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## Open revolt against Freeport/RTZ

*Tribal people whose lands have been seized against their wishes and whose environment has been gravely damaged by the US/UK-based copper-and-gold giant, Freeport McMoRan/RTZ, took part in a three-day revolt against the company in March, after years of frustration at the total indifference of the company, the Indonesian government and the Indonesian armed forces.*

'Because Jim Bob Moffett and Freeport are deaf to our complaints and demands, because the Government continue to ignore the problems of the Amungme and Komoro people and all the other native inhabitants of Irian Jaya, we have been forced to use this kind of language to tell them what we want,' said an Amungme tribal leader, standing in the midst of hundreds of his kinsmen as they attacked a Freeport facility in Timika on 12 March.

This was on the third day of the mass revolt that shook the copper-and-gold mine to its roots, leaving millions of dollars worth of damaged and destroyed property in its wake. By all accounts, the revolt erupted spontaneously, taking not only the company but also the Indonesian armed forces completely off guard. Whatever happens in the months to come, this outpouring of pent-up fury will go down in the annals of West Papuan resistance as a landmark event.

### **Jo-Mun Nerek is shrouded in blood and gold**

Freeport's most deadly sin against the Amungme people is the sacrilege visited on the tribe's sacred mountains. Their spiritual ancestor, *Jo-Mun Nerek* lived in the mountains from where he watched over and protected the Amungme people. The Amungme believe that when they die, their spirit will find a resting place in these mountains. It has always been their profound belief that their tranquility and prosperity are secure as long as their spiritual ancestor is left undisturbed. But now the mountains belong to Freeport and have been destroyed in the search for copper and gold.

Source: Yoni, Issue No. 1, October 1995

The revolt was sparked after Wiliamus Kogoya, a Dani from Banti kampung in the village of Waa, just a short distance from the Freeport mining town, Tembagapura,

was knocked down by a vehicle driven by a Freeport employee. The injured man was badly beaten. He was presumed dead and his body was tossed into the river. Later, another Freeport employee dragged him out of the river, still alive, and rushed him to the hospital in Tembagapura. When the news reached Banti, dozens of villagers rushed to the hospital to make inquiries but were confronted by Freeport security guards. Angered by Kogoya's treatment, a scuffle broke out with the security personnel.

News of the incident spread fast down to Timika on the coast. The atmosphere grew even worse when a Papuan woman was prevented from entering the shopping mall in Tembagapura. In the fracas that followed, the child she was carrying fell to the ground and suffered cuts on the head.

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# WEST PAPUA

The next day, on 10 March, hundreds of people, young and old, living in Waa - Amungme, Dani, Moni, Nduga and Ekari, including many employed by the mining company - joined forces to march on Tembagapura. Many were armed with bows and arrows, stones, sticks and anything they could lay their hands on. A Freeport security post was the first target. Office buildings then came under attack as people broke into the premises and destroyed files, computers and other equipment. Confronted by a seething mass of angry people, the security personnel took to their heels. The mayhem continued for two hours.



*Devastation at Freeport sites in Timika*

The next day, some three thousand people returned to Tembagapura where they inflicted damage on many more buildings, including the homes of expatriate employees. Among the buildings destroyed were the government relations office, a school, living quarters, bars and restaurants and the shopping mall, all of which were completely destroyed. As the action continued, Freeport, army and government officials tried to calm things down and offered a dialogue with community leaders. In response they said the only people they wanted to meet were Freeport's chief executive officer, James R. Moffett, and President Suharto.

## **Timika and Kuala Kencana sacked**

On the third day, a crowd which had by now swelled to about six thousand people went south, some in commandeered Freeport vehicles. They split into two groups; one attacked Kuala Kencana, still known as 'New Town', and the other attacked the coastal company town of Timika. Kuala Kencana, officially inaugurated by Suharto last December, was built to accommodate the many more thousands of people needed to work for the company when its mining operations expand following enlargement of the company's concession area from 11,000 hectares to 2.6 million hectares in 1994. Construction of this town has devoured 25,000 hectares of land belonging to the Amungme and Komoro tribes, all of it seized without consultation or compensation.

First to come under attack was the main Freeport security post, after which offices were broken into and attacked. Soon, all buildings were being targeted and massive damage was inflicted on many new buildings.

From here the masses moved on to Mile 34, a satellite Freeport town where yet more offices and buildings were destroyed. As one activist told TAPOL while the action was underway, the people were 'unstoppable'. Later that day, a Crusher and a repair shop in another satellite town were torched and reduced to ashes.

Meanwhile, the other group was in Timika where they targeted the Sustainable Development Centre and the headquarters of Petrosea, a sub-contractor which handles much of the construction work for Freeport. Premises owned by sub-contractors for a company owned by Labour Minister Abdul Latief were badly damaged.

They next made for Timika airport which, like everything else in this region, belongs to Freeport. This airport was constructed by hundreds of Amungme and Komoro people who were dragooned into forced labour gangs to work for the construction company, Bechtel Pomeroy. By the time the protesters arrived, the airport was surrounded by about five hundred armed troops, making it difficult to gain access. Some did manage to breach the defences and were fired on. Two men were hit in the leg. There are contradictory reports about the damage inflicted at the airport. Some say that hangars were destroyed.

A spokesman for Freeport, Edward Pressman, said at least \$1.5 million worth of damage was inflicted on Freeport property. (The company might be understating things.)

That afternoon, two army officers visited the office of the Amungme Tribal Council, LEMASA, in Timika to hold talks. One tribal leader said: 'We are waging war on Freeport and the government which has refused to recognise our existence and has trampled on our rights.'

During the three days of mass action, it is reported that nine Freeport security personnel were seriously injured and seven local residents were arrested as ring-leaders.

## **Special troops move in**

During the first two days of the uprising, the local security forces of Freeport, the police and the territorial troops seemed incapable of controlling the protesters. By the third day, hundreds of reinforcements had been rushed in and were patrolling all the towns which had come under attack, making it difficult for the protests to continue.

The army's apparent initial reluctance to protect Freeport property may reflect military resentment towards the company which has tried, since coming under attack for involvement in large-scale human rights abuses during 1994 and 1995, to distance itself from the armed forces.

After the three-day revolt, Lieut.-General Soeyono, armed forces chief of general staff announced that a rapid deployment force battalion (PPRC) from the army's strate -

gic command, KOSTRAD, had been sent to Tembagapura to provide round-the-clock defence of the mine's diverse properties. He said that this 'vital national asset' has equipment worth \$700 million including computers which contained 'extremely valuable information', far too valuable to be left unprotected.

The revolt shut down mine in Tembagapura for three days; for several days, Papuan workers at the company refused to go back to work. In the stock market, Freeport shares came under pressure but rallied after confidence grew that this was not about to become 'another Bougainville' (where CRA's largest copper mine was forced to close after violent protests in 1989).

'In the cold light of day it is Indonesia, not Papua New Guinea. The Indonesian government, a stakeholder, sees Freeport/RTZ as one of the country's most important resource projects and will use its army to protect it, providing a measure of security which could not be counted on in PNG,' an analyst was quoted as saying. [*Sydney Morning Herald*, 14 March]

Attacks on the CRA copper mine in Bougainville, in protest against extensive pollution of the river, forced the company to close down and led to a declaration of independence from Papua New Guinea.

### **Moffett forced to confront protesters**

Chief executive Moffett was clearly rattled by the extent of the damage, when he met representatives of the Amungme people on 14 March, even breaking down at times. The outspoken Amungme woman, Josepha Alomang, vehemently attacked the company for maltreating her in detention last year and fiercely rejected the continued presence of Freeport. The atmosphere became even more charged when Andreas Anggaibak, executive director of LEMASA, said that local tribes were in agreement that 'Freeport operations should be shut down'. Later, Anggaibak was warned by Brigadier-General Prabowo, commander of KOPASSUS, who was also present at the meeting, that this would be tantamount to a declaration of war.

LEMASA presented Moffett with a series of demands which, if accepted, would significantly curtail the mine's operations. At the end of this highly-charged meeting, Moffett promised to respond in thirty days' time. The demands include ending all construction by Freeport subcontractors, disbanding the Freeport security department, dismissing some of the more obnoxious security personnel, compensation for land used by Bechtel-Pomoroy (which built the Timika airport and the Sheraton Hotel) and accepting LEMASA as the sole body to negotiate with the company regarding the use of their land.

The Jakarta-based environmental NGO, WALHI and three other organisations thought that the meeting was very unsatisfactory. It was hastily convened to halt the rioting and had done nothing to solve the basic problems which could spark yet more unrest, they said. These are: Freeport's exploitation of natural resources which *de jure* belong to the tribal people; company discrimination against local residents (one contact calls it an *apartheid* system), and the damaging environmental impact of the mining operations. The NGOs also stressed that army interference should end.

However, a couple of days later, more than twenty Amungme tribal leaders were 'escorted' to Jakarta by

## **WEST PAPUA**


Brigadier-General Prabowo - who has played such an interventionist role in recent events in West Papua - to meet top-level central government officials. They were told by Ginandjar Kartasmita, Minister for National Planning, that there was no question of Freeport ever being shut down. The contract with the company is inviolable; it would even be difficult to revise the terms of the contract, he said.

### **WALHI under attack (sub-heading)**

True to style, the military were soon looking for 'outsiders' to blame for the uprising. Freeport's public relations officer in Jakarta, Edward Pressman, revealed his true colours when he said that 'unidentified outsiders' had been roaming the area before the unrest armed with 'walky-talkies' to maintain long-distance communications - though why on earth this was suspect while Freeport's presence was not, was not explained. 'They were clearly not Amungme people,' he said, 'because they had straight hair. It's possible they were from other groups or from the OPM who are in close contact with the local community.'

The suspect 'outsider' was soon identified as WALHI, the environmentalist organisation - a member of Friends of the Earth International. The finger was pointed at Emmy Hafild, the NGO's Co-ordinator for Special Programmes. 'We're used to being accused of all kinds of things,' she told the weekly, *GATRA* [21 March] Late last year, it came to light that Freeport-McMoRan tried unsuccessfully to convince US-AID to stop funding WALHI because it objected to US tax-payers' money being used in ways harmful to 'US interests'.

Interviewed by *GATRA*, Hafild said the LEMASA Council had formulated thirty-three demands regarding Freeport which have not yet been made public because they are still under review. Summarising, she said they were that the mining company should give the Amungme people back their forests and clean up their rivers. Freeport's presence in the area had been a catastrophe for the local people who had enjoyed virtually no benefits at all. She strongly denied that she had played any role in encouraging the uprising. WALHI Director Zulkarnaen said it was an insult to the integrity of the tribal people to suggest that they were being incited by others.



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# WEST PAPUA

Freeport's managing director, Hoediatmo Hoed said that while it was true that the company had amassed great wealth, a lot of the profits went back to the Indonesian government in taxes, dividends and royalties. He too aimed a swipe at WALHI, accusing it of spreading disinformation about the company's environmental audit and even going to court to challenge its legitimacy. 'They are always attacking us,' he complained. [GATRA, 21 March]

## Numerous protests against Freeport

Freeport-Sulphur as it was then known obtained its first concession to exploit the Ertsberg mountain for copper and gold in 1967, soon after the Suharto regime enacted a new foreign investment law. This was the first foreign investment contract under Suharto's New Order, concluded so soon after the law was enacted that the company literally wrote its own contract. Since then, there have been no fewer than ten major protest actions:

1972: Fences were built round Nemangkawi in an attempt to halt the exploitation of Erstberg.

1973: Unrest erupted because local people felt humiliated by company activities. Four company employees were killed and many Amungme people were injured.

1973: Fences were erected and a base camp burnt down as the area of mining operations spread.

1977: Pipes carrying slurry down to the coast and petrol tanks were blown up by the OPM after the company started operating in an area without the people's permission.

1985: Tribal women staged a sit-in to protest an accord signed by sixteen tribal chiefs to surrender the hunting grounds of Amungme and Komoro peoples.

1985: Tribal women scattered vegetables in Timika airport after the company decided to purchase vegetables from Jayapura and Wamena, instead of using locally-grown produce.

1990: Timika airport was burnt down in protest at the construction of the Sheraton Hotel in Timika.

1993: The road leading to 'New Town' (which was re-named Kuala Kencana by Suharto last December) was blockaded, in protest at the construction of this new urban centre.

1994: The West Papuan flag was raised on Christmas Day, in protest at the expansion of Freeport's concession area from 11,000 hectares to 2.6 million hectares.

1995: Riots in Tembagapura, Kuala Kencana and Timika, following humiliating treatment by Freeport security officers.

Source: Statement by WALHI, 15 March

## Komnas HAM asked to investigate Freeport

The National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM) has agreed to visit Timika to investigate human

rights violations, following representations by a delegation from LEMASA which called for an examination of Freeport/RTZ's involvement in these abuses. In a statement to the Commission, the delegation said: 'The root of the problem is the violation of Amungme, Komoro, Dani and Ekari rights since Freeport entered Irian Jaya.' The statement also said that no fewer than seventy-seven local residents were killed by the military between July 1994 and June 1995, during operations to protect the company. This is far higher than the number of deaths documented in two major human rights reports (by ACFOA and Bishop Munninghoff) published during 1995.

Investigations carried out by Komnas HAM last year failed to look into the company's role although it endorsed the report by Bishop Munninghoff published in July which clearly implicated the company. Ever since, there has been strong pressure on the Commission to look into Freeport's role. With events in Timika having escalated so rapidly, it is likely that the Commission will carry out this mission very soon and this time it can hardly repeat its past refusal to focus on company activities. ★

*continued from page 21*


mestic law they have a right to use reasonable means in the prevention of a crime (Criminal Law Act 1967, s.3).

## Support Ploughshares Women

The women have been refused bail and are on remand at Risley Prison, near Warrington. Readers are urged to write to these four outstanding women:

Lotta Kronlid VD0087; Andrea Needham VD0088; Joanna Wilson VD0089; Angie Zelter VD0184.

HMP Remand Centre, Risley,  
617 Warrington Road,  
Risley, Cheshire, WA 6BP



From 25 - 31 March, a network of activists are organising demonstrations at all BAe sites in protest at the delivery of two BAe Hawks a month in 1996 to Indonesia. From noon on 27 March there will be a twenty-four hour vigil outside the Foreign Office in Whitehall with speakers and leafleting. The Minister of State, Jeremy Hanley, will receive a delegation of MPs and activists to talk about the export of British arms in light of the genocide in East Timor and hand over a petition of almost 20,000 signatures from concerned citizens. ★

## SECOND TAPOL OFFICE

TAPOL has established a second office in the centre of London. Address: 8 Hop Gardens, London WC2N 4EH, Tel. 0171 497 5355, Fax 0171 497 5313, email: hops@gn.apc.org

## Wainggai's death sparks protests

*The death in prison of Thomas Wainggai under mysterious circumstances sparked widespread unrest when his body arrived at the airport near Jayapura, on 18 March. Thousands turned out to pay their last respects to a very popular leader of the resistance struggle and went on the rampage after plans to carry his body to Jayapura were thwarted by the security authorities.*

Dr Tom Wainggai who worked for years as a lecturer at Cendrawasih University, Abepura, has been a well-known symbol of the struggle against the annexation of West Papua by Indonesia. On 14 December 1988, he led a flag-raising ceremony in Jayapura, supported by about a hundred followers, including a number of Protestant ministers. As they pulled down the Indonesian flag and hoisted the *Bintang Kejora*, the Morning Star, which is the West Papuan national flag, Dr Wainggai announced the proclamation of the *West Melanesian Republic*. While the ceremony was in progress at the Mandala Stadium, troops charged in and beat up many of those present.

Wainggai and most of the others present were rounded up and many were later charged with rebellion under the anti-subversion act. Wainggai was sentenced to twenty years and his wife, Teruka, was given an eight-year sentence because she had sewn the flag. Others received sentences of between two and six years for distributing song sheets and a variety of other 'offences'.

During Wainggai's trial, thousands of people mobbed the court-room, wanting to get in. There was such great interest in the event that the venue of the trial was switched away from Jayapura to keep the crowds at bay. [Details of these trials are published in several issues of *TAPOL Bulletin* during 1989.] In January 1990, Dr Wainggai and his wife were transferred from Jayapura to Jakarta. Tom was taken to Cipinang Prison and his wife to Tangerang Prison. The transfer was prompted by the fear that their presence in Jayapura could be a source of political unrest and an embarrassment for the authorities. Teruka was released in November 1993, after serving half her sentence.

### Mysterious death

The death of Tom Wainggai came as a complete surprise to everyone. He was not known to have been suffering from any chronic ailment. A few days before his death, he complained of stomach pains and, believing that his food had been tampered with, he refused all prison food from then on. His condition did not improve. A request for an examination at a Christian hospital was refused. On 14 March, as his condition continued to worsen, he was rushed to a police hospital but was dead on arrival.

A request by the family for an autopsy under the supervision of the International Red Cross was refused. According to the Cipinang Prison doctor, he died from a heart attack but few people are prepared to believe this.

### Mass protests in West Papua

Four days after he died, his body was flown to Jayapura but only after the army high command in Jakarta had tried

to prevent this. A decision at the armed forces headquarters that the burial should take place in Jakarta was resisted by the regional commander, Major-General Dunidja. Dunidja may have thought that failure to return Wainggai's body to the family residence would have caused even greater unrest than going through with the funeral in Jayapura.

What happened next shows how widespread is the support for a figure like Thomas Wainggai and how deep is the resentment against Indonesia.



*Dr. Tom Wainggai*

To greet his arrival, many hundreds of people had lined the road from Sentani airport to Jayapura. Hundreds of supporters who were waiting at the airport planned to carry the body on the 35 kilometre journey by foot. They also planned to take the hearse to Cendrawasih University in Abepura to allow colleagues there to pay their respects. However, Wainggai's coffin was quickly loaded onto a waiting ambulance and driven off at high speed, leaving the crowds disappointed and angry. As they marched to Abepura, people lining the road joined the crowd and in Abepura, hundreds of students poured out of the University, swelling the numbers to several thousands. The crowds consisted largely of young people, including many students.

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Infuriated by way their hero's body had been hijacked and distrustful of the official explanation of the cause of death, the crowds began to attack government buildings, burn vehicles and pelt shops with stones. The Abepura market where the produce of nearby transmigration sites are sold was gutted by fire; this, like most other targets was something symbolising Indonesia's unwelcome presence in West Papua. According to the Jakarta daily, *Republika*, Abepura was in the control of the protesters for an hour or more. Some protesters carried banners saying: 'OPM Freedom' or 'West Melanesia Freedom'. These slogans were also scrawled onto walls in the streets.

During the riots which lasted several hours, four people were killed and many were injured. There were also a large number of arrests.

## Thousands attend funeral

As news of the disturbances spread, the streets in Jayapura and Abepura became deserted and all business activity stopped. There was great tension in both towns as the funeral approached. Crack troops were brought in, to forestall further unrest. Lieutenant-General Soeyono, chief of general staff of the armed forces told *Republika* [20 March] that two Rapid Reaction units from KOSTRAD, the Army Strategic Command, each consisting of 108 men and two Mobile Brigade (crack troops from the police) from South Sulawesi and West Java of 128 men each were flown in to keep things under control.

Thousands of people gathered outside the Wainggai home where the funeral service was held and followed the cortege to the Kayubatu cemetery, singing hymns and songs from Serui, the birthplace of the deceased.

Meanwhile in Abepura, there were further attacks on property owned by Indonesian immigrants, though not on the scale of the previous day. Altogether about fifty people were arrested. Army spokesmen blamed 'separatists' for the troubles and said many trials would follow.

Tensions continued into the third day when markets and shops in Jayapura suddenly closed as rumours circulated that 'Molotov cocktails' had been discovered by the security forces, while in Abepura, a group hoisted the Papuan 'Morning Star' flag in defiance of the authorities.

Commenting on the unrest, Bishop Munninghoff described conditions in the region as being highly combustible and could ignite fast if doused with petrol.

## 'Another East Timor'

Commenting editorially on the situation in 'Irian Jaya', *Republika* [20 March] wrote: 'We could face yet more trouble in the coming days if, like East Timor, this most easterly province turns into an international issue. Some people think this is unlikely because Irian Jaya became part of the Republic much longer ago than East Timor but far greater caution is needed in handling the situation, and the sooner the better.'

The comparison with East Timor could be taken much farther. Nearly 35 years after Indonesia annexed West Papua, it is the younger generation that harbours deep resentment against the overwhelming Indonesian presence. ★

# Hostage crisis drags on

*As we went to press, eleven of the 26 hostages captured on 8 January by the OPM - the Free Papua Movement - were still in captivity. Meanwhile, for the first time, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on West Papua. Its President was in contact with OPM representatives to discuss the situation in the territory.*

The rapid escalation of events in West Papua - the capture of hostages, including seven foreigners, the three-day revolt in and around Tembagapura and the mass protests after the death of Dr Thomas Wainggai - is drawing ever greater international attention to the situation there. Ever since the UN handed over the territory to Indonesian administration in 1963 and endorsed the fraudulent 'Act of Free Choice' in late 1969, the international community has ignored developments there.

The hostage crisis is now into its third month. While everything suggests that the eleven remaining hostages are in good health, the OPM unit holding them clearly still wants to use the crisis to press its case for a Free West Papua as hard as it can. However, there have been many calls on the group headed by Kelly Kwalik, an Amungme, and Daniel Kogoya of the Nduga tribe, from supporters, including OPM representatives abroad, to release them immediately. The first to send such an appeal was TAPOL. We wrote to Kwalik on 26 January saying: *For the first time since West Papua was occupied by Indonesia... the name and struggle of the OPM has gained wide recognition. This is an important political asset for worldwide ef-*

*forts to make the question of West Papua better understood and supported.'*

On 1 February, the London-based West Papua Forum issued a similar plea: *The Forum believes that their immediate release would be conducive to creating a better understanding in Britain and throughout the world of the tragic difficulties... confronted by the people of West Papua since their country was annexed in 1963.'*

Initially mediation efforts by churchmen under army supervision led nowhere. Kwalik would have nothing to do with the army and indicated that he would respond to mediation by the International Red Cross (ICRC). This was not an option favoured by the military who were almost certainly responsible for the delay in involving the international agency. Finally, on 9 February, the ICRC sent a team of senior officials to the area to take over negotiations and it has remained there ever since. The army chief-of-staff, General Hartono, has complained bitterly several times about what he describes as 'international interference' but it is clear that the ICRC role is backed by the western governments whose citizens (four Britons and two Dutch) are being held. With the help of local tribal contacts, ICRC officials established contact with the OPM and were able to

arrange for the hostages to have medical check ups. Supplies of food and other essentials are being provided and the condition of the hostages is known to be satisfactory, including the Dutch woman, Martha Klein, who is pregnant.



*Kelly Kwalik in Amungme village photo Ben Bohane*

At Kwalik's request, the ICRC visited an OPM representative in Papua New Guinea, Moses Werror, who agreed to issue an instruction for the hostages' release. But the Werror message has so far failed to end the stalemate.

On 18 March, after the death of Thomas Wainggai, a Papuan hostage named Abraham Wainggai, nephew of the dead man, was unexpectedly released and handed over to the ICRC. He said the eleven hostages were all in good health and had borne up well to the ordeal, even during the first couple of weeks when they were moved to different locations in the jungle almost every day. Disregarding the army's wishes that the released hostage should be taken to Wamena and handed over to the military, the ICRC took

*continued from page 17*

clampdown on the so-called 'Warsidi' sect in February 1989 when dozens of people were shot dead. After years of neglect, Mulyadi was charged under the anti-subversion law and more than a dozen witnesses were heard. After several weeks however, the prosecutor decided that the evidence was insufficient for a conviction and announced that all the charges were being withdrawn. The judge abandoned the trial and allowed the man to walk free.

No doubt too stunned by his sudden release, Mulyadi has said nothing about suing the government for compensation, but lawyers from the Legal Aid Institute insist that the initiative should come from the law enforcement agency or from the prosecutor. However, a comment by the most senior law enforcement official suggests that Mulyadi will have a hard time getting any recompense for the years he spent in detention. Commenting on the case in Parliament, Attorney General Singgih claimed that Mulyadi had

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him to Timika for a medical examination before returning him to his family.

Clearly the major obstacle to the releases is the huge build-up of troops in the area in the past couple of months. Reinforcements were flown into the region where the kidnapping took place, despite army assurances that they were taking the 'persuasive' approach. People in the vicinity of Mapnduma are known to fear military reprisals against them, either as part of an operation to 'rescue' the hostages or as retribution after the hostages have been released. The recollection of the army's retaliation in 1977 when hundreds of villagers were slaughtered after an OPM attack on Freeport slurry pipes is still very much on people's minds.

Following revolts in March around the copper-and-gold mine and in Jayapura, yet more troops have been brought in, a situation that is hardly conducive to creating an atmosphere of safety for everyone concerned.

### European Parliament resolution

The substantive paragraphs of the first ever resolution adopted by the European Parliament at its session in March on the question of West Papua read as follows:

1. Calls for the immediate release of the hostages,
2. Urges the Indonesian army to remove its troops as a step in the release of the hostages and under no circumstances take military action,
3. Calls for international monitoring of this process to ensure the safety of the hostages and the Papuan villagers, and supports in particular the continuing presence of Dutch and British official observers in the region,
4. Calls for the continuation of the initiative of its President by immediately sending a delegation of the Parliament to monitor the human rights situation during and after the eventual release of the hostages, in close cooperation with the representatives of the member states in Jakarta,
5. Asks its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Indonesian Government and the Free Papua Movement.

★

been freed 'not because he was mistakenly arrested but because there was insufficient evidence' to obtain a guilty verdict. [*Kompas*, 3 February]

### Soldiers to be charged for Nipah killings

Nearly three years after four people were shot dead while they were protesting against the seizure of land in Nipah, on the island of Madura, in September 1993, the East Java military commander has announced that three soldiers will face court martial for their role in the incident. A police officer will also be charged but the army officer who was the district chief at the time, Bagus Hinayana is not being charged although he may be called as a witness. At the time of the protest, the land was being measured up in preparation for the construction of a dam without having first obtained the consent of the land-owners.

★



## The Suharto empire called Indonesia

*Long-lasting dictatorships create their own personal style. After thirty years of Suharto rule, nepotism has reached unprecedented levels. In the last few months Suharto has been at the centre of scandal after scandal, upsetting even his closest political and economic buddies.*

Cronyism is an integral part of the rise and fall of dictators. The downfall of Asian dictators like Marcos and Chun Do Hwan/Roh Tae Woo are good examples. Having achieved political and economic with the help of cronies, cronyism eventually becomes the Achilles' heel. Cronies become rivals while the opposition grows in popularity as the scandals multiply.



Suharto is heading towards a similar debacle, having alienated many of his political cronies, including many army officers, while ditching old business cronies to enhance the fortunes of the business empires of his own family. His highly personalised dictatorship is creating disaffection in business circles. Here are some recent examples of Suharto's nepotism.

### The Timor car venture

In March, Tommy, Suharto's youngest son, stunned the business world with the launch of a new car called the *Timor Sedan*. Of course, the name has nothing to do with Jakarta's nagging diplomatic headache. Tommy disarmingly claimed that *Timor* was chosen because it stands for *Teknologi Industri Mobil Rakyat* (People's Car Technol-

ogy), to be produced by his innocently named company *PT Timor Putra Nasional* (Timor National Son).

There may be nothing special about running a car factory; after all, Suharto family businesses range from toll roads to publishing, shipping to television stations and chemical plants to hotels. But what is special about this venture is that it will be exempted from paying duties on component imports and from the luxury tax. Helped along by Daddy, Tommy Suharto's *Timor* cars will sell for 35 million rupiahs (about US\$15,000), half the price of other middle-range cars whose prices are hugely inflated by taxes and import duties.

Minister for Trade and Industry Tungki Ariwibowo awarded Tommy Suharto the title of 'Industrial Pioneer' and declared the *Timor* Car, still only available as a prototype, the 'National Car'.

In fact this 'national' car is basically Korean, produced by KIA, third in line among car makers in Korea, and assembled in Cikampek, West Java. As things stand at present, 20 per cent of the components will be made in Indonesia, rising to 60 per cent after three years. Most cars produced in Indonesia are Japanese (Toyota, Mitsubishi and Suzuki), with smaller shares for US, European, Australian and Korean models. The *Timor* venture will shake the car market to its foundations, hitting the Japanese car industry particularly hard. We have certainly not heard the last of the *Timor* scandal.

### Bambang's chemical plant

Another major scandal concerns the protection granted to *PT Chandra Asri*, Indonesia's largest petrochemical plant. Since the start, the company has lurched from scandal to scandal, violating every conceivable law. Although the huge polyolefin company, worth almost US\$2 billion, is a joint venture between Bambang Suharto, two businessmen Prayogo Pangestu and Henry Pribadi and Japanese capital, it was declared a 100 per cent foreign investment by President Suharto, protecting it from a variety of laws and regulations. In 1994, when the plant started producing, the government said *Chandra Asri* would receive no protection and would have to compete in the open market. But the company was losing money, with polyolefin from South Korea and Taiwan selling at much lower prices. So Suharto had to do something to protect his family business interests.

By decree in February, a 20 per cent import tax was imposed on ethylene and propylene imports (on top of an earlier 5 per cent), shielding Bambang's company from foreign competition. Another son, Sigit Suharto, is the leading producer of polyethylene household wares. No doubt, the Indonesian consumer will soon have to foot the bill in higher prices for plastic pails, cups and so on.

## The Suharto foundations

Jakarta watchers often describe the foundations run by President Suharto as one of the main ingredients of his rule. In a patron-client society, loyalty to Suharto is handsomely rewarded. Through his foundations Suharto has created loyalty structures, buying up people's loyalty. Since the fifties when he was still the regional commander in Central Java, Suharto has relied on this; he has had plenty of time to perfect the system.

His three main foundations or *yayasans* are Supersemar, Dharmais and Dakab. While foundations are supposed to be non-profit-making bodies, the Suharto dynasty has used them as the launching-pad for their business ventures, thereby strengthening Suharto's power base. The three foundations own 90 per cent of the Bank Duta shares, one of the largest private banks in Jakarta. They also hold a major stake in Nusamba Group, a trust consisting of 43 companies. The *yayasans* also invest in real estate and own high rise buildings in the most expensive districts of the Jakarta business area. Although the foundations adopt social objectives, they function primarily as business enterprises.

The way Suharto lays his hands on funds for his *yayasans* is a story in itself. Monthly contributions are deducted from the wages of civil servants to finance the foundations, while government decrees have further inflated revenues. In 1983 the Finance Minister decreed that 5 per cent of banking profits should go to the Supersemar and Dharmais foundations.

The biggest foundation, Dharmais, with a cash flow of Rp 900 billion (US\$ 400 million), has invested in shares and in the currency market and owns a hospital specialising in cancer treatment. Practically the entire first family and their cronies sit on the boards which are all chaired by Suharto. The money that trickles down to the population projects President Suharto as a benefactor. The Supersemar foundation handles education and scholarships. As chair, it is Suharto who grants the scholarships. By funding the construction of mosques and churches, the Dakab foundation projects the President as the greatest dispenser of charity. Dakab also finances the ruling party Golkar, with each provincial branch receiving enough money to be able to live on the interest.

## Yayasan Dana Sejahtera Mandiri

A new foundation came into being at the end of 1995, the *Yayasan Dana Sejahtera Mandiri (YDSM)*, set up by Presidential Decree, Kepres No.90/1995. Its revenue will come from companies earning more than 100 million rupiahs annually which are obliged to transfer two per cent of their profits to the *YDSM* account. All the mega business tycoons, Liem Sioe Liong, Sudwikatmono, Bambang Suharto, Eka Tjipta Widjaya, Bob Hasan and Prayogo Pangestu, sit on the board, with Suharto in the chair. In its first year, *YDSM* will collect an estimated 400 to 500 billion rupiahs, rising to 700 or 800 billion rupiahs a year later.

In 1990 Suharto had an historic meeting at his Tapos ranch with leading business tycoons. He appealed to the business world to channel 25 per cent of their profits to co-operatives. Some of the tycoons went along with the idea but considered the levy preposterous. Moreover, the majority of Indonesian co-operatives are in very bad shape, functioning as nothing more than extensions of government institutions. Five years later the tycoons met again at a

## POLITICAL ECONOMY

Pancasila refresher course where Eka Tjipta Widjaya, the paper and pulp tycoon, came up with the brilliant idea of contributing 2 per cent of his profits to the fight against poverty. President Suharto seized on the idea and within days, a Presidential Decree had been proclaimed.

The stated objective of the new foundation is to help millions of Indonesians who live below the poverty line, according to official figures, some 11.5 million. No one seems to know how the money will be distributed to the poor but it will be left Suharto to decide.


There have been many complaints. Public joint ventures will have to tell their shareholders about the 'disappearing' 2 per cent. Aberson Sihaloho, an outspoken MP from the PDI, argues that the presidential decree is in breach of Article 27 of the constitution which states that people have the right to a decent life. He dismissed the idea that people should give charity to the poor as 'bullshit'. Eradicating poverty, he argues, should be dealt with through the state budget, not through charitable *yayasans*.

## Aviation powerhouse

Much has been written about IPTN, Indonesia's aircraft industry. Rudy Habibie's technological dream, shared by Suharto, is to create an Indonesian aviation powerhouse. State funds available for IPTN seem to be unlimited; its latest venture, the turbo-prop commuter 70-seater N-250 plane has gobbled up more than \$1 billion and is losing money. The N-250, already on the market, is seriously flawed. It is overweight, the rails holding the wing flaps are warped, it leaked oil during its maiden flight and some of the controls in the cockpit are in physically uncomfortable places. IPTN has set up a new US\$120 million unit on an

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# POLITICAL ECONOMY

old military air base in Alabama. While Alabama is only too happy to receive Asian investments, Habibie hopes to create an opening in the US market for his middle-range aircraft.

In the meantime Habibie has moved on and has designed plans to manufacture a 130-seater commuter plane, the N-2130. Again Suharto has come to the rescue. This time the state budget will not be robbed but a new company will be set up, chaired by Suharto. Others on the board are former vice-presidents ret'd General Umar Wirahadikusumah and ret'd General Sudharmono, Minister of State Saadillah Mursyid and top bureaucrats like Giri Soeseno and Rahardi Ramelan.



*The Suharto dynasty (without grandchildren)*

## Political arm twisting

This new company is called *PT Dua Satu Tiga Puluh* (*DSTP*, Two One Thirty), which stands for '2 pilots, 1 mechanic, 3 cabin crew and 130 passengers'. The project will cost US\$2 billion so Suharto had to look for the money somewhere. Some of his favourite Indonesian-Chinese businessmen were, as always, ready to chip in, including Prayogo Pangestu and others. So far, 55 ethnic Chinese tycoons have been approached and have come up with half the \$400 million capital outlay. The 'generous' Prayogo Pangestu received ample reward from Suharto, a 20 per cent surcharge on imported polyolefins (see above). Observers say that *DSTP* is basically a fund-raising company, and barely differs from an earmarked tax as was the case with previous IPTN projects. It is doubtful whether this new enterprise will ever become economically viable. But as long as Suharto remains in power, aviation dreams will continue to be a political priority.

## Other crumbs

Suharto's nepotism barely distinguishes between what is private and what is public. A friendly gesture from neighbouring Malaysia led to a barter deal to trade N-250 planes for the Proton, the Malaysian-made car. The first 100 Protons arrived in Jakarta and were immediately given to a new taxi company run by eldest daughter Tutut Suharto. Although for several years, no new taxi licenses have been issued by the municipal authorities, an exception was made for the first family.

Another scandal that made it to the foreign business pages was about grandson Ari Sigit Suharto, a jetsetter who visits Jakarta discos every night. He is the son of eldest son Sigit Suharto. The 26-year old Ari is already a well established businessman, involved in hotels, the distribution of urea tablets, trading in delicacies like bird's nests and imported traditional Chinese medicines. But the scandal concerned the labelling of beer and other alcoholic beverages. As in most countries, a small levy is charged on alcoholic drinks. Ari Sigit Suharto's company managed to obtain permission in several provinces to impose a levy on top of the official one, a so-called private tax 'to prevent alcoholism'. Consumers in Bali were suddenly paying between Rp 600 and Rp 1000 extra, an easy way to get rich without lifting a finger.

Beer producers and distributors protested and stopped selling beer in Bali. The scandal made headline news for days, in particular, reports that foreign tourists were buying more expensive import beers. Finally President Suharto had to step in and halt the levy. Grandson Ari will now have to find other ways of making a quick buck. He is learning fast from his uncles. The bird's nest trade has been turned into a monopoly with Ari as chair. Other grandchildren Dendy, Danti and Dani (Tutut's offspring) and Retno and Seto (Ari's younger sister and brother) have also been launched on their careers as business(women). The national cake gets smaller by the day with second generation Suharto kids grabbing their share. ☆



*continued from page 13*

many women's health groups say that it should never be used by a woman who does not have quick access to good emergency health care (a rare situation for Indonesian women). The report also does not discuss the potential health risks of Norplant and Depo-Provera even when properly used, nor of the very new and very worrying Cyclofem, an "anti-pregnancy vaccine" which prevents conception by working on the woman's immune system. As is common with contraception methods whose use is funded in the Third World by large donor agencies, Cyclofem has not been satisfactorily tested for safety and side effects. It is true that giving women informed choice means that they have the right to use any contraceptive method they choose when provided with full information. But the reality of the choice is surely undermined, not only by the lack of information, but by the decision of agencies like the World Bank to fund these forms of contraception specifically.

This report also does not discuss in detail the extensive reports of "economic coercion", and includes only a few paragraphs on East Timor. It is clear that the writers felt they did not have the resources to do the research necessary to look into this very particular and disturbing situation and were able to make only the most general comments -- although elsewhere, and interestingly, they note, with reference to Aceh, that "ABRI Masuk Desa, the armed forces community service program, is especially active in areas where there is a basis of opposition to the government". ☆

# Suharto's praetorian guards

*The careers of Prabowo and Wiranto are bright. Last year Prabowo was promoted to brigadier-general and appointed KOPASSUS commander. Wiranto was recently appointed KOSTRAD commander with the rank of Lt.-General. These two commands, with the best trained soldiers, are now in the hands of Suharto stalwarts, a clear sign that Suharto is preparing for a seventh term.*

Prabowo, 44, has impeccable credentials to reach the top. First and foremost he is the favourite son-in-law of the President; he married Siti Hediati Suharto in 1983. None of Suharto's three sons pursued a military career, making Prabowo the only military man in the next Suharto generation and the darling of Tien Suharto. In the early eighties he joined the prestigious Detachment 81, a special unit of red berets to protect the President. This was also when he met his future wife.

Prabowo is not from a military family; his father is a well-known professor of economics and he grew up abroad, in Malaysia, the UK and the US. It was quite exceptional for the young Prabowo to enter the military academy in 1970 instead of pursuing an academic career. He was determined to become a model soldier and joined the red beret forces, now called *Kopassus* (*Komando Pasukan Khusus*, Special Troops Command). He graduated in 1974 with the rank of second lieutenant and was soon sent to fight in Timor.



*Suharto kissing favourite son-in-law Prabowo*

## The killing of Nicolau Lobato

Prabowo is an old Timor hand, having served many years in Timor. In fact East Timor has become one of Prabowo's obsessions. He concocted several intelligence schemes to destroy the strong clandestine front in East Timor. Prabowo troops have been identified as being responsible for many brutalities against the Timorese, in raids, mass arrests and summary executions. He also created his own infrastructure of Timorese, mostly former Apodeti members, for the purpose of 'using Timorese to fight Timorese'. In one operation in the early eighties, he was almost killed and was flown back to Jakarta for treatment. For several years thereafter, he avoided East Timor.

He has also adopted several Timorese war orphans and paid for their education. Prabowo has served four lengthy stints in East Timor, as well as shorter stints like being responsible for security during the Pope's visit to East Timor. Prabowo's presence in East Timor has always been high profile, leaving a trail of victims. As a combat soldier Prabowo was also involved in combat operations in West Papua and Aceh.

In 1979, in the worst period of suffering for the East Timorese, Prabowo commanded *Nanggala 28*, the special Kopassus squad which ambushed Nicolau Lobato, president of Fretilin. After this major success for the Indonesian army, the Indonesian Commander-in-Chief General Yusuf flew to Dili to congratulate First Lieutenant Prabowo and his men. Prabowo received a special promotion. In other military campaigns, Prabowo captured Guido Soares, a Falintil commander, Somotxo, a Fretilin Central Committee member and Koliman another important guerrilla commander.

## A model combat soldier

Throughout his long military career, Prabowo has never served as a territorial soldier, only as a combat soldier, mostly in Kopassus with the exception of a six-year stint in *Kostrad* (Strategic Reserve Command), the other elite military outfit. *Kostrad* consists of two elite divisions designed for rapid deployment. The *Kostrad* divisions are undoubtedly the best equipped in Indonesia, ready for dispatch to any part of Indonesia at short notice, air-lifted complete with tanks, armoured cars, helicopters and combat squads. They are capable of dealing with internal 'unrest' with the minimum of delay. Together with Kopassus, the two units are called *Kotama* (from *Komando Utama*, Prime Command). Under *Kotama* there is a special unit called *Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat* (*PPRC*, Rapid Deployment Force) along the same lines as the US Rapid Deployment Force or Britain's SAS units.

In 1988 and 1989 Prabowo commanded *Kostrad* battalion 328 which was awarded as the foremost battalion in the country. Unlike most military officers, Prabowo is a more studious type, often called a bookworm. He is depicted in the press as being very popular with his soldiers. During special operations Prabowo treats his men generously with large sums of money to compensate for the tough life. Money is no problem, his wife, like all her siblings, being a successful businesswoman.

## Prabowo destined for high office?

With Suharto's personalised rule [see article on Suharto's nepotism] Prabowo's career is secure. Prabowo is far ahead of his fellow graduates, the only one of his class of 74 to have reached the rank of general. Other outstanding officers from his class are Colonel Mahidin Simbolon (now military commander in East Timor), Colonel Syafrie

Syamsudin (commander in Bogor) and Colonel Ryamizard (commander in Palembang).

But more interesting are Prabowo's non-military duties. He has recently been busily flying between Jakarta, Jayapura and Wamena, first to co-ordinate military actions for the release of the hostages in Mapnduma [see separate article], and later flew in when demonstrators took over Timika and Tembagapura for three days [see separate article].

## Prabowo, the politician

In the first weeks of the hostage affair Brig.-General Prabowo flew to Wamena to co-ordinate the actions of the military, giving press conferences, co-ordinating contacts between missionaries and the OPM and so on. He was acting not merely as a military commander but on the orders of his father-in-law. Prabowo made it clear he was pursuing a strategy to negotiate the release of the hostages, in line with the wishes of the German, Dutch and British governments whose citizens had been kidnapped. When the hostage affair dragged on, Prabowo returned to Jakarta, leaving the crisis to Major-General Dunidja, the territorial commander.

He was back again after the Timika riots. The Freeport/RTZ investment is of paramount importance for the US and the Suharto government. Again, Prabowo was fulfilling a non-military mission. He was there when the locals presented their grievances to the Freeport chief, and took 22 tribal chiefs to Jakarta for meetings with cabinet ministers, in an effort to get them to tone down their demands and find accommodation with Freeport and the government. Increasingly, it seems Prabowo will take his orders from Bina Graha, the President's office, and not from Cilangkap (armed forces headquarters).

## Wiranto, the loyal adjutant

The other officer whose career is on the up and up is three-star General Wiranto, just appointed Kostrad commander. Wiranto, 49, graduated from AMN, the military academy, in 1968. He started his military career as an infantryman and after serving in different territorial commands in intelligence, logistics and operations, he became Kostrad Infantry Brigade 9 chief-of-staff in 1985. He remained with the command until 1989 when he became Suharto's adjutant for four years, a crucial period which determined his future career. In April 1993 he became chief-of-staff of the Jakarta Military Command. Eighteen months later, he became the commander in Jakarta and in March this year was appointed Kostrad commander with the rank of Lt.-General.

Wiranto is a typical officer in the Suharto mould. Toughness, ruthlessness and loyalty to Suharto have brought Wiranto to the top. His language is uncompromising. His last statement as military commander of Jakarta is typical: "*Those who want to disturb the elections will be wiped out (akan dihabisi)*".

## Two types of military

The average Indonesian officer sees himself as protector of the nation. But these days there is a gap between officers like Wiranto and Prabowo who are set on defending

the status quo, keeping Suharto at the helm and others who feel increasingly uncomfortable about suppressing workers, peasants or students who are making just demands.

Military analysts draw a distinction between *ABRI Merah-Putih* (ABRI red-and-white, the Indonesian flag) and *ABRI Cendana* (the President's ABRI, Cendana being his residence). In 1995 there were no fewer than five reshuffles within ABRI and in 1996, there have already been three major reshuffles. Many bright *ABRI Merah-Putih* officers have been packed off into retirement or as ambassadors. Suharto's obsession these days is to replace officers which are a potential threat to his rule.

## Political significance

It is a public secret that Suharto doesn't get along with many senior officers. The old alliance between General Suharto and ABRI, the armed forces, fell apart in the eighties. His last military stalwart was General Benny Murdani but in 1987 the relationship turned sour. General Murdani was removed and since then, the Murdani gang, mostly men with intelligence and/or Kopassus antecedents, were removed. These days Suharto relies on adjutants or officers with a sense of absolute loyalty towards their superiors. The present ABRI top brass is a mixture of the two tendencies: loyalty and/or former adjutants. The president has the final say in the appointment of officers. Lately differences came into the open when appointments proposed by Minister of Defence General Edi Sudradjat were rejected by the president.

The period up to the general elections in 1997 will be crucial. The political climate is heating up and all the signs are that Suharto will stand for another term. The appointment of Prabowo and Wiranto at the helm of the Kotama units is the clearest signal that Suharto wants this. He is bent on removing any obstacle, especially now that dissident voices within the armed forces are becoming more vocal.



The political situation has changed drastically in the last five years. Although civilian democracy is still far off, opposition to Suharto rule is gaining momentum. The promotion of officers like Wiranto and Prabowo goes both ways. While Suharto seems to have strengthened his position, discontent within military ranks is bound to grow. The civilian opposition is also watching closely to see which general is on which side of the fence. ★

## Family planning programme criticised

*In July last year, the New York-based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and the Indonesian NGO, ELSAM (Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy), published a report assessing several Indonesian projects, including the handling of the World Bank-financed Kedung Ombo dam. The following summarises their assessment of Indonesia's Family Planning Programme.*

In November, some months after this document appeared, a government minister accused NGOs at home and abroad of disseminating false information about Indonesia's family planning programme, and lobbying international agencies to stop funding Indonesia. [*Jakarta Post*, 16 November 1995] Although Ginandjar Kartasasmita, Minister for National Planning, did not name the NGOs, this is clearly the document to which he was referring. He even accused the NGOs in question of trying to destabilise the country. 'Criticism and sabotage are two different things.... Preventing aid means sabotaging the country's development,' he claimed.

The report looks briefly at reproductive health issues, the right to information, and reports of coercive practices in family planning. Most examples come from West Java, where implementation has been best monitored by NGOs and independent researchers.

### 'Structurally determined coercion'

Some frightening examples of more or less coercive practices are revealed. In 1988, women were locked in a village hall to "persuade" them to accept contraception, and later women were allegedly held at gunpoint until they agreed to the insertion of an IUD. These are less common than cases of "subtle coercion", often through social pressure. But the report concludes that the most serious problem is what they call "structurally determined coercion", relying on paternalism and on programmes which "take the form of commands rather than requests and offers" -- and which are frequently carried out by military officials.

The heavy involvement of ABRI in the family planning programme is one of the most obvious and serious barriers to the ability of women to make a free and informed choice about contraception. In a military dictatorship like Indonesia, women would find it difficult to refuse contraception urged upon them by ABRI personnel, even if they are supposed to be part of the "community services" and even if no overt coercion is involved. The report's strongest recommendation on the family planning programme is that ABRI involvement be eliminated or reduced to a minimal role of providing transportation and infrastructure.

The report also notes that, although the policy-makers in the Family Planning Ministry say their programmes are no longer target-based, the personnel who implement the programmes are still thinking above all in terms of targets. Whether this is the influence of the "military mentality" at the lower levels, or whether the Ministry never intended their rhetoric to be implemented in practice, is an open question.

The report also concludes that most Indonesian women lack the most basic information about different contraceptive techniques, how they work, and possible side effects. The family planning officials rarely provide such information, and there are almost no alternative sources, and for women who live outside big cities, there are none at all.

### Norplant removals not provided for

With regard to the Norplant programme, adequate follow-up of acceptors to ensure that implants are removed after five years simply does not exist. This is potentially a serious health threat, as the women with exhausted implants may not be aware that their contraception is no longer effective, and will probably be at greater risk of ectopic pregnancy, a condition which can be fatal. It is true that the link between the continued use of an exhausted implant, and ectopic pregnancy, is not confirmed, but there is sufficient evidence to make the lack of follow-up care very worrying.

It should be noted that this report is in some respects quite conservative, particularly with regard to reproductive health issues. It should be a matter of concern that the "more effective" contraceptive methods favoured by the Indonesian government and by the World Bank (which funds Norplant and IUDs specifically) are also by a long shot the more dangerous -- indeed, the IUD, though less "experimental", may be the most dangerous of all, and

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# Seven days interrogation

*Tongris Situmorang worked at a Nike shoe-factory in Serang, West Java until five months ago when got involved in an action to demand better wages and conditions in the factory. The result: Tongris was sacked, held in a room at the plant and interrogated for seven days by local military officers.*

The military wanted to know more about his labour activities and whether people from outside had incited the workers. Tongris and another 22 workers went on strike for higher wages and better food. The factory was paying the official minimum wage of 4,600 rupiahs, a meagre US\$1.97 a day. Tongris said: "They told us not to demand anything. They said we wouldn't get any more money. But I have sued the company to get my job back".

## Globalisation of the economy

A common strategy employed by many companies in Europe and the US is to sub-contract production. Nike, the US shoe giant, is notorious for its use of sub-contractors. Practically all Nike plants in Asia are owned by South Koreans, notorious for their maltreatment of workers. Predictably, the Nike parent company in the US said they knew nothing about the Tongris Situmorang case. They explained that each Nike sub-contractor was required to adhere to a code of conduct drawn up by Nike which frequently inspects sub-contractors' operations, including treatment of the labour force and working conditions.

Parent companies like Nike have made a deliberate choice in setting up businesses in Indonesia, attracted by cheap labour and promises by the Indonesian government not to allow strikes. Dusty Kidd, Nike's head of communications, said: "We can't dictate to governments how they run their labour laws". As he puts it, it's better to work in a shoe factory than not to have a job at all.

More than 5,000 workers produce for Nike in Indonesia. The contrast is stark: the upmarket Nike Pegasus Air which retails for US\$100 a pair in the high streets costs US\$2.25 to produce.

## Pungli strongly affect wages

The Indonesian economy is known to be a high-cost economy. Despite the low wages, manufacturers in neighbouring Malaysia can produce more cheaply. The average wage of a Malaysian worker is four times his colleague in Indonesia. Everybody, including President Suharto, knows where the problem lies. It is called *pungli* (*pungutan liar*, wild or illegal levies). Everybody in Indonesia has to deal with *pungli*, including the first family and cabinet ministers. It is a way of life, or endemic, as Indonesia watchers say.

Indonesia's lack of competitiveness became such a matter of concern that President Suharto decided to instruct his labour minister to get rid of a whole range of *pungli* within his department. A number of studies have shown that wages account for at most 9 per cent of the total costs of a manufacturing company. Three times as much is 'spir-



*Pengusaha=Entrepreneur, Bagian Laba=Part of Profit, Pungutan=Levy, Buruh=Worker from:Surabaya Pos 4 Febr. 1996*

ited away' in *pungli*. According to SBSI leader Mochtar Pakpahan, illegal levies account for between 25 to 30 per cent of a company's costs. His figures are confirmed by Aburizal Bakrie, chair of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and also a successful businessman. He came out with the figure of 27 per cent of production costs siphoned off in *pungli* but refused to say whether the figure applied to one of his own companies. The bottom line is obvious: the higher the *pungli*, the less there is to pay the workers.

## Official and unofficial *pungli*

To make matters worse, there are official and unofficial *pungli*. 'Unofficial *pungli*' are usually known as *uang silyuman* (phantom money) which includes bribes to local officials for licenses, smear money to obtain bank credit and protection money for the local military command. The 'official *pungli*' is as complex, and includes levies to civil servants like health inspectors, hazard controllers or contributions towards national holiday celebrations. Labour Minister Abdul Latief admitted that there were 37 official *punglis* in his department, all levied by virtue of ministerial

decrees. The meagre wages earned by civil servants has made official *pungli* a source of extra income.

The dividing line between official and unofficial levies is thin. Many licenses, identity cards and passports are valid for one or two years only, bringing in more money for officials every time documents have to be renewed. A new passport costs Rp. 75,000 (about £25) but few people acquire a passport at that price. The more you pay, the quicker the passport will be issued. Those who don't pay the extra may have to wait forever.

### ***Pungli* causes a bus strike**

Bus and mini-bus drivers also have to pay *pungli* at bus terminals. During the week before the Muslim New Year, the pressure on public transport is intense. Most people return home for the festival, overloading the trains and buses. Officials at the bus terminals trebled their fees. In Tulungagung, East Java the bus drivers and conductors decided to go on strike in protest. Usually what happens is that a company 'rents' its buses to a crew for a fee. If the company has to pay more levies, the fees go up. Although bus drivers can increase the fare, intense competition makes this difficult.

Hundreds of transport workers from the Putera Jaya Company decided to stop work. They parked their vehicles along the main road in front of the bus terminal creating a huge traffic jam. Several vital bus routes Trenggalek-Tulungagung-Blitar and Blitar-Kediri-Nganjuk were deserted. The strike lasted for three days and the situation

*continued from back page*

ing party GOLKAR started electioneering months ago, even though, according to the election law, campaigning is supposed to be limited to a few weeks before polling day. In the circumstances, the two other parties permitted to contest seats, PDI and PPP, recently decided to hold their own rallies and public gatherings.

In the next twelve months, political life in Indonesia is certain to be swept along by an election fever during which anti-GOLKAR sentiments are expected to gather momentum, particularly among younger, first-time voters. The supremacy of GOLKAR has never been in doubt in the five elections under the New Order but 1997 is likely to be different. Another important factor is the succession. Although Suharto is still coy about saying whether he will stand for a seventh term, everything points in that direction, but anti-Suharto feelings are growing by the day, even among the affluent middle class.

### **The GOLKAR-ABRI relationship**

Ever since Suharto took power, there has been a special relationship between ABRI, the armed forces, and GOLKAR which was created by the army in the early sixties to counter the growing influence of the PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party. In 1969, by which time Suharto had installed himself as President, it was decided to use GOLKAR as the armed forces' election machine.

Since then GOLKAR, with strong army backing, has enjoyed special privileges at election time, just like the communist parties in the former Soviet Union and China. Especially in the countryside villagers were under enormous pressure from the local military to vote for GOLKAR with the result that it always 'won' with around seventy per cent of the vote. Not quite a one-party system but the re-

## **LABOUR**

returned to normal only after the *pungli* rate was reduced.

### **6000 workers on strike in glass factory**


Workers' unrest usually escalates when Idul Fitri, the Muslim New Year, approaches. The workers are entitled to an annual bonus but are often disappointed because the management delays payment or pays less than the amount agreed. The 6,000 workers of PT Mulia Industrindo exploded on 6 February when they realised that the management had deducted a tax from their bonus. The company which is located in Bekasi, the industrial belt of Jakarta, produces glassware and ceramics.

Strike action quickly escalated when negotiations with the management broke down. The action, the biggest strike so far in 1996, continued on the next day when another demand was brought forward, to reinstate Heri, a worker who had been sacked the day before. Their anger was such that they pelted the windows of the offices and the car park with stones. Then the workers went outside the gate and started to demonstrate in the streets. Combined police and military platoons stepped in and chased the workers. Tear gas was thrown and the police fired warning shots. Four workers were arrested, two for stone throwing and two as the leaders of the strike. The head of the Bekasi manpower department Amar Samsurdja said that the action had been "misused by elements who claim to be from SBSI". ★

sults were always predictable.

In the eighties, a rift between the president and ABRI generals affected GOLKAR. Rather than being the ruling party it came to be seen as the party of the ruler. During the 1992 elections some sections of ABRI were less than enthusiastic about GOLKAR with the result that it lost 17 seats in the national parliament, with 68 per cent of the vote, instead of 72 per cent, which was seen as something of a calamity. General Wahono who chaired GOLKAR at the time was ditched by Suharto and replaced by Harmoko, the Minister of Information. For the first time a civilian took over as the chair of GOLKAR.

As the 1997 elections draw near, the divisions within ABRI regarding GOLKAR are likely to escalate. The Suharto loyalist wing will do everything it can to secure the kind of victory GOLKAR enjoyed during the seventies and eighties while others in ABRI will stay neutral, with potentially devastating results. As these rifts deepen, the role of KIPP in paving the way for a shift towards democracy could turn out to be quite significant. ★





## New wave of Muslim trials

*Almost unnoticed by the public and hardly reported in the Indonesian press, there has been a wave of arrests of Muslims in the past few months. It is not easy to understand what is going on; the following account is based on scattered reports in the Indonesian press.*

The so-called extremist Muslim groups are described by the authorities under a number of headings. The generic term is *NII* (*Negara Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Islamic State) but the term *GPK* (*Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan*, Security Disrupter Gang) is also used. The terminology is the cause of some confusion. In the past, the military made a clear distinction between 'extreme left' (the communist threat) and 'extreme right' (those who want an Islamic state). But during the recent arrests, the military have described some of the Muslim groups as being 'extreme left' who are using the mask of religion.

In the last two years, 428 people have been arrested in the Greater Jakarta area alone. In other areas like South Sulawesi, and Central and West Java, dozens have been detained and several thousand have received 'guidance lectures' by the military.

### Arrests in Jakarta

In a report to Parliament the ABRI (armed forces) fraction said that the 428 people arrested and interrogated in the Greater Jakarta area from 1993 and 1995 included 164 arrests by the South Jakarta Military Command, 105 in Bekasi, 52 in West Jakarta, 43 in Tangerang, 27 in North Jakarta, 11 in East Jakarta and 7 in Central Jakarta. During the most recent raid on 9 December, 11 people were arrested in Bekasi.

So far there have been no reports of trials in Jakarta. The latest Muslim to go on trial was Mochammad Rais Abas, described as former commander of the *NII*, district IX. He was charged in May 1993 and was sentenced to 4 years and 6 months; the charge was subversion for trying to replace the Pancasila state ideology with the Al Qur'an and Hadits.

Another suspect mentioned in the press is Syarifin Maloko, a Muslim preacher who served a prison sentence in the 1980s following the Tanjung Priok massacre. Syarifin Maloko denied the new charges against him, insisting that his sermons are religious, not political. [*Tiras*, 8 February, 1996].

### Subversion trials in Banjarnegara

In the small town of Banjarnegara in Central Java, trials of the followers of a sect called *Sukma Sejati* (True Soul) are underway. Hundreds of people inundated the district court of Banjarnegara to follow the proceedings. Five people are on trial: Heru Antono, Dwi Heriatmoko, students, Sri Purwati, a law graduate, Teguh Mulyaningsih and Ponidi. They have been under arrest since 10 November last year and are accused of trying to set up an Islamic State, a very serious charge. They are being charged under the controversial anti-subversion law with a maximum

sentence of death. They allegedly spread their influence in 12 sub-districts and were very uncooperative during the interrogations [*Bernas*, 30 November 1995].

The prosecution told the court that the movement did not plan a revolt but has spread its teachings and recruited new members. Major-General Yusuf Kartanegara, the former military commander of Central Java and at present intelligence assistant at army headquarters in Jakarta, made the arrests. He said the five were arrested when the security forces discovered documents connected with Kartosuwiryo, who was the *NII* leader during the fifties, in a car. According to the general, the driver was known to be ex-PKI. In the words of Colonel Lintang Waluyo, the local commander: "They are left extremists who are using religion as a mask. They are not Muslim at all" [*Forum Keadilan*, 25 March 1996]. Colonel Waluyo estimates that around 300 *NII* members are still at large in his sub-district and has appealed to them to surrender to the authorities. [*Bernas*, 2 March 1996].

### Arrests in Central Java

The military sub-district command in Klaten has arrested five people identified by the initials Dm, Sr, Bt, Nk and Sd, of whom three are women. They are accused of trying to establish an Islamic state. The five are teenagers and allegedly part of a larger network consisting of cells.

Another person was arrested in Purwokerto, also identified only as At, 27 years old. According to *Bakorinda*, the local military intelligence, a network of people which has spread to West Java has been detected. At is responsible for Banyumas, Kok. and Kas. for Cilacap, Im. for Temanggung, Kir., Rob., Jaw. and Mus. for Kebumen, Habs. and Ii. for Kuningan, West Java and Abd. and Wan (not clear). According to press reports, At was released by the military, probably to track down other members of the network. [*Pikiran Rakyat*, 20 January 1996].

### GPK in South Sulawesi

Late last year the police authorities arrested dozens of people during a raid on the headquarters of a movement led by P.Mn. (initials only), 65 years old, in the village of Nepo, Barru district, 145 kms north of Ujung Pandang. In December it was reported that of the 53 suspects, 16 are under arrest while 37 are still at large.

According to the authorities the sect has adopted controversial regulations for their followers: they believe in sacred sites, oblige the men to march like soldiers and threaten local people who refuse to join the group. The police brought in their crack troops, the Mobile Brigade and anti riot squads, to enter the premises. P. Mn, the leader of the sect, is one of those detained [*Pelita*, 30 November 1995, *Kompas*, 8 December 1995].

★

## Sri-Bintang continues to fight back

*Former member of Parliament, Sri-Bintang Pamungkas, now on trial for 'insulting the President', is still causing ripples by striking back at those who have tried to discredit him politically. In court meanwhile, the prosecutor has demanded a four-year sentence for allegedly calling Suharto a 'dictator'.*

The charge against Sri-Bintang is that he used the word 'dictator' with reference to President Suharto, during a lecture on the Indonesian economy given at the Technical College of the University Berlin in April last year. It matters little that the tape used as evidence in court was of such poor quality that it was difficult to identify the voices or understand the context in which the offending remark was made, and by whom. Nor indeed why the regime feels so threatened that it uses a draconian law introduced in the colonial era to protect the 'good name' of the head of state. However, the Sri-Bintang 'case' had to go ahead, come what may, in retaliation for the embarrassment Suharto suffered at the hands of protesters during his visit to Germany last year. Attempts to bring charges against Sri-Bintang for 'masterminding' the demonstrations were abandoned and the prosecution decided to charge him for 'insulting' the head of state.

Although the evidence has been shaky at best and farcical at worst, the prosecutor in his summing-up, felt no compunction about demanding a four-year sentence, two years short of the maximum penalty. With defence statements still to come, the verdict is not expected until some time in May.

### Dramatic testimony from Germany

One of the most dramatic moments in the trial was when a 56-year old Indonesian who has lived in political exile in Germany since 1965 agreed to return to Indonesia to testify as a defence witness. Sunarto was a student in the Germany Democratic Republic when Suharto seized



*Witness Sunarto in court. Sri Bintang is sitting at the back.*

power; he is now stateless and knew that he risked being arrested as a pre-1965 'leftwing suspect' on his arrival in Jakarta. Following a request from the defence, the judge ordered the prosecutor to arrange for Sunarto to appear in February but it was not until defence lawyers took the matter up themselves with the Foreign Affairs Department that the necessary permit and guarantees of his safety were obtained. More than a month was wasted because of procrastination by the prosecutor.

As none of the prosecution witnesses could clarify the words used by Sri-Bintang, Sunarto's testimony was crucial. Sunarto told the court that Sri-Bintang's lecture was devoted entirely to a critical assessment of the Indonesian economy. The word 'dictator' only cropped up during questions and answers and referred to the systems of government under Sukarno and Suharto, not to individuals.

After weeks of anxiety, Sunarto's brief sojourn in Indonesia passed without mishap, apart from protests by hooligans outside court who have been plaguing the court sessions and shouting anti-Bintang slogans.

### More lawsuits flying

Sri-Bintang recently lost a lawsuit against President Suharto whom he accused of unlawfully dismissing him from Parliament. A complaint against the Attorney-General for banning his travel abroad has been upheld in court. He has now gone ahead with a lawsuit against the chairman and 21 members of his former party, the PPP, for initiating proceedings to have him removed from Parliament. He has also announced his intention to file a lawsuit against the Indonesian ambassador in Bonn for libel following a letter from the ambassador to a German member of Parliament, alleging that Sri-Bintang was on trial because he spoke about 'the possibility of a revolution' in Indonesia.

The ever-defiant former MP has become one of the most popular politicians in Indonesia. He is frequently invited to speak at meetings on campus though not infrequently prevented from doing so by the local police or military.

### Acquitted after six years detention

A man who was held in detention without trial for nearly seven years and eventually brought to trial for alleged involvement in a Muslim sect that was hounded by the army in 1989, was acquitted after the prosecution decided to withdraw the charges.

**Mulyadi bin Jaimo**, now 38 years old, was arrested in Lampung, South Sumatra, after a vicious  
*continued on page 7*

## Support for asylum-seekers needed

*More than two dozen East Timor solidarity groups from around the world, including a number of Indonesian groups, have called on governments whose embassies are entered by East Timorese seeking asylum to treat their requests with sympathy and understanding.*

For several months, the tragic spectacle of young East Timorese scaling embassy walls or in other ways gaining entry into embassies in Jakarta has testified to the desperation of numerous young people facing intensified repression in the territory. Unlike previous asylum bids which made political statements on behalf of the clandestine front, the recent asylum bids have been made by young Timorese fleeing to Jakarta from East Timor and entering whichever embassy is physically accessible.

Asylum bids have been made at the Australian, French, Dutch, Polish, Russian, French and New Zealand embassies. Since the joint statement was issued on 28 February, nine Timorese who sought asylum in Australia were all refused. After remaining in the embassy for nearly a month (five left early to get hospital treatment), they left and are now under the protection of human rights activist, J.C Princen in Jakarta. In March, four went into the Polish and French embassies; within a day, they had left for Portugal.

The Joint Statement which was launched in Bangkok during the Pre-Summit NGOs Conference, points out that 75 of the young East have already gone to Portugal. None of the countries approached has been willing to offer asylum. It calls on governments to exert pressure on Jakarta to take immediate steps to improve the human rights situation in East Timor that gives rise to these desperate flights.

It says that embassies should treat Timorese who seek asylum with understanding, protect their safety while they are in the embassy and to do everything possible to comply with their requests for political asylum. Under international law, countries which have signed the relevant treaties must duly consider all applications for political asylum. Countries should accept their legal obligations and insist on their rights.

A mechanism should be established for asylum-seekers to take their decisions in a non-coerced manner. Portuguese government officials, with UN help, should be allowed to meet individual asylum-seekers and help the embassy and home-capital personnel determine if political asylum is appropriate in countries other than Portugal. Asylum-seekers should also be given access by telephone to lawyers from the country in which they are seeking asylum.

Governments which turn to Portugal to take in asylum-seekers should state publicly that they acknowledge Portugal as the administering authority in East Timor. Democratic countries should accept a humanitarian obligation to assist Portugal, for whom support of increasing numbers of East Timorese refugees is becoming an economic burden.

### Prisoner worried by the trend

Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha, who is serving a life sentence in Semarang for his part in organising the demon-

stration in Dili on 12 November 1991 when the Santa Cruz massacre occurred, is clearly worried by the flight of so many young Timorese. He sent out a plea to young Timorese who have stood in the front line of the freedom struggle to put an end to requests for political asylum. 'The diplomatic front will not be able to achieve anything if there are no actions in Timor,' he wrote. He said that he realised that many really had to get out 'but for all who can hold on, it is better to persist'.



Gregorio also strongly protested against governments who place their economic interests above humanitarian considerations. He warmly welcomed the Indonesian pro-democracy movement for its support to the struggle for East Timor's liberation.

### Labour leader calls for referendum

Muchtar Pakpahan, leader of Indonesia's largest independent trade union, the SBSI, has made a public call in Jakarta for a referendum to be held in East Timor. Speaking to members of Parliament, Pakpahan, who is also a constitutional lawyer, said that since so many countries still refuse to recognise Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, 'Indonesia must take the brave step of ending the dispute by holding a referendum'. He said that this would be consistent with Indonesia's basic ideology which in-

cludes freedom, peace and social justice. [*Jakarta Post*, 15 March]

Pakpahan had just returned to Jakarta from Lisbon where he attended a youth solidarity conference. The conference was attended by a large number of East Timorese, many of whom had recently fled to Portugal after entering embassies in Jakarta. He received a standing ovation when he declared that holding a referendum in East Timor would be in accord with the Indonesian Constitution. There was also a very warm welcome for the trade union leader when he grabbed a guitar, during the closing session, and sang two songs about torture and maltreatment which he composed while he was in prison last year.

## **EAST TIMOR**

### **Readers Digest banned**

Distribution of the March issue of *Readers Digest* (the Far East edition) was banned in Indonesia because it carried a lengthy article and interview of Ximenes Belo, the Bishop of Dili. The censorship authorities in Indonesia have been rather lax recently about allowing foreign publications which contain less than complimentary articles about Indonesia to circulate. However, it seems that this article about Belo in such a widely-read magazine was more than they could stomach. ★

## **East Timor well aired in Bangkok**

*East Timor was once again at the centre of attention in the ASEAN region during an Asia-Europe summit meeting and a pre-summit NGOs conference in Bangkok, despite strenuous efforts by Jakarta to keep it off the agenda as 'irrelevant'.*

The Asia-Europe Summit, held in Bangkok on 1-2 March 1996, was the first top-level meeting of the European Union's fifteen members, the seven members of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei and Vietnam, along with China, Japan and South Korea. The meeting was convened to strengthen trade and investment relations between the two blocs. There were strenuous efforts from the start, particularly by the ASEAN members to keep human rights issues off the agenda.

The decision to hold this conflagration followed years of stalemate in efforts to draw up a 'third generation' economic accord between the European Union and ASEAN because Indonesia refused to accept the inclusion of a human rights clause. This led to Portugal exercising its veto to block any agreement. Portugal was in fact keeping faith with an EU decision adopted in late 1991 that all economic accords with third countries or blocs should contain a human rights clause. Portugal's principled stand, taken out of respect for the grave human rights situation in East Timor, aggravated several of its EU partners who have been eager for years to profit from the rapid economic growth in a number of Asian countries.

In the months leading up to the Summit, Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, use every opportunity to insist that the event should not be sullied by any mention of 'irrelevant issues' like human rights and East Timor. He even privately warned EU ambassadors in Jakarta that any mention of East Timor could result in President Suharto staging a walk-out.

### **Portuguese PM corners Suharto**

On his departure for Bangkok, Portugal's new Prime Minister, Antonio Guterres, told the press that he had every intention of raising East Timor during the Summit. In Bangkok, he told a delegation of NGO representatives a few hours before the pre-Summit informal dinner on 29 February that he would do so at the very first opportunity, if possible during the dinner. This is in fact what happened.

As the heads of government were leaving the dinner, he approached Suharto and asked for a discussion about East Timor - the first time that such high-level contact between the two countries had taken place since the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in December 1975 when diplomatic relations were severed. During a fifteen minute conversation, PM Guterres said his government would agree to the establishment of 'interest sections' in friendly embassies in Jakarta and Lisbon in exchange for a decision by Indonesia to release resistance leader Xanana Gusmao and other East Timorese political prisoners, and if Indonesia would take measures to improve the human rights situation in East Timor and allow the UN to monitor the human rights situation there. [Establishing 'interest sections' is not the same as restoring diplomatic relations.]

The meeting clearly caught the Indonesian head of state and his foreign minister off guard. It is reported that Suharto listened to the Portuguese Prime Minister for several minutes before summoning Alatas and telling him that the issues raised should be taken up at the next round of UN-sponsored talks between Indonesia and Portugal in June this year.

Alatas was later dismissive about the encounter and said the 'interest sections' proposal was 'nothing new'. He also insisted, as he has done so often in the past, that Xanana cannot be released because he was found guilty on 'criminal' charges.

### **East Timor reverberates**

Speaking at a very well-attended press conference immediately after his encounter with Suharto, Prime Minister Guterres said he had presented an 'innovative proposal' which could be very positive for East Timor. If his proposals were taken up, 'we will have a completely new situation', he said. The resistance leader would be able to participate in the political process as a free man. But if Jakarta rejects the proposal, Indonesia's position will be 'viewed negatively by the international community'. He added that it had been 'worthwhile to be here if only for this'. [*Lusa*, 29 February]

# EAST TIMOR

What with this initiative and the focus on East Timor during the pre-Summit NGOs meeting, East Timor really took centre stage in Bangkok. East Timor turned out to be far from 'irrelevant' and attracted far more press attention than any other issue raised at the Summit.



The Ottawa Citizen 31 Jan. 1996

Portugal's diplomatic initiative succeeded in focusing attention on East Timor at the very heart of ASEAN, a regional bloc that has persistently refused to take issue with Indonesia for its brutal invasion and unlawful occupation of East Timor. Under ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the member states agree not to interfere in each other's 'internal affairs', with Indonesia extracting a high price from its neighbours to 'lay off' East Timor.

## NGOs highlight East Timor

A very favourable atmosphere for East Timor had already been created during the pre-Summit meeting of NGOs. This NGOs conference was convened at very short notice by Forum for the Global South based in Manila and the Transnational Institute based in the Netherlands, with the theme: 'Beyond Geopolitics and Geoeconomics: Towards a New Relationship Between Asia and Europe'. Over 350 women and men took place, representing NGOs in both continents.

In the weeks before the conference, the Thai government appeared determined to prevent it from taking place at all. It had already been announced that East Timor's resistance leader, Jose Ramos-Horta, would not be allowed to visit Thailand for the occasion and later, there were rumours that some overseas participants had been blacklisted. The government tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Asia Hotel, where the meeting was held and all visitors from abroad were staying, to cancel the bookings. These manoeuvres were widely publicised in the local press and Bangkok's leading social critic, the Buddhist writer, Sulak Sivaraksa, warned the government that he would organise such powerful protest that he could bring the government down.

In July 1994, plans to hold an NGO's meeting in Bangkok to discuss East Timor met with fierce government opposition. Although it went ahead, many last-minute changes had to be made because on that occasion, the Asia Hotel agreed, under government pressure, to withdraw facilities that had been agreed.

Under the circumstances, the very fact that this year's NGOs conference went ahead as planned was a major victory for ASEAN people's solidarity.

The highlight of the three-day agenda was a session on 'special issues' which included East Timor, Burma and Northern Ireland. Speaking on the question of East Timor, Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL strongly condemned the decision of the Thai government for refusing to allow Jose Ramos-Horta, co-chair of the National Council of Maubere Resistance, to come to Bangkok. She also condemned the attitude of most members of the European Union for putting business and profits before human rights and pressing ahead with the sale of weapons to the Suharto regime. She spoke about the steadily deteriorating human rights situation in East Timor which was forcing an ever increasing number of young Timorese to flee their homeland and seek asylum abroad by entering embassies in Jakarta.

Immediately following the session, there was a very well attended press conference and the following day, the question of East Timor was widely reported by most Bangkok newspapers.

Other Indonesia-related issues were also raised at the conference by Anna Mukarnawati, representing the Yogyakarta-based NGO, *Yasanti*, which campaigns on labour issues, who spoke about organising workers' solidarity actions in Indonesia, and Arimbi Hp from the environmental organisation, *Walhi*, who delivered a statement on toxic waste. ★

## East Timor conferences in 1996

Following a number of successful conferences in 1995, several international conferences on East Timor are planned for 1996. The annual East Timor conference in Portugal, organised by the Oporto University, took place in Lisbon on 22-24 February. A number of Indonesians were present, including trade union leader, Mochtar Pakpahan, Wilson, co-ordinator of SPRIM (Solidarity Struggle of Indonesian and Maubere People), and Yenni Damayanti of PIJAR. Following the conference, Wilson, who is co-ordinator of PPBI, Struggle Centre of Indonesian Workers, also toured Europe, visiting the Netherlands, the UK, Dublin, Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, Italy and Geneva.

Later this year, East Timor conferences are planned in Sydney in June, in Dublin at a date still to be fixed, and in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in November. The latter will be the second Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor, following the first which was held in Manila in 1994.

## Beating swords into ploughshares

*Four women are now awaiting trial after they entered a British Aerospace factory and severely damaged a Hawk aircraft that was about to be delivered to Indonesia.*

In the early hours of Monday 29 January 1996, three of the four women, Andrea Needham, Joanne Wilson and Lotta Kronlid of the 'Seeds of Hope East Timor Ploughshares', having decided that they had used every avenue of protest, snipped their way through the fence of the BAe factory test site in Warton, Lancashire. In the 56th ploughshares action world-wide and the third in Britain, the women, inspired by the biblical injunction "to beat swords into ploughshares" (*Micah, 4,3*) armed with household hammers and taking full personal responsibility for their actions, started their non-violent act of disarmament.

When they found Hawk jet number ZH 955, destined for Indonesia, they took out their hammers and, blow-by-blow, disabled all components and connected to the weaponry - the nose cone, radar, bomb attachment under the wings and control devices in the cockpit. Undetected for nearly two hours, they punctured the fuselage and smashed millions of pounds worth of damage to radar equipment and missile guidance systems. They hung banners on the aircraft, poured seeds and ashes over the plane and planted photos of children, of the victims of the Santa Cruz massacre, and left a "Seeds of Hope" video and report containing their statements of intent.

### A complete write-off

Before being detected, they notified the Press Association and made no attempt to slip away. Security guards only realised what was going on when the press made inquiries. They were arrested next to the damaged plane and were charged with criminal damage to the tune of more than £2 million. Jet ZH 956 was a complete write-off.

In June 1993 a £500 million contract was granted to British Aerospace BAe for the supply of eight Hawk 100 advanced trainer/light attack aircraft and sixteen Hawk 200 single-seat fighters with spares and training. In the lead-up to the 1993 Hawk deal, Indonesian Air Marshal Sibun noted that "the planes will be used not only to train pilots, but also for 'emergency' air-to-ground attacks. In fact, the Hawks were made especially for air-to-ground assaults".

For over three years, since well before the Hawk deal was signed in June 1993, thousands of people have campaigned to stop the deal. In Britain a large coalition of human rights, peace and anti-arms trade groups opposes the sale with letter writing, petitions, street stalls, public meetings, demonstrations at the AGMs of BAe, peace camps,

talking to BAe workers, lobbying MPs, and acts of civil disobedience including trespasses, die-ins and blockades at government buildings and British Aerospace sites. Efforts to stop the Hawks deal culminated in a mass lobby of Parliament on December 7th 1995.

On 30 January 1996, Angie Zelter and 51 co-informants, "laid information" before Norwich Magistrates



*From left: Andrea Needham, Joanna Wilson, Lotta Kronlid and Angie Zelter*

Court. Angie attempted to present a summons for the arrest of Ian Lang MP, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, for conspiring to aid and abet acts of genocide as defined in the Genocide Act 1969. After a two-hour hearing the magistrate rejected their application. Angie, whose statement of intent was shown on the video left with the aircraft, was later arrested as she was going to a meeting in Preston to speak about the action, and with a hammer in her bag.

All four women have been charged with conspiracy; Andrea, Joanne and Lotta have also been charged with actual criminal damage. They expect to go on trial in June.

According to the Ploughshares Women, the Indonesian military regime is violating the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide directly and so are the British Government and British Aerospace. The women say that they acted in solidarity with the courageous people of East Timor who have called upon the West to hear their suffering and to stop selling arms to Indonesia. The women say that under international law they have a duty to refuse to have any part in war crimes (Nuremberg Principle VII) and under British do-

*continued on page 4*

## Partners in Repression: The Reality of British Aid to Indonesia, Paul Barber, TAPOL, London, 1995, 47 pp, PB £3.00

Together with Ann Clwyd MP's recent case-study analysis of British aid to Indonesia (**British Aid to Indonesia: The Continuing Scandal**), Paul Barber's analysis in this short text provides us with a detailed and systematic critique of recent British Government aid policies toward Indonesia.

Barber shows how the current bilateral aid programme is part of a deeply rooted and long-standing relationship between Indonesia and the UK based firmly on Britain's growing strategic interests in maintaining close relations with the Suharto Government. Britain's wish to strengthen further its bilateral relationship has resulted in substantial increases in aid in recent years, despite the Indonesian Government's worsening human rights record. In a detailed examination of the UK's aid programme, Barber documents its limitations in achieving its stated objectives - of good government, poverty reduction and the promotion of human development.


Whilst donors such as the USA, Canada and Germany have reduced aid disbursements in recent years in response to the human rights situation, Britain has strengthened its bilateral programme. In July, at the meeting of Indonesia's major aid donors - the Consultative Group on Indonesia, Britain committed \$155 million. This figure, according to Barber, represents a 27.05% increase over the two years since 1993, and is the highest increase of all donors, with the exception of the Japanese Government.

Approximately two-thirds of aid to Indonesia from the UK is accounted for by commercially oriented funding under the Aid and Trade Provision programme, and by expenditure from the Commonwealth Development Corporation. In Pergau Dam-like style, the substantial increases of the last two years have come at a time when lucrative arms sales contracts have been signed, or are being negotiated with Indonesia.

Barber documents what he rightly calls the "dubious nature" of some of the projects funded notably in the mining and telecommunications sectors. An item of particular concern in the Technical Co-operation area relates to a Police Management Training Project, involving expenditure of £126,000 in 1993/94 and £268,000 in 1992/93. The Indonesian police force is part of ABRI (the Armed Forces), and, as Ann Clwyd has documented, there are many examples of human rights abuses committed by the Indonesian police, as outlined in the Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extra Judicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions in Indonesia and East Timor, presented after the Rapporteur's visit in July 1994.

Despite UK government assurances that aid does not fund projects in East Timor, this seems not to be the case. According to Barber's analysis, £2.5 million was awarded to the Regional Physical Project for Transmigration, for implementation between 1984 and 1990. This was intended to improve the capacity of the Ministry of Transmigration's Settlement Preparation Directorate in providing

maps and data on land quality and availability. As is well known, Indonesia's transmigration programme has involved human rights abuses, land deprivation and envi-



ronmental degradation. Furthermore, the programme includes East Timor.

In a section of his text on "Aid and Good Government", Barber presents the aims of UK aid, as formulated officially in 1994: to support democratic processes, encourage transparency in decision-making, reduce corruption, promote the protection of human rights and adherence to the rule of law. In relation to each of these criteria, documents how the UK government systematically ignores these objectives in its Indonesia aid programme. Whilst aid has increased, the Suharto government has become manifestly more corrupt, the political system has remained restricted, military spending has increased, and human rights abuses continue to be widespread.

Barber calculates that the proportion of British aid spent on human development in Indonesia may be below the 2.9% average of all donors. This may be a little on the pessimistic side, but there can be little doubt that - with the exception of expenditure on education 'much of which goes to promote English language teaching', and some small-scale village projects, only a small amount of total expenditure is spent on human development.

In conclusion, the author provides appendices listing project aid expenditure 1992-94, Aid and Trade Provision

Agreements, and Commonwealth Development Corporation Investments.

At a time when aid policies are coming under increasing scrutiny, this short work provides us with a clear, well-documented analysis of the UK-Indonesia case. One is led inescapably to the conclusion that - even by their own somewhat limited standards, British aid policies have failed. More generally, huge amounts of public aid are being spent on projects which are of only limited benefit to the poor in Indonesia, and which in many cases have little developmental merit.

*John Taylor*

### **Women in Indonesia and East Timor, Standing Against Repression, Amnesty International, London, Dec. 1995, 23 pp.**

Repression against women and the stand they take in response is all too often overlooked when human rights violations are reported. This is very much the case too with Indonesia and East Timor.

In its latest report on the area, Amnesty International tries to redress the balance. The report focuses on the way women suffer either as detainees, as rape victims or as the wives or relatives of men who fall victim of the Indonesian regime.

While a good deal of background information is not out of place in a general report on the human rights situation in Indonesia and East Timor, one would have hoped for even greater focus on the specific situation of women.

Particular references to repression against women are made as regards women labour activists, family planning, East Timor, Aceh and the ill-treatment of women in general. As the report states, 'women [make] up a large percentage of workers in the manufacturing industry - an area of low wages and poor conditions' [p.4] What can happen to women who try to improve their conditions is shown in the widely-reported case of woman labour activist, Marsinah - murdered in 1993 - to which the report devotes three pages. 'An autopsy revealed that her attackers thrust a blunt instrument into her vagina, causing severe bleeding.' [p 7-8] Such bestial treatment would never be directed against men.

As far as ill-treatment in detention is concerned, the danger women face in a male dominated police and military apparatus is seriously aggravated by the fear of sexual harassment, molestation or rape. This comes on top of such dangers as torture, non-access to lawyers and relatives, and arbitrary detention.

A specific form of harassment against women is the detention of suspected prostitutes. These arrests occurred on a large scale in 1994 during *Operasi Bersih* (Operation Cleansing) prior to the APEC meeting in Jakarta and Bogor. The women who were arrested were not only subjected to vaginal examination while in detention but in at least one reported case, a woman had to pay a fee of Rp15,000 [£15] on her release, without having been tried or charged.

In the case of East Timor, one gets a picture of women being treated as the spoils of war, as the cases of forced cohabitation with Indonesian officers indicate. East Timorese women asylum seekers in Australia say that sexual harass-

## **BOOK REVIEW**

ment of women by members of the Indonesian security forces has increased since the unrest in the territory in 1994. Because of a sense of shame, many East Timorese women have never spoken about their rape ordeals.

In Aceh, women suffer in a different way from the region's confrontation with Jakarta. Many women are now widows in the wake of the armed confrontation between *Aceh Merdeka* [the Free Aceh Movement] and the Indonesian army. Their husbands were detained, tortured and killed by the army, leaving the women in a difficult situation, to fend for themselves and their families.

Whilst in Aceh not a single perpetrator of unlawful killings has been charged, this has happened elsewhere, albeit extremely rarely and reluctantly. It is one of the few positive things to have resulted from the much greater reporting of repression against women in the Indonesian media. The impression one gets is that intimidation is far less effective these days.

Amnesty ends the report with a series of very reasonable recommendations, such as suggesting that women guards should be present when women are interrogated, to reduce the risk of rape.

Not surprisingly, the Indonesian Embassy in London issued a statement rejecting the report in its entirety and claiming that there is no such thing as gender-specific repression in Indonesia. It argues its case by saying that a woman heads the Department for Women's Affairs. But it has nothing to say about how women are positively protected from repression and sexual harassment. Nor does it deny that human rights violators against women and men alike enjoy widespread impunity.

*Hubert Gieschen*

### ***In the last two months TAPOL has received the following review copies:***

**Politics in Indonesia, Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance**, Douglas Ramage, Routledge, London, 1995, 296 pp, 0-415-12548-0, HB £35.00

**The Dark Side of Paradise, Political Violence in Bali**, Geoffrey Robinson, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1995, 342 pp, 0-8014-2965-X, HB US\$ 35.00

**On The Subject of "Java"**, John Pemberton, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1995, 320 pp, 0-8014-9963-1, PB US\$ 17.95

**Bayang-Bayang PKI**, ed. & coord.: Stanley, Santoso, Institut Studi Arus Informasi, Jakarta, 1995, 180 pp, 979-8933-00-1, PB.

**Gerilya Yang Tak Pernah Selesai, H.J.C.Princen 70 Tahun**, Panitya 70 Tahun HJC. Princen, Jakarta, 1995, 91 pp, PB

**Soebadio Sastrosatomo, Pengemban Misi Politik**, Rosihan Anwar, Pustaka Utama Grafiti, Jakarta, 1995, 264 pp, 979-444-351-4, PB Rp 10,000

*continued on back page*



## Committee to monitor elections established

*After months of preparation, an Independent Committee to Monitor the Election (Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu or KIPP) was established on 15 March. The aim is to monitor everything connected with the election, to publish reports, organise discussions and conduct opinion polls.*

The emergence of KIPP is an interesting political initiative, the first attempt since the birth of the Republic to create an independent watchdog for the elections. Within weeks the idea gathered momentum and many different groups within the pro-democracy movement decided to get involved. No other political initiative has succeeded in building such a common platform. In no time, KIPP branches started springing up in all parts of the country and people from Aceh in the extreme north-west to Ujung Pandang in the east have volunteered to take an active part in this new movement.

### KIPP structure

The new organisation consists of two structures, a presidium which is responsible for day-to-day organisation, and a consultative body which will function as a team of experts and advisors. The list of personalities who have joined in is quite impressive. The presidium is chaired by Gunawan Muhammad, former editor of the banned *Tempo* magazine. Mulyana W. Kusumah of the LBH, the Legal Aid Bureau, was elected secretary-general. Other activists like Standar Kia, Beathor Suryadi, Budiman Sujatmiko and

Tohap Simanungkalit are members of the presidium, reflecting the broad variety of views within the pro-democracy movement. The team of experts includes many outstanding academics like Arbi Sanit, Arief Budiman, Loekman Soetrisno, M. M Billah, Aries Arief Mundayat and others. Others who have thrown their weight behind this new movement include outspoken politicians like Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Dahlan Ranuwihardjo and Ridwan Saidi, pro-democracy figures like Marsilam Simandjuntak, Poncke Princen and Permadi, NGO leaders like Zulkarnaen, Nursyahbani and Kartjono, church leaders like SAE Nababan, Romo Hardoputantro, Romo Pujosumarto and the trade union leader Muchtar Pakpahan. Nurcholis Madjid, a key member of ICMI, the pro-government Muslim organisation, has also decided to join KIPP.

### A timely initiative

The next general elections are scheduled for 1997 but the new organisation will remain in existence right through till the appointment of the president in 1998. There is a great deal of excitement in Indonesia about this timely move. The elections are indeed still a year off, yet the rul-

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**Forest Politics in Suriname**, Marcus Colchester, NOVIB International Books, Utrecht, 1995, 96 pp, 90-6224-975-2, PB

### BOOKS ON EAST TIMOR

**East Timor: Genocide in Paradise**, Matthew Jardine, Odonian Press, Tucson, 1995, 96 pp, 1-87825-20-8, PB US\$ 6,00

**TIMOR: Twenty Years On**, ed. Ken Coates MEP, Spokesperson 62, 1995, 113 pp, 0-85124-583-8, PB

**Complicity, Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy**, Sharon Scharfe, Black Rose Books, Montreal/New York, 1996, 249 pp, 1-551640-32-5, PB

**East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation**, ed. Editors: Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley, Cassell, London, 1995, 259 pp, 0-304-33265-8, PB £12.99

**East Timor, Generations of Resistance**, Photographs by Steve Cox, Introduction by Peter Carey, Cassell, London 1995, 120 pp, 0-304-33252-6, PB £19.99

**East Timor, Blood and Tears in ASEAN**, Sonny Inbaraj, Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, 1995, 170 pp, 974-7047-72-1, PB

Several of the listed books will be reviewed in future TAPOL Bulletins.

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