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# Number 17

# timor

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# Conflict and Tension

Reports describing intense conflict in parts of East Timor have been accumulating. A major offensive was mounted in advance of the visit last November of President Suharto. "The Information Bureau of Fretilin in Lisbon reported on 26 December that the build-up of Indonesian troops began in August, in particular in the rugged mountainous region of Matebian. In August, 15 battalions were operating there, supported by aircraft and heavy artillery. Two months later, the number of battalions increased to 25, to safeguard security during Suharto's visit. By November, the number had risen to 32 battalions, making it a military operation not unlike the grim years of 1978 and 1979." [*Tapol Bulletin*, 91, Feb. 1989.]

The reports indicate that Fretilin suffered serious losses, particularly in the area of Mount Matebian. At the same time, numbers of Indonesian troops were killed, and Fretilin counter-attacked in several parts of the country over the New Year.

## Xanana's Escape

*East Timor News* confirms that last August Xanana Gusmão was nearly killed after being surrounded by Indonesian troops on the banks of the Galata River. Though Xanana himself escaped, his chief bodyguard Commander Oan Timor and Commander Bere Malay Laka (Frederico Raimundo), the third most important figure in Fretilin's command structure, were both killed. Fretilin suffered "significant casualties". [*Monthly Memo*, 19, February 1989.] The report suggested that Xanana's whereabouts may have been revealed under torture by three guerrillas who had been captured some days earlier.

*A Paz é Possível em Timor-Leste* speculates that this clash was connected to an incident involving Fr. Locatelli. [See *ETL* 15/16.] "The site of this battle on the Galata river corresponds roughly to the place where, in August, the meeting between Xanana and the Italian missionary Locatelli took place. Because the date has not been named, whether it was the same incident or followed from a pursuit during the next few days is not known." [Newsletter 28, January/February 1989.]

According to a document written in Timor and dated September 25 (received in Lisbon on January 22

1989): "On 17, 18 and 23 September 1988 two fighter planes bombed the Ponta Leste areas, south of Viqueque" and on 21, 22 and 23 September "there was intense exchange of fire in Galata (Venilale), Uaibobo (Ossu area), Kelicai and at the foot of the [Matebian] mountain". It adds that "Indonesian forces have been trying to poison all the natural sources of water" in the area, and that "Five kilometres from the town of Venilale, on the Ossoala mountain, forces of [Fretilin] Unit III clashed with Indonesian forces" and suffered losses. [*Monthly Memo*, 20, 15 February 1989.]

## Fretilin Counter-attacks

From the turn of the year, Fretilin reported several counter-attacks — designed to challenge the Indonesian government's claim that the territory was pacified, and also perhaps to release the pressure on guerrillas in the Mount Matebian area. The Fretilin Information Office reported conflicts at Laline and also in the area of Ainaro on January 21, and a co-ordinated attack on several towns, including Dili, on December 30 or 31. Fretilin claimed that 37 Indonesian soldiers were killed at Laline, at least 36 were seriously wounded in the Ainaro battle, and that no less than 84 Indonesian soldiers were killed and another 27 wounded during the attack on Dili, when Fretilin reported that a munitions dump blew up. [*Monthly Memo*, 20, 15 February 1989.]

Such incidents, and specifically the attack on Dili, were denied in mid-January by Gen. Sutrisno, Commander-in-Chief of Indonesia's Armed Forces, who said that the situation in Timor was "becoming safer all the time". Gen. Sutrisno visited East Timor over Christmas, following a tradition established by his predecessor, Gen. Murdani. He was accompanied by Air Force and Army Commanders. [*Monthly Memo*, 20, 15 February 1989.]

*A Paz é Possível* (drawing on information provided by a Fretilin source) described the assault on Dili in greater detail. "The attacks took place in the Lahane and Taibesse districts of Dili and in Balibar three kilometres to the south. Another attack was mounted against the town of Viqueque. According to information received from inside, Timorese soldiers from 744 and 745

battalions joined the resistance. According to other information from the Fretilin Office in Lisbon the (Timorese and Indonesian) soldiers belonging to these two battalions are currently being held in Becora prison in Dili along with 25 *Hansips* (Indonesian auxiliaries) recruited in East Timor.

"According to Agence France Presse, which quotes Alfredo Ferreira, spokesperson for the Timorese resistance movement in Australia, Fretilin blew up an ammunition dump near Dili on January 1 — the day on which East Timor was scheduled to become 'open' to non-residents. The explosion caused the death of 84 Indonesian soldiers and seriously wounded 27. According to the same source, the soldiers killed by the explosion were buried in 8 mass graves near Dili." [*A Paz é Possível em Timor-Leste*, No. 28, January/February.]

*Tapol Bulletin* reports, drawing on Darwin sources, that attacks also took place against Baucau, Lospalos and Alas on New Year's Day, and suggests that the deteriorating security situation is likely to have caused the Indonesian government to further delay the implementation of its decision to 'open' East Timor. [See *TL* 15/16.]

## "Open" but Shut

Certainly there has been little sign that access to and from East Timor has been fundamentally eased. According to *Kompas*, a military commander in Kupang, capital of the West Timor, said that anyone wishing to enter East Timor from West Timor would still have to obtain prior authorisation from the Indonesian authorities. [It is not yet clear whether the administrative controls on access from West Timor are the same as those applied to travellers departing from Bali, Jakarta or other parts of Indonesia.] Although a number of journalists have visited at the invitation of the Indonesian authorities, at least three foreigners were reportedly prevented from entering on January 1. [*East Timor News Monthly Memo* No. 20.]

*Tapol Bulletin* quotes from some of the journalists who have been able to go in. [No. 92, April 1989.]

Martin Cohn found that "When I asked to travel to remote villages... the government insisted on an escort of armed soldiers, plain-clothes security officers and other officers. At some interviews, four notepads recorded the ensuing conversation: my own, plus those of the information officer, protocol officer and intelligence agent. It took a special plea to persuade my

eight minders to stay behind during the visit to Venilale's orphanage. Still, a man identified to me as a government informer shadowed me and photographed anyone willing to be interviewed." [*Toronto Star*, 5 February 1989.]

Writing in *The Guardian*, Juliet Rix reported that travel restrictions are eased but that the army has not lessened its grip. "Details of foreigners' passports are meticulously noted on arrival and Indonesian identity cards which most Timorese now have are constantly checked." She reported that there are military check points every twelve miles on the roads, and that "Many Timorese are afraid to speak to foreigners for fear of subsequent interrogation which may still involve physical as well as mental abuse." [February 22, 1989.]

Seven British MPs who visited East Timor in March were refused permission to visit Baucau — nerve centre of Indonesian military operations in the eastern sector — because 'no helicopter was available'.

## Church Inside

It is reported that the political police [Intel] is "trying to identify all those (catechists, nurses, drivers, servants, teachers, etc) who speak to the Bishop and priests, especially the priests in Lospalos, Baucau, Fatumaca, Viqueque, Same, Ainaro and Bobonaro, because, according to Intel, they are the most active links with the armed resistance." [*Monthly Memo* 20, February 1989.]■

## Papal Visit?

The Indonesian Foreign Ministry has announced that, during his visit to Asia in October, Pope John Paul II will visit Indonesia — and that East Timor will be on his itinerary. [*UCA NEWS*, No. 496, March 8.]

The Vatican has not officially confirmed this information, but it is privately considered to be reliable, although the decision is still unconfirmed.

The Pope will be travelling from the International Eucharistic Congress, to be held in Seoul, and will probably stop in Hong Kong before going on to Indonesia and Mauritius. His trip will last from October 6 to 16.

In Indonesia he is scheduled to spend time in Jakarta, Yogyakarta (Java), Kupang (West Timor), Dili, Maumere (Flores) and Medan (Sumatra).

### Diplomatic implications

The Pope's visit is described as 'pastoral' in nature and it will therefore be possible for church officials to step around the more thorny diplomatic issues, including East Timor, over which the Vatican and Indonesia do not see eye to eye.

If Pope John Paul does land in Jakarta, however, it will be a triumph for the Indonesian Bishops' Conference, which has long desired to see him visit — and seen plans evaporate more than once, probably because of the sensitivity of the East Timor issue.

A stop-over in Dili can have two effects. It can give the impression that the Vatican, after years of hesitation, is finally willing to move towards

recognising Indonesia's authority over East Timor — and the eventual incorporation of the Diocese of Dili within the Indonesian Bishops' Conference (as the majority of Indonesian bishops desire).

Or it can strengthen the image and authority of the Catholic church within East Timor, thereby sustaining the view of all those Timorese — Catholic and non-Catholic — who perceive the Catholic church as a protector of their rights.

The way the Pope tips will be the political test of his visit — though neither Jakarta nor Rome are short of subtlety and may prefer to blend ambiguity in ways that enable the partisans of Indonesia and supporters of Timor both to claim Papal understanding.

The present arrangements are not, however, ideal for those who would prefer to see the Pope emphasise that East Timor remains separate from Indonesia, because the schedule assumes that he will travel to parts of Indonesia both before and after his short trip to Dili. The date of his stopover in Dili seems to have been chosen because October 13 is an extremely important religious festival in East Timor.

### Publicity

Whatever happens, a visit will cast an intense light upon Dili, for a few hours. What might be made of it?

It will be interesting to see whether the world's press will (a) give Dili a miss; (b) swamp the security arrangements that will be set in place by the Indonesian army; (c) be tamed themselves, to the point where they find nothing of interest to write about outside the official programme.■

## Death of Moisés do Amaral

East Timor Link learnt with sadness of the death, on February 22, of Moisés da Costa do Amaral, a prominent leader of the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), a man well known to all those concerned with East Timor. Jill Jolliffe writes from Lisbon.

Mr do Amaral died suddenly, aged fifty, shortly before a scheduled meeting with Portuguese Foreign Minister João de Deus Pinheiro.

Very well known in the Timorese community, his funeral was attended by hundreds of Timorese refugees. UDT Vice President Paulo Pires, delivering the oration, declared that he had "died fighting as surely as our compatriots in Timor".



Mr do Amaral was an architect of the recently-formed United Front, or 'Convergence', between Fretilin and the right of centre UDT. In 1986 the two parties agreed to enter an alliance to pave the way for a UN-negotiated settlement on East Timor.

Mr do Amaral's family suffered deeply following the Indonesian invasion. Of his eight brothers and sisters, five died following the invasion, as did both his father and mother. Mr do Amaral, who was abroad in December 1975, calculated that only a few dozen survived from among his clan, which had numbered about 600. With his death, his family and East Timor have suffered another loss.■

# Samalari

The latest issue of *East Timor News* gives details of the treatment accorded to residents of Samalari, a resettlement village in the region of Baucau. Considered to remain sympathetic to nationalist ideas and to the guerrillas, its residents suffer from threats and abuses.

In early September of last year, residents of Samalari were told that new restrictions were to be placed on their movements outside the village and that the local authorities would accept no responsibility for people arrested or killed by the military. "Until now, Fathers João de Deus and Locatelli, as well as Deputy Aleixo would defend you, but now these three have signed the measures restricting your movements and, consequently there is no-one to defend you... If any are killed out there by the TNI Bapaks their bodies will not be returned home and neither will authorisation be given for burial, so they will be left out there to rot."

According to documents received in Lisbon, the people of Samalari are particularly repressed. They are forced to organise 'liberation' and 'brotherhood' parties, to which they have to contribute the food. Every Saturday, young single women are forced to dance with the Indonesian troops.

Deputy Aleixo Ximenes — mentioned as one who 'protected' the villagers — was among several

prominent Timorese arrested during 1988, apparently for failing to provide high quality information to the Indonesian military authorities. Those named included: Aleixo himself — leader of the deputies in Baucau; Joaquim de Sousa Guterres, ex-Commander of the Venilale Hansips and the traditional chief of Bado Hóo; Manuel Brito; and Jorge, Joaquim and Pedro Ximenes. Following these arrests, people fled into the bush to seek protection from the guerrillas. They came back after Aleixo and Joaquim returned.

Aleixo had himself sought refuge in the Bishop's house. Joaquim was tortured in Baucau: among other cruel treatments, he was reportedly forced to stand for 24 hours in a tank of water. [Monthly Memo 21, March 1989. The precise dates of these incidents are not given.

## Torture

These reports — which are among several received by *East Timor News* that cover 1988 — challenge the information presented to seven British MPs who visited East Timor on March 7-8. They were told by their hosts that torture no longer occurred. Alexei Guterres, a political prisoner in Becora prison whom the MPs met in private, also told them that though he had been tortured in 1986 he had not suffered physical mistreatment recently.

This may be true for Dili — though the prison record and the recent condemnation of abuses by Bp. Belo suggest otherwise. [See *ETL* 15/16].

The test, however, must be what happens to those out of view in the rural areas: and quite clearly, as the case of Samalari shows, there it is another story.

## Viqueque

The difference in the East clearly struck a journalist from the British *Daily Telegraph* who travelled to East Timor with the British MPs. "East of Dili," wrote Christopher Lockerwood [DT, March 17], "in the remoter region which has not benefited so much from Indonesia's presence, integration is viewed as less of an unmixed blessing.

"I recently travelled to Viqueque, a remote and destitute district capital in the south-east of the island, which, with the area surrounding Los Palos in the extreme east, is the base where the remnants of the Fretilin are still most active.

"From Dili, Viqueque can only be reached by a bumpy nine-hour bus ride across barely fordable rivers and over terrifying mountain roads and passes.

"In Viqueque it is impossible not to be aware of the continuing conflict. Security is tight, and villagers have been ordered to build walls around their settlements.

"Five battalions are stationed in the district with a total strength of 3,000 to 4,000.

"Residents of Viqueque (pop. 20,000) say there are probably 800 to 900 armed Fretilin rebels in East Timor. Officials in Dili put the number at 200 to 300."■

# Timor's Political Management

In the last issue of *East Timor Link* we featured the decision of the Indonesian authorities to 'open' East Timor, and described some of the potential implications that such a change might have — if implemented. Since then, there has been little evidence that the Indonesian authorities seriously intend to enable visitors to travel with real freedom within the territory, and a worsening security situation makes such 'openness' improbable. Nevertheless, more officially sponsored visits are likely, and Indonesian embassies abroad are sure to press Jakarta's claim that East Timor is now 'pacified', and qualifies to be described as a province of 'equal status' with Indonesian provinces. The last issue of *Tapol Bulletin* contained a short analysis of East Timor's political organisation. This points out how markedly different East Timor's government has been from that of other

provinces, and reminds readers of the powers enjoyed by elements of the military. We reprint part of the article here.

East Timor has never been run like an Indonesian province. With regard to the military structure, on top of the territorial structure there is a special command called *Koopskam* to cope with security and keep the territory on a war footing.

In 'civil' affairs, besides the provincial administration under the governor, there are two rarely-mentioned structures directly under Jakarta's control. Interior Minister Rudini said on 12 December that these two structures, the *Tim Koordinasi Antar Departemen Urusan Timor* (Coordinating Inter-Departmental Team on East Timor) chaired by the Secretary-General of the Interior Department, and the *Tim Pelaksana*

*Pembangunan Pusat* (Central Team for Development Implementation) directly under the commander-in-chief, should now be reviewed. This suggests that Rudini wants them dissolved now that the objective of 'ensuring East Timor's integration' has been achieved.

The first team is under Major-General Nugroho, a tough intelligence officer who was in charge of running the 1987 elections and was most likely also responsible for stage-managing the elections in East Timor. The second team was in the hands of General Murdani as commander-in-chief. This, combined with his overall supervision of *Koopskam*, made him the virtual boss of East Timor. Now that East Timor is to be run like an 'ordinary province', the role of the Interior Ministry will be enhanced, but this is the most highly militarised part of the bureaucracy anyway.■

# STUDENT PROTESTS

**Student protest in East Timor has been growing. We reprint an analysis written by A Paz é Possível em Timor-Leste.**

Student demonstrations lasting several days took place in Dili during July, particularly on July 17 to 20 in front of the Government Central Offices. This news, relayed by underground networks, was indirectly confirmed by the Governor, Mário Carrascalão, when he told *Tempo* magazine: "Two weeks ago there was a demonstration, perhaps for the first time in Dili, when about 300 students in their first years of secondary school protested because they couldn't go on to the following years." The Dili correspondent Petrus Suryadi confirmed that about 500 students from several districts of East Timor were involved. "These demonstrations show there is freedom of speech in the territory and that everyone can express their opinions and wishes without fear," he wrote, saying, "riot police had to intervene because the students were causing traffic jams in the streets of Dili, but no arrests were made."

There is no doubting Mário Carrascalão's efforts to ensure that some forms of protest are allowed. Underground informants even suggest that he warned Indonesian soldiers not to use firearms against the students. The same sources also say that, though there were no arrests at the time of the protests, there were later: 25 students were arrested at the end of August.

Publicly, the student demonstrations are motivated by the problem of access to higher education and to scholarships to Indonesian universities. On the same issue there were protests in Dili during July 1987. Nevertheless, the conflict has deeper causes. One of the slogans of the demonstrators ran: *If the schools have no room for us, we'll join the school of Xanana Gusmão*. Xanana Gusmão leads the armed resistance. This threat is not mere provocation; there are other grounds for revolt.

## **Students of Indonesian origin are privileged**

Governor Mário Carrascalão appears to have a case when he argued that "no-one can move on to higher education without taking exams, and East Timorese students must have the same conditions of access as Indonesian students from other provinces, because no privileges in education are acceptable in Timor." But it is precisely against privilege that the Timorese students are protesting. According to them, teachers — almost all of whom are Indonesian — are biased in favour of pupils who are of

Indonesian origin. Of 100 students accepted by the SMTA in Baucau, for example, only 20 were Timorese, the others being the sons of soldiers and officials from Indonesia.

The situation seems to have got worse since the authorities realized that their plan to integrate through the schools had failed. In spite of very strict selection on political grounds, the Timorese students chosen to become the future leaders of Indonesia's "27th Province" did not meet expectations. The best known case is that of the four university graduates who sought refuge in the Dutch Embassy in Jakarta during November 1986 and who asked for Portuguese passports in order to escape the persecutions of the intelligence services . . .<sup>1</sup>

## **Incidents in Indonesia . . .**

Carrascalão's appeals to the students to desist from 'political activity' have been accompanied by pressures of all kinds:

- Withholding student grants: in January 1988 the Timorese students of the Akademi Usaha Perikanan had not received their grants for six months;
- Surveillance: during the same period the Indonesian government threatened to send no more students to Indonesia, because they found it was more difficult to control them there. In some universities, teachers and other students help with surveillance.
- Physical threats: In Denpasar (Bali) Timorese students have been threatened by the police because they listened to foreign radio programmes; in July 1988 these students were surrounded by Indonesian civilians armed with sticks and knives because they had expressed 'anti-Indonesian views'. Indonesian soldiers had to intervene to protect them . . . but who had incited the civilians against the Timorese?
- Imprisonment and rough treatment: Germano da Silva was arrested in Dili during October 1986 while on holiday and held in police intelligence headquarters until 1988; Santino Oliveira was beaten by soldiers and arrested in December 1987.
- Mysterious deaths: Acácio, from Lospalos, a student in the Agricultural Institute at Semarang, was found dead in a well in May 1987; José Moniz da Silva, an economics student at the Further Education college in Jogjakarta was

killed in a strange road accident witnessed by no-one in November 1987; Miguel Noronha, a third year student of philosophy at the Malang Seminary was killed in another accident on September 13 1988.<sup>2</sup> There are firm signs of a political crime in the second case, and cause for suspicion in the other two.

## **. . . In East Timor**

Similar incidents have occurred in East Timor, although learning about them is more difficult because of the territory's isolation. The known cases are not necessarily the worst.

The student protests that took place in Dili during December 1987 have already been reported: On the walls they sprayed *Timor is our country* and *We want Freedom and Independence*. "It was the first time such a thing had happened; we felt satisfaction but knew there would be reprisals," declared Reinaldo dos Santos, a refugee, to *Anglo-Portuguese News*.

On August 16 1988 five students from the school of agriculture in Natarbora (Same) were raped by Indonesian soldiers and teachers and then, because they resisted, shot dead.

On September 3, pupils of St Joseph's forcibly detained an Indonesian teacher named Damianus who had dared to strike a Timorese nun, Sister Floriana. Neither the headmaster nor the bishop intervened and it was left to the civil and military police to secure the teacher's release the following day.

On September 8 a Timorese teacher from the Salesian school in Fatumaca was arrested, taken to Dili and tortured.

These incidents and attitudes make it easier to understand the mood of the student population and the decisions which some students have felt they had to take. In 1987 we heard about 15 students from Lospalos who joined the guerrillas. News which has reached the outside world suggests that many more took the same path in 1988: 250 students went from Natarbora and the surrounding area after the murders described above; 25 students went from Baucau, also in August; 300 students and teachers in and around Ainaro left in September.

It is partly to ease this pressure that Governor Carrascalão has been calling for East Timor to be opened up and has encouraged young Timorese to leave and look for work in Indonesia.

Note 1: See *ETL* 7, 8, 9.

Note 2: See *ETL* 12/13, April 1988, p.4.

[*Etudiants Timorais Rejoignent la Guérilla*: translated by Timor Link from *Em Timor Leste a Paz é Possível*, No. 28, January/February 1989.]

# Solidarity Groups meet in Denmark

The Annual Meeting of European solidarity groups was hosted this year in Denmark by the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). The meeting, which took place over the week-end of February 11-12, was attended by 15 organisations from ten countries.

We reprint below the Resolutions of the meeting:

*We note with great satisfaction the continuing struggle of the people of East Timor for their fundamental rights and freedoms as related to us by the representative of the National Convergence of East Timor and receive with gratitude the gifts sent to us by the women of the East Timorese resistance.*

## Self-determination and human rights

1. We strongly disagree with recent suggestions that the human rights situation in East Timor has improved, for the following reasons:

- (a) An estimated 2,000 Timorese people were killed in East Timor during 1988;
- (b) 3,000 Timorese were arrested arbitrarily in Dili during the first week in November 1988, before the visit of Suharto to East Timor. Many of these prisoners were tortured.
- (c) East Timorese people continue to live in resettlement areas to which they were forcibly relocated.

We note the statement by Bishop Belo of East Timor on December 5th 1988: 'We oppose this barbaric system and condemn the lying propaganda, according to which human rights violations do not exist in East Timor.'

1. We emphasise that the bureaucratic changes which have been undertaken by Indonesia with respect to East Timor ('Equalisation of East Timor

with other Indonesian provinces') do not warrant the use of the concept of 'opening' in any way whatsoever. The concept of 'open' is meaningless and irrelevant to the status of East Timor as an occupied colonial territory of Indonesia.

3. Considering that Indonesia has no legal right to be in East Timor, any visit to the country should be able to proceed without interference from the Indonesian authorities; considering also that even though Indonesia says that East Timor is 'opening up' the government will not allow anyone to enter who opposes the principle of occupation;

We therefore have immediate reservations about any visits which do not fulfil the following minimal conditions:

- (a) Free movement throughout the whole of East Timor;
- (b) Unsupervised free access to all Timorese;
- (c) Visitors should be able to choose their own independent interpreters and advisers.
- (d) Visitors should be able to stay in East Timor for as long as they need;
- (e) No limit [should be set] on the number of persons in the group.
- (f) Recognition that East Timorese are under strong pressure not to speak out for fear of retaliation by the Indonesian authorities.

## International meetings

4. We consider that the occasion of the Non-Aligned Movement meeting, to be held in the Hague, Netherlands, in June 1989, will be a major opportunity to promote the cause of East Timor.

5. We will also lobby our governments on the occasion of the IGGI meeting in June.

## INTERNATIONAL ROUND-UP

6. We agree to continue our support and participation work at the UN Decolonisation Committee in New York, during August.

## National and international activities

7. We support the initiative of establishing the Parliamentarians for East Timor organisation and call on solidarity groups internationally to encourage recruitment of Parliamentarians.

8. We consider that the European Parliament resolution Doc. 82-143/88 (adopted September 1988) is the strongest statement in favour of East Timor in recent years and constitutes a resounding defeat for the Indonesian diplomatic offensive of 1988. Follow-up activities should include:

- (a) Supporting point 18 of the Resolution which requests the European Commission to give a progress report on the situation in East Timor within six months;
- (b) Arranging a hearing at Strasbourg on East Timor after the European elections in June 1989.

9. We welcome the principled diplomatic initiative being taken by the Portuguese authorities for the resolution of the conflict in East Timor according to Article 297 of the Portuguese Constitution which binds Portugal to 'promoting and guaranteeing the right to the independence of East Timor'. We are looking forward to the realization of the plan for an International Conference of Parliamentarians on East Timor and hope that it will take place in Lisbon during 1989.

10. We are very impressed by the rapid rise and consolidation of the Free East Timor Japan Coalition. We commit ourselves to supporting internationally its crucial work of trying to influence Japanese government opinion on East Timor.

# Japan

After a pause, the *Japan East Timor Memo* is again available, bringing news of Japan's flourishing solidarity movement in support of East Timor. The newsletter is distributed free. For further information, contact: Solidarity with Independent East Timor, c/o Kyoto Citizens' Network, 9 Yoshida-shimo-adachi-cho, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606, Japan.

Issue 5 reports on the recent tour by José Adriano Gusmao and José Ximenes Guterres, who were invited

to Japan by the Free East Timor Japan Coalition, which consists of eight East Timor solidarity groups. Between November 18 and December 9, the two spoke in 22 Japanese cities. *Japan East Timor Memo* reports:

"This was the fourth speaking tour by East Timorese in Japan, but many of the cities the two men visited had never welcomed Timorese before. Their audiences were moved by their accounts of the heroic struggle of the Maubere people for independence and deeply disturbed to learn that the Japanese government supports the Suharto regime, both politically and economically, in its suppression of the

Maubere people. Japanese economic aid, the two pointed out, enabled Jakarta to build facilities to track down Fretilin's shortwave radio transmissions. They said too that the hospitals, roads and schools built in East Timor with economic aid only facilitate Indonesian control of East Timor and do not benefit the people.

"The speaking tour was well reported by the press, and several television stations also publicised it on the news. The East Timorese also addressed the Dietmen's Forum on East Timor, a parliamentarians' forum composed of members of both Houses of the Diet." ■

# Timor Gap

In an article published in *Inside Indonesia*, Keith Suter discusses the Timor Sea dispute involving Indonesia, Australia and Portugal (not to mention East Timor's people!). Of particular interest is his discussion of Portugal's case for appealing to the International Court of Justice, and the possibility that Australia and Indonesia are in breach of the UN Law of the Sea. We also note a report in *Japan East Timor Memo*, which signals possible Japanese involvement.

Keith Suter reminds us that the agreement reached over the seabed by Australia and Indonesia [See *ETL* 15/16] confirms Australia's *de jure* as well as *de facto* recognition of Indonesia's claim to govern East Timor. The treaty was hailed in Australia as an imaginative resolution of a difficult problem caused by the fact that Australia and Indonesia have different interpretations of the UN Law of the Sea — the document that governs the way in which states divide up marine territory.

He goes on to counsel prudence, however. "The euphoria should not obscure some problems. These arise mainly from the legal quagmire which may be presented if Portugal takes the agreement to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) [...] The UN still regards Portugal as the administering power of East Timor. Portugal also considers itself to be the administering power. The agreement may bring the issue to the boil. If Portugal continues (what it appears to me) its policy of lackadaisical interest in East Timor, then it will miss an important opportunity to reassert its authority. After all, Australia and Indonesia can be seen as dividing up Portugal's potential wealth. Additionally, Indonesia can use this agreement as further evidence of East Timor's absorption into Indonesia and so urge the UN to accept that the East Timor issue has been resolved and should be dropped from the UN agenda.

"Portugal's obvious option is to take Australia and Indonesia to the ICJ for this 'interference' in Portugal's 'internal affairs'. Just to appear as a defendant at the ICJ will cause Australia and Indonesia some embarrassment. If the ICJ decides against Australia and Indonesia, then Australia and Indonesia will have to decide whether or not to disobey the ICJ.

## UN breach?

"Just to make life even more complicated for the Australian and

Indonesian governments there is another issue about which I remain somewhat unclear. The 1982 UN Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted a resolution dealing with territories whose people have not yet attained full independence or other self-governing status recognised by the UN. The Conference was concerned that such territories could have their rights waived by a foreign governing power so that even after they obtained independence they may have lost out from some or all of the benefits of the new Law of the Sea.

"This resolution says that in the case of such territories, the new Treaty shall be implemented for the benefit of the people of the territory with a view to promoting their well-being and development. Any exercise of these rights shall take into account the relevant UN resolutions. Current UN policy remains that of opposing Indonesian control over East Timor and calling for an act of self-determination.

"In other words, Australia would seem to be acting contrary to that resolution. In 1984 I wrote to the then Foreign Minister on this matter and a member of his staff replied that 'our legal advice is that the resolution has no bearing on these discussions either as to their nature or substance'. I also wrote to the Legal Counsel for the UN Secretary General in New York and was advised that 'the UN so far has not taken a position with regard to this matter and I therefore cannot give comments or advice to you'." [Keith Suter, *Oil in Troubled Waters*, from *Inside Indonesia*, December 1988.]

A matter to follow up?

## Japan

In a separate development, the Japanese press has been reporting statements by Australia's Energy Minister, Peter Cook, that Australia wants to see Japanese consortia participate in developing the Timor Gap. *Japan East Timor Memo* (No. 5) writes:

"Last August Inpex Ashmore Petroleum, a subsidiary of Indonesia Petroleum (Inpex), together with BHP (Australia) and Conoco (USA), succeeded in producing 5,736 barrel/day of oil in AC/P7 on the Australian water of the Timor Sea. The consortium is going to dig three or four more experimental wells. Commercial production is likely to start in 1990 at the earliest. [...]

"The possibility that a Japanese company will participate in the oil exploitation of the Timor Gap is high. Meanwhile the Japanese government

has not officially recognised the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia. It is highly likely, however, that the government will take no measure when a private company makes a bid for it on the ground that such an act can be considered as government interference in the private sector." ■

## DIPLOMATIC

# MEPs Follow Up

In the last issue we described the visit to East Timor made by four Members of the European Parliament, shortly before the Parliament voted by a large majority in favour of a motion that strongly criticised Indonesia's position and record in the territory. [See *ETL* 15/16.] Ms Beate Weber, one of the MEPs involved, has since written an open letter to the Indonesian Ambassador in Brussels, Mr Atmono Suryo, requesting clarification on two points that concern her.

She asked, first of all, why it had been found necessary to arrest some 3,000 people on the occasion of President Suharto's visit to East Timor, as reported in the international press. "We had always been told on request [during the visit] that there are no more serious problems and that the population totally accepts the presence of the Indonesian State on this part of the island of Timor. If the operations mentioned above took place, there is a clear contradiction between what we had been told and the real situation, a fact I would regret very much."

## Referendum

The second matter Ms Weber raised is a point that was perhaps under-reported when the delegation published its findings. She asked the Ambassador to clarify whether or not there will be a referendum in East Timor to determine the wishes of the people there, "a question we always raised in the discussions on site and which, in fact, is one of the main interests expressed in the report and the decision of the European Parliament in September 1988". ■

# PET News

AT the latest count, the group Parliamentarians for East Timor [PET: see *ETL* 14, 15/16] had over 100 members, unevenly distributed between Australia, Canada, the German Federal Republic, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. ■

# JOAO MARIA DOS REIS

We print below the testimony of João Maria dos Reis to the UN Human Rights Commission.

I am Timorese, a former civil servant of the Portuguese colonial administration and, until my departure from East Timor last October, was working in the Indonesian Government's Department of Information.

Considering the general conditions in East Timor since the invasion of my country by the Indonesian army, I recognise that my situation was privileged. This was because, firstly, I remained in Dili and gave myself up to the invaders at the time of the invasion itself, while the majority of my contemporaries sought refuge and resisted up in the mountains and, secondly, because I was integrated into the Indonesian Civil Service.

In spite of this, I chose to leave my country because I did not feel at ease under foreign occupation, and also in order to escape from persecution, from which no Timorese is ever safe. Another reason for leaving was my wish to make international public opinion aware, by way of my testimony, of the suffering of our oppressed and tortured people because it continues to reclaim its freedom and fight for its right to independence.

Mr. President, I have witnessed innumerable cases of human rights violations perpetuated by the Indonesian military. Since, here, I am unable to refer to all of them I will cite those which I experienced at closest range:

- *The day after the arrival of the Indonesian troops in Dili, on 8 December 1975, I went along with a group of my contemporaries to report to the invading forces' headquarters. On the way we were intercepted by an army unit which, on recognising one of our group in a photograph of a Fretilin demonstration, took him off to the Sota beach and gunned him down with automatic weapons.*
- *Three days later, on 11 December, I was arrested. They tortured me with electric shocks; they tied my thumbs together, then placed between them wires which were attached either to the electricity supply or to the batteries of manually operated telephones.*
- *On 8 October 1976 I was rearrested, taken to the Sang-Tai-Hoo building, and again tortured, just because they were*

*unable to get an 8 mm. film projector (which they had found in my house) to work. They made me start up the projector and then they forced three prisoners (a young girl and two older women) to watch pornographic films. They raped them and sexually abused them throughout the day.*

- *In 1978 Juvenal Inácio (my brother-in-law) a Fretilin member, was captured and taken to Dili. The Deputy Chief of the Secret Service, a Lieutenant Colonel Bambang, allowed Juvenal's wife and two daughters to visit him. On the third visit, however, they were told he was unavailable because he was being interrogated by the then Minister of Defence, General Yusuf. The following day they were told that Juvenal had been taken away. His whereabouts were never revealed and today he continues to be 'disappeared'.*
- *On 13 December 1980 I was arrested and tortured for the third time, falsely accused of having taken part in the attack and destruction of Dili's television building. They tortured me with electric shocks and burned me with cigarettes because I would not confess to something I had not done and because I refused their request to falsely accuse the Administrator of the Borough of Dili, Mário Sanches da Costa, and the Deputy Governor of East Timor, Francisco Lopes da Cruz, both of whom had been appointed to these positions by the occupiers.*
- *To be brief, I will outline a further recent case; on 9 July 1988 three students from Cribas, one of whom was my cousin Domingos Alves, were forced by Red Berets to go into the bush and try to contact the Resistance. They carried with them a document which was supposed to serve as a justification in case they were intercepted by any Indonesian battalion. The first day they were found by the 125 Battalion which, ignoring the said document, separated Domingos from the other two and proceeded to torture him, using a knife. When they heard his screams, the other two tried to escape: One was shot, but the other managed to reach the village and informed Domingos' relatives. Domingos' father protested to the Red Berets, but only after three days did he manage to get authorisation to go to the place it had happened. He found the body of his son: his head had been severed from the body and sexual organs cut off and stuffed into the mouth. Back at the village he received orders not to divulge what had happened. It was an Indonesian that reported all this to me, and later I got confirmation from relatives.*

Mr. President, I would also like to speak a little about freedom of movement and the visits to East Timor.

I began to plan my departure from East Timor in 1984, when my sister and children managed to leave under the protection of the International Red Cross to reunite with my parents in Australia. As she was the wife of Juvenal Inácio (about whose 'disappearance' I have already spoken) I had to pay 2,500,000 Rupees (US\$ 1,500) to obtain a document stating that she was not involved in subversive activities.

I later began to win favour with the Secret Service and in 1986 was invited to request permission to visit my family in Australia. I was the first Timorese by birth to obtain authorisation to visit relatives abroad. My departure for Australia must have been useful propaganda for Indonesia, but my wife and a friend had to sign a document accepting responsibility in case I did not return.

In 1988 I managed to get authorisation for my wife and five children to visit relatives in Australia. This time I had to sign the declaration of responsibility in case of their non-return. I was not allowed to leave my neighbourhood without permission but, claiming it was necessary for reasons connected with my work, a permit was given. I travelled to Kupang in Indonesian Timor, and from there to Jakarta. There I managed to buy (for 9 million Rupees) an authorisation from the Secret Service (BNIS) to leave Indonesia, as well as passports for me and my sister-in-law. Our relations, including my wife, only learned of our escape once we were out of Indonesia.

If time allowed I could speak about the visits of foreigners to East Timor, organised by the Secret Service and by the department of Information where I was working. This latter Department is headed by a Timorese, but 95% of the officials have come from Indonesia. They choose which places are to be visited, as well as the people who may speak to the visitors. The crowds may only shout out 'Long live Indonesia' and 'We want integration'. Time constraints, however, do not allow me to expand on this subject.

Distinguished members of the Commission, I appeal to you and to the governments you represent to study carefully the situation of generalised repression which has afflicted East Timor for over 13 years.

João Maria dos Reis