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The Indonesia

Human Rights Campaign

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Massacres and assassinations in Aceh

There is no sign of an end to the killings in Aceh. On the contrary, they continue to escalate. Aceh is now the worst war zone in Asia. No part of the province is untouched by the tragedy and no family is unscathed by the toll in lives lost, disappearances and the associated trauma. Two massacres occurred in August and the number of public figures assassinated has lengthened with the killing of the rector of Aceh's leading state university and several members of legislative assemblies.

On 9 August 2001, a massacre that took the lives of at least thirty people occurred on the premises of a palm oil plantation, PT Bumi Flora, in Banda Alam, Julok sub-district, East Aceh. Seven men were severely injured and taken to a local hospital where they were placed under heavy guard by the Indonesian military; three were later transferred to a hospital in Medan. It later emerged that several men were not hit and were able to flee from the site; one of the survivors went into hiding and was subsequently interviewed (see below). This is the worst massacre to have occurred in Aceh since July 1999 when 56 men were slain by troops at the Bantaqiah religious school in North Aceh.

Military cover-up

The massacre occurred at around 8am. At 7.30, a unit of about twenty soldiers pushed their way into the workers' barracks and without warning or provocation, ordered all the Acehnese men workers to come out of their homes and assemble in a yard. The women were ordered to remain in their homes while the men were ordered to strip to the waist, to squat in rows. They were then summarily shot dead. The killers had made a point of ensuring that the victims were all Acehnese and checked on the ethnic identity of all their victims.

One of the men came out of his home carrying his two-and-a-half-year-old son, thinking that soldiers would not harm someone carrying a child. The man and his child were both killed, while the child's mother who tried to take the boy from his father's arms was wounded when the soldiers opened fire.

The moment news of the massacre broke, the security forces alleged that the Free Aceh Movement was responsible, claiming that their men had tried unsuccessfully to collect money from the workers. GAM denied any involvement and said that a few days earlier, they conducted an attack on an army post recently set up near the plantation when they succeeded in killing a number of Indonesian soldiers. (This has not been confirmed by the Indonesian military.) According to GAM, the massacre may have been in retaliation for this action.

Calls for an independent investigation of the massacre

from TAPOL and other human rights organisations have gone unheeded.

Witnesses identify military as the killers

Following the massacre, the security forces sealed off the area, making it very difficult for human rights monitors to go and investigate. About a week after the tragedy, a fact-finding team was set up by the district chief of East Aceh. The team was able to enter the area, possibly with a military escort, and interview witnesses but its findings have not yet been made public. TAPOL has seen some of the testimonies given to the Team which make it clear that the killers were Indonesian soldiers. It seems that the local officials who were part of the Team fear the consequences of producing a report which exposes the falsehoods of the Indonesian military.

Two witnesses who went into hiding after the massacre were interviewed by a Japanese activist from Nindja, an organisation with a track record of monitoring the human rights situation in Aceh. The interviews were later reported

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by CNN's online service. One of the witnesses was one of four men who survived the massacre. He said that the perpetrators 'were wearing military fatigues and carrying M-16 rifles (and) entered the plantation area from the back of the workers' houses'.

The other was the wife of one of the slain men who said: 'It was the military who did the shooting. It was not possible that GAM did it. They could not speak Acehnese. They asked, "Are these Acehnese or Javanese?" I said, Acehnese. They only nodded their heads and did not speak more".'



[CNN.com, 2 September 2001]

The interviews were also made available separately to TAPOL. According to the woman, the men were ordered to strip to the waist and within two minutes of leaving their homes, she heard a single volley of gunfire. 'I thought the soldiers had shot into the air, but when I went outside, all the men were lying prostrate on the ground. The whole thing took no longer than three minutes. One man was carrying a child but it was killed as well. His wife tried to grab the child but she was also hit.'

She said that the women did not go out to attend to the bodies because they were afraid that the military might return. At two in the afternoon, an Indonesian Red Cross ambulance arrived and took the bodies away for burial..

SIRA investigations

SIRA, the Information Centre for a Referendum in Aceh, produced two reports, the second of which, dated 29 August, stressed that conditions in the area were very tense because of the heavy presence of security forces and helicopters flying overhead. One witness, a plantation worker from nearby Langsa, said that on his way to work, he passed two military trucks on their way to the plantation. Another witness, probably a young boy, explained that soldiers came looking for his father who was not at home. When they found him, they took him back to his home, ransacked the house and took what money they could find, then ordered him to stand outside the house where they shot him dead.

After shooting their victims, the soldiers examine the bodies one by one, turning them with their boots and rifle tips, and shooting those who were still alive. (We now know that some of the men, probably covered with blood, were able to feign death.)

TAPOL has seen the testimonies of several witnesses who say they saw soldiers scoop up blood and sip it. The SIRA report also identified the perpetrators as non-organic troops

sent from outside the province. They were members of Tim Rajawali, a unit composed of specially-trained counter-insurgency troops from the ranks of KOSTRAD, the army's strategic command, KOPASSUS, the elite commandos and the West Java Siliwangi division. These troops had set up a new military post near the plantation shortly before the Julok Massacre.

Nine killed including five boys

The Julok Massacre was followed, ten days later, by a second massacre in the nearby sub-district of Idi Tunong. Nine males were shot dead in cold blood, including five boys aged between 13 and 16 years. Prior to this second massacre, Tim Rajawali soldiers had been conducting house searches and regular foot-patrols, looking for witnesses of the Julok Massacre.

According to a report by the Coalition of Human Rights NGOs, troops entered the village of Baro, Idi Tunong sub-district at 9pm on 19 August and came upon a group of boys drinking coffee together. The boys were ordered to produce their identity cards which were confiscated and to strip to the waist. The troops then moved on to another coffee shop where they rounded up a number of males. By this time, they had caught altogether twelve men. Three boys managed to escape and fled to the hills chased by soldiers, while the other nine were taken off to an unknown destination.

Two days later, villagers heard that there were several newly-dug mounds of earth in the nearby village of Kayu Tiga. Later that day, Red Cross volunteers and activists from the NGO Coalition went to Kayu Tiga where they found four shallow graves. The bodies were those of the nine men and boys who had been taken away two days earlier. All the bodies were covered with injuries caused by stabbing, slicing with knives, beating with blunt instruments and strangulation. [This report is based on two reports of the massacre, one by SIRA and one by the Human Rights NGO Coalition.]

Subsequent reports in the Indonesian press alleged that the graves had been discovered by the security forces as reported by the army, but local activists called this a distortion of the truth.

SIRA has also reported other incidents just before the Massacre of the Nine. On 18 August, soldiers shot at and wounded a student in the village of Simpang Tomon in Idi Rayeuk sub-district. The troops were identified as coming from Company B, based in nearby Peudawa. Later that day, these troops, travelling in two trucks escorted by an armoured assault vehicle, alighted from their trucks to harass people on the road, in shops and fishing in the river. People panicked and started to flee, whereupon the troops opened fire, killing three men who were fishing. Another fisherman was caught as he tried to flee the scene. He was badly beaten up and left on the roadside in a critical condition.

Intelligence operation

How to explain this mindless spate of killings inflicted on groups of civilians, concentrated in one part of East Aceh? SIRA says there are indications that this is the work of military intelligence based in Medan, where the North Sumatra regional military command, Bukit Barisan has its headquarters. Compare this perhaps to the intelligence operation based at the Udayana military command in Bali during the

weeks and months before and after the ballot in East Timor on 30 August 1999, when militias ran riot throughout East Timor. The motive for such an operation is not difficult to deduce: to accuse GAM of killing civilians and to terrorise villagers who have deep-felt anger towards the Indonesian security forces and perhaps see GAM as an acceptable alternative. Intelligence operations are, by definition, extremely difficult to pin down. Hence the need for an independent investigation into the events surrounding the Julok Massacre.

On 10 September, Ann Clwyd MP, chairperson of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, called on the National Human Rights Commission to set up a special commission of investigation into the Julok Massacre and related killings. She said the investigation team would need the participation of experts trained in the exhumation of bodies and said that the investigation team should ensure the full protection of witnesses and provide necessary safeguards to witnesses once the commission has completed its work.

University rector assassinated

On 6 September, the people of Aceh were once again shocked by the assassination of a well-known public figure, the rector of Syiah Kuala University, who was killed while being driven home from work. Professor Dayan Dawood was shot in the head and chest by unidentified gunmen who were able to escape. His driver, who was unhurt, immediately drove to a nearby hospital but Professor Dawood was dead on arrival.

The assassination occurred in broad daylight on one of Banda Aceh's main highways which was swarming with troops in preparation for the visit to Aceh two days later of President Megawati Sukarnoputri. Two days before he was killed, Professor had gone on record with an offer to mediate in the stalled talks between GAM and the Indonesian government.

In a statement on 7 September, calling for 'a thorough and impartial investigation into the killing', Human Rights Watch said the assassination which occurred within half a kilometre from the governor's office could not have happened 'without the complicity of military elements'. A local human rights NGO shows this to have been quite an understatement. USADHA, the Union of Activists for Democracy and Human Rights in Aceh, said that the rector was shot just a hundred metres from a military post guarding the governor's office. The killers struck as the traffic slowed before going up a slope onto a bridge, near a set of traffic lights. A jeep just in front was moving slowly, and the gunman, on a motorbike, took aim and was able to get away easily by turning left along a side street, despite the presence of large numbers of soldiers patrolling the area.

The assassination came a year almost to the day after another senior academic was killed. Professor Syafwan Idris, rector of the Islamic University, ar-Raniry, was killed in his home on 16 September 2000.

Three days before Prof Dawood's murder, the head of the Teachers' Association in Aceh, announced that 135 elementary, junior high and high school teachers had been victims of violence over the past two years.

Legislators assassinated

There has also been a spate of killings of Acehese members of local and national legislative assemblies. Five days before the murder of Professor Dawood, Zaini Sulaiman, a member of the Aceh provincial (first-level) legislative assembly representing the United Development Party, the PPP, was shot in the head by gunmen at his home on 1 September following evening prayers.

The other legislators killed since June last year are: Harun Aldi, a member of the second-level South Aceh legislative assembly - DPRD-II - representing the Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle (PDI-P). His badly-injured body was found on 11 June 2000 by villagers in the village of Ruak, North Kluet sub-district. South Aceh.

Tgk Ibrahim Ilyas, a respected religious teacher, was a member of the second-level North Aceh legislative assembly - DPRD-II - representing the Development Party, PPP, was shot dead on 12 September 2000 at 8.30pm. A month before he was murdered, the victim received threats from a young man who said his group was not happy with the DPRD member's activities in regard to their group. He told a friend that he had also received a death threat.

T. Djohan, a regional representative for Central Aceh in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), was shot dead on 10 May 2001 as he was walking home after prayers at the Grand Mosque in Banda Aceh. He was shot in the chest and died instantly. Shortly after the murder, there was a power cut, plunging the area into darkness. People nearby left his body untouched for nearly half an hour after hearing shots. Before his death, he had been pressing for negotiations between GAM and the Indonesian government as the best way to solve the conflict in Aceh.

There has not been a single conviction or reported arrests of suspects for any of these murders, nor for the murder in January 2000 of Nashiruddin Daud, member of the Indonesian parliament and of the investigation commission on Aceh set up during the Habibie administration. This can only mean that the police are either utterly incompetent or are being prevented from conducting criminal investigations to conceal the role of the military.

Problems with the political elite

A likely explanation for the atrocities against Acehese public figures is that many, who shrink from the idea of Aceh seceding from Indonesia, are voicing strong opinions about the continuation of the military operations. Several well-known figures who have given their full support to special autonomy for Aceh, the Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) province, are equally supportive of a peaceful solution for Aceh.

When MPR member, Ghazali Abbas Adan, who already describes himself as a representative of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD), called on both sides in the conflict to lay down their arms immediately under the supervision of a third party, he was vehemently attacked by the security forces. Ghazali also said: 'Whichever side refuses to do so, for whatever reason, will expose themselves as being the ones who want to prolong the sufferings of the people of NAD.' Furthermore, he said, 'increasing the number of troops in Aceh only makes the situation even worse and adds to the number of civilian casualties'. He criticised state officials and members of parliament who are pressing the military to resolve the conflict. Such people, he said, 'have lost all reason and are ignoring history'. [Analisa Online, 5 September 2001]

These remarks called forth a blistering attack by police commissioner, Sad Harun, spokesman for *Opslihkam*, the Operation for the Restoration of Order, by which the current military operations are known. Sad Harun said that Ghazali's statement 'raises serious questions about his position in the MPR. ... The protracted conflict in Aceh requires clear thinking. The innocent and ill-informed people of Aceh should not be turned into willing dupes of GAM strategy.' [Analisa Online, 6 September] ■

No change for Aceh under Megawati

Now that Megawati Sukarnoputri is president, the chances of any improvement in Jakarta's policy towards Aceh appear to be very slim. During a brief visit to Banda Aceh, her contacts with Acehnese civil society were minimal and carefully selected. Meanwhile, talks between Jakarta and GAM are stalled following the arrest in July of GAM negotiators.

It is clear that Aceh is a major pre-occupation and headache for the new administration under Megawati Sukarnoputri. Her chief minister for political affairs and security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono recently told the press that Aceh is high on the agenda of every cabinet meeting.

Under her predecessor, Abdurrahman Wahid, the presidency and the military were pulling in different directions with Wahid being keen to promote negotiations whilst the army was committed to the 'security approach'. In the end, three months before being impeached, Wahid was forced to issue Presidential Instruction IV/2001 (Inpres IV/2001) in April giving the armed forces the 'legal umbrella' they had been demanding to conduct a tough counter-insurgency

human rights abuses. She acknowledged that past government policies in Aceh had been wrong and harmful to the people. However, she made no mention of the need for justice and accountability which is what these people want above all else.

In Aceh, the population was under strict orders to 'celebrate' Indonesia's national day by flying the Indonesian red-and-white flag not just for the usual couple of days but for virtually the whole month of August. There were reports that motorcyclists and drivers were stopped by the police and ordered to pay a fine for not flying the flag on their vehicles.

In a speech to the Indonesian community in Kuala

Lumpur later in the month, Megawati's tone had changed from conciliatory to tough. Referring to the resistance underway in Aceh, she said: 'Stop the subversion or face appropriate and tough action by the central government in line with the laws of the Indonesian republic.' [Reuters, 28 August] She was making it clear that Presidential Instruction IV/2001 was here to stay. Since the start of new military operations at the beginning of May this year, the death toll especially among civilians has escalated. (See separate article.)

Like virtually all members of the political elite in Indonesia, President Megawati is firmly committed to preserving the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) at all costs, which explains her refusal even to allow the question of succession to be discussed and to rely on tough action to hold the Republic together.

This is not a position that has found favour with Indonesia's leading English language daily. In an editorial titled 'Folly of Military Option', The Jakarta Post warned that with the commander of the army's strategic command Lt General Ryamizard Ryacudu calling for 'the total annihilation' of GAM, the situation in Aceh 'is now ripe of full-scale conflict'. 'The government's decision to pursue the military option... defies logic and is shortsighted.' It described the TNI's claims that it is 'winning the hearts and minds' of the Acehnese and 'close to crushing GAM' as propaganda aimed at turning public opinion in favour of the military opinion. 'It could be the one single major factor that pushes Aceh out of the republic.' [Jakarta Post, 29 August]

According to the armed forces in Jakarta, there are now some 20,000 Indonesian troops in Aceh, as well as five warships patrolling the waters allegedly to prevent arms smuggling to GAM. The troops include three combat battal-



GAM Commander Abdullah Syafei, his troops well equipped with modern weaponry.

campaign with total impunity. The result has been to intensify military operations, to send the death toll spiralling upwards and to undermine the talks process.

Now the presidency and the armed forces are on the same wavelength. The main thrust of Jakarta's policy under Megawati is to mollify the Acehnese by granting them special autonomy including (eventually) a larger share of the proceeds from its natural gas, combined with a military campaign to 'obliterate' GAM. Government ministers still insist that they have not abandoned dialogue but such claims ring hollow in light of the arrest and conditional release of the GAM negotiators.

An apology but no talk of justice

In a state address on 16 August to mark Indonesia's national day on the following day, President Megawati apologised to the people of Aceh and West Papua for years of

ions and 771 soldiers who have received special training at the Batuujajar training centre run the army's elite commando corps, Kopassus [Jakarta Post, 15 August].

Conditional release for GAM negotiators

A few days after Megawati's state address, it was announced that the six men who had been negotiating on behalf of GAM, the Free Aceh Movement, and who had been arrested on 20 July while taking part in talks with the Indonesian side in Banda Aceh, would be released. However, when five of the men were released at the end of August, it was made clear that their release was conditional; charges of rebellion against them under Article 106 of Indonesia's Criminal Code have not been dropped and they were required to report to the police twice a week. The sixth man was not released and will be charged for falsifying a passport.

The arrests and the charges against the six men are a clear breach of faith. When GAM and Indonesian government negotiators met in July this year in Geneva under the auspices of Humanitarian Dialogue Centre (formerly known as the Henri Dunant Centre), assurances of safety were given, even though the joint committees set up under the Humanitarian Pause agreement had been suspended. The police have turned things on their head, arguing that since the committees had been suspended, the men are no longer recognised as negotiators.

Indonesia's chief of police, General Suroyo Bimantoro said the men's future would depend on whether they had committed any wrongdoings during their negotiations with the government. 'Their legal immunity was only valid when they were involved in negotiations with the government. As the negotiations have ended, such immunity has automatically ended,' he said. [Jakarta Post, 29 August]

Human rights lawyer Johnson Panjaitan, commenting on the five men's conditional release, said the authorities had been forced to release them because of international pressure. 'If the charges against them are not dropped, this will just be an attempt to deceive the people of Aceh.' [Tempo Interaktif, 21 August]

When the last round of talks ended in Geneva on 1 July this year, it was said that the two sides would hold further talks in September. The chances of this happening any time this year now seem very remote indeed.

In a statement on 13 September, GAM's chief negotiator, Dr Zaini Abdullah expressed support for an International Wise Men's Group to provide a new framework for the dialogue process. He said that comprehensive investigations of all human rights abuses were necessary to create an environment conducive to dialogue, and stressed that 'conditions imposed on the release of the GAM negotiators must be removed and assurances must be provided for the safety and freedom of movement of all those involved in the dialogue mechanisms.'

Special autonomy for Aceh

In July this year, the Indonesian parliament adopted a bill conferring special autonomy on Aceh which was signed into

law soon after Megawati took office. The province of Aceh is now to be known as Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam or NAD.

Special autonomy is nothing new for Aceh and was conferred on the province by Megawati's father, Sukarno, following a rebellion in the 1950s. Under Suharto, Aceh's 'special' status ended up in its being declared a 'military operational zone'. The special autonomy law includes a provision for the implementation of syariah law in Aceh. This was one of the pet projects of former President Wahid,

after he abandoned his commitment to support the holding of a referendum in Aceh, but it has never been a demand of the Acehnese who are devout Muslims but among whom Muslim fundamentalism has never taken root.

It is not clear when exactly the law on special autonomy will be implemented but Governor Abdullah Puteh clearly believes that the core issue for Aceh is that it should receive its full share of the 70 per cent of natural gas proceeds allotted under the law on



financial distribution between the centre and the regions. He also laments the fact that implementation of Inpres IV/2001 has focused solely on the security aspect although it was initially proclaimed by the government as being a 'comprehensive' six-point programme covering all aspects of life in Aceh, including social and economic affairs.

Megawati visits Aceh

In a move to show the importance that she and her government attaches to dealing with the question of Aceh, President Megawati visited the provincial capital, Banda Aceh, on 8 September. Although TNI spokesmen were giving assurances that the security situation in Aceh was good, the President's visit was limited to just five hours in the provincial capital. Only two thousand people were on the streets to greet the President, most of them school-children given the day off for the occasion.

Although Megawati said prior to the visit that she planned to hold a 'dialogue' with the Acehnese, she spent only one hour meeting an audience of one hundred people who had been screened by the governor. Only six people were given the opportunity to speak and the president's only response was that she would 'take your concerns' back to Jakarta for consideration. Despite the best efforts of the

governor, things did not go well for the president According to a report in The Jakarta Post, [10 September], pleas for the military campaign to be abandoned figured prominently. A representative of Yadesa, the only NGO present at the meeting, said: 'The more troops coming to Aceh, the more unarmed civilians will be killed. Therefore Inpres IV/2001 should be revoked' He also said that civilians who had been shot and wounded by military personnel were entitled to compensation.

Two others who spoke stressed the need for talks with GAM to be resumed, while a woman in the audience urge Megawati to do something about the sufferings of Acehnese women due to the prolonged conflict.

The head of one of Aceh's leading human rights NGOs, Maimul Fidar who was not at the meeting said it would be pointless if she went to Aceh 'only for sightseeing'. 'She must talk with poor Aceh people in refugee camps and rights violations in Aceh must be settled legally.'

Another Jakarta daily reported a week after the visit that a group of community leaders and ulama submitted a number of proposals to the president. They included: revocation of Inpres IV/2001, an end to violence, the resumption of talks with GAM and punishment for all those guilty of acts of violence. 'They are still waiting for the government's response,' wrote Kompas [15 September]

GAM under attack for violations

In a major report titled 'The War in Aceh', the US-based Human Rights Watch coupled its condemnation of violations by the Indonesian security forces with an account of violations perpetrated by units of GAM.

The report listed killings of suspected military informants, family members of Indonesian military personnel, unlawful detentions, forced expulsions especially of Javanese, destruction of property and systematic extortion. 'In meetings with Human Rights Watch, senior GAM officials acknowledged that the organisation had committed abuses in the past but claimed that these were less the result of a GAM policy than the actions of GAM members acting on their own account. As GAM extended its control, they asserted, this problem was being addressed.'

The recommendations focused on the obligation of both sides in the armed conflict to comply with international humanitarian law to ensure the safety of civilians and non-combatants. [See www.hrw.org/reports/2001/aceh]

GAM also came under attack for a number of threats to Aceh's only daily newspaper, Serambi Indonesia, which led to the daily suspending publication for nearly two weeks in August. GAM said that its field commanders had objected to 'biased reports', especially a report alleging that GAM was responsible for the Julok Massacre (see separate article). A statement by GAM spokesman, Sofyan Dawod, acknowledged that the paper was under strong pressure from military intelligence to publish reports that comply with the wishes of the security force but accused it of 'no longer acting as an independent and neutral press, thereby 'contravening the principles of a free press'.

TAPOL took GAM to task for forcing the daily to close. In a statement on 23 August it said that 'there can be no justification for the ASNLF (GAM) to prevent the daily from appearing, thereby being guilty itself of a serious violation of the principle of the freedom of the press'. It recognised that 'the security forces are in a position to gain an important propaganda advantage by being able to force Serambi to publish only their version of events while recog-

nising also that 'the paper and its journalists cannot be expected to risk their lives because of the way they report events in Aceh'.



TAPOL BROCHURE: A REIGN OF TERROR, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ACEH 1998-2000, NOW AVAILABLE IN BAHASA INDONESIA

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stood in the way of accountability for the crimes in East Timor and is hardly likely to help her in standing by the pledge she made in Washington.

While Bush agreed to lift the executive's embargo on commercial sales of non-lethal defense articles for Indonesia, he gave no undertaking to end arms sales, knowing full well that this is a matter for the US Congress where support for the Leahy amendments is still strong (see page 12). If Megawati fails to deliver on her accountability pledge, the Leahy amendments will prove an impregnable barrier to the resumption .

The key figures in Megawati's kitchen cabinet

Indonesian analysts have rightly warned that ending the Orde Baru (New Order) in a structural sense means more than replacing Suharto as president. In August, the MPR, the People's Consultative Assembly, elected the third Indonesian president since Suharto's downfall in 1998. Many thought that the political demise of the man who embodied the Orde Baru would lead to its collapse but far from being dismantled the Orde Baru structures are more solid than ever.

Officially, the dominant political structure during the three decades of the Suharto dictatorship centred around Golkar, the ruling party, also known as 'the party of the ruler'. The Golkar structure consisted of three components, the Golkar party structure, the vast bureaucracy and the military. Suharto ran the party structure through a body called Setneg (Sekretariat Negara, State Secretariat), whose head is known as Sesneg (Sekretaris Negara, State

Secretary). This post is comparable to the chief of staff of the White House in Washington. The Setneg performed a critically important role; more often than not key decisions regarding the economy or politics were taken here rather than in the cabinet. The State Secretary himself was always a key figure in Golkar, more often than not concurrently the chairman of the ruling party.



Megawati, the third president in three years

In addition, the highly corporatist Orde Baru, meant that all civil servants were obliged to join Golkar which was the embodiment of a patron-client structure; the three million strong bureaucracy became the backbone of this structure. In the early sixties some anti-Communist officers created Sekber Golkar to counter the rapid growth of organisations aligned to the PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party. In 1967 Suharto and his inner core of officers turned this into their political vehicle, called simply Golkar. Until the downfall of Suharto in 1998, the TNI played a dominant role in Golkar.

With the collapse of the Suharto dictatorship, Golkar lost its monopoly as the dominant party when the general elections were held in 1999. Its stage-managed majority of more than 70 per cent under Suharto fell to 26 per cent of the vote, placing it second after the PDI-P. Even so, it garnered

The Orde Baru

more votes than many had predicted. Today, Golkar leaders no longer hold top-ranking positions in the state; civil servants are free to choose their own political affiliations while the military have loosened their ties to Golkar which is now just like any other party. In reality however, things are somewhat more complex.

But there is another, more crucial way of analysing Orde Baru's structures. The two dominant power structures during the Suharto dictatorship were military involvement in every aspect of life, known as Dwifungsi, the dual function, and a patron-client system that functioned through the bureaucracy. In those days, most decision making went through Golkar channels, but nowadays the old structures remain in place though without Golkar being in control.

During the 21-month Wahid interregnum, the military and the bureaucracy resisted any meaningful change, sabotaging and obstructing the presidency to such an extent as to make Wahid incapable of governing. His successor, Megawati, will be more cautious. Her cabinet appointments show that she has gone a long way to accommodate the military and the bureaucracy.

Key posts for military

Some key cabinet posts have gone to the military, among them the very influential interior ministry now headed by Lt. General Hari Sabarno, a military hardliner who was for years the spokesperson and then chairperson of the TNI in parliament. While most of today's military leaders seem to lack any skills as politicians, Hari Sabarno is a good example of a military man who has been used to wielding power ever since the heyday of the Suharto era. His appointment as interior minister is very significant. Alongside military and police headquarters, this department is geared to monitoring, controlling and curbing activities in the regions. It has always been the most heavily militarised department, running in parallel with the army's territorial structure of Indonesia. One of his first moves as minister was to announce that he would revise the regional autonomy laws that came into force in January this year, in order to protect the unitary state against disintegration. Hari Sabarno is still on the active payroll of the armed forces.

The top cabinet figures filled by retired military are Lt. General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Lt. General Agum

Gumelar both of whom were reinstated in the posts they occupied under Wahid. Susilo is once again co-ordinating minister of political and security affairs while Agum Gumelar is back as minister of transport. These are both very strategic positions. Agum was able to use his control of the transportation system to prevent pro-Wahid crowds from going to Jakarta to support the former president when he was under heavy pressure from his political enemies.

Important as these posts are, our intention here is to highlight two members of Megawati's cabinet who will play a key role in the decision making-process at the highest level. The first is Lt. General (retired) Abdullah Mahmud Hendropriyono, the newly appointed head of BIN (Badan Intelijens Negara, State Intelligence Agency) and Bambang Kesowo, who has been appointed as Sesneg (Sekretaris Negara, State Secretary). They both epitomise the re-emergence of the military and the bureaucracy, the two pillars of the Orde Baru.

Lt. General (retired) Abdullah Mahmud Hendropriyono

For the first time ever, the head of the key state intelligence body is a member of the cabinet. BIN (previously called BAKIN) was formerly directly under the president. In the Suharto days BAKIN functioned as a private intelligence agency for Suharto, run for almost twenty years by Lt. General Yoga Sugama, his close confidante. Under Wahid. BAKIN was renamed BIN and under Megawati, it has assumed far greater importance than ever.

Quite justifiably, Wahid had a deep distrust of BAIS, the military intelligence body which was like a state within a state over which he had no grip. Everyone knows that BAIS is where sinister military operations and ploys are concocted. The revamped BIN will function as the umbrella for all intelligence bodies, including the army's BAIS, and the intelligence arms of the police, the navy, the airforce and home affairs. The powers of the head of BIN, (known as KABIN), are comparable to those of the national security chief in Washington. It is a position of policy-making and decision-making, on a par with the ministers of foreign affairs and defence, which explains why Kabin Hendropriyono has become member of the cabinet.

Hendropriyono pushed hard to get this job and his success is a mark of his political importance and his closeness to President Megawati. Unlike most of today's top-ranking TNI officers who prefer to take a backseat in politics, Hendropriyono enjoys the limelight. He epitomises the image of a ranking TNI officer with a Kopassus (the army red beret elite troops) background plus all the skills and experiences of a territorial commander of the army.

Hendropriyono was born in Yogyakarta on 7 May 1945 and graduated from the Military Academy in 1967. He spent twenty years in Kopassus and was a second-year cadet in 1965 when Suharto seized power and was clearly impressed by the exploits of Kopassus (then called RPKAD) in its brutal witchhunt against the so called Communist threat. By 1986, when he left Kopassus, he was a top counter-insurgency and intelligence officer. His stint as a Kopassus intelligence officer from 1967 till 1986 covered events like the

crackdowns against the student movement in 1974 and 1978 with strong military intelligence backing. In December 1975 East Timor was invaded, after a period of incursions across the border from West Timor. The September 1984 massacre of peaceful Muslim demonstrators in Tanjung Priok was the start of prolonged persecution of Muslim activists.

His official biodata reveals almost nothing about the twenty years he served as an intelligence officer at Kopassus but it can be assumed that, as he rose to become its head of intelligence by 1986, he must have been involved in all these tragedies.

In 1986, his territorial career was launched when he was assigned head of intelligence at Kodam Jaya, the Jakarta Military Command, shortly after the dozens of trials of Muslim activists that

followed in the wake of the Tanjung Priok Massacre. The following year he became the Danrem Korem 043/Garuda Hitam, the district military commander in Lampung, South Sumatra. On 7 February 1989, Hendropriyono, then a colonel, led an attack against a local community of about 550 people in Talangsari, Lampung. His heavily-armed men literally butchered the defenceless villagers. At least 200 villagers were killed and many were imprisoned for years. The official version was that the local community belonged to an extreme Muslim sect but in fact the villagers were involved in a land dispute. From this time on, the human rights community began to call him the 'butcher of Lampung'.

While other atrocities from the Suharto era have been investigated under pressure from the victims, the Lampung Massacre has quietly disappeared, thanks to efforts by Hendropriyono to bribe the victims into dropping any idea of pressing for an investigation.

There was a brief interlude in his territorial career when he became a director of BAIS, but soon afterwards, he was appointed commander of the Jakarta military command. Usually, Jakarta military commanders are destined for high office but after serving here for 18 months he was ditched by Suharto. Although Hendropriyono had all the necessary military skills, Suharto had doubts about Hendropriyono's loyalty. Hendropriyono was replaced by Wiranto, the officer who later, as armed forces commander, oversaw the destruction of East Timor in September 1999 and the burning, looting and mass-rape in Jakarta in May 1998.

After his removal from the top post in Jakarta, Hendropriyono became director of Pusdiklat (Pusat Pendidikan dan Latihan, Centre for Education and Training) a marginal post for such a senior officer. The precise nature of the conflict between Suharto and Hendropriyono is not clear but the latter had made no secret of his political ambition. As Jakarta commander, he always maintained a high profile and kept himself in the public eye with weekly meet-the-people sessions every Wednesday morning and by attending parties and weddings. He became popular with the affluent middle class by making tough statements on eradicating petty criminals and dealing with social activists. This must have worried Suharto who had an aversion to popular officers who he saw as a threat to his own power base.



Bambang Kesowo (left) and Hendropriyono, key players in the new cabinet

Originator of the armed militia concept

However, in 1996 Suharto, no doubt in recognition of his capabilities, brought Hendropriyono back into the fold by appointing him Sesdalobang (Sekretaris Pengendalian Operasional Pembangunan, Secretary for Operational Guidance of Development). This made him in effect the president's assistant to deal with regional security matters. He became a kind of roving operator, observing and monitoring likely places of unrest in remote parts of the country. His concept of arming civilians emerged during this period.

It is no accident that Hendropriyono's skills were utilised again by Suharto. Hendropriyono is largely responsible for designing and promoting the concept of an armed civilian militia. As the largest archipelago in the world, many military strategists acknowledge on-going security problems across the 13,000 islands. With both Suharto and Hendropriyono being obsessed by security problem, it was Hendropriyono who thought up the idea of creating armed civilian militia, in particular in so-called trouble spots. In December 1998, while serving as transmigration minister in the Habibie cabinet, he launched this idea of his. 'Security is important', he told the press, 'Security can only be guaranteed if people protect their own property and uphold democracy.' The civilian militia would be a multipurpose organisation, he said, because it could be used to handle anarchic situations and unrest. It was also his idea to give the militia uniforms and ranks while keeping them under the supervision of armed forces headquarters. The East Timorese militia and the militia units in Aceh grew out of Hendropriyono's concept.

In between holding these jobs, Hendropriyono acquired degrees in law and economics. After the 1999 elections he set up a law office called HELO (Hendropriyono Law Office) which he used extensively for self-promotion. He became close to Megawati during this period and was soon regarded as one of her closest military advisors.

During his long career as a territorial officer he created extensive business interests, in particular with Indonesian Chinese businessmen in Jakarta. Hendropriyono is now very wealthy and it remains to be seen how much of this wealth he will declare under new regulations requiring office holders to reveal the extent of their personal fortunes.

Another of Hendropriyono's contributions was the drafting of the constitutional amendment establishing the principle of non-retroactivity for crimes against humanity which was adopted by the MPR at its session in 2000. With no one noticing what was happening, it was the armed forces/police group in the assembly, headed by Hari Sabarno, who pushed the amendment through. This amendment could frustrate all efforts to try the perpetrators of past crimes, despite recent moves to set up ad hoc human rights courts.

Hendropriyono's appointment as head of BIN and member of the cabinet is bad news for democracy in Indonesia. Military intelligence officers have always played a key role in determining the course of Indonesian politics. Hendropriyono is a continuation of the disastrous role of predecessors like General Ali Murtopo and General Benny Murdani. His track record shows him to be a ruthless man with a strong preference for the 'security approach'. Sooner rather than later the pro-democracy forces are likely to feel the effects of Hendropriyono's policies.

Bambang Kesowo

Bambang Kesowo is the new Sesneg (Sekretaris Negara,

State Secretary) and was previously the secretary of Vice-President Megawati. He was born in Sragen, East Java on 27 March 1945. He got a law degree at Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta and did a PhD in business law at the Harvard Law School. While still a young man in 1968, he joined the staff of Setneg, where he remained throughout the Suharto era, eventually becoming Megawati's secretary on her assumption of the vice-presidency.

While the military apparatus is often described as 'a state within a state', Setneg is the actual state in a nutshell. At its peak in the eighties, all important political and economic decisions were taken in Setneg. Gradually Setneg powers spread in all directions, like an octopus. As Suharto's rule became increasingly personal, he used the state secretary as his main tool of power. All projects above 500 million rupiahs needed his approval. All projects outside the official budget also went through him while all presidential aid projects were handled within the Setneg pipeline. The many yayasan (foundations) set up by Suharto which he used to acquire funds in order to buy loyalty, were also controlled by Setneg.

Setneg also played a key political role as the politburo of the bureaucracy. Large chunks of the money acquired by Setneg were used for political purposes, such as buying loyalties, strengthening patron-client relations within Golkar, keeping an eye on mass organisations, supplying money for intelligence operations. By the time Suharto was forced to step down, Setneg had a staff of 4000, all working one way or another for the president.

As head of this super-ministry, Bambang Kesowo has become Indonesia's most powerful bureaucrat, indeed much more powerful than other cabinet ministers whose powers are confined to single ministries. Bambang Kesowo fits the cliché: 'Ministers come and go but civil servants go on for ever.'

He has already served under three presidents, moving upwards all the time. When Suharto was ditched in 1998 his career was nearing the top as deputy cabinet secretary. When Megawati became vice-president one year later, he was asked to become her private secretary, using Setneg as his office. He created a large structure of five divisions around her vice-presidency, much to her satisfaction. With his boss now president, his promotion to the highest rung on the ladder of the power structure was inevitable. People whisper that Bambang has become the second closest man to Megawati after her husband, Taufik Kiemas.

During his many years in Setneg, Bambang Kesowo became familiar with all the ins and outs of the power game. He became an integral part of the nepotistic culture that blossomed round the Suharto clique and built contacts with all the important players in business and politics. He was involved in drafting government regulations and designing many national projects, including the highly controversial Timor national car project which was the pet project of Suharto's youngest son, Tommy Suharto, now a fugitive from justice. The significance of this carryover of the top figure in the bureaucracy from the Orde Baru to the Megawati presidency cannot be under-estimated.

Most assessments of Megawati's cabinet have praised the professionalism and even-handedness of its composition. What they ignore is the key placement of two people who are the very embodiment of the military-bureaucracy alignment that served Suharto so well. ■

A Human Rights Agenda for Megawati

In August, TAPOL wrote to the newly-elected President Megawati to draw her attention to a number of issues that must be addressed to ensure that Indonesia's transition to democracy is based on respect for human rights and adherence to the rule of law. This is the text of our letter :

Priority areas: Aceh, West Papua, and West Timor

We are gravely concerned that former President Wahid's conciliatory approach to solving conflict in areas, such as Aceh and West Papua, has given way to the military solution. Apart from being counter-productive, this invariably involves widespread violations of fundamental rights. We urge you to negotiate solutions to the problems in these areas and to ensure that human rights are observed and actively promoted at all times. In particular, we call upon you to:

- Halt the current military operations in Aceh under Presidential Instruction IV/2001 and the security operations in the Wasior region of West Papua.
- Withdraw all non-organic troops from both territories.
- Ensure that the peoples of Aceh and West Papua are able to peacefully exercise their rights to freedom of expression - including their right to express their support for independence - freedom of association, freedom of assembly and other fundamental rights and that they are protected from extra-judicial executions, torture, and arbitrary detention.
- Ensure that members of the police and armed forces strictly observe international human rights and humanitarian laws, especially insofar as they relate to civilians and other non-combatants.
- Guarantee the security and freedom from arrest, intimidation and violence of human rights defenders and humanitarian workers so that they can carry out their work effectively and without fear of reprisals.
- Guarantee the security and freedom from arrest of those involved in negotiations with government representatives so that there is no repeat of the recent arrest of negotiators of the Free Aceh Movement in Banda Aceh.
- Allow independent investigations into recent massacres, especially the Julok massacre in East Aceh, and invite to Indonesia the UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial Executions to investigate recent atrocities and to report on issues associated with her mandate.
- Respond to the request made in November 2000 by the UN experts on torture, extra-judicial executions, violence against women, human rights defenders and arbitrary detentions for the Indonesian Government to investigate allegations of, and provide information on, abuses committed in Aceh within the experts' mandates.
- Implement the recommendations of the report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women following her visit to Indonesia in 1998, invite the Special Rapporteur for a follow-up visit, and invite the Special Rapporteur on Torture and the Special Representative on Human Rights Defenders to visit Indonesia and report on the human rights situation in relation to their fields of expertise.

- Lift all restrictions on foreign-based journalists visiting Aceh and West Papua.
- Continue the process of creating a civilian police force, which functions to protect citizens and not to restrict, by repressive means, legitimate social or political protest.

We remain concerned that there is no apparent end to the refugee crisis in West Timor nearly two years after the refugees were forcibly expelled from East Timor. The registration process in June 2001 did nothing to contribute to the safe repatriation or re-settlement of the refugees. The power and influence of the militias operating in the territory remains largely unchallenged. We, therefore, urge you to:

- Fulfil Indonesia's responsibility to disarm and disband the militias.
- Provide secure conditions for the return of humanitarian agencies to West Timor and for refugees to make a free and informed choice about whether they wish to stay in Indonesia or return to East Timor.
- Protect the security of those refugees who decide to return to East Timor and take proper measures to ensure their safe repatriation.

Ending Impunity

Human rights violations will not end while those responsible for past violations are protected from due process and punishment. We urge you to end impunity by:

- Revising the Indonesian Constitution to ensure that the non-retroactivity principle does not apply to acts or omissions which were crimes under international criminal law at the time they were committed (see Article 15(2) ICCPR).
- Revising the Law on Human Rights Courts so that it complies fully with international standards (see recommendations in: Amnesty International - Indonesia: Comments on the Law on Human Rights Courts (Law no. 26/2000)).
- Ending the practice of using *koneksitas* courts, or any other form of military tribunal, for human rights cases and any other cases which are not strictly concerned with military discipline.
- Conducting investigations, establishing human rights courts or ad hoc courts, and bringing to justice those responsible for gross violations of human rights, including those in positions of political or military command responsibility, in particular in relation to:
 - “ the massacres perpetrated in the months following the seizure of power by former President Suharto in 1965;
 - “ the numerous atrocities and human rights abuses committed in Aceh and West Papua since the 1960s;
 - “ Other grave incidents such as the Tanjung Priok massacre in 1984 for which an ad hoc court has already been established, the Lampung killings in 1987, the attack on the offices of the PDI party in July 1996, the disappearance of

pro-democracy activists in 1998, the Trisakti/Semanggi student killings in 1998/99, and the killings, torture and arbitrary detentions revealed by the Commission of Inquiry into events in Abepura, West Papua in December 2000.

Justice for East Timor

It is our view that those responsible for serious crimes committed in East Timor must be made to account before an ad hoc international criminal tribunal. We have long felt that there are too many political and legal obstacles in the way of credible trials in Indonesia. This has meant that, more than two years since some of the crimes were committed, there have been no indictments, let alone trials in Indonesia.

The decree issued by former President Wahid establishing an ad hoc court for East Timor restricted the court's jurisdiction to crimes committed after the ballot in August 1999. This meant that many serious crimes, the planning of the violence, and the organisation of the militia forces in preparation for the ballot, would not be covered. The decree fell far short of a commitment made by Indonesia at the UN Commission on Human Rights in April 2001 "...to ensure that the violators of human rights and humanitarian law committed during the violence in 1999 are accounted for..."

With respect, we would argue that your amendment of the Wahid decree did not improve matters. You have revised the temporal jurisdiction of the court so that it covers April and September (but not October) 1999, and you have restricted the territorial jurisdiction to crimes committed in Dili, Liquica and Suai only. Again this means that many crimes are not covered.

We remain concerned that there are no plans to prosecute those in the highest positions of command responsibility for the East Timor violence, such as General Wiranto and Major-General Zacky Anwar Makarim, both of whom were named in the report of Indonesia's Commission for Human Rights Violations in East Timor (KPP-HAM).

We also regret that the Indonesia has failed to co-operate with the authorities in East Timor in accordance with the memorandum of understanding on legal co-operation signed with UNTAET in April 2000.

We believe that an international tribunal will remain the only option unless the above points and others mentioned in this letter are properly addressed. The temporal jurisdiction of the ad hoc court should, at the very least, coincide with the mandate of KPP-HAM - which covered violations of human rights between January and October 1999 - and all those named in the KPP-HAM report should be brought to justice. Measures should also be taken to instigate a process of accountability for serious crimes committed in East Timor since 1975.

Political crimes and political prisoners

We are extremely concerned by the recent tendency of the authorities to criminalise peaceful political activities. This has given rise to a new generation of political prisoners. The suppression of political activity and expression in this way has no place in a country based on democratic principles and we urge your administration to:

- Release all political prisoners and all those awaiting trial on political charges (whether in prison or under any other form of detention) immediately and unconditionally, in particular:

- Muhammad Nazar, Faisal Saifuddin and Kautsar of Aceh;
- the five Papuan Presidium leaders and 17 others convicted in relation to events in Wamena, West Papua in October 2000;

- eight political activists arrested in Bondowoso, East Java in August 2001 for distributing anti-government leaflets;

- 12 activists currently in detention in Bandung following their arrests for demonstrating against new labour laws and fuel price increases;

- Purwadi, the head of the People's Democratic Party in East Java.

- Drop criminal charges against all those facing charges in relation to their peaceful political activities, including the five Papuan Presidium leaders on trial in Jayapura.

- Repeal all articles in the Penal Code and other penal provisions which make the expression of political opinions or political activities a criminal offence, especially Article 106 (rebellion), Articles 134 and 137 (insulting the President and Vice-President) Articles 154, 155 and 160 (the "hate-sowing" Articles) and Articles 107a to 107f (articles incorporated into the Penal Code when the anti-subversion law was repealed in 1999).

- Lift all restrictions on journalists and international trial observers attending trials and ensure that all trials are fully open to the public and conducted in accordance with international fair trial standards.

Other legal and judicial reforms

Whatever improvements are made to Indonesia's laws and legal procedures, the rule of law cannot prevail unless professional, independent and impartial legal personnel are available to carry out investigations, prosecutions and trials. You are aware of the serious problems of corruption within the judiciary and the prosecution service and we urge you to give the highest priority to institutional reform. In particular, we recommend that:

- Judges should be appointed on the recommendation of an independent judicial commission comprising members of the judiciary, representatives of the private legal profession and representatives of civil society.

- Judges should be given security of tenure for lengthy terms and should be dismissed only if they are no longer worthy of judicial office.

- Judges, prosecutors and defence lawyers should undergo intensive training in international human rights law and practice.

- All laws, regulations and practices relating to the function and conduct of the legal profession should be consistent with the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, the Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors and the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers.

To protect the rights of defendants, victims and witnesses, we recommend:

- The early review and revision of the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) so that it complies with international

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West keen to enhance military ties

Hawkish elements in the Bush administration are supporting a campaign emanating from the Pentagon to resume full co-operation with the Indonesian military, despite a lack of progress on human rights and military reform. There are also signs that the UK may be looking to upgrade its military relationship with Jakarta.

Western diplomats were quick to welcome Megawati's Sukarnoputri's peaceful accession to the presidency of Indonesia on 23 July and have since worked hard at developing a close relationship with her new administration. According to one US official, 'She hasn't put a foot wrong yet' [International Herald Tribune, 7 September 2001]. She is likely to be given special treatment when she meets President Bush in the US on 19 September.

The question of military ties is likely to feature high on the agenda of their discussions. Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld made the administration's position clear on a visit to Australia at the end of July when he said he favoured the early re-establishment of training assistance, as well as the supply of weapons and equipment, to the Indonesian military (TNI). Numerous media reports have appeared in the US in recent months concerning the possible resumption of military co-operation despite the existence of stringent restrictions on military training and financing.

US interests override human rights

The administration's position is no doubt driven by Indonesia's strategic importance to the US and by the view that Indonesia's integrity is vital to regional stability. With its abundant natural resources it is also regarded as a prime location for foreign investment. Both Megawati, as a nationalist committed to Indonesia's territorial integrity, and the TNI, as a powerful political player and the only force regarded as capable of guaranteeing the country's integrity, are seen as essential partners in protecting US interests in the region.

These considerations appear to override concerns the US may have about human rights in much the same way as they did during the Suharto dictatorship.

It is significant that two of Indonesia's largest foreign investment projects - the Freeport copper-and-gold mining operation in West Papua and the Exxon Mobil natural gas operation in Aceh - are controlled by US multinationals and are based in areas of conflict where they are safeguarded by the Indonesian army. Indonesian law requires that strategic assets such as these are protected by Indonesian security forces and it is a matter of record that numerous human rights violations have been committed by security forces in their vicinity.

Case against co-operation stronger than ever

Contrary to the impression created by some in the US administration and by certain journalists and diplomats - who have portrayed the military as defenders of democracy because they refused to support former President Wahid's attempt to impose a state of emergency - the case against enhancing military ties is now stronger than ever.

In reality the military did everything in their power throughout Wahid's presidency to thwart his efforts to push forward with a programme of reform. During the latter part of the Wahid interregnum, the military were able to regain much of their former influence and are now in a much stronger political position than they were when the US military restrictions were imposed following the devastation of East Timor in 1999. In a recent report on the armed forces, Jane's Defence Weekly describes the TNI as 'more powerful than ever, particularly when compared to Indonesia's ineffective civilian institutions' [Jane's, Vol. 36, No.9, 30 August 2001].

Megawati's accession to the presidency was largely the result of the anti-reform strategy of the military and elements associated with the New Order regime of former President Suharto. The TNI's current appalling record in Aceh and other parts of Indonesia is detailed elsewhere in this Bulletin.

Restrictions still in force

The US State Department may be more cautious about the early resumption of military ties. Secretary of State Colin Powell has said that the US wants to improve bilateral ties, but not at the expense of human rights [AFP, 30 July]. Certainly, there is still strong opposition within Congress to the lifting of current restrictions. Activists and grassroots organisations in the US have played a vital role in raising Congressional awareness of the dangers of re-engagement. TAPOL has written to Secretary Powell expressing its concern about a change in policy.

In any event, it will be difficult for the administration to overcome the current restrictions. The US Government curtailed military ties with Indonesia in the early 1990s and suspended them following TNI involvement in the violent destruction of East Timor in 1999. According to a Congressional amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act ('the Leahy amendment') bilateral military financing and training cannot be resumed until certain conditions - concerning the trials of those responsible for the East Timor violence and the resolution of the refugee crisis in West Timor - are met. Commercial arms sales and other military ties are restricted by a 1999 executive order of President Clinton.

Senator Tom Harkin, a senior member of the US Senate's Appropriation Defence Committee, insists that the embargo will remain in force. 'If they believe they're going to be able to (resume) military (sales) and they're going to be able to just move ahead and spend US taxpayer's dollars to do that without us throwing a monkey wrench in the works, they're sadly mistaken.' [Interview with the ABC's 'World Today', 7 September 2001]

In July, the International Crisis Group (ICG) published an

important briefing paper titled 'Indonesian-US Military Ties', which highlighted Indonesia's lack of progress in meeting the Leahy conditions. The same month, the House of Representatives continued the Leahy restrictions for fiscal year 2002. The matter will be considered by the Senate shortly and the conditions for the resumption of military ties may even be strengthened to take account of concern about atrocities being committed in Aceh, Maluku and West Papua.

Notwithstanding the current restrictions, there has been a degree of phased re-engagement over a period of months with the authorisation of the sale of certain spare parts, participation in joint regional naval exercises and military-to-military contacts. This insidious undermining of the restrictions is disturbing and must be challenged at every step.

Re-engagement will signal approval of current Indonesian military operations and further embolden the TNI. In any event, it is unlikely to meet US objectives. The ICG paper rightly points out that '...the bilateral military relationship has not been effective to date in producing an Indonesian military that meets the standards of a modern, professional force under civilian control or promoting long-term stability in Indonesia'.

soldiers marching, West Papua.



There is also concern in Congress about US training of Indonesian police officers. In a letter to Secretary Powell at the end of July, several members said they recognised the Indonesian Government had taken positive steps to separate the police from the military, but pointed out that 'this has not yet translated into a professional civilian police force that functions under the rule of law'. Recent rights violations committed by the police, particularly by Brimob, the special forces of the police, in Aceh and West Papua, 'put into question the wisdom of extending such [police] training from the United States at this time,' they said.

UK urged to impose restrictions

Despite concerns about its moves to re-engage with the TNI, the US has taken a valuable lead in maintaining sanctions until now. Unfortunately that lead has not been followed by other countries, which are not averse to filling the gap left by the US. The East Timor-related European Union arms embargo was lifted after just four months in January 2000 and since then the supply of military equipment has continued uninterrupted.

During a visit to Jakarta by a Foreign Office minister, Ben Bradshaw, a Jakarta Post report on 29 August incorrectly stated that Britain was about to 'resume' arms sales (sales have in fact never stopped), but it raised serious questions about the UK Government's arms export policy and the

nature of its ties with the TNI. The implication was that there has been a shift in UK policy towards a more intensive engagement with the TNI. This has been denied by the Foreign Office, which insists it no longer sells major items of equipment, such as tanks, because of the risk of internal repression, and that it is not involved in military training.

TAPOL has written to the Foreign Office stating that UK ties with the TNI are already unacceptably close. It says there should be a prohibition on the export of all kinds of military equipment, including spare parts and upgrade equipment. TAPOL urged the British government to follow the lead of the US and to send a consistent message with the US that meaningful co-operation will not be countenanced until substantial reforms of the military have been achieved and senior military officers have been brought to justice for past violations and crimes against humanity in East Timor and elsewhere. ■

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standards, particularly those relating to detention and fair trial set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.

- The implementation of the recommendations of the report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions following its visit to Indonesia in 1999.
- An invitation to the Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions to make a follow-up visit to Indonesia.
- The provision of an effective protection programme for victims and witnesses, operated independently of the police and security forces, with special attention being given to the needs of children and the victims of gender-related violence.

National Plan of Action

We urge you to implement the Indonesian National Plan of Action on Human Rights, 1998-2003, launched by former President Habibie in June 1998. In particular, we call upon your administration to:

- Accede to the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights ('ICCPR') and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Genocide Convention and other instruments referred to in the Plan of Action.
- Promote and protect the human rights set out in the above instruments before the ratification process is completed.
- Implement all international human rights instruments already ratified by Indonesia, in particular the Convention Against Torture, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
- Ensure that Indonesian domestic law and practice fully comply with Indonesia's obligations under the above instruments and with its other obligations under international human rights law.

We thank you for your kind attention to these matters and hope that you find our recommendations helpful. We would value your response to our suggestions and we look forward to a dialogue with you and your ministers on these critical issues. ■

Timorese go to the polls

On 30 August 2001, the people of East Timor went to the polls in huge numbers to vote for a Constituent Assembly. Ten days later, the UN electoral commission declared that the ballot had been free and fair. The elections were a great success with more than 90 per cent of the electorate taking part and practically no violence. The 88 members of the Constituent Assembly will decide on the next steps to full independence which is likely to happen in 2002

In East Timor today two years after the devastating events in September 1999, reconstruction is underway, roads have been repaired, economic activity is vibrant, schools have been rebuilt and water, electricity and irrigation systems are functioning again. The university has reopened and health clinics are getting started. The markets are full of goods from local suppliers as well as from Indonesia and Australia.

However, such was the extent of the destruction wrought by the Indonesian military and militia that it will take decades before reconstruction is completed. Economic opportunities are very limited and many are living in dire poverty. The continued presence of thousands of UN personnel, executives and staff of foreign businesses and international agencies has brought its own problems in the form of a two-tier society especially in Dili, where boom-town conditions prevail. While foreigners and a small number of East Timorese earn huge salaries, the majority of East Timorese have a hard time making ends meet.

As compared with UN missions elsewhere, the UNTAET experience in East Timor has on the whole been a positive one. The appointment of East Timorese as ministers in the transitional administration has helped to reduce the danger of top-down administration and ensured that local communities have been involved in reconstruction programmes. The East Timorese have made known their political and economic demands to the UN and the international aid organisations, demanding a proper share in the administration, demanding transparency and focusing on small business enterprises run by local people. UN bureaucrats may have learned a great deal from their time in East Timor, especially in involving the local people in rebuilding and reconstruction. This was the context in which the elections took place in East Timor.

UNTAET has set a time limit of 90 days for the Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution. The Assembly will then decide on the next step to nationhood. It is widely expected that, after completing its work, the Assembly will reconstitute itself as the country's national parliament, avoiding the necessity of conducting another general election.

In its drafting of a constitution, the Assembly may follow in the footsteps of Portugal in 1974, after the demise of the fascist dictatorship. The Portuguese opted for a semi-presidential system where both president and prime minister share state power and responsibilities. Following the elections, the head of UNTAET swore in an East Timorese council of ministers, replacing the former transitional council which consisted of Timorese and non-Timorese who were handpicked by the UN.

Multi-party elections

More than two decades of living under an oppressive Indonesian occupation had the effect of politicising the population. Despite deep poverty, widespread illiteracy and an education system geared towards turning the Timorese into 'good Indonesians', the Timorese people developed many layers of creative opposition against the Indonesians. In the final years of the occupation, an umbrella body was created, the CNRT, the Timorese National Resistance Council which unified all shades of political opinion and social classes, from deeply religious Christians to orthodox Marxists, political parties from right across the spectrum, the former pro-Portuguese and pro-Indonesian parties to the several pro-independence parties.

As election time drew near and the CNRT was disbanded, sixteen parties came forward to register for the elections. They even included a monarchist party and a pro-autonomy (pro Indonesia) party.

Fretilin's victory widely predicted

From the outset, it was clear that Fretilin would gain the most seats. The big question was whether it would win a two-thirds majority which would have put it into a commanding position over the future constitution.

Fretilin, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, had led the struggle against the Indonesian occupation for almost 24 years, and had been the main target of the Indonesian military, suffering enormous hardship and loss of life. In the late seventies, the Fretilin leadership was decimated and most first-generation leaders died at the hands of the occupiers.

In the early eighties, under the leadership of Xanana Gusmao, one of the few leaders to survive, Fretilin was reorganised and developed a vast underground network called NUREP (Nuclei Resistencia Popular, Cells of People's Resistance). These cells became the backbone of the resistance and succeeded in infiltrating the Indonesian administration to the very top, even penetrating the governor's office. So desperate were the Indonesian military that they distrusted every East Timorese. At its peak, NUREP is thought to have involved at least 10,000 ordinary citizens, some of whom provided logistical support to the Falintil guerrillas in the mountains. Most members infiltrated the Indonesian civilian and military apparatus. The NUREP network, along with the student movement that emerged in the late eighties, conducted the struggle for independence right up to the final defeat of the Indonesian military in 1999.

The election results

The total number of votes cast was 384,248, of which 20,747 were declared invalid. The results were as follows:

Party	Seats	Percentage
PDC	2	1.98
UDT	2	2.36
PD	7	8.72
Fretilin	43	57.37
Kota	2	2.13
PNT	2	2.21
PSD	6	8.18
UDC/PDC	1	0.66
PPT	2	1.78
PST	1	2.01
ASDT	6	7.84
PL	1	1.10



East Timorese going to the polls

Besides seats that were filled on the basis of proportional representation, thirteen seats were allocated to the 13 districts. Fretilin won overwhelmingly in 12 districts, while the seat in Oecussi was won by an independent candidate. Four parties: Apodeti, Parentil, PTT and PDM failed to get enough votes to win a seat in the Assembly. Should general elections be held in the near future, they are likely to produce similar results. Some parties clearly have deep roots in Timorese society while others are little more than extended families or leftovers from former, traditional structures.

With the lion's share of the seats held by Fretilin, its president Lu'olo (whose real name is Francisco Guterres) promised that it would form an all-inclusive government that is transparent and efficient, free from corruption and nepotism. Fretilin secretary-general Mari Alkatiri is slated to become the country's first prime minister. He was one of the founders of Fretilin in 1974. At the time of the Indonesian invasion in December 1975 he was abroad. For many years he functioned as Fretilin's representative in Mozambique while frequently representing the East Timorese resistance on the international arena. He was the minister for economic affairs in the transitional UNTAET government and was responsible, along with a UN official, for negotiating a new treaty about the Timor Gap oil reserves with the Australian government and oil companies. For many years Fretilin and its armed wing Falintil, were the only organisations of resistance. In the mid eighties the political parameters changed. In the interests of national unity against the occupation, new initiatives were taken. Falintil became the national army of resistance. The majority of the guerrillas continued to be loyal to Fretilin, while some shifted their focus to non-party activities.

The best-known East Timorese leaders, Xanana Gusmao (inside East Timor) and Jose Ramos Horta (who lived in the diaspora) were both founders of Fretilin and continued as party members for many years. Each of them, for their own reasons, left the party. In Xanana's case, he saw this move as being important for the sake of national unity. He became chairman of the CNRM, later renamed CNRT, the umbrella organisation for all East Timorese organisations in the resistance. Horta had left the party some years earlier, preferring to hold himself aloof from the parties. Horta became East

Timor's outstanding diplomat, a familiar figure throughout the decades of the Indonesian occupation in international gatherings, at the Security Council and the General Assembly and wherever it was necessary to speak on his people's behalf. In 1996, he won the Nobel Peace Prize, along with Bishop Belo. He became the key representative of Xanana's policies of unity. Had these two men stood as Fretilin representatives, the election results would have been even more heavily weighted in Fretilin's favour.

Fretilin's programme includes support for pluralism, tolerance, dialogue and peace. It has pledged itself to support East Timor's ratification of all the major UN treaties and covenants. Its economic programme focuses on the development of agriculture, fishing, co-operatives, literacy, tourism, sustainable development of natural resources and foreign investment.

PD, ASDT and PSD

It's worth taking a closer look at the possible alliance partners of Fretilin, the three parties that achieved relatively good results: PD (Partido Democratico), PSD (Partido Social Democrata Timor Lorosae) and ASDT (Associacao Social Democrata de Timor).

PD (Partido Democratico)

PD was founded only three months prior to the elections but took second place with almost 32,000 votes and seven seats. The fact that it was able to achieve such good results despite its short existence means that PD activists are well known in Timorese society. Its following is largely from the students and women's organisations notably from Renetil, the student movement that carried out numerous actions in the big cities of Indonesia in favour of East Timorese independence. Renetil became an essential part of the independence movement and together with the clandestine network inside East Timor (the NUREPs) they formed a coalition that made life very difficult for the Indonesian authorities. It might have been expected that Renetil members would join Fretilin after the Indonesians left East Timor in 1999, but this did not happen. In the course of the struggle many differences emerged, often marginal but sometimes quite substantial. One clear difference is the generation conflict. The Renetil members, today's PD activists, describe themselves as the post-75 generation, meaning that they grew up or were born after the Indonesian invasion. This description by itself has many implications. At a congress in 2000, the idea of Renetil becoming a political party debated at great length. In the end, the proposal was postponed. When it emerged as a party two years later, the PD had little time to campaign but the fact that its leaders and members were popular in many districts ensured it a good result.

Renetil leader Fernando Araujo (arrested after the Santa Cruz massacre and jailed for 6 years in Jakarta) in an interview with *Watch Indonesia* makes it clear that one of the reasons for creating PD was to counter the domination of Fretilin. In the process of democratisation it is very unhealthy for one party to dominate the political scene, he said. He describes some Fretilin people as suffering from 'veteranism', implying that they were the generation that suffered and sacrificed the most.

Another difference between Fretilin and the PD is in ideology. Fretilin is often described as a leftwing party with Marxist and social democratic tendencies. PD is more prag-

matic although some members have leftwing credentials similar to radicals in the pro-democracy movement in Indonesia. Again, the generation gap plays a role; while the Fretilin generation see themselves as the power-holders, the younger generation are pushing for rejuvenation.

Some points from the PD political programme: participatory democracy, respect for human rights, a market economy with state intervention, equality in education, social welfare based on solidarity and a reliable security/defence system.

PSD (Social-Democratic Party)

The PSD is also a relatively new party, set up in 2000, but with a few well-known vote-getters, notably Mario Carrascalao who served as East Timor's governor for two terms under the Indonesian administration in the eighties, and won respect for the way he protected East Timorese. Many board members were living in the diaspora, mostly in Australia. Despite the excellent skills they had gained while abroad its foremost leaders were not well known to people in the countryside. At one point it was expected that Jose Ramos Horta would join PSD, which certainly would have helped attract votes but in the end, the Nobel peace prize laureate decided not to join any of the parties.

The PSD leaders have developed a close working relationship with Xanana Gusmao and Horta, giving them a strong bargaining position with Fretilin in the formation of East Timor's first post-independence government. It is widely assumed that Xanana will become the country's first president when a presidential election is held (assuming that the constitution provides for this), while Horta's diplomatic skills are likely to be seen as indispensable for the new nation-state.

Some points in its programme: support for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pluralism, participatory democracy, social justice, the setting of a minimum wage, and rights for women, children and minorities.

ASDT (Timorese Social Democratic Association)

A new party using Fretilin's original name. The chairman is Francisco Xavier do Amaral, the first Fretilin President in 1975. He surrendered to Indonesian troops in 1976 and was held in semi-captivity for many years in the home of General Dading Kalbuadi a prominent Indonesian officer who spearheaded the invasion of East Timor. In the eighties he was often sent abroad by the Indonesian authorities to attend meetings of the UN Commission of Human Rights in Geneva and present the version of the authorities about conditions in the territory.

It is not easy to place ASDT on the political map. Many of the issues it raises are part of the old Fretilin political agenda. But it would be incorrect to describe ASDT as a Fretilin offspring as most of its members and leaders were not part of Fretilin in the old days. There is a lot of animosity between Fretilin and ASDT.

While Fretilin leaders have become 'respectable' and are preparing themselves to run the country, ASDT members engage in street politics, trying to attract support from disgruntled people. Another issue of theirs is promoting the term *Maubere*, the pejorative term for East Timorese living in the countryside from Portuguese colonial days. The other controversial issue is the party's support for 28 November 1975 when the Democratic Republic of East Timor was

proclaimed, as the country's independence day, whereas the general consensus is to use 30 August 1999, the day of the referendum. ASDT achieved good results in the elections, with 6 seats but it remains to be seen whether it can play a constructive role in building East Timorese nationhood.

Some points in the ASDT programme: going back to the old Fretilin programme of priorities in the economy, education, health, employment, equality and the environment. It favours a presidential/parliamentary system and a directly elected president.

Spectacular results for women

As a young nation East Timor has an excellent opportunity to avoid mistakes made by other newly independent states. Self sustainable development, the environment, small-scale economic enterprises are some of the critically important issues.

One issue that has been widely discussed is the position of women. In March, REDE, the East Timorese Women's Network tried unsuccessfully to push for a quota of 30 per cent for women on party lists. Although this proposal was rejected, the results were a boost for women. Twenty-four of the 88 seats are occupied by women which is not far from the 30 per cent advocated by REDE. This is far better than in other Asian or Pacific states and is comparable to level of women's representation in Scandinavian countries. The breakdown is as follows: Fretilin 17, PSD 3 and ASDT, PST and PNT each 1 seat. All the PD members are male.

Election observations

IFET, the International Federation for East Timor, a coalition of East Timor solidarity groups from 22 countries, of which TAPOL is a member, organised an Observer Project for the elections. While being very positive about the process and the very high turnout, it drew attention to some serious drawbacks.

IFET has concluded that the campaign and voting were largely free and fair, and that the results accurately reflect the preferences of the population on the limited issues and choices placed before them. Although the lack of discussion of constitutional issues was disappointing, the political parties behaved on the whole with decorum and mutual respect, and few if any voters were coerced or intimidated. This is a good sign for the future of elections in East Timor.

IFET was disappointed with the capacity-building aspect. It drew attention to a wide differentiation in the competence of district electoral officers, all of whom were foreigners. Many had trouble communicating with their East Timorese staff, and the working relationship was often strained. East Timorese poll workers were frequently excluded from opening and closing the polling booths, and given menial tasks. Much should have been done to provide better working conditions and training for local staff, many of whom worked more than 10 hours without a break or food on election day. Their assignments should have been more flexible and more should have been employed to ensure that voters did not have to wait so long to cast their votes.

Some voters were required to cast their votes in other districts, requiring them to walk long distances. Within towns there appeared to be little logic as to which polling booth people should use. Many, including people in hospital or prison, were stripped of their right to vote because

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1965: What the US and Britain knew but never revealed

The recent (inadvertent) release of more cables between the US embassy in Jakarta and Washington in late 1965 has supplied more pieces of the jigsaw puzzle mapping Washington's enthusiastic support for the Indonesian army's bloodthirsty crackdown against the Indonesian Communist Party when up to a million people were slaughtered. Also, a new book published in July shows how the British embassy helped to spread misinformation about what was happening in Jakarta.

Both Washington and London were of the opinion years before these events that President Sukarno should be removed. The communist party was growing fast in a country of strategic and economic importance to both Britain and the US. Sukarno had gone too far in his advocacy of a policy of non-alignment and his friendly links with the Soviet Union and China.

After the CIA's disastrous involvement in the regional rebellions of the late 1950s, Washington changed tack and now saw that its interests lay in building close ties with the Indonesian armed forces under its commander, General A.H. Nasution. In mid 1960, Nasution proved his worth by using special martial law powers to ban the communist party in three provinces, South Sumatra, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan. (The bans were later rescinded on the president's orders.)

Liquidating Sukarno

While on a visit to Washington in September 1960 for talks with the State and Defence Departments, General Nasution was given an assurance of US support in the event of a showdown between him and Sukarno over the communist issue. Assistant Secretary of State Graham Parsons was given the authority to tell Nasution that 'we are aware of and heartened by recent actions which the Army has taken to curb Communist power.... If American help is wanted in the form of military and economic assistance, the United States in such circumstances does its best to be helpful and quickly.... We would like General Nasution to feel that the United States would wish to be helpful to Indonesia too in such circumstances.' (1) Five years later, the US had the chance to honour that pledge.

Britain was also in on the act. A CIA memorandum of June 1962 stated that President Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had agreed at a meeting in April that year that it was desirable to 'liquidate' Sukarno, 'depending on the situation and available circumstances'. (2) Britain's hostility towards Sukarno went back many years and intensified after he launched his konfrontasi policy against the establishment of Malaysia in 1963. There were even British and Australian plans to spread the war being waged along the border between Indonesia's Kalimantan and the northern territories of Borneo to other parts of Indonesia. (3) The animosity towards Sukarno continued after Labour took over from the Tories in 1964.

Supporting the massacre

The action taken by a group of army officers in Jakarta on 1 October 1965, when six generals were kidnapped and killed ostensibly in a move to pre-empt a coup against Sukarno, led within hours to a counter-attack and to a

counter-coup by General Suharto. A massacre of unprecedented proportions against the PKI and its millions of supporters was soon underway and Suharto slowly but surely undermined and eventually ousted Sukarno, installing himself as president.

On 5 October 1965, in what was probably his first comment on the events of 1 October, the British ambassador, Andrew Gilchrist said in a letter to the Foreign Office: 'I have never concealed from you my belief that a little shooting in Indonesia would be an essential preliminary to effective change in Indonesia, but it makes me sad to think that they have begun with the wrong people.' (4) Soon his hopes for 'a littler shooting' against the 'right' people were to be fulfilled, beyond his wildest dreams.

Within days of the murders on 1 October, both the British and US ambassadors were directing their attention to blackening the PKI and destroying the credibility of Sukarno. On 6 October, without waiting for any evidence of the PKI's involvement in the murder of the generals, the British embassy in Jakarta advised British intelligence headquarters in Singapore about the line to be taken regarding events in Jakarta: '...we certainly do not exclude any unattributable propaganda or psywar activities which would contribute to weakening the PKI permanently. Suitable propaganda themes might be: PKI brutality in murdering Generals and Nasution's daughter... PKI subverting Indonesia as agents of foreign Communists... But treatment will need to be subtle, e.g (a) all activities should be strictly unattributable, (b) British participation or co-operation should be carefully concealed... (d) material should preferably appear to originate from Pakistan or Philippines.' (5)

Although Britain and Indonesia were still in a state of war, it was in Britain's interests to ensure that the Indonesian army should now concentrate its forces on destroying the PKI. A cable from the Political Adviser (POLAD) to the Commander-in-Chief Far East in Singapore to the Foreign Office in London on 8 October referred to a suggestion of Ambassador Gilchrist in Jakarta 'that we should get word to the generals that we will not attack them whilst they are chasing the PKI. The C-in-C thinks this has some merit and might ensure that the Army is not detracted from what we consider to be a necessary task.'

On 5 October, the US ambassador, Marshall Green, said in a cable to Washington that events in Jakarta 'may embolden army at long last to act effectively against Communists'. Weighing up what the US could do to 'shape developments to our advantage', Green set out a number of guidelines, Point B of which was: 'Covertly indicate clearly to key people in army such as Nasution and Suharto our desire to be of assistance where we can', while Point E was: 'Spread the story of PKI's guilt, treachery and brutality (this priority

effort is perhaps the most needed immediate assistance we can give army if we can find way to do it without identifying it solely or largely as US effort.' (6)

On 20 October 1965, Ambassador Green reported to Washington that 'the (communist) party has received... blow to its image... and some damage to its organisational strength through arrest, harassment and, in some cases, execution of PKI cadres... Some thousands of PKI cadres have reportedly been arrested in Djakarta area alone and several hundred of them have been executed.' While admitting that the PKI organisation may still be largely intact, Green concluded by saying: 'Army has nevertheless been working hard at destroying PKI and I, for one, have increasing respect for its determination and organisation in carrying out this crucial assignment.' (7)

A memorandum on the Indonesian army circulated within the State Department early in November said the army's relations with the Pentagon are based on associations developed during training in the US and were 'founded on trust, respect and a network of deep personal friendships'. Gong on to consider how the US government might support the army,

it said: 'In the life and death struggle which has finally been joined with the PKI, the Army deserves our support. (8)

The chances of providing that support were soon to present themselves. A senior intelligence officer, Sukendro got in touch with the US embassy in Bangkok in late October to ask Washington for assistance. This included 'small arms to arm Moslem and nationalist youths in Central Java for use against the PKI'. According to the Bangkok embassy, 'Sukendro was obviously pleased with the favourable response to his request on behalf of the Indonesian Army leadership.' Covert arrangements would take the form of the 'Army's ostensible purchase of medicines and a review of the medical list by Sukendro's doctor'. (9) Nothing is yet known about quantity of arms supplied as 'medicines' but they had been requested to arm non-military killers and make the anti-PKI slaughter appear to be a 'popular' reaction to the events of 1 October.

A cable from Marshall Green the previous day said: 'In Central Java army (RPKAD) is training Moslem youth and supplying them with weapons and will keep them out in front against the PKI. Army will try to avoid as much as it can safely do so direct confrontation with PKI.' He added: 'Smaller fry are being systematically arrested and jailed or executed.'

Britain's black propaganda campaign

The points made in the British embassy's note of 6 October

led to the opening in Singapore two weeks later of an office of the Foreign Office's Information Research Department (IRD). It was headed by Norman Reddaway, one of the Foreign Office's most experienced propaganda specialists, and chosen by Gilchrist as the best man for the job.

Reddaway's prime target was the BBC's Southeast Asia correspondent, Roland Challis whose book, published earlier this year exposes the methods used by Reddaway and

Gilchrist to spread black propaganda about what was happening in Indonesia. (10)

The brief of IRD (set up in 1948 and disbanded in 1977) was to 'collect information about communist policy, tactics and propaganda and to promote anti-communist policy via missions and information services abroad'. But IRD in Singapore had an extra brief, explained in a note from Reddaway to Challis: '... do anything you can think of to get rid of Sukarno'. IRD's strategy was three-fold, to target the



massacre in Central Java, 1965

PKI, to tar Sukarno with the communist brush and to provide documentary support for Suharto's interpretation of the events of 1 October 1965. Foreign journalists relied almost exclusively on information from this single source, since they were not able till mid 1966 to visit Indonesia though, as Challis writes, 'MI6 agents came and went at will'.

Reddaway's main source of information was top secret telegrams, about four a week, by diplomat pouch from Gilchrist in Jakarta. Besides this of course, information was flowing into the IRD office from other sources, through intercepts, and from US and Australian intelligence sources all of whom knew exactly what was going on but, writes Challis, 'control of information was rigorous. No word of the slaughter came my way.' Other British media on the receiving end of the IRD's doctored reports were The Times, Daily Telegraph, Observer and the Daily Mail. A quick perusal of the distortions that appeared in the British press, 'civil war,' 'armed communist gangs', and so on, as the massacres progressed show how successful this black propaganda was. No wonder there was not a murmur of protest in the UK to stay the hand of Suharto's killers.

When Reddaway was asked by Gilchrist many years later to summarise some of the stories re-cycled from the embassy through the IRD, his list included the following: 'Various sitreps from yourself which were put almost instantly back to Indonesia via the BBC. You may remember complaining that the versions put back were uncomfort-

ably close to those put out by yourself.' (11)

What the embassy really knew

Documents released by the Public Records Office in the mid-1990s, in accordance with the 30-year rule, include many cables from the embassy to the Foreign Office in London which show how closely British diplomats were following the slaughter. And they were liaising closely with the Americans and the Australians in a joint effort to 'try to keep a score'.

In a cable dated 13 January 1966, James Murray, British Chargé d'Affaires wrote: 'It is a matter for constant speculation here how many Indonesians have been killed ... since 30 September.... The Americans, with their considerable intelligence resource, try to keep a score and I understood their latest estimate was about 150,000. A report that the Australians have from a police source puts the deaths in Bali alone at 28,000.'

On 23 February 1966, Gilchrist wrote a three-page report containing the findings of the Swedish ambassador who had been able to make a tour of Central and East Java in the company of a Swedish engineer who was inspecting telephone exchanges installed by Ericsson. Travelling with his Indonesian wife, the ambassador was able to speak to lower-ranking officials out of earshot of government officials. Here are extracts from his letter:

'The Ambassador and I had discussed the killings before he left and he had found my suggested figure of 400,000 quite incredible. His enquiries have led him to consider it a very serious under-estimate.'

'A bank manager in Surabaya with 20 employees said that four had been removed one night and (to his certain knowledge) beheaded. A British expert employed in setting up a spinning factory near Surabaya said that about a third of the factory technicians, being members of a Communist union, had been killed. ... The killings in Bali, according to what the Ambassador could pick up, had been particularly monstrous. In certain areas, it was felt that not enough people (emphasis in the original) had been killed.'

The man who had spoken of the need for 'a little shooting' four months earlier now appeared to be horrified himself at what was happening. Needless to say, none of this was allowed to leak out to the public.

It was clearly with Western connivance that the true horror of the killings unleashed as Suharto took control of Indonesia were kept secret. No wonder that even today, few commentators or journalists have any notion of Suharto being a genocidal killer and his name is never mentioned when people call for the world's worst criminals against humanity to be called to account.

Endnotes

- (1) US National Archives, RG 59 Records of DOS, Decimal File 1960-63. The document was cited in Roland Challis, *Shadow of a Revolution*, 2001, Sutton Publishing Ltd, p 48.
- (2) James Oliver and Paul Lashmar, *Britain's Secret Propaganda War*, Sutton Publishing Ltd, 1998, p 4.
- (3) *Ibid*, p. 5.
- (4) Letter from Andrew Gilchrist to E.H. Peck, head of the Southeast Asia Division at the FO, 5 October 1965.
- (5) British embassy cable to POLAD (Political Adviser) Singapore, No 1835, 6 October 1965.
- (6) Cable No 868. Ref: Embtel 852, 5 October 1965.

(7) Cable No 1090, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 INDON.

(8) Memorandum from Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs to Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 3 November.

(9) RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL, 23-9 INDON, 5 November 1965.

(10) Roland Challis, *Shadow of a Revolution: Indonesia and the Generals*, Sutton Publishing Ltd, 2001.

(11) Challis, p 102. ■

Arsenio Bano joins new East Timor government

Arsenio Bano, a close friend and associate of TAPOL for many years, has been appointed as Minister for Labour and Solidarity in East Timor's Second Transitional Government.

Arsenio, who was one of the 29 East Timorese who occupied the US embassy during the 1995 APEC conference in Jakarta, came to London from Portugal shortly after and joined our staff as documentalist and analyst of East Timor and Indonesia. We always treasured his insight into the developing situation in East Timor. He left London in October 1999 to return to East Timor, keen to be there as soon as possible after the outstanding ballot results and the appalling destruction inflicted on his people by the Indonesian army and their militia proxies.

He became active in building civil society and was appointed director of the NGO Forum in 2000. He also devoted much of his attention and energies to the situation in Oecussie, which is where he was born and grew up.

TAPOL warmly welcomes his appointment to a post that will give him many opportunities to protect East Timorese workers and help forge ties with solidarity movements around the world. ■

continued from p16...

there was no absentee voting procedure and because voters had to use a designated centre (see report from the Judicial System Monitoring Programme).

Another concern relates to the lack of voter education before the vote. Based on numerous interviews with people after they voted, IFET observers found that many voters, particularly elderly voters and women, did not know that they were voting for a Constituent Assembly or what the Assembly was for.

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 Helen Hill, Tales of the Reconstruction, Arena Magazine 54, August-September 2001, Melbourne, Australia
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Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk, *Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia*, Rand Publication, 2001, 115 pp, ISBN 0-8330-3006-XMR-134-AF

The territorial integrity of Indonesia, the world's largest archipelago and fourth most populous state, is of concern to many governments, military establishments, academics and think-tanks, particularly in the US. The fear that Indonesia's political transformation might turn into a nightmare, an 'Asian Yugoslavia', as the authors put it, is the main reason why this book was written. Indonesia's geopolitical weight making it the bedrock of Southeast Asia, is another expression used by the authors. As explained in the preface, this book was the result of a research project in the Strategy and Doctrine Programme of Project AIR FORCE, sponsored by the US Air Force.

The authors have a track record of writing about the Southeast Asia region and Peter Chalk is also very knowledgeable on the topical issue of terrorism. The publication is subdivided into ten chapters, with a concluding chapter on 'Implications for the US and the US Air Force'. All the main problems in Indonesia are covered and in common with most think-tank publications, there is a chapter on possible scenarios about Indonesia's political future.

The book gives a good overview of the present problems Indonesia is facing, and tries hard to be up-to-date. However, this also creates problems; as with many other recent publications on Indonesia, they quickly get out of date, with developments occurring at breakneck speed. Megawati is the third president since the fall of Suharto in May 1998. This publication was finalised during the Wahid administration and since then some political parameters have shifted considerably.

It's probably not fair to accuse the authors of superficiality. No one can be expected to analyse such a complex place as Indonesia in a hundred pages. For almost three decades, the Suharto years, Indonesian politics had little to commend itself for thoughtful analysis. Political life was basically non-existent and analysing Indonesia became very boring. This has now changed markedly. The fall of Suharto has opened new avenues for democracy but also opened a Pandora's box. The book deals with all these problems but often only touching the surface or with snapshot observations of the many trouble spots. Since the book was written, the problems in Aceh and Papua have worsened dramatically while Maluku has moved into new, more peaceful phase.

One analytical framework is properly highlighted, the burning issue whether the fall of Suharto has also meant the unravelling of the institutions that underpinned his regime. The authors believe that this has happened while other analysts insist that the power of some institutions have in fact increased. The new Megawati administration in many ways reflects the restoration and consolidation of the two major institutions: the military and the bureaucracy. (See separate article in this issue.) The difference is, as we have seen in many Eastern European governments, they simply change their ideological caps and continue to rule.

The section on East Timor fails to mention the crucial point that East Timor was militarily invaded by Indonesian troops in December 1975 and therefore the Jakarta administration lacked the legitimacy of the international community. In contrast, it is correctly mentioned in the (West) Papua

section that the region was not part of the original republic. It is a pity that both the vibrant Papuan and Aceh civil societies and their many shades of NGOs and political organisations receive no attention. It focuses only on GAM and OPM, the two liberation organisations. A proper political solution for the two trouble spots cannot be achieved without the involvement of civil society.

But it is the recommendations at the end of the book intended for the US Air Force and specifically the Pacific Air Forces Command that merit most attention. The first recommendation is to support Indonesia's stability and territorial integrity, a cliché used by every foreign diplomat. The second recommendation is more controversial as it recommends re-engagement with the Indonesian military. So far, US Congress has halted engagement with TNI until substantial improvements have been made. Military operations in Aceh show that the TNI hasn't changed in practice; it is still violating human rights on a grand scale and impunity is still the name of the game in post-Suharto Indonesia.

The authors regret the ending of IMET training for Indonesian officers, arguing that the lack of exposure to 'US values' through this training may well be 'a contributing factor to the rising tide of anti-American sentiment among senior and mid-level Indonesian military officers today' (page 101). This ignores the fact that several generations of top Indonesian officers since the fifties, trained by IMET, were precisely the ones who committed all the heinous crimes against humanity in the past 35 years.

The authors justifiably put strong focus on the strengthening of the defence capacities of the Indonesian air force and navy - as they were by and large not involved in internal security operations and therefore not involved in the human rights abuses.

The third and fourth recommendations relate to helping rebuild a constructive Indonesian role in regional security plus the development of a regional crisis reaction force which fits in with the present (at least until the terrorist attacks on 11 September) isolationist position of the Bush government. On one hand, this means that the US is happy to maintain the position as the sole superpower on this planet while being unwilling to become the global cop. In the same way as it sees the role of Europe as a military force, the US wants to see the emergence of an ASEAN military force to deal with the regional problems.

Liem Soei Liong

Special autonomy for Papua provokes controversy

While Indonesian security forces, in particular the notorious Brimob, continue to commit atrocities in West Papua, efforts are being made to win over the population by enacting an autonomy bill that contains a number of concessions on matters regarding the status of the territory. Meanwhile, a new initiative on exposing the illegality of the territory's integration into Indonesia has been taken.

Following the hugely successful congress in June 2000 which gave birth to the Papuan Presidium Council and adopted a resolution supporting independence, there have been sustained efforts to counteract the pro-independence movement by offering West Papua a very special kind of autonomy. The results of the congress, held while Abdurrahman Wahid was president and with his implicit endorsement, came as a shock to Jakarta because of the clear evidence of widespread alienation in West Papuans from Indonesian rule. Once Suharto had been forced out of office in May 1998, West Papuans made good use of the greater freedom by giving expression to their pro-independence views by flying the West Papuan flag.

But efforts to produce a special autonomy bill acceptable to all sides have run into problems. A bill drafted by a team from the university and several Papuan public figures grants the population the right to fly their own flag and have their own anthem, and opens the way for an independent investigation into the process, the so-called 'Act of Free Choice', by which the territory was integrated into the Indonesian Republic in late 1969. It would also give the local people a substantial share (80 per cent) in the proceeds from the exploitation of West Papua's abundant natural resources.

Enticing as this might sound, a group of Indonesian legislators who visited Wamena in the central highlands in August to consult the local people about the draft were told in no uncertain terms that the people refuse autonomy. 'We want independence', yelled hundreds of villagers as they chased the parliamentarians back to their hotel.

The Presidium chairperson, Theys Elauy, who is currently facing charges of subversion in a court in Jayapura, said: 'We are not Indonesian. Our culture, our hair, our skin are so different.' According to West Papua's leading human rights activist, John Rumbiak, 'The people here no longer believe in any kind of political offer. They believe that independence is the only solution.' A Catholic priest, Theo van den Broek, who heads the justice commission of the Diocese of Jayapura, said: 'If this is watered down and forced on the community..., there will be a lot more protests..., more violent action!'

But the military commander of the Trikora regional command, Major-General Mahadin Simbolon, said: 'We cannot tolerate any other flag to be raised than our red-and-white.' He even accused local human rights groups of 'purposely exaggerating the security crackdown, or even inventing incidents, so that the international community will always pay attention to Papua.' Simbolon previously served as the military commander in East Timor and is no stranger to confronting a population pressing for recognition of its right to self-determination. [*Asia Wall Street Journal*, 21 August 2001]

This draft is also having a rough ride in the Indonesian

parliament, where most fractions see it as likely to undermine West Papua's status as part of the unitary state of Indonesia. There are moves in parliament to draft an alternative bill which is even less likely to receive approval by Papuans.

One of Indonesia's leading academics, the sociologist Selo Sumardjan, said that the main issue in Papua was not special autonomy but injustice, repression and discrimination. He berated the central government's discriminative treatment of Papuans, 'the human rights abuses and the wide disparity between indigenous locals and migrant people'. He said the central government has for decades 'looted' resources and given nothing in return to local people who have been abandoned to their prolonged backwardness. [*Jakarta Post*, 31 July, 2001]

Legal challenge to integration

Meanwhile, Professor Sam Blay, a law professor at the University of Technology, Sydney, who is an expert on self-determination, has agreed to head a team of lawyers from around the world to prepare a case to overturn the legal basis of Indonesian rule. The aim is to persuade members of the United Nations to re-examine the issue by seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Another idea is to seek a declaration by a Dutch court that the Dutch government's conduct in the period before the fraudulent Act of Free Choice amounted to a dereliction of duty. That Act, conducted in 1969 under heavy pressure from the Indonesian armed forces and Suharto's intelligence assistant, Ali Murtopo, consisted of a unanimous decision by 1,025 hand-picked tribal chiefs to accept the territory's integration into Indonesia. The decision was 'taken note of' in a resolution of the UN General Assembly in November 1969.

Ghanian-born Professor Blay, who has been engaged by the Papuan Presidium Council to head the inquiry, said: 'Without the law, the West Papuans have no basis to argue the case.'

In Jayapura, the deputy chairman of the Presidium Council Tom Beanal, addressing the Papuan Women's Conference attended by 500 delegates, reiterated the Council's commitment to the struggle to be free. Speaking the day after Abdurrahman Wahid had been ousted as president, Beanal said: 'Whoever leads Indonesia, we will continue the struggle to be free.' He also said the Council remained committed to peaceful dialogue, not violence. [*Jakarta Post*, 25 July 2001]

Papuans kept out of Pacific Islands Forum

The Presidium suffered a setback however in its bid to maintain contact with the Pacific Islands Forum. At the Forum's meeting in Kiribati in 2000, representatives of the

Papuan Presidium Council were invited to attend as observers and were instrumental in persuading the meeting to adopt a position regarding West Papua, condemning the continuing violence there.

This year's meeting, held in Nauru in the middle of August, went ahead without any West Papuans. For the first time, the Indonesian government was invited to send an observer. The Forum's decision came as a shock to Jakarta which felt that it had been outmanoeuvred by the Presidium and must have lobbied hard for an invitation to this year's meeting.

Days before the annual meeting was due to start, the Nauru government made it known that West Papuans would not be welcome. The Presidium's international representative, Franzalbert Joku, who has campaigned strenuously to gain international recognition of West Papua's plight in the past year, told Dateline, a programme of Australia's SBS television channel, that the setback was not unexpected. He said that once the Forum had agreed to invite Indonesia as a dialogue partner, Jakarta started pressing the other participating nations to oppose West Papuan participation.

He accused the Australian government of being instrumental in putting pressure on Nauru to keep the Presidium out. After the 2000 meeting, Australia was heavily criticised by Jakarta for the position taken then by the Forum. [SBS Dateline, 15 August 2001]

In 2000, Nauru was one of two South Pacific countries to speak in favour of self-determination for West Papua at the UN General Assembly. The other country was Vanuatu.

Even without West Papuans being present however, the Forum included a paragraph in its final statement about the situation in West Papua, which reads as follows:

'Forum Leaders expressed continuing concern about violence and loss of life in the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya (West Papua). They encouraged the Indonesian Government, the sovereign authority, to ensure that the voices of all parties in the province are heard in order to achieve a peaceful resolution of their differences. Forum Leaders welcomed the recent presentation of special autonomy proposals to Indonesia's Parliament. They also urged all parties to protect and uphold the human rights of all residents in Irian Jaya (West Papua). Forum Leaders agreed to follow closely developments in the province.'

Mamberamo project threatens 35 tribes

Plans to dam the waters of the magnificent Mamberamo river, first thought up while Suharto was still in power, appear to be proceeding, after several years of delay, caused by Indonesia's economic crisis. According to a scientist, Eben Kirksey, who coordinated a World Wildlife Fund expedition to the region to study the area's biodiversity earlier this year, the river drains an area larger than England that is home to 35 nomadic tribes. Damming the river, he argues, could flood up to half the territory of West Papua.

On 2 April this year, the governor of Irian Jaya (West Papua) J.P Salossa, announced that the \$6 billion Mamberamo megaproject was proceeding 'with renewed momentum', thanks to funding from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

The dam would provide energy to fuel an immense industrial estate including metal smelting works, sawmills, agribusiness plantations and petro-chemical processing factories.

The WWF expedition travelled upstream to Iau where the

village chief told the team: 'I would rather be shot in the head than resettled.' [The Guardian, 1 August 2001] ■

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and was the subject of an urgent action entitled 'Fear of torture' by Amnesty International.

Brimob also shot dead a peasant woman, **Ester Matipoi**, 28, from Yopanggar, after accusing her of giving food to the family of the teacher, Daniel Yairus Ramar. A boy, aged 11, **Michael Numayom** was also shot dead in the same village.

Economic activity halted

Dozens of homes have been torched during sweeps and tight controls have been imposed on the daily activities of

the inhabitants. Implements that they use in their daily work, such as fishing tackle and axes, have been destroyed, leading to food shortages. Villagers now need travel passes if they want to go anywhere, and anyone who is unable to produce an identity card is held and beaten. Local markets have virtually come to a standstill since the operation began. Even so they are required to supply food several times a week for Brimob troops.

Confronted by calls for the operation to be halted, the the security forces have said that the operation will not end until the seven weapons that were seized when five members of Brimob were killed on 13 June have been recovered.

Local church leaders and human rights defenders have called for the withdrawal of Brimob from Wasior, for a halt to the atrocities perpetrated against the civilian population, for people to be compensated for the loss of homes and personal belongings, and for all those responsible for the atrocities to be called to account in a court of law.

Source: 'Crimes Against Humanity' *The truth about the Sweep and Crush Operation in Wasior, district of Manokwari.* A preliminary report by ELS-HAM, 22 August 2001. ■



Brimob's 'Sweep-and-Crush Operation'

During the past few months, West Papuans have been subjected to an increasingly brutal series of abuses, particularly in the region of Wasior. There have been killings, disappearances and torture inflicted on civilians who have fallen victim to a special operation mounted by Brimob, the special forces of the Indonesian police.

The code name of the operation, 'Sweep and Crush', means that this is intended to be a military operation against the armed resistance movement, the OPM, but the entire operation has been directed against villagers living in or near the sub-district of Wasior, in the district of Manokwari. For several months now, the region that has been sealed off to prevent church leaders and human rights activists from entering.

Brimob, the police force Mobile Brigade, is invariably the force identified as the ones responsible for the frequent abuses. Although the police force was separated from the armed forces near three years ago, in a move to civilianise the force, Brimob has earned itself a reputation, particularly in West Papua and Aceh, of being the most brutal security force in the country.

Local dispute has fatal consequences

According to a report released in August by ELS-HAM, the leading human rights NGO in Jayapura, the operation has resulted in ten summary executions, a number of disappearances and the burning of many homes.

Villagers in Wondama had been in dispute for years with a local logging firm over the amount of compensation for trees felled in their forest land. On 31 March this year, at a point when the dispute was reaching a climax, three employees of the company were shot dead during an attack by an unidentified armed gang. The murders led to the arrival in the region of Brimob units to hunt down the OPM, thought to be responsible for the attack. In an atmosphere of fear, many villagers fled their homes. Additional Brimob forces were detailed to guard all the logging companies in the area. On 3 May, Brimob seized a 22 men on their way home from Wasior to Puncak Jaya district, after attending a traditional ceremony. Six of the men were shot dead, two were seriously wounded and the others were arrested.

On 13 June, two and a half months after the first logging company was attacked, an armed gang attacked another logging company, CV Vatika Papuana Perkasa (VPP), in the village of Wondiboi, killing five members of Brimob who were on guard, and a civilian employee and seizing several guns and ammunition. Following this attack, the police force/Brimob, with the backing of the regional military command, launched *Operasi Penyisiran dan Penumpasan* (Sweep and Crush Operation) and sealed off Wasior. Many more Brimob troops were flown to the area; they appear to be the ones primarily responsible for the sweeps against the local population in their search for the OPM.

The Brimob sweeps were extended to the district of Ransiki where nine people were arrested and tortured, including a 15-year old schoolboy, **Sefnat Kawey**, who was beaten so badly he fell unconscious. He was later dragged along an asphalt road to Brimob headquarters.

Husband murdered, wife harassed

Among the many dozens of people taken into custody, was a 51-year-old primary school teacher, Daniel Yairus Ramar who died in police custody in Manokwari, two hours after he had been interrogated for the umpteenth time. The police later alleged that he had died 'of natural causes'. **Daniel Yairus Ramar**, was the head of the Council of the Tribal Wondama Community and had been severely tortured because he denied that he took part in the armed attacks in Wasior Sub-district, Manokwari District earlier in the year.

When relatives went to the hospital where his body had been taken, the police said the body could only be released for burial if they undertook not to press for accountability for the death. But relatives later said that they would not be intimidated into keeping silent.

The victim had been arrested in South Yapen, along with his wife, Amelia, and their five daughters and taken from there to Manokwari.

After his death, his wife, **Amelia Woisiri**, was subjected to heavy pressure by the security forces to confess that her husband had been involved in the armed attacks on two logging companies and to locate a gun he was alleged to own. She vehemently denied their allegations but was taken against her wishes to Nabire and warned that Brimob would

Tornado Bokway, 27, was severely beaten by eight members of Brimob and suffered swellings and bruises to his face and hand. This followed an incident when he was kicked without provocation by a drunken Brimob member, while watching a football match with two friends, and tried to fight back. The Brimob member and seven others later followed him in a truck and beat him up. He was later interrogated at the Manokwari police station and ordered to reveal the whereabouts of his two friends. This is typical of the unprovoked brutality used against Papuans by officers who seem to regard every Papuan as a potential threat.



be called in to interrogate her if she did not comply with what the police wanted her to do. She was also told that if she did not cooperate, she would end up dead like her husband. She was taken into police custody on 15 August

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Indonesia and the current world crisis

On 19 September, President Megawati Sukarnoputri went to Washington to meet President Bush for a state visit that had been agreed before the horrendous events in New York and Washington on 11 September when more than six thousand people of many nations met their deaths as the result of a heinous, terrorist attack. TAPOL joins in mourning those who were killed, while continuing to mourn the one million or more Indonesians who met their deaths as Suharto took power in 1965/1966. On that occasion, Washington gave unstinting support to Suharto and the Indonesian army to continue with this massacre and made no calls on the world community to fight terrorism - state terrorism - which might well have halted the massacre in its tracks.

By deciding to go ahead with the meeting with the Indonesian president at a time when he is building an international coalition for his 'war against terrorism', Bush evidently expected Indonesia, with the world's largest Muslim population, to stand 'shoulder-to-shoulder' with Washington as it whips up international support for his warmongering project. In the event, Megawati went no farther than to pledge 'to cooperate with the international community in combating terrorism'.

Megawati's measured response shows that she knows full well that support for Washington in Indonesia is less than enthusiastic. Many Indonesians will not forget that during the three decades of the Suharto dictatorship, all administrations in Washington kept silent about the massive, ongoing repression and grotesque human rights abuses and did nothing to halt arms supplies until undeniable facts emerged about the death and destruction in East Timor in 1999. Megawati also knows that she could face a serious backlash from Indonesian Muslims should she sign up for a war on countries with huge Muslim populations.

Cooperation on counter terrorism

The two presidents agreed to 'strengthen bilateral cooperation on counter-terrorism'. Indonesia has been plagued for more than a year by many bombings which have killed and maimed hundreds and destroyed property. The Indonesian police have shown themselves to be virtually incapable of tracking down and bringing to justice the perpetrators of these terrible crimes. She would have done better to pledge reform of the police and improve their ability to fight crime. Undoubtedly many of those responsible for these crimes have links with groups in other countries, but reports currently circulating in Indonesia that Osama bin Laden may be behind the spate of bombings stretches credulity. Still worse, they may be part of a strategy to enhance the role of Lt. General Hendropriyono who Megawati appointed to head the new State Intelligence Agency (see page 7). No doubt, some of the \$5 billion now allocated to Bush's 'war on terrorism' will find its way into this Agency's coffers and Megawati's intelligence supremo will enjoy the new prominence bestowed on his network of spies and 'intel' operatives.

It should not be forgotten that the army connived in inflaming the religious strife that has held Maluku in its grip since

early 1999. *Laskar Jihad* gangs were not prevented from going to Maluku and funds from top army commands were used to support these gangs. The credentials of the Indonesian armed forces in fighting these self-confessed Muslim extremists is less than salubrious.

Accountability for human rights abuses

Megawati made a pledge, in her statement with Bush, 'to resolve outstanding issues relating to past human rights violations, especially in conflict zones'. She asserted that 'as a state based on the rule of law, respect for human rights and freedom of religion, Indonesia recognises the importance of accountability for human rights abuses'.

TAPOL warmly welcomes this pledge. However, we know that, if she stands by this pledge, she will find herself on a collision course with numerous military officers, retired or still on active service, who must be held accountable for crimes against humanity in East Timor, in Aceh, in West Papua and in Indonesia during the Suharto regime of terror. The man she chose as Attorney General, A.M. Rahman, has a deplorable reputation for the job he now holds; he has

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