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## Disturbances engulf Timor

*In early September, disturbances swept across East Timor, engulfing several towns. Whatever the incidents that sparked the disturbances in different places, the primary cause is the desperation felt by East Timorese at seeing their illegally occupied country flooded with Indonesian migrants.*

The capital, Dili was hardest hit but other towns, including Maliana, Viqueque, Ermera and Manatuto were also affected. Disturbances broke out in Dili on Friday, 8 September and continued through the weekend. Crowds of youths gathered in several parts of the capital and attacked Indonesian-owned shops and stalls and burnt vehicles in the biggest outburst of anger yet to hit urban centres in East Timor in the past twenty years.

Dozens of people were arrested and unconfirmed reports were received that three or four Timorese had been shot dead or stabbed by migrants.

### Catholicism abused

What sparked the trouble was a remark made by a prison official in Maliana prison on 2 September. While giving

'spiritual guidance' at the prison, he made a defamatory remark about the Catholic religion which was heard by warders as well as prisoners. According to *Gatra*, the warders allowed the prisoners to leave the prison in order to call the official to account. [*Gatra*, 21 September] Angered by the abuse, the prisoners and warders sent a petition to the governor of East Timor asking for the man to be disciplined. As there was no reaction for days, demonstrations took place in Maliana on 6 September followed by clashes between the demonstrators as security officials. The next day, Buginese-owned stalls in Viqueque were attacked.

Soldiers are also reported to have entered the Catholic church in Maliana during mass, insulting the priest and later profaning a statue of Mary outside the church.

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## Bishop exposes atrocities in Timika

For the first time ever, the Suharto regime has been faced with damning evidence of grave human rights violations in West Papua following the publication in Jakarta of a report by a senior Catholic priest. The revelations also turn the spotlight on Freeport/RTZ, the giant copper-and-gold mining company whose operations have caused such havoc for the tribal people driven from the land where they used to live.

The report was prepared by Msgr H.F.M. Munninghoff, Bishop of Jayapura and made public in August by a group of human rights NGOs when they submitted it to the National Commission for Human Rights.

The impetus for carrying out investigations in Timika where massive atrocities have occurred since June last year came from a document published in April this year by ACFOA, the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, entitled *Trouble at Freeport* [see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 129, June 1995] In his foreword, the Bishop says that the document

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### **STOP PRESS: FIVE EAST TIMORESE SEEK ASYLUM, SEE PAGE 14**

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was conveyed to the Indonesian Bishops Conference (KWI). Although initially intended as an internal document, it is clear that the decision by several NGOs, including the Catholic peace and justice commission, the LPPS, to go public was taken with the blessing of the KWI.

The National Commission for Human Rights immediately decided to act on the report. It has since sent two investigation teams to the area and published its findings on 22 September. While being vague on a number of questions, the Commission basically confirms the Munninghoff findings.



**Bishop Munninghoff**

West Papuan students held a demonstration in Jakarta demanding action and a new group, the National Forum of Concern for Human Rights in Irian Jaya has been set up.

## Massacre at Hoesa

The most shocking incident documented by Munninghoff is the massacre of eleven people at the village of Hoesa on 31 May this year, when soldiers from the 752 Trikora battalion (Trikora is the military command for the region of Irian Jaya), stationed in Paniai, opened fire on a group of villagers as they were gathered together in an act of worship. The eleven dead included four children between the ages of 2 and 15, a woman and a Protestant minister. The minister who was leading the prayers, Rev. Martinus Kibak, was shot dead from behind, with his arms raised in surrender.

Piecing this together with information collected by a journalist from the weekly *Tiras*, who later visited the area with members of the National Commission for Human Rights, it appears that the group in Hoesa had spent several

months in the forest, seeking refuge from fighting between Indonesian troops and guerrilla forces of the *Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, OPM, the Free Papua Organisation. They had gathered in Hoesa to decide whether to remain in the forest or return to their village when they were discovered by a unit of soldiers who had been sent on a mission to hunt down members of the OPM. On seeing the group, the troops opened fire without warning, with horrifying consequences.

## Four murdered on Christmas Day

The Munninghoff Report includes an eyewitness account by a man who survived a murderous attack on a group of fifteen men. The witness, who suffered torture and beatings, was with the group when they returned by bus to Timika after celebrating Christmas Day, 1994 in Waa, a village near Tembagapura, the company town of Freeport/RTZ mine.

The witness described how he and a group of Dani had obtained permits to travel to Tembagapura to spend Christmas in Waa, 2 kms from the company town. (Note how local people can only visit the area with the permission of the authorities. According to an agreement imposed on the Amungme people by the company in 1974, they are prohibited from entering their own land.) On their way back to Timika, they were stopped at a Freeport Security Station, accused of being 'GPK rebels', the term used by the regime for members of the OPM, and of attending an OPM flag-raising ceremony in Tembagapura on Christmas Day. Although they vigorously denied this, they were arrested at the Station by soldiers from the 733 Patimura division, severely beaten, then taken to Tembagapura where they were held in Freeport containers (3x6 metres in size), beaten, kicked, and robbed of their possessions. The use of Freeport containers is mentioned in many of the incidents described in the report.

Eventually they were put on a Freeport bus for the journey back to Timika but on the bus, soldiers put sticking tape over the eyes of some of the men. In great fear, one man, Wendi Tabuni, decided to escape by jumping through the window but he was stabbed in the abdomen by a soldier. He managed to stagger off the bus but was chased by soldiers who shot him in the head. His body was then thrown down a ravine.

After arriving in Timika, the other fourteen were taken to the Freeport workshop in Koperakopa and again beaten. Three of the men, Yoel Kogoya, Peregamus Waker and Elias Jikwa, still with their eyes taped, died of their injuries after being severely beaten with sticks on the backs of their necks.

Although only the four men who died are named, the Bishop says he has the names of all the men involved.

## A litany of horrors

The 28 pages of the Munninghoff Report describe in detail other grave abuses which were perpetrated by soldiers, in some cases with Freeport assistance, from June 1994 to the first half of 1995, most of which had been mentioned in the ACFOA report. Besides summary executions, they include arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, disappearances, surveillance and destruction of property. In many cases, the names of the victims are listed, including twenty victims of detention and torture who had been attending church services when a peaceful flag-raising demonstration took place

early on 25 December in Tembagapura. All are employees of Freeport except for two tribal chiefs. One man was shot dead during the flag-raising ceremony. All twenty were forced to sign false confessions that they had taken part in the flag-raising before being released.

Although the Munninghoff Report covers much the same ground as the earlier ACFOA document, its political impact in Indonesia has been far greater, coming as it has from such an impeccable source. Bishop Munninghoff is a member of the Franciscan Order and has spent most of his 74 years in Indonesia. He became an Indonesian citizen some thirty years ago.

## Freeport/RTZ's involvement

The atrocities perpetrated in the Timika region have inevitably drawn attention to the company whose activities have dominated the area since it started mining operations in 1972.

It is the presence of the copper-and-gold mine operated by Freeport Indonesia Corporation or FIC, a subsidiary of US-based Freeport McMoran that has inflicted untold damage on tribal people whose ancestral lands were seized by the company to make way for what has become the world's largest and most profitable copper-and-gold mine. (See separate item.) Last year, another mining giant, RTZ, bought shares in the company and, together with the US-based parent company, must be held responsible for the tragedy inflicted on the local people. Since the company was granted new concessions last year, local people have renewed their opposition to the mine and the OPM has launched operations in the region.

But what is at issue as well is the company's involvement in the abuses documented by the Bishop of Jayapura. Although the Bishop later insisted that his concern was with human rights abuses, not with the activities of Freeport, the document is peppered with references to company facilities, personnel and company security stations where victims were held and in some cases tortured. Armed forces spokesman, Brigadier-General Suwarno Adiwijoyo himself implicated Freeport when he told the press that troops had 'chased GPK rebels together with Freeport which supplied the vehicles', adding that the company later donated the vehicles to the army. [*Tiras*, 24 August]

Since the appearance of the Munninghoff Report, senior executives of the company have been trying hard to extricate themselves, claiming that security in the region is the sole responsibility of the Indonesian armed forces. For the Suharto regime, the last thing it wants is for its most successful and profitable foreign company to be exposed to charges of involvement in such atrocities. There has not been a whisper of concern about the abuses.

## The armed forces response

The Timika report appears to have caused a rift within the armed forces. While armed forces commander in chief General Feisal Tanjung and Defence Minister, General Edi Sudradjat have said that there would be investigations for which purpose a Military Honour Council would be set up, army chief-of-staff General Hartono said such a move was not necessary as the matter could be adequately handled by the local command. [*Kompas*, 23 September] Hartono may be sending a message to his superiors that he is not prepared to have his men put under the spotlight yet again for the way

they conduct operations against 'GPK rebels', whether in East Timor, West Papua or wherever.

Earlier this year, the army was forced to admit that soldiers had killed six civilians in Liquica, East Timor and to court-martial two soldiers for 'violating procedures'. The Timika Affair has once again forced the army to face condemnation for brutalities by soldiers out on operation against unarmed civilians, in their attempts to crush guerrilla forces.

Faced with clear evidence of atrocities, the Trikora military commander, Major-General I Ketut Wirdhana, has tried to justify army operations in the area. 'If they unfurl (someone else's) flag,' he said, 'they (the OPM) should be shot'. [*Tiras*, 31 August] But many of those killed had nothing to do with unfurling flags. Moreover, as Bishop Munninghoff has said in several interviews, such behaviour is in contravention of the law.

The Bishop gave a robust response to army criticisms of his report. 'I have read the commander's angry remarks and he talks about things that aren't in my report,' the Bishop told *Tiras*. In an interview with *Forum Keadilan* [11 September], the Bishop criticised the military commander for saying that the OPM should be exterminated. 'Why not arrest them and try them according to the law? Why is it that OPM members are shot only for unfurling an OPM flag?' [*Forum Keadilan*, 11 September]

## National Commission accuses army of killings

The National Commission has clearly placed the blame for the killings in Timika on the army. In a press statement issued on 22 September, following its second investigation trip to Timika it expressed 'regrets and profound concern for the human rights abuses committed by the security forces'. Without giving details, it confirmed that sixteen civilians have been murdered and four have disappeared. TAPOL has been informed that this includes the eleven killed in Hoesa and the four men killed during and after the bus drive from Tembagapura to Timika on Christmas Day.

The Commission also confirmed that a number of serious abuses have taken place. Using the terminology of UN human rights covenants, it listed: indiscriminate killings, torture and inhuman/degrading treatment, unlawful arrest and arbitrary detention, disappearances, excessive surveillance and destruction of property.

The Commission was under pressure, especially from the Forum of Concern, to investigate Freeport's direct and indirect involvement in the atrocities. In the event, it mentioned the company twice, once to point out that army activities in the area are aimed at safeguarding the security of the Freeport mine which is designated as a 'vital project'. It also said that operational duties as between the local government, the army and Freeport need to be clarified, to determine the legal responsibilities of each in protecting basic human rights.

For many years, the army has written the OPM off as an insignificant force but it has now had to change its tune, in  
*continued on page 5*

# Greed is the name of the game

*Freeport/RTZ is the supreme example of a multinational corporation, ruthless in the pursuit of profit and notoriously neglectful of the rights of native people and the environment. With its new contract expanding the concession by 2.6 million hectares, Freeport has attracted extra funds from RTZ. The planned expansion of mining operations in West Papua is bad news for the local people.*

PT Freeport Indonesia Corporation (FIC) which has now joined forces with RTZ is in the news. The huge gold/copper mine [see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No.128, April 1995] has become the world's biggest single mining operation. The killing of local people [see separate item] has become an international issue. Prominent Papuans in Jakarta insist that the atrocities in Timika are closely related to Freeport's presence. Michael Manufandu, a member of the new National Forum for Human Rights in Irian Jaya said 'In our opinion, Freeport is morally responsible for what is happening. ABRI is there at their request.' Predictably, FIC has denied any responsibility.

According to Jim Bob Moffett, Freeport chief executive, the company is beneficial for the local people. Freeport is waging an aggressive advertising campaign, using videos and glossy ads which show schools and health clinics built by the company and also give a profile of New Town, the new \$500 million town to be built for the administrative and logistics staff. The new town will have luxury recreational facilities: an 18-hole golf course, health clinics and swimming pools. The dark side of the Freeport project is never mentioned.


The Amungme tribe who lived in the area of the mine could never have foreseen the consequences when they signed an agreement with Freeport in 1974. In exchange for a promise of jobs, schools and clinics, they were banned from entering certain areas. Mount Jelsegel-Ongospel (better known as the ore mountain Ertsberg: the initial Freeport mine, an area of 100,000 ha), a sacred mountain for the Amungme, has now become a crater. The Kamoro people, the tribe who lived on the lowland and plains were also forced to leave. They were relocated from the Amanapare beach to Kwani Lama. Other smaller tribes like the Iwaka, Dani, Ikari, Moni and Duga also lost their ancestral land.

The first area to be exploited under the new contract, Grasberg, will further erode the land rights of the tribal people. In desperation, a chief of the Amungme, offered his knife to the FIC representative and said: "Take it and kill me, because I can't stand these problems any more.....Slice the left side of the body and bury each piece from here to Grasberg.... On your way back round up all the Amungme people, our pigs and every piece we have. And make a huge hole to bury us with all our belongings. You cover that and then do anything you want"<sup>iii</sup>

## Macro and micro 'benefits'

The Freeport/RTZ enterprise is gigantic in every sense, Freeport McMoran owns 81.28% of FIC shares, 9.36% is owned by Aburizal Bakrie, one of Indonesia's corporate giants, and the rest belongs to the Indonesian state. RTZ

recently decided to invest an initial US\$450 million in the enterprise. Revenues flowing into the state coffers amounted to US\$138 million last year, including tax, royalties and dividends. FIC claims that it spends Rp 500 million annually to purchase local agricultural products and fish and that income per capita in the region is far higher than in many other regions. But who benefits?



Only 3 - 4 per cent of the 15,000 mine's workforce are local people who are taken on for unskilled jobs. Even drivers and maintenance technicians are recruited from Java and Sulawesi. Indonesians fill most of the better jobs while expatriates, mostly Americans and Australians, earn on average 5 to 6 times more than the Indonesians. Around Tembagapura and Timika, the main population centres, Freeport has built facilities like schools, churches and mosques but villagers enjoy none of those facilities. Local people, for instance, are not allowed to shop at the supermarket in Tembagapura.<sup>iii</sup>

## Pitiful environmental record

A critical environmental issue is the damage caused by the tailings, the effluent from the mining process. This is denied by the company. At least 115,000 tonnes of untreated tailings is dumped into the rivers Aghawon, Otomona and Ajikwa which flow through the region. As *The Nation* reports: Freeport PR men claim that the Ajikwa could pass US standards for drinking water, but when one visitor recently asked a Freeport security guard if he drinks from it, the officer laughed: "If you drink that water, you'll die."<sup>iv</sup>

*WALHI*, the Indonesian Forum for the Environment, has been in the forefront, criticising FIC's behaviour. Both Freeport and RTZ are notorious polluters in many parts of the world. Against their falsehood that mining causes "absolutely no damage to the forests" and "no acid drainage problems" to rivers below, *WALHI* insists that the tailings have already done a great deal of damage. Because of the excessive disposal of Freeport tailings, the course of the Ajikwa river has swerved towards the Minajerwi river. The water has flooded the area and destroyed 21 ha of tropical forest and sago trees. Sago is the staple food of the local population.

In answer to the many criticisms, FIC placed huge advertisements in the Indonesian press, bragging about the way they tackle the waste of the mining and claiming that the tailings are harmless. The ads provoked controversy because it gave the impression that Freeport has done everything possible to conform with environmental regulations but a denial came from the Environment Minister Sarwono: "It's all right to promote your business but to my knowledge they (FIC) haven't completed the final environmental audit. They should finish that first." Last year Britain and Holland banned a TV ad, produced by *MPI*, the Indonesian Forestry Community (federation of timber tycoons) because it falsely portrayed tropical forest protection. Propaganda by Freeport should be banned in Indonesian newspapers, a view shared by readers who have written to the press.

Freeport-McMoran which is based in the US is a notorious polluter; its projects have left a trail of despoiled land and poisoned water. In the US alone Freeport is facing fierce opposition from the citizens in its home state Louisiana (against dumping of toxic waste in the Mississippi River) and in Austin, Texas (real estate development in Barton Springs, the local outdoor swimming place).

## ABRI-FIC connections

Anyone visiting the area can see the close links between FIC security guards and local ABRI units. The main road to the mining site can only be entered with permission, through military checkpoints. It is common knowledge that security in the area is the responsibility of the two agents. It is well known that company bosses in Indonesia pay the local military to protect them from hazards like strikes. *Uang siluman* (phantom money) is one of the major stumbling blocks in achieving normal labour relations. Instead of paying workers decent wages, the money goes to the military. To justify these allowances the military use heavy-handed methods against the workers.

The needs at FIC are different. The workforce is relatively well-paid and so far no strikes have occurred. It is security against the local people that is needed, and protection against the OPM, the Papuan independence movement, which has attacked Freeport in the past, destroying an important pipeline. The enormous expansion of FIC has caused apprehension not only in the area but among Papuans everywhere. According to *The Nation*:

*"Emmy Hafild of WALHI, a Jakarta-based organisation that monitors Freeport activity in Irian Jaya, says seventy military personnel patrol the mining site. An Indonesian general told her Freeport helps pay their salaries.*

*The company denies any link to the Indonesian military and any responsibility for the repression of locals, but that's not what on-site visitors have heard from the com*

*pany's own employees. One recent Western traveller was told by a Freeport security employee that he and his co-workers amuse themselves by shooting randomly at passing tribesmen and watching them scurry in terror into the woods. That same traveller, who asked not to be identified, wandered into the mining site while hiking and was locked up for several hours in a cell jointly guarded by Freeport security and Indonesian soldiers".<sup>vi</sup>*

Try to square that story with company claims that their security guards are not armed.

Freeport Indonesia Company is the flagship of the two mining giants. RTZ, world's biggest mining company will expand its investments to a total of US\$1,7 billion in the coming years, quite understandably, with copper reserves conservatively estimated at US\$23 billion and gold reserves at US\$15 billion. Freeport McMoran has put the Grasberg mine at the top of its operations. Smaller mining projects in Nevada and California have been ditched, so as to devote more attention to this project. For the modern corporation, profit takes precedence, whatever the rights of the local people might be.

<sup>i</sup> *Republika*, 2 September 1995

<sup>ii</sup> *The Nation*, 31 July-7 August 1995, p.125

<sup>iii</sup> *Forum Keadilan*, 11 September 1995

<sup>iv</sup> *The Nation*, op.cit., page. 127

<sup>v</sup> *Forum Keadilan*, 28 August 1995

<sup>vi</sup> *The Nation*, op.cit, page. 126

*continued from page 3*

an attempt to justify the killing of civilians. Defence minister General Edi Sudradjat has now admitted that the OPM is an organised force, with a commander, a flag and weapons. 'Because they employ guerrilla tactics, it's not surprising that there have been casualties among the people.' He also spoke of the existence of a clandestine front, replicating the problems the army faces in East Timor. [*Republika*, 20 September] The generals must certainly be far from happy that the National Commission for Human Rights intends to meet the local OPM leader, Kelly Kwalik, during a forthcoming visit to Timika.

## Forum of Concern established


West Papuan students in Java and leading figures in the West Papuan community have set up a Forum of Concern for Human Rights Violations in Irian Jaya. Speaking before the National Commission's second trip to Timika, Rev. Karel Phil Erari said the Forum is sure the atrocities are related to Freeport's presence. The Amungme people regard their land as 'mother' in need of protection but the company has inflicted untold damage on it. He condemned the company for failing to understand the meaning of land, just as white people have failed to understand the meaning of land to the Indians and the Aborigines. [*Republika*, 5 September]

Veterans who fought for West Papua's integration into Indonesia have criticised the army's handling of the Timika situation and its branding of all protesters as 'separatists'. 'If the killing goes on,' said Dimara, 'I don't think there is any alternative to returning Irian Jaya to United Nations administration.' [*Jakarta Post*, 18 September]

## The Pramoedya debate

*Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Indonesia's leading novelist, has become the centre of a heated political and cultural debate. Most major newspapers and magazines have given wide coverage to the issue. Pram has become the focus of a debate encompassing all aspects of the Indonesian cultural scene.*

It started with a controversy over the award to Pramoedya of the Magsaysay 1995 Prize for Literature [see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 130, August 1995]. Mochtar Lubis, a Magsaysay laureate and outspoken opponent, handed back his award because he refused to be in the same class as someone who "had done very bad things against Indonesian writers and artists when the Communist Party was in power with the late president Sukarno" [*Jakarta Post*, 31 August]. Twenty-six people from the arts and literature world issued a statement criticising the Magsaysay decision.



*Pramoedya on the front page*

In response, 154 people signed an open letter in support of Pramoedya, recalling that an open and fair platform for discussion does not yet exist in Indonesia. They said that Pram cannot speak freely; his writings and statements cannot be aired in public. It was the start of a huge debate.

### No passport for Pramoedya

From the start it was clear that Pramoedya would not be allowed to go to Manila to accept the award because he is an ET (ex-political prisoner), Defence minister ret'd General Edi Sudradjat said the government "has not yet issued a permit to the former political prisoner Pramoedya Ananta Toer to go abroad" [*UPI*, 25 July 1995] Nor could his publishers, Yusuf Isak and Hasjim Rachman, also ETs,

go to Manila. Pramoedya's wife Maemunah, with novelist Marianne Katoppo, went to collect the award.

Pram's acceptance speech which was read by the novelist Marianne Katoppo, was called *Literature, Censorship and The State: How Dangerous are Stories?* As in his earlier essays, Pram criticises the stifling Javanese-Hindu tradition which extols the virtues of the *ksatria* caste and glorifies war and the state. As a Javanese, Pram is conscious of the danger of literature serving the state to uphold power. Avant garde literature has never emerged in Java, with the exception of a brief period under the Japanese, when poets like Chairil Anwar rebelled against the oppressors.

Pram sets forth his political convictions, the convictions that landed him in jail for 14 years under Suharto and a year under Sukarno:

*'Maybe there are some who wonder why to me literature is closely linked to politics. In my view, the life of each individual in relation to society, and especially in relation to the nation, is always closely related to politics. The fact that one accepts, rejects or affirms one's citizenship indicates a political attitude. The fact that one raises one's national flag indicates submission to the authorities, hence it shows that one is obedient politically. So, too, literature cannot be divorced from politics since this literature itself is born of humankind. As long as there is a social system and a power that controls it or abuses it, each individual will be a political animal. The ancient Greeks were already aware of it and so are we.'*


*'Somehow, at one time, the notion was born that politics is dirty, therefore literature has to be divorced from politics. If some things are dirty, for sure there are other things that are clean.'*

*'This notion of separating literature from politics in fact originates from those writers whose attitude is that of not involving themselves in politics. Politics cannot be just understood in the framework of certain political parties. Politics are all those aspects that are related to power. As long as there is a human society, there will be the exercise of power by one human person, or a group of human persons, over others regardless of whether it brings about good or evil, whether it is clean or dirty.'*

*'The literature that "rejects" politics, that professes to be wholly apolitical, is obviously produced by those writers who have found a comfortable niche in the halls of power. While those who call for progress and justice, even if they have to wander through a lonely wilderness of rejection and misunderstanding, continue to tell their stories - a vision of the world as a place where all can stand and keep their hands high and live in full humanity.'*

## Background

Pramoedya's views on literature and politics have not changed since his *Lekra* days. In the early sixties the art and literary world in Indonesia was politically divided into two blocks, the left-leaning block under *Lekra* and *LKN* and the liberal block, usually known under the name *Manikebu* (for *Manifes Kebudayaan*, Cultural Manifesto). Through his column in *Bintang Timur*, Pram started a polemic with his cultural opponents. Those were the days of Sukarno's Guided Democracy. Political life was full of leftist rhetoric: anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. Those seen as liberals were accused of opposing Sukarno's teachings and being counter-revolutionaries. The *Manikebu* proponents had a difficult time; some of them lost their jobs or had difficulty finding publishers. *Manikebu* was eventually banned.



In October 1965 the situation went into reverse.. Suharto and the generals took power and *Lekra* and *LKN* were banned. Many *Lekra* members fell victim to the horrendous '65-'66 massacre; others like Pram spent years in concentration camps or jails. Over the years, the *Lekra-Manikebu* polemic has occasionally flared up, the *Manikebu* people attacking the undemocratic, that is to say, communist methods of *Lekra*. But *Lekra* members couldn't take part. They were either in prison or had been silenced as ex-political prisoners. In most cases, Pramoedya has been at the centre of these one-sided 'polemics'. While those who denounce Pramoedya speak at length about repression during *Guided Democracy*, they say nothing about the killings and incarceration of people after 1965. Pram had and still has a very angry pen but he cannot be held responsible for the incarceration or the sacking of his opponents.

Pramoedya has never been the one to start the polemics. It is simply that the books he has written have received national and international acclaim, making him the centre of attention. Translated into more than 20 languages, Pramoedya has undeniably become Indonesia's best known author. Even with all his books banned in the country, his is

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a household name. Gagged and banned, Pramoedya has become the cultural giant of Indonesia. For those who rile against him, the Magsaysay Award was the last straw.

But the *Manikebu* proponents should not be put in one basket. Suharto's *Orde Baru* did not bring the cultural freedom some people expected. On the contrary, it started with the banning of more than 40 magazines and newspapers, one-third of all the existing publications. Banning and curbing cultural performances and harassing artists is a daily feature. The *Manikebu* signatories now fall into several categories. Diehards like Wiratmo Sukito, Ikranagara and Taufiq Ismael still use Cold War language, others favour reconciliation while others have taken sides against *Orde Baru*'s lack of cultural freedom and oppression. Goenawan Mohammad and Arief Budiman belong to the latter category. Many post-65 artists and cultural workers, free from the *Lekra-Manikebu* historical burden, have taken sides in favour of Pramoedya. Their daily reality is the suffocating *Orde Baru* reality. This is by far the largest and most important group, the majority of the art and literature community in Indonesia and they will surely prevail in the post-Suharto era.

### Post-Suharto debate

Indonesian politics hardly ever identify the real target. Before 1965 some Sukarno opponents went as far as setting up the *Badan Pendukung Sukarno-isme* (Movement to Support Sukarno's teachings). History is repeating itself. Instead of attacking Suharto, attacks are directed against the business activities of the children of highly-placed officials, which everyone knows means the sons and daughters of the president.

The renewed *Lekra-Manikebu* cultural debate is in the same mould. The *Manikebu* diehards seem to defend the status quo while others demand more cultural freedom. Pramoedya is being (mis)used as the central issue. The diehards take Pramoedya as a symbol of the oppression of cultural freedom while others see Pramoedya as the symbolic victim of the *Orde Baru*. The former are rooted in the past, the latter look to the present and the future.

But the debate has opened new avenues. Pramoedya, until recently only interviewed in local student magazines or the samizdat press, is now being interviewed by major political magazines like *Tiras* and *Forum Keadilan*. All the major newspapers have covered the issue. Another new avenue was the 'cultural dialogue' in *Taman Ismael Marzuki*, one of Jakarta's main theatres. Several contending blocks had an emotional clash over the Pramoedya debate, though he himself was not present. This debate went ahead in public without intervention from the authorities.

Perhaps the Pramoedya debate has opened new horizons. Only time will tell.

### New Book:

**Eyewitness**, by Seno Gumira Ajidarma,  
Tom Thompson Publ., Sydney, 1995,  
144 pp, A\$ 14.95

# Golkar's decline

*The 'Kuningisasi' (literally, 'yellow-isation') campaign has become a very controversial issue in Central Java. Although vehemently denied by Harmoko, chair of Golkar, the order for people to paint everything yellow, fences, walls and even tree trunks, has clearly come from above. Students in Central Java students have been out on the streets in protest.*

Throughout Central Java, the authorities ordered local 17 August (Independence Day) Committees to have everything painted yellow, including houses. Civil servants, eager to please, got cracking fast and 'yellow-isation' was soon under way. In Solo, it looked as if a yellow dust-storm had hit the city. Government buildings turned yellow; fences, tree-trunks and even sports uniforms became yellow. Officials say that because the Republic was celebrating its Golden Anniversary, yellow was the 'colour of the year'. But yellow is also the symbol of Golkar, the ruling party, nowadays described as the party of the ruler. The two other parties, PDI and PPP, are identified by the colours red and green.

The campaign gave birth to a new organisation called *GRAK, Gerakan Rakyat Anti-Kuningisasi*, or People's Movement Against Yellow-isation.



*Harmoko in yellow Golkar safari outfit*

What was in effect a covert Golkar campaign provoked furious reactions. In several Central Java cities like Solo and Kudus, students went on the streets to demonstrate against yellow-isation. They complained not only about the compulsory use of yellow paint but also about the saturation coverage for Harmoko on the state TV whenever he goes travelling, i.e. electioneering. The demonstration in Solo on 14 August was violently broken up by the police. A week later, students staged a noisy demonstration in Jakarta in front of the national parliament. Banners reading "*Retake Democracy*", "*Reject disguised campaigns*" and "*Reject yel-*

*lowisation*" were carried by the students. Public reaction was very favourable.

## The Harmoko safaris

Although general elections are still two years away (in 1997), Golkar has been campaigning ever since the last elections. Strictly speaking, campaigning is only allowed in the month before the election. Neither of the other two parties could conceivably get away with what Harmoko has been doing. Golkar's share of the votes fell from 73 per cent in 1987 to 68 per cent in 1992, and although it can still expect a big majority, support is rapidly eroding.

Harmoko, Suharto's key lackey, was catapulted into the position of Golkar chair, previously always held by a top general. Harmoko is a good orator, has been the Minister of Information for a record three terms and, last but not least, is unshakeably loyal to Suharto. On taking over, Harmoko had the impossible task of trying to turn Golkar into a proper political party while cutting close ties between Golkar and ABRI. Since then, Harmoko has been a busy man, criss-crossing the country, meeting people in towns and villages. It is no accident that the name safari is used for Harmoko and his convoy, all dressed in Golkar yellow. After leaving a region, the whole place is daubed yellow.

## Short history of Golkar

Golkar was originally the creation of ABRI, the Indonesian armed forces, or to be more precise, the product of a group of anti-Communist officers who set it up to confront the communist party in pre-1965 days. In the early days of Suharto's rule, Golkar was turned into the election machine of the New Order. With the full support of ABRI, Golkar easily won the 'elections', arm-twisting other parties and forcefully driving people, especially in the country-side, to the ballot box to vote Golkar. All cabinet ministers had to join in the campaign. All civil servants and their families had to join Golkar. Golkar became the mastodon of Indonesian politics. Golkar 'won' two-thirds of the votes. Those were indeed the golden days of Golkar.

In the seventies the other political parties were forced to fuse into two federations, PDI and PPP, to function as decoration in the elections; a one-party system with fringes. In the thirty years of Suharto's reign, he has placed Golkar people everywhere, in the cabinet and as governors. He himself chairs the Advisory Board of Golkar which places him in control.

In the 1987 election the first strains between Suharto and ABRI became visible in Golkar. Lt.General Sudharmono

was running Golkar and concurrently Minister of the State Secretariat. Although an army man himself, ABRI headquarters saw him as a bureaucrat, which he indeed was. Under guidance from the president, he curbed the influence of ABRI in the top echelons of Golkar and later became the vice-president. Unhappy at the move, ABRI was forced to take a backseat. In the years up to 1992 the cleavage between Golkar and Suharto worsened and many feuds broke out in Golkar, often at the provincial or district level when ABRI candidates had to compete with Golkar bureaucrats for positions in local government. General Benny Murdani, who was at the time the undisputed first man in ABRI, gave clear anti-Golkar signals, indicating that members of the armed forces could switch their loyalty to another party.

During the Sudharmono period, Golkar adopted a new direction and structure. It changed from a loose federation into a political machine with three components, A(BRI), B(ureaucracy) and G(olkar) functionaries. The latter category was destined to become the dominant group. Each Golkar provincial office received one billion rupiahs and they could easily fund all their activities from the interest. It now resembles parties like the Japanese LDP or the Mexican PRI, parties that have been in power for half a century or more, holding a monopoly over cabinet posts and the top bureaucracy.

## Jurassic Park

The similarity with LDP and PRI is quite striking; both parties are in disarray and are shadows of their former selves. Golkar's influence is also eroding and as ABRI has disentangled itself from Golkar, things have grown worse. In a frank outburst Major-General Sembiring explained how instrumental ABRI was in securing Golkar victories in past elections, using forceful persuasion to people to vote Golkar. While army officers from the seventies regarded Golkar as their flesh and blood, the ABRI leaders of the nineties have had a different experience. Golkar is seen these days as the party of the ruler i.e. Suharto, instead of the ruling party as in the days when Suharto was still close to the generals.

While it is true that Golkar is losing political clout, the reality on the ground is more complex. A sizeable number of ABRI officers still pledge loyalty to Golkar for the simple reason that they hold positions in the bureaucracy. Many officers have been assigned as district chiefs or to other key positions in the local administration which places them much more in the Golkar mould. Conflicts often emerge between military: ABRI officers who are chosen by the military, against officers chosen by army officers who have become bureaucrats, the bottom line being, which outfit (ABRI or bureaucracy) provides the bread and butter.

## The end of a relationship

The formal relationship between Golkar and ABRI seems to be definitely terminated. Harmoko has made strong statements about the non-involvement of ABRI in Golkar affairs. Top generals are now saying the same: it's better for ABRI to withdraw from Golkar. Ret'd Major-General Soebyakto, former head of the prestigious National Defence Council, revealed to the press that: *"I think I received the signal from the president that the present leadership [of Golkar], has to consist of civilians. We [the military] need to know our place. ABRI will just give support from outside and will not meddle with Golkar's domestic affairs. Let Golkar decide their own political course"*. (Forum Kead

lan, No.30, 24 August 1995). In the same interview the general strongly criticised the undemocratic procedures within Golkar: the organisation is run like a bureaucracy and its leaders are not elected in a democratic manner.

## The call for an opposition

In New Order vocabulary, the word opposition has been taboo for many years. In a corporatist state everything revolves around harmony, harmony between bosses and workers and harmony between government and political parties. Gradually also this kind of *Orde Baru* truth is eroding. The absence of any open, formal opposition has now been challenged by Nurcholish Madjid, a leading Muslim intellectual. In a recent seminar he said: *"The existence of an opposition party will make the checks and balances in state affairs more effective"*. Nurcholish wants the two existing parties PDI and PPP to be remoulded into opposition parties with positions that are distinct from Golkar. He is not the first person to talk about the need for an opposition but his statement came at the right moment. Others like Arief Budiman have said that opposition is the minimum requirement of a democracy.

People who defend the status quo argue that opposition is out of step with Indonesian culture but Arbi Sanit, another academic, disagrees, saying that having no opposition parties reflects the basic philosophy and political concept of the *Orde Baru* and has nothing to do with cultural identity. But Sri Bintang Pamungkas [see separate item] has given up on PDI and PPP. Only the emergence of a new political party from outside the system can play the role of an opposition party, he argues.

The discussion about an opposition became so lively that Suharto felt it necessary to join in. For him, the idea of opposition is inconsistent with the state ideology and constitution and existing political parties are partners of the government. But the die had been cast and even Suharto was unable to stop the discussion about an opposition.

## More reactionary

Golkar's only remaining forte is that it still functions as the extension of government and the bureaucracy. Tens of thousands of families make a living from Golkar and will defend the status quo. LIPI, the Indonesian Academy of Sciences, was asked by the government to propose changes to the present election and political system. Dr. Mochtar Pabotinggi, its head of the research and development of political affairs, told the press of his frustration with Golkar as the majority party and its unwillingness to recognise the need for political reforms. Golkar has become more reactionary, lacking both political programme and ideology, he said. Golkar is only interested in winning elections.

This is probably the basic truth about Golkar. In the early days, when Suharto and his chief trouble-shooter Ali Murtopo needed a political vehicle to win elections, Golkar was the chosen implement. It was never intended to become a 'proper' political party with a programme and ideology. It just does whatever the government tells it to do. In the swiftly changing political climate, Golkar will find it increasingly difficult to keep up. Harmoko's unpopularity and Golkar's lack of appeal to young voters could become a crucial factor in the next general elections.

## Using the court as a free-speech platform

*It is often argued that the courtroom is the only place in Indonesia where freedom of speech is possible. This has been shown in the recent trials of three journalists. From the outset, it was clear that the principle of free speech was on trial, not the three individuals and that they would use the courts as a platform from which to speak their minds.*

Ever since June last year when three political weeklies, *Tempo*, *Editor* and *DeTik*, were banned, journalists from the alternative press have been producing unlicensed publications to publish articles that cannot appear in the licenced press. One of the journals is *Kabar Dari Pijar*, the publication of *PIJAR*, an activist NGO which came into being several years ago, and the other is *Independen*, the journal of the newly-established *Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (AJI)*, the Alliance of Independent Journalists which was born last August.

These two publications consciously placed themselves outside the system, refusing to acknowledge the right of the government and in particular Indonesia's censor-in-chief, Information Minister Harmoko, to decide whether or not a group of people may publish a newspaper. For several months, these journals appeared with little interruption and became very popular, but in March this year, Harmoko decided to strike.


### The accused

And so it was that Tri Agus S. Siswowardjo of *PIJAR*, and Ahmad Taufik and Eko Maryadi of *AJI*, were arrested. Along with Taufik and Maryadi, a young student, Danang Kukuh Wardoyo, who was employed by *AJI* to help in the office, was also arrested. Taufik and Maryadi were tried together; the other two were tried separately. The charges were based on two 'hate-spreading' articles and an article from the 1982 Press Law. The unfortunate Danang was tried basically for helping *AJI*.

Ever since the trials started in July, the courtrooms became a field of battle between a power-crazy regime determined to stifle free speech and a new generation of journalists committed to upholding what they rightly see as the central plank of democracy. Waged by men who faced their accusers fearlessly and with verve and humour, the trials have seriously discredited the regime, showing just how weak and paranoid it has become.

Oddly enough, the first to be found guilty and sentenced was Danang, who got twenty months for helping Taufik and Maryadi to commit a crime even though at the time he was sentenced, they had not yet been found guilty. This was reason enough for the two *AJI* journalists to deride the courts for having fixed their own verdicts in advance.

Then it was the turn of Taufik and Maryadi who waged a joint defence, to be sentenced, each getting thirty-two months. Given the severity of Danang's sentence, one might argue that the two of them were treated relatively leniently. Finally came Tri Agus; he got an 'in-between' sentence of two years.



*Eko Maryadi (left) and Ahmad Taufik in court*

The trials of the three journalists played to packed houses, with large crowds of supporters attending every session. When the verdicts were announced, there was mayhem in court with people yelling abuse at the judges and shouting slogans about the death of free speech. Protest reached such a pitch in the trial of Tri Agus that the judges were forced to slink out before the session had been brought to a close.

### The AJI defence

Once it got started, the *AJI* trial soon became a huge embarrassment for censor-in-chief Harmoko, for it was this fearless group that placed on record the scandals surrounding the Minister, who has shamelessly used his position of power to grab shares in a number of newspapers in exchange for government licences. It was Issue No 10 of their journal, *Independen*, exposing this scandal that was the final straw for Harmoko, which became an important exhibit in court. No wonder the prosecution was not willing to consider a request by the defence for Harmoko to be called as a witness. Another key witness, the man who chairs the Jakarta branch of the pro-government association of journalists, the *PWI*, and who expelled thirteen *AJI* members, also refused to testify. Here was proof, the defendants declared, that this was a political trial.

A major section of their defence plea was devoted to recounting the history of censorship and press freedom in In-

Indonesia, going back to the early twentieth century when the Dutch colonial regime introduced restrictive press laws. It listed the papers and journals that have been banned over the years, right up to the present day, although it failed to mention the worst censorship blow of all in the country's history - the felling in October 1965 of nearly a quarter of the dailies and periodicals then in existence.

Taufik and Maryadi also drew up something like a roll of honour of journalists who have been forced to serve time for their dedication to free speech since the early days of the Indonesian press.

## Harmoko's role

It was when they turned to a detailed discussion of the contents of *Independen* that the role of Harmoko in having them arrested was exposed. The article entitled: *Harmoko is the King of Licencing and the God of the Indonesian Press*, with its frank and detailed account of the Harmoko scandal led the Minister to report the journal to the police. Police officers giving evidence told the court they made their assault on *AJI* after Harmoko had made a formal complaint.

Bitter at Harmoko's refusal to come to the witness-box, Taufik and Maryadi said: *'Such is the nature of bureaucrats who shield behind the trappings of power to destroy people's liberty. All they have the courage to do is fling accusations around, then order the police, the prosecutors and the judges to find an article, any article, to indict us. People like us have to be punished!'*

Harmoko was also taken to task for using his privileged position to monopolise the television screens to campaign for *GOLKAR*, the government party of which he is the chair. A Jakarta newspaper recently reported that while Harmoko appears on average thirty times a month, the leaders of the other two parties appear at most only once a month.

The defendants reminded the court that *AJI* has not been banned, nor has it ever received any warnings from any authorities and that, prior to their arrest, the two of them had never been summoned by anyone, civil or military. The organisation has won international stature by being accepted as a member of the *International Federation of Journalists*, and while the trial was in progress, the New York-based *Committee for the Protection of Journalists* awarded one of its 1995 International Press Freedom Awards to Ahmad Taufik as a member of the *AJI* Presidium.

## The PIJAR defence

The key prosecution charge against Tri Agus, or more correctly against *Kabar Dari PIJAR*, was that in one issue, reporting on a meeting to protest against the press bans, it used the headline: *'Adnan Buyung Nasution: This country has been thrown into chaos by a man named Suharto'*. For this, he was charged with insulting the head of state, in addition to charges under the hate-spreading articles. The question of whether you prosecute the person who made a statement or the person who quoted him, or indeed whether Nasution actually used these words - he appeared as a witness and told the court he could not remember the words he actually used - was, for the defendant, beside the point:

*'I state here quite categorically,'* he declared in his defence plea, *'that if I want to insult Suharto, why should I quote the words of Buyung Nasution? I have a veritable mountain of insulting words to aim at Suharto but I am waiting for the right moment to use them.'*

Tri Agus gave an account of the genesis of his organisation, *PIJAR*, and its role in his own development as an activist. It opposes the centralisation of power, the uniformity of ideas, the containment of plurality and the stifling of critical opinions. *'An underground press, an alternative press, a samizdat like Kabar Dari Pijar is absolutely crucial under a system of repression against the press and critical groups of people.'*

## Suharto, the cause of the chaos

Dealing at some length with the havoc caused by Suharto since he came to power after the events in October 1965, Tri Agus also focused on East Timor. In the most outspoken analysis ever delivered about East Timor in an Indonesian court, Tri Agus described the 1975 invasion as an *'unconstitutional act which put Indonesia to shame and drew condemnation throughout the world'*. After dwelling on the huge death toll, Tri Agus then related a story about the curfew in East Timor:

*'One evening in Dili when a curfew was in force, anyone seen out on the streets after ten pm would be shot. Two corporals in the Indonesian army named Salimin and Kardiman were sitting chatting. It was half past nine. Suddenly, the sound of a shot rang out: Salimin had shot a young man.'*

*"What on earth are you doing?"* said Kardiman. *"It's only half past nine. Why did you shoot him?"*

*"I know him. His name is Gomes and he lives in Tasi-tolu, out in the suburbs. I know for sure it will take him longer that half an hour to get home,"* replied Salimin calmly.



Tri Agus Siswomihardjo

More havoc was created by Suharto with the killings of criminal suspects in the mid-1980s which he justified as being 'shock therapy', with the massacre of Muslims at Tanjung Priok in 1984, with his insistence on single, corpo-

ratist organisations for all sections of the community, and with the militarisation of the state since he came to power in 1965.

The economic development which is at the heart of all Suharto's statements has resulted in a huge gap between rich and poor. The richest twenty per cent of the population controls 60 per cent of the wealth while 60 per cent, the poorest get only 20 per cent. The conglomerates can grow very fast because of their proximity to those in power whilst corruption is so serious that Indonesia has been named the most corrupt country in the world.

## A time of madness

Along with economic globalisation and worldwide com-

munications networks, a time of madness has arrived. The centralisation of power has now become the personalisation of power. Everything depends on Suharto. In the armed forces, loyalty to Suharto counts for everything, merit and achievement for nothing. Since Suharto is the source of all the chaos, the only way out is: SUCCESSION. As Lord Acton once said: All power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

In his concluding remarks, Tri Agus said he placed no hopes in the court. *'If you sentence me, I won't hate you. If you give me a short sentence, I won't praise you. All I ask is that you account for your actions before God. I have no doubt that I won't be the last to go to prison for insulting Suharto because there are more than enough reasons for people to insult him.'*

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## The Permadi case, a political trial par excellence

*There was never any doubt that Permadi would be punished. His trial was a typical showtrial, staged to convince the world that a judiciary exists. The soothsayer mocked the authorities by his talk of "supernatural" phone calls demanding his imprisonment under any article of the Criminal Code.*

Permadi is convinced his case was engineered or *di-rekayasa*, a widely-used term these days in Indonesia. A great orator, he is happy to be known as the "mouthpiece of Bung Karno". Sukarno, Indonesia's first president, was also a gifted speaker. Permadi Satrio Wiwoho, a wellknown public figure, has many talents, but is best known as a soothsayer. Always dressed in black, his public meetings attract huge crowds. His trial [see also *TAPOL Bulletin* No.129 & 130] was such a travesty that even the stifled Indonesian press showed sympathy for Permadi.

### Blasphemy, the side issue

Permadi was charged with blasphemy, under Article 156a of the Criminal Code, for sowing hatred against a certain religious community. He allegedly insulted Islam by calling the Prophet Mohammad a benign dictator during a debate with students at the Gadjah Mada University in April 1994. Charges against him were made a year later using a cassette tape of the debate as evidence. During the trial it became obvious that the cassette was heavily doctored, placing Permadi's words out of context.

Like most Javanese, Permadi is nominally a Muslim; for him to insult his own religion would not make sense. In fact Permadi was planning to go to Mecca this year to perform *umroh* (pilgrimage). Being very outspoken, he might well have 'insulted' someone else in his many public speeches. In 1992 Permadi was predicting that Suharto would not last and he recently predicted that Megawati Sukarno who now chairs the PDI would become the next president.

As suggested quite openly in the Indonesian press, Permadi went on trial not because he insulted the Prophet but because he insulted the man in power.

### Stage-managed

On 16 March, a notoriously ambitious Golkar politician named Din Syamsuddin accused Permadi of blasphemy and circulated the edited tape widely. Within weeks, a hate cam-

paign against Permadi was underway. Fanatics demanded he be tried; some even wanted to use physical violence against him. On 17 April, Permadi went to the police for protection.

During the trial, the stage-management continued. Most of the witnesses proclaimed him innocent but a key prosecution witness, Ali Hardi Kiai Demak, a member of parliament from the PPP who was present during the discussion, insisted that Permadi insulted the Prophet. He claimed that he raised his hand in vain to stop the discussion. Others in the public, according to Ali Hardi, also protested loudly. The other witnesses, including the moderator of the discussion, gave a totally different account of what happened.

### Released to save face

The sessions were lively, with the public supporting Permadi and the defendant performing well. His defence plea was one of the longest ever in a political trial, taking nine hours to read. He combined fiery words with chanting. The public cheered him on throughout. The prosecutor asked for one year but he got seven months. No doubt to save face all round, the high court which is due to hear appeals from both defence and prosecution, ordered his immediate release.

So for now, Permadi is back home with his family. Hundreds of supporters flocked to welcome him back and found him in high spirits, undaunted by his months in prison.

### (Mis)using religion

The hate campaign against Permadi was a blatant misuse of religion for dirty political games. Politicians like Din Syamsuddin and Ali Hardi were used to whip up religious fanaticism with lies and fabrications. Fortunately, the majority of Muslims did not fall for this ploy. Permadi had support from Muslim leaders, with youngsters from the local Muhammadiyah agreeing to guard his house.

Using religion to stir up political support is becoming something of a habit [see also article on East Timor]. One of

Indonesia's most powerful men, Harmoko, was recently close to becoming a target of religious bigotry himself.

While the Permadi trial was in progress, Harmoko, in one of his numerous speeches, quoted incorrectly from the Qur'an. Although he quickly apologised to President Suharto and MUI (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*), the damage had been done. Demonstrations erupted in a number of cities, demanding that Harmoko be tried. Harmoko symbolises the greed and wickedness of the regime and many have suffered because of his wrongdoing so it was more than understandable that people would go onto the streets to demand justice for Harmoko. But to put Harmoko on trial for blasphemy, like Permadi, means applying Suharto's oppressive standards. One day Harmoko may have to account for his corruption and abuse of power but that will be another kind of justice.

## Sri Bintang on the offensive

Since May, when Sri Bintang Pamungkas was declared a 'suspect', his trial has been pending. The authorities plan to charge him under Article 134 of the criminal code for insulting the head of state. The case relates to his presence at a demonstration in Hanover while Suharto was there. A subsequent demonstration in Dresden so infuriated the president that somebody had to take the blame. So Sri Bintang became the scapegoat. The authorities have been trying hard to construct a case, but so far it's all quiet on the judicial front.

An outspoken politician, Sri Bintang enjoys a great deal of support and is full of confidence. Instead of sitting back and waiting for his trial to start, he has gone onto the offensive. He has taken out a lawsuit against President Suharto for his dismissal from parliament, a thing that can only happen by presidential decree. At the same time, he has taken the Attorney-General to court for issuing an order preventing him from going abroad for a year. Both cases have been accepted by the administrative court and will soon be heard.

Sri Bintang's case has received considerable international attention. The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) has the case under investigation. In Germany, twenty-two people are ready to appear as defence witnesses; all were involved in organising the demonstrations against Suharto.

## Victory for Arief Budiman

The popular academic, Dr. Arief Budiman, has won his case in the administrative district court in Semarang for wrongful dismissal. A huge celebration was organised on the university grounds, attended by lecturers, students and parents. As reported earlier [see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No.126, December 1994], Arief was dismissed by the Satya Wacana University Foundation (*YPTKSW*) on 31 October 1994, since when the university has been unable to function properly. Protests by lecturers and students have turned the campus into a battleground. All efforts to seek a compromise have failed to convince the university authorities to reverse their decision. They have one powerful ally, the local military authorities. One of the most outspoken academics in Indonesia, Arief has often upset authorities. He was dismissed for tarnishing the good name of the university and its authorities.

In January Arief decided to take *YPTKSW* to court. The case was finally heard in August, ending in victory for Arief: *YPTKSW* found guilty of wrongful dismissal and or

## POLITICAL TRIALS

dered to pay 5 million rupiahs compensation. Earlier, the administrative court took a sensational decision revoking the government's decision to suspend the license of *Tempo*. Despite this decision, *Tempo* has not yet been allowed to reappear.

Despite the court ruling in his favour, Arief is doubtful about his future as a lecturer. *'I have my doubts whether I can teach again, because the power lies in the hands of the rector and the foundation'*. [*Forum Keadilan*, No.10, 28 August 1995]. At the moment, he is finalising a manuscript in Australia.



*continued from page 17*

## Training Indonesian police officers

The report also challenges the training programme for members of the Indonesian police force. While the government claims it hopes that training will help develop respect for human rights, Clwyd insists that *'the use of British aid money to train the brutal Indonesian police force is a moral disgrace and a reckless waste of taxpayers' money'*.

It looks in particular at the record of Colonel, now Major-General, M. Hindarto who received training in the UK from April till September 1986 and, based on a sworn statement by an East Timorese, itemises human rights violations perpetrated by the police in East Timor during the time Hindarto was chief-of-police for Nusa Tenggara, which includes East Timor.

Pointing out that ODA procedures state that it 'considers non-military security organisations such as police forces as legitimate beneficiaries of the aid programme', the report points out that the Indonesian police force is part of the armed forces and *'even the briefest consideration of the human rights record of the Indonesian regime and the Indonesian police should surely have put a stop to this funding'*.

## East Timor projects

Finally, the report attacks the government's inconsistency in supporting projects in East Timor despite having announced that, as it does not recognise Indonesia's annexation of East Timor, *'we do not therefore fund government to government aid projects in East Timor'*.

Three projects all of which operate in East Timor have received British aid money: the Regional Physical Planning Project for Transmigration, the National Overview of Land Resources Project, and the Regional Physical Planning, Map Improvement and Training Project. By funding such projects, Clwyd says, the government has in fact not only recognised East Timor's annexation, but aided it.

Arguing that the British government has shown contempt for human rights in East Timor, Clwyd accuses the government of 'lying to Parliament' when telling it that no British aid goes to East Timor.

# Peasant revolt in East Java

*The peasants in Jenggawah have a long tradition of revolt. This tobacco-growing district is commonly called "tanah raja" (king's land) in recognition of the richness of the soil. The Dutch opened up this area for tobacco growing in 1860. Besuki Na Oogst, a high quality tobacco leaf for cigars originates from this area.*

On the evening of 30 July thousands of peasants and their families, carrying torches, marched to the PTP XXVII, the State Plantation, and started to attack the buildings. In no time, at least 21 tobacco storage sheds in the Jenggawah and Rambipuji subdistricts had been destroyed. The following day the actions continued; armed with machetes and knives, the peasants attacked the main buildings of the State Plantation, including the homes of the personnel, cars and motor bikes. Everything was destroyed. Two days later the angry peasants attacked the office of the BPN (*Badan Pertanahan Nasional*, National Board of Land Affairs) office. Indro Budi Waspodo, the BPN Chief, was badly beaten up. Other properties of the plantation and six more tobacco sheds went up in flames. Thousands of police and military were called in but were unable to control the situation.

## Land conflict

The angry outburst is the result of a long-standing conflict with the authorities over the use and ownership of the land. The Jenggawah peasants have been growing tobacco for generations. Under arrangements with the former Dutch Plantation LMOD, the peasants were allowed to use the land to grow tobacco leaves while the plantation bought up the harvest. The Dutch cigar industry became world famous because of the Jenggawah tobacco leaves.

In 1958 LMOD was nationalised and from then on, conditions for the peasants went downhill. The land, amounting to 2,815 ha, was declared to be state property and handed over to the state plantation. In 1978 the first protests erupted when it was decided to allocate the peasants only 0.3 ha each while plantation officials and foremen received much more. Storage sheds were torched and many peasants received prison sentences.

The recent outburst is a continuation of that conflict. In November last year, the BPN renewed the land-use lease to PTP XXVIII while the peasants who have tilled the land for generations were left with no rights at all. The peasants demanded that the land be converted to them, but in vain.

## Dark forebodings from the army

Other grievances added fuel to the conflict, especially cheating by plantation foremen when the crops are weighed; foremen often try to intimidate peasants by destroying their crops. The relationship between the peasants and the plantation has worsened over the years. Formerly, the peasants were free men but their status today is little more than plantation workers.

Many plantations are run like modern industries, with workers employed by the company but this is at variance with the tradition of Jenggawah tobacco growers who were never employed by the plantation but grew and sold their crops. The provincial and military authorities of East Java will not countenance their demand for land to the tiller. East Java's military commander, Major General Imam Utomo, said: "This kind of thing happened in 1964. Let's hope it won't happen again" [*Kompas*, 4 August 1995]. From 1963 and 1965 East Java was the centre of many peasant conflicts, most of which were organised by the peasants' union, the BTT, which was under communist leadership.

## Five East Timorese seek asylum at British Embassy in Jakarta

Five East Timorese, all in their early twenties, entered the British embassy in Jakarta on 25 September 1995. All five have been on the run from the security forces in illegally occupied East Timor and fled to Jakarta in the recent past. At the moment of writing the five are still in the compound of the British embassy. The British embassy has told journalists in Jakarta that their request for asylum has been sent to London for consideration.

The five are: T.J. Temotio, 23 yrs; Antonio Baptista Sequeria, 24 yrs; Nelson Turquel, 25 yrs; Joaquim Alim, 24 yrs and Egas Soares, 25 yrs. They are all active members of the clandestine front in East Timor and have taken part in various demonstrations against the Indonesian occupation in the last few years. The Indonesian security forces are actively pursuing the five asylum seekers. T.J. Temotio was actually arrested earlier and faced severe torture. The others avoided arrest and went into hiding. This is the fourth time that East Timorese have sought asylum in foreign embassies in Jakarta.

In a petition presented to the embassy, the five demanded implementation of all the decisions of the recent inter-Timorese talks in Austria in June this year, and the unconditional release of all Timorese prisoners, including resistance leader Xanana Gusmao and his inclusion in talks to reach a settlement of the East Timor question.

## Media under again

After months of what might, in Indonesian terms, be called a period of relative calm, the media is once again under pressure. Issues that have grabbed the headlines are the huge controversy about Pramodya Ananta Toer, a discussion on the need for opposition parties and the killings in Timika, West Papua. The authorities are now feeling that things have gone too far.

### Sunday paper suspended

*Media Indonesia Minggu* which is the Sunday edition of *Media Indonesia*, has suspended publication for four weeks. The official reason is 'to raise the image of this newspaper in order to have it function as a press which is free and responsible'. According to a release by *PIJAR*, one of whose activists has just been given a two-year prison sentence [see separate item], there is more to this suspension than meets the eye.

One very likely reason is that the paper carried a lengthy interview with Nurcholish Madjid discussing his statement about the need for opposition parties in Indonesia. After his initial statement, President Suharto responded with a declaration that there is no tradition of opposition politics in Indonesia. It was assumed that newspapers would take the hint and stop carrying stories about it. But *MIM* did not take the hint, with the result that one of its owners, Bambang Trihatmodjo, Suharto's oldest son, phoned the editor, Surya Paloh and pressed for 'remedial action'.

According to *PIJAR*, the authorities are moving more cautiously, fearing that further newspaper bans would renew the international opprobrium that followed the banning of three journals in June 1994. On several issues, broad hints have been enough to convince the media to stop covering a 'sensitive' issue. One was the controversy over the country's foreign debt burden which broke out before this year's meeting of the CGI, the international aid consortium for Indonesia.

### TV chat show taken off the air

The popular chatshow, *Perspektif*, on SCTV has been dropped under pressure from the authorities. The company says that the show was being 'rested' for an unspecified period 'for a review of its format as part of wider scheduling changes'. But according to Mochtar Lubis, senior journalist and writer who was the guest on a recent *Perspektif* programme, 'if management were sound, they would not stop *Perspektif* as it was one of the most popular and thoughtful programmes on Indonesian TV so they must be under really heavy pressure to do that.'

The host of the programme, Wimar Witoelar told *Jakarta Post* that he was given only four days notice of the decision. Only ten of 26 scheduled episodes had been shown. 'I feel as if I was holding a party but suddenly the lights were switched off,' he said. [*Reuter*, 19 September]

Some months ago, an interview with the judge, Benyamin Mangkudilaga, who passed a highly embarrassing verdict at the State Administration Court, criticising Infor

mation Minister Harmoko for his decision to ban the weekly, *Tempo*, was withdrawn.

### Regional paper under threat

*Lampung Post*, part of the Media Indonesia Group, which appears weekdays and Sundays in the South Sumatra capital has been threatened with closedown, after it published an interview with Pramodya Ananta Toer who has been at the centre of controversy after receiving the Mag-saysay Award for Literature.

In an attempt to forestall closedown, the paper has already sacked five journalists. The regime's displeasure at the interview which ran under the heading: *Pramodya: It was after independence that I lost my freedom*, reached the newspaper via the provincial governor after he had been approached by Director-General Subrata of the Information Ministry. Subrata also informed the Lampung military commanded of the need for action against those responsible. According to NGO sources, the military plan to investigate the affair to find out who was behind the interview.

Even though action has been taken against five journalists, it appears that the threat of closure still hangs over the paper.



## 'ET' stigma removed but surveillance remains

*The government announced in August that identity cards for ex-political prisoners will no longer bear the 'ET' code but the system of monitoring the ex-prisoners will not end. And the day after three 1965 prisoners were released after having been granted presidential clemency, two other 1965 prisoners were informed that their executions were imminent.*

Pressure for the removal of the 'ET' code on the identity cards of nearly 1.4 million 'ex-tapols' has been building up in Indonesia for well over a year. The decision to remove the code came in response to that domestic pressure.


The regulation to stigmatise former prisoners held for alleged involvement in communist or pro-Communist organisations was enacted in 1981 in an Interior Ministry Instruction ordering local authorities to 'give guidance to and control former G30S/PKI detainees and convicted prisoners'. Of the one and a half million people held from 1965, many until the late 1970s, less than a thousand were ever tried. But in trials were purely political and were staged to 'prove' that the Indonesian Communist Party had master-minded the coup attempt on 1 October 1965.

### Half a step forward

Removing the code from identity cards (IDs) may make life a bit easier for the ex-tapols simply because their 'special status' will no longer be so visible whenever they are required to show their IDs in order to apply for jobs, passports or other basic amenities available to citizens. However, the regime was not going to allow this change to basically alter its grip on the activities and whereabouts of people whom it still regards as a danger to stability.

Interior Ministry officials said that a person's ET status will continue to be recorded on the register held about every citizen. The decision to stop using the code on IDs was taken concurrently with a decision to overhaul the ID system completely. Every citizen will in future have numbered cards recorded on a centrally-controlled database. A citizen's 16-digit number will have to be given for a whole range of civic requirements. One of the questions to be answered when obtaining an ID will relate to a person's ET status, making it possible for officials to keep tabs on these 'undesirable' people. Officials authorised to consult the database will all have to undergo special security screening. [Kompas, 22 August]

In any case, the new, unmarked IDs will only be issued when a person's card expires. Hence, when three ex-tapols, Pramoedya Ananta Toer and his publishers, Hashim Rachman and Jusuf Ishak, wanted to go to Manila in September for the Magsaysay Award ceremony (see separate item), they were unable to get permission to leave.



### 'We won't relax vigilance'

Interior Ministry Director-General for Social-Political Affairs Soetoyo NK, speaking in Parliament the day after the decision was announced, said that vigilance will not be relaxed because 'even though the PKI has been outlawed, communist ideology will never die. ABRI (the armed forces) certainly has its own methods for keeping tabs on them so that if they try anything on, it will be easy for us to detect it'.

The Director-General was happy to be able to announce that 'ideological guidance' over the years had been very successful. Whereas in 1971, all 1.4 million 'ex-tapols' were denied the right to vote in the general elections, in 1992, 'only 36,000' were kept off the electoral rolls, thanks to all the efforts by local officials to alter their way of thinking. [Suara Pembaruan, 19 August]

But the decision to remove the code does not affect the system of 'penelitian khusus' known as *litsus* which, officials insist, is something quite separate from the ET regulation. *Litsus* is required, we are assured, because of the need to check up on the 'ideological influences' to which people are subjected -- from close and not-so-close relatives with an ET status -- when applying for a job in the civil service or other 'sensitive' posts. '*Litsus*' controls will not be lifted, said Soetoyo.

### A human rights abuse

Human rights activists have expressed dissatisfaction with the retention of controls on ex-tapols. Vice-chair of the National Commission for Human Rights Marzuki Darusman, who has spoken out against the coding on a number of occasions, added his voice to the protest. 'If removing the ET code is accompanied by a policy of retaining

the controls, this is a violation of their human rights,' he said.

*Suara Pembaruan* also recorded the views of a 51-year old ex-tapol, Mrs SL who lives in Yogyakarta. While not wishing to reveal her identity, she said she was greatly relieved at the change. 'It does at least remove one mental burden.' Both she and her husband have the code on their IDs. She said her local community now accepts their presence with equanimity. She runs a small business and doesn't need to present her card very often, but for simple things like taking part in the local quiz show, she dreads having to show her card. 'I hope we'll be treated better from now on and won't have to apply for travel permits whenever we want to leave town,' she said.

## 1965 prisoner executions imminent?

On 17 August, when the whole country was celebrating the 50th anniversary of independence, two 1965 political prisoners who have been on death row for more than twenty years and in prison since October 1965 were shocked by the news that their executions were imminent. One day earlier, three long-term 1965 prisoners had been released from Cipinang Prison, Jakarta, after being granted presidential clemency. [See *TAPOL Bulletin* No 130, August 1995]

The two men, Sergeant-Major I. Bungkus and Sergeant-Major Marsudi were both members of the Cakrabirawa palace guard at the time of their arrest.

It was Minister of Justice Oetoyo Oesman who made the announcement without mentioning names, saying that others, including three criminal prisoners, being held on murder charges were also due for imminent execution.

## EX-POLITICAL PRISONERS

After the announcement, there were a number of reports in the Indonesian press, repeating the Minister's statement, referring specifically to Bungkus and Marsudi, and interviewing members of Bungkus' family who had decided to rush to Jakarta from East Java to visit him for the last time.

The announcement attracted a great deal of international attention, in particular because the Dutch Queen was due to arrive in Jakarta on a State Visit a few days later. During her visit, the Dutch Foreign Minister raised the forthcoming executions with Foreign Minister Ali Alatas who then accused the press of 'misinterpreting' the Justice Minister's words. Faced with the prospect of international condemnation, the Justice Minister also claimed he had been 'misunderstood', that nothing was imminent and that the instruction for the two men's executions had not yet been issued. Only then could the executions proceed.

For the time being, the men's lives have been saved but the threat of execution still stands, also for three other death-row prisoners: Sukatno, Asep Suryaman and Isnanto.

## TAPOL calls for General Amnesty

On 23 August, TAPOL called on a number of governments to support the idea of a General Amnesty for all the 24 political prisoners held in connection with the 1965 events. It said that only a General Amnesty would end the misery of the death-sentence prisoners who have lived at least half their lives in prison and would mean resolving the problem of the entire group without discrimination.

# Labour MP attacks British aid to Indonesia

*Britain's vast programme of economic assistance to Indonesia has come under fire from a Labour MP who has demanded that some of the projects should be examined by the National Audit Office.*

The report, entitled *British Aid to Indonesia: The Continuing Scandal*, was produced by Ann Clwyd, MP who was Shadow Secretary of State for Overseas Development before the last general election. The document was prepared after she had tabled hundreds of questions to the government on all aspects of its aid programme for Indonesia.

In her introduction to the report, Ann Clwyd says that the overriding objective of British aid programmes is to promote big business. In Indonesia, the commercially orientated Aid and Trade Provision funding accounts for 50 per cent of the ODA programme for Indonesia. Under the present government, ATP has expanded and been used to support British companies, with no meaningful attempt to impose development criteria. British business is promoted whether it is civil or military even if it involved the supply of arms which may be used for internal repression.

## GEC under the spotlight

The report examines in particular the GEC group of companies and an intriguing web linking controversial aid contracts and arms deals with former Tory ministers.

\* GEC-Marconi has supplied an integrated communications system to the Indonesian Navy;

\* Marconi Communications has supplied short-wave radio transmitters involving an ATP soft loan of £26.9m, for the National Broadcasting Network

\* GEC-Avionics has supplied navigational implements for the Hawk aircraft sold to Indonesia by British Aerospace.

\* GEC-Marconi won a contract to supply a short-wave broadcasting system for *Radio Republik Indonesia*.

Ann Clwyd criticises the ODA for failing to undertake a proper appraisal of each project in line with government guidelines, taking into account democracy, pluralism, participation and respect for human rights. The short-wave transmitters project, for instance, supports an Information Ministry which suppresses freedom of expression and has a record of political interference in the media.

Clwyd's report shows how senior executives of GEC include Tory ministers. Lord Prior, who held many portfolios, has been chairman of GEC since 1984, several GEC executives sit on government quangos promoting exports, and now, former Trade Minister, Richard Needham, who made five visits to Indonesia during his stint at the Board of Trade, became a GEC Director in September this year, less than two months after leaving office.

*continued on page 13*

*continued from front page*

News of this incident quickly spread to other parts of the country, sparking the disturbances in Dili. After a day of rioting on Friday, Timorese youths torched the capital's biggest market at Comoro on Saturday; the market, where virtually all traders are from Indonesia, was totally destroyed.

In Viqueque in the south-east, other issues helped to inflame passions with the result that other symbols of the presence of Indonesians were attacked, including a Protestant church and a local Muslim prayer-house, known as a *mushola*. The atmosphere has been volatile in the town for more than a year, after Jakarta insisted on appointing an army officer as chief administrator instead of a local Timorese resident.

## Xanana Gusmao supports the youth

A message dated 10 September, from jailed resistance leader, now being held in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta, hailed the *'acts of genuine revolt by the populations of Baucau, Ermera and Viqueque, I also express my full support for the acts of rejection by the Dili population where 52 compatriots have been detained by the colonialist forces.'* Xanana said there could be *'no peaceful coexistence with the occupiers of our homeland who are carrying out a physical, ethnic and cultural genocide of our people.'*

## Illegal occupation is the issue

Although he rarely comments directly on any political issue, President Suharto went on record to say that the disturbances had "no relation whatsoever to the question of the territory's integration in Indonesia". Speaking to the press after a meeting with the President, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said: *'We regret that a ruckus occurred there but as explained by the proper authorities there, this issue is SARA, not political.'* [*Jakarta Post*, 12 September] (SARA is regime jargon for 'ethnic or religious conflict'.)

But Major-General Adang Ruchiatna, military commander of the Udayana command, based in Bali, blamed the clandestine front. *'The disturbances were instigated by the 3,000 people who are everywhere, in Bali, Malang, Jakarta and Salatiga. They maintain regular communications with each other and with the movement in East Timor.'* [*Republika*, 11 September] (The army has settled for a figure of 3,000 as being the number of people involved in the clandestine front.)

It is inevitable that protest against the forces of occupation and against the huge influx of migrants from Indonesia becomes entangled with religious issues. Most of the migrants are Muslims and many mosques have been built, leading to fears by the local inhabitants that their cultural identity, which is closely intertwined with their religious beliefs and practices, is in danger of being swamped. Moreover, there have been numerous instances of members of the armed forces and other officials desecrating religious monuments and rituals. It is difficult not to conclude that there is a deliberate attempt by the forces of occupation to provoke local inhabitants; they know perfectly well that offences against religious sentiments can easily ignite protest, retribution and even the rioting that has hit East Timor in the recent past. The benefits for the occupiers are two-fold: the focus of protest can be deflected along religious and ethnic


lines, and the army can assert that their high-profile presence must be maintained in the interests of 'law and order'.

## Bishop Belo condemns Indonesia

Bishop Belo, head of the Catholic Church in East Timor, told *Radio Australia's 'Laporan Internasional'* [11 September], an Indonesian language current affairs programme, that it was no longer the time to ask the East Timorese to be patient:

*'We have been patient for too long. From 1976 till now we have been told to be patient, to wait a little longer. For how long does one have to be patient and to wait? The Timorese people are treated like chickens and ducks. Shoo them here, shoo them there.'*

Asked whether the military commander, Major-General Adang Ruchiatna - who rushed to Dili as soon as the disturbances broke out - would be able to calm people down, the Bishop was blunt: *'I don't trust him.'*



**Bishop Belo**

Asked whether youths in Dili had been arrested because they were members of Fretilin, Belo said:

*'Does it mean that just for being Fretilin, a person is arrested and tortured? You must be careful. They are human beings. I think the military officers and the high-ranking public servants who have allowed the situation to reach the point it is at now, are the ones who should be arrested.'*

The Bishop told other journalists that the troubles were the result of the government's failure to address religious and ethnic tension. *'All they have done is give a 1,001 excuses. They have been building mosques without consulting anyone while rich migrants are buying up all the land.'* He was also unhappy that East Timorese are being taken to Islamic schools in Java. [*Reuter*, 11 September]

Belo told *Gatra*, in an interview which is ringing with anger and cynicism, that people from the centre have no idea of the real situation here. *'Yes, okay, our people are backward, ignorant and uneducated but we have our own tradi-*

tions, values, lifestyles. People from over there should try conforming to our traditions and not expect us to conform to theirs. I thought the opening up of the territory (in 1989) was supposed to be for our benefit, not for others.'

You were busy going round and appealing to the young people to calm down. But next day, there were more fires, said his interlocutor 'Yes, because we had agreed that if the youngsters returned to their homes, the security would leave the streets as well. But what happened? That same night, security people went round arresting the kids, so what do you expect?' [Gatra, 21 September]

## Many people arrested

Early on, chief-of-police Andreas Sugianto, said that sixteen people were arrested of whom nine were quickly released. Later, he announced that ten others had been arrested on suspicion of instigating the troubles and hinted that others were being sought. However, *Republika*, the Jakarta daily which is now always first with news about East Timor, quoted Andreas Sugianto as saying that 53 people had been arrested. Bishop Belo however gave a much higher figure of eighty arrests. [Republika, 10 September]

These figures apply only to Dili; the nationwide figure is likely to be very much higher.

## Two youths shot dead

In July, Indonesian soldiers shot dead two young Timorese men close by their homes in the village of Wailakama, in the region of Vemasse. The victims were Marcelino da Silva Belo, leader of the Catholic youth organisation in the village, and Augusto Freitas Belo, a student. The summary executions occurred on 27 July, when troops in the area were investigating an attack against a local army chief. The two were accused of being members of the resistance. According to the Portuguese news agency, *LUSA*, which first broke the story a month later, the killings were clearly premeditated: the villagers were ordered to gather round and witness the executions.

In September, the military commander of East Timor, Colonel M Simbolon, announced that the army would investigate the killing of two civilians in Viqueque on 24 August. He said that the two victims, Inacio da Silva and Manuel da Silva, had been shot dead early that morning, while out on a hunting expedition with other villagers, in an area known, according to Simbolon, to be a stronghold of the guerrillas.

'My officers addressed them but there was no reply,' said Simbolon. 'They then opened fire and two died on the spot.' [Jakarta Post, 7 September] Earlier reports from the resistance spoke of two civilian deaths in Viqueque on 24 August, without giving their identities. The killings sparked disturbances in the town when youths burnt four mosques and destroyed stalls owned by Indonesian traders. A number of Timorese were later arrested.

Simbolon's statement suggests that some army officers want to avoid accusations about civilians being killed and forestall demands for investigations by initiating his own.

## Clandestine leader disappears

Mystery surrounds the fate and whereabouts of Pedro Nunes, known also as Sabalae, who was caught by army troops on 29 June, on his way back from a visit to a guerrilla base, and taken to a military post at Tibar. He was

## EAST TIMOR

travelling by motorbike with a friend, Remigio Levi da Costa Tilman, who was also arrested.

Sabalae is the secretary of the East Timorese clandestine front and is a member of the leadership of the resistance, along with Konis Santana who heads the armed resistance, and Jose Ramos-Horta who heads the diplomatic front abroad.

News of the capture of Sabalae was received soon after it happened; it was speedily and vigorously denied by the spokesperson of the armed forces, Brigadier-General Suwarno Adiwijoyo. [Reuter, 4 July] However, the resistance movement is convinced that he was captured and has initiated its own investigations into the circumstances of his arrest, fearing betrayal from someone inside the movement.

It is feared that the two men have been murdered. One report claims that a Timorese intelligence agent named Fernando Boavida who escorted the two men to the interrogation centre of *SGI*, army intelligence, shortly after their capture, has himself been eliminated, to prevent news of Sabalae's arrest from leaking out.

## Xanana gets remission, then loses it

Resistance leader Xanana Gusmao, who is now serving a 20-year sentence in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta, was among a large number of prisoners to be granted five-months' remission on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Indonesian independence. Soon after, however, it was announced that the remission had been revoked because, in violation of prison rules, he sent out a letter to East Timorese women on the occasion of the UN Women's Conference in Beijing.

Whether or not this remission stands or falls matters little to the prisoner himself. What is odd about this story, however, is that a senior official of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, Irawan Abidin, claimed in an article in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* [3 August] that all the letters, messages and taped interviews attributed to Xanana Gusmao during his time in Cipinang are fakes. Xanana, it would seem, is being punished because of a letter which, according to Abidin, must have been a fake.

### New Books on East Timor:

*East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation*, Edited by Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley, Cassell, London, New York, 1995, 260 pp, £ 12.99

*East Timor: Genocide in Paradise*, Matthew Jardine, Odonian Press, Arizona, 1995, 95 pp, US \$6.00

### Forthcoming:

*Surviving Indonesia's Gulag, A Western Woman Tells Her Story*, by Carmel Budiardjo, Cassell, London.

HB £40.00, PB £12.99

Publication Date: December 1995

### Violations on all fronts

Meanwhile, atrocities and violations are continually being reported, while Indonesian troops are said to be engaged in major military operations against the armed resistance.

There are fears for the safety of Afonso Pinto, a Timorese who was a candidate for the post of district chief in Viqueque (he didn't get the job) and attended the Timorese talks in the UK last year, organised by the Indonesian authorities. On that occasion, he expressed disappointment with the process of integration. He is reported to have been taken on 'assignment' by an army officer. After saying farewell to his wife, all trace of him has been lost.

In Dili, Matias Gouvea Duarte, a health worker aged 44, has gone on trial. Known also as Hunuk, the defendant is accused of helping to conceal Xanana Gusmao before his capture, and of supplying the resistance movement with medical supplies and cash. Under one of the many charges he faces, he could get life imprisonment. He has refused to accept any help from Indonesian lawyers. [*Jawa Pos*, 16 August]

The trial of Hendrique Belmeiro da Costa is also underway. He too is charged with having helped to conceal Xanana Gusmao during his trips to Dili, before his capture. A hearing in mid-September was postponed because he was too unwell to appear. The unstable situation in Dili was

also given as a reason for the suspension. [*Jakarta Post*, 16 September]

Meanwhile, the fate of five men who were abducted in Dili during disturbances there on 9 January this year is still shrouded in secrecy. During a visit to Dili in August, BBC correspondent, Catherine Napier, spoke to Isabel da Conceicao, the wife of one of the men, who told her how soldiers came to the family shack in broad daylight in Vila Verde Matadouro. 'The military came and took him and beat him and threw him in a truck. I was screaming, "Why are you taking my husband?"' That was seven months ago. While the military deny all knowledge of the event, local residents believe the five men were taken to a local barracks and killed. [*The Times*, 18 August]

### Prisoners to be moved from Dili?

News has just been received of the possible transfer to prisons in Maluku and Java of up to ninety East Timorese prisoners now in custody in Dili. The reasons for the transfers are the shaky security situation and the visit to East Timor in late November this year of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. It will be recalled that six Timorese prisoners now being held in Kedungpane Prison, Semarang (and still there despite their protests) were moved from Dili shortly before the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings visited East Timor in November 1993.

## The threat of wider religious conflict

*There are signs that moves are afoot to inflame passions among Indonesia's Muslims in opposition to the people of East Timor, and turn the righteous struggle of the East Timorese into an out-and-out religious conflict.*

For the first time ever, attempts are underway in Indonesia to identify the Indonesian migrant community in East Timor as a disadvantaged minority. This is a crude distortion of their position; in truth, they dominate business and the economy and have bought up a great deal of land in urban centres. They also hold most positions of influence in the administration and other sectors of the community, and are to be found as teachers in the secondary schools.

Indonesian migrants now account for more than twenty per cent of the population. According to Mauro di Nicola, writing in *Uniya*, the Australian Jesuit magazine [Spring, 1995], there are an estimated 180,000 Indonesians in East Timor, out of a population of 830,000. Some months ago, the Indonesian weekly, *Gatra*, estimated that there were 50,000 Indonesians in Dili alone. The vast majority live in the capital and in the district and sub-district capitals. Several thousand families have been resettled as 'transmigrants' on some of the most fertile land in East Timor, most of whom are Javanese or Balinese.

At a time when East Timorese resistance to the presence of Indonesian migrants has reached a new level of intensity, the Jakarta daily, *Republika*, which is known to be the mouthpiece of ICMI, the association of Muslim intellectuals of which Research Minister Habibie is the chair, ran a se-

ries of articles the theme of which is that the 20,000 or so Muslims in East Timor, almost all of whom are Indonesians from South Sulawesi and Java, are facing discrimination.

One article complains that a mosque in Los Palos has been ordered not to broadcast its calls to the faithful over loudspeakers, so as not to upset the local inhabitants. The paper also says that a Muslim community in the eastern sector of East Timor has been prevented from building a small prayer-hall or *mushala*, as a result of which the faithful have been forced to travel a long distance to the nearest Muslim prayer-hall.

Another of the articles, all of which were published on 8 September, describes at some length the pressure on a Muslim-run school for having recruited Catholic children. The children were ordered to leave the school but later, according to *Republika*, they drifted back because the fees were far lower than at other local schools.

The general tone of the articles is that local authorities, including the security forces, are seeking to contain the rapidly expanding Muslim communities in East Timor, placing them in the position of a minority facing discrimination.

*see page 21*

## Republika ups the ante

A week later, the paper ran an article claiming that readers were critical of the restrained tone of its presentation of the predicament of Muslims in East Timor. 'If all the information in our possession were to be made public,' the columnist, Zaim Uchrowi admitted, 'I fear that many Muslims would be very angry. If this anger is not contained, the disturbances in East Timor could erupt everywhere.'

The writer claims that many people wonder why so much money is being squandered on East Timor, considering that one section of the community - the Muslims - are at such a disadvantage. [*Republika*, 17 September]

ICMI is probably the only Indonesian Muslim organisation with a significant presence in East Timor. With huge resources at its disposal, ICMI is likely to be the only Indonesian party organising the largely-Muslim migrant com-



*Indonesian children in front of the mosque in Lospalos*

munity in East Timor. (ICMI would strongly object to be identified as a 'party' as there are supposed to be only three political parties in Indonesia.)

It should be noted however that ICMI represents a variety of views and interests. Set up less than five years ago as an organisation of Muslim intellectuals, its membership ranges from ambitious politicians, bureaucrats and academics to people outside the power game. New as it is, it is already able to exert influence on all important issues, including East Timor.

There have been several as-yet unsubstantiated reports about a ICMI document setting out a programme for the Islamisation of East Timor. These *Republika* articles suggest that an equally sinister plan is afoot, to arouse the passions of Muslims in Indonesia in defence of their co-religionists in East Timor, a plan which could have unforeseen consequences.

## EAST TIMOR

### Pro-Muslim protests in Bandung

The day after the September disturbances in Dili, *Republika* reported a demonstration by students of the Islamic College, IAIN, in Bandung, protesting at the plight of the Muslims in East Timor. The demonstration, organised by the Student Forum for Solidarity with the Muslim Minority in East Timor, called on the government to stop 'spoiling' East Timor. [*Republika*, 10 September]

The Indonesian Ulama Council, MUI, has called on the government to send a fact-finding mission to East Timor to investigate the background to the disturbances.

A number of groups have started organising in defence of the Muslims in East Timor. There have been prayers at the state university in Bandung where the students called for firm measures against those involved in the riots in East Timor and condemned people who spread reports about a process of Islamisation among the Timorese.

In Jakarta, after Friday prayers at several mosques on 15 September, there were collections to raise money and clothing for the Muslims in East Timor. Responding to approaches from members of the Islamic Solidarity Committee, the secretary-general of the National Commission on Human Rights, Baharuddin Lopa promised to press for action to prevent any more 'acts of brutality' against Muslims in East Timor.

But other voices are calling for calm. Mulyana W. Kusuma of the Legal Aid Institute agreed that the targetted community should be given protection but added that the essence of the ethnic and religious conflict in East Timor is the fact that the issue of the territory's integration into Indonesia remains unre-

solved.

It is still too early to say whether those who seem bent on inflaming passions against the East Timorese will gain the upper hand or whether moves by groups like the Catholic Bishops' Conference, who talk of the need for dialogue to prevent an explosion of religious conflict, will prevail.

### The broader context

The threat of religious conflict is not only confined to illegally occupied East Timor. Christian communities in several parts of Indonesia are under pressure, often the result of provocative behaviour by people from outside their region. A serious incident in Maumere, Flores was reported in *TAPOL Bulletin* no 130, August 1995 when Catholics demonstrated in force after feeling dissatisfied with the sentencing of a man who desecrated the host during a mass. The presence of outsiders, often Buginese from South Sulawesi or Javanese, is causing friction in many places in the eastern part of the archipelago.

To reduce the conflict in East Timor to one of SARA, (ethnic and religious conflict), as many people in Indonesia now seek to do, means ignoring the very essence of the

question of East Timor, namely that it is not part of Indonesia but an occupied country whose people demand the right to determine their own future. In such circumstances, religious provocations take on a deeply political significance, as does the way in which people respond to these provocations.

## East Timor and arms trade on stage

The story of a young British peace activist's campaign against the sale of Hawk aircraft to Indonesia has been staged by Dublin's leading radical theatre group, *Calypso Productions*. Chris Cole, who has served two prison terms for opposing British Aerospace deals with Indonesia, is the inspiration for *The Business of Blood* which opened to a packed house in Dublin on 14 September.

The play by Kenneth Glenaan and Donal O'Kelly gives a faithful and dramatic portrayal of Chris Cole's campaign to highlight the despicable role of British Aerospace in providing the Indonesian regime with weapons of war, in disregard for its illegal and brutal occupation of East Timor. At the heart of the drama is Chris's one-man invasion of the British Aerospace factory in Stevenage in January 1993 when he succeeded in wrecking cones and computer equipment related to the production of Hawk aircraft before security personnel discovered him at work.

Chris Cole, who was present at the world premiere, later spoke to TAPOL:

'I'm not thrilled at the thought of becoming a public figure,' he said, 'but if the play helps to raise issues to a broader public, then I welcome it. For me as a Christian, it is essential for individuals to recognise that they have a personal responsibility to do something against things they don't like. We can't leave it to governments.'

Chris was recently released after serving four months of an eight-month sentence for breaching a court injunction not to trespass on British Aerospace premises. Would he do it again?

'Each time, the stakes get higher,' he said, 'and I don't want to spend all my time in prison. I need to be more creative about what I can do, like *Tempo* journalists in Indonesia who branched out in other directions after their journal was banned. I'm often invited to speak at meetings and I need to deepen my own understanding of peace issues, so I've decided to take a course in theology to refresh myself. I must find ways of supporting others; I needn't be in the front line all the time.'

Had he ever thought of visiting East Timor?

'I would like to but it's not essential to the work I do. I want to convey to people the enormity of the crimes of a company like British Aero space. Just think of it! UN annual assistance to war-ravaged Cambodia amounts to \$1.8 billion but British Aerospace sells war equipment worth \$4 billion a year, most of it to countries like Indonesia.'

### Performances in Scotland and London

The play will run for three weeks in Dublin, tour Ireland and then tour the UK. It will perform at The Artist, Glasgow from 7 - 9 November, at the Union Chapel Project in London on 12 November, the fourth anniversary of the Santa Cruz Massacre, and at the Traverse Theatre, Edinburgh from 15 - 19 November.

Contact the *British Coalition for East Timor* for more information: Phone/fax: 0171 252 7937.

## Indonesia discussed at UN sub-commission

Human rights violations in Indonesia became a major topic for the first time at this year's session of the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. Among those present to speak were Rosa Yenny Damayanti, a PIJAR activist currently in Europe, S. Hersri, the writer who spent fourteen years at the Buru penal camp in the 1970s, and Hendardi of the Legal Aid Institute (YLBHI) in Jakarta. A number of NGOs also spoke about Indonesia in their own submissions.

A resolution which highlighted the 30-year-long imprisonment of 1965 prisoners, the trials of independent journalists and reports of abuses in West Papua was tabled by three expert members of the sub-commission from the US, Norway and Chile. It was clear that the Indonesian mission which attended as observers lobbied hard among experts from Africa and Asia to oppose the resolution. Nine experts voted for, 14 against and no abstentions; the Greek expert, who normally supports resolutions like this did not vote.

### European Parliament adopts resolution

At its September plenary session, the European Parliament adopted a strongly worded resolution on East Timor and Indonesia. It condemned continue military oppression in East Timor, supported the people of East Timor in their struggle for self-determination and called on the international community and in particular the EU Member States, to halt arms sales to Indonesia and suspend all economic co-operation while East Timor remains occupied.

On Indonesia, the resolution expressed concern that hundreds of political prisoners are being held, including some under sentence of death in connection with the 1965 events. It expressed shock that Jakarta plans to implement the death sentences passed against two soldiers, Bungkus and Marsudi. The Parliament called for the release of all political prisoners and in particular called for amnesty for all the 24 prisoners still being held in connection with the 1965 events.

*Subversion as Foreign Policy, The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia*, Audrey R. & George McT. Kahin, The New Press, New York, 1995, 320 pp, US\$25.

The authors are undoubtedly the best people to write a book like this. George Kahin is the *eminence grise* of Indonesianists in the US and one of the leading authorities on US foreign policy; his wife, Audrey Kahin is a specialist on Indonesian regional problems. This combination has made this book a must for specialists and laypersons on Indonesian affairs. The title, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, might sound like a thriller but the book is a very readable work of research, not only exposing the clumsy Eisenhower/Dulles intervention in Indonesia but also providing a clear picture of the complex situation in post-colonial Indonesia during the fifties.

The sources used are more than impressive. George Kahin's impeccable record as a highly respected social scientist of long standing gave him access to numerous records, including thousands of declassified documents from the State Department and the CIA (although some proved hard to obtain). On top of this, the Kahins interviewed an array of retired US officials as well as Indonesian politicians who were directly involved.

### Regional rebellion under the microscope

The book is about the PRRI/Permesta rebellion in the latter part of the fifties in Sumatra and Sulawesi, an event that many Indonesians still remember vividly but which is hardly known anywhere else. The rebellion, led by colonels in the *daerah* (regions) received covert support from Washington. The supply of weapons, the formation and deployment of a secret CIA air force unit and logistical support from the US Pacific Fleet were organised by 'Ike' Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Many thousands of Indonesians lost their lives in this war; the Americans of course lost no one. Although the rebellion soon turned sour, it certainly changed the course of history in Indonesia.

President Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers (John Foster, and Allen, head of the CIA) were the ones responsible for this operation. The intervention was typical of the cold war atmosphere of the fifties, the arrogance of the US administration and their determination to intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries. The US was intervening all over Asia but the case of Indonesia is well worth looking at closely.

Washington's intervention in Indonesia, arguably the richest ex-colony in the world, was, according to the Kahins, far more serious than the Cuban crisis of the 1960s. What so infuriated Washington was President Sukarno's close ties with the PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party, and his efforts to pursue a policy of non-alignment. Such policies were intolerable to cold war stalwarts like Ike and Dulles.

### An Eisenhower/Dulles venture

The covert operation supporting the rebel colonels is usually described as a CIA operation but the Kahins reveal that the administration was involved at the highest level.

With hindsight, everyone agreed that the operation was disastrous, a blunder of gigantic proportions.

Any analyst in Indonesia could have told Washington that a few incompetent colonels in the regions stood no chance against the centre. The composition of the army is primarily Javanese. The islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi consist of many distinct ethnic groups while the rebellion was limited for support from people in Tapanuli, Minangkabau and Menado. General Abdul Haris Nasution, himself from Tapanuli, was in charge of the Indonesian armed forces and showed great determination in leading Javanese battalions into war against the rebellion. CIA is largely to blame for making wrong assessments about the conflict between Jakarta and the regions. CIA chief Allen Dulles, reporting to the National Security Council on 14 March 1957, came up with this ludicrous statement: "*The process of disintegration has continued in Indonesia to a point where only the island of Java remains under the control of the Central Government. The armed forces of all the outlying islands have declared their independence from the Central Government in Jakarta*" (p.86).

### Sumitro, the CIA agent

The chief liaison between the PRRI/Permesta rebellion and the outside world - the CIA, the British and the US Government - was Professor Sumitro, an economist who has served in Sukarno and Suharto cabinets. Sumitro was instrumental in creating enthusiasm for the rebellion among decision makers in London and Washington. This is the same Sumitro who now has such a cosy relationship with the Suharto family since his son married Suharto's second daughter. Another key CIA contact was Benigno (Ninoy) Aquino who was assigned to channel money and arms to the rebels. Besides the Clark Field airbase, the Philippines was chosen as the training camp for the rebels. Ninoy went so far as to open up the family hacienda, Luisita, in Tarlac as a training camp for Permesta soldiers.

As the debacle unfolded, US-Indonesian relations reached their lowest point. Crates of US arms, intended for the rebels but confiscated by the Indonesian army, were put on public display. On 18 May 1958 Indonesian anti aircraft guns shot down a rebel B-26 plane flown by an American pilot, Allen Pope, turning Uncle Sam into the ultimate symbol of evil for the Indonesian public.

Once the rebellion had collapsed, Washington was forced into a major effort at damage limitation. On 20 May John Foster Dulles issued a press release in which he said: "*I would say this that the United States believes that the situation in Indonesia can be and should be dealt with as an Indonesian problem. The U.S. itself is a nation which has suffered civil war, and we have sympathy and regret when another country undergoes the losses in life and economic dislocations that are incidental to civil war. But we do believe that the situation can be and should be dealt with as an Indonesian matter by the Indonesians without intrusion, and we hope that there will be quickly restored peace and stability in the Indonesian Republic*" (p.182)

In the wake of the collapse of the PRRI/Permesta rebellion, the army grew in stature while the democratic forces lost out. With the rebellion crushed, the Indonesian armed

## BOOK REVIEW

forces achieved unity for the first time in its history. A few years later, in 1965, it was able to liquidate the PKI. President Sukarno emerged stronger than ever after the rebellion and, inspired and encouraged by General Nasution, he crafted the concept called Guided Democracy, which signalled the demise of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia. Martial law had been declared in order to crush the rebels. It remained in force to the detriment of all aspects of Indonesian political life.

The general elections, scheduled for 1959, were indefinitely postponed in September 1958. These elections might have been historic; the PKI was by then the biggest political party in Java. Washington was delighted. The authoritarian Guided Democracy period, with all its anti-imperialist rhetoric, became the route for the military to join the power game. General Nasution became Minister of Defence and Commander of the Armed Forces. Other generals became cabinet ministers. These developments were the dress rehearsal for the army's seizure of power in October 1965.

Liem Soei Liong

### *Stability & Unity, On a Culture of Fear, The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development [FORUM-ASIA], Bangkok, 1995*

The book provides an excellent, concise and easily accessible overview of the events establishing contemporary Indonesia. This is the first comprehensive report of the human rights situation in Indonesia since Independence, and most importantly, it is published by a regional organisation. It is highly recommended reading for people who do not have an in-depth knowledge of life today in Indonesia.

The book traces briefly the historical development of the legal and political structures; the present political and legal system and their impact on the promotion and protection of human rights; the extent to which rights and freedoms are protected; economic developments and their impact on human rights; and human rights violations in armed conflict situations such as Aceh, West Papua and East Timor. In an informative analysis, the book considers rights and freedoms relative to the person, labour, NGOs, students and freedom of expression. Finally it considers development policies and human rights in the realms of economy, the controlled media, security, land ownership, transmigration, indigenous people, women and children, and the environment. Its conclusions and recommendations are truly impressive.

This FORUM-ASIA publication shows clearly that the military looms large over politics and society, it is the dominant force in the legislature and in the executive, and has a significant place in the economic sphere. The book lays bare the fact that there is no independent system of laws and practices that respect and protect human rights, and that the State ideology, Pancasila, is universally applied to suppress all other ideologies.

The beauty of this publication is that it covers all of these issues concisely in just 242 pages - all the while keeping its analysis easy to read and informative.

The main conclusion is that "50 years have passed since the formation of the Indonesian nation state and it is sad to say that the state has not yet grown out of its authoritarian and centralising tendencies. This is in effect to say that the Indonesian state is still waiting for its democratic transformation. The Constitution of 1945 which is still in force and the legal and political structures that have developed under it still stifle the growth of any democratic practice".

Mary O'Connell

Published 17/8/95 and available from: FORUM-ASIA, attn. Ms. P Janthong, 109 Suthisarn Winichai Road, Samsennok, Huay Kwang, Bangkok 10310, Thailand. US \$ 15= (inc. p&p) cheques payable to FORUM-ASIA.

*Article XIX*, the London-based organisation which works to oppose censorship worldwide, published a paper entitled: 'Surveillance and Suppression: The Legacy of the 1965 Coup in Indonesia' to mark the 30th anniversary of the events in Indonesia that led to the clampdown on the PKI and all leftwing organisations.

Copies are available from: *Article XIX*, Lancaster House, 33 Islington High Street, London N1 9LH.

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