



**VICTORIA UNIVERSITY**  
MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA

*Timor link, no. 23, May 1992*

This is the Published version of the following publication

UNSPECIFIED (1992) Timor link, no. 23, May 1992. Timor link (23). pp. 1-8.

The publisher's official version can be found at

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# TIMOR

Number 23  
May 1992

The Santa Cruz massacre, in which Indonesian troops killed up to 200 pro-independence demonstrators in East Timor last November, received worldwide publicity, forcing governments to make representations to Indonesia (see *Timor Link*, No 22, February 1992). Indonesia, stung by the criticism, responded unusually quickly, and set up a commission of inquiry into the events.

This issue looks at the commission's findings and describes reactions in the United States and Britain to a five-week 'damage limitation tour' by the Indonesian foreign minister, Ali Alatas. During his visit to the United States, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Canada, Brussels and Geneva, he assured Western governments that action would be taken against those responsible for the killings.

Two generals, Brigadier-General Rudolf Warouw, the military commander of East Timor, and Udayana Regional Commander Sintong Panjaitan have been relieved of their duties. But at the same time subversion charges are being brought against several East Timorese arrested as a result of the Santa Cruz massacre.

*Timor Link* also analyses the longer-term international implications of the Santa Cruz massacre and looks at the current efforts of some Western governments to pressure Portugal, the former colonial ruler and current president of the European Community, to temper its demands for East Timor's self-determination. At the recent session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, an EC-backed resolution was blocked.



What future for East Timor?

## Opportunities for pressure

**JOHN TAYLOR, author of *Indonesia's Forgotten War*, analyses the prospects for East Timor's self-determination in the wake of the Santa Cruz massacre, highlighting the changes that have taken place in the international context since Indonesia's invasion in 1975.**

The Santa Cruz massacre is the latest in a series of human rights atrocities committed by Indonesia in East Timor. In July 1981 approximately 1,000 people were killed in an Indonesian 'fence of legs' (*pagar betis*) operation in Aitana. In September 1981 some 400 people were murdered by soldiers in Lacluta. And since 1975 at least 150,000 people have died as a result of military campaigns and starvation induced by forced resettlement. There has been extensive imprisonment without trial, extra-judicial

killings, disappearances and widespread torture.

Despite this level of repression, however, the occupation has on the whole been unsuccessful from Indonesia's point of view.

Resistance has continued unabated. Most of those taking part in the demonstration preceding the Santa Cruz massacre were from the 'second generation', the children of the 1970s whom the Indonesian military had hoped to socialise as an indigenous support base for East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia.

The economic development that has taken place since 1975 has not benefitted East Timor's population, but rather migrants from eastern Indonesia and a small group of military leaders who have accumulated substantial sums through control of the import-export trade.

Dipomatically, the occupation has proved to be something of an embarrassment for Indonesia, with the issue of East Timor raised critically and repeatedly in international fora.

### New context

To predict trends for the coming period in East Timor, one has to recall the context in which the invasion occurred. This was characterised by an international situation in which many of the leading industrial powers were prepared to condone Indonesian actions.

Following the Vietnam debacle, the United States was consolidating its relations with friendly powers in the region. Indonesia, as a staunchly anti-communist, strategically located state, was given priority. Portugal, following its 1974 'Carnation Revolution', was trying to divest itself of its colonial territories as quickly as possible and was prepared to concede control of East Timor to Indonesia if necessary. Australia was moving closer economically to South-East Asia and, like Japan, saw Indonesia as a crucial partner, particularly over oil in the post-1974 Opec era.

This international context has changed dramatically. The Cold War has ended and Indonesia is now of lower strategic importance to the United States. Other South-East Asian economies like Malaysia and Thailand have developed rapidly,

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providing other counterbalances to Japan's economic presence in the region. And Portugal, rather than acquiescing in Indonesia's actions, is now a leading critic of the occupation and is calling for a military withdrawal and a referendum in the territory.

The only government remaining supportive of Indonesia is Australia, whose determination to exploit oil deposits in the seas between East Timor and Australia has overridden all other considerations.

Internationally, there is also a resurgence of nationalism, an increasing importance accorded to regional movements, and an emphasis on aid and loans being conditional on 'good governance'. In this changed situation, governments such as those of the United States, Japan and the European Community have no need to remain so supportive of the Indonesian project in East Timor.

This does not mean to say that they will not support it, of course. But the international climate is such that these governments are more likely to be more responsive to pressure than in the 1970s.

### Changes in Indonesia

Similarly — although this should not be overstressed — conditions in Indonesia have changed a little. Diplomatically, it is conceded in private that the invasion was a mistake. Politically, some non-governmental organisations, and even some individuals within the army, are questioning the benefits of a continued military presence. For some, the occupation is identified with a political regime whose culture and organisation require major changes if Indonesia is to industrialise with the same speed and success as other South-East Asian regimes.

Against this, of course, are the obvious points that many of today's prominent generals earned their stripes in campaigns in East Timor: that leading generals continue to gain substantial wealth from companies in East Timor; that withdrawal would involve such a loss of face that it is unthinkable. Such views are deeply entrenched; but, unlike 1975, there are differences over the need to continue the military presence at its present level.

This limited questioning of the military role, together with the reduced need for the governments of the industrialised states to support the Indonesian regime, have created opportunities for international pressure on Indonesia which were never possible in earlier periods of the occupation. This may explain why the criticisms of the Indonesian military from within the Indonesian government have been voiced more openly in recent years.

### Prospects

It should also give added impetus to groups and organisations working on East Timor internationally that their rigorous presentations of human rights abuses will not fall on such deaf ears as in the past. The conditions for a resolution of the conflict in East Timor now seem to be more favourable than ever before.

Having said this, however, it should also

be remembered that these conclusions have also been reached by Indonesia's military leaders who will try to repress the problem before it develops into a more open issue. So while, on the one hand, Indonesia's foreign minister travels the world claiming that those who shot unarmed demonstrators in the Santa Cruz cemetery on 12 November 1991 are to be punished, on the other hand, a new commander is appointed with the aim of introducing a more rigorous system of control and eliminating the opposition as quickly as possible.

In the short term it is likely that the apparatus of internal repression will be

strengthened following the Santa Cruz massacre. As with previous attempts, however, this is unlikely to succeed and the need for a resolution of the problem through negotiation will re-emerge.

International pressure on the Indonesian government must therefore maintain the impressive momentum it has developed since the Santa Cruz massacre, both to publicise the undoubted increase in human rights abuses in the coming months, and to continue to press for a solution based on military withdrawal and a referendum on self-determination.

## A sop to the world

**KIRSTY SWORD criticises the advance report of the Indonesian National Commission of Inquiry (KPN), set up by the Indonesian government to provide an acceptable explanation to Western governments of the Santa Cruz massacre.**

One of the most controversial findings of the KPN's nine-page preliminary report was that 'about fifty' civilians had been killed as a result of a 'spontaneous reaction by soldiers... to protect themselves'.

The fact that the KPN found the official military figure of 'only 19' to be inaccurate was seen by several commentators, including Amnesty International, as evidence of the pressure exerted on members of the Commission to produce a report which would satisfy foreign aid donors critical of the Indonesian military's version of events. There was no explanation of how the figure of 50 had been arrived at: eyewitnesses and other sources had put the death toll closer to 200.

Another important discrepancy between the report and eyewitness accounts related to the conduct of the demonstrators and the response of the security forces to them. The report described the demonstrators and mourners as 'savage and quite out of control'. This negative picture clashed with both the testimonies of foreign eyewitnesses and evidence recorded on video by a British cameraman which clearly showed the enthusiasm and emotion of the crowd being kept in check by a number of young organisers of the demonstration.

The report however, devoted considerable space to what it described as the demonstrators' 'premeditated provocation' of the security forces. It repeatedly described their use of 'anti-integrationist' flags and slogans, as if to prove that the

demonstrators were themselves to blame for the slaughter and that, by extension, the security forces were justified in their use of lethal force.

Although the report acknowledged that, in addition to the shootings, demonstrators were subjected to stabbings and beatings by the security forces, it ignored substantive evidence showing that the military's violence was perpetrated in a systematic and premeditated fashion. Instead, a group of 'irregular members of the security forces acting outside the command structure' were blamed for the worst of the security forces' excesses.

As the International Commission of Jurists noted in 'Blaming the Victims', which it presented to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 21 February, the reports of eyewitnesses contradicted the KPN report on every major point. The ICJ's evidence showed that the killings were not the result of provocation but a premeditated use of force against peaceful demonstrators.

The ICJ report found that the Indonesian report failed to meet internationally recognised standards of impartiality, credibility and technical competence, noting that the KPN made no attempt to interview non-Timorese eyewitnesses 'who could testify without fear and whose accounts contradict the findings of the advance report on every key issue'.

### Military discomfort

Furthermore, it is clear from the tightly controlled visit of Amos Wako, the special envoy of the UN secretary-general, to East Timor in early February 1992, that the Indonesian military was unhappy with the

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# EAST TIMOR: A forgotten issue

Timor, area 7,400 square miles, is one of the easternmost islands of the Indonesian archipelago and lies 300 miles north of Australia, its nearest neighbour. The western part of the island, formerly a Dutch colony, belongs to Indonesia, whereas East Timor was for more than 400 years a Portuguese colony.

In 1974 Portugal decolonised East Timor and the territory's newly formed political parties began discussing options for the future — federation with Portugal, independence, or integration with Indonesia.

The Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) initially favoured the first option but then joined a coalition with the nationalist liberation movement, Fretilin to demand independence and call for a rejection of colonialism and racial discrimination. A third party, Apodeti, with a small political base in the country, was used as a vehicle for Indonesian propaganda and pressure in favour of integration.

On 11 August 1975 the UDT staged a coup to pre-empt Indonesian threats to intervene if Fretilin came to power. In the ensuing civil war, 1,500 people lost their lives. By September 1975, however, Fretilin was in control of virtually all of Portuguese Timor, following defection of Timorese colonial troops to the liberation movement's side.

Indonesia, like the United States, was worried by the proximity of an independent

state with radical policies and continued to threaten East Timor, despite previous assurances that Jakarta would respect the right of the East Timorese to independence.

In September 1975 Indonesia closed West Timor to journalists and on 7 December it launched a full-scale invasion of East Timor with the knowledge of the United States and the encouragement of Australia. East Timor was proclaimed the '27th province' of Indonesia.

The invasion and annexation of East Timor has been brutal: up to 200,000 people, a third of the population, have died as a result of Indonesian rule. But the majority of Timorese have not accepted subjugation; Indonesia has been unable to eliminate the desire of the East Timorese for self-determination and an armed resistance movement still remains in the hills, albeit in dwindling numbers.

Although the invasion has been condemned by successive United Nations resolutions, the international community has done little or nothing to implement them, given the major economic and geopolitical interests of the United States, Japan and particularly Australia in the region. Indonesia's crucial strategic location and regional status — it has the world's fifth largest population, and large reserves of oil and other natural resources — have all encouraged the world to downplay East Timor's agony.

changes made by the KPN to their original version of the events.

The Indonesian armed forces (ABRI) are rarely criticised in Indonesia and are not used to being dictated to. It is said that ABRI's chiefs are particularly disgruntled with the blame laid at the feet of General Warouw, the sacked East Timor military commander. General Theo Syafei, Warouw's replacement, is known to have a more confrontational approach, and it is understood that the military presence in Dili has been increased in recent months.

Wako's visit was heavily supervised by the military, which surrounded the airport in wait of his plane. Several days before his arrival, security forces blanketed the entire city, according to a Dili policeman, and arrests were made to pre-empt demonstrations.

## Visit of UN envoy

In the wake of the KPN's report, a special envoy of UN secretary-general, Kenyan attorney-general Amos Wako, visited Indonesia and East Timor for six days in early February 1992. He was granted entry by the Indonesian government on the understanding that his visit would be clarificatory rather than investigative in nature.

Although his plane landed safely in Dili, a plane carrying scores of journalists to Dili was unable to land 'because of bad weather'.

Prior to his visit to East Timor on 12 February, Wako met Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, Indonesian Attorney-General Singgih and State Secretary Murdiono, having examined the contents of the advance report on the Santa Cruz massacre. He also met members of the KPN.


On arrival in East Timor, Wako held a meeting with East Timor's governor, Mario Carrascalao, accompanied by UN officials, the military commander of Udayana Region, Major-General HBL Mantiri, and Hadi Wayarabi, a member of the KPN. They discussed what measures the Indonesian government had taken over the Santa Cruz killings.

Wako also had a private meeting with Bishop Carlos Belo, the Apostolic Administrator of Dili, and Dili Diocese Vicar General Father Alberto Ricardo.

Wako followed the route of the fateful funeral procession which led to massacre in the Santa Cruz cemetery (held for a youth shot dead earlier by Indonesian troops). He was accompanied by Major-General Mantiri, but did not leave his vehicle.

Questioned by journalists at the end of his trip, Wako said that he had been assured by President Suharto that the troops found to have been involved in the killings will be prosecuted.

Among the issues raised by Wako were the prosecution of military personnel, identification of the dead and missing, the establishment of the number, location and identity of bodies, and general questions about East Timor's development. Further conclusions and recommendations would, he said, be included in his report to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali.



## UN role

Between 1975 and 1982 the United Nations adopted ten resolutions on East Timor. Security Council resolutions in 1975 and 1976 called for immediate withdrawal of Indonesian troops and for the people of East Timor to exercise their self-determination. Similar resolutions were adopted annually until 1982. Since then the 'Question of East Timor' has been entrusted to the UN Secretary General. The UN still refuses to recognise Indonesia's illegal occupation, and regards Portugal, the former colonial ruler, as the Administering Power.

## Blaming the victims

**While the Indonesian government has promised court-martials for eight senior officers found responsible for their role in the Santa Cruz killings, it is unclear whether any punitive action will be taken. At the same time, several East Timorese arrested in Dili and Jakarta for peaceful protests against the Santa Cruz massacre face serious charges, including subversion, which carries the death penalty.**

In Dili, the capital of East Timor, those arrested are charged with organising or participating in the memorial procession which preceded the Santa Cruz massacre (held for a youth shot dead by Indonesian troops in October 1991). Two, Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha and Francisco Miranda Branco, are charged with subversion and masterminding the demonstration. The other six are charged with 'expressing hostility'. Their trials have not yet begun.

Some 24 other East Timorese arrested in connection with the Santa Cruz massacre were reportedly released early in March 1992. But Indonesian press reports quoted by Amnesty International in their 'Urgent Action' request issued on 26 March 1992 indicate that they may actually be held outside Dili where they are undergoing 'mental guidance' to 'become sound Indonesians capable of taking part in development' in the custody of Brigadier-General Theo Syafei, the military commander of East Timor.

In Jakarta, the Indonesian capital, Fernando Araujo and João Freitas Camara are charged with subversion, while Agapito Cardoso, Domingos Barreto and Virgilio da Silva Guterres face the charge of 'spreading hatred'. As in East Timor, a group of 17 students have reportedly been released but are now in detention in East Jakarta, pending the emergence of new evidence

with which they could be prosecuted. They are also likely to be called back to the trials as witnesses.

### Observers

Whereas the detainees in Dili were allowed a lawyer (though not of their choice) during interrogation, the Jakarta detainees, many of whom were held in incommunicado detention, were initially denied access to relatives and lawyers in all but a few cases, in contravention of the Indonesian Code of Criminal Procedure (KUHAP) and international law. They are now, with the exception of Fernando de Araujo, who has been denied legal council, being defended by the *Lembaga Bantuan Hukum* (Legal Aid Institute, LBH) which was at first refused access to them.

Four students detained in Denpasar, Indonesia, were also badly beaten and tortured.

The Jakarta trials began in the second week of March. This is the first time that the trial of East Timorese prisoners will take place in Jakarta and they are being watched with interest by many organisations, including the International Commission of Jurists. They will be watching to see if the proceedings comply with Indonesian law — criticised as failing to protect human rights (see box) — and international legal standards, as set out in UN covenants.

## Repressive system

In a report submitted at the 48th session of the UN Commission of Human Rights Commission in Geneva in February, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Professor PH Kooijmans has recommended that Indonesia should set up a commission to deal with widespread human rights abuses.

Although he did not witness the Santa Cruz massacre, Kooijmans was in Dili at the time to investigate torture in Indonesia at the request of the UN secretary-general, and his recommendations will add to the pressure on Indonesia over East Timor.

His 22-page report, which makes special mention of the events of 12 November in East Timor, gives a detailed description of the complexity of the Indonesian legal system and its shortcomings in the area of human rights. It alleges that torture is routinely practised, particularly in unstable regions under Indonesian control like East Timor and Irian Jaya or where state security is perceived to be threatened. Abuses often occur during incommunicado detention.

He blames these human rights violations on the 'virtually unbridled power of the police', who have unrestricted control over detainees during the first 20 days of detention, and

### Indonesian criticism repressed

One of the East Timorese on trial in Jakarta, João Freitas da Camara, is also charged with receiving donations from foreign organisations, quoted in the indictment to include the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, Amnesty International and CIIR.

The repressive measures used by the Indonesian authorities against the East Timorese have also been used to quell criticism by Indonesian human rights activists and journalists.

On 20 November three Jakarta human rights activists, Indro Tjahyono, HJC Princen and Yopi Lasut, were called by the authorities to answer questions on their sources of information on the Dili massacre. They were subjected to daily interrogations until 7 December.

Three journalists with the weekly magazine *Jakarta, Jakarta* lost their jobs in January 1992 after they published testimonies of eyewitnesses of massacre which contradicted the findings of Indonesia's Official Commission of Inquiry.

At the end of February, the Indonesian government stopped allowing journalists to enter East Timor, as tension mounted over the expected arrival of a Portuguese peace ship (see p.5). A number of foreign visitors have also been expelled from the territory, including a Japanese activist, Wada Tetsuro, who was interrogated for seven hours, made to sign blank forms and had films and videos confiscated.

highlights the fact that 'judges do not oblige the police and the armed forces to respect the law by vigorously rejecting all forms of illegal arrest and all evidence obtained during irregular detention'. Nor is there any independent authority to which complaints about torture or maltreatment can be addressed.

He concludes that discontent in East Timor 'can only be removed by a policy of strict respect for basic human rights, even if those basic rights are not respected in the same way by the other side'.

Among Kooijmans' proposals for improving Indonesia's human rights record are ratification of the 1984 UN Convention against Torture, creating an awareness of human rights in an independent judiciary, the extension of criminal investigating procedures, respect of the detainee's right of access to a lawyer, the dismissal in court of evidence illegally acquired, the repeal of Indonesia's notorious Anti-Subversion Law, and the creation of a national commission on human rights.

He also recommends the establishment of an authority to deal with complaints of human rights violations, endowed with investigative powers. Places of detention should be visited regularly by an independent authority, and officials found guilty of committing or condoning torture 'severely punished'. Jurisdiction over offences committed by members of the armed forces and the police should be entrusted to the civilian courts.

# Portugal faces pressure to compromise

**Portugal's decision last October to cancel a parliamentary delegation to East Timor — seen as crucial to breaking the deadlock in UN-sponsored negotiations between Lisbon and Jakarta over the annexed territory's future — caused massive disappointment among Timorese (see *Timor Link* February 1992).**

**Since the Santa Cruz massacre, Portugal has been seeking support for an international settlement of the dispute. But as this report on discussion of East Timor by the UN Commission on Human Rights shows, Lisbon faces considerable pressure from its Western allies to compromise with Jakarta.**

Portugal, recognised by the UN as the 'administering power' of East Timor, assumed the presidency of the European Community for six months in January 92, anxious to use its position to obtain progress for a settlement in its former colony.

On 4 February Portugal obtained EC backing for UN-sponsored talks between Lisbon and Jakarta on the territory's future, with 'political debate without conditions' to be held under the auspices of the UN secretary-general. The talks would be aimed at finding a 'just, global and internationally acceptable solution for East Timor' in the words of Portuguese Foreign Minister Joao de Deus Pinheiro.

Within weeks, however, Portugal, under pressure from fellow EC member states, found itself forced to weaken its position at 48th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in Geneva where East Timor was back on the agenda for the first time in seven years.

## Disappointment

To the deep disappointment of the Timorese and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including the International Commission of Jurists, Pax Christi and Amnesty International, which had been lobbying for over three weeks, Portugal and Indonesia agreed a 'Consensus Declaration' with the support of Dutch and British delegations. Declarations carry less weight than resolutions, and an earlier resolution, drafted by the EC, had been withdrawn.

The text of this draft resolution was relatively strong. While not calling for a UN investigation of the Santa Cruz massacre, it recalled past UN resolutions, appealed for a comprehensive and internationally acceptable settlement, called for access to East Timor by human rights organisations, and included an clause which would make sure that East Timor would be discussed at the UNCHR's next session the following year. Portugal was pushing the resolution, both as chair of the EC and as the

UN-recognised administering power of the territory.

## Background manoeuvres

The resolution was co-sponsored by a wide variety of countries — 6 Latin American, 2 African and 20 European. Other countries joined later bringing the total to 32. However only 14 of these were members of the Commission and had voting power, the others held only observer status. The Portuguese-favoured resolution was quickly opposed by several countries, including Japan, the United States and Australia. The latter, which recognises Indonesia's occupation of East Timor, was particularly determined to block the resolution's presentation and sought to confuse other delegates by accusing the Portuguese delegation of procedural irregularities.

These manoeuvres were seen as an effort to persuade Portugal to reach an agreement which would be acceptable to Indonesia.

Portugal found itself in a difficult position, caught between the Timorese lobby, which wanted it to stick with the resolution, and the fear that its text would be defeated. With Japanese backing, Asian members of the UNCHR had also decided to push for a 'no-action' motion, supporting each other in an effort to avoid criticisms of their own human rights record.

Rather than risk defeat, Portugal opted for the Consensus Declaration favoured by Britain, Germany and Holland. This was finally read out on 4 March by the UNCHR chairman.

## Scope for action

The Timorese lobby was mystified as to why Portugal was prepared to negotiate with Indonesia having won such strong support for its resolution.

Despite the disappointment of the Timorese lobby, however, the final declaration agreed still leaves scope for pressure on Indonesia. It urges Jakarta to improve the human rights situation in East Timor, and to implement the recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture presented to the UNCHR at the same session (see box, p.4). It also requests the UN secretary-general to follow closely the human rights situation in East Timor and 'looks forward to a report', meaning therefore that Indonesia will have to allocate money and initiate a process by which this will be produced.

Some would argue that the declaration is more binding than a resolution because it is a consensus and is co-signed between Indonesia and Portugal. If Indonesia does not keep its word it can be held accountable by all member states and co-sponsors. The EC has a special responsibility because it originally presented the resolution, and finally favoured a declaration.

Indonesia has claimed victory, but the Suharto regime will nevertheless be under close scrutiny in the coming months to see if it keeps its promises.

Portugal has already pointed out Indonesia's lack of progress in a statement issued on 16 March, complaining that while many civilians are being tried as a result of

the Santa Cruz massacre, 'the perpetrators of this brutal outrage have been neither brought to trial nor even identified, despite statements and undertakings to this effect'.

The statement also refers to the commitments made by Indonesia at the UNCHR to treat civilians who had been arrested humanely, to arrange proper legal representation and a fair trial for those charged, to release immediately those not involved in violent activity, and to grant access to East Timor to human-rights and humanitarian organisations.

The Portuguese note further that one of the prisoners on trial in East Timor for subversion was refused four different lawyers before a fifth was appointed by the court. Observers from the ICJ and other organisations, as well as foreign journalists, have been prevented from entering Dili. 'All the signs are that the means of defense granted to the accused, and their chances of a fair trial are negligible'... ..'Indonesia must be made to honour the undertakings it gave only a few days ago before the Commission on Human Rights and the international community....'

● *This report is partly based on a report provided by Russell Anderson, an Australian journalist who witnessed the Santa Cruz massacre and who lobbied at UNCHR.*

## Peace mission halted

On 27 February a Portuguese peace boat, the *Lusitania Expresso*, left Lisbon, aiming to sail to East Timor via Darwin in Australia to lay wreaths at Santa Cruz cemetery where the victims of last November's massacre were killed. On board were former Portuguese president Antonio Ramalho Eanes and 120 journalists and peace activists from 21 countries, including Australia, Canada, Japan, Italy, Britain, the United States and Portugal.

As the peace mission gained sight of East Timor, however, it was forced to turn round, as Indonesian planes flew over threateningly. Jakarta had previously warned that it would arrest the ship's passengers and Bishop Carlo Belo, the Apostolic Administrator of Dili, had warned that the mission would bring disorder rather than peace. While the passengers could return home after the publicity, the mission would only create problems for the East Timorese.

The controversial mission nevertheless succeeded in drawing attention to the plight of East Timor as the Indonesian government sought to redeem itself internationally.

## Movement in the US?

**ARNOLD KOHEN discusses whether the attitude of the United States has changed in the wake of the Santa Cruz massacre, looking at reactions to the US tour of the Indonesian foreign minister and the Indonesia government's official report on the killings.**

On release of the report of the Indonesian government-appointed Commission of Inquiry (KPN) on 26 December, some members of Congress issued letters and statements challenging the validity of the commission's findings and expressing concern over continuing human rights violations. They also suggested that US aid to Indonesia could be reduced or eliminated entirely.

Despite sharp criticism of the KPN report in Congress and by the press, however, the US State Department stuck to its initial characterisation of the report as 'serious and responsible'; some sources close to the US government insist that it was heavy pressure from US officials, anxious to dampen criticism of Indonesia, which brought about the minor concessions in the commission's report in the first place (see p.4).

### Damage limitation?

In February Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas travelled to Washington in an effort to defuse congressional protests and press criticism over the massacre and Indonesian policies in East Timor. Criticism focused not only on human rights abuses and other atrocities but also the fundamental fact of Indonesia's illegal occupation of the territory.

While Alatas certainly received a sympathetic hearing at the State Department, his audience in Congress was far less receptive. A senior senator began one meeting by bluntly telling Alatas that after everything he had heard about East Timor over the past 15 years, the events of 12 November came as no surprise. The reaction to Alatas' message was no better among the main congressional activists on East Timor.

As for the media, it was rough going for Alatas in a press lunch at the National Press Club. Much of the question and answer session was taken by sharp exchanges with journalists Allan Nairn and Amy Goodman, the American witnesses to the Santa Cruz massacre who were badly beaten by Indonesian troops.

Other questioners focused on Indonesia's long history of atrocities in East Timor, the murder of five Australian television journalists by Indonesian troops in East Timor in 1975, the barring of several journalists from a press conference given by Alatas in London during his tour, and the tight restrictions on foreign press reporting.

Alatas' efforts with the media fared no better elsewhere. As one senior journalist for

a major paper put it: 'Why did he even bother?' Indeed, a *Boston Globe* editorial on 21 February sharply attacked the Indonesian damage control campaign, noting that there was 'macabre irony' even in the location of Alatas' National Press Club briefing, situated as it was in a room dedicated to the First Amendment to the US Constitution, which guarantees freedom of the press.

For its part, the *Washington Post* of 29 February reiterated its earlier calls for self-determination in East Timor (see *Timor Link*, February 1992) and refuted the arguments made by Alatas during his visit.

### Senate hearings

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held two hearings, entitled 'Crisis in East Timor and US Policy Toward Indonesia', on 27 February and 6 March — the first to be devoted exclusively to East Timor by the body. The stated aim of the hearings was to place the issue of self-determination for East Timor on Washington's political agenda.

Witnesses on 27 February included Allan Nairn; the Rt Rev Paul Moore Jr, the former Anglican Bishop of New York (who visited East Timor in late 1989 and who had warned in January 1991 in a letter published in the *New York Times* of the danger of a Tiananmen-style massacre in East Timor); Geoffrey Robinson of Amnesty International; and Sidney Jones of Asia Watch, who visited East Timor in early February and came away shocked at the repressive atmosphere there.

Nairn strongly attacked the KPN's report and called for a cut-off of all US military aid and sales of military equipment to Jakarta. Both Nairn and Moore made stirring appeals for US pressure to bring about authentic self-determination for East Timor. Amnesty and Asia Watch supplied detailed reports on human rights violations in the territory and cast doubt on Indonesian claims.

On the morning of the 27 February hearing, perhaps not coincidentally, the Indonesian government announced that eight officers and enlisted men would be court-martialled.

On 6 March Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kenneth Quinn testified. Contradicting numerous reports of Indonesian repression after 12 November, he was supportive of most official Indonesian claims about recent events and reiterated earlier US statements in favour of continued US military training to Jakarta. 'It seems evident that continuing co-operative engagement, not retribution, best serves the human rights goals we all seek' Quinn claimed.

Regarding the political status of East Timor, the State Department representative broke no new ground. 'We support the 1982 UN declaration to promote an Indonesian-Portuguese dialogue under the auspices of the UN secretary-general to resolve the East Timor issue'.

At a further hearing on 31 March on unrelated matters, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Claiborne Pell asked Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon several questions on East Timor. Although in previous testimony the State Department

had taken pains to downplay the seriousness of the human rights situation in East Timor in the months after 12 November, Solomon described it as 'serious, if not explosive'.

## Britain cautions Alatas, but arms sales continue

**The British Government has largely, though not unreservedly, accepted the results of the advance report of the Indonesian Commission of Inquiry (KPN). But aid and arms sales look set to continue.**

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office issued a statement on 28 January, urging the Indonesian government to end human rights abuses in East Timor and to permit a special envoy from the United Nations to visit the territory and report on the situation there.

It also urged Indonesia to 'pursue a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable settlement of the East Timor issue', welcomed the sacking of two generals over the Santa Cruz massacre, called for others responsible in the armed forces to be punished, and called on the Indonesian authorities to investigate the 'continuing discrepancies in the number killed' and the many unaccounted for.

The statement was made in advance of the visit to London of Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas who assured his British counterpart, Douglas Hurd, on 5 February that action would be taken against all those who had broken the law in East Timor, including members of the armed forces, and that a full review of policies would be carried out.

### No comfort

But if those concerned with human rights in East Timor had taken comfort in the British government's seemingly tougher line, this was quickly offset by the announcement on 15 February that Britain is to sell a Royal Navy supply ship to Indonesia for £11 million.

The government was forced to wait several weeks before its announcement, following the screening of the *First Tuesday* documentary 'Cold Blood' on 7 January, which provided the British public with horrific on-screen evidence of the Santa Cruz massacre. The ship, *Green Rover*, began its refurbishment by the Swan Hunter Ship Yard on Tyneside in April. The Ministry of Defence, which confirmed the sale, insisted that human rights considerations had been considered during the sale negotiations.

During Alatas's visit the Labour Party

shadow minister for overseas development, Ann Clwyd had called on the government to uphold its stated policy of linking aid to 'good governance' by suspending British aid for Indonesia (worth £22 million in 1991) and imposing an arms embargo.

### Clash of opinions

On 11 March, at the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies, a public debate took place on East Timor in the 1990s.

Before a packed audience, Dr John Taylor, a contributor to *Timor Link*, and Peter Gordon, producer of 'Cold Blood', gave presentations. They were followed by Arizal Effendi, head of the political department of the Indonesian embassy in London, who sought to defend Indonesian development of East Timor and blamed Portugal for many of the territory's problems.

He defended the 'independence' of the KPN and accused foreigners of provocative interference, claiming Indonesia had escaped censure by Western governments at the UN Commission of Human Rights. He appealed to the outside world to 'stop flogging a dead horse' and to let Indonesia get on with developing East Timor 'in peace'.

He denied that journalists were banned from East Timor and affirmed that there would be court-martials of offending

military officials following the Santa Cruz massacre. His comments drew angry interjections from the audience, which included Timorese.

An ecumenical memorial service for the victims of the Santa Cruz massacre and for those on trial in Jakarta and Dili was celebrated at St Bride's Church, Fleet Street, London, on 20 March. The service was led by Rt Rev Patrick Kalilombe, former Catholic Bishop of Lilongwe, Malawi.

### British Catholics petition Indonesian embassy

Outraged by Yorkshire Television's 'Cold Blood' documentary, parishioners of St Agnes Church, Cricklewood, London, sent a 900-signature petition to their member of parliament, Rt Hon John Marshall, at the end of January.

They also sent a copy to the Indonesian, Portuguese, Australian and US embassies, accompanied by a letter which denounced the Santa Cruz massacre, the illegal occupation of East Timor and the 'apparent indifference of the British, American, Portuguese and Australian governments'.

In a reply which was individually sent to most of the petitioners listed, the Indonesian embassy claimed that the documentary had been one-sided and that 'so-called journalists and tourists' had incited demonstrators at the Santa Cruz cemetery, leading them to provoke the armed forces.

## International round-up

### European Community

On 14 February the EC made a mollifying statement on East Timor. It urged Indonesia to bring to trial all those responsible for the 'violent incident', as it called the Santa Cruz massacre, and called for clear information about the number killed and still missing.

The EC was encouraged that Jakarta had criticised its own armed forces, that two senior army commanders had been dismissed, and that it was intending to conduct further investigations. It also urged Indonesia to treat humanely those detained after the shootings, to release those uninvolved in violent activities, and to ensure that those remaining in detention were given a fair trial.

The EC welcomed the visit to East Timor of Mr Amos Wako, the personal envoy of the UN secretary-general (see p.3), and looked forward to his report. Lastly, the EC statement backed a 'constructive' Portuguese proposal for dialogue without preconditions between Portugal and Indonesia under UN auspices. (see p.5)

### The Netherlands

On 28 February Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek expressed support for the advance report of the Indonesian Commission of Inquiry (KPN) and claimed that the measures taken against several soldiers showed that the Indonesian authorities had accepted the inquiry's findings that some soldiers had acted outside proper authority.

Tension has nevertheless been building up between Holland, which ruled Indonesia for 350 years, and Indonesia. This followed a reprimand delivered by President Suharto when accepting the credentials of the new Dutch ambassador to Indonesia, which was received with indignation in the Netherlands.

Relations deteriorated further on 26 March when the Indonesian government dissolved the International Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), the forum through which aid is pledged to Indonesia. IGGI, hitherto chaired by the Dutch, pledged US\$4.75 billion last year. Indonesia accused the Dutch of political intimidation and stated that it wanted projects terminated within a month. It stressed, however, that debt repayments would be met.

Indonesian Secretary of State Murdiono said that the Netherlands was using development assistance as 'a tool for threatening Indonesia' and cited Dutch criticisms of the execution in 1990 of six prisoners accused of participating in a 1965 coup attempt in Indonesia as an example.

Holland provided US\$91 million of development aid in 1991-92. The dissolution of IGGI raises questions about aid conditionality, with Indonesia going on to seek a new forum for the channelling of aid. The World Bank has agreed to chair a

## A helping hand

**HUGH O'SHAUGHNESSY criticises the efforts of the British government to help the Suharto regime to mitigate the diplomatic damage it has suffered because of the Santa Cruz massacre.**

In March British diplomats took a leading part in ensuring that the UN Commission on Human Rights (see p.5) did not issue any strong censure of the regime for the massacre.

This conduct mirrored actions in the European Community in January when Britain mobilised to forestall the strong condemnation by the Twelve of the Dili massacre that was called for by Portugal, the current president of the community. Even after the EC issued its weak condemnation, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) spokespeople were under instructions to do their best to minimise its impact.

### Interests

The reasons for such an attitude are clear. Britain wants to maintain good relations with a country as populous as Indonesia because it is an important market for the British arms industry.

Britain is also keen not to break ranks with a Commonwealth government like Australia's. Canberra has, alone in the world, formally recognised as legal the seizure of East Timor and the Australians expect great benefit to accrue to them from the joint exploration with Indonesia

of the oil lying in the Timor gap between Australia and occupied East Timor. The foreign minister of the Labour administration in Australia, Senator Gareth Evans, has worked closely with the Indonesians in attempts to solve the crisis in Cambodia.

Sales of British military equipment to Indonesia are, even at the simplest level of land rovers, aiding the Indonesian war effort in occupied East Timor. More sophisticated British weapons are certainly being used by the Indonesian occupying forces against the Timorese resistance.

Anglo-Indonesian military co-operation, meanwhile, does not end with the supply of weapons. Indonesian officers have for several years been given training in Britain. After attending FCO-arranged courses in English at Silsoe College near Bedford, two Indonesian officers are the newest in a series of men to study at the Royal College of Defence Administration at Shrivenham.

Named Hardiwan, a Catholic officer in the navy, and Bambang, they are being taught the vital techniques necessary to keep forces in the field in occupied East Timor — with the assistance of British taxpayers' money administered through the FCO. The British Council has denied that any part of the men's training is being funded from its budget, though, when pressed, it did admit that it has made arrangements for them at the behest of the FCO.



new forum which will hold its first meeting on 16-17 July in Paris.

### Japan

Meeting in Odawara, Japan on 21-23 March, the International NGO Forum on Indonesia, composed of non-governmental organisations from Asia and Western countries (including 30 from Indonesia itself), included a statement on East Timor for the first time in its aide memoire. This is the document which NGOs use to lobby governments.

The statement deplored the killings of 12 November and stated that the differences between East Timor and Indonesia 'must be resolved by open dialogue towards a just, peaceful and permanent settlement'. It urged that development projects should enable the Timorese people to live in peace and recommended an end to coercive government policies, respect for the law and human rights, space for the activities of local institutions such as the church, the preservation of the East Timorese cultural identity, the establishment of local government, the protection of Timorese land rights, the abolition of economic

monopolies, and increasing the role of NGOs in East Timor for development purposes.

Meanwhile, the Japanese government welcomed the Indonesian army's decision to punish army officers who were in command during the shootings in Dili, and said that Tokyo's policy of economic assistance would not change, despite the Santa Cruz massacre. These assurances were given by Japanese Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe on 17 February, when Ali Alatas visited Tokyo as part of his five-week 'damage limitation trip' to aid donor governments.

In talks with Watanabe, Alatas criticised Western nations for linking economic aid to respect for human rights, claiming that the suspension of aid would not help the East Timorese and might cause nationalistic reactions in Indonesia.

### Canada

Alatas visited Ottawa on 24 February, hoping to rescue Canadian aid which was suspended following the Santa Cruz events. External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall, referring to the advance report of the KPN,

said that the Indonesian government had made 'considerable progress in attitude' and described the Timorese charged with subversion as 'the perpetrators' of violence. The minister gave signs that Canada was willing to restore aid but was being challenged by both major opposition parties on the issue.

### Solidarity groups meet in Geneva

East Timor solidarity groups from around the world held their 12th annual consultation in Geneva on 14-16 February, coinciding with discussion of East Timor at the 48th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights. Several eyewitnesses to the Santa Cruz massacre were present, as well as East Timorese resistance representative Jose Ramos Horta of the National Council of Maubere Resistance and Mari Alkatiri, deputy head of the external delegation of the East Timorese liberation movement Fretilin.

The meeting reaffirmed its support for peace talks without preconditions. In 1992 groups will make this goal, and the release of political prisoners, the priority for their work.

## CHURCH

# Timor bishop wins admiration

At a seminar held at Yogyakarta's Gadjah Mada State University, Indonesia, on 27 December, Muslim Doctor Ahmad Azahar Basyir, an Indonesian philosophy lecturer, expressed his admiration for the firm and consistent way in which East Timor's Bishop Carlos Belo, the Apostolic Administrator of Dili, had pursued the truth about the Santa Cruz Massacre. He said it set a high precedent for other religious leaders to

follow on the issue, adding that 'most Indonesians do not have the courage to say what is right and what is wrong'.

At the same seminar, Abdurrachman Wahid, chairman of Indonesia's Association of Muslim Scholars, *Nahdlatul Ulama*, commented that 'with the input provided by Bishop Belo, The National Investigation Commission's report on the Dili tragedy became more accurate, although

theoretically it is not 100 per cent true'.

He refuted the commonly held Indonesian Muslim view that Belo and East Timor Governor Mario Carrascalao were opposed to East Timor's integration, saying that their voices reflected their high sense of responsibility to their people and community. He felt that the Indonesian government and people should thank Bishop Belo and Mario Carrascalao for their courage in speaking out, especially about the number killed in Dili on 12 November.

An issue presently concerning Bishop Belo greatly, however, is the renewal of visas for the foreign missionaries working in the territory. He recently appealed for more priests and religious to be allowed into East Timor. At present the ratio is one priest per 10,000 Catholics.

Noting the increased military presence in East Timor since the Santa Cruz massacre, Belo asked whether 'civilians should be regarded as enemies. The problem will never be solved if we have another incident like the 12 November,' he said.

### New Pro-Nuncio in Jakarta

The new pro-nuncio to Indonesia, Archbishop Pietro Sambi, presented his credentials to President Suharto on 16 March. He praised Indonesia for guaranteeing religious freedom in its constitution and called it a model for the world. His speech made the local headlines the following day.

Regarding the Catholic Church in East Timor, Archbishop Sambi denied strains in its relations with its Indonesian counterpart. 'But while advocating collaboration, he said that 'The relationship between the church in East Timor and the church in Indonesia has to be dictated by the principles of the Gospel and by the nature of the church itself, not by the United Nations.'

## New publications on East Timor

### 'Opening Up': Travellers' Impressions of East Timor 1989-91

Edited by Kirsty Sword and Pat Walsh.

A booklet containing accounts of visitors to East Timor since the territory was opened up at the beginning of 1989.

50pp, available from the Australia East Timor Association, PO Box 93, Fitzroy 3065, Australia.

### 'East Timor': An International Responsibility

29pp, Comment Series, Catholic Institute for International Relations, May 1992.

This booklet sets out a brief history and analysis of the situation in East Timor, and assesses prospects for the future.

Price £1.00, available from CIIR, Unit 3 Canonbury Yard, 190A New North Road, Islington, London N1 7BJ.