaints about "Javanisation", even about "the obliteration of the Melanesian people", he said. In an article on the issue, Mubyarto unwittingly touched on the central issue however when he said in the opening paragraph (*Sinar Harapan* 19 February 1985) that "going to Irian Jaya is like visiting a foreign country". He tried to rebuff complaints about Javanisation by arguing that the Javanese peasants now being resettled in the region are anything but aggressive, not the kind of people to dominate others. "If you want to look for aggressive types", he said, "then you should take a look at the very large number of spontaneous transmigrants (not government-assisted) who are flooding into the region from Maluku and Sulawesi, particularly South Sulawesi who "often lord it over the native inhabitants and even (sic) over the Javanese."

But Mubyarto completely misses the point. By bringing the number of Javanese inhabitants in the region to close on a million before the end of the decade, it will fundamentally transform the social and cultural character of West Papua and drastically alter its food-producing traditions, if it doesn't first transform the region into a desert. Transmigration sites are required to have 25% "native sons" (Papuan) in their midst. But Mubyarto quotes a Javanese peasant who feels exasperated by the "translocals", as the Papuans are called, for not wanting to tend and till the land and spending their time hunting and engaging in other "useless" exploits. This incompatibility leads Mubyarto to suggest that the target of a 25% mix should not be continued because it is proving unworkable. He favours instead the programme of population resettlement (*pemukiman kembali*) of the so-called "*suku-suku terasing*" (alien tribes) now being implemented by the Department of Social Affairs. This is preferable as a way of giving "guidance" to tribes who live very "dispersed and unsettled lives" and are not yet accustomed to tilling the soil. This incidentally is the programme strongly advocated by the region's military commander, Major-General Sembiring (See *TAPOL Bulletin* No 65 September, 1984).

The trouble with all discourse by Indonesian social scientists about "Irian Jaya's problems" is that the underlying factor is not social or economic; it's security and the need to curb resistance to Indonesian rule. This is why such a technocratically reasonable suggestion as the re-scheduling of the programme has touched a raw nerve and provoked hints that advocates of such sensible thoughts could be seen as being tools of the OPM. Once security has been incorporated as an essential part of the project, there is little that social scientists can do to inject reason into the regime's extravagant targets.

Death Squads

"Anti-Guerrilla" squads take to the streets



Jakarta's Police Chief, Sudarmadji.

A journalist in Kediri, East Java, recently found a dead body in his front garden late at night after members of his family had been awoken by unusual noises outside the house. The victim was not a local inhabitant and had been stripped of his clothing, without any identification. His body showed signs of gunshot wounds as well as having been severely beaten about the head.

The journalist, Heru E.Y.S., works for a weekly paper, *Swadesi* and another periodical, *Fakta*. It was not the first time an unidentified corpse was discovered in the neighbourhood. A few days before, a

body turned up on the premises of a local official, and it was Heru E.Y.S. who publicised the incident in his paper.

The Kediri experience is by no means an isolated event. In fact, Indonesian media publications are again reporting "mysterious" street executions in many cities. On 18 January, *Tempo* reported that six corpses of known criminals had been found in Jogjakarta. The military commander, Lieutenant Colonel Tuswadi, the officer who first launched the wave of death-squad killings in 1983, said his men were under orders "not to take risks" with difficult criminals and to shoot them down if necessary.

Again there are reports appearing about many shootings in major cities. On one day last October in Medan, North Sumatra, 5 corpses were discovered, and in the four months to February, forty corpses were found in the city, many of them with tattoo marks. Several towns in West Java are reporting many unexplained shootings, and in Pasuruan, East Java, four bodies were found in two days. In Jakarta, there were 90 deaths caused by shooting during 1984, and most of the victims are believed to be "recidivists".

Shoot on the spot!

But gangs of servicemen authorised to shoot people in the streets are now being

Murdani on Transmigration and National Security

The security aspect of transmigration has now been publicly acknowledged by General Murdani who told a seminar on transmigration in Jakarta that the programme is vital to the strengthening of national resilience (*ketahanan nasional*). This is the only programme in the economic field, he said, that must quite categorically be related to the interests of defence and security. The preparation of sites and the removal of obstacles to land availability need to be given special focus because the choice of locations is intimately related to the whole concept of "territorial management" in the regions. ("Territorial management" is an integral part of the Army's internal security doctrine.) Therefore, in addition to the regional government, the Armed Forces must be involved in the selection of sites from the very start, he said. (*Sinar Harapan*, 8 March 1985)

17,653 families moved in six months

According to figures compiled by *Kompas* (11 January 1985), altogether 17,653 transmigrant families were moved from Java to Irian Jaya in the first six months of the current five-year plan which started in April last year. The regional dispersal of these families is as follows:

4,593 families to Merauke; 1,745 families to Paniai; 2,417 families to Manokwari; 6,136 families to Sorong; and 2,762 families to Jayapura.

This compares with a planned total for the five years of 137,000 families who will need, in all, 689,000 hectares of land.

If *Kompas* figures are correct, it seems that the current Five-Year target is being over-fulfilled, with more than 10% already moved in the first six months.

given a new guise. Major-General Sudarmadji, chief of the Jakarta Police, announced in January the formation of Urban Anti-Guerrilla Teams (*Team Anti-Gerilya Kota*), ostensibly to deal with rising crime. These teams have been given orders to shoot "difficult" criminals on the spot, and indeed, a number of shootings have already occurred. These "shoot-to-kill" teams are now being referred to with a variety of names such as *Team Anti-Banditisme* and *Team Pasukan Pemburu Sergap* (Pouncer Squads).

While the police are busying themselves with such squads, the Jakarta Municipal government, not to be outdone, have started training its 28,000 strong *hansip* members (civil defence) in "anti-riot operations". One of the future tasks of this upgraded force will be, according to the Governor of Jakarta, himself a military man, "to safeguard security during the 1987 general elections". (*Kompas*, 21 February)



**Tembak ditempat
= shoot on the spot.**

Salman Hafidz executed by firing squad

The convicted Muslim prisoner, tried for subversion for his role in the attack on a police station in Cicendo, West Java on 11 March 1981, was executed by firing squad in February. He is thus the second of 4 Muslim prisoners already sentenced to death for their involvement with the "Imran group" to have been executed. The first was Imran bin Mohammad Zein himself, who was executed in March 1983. Others of the group also under sentence of death are Azhar bin Mohamad Safar and Maman Kusmajadi.

He was known to his family and friends as a man dedicated to the idea of establishing an Islamic state and refused to recognise the Indonesian legal system. Although after his sentence, appeals against sentence were made to the High Court and the Supreme Court, this was probably not done on his initiative. According to *Tempo* (23 February 1985) the appeal for clemency was submitted to Suharto not by Salman but by the man who led the prosecution against him. The clemency appeal was rejected in January and within a month, Salman was dead.

The death sentence was based on the charge of subversion, not on the charge of murder, although three policemen were killed in the Cicendo attack.

Members of his family who met Salman shortly before the execution found him still firm in his beliefs and

convinced of the righteousness of his cause. He asked his family to take hundreds of pages of comments on the Quran he wrote while in prison and expressed the wish that this should be published after his death, but the papers were withheld by the prison authorities and are still in their hands.



Salmun Hafidz on trial in Bandung. (*Tempo*, 27 February, 1982)

Censorship

Many periodicals closed down

Twenty-six periodicals published in a number of cities have been banned, according to an announcement by the Department of Information on 14 January. The bans were imposed in October but not made public for three months. The publications affected include a wide range of journals serving many sectional interests. Some are in-house school or faculty journals while others are for more general readerships. Muslim journals are among those being closed down.

Literally every single kind of published periodical however limited it is in circulation is required by law to possess a licence of some kind or another. Even journals issued by schoolpupils for distribution within the school walls must have a permit. Some of the publications banned are school journals which offer children at school a platform for creative writing. The nine publications banned in Bali, for instance, are all produced by OSIS (Organisasi Siswa Intra-Sekolah) the Inter-School Pupils Organisation. The director of one such journal called *Gema Swastiastu* found it difficult to understand the reasons for such a ban. Its contents are completely non-political, with only short stories, poems, jokes and photos of school activities.

One journal that has been closed down in Bandung is *Kharisma*, published by the Bandung Institute of Technology Mosque Association. *Kharisma* has been in existence since 1981 and circulation grew from 2,000 in the first year to 5,500 by the time it was closed down. *Al-Ikhwan*, the monthly publication of the Mosque Youth Co-ordination Centre in Yogyakarta is a monthly that has not appeared since last October.

The complete list of banned publications is as follows, according to *Merdeka* 14 January:

Cummicare (Padang), Assalam (Pekanbaru), *Kharisma*, Bandung Sakti and Komposisi (all of Bandung), Permata, Prospek, Pos Masa, Jantera, and Aspirasi (all of Jakarta), *Al Ikhwan* (Jogjakarta), SK Kampus Mentari (Surakarta), Gelora Saraswato, Himpi Bali, Widya Dharma, Kertha Askara, Kertha Patrika, Pramaya, Gema Swastiastu, Bali Smerti and Gita Saraswati (all of Denpasar in Bali), Suara Pambaharuan (Menado), Sumber Rhena (Ternatè) Bull, Markas Cabang (Ujungpandang), and Seri Buku Voc (Flores).

Afraid of their own history

A book entitled *Tingkah Laku Politik Panglima Besar Soedirman* (The Politics of Supreme Commander Soedirman) has been banned by the Attorney General "because it can raise doubts about the loyal service of the Supreme Commander Soedirman, especially in the younger generation who did not experience the physical struggle in the early period of independence. Not only that, it can arouse a feeling of cynicism among Indonesian people about the loyal service of the Indonesian Armed Forces".

The book contains four papers written by General (Ret.) A. H. Nasution, Ruslan Abdulgani, Professor S. I. Poeradisatra and Sides Sudyarto, but the Attorney General regards only the articles by the latter two as being "dangerous". The article that has been singled out as being particularly "dangerous" is by Professor Poeradisatra, otherwise known by his pen-name, Buyung Saleh, which is entitled "Supreme Commander Soedirman's Ties with the Union of Struggle". The Union of Struggle (*Persatuan Perjuangan*) was a mass movement launched at the beginning of 1946 by the left revolutionary figure, Tan Malaka which won widespread support in favour of struggle (as opposed to *diplomasi*) for independence, but quickly disintegrated after Tan Malaka was arrested in March that year. It is well known that General Soedirman, then Army commander and now cultified as the great founder of the Indonesian National Army, supported Tan Malaka's initiative. Moreover, he was later deeply involved in an abortive plot with Tan Malaka supporters in July 1946 (Tan Malaka's links by this time were tenuous as he was still behind bars) to force President Sukarno to hand over powers to the Army. Another Army officer involved in this plot was Lieutenant-Colonel (now retired General) Suharto, President of Indonesia. It is not surprising that the government should have jumped on an interpretation of those events which reveals Soedirman's links with one of the most outstanding leftist figures in modern Indonesian history.

S. I. Poeradisatra has been picked on also because he is a former political prisoner, a point hammered home by two Jakarta dailies, *Pelita* and *Angkatan Bersenjata* which "expose" the writer's former membership of the leftist cultural union LEKRA, and accuse him of "involvement" in the October 1965 events because he was an (untried!) political prisoner in Jakarta and on Buru Island.

Without comment

The coconut symbol in Marihat Raya Village

Sahat Gultom was very bitter. "My brother-in-law was involved in the PKI but I'm the one to suffer," he said last week at his home in Marihat Raja village, district of Simalungun, 150 kms from Medan (North Sumatra).

He has reason to feel disappointed. His name was deleted from the list of candidates for village head because his wife's brother, Satia Sinambela was once a member of PGRI-Nonvaksentral [the teachers' union not affiliated to any trade union federation, Ed.] which was regarded as an affiliate of the PKI [the Indonesian Communist Party]. Gultom has been village head of Marihat Raja since 1980 when he was appointed by the District Chief without any election. "I'm pure New Order," he said. The proof? At the 1982 elections, GOLKAR romped home with 93% of the votes compared with 43% in 1977 when the rest went to the PDI [the merged nationalist and Christian parties].

The election for village head took place on 21 February. At the polling booth in the local school, there were two seats for the candidates but only one was occupied. Kamidin Butarbutar 42, sat on the seat with the paddy symbol. The seat with the coconut symbol was empty because Sahat Gultom's candidacy had been declared invalid by J.F. Nainggolan, chairman of the election committee, without saying why. He only said: "Anyone in favour of Butarbutar should pierce the paddy symbol. If you don't want him, pierce the coconut symbol." The results were announced: 422 votes for paddy and 600 for coconut though 121 of these votes were declared invalid. Most of the people present cheered and clapped. "Long live Gultom!" they cried. But their happiness soon turned sour when Nainggolan announced that the election had been cancelled because a single candidate must win at least half the votes. In any case he said, the coconut symbol was declared null

and void because Gultom's candidacy had been invalidated.

Gultom's supporters were understandably dismayed. Many hadn't realised his candidacy had been invalidated though according to the sub-district chief, it was announced the week before in a notice put up at the Election Committee office. The head of the office of social-political affairs of Simalungun District had himself told Gultom in 1984 that he could not be nominated, yet Gultom persisted. One official caught red-handed some Gultom supporters handing out statements of support for him.

Simalungun District Chief, Johan Pandapotan Silitonga, said that Gultom's nomination had been rejected because he has no SKBD — *Surat Keterangan Bersih Diri* — or Cleanliness Certificate. "You see," he said, "his brother-in-law was involved in the PKI."

SKBDs are issued by the Social and Political Affairs Office of the North Sumatra Provincial administration and they certify that the candidate is not closely related to anyone involved in the PKI. Close relatives mean: blood or adoptive parents or guardians who may have influenced the person's thoughts, blood or adoptive brothers and sisters, parents-in-law, wife, or the blood or adoptive brothers or sisters of the person's wife or husband.

"If a person has no SKBD, there's always the chance of his/her being manipulated; for instance, issuing a G30S/PKI non-involvement certificate to someone who was involved, or deleting the name of someone involved from a list of people involved in the PKI. After all, the PKI is still a latent danger, isn't it?" said one Election Committee official.

Gultom's supporters regard him as a friendly fellow who doesn't create problems for the people and who has achieved many things. Under his

leadership, Marihat Raja village got several awards, and his wife, Emma Sinambela was chosen to take part in the National Festival for Peasant Contacts in Lampung in 1984.

It's true her eldest brother, Satia Sinambela was a member of the PGRI-Nonvaksentral. As the village teacher, he was required to report weekly to the authorities after the G30S/PKI affair (in 1965), until he died in 1980. Even so, his relationship with Gultom has invalidated Gultom's candidacy. "Now it's up to the government," said Gultom, resigned to his fate.

Translated from Tempo, 16 March 1985

How to achieve box-office success

Newspapers in Jakarta reported in January that the docu-drama film, *Treason of the G30S/PKI* (Pengkhiranatan G30S/PKI), produced by Arifin C. Noer about the October 1965 events, broke box-office records in Jakarta in 1984. No fewer than 600,000 went to see it in Jakarta alone.

The following letter appeared in *Sinar Harapan* recently:

Newspapers in Surabaya have reported that the film, *Pengkhiranatan G30S/PKI* has broken box-office records. Virtually every single school and university throughout the city has been given their turn for going to see the film. "Already showing for X number of weeks," proclaim the advertisements.

But did you know people are being forced to buy tickets? All school-pupils and university students are required to buy tickets though it's up to them whether they go or not. The main thing is, the cash should pour in and the film producer rake in a big profit. One shouldn't forget though that the film includes such big names as the much-loved and admired Bung Karno (former president, Sukarno). Tickets are selling for as much as Rp.5,000, even for Rp.10,000. Many students are afraid not to go and see the film because they believe they could face sanctions.

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