



VICTORIA UNIVERSITY
MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA

Tapol bulletin no, 127, February 1995

This is the Published version of the following publication

UNSPECIFIED (1995) Tapol bulletin no, 127, February 1995. Tapol bulletin (127). pp. 1-24. ISSN 1356-1154

The publisher's official version can be found at

Note that access to this version may require subscription.

Downloaded from VU Research Repository <https://vuir.vu.edu.au/26046/>



The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

TAPOL Bulletin No. 127

February 1995

Strikes more than doubled in 1994

There was a huge upsurge in the number of labour disputes and strikes in Indonesia's major industrial cities in 1994. The independent union, the SBSI, has come under extreme pressure from a 'bleeding to death' strategy by the authorities, and another independent union has emerged. Meanwhile, inspired by the spirit of struggle of Indonesian workers, international support has intensified.

The struggle of the SBSI

After mock trials and unconscionable verdicts for Muchtar Pakpahan and other leaders of the SBSI, the Indonesian Prosperity Trade Union, the Indonesian press has recently reported nothing about this independent union. Although difficult to prove, it seems likely that a blackout has been ordered by the authorities, part of a deliberate strategy to harass and isolate the union.

It is apparent that the authorities have developed a new strategy, not simply a blanket ban but a 'bleeding to death' strategy. After jailing many of the SBSI's important leaders, the union's bank accounts were frozen. Visitors to the SBSI office are harassed by intelligence officers. The press blackout is part of this strategy.

During the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation summit, when Indonesia was determined to appear to its important guests as an orderly country, board members of the SBSI were visited by intelligence officers and warned not even to contemplate organising any protests. Despite these harassments, the SBSI office in Jakarta has continued to function. But these difficulties, not least its inability to use its funds in the bank, have curtailed the development of SBSI branches in the regions.

This year will be a test for SBSI to see whether it is strong enough to withstand government persecution. It is likely that military intelligence will try to infiltrate the union so as to create disunity. This happened some years ago to the SBM, an independent union set up in 1990. In the meantime, international support for SBSI is growing, as reflected in the resolution of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions at its Executive Board meeting in Brussels in December.

The emergence of a new union

With so much labour unrest all over the country and the inability of the government-sponsored union, the SPSP, to defend the workers, there have been more organisational initiatives. On 22-23 October in Ambarawa, Central Java, about a hundred delegates representing workers' committees in Jakarta, Tangerang, Bogor, Yogyakarta, Semarang, Solo,

Salatiga, Surabaya and Medan set up a new trade union, the PPBI (*Pusat Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia*, Centre for Indonesian Workers' Struggle). This is the third independent union to emerge after the SBM, the Solidarity Union, and the SBSI. The event was ignored by the press. PPBI members have been involved in several strikes and the union claims to represent between 10,000 and 15,000 workers.

The congress adopted a general programme and a programme of demands. The general programme covers burning issues like the struggle for wages and special allowances, improved health and safety standards, the right to organise, free assembly and speech, the repeal of all anti-worker regulations and an end to military intervention in labour conflicts. The programme of demands includes a national daily mini-

| | |
|--|-------|
| 1965-1995: 30 years of military rule | |
| A political slur that will stick for life | p. 15 |
| Human Rights | |
| Human Rights Day in Indonesia | p. 5 |
| Dutch state against Poncke Princen | p. 13 |
| Human rights briefs | p. 14 |
| Economics | |
| Suharto, the free-trade wizard | p. 6 |
| Profile | |
| The Rudy Habibie empire | p. 8 |
| Interview | |
| Indro Tjahjono: Prospects for the opposition | p. 11 |
| Aceh | |
| More trials in Aceh | p. 17 |
| East Timor | |
| Abuses escalate in East Timor | p. 18 |
| UN condemns massacre handling by army | p. 20 |
| Migration into East Timor must stop | p. 22 |
| UN-Sponsored talks inch forward | p. 22 |
| Aditjondro testifies at Neves trial | p. 23 |
| Book Review | p. 24 |

minimum wage of Rp 5,000 (US\$ 2.30). It calls for the repeal of regulations allowing only one union to exist and implementation of minimum redundancy payments. The new union grew out of workers' committees that had been set up in different factories. Having developed experience in organising strikes, the workers then decided to establish the PPBI.

Marsinah case must be re-opened

A decision by the High Court in East Java to quash the 17-year sentence for Yudi Susanto who was accused of having masterminded the murder of Marsinah, the woman workers' leader, has discredited the entire case as constructed by the police and the prosecution, clearly working at the behest of the army. Nine people were found guilty of offences in connection with Marsinah's murder in May, 1993, whose mutilated body was found several days after she had led a strike at a watch-making factory. All the accused but one, a low-ranking army officer, were part of the management or security forces at the factory. Yudi Susanto himself was the proprietor. The sentences ranged from nine months for the woman personnel manager to the 17 years given to Yudi. Several company employees got ten years or more.

Numerous irregularities were exposed while the trials were in progress. [See *TAPOL Bulletins* in Nos 120 and 122, December 1993 and April 1994.] The accused had all been abducted by the military for nineteen days, subjected to torture and forced to sign confessions about their complicity in the murder. The courts ignored their decisions to retract written confessions although they were able to prove that they had been maltreated.

The Legal Aid Institute undertook its own investigations which pointed to military involvement. The trials were given much prominence in the national media and criticised by many lawyers. The government-appointed National Commission for Human Rights also criticised the trials and called for a review of the judicial process.

The police and the prosecutors involved in the trials have strongly resisted any re-consideration of the case and are even trying to have the High Court verdict quashing Yudi's sentence reversed, although by law, a verdict acquitting a defendant cannot be challenged in an appeal.

By contrast with Yudi's acquittal, the High Court has upheld some of the other verdicts.

The ICFTU resolution

A strong resolution was adopted at the 105th executive meeting of the International Confederation of Free Trade Union (ICFTU), following a resolution by the ICFTU-APRO Regional Executive Board on 'Solidarity with the SBSI', the ICFTU's April-May 1994 complaint to the ILO and its October 1994 report 'Trade Union Repression in Indonesia'.

The 3 page resolution stresses that :
the Government of Indonesia, despite promises made earlier this year and some limited changes in labour legislation, continues to blatantly and systematically violate internationally-guaranteed trade union and other human rights, such as the right to freedom of association, to organise and to bargain collectively and the right to freedom of expres-

sion, to a fair trial, to personal security and even to the right to life.

the resolution reaffirms:

its commitment to provide humanitarian assistance and extend maximum moral, political and material support to repressed leaders and activists of the SBSI, and its commitment to provide all available assistance in the organising, training and legal work of the SBSI and any other legitimate trade union activity carried out by this organisation.

and emphasises:

its willingness to accept into ICFTU membership by the end of 1995 such Indonesian workers' organisation as may convincingly establish its bona fide credentials as a genuinely free, independent, representative and democratic trade union organisation.

The resolution ends with a call on the Indonesian government to:

* *rescind the unfair verdicts against 'Muchtar Pakpahan and all other unjustly detained trade unionists, and order their release from prison as a matter of urgency;*

* *guarantee and ensure until then that their basic rights as detainees are fully respected, including those with respect to access to relatives, lawyers and trade union colleagues;*

* *speed up the process of revision of the country's labour code and practice, with a view to bringing them in line with universally-accepted standards and specific ILO recommendations on trade union rights in Indonesia;*

* *implement at once the right to freedom of association by granting the long-awaited registration of the SBSI as a trade union.*

The upsurge in strikes

The Jakarta Labour Office recorded 138 strikes in the capital, as compared to 64 strikes in 1993. The Surabaya Legal Aid Institute recorded 314 labour disputes in the city in 1994 as compared to 153 the previous year. Figures from the government-sponsored union, the SPSI, are even more spectacular. Chair of the union Imam Sudarwo, said in December that there were 1,130 strikes nation-wide in 1994 as compared with 312 strikes in 1993, an increase of 350%. This means that there were no fewer than three strikes a day. West Java holds the record with 581 strikes, followed by East Java with 200, Jakarta with 146, North Sumatra with 140, Central Java with 54, Riau with 5, West Kalimantan 3 and one strike in South Sumatra.



The banner reads: "Women Workers of Indonesia, Unite to Demand Justice".

Indro Sugianto, chair of the *LBH* (Legal Aid Bureau) in Surabaya said that workers' rights continue to be the central issue in cases handled by the Institute, the main issue being wages. Of a total of 314 strikes, 304 were conflicts concerning wages. Most companies simply ignored the *UMR* (Regional Minimum Wage) fixed by the government. Although minimum rates have risen marginally, they are still little better than starvation wages and cover only about 60 to 70% of minimum survival needs.

According to figures published by Freddy Tuamelly of the Jakarta Labour Department in 1994, 47,265 workers took part in 138 strikes and 401,395 working hours were lost because of labour unrest. About 80% of the cases were demands for the minimum rate; the remainder concerned the right to set up trade unions, holiday allowances and other working conditions. Tuamelly presented a grim picture. Altogether 3,855 companies were given warnings about violating regulations, in most cases for not paying the minimum wage.

Unemployment figures are also soaring. Of the 174,692 people seeking jobs only 13.89% or 24,259 were successful. This is far worse than in 1993, and a further deterioration is expected this year, when the number seeking work in Jakarta is expected to increase to 250,000 people.

Phantom costs

One topic constantly in the headlines is the notorious *biaya siluman* or phantom costs, hidden costs which make Indonesia a high-cost economy. It is customary for factory owners to pay 'dues' to security officers and local government officials. At times like Christmas and New Year these costs soar to cover the shopping expenses of the officials. No less than 30% of production costs is widely thought to go to *biaya siluman*. The higher these costs, the less there is to pay the workers. In a rare moment of frankness, Labour Minister Abdul Latief, himself a successful businessman, warned about the practice of paying phantom costs.

Some examples of recent strikes

Although there is clearly pressure on the press, reports about strikes have become a regular feature because labour disputes are now such a common occurrence. Workers have become more creative and lively in the methods used. Workers express themselves more freely, using witty posters and slogans. Some strikes turn into demonstrations outside the local assemblies or the local police headquarters. On some occasions the workers have decided to occupy the local Labour Office. The process is giving birth to natural workers' leaders.

Ten times in a row

Workers at *PT Ganda Guna Indonesia (GGI)* are now so angry that it has become a habit to go on strike. Working conditions at the factory, a manufacturer of household products, are particularly hazardous. The factory is situated in Tangerang, one of the major industrial centres near Jakarta. On 10 January this year, the workers went on strike for the tenth time, having gone out on strike nine times during 1994. About 1,000 workers, supported by a hundred students, demanded better safety measures in the factory and social insurance. There have been dozen of accidents and over thirty workers have lost fingers, hands or other limbs.

Health and occupational safety is a low priority for most companies. According to official statistics, accidents in the workplace totalled a staggering 17,775 in 1994, killing 303 workers and injuring more than 13,000. The strikers this time organised a march to the local assembly, the DPRD. During the rally, security officers used wooden truncheons to beat up the workers. Several students were arrested. Members of a new trade union, the *PPBI* (see above), helped to organise the march.

Hak Berserikat = Right to Organise
Stabilitas = Stability



In early December, workers laid down tools for the seventh time. The demand then was for a lunch allowance of Rp 1,000 (about US\$ 0.40) and transport money of Rp 500 (US\$ 0.20). This modest demand was turned down by the management and a strike followed. The striking workers then proposed alternatives and were ready to accept a meal instead and if the company would agree to provide company buses, the problem of transportation could be resolved. For a whole morning, the workers occupied the factory grounds, carrying posters. By afternoon it was clear that the management was not going to agree so the workers repeated their actions on 21 and 28 December. This again proved futile so the action was repeated on 10 January, this time including demands about safety measures. These are supported by some local officials.

GGI is a notorious violator of labour regulations which, set against international standards, are very inadequate. The head of the Tangerang Labour Department has frequently warned the management

about its violations and intends to take the company to court. Clearly, the *GGI* workers have a case. They have displayed determination and consistency in the struggle, which are both essential against such an atrocious employer.

Shoe factory hit by strike

Also in Tangerang, more than 2,500 workers at *PT Sarkis Pacific Indonesia (SPI)* went on strike on 12 December for the right to set up a union. Carrying banners, the workers



Security officers against striking workers. In labour conflicts the military always intervene, only increasing tensions.

refused to go back to work unless their demands were met. They complained in particular against the head of personnel who has behaved like a dictator, sacking workers at random. The workers sent a letter to the management signed by 150 people. The anger escalated when the management refused to comply with the demands and instead fired 15 workers without severance pay. A strike became inevitable.

A delegation of 18 workers discussed their demands with the management: to end harassment of workers and start discussions about several working conditions like lunch allowances, transport money, overtime bonuses and health insurance. Officials from the Labour Department and the *SPSI* were also present. Press reports said nothing about the outcome of the talks, but negotiations are bound to be tortuous and prolonged.

In the last ten years, shoe manufacturing has become big business in Indonesia. Expensive shoes are made by Indonesian companies under contract to western companies. The shoes are produced by grossly underpaid workers and sold at astronomical prices in Europe and the US, bringing huge profits for the companies. Competition in the region, particularly with countries like China, has driven the manufacturers to boost productivity at the expense of the workers and working conditions.

Minimum wages

About 1,800 workers, mostly women, at *PT Surya Indah Garmino (SIG)* went on strike on 15 December as all efforts to consult the management had proved futile. They carried posters saying: 'We are not robots', 'Eradicate the contract-

system' and 'Pay our wages'. The two major grievances were wages and the change from daily to contract-based wages.

The official minimum wage for Central Java is Rp 2,700 (US\$ 1.30) a day, which is a starvation wage. The highest wage paid to workers at *SIG* is Rp2,500, while some are paid less than Rp 2,000 a day. To make matters worse, the management decided without consultation to switch to contract-based wages which demands more output in the same period of time. After negotiations broke down, the strike turned into an emotional event. The workers refused further talks with the management and efforts by officials of the Labour Department and *SPSI* officials to cajole the workers into returning to work, were unsuccessful. The workers marched out of the factory grounds in a very orderly fashion.

Two more Medan activists sentenced

In December two activists from NGOs which support workers actions were jailed in connection with the mass action of workers in Medan, North Sumatra in April 1994.

Parlin Manihuruk, 33 years, of *YKPS* was jailed for eleven months for 'inciting workers' into taking part in a demonstration. The judge, passing sentence, said the accused had not shown any remorse. In his favour, the judge noted that he was still young and can be expected to reform.

The last person jailed in connection with the so-called Medan riots, **Maiyasyak Johan**, 38 years, got 10 months. The defendant, a well-known human rights lawyer and director of the *LAAI*, the child advocacy NGO, has often given legal advice to sacked workers or those in conflict with their employers. The judge found Maiyasyak Johan guilty of "incitement, leading to serious damage in several factories" in Medan in April 1994.

In all 88 persons have been jailed, including Muchtar Pakpahan, the *SBSI* chair, who received the highest sentence, three years. He was not even in Medan during the event.

Pematang Siantar activist arrested

Daulat Sihombing, an activist with *FKPM*, an NGO which supports workers' actions, was arrested on 5 January by two members of police intelligence. They arrested him at the local office of the Ministry of Education in Pematang Siantar where he was employed. He was interrogated the next day, after which a two-week arrest warrant was issued.

Daulat had been on the 'wanted' list for six months and is apparently being held as a suspect for 'inciting workers', the charge used again the lawyer, **Ronsen Purba**, who was arrested last June and has been jailed for seven months. Another *FKPM* activist, **Rosmerita**, was also interrogated by the police at around the same time.

Eleven Pematang Siantar workers who were jailed last October have now been released. Their one-year sentences had been reduced on appeal to seven months. Two others who were jailed shortly afterwards, **Effendi Simbolon** and **Abdul Ikhwani Siagian** will have to serve out their one-year sentences which expire in July this year.

Human Rights Day in Indonesia

Human Rights Day on 10 December, the 46th anniversary of the adoption world-wide of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was marked by a number of meetings, some of which had to contend with obstructions and harassment from the security forces. An increasing number of groups and institutions held celebrations.

The main celebration in Jakarta was the presentation of the 1994 Yap Thiam Hien Human Rights Award to the East Java lawyer, Trimoelja D. Soerjadi, for his courageous struggle in defence of basic rights.

Defendants' rights need protecting

Trimoelja D. Soerjadi rose to prominence last year for his robust defence of the proprietor of a watch-making factory in East Java who was charged and found guilty of masterminding the murder of labour activist, Marsinah in May 1993. This trial, as well as those of eight others charged for the same offence, was riddled with grave irregularities on the part of the arresting authorities, the prosecution and the courts. Shortly before the award ceremony, the High Court in East Java quashed the 17-year sentence of Trimoelja's client, Yudi Susanto and he was allowed to walk free from prison. [See separate item.]

The award ceremony was organised by YAPUSHAM, the Centre for the Study of Human Rights Foundation, which is chaired by Todung Mulya Lubis and of which Goenawan Mohamad, senior editor of the now-banned weekly, *Tempo*, is the director.

Court mafia system rife

Ninety per cent of court cases in Indonesia are fixed in advance because of the operations of a so-called 'court mafia', with payments securing the desired verdict. A recently retired member of the Supreme Court, Professor Asikin, has been quoted as saying that fifty per cent of cases are fixed by the mafia. But Trimoelja D. Soerjadi, who has worked as a barrister for more than twenty years, believes that the figure is far higher.

Another method of fixing the outcome of trials is by the officials directly involved in judicial procedures having consultations. They meet in an institution known as *Mahkeja-pol*, a board in each region which is composed of the head of the district court, the attorney and the chief of police. According to Trimoelja, the *Mahkeja-pol* always meets to discuss the more important trials. "But what about the independence of the judge? If they have had meetings in advance, the district court chairman will then pass down instructions to the judges handling the case. Isn't that impossible? If a judge passes a verdict that goes against what his chairman told him to do, he's not likely to be given any more trials to judge." [Interview in *Forum Keadilan*, 5.I.1995]

In his acceptance speech, Trimoelja called for an overhaul of the Criminal Procedural Code because it fails to protect

the basic rights of defendants and contains no provisions for officials who have been found guilty of unlawful arrest to be investigated and disciplined or punished. In the case of his client, Yudi Susanto, the district court ruled before his trial began that he had been detained unlawfully yet no officials were charged for having violated the procedures. Trimoelja also spoke about many unlawful practices to which his client was subjected while in army custody for the first 19 days of his detention in October 1993. [*Jakarta Post*, 12.XII.1994]

Last year, the Award which is named after one of Indonesia's foremost human rights lawyers, was granted posthumously to the labour activist, Marsinah. The true facts about her death at the hands of the military have still to be revealed. [see special item].

Clashes with police in Bandung

Human Rights Day celebrations were held at several universities in the West Java capital of Bandung. The issues raised at all the events were the many abuses perpetrated in Indonesia during the past year, particularly the closure of three weeklies, *Tempo*, *Editor* and *DeTik*, in June, the many labour disputes stemming from the denial of the workers' right of association and abuses that have occurred in East Timor.

When students celebrating the occasion at the Bandung Islamic University left the campus to march through the streets of the city, they were confronted by security forces with anti-riot gear. As students tried to force their way out, scuffles broke out and they were clubbed with rattan batons. A number of people were hit, including two journalists who were mistaken for students by the security forces.

During the campus meeting, the gathering responded angrily to an announcement that Baharuddin Lopa, secretary of the National Commission for Human Rights, failed to respond to an invitation to speak at the rally.

The other Human Rights Day celebrations were held at the city's Pasundan University and the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN). [*Jakarta Post*, 12.XII.1994]

Jakarta gathering harassed

Another meeting in Jakarta convened by the Society for Human Rights Information and Advocacy (*Pernia*) was not actually dispersed by the police but suffered a series of deliberate obstructions. *Pernia* is a new human rights organisation set up in Jakarta by long-time activists.

The first was when the police tried unsuccessfully to exert pressure on the owners of the building where it was held to cancel their booking. Some months ago, the police dispersed a seminar held at the same venue on land rights that was organised by the Legal Aid Foundation, YLBHI.

People arriving to attend the Human Rights Day celebration were confronted by police who tried to turn them away,

alleging that the event had been cancelled. Later, while the meeting was in progress, there was a short circuit that turned off the loud-speaker system and the air-conditioning. There was no trouble with the electricity supply in an adjoining room which convinced those present that the switch-off was deliberate.

Princen on extra-judicial killings

The highly-respected human rights activist, Haji J.C. Princen used the occasion to draw attention to the shoot-to-kill policy of the security forces in Jakarta. He told the Jakarta meeting that the police had shot dead 134 people in the streets of the capital in the period from January 1992 to February 1994. The people thus treated were not even proven criminals. "The 'presumption of innocence' principle is sacred and must be upheld in any state claiming to be based on the rule of law," he said. Some victims had been shot after they had been hand-cuffed while others were shot at close range.

He said it was about time the government enacted a clear provision against violence and for anyone working for the security forces to be suspended from duty while being investigated for acts of violence.

Princen read out the names of many of the victims of the shoot-to-kill policy. [Merdeka, 12.XII.1994]

Campus newspaper banned

Warta UI, the campus publication of the University of Indonesia, one of the country's leading state universities, has been banned by the rectorate for publishing the results of a poll on the decision to raise tuition fees. The hike in fees was at the centre of campus events to mark Human Rights Day.

A well-attended rally held on Human Rights Day criticised the university authorities for obstructing free discussion

on campus about the country's political system and preventing prominent outside speakers like human rights lawyer Adnan Buyung Nasution from addressing meetings on campus. The rally which included poetry recitations focused primarily on the almost twofold increase in tuition fees. The current fee of Rp. 400,000 per semester may not be prohibitive for middle class families but it is way beyond the capacity of students from worker or peasant families., speakers told the rally.

After marching along the streets of Depok, south of Jakarta, where the university is located, some university lecturers, backed by the university security forces, used violence to prevent the students from re-entering the campus. Students responded with yells of "Fascists!" and "Repressors!". [Jakarta Post, 14.XII.1994]

Digul Award for four jailed activists

Four jailed activists, convicted on a variety of charges, have been given a newly-established award, the Digul Award. The four are: **Yeni Rosa Damayanti**, convicted for 'insulting the president', **Muchtar Pakpahan**, jailed for organising workers, **Bambang Beathor Suryadi**, jailed over the question of freedom of expression, and **Dedi Ekadibrata**, a student of law, convicted for helping people involved in land disputes. They have been honoured for their dedication to humanitarian principles. [Merdeka, 14.XII.1994]

The Award, named after the place where people involved in an uprising against Dutch colonialism in 1926 were exiled, is from MIDKA, Indonesian Society for Democracy and People. The winners of the Award were named on Human Rights' Day and were to receive their awards in jail (although Yeni has since been released). MIDKA spokesperson Agus Edi Santoso said the decision was taken after consultations with activist groups in many parts of the country.

Muchtar Pakpahan's plight has also been marked by a calendar with Muchtar behind bars on the cover and the words: "I have taken the path of prison for you, the workers." Muchtar told visitors he was moved to tears by the calendar.

The calendar was produced by the Workers Solidarity Team; proceeds from sales will go to a solidarity fund for workers.

Suharto, the free-trade wizard

During the APEC Conference all the signs were that Suharto had joined the camp of free-trade advocates. 'Free trade is a must' said the president, much to the surprise of Indonesian analysts who know just how much state protection there is for companies owned by palace cronies or by the Suharto dynasty. But the free-trade rhetoric lasted only a few weeks, collapsing at the first hurdle.

Hosting the APEC Conference, Suharto crafted a declaration which surprised even the staunchest free-trade champions like Singapore and Japan. It called for the elimination of all trade barriers and the creation of the biggest free-trade area in the world by 2020. On several occasions Suharto reiterated his conversion to the free-trade cause: on 19 December he said: "We have to realise, whether we are ready or not, the world is moving fast towards a free trade system" and concluded "We cannot afford to be left behind" [Jakarta Post, 20 December 1994].

Suharto's championing of free trade has created a deep rift among the top bureaucrats in the country. Many western-trained technocrats have welcomed the free-trade credo of the president, arguing that free trade will create better competitiveness for manufacturing industry and greater openings to

the global market. But the more nationalist-oriented economists are dumbfounded and argue that this would be a sell-out, a betrayal of national interests and the young manufacturing industry which could eventually be gobbled up by more powerful foreign competitors.

The reality in the Indonesian economy is of course somewhere in between. Although Indonesian economic state policies faithfully toe IMF/World Bank guidelines, which propagate free trade, it is still an economy ridden with all kinds of tariffs, barriers and hidden costs.

The Chandra Asri case

In December Suharto's free-trade advocacy was put to the test by the Chandra Asri case. Chandra Asri Petrochemical

Centre (CAPC) is not just any old company; it is partly owned by Bambang Suharto, the President's second son, and Prayogo Pangestu, Suharto's current favourite crony. *CAPC* is the supreme example of a company born, bred, groomed and protected by the state. Prayogo received an interest-free loan of US\$218 million from two state-owned banks in order to participate in the project, together with *Bimantara*, Bambang Suharto's company, Sudwikatmono, Suharto's cousin, Henry Pribadi, another crony and the Japanese plastics giant, *Marubeni*. In 1991, the Indonesian government was forced to shelve all mega-projects for budgetary reasons. *CAPC*, costing a total of US\$ 1.6 billion and almost entirely financed by external loans, was one of the giants was brought to a halt.



A few months later, *CAPC*, helped along by some neat footwork, was allowed to go ahead, by simply declaring the project to be a 100% foreign investment, despite the fact that the majority of the shares were in the hands of the same people, only now using holding companies based in Hongkong. This clearly was and is Suharto's pet project and the prospects of monopolising a domestic market of almost 200 million people are bright indeed.

The well-connected company is designed to produce olefins like ethylene and propylene, the basic ingredients for household plastic products, film, synthetic fibres and yarns. In the first months of 1995 *CAPC* is expected to start producing up to 522,000 tonnes of ethylene annually, along with 243,000 tonnes of propylene and 300,000 tonnes of polypropylene.

Ministers at loggerheads

Then in December, Peter Gontha, a senior *CAPC* executive, submitted a request to the government for tariffs of between 35 and 40% on olefin import products. Gontha argued that neighbouring countries like Japan, Malaysia and Thailand do exactly the same to protect their petrochemical industries. *CAPC* will save Indonesia annually US\$1 billion in foreign exchange and could create 800,000 jobs. The request was the catalyst for a simmering conflict between technocrats and nationalists.

Finance Minister Mar'ie Muhammad, an austere bureaucrat and belonging to neither camp, spoke against the tariffs. Mar'ie Muhammad who has shown his muscle on earlier occasions, has gradually built a reputation of being against favouritism for big corporations, an odd-ball in Suharto's cabinet. Last year he won one big battle against the powerhouse and colleague minister Habibie when he refused to pay the huge sum of US \$1.1 billion for the purchase of 39 refurbished former East German naval vessels. Habibie was forced to accept a third of that amount.

Others joined Mar'ie Muhammad and spoke against protectionism, not least Prof. Soemitro Djojohadikoesoemo, the eminence grise of Indonesian economists and an in-law of the president. (Soemitro's son Prabowo married to Suharto's daughter Titi). Soemitro argues that this kind of protectionism only creates a high-cost, inefficient economy, creating unnecessarily costly products in the downstream manufacturing industries. Others like Ginandjar Kartasasmita, head of the State Planning Bureau and Hartarto, the Co-ordinating Minister for Industry and Trade take an in-between position, rejecting tariffs higher than 5%.

The other camp, notably Minister of Industry Tungky Ariwibowo and Minister for Investments Sanyoto Sastrowardoyo, firmly back tariffs. Both received support from many domestic business groups.

The procedure is for a decision to be taken by an interdepartmental working group, the special tariff team, composed of officials from the finance, trade and industry ministries. Initially chaired by Finance Minister Mar'ie Muhammad, Suharto stepped in, replaced Mar'ie Muhammad by Hartarto and brought Sanyoto in. The decision to be taken was by then obvious.

Protectionism prevails

At the end of 1994, Minister of Investments Sanyoto had a long session with Suharto and announced afterwards that Suharto told to him that giving protection to upstream industries should be seen against the long-term prospects of the Indonesian economy. A week later, Suharto delivered his annual budget speech and went to some lengths to explain the justifications for protection. Provided certain conditions are met, tariff protection can be given to upstream industries. A few months earlier, that same Suharto had designed a deregulation package ruling out tariff escalation for the products of new industries. Suharto also said that protection is justifiable for a limited period only and must be gradually reduced, which is what *CAPC* was requesting. Though *Chandra Asri* was not mentioned, everybody knew that he had spoken the last word on the matter. Suharto's free-trade credo lasted less than two months. Nepotism is the name of the game.

Continued from page 13

his normal human rights activities. The hurricane he unleashed in Holland has turned the reckoning with the dark 1945-50 period into a much more public issue. Minister for Development Aid Jan Pronk recently spoke openly of recognising 17 August 45 as Indonesia's National Independence Day. It is now up to the Dutch government to re-write history. After half a century, change in Holland is long overdue. Poncke Princen unwittingly contributed to this process.

The Rudy Habibie empire

Rudy Habibie is arguably Indonesia's most influential citizen, after President Suharto, of course. Although officially he only holds the humble position of Minister of Research and Technology in the cabinet, he is far more powerful than that. As Suharto's foster-son, Habibie's power seemingly knows no bounds.

Having Suharto's confidence and friendship is the key to Habibie's success, the gateway for the creation of an economic and political empire. At first, he was known simply as the high-tech czar of Indonesia, in charge of all its vital industries; since 1990 he has emerged as a political powerhouse, chairing ICMI, the Muslim Intellectuals' Union, as well as playing a vital role in GOLKAR, the ruling party. No wonder many of his supporters see Rudy Habibie as the next president of the Indonesian Republic.

The Suharto-Habibie liaison

The Suharto relationship with the Habibie family goes back to the early fifties when the young lieutenant colonel was sent to Sulawesi to crush a local rebellion. In his autobiography, Suharto speaks fondly about the Habibie family who lived near the garrison. Mrs. Tuti Marini Habibie, Rudy's mother was a native from Yogya and cooked delicious Javanese meals, the kind of food Suharto cannot live without. Bacharuddin Jusuf (Rudy) Habibie, born in Pare-Pare (South Sulawesi) on 25 June 1936, was a teenager at the time but those first contacts proved to be the start of a long relationship. Rudy Habibie graduated in engineering in Bandung and obtained his PhD in aero-engineering in Aachen, Germany. In 1974, Rudy Habibie, already in a senior position at the German aircraft company MBB, was summoned home by Suharto.

1974 was a hectic year for Indonesia. Huge demonstrations, the so-called *Malari events*, rocked the capital and threatened Suharto's rule. The regime was quite shaky and it took all the skills at Suharto's command to consolidate his rule. The Indonesian economy, primarily based on oil revenues, was in need of a new thrust. Habibie was the man chosen for the job. After a day discussing grand schemes to industrialise Indonesia, Suharto and Habibie agreed on a plan.

From then on, Habibie had a free hand and unlimited funds were put at his disposal. The story goes that Suharto told the ambitious young engineer: "Habibie, you can do whatever you want short of fomenting a revolution". In Suharto's autobiography Habibie occupies a prominent place; Suharto explains at length why he shares Habibie's views and supports his methods.

Habibienomics


For the first fifteen years of the New Order, economic policies were primarily designed by the technocrats, western trained economists nicknamed the 'Berkeley Mafia'. The thrust of this World Bank/IMF style economy is what is commonly called comparative advantage i.e. using a country's natural resources and cheap labour to the best advantage

for its role in the world market. The Indonesian economy has been groomed along these lines: exploitation of natural resources and an export-oriented industry with semi-slavery conditions for the labour force.

Habibie rejects this approach and argues that his economic policies will pave the way for industrialisation. He is scathing in his criticism of the fast-growing domestic manufacturing industry producing shoes and blue jeans for the world market. His views, nowadays called Habibienomics, can be described in a nutshell as, not the comparative advantage but the competitive advantage approach. Comparative advantage can provide rapid economic growth in the short term but will ultimately collapse as industries are relocated to other regions with even lower labour costs. The competitive advantage is based on technology which

will give an added value to domestic production.

The high technology industries, Habibie argues, will not create growth in the short term, but will produce a beneficial spin-off right across industry in the longer term. Engineers and technicians sufficiently trained in their specialised areas will spread their skills and knowledge across the board. He firmly believes that the state should pioneer this process, given that private firms cannot provide the necessary re-



sources for research and development. Habibie often speaks highly of the success stories of Taiwan and South Korea, who used the state machinery to boost industrialisation.

The high-tech czar

So far President Suharto, although decidedly in favour of Habibienomics, has had to keep a balance between the two approaches. The World Bank/IMF approach promoted rapid economic growth in the second half of the eighties, helping to foster business tycoons, including Suharto's sons and daughters. The path taken by Habibie has predictably been thorny. He set up two important centres: BPIS and BPPT. BPIS, the Coordinating Agency for Strategic Industries, is the flagship of the entire strategic sector which includes ten state companies in all, among them: IPTN, the aircraft industry, Krakatau Steel, PT PAL, the shipbuilding industry and PT PINDAD, the weapon and ammunition factory. BPPT is the country's technological think-tank, providing jobs for hundreds of highly-trained engineers and technicians.

Besides being Minister of Research and Technology, he holds at least a dozen other prestigious positions, making him an Indonesian superman. Next to chairing all these agencies, he is the managing director of the strategic companies IPTN, PT PAL, PT PINDAD and chairs the Development Agency for Batam, the boom island close to Singapore.

High cost economy

The Habibie way of running high-tech companies has been controversial from the start. The companies absorb huge amounts of state funds and are likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future. The lack of transparency about the finances of the companies has been a nightmare for ministers and bureaucrats in charge of financing. IPTN, the aircraft company, in particular has caused huge problems.

IPTN, located in Bandung, West Java, employs at least 15,000 highly trained people and is projected to grow to 60,000 by the turn of the century. It started as an air-force repair facility but now produces small aircraft, helicopters under license, aircraft components and weapon systems. Initially, Habibie undertook production in cooperation with foreign aircraft companies like Bell in the US, CASA of Spain and MBB of Germany but in 1989 he decided to develop his own aircraft, the N-250. The 70-seater is an ambitious project with highly sophisticated technology such as glass-cockpit avionics and a special flight-control system, for which IPTN has relied on foreign suppliers.

After major technological and financial problems, the N-250 was officially launched during APEC, the Asia-Pacific Economic conference, in the presence of an array of world leaders. Although IPTN talks optimistically about selling 700 N-250s, there are no signs this will be achieved. Despite a host of financial disasters, Habibie remains confident and is looking ahead to another project, a 130-seat fly-by-wire, transonic speed twin-jet.

At least US \$1.6 billion state money has been sunk into IPTN, but the company has yet to become internationally competitive or genuinely profitable, argue economic analysts. In particular, the prestige-project N-250 has been at the centre of controversy. In 1993 Habibie became embroiled in a battle over state funding for the N-250. The new Minister of Finance Mar'ie Muhammad reportedly refused to channel more money into the project and IPTN was forced to dig into its own capital reserves. President Suharto came to the rescue, instructing the Forestry Minister to release US\$ 185 million from the reforestation funds to keep the project afloat. Several environmental groups tried unsuccessfully to prevent this. [See also *Tapol Bulletin* No. 125, October 1994].

PROFILE

Habibie's special status

PT PAL, the shipbuilding firm, illustrates vividly Habibie's special status:

...The tax audit discovered that PT PAL had under-reported income for a three-year period, 1985 to 1987. In a letter dated 10 October 1990, then Finance Minister Sumarlin informed Habibie that PT PAL was liable for past tax payments plus fines, which together amounted to about US\$ 80 million. On 25 March 1991, Habibie wrote back refuting the audit and saying that payment of past taxes 'would be a burden for PT PAL and damage its future prospects'. He sent a copy of the letter to Soeharto. Two days later, State Secretary Mardiono passed on a terse, very un-Javanese message from Soeharto to Sumarlin: 'If the Minister of Finance has a problem with waiving PT PAL's tax payments, then the President will do it. PT PAL is a state-owned company, not a private Habibie enterprise, and it doesn't need to be squeezed of tax.' The subject was dropped. [A Nation in Waiting, Adam Schwarz, Allen & Unwin, 1994, pg 72].

As is often the case, promoting high-tech goes hand in hand with the promotion of technology for military purposes. The majority of Habibie's strategic companies are part of Indonesia's growing military industrial complex. While in the early period, top-ranking generals benefited from Habibie's industrial empire, in the past decade, sharp differences have arisen. Officers used to running their own affairs and buying their own hardware have been side-stepped by Habibie. The bottom line is money; everybody knows that the purchase of weapons provides plenty of kickbacks which now fill the pockets of the Habibie clique. Moreover, the generals resent being forced to purchase helicopters, ships and aircraft from Habibie's companies when better vehicles are on offer on the world market.

It was the purchase of 39 naval vessels from the former East German navy that brought into the open the conflict between Habibie and the generals and technocrats. As Habibie's power has increased, he has gained more enemies. Now that he has built a political power base, the number of enemies has multiplied.

ICMI, Habibie's political vehicle

In December 1990 Habibie set up ICMI, the Association of Muslim Intellectuals, and became its chair. Only a nominal Muslim, Habibie was initially hesitant about taking it on but pressure from several influential Muslim intellectuals, and particularly from Suharto persuaded Habibie. Given the stalemate in politics, ICMI quickly became a powerhouse, a rallying point for at least three trends in political Islam: the natural Habibie allies, technologists and bureaucrats working within the Habibie empire; Muslim intellectuals, often called Muslim modernists, who have been searching for decades for a political umbrella and see his cosy relationship with the president as providing unprecedented opportunities. The rest joined ICMI for a variety of reasons: dissatisfaction with the obscure role of political Islam in Indonesia or the economic strength of the Indonesian Chinese or the over-representation of Christians within the Indonesian hierarchy.

While Habibie relies primarily on the first and third groups, it is the Muslim intellectuals who have a clear agenda for *ICMI*. A small group of Muslim intellectuals first had the idea of setting up *ICMI* and Suharto embraced it as it suited his need to broaden his political base, using it as a buffer against the military. Suharto rewarded *ICMI* quite generously with several posts in the cabinet and a number seats in parliament representing the ruling party, *GOLKAR*. *ICMI* people catapulted into high positions, all of them from the first group, the Habibie loyalists. The second group, often called 'the real *ICMI*', by no means unified in their views, have built an influential think-tank called *CIDES* (Centre for Information and Development Studies) and a well-run newspaper, *Republika*.

To put it bluntly, tired of fighting the system, they opted to join it, in other words, translating clientelism through Habibie into more political power, as has already happened. In the political game of who is using who, thirty years' rule has made Suharto a past-master. It has become clear that Suharto distrusts 'the real *ICMI*' and will never allow them to become too powerful.



Suharto and Habibie share the same concepts

Habibie the politician

The Suharto-Habibie duo performed quite a political tango when they stage-managed two major events in 1993: the *MPR* (Congress) session in March that re-elected Suharto and the *GOLKAR* congress in October. On both occasions Habibie acted as the manipulator (with Suharto behind the scenes), curtailing the influence of the military and the technocrats and promoting *ICMI* bureaucrats and Suharto loyalists. For the first time the *GOLKAR* chairmanship was occupied by a civilian, Harmoko, the Minister of Information and known as the "censorship boss".

On many occasions, Habibie has boasted that he learned his ABC as a politician from his guru Suharto. The *GOLKAR* congress was typical of Suharto's craftsmanship with Habibie executing the plot. The outgoing board under ret'd general Wahono was humiliated over its successor board - Habibie was ready with his own list of candidates. The new board was nepotism and political clientelism at its crudest. Tutut Suharto became vice-chair while Bambang Suharto emerged as treasurer. Habibie installed eleven of his cohorts

on the board, proving that *ICMI* has become the stepping-stone to higher realms.

Greed and nepotism

As a civilian, Habibie is the only non-military person in 30 years of Suharto's rule ever to have gained so much power. A remarkable achievement but, as analysts say, Habibie could only have come this far thanks to his special relationship with Suharto. In the past Suharto used different allies, General Ali Murtopo, General Benny Murdani or General Sudharmono. But their relationship with Suharto was fundamentally different. Suharto profoundly distrusts anybody who gets too powerful. At the peak of their careers, these generals were stripped of their powers.

His tie with Habibie is a different ball-game. Suharto has complete trust in him and apparently does not see him as a potential threat. Their personalities differ markedly. Suharto is a bland, uninspiring man while Habibie has a dazzling style, with a reputation of engaging in hours'-long monologues extolling his technology dreams. But the two have a lot in common, not least their greed and favouritism for close relatives.

Political analysts in Jakarta say that Rudy Habibie's nepotism is unending. The Habibie family has become quite a dynasty with at least 40 companies involving brothers, sisters, children and in-laws. Rudy Habibie's private residence in the elite Jakarta suburb of Kebayoran Baru is an example of the burgeoning wealth of the Habibie dynasty. Starting with just a villa, the Habibie residence has spread to include all the houses in the block, an entire complex of affluence. Similarly, Suharto's residence in Jalan Cendana clawed up the entire block.

The majority of Habibie companies are known as the *TIMSCO* Group, named after Timmy, the nickname of Suyatim Abdulrachman Habibie, the youngest of Habibie's brothers. The *TIMSCO* Group consist of at least a hundred companies, including affiliates, many of which were set up to carry out special tasks, while thirty to forty have longer-term tasks. Many are joint ventures with the Suharto crony Liem Sioe Liong or with members of the Suharto clan, notably sons Bambang and Tommy, daughter Tutut Suharto and cousin Sudwikatmono.

The holding company is *PT TIMSCO Indonesia* whose activities range from trading, consultancies, plantations, chemical industries, pig and poultry farming to construction, tele-communications, aerial mapping and tourism. According to official figures for 1993, *PT TIMSCO* had a turnover of Rp 630 billion (US\$ 300 million) and assets worth Rp 290 billion (US\$150 million). A list of the Habibie family companies is available on request from the TAPOL office.

Sources:

- Tapol Bulletin*, No. 73 January 1986, No. 110 April 1992, No. 116 April 1993 & No. 120 December 1993.
- Adam Schwartz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s*, Allen & Unwin 1994.
- Suedostasien Informationen*, No. 3/IX, September 1993.
- Forum Keadilan*, No. 20/II, 20 Jan. 1994.
- Man of the People*, Paul Lewis Flight International, 23-29 Nov. 1994.
- Suharto says aircraft firm must be more efficient*, *Lewa Pardomuan*, *Reuter dispatch*, 10 November 1994.
- Big ideas or big ambition?* Harold Crouch, in *Independent Monthly*, Sydney, August 1994.
- Indonesia's Habibie denies high-tech objectives 'crazy'*, John Owen-Davies, in *Business Times*, Kuala Lumpur, 2 Nov. 1993.
- The Habibie Family's Companies*, unpublished document.
- Jakarta Post*, 11 & 19 November 1994.
- Suara Karya*, 5 July 1994.

Prospects for the opposition

Indro Sukmadji Tjahjono, a human rights activist who visited London in November as part of the Stop Arming Indonesia campaign, spoke to TAPOL in an interview about the prospects and problems of developing an effective opposition in Indonesia

How did you become an activist?

My family is from Madiun, East Java and my father was a government official. After spending my childhood years in Irian Jaya, I went to school in Jakarta. Already at secondary school I had articles published in the national press, mostly about economics and the problems of the weaker elements in the economy, the small businesspeople and traders.

At the Bandung Institute of Technology, I got involved in student activities, editing campus magazines. I was on the *Majelis Pemusyawaratan Mahasiswa* (Student Consultative Council), in charge of the education commission.

In 1977, after a protest against the ITB Student Council (DM), I was forced to resign and I became chair of the new DM. We invited DMs from all over the country to a meeting in Bandung at which we adopted the *Ikrar Mahasiswa Indonesia*, the Indonesian Students' Proclamation, on 28 October 1977, calling for the proper implementation of the 1945 Constitution, a special session of the MPR - the supreme legislative assembly - to call President Suharto to account for his many irregularities in economic affairs and in constitutional matters, and for students to forge unity around these demands and organise actions on campus. This was after the 1977 elections when there were numerous irregularities and harassment of political leaders.

All campuses occupied by army

After a second meeting of the DMs, with representatives coming from universities in Java and the other islands, the on-campus activities spread. Then the army occupied all campuses for more than six months and lectures were suspended because of the occupations, resulting in a one-year suspension of studies.

In 1978, all the DMs were dissolved and replaced by organisations strictly controlled by the university authorities. There were many conflicts between students and the authorities and all activities of a political nature on campus were banned, meaning that students had to conduct activities outside the campuses.

In the clampdown, six hundred student activists were arrested, of whom about half were held for some time. Thirty-five were tried under the 'hate-spreading' articles of the Criminal Code. I went into hiding. After things had calmed down, I turned myself in to the police. I was sentenced to eleven months. We were treated more leniently in those days than the two Bambang and Bonar Tigor Naipospos in the 1980s; they got eight years each as well as being expelled from college. We weren't expelled and were able to complete our studies.

After graduating, I set up the 28 October Foundation to deal with political and social affairs and help those victimised in the clampdown, but this didn't get very far. Many of the activists were frustrated and stopped being active.

With others I then set up the Indonesian Research Association to study the critical social sciences theories that have no place in Indonesian universities. We did research and held seminars. We wanted research to be conducted with a clear sense of commitment to the common people, the praxis theory of investigation. We used the theories of Habermas, Gramsci and Marx and created a Forum of Transformation Social Sciences, to use the social sciences to transform society. We studied many books that Indonesians were afraid of reading or would only discuss in secret. We started doing this out in the open.

But there was a split between those who wanted to stick to an intellectual role and those who felt that science alone was not enough. It was not enough to be committed in theory; we also had to be engaged in the problems of society. I was with the latter. This was why I decided to join SKEPHI, the Forestry Conservation Network, a body for applying ideas in practice.

In environmental affairs, there are different approaches. Some are concerned with conservation along capitalist lines, But SKEPHI was the only environmental organisation look-



Indro Sukmadji Tjahjono (right) demonstrating outside the British Aerospace Extraordinary General Meeting in London.

ing at issues in a more critical way. Our position is that it is not enough to issue statements; we must also get involved in actions. This also involves basic human rights so we set up INFIGHT, the Indonesian Front for the Defence of Human Rights, giving us a broader scope for political activities.

What is the position of SKEPHI now?

Two years after I joined, we announced that it was no longer an NGO but a People Network. We would no longer function as an NGO but immerse ourselves in peoples' struggles. In those days, NGOs could not be relied on for this because they stuck to the principle of development and did not side with the people.

We encountered problems when we started to organise training sessions for NGOs in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Irian Jaya and West Java and tried to socialise the NGOs to side with the people. But it didn't work because the local NGOs were tied to the idea of development.

Involvement in land disputes

Then we began to get involved in land struggles. Wherever there is a conflict, a dispute between people and state institutions, we will get involved.

It is not for us to create conflicts. The conflicts must already exist but we see our role as being to elaborate on the issues involved. While other NGOs may not agree with students getting involved, our organisation sees it as our responsibility to go out and give support. So you should not see SKEPHI as an NGO. We do what we can to help actions.

This means organising students who have adopted a critical approach, many of whom have had to quit their studies because of this. As a result, by a dialectical process, cadres emerge. We have had a fair amount of success. Students who have helped facilitate disputes learn to become more critical.

This is the way to go, rather than propagating leftist or other theories. Our approach is not to teach this or that theory but get people involved in disputes so it's then a matter for them to choose. It also helps to foster courage.

It has taken me a long time to reach this position, since 1977. It has been a lengthy path for me, with many disagreements and conflicts, losing friends and facing splits with PSI (the Socialist Party) people who don't want to get involved in actions.

But I think we can pride ourselves on having achieved a degree of consistency, presenting students with the choice of becoming intellectuals or people engaged in the struggle.

The results have been considerable with many students getting the courage to take risks that could be fatal. As you can see, we have survived and this emboldens others to get involved.

We've moved on as well, taking up the issue of East Timor. The students mix with East Timorese, lots of whom come to our office.

Since when have you at SKEPHI been involved with East Timor?

It goes back to before the Dili massacre and before INFIGHT was set up; we were in contact with West Papuans in the OPM, and with East Timorese. Then INFIGHT came along. In those days we worked closely with Princen and his human rights organisation, LPHAM.

A culture of resistance

These days, a number of organisations have emerged with a critical approach. In the old days, people were afraid to take a confrontative position towards the government but now people have lost their fear. A culture of resistance has developed, which is very important. It's not possible to help the exploited people without becoming involved in acts of resistance. It's as straightforward as that.

Various leftward-leaning groups of many kinds are now emerging all over the place. What we need now is unity.

How would you assess the opposition movement in Indonesia today?

There's a lot of opposition today and that's very positive, to oppose the exploitative regime and oppose state hegemony. But the problem is that these disparate forces are difficult to unify. There is no leadership nor is there yet any form of organisation although the culture of resistance is now well established. We need to avoid conflicts among people in the opposition so as not to damage the movement that now exists. If contradictions emerge, we need to talk them through, exchange ideas,

When we talk of leadership, it's not something that can be created but rather something that emerges. During the course of confrontation, the leadership will be sure to emerge. This should happen by a natural process. It's part of the dialectical process of our resistance. One thing to beware of is when during an action, students push themselves forward as a leader.



We have to take account of the balance between the opposition and those who hold state hegemony. It is very unbalanced, not because of the social forces backing each side but because one side is armed and the other is not.

Using armed power is an integral part of state hegemony. The theory of resistance against an armed force is to wage armed struggle but this would have appalling consequences for us. It would be impossible in Indonesia.

So how do you cope with this problem?

We need to develop a form of non-violent opposition and we are conducting training in this direction.

Last June when the three magazines were banned, a big protest movement developed but it was confronted by armed troops. Did this kill the protest?

No, it's not dead. We are working towards a recovery, a way of overcoming the problem. Dialectically speaking, all the ingredients are there, the front, the cadres, the students. But those on the other side have arms concentrated in their hands. Our concept is non-violence, a principle that requires a mass movement. With a mass force, we can smash the thesis of armed power which is that arms serve a useful purpose because people are afraid of being killed. That is their premise. If we can gather a large enough force, they will not be able to use their weapons. We can learn a lot from the Philippines. They had the courage to lie down in front of the tanks. The army could do nothing and the Marcos regime crumbled.

And we need to combine the principle of non-violence with spreading information. There has to be a link between international opinion and our movement at home. If some of us are killed during a non-violent action and nothing is reported in the press, the action will serve no purpose.

We never expected the three major publications to be banned in 1994. Banning on such a scale last occurred 17 years ago, in 1977. This was a serious setback. The groups abroad are out of the reach of the armed forces and can follow and monitor everything we do. This will help to create new networks.

SKEPHI/INFIGHT
Jl. Pulo Asem Raya 23
Jakarta 13220
Tel/Fax 62 21 4711388

The Dutch State against Poncke Princen

A kind of national hysteria broke out in the Netherlands, the usually rather tolerant or even dull country facing the North Sea. It was the visit of human rights activist Poncke Princen that provoked such intense emotions. Why is Poncke Princen such a controversial figure in the Netherlands?

For Indonesian human rights activists Poncke Princen is best known as the founder and chair of LPHAM, the Institute for the Defence of Human Rights, based in Jakarta. His courageous stance has often brought him into conflict with the Indonesian authorities. He was jailed under Sukarno and again under Suharto. It is less well known that he is Dutch-born and opted to become an Indonesian citizen. Poncke Princen is now 67 years old; he is wheel-chair bound because of a stroke and had surgery for skin cancer a few years ago.

The colonial wars

One of the darkest pages in Dutch history was the attempt to recolonise Indonesia after the Pacific War. Following the Japanese defeat in August 1945, Indonesian independence was inevitable. On 17 August 1945 Sukarno proclaimed independence, the first move in the post-war period of decolonisation in the Asian continent. The first to be sent to restore Dutch rule in the former Netherlands East Indies were British troops, with the task of disarming the Japanese. The troops had a rough time as the Indonesians were not prepared to welcome any foreign troops. When the Dutch decided to send a large contingent of troops to the area, armed conflict became unavoidable.

The post-war Dutch government and parliament were overwhelmingly in favour of recolonising Indonesia. The Indonesian declaration of independence was simply ignored and Dutch troops were sent to Indonesia on the pretext of restoring law and order. But Holland was itself in a bad shape, having barely survived five years of Nazi occupation. The only well-groomed troops were the 7 December Division and the Princess Irene Brigade. Almost all the rest were conscripts, many of them undernourished young Dutch. Poncke Princen had the misfortune to be enlisted.

But although he was not yet twenty, he already had a reputation of going against the stream. He was held briefly in detention during the German occupation.

Although the majority of Dutch people supported the sending of troops to Indonesia, it is not widely recognised that many young men refused to take part in this unjust war. Organised primarily by the Dutch Communist Party, hundreds of young men went into hiding to avoid the draft. Others went to Indonesia to develop links with the Indonesians. A few individuals decided to join the ranks of the Republicans, as the Indonesian troops were called. Poncke Princen was one of them and came to be seen as a deserter by the Dutch state.

Once a deserter always a deserter

The two colonial wars the Dutch launched in the former East Indies were called '*politieacties*' or 'police actions' and the name is still used in Dutch history books to this very day. Successive Dutch governments, including the present one, have not dared to touch such sensitive issues as war

crimes perpetrated by Dutch troops and refusal to acknowledge that the country was involved in a colonial war.

On 27 December 1949, the US dragged the two warring parties to the negotiating table and forced the Dutch to hand over sovereignty to the Indonesians. Poncke Princen was ahead of his time, fired by a healthy political intuition to side with the Indonesians. The 17 August proclamation of inde-



Amsterdam graffiti welcoming Poncke Princen


pendence is still not recognised by the Dutch as this would mean that the sending of troops in 1947 was an act of colonial aggression.

Poncke Princen has become the catalyst for the conscience of the Dutch people. It is still painful for many veterans of that war, who fought under the pretext of restoring peace and order, to be asked to accept that they were deceived by the government and were actually participating in a colonial war. Rewriting history is always a painful process and accepting collective guilt is always awesome and difficult. For many Dutch, including many born after the Second World War, Poncke Princen remains a deserter.

This became painfully apparent when Poncke Princen applied to the Dutch government for a visa to spend Christmas with relatives and friends in Holland. A national hysteria erupted and the question was debated in every forum, including Parliament where a small majority was against giving him a visa. The Foreign Minister ignored the vote and granted Poncke Princen permission to come to Holland. Emotions ran high as right wing veteran groups thundered warnings of revenge, threatened an attempt on his life and filed a court case against him. Poncke Princen's brief visit to Holland had to be very low profile, no press interviews, no public meetings; even private meetings were tightly guarded secrets. The atmosphere was tense enough for the government to provide him with constant police protection.

Poncke Princen is back in Indonesia, once again busy with

Continued on page 7



Debate on nuclear energy banned

A seminar convened by two of Indonesia's leading environmental non-governmental organisations to discuss the highly contentious issue of developing nuclear power had to be cancelled at the last minute because police permission was not granted.

The convener, Muhammad Anung told a very disappointed crowd of participants and journalists who had turned up to cover the event that objections had been raised by the Ministry of the Interior because of the presence of "one of the speakers". He said it was clear that this was directed at Abdurrahman Wahid, newly elected chair of the mass organisation, *Nahdatul Ulama*, who was not listed as a speaker but who was going to attend. He is known to be vigorously opposed to the building of a nuclear power plant, Gus Dur, as he is popularly known, has warned that he will camp out and start a fast at Mount Muria in Central Java, the site of the country's first nuclear power plant, if plans for the plant go ahead.

The NGOs involved in organising the seminar are *WALHI*, the Indonesian Forum for the Environment (and a member of Friends of the Earth), and *MAI*, the Anti-Nuclear Society of Indonesia. The venue was at the *Erasmus Huis*, the Dutch cultural centre in Jakarta.

Anung said he thought that the refusal was prompted by fears that the debate would generate a major campaign to oppose the building of a nuclear power plant in Indonesia.

Mulyana W. Kusuma, executive director of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation, strongly criticised the ban. The Foundation is currently suing the police for banning one of its own seminars, to discuss land issues last July. [*Jakarta Post*, 23.XII.1994]

What the *Jakarta Post* report and an accompanying editorial on the same day fail to mention is that the real source of the ban is almost certainly Dr B.J. Habibie, Minister for Technology and Research, who is the prime mover behind the nuclear power project. Habibie was also clearly behind the banning of three major political weeklies last June at a time when his controversial deal for the purchase of 39 warships from Germany was under public scrutiny.

Chinese songs not allowed

Police in Surakarta and Banyumas, Central Java banned the singing of Mandarin songs at hotels and other places of entertainment where parties were being held to celebrate Christmas and the New Year. The Surakarta police chief said the ban was imposed "to prevent racial conflict." [*Jakarta Post*, 23.XII.1994]

Similar bans have been imposed in past years over the festive season. Indonesia which has a population of some three million citizens of Chinese origin is the only country in Southeast Asia that bans the use of Chinese characters by shops and will not allow any newspapers to be published in Chinese.

1994 a year of setbacks

Human rights lawyers from the Indonesian Human Rights Foundation (YLBHI) have described 1994 as a year of setbacks for human rights in Indonesia. Chair of the Foundation Buyung Nasution said the atmosphere was now so appalling that people "are even afraid to talk about human rights". He

mentioned in particular the banning of three major political weeklies in June and the trials of a number of labour activists in North Sumatra. Following the bans, newspapers "have become afraid to print controversial stories and to hurt those in power", said Buyung.

Mulyana W. Kusuma, Executive Director of the Foundation, said that government participation in various international conferences on human rights is "nothing more than rhetoric". He was particularly angry with the bans on public meetings, saying that fifteen meetings and seminars had been prevented from taking place during the year.

But the Foundation also noted a greater awareness in society, reflected in the fact that a number of organisations have sought to challenge government policies in the law courts.

Referring specifically to East Timor, Buyung said that the government should review its policy. "It should have the moral courage to settle the East Timor case which has been a burden for Indonesia and has been very costly". [*Jakarta Post*, 10.XII.1994]

Peasants from Madura seek justice

Four farmers representing thousands of people in the Sampang district of the island of Madura were in Jakarta in December to renew pressure over the killing in September 1993 of four Madurese in defence of their land. The shooting occurred when government officials visited the area to measure the land being acquired for a large reservoir, without consulting the people who work the land.

The four representatives said that officials from the national land agency have again been in the area to measure up land even though the dispute has not yet been resolved.

"We want the incident settled and those guilty brought to trial. Only after that will we agree to further discuss deals concerning our land", said M. Makruf, one of the four men.

They took their complaints to the National Commission for Human Rights, asking that all efforts to acquire the land should be halted until the matter is fully resolved in court.. They also urged members of the Commission to visit the area and talk to people about the continuing practices of intimidation.

The Commission secretary, Baharuddin Lopa was decidedly unhelpful however, saying the people of Madura should give the government two or three years to prosecute those responsible for the killings. [*Jakarta Post*, 20.XII.1994]

Nuku's appeal turned down

The Supreme Court has turned down an appeal for clemency from Nuku Suleiman, a human rights activist who was jailed in the Jakarta District Court last year for four years. He was charged with "insulting the President". The four-year sentence was increased to five years by the Jakarta High Court and this is the sentence he will now have to serve following the Supreme Court's verdict. The charges related to the distribution of stickers accusing Suharto of numerous massacres.

The High Court said it increased the sentence because the accused "used the court-room as an arena for political propaganda to insult the President and the judiciary". [*Kompas*, 4.I.1995]

A political slur that will stick for life

As the thirtieth anniversary of the Suharto-led military seizure of power in Indonesia in October 1965 approaches, TAPOL has decided to devote space in each Bulletin this year to various aspects of military rule and Suharto's seizure of power. This time, our focus is on the vindictive measures against people accused of alleged involvement in the G30S, the event that paved the way for Suharto's power grab. Hundreds of thousands of people are still stigmatised, 30 years on. But the stigma is also used to punish people with no PKI links at all.

Kedung Ombo peasants stigmatised

Two villagers are still being stigmatised because the initials 'ET' were stamped on their identity cards. This was their punishment for demanding fair compensation for land taken from them for the World Bank-funded Kedung Ombo dam that removed thousands of peasants from their land in the late 1980s.

The initials 'ET' stand for 'ex-tapol' and are stamped on the identity cards of anyone who spent time in prison for alleged involvement with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) before it was banned in 1965, or for anyone branded as a communist suspect. Allegations of PKI involvement are automatically linked to alleged involvement in the G30S (September 30 Movement), the name of the group of army officers who kidnapped and killed members of the army general command. This event triggered Suharto's counter-move, setting in motion his gradual seizure of power.

The 'ET' stigma makes them liable to a range of civil rights abuses and is a form of political discrimination that still afflicts millions of citizens in Suharto's New Order regime thirty years after the events of October 1965.

But Tjitro Pawiro Kasman and Dalimin Resopawiro were never arrested as communist suspects nor were they ever branded as PKI suspects. It was only when they, and others with them, decided to make a stand for decent compensation for their land in the late 1980s that the authorities thought up a new form of punishment. The decision to mark their identity cards with 'ET' followed a vindictive attack on the Kedung Ombo peasants by President Suharto who accused them of 'behaving like ex-PKI' in their struggle for justice.

At first, Tjitro Pawiro and Dalimin were unaware of the consequences of the initials; not understanding what they stood for, they thought little of the matter. They concentrated instead on fighting for compensation. On one occasion they and many other villagers, all with 'ET' stamped on their cards, were summoned by the sub-district office and told to abandon their fight over compensation but they refused to comply.

Tjitro Pawiro told *Forum Keadilan* that he spent weeks frantically trying to move his belongings out of the reach of the reservoir waters as they rose steadily, covering part of his land. In the end, he set up a homestead on a plot beyond the water's edge and as things quietened down, he turned his attention to this other problem.

When he realised that the initials would have consequences not only for his own civil rights but also for those of his children, he asked the village head to have them removed,

only to be told that this was a matter not for him but for the sub-district administrator.

False witness in court

He then turned for help to the Semarang Legal Aid Institute (LBH) who advised him to go to court to have his name cleared. When the case came up in the Boyolali district court, government officials testified that he had been a member of the PKI's youth and peasant organisations, that his father whose house he inherited, used to display the hammer-and-sickle in his house. Many other totally false allegations were made in court but despite vigorous rebuttal of these lies, he lost the case.

To add to his problems, on a number of occasions while the case was being heard, local officials tried to bully him into dropping the case. The village head also warned him that it was a waste of time trying to get the initials removed.

An appeal to a higher court was made but without success and the case is now before the Supreme Court with little chance of an early verdict. The Supreme Court's decision announced last July, in favour of the claim for compensation by several dozen Kedung Ombo villagers [see *TAPOL Bulletin* No 124, August 1994], prompted the hope that things might go his way, but now that the Supreme Court has reversed its own decision [see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 126, December 1994], all hopes have been dashed.

His identity card was renewed several times in the past, each time still with the damning initials. Now, at last, they have been removed but he has been advised by his lawyer that this is not the end of the matter. If he cannot get his name cleared by a court verdict, the 'ET' stigma will remain with him for the rest of his days and will also haunt his children. [*Forum Keadilan*, 9.I.1995]

'The PKI stigma has shattered my life'

Sartiman, 47, employed for twenty years by the foreign-owned oil company, Asamera Ltd, in Aceh, North Sumatra, was sacked after it was alleged during political screening that his political background was 'unclean'. His two brothers, Tukimin Habdi, 40, and Mardiono, 36, also employed by Asamera, suffered the same fate.

The witch-hunt began when the Personnel Department claimed that his late father, Suwondo, had been secretary of the Kampung Jawa, Aceh, branch of the peasants' union, BTI, which was banned after October 1965, along with dozens of organisations linked to the PKI. Here is a summary of Sartiman's story as told to *Forum Keadilan* [22.XII.1994]

At the time of the screening, in 1985, Sartiman had been working for the company for 18 years. He was screened in 1967 when he started with the company and found to be 'clean'. By the mid-1980s, he was head of Internal Relations and being given various trustworthy assignments. However he was subjected to screening for a second time and when the BTI allegation was discovered, the state oil company, Pertamina, insisted on further investigations. In 1987, the Asamera Field Manager, L.R. Langford, decreed his dismissal, stating that this was because he did not come up to scratch in his job.

Sartiman was convinced his father had not been a BTI activist. He spent two years trying to find the real Suwondo who had been the BTI branch secretary and eventually found him in East Aceh. The man had been incarcerated for many years as an untried prisoner on the island of Buru. He gladly gave Sartiman a declaration that he had been the secretary of the BTI branch in question.



Back home, the local military command accepted the explanation, also notifying the Pertamina central office. Sartiman hoped that he would now get his job back but the company refused to take him back, saying they were now 'overmanned'.

The slur, says Sartiman, has damaged his social standing. People are unwilling to visit him. When he invited hundreds of people to a gathering for the *Maulid* holiday, only six turned up. His children complain of being jeered at by their school-mates for being 'involved with the PKI' and want to stop going to school.

In an attempt to clear his name, Sartiman took Asamera to court, demanding that they publish statements in the press apologising to him and his family and seeking damages of five billion rupiahs. He won his case in the district court and also in the high court, but the company has now appealed to the Supreme Court for a reversal of the verdict.

"I have no idea what the result will be. I have been gravely damaged and my family's good name has been tarnished. I am entitled to damages."

Cleansing parties of 'PKI'

A furious row has broken out about the presence of alleged PKI sympathisers inside the Indonesian Democratic Party, the PDI. While the purpose of the witch-hunt is to discredit the PDI and undermine its potential for winning votes at the next general election, it draws attention once

again to the continuing discrimination against anyone branded as a PKI sympathiser and to their exclusion from the governing bodies of the political parties, even at the lowest levels.

The row centres around the leader of the West Java branch of the party, Djadjang Kurniadi, 56. The West Java military command's security agency, the *Bakorstanasda*, announced in December that his position as chair was untenable because he was allegedly from "an unclean environment". The charge relates to claims that he was an activist in the 'ASU' wing of the former PNI, one of the components in the PDI. This wing was seen as being close to the PKI in 1965 and was purged from the party very soon after the military took over.

Djadjang Kurniadi denies the charge but has nevertheless been compelled by the furore to withdraw as chair and is considering legal action against *Bakorstanasda* to clear his name.

While this row was simmering, the military commander of Central Java, Major-General Soejono, came forward with charges that local PDI leaders in Kudus, Magelang and Banyumas are also "politically unclean".

The press coverage of the row stresses repeatedly that all persons holding positions in the political parties are subjected to political screening, the so-called '*litsus* test'. The tone of the discourse is one of righteous indignation that people already screened should now be subjected to such allegations. The anger is understandable because these charges can have devastating consequences for the individual concerned. Djadjang, for one, has complained that members of his family are already suffering as a result.

Nowhere, however, is there any expression of amazement or disgust that such discrimination still exists and that, as one of Indonesia's most outspoken human rights lawyers, the late Yap Thiam Hien, said many years ago, "ex-PKI prisoners" and others tainted with the PKI brush are "civilly dead".

1994, the year of the bans

Kompas [22.12.1994] must have taken a deep breath when it published an article on the state of freedom of expression and the policy of licensing events in Indonesia during 1994.

The report shows how the banning of three leading magazines in June forced the remaining periodicals to 'lie low' and avoid publishing controversial political and economic news. It warns that the licensing policy will not help improve Indonesia's image in the world and lists sixteen events - seminars, poetry readings, even meetings between a lawyer and his clients - that were disbanded by the police because the necessary permit had not been issued.

It points out that the police are very selective, disbanding some seminars and allowing others to proceed without hindrance. The authorities have in particular made use of Article 510 of the Criminal Code which speaks of the need for a police permit for events that could disturb public disorder.

In fact, many organisations that are part of the growing pro-democracy movement are turning their backs on so-called requirements of the law. The new spirit of resistance now abroad has meant that many groups do what they want to do, never stopping to ask for anyone's permission. There is a yawning gap between what the authorities want, with their 'security approach' and what happens at the grass-roots. 1995 promises to be an interesting and eventful year.

More trials in Aceh

In December a new series of trials started in Aceh, this time against members of a sect commonly known by the name Jubah Putih (White Robes). The flamboyant leader, Tengku Bantaqiah, heads a religious congregation called Pesantren Dayah Babul Mukaramah in West Aceh.

According to press reports, five trials are scheduled: the defendants are **Tengku Bantaqiah**, 46 years and four of his followers, **Nurhayati**, **Tengku Syamaun**, **Muhammad Amin** and **Syamsul Bahari**. This is not the first time for members of this sect to go on trial. In September 1987, four members of the *Jubah Putih* sect were tried and sentenced. The sect held a spectacular action in Sigli, protesting against the selling of alcohol and the opening of food shops during the fasting period. Tengku Bantaqiah managed to escape by fleeing into the dense jungle. For several years there were no press reports about him and his followers. In 1990 the Governor of Aceh, Ibrahim Hasan took the sect under his wing and gave it 200 million rupiah to support the congregation. Now, suddenly, Tengku Bantaqiah was brought on trial on subversion charges of being involved in *GAM* (Free Aceh Movement).

Tengku Bantaqiah and the ganja trade

There are two serious charges against Tengku Bantaqiah: involvement in the production and trafficking of ganja and being the logistics commander of *GAM*. The first allegation would appear to be true, Tengku Bantaqiah has urged his followers to grow ganja bushes to earn money for the sect. Ganja is traditionally widely used among Acehnese but since the flower power days of the seventies, trade in ganja has become a lucrative business and Acehnese ganja has become an export commodity. Most of the ganja trade is in the hands of local security officers, military and police alike. It is not unlikely that, by starting his own small business, Tengku Bantaqiah was seen as a competitor who should be eliminated.

The second allegation, Tengku Bantaqiah's involvement in activities of *GAM*, is possibly a typical military intelligence ploy. This is not the first time that *GAM* activities have been linked by the Indonesian authorities to the ganja trade. Political activities linked with criminal activities is the message the authorities want to convey in Aceh. It was convenient for the authorities to link this case with *GPK* (Security Disrupter Gangs) activities, the name commonly used in Indonesia to describe the *GAM* movement. It is also clear that the Indonesian security officers in Aceh are using religious congregations to fight the influence of *GAM*.

(Mis)using religion

Simultaneously, security officers and local leaders are circulating tens of thousands of pamphlets to appeal to *GAM* activists to come down from the mountains and forests and surrender. In the Sigli area a Muslim leader, Tengku Muhammad Arsyat of the Darussa'adah congregation, explained that close relatives of those still in the mountains are eager to be back with their husbands, sons and brothers. Tengku Arsyat is confident that the security forces will be kind to those who surrender. The pamphlets, written in Acehnese, reflect a religious tone of forgiveness, emphasising the reunification of broken families. Lt. Colonel Suherman, the military commander of the area, confirmed on 22 November 1994 that the

leafleting was done with the full backing of the authorities. He hopes that those still in the mountains will listen and respond to the religious appeal.

In the same period Colonel Djoko Subroto, commander of the military sub-district *Korem 011/Lilawangsa*, organised an *acara syukuran* (thanksgiving celebration) after Friday prayers in the main mosque in Matang Kuli, North Aceh, to give thanks for peace and order having been restored in the area. The colonel referred to the four ex-guerrillas in the Pidie area who surrendered and are now safely back with their families. He will not, of course, refer to the cruelties and barbarism of the Indonesian military which led many Acehnese families to flee to the mountains or to neighbouring Malaysia. Earlier, Karimuddin Hasjibullah, District Chief of North Aceh, told the community to use empty plots in the Matang Kuli sub-district to grow fruit trees. These empty plots could well be land deserted by people who fled the oppression. The thanksgiving celebration ended by Colonel Djoko Subroto handing over money to develop the Matang Kuli mosque.

The huge efforts by the security forces, including the (mis)use of religious means, is an indication that the security situation is far from normal. The military nowadays concentrate on territorial management codenamed *Operasi Jaring*.

Isolating guerrillas from the population.

The Indonesian military authorities describe the activities of *GAM* as 'a thorn in the flesh' and admit that regular clashes still occur. Their latest operation is called *Operasi Jaring V*, the main aim of which is to isolate *GAM* fighters from the population. The authorities hope to achieve this with a 'special guidance programme'. The operation includes a special unit of 25 people brought in from army HQ in Jakarta, with training in modern mass-communication methods, to give briefings in the villages. Infrastructural improvements are also part of *Operasi Jaring*.

The military argue that isolated villages in Aceh are an easy prey for the propaganda of the rebels. Military commander Major-General Albertus Pranowo has acknowledged that Acehnese villagers often regard the Indonesian military as infidels. Easy access to isolated areas will improve integration with the rest of Indonesia. Another worry is *GAM*'s stock of weapons. Colonel Robin Mukav, assistant for operations of the North Sumatra military command, has explained that apart from weapons captured from Indonesian soldiers, imported weapons are also being used by the guerillas., financed, he claims, by the profitable ganja trade.

Reports of clashes between *GAM* and the Indonesian forces are rarely carried in the press but this does not necessarily reflect the true situation. Aceh is a very isolated region, in some respects even more so than East Timor. Human rights violations occur daily in both areas but the abuses in Aceh are less likely to be reported. Independent observers and UN special rapporteurs have never been allowed to visit Aceh. It is a region where the Indonesian authorities have a lot to hide.

Abuses escalate in East Timor

In the period since November when there was a week of demonstrations in East Timor, the human rights situation in East Timor has deteriorated. On 1 January, a massacre occurred in Baucau and there have been numerous arrests and reported disappearances. Once again, the forces of occupation have opened fire on defenceless protesters.

The many protests that shook Dili during November led to about 130 people being arrested [see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 126], many of whom were tortured. The BBC correspondent in Jakarta reported on 8 December that young people regarded as 'potential trouble-makers' "were reportedly stripped naked, beaten and tortured with electric shocks by the military. They and others were also ordered, apparently by the local mayor, to have their heads shaved as a further deterrent".

According to the strategy of short, sharp detentions, most were released after a few days but live in fear of re-arrest. Some are likely to face trial.

Six villagers executed in cold blood

Six villagers from the village of Gariana were shot dead on 12 January by Indonesian soldiers. This cold-blooded execution occurred a few hours after a clash between Indonesian troops and the East Timor resistance army, FALINTIL, during which a young guerrilla was injured in the hip and four Indonesian soldiers were killed. Gariana is located in between Liquica and Maubara, an area known to be a centre of guerrilla activity.

In a press release, the CNRM named the six victims as Jose Nunes, 35 years old, Gariana village head; Abel Nunes, 30, village head of the neighbouring village of Bauboa (or Bahuboa); Victor, 24, of Gariana-Maubara; Augusto Pinto Nunes, 20, of Gariana; Americo Araujo, 20, of Leotila-Liquic; and Osario Soares, also of Leotila-Liquic.

The execution was carried out by troops from the local military command (*Kodim*) under the command of 1st Lieutenant Jeremias Kase, intelligence deputy of the command.

The day after the executions, the Indonesian army claimed that six guerrillas had been killed "when they were trapped after a battle with government troops". This deliberate fabrication was widely reported in the world media.

Six days after the executions, the BBC correspondent in Jakarta said that reports from residents in East Timor directly contradict the army's version and confirm the CNRM's account. She reported:

"Independent sources told the BBC that three Indonesian soldiers had been killed in a confrontation with the resistance, and when the army failed to find those responsible, a local commander rounded up six civilians suspected of sympathising with the guerrillas and executed them in cold blood."

"We'll cut them to pieces"

Speaking shortly after the events of mid-November when protests in East Timor had been widely reported worldwide,

Colonel Kiki Syahnakri, regional commander for East Timor, did not mince his words:

We will not tolerate any more disturbances or demonstrations in East Timor, especially in the capital, Dili. If repetitions occur, the armed forces will act firmly against everyone involved as well as the organisers. I will not hesitate to cut them to pieces ['sikat'] because we've pleaded with them enough and our patience is exhausted. [Jawa Pos, 1.XII.1994]

The colonel was clearly frustrated that the army's hands were tied in November because of the presence of many foreign journalists, forcing the security forces to restrain themselves and avoid using firearms. There were a number of bloody incidents [see *TAPOL Bulletin* No 126] but in some instances the protesters got the upper hand; on one occasion they even had the police with their riot shields and truncheons on the run.

Mobile Brigade moves in

A new element in the strategy of the army of occupation is the decision to give the police, in particular its special force, the Mobile Brigade (BRIMOB), responsibility for security in Dili. Nowadays, statements from Dili about protests and arrests are made not by the army but by the police chief, Colonel Sugianto Andreas.

The move was announced by national chief of police General Banurusman in Surabaya as two BRIMOB companies from Kupang and Bali were sent to Dili for special duties. "With the army focusing on the GPK (the regime's term for the armed resistance), it will be BRIMOB's task to safeguard security." [*Pikiran Rakyat*, 12.XII.1994]

Meanwhile at the receiving end, chief of police Colonel Sugianto Andreas said BRIMOB forces would be brought up to battalion strength for special duties in Dili. As yet these troops have no barracks of their own and live in tents behind the Comoro district police command. [*Jawa Pos*, 12.XII.1994]

Using police has become a policy of the armed forces throughout Indonesia, but everywhere the police are known to be ruthless. In East Timor, the shift has not and will not change the level of brutality. Indeed, because it is an occupied territory, all the forces behave much more ferociously in East Timor. Moreover, the Indonesian police is not a civilian force but part of the armed forces. The police carry arms and BRIMOB is a particularly tough and vicious section of the force.

Protesters shot dead in Baucau

The New Year started with a serious incident in Baucau, located about 120 kms east of Dili. Baucau is the headquarters of the troops garrisoned in East Timor and has the army's main air-base nearby. On 2 January, troops opened fire on a crowd of about a thousand unarmed protesters gathered out-

side a church. According to some reports, as many as five people were shot dead, with many more wounded. According to a press release from the CNRM, the death toll would have been much higher but for the fact that many fled the location and took shelter behind a small hill nearby. To hide evidence of the massacre, troops were quickly out on the streets, hosing away blood.

The crowds had gathered to protest the killing of an East Timorese named Armanda Ximenes by an Indonesian migrant on New Year's Day, in yet another clash between the two communities. A similar incident had sparked protests in Dili on 12 November.

The unrest in Baucau spread to other towns, including Ermera, south-west of Dili, Viqueque and Dili itself.

There are pent-up feelings of anger towards the many Indonesians now dominating commerce and the administration, so this murder quickly led to attacks on Indonesian-owned property and vehicles; one of the two main markets which is located in the old part of the town, built by the Portuguese, was completely destroyed by fire. It is here that most Indonesian shops and restaurants are located.

It was later reported that 700 Buginese had taken refuge in the military base. Many were quoted as saying the one thing they wanted was to get out of East Timor.

Demonstration in Dili

On 9 January, to coincide with the talks in Geneva on the future of East Timor, a demonstration took place in Dili, with banners and posters calling for self-determination and the release of the jailed resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao. There was also a demonstration outside the gates of the University of East Timor.

The atmosphere throughout the country is described by local activists as very tense, with a sharp escalation in the level of spying by 'intel' agents. According to one report:

Troops continuously stalk the streets in groups of 10 or 12 men armed with metre-long sticks. Some are dressed in black jackets with an eagle's wings embossed on it; others wear yellow jackets sporting the word 'keamanan' (security). Christmas could not be celebrated properly as most people preferred to stay at home rather than visit friends and relatives.... A fully-armed riot squad travelling in six to eight vehicles patrolled the churches, the Vila Verde Cathedral and the churches in Becora and Motael.

The writer spoke of military reinforcements arriving by sea and from West Timor, bringing heavy equipment, including artillery and tanks. A new identity-card operation was launched, with the military blocking all the roads leading into Dili. He names many people who have been detained. **Henrique Belmira**, 43, was severely tortured by an intelligence unit known as the SGI. He now had injuries on his arms and legs and a wound on the temple that needed seven stitches.

Another source reported that, following the 9 January demonstration, many people were picked up at night. "The situation is much worse than before. Every place, coffee-shops, restaurants, shopping centres are full of these bloody guys."

On 16 January, Colonel Sugianto announced that 28 people would go on trial soon. They include eleven East Timorese and one Buginese who will face criminal charges in Baucau, and sixteen who will face charges related to the pro-independence demonstration in Dili on 9 January. The police chief warned that they were still looking for other Timorese who "may have been involved in the protest". [Reuter, 16.XII.1995]

Attack on Dili newspaper

A gang of youths from *Pemuda Pancasila*, an organisation with a reputation for thuggery, attacked the office of the Dili newspaper, *Suara Timor Timur*, destroying several computers and other equipment. The marauders were looking for Jacob Herin, a journalist with the paper who had reported an attempt on the life of the leader of their organisation, Achmad Alkatiri. The report appears to have been an uncontroversial account of the incident.

Herin was later found by the mob, dragged away to Alkatiri's home and severely beaten. Although the incident was widely reported in the Indonesian press with several officials condemning it, no-one has been arrested for this criminal attack on the newspaper and one of its journalists.

This is the latest in a series of attacks on the newspaper whose reporting of events in East Timor has antagonised staunchly pro-Indonesian groups.

Three Timorese arrested in Sorong

Three young East Timorese who were trying to flee to Australia were apprehended in Sorong, a region in the west of West Papua. According to Major-General Ketut Wirdhana, the military commander of the province, the three had come to Sorong to take part in a football match with a local team but remained behind after the others returned to East Timor.

In one Indonesian press report, the three have been named as **Lino Gutierrez**, 23, **Jose de Costa**, 26 and **Luis Pinto**, 19, all from Dili.

Wirdhana said that the three had been able to obtain identity cards, certificates of good conduct and passports in order to make their escape. They will be sent back to East Timor where they are to face criminal charges.



Army's handling of massacre condemned by UN

A report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Killings has roundly condemned the army's handling of the November 1991 massacre, describing it as "a planned military operation". The report bears out all the criticisms made of Jakarta's own investigations of the massacre and should compel western governments to reconsider their supine acceptance of the army's version.

The Special Rapporteur, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, visited East Timor in July last year in compliance with a decision of the UN Human Rights Commission. His objectives were:

...to assess the (Indonesian) Government's fulfilment of the standards under international law by law-enforcement officers and its obligations to investigate all allegations of summary executions, to bring to justice their perpetrators, to provide compensation to the families of the victims and to prevent their recurrence.

The massacre occurred when troops opened fire on a huge crowd of demonstrators outside and inside the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili on 12 November 1991. They had gone to the cemetery to pay tribute to a young East Timorese who had been shot dead two weeks earlier by Indonesian troops. Figures compiled on the basis of East Timorese investigations have revealed that 273 people were shot dead, a large number were wounded, and many more disappeared. More recent investigations have shown that scores, perhaps hundreds, of the wounded taken to the military hospital in Dili were put to death in what has been called 'the second massacre'.

The Special Rapporteur's report deals specifically with the investigations undertaken by two bodies set up by President Suharto, the National Commission of Inquiry and the Honorary Military Council and by various authorities in East Timor.

A devastating indictment

The findings of the Special Rapporteur were devastating on all counts. In an assessment of the government's responsibility, the Special Rapporteur rejected the claim that the troops were responding to threatening behaviour. There was no evidence that the demonstrators carried firearms and the sticks produced in court at the various trials were used to hold up banners, not as weapons. Film footage had shown soldiers moving around the cemetery "without any fear or constraint while others (were) beating people on the ground... demonstrators who were trying to flee the scene of the killings were shot in the back (and) after the shooting had stopped, soldiers went on stabbing, kicking and beating the survivors (including the wounded)". He concluded that the claims of some officials that the security forces had fired in self-defence were "unsubstantiated".

The Special Rapporteur was scathing about the investigations carried out by the police, arguing that, given that the police is a part of the armed forces, "the conditions for an independent and impartial investigation were not present". In particular, there were no autopsies of the 19 bodies buried in the military cemetery, nor was "any ballistic examination conducted to connect the bullets fired with the weapons of the security forces present at the cemetery".

As for the police examination of witnesses of the massacre, "they were questioned on their involvement in the organisation of the demonstration rather than on possible

unlawful acts... by members of the security forces or the identity of the killed and disappeared".

The Special Rapporteur was clearly dumbfounded by the methods adopted by Indonesia's National Commission of Inquiry (NCI) to excavate graves where bodies of the victims are believed to have been buried. He was told that "a tractor had been used". In the careful language used throughout the Report, the Special Rapporteur said he "(could) not help being surprised that such an indiscriminate means of digging, contrary to the basic methodology of any expert exhumation and likely to be detrimental to the outcome of any subsequent forensic analysis, was used".



Bacre Waly Ndiaye (right) in Jakarta. On the left is Baharuddin Lopa, secretary of the National Commission for Human Rights.

As for the atmosphere in which the NCI conducted its investigations, "most eye-witnesses interviewed were "in prison or military hospital and ... they were monitored by the security forces and not conducted confidentially". Elsewhere, the report said that families were "afraid of reporting the death or disappearance of relatives (for fear of being) brought to court for having links with the clandestine resistance or for having supported the demonstration... Most were too afraid even to report to the Bishop."

The Special Rapporteur was clearly dissatisfied that neither the report of the Honorary Military Council nor the final report of the NCI have been made public. He was also dissatisfied that the district attorney had played no role in the investigations, indeed "his office was not competent in offences involving military personnel. The only actions taken by the District Attorney were related to the prosecution of participants in the demonstration." Because victims of human rights abuses have no access to the judicial system, "complaints have to be filed with the police which belongs to the armed forces. In practice therefore, investigations are rarely concluded. This can hardly be called an effective remedy."

As for compensation for the victims, procedures were "ineffective and cumbersome. Members of the public with a

human rights grievance face the daunting prospect of complaining to the armed forces, the very authority they believe to be responsible."

Killings could recur

Stressing that none of the lessons regarding the behaviour of the security forces had been drawn, leading the Special Rapporteur came to the conclusion "that the conditions that allowed the Santa Cruz killings to occur are still present. In particular members of the security forces have not been held accountable and continue to enjoy virtual impunity".

With regard to actions taken against members of the security forces, the Special Rapporteur pointed out that "none of the few military personnel accused was charged with homicide, serious assault or for having committed enforced disappearances". He went on:

The inappropriately light sentences on the few members of the armed forces accused... in no way provide a deterrent for the recurrence of a similar tragedy in the future... and illustrate the little importance given to the respect of the right to life by the Indonesian enforcement officials in East Timor.... there was an unreasonable disparity between the sentences passed upon the perpetrators and upon the victims; the latter were in fact those really blamed for the killings... (which is) illustrative of an implacable determination to suppress political dissent (rather) than a genuine commitment to protect the right to life and prevent extrajudicial executions."

Stop calling it an 'incident'

A key recommendation of the Special Rapporteur which he said was crucial to reaching a solution to the problems facing East Timor was "for the Government ... to recognise its responsibility and declare that killings and not an 'incident' took place in Santa Cruz".

The Special Rapporteur called for a new inquiry involving the participation of experts internationally recognised for their objectivity and competence which would reduce the fear and mistrust among the East Timorese which were so detrimental to the NCI investigation".

He stressed the need for a civilian police force under the authority of the Prosecutor, in effect calling for the demilitarisation of East Timor. He recommended a "drastic reduction of the military presence in East Timor (as) a prerequisite for confidence building measures allowing families to feel safe enough to report about their missing or killed relatives. This reduction should not only affect combat units but all troops present in the territory, including territorial battalions and military intelligence."

Other recommendations focused on ensuring the presence of independent NGOs in East Timor for investigation, monitoring and legal assistance and the need for Indonesian and international NGOs to be allowed full access. He also called for the establishment of a commission for human rights in East Timor, pointing out that Indonesia's National Commission for Human Rights "is not the most appropriate mechanism to deal with human rights violations in East Timor", nor is it trusted by the population.

National Commission visits East Timor

It is hardly a coincidence that within a month of the publication of the Special Rapporteur's report, the National Commission for Human Rights made its first visit to East Timor. The East Timorese member of the Commission, Clementio dos Reis Amaral, had some harsh words to deliver, saying that civil servants and armed forces personnel need to restore public confidence in themselves. Possibly

EAST TIMOR

picking up the Special Rapporteur's profound dissatisfaction with the role of the police as a civilian law-enforcement agency, he said the police must be recognised by the government as the official law enforcers, and they should moreover comply with 'existing procedures'. However, he steered clear of the basic institutional problems raised by the UN expert and had nothing to say, in public at least, about the need for demilitarisation.

We must not summon anybody for questioning at night or in places other than the police station. Anybody who is summoned for questioning must be accompanied by a legal counsel.

Reis Amaral was clearly worried because the international community "is still making an issue of East Timor's integration into Indonesia" and thought that "if the human rights situation improved, it would help provide a comprehensive solution to the issue". [Suara Pembaruan, 27.XII.1994]

UN Human Rights Commission should act

The Special Rapporteur's document is to be laid before the UN Human Rights Commission which meets in Geneva in February and March. The only appropriate move is a resolution condemning Indonesia for the total inadequacy of its handling of the Santa Cruz massacre, calling for implementation of the Special Rapporteur's recommendations, along with the recommendations made two years ago by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, all of which have been ignored by Jakarta.

At last year's session, the Commission contented itself with a consensus statement, a watered-down declaration designed to satisfy the Indonesian Government. The Indonesian mission invariably argues that it will ignore the terms of a resolution which it votes against, beguiling some countries into accepting the argument that a consensus statement will safeguard implementation. But the statement last year called on the Indonesian Government "to continue its investigation on those still missing and the circumstances surrounding the (Santa Cruz) matter". The Special Rapporteur's report reveals that such pious hopes have led nowhere.

As we go to press, all the signs are that, within the European Union, there is little stomach for a strong move, fearing that this might "upset" Indonesia. Much would depend on the EU taking the initiative for a resolution and for more special rapporteurs - on torture again and on disappearances - to carry out investigations in East Timor.

Irish MEP wants UN presence in Timor

An Irish member of the European Parliament, Niall Andrews, has called for UN monitors to be installed immediately in East Timor to protect the population from persistent massacres by Indonesian troops. He said a permanent UN office should be set up in East Timor as soon as possible and wants the EU to take the initiative. [Network Radio News, 8.I.1995]

Migration into East Timor must stop

Over the past decade tens of thousands of migrants from Indonesia have flooded into East Timor, effectively turning the towns into Indonesian towns and marginalising the East Timorese. There could be as many as a hundred thousand Indonesians now settled in East Timor, besides the troops and their families.

This is the cause of the urban violence that has erupted and could easily provide the flashpoint for further clashes in the near future. These clashes are clearly distinct from actions organised by the clandestine movement but reflect the profound discontent among East Timorese who are socially deprived and unable to compete with traders from Indonesia, many of them Buginese from Sulawesi who are known for their mobility and generations of experience as traders. For years there has been a serious unemployment problem for young East Timorese school-leavers, with Indonesians invariably getting most but the very menial jobs.

The influx of Indonesians is also changing the composition of the population which is politically beneficial for Jakarta. While such large numbers of Indonesians arrive, the East Timorese themselves are under pressure to practise birth control.

It could well be that the forces of occupation see urban violence as something to detract from the political thrust of clandestine activities and may even have provoked the recent

incidents. They have everything to gain from the emergence of ethnic conflict.

Apart from the Balinese and Javanese farmers who have come to East Timor under the government-sponsored 'transmigration' programme, most migrants travel to East Timor on their own steam, with the encouragement of the authorities assisted by facilities such as easy access to land and the support of their own ethnic community networks. (In East Timor, 'transmigration' is a misnomer. The word is only applicable for migration *within* a country.)

The recent incidents have even got some of Indonesia's closest allies worried. Governor Abilio Soares said, after the Baucau tragedy, that he was hoping to introduce a regulation to repatriate all 'jobless migrants'. Whether this goes ahead however is not for the governor to decide. Several recent initiatives of his - in favour of a degree of autonomy, and promoting the appointment of Timorese as district heads - have been flatly rejected by Jakarta.

It is high time for an international campaign to compel Indonesia to halt all further migration into East Timor. Vessels are known to arrive in Dili every few weeks disgorging hundreds of Indonesian families to swell the number of migrants. Ending further migration would be only the first step. The next step would be to consider a programme for the repatriation of Indonesians in East Timor.

UN-sponsored talks inch forward

The fifth session of the talks between the Indonesian and Portuguese foreign ministers in January represented a small but significant step forward, with agreement to hold 'all-inclusive' talks between East Timorese.

The two ministers, Durao Barroso for Portugal and Ali Alatas for Indonesia, met in Geneva on 9 January. There was no progress at all on the substantive issue of self-determination for East Timor, with the two governments still poles apart. But the decision about all-inclusive talks means that East Timorese representatives will at last be involved in the process.

The stress on 'all-inclusive' talks means going far beyond the highly restrictive and meaningless 'reconciliation talks' held under Indonesian auspices, that were twice convened in the UK. They involved two discredited East Timorese - Lopes da Cruz, President Suharto's special ambassador on East Timor affairs and signatory of the November 1975 Balibo declaration that signed away East Timor's birthright, and Abilio Araujo, the sacked leader of Fretilin's external delegation.

Even well-known East Timorese who have collaborated for years with the Indonesian forces of occupation, such as Salvador Ximenes, who attend the 'reconciliation talks', have spoken of the futility of speaking only to Araujo on the 'anti-integration' side of the dispute. Manuel Carrascalao, brother of the former governor, also a long-time collaborator, recently said in an interview that "Abilio Araujo is more pro-Indonesian than I am".



Happy faces after the Geneva meeting. Left to right: Durao Barroso, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Ali Alatas.

The Secretary-General's Statement issued after the January talks states that the East Timorese dialogue "will provide a forum for the continuing of free and informal

exchange of views" but "will not address the political status of East Timor". However, as many commentators have pointed out, who is to decide what the Timorese actually talk about? Unlike the UK-based talks with Indonesian diplomats hovering in the background and Lopes da Cruz making sure that Araujo toes the line, the UN-sponsored dialogue will be in a much better position to determine its own "free and informal" agenda.

That Indonesia is out to control the agenda was made clear from a statement by Ali Alatas shortly after the Geneva confab when he said that Jose Ramos-Horta, who is co-chair of the CNRM (National Council for Maubere Resistance), could join the talks "so long as he does not raise political issues". Magnanimous indeed! But if the talks are truly all-inclusive, we can be sure that Ramos-Horta will not be the only one round the table keen to set a broader agenda. He may even find a lot of support there for the top resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, now incarcerated in Jakarta, to take his rightful place in the talks.

The sixth round of talks between the two ministers are scheduled for 19 May in New York.

Talks unhelpful to human rights situation

While the UN-sponsored talks move so slowly, the situation in East Timor continues to deteriorate. It would be unconscionable if the diplomat manoeuvrings were allowed to

EAST TIMOR

stand in the way of pressure from the international community, in particular from countries with close economic ties with Indonesia, for a dramatic improvement in conditions inside East Timor. They should not be allowed to prevent the forthcoming session of the UN Human Rights Commission from censuring Indonesia on a range of human rights issues [see separate item].

Araujo-Suharto meeting on hold

In December, President Suharto announced his willingness to meet external East Timorese leaders. This meant in fact receiving Abilio Araujo, former Fretilin leader. Araujo arrived in Jakarta before Christmas 1994 and told *Forum Keadilan* [No.18/III, 22 Dec. 1995] that he was hoping to meet the President after the New Year. Up to the time we went to press the meeting had not taken place, however.

The long delay is indicative of a degree of confusion in Jakarta's position vis-à-vis talking with East Timorese. Could it be that the Alatas line of agreeing to 'all-inclusive talks' is colliding with Suharto's intentions to promote the restrictive 'reconciliation talks' that have been funded and sponsored by his eldest daughter, Mbak Tutut?

Neves trial hears testimony from Aditjondro

The trial of Jose Antonio Neves, the East Timorese theology graduate, which has been under way for months already, heard evidence on 14 December from Indonesian academic George Aditjondro. The news of Aditjondro's testimony was conveyed directly to TAPOL. The trial is taking place at the Malang district court, East Java, and has been completely ignored by the national press.

Aditjondro, who himself faces possible prosecution because of a lecture he gave at a university in Yogyakarta in August on charges that could jail him for 18 months, drew comparisons between the struggle of the people of East Timor and those of the people of Palestine and the Western Sahara. A solution for East Timor can certainly be reached if the UN-sponsored talks include the resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, he told the court.

He said that East Timorese students studying in Indonesia have come under the influence of their own nationalist struggle as well as the nationalist struggle waged by the people of Indonesia that led to the proclamation on 17 August 1945. He likened East Timorese students in Indonesia to Indonesians who studied in the Netherlands before the Pacific War and drew inspiration there from the Dutch movement for its own liberation.

The session was well attended by East Timorese students from several universities in East Java. There was a great deal of cheering for Aditjondro and jeering when the prosecutor tried, under questioning, to impugn his intentions and reliability.

Six Timorese prisoners on hunger strike

Six East Timorese prisoners who were tried in Dili after

the November 1991 Santa Cruz massacre and sentenced of terms of up to life, announced early in January that they would go on hunger strike from 9 January, the day when talks were held in Geneva to resolve the question of East Timor.

The six men, Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha, Francisco Miranda Branco, Saturnino da Costa Belo, Jacinto das Neves Raimundo Alves, Filomeno da Silva Pereira and Juvencio de Jesus Martins, were suddenly transferred from Dili to a prison in Semarang in May 1994, shortly before the UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial Killings was due to visit Dili. As a result, the Special Rapporteur was unable to visit them in Central Java and sent a member of his team to meet them.

The men are now being held at Kedungpane Prison, Semarang and have made repeated requests to the chief of the Prison Service, Baharuddin Lopa, to be returned to Dili. Having failed to receive any response, they decided to start a hunger strike to back up their demand.

They made four other demands: the inclusion of resistance leader Xanana Gusmao in the talks on East Timor's future, a call on Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas to show seriousness in his efforts to resolve the question, a call for a new investigation of the Santa Cruz massacre, and the return of the bodies of all the victims of the massacre to their families for a decent burial in accordance with East Timorese tradition.

Late news

According to *Suara Merdeka* on 23 January, the hunger strike lasted for four days. The prison director stated that he was conveying the prisoners' request for transfer back to Dili to the prison authorities in Jakarta.

***The True Cost of Conflict*, edited by Michael Cranna for Saferworld, Earthscan, £ 14.95 hb**

This new study is unique. It is a must for policy and decision makers all over the world. The conclusions drawn are by no means earth-shattering as everybody knows that conflicts cause destruction and chaos. But conducting a cost-benefit analysis on seven cases, as this study does, is a new departure. *The True Cost of Conflict* looks at what conflicts cost the countries involved in the conflict, and assesses the impact of each conflict on the economies of the Western industrialised nations. By outlining the costs of conflict to the west, the researchers aim to alert western voters to the consequences of their governments' current approaches to conflict prevention and management, as well as to their policies on arms exports.

Six criteria are used: development; economy; infrastructure; civil and political rights; environment; and refugees. The seven conflicts are well chosen: the Gulf War, Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, the civil war in Mozambique, the guerrilla war in Peru, Kashmir's independence struggle, the civil war in Sudan and the war in former Yugoslavia. The conflicts include wars between nations as well as guerrilla warfare. The countries they occur in are among the world's major powers. Some involve only local combatants while others have prompted the outside world to become directly involved. Some have international importance while others have remained local with hardly any international reverberations.

The key motive of the study, as the editor says, '*is to encourage people to look at conflict in new ways. By laying bare the true costs and benefits of conflict in a way not attempted before, the book aims to bring new insights to the debate on global security.*' The study looks not only at deaths and casualties but also at the economic costs to the countries involved as well as their trading and investing partners.

East Timor is subjected to a fine piece of research by Ian Robinson. Using a wide range of background information, he concludes that '*the destruction of East Timor's identity pre-1975 appears almost total. The people remain traumatised, alienated and unhealthy by Indonesian standards, and unconvinced by the considerable investment Jakarta has injected...*'. The cost-benefit analysis is then applied to the invader Indonesia, neighbouring Australia, the West and the international community. The 24-page chapter is very useful, adding valuable arguments for those who seriously want to bring the conflict to a just and peaceful end. Some of the costs for the international community identified by the report are:

Repeated abstentions by the US and UK in the voting on UN resolutions condemning the invasion, and the UN's inability as a result to do anything about it, has undermined its authority;

Portugal has taken Australia to the International Court of Justice over the East Timor Gap Treaty, which it considers as being a violation of international law;

Australia has received 5,000 East Timorese refugees.

The final chapter presents policy proposals which would help forestall conflicts and facilitate early resolutions. One obvious proposal is to curb the arms trade, the basic ingredient of armed conflicts. As the authors convincingly argue, action to prevent conflicts is urgent. The cost of doing nothing is simply too high, socially, morally and economically.

Liem Soei Liong



STOP ARMING INDONESIA: A European perspective on arms trade to a military regime.

A pamphlet with chapters on the involvement in the arms trade of countries in which the various members of ENAAT (European Network Against Arms Trade) are based. It also gives an account of the role of the military in Indonesia and more generally, discusses the arming of Southeast Asia. The booklet is available from CAAT (Campaign Against Arms Trade), 11 Goodwin Street, London N4 3HQ, Tel. 0171 281 0297. Price £ 5.00, plus 40p postage (inland) and 64p (Europe).

Please note new rates for *TAPOL Bulletin* from issue No.127

SUBSCRIPTIONS

| Annual rates (six issues) | UK | Europe & overseas (air only) |
|------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------|
| Individuals | £16.00 | £16.00 |
| Unwaged | £ 8.00 | £ 8.00 |
| Institutions | £22.00 | £22.00 |

Girocheques and Eurocheques are welcome.
TAPOL's Giro account No. 56 781 4009

Please, **NO** US, Australian or Canadian personal cheques to UK

Australian subscribers may pay in AS to:

TAPOL (Australia)
PO Box 121, Clifton Hill, Vic 3068

Rates for individuals AS40, unwaged AS20, institutions AS70

Dutch subscribers may pay in Dfl to:

S.L.Liem
Binnenkadijk 267, 1018 ZG Amsterdam
Postgiro 4637291

Rate for individuals Dfl46, unwaged Dfl23, institutions Dfl80
Kindly state the payment is for TAPOL

Canadian and USA subscribers may pay in CS to:

TAPOL-Canada, c/o ETAN-Canada
P.O.Box 562, Station P, Toronto M5S 2T1

Rate for individuals C\$35, unwaged C\$18, institutions C\$70

All other subscriptions and all correspondence to:

TAPOL, 111 Northwood Road, Thornton Heath,
Surrey CR7 8HW, United Kingdom, Tel.: (0181) 771 2904,
Fax: (0181) 653 0322, Email: tapol@gn.apc.org

PLEASE NOTE DONATIONS ARE ALWAYS WELCOME