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
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EDITORIAL

STARTING SOMETHING IN ASIA?

In this issue of *Timor Link* we include the full text of the Statement published in Manila on November 18 by those who participated in the "Asia-Pacific Consultation on East Timor". The event should be celebrated. Representatives from 13 countries and many different kinds of organisation attended the three days of intense work. Most of all, the meeting broke new ground.

It was the first international meeting to be convened by and for Asian and Pacific groups to discuss East Timor.

It was also the first such meeting to be held in ASEAN. Until this time, it has been virtually out of the question to think of holding a conference on East Timor within any member country of ASEAN.

The Conference should not therefore be valued for its direct political impact, which was small, but because it contains the seeds of future developments which might, over the long term, be enormously important for East Timor.

First of all, its success suggests that it may now be possible to raise East Timor as a serious public issue within the Asian-Pacific region - if not immediately, at least over a period of several years. It has also surely given new impetus to the work of several East Timor groups that are already in existence, in Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Hong Kong. Now others may take root - to start with, most probably in the Philippines and Papua New Guinea. The conference has vindicated the vision of a number of East Timor activists, particularly in Australia, who have been working patiently for several years with such a meeting in mind.

What is at issue is of still wider importance than this, however.

It is not merely a matter of bringing into play a new area of the world which has not been active on East Timor. If the question of East Timor does not become an Asian issue, a Pacific issue, if it continues to be raised only or mainly by groups in the developed

industrial countries of the West, then it will become increasingly marginal. Europeans, North Americans and Australians may continue to protest, probably in dwindling numbers, but unless Asian and Pacific peoples are involved the issue will never return to the main political agenda. The Western governments still hold the power to secure a political settlement, by bringing Indonesia to the negotiating table; but they will never feel under pressure to do so, unless the demand for a settlement in Timor is given legitimacy from within the Asian and Pacific region.

For all those concerned about East Timor, therefore, this conference — seen as a small beginning to a long-term venture — is one of the most important events of recent years. At issue, fundamentally, is the political relevance of what we are all doing, in our different attempts to secure justice and peace in the territory.

ASIA-PACIFIC CONSULTATION ON EAST TIMOR — STATEMENT

Delegates from 13 countries attended the first Asia - Pacific Consultation on East Timor, held in Manila, Philippines, 16-18 November 1987. Participants included representatives of the two Timorese political parties, UDT and Fretilin, officials of several International Church networks, human rights and development agencies and delegates from Asia, Pacific and European solidarity groups.

The Consultation was convened to consolidate and expand emerging concerns on the issue within Asian and Pacific Churches and community organizations.

ANALYSIS

In its analysis of the issue the Consultation highlighted the following points:

1. East Timor remains a major military problem for Indonesia. This is clear from the number of combat troops in the territory, the special command structures directly controlled from Jakarta, the tight internal security situation and continued denial of external access.
2. The Indonesian presence in East Timor is not just a military occupation but is increasingly colonial in character. The economy is controlled by monopolies dominated by the Indonesian elite and social, cultural and political life has been structured to serve Indonesian interests at the expense of the East Timorese people who are systematically excluded, marginalised and powerless.
3. Gross human rights violations continue with varying intensity. However it also needs to be recognized that the ever-present climate of fear, restrictions on free communication, legal rights, assembly and travel are now institutionalised in East Timor. The suppression of East Timorese culture and the systematic Indonesianisation of Timorese society also constitute an abuse of rights fundamental to the preservation of Timorese identity.
4. Timorese armed resistance to integration remains seemingly indestructible and is a powerful symbol of East Timorese opposition to the annexation. However it also should be recognized that the less well known attitudes of East Timorese at all levels of society,

including clergy, civil servants, students, and village people, are testimony that opposition to integration remains entrenched throughout East Timor. This is also reflected in the decision of the two major Timorese political parties, UDT and Fretilin, to work together in the political struggle for independence.

5. The local Catholic Church has grown rapidly to become a mass organization to which most Timorese adhere. It is administered directly from the Vatican through an Apostolic Administrator and is not formally part of the Indonesian Church. The Timorese Church continues to call for an end to conflict and human rights abuses and for a just settlement, and for greater freedom to fulfil its heavy pastoral responsibilities. The Church is subjected to considerable political pressure, both externally and internally, and keenly feels its isolation. It needs increased support and contact particularly from the international church community.
6. Western and regional economic, political, military and security ties with Indonesia constitute a major barrier to the advancement of the Timorese cause. Regionally this is exemplified in the interdependence of the Japanese and Indonesian economies, ASEAN political commitments to Indonesia, the active cooperation with Indonesia of other governments in the region particularly Australia and Papua New Guinea, and Indonesia's increasing drive to extend its political influence in the South Pacific.
7. East Timor has not been voted on at the United Nations General Assembly since 1982 and Indonesia continues a major diplomatic and disinformation campaign to quash any discussion on the issue. Nevertheless East Timor remains an issue of active concern to a range of United Nations bodies and to many international and national forums, involving governments, political parties, parliaments, churches and non-governmental organizations.

KEY AREAS FOR ACTION

1. *United Nations*
 - a. At its session in Geneva in February 1988 the *United Nations*

Commission on Human Rights will consider the human rights situation in East Timor. It is recommended that member states of the Commission, particularly those from Asia, be urged:

- * to support a continuing review by the Commission of the human rights situation in East Timor and
 - * to endorse calls for the full participation of the East Timorese people in future United Nations sponsored talks on the issue.
- b. Talks on East Timor held between Indonesia and Portugal under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary General have not allowed for formal East Timorese participation.

It is recommended that representations to the Secretary-General urging full Timorese participation be intensified. There will be no lasting settlement without Timorese cooperation.

Such representations should also express dismay at the inadequacy of official United Nations reports on the issue.

- c. *The United Nations Committee on Decolonization* will hear petitions on East Timor in August 1988 in New York.

It is recommended that strong NGO and government submissions be made, particularly from within the Asia-Pacific region.

2. *Portugal*

Ambiguity in recent statements on East Timor by the Portuguese Government, which has a major responsibility for ensuring a just settlement of the issue, is cause for alarm, as is Portugal's failure to ensure Timorese participation in the talks process.

It is recommended that representations be made to the Portuguese Government on these failures.

It is further recommended that expressions of concern on Portugal's role be made to Portuguese Church bodies, political parties and the Parliamentary Commission on East Timor.

It is also recommended that Portugal be urged to recognize UDT and Fretilin and to materially support their work.

3. *The Church* Because of the disputed political status of the

territory, the Holy See has assumed direct responsibility for the Catholic Church of East Timor.

It is recommended that the Holy See be urged at every opportunity, particularly by Catholic bodies, to maintain its direct jurisdiction over the diocese of Dili until a just solution has been achieved based on the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination.

It is further recommended that the World Council of Churches and the international Protestant community be urged to dialogue directly with the Christian community in East Timor in a spirit of solidarity and common commitment to justice and peace.

It is also recommended that churches be urged to sign the document 'East

Timor: A Christian Reflection' as part of their overall effort of Christian education and advocacy on East Timor.

IMPLEMENTATION

The following broad action proposals were agreed to by the Consultation participants:

1. The provision of basic information on the issue for the wider community;
2. The regular information servicing of key non-governmental networks in Asia and the Pacific;
3. The establishment of support networks in Papua New Guinea and the Philippines;
4. Monitoring and lobbying of the principal non-UN political forums;

5. The documentation of the effects of the Indonesian occupation and colonization of East Timor on women and on children.
6. The encouragement of human rights, humanitarian and other organizations to seek independent access to East Timor.

The Consultation participants sent messages of concern regarding East Timor to the Japanese, Philippines and Portuguese Governments and the United Nations Secretary-General. Messages of solidarity were sent to the Timorese people and the European and North American support network. It was resolved to reconvene at an appropriate time in the future.

St. Theresa's College, Manila.

18 November 1987 ■

NEWS FROM INSIDE

Human Rights

In time for the UN Human Rights Commission meeting, *A Paz é Possível em Timor-Leste* has compiled a complete list of reported arrests and human rights violations in East Timor from January 1985 to December 1987.

In publishing the report, the authors recognise that, because of the almost unique conditions obtaining in East Timor, "it is impossible to check the level of accuracy of all information reaching us". They have relied upon three principal sources: private communications received through contacts in the Catholic church; documents produced by the Timorese resistance; and, finally, private communication with individuals, chiefly with refugees.

Where information can be cross-checked, it has proved broadly reliable. A recent issue of *A Paz é Possível* newsletter, published in January-February, provides an illustration.

According to *Amnesty International* reports and official Indonesian statistics, 72 Timorese have been tried and sentenced in the last two years. It turns out that the arrest of at least 30 among these cases had already been reported independently by Fretilin and other sources. "Involuntarily," *A Paz é Possível* concludes, "by bringing these prisoners up for trial, the Indonesian authorities have confirmed the reliability of information coming out of Timor along clandestine routes."

The new report, which is 35 pages long, contains details of 991 cases - 249

in 1985, 694 in 1986 and 48 in 1987 (for which year the list will be far from complete because of the long delays in transmission of information).

The mass of evidence that this represents acquires still more significance when it is remembered that many cases are never reported. "The climate of terror which exists in the territory," they write, ". . . leads the immense majority of Timorese to keep silent, even among themselves, about the situation that faces them.

"Refugees tell us that they have refrained from asking questions about members of their family who have been taken away by the military, or from visiting others who have been judged and sentenced for political reasons: to show interest in their fate could be enough to cause them too to fall under suspicion of rebellion.

"When people from other towns come to Dili, as far as possible they avoid contacts even with members of their own family living in the capital, to make sure that neither are considered responsible for news that may appear about their home region."

Grim reading

The short text makes grim reading. It is an accumulation of individual tragedies, each recorded with a brief commentary that only hints at the terrible experiences described and the collective memory of suffering and endurance which the people of East Timor have been accumulating for more than a decade. For example:

1985: "Francisco Belo, member of the resistance wounded and captured near Venilale, taken to the Hotel Flamboyant in Baucau from which he disappeared in January."

1986: "Manu Rusu, young adolescent from Uabubo. Arrested on February 22 by 'Group 4', tortured

with electric shocks, cigarette burns, stood two days in a tank of water up to the waist without food."

1986: "Brigita Guterres, 25 years old, raped on November 3rd at Venilale by two soldiers from Company C, Battalion 516, when making her way to her vegetable plot."

1987: "End of February/beginning of March, the whole population of Iliomar was threatened with death if any tears were shed during the execution of 17 civilians, killed with bayonets by 17 soldiers of the 9th Zipur Battalion on the orders of the Battalion commander. Among the 17 who died: Jaime da Costa, 27, civil servant of Iliomar, Martinho Hornai, 36, traditional chief of the same town."

(*Timor Oriental - Droits de l'Homme, Les Violations Continuent*, published in French, may be obtained from *A Paz é Possível em Timor-Leste*, c/o CRC, rua Castilho, 61-2, Lisbon 1200, Portugal; or from East Timor News, rua Pinheiro Chagas, 77-2, Lisbon 1000, Portugal.)

Moises do Amaral

A recent interview with Dr Moises do Amaral, published in *Tapol's* February issue, illustrates the *density* of suffering. Dr Do Amaral, leader of the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), was not in East Timor when the invasion occurred. He has never been able to return. He described to *Tapol* what the war and Indonesian occupation has meant to his family and his community.

"My parents had twelve children, of whom three died many years ago. Of the nine surviving brothers and sisters (including myself), I discovered that five died following the invasion so there were only three left apart from me, a sister in East Timor, a sister in Australia and a brother in East Timor.

Also, only six nephews have survived. I also lost two half-brothers and many nephews and nieces.

"I know my father died of starvation. I also know that my youngest brother was killed together with his wife. My mother also died because of the famine [of 1978-79 Eds.]. A younger sister died because she refused to surrender to the Indonesian soldiers. She was only 22. Her name was Teresa. Two other brothers wanted to surrender but when she refused to surrender, they refused as well.

"As for my father, he became weak and hungry. So he decided to try and reach a village to ask for help. He had one of his grand-daughters with him. But he did not have the strength to finish the journey so he sat down on a stone and they both died, there by the road. That was in 1978. After that, my brother surrendered in 1979, and then he was killed.

"(. . .)At the last census before the invasion, my clan consisted of almost 600 persons, and there were about 2,500 people in our tribe, the Fatuberliu tribe. My father was a *liurai* (clan chief).

"Almost the entire clan has been wiped out. Only a few dozen people have survived. Some are living in Same and some in Dili. But many other clans from Fatuberliu have also completely disappeared. I think the reason for the heavy death toll is that in the early years of the occupation, from 1976 to 1979, many people from other parts of the country fled to this region and took refuge there. Because of this, the Indonesians regarded our clan as highly suspect, people who should all be wiped out.

"The region was also heavily bombed in the years up to 1979, so by 1980, there was almost no-one left. At that time, I asked the Red Cross if they could trace any of my relatives. They were not able to, and it was only later, when people from the region arrived in Portugal, that I heard what had happened." (From *Tapol Bulletin*, No 85, February 1988.)

Students in Fear

In previous issues of *Timor Link* we have reported on the plight of the four Timorese students in Jakarta whose request for asylum, granted by Lisbon, has been frustrated since the end of 1986 by the Indonesian authorities' refusal to grant them an exit visa. The four are still unable to leave and continue to wait, in difficult circumstances, for their case to make progress.

Concern is now being expressed about the safety of other Timorese students, dispersed in universities and

colleges in many parts of Indonesia. Many of them have been under surveillance; now, it seems, some of those who are believed by the authorities to sympathise with Timorese nationalism are being physically threatened.

East Timor News (Urgent Communique No.1, February 15 1988) reports on the fears of many of these students following the deaths of two students in circumstances they believe to be suspicious.

In May 1987, first of all, a politically active student from Los Palos, studying at the Agricultural Institute of Semarang in central Java, was found dead inside a well.

The second death took place in December 1987. José Antônio Moniz da Silva, a mature student attached to the Faculty of Co-operative Economy at the Karamala Institute in Jogjakarta was reported to have been killed on the morning of December 15 when he ran over a child on his motorcycle. Suspicion about the incident has grown among Timorese students, because no witnesses have come forward, and the child in question has not been identified. Reports suggest that Mr da Silva sustained only one injury, to the back of his head.

It is known that after José da Silva wrote a critical report about East Timor to Governor Carrascalão in July 1987 (following his request for input from students), he was visited by Dr Amarudin, head of public services in Dili. José da Silva was told a Commission from Jakarta would be coming in December to question him. Some students have concluded that Mr da Silva's report was intercepted by the secret services and that they were responsible for his death.

Other students have been arrested and detained. One, Germano da Silva, a student of Public Administration who was arrested while on holiday in Dili in October 1986, is still detained by the military in Dili.

Timor Polled

East Timor News (Monthly Memo No.7, December 1987) also reports that during the first half of 1987 the Indonesian authorities secretly monitored public attitudes in East Timor, by use of informers and secret agents. Students and civil servants were particularly targeted, according to the reports.

The purpose of the exercise was to gauge the degree of Timorese support for, or opposition to, integration within Indonesia. The results were apparently very clear.

A very high proportion of Timorese, the survey concluded, opposed

Indonesia's presence in East Timor. The students, in particular, are openly critical. Attitudes in the civil service are more divided, between those who avoid political involvement or conversation about political matters, those who are outwardly pro-Indonesian but 'seem afraid' and those who speak in favour of progress but remain silent about their attitude towards integration with Indonesia.

(The *Monthly Memos* may be obtained upon request from *East Timor News* c/o Rua Pinheiro Chagas, 77-2, 1000 Lisbon, Portugal.) ■

New Cabinet

On March 10, President Suharto was returned unopposed for a fifth five-year term as President of Indonesia.

On March 22, he announced the Cabinet that will take Indonesia into the 1990s. Half its members are new, reflecting the view that a new generation must be given experience of high office.

Two appointments are of particular interest for those who watch Indonesian policy towards East Timor.

Firstly, in the Foreign Ministry, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja has departed, as expected. His replacement is the able Ali Alatas, very well known to Portuguese diplomats and all who follow East Timor, because as Ambassador to the United Nations he orchestrated Indonesia's effective diplomatic campaign in New York. Aged 55, Mr Ali Alatas can be expected to sharpen up Indonesia's international diplomacy.

General Murdani . . .

The second significant move concerns General Benny Murdani, who has been appointed Minister of Defence.

Often described as the second most powerful man in Indonesia, General Murdani announced that he would be stepping down as armed forces' commander at the beginning of February.

This position is being filled by the present Army chief, General Try Sutrisno.

General Murdani is not apparently diluting his power in the military, however: it is announced that he will continue to retain command over Indonesia's powerful security and intelligence network.

... and Timor

General Murdani's interest in East Timor is not apparently waning, however. Organiser of the original invasion, for some years directly responsible for the territory's 'pacification', he is still Chairman of East Timor's Development Committee, and his public image as the regime's strongman is inseparably associated with the war there.

On Christmas Day 1987, as has

become his custom, General Murdani (who is a practising Roman Catholic) visited the troops in East Timor. In a subsequent statement, he once again informed journalists that Indonesia will accept the surrender of guerrillas. He denied that Indonesia has "any intention of converting the local (Catholic) community to Islam" and said that the East Timorese "are free to conduct religious services according to their free will, according to their religious teaching."

Speaking of the resistance, General Murdani assessed guerrilla strength at some 500. This figure is the same as

that he put forward three years ago. This year, however, he also acknowledged that the conflict is unlikely to end soon. "It may take several more years to clean them all out," he told *Reuters*.

On the arms possessed by the resistance movement, General Murdani said: "Some of them are armed with weapons, some are not. Their weapons are already outdated. Only between 10 and 11 per cent of their weapons were obtained from our soldiers." (*Jakarta Post*, December 31 1987) ■

DOCUMENT

Fixing Foreign Visits: Secrets from 1976



A remarkable document recently came into the hands of *A Paz é Possível em Timor-Leste* in Lisbon. We publish extracts from it below.

It was held in secret for twelve years, inside East Timor, by an official in the Timorese civil service, and was finally smuggled across the border into West Timor, hidden under the floor carpet of a car.

Many allegations have been made over the years about the different techniques used by the Indonesian

authorities to ensure that foreign visitors leave East Timor with a favourable impression. Here is documentary proof of that manipulation.

Written in Portuguese on three sheets, the document contains the instructions that officials received in advance of the expected arrival of Mr Guicciardi, special representative of the United Nations Secretary General, who attempted to visit the territory at the beginning of 1976. (Mr Guicciardi

eventually gave up, after repeated Indonesian obstruction.)

The document has not been professionally validated, but there is no reason to suppose that it is not genuine.

*Komando Tugas Gabungan
Comando Resort Militer*

Guidelines regarding contacts with the UN Delegation

1. *General*
 1. Results of the meeting with Colonel SOEBIJAKTO, ASS.1/DEFENCE DEPARTMENT on preparations for the visit to East Timor by the UN delegation.
 2. It is necessary to give proper instructions to the Territorial Units, particularly those in KASI-5 which have the job of orienting the Provisional Government in the Districts, and also the Political Parties and the District Legislative Assemblies.
 3. It is most important that uniform replies be given to the various questions the delegation may put.
 4. Members of the Provisional Government should be properly briefed, since, because of their position, they will be approached by members of the aforesaid delegation.
2. *Questionnaire (Questions and Replies) and Tasks to Carry Out*
5. It must be made clear that the Provisional Government now exercises full governing powers, and is therefore the body whose duty and right it is to deal with the delegation on all matters relating to East Timor. All other military or civilian authorities should remain out of view during the delegation's stay.
6. All members of the Armed Forces stationed in the town will continue to carry out their duties, but must nevertheless wear civilian dress so that it should appear to the

- Delegation that they are unarmed civilians.
7. All members of the military disguised as unarmed civilians must avoid any contact or conversation with the delegation.
 8. All sites occupied by the Armed Forces or already abandoned by them must show no indication (weapons, munitions, notices) which might betray their presence or movement through such localities. Roads must be cleaned and free of military equipment.
 9. It is expressly forbidden for any personnel to move through the streets bearing any sign or marking that indicates that they are members of the armed forces. That is, it is recommended once again that the only military personnel who should appear in the streets are those who are to all appearances civilians. The population should be told that they have nothing to fear and should continue their daily lives normally.
 10. The places which will probably be visited are Oe-Cussi, Dili, Atauro, Baucau and Manatuto. Aileu, Balibo, Maliana, Lospalos and Laga might be visited later. It is extremely important to make sure that the Delegation does not spend the night at any of these places, and, if members of the Delegation should desire to do so, the Provisional Government must firmly oppose the idea, finding any pretext. If the Delegation should want to visit any area that is still subject to military activity the Provisional Government must refuse, advancing as justification the very bad state of the roads, bad weather conditions for flying, or the reluctance of the communities living in these areas to meet the Delegation because of the bad treatment they have received at the hands of FRETILIN.
 11. The leaders of the local parties, i.e. APODETI, UDT, KOTA and TRABALISTA, should be well-briefed to enable them to inform the UN Delegation about the following points:
 - a) FRETILIN's activity is communist in character because it has generated terror, threats, torture and destruction;
 - b) FRETILIN in reality was dominated by activists who came deliberately from Portugal, sent by Portuguese government, and under communist influence, and Rogério Lobato's visit to Lisbon and the communist countries was assisted by the Portuguese government;
 - c) Avoid stating that all Fretilin

- supporters are communists since the majority consist of people who know nothing of communism, but who were unwittingly deceived by the leaders of FRETILIN;
- d) Find out the weak points of the Provisional Government and do as much as possible to deal with this problem;
 - e) Guide the choice of the people's representatives in the Legislative Council so that these are genuinely acceptable to the people.
- [Paragraphs 11-28 provide answers to be given to questions about East Timor's political parties, the number of combatants, social and cultural conditions, the reasons why the Provisional Government refused Australian aid, and its plans for the future. Eds.]
29. What treatment is given to prisoners of war and how many are there?
- (Reply)
- a. Indicate some building that might serve as a prison, which must be guarded by sentries whose weapons are not primed to fire.
 - b. Select some sensible people, particularly from among the armed forces, to play the role of prisoners of war who have already surrendered to our troops and who are being well treated.
 - c. To ensure realism, rations should be improved and those playing the part of prisoners must fulfil their role scrupulously.
 - d. Prisoners' answers must be in line with the Government's instructions, notably in regard to the total number of prisoners held, their good treatment and the improvement they experience in their conditions as the situation returns to normal.
30. What are the Provisional Government's plans regarding the Chinese?
- (Reply)
- a. The Provisional Government recognises only one China, and
 - b. Continues to respect the rights of the Chinese, and will offer them greater opportunities to work in the commercial sector.
31. To make sure that political leaders do not contradict one another in front of the UN Delegation, those who are to meet the Delegation must be selected, thereby avoiding the possibility that they might betray the principle of Integration within Indonesia.
32. What is the Provisional Government's programme for integration within Indonesia?
- (Reply)
- a. We are going to introduce a new

- educational system for the new generation, as has been done for the Indonesian people, that is, a united people with a national language, and maintain the policy of good neighbourliness with other peoples (. . .)
- b. If necessary we have sufficient funds to finance the process of self determination.
33. In what state are East Timor's economic infrastructures?
- (Reply) The Portuguese government did nothing for the development of East Timor, for example as regards roads, bridges etc. All-weather roads exist only in Dili and there are none anywhere else; there are few bridges and, since most rivers lack them, crossing is difficult particularly in the rainy season.
34. Are there or are there not some Australian journalists in Timor, and if so where are they?
- (Reply) We have never seen a foreign journalist in Timor, so we know nothing about this matter.
35. Is the presence of the Communist Front in Timor still necessary?
- (Reply) The presence of the Communist Front in east Timor is not necessary because the people are Catholic and, since their religious conviction is very deep, they respect and recognise the existence of God.
36. When the UN Delegation arrives it is not necessary to prepare a welcome by the people because the provisional Government has vehemently rejected the UN's interference in East Timor's internal affairs. Banners of protest against UN interference should be prepared, such as the following:
- a. UNITED NATIONS HANDS OFF TIMOR TIMUR IS TIMOR*.
 - b. WE ARE ALREADY INTEGRATED WITH INDONESIA.*
 - c. EAST TIMOR PEOPLE ARE INDONESIAN NOW.*
 - d. UNITED NATIONS WE DO NOT WANT YOUR INTERVENTION HERE*
 - e. And others.
37. When the UN Delegation arrives, every element of the Indonesian Armed Forces should be duly advised to carry out precisely the instructions set out above.

Office of the Provisional Government
in Dili, January 16 1976.
Secretary to the Provisional Government
Zeca Araujo

* Written in English (as reproduced here) in the original. Eds. ■

Father Felgueiras

According to reports, Father Joao Felgueiras, SJ, was still held up in Jakarta during February, waiting for permission to return to East Timor.

Readers will remember (TL 10, July 1987) that last year Fr. Felgueiras was the subject of some controversy when, for family reasons, he came out of East Timor for the first time since 1975. It was reported that he would not be authorised to return. A similar threat hung over the future of a second Portuguese priest, Fr. José Martins, who has also been teaching at the junior seminary in Dili.

At the end of October 1987, however, after extensive discussions, Fr. Felgueiras learned that he would not be prevented from continuing his service in the territory.

The exact chain of events, and its significance, is unclear; nor can we say whether the new delay implies that Fr. Felgueiras' return is again in question. It does appear, however, that the decision originally taken last year were reversed.

In a series of separate statements, Mgr Belo, the Apostolic Administrator, the Indonesian authorities, and the Indonesian Jesuit provincial, Fr. Darminto, each affirmed that they had no wish to stand in the way of Fr. Felgueiras' return.

According to *East Timor News* Memo No.5), however, Jesuit sources are said to have confirmed that Fr. Felgueiras is to work under the authority of the Portuguese Jesuit Provincial.

This might be the key development. In 1986, Jesuits living in East Timor were asked to place themselves under the Indonesian Provincial, having been governed directly from Rome since 1975, under a provisional arrangement that took account of East Timor's exceptional situation.

An important principle is at stake here. It affects all the Jesuits in East Timor, not merely those who are of Portuguese nationality. It is reported that the Jesuit General, Fr. Kolvenbach, has taken the case in hand personally, and reports claim that Fr. Felgueiras himself is due to return to Rome in April to present the arguments of the Jesuits in East Timor before their superiors in Rome. ■

Clergy Needed — Must be with the people

Mgr Belo, Apostolic Administrator in East Timor, has asked Religious Orders in Indonesia to help fill shortages of personnel in his diocese.

A Paz é Possível (December 1987) reports the request, which was circulated during the August meeting of Indonesian Major Religious Superiors by its Secretary, Fr. Djikstra.

The shortage of personnel is not a new problem; but Mgr Belo's anxiety about it is compounded by rapid population growth and also by the long-term presence of Islam. Some 34 teachers from Saudi Arabia have been given permission to settle in East Timor, and the document expresses fears that, unless new clergy arrive in the next four or five years, irreversible damage will be done to the church's

standing.

The request also records that, whereas most of the Canossian and Carmelite Sisters in the territory are Timorese, the Indonesian orders which have begun working in East Timor since 1975 (St. Charles Borromeo, Queen of the Rosary, St. Ursula Sisters and the Servants of the Holy Spirit) have not attracted any Timorese aspirants.

It is known that some of the Indonesian religious are not popular among the Timorese.

The document alludes to why this is, in affirming that religious from Indonesia should come "in a spirit of inculturation: to see with the eyes of the people, to love with the heart of the people, and to co-operate with the people."

"New pastoral methods must accord with the situation and condition of local believers," it goes on. "Pastoral methods must be used which correspond to the aspirations of the people, the Church and local believers."

The authors of the request describe East Timor's political situation with bleak economy. "One can say," they write, "that in East Timor two forces are in conflict: our brothers in the mountains, of the maquis, who remain firmly committed to their objectives, and our brothers who have come to establish order. Result: the government's position is more military than civilian."

(Quotations are translated from the French text of *A Paz é Possível*. Eds.) ■

CHURCH NEWS

Pope Reaffirms Concern, Doubts Remain

"The church's universal mission of service leads her to hope that particular consideration will be given to the protection of the ethnic, religious and cultural character of the people of East Timor."

With these words, addressed publicly to the new Indonesian Ambassador at the Vatican on December 14 1987, Pope John Paul II reaffirmed the Vatican's continued

concern about the situation in East Timor. In this issue, we look at why some observers hesitate to say where the Vatican really stands.

On December 14 the Pope was echoing almost exactly remarks he made in July 1984, when he received the credentials of Ambassador Roni Hendrawan Kuniardi's predecessor, General Sastrapoesita.

On that occasion, he stated that "the

Holy See continues to follow the situation in East Timor with preoccupation and with the hope that particular consideration will be given in every circumstance to the ethnic, political and cultural identity of the people."

His recent remarks have served to remind Indonesia that East Timor remains an issue for the Vatican. The Pope was not provoked, as he was in



Mgr da Costa Lopes with Pope John Paul II

1984, into making his remarks. Diplomats were reported to have been surprised by his intervention.

The Indonesian government reacted with predictable sharpness. Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja said that the Pope was not well briefed. "The Pope is one-sidedly informed . . . Local culture is not endangered at all," he told journalists (*Jakarta Post*, 17.12.87).

Governor Mario Carrascalão, though not referring directly to the Pope's remarks, also stated in a speech on December 20 that the Indonesian government had never threatened Timorese culture.

Franz Seda, a member of the Pontifical Commission for Justice & Peace who has strongly defended Indonesia's record in the territory, also commented at length. Formerly a government minister, Mr Seda claimed that "the remarks reflect a positive attitude on the part of the pope towards Indonesia, because John Paul II is speaking to us and discussing (East Timor) with us and not with Portugal or the United Nations." (*UCA News*, No. 433, December 23 1987.)

Vatican Attitudes

The incident illustrates the importance which diplomatic opinion attaches to the Catholic church's attitude towards the Timor question and also the uncertainties which veil that attitude. Official statements, predictably diplomatic in phrasing, have been variously used to assert that the Vatican supports the East Timorese cause, and, conversely, that it is ready to recognise the Indonesian occupation as soon as the diplomatic balance shifts decisively in favour of Jakarta.

The truth, no doubt, is considerably

more complicated than either of these interpretations.

It is generally recognised that opinion is divided among those who advise on policy. In particular, there are those who understand, and have sympathy for, the perspective of the Timorese church, and those - generally more conservative, perhaps more powerful - who are more preoccupied by the need to preserve the Catholic church's long-term interests in Indonesia. It is not necessary to assume that both these views cannot to some extent be held at the same time.

Proponents within the church of both sides - the Indonesian nationalist and the Timorese nationalist positions - are able to obtain access to the highest level within the Vatican. Indonesian views are represented through members of the Indonesian Catholic Bishops' Conference, and such figures as Mr Seda. The Vatican's diplomatic representative in Jakarta (the Pro-Nuncio) is also assumed to be a channel of influence: although the Pro-Nuncio represents both Indonesia and East Timor (which the Vatican administers separately), it is the experience of observers that the last two Pro-Nuncios have shown sympathy for the Indonesian point of view.

On the Timorese side, Mgr da Costa Lopes and, to a greater extent, Mgr Belo have been able to speak directly to high Vatican officials and meet Pope John Paul II himself. Since the diocese of Dili is administered directly from Rome, there is regular written correspondence. In addition, senior representatives of the religious orders serving in East Timor — notably the Salesians and Jesuits — are kept well-informed of the situation in the territory.

Such evidence as there is suggests that the Vatican is not only well informed but has an agreed private assessment of the facts regarding East Timor's recent history. A couple of years ago it was certainly taken for granted at very high level that extreme violence has occurred, that economic deprivation was serious, that Indonesia's presence has been associated with abuses of human rights and corruption, and that the people of the territory have been widely alienated as a result.

A Political Pivot

The Vatican is, of course, a state as well as the centre of Catholic authority. The Vatican is subject to representations and pressures from governments. It has been consulted in relation to the talks between Portugal and Lisbon sponsored in New York by Mr Perez de Cuellar. The Indonesian government would love to welcome John Paul II to Indonesia - a visit he has already deferred, at least in part because of the Timor conflict. For its part, Portugal has attached particular importance to support from Rome. For several years in the early 1980s, the Catholic church seemed to be one of Lisbon's few independent, credible allies on the issue. The Portuguese Prime Minister, Cavaco Silva, visited Rome in October, soon after his re-election, and certainly raised the matter of East Timor when he did so.

It is far from certain that he obtained the assurances he was seeking, however. While it is not surprising that no public statement or commentary was issued after the talks, Portuguese officials have been noticeably downbeat recently in speaking of their diplomacy in regard to the Catholic church.

Statecraft or Divided Counsel?

However one looks at it, the signals sent out by Rome have been consistently ambiguous, allowing both Portugal and the Indonesian government — as well as the Timorese and Indonesian churches — to draw comfort for their point of view. Is a detectable drift now taking place, in favour of Indonesia's point of view? It still remains almost impossible to say — not least because in Timor itself the Catholic church is passing through a period of difficulties. From 1981 until 1985 the Timorese church was able to speak out, intermittently but with conviction, in the name of its people. For some months now, it has been almost silent. Though many factors may be involved, not least among the causes is the beleaguered position of

the Apostolic Administrator, Mgr Belo. Extreme pressure has been brought to bear on him by the Indonesian authorities, and he is also faced by opposition to him within the diocese. Given that he is the only figure in the Timorese church with direct access to the highest levels of the Vatican, his loss of authority will certainly have reduced the influence of pro-Timorese voices in Rome.

The Pro-Nuncio Bends Light

A good example of Rome 'bending light' in relation to Timor was given recently by the current Pro-Nuncio, Mgr Francesco Canalini, interviewed at length by *Pembaruan* in September 1987. As quoted in the article, Mgr Canalini set out very carefully the logic of the Vatican's diplomatic position with regard to East Timor, but dwelt lightly upon or omitted to mention the church's publicly-stated concern about human rights abuses, humanitarian needs and Timor's political identity. Some of these issues are matters which the Indonesian Catholic church has itself raised.

Mgr Canalini stated, quite correctly, that while the conflict in Timor remains unresolved, the Vatican would not take sides but "awaited a settlement in accord with international law". He explained the Vatican would not transfer East Timor from its "Europe" to its "Asia" department, because to do so "would implicitly constitute recognition of the Indonesian dimension" and pre-empt an eventual settlement.

The same reasoning lies behind the Vatican's refusal to integrate the diocese of Dili within the Indonesian Bishops' Conference.

Mgr Canalini then went on, however, to say that in practical terms the problem was only a legal one - because, for example, Mgr Belo attends meetings of the Indonesian Bishops' Conference and the diocese of Dili runs development programmes in co-operation with the Indonesian Bishops' Conference.

As it stands, this argument is deeply disturbing. It implies that, for the Vatican, no issues of substance lie at the heart of its refusal to adopt Indonesia's point of view over the issue. Such a conclusion is at odds with the public and private view of the Vatican, as expressed by the Pope - and a number of Bishops' Conferences.

Moreover, such a view fundamentally trivialises the significance of the Vatican's commitments to international law. It suggests that it is merely for reasons of procedural formality - or worse, administrative habit - that Rome will wait for the



Mgr Belo

international community to resolve this dispute before defining its policy. No weight is given to the moral and political principles which underpin the Timor conflict, and upon which international law and Timor's demand for justice depend.

*"Asked if there were a problem in Indonesia-Vatican relations after East Timor was integrated into Indonesia, Mgr Canalini hesitated, seemed to be trying to remember, and finally said 'Nooo'. But the Vatican had once conveyed a statement of concern connected with human rights. He quickly added that the situation had very much improved. The Vatican always had to be careful there not be anything contrary to human rights. 'Compared with the past, of course, the human rights situation is better.'" (Quote from a summary of the *Pembaruan* article, in *Indonesia News Service*, No.37, 7.10.87.)*

It is easy to detect the shallowness of a diplomatic position that — as set out in this article — is markedly less principled than that of governments in the European Community. In more formal circumstances, one assumes the Vatican's presentation would be intellectually more impressive.

Even if that is so, we cannot take it for granted that nothing has altered. Pope John Paul II did not reaffirm last December exactly what he told the Indonesian Ambassador in July 1984. His remarks were significantly less demanding upon the Indonesian authorities. Nowhere was the Vatican's attitude described by any word as strong as "pre-occupied". Above all, gone in 1987 was the reference to concern for the territory's political identity.

Were these words and these absences chosen? The people of Timor can only wait and see. ■

Fourth Christian Consultation

The Fourth Christian Consultation was held in Lisbon in January, sponsored by Portuguese Pax Christi, the Presbyterian Evangelical Church of Portugal, *A Paz é Possível em Timor-Leste* and CIIR. It was attended by representatives of Christian organisations from six European countries and the United States, as well as a sizeable number of representatives from Portugal, and followed up three previous meetings held in Holland and Geneva. As in the past, the meeting, which lasted from Friday January 22 to Sunday January 24, was private. No report will be distributed.

The Lisbon meeting offered the foreign participants a rare opportunity to meet directly with members of the Timorese community in Lisbon. On the Saturday morning four refugees spoke formally to the meeting, describing their experiences in East Timor after 1975. The meeting then broke up into small groups for informal discussion between participants and larger groups of Timorese.

This direct contact enriched the atmosphere of the meeting very significantly, and for many who took part it was a moving experience.

On Sunday afternoon, the delegates visited the refugee camp at Balteiro, on the outskirts of Lisbon, where Timorese from all over the capital had gathered to welcome them, with a meal and performances of Timorese music and dances.

The Conference also met representatives of Fretilin and the UDT, who made a joint presentation on Saturday evening.

The Consultation was widely covered by the Portuguese media, and on the Monday following the Consultation some of those who took part met with advisers to President Mário Soares, members of the recently appointed Parliamentary Commission on East Timor and officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A group was also received by the Secretary to the Archbishop of Lisbon.

A fifth meeting will take place, but a date and place have not yet been confirmed. For further information, readers may contact one of the three organisations which have agreed to sponsor it: CIIR in London, *A Paz é Possível* in Lisbon (Rua Castilho 61-2-Dto, 1200 Lisbon), and Netherlands

New Church Statement on East Timor

Eukumindo — the European Working group for Ecumenical Relations with Indonesia — is an association of protestant churches and mission organisations. Its members include organisations from West Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the Community of Churches in Indonesia (PGI). In December, Eukumindo published, in German, the draft of an important position paper on East Timor, which is reviewed here by Robert Archer.

A New Direction

In previous issues we have signalled the appearance of ground-breaking

statements on East Timor by the United States National Council of Churches in Christ (ETL 10, July 1987) and the Uniting Church in Australia (ETL 11, November 1987).

The publication of a third document, this time by an international association rather than a national body, confirms that the Protestant churches are indeed adopting a new approach in their handling of this acutely sensitive issue.

Put most simply, whereas Protestant church organisations have preferred since 1975 to be silent in public about East Timor in order to dialogue in private with their Indonesian partners, some of these organisations are now continuing that dialogue on the basis of carefully presented position papers that set out their point of view.

In part this is a response to concern within their own churches and in their countries. To a greater degree, it seems to be due to recognition that private dialogue with Indonesian church partners has not brought about change. Moreover, the dialogue itself has been painful and frustrating, continued in the teeth of Indonesian resistance to open-ended discussion.

The statements that have been published face up to this difficulty in different ways. The NCCC-USA chose

to present a painstaking historical summary of the facts, which demolishes the official Indonesian analysis without ever making direct reference to it. The Uniting Church, in contrast, opted to challenge the assumptions about the obligations of partnership which have underpinned the Protestant churches' reticence since 1975.

All the statements nevertheless make considerable effort to comprehend the views of their Indonesian church partners. In general, these have been expressed forcefully. In many instances, discussion has been vetoed altogether, on the grounds that East Timor is an internal domestic matter.

In fact the official Indonesian Protestant presentation of events since 1975 has followed closely the official analysis of the Indonesian government - though some Indonesians who visit the territory regularly may acknowledge privately that all is by no means well.

Eukumindo

Of the three, Eukumindo has the longest and most intimate relationship with Indonesia. Most of its members are Indonesian-speaking and have lived for years in the country. Very understandably they sympathise with



Fishermen. Elaine Briere, 1974

Indonesian perceptions of their own history, and give considerable weight to the cultural factors conditioning that perception. As a result, many Eukumindo members would tend to disown criticisms of Indonesia which impose "Western" assumptions on Indonesian social and political processes. This position is held the more strongly, again very understandably, because the European mission organisations themselves have a long "colonial" past.

At the same time, Eukumindo shares the universal moral and spiritual values of Christianity - upon which those same "Western" values claim to be founded. There is inevitably some tension in this position.

The Document

There are propositions in Eukumindo's draft position paper with which those sympathetic to East Timor's claims would certainly take issue. On occasion, forgiveably perhaps in a draft, the writing is insensitively worded.

More than the NCCC-USA statement, and far more than the Uniting Church, the draft seeks to accommodate the Indonesian point of view.

If the Paper is seeking to make an impartial presentation of the views of those engaged in this crisis, it is here that its principal flaw is to be found. For, while the authors take care to explain the feelings of most Indonesians about an issue which engages their country's history and honour, they do not take comparable account of East Timorese feelings about their culture and their history. Since the majority of Timorese do not consider themselves to be "Indonesian", it is an omission which may, unfortunately, undermine the report's usefulness; one hopes it can be remedied in a later draft.

In recompense, the authors offer insights into the thinking behind Indonesian perceptions of the issue that should be considered, even if they are not always completely convincing. We are reminded, for example, that: "When Indonesia decided to make East Timor the 27th province of Indonesia, both government and people acted on the erroneous assumption that the East Timorese would accept with enthusiasm what was dear and precious to them: Pancasila, the national language and their army of freedom fighters. (. . .) That this enthusiasm had grown out of a common historical experience and without it was not possible, was realized by almost no-one, and this led

to disappointments and enormous communications barriers."

Again, "The charge of 'cultural genocide' . . . which Indonesia is said to be perpetuating against East Timorese by introducing the Indonesian language, is incomprehensible to Indonesians. In this connection Indonesians point to the cultural alienation of East Timor by the Portuguese, as shown by the 'Latinisation' of almost all names and the fact that none of the local languages of East Timor . . . but Portuguese remained the official language."

Important conclusions

There is much to debate about the body of the text - and about the 'way of seeing' which lies behind the authors' approach. The document is more understanding of Indonesian perceptions than any previously published non-Indonesian church statement; though, for its criticisms of the Indonesian army, and its implied admission that East Timor is an international issue, the authors may still find they are criticised by Eukumindo's Indonesian partners. Some sections will certainly be challenged from the Timorese side.

In this context, the document's conclusions should be noted with special care. In effect, they represent the point at which the European churches are likely to approach closest to Indonesian views on East Timor. No Western church body has a more intimate relationship with the Indonesian churches, none has more experience of Indonesia, or identifies its own interests with those of the Indonesian churches more completely. To the extent that there is a gap between Eukumindo's conclusions and those of the Indonesian church, that gap measures the degree to which the Indonesian church stands isolated in its perception of East Timor.

We quote the conclusions in full below: it will be seen that the gap is, in fact, wide.

"In the difficult situation of East Timor - in many ways tragic and politically very complex - it cannot be for Eukumindo or similar organisations to produce suggestions, let alone demands, for the necessary measures. The indigenous churches can do this, but even for them it is difficult.

"Nevertheless, Eukumindo can express pleas which have a chance of being considered in the future reflections of those whose role is to take the decisions. Eukumindo welcomes any political step which contributes to an improvement of the situation of people in East Timor. This is the sense

in which the following points are to be understood:

- "1. We are concerned at the fact that so little reliable information exists about East Timor. We therefore request better facilities for visits to East Timor by international journalists, church representatives and representatives of international relief organisations.*
- "2. We are disturbed by reports that sections of East Timor's population continue to suffer lack of food and medical care, particularly in remote areas and conflict zones. We therefore ask that organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Parpem PGI and similar bodies are enabled to provide relief in these areas also, and that no political conditions should be attached to this relief.*
- "3. We are disturbed by reports of human rights violations against East Timorese, of torture, broken promises of amnesty, etc. Such stances are against the declared will of the Indonesian government. We therefore ask that ICRC representatives should be given free access to all prisons in which political prisoners are held.*
- "4. We are anxious that all possibilities should be exhausted in order to attain a solution for East Timor which is acceptable to all sides, so that the armed conflicts and the fear of lawlessness may cease.*
- "5. Eukumindo is prepared, within the limit of its capacities, to cooperate with all concerned, particularly with all church organisations, to collaborate in the resolution of disputed issues and to press for the provision of the necessary material assistance."*

(Translated from the German by CIIR.) ■

PORTUGAL

PARLIAMENTARY VISIT TO TIMOR?

New interest is being shown in the idea of sending a Portuguese parliamentary delegation to East Timor. We report below on the background to this controversial proposal, and on the newly appointed Parliamentary Commission on East Timor, which might play a critical role in Portugal.

New Parliamentary Commission

After considerable delay, the Portuguese Parliamentary Commission on East Timor has been re-convened and its membership agreed.

Parliament being the third instance of power under the Portuguese constitution, with the Government and the Presidency, the Commission has the potential to be an important influence upon — and possibly an instrument of — Portuguese diplomacy.

The last Commission carried weight because it had support across the political spectrum. Its first report on East Timor, published in November 1986, was adopted unanimously by Parliament, adding political substance to Dr Cavaco Silva's assertive diplomacy on the issue (TL9 March 1987).

The new Commission will also represent all sides of the National Assembly. It contains 29 members, of whom 16 belong to the government Social Democratic Party (PSD), 7 to the principal opposition Socialist Party, and 6 to other groupings (PEP-2, PRD-1, CDS-1, Verdes-1, JD-1).

Its Chairman will be a senior PSD politician, Manuel Dias Loureiro, the party's General Secretary. Although Dr Loureiro has not had a direct involvement in the East Timor issue, his chairmanship will carry authority by virtue of his position in the Party and relationship with the Prime Minister. It is widely assumed that Dr Cavaco Silva takes a direct interest in the direction of policy on East Timor, in consultation with the President, Mário Soares.

The UN and Matters of Protocol

At the end of February, the Commission had still to determine its programme of work — although preliminary discussions had begun. It is already certain, however, that the

principal item for discussion will be the question of whether or not, and under what conditions, a Portuguese Parliamentary delegation should visit East Timor.

Such a visit became a possibility when it was discussed in New York, during UN-sponsored talks.

The Secretary General's Report (1987) subsequently stated that "The two sides are considering the possibility of a Portuguese parliamentary delegation visiting East Timor with a view to obtaining first hand information on the situation."

This statement immediately aroused controversy within Portugal on two grounds. (See TL 11, November 1987.) The less important essentially concerns domestic politics and the relations of power, under the terms of Portugal's constitution, between the Government, the Presidency and the National Assembly - each of which are held to be sovereign. Without prior consultation, the government (responsible for conducting the talks with Indonesia) had no right to involve Parliament in proposals about a visit to East Timor.

It appears now that the apparent slight to Parliamentary sovereignty was due to mistakes by the Portuguese diplomatic mission in New York, which failed to pick up the implications of the Secretary General's wording.

It is understood that Portuguese diplomats have since explained to Indonesia that it is not possible for the Government to make commitments in the name of the Parliament; and that Indonesia will now issue an invitation from its own Parliament to the Portuguese Parliament, thereby restoring proprieties.

Matters of Substance

The second ground of dispute within Portugal's political establishment is one of considerable importance to East Timor, and turns on the question of whether it is possible to make an independent and responsible visit to East Timor, when that visit will be hosted by the Indonesian authorities.

Paradoxically, the Portuguese political establishment is divided between those who assert that any visit under such conditions would be irresponsibly risky and would certainly be exploited by Indonesia to damage

Portugal's diplomatic credibility; and those who claim, using exactly the same arguments, that Portugal cannot afford to refuse such an invitation outright.

At stake is the fragile edifice of Portuguese diplomacy, erected with such effort in recent years. If a parliamentary delegation visits East Timor and concludes that "things are altogether better than we thought" or (more likely) is seen by the international press to find no evidence upon which to base criticism, immense damage would be done to the credibility of the Portuguese government's posture — even more in the private talks with Indonesia, perhaps, than in public. The Indonesian authorities, as is well known, are perfectly able to control international visits, preparing crowds, seeding appropriate witnesses in the path of delegations, sanitising and smartening up the environment.

A feeble report from an ill-considered parliamentary delegation would probably lay in ruins the political consensus upon which the recent recovery of Portuguese confidence on this issue relies.

On the other hand, Portuguese diplomats close to the UN process recognise that it might also be fatal to Portugal's international credibility if she was seen to refuse the risks involved in making a visit. Having repeatedly called upon Indonesia to open the territory to international observers, could Indonesia make a more generous gesture than to invite its principal diplomatic opponent? Moreover, many Timorese could talk directly to a Portuguese-speaking delegation. In these circumstances, the Indonesian authorities are also seen to be taking considerable risks. If Portugal shied away from this invitation, the diplomats conclude, it could no longer claim to represent neutrally the interests of the Timorese people, and would have forfeited the moral authority upon which its diplomatic influence principally rests.

The same diplomats also point out that, should the delegation find evidence to support its criticisms of Indonesian rule, its diplomatic position would be strengthened immeasurably. And why should it not? Precisely because so many Timorese

speak Portuguese, and will realise the importance of such a mission, a delegation from Lisbon is likely to receive information, however many precautions may be taken by the Indonesian authorities. A successful and credible delegation, they argue, might undermine Indonesia's diplomatic offensive.

Even if Indonesia is bluffing, they argue, the challenge must be taken up, if only to open up new avenues of discussion in the UN talks, which at present stand almost deadlocked.

Brinkmanship . . . and Insurance

The proposal therefore raised ticklish questions for the Indonesian as well as the Portuguese state. It is likely that, taking advantage of the fact that the Portuguese government cannot negotiate directly for, but must consult with, the Parliament, a quite prolonged series of conversations will begin, spread over months rather than weeks, during which both governments will attempt to secure favourable arrangements for the visit without prejudicing their long-term negotiating position.

Both governments have already begun taking out insurance. Cavaco Silva has made it clear that any parliamentary delegation will not engage the government's responsibility - meaning, presumably, that if a delegation goes and issues a damaging report, the government can disown it. He has also stated publicly that the government will not give its approval to any delegation that cannot travel freely, spend sufficient time in the territory, or choose its itinerary etc.

For their part, the Indonesian authorities have emphasised that an *investigative* Portuguese delegation would not be welcomed (TL 11, November 1987). Reports suggest that the authorities in East Timor are already preparing the ground very carefully for an eventual visit. Transport links are being improved, towns 'beautified', the political authorities in different districts briefed, food and medical stocks released to different areas.

In such manoeuvring, the Cavaco Silva government is in rather a better position than most of its predecessors. Dr Cavaco Silva's Social Democratic Party, recently returned for a new term, enjoys an absolute majority in Parliament. He has both the time and the parliamentary votes to press through policy decisions.

In addition, he appears to have reached a working understanding on Timor policy with the President, Mário Soares. The two men are reported to

co-operate closely on Timor affairs. Their consensus, if sustained, will be important, because the Constitution requires presidential assent to policy on Timor, and, indeed, currently defines the direction of Timor policy. Though the Timor clause in the Constitution may be amended this year, most evidence suggests that the substance of the government's policy is unlikely to alter.

The cross-party consensus in Parliament is another important asset to the government. It enables Cavaco Silva to claim, reasonably, that Portugal is united behind his government on the issue.

In presenting its case to Jakarta, therefore, the government can reasonably claim that, given this national consensus, it must respect public and parliamentary opinion. But it is also in a position to press policy through, if necessary.

All of this suggests, reassuringly, that no visit will take place without the most detailed discussion of its modalities and very careful examination by both sides of the political risks. Portugal has cards to play and will have opportunities to withdraw. We do not even know whether, privately, either government seriously believes that a visit is desirable. On this reading, there is no reason to suppose that talking about a visit is the prelude to a diplomatic catastrophe.

Doubts

A very serious doubt, nevertheless, remains in the minds of observers sympathetic to East Timor. It concerns the Portuguese government's political judgement during its negotiations in New York. The exact circumstances in which the original proposal to invite a Portuguese visit took shape remain unclear. (The public facts have been set out at length by *Timor Information Subject Memo* 1 of 1988.) According to some analysts, however, the Portuguese government was astonishingly cavalier in taking the idea forward last year when it was first raised. Though it requires just a moment's thought to appreciate the implications such a visit might have for Portugal's long-term diplomacy, it is confidently stated by some sources that the government was ready to press forward at speed with a visit towards the end of last year, and *made no attempt to define the delegation's terms of reference or the conditions under which a visit would take place.*

Those who report this, claim that the fault lay principally with the Portuguese diplomatic mission in New York, which has made numerous

mistakes and in general failed to promote Portugal's views on East Timor adequately within the United Nations. Senior positions at the mission are fortunately due for renewal, and it is to be hoped that more energetic diplomats may be placed there.

Nevertheless, such an astonishing failure of judgement should have been detected and vetoed immediately in Lisbon. If true, the whole incident suggests that Lisbon fundamentally underestimates the quality of Indonesian negotiation. The reports have sent alarm bells ringing among observers of Portuguese diplomacy on Timor - and help to explain why some parliamentarians have argued recently that, if plans for a visit do go forward, President Soares' approval will be critical. Why? Because the Presidency is the last political institution in Portugal which is not controlled by Cavaco Silva's government. He will be expected to guarantee that proper and defensible arrangements have been made. ■

United States

Senator Durenberger and Congressman Tony Hall continue to raise the issue of East Timor in the United States Senate and Congress. At the beginning of February they reminded both houses that last year 40 Senators and 137 Congressmen from both the Republican and Democrat parties signed letters expressing concern about the situation in the territory.

"By sending that letter," declared Senator Durenberger, "my colleagues and I wanted to ensure that East Timor received international attention to help alleviate the suffering in that territory. I intend to pursue further efforts of this nature on the East Timor issue in 1988, not only because the suffering in East Timor persists, but also because silence can only help to breed further abuses in that little-known territory."

European Parliament

Mrs Ien van den Heuvel, who chairs the Sub-Committee on Human Rights of the European Parliament, has issued the draft report on East Timor which is being prepared for the Political Commission.

A draft Resolution, addressed to the Council of Ministers, has been submitted with it. If approved, this Resolution will ask the European Foreign Ministers "to take initiatives that, after a period of transition, will enable a referendum to be organised so as to permit the population to choose freely the future of East Timor."

The Resolution would also "insist" that the European Council of Ministers should make contact "with all the parties directly concerned by the conflict" and report back to the European Parliament on action taken.

It calls upon the Commission to raise the issue of East Timor in conversations with the Indonesian government, and to provide immediate aid both to the population in East Timor and to Timorese refugees in Lisbon.

It calls upon the Commission to report on this issue within six months of the Resolution's approval.

The Reference of this 13 page draft document, titled *Projet de Rapport sur le Timor Oriental*, is WG(3)6546F, PE 116.178. It is dated 11 September 1987. (Quotes translated from the French by *Timor Link*.)

European Solidarity Groups

The annual meeting of European solidarity groups working on East Timor took place this year on February 12-13. It was hosted in Vienna by the Austrian group, and was attended by organisations from West Germany, France, Britain, Spain, Portugal, and Holland. A representative from Japan was also welcomed.

Mr Abilio Araújo represented Fretilin at the meeting.

The next meeting will be held early in 1989, probably in one of the Nordic countries.

IPU IN BANGKOK

In October, the Inter-Parliamentary Union again voted in favour of a resolution expressing concern about the situation in East Timor.

Voting at the IPU's 78th Conference, the resolution was passed by a large

majority (791 in favour, 122 against, 207 abstentions).

More significantly, the 1987 Meeting was held in Bangkok, in the heart of Southeast Asia, in the capital of Thailand which is a member state of the Association of South East Asian nations (ASEAN) to which, of course, Indonesia belongs.

ACP-EEC Vote for Timor

At the beginning of October, Lisbon hosted a meeting for members of the commission which oversees the Lomé Convention - an aid and development consortium involving governments of the European Community and a large number of African, Caribbean and Pacific nations (the ACP countries).

On October 1, the conference unanimously approved a strong resolution on the issue of East Timor. It was put forward by a cross-party group of Portuguese deputies in the European Parliament and representatives of the Portuguese-speaking African countries.

The resolution will now be placed for approval before all the governments which are signatory to the Lomé Convention, members of the European Commission, and the ACP/EEC Council of Ministers.

We reprint the text (which we have translated from the French).

"The Round Table Conference of ACP-EEC Partners, meeting in Lisbon (Portugal) from September 28 to October 2 1987,

A. considering that the Round Table Conference of ACP-EEC partners is meeting in Portugal (Lisbon), a member State of the EEC and the Lomé Convention, with historic responsibilities towards East Timor which are enshrined in its constitution,

B. considering the existence of aid agreements between the EEC and the member States of ASEAN, to which Indonesia belongs,

C. considering that the different Lomé Conventions are inspired by the universal principle of self-determination and the independence of peoples,

D. taking note of the consensus of views reached by the Portuguese authorities and the authorities of the five Portuguese-speaking African countries on the question of East Timor,

1. condemns the illegal and illegitimate

occupation of East Timor by Indonesia;

2. reaffirms the inalienable right of East Timor's people to self-determination and independence;

3. invites the interested parties to resolve the question of East Timor within the framework and according to the principles of the United Nations Charter;

4. instructs (the Conference) co-presidents to transmit this resolution to the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers, to the Commission and to the governments of States which have signed the Lomé Convention."

Approved unanimously.

Australia

Agencies Urge Independent Inquiry

The latest issue of *East Timor Report* (issue 12, November 1987) highlights a major new international campaign to gather support for an independent, international inquiry into East Timor.

The proposal was originally launched by Mr James Dunn, who used to be the Australian Consul in Dili and is the author of *Timor, A People Betrayed* (Jacaranda Press, 1983). In September, his initiative received official support from the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), the co-ordinating body for some 75 Australian non-governmental organisations working in the field of overseas aid and development.

At the same meeting, ACFOA's Human Rights Desk was given a further mandate to "monitor and advise on all aspects of the issue" of East Timor, and ACFOA's Executive Committee was directed to seek every occasion to promote ACFOA policy on East Timor.

The Enquiry's Brief

According to *East Timor Report*, the international commission of enquiry would call upon experts from all five continents, and seek:

"1. to investigate the circumstances in which East Timor was incorporated into Indonesia, and especially whether any acceptable act of self-determination has taken place, as Indonesia has persistently alleged;

"2. to examine the course of events in East Timor since 1975, with an emphasis on the extent to which human rights have been violated, and on the responsibility for such violations;

"3. to study the present situation in the territory in terms of the position of the

East Timorese people, from economic, cultural and political points of view and including, if possible, an assessment of what, at this time, are the wishes of the people themselves; "4. to propose, on the basis of the foregoing, possible solutions to the problem, having regard to a careful assessment of the wishes of the East Timorese people; "6. to examine and report on the international dimensions of the problem."

The Commission would be expected to contact all parties to the question, and to visit the territory, if permitted, on the basis of free and unrestricted access. International support for this initiative is being sought. For further information, write to ACFOA Human Rights Sub-Committee, 124 Napier Street, Fitzroy, 3065 Australia.

East Timor Report, edited by Pat Walsh, is obtainable from the same address.

UK.

Refugee Children's Fund

Paul Barbara, who has run a number of sponsored protests in support of East Timor (see TL 10, July 1987) has started a small fund to raise money for refugee Timorese children in Lisbon.

He set the project going at the end of last year by staging a hunger fast over the Christmas period.

He expects to visit Lisbon this year to make direct contact with the Timorese community in Portugal.

If you are interested in supporting this fund, you may address contributions to CIIR/Timor Link, marking them clearly *Timorese Refugee Children Fund*. Please ensure that you indicate clearly your name and your address (for our records — not for publicity!). ■

DIPLOMATIC

UN Human Rights Commission

The 44th Session of the United Nations Human Rights Commission opened in Geneva at the beginning of February, and continued until the first week of March.

As reported in our last issue, East Timor was returned last year to the

official agenda by the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, having been voted off the agenda in 1985. We cited the text of its resolution on East Timor, which was passed by a small majority after intensive lobbying in Geneva.

Non-governmental organisations have also supported East Timor's case during the current session. Both Pax Christi and Pax Romana made interventions, as they did last year.

Several governments also made formal reference to the territory when they intervened under Item 9, the Right to Self-Determination. They included Portugal, France, São Tomé & Príncipe and Mozambique. The Indonesian Ambassador exercised his country's right of reply to the criticisms that were made.

Towards the end of the session, on March 8, a Timorese recently arrived from East Timor appeared as a witness. Mr Cristiano Costa found his way to Macao earlier this year. At the end of his statement he asked for assurances that his family would not be victimised because he had spoken publicly to the Commission.

No vote was taken and no resolution was presented. Whether East Timor will be included on the agenda of the UN Human Rights Commission next year therefore remains an open question. The margin in favour of the resolution passed by the Sub-Commission last year was so small that there would be a real possibility of defeat. If the Session of 1988 can be described as a success because Timor was mentioned, and mentioned by a wider range of governments than usual, it was nevertheless one that was achieved on the retreat.

Mr Yusuf Wanandi

Controversially, the Indonesian government tabled Mr Yusuf Wanandi's name as a candidate for one of the five Asian positions on the UN Human Rights Sub-Commission, which will convene in 1989. Mr Yusuf Wanandi is director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, a 'think tank' which is very close to the government. He himself has long been involved with the East Timor question and is credited with responsibility for arranging most diplomatic and academic visits there.

His appointment was therefore seen by many as singularly inappropriate to this position. There were objections on the general ground that this was a blatantly political selection; and on the specific ground that he is not an independent witness in regard to East Timor - indeed has actively

campaigning in support of his government's views.

In the event, his candidature was not successful; he was pipped at the post for the last Asia seat by the candidate from the Philippines. ■

Christian Reflection: Update

The *Christian Reflection on East Timor*, already available in English, Portuguese, German and French, has now been published in Japanese, by the Catholic Commission for Justice & Peace of the Bishops' Conference of Japan.

CIIR has received new endorsements from a number of countries to those made public in previous issues of *Timor Link*.

More are expected from Asia and the Pacific following the recent Asia-Pacific Consultation on East Timor, reported elsewhere in this issue.

Among those who have given us permission to publish their names are: the Centre for the Progress of Peoples, Hong Kong; Professor R.C. Willis, Professor of Spanish and Portuguese Studies at the University of Manchester, UK; K. Lloyd, Nottingham, UK; Ramon E. Castaneda, New York, USA; Mr and Mrs Campagnolo, Portugal; Fr Ton Zwart, Philippines; the Christian Campaign for the Abolition of Torture, Mulhouse, France; and Mr Samuel Keller, Austria.

We have also received many signatures from individuals and groups in Japan. They include: Emi Yokota, Yoshie Sakaguchi, Yoko Nakamura, Tsunejiro Oshita, Shoko Ohnang, Kyoko Nichishita, all from Nagoya; Nagoya Catholic Commission for Justice & Peace; The Nagoya Association for East Timor; Keiko Niwa, Aichi; the Kin-no Kai, a group of Buddhists in Nagoya; the Sasashima Daily Workers Labour Union in Inazawa, Aichi; Akira Uzie, Sendai.

The *Reflection* was made public following the third European Christian Consultation on East Timor, held in Geneva at the beginning of 1987. It sought to render public the sense of concern which is widely felt in Christian circles. Rather than being a "final" statement, however, it was written in order to stimulate discussion

and more open debate among all denominations in the Christian churches. That debate has continued to amplify. We report on the latest developments in this issue.

If you wish to read the *Reflection*, write to *Timor Link* at CIIR (English, French), A Paz é Possível em Timor Leste, Lisbon, Portugal (Portuguese); the German Catholic Justice & Peace Commission, Kaiserstrasse 163, D-5300 Bonn 1, RFA (German); or the

Catholic Justice & Peace Commission of Japan, 10-1 Rokubanchu Chiyodaku Tokyo 102, Japan (Japanese).

If you then want to support the appeal which is made in its pages, you are still most welcome to do so. The Consultation group does not expect anyone to sign who does not wish, or cannot do so. What we ask, and hope, is that people will show their concern in any and every way they feel to be appropriate for them. ■

Refugee Video

CISSET Newsletter reports that a video is now available telling the story of the East Timorese refugee community in Australia.

"*The Shadow over East Timor*" was

shot in 1987 by Denis Freney, James Kestover and Mandy King. We assume it is in English, and it can be obtained c/o CISSET if you write to PO Box 1092, Fitzroy North, 3068 Australia. ■



TO OUR READERS

AN APOLOGY

You received no copy of *Timor Link* in December. We would like to apologise for any inconvenience this may have caused. We hope this double issue will be some compensation.

The default was due to sudden and unforeseeable pressure of work on CIIR's Asia staff.

NEW SUBSCRIPTIONS

Please note that with this issue we begin a new subscription. The cost is to remain the same as in 1987. There will be no increase. All subscriptions will run from January to December.

To subscribe, please complete and sign the loose flyer enclosed with this issue and return it to CIIR, with your payment. Cheques should be made out to CIIR.

COMMENTS

If you wish to continue to receive the newsletter, can we also ask you to consider filling in the comment box. We want to know which sections of *East Timor Link* are useful to you, and what you don't like. Who reads it? How often? Every page? Please help to give us an idea.

CANCELLATIONS

If you do not wish to continue to receive *East Timor Link*, may we particularly ask you to let us know. This will save us expense, and save you time and irritation. Thank you.

Timor Link is published at least four times a year by the Catholic Institute for International Relations, in association with A Paz é Possível em Timor Leste in Portugal.

We invite readers to make a subscription towards our costs, of £5.00 for individuals and £10.00 for institutions. All subscriptions run from January to December.

We welcome correspondence.

22 Coleman Fields
London N1 7AF England
Tel: (01) 354 0883
Telex 21118 CIIR G.