This is hardly an occasion for celebration. Many of the basics in Indonesia have not changed. The military regime that came to power in 1965/66 under General Suharto is still a fact of life although relations between Suharto and the armed forces (ABRI) have been re-shapped by rivalries over the sharing of power. Suharto remains in charge, having begun his sixth term earlier this year. He is one of the longest-serving dictators in the world.

When it first started, TAPOL was called the British Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners. The name was intended to focus on the fate of the many tens of thousands of tapol (tahanan politik, or political prisoner) still being held, the vast majority without charge or trial, following the violent crackdown against the Indonesian Communist Party and the left-wing movement in general which started in October 1965. As many as half a million people were rounded up across the country, as army hordes carried out and incited massacres which left up to a million people dead by the time Suharto formally grabbed power from President Sukarno in March 1966.

TAPOL also highlighted the injustices of the many political trials which resulted in dozens of death sentences and severe sentences against hundreds more.

Within six months of TAPOL's birth, an army crackdown against a mass-based student movement in January 1974 gave birth to a new generation of tapol. Since then, TAPOL has campaigned on behalf of Indonesian political prisoners of all political hues. In particular, it closely monitored the scores of trials which put hundreds of Muslims behind bars, following the army massacre in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta on 12 September 1984. Other massacres have peppered the whole period, the dead-squads that operated in 1983/84, the Lampung massacre in February 1989 and the killing of several thousand people in Aceh, to mention but a few.

Faced with mounting international pressure, the Indonesian military regime, condemned as one of the worst human rights offenders worldwide, released the vast majority of untried tapol in the late 1970s but to this day, nearly a million and a half so-called 'ex communist prisoners' have few civil rights, while dozens remain in prison serving life sentences or awaiting execution.

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### A broader campaign

It soon became obvious that TAPOL would have to take on board a much wider range of issues, not only human rights abuses of all kinds within Indonesia proper but also the rights of people living in territories who reject Indonesian rule. As early as January 1974, it began reporting atrocities in West Papua, which was annexed by Indonesia in 1963. During that same year, as East Timor (then still known as Portuguese Timor) stood on the brink of an act of self-determination, the Suharto regime began flexing its muscles for an onslaught, culminating in the invasion in December 1975 which has brought incalculable loss of life and suffering to the people of East Timor. Since then, mass killings and atrocities have engulfed the people of Aceh, a situation that TAPOL was among the very first to draw attention to.

In March 1980, TAPOL's sub-title was changed to the

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British Campaign for the Defence of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia. Six years later this was again changed to its present name, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign, reflecting the fact that the organisation has since then functioned more as an international than a purely British campaign. But TAPOL has remained our masthead, for historic reasons as well as to stress that campaigning for political prisoners still continues to be our main focus.

Throughout the early years of its existence, TAPOL was unable to form alliances with human rights groups in Indonesia; having been branded by the regime as 'pro-communist', not a 'pure' human rights organisation, it became an 'untouchable' for most people in Indonesia where any hint of sympathy for 'communist tapols' was extremely risky. Things began to change in the early eighties. The appearance of a TAPOL book, Indonesia: Muslims on Trial in April 1987 (which has been translated into Indonesian) was seen by many groups in Indonesia as the final proof - if such was needed - that TAPOL does not restrict itself to defending only communist prisoners. Today, TAPOL enjoys close relations with many human rights activists and groups and with the pro-democracy movement in general.


What is it that distinguishes TAPOL from other human rights organisations like Amnesty International and Asia Watch which also campaign on Indonesia? First we are tiny by comparison, employing a smaller staff even than they can employ for Indonesia-related action and research. However, the range of issues goes far beyond what they can do because of their carefully-defined mandates. TAPOL's mandate is limited only in the sense that it regards any human rights abuses perpetrated by the Indonesian military regime, whether in Indonesia itself or against liberation struggles, as its legitimate concern.

Because of a heavy involvement with the situation in East Timor, TAPOL has become part of the global East Timor solidarity movement. It also set up and still facilitates an electronic-mail conference on East Timor which has become a prime source of up-to-date news. On West Papua, the TAPOL publication, West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, ran into three editions and is still selling well.

Campaigning against foreign support
It has always been a primary concern of TAPOL to exert pressure on governments to stop aiding and abetting the Indonesian military regime, either by supplying equipment to its armed forces or providing economic aid. Indeed, our very first action in London was a campaign in June 1973 to protest against the meeting that month of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia which has, since 1967, allocated increasing sums of money to keep the regime afloat. This aligned the organisation with the principle that has now become known as 'conditionality', establishing linkage between foreign economic assistance and the recipient country's human rights conduct.

TAPOL's initial taste of campaigning against armaments manufacturers came in April 1978 when British Aerospace announced its first deal to supply ABRI with Hawk ground-attack aircraft, at a time when the war against East Timor was at its height. Since then, in collaboration with campaigners against the arms trade in the UK and elsewhere, TAPOL has exposed and condemned all those - exporting companies and governments alike - who put profit before principle, arming the armed forces which are responsible for so many massacres and atrocities, in Indonesia as well as in Aceh, East Timor and West Papua.

Human rights campaigners should never count their successes in terms of the number of people released or a fall in the numbers killed or who 'disappear'. Unfortunately, for as long as the regime that was created by Suharto and ABRI remains in existence, such statistics mean little because new generations of victims take the place of earlier generations and the repressive apparatus remains in place.

If TAPOL can claim any success, it lies in the fact that it has added its mite to a situation today in which Suharto's Indonesia cannot escape the scrutiny of the world community. This is the collective achievement of many NGOs and groups, and above all of the victims of the Suharto regime whose courage and fortitude have been our constant inspiration.

Timor at UN Decolonisation Committee
The UN Decolonisation Committee meeting in New York on 13 July this year heard petitions on East Timor from 21 NGOs and individuals. Besides four Portuguese MPs from all the main parties, the following spoke at the Committee:

The National Council for Maubere Resistance, Dan Heap MP (Canada), East Timor Action Network - USA, TAPOL, Agir pour Timor, Amnesty International, Asia Watch, Komitee Indonesie, Prof. Roger Clark, International Platform of Jurists for East Timor, East Timor Alert Network - Canada, FRETTLIN, Pax Christi, British Coalition for East Timor, Free East Timor Japan Coalition, Bishop Soma (Japan) and the Catholic Institute for International Relations.

The Tunisian member of the Committee, in a departure from procedure in previous years, questioned the integrity of several petitioners by imputing that their concerns about human rights did not extend beyond East Timor.

TAPOL's submission which, as on previous occasions, dealt with the nature of the military operation in East Timor, is published as Occasional Reports No. 22.
East Timorese refused diplomatic protection

On 23 June, seven East Timorese who have been on the run from the army since the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991 sought protection at the Finnish and Swedish embassies in Jakarta but both embassies were anxious to get them off the premises as quickly as possible so as not to endanger their profitable business ties with Indonesia.

Four of the men, Clementino Faria, Manuel Brito Ximenes, Oscar Goncalves da Silva and Ventura Valentino Conceicao, sought protection at the Finnish embassy, while the other three, Florencio Anunciacao Fernandes, Profririo da Costa Oliveira and Jose Manuel de Oliveira Sousa went into the Swedish embassy. All are between the ages of 20 and 27.

The two embassies are situated in the same office block in central Jakarta, on different floors. Access is by lift to the respective corridors, with glass walls enclosing the front reception rooms. Throughout the asylum bids, there were troops on guard in the corridors where extra-territorial rights do not apply.

Although the Timorese took documents explaining why they had decided in desperation to seek protection and help to leave Indonesia as quickly as possible, the staff in both embassies showed no sympathy for their plight. From the start, they did everything possible to persuade them to leave their premises. The East Timorese were told that Finland and Sweden could not, by law, grant asylum at their embassies; they could only do so once a refugee had arrived on their home territory.

In actual fact, the East Timorese did not need political asylum as they are all Portuguese citizens. They needed safe passage out of the country; once abroad, they are entitled to Portuguese passports. But even this turned out to be too much to ask of their unwilling Finnish and Swedish hosts. Considering that Sweden in particular has granted political asylum to so many people facing persecution, including Acehnese and West Papuans, their hostile attitude towards these young fugitives from Indonesian terror is hard to comprehend. Swedish protestations about not granting asylum on embassy premises sounded hollow; a very large number of Chileans on the run from the Pinochet regime in the 1970s were helped out of the country after taking refuge at the Swedish embassy in Santiago.

Worthless military 'assurances'

As soon as the Timorese arrived at the embassies, the Indonesian authorities started exerting pressure, in the person of Major-General Hendro Priyono, military commander of the Jakarta military commander. He was a frequent visitor to the embassies, spending as long as four hours at a stretch, persuading the staff of the army's good intentions. Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials were nowhere to be seen. Suharto's recently-appointed 'roving ambassador' for East Timor affairs, Lopes da Cruz, was also recruited to put pressure on the seven. Acting as a mediator was Indonesian human rights activist, Haji J.C. Princen.

Conditions for the four at the Finnish embassy were particularly oppressive. They were prevented from entering the embassy proper and kept in a reception room, separated only by a glass wall from troops who were on guard. Within 24 hours, the four East Timorese had been prevailed upon to leave. They were given no written assurances of any kind. The document they signed says merely, 'We are leaving the embassy of our own free will' after joint discussions with the above-mentioned officials and the Finnish ambassador. They were taken to the Jakarta home of Lopes da Cruz, whose role as top-ranking Indonesian collaborator goes back to the days when he signed the treacherous 'Balibo Statement' on 30 November 1975, begging Indonesia to take over East Timor.

The three at the Swedish embassy held out for ten days, insisting all the time that they wanted to leave Indonesia. Throughout their stay, the Swedish embassy staff were under strict instructions not to permit the East Timorese to communicate with the outside world or to receive phone-calls. While Princen acted as mediator, Hendro Priyono and the Swedish chargé d'affaires collaborated closely to force the men to leave the embassy, jointly drafting a statement that they would be required to sign. The extent of this collaboration was revealed in a letter addressed to TAPOL, signed by the three, which was smuggled out of the embassy halfway through their stay there:

Since we have been at the embassy, several intelligence agents have been intimidating us and threatening us outside the door... with offensive words like 'Timur inananhuir cucinai'... We are not being treated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 14 and 15 of the Universal Decla-
Seven persecuted men

The seven who sought embassy protection all left East Timor in mid-1992 to escape army persecution following the Santa Cruz massacre of 12 November 1991. Two were seriously wounded during the massacre and all have been involved in various actions against the forces of occupation since 1989, resulting in abuses. Most of them left East Timor for Kupang along with other colleagues and went into hiding there. Before proceeding to Jakarta where they hoped to be able to mingle with the population more effectively than in Timor, two returned to Dili. One of them, Agostinho Pereira, was arrested at Dili airport as he was about to leave for Jakarta. He was beaten on the spot by soldiers till his face was swollen and blood was oozing from his ears.

Agostinho's arrest led to many other arrests, causing his colleagues in Kupang to fear that he had been forced under torture to divulge many friends' identities. They also knew he had incriminating documents in his possession. This convinced them to make their way immediately to Jakarta.

In a letter to international human rights organisations, including TAPOL, signed by five of the embassy seven, they spoke about Agostinho's arrest, appealed for help "to ensure the vital security of all those who are hounded, imprisoned, threatened" and said they wanted to go into political exile. The letter was published in TAPOL Bulletin No 113, October 1992. They took copies of this page of the Bulletin into the embassies along with other documents giving details of their own experiences of army terror.

After the election of President Clinton, they wrote to him "to draw your attention to the desperate political situation we now face".

* Clementino Faria Oliveira was arrested in October 1989 after taking part in the demonstration during the Pope's visit to East Timor. Released three months later, he was under constant surveillance and had several close shaves with the security forces trying to re-arrest him. After participating in the 12 November demonstration, his home was raided by troops hunting for him. He decided to leave for Jakarta where he was in hiding until he entered the Finnish embassy on 23 June.

* Jose Manuel de Oliveira Sousa escaped from the Santa Cruz massacre without being wounded. Later, troops burst into his home to arrest him and his brother. They both escaped, but got separated. He lost contact with his brother and has had no news from him ever since.

* Profirio da Costa Oliveira took part in the demonstration when US ambassador was in Dili, and had to leave school as he was being sought by the Joint Intelligence Unit (SGI). He was badly wounded at the massacre and escaped, covered in blood. He then fled from the Motael clinic and was taken in by nuns somewhere safe where they treated him for eight months. He left East Timor in July 1992 and in Jakarta continued to be hounded by 'intel'.

* Florencio Anunciacao Fernandes was cared for from the age of eight by a priest. He took a course at the University of East Timor and became assistant manager of Hotel Turismo. He abandoned his studies after taking part in the Santa Cruz demonstration. Feeling under threat after that, he and two brothers fled to Kupang. The house where they were taking refuge was surrounded by troops and their host, Luis Xavier Gaspar, was arrested and has not been heard of since. The next day Florencio fled to Jakarta.

* Ventura Valentin demonstrated when the Pope visited East Timor and was subsequently arrested, imprisoned and tortured for three months. Later with other school pupils on 19 September 1990, he unfurled a Fretim banner at school and was again arrested. Again for two months, he underwent beatings and torture and was often denied food. His sister and her husband who live in Los Palos were often intimidated while he was under arrest. After his release, his every move was monitored by the security. This forced him to leave for Kupang in May 1992 and then go to Jakarta in July. He is the only one of the seven who did not take part in the Santa Cruz demonstration.

* Oscar Goscalves da Silva's entire family has been under threat ever since the 1975 invasion of East Timor. After attending the Santa Cruz demonstration, his family came under even greater danger so he decided to escape to Jakarta.
Another occasion, the three returned home from an outing. The troops tried unsuccessfully to confiscate the tape. The cameraman went there to interview the three Timorese; the embassy at any time with a view to assuring the proper contact of Human Rights. All the time the military and the UNHCR's unhelpful role

The three also accused the local UN High Commission for Refugees representative of putting pressure on them to sign a statement prepared by the embassy staff and the military. In an interview later with a Jakarta daily, the agency's representative in Jakarta, David Jamieson, insisted that the UNHCR has no role to play in such an affair, arguing that it could not intervene on behalf of persons claiming refugee status "when they are in their own country". This contradicts the UN's official position which has never accepted Indonesia's claim to have integrated East Timor; the UN's position means that East Timorese in Indonesia are in a foreign country and are therefore eligible for consideration as refugees under the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees.

A change in UNHCR policy is certainly called for and is understood to be under consideration.


Although they remained resolute, the three in the end decided to leave the Swedish embassy, primarily because they were given to believe that they would be able to leave Indonesia with the assistance of the International Red Cross (ICRC) which has helped many East Timorese go abroad either for family reunification or for humanitarian reasons.

The statement they were required to sign guarantees that they will "not be subject to any persecution, interrogation, intimidation or arrest or similar action as a consequence of (a) their stay at the Swedish embassy, or (b) their actions in the past, with the exception of any criminal offence covered by the Indonesian Criminal Code (KUHP) such as theft, rape or the like". It was also agreed that the three "shall have full freedom to contact Mr Princen and the Swedish embassy at any time with a view to assuring the proper functioning of this agreement".

The three were taken to the home of Haji Princen and have been under his protection ever since. The tiny house where Princen lives has been under constant surveillance by 'intel' agents who have made many intrusions into the house. One intrusion occurred when an Australian television cameraman went there to interview the three Timorese; the troops tried unsuccessfully to confiscate the tape. On another occasion, the three returned home from an outing with Princen to find a soldier in their room. Although complaints have been made to the Swedish embassy, it has led only to a temporary relaxation, with the spies moving a short distance away but still lurking in the vicinity.

In July, Princen was able to take the four Timorese away from the home of Lopes da Cruz where they were living like prisoners and moved them to Ciliitan, under the protection of a Dutch Catholic priest.

All seven have registered their names at the Jakarta office of the ICRC to leave Indonesia and the agency has accepted responsibility to work towards that goal. As in all cases of departure under the ICRC programme, approval of the Indonesian government is required. All seven, along with Princen, are resigned to the fact that this will take time. In the meanwhile, they are living a very precarious existence.

"A piece of engineering"

For Jakarta, the asylum bid came as a slap in the face. East Timor was again making headlines in the Indonesian press, with more evidence of deep-rooted unrest in Indonesia's '27th province'. People like Foreign Minister Ali Alatas tried to discredit the asylum bid as a "piece of engineering" [direkayasa, which implies that the persons concerned are being manipulated by unseen forces]. Caught unawares while still in Vienna for the UN World Conference on Human Rights, Alatas accused Amnesty International of all people of being behind it. His proof? That within hours, they had been able to produce a one-page urgent action!

He also wondered how Portuguese journalists could have been phoning him for his reactions even before he had heard about the affair from Jakarta. He alleged, "They want to blacken Indonesia's name, to corner us". [Kompas, 26.VI.1993]

Another 'explanation' came from Major-General Hendro Priyono who told Forum Keadilan that Jose Ramos-Horta was the 'engineer' because he was phoning the asylum-seekers at the Swedish embassy every day and telling them what to do. [In actual fact, the embassy staff, as Hendro knows very well, would not allow the Timorese to take any phone-calls.]

Business interests take precedence

After the Swedish embassy had rid itself of the three Timorese, the chargé d'affaires went out of his way to thank the Jakarta military commander for his "cooperative collaboration even to the extent that the military commander himself took a personal hand in the matter". [Media Indonesia, 6.VII.1993]

The unseemly eagerness of the Swedish and Finnish embassies to get rid of their unwanted guests can only be explained by the two countries' extensive business interests in Indonesia. According to Stockholm-based journalist Alfred de Tavares, the asylum bid could hardly have come at a more embarrassing moment for Sweden whose government had just been celebrating a deal with Indonesia worth $1.5 billion for the Swedish multinational, ABB, to build three power stations in Indonesia. Sweden's leading weapons producer, Bofors, has longstanding links with Indonesia, in particular for the supply of guided missiles.

Last September, the two countries signed an agreement on the protection and promotion of investment. Direct econ-

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Suhartos's clemency hoax

A massive hoax has been mounted by the Indonesian regime which alleges that Xanana Gusmao, the resistance leader sentenced to life in May, has lodged a plea to President Suharto for clemency. While this 'plea' could break all records in procedural swiftness, the appeals procedure for other convicted East Timorese political prisoners have been grossly mishandled by the courts.

The forces of occupation in East Timor seem set on a strategy of obliterating the figure of Xanana Gusmao as the symbol of resistance to Indonesian rule. This is not to say they will physically exterminate him, but they will turn him into a non-person. They hope also to obliterate East Timor's resistance movement, the CNRM, hoping in this way to remove both him and it from living memory.

One part of this strategy is to fabricate a story that Xanana Gusmao has lodged a plea for presidential clemency, meaning that he acknowledges guilt. This is totally at variance with the position he adopted in his defence plea and is simply not credible. In his defence plea, Xanana declared:

_I reject the competence of any Indonesian court to try me, and in particular the jurisdiction of this court which has been implanted by force of arms and crimes committed against my homeland, East Timor._

If, as is expected, President Suharto announces a deduction in Xanana's life sentence within the next few weeks, the regime expects to curry favour with many of its trading partners for its display of 'generosity and goodwill'. International pressure against the unjust and illegal sentencing of Xanana Gusmao has steered clear of denouncing the trial as unlawful and concentrated instead on calling for 'leniency' or clemency. To its discredit, this was the position officially taken by the European Community's Council of Ministers, despite Portugal's strong condemnation of the trial as not only unjust but also unlawful.

Mystery surrounds Xanana

Since he was bundled into an army truck, blindfolded, after being sentenced to life by an Indonesian court in Dili on 21 May 1993, Xanana Gusmao, leader of the East Timorese resistance movement has been held incommunicado. Neither his parents nor his sisters have been allowed to visit him and nothing is known about his present whereabouts.

When Xanana revealed that his alleged compliance with his captors was only a ruse to enable him to speak out in court, the army's strategy exploded in their faces. This will certainly have led the BAIS (intelligence) and Kopassus (elite troops) units in whose hands he has been held since his capture last November, to punish him with unimaginable severity. There have already been reports from clandestine sources that Xanana has been severely beaten since the verdict. A report from a reliable source that cannot be named says that Xanana is in a state of mental disorientation and 'unable to speak coherently'. This suggests that he has been given drugs capable of destroying his ability to act of his own free will.

Military commander Major-General Theo Syafei has made it clear that Xanana will not be held in East Timor but has given no indication of where he will be held or whether he has already been removed from Dili. A mystery now surrounds his whereabouts and his state of physical and mental well-being.

According to church sources in Dili, Xanana was moved to an unknown destination a few days before a visit to East Timor by the Vatican ambassador, Mgr Pietro Sambi, on 22 July. This may have been to sabotage any attempt by the ambassador to meet Xanana during his visit. [Publico, 24.VII.1993]

Xanana declared in his lengthy defence plea which he was prevented from reading to the court after only two pages on 17 May, that he would go on hunger strike. His unkempt appearance and demeanour in court on the final day of his trial (he was seen briefly on television) led to fears that he was already on hunger strike and seemed to be under considerable stress.

'Clemency plea'

On 4 June, the Indonesian lawyer Sudjono, who was foisted on Xanana when he was in police custody in Jakarta (at the hearing on 5 May, Xanana announced that he no longer wanted Sudjono to defend him), announced that he had lodged a plea for presidential clemency on Xanana's behalf and with Xanana's permission. There is nothing to show that Xanana knows anything about this. Indeed, according to the BBC World Service, none of the plea documents...
lodged with the Dili district court by Sudjono bore Xanana's signature. The lawyer said he had done this because it was the quickest way to resolve the case, as appeals through the courts take months if not years to complete.

Within days, Moerdiono, Subarto's State Secretary, said the clemency plea would be handled promptly; in mid-July, the chair of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Purwoto S. Gandasubrata said he would within days give the president his recommendation on the plea, which could clear the way for an announcement by Subarto during August.

How are we to assess the behaviour of the judiciary? In court, the presiding-judge refused to allow Xanana to read more than the first couple of pages of his defence plea, an unprecedented denial of a defendant's right, unheard of in any political trial in living memory. Then, the judiciary snaps into top gear to make sure that Xanana can be granted clemency in record time. One guess is that Subarto will announce clemency on 17 August, a day for granting remission to prisoners. This could conveniently coincide with the talks being sponsored by Indonesia between East Timorese, another of their 'goodwill' gestures [see separate item].

**No leniency for the others**

As for the East Timorese serving harsh sentences in Dili and Jakarta for participating in peaceful demonstrations, the judiciary is showing no leniency or haste in handling their appeals. *Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha's life sentence for helping to organise and taking part in the peaceful demonstration in Dili on 12 November 1991 has been upheld by the Supreme Court. His lawyer, Luhut Pangaribuan, strongly criticised the procedure; he was never informed that the High Court, the first court of appeal, had issued its verdict on Gregorio's sentence and had only read about the Supreme Court's verdict in the press.*

The three East Timorese still serving sentences in Jakarta for taking part in a peaceful demonstration in the capital on 19 November 1991 have also had their sentences upheld by the Supreme Court. *Joao Freitas da Camara was given ten years, Fernando de Araujo got nine years and Virgilio da Silva Guterres got two years and six months. Here too the same lawyer has complained that the teams of lawyers acting for the three have been kept in the dark over high court and supreme court hearings and verdicts. Luhut told the press he heard nothing about the Supreme Court's decision until he visited the three in prison in June.*

Having exhausted procedures to appeal against sentence, the three East Timorese in Jakarta have refused to ask for clemency, insisting that they are guilty of nothing. Luhut said they told him: "It is those who put us in jail who are guilty and who should make an apology."

Luhut had not yet met Gregorio in Dili to ask him how to proceed now that his life sentence has been upheld by the Supreme Court. It is more than likely that he will adopt the same position as the Jakarta three.

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**EAST TIMOR**

**Dili demonstrators arrested**

For the first time since November 1991 when hundreds of peaceful demonstrators were shot dead by Indonesian troops inside and outside the Santa Cruz cemetery, a group of young East Timorese organised a demonstration in Dili on Thursday 22 July.

In Dili at the time and officiating as a Mass in the Dili Cathedral was Mgr Pietro Sambi, the Vatican ambassador to Jakarta. As in earlier days, the East Timorese had apparently decided to take advantage of a visit by a foreign dignitary to give vent to their opposition to Indonesian rule.

Forty youths gathered outside the Cathedral in Dili. As those attending the Mass were leaving, some shouted in Portuguese, "Viva Timor Leste!", "Viva Xanana!" while others unfurled banners written in English "Integration, No! Independence, Yes!"

Within minutes, troops were on the scene to disperse the demonstration. Twenty-six demonstrators were arrested and taken away for questioning by the troops, church sources contacted later said. Twenty-four were later released but two brothers, Pedro Fatima Ferreira, 25, and Estevao Ferreira, 23, were still in detention four days later. [Publico, 25 VII 1993]

Publico sources also said that during sweeps by the security forces, 36 others were briefly detained, possibly also because of the demonstration. Other arrests took place in Lospalos and Dili shortly before the demonstration. One of the detainees, Marcelino do Cen, was transferred to Dili for interrogation. The wave of arrests suggests that the clandestine network was ready for a series of actions to coincide with the ambassador's visit.

Given that the military commander, Major-General Theo Syafei, has repeatedly warned of firm measures against any demonstrations in East Timor, the youths who took to the streets showed tremendous courage and could pay dearly for this challenge.

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**Continued from page 5**

omic aid to Indonesia has been small because of the controversy surrounding financing a regime that is disqualified under Swedish law from getting aid because of its human rights record. The government gets round this by channelling aid through the Nordic Investment Bank owned by Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland, which has provided $150 million in aid to Indonesia since 1978. Finland's business interests in Indonesia are related mainly to timber and the paper and pulp industry. This includes funding through FINNIDA, the government's overseas aid agency of the supply of seedlings for timber estate projects and consultancy agreements for paper and pulp projects. A joint investment project in Cirebon, Central Java, will provide a market for Finnish equipment to a newsprint mill. [Pulping the Rainforest, Special Report No. 1 of Down to Earth, July 1991]
On 20 July, the Indonesian government announced that it had given the go-ahead for talks to take place between pro-integration and anti-integration East Timorese. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas gave the green light after meeting President Suharto, a standard procedure by cabinet ministers to signal that the move has Suharto's approval.

Following the announcement, Francisco Xavier Lopes da Cruz, Suharto's 'roving ambassador' for East Timor affairs and the regime's top-ranking Timorese collaborator, stepped forward to handle the matter on Suharto's behalf.

Some commentators were taken by surprise, seeing this as a concession to world opinion made by Suharto under pressure. It is however a slick diplomatic manoeuvre designed to fend off persistent calls for the East Timorese, in particular the East Timorese resistance, to be involved in the UN-sponsored talks between Indonesia and Portugal.

After insisting that Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor "will not be an issue", Lopes da Cruz set the stage for the talks by saying he recently met Fretilin's Abilio Araujo in Brussels and claimed that the initiative for the talks had come from the latter. Abilio Araujo heads Fretilin's external delegation, the DEF. Others see the origins of the idea as having come from Indonesian army intelligence which played such a crucial role in the early period of Indonesia's war to grab East Timor.

Origins of the 'talks' idea

The first mention of talks between pro-integration and anti-integration East Timorese came in April this year, just before the UN-sponsored Rome talks between Indonesia and Portugal on 21 April. The idea was mooted in interviews made by Indonesian journalist Petrus Suryadi, during a visit to Lisbon. Suryadi who writes for the Jakarta daily, Suara Pembaruan is known to have close links to army intelligence, BAIS, through the Indonesian military attaches in Brussels and The Hague. His trip to Lisbon is known to have taken place at their instigation.

Many East Timorese political exiles in Lisbon were wary of Suryadi's background. The only ones to respond to his approaches were Abilio Araujo and Jose Martins, leader of the minuscule Kota party who in 1975 threw in his lot with Indonesia, defected a year later, but more recently again took a pronounced pro-Jakarta stance. Few people doubt that Martins has all along been a tool of military intelligence. It therefore came as no surprise to read about his enthusiasm over moves from Jakarta for talks between East Timorese.

The shift in position by Abilio Araujo came as more of a surprise and it is far from clear that he represents Fretilin or that his enthusiastic response to such talks represents the views of a party that has been the staunchest opponent to the Indonesian invasion and led the armed resistance in the interior from 1975 on. Indeed, the deputy head of DEF, Mari Alkatiri, told LUSA [Diario de Noticias, 23.VII.1993] that the majority of Fretilin leaders categorically reject the position taken by Araujo who, he said, is acting in his personal capacity.

In an interview with Suara Pembaruan on 8 April, Araujo came out with a number of remarks that are uncharacteristic for a Fretilin leader. He criticised the young people who participated in the Santa Cruz demonstration in Dili on 12 November 1991 for unfurling banners which, he claimed, had "acted as a provocation". He went on to accuse the Catholic church in East Timor of going beyond the bounds of its 'non-political' role and then declared that all sides in the East Timor conflict, Indonesia, Portugal and Fretilin should acknowledge that they had made mistakes in the past.

It was in a later interview with Radio Netherlands that he made the suggestion that pro- and anti-integration Timorese should talk to each other. He acknowledged that Petrus Suryadi had "offered his services" to make this possible. It is difficult to believe that Araujo does not know he is accepting the services of the very intelligence network which has played such a sinister and de-stabilising role in East Timor throughout the history of Indonesia's war against East Timor, bringing so much suffering to the people of East Timor.

In an interview last month with the Lisbon daily, Diario de Noticias [30.VI.1993], Araujo acknowledged that the talks could only happen if Jakarta gave the green light and thought they would take place before the next round of talks between Indonesia and Portugal in New York on 17 September this year. He also revealed that he now believes that the armed resistance in East Timor is "worn out" and that all that now remains for the East Timorese is to "wage cultural resistance".

Besides Petrus Suryadi, the other figure to emerge as a key link in this murky affair is the Portuguese journalist-businessman, Nuno Rocha, a close friend of former Indonesian foreign minister, Mocitar Kusumaatmadja who produced a glowing report of a visit to East Timor in the late 1980s and later published a book entitled, East Timor, the 27th Province.

Rocha visited Jakarta in April this year to sound out the Indonesian government on Araujo's willingness to hold talks. His announcement that Jakarta would insist on Jakarta, not Bangkok, as the venue and would refuse to allow any discussion on Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor led Araujo to abort the talks at that stage.

As yet, Araujo is the only anti-integration East Timorese in exile to want to take part in these talks. The initiative has been roundly condemned by CNRM overseas representative, Jose Ramos-Horta. In April this year, at the time of the Rome talks, Horta for the CNRM, Mari Alkatiri for Fretilin and Joao Carrascalao for the UDT, in a joint statement, rejected Jakarta's talks initiative. Alatas was in no position, they said, to offer any concessions on human rights, let alone address the roots of the problem. The deputy chief of the UDT in Portugal has also rejected the idea, saying that the Timorese should only accept a format which involves Portugal as the administering power.
Discrediting the resistance
So, what are Jakarta's motives in promoting the talks? It hopes to win international favour by appearing to allow opposing East Timorese to come together in an attempt at reconciliation. Jakarta would like to dress this up as a 'confidence-building measure' to end the stalemate in the UN-sponsored talks.

But the international community should realise that Jakarta's format is designed to exclude the East Timorese resistance. It is Jakarta's intention in particular to exclude the embodiment of that resistance, the National Council of Maubere Resistance, whose leader, Xanana Gusmao, was sentenced to life by an Indonesian court in May this year, and now languishes, incomunicado, in some God-forsaken prison goodness knows where. The rightful participant in any talks is Xanana Gusmao himself, or those who are his legitimate representatives.

The arrest and trial of Xanana Gusmao set in trail a strategy to obliterate both him personally and the entire resistance movement, hoping to remove them as the rightful participants in any negotiations to lead to an act of self-determination in East Timor. Before his arrest, Xanana Gusmao repeatedly called for talks leading to a peaceful solution to the conflict and declared his willingness to take part in talks. He returned to this theme in the defence plea that he was prevented from reading out in court, when he called on the international community "to press Jakarta to accept dialogue with the Portuguese and the Timorese in the search for an internationally-acceptable solution".

The voice of Xanana Gusmao has now been silenced but resistance inside East Timor is in no way diminished by his absence. Its right to a place in the talks cannot be snuffed out by a diplomatic ploy from the regime that has illegally occupied East Timor for nearly eighteen years and brought untold suffering to its people.

Fifth conference on East Timor in Portugal

For the fifth year running, the University of Oporto organised a conference on East Timor. This year, the focus was on developments in Indonesia. The Timorese leader José Ramos-Horta who was among the speakers, announced the new structure of the resistance.

Prof. Antonio Barbedo Magelhaes has been convenor of all five conferences. A dedicated activist, he has become known affectionately as Mr. East Timor. This time he invited several top Indonesianists, Ben Anderson, Daniel Lev, Akihisa Matsuno and Ingrid Wessel while noted East Timor specialists like Roger Clark, John Taylor, Michel Robert, Masao Yamagushi, Artur Teodoro de Matos. Adriano Moreira MP and Pedro Pinto Leite were also present. TAPOL was represented by Liem Soei Liong who gave a talk on Indonesia's Orde Baru. Besides Portuguese politicians, Lord Avebury (UK) and Gary Gibson (Australian MP) were among the speakers; human rights activists came from five continents: Asia, America, Africa, Australia and Europe also participated in the conference.

These conferences are particularly interesting because of the active participation of the East Timorese community.

Because of the special focus on Indonesia, a large delegation came from Indonesia, including Indonesian exiles, Indonesian activists living abroad and a number of Indonesians who made a special (and risky) effort to travel from Indonesia to Portugal. As there are no diplomatic relations between the two countries, there are complications for Indonesians travelling to Portugal. Indonesian participation was very active; for the first time the East Timorese refugee community was able to share thoughts with Indonesian dissidents. The Oporto conference (this time held in Estoril, just outside Lisbon) has become a unique meeting place for East Timorese, Indonesians, Portuguese and the international community. Here is international solidarity with East Timor in action.

The new structure of the resistance
José Ramos-Horta told the conference of the new structure of CNRM (National Council of Maubere Resistance), the umbrella organisation of the resistance. He denied that there was a vacuum in the leadership after the arrest of Xanana Gusmao and Mau Huno. Konis Santana immediately took over and after a period of consolidation, a new structure was created.

The resistance is now represented by a troika: Konis Santana for the Executive Council of the armed resistance (CEL), José Ramos-Horta as CNRM special representative abroad and a third person representing the Executive Council of the clandestine front (CEFC) not identified by name. The CEL and CEFC each have five members. The CEL is divided into commissions, one of which is a Political and Military Commission (PMC) which includes political party structures like the Fretilin Directive Committee and the chief-of-staff of Falintil, the armed wing of the resistance.

Abroad, CNRM is rapidly building its own structure with representatives in different countries. CNRM representatives include: Jose Antonio Amorim Dias at the European Community, Luis Cardoso in Portugal, Alexandra Corte Real in the South Pacific, Lay Konen in Melbourne, Filomeno Andrade in Sydney and Abé Barreto in Canada. Other appointments will follow. An Information and Documentation Centre has been set up with experienced activists like Agio Pereira, Ines Almeida, Lola Reis and Geraldo Magno.

The new structure differs in many respects from the structure under Xanana. Recognising the importance of political work in the towns and among Indonesians, the Clandestine Front is now more prominent. Second, politics have taken a commanding position as the Falintil chief-of-staff is now under the Political and Military Commission. As he is in captivity, Xanana Gusmao occupies no formal position in the new structure but is acknowledged as the nominal leader and a source of inspiration for the resistance. He is definitely not written off by the new CNRM leadership.

For more information and papers from the Fifth Oporto Conference, contact Prof. A. Barbedo de Magelhaes, Engineering Faculty, Oporto University, Rua dos Bragas, 4099 Porto Codex, Portugal.
"I met no-one who supports the occupation"

A US journalist who visited East Timor in mid-June was deeply impressed by the strength of feeling in the country against the Indonesian forces of occupation. He expressed amazement at the continued strength of the resistance despite the heavy hand of repression. The nature of the repression had become a recruiting ground for the armed resistance in the interior.

In an interview with TAPOL, Reese Erlich, a freelance journalist from Oakland, California, said he spent three days in East Timor without the authorities paying any apparent attention to his presence. This enabled him to move round freely, talk to people - using Spanish - and visit several villages and towns. At the end of the third day, he was approached by an official, accused of carrying out 'unauthorized journalistic activities' and told to leave for Jakarta the next morning.

Erlich said he chatted to many people - in the streets, in the markets and on buses - but did not meet a single Timorese who supported the Indonesian occupation. The moment the conversation turned to anything serious, people were unanimous in their opposition to integration.

He was particularly struck by his interview of Father Dominggus Soares in Ermera who agreed to talk on the record. Other priests were not willing to be quoted but all expressed opposition to the Indonesians and were in general sympathy with the resistance.

Resistance confident of victory

Erlich was able to meet a number of middle and upper-level activists attached to the resistance in the central region and interviewed Ramon, a middle-level resistance council leader. "We want Christian socialism because all the Timorese are Catholics," said Ramon, adding that the independent East Timor envisioned by the resistance would adopt the principles of European-style social democracy.

Ramon told Erlich that the movement has about a thousand people in the hills, 350 of whom bear arms. The resistance has twenty-four groups active in Dili, mostly among students and workers. It no longer hopes for a military victory. "In the military struggle alone, Indonesia will win. But in the political struggle, the victory is ours." They pin their hopes on international pressure to force concessions from Jakarta. Commenting on US support for the UN Human Rights Commission resolution condemning Indonesia, Ramon hoped Clinton would back up its vote with action. "We don't need support in words but in deeds." [San Francisco Chronicle, 13.VII.1993]

Erlich told TAPOL that although the military presence was not over-conspicuous in Dili, as soon as one goes along the country roads and villages, soldiers are to be seen everywhere. He had come away from East Timor with the sense of a pervasive fear of spies and police everywhere. It was hard to find anywhere safe from the prying eyes of the security.

"We all fear for our safety"

These excerpts are from Reese Erlich's interview of Father Domingus Soares of the parish of Ermera:

Q: What is the state of the coffee trade?

Ermera is the richest district in East Timor mainly because of coffee. Before it was economically well off but now the region is disadvantaged because of the low price of coffee. Our coffee is exported by DENOK which I hear belongs to generals with stars. People are very upset. We have talked to those responsible about introducing a free market but this is very difficult to achieve because we are living under the monopolistic generals and in Indonesia, it's very difficult to oppose those who are higher up.

Q: What is the impact of the arrest of Xanana Gusmao and his second-in-command on morale?

Above all Xanana Gusmao is a leader of the Timorese people. He has always been seen as their leader. His 17 years of work in the jungle put him in a very favourable position with the Timorese who are hoping for their freedom. The people see them as heroes who have fulfilled their duties and are now at the mercy of the enemy. The resistance has not died down and has a new leader, Konis Santana.

Q: Do you fear for your own safety, given the outspokenness of your views?

Here in Timor we all fear for our safety and security. We see that when a Timorese has the opportunity to leave, they do so either through the International Red Cross, or as business people with a lot of money. I myself am not afraid of death - today or tomorrow, it's all the same. The important thing is to defend justice for our people who have suffered enough. Dying today or tomorrow is of no consequence to a priest; that's the least of my concerns.

Q: What is the situation with the extent of the military presence?

Here in Timor, their presence has always been a big problem. It was supposed to be the way in which they could control the Timorese as we have seen in the November 12 saga. They retreated when the world cried 'foul' so they tried other means.

At the moment they are using a network of territorial command all over East Timor. In the villages they build houses, work on the rice-fields and visit vegetable gardens. They aim at conquering the people through their hearts but they are just seen as an army presence who are armed even when they go to the fields. Their caring strategy does not melt our hearts because we are people of strong will who won't be bought. What we want is our freedom.
ICRC forced to stop prison visits

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) issued a statement in June deploring the difficulties it has had in the conduct of prison visits in East Timor. This outspoken condemnation of the behaviour of a host government means that independent observation of the condition of prisoners in East Timor has reached a new low.

The ICRC has maintained an office in East Timor since 1979, one of its tasks being to conduct visits to political prisoners on a regular basis. It is well known that the humanitarian agency has access to only a limited number of detention places. Detention centres run by local military commands are excluded, as are many places where people are taken in for intense interrogation, almost invariably to the accompaniment of torture.

The ICRC's presence in East Timor is based on the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention regarding the protection of populations in occupied territories. The Geneva Conventions relate to the humanitarian laws of war and the ICRC has responsibility for safeguarding adherence to these laws.

The agency had an office in East Timor in 1975 but was forced to leave in the wake of the Indonesian invasion in December 1975. It was not allowed to return until March 1979, following an international outcry over reports of huge loss of life during the Indonesian army's large-scale operations to gain control of the territory.

Visiting political prisoners became one of the main activities of the ICRC in East Timor. In 1992, ICRC delegates visited 110 East Timorese prisoners in 20 places of detention in Dili and Jakarta, but since the beginning of this year, the military authorities have made it impossible for the agency to continue with this programme.

Theo Syafei wants to end ICRC presence

Major-General Theo Syafei who was recently promoted from being commander of the now-disbanded special operations command, Kolakops, to becoming commander of the Udayana/Xth regional military command based in Bali, is still personally directing army operations in East Timor. He has repeatedly displayed contempt for all international agencies, from the UN down, which are seeking to monitor the situation in East Timor.

In May this year he announced that it was no longer necessary for the ICRC to maintain an office in East Timor. The announcement came as ICRC President, Cornello Sommaruga was in Jakarta to complain about difficulties the agency was having in the conduct of prison visits in East Timor. But Syafei's call for it to quit did not seem to have the approval of President Suharto who told the ICRC President that the office in East Timor would remain open.

A programme of visits which began on 25 May was abandoned amid angry denunciations by Pierre Pont, the ICRC chief delegate in Indonesia, who told the press in Jakarta that the agency had been forced to take a "very complex, serious and heavy decision (because) the necessary conditions for Red Cross have not been met".

Soon after, international pressure intensified for independent observers to meet Xanana Gusmao who had been given a life sentence on 21 May and was believed to be on hunger strike. The only agency likely to carry out this mission with not too much difficulty was the Red Cross so it appears that Ali Alatas, under pressure regarding Xanana's state of health, prevailed upon the military to provide the necessary conditions for Red Cross visits to resume.

The ICRC announced a new programme of visits starting on 17 June while Major-General Theo Syafei made it clear that he would not make things easy for them. "They will be here for two days but they had better not try to disrupt or influence interrogation, or I'll send them home," he said.

Although the ICRC refrained from saying who they met when the programme of visits began, Syafei says that they did meet Xanana. A few other prisoners were visited but when the team complained about many prisoners being moved before they could be visited, the team was told it would have to go to Bali for discussions with the military commander before the scheduled visits could continue. This made its work impossible, forcing the team once again to abandon the programme of visits. This time, the agency delivered a sharp public rebuke of the government (see box).

Since then, the position has not changed and prisoners in East Timor have been deprived of the minimal protection that the ICRC has been able to provide.

ICRC statement

The following is the text of ICRC Communiqué No 93/18 issued in Geneva on 22 June 1993:

"In response to guarantees received by its President from the highest authorities of the Republic of Indonesia in early May in Jakarta, the International Committee of the Red Cross has tried to resume its visits to all persons detained in connection with the situation in East Timor. The visits were suspended in January 1993.

"The ICRC's first attempt to resume the visits on 25 May had to be interrupted two days later owing to restrictions placed on its customary visiting procedure. A further attempt on 17 June was cut short the next day because of failure to obtain access to all the detainees despite prior assurances to the contrary by the relevant authorities.

"The ICRC deplores these continuing difficulties and appeals to the Indonesian authorities to take all necessary steps to resolve them and enable the visits to be carried out smoothly."
Aid for Suharto still going up

The Consultative Group on Indonesia this year announced an aid programme of $5.1 billion to the Suharto regime, an increase of US$ 200 million. Earlier signals suggested that foreign aid to Jakarta might decrease but four countries, Japan, Spain, Austria and the UK saved the day for Jakarta.

There were signs that the idea of linking human rights to development aid was gaining ground. Six CGI member states reduced their bilateral aid, including the US, Australia, France and Belgium, though human rights may not have been the reason as aid amounts from some countries tend to fluctuate from year to year. Belgium reduced it aid to zero after Suharto refused to accept any mention of human rights in a new aid accord still under discussion. In 1992, Suharto ended the aid programme from Holland because it had linked aid with human rights. Canada is more complicated. Last year Canada froze its aid to Indonesia but this year it allocated US$ 30.5 million, most of it for the Canada-Indonesia university aid program.

While human rights considerations are playing a role, realpolitik arguments still predominate. Before the CGI conference, the Economic Affairs Coordinating Minister who heads the Indonesian team to the CGI, Dr. Saleh Affif, warned that the EC may be reluctant to channel more aid to Jakarta and the third world because of security problems relating to conflicts in eastern Europe which could spread across Europe.

Profit above principles

In most cases development aid remains an extension of foreign policy or helps to reinforce economic interests. Japanese aid, at US$ 1,440 million (up US$ 220 million on last year), accounts for a third of CGI aid and a sign of how extensive Japanese-Indonesian economic relations are. Japan needs to strengthen ties with Asian-Pacific countries against growing criticism from the west about Japan’s huge trade surplus. Several years ago, Japan announced four human rights criteria that should be linked to aid, but they have never been applied to Jakarta.

As for the UK, its aid this year nearly tripled from US$ 35 million to US$ 98.6 million in concessionary aid, while British economic interests in Indonesia are expanding fast. They include the recent deal for 24 Hawks fighter planes, the PT PENI polyethylene plant (half owned by BP Chemicals and 24 per cent by Sigit Suharto) and PT Kaltimprima, owned by BP Coal, Indonesia's largest coal mine.

The Indonesian economy: boom or recession?

Indonesia is often proclaimed by the World Bank as a third world country that has coped successfully with poverty, development and economic growth. But one should not ignore the natural resources it possesses as compared to the Philippines or Thailand. In many ways Suharto has been very lucky. Indonesia is still Asia's largest oil exporter, it is the largest natural gas exporter in the world and it has become the fourth largest coal exporter after Australia, South Africa and the US.

With large foreign exchange earnings, it has been able to pour large sums into a wide variety of projects: giant steel mills, satellite networks, the aerospace industry, infra-

The Asian Pacific region has enjoyed a boom and Indonesia has received its share of investments in manufacturing. Indonesia is now an Asian cub, following tigers like Hongkong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea. Manufacturing output will soon overtake oil and agricultural output. In the last five years, $34 billion in direct foreign investment has entered Indonesia and annual economic growth has remained steady at around 7 per cent.

The darker side

But this success story has its darker side. Indonesia is Asia's largest debtor. The external public and private debt is estimated as $85 billion of which around $50 billion is public. Debt servicing this year will absorb $7.2 billion, far in excess of the $5 billion from the CGI. Non-oil exports have risen to $23 billion while non-oil imports have risen even more, to $27 billion. Foreign investment is in decline, with investors turning to countries like China, Vietnam and India which offer more attractive tax holidays, higher productivity and better infrastructure.
Casino economy and bad debts

The Indonesian banking system is in crisis. The casino boom of the late eighties has led to cash flow problems in the banking sector. Bad debts are threatening to engulf Indonesian banks. The collapse of Bank Summa, one of the largest private banks, is a sign of how serious things have become. The unbridled growth of private banks in the last ten years has now come to a halt and a major overhaul of the banking system (including many mergers) will be needed to restore confidence. The easy lend-and-spend days are over.

The central bank estimates that state and private banks have bad debts totalling some 3.5 trillion rupiahs (US$ 1.66 billion) but many analysts believe the figure is between 10 and 20 trillion rupiahs. The state banks have been worst hit not least because of unlimited borrowing by Suharto's offspring and palace cronies. In June a list of Indonesia's worst corporate debtors was leaked. Economic analysts say the leak was made with backing at the highest level of government. The list includes non-performing loans - where no interest has been paid for over three months - of six state banks. Bankers in Jakarta say the non-performing loans of state banks amount to 15-30% of their portfolios.

Racist language

Consternation grew when a decision was announced placing a six-month travel ban on more than 300 businessmen accused of owing state banks more than 250 million rupiahs. Were this decree to be applied properly, none of Suharto's enterprising offspring would be able to travel abroad.

To allay public fears, Suharto assured the ailing cooperative movement that conglomerates would not be allowed to dominate the economy. Anti-Chinese sentiment is in the

Fourth largest country in the world

Unlike other Asian–Pacific countries with small populations, Indonesia has to cope with 2.3 million new entrants to the labour market a year. Indonesian workers are the lowest paid in the region; average wage costs are 30 dollar cents (about a third of neighbouring Thailand and Malaysia) and well below the meagre wages paid in China.

The World Bank is not all smiles however. Its 1993 report on Indonesia criticises the government over the poor results of its deregulation. The Bank has been pressing Indonesia for several years to liberalise (or deregulate) the economy. Unless this happens, it argues, it runs the risks of falling behind its fast growing neighbours.

Free trade and monopolies

The Indonesian economy has moved in two different directions. While manufacturing industry has entered the competitive global market, other sectors are heavily protected. The economic reforms of the mid eighties, in theory to develop a laissez-faire economy, have been very profitable for the well-connected conglomerates. Meanwhile new monopolies have emerged, primarily run by the six Suharto offspring. The burgeoning business interests of the Suharto family have become a major issue in Indonesia today. They range from billion-dollar petrochemical plants, toll highways, airline ventures to the monopoly of citrus fruit in Kalimantan.

Another heavy financial burden for the state is the high-technology dreams of Suharto's favourite minister, Habibie. Habibie stresses the need to develop high-tech industry alongside traditional export-oriented manufacturing goods like textile and shoes. His strategic industries, aircraft, ships and weapons, part of the Indonesian military industrial complex, are very costly. State subsidies of between $1.5 and $2 billion are gobbled up annually by Habibie and his high-tech plans.

Jubilant stories about Indonesia's economic success are being toned down. Analysts now use more restrained language: "The economy is off track" or "it has to find its proper course", or "sound but slow", or as the World Bank puts it: "If the momentum of development can be maintained..." Much of Indonesia's economic boom of the eighties is an empty shell. It is the same casino economy as elsewhere, with the difference that Indonesia has to cope with a population that is fast approaching 200 million souls.

World Bank should respect human rights

TAPOL called on the World Bank, which presides over the CGI, to consider human rights when decided if Indonesia should get $5 billion aid this year. Conditionality of aid should be an integral part of Bank and CGI policy, it said in a letter to the Bank's president, Lewis Preston.

Asia Watch also wrote to the Director of USAID asking that many rights issues should be raised at the CGI meeting.
The army takes on the students

In the last few months there has been a marked increase in student protests across the country. Most actions relate to campus affairs, protests against high tuition fees, dissatisfaction with the quality of teaching, lack of academic freedom and so on. Yet the military have resorted to an extraordinary level of violence against these low-level actions.

The impression is growing that somewhere in Cilangkap, the military have resorted to an extraordinary level of violence against these low-level actions. At the recent ABRI [Armed Forces] leadership meeting, the new commander-in-chief, General Faisal Tandjung, warned the top brass that democratisation, openness, human rights and environment were the main issues. These issues are gradually becoming the focus on the campuses.

Colonel Wahyu Hamidjaya from the Yogyakarta military command has complained that students often create organisations for a single cause, then emerge with another cause-oriented organisation under a different name. Military intelligence call this organisasi tanpa bentuk (organisation without shape), usually regarded as the style adopted by communists working underground. The military know that the many committees and action groups are composed of students who can mobilise a great many people as well as students. The Yogyakarta military command has announced a list of 20 names of students who are regarded as key persons in many demonstrations.

Protests on campus, in the streets and at the parliament building have become commonplace.

Here are a few examples:

Arena, a case of press freedom

At the State Muslim Institute (IAIN) Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta a fierce conflict broke out between the students and the Dean Dr. Simuh after he banned the campus magazine, ARENA the latest issue of which carried articles about the wealth of the sons and daughters of high-placed people. ARENA also published interviews of outspoken dissidents like Adnan Buyung Nasution and Arief Budiman. After a student proposal for talks with the IAIN authorities was rejected, direct actions followed. An open forum was organised as well as a boycott of semester exams followed by occupation of the Dean's office.

A police contingent arrived and students who resisted were attacked, beaten, kicked and dragged off. Thirteen students were detained and released after interrogation. Other students were held at the Dean's office and interrogated on the spot. The authorities proposed a solution to the conflict, allowing ARENA to continue but as a general publication. Whereas previously ARENA was a publication with a restricted circulation, it will now need two permits from the Ministry of Information. This could be the kiss of death.

'Kidnap' of college teachers

The conflict at ISTN (National Institute for Science and Technology) has also created a stir. It started with a row between students and teachers in the Electronics Department. The students wanted to do field work in a rural area but the authorities said there were no funds. Since tuition fees are very high, the students sought clarification. Meanwhile other complaints were piling up: bad teaching and lab. facilities, unreliable lecturers, dictatorial conditions, etc.

The students decided to occupy the dean's office and demanded negotiations with the authorities. The college sent four people to negotiate but while the negotiations were under way, a huge police force forced its way onto the premises, throwing tear gas and using excessive force against the students. There were many broken ribs, bruises and injuries among the students. Fifty students were arrested and released after severe interrogation.

It now appears that five students have been selected to go on trial, charged with kidnapping. Police brutality only aggravated the conflict. The ISTN students have twice gone to parliament to demand the release of their colleagues and to protest against police intervention. Answering charges that the ISTN officials were being held hostage, the students insist that the four were negotiating with them, another relatively minor issue which has been blown up because of police violence.

Trials in Central Java

An incident more than a year ago in Semarang, Central Java, has now come to court. Lukas Luwarso (25) and Poltak Ike Wibowo (25) have been charged under article 154 of the Criminal Code which is commonly known as the hatazaai (incitement to hatred) article. This law can result in up to seven years in prison for anyone found guilty of inciting hatred of state authorities. The two students have been indicted for involvement in an event on 20 May 1992, National Awakening Day, during pre-election days when meetings and public gatherings were easier to hold.

The students at Diponegoro University in Semarang organised a Public Forum attended by many thousands of students. It was a lively event which was compared to Speaker's Corner in London. A group called Forum Ma-
hasiswa Semarang (Semarang Student Forum) expressed dissatisfaction with the general elections. According to the indictment, their statement described the elections as a money-wasting, politically-engineered event. It also criticised the fact that many seats in parliament and the upper house go to presidential appointees.

The 20 May event became known as a golput (golongan putih, white or 'blank voting slip' group) event. Golput has emerged at every general election, calling on people to go to the polls and hand in blank voting-slips. The golput vote in Central Java was particularly high, especially among the youth. The two students are accused of asking people to exercise a golput vote. During the trial the two students held firm. Lukas Luwarso told the court: "We criticised without anger. And social control is an expression of our civic duty. What's wrong with that?" Poltak said: "I agree with golput because golput does not violate existing laws or democracy".

The two students are being defended by the Semarang LBH chapter; the well-known human rights lawyer Buyung Nasution has agreed to join the defence team.

Solidarity before and after the opening hearing was enormous. During one support rally at the Teachers' College in Semarang two students, Kunadi and Taufan Arif, were arrested by the military authorities. More student groups have emerged in support of the two defendants: the Semarang Students Solidarity, Students Solidarity of Indonesia and the Anti-Fascist Youth and Student Front. In Jakarta several hundreds of students carrying posters and banners went to Parliament to protest against the trial. The group calls itself Forum Komunikasi Mahasiswa Merdeka (Free Student Communication Forum) and carried banners saying: "Down with the haatzai laws" and "Golput is the hallmark of democracy". The students were also campaigning against another trial, the so called TUR (land-for-the-people) case (see also Tapol Bulletin 117), in which two people have been charged for distributing the banned TUR calendar in 1991.

Commentators in Jakarta say that these two old cases have been revived as a warning to the students.

Pre-emptive security
The new Minister of Education Dr. Wardiman Djoyonegoro was due to visit Gajah Mada University in Yogya on 3 July. Demonstrations against him were expected and security officers were on alert well in advance. The night before the visit, the police raided a student gathering and arrested 8 persons. The gathering was attended by students from Jakarta, Semarang, Solo and elsewhere. The students

Continued from page 24

Even as this review was being written, a report came in of troops raiding a meeting of Aceh Merdeka guerrillas in a small village in Matangkuli district, killing two and injuring eight others. This is based on official army sources and is bound to be only a partial account of what really happened.

Amnesty condemns the fact that no military or police officials have been brought to justice for human rights related offenses in Aceh. Ironically, this complaint appears immediately after the quotation of Pramono telling people to go out and kill. Having made it clear that the atrocities are officially authorised at the highest level, what chance is there for anyone to be brought to justice? Here is a case, as with so many of the crimes perpetrated in Indonesia since 1965, for a war-crimes tribunal or a tribunal for crimes against humanity. The regime itself cannot be expected to bring its own well-trained practitioners to justice.

Amnesty rightly takes the international community to task for the fact that the grave violations in Aceh have gone virtually unnoticed by member States of the UN. This August, the UN will have a chance to rectify this when the UN Human Rights Sub-Commission meets. Let this be the occasion for the experts who sit on that body to adopt a resolution censoring Indonesia and calling for international investigations in Aceh like those that have already been demanded for East Timor.

Carmel Budiardjo
UK-Indonesia ties surge ahead

In June 1993, Britain's relations with Indonesia reached an unprecedented level. Britain became that country's largest arms supplier, with the final contract for 24 Hawks signed with British Aerospace. It also agreed to an unparalleled increase in its annual aid commitment to Indonesia.

While the issue of human rights was being trampled on at the UN Human Rights Conference in Vienna, it was being downgraded more concretely by developments in Britain's relations with Indonesia. On June 10, British Aerospace finally announced its contract with Indonesia for 24 Hawk trainer/ground attack aircraft, worth £500 million including spare parts and technical training. Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, after visiting Jakarta in May to seal the deal, said it was 'splendid news for British Aerospace'.

Many British press reports focused on the controversy sparked by the deal. "Hawk deal promotes human rights row - Britain accused of 'cheering on' Indonesian military as Rifkind hails £500m order" ran the Guardian headline. The Independent pointed out that in 1989 as foreign secretary, John Major prevented the sale of Hawks to Iraq for fear they would be used against the Kurds. This time, however, he said he was "delighted" at the deal. Yet the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Parliament recently passed a resolution calling for a complete halt to all arms sales to Indonesia.

The British government gave further support to Suharto at the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) of donor countries and organisations. While several countries reduced their aid commitments for the coming year, Britain pledged 250 per cent more in aid, offering £81 million, the largest percentage rise given by any country.

The increase was met with derision in the House of Lords. Leading the debate was Lord Judd, Opposition spokesman on overseas aid: "Will the minister come clean? Is this not a sad story in which trade and arms export interests have taken precedence over human rights? ... When will the government change their rhetoric into tangible, effective pressure on the regime?" [Hansard, 21.VII.93]. For the government, Baroness Chalker argued that British aid was 'helping the poor in Indonesia'. The truth lies somewhat nearer home. The government's declared policy is to consider a country's human rights record when deciding on aid. When it comes to Indonesia, however, there has always been a readiness to ignore this.

Business interests

While the UK's higher aid commitment was dressed up as a reward to Indonesia for pursuing a tight fiscal policy and reducing poverty levels, it is in fact a promotion for British economic interests in Indonesia. A growing proportion of British aid to Indonesia is made up of Aid and Trade Provisions (ATP) - concessionary loans and mixed credits for the purchase of British goods. In 1991/2, around half was ATP. This year, 80 per cent will be ATP in the form of a £65 million concessionary loan for the construction of a power station in East Kalimantan, to be contracted to British companies. East Kalimantan is where major mining projects will need a plentiful power supply. Kaltim Prima Coal, which will double its output over the next few years for the export market, is half owned by a subsidiary of British Petroleum. The Kelian gold mine, operated by an Australian subsidiary of the British RTZ company, plans to divert the Kelian River to exploit its recent discovery of gold reserves.

The power sector is one of several sectors to which Aid and Trade Provisions have been channelled. It is also one in which, the Department of Trade and Industry says, there are continuing good prospects for trade. British Gas has just won a contract to install a generator in Serpong, West Java, where a 72-hole golf link is no doubt making heavy demands on the region's power supply.

The other area targeted by Britain's ATP is Indonesia's communications infrastructure, such roads, rail, radio, bridges and airports. British exports to Indonesia are dominated by components for such projects: heavy machinery, transport and power generating equipment.

Improving a country's infrastructure is a sure way of laying the groundwork for foreign investment. The other ingredient - political stability - is something which the British government has put much effort into developing. Selling ground-attack aircraft to a military regime not only strengthens its oppressive might, it serves as a public symbol of what Britain usually does through silent diplomacy, sending a clear message of support for the nature and power of the Suharto regime.

TAPOL's 10-page backgrounder: 'UK: the British Perspective' is available for £1 including postage.
Protests against arms deals

Protests against the British Hawks deal and the German warship sale resulted in several direct actions. In San Francisco, a demonstration was held outside the Indonesian consulate to protest against US arms deals with the regime in Jakarta.

The protest in Germany was unique. A coalition of peace groups joined by Watch Indonesia in Berlin launched direct action to halt the sale of 39 warships. The organisers named the action Timor und kein Trupp (No mess in East Timor) and the Whitsun weekend became the date of the rally. The ships, sold at rock-bottom prices to the Indonesian Navy, are harboured at the Peenemunde harbour, the site where Hitler built his V1 and V2 rockets.

Cheap but dear
The 39 warships, two-thirds of the former East German Navy are being sold off cheap but US$ 327 million will be invested to refurbish the ships with high-tech communications equipment and sophisticated weaponry. Germany will also supply Indonesia with 3 new submarines, each costing US$ 400 million. All told, the project to upgrade the Indonesian Navy will cost around US$ 2 billion. According to the German government's communiqué, the ships will be used in Indonesian waters against pirates, drugs dealers and mine-sweeping, but the protestors highlighted the aggressive character of the Jakarta regime (examples: Aceh, East Timor and West Papua) and the plight of many Acehnese refugees who fled across the Malacca Straits after persecution by the Indonesian army.

Peaceful, well-organised action
Hundreds of protestors from Berlin and Peenemunde attended the peace rally. For three days four corvettes and a landing ship were occupied by demonstrators and be-decked with slogans and banners stating: Freedom for East Timor, A New Europe, New Hope, No warships to East Timor, Germany – accomplice to Genocide, etc. The preparations were good and the police were caught unawares. The campaign was peaceful and on the third day the protestors left the ships voluntarily. Media coverage was impressive and as the organisers put it:

Once again it showed that the government in Bonn is not prepared to take responsibility for promoting human rights, but carries on supplying dictatorships with arms while infringing its own laws. On the other hand, we succeeded in denouncing this disgrace to German politics. We developed effective resistance – by nonviolent means – to inform the public and disrupt the arrogant complacency of the political powers in Germany. Our feast of peace was an invitation to intervention. We shall continue with it.

The anti-Hawks campaign
On 11 June, the day after the announcement of the Hawks deal, the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), TAPOL, CND, Blacksmith and Arrow demonstrated at the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall. A letter was delivered by Nick Harvey MP and representatives from the demonstration. The following week, a demonstration touring all the relevant offices in central London was organised by Arrow.

On 17 August, a demonstration calling for the cancellation of the Hawks deal is planned outside the office of British Aerospace at 1 Brewer's Green, Buckingham Gate, London on Indonesia's independence day, 17 August, 12 noon – 5pm. TAPOL urges readers to write to their MPs to protest against the Hawks deal with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office. The £500 million deal will need substantial help in its financing. An agreement with the government's Export Credit Guarantee Department may not yet have been made.

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The occupation of German corvettes
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An unfortunate diplomatic blunder

Suharto's relations with US presidents Reagan and Bush were always cozy. The Suharto-Clinton relationship may be on a collision course. The forty-minute meeting between the two during the G7 summit in Tokyo, for which Suharto had lobbied so hard, turned into an occasion for yet more embarrassment over East Timor.

The meeting between the two presidents had been on the cards for months. Suharto was obsessed with a desire to be invited to this year's G7 summit as the honorable chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) representing more than 100 countries. Two ministers, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and Research Minister Rudy Habibie, were dispatched to the G7 capitals to plead for an invitation. From the outset Suharto's chances to attend the summit were bleak. When the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl visited Jakarta some months ago, he conveyed the message that Suharto was welcome to meet G7 summiteers individually but not be part of the summit agenda.

Alatas versus Moerdiono

Suharto is nothing if not stubborn. To attend the summit would be the climax of his presidency. It was only after strenuous efforts that he had become chair of NAM which spurred him on to ever higher goals. Indonesia's tarnished global image has been something he has had to bear for far too long - the Santa Cruz bloodbath in November 1991 and the killings in Aceh have been widely reported internationally.

G7 members had hinted that it would be embarrassing to receive a human rights violator like Suharto but these signals were ignored by Suharto and he relentlessly pressed his case for an invitation to Tokyo.

Major-General (ret'd) Moerdiono, Suharto's Secretary of State saw things differently and felt that Suharto was being made to look as if he was grovelling in front of the world leaders. On several occasions Moerdiono declared that the Tokyo visit was unlikely to happen. But Foreign Minister Ali Alatas took a different approach; so much had been invested in making the Tokyo visit a fact that a cancellation would be a slap in the face for Suharto. When he eventually had to swallow defeat, Suharto decided to accept Alatas' advice and meet some G7 leaders privately. Alatas was skilled enough to make it look good: "We never asked to participate in the G7 meeting", he said, adding that it would be "more efficient" to address all the G7 leaders at once. In the end Suharto was received by the host Miyazawa and made a courtesy call on Helmut Kohl. His only proper meeting was with Bill Clinton.

US Senate and Mickey Kantor

Jakarta was more or less prepared for a showdown with Bill Clinton. There had been many warnings from Washington. The Indonesian press was hinting that human rights would be on the agenda. US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor had announced that the US was suspending GSP benefits (exemption from duties on certain imports) for Mauritania while GSP privileges for Indonesia were placed under review because of concern about workers' rights and freedom of assembly. Indonesia was given eight months' notice to improve, or else face sanctions. Earlier this year Suharto sent a mission to Washington to argue against such a decision but to no avail. The suspension of GSP benefits will cost the Indonesian economy annually around $400 million.

In Tokyo, Alatas invited Mickey Kantor to send a mission to Jakarta to review Indonesian labour laws in order, as he put it, "to remove some lingering misconceptions".

Another even bigger headache was East Timor. Before his Tokyo trip Clinton received a letter signed by 43 senators from both parties, urging the president to raise US concerns about the situation in East Timor. It became unavoidable that human rights would be raised. When the meeting took place, each side was well represented. Suharto was accompanied by Moerdiono and Ali Alatas, NAM coordinator Nana Sutresna, Economic Advisor Widjoyo Nilisastro and Head of the American desk at the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, Irawan Abidin. Bill Clinton had with him National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and his deputy Sandy Berger, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and his Assistant, Winston Lord, along with National Security Assistant Sandra Kristoff. After the meeting the Indonesian team went straight to Haneda airport to return home.

Silent diplomacy turns sour

Following the encounter, the Clinton team kept its cool and disclosed little apart from generalities. Whatever Clinton had said was not for public consumption which is not uncommon in matters of high-level state meetings. But it was Suharto who decided to go public. The private TV channel RCTI, owned by Bambang Suharto, later broadcast footage of a tense and angry president giving his version of the meeting. He had told Clinton: "Indonesia is very sensitive concerning the issue of human rights" because of "our experience of 350 years under colonialism, where our human rights were trampled by the coloniser".

What exactly President Clinton said about East Timor is shrouded in secrecy but we know what Suharto answered, namely that Indonesia's involvement with East Timor was motivated solely by a desire to help the majority of its population. "I told him (Clinton) that we accepted the East Timor integration because we respect the human rights of the majority of East Timorese", said Suharto adding that Indonesia had neither territorial nor economic interests in East Timor.

Whatever happened clearly stung East Timor's tormentor and marks a further shift in Washington towards a more interventionist stand.
East Awin problems explained

Robert Shunanek's article, summarized in Bulletin 117, shed light on the appalling conditions at the East Awin refugee site. Correspondence recently received by TAPOL from the site confirms the severity of these conditions, and the desperation and frustration felt by many refugees.

The two demonstrations at East Awin at the beginning of 1993 signalled serious frustration among the refugees. On 25 January, demonstrators hoisted the West Papuan flag in place of that of the UNHCR. On 3 February, representatives from the Warastone and Blackwater camps at the site presented a petition to the UNHCR and the PNG authorities. Looting broke out.

Since 1984, the Australian government has been providing funds for food and medical care, to be administered by the UNHCR through the Provincial Affairs Department of PNG. But according to our source, neither food nor medical care is being provided. The refugees are increasingly expected to live off the vegetables they grow in their gardens. But the soil is poor, and what they can sometimes grow – sweet potatoes, watermelons, cucumber and bananas – is lacking is essential proteins. Because of this, and as no basic necessities are supplied, the refugees sell their garden produce in Kiunga, so as to buy rice, sugar, salt, kerosene, cooking oil, soap, toothpaste and clothes.

But getting to Kiunga involves a long trip by truck and river. The trucks belong either to the UNHCR, the 'fruit and vegetable business' (funded by an EC loan) or the Refugee Business Association (RBA – financed by a grant from the Netherlands). All charge high fees: a return trip to Kiunga with a small cargo costs some $13. This is more than what a family will spend on provisions, doubling the cost of what they buy. This is what sparked the demonstrations and

looting at the beginning of the year. TAPOL's correspondent gives three reasons for their anger:

- the funds for the RBA truck were given to the refugees as humanitarian aid, not for a business project;
- there is no other way for the refugees to earn money;
- as political and not economic refugees, their status should be recognised and their freedom of movement guaranteed.

The UNHCR

The main grievance concerns the UNHCR, which is said to be developing East Awin as a business project, not for human development. Furthermore, the UNHCR never takes a close look at conditions in the camps, so does not know what the refugees need. The exception is when there is a programme of repatriation. "Whom [it] does not repatriate, the UNHCR [does] not visit", wrote our source.

The UNHCR was due to close its office in Port Moresby in July. So where does this leave those it has a mandate to protect? The refugees at East Awin live in a vacuum of information. No one knows what their needs are, and they know nothing about their future. "We have not been told anything. We have not seen any sign of the future, but we have seen repression of refugees' basic rights."

Refugees repatriated

District head of Merauke, West Papua, Raden Soepardjo, must have had his frustrations relieved in May when 2126 West Papuan refugees who had fled to PNG last year after clashes between the OPM and Indonesian security forces, were repatriated to Merauke. Soepardjo had scorned the UNHCR earlier this year for protecting the refugees in PNG.

The repatriations were carried out by the UNHCR, the PNG Department of Village Services and Provincial Affairs with aircraft of the Missionary Aviation Fellowship which operates in West Papua. The ICRC has said that, despite the closure of its office in Jayapura, it will continue its work in West Papua, and so presumably monitor the safety of the returnees. Indonesia's treatment of the ICRC in East Timor in recent months, however, casts considerable doubt over its ability to do so.

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TAPOL Bulletin No. 118, August 1993
Petition to the UNHCR and PNG Authorities
from Blackwater Refugee Camp, East Awin
3 February 1993

We are West Papuan refugees staying in East Awin refugee site, PNG territory, for nearly ten years, whose
refugee rights have been violated by the UNHCR/PNG authorities and who are now suffering hunger and dying
for (lack of) medical care.

There has been heavy pressure from Jakarta, Canberra, Port Moresby and the UNHCR not to grant refugee status
to West Papuan refugees as political asylum seekers. Although PNG acceded to the UN Convention on Refugees
of 1951 and 1967 in 1986, this did not bring any progress in finding a third country.

The ostensible legal basis for the determination of refugee status in Papua New Guinea is National Executive
Council (cabinet) Decision 4/86 of 21 January 1986, although this cabinet decision has not been enacted into law.
Under this decision the competent authority for determining refugee status is the Minister of Foreign Affairs who
acts on the recommendations of the National Security Advisory Committee. The determination procedure is as
follows: Applicants for refugee status are interviewed by a team of officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Ministry of Provincial Affairs, the Prime Ministers Office and the UNHCR. All this amounts to nothing.

Recent changes of attitude of the PNG authorities with respect to the determination of refugee status and the
treatment of those deemed to be 'illegal border crossers' rather than refugees gives serious cause for concern.
In a statement to the press in mid-1990, PNG's Foreign Minister Sir Michael Somare warned that suspected Free
Papua Movement (OPM) activists would be forcibly returned to Indonesia.

The way the UNHCR/PNG authorities have been treating West Papuan refugees aims to depoliticise us. They
want us to repatriate to our country of origin.

We, West Papuan refugees now in East Awin Refugee Site, in our name and in the name of all the heroes who
have been killed by the PNG and Indonesian government over 30 years, declare that the question of our status
has been cruelly and inhumanely handled. Meanwhile:

- We are dying as a people and as a nation because of violations of refugee rights as set out in the
Conventions 1951 and 1967 (Articles 17 1, 2 and 3; 28; 30 1 and 2; and 31 1 and 2);
- Our individual rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles (13) 1 and (14) 1 and
the Convention on Diplomatic Asylum of 1954 are being violated;
- The PNG government lays greater emphasis on maintaining its relationship with Indonesia than on solving
refugee problems.

We demand that the PNG government immediately withdraw all its repressive decisions, give us freedom of
movement for residence in its territory and resettlement in a third country.

It should give full authority to the UNHCR to solve the refugee problem in accordance with the global procedure
or international law for refugees.

(This petition, signed by five deputies, has been slightly edited.)

Just Out

WEST PAPUA Update
A news diary service on West Papua sponsored by the Australia West Papua Association (AWPA)
P.O. Box, 1148 Collingwood 3066, Australia

Number 15, June 1993
New transmigration plans for West Papua

In the mid 1980s, international criticism of Indonesia's transmigration programme seemed to have had some effect, and the programme was slowed down or left to people to migrate spontaneously. But plans to flood West Papua with government-sponsored transmigrants are again gathering momentum.

The pace of development Indonesia is planning for West Papua will require a 100 per cent increase in the population, according to the new Transmigration Minister, Siswono Yodohusodo. Contemplating the abundance of unexploited natural resources in West Papua, Siswono suggested that the present population density of four people per square kilometre made development inefficient. The ideal density would be 400 people per square kilometre, he said [Jakarta Post, 2.VI.92].

West Papua has always been a prime target of the programme. The government's original goal was to move hundreds of thousands of families there from Indonesia's crowded inner islands. But the programme became the butt of criticism from environmental and human rights groups. The colonisation of West Papua through transmigration has been detrimental not only to the culture and livelihood of its indigenous peoples but also to the environment which they now have to share with Javanese migrants. The latter have themselves suffered from poor facilities, including basic supplies such as water.

By the late 1980s, the official programme had slowed, in apparent recognition of its sensitivity. But Siswono's recent assertions make no bones about the government's plans. The new governor, Jacob Pattipi, is keener on the programme than his predecessor. He recently discussed transmigration with President Suharto, who proposed that the movement to West Papua be stepped up to help solve acute manpower shortages. The districts of FakFak, Sorong and Manokwari were identified as suitable locations. (Sorong already has 209,000 hectares reserved for transmigration, and Manokwari, 225,000 hectares.) All the areas are subject to large-scale investment projects requiring extra labour: while FakFak is home to the enormous Freeport copper and gold mine development (see separate article), and Sorong the location of a huge Kayu Lapis pulp mill, Manokwari has been identified by Siswono for its potential in marine, agricultural and plantation products, in particular the country's largest area of sago palms: fish and shrimp farms are already a big source of exports from the region.

Another area targeted for agro-industry is Merauke, where the transmigration sites are typical of the scheme's failure. Having suffered drought and the inability to grow rice, many transmigrants have returned to Java. But according to Siswono, "it is not impossible for Merauke to become the rice-bowl of Irian Jaya, because it has a river which could irrigate 100 million hectares of rice fields." The Transmigration Department estimates that, if a large dam were built on the Digul river, the area could accommodate 100,000 transmigrant families.

The magnitude of Governor Pattipi's transmigration plans is breath-taking. He has announced that in the next five years the province will receive 52,000 families (some 210,000 people). As if that weren't enough, he wants the government to increase the number fivefold to 52,000 families a year in the next five years! Until last year, West Papua had received altogether 42,611 transmigrant families.

Freeport's pollution exposed

Local tribal leaders are holding Freeport Indonesia responsible for the recent outbreak of disease near its copper and gold mines in West Papua. The third largest mining operation in the world, Freeport's is planning far bigger things for the future.

Sympathy for Mimika-Amungme people

The Mimika-Amungme Community (SMAC) have accused Freeport of destroying the local environment; they link the river pollution caused by the company to outbreaks of skin disease and diarrhoea, and an increase in the number of miscarriages around its mining area.

Denying the accusations, a Freeport director alleged that poor hygiene awareness among the people was the more likely cause of the diseases. Freeport invested in a public relations drive when it realised last year that resources were going to keep it there for at least another 30 years. The company portrays itself as the great benefactor of health and well-being in West Papua, with impressive programmes in education and community health care.

Freeport's Adrie Machribie even claims that these diseases are widespread in Irian Jaya, and are not restricted to villages close to the river affected by its mining operation. Arguing that the town where the rise in miscarriages has occurred is 30km from the Ajkwa river, he says it could not have been caused by Freeport's activities.

Anyway, according to Machribie, Freeport is only discarding tailings which have a characteristic indistinguishable from natural sediments carried in the rivers while tests of the river water carried out by the firm revealed no excess of hazardous metal which might cause the diseases.

Government investigations support the Freeport view, claiming that the rise in miscarriages may be caused by poor nutrition, the mothers' young age or venereal diseases.

Sedimentation 'just like nature'

About 95 per cent of the 60,000 tons Freeport processes each day is dumped into the rivers in the form of tailings.
Freeport’s President–Director Hoediatmo Hoed admitted that dumping increases sedimentation in rivers but said that since the same thing happens naturally it does not harm the environment. 

However, build-ups of sedimentation have been causing severe problems for the local people, including the flooding of their sago plains from the Ajkwa river into which the tailings are dumped. Reports last year that these waters had been dangerously contaminated were vigorously attacked by Freeport’s public relations machine.

In response to SMAC’s charge that the company employed too few Papuans, Hoediatmo said that Freeport preferred to employ local people, but their skills were inadequate. He pointed out that Freeport is helping a government–run training centre and provides scholarships to Irianese (Papuans) to study at universities. Freeport currently employs some 12,000 people, of which around 1,500 are Papuan.

**Freeport’s new world**

Freeport’s plans to expand its processing capacity by 50 per cent to 90,000 tons per day involve building a new town for 20,000 people. Situated north of Timika on the road to Tembagapura, the company town will occupy 7,000 hectares of Amungme land between the Ajkwa and Iwaka rivers. Consisting of apartments, shops, and a school, it will share the utilities already installed for the company’s workers living in Timika. It is envisaged that the two towns will eventually merge.

Pattipi, West Papua’s new governor, must be pleased. An influx of 20,000 people would fulfil half of his ambitious new annual target for transmigration to the territory!

**Moi people’s plea for world action**

As their forests continue to be felled, the Moi people continue to protest. But negotiations with the government and the company have reached a stalemate. Their desperation was expressed recently in a request for international support about their situation, despite the danger more publicity might bring.

The Moi have been protesting about the activities of PT Intimpura since 1991, when it first became clear that their needs and wishes were being ignored. An agreement with Intimpura in June 1992, stipulating forms of cooperation between the two parties has been repeatedly ignored, precipitating a series of attacks by Moi people on the company’s facilities.

In a typical blanket response to any indigenous voice raised in West Papua, the authorities responded to the latest clashes by claiming it was carried out by ‘security disturbers’ (the official term for OPM members). When protesting villagers got involved in a punch-up with officials in April, they were told, "No land is owned by Moi people; land is owned by Irian Jaya – Maluku Military Command, Kodam 8", and this is the reality in more ways than one. There are nine senior army officials with interests in another company working on Moi lands: Kayu Lapis, one of Indonesia’s powerful conglomerates owning several subsidiaries with timber concessions in West Papua.

A previous clash between the Moi and PT Intimpura was in November when 14 Moi villagers were arrested. These men were recently released. But now three other Moi villagers face murder charges for the death of a policeman who died in Moi territory. The Moi have denied responsibility and point to the fact that he was in a sacred site when he died.

The strains of the struggle are beginning to show. The Yolom Fai team appointed by the Moi to negotiate with the logging company and the government are under intense pressure: followed every day, they are too afraid to communicate with their own people. Consequently, the Moi have become suspicious of them.

**Transmigration ‘gift’**

A report in the Jakarta Post suggests that the Moi people have handed over 20,000 hectares of land for a transmigration site. Villagers in several subdistricts of Beraur are said to have waived compensation for the land so long as their people are allowed to resettle on it under the state-sponsored transmigration programme. In light of the tenacity with which the Moi have kept up the struggle for their land, such a report is hard to believe. Nearly 30,000 transmigrants have settled in the Sorong regency during 1993.

*22* TAPOL Bulletin No. 118, August 1993
Woman strike leader murdered in East Java

A woman activist named Marsinah has been murdered in East Java after being involved in a strike at a watch-making factory. Her death has inspired a country-wide campaign of protest and solidarity and calls for an end to military intervention in labour disputes.

Marsinah who was in her early twenties was found dead in a forest about two hundred kms from the factory where she worked. She must have been in the hands of her assassins for three days. Her body was covered with bruises and a large implement had been thrust into her vagina, proving that she was violently tortured by her assassins.

Staunch defender of workers' rights
Marsinah was known to her colleagues as a fearless defender of workers' rights at the factory in Surabaya where she worked, PT Catur Putra Surya. The strike action was similar in most respects to the numerous strikes that have swept through the industrial heartland of Indonesia, mainly in West Java but spreading recently to East Java. All the ingredients are there, low wages, no democratic union and direct and heavy-handed military interference which, many fear, may have been the factor leading to her tragic death.

Marsinah had finished high school. Close relatives and friends speak of her as a hard-working student who was continuing her studies while holding a job at PT CPS, taking courses in computer operation and English.

The dispute at PT CPS was over the failure of the company to raise the basic wage in accordance with a regulation issued by the governor of East Java. To press their demand for an increase, workers went on strike on 3 May. On the next day, they held a demonstration outside the factory but were kept away by security forces that had been called in to protect the premises. Later that day, negotiations were held between workers' representatives including Marsinah, officials from the company, the local Manpower Office and the local military commands. There was a heated discussion during which Marsinah was particularly vocal.

On the following day, 5 May, 13 workers involved in the action were summoned to Kodim, the local military command, and held there for the day. Marsinah made many attempts to check on their whereabouts. After spending some time that evening with her work-mates discussing the latest developments, Marsinah left, saying she would take a meal on the way home. Her friends never saw her alive again. For several days they could discover nothing about her but it later transpired that her body was found in a woodland in Nganjuk, some 200 kms from the factory and that she had died on 8 May.

Company profile
PT CPS produces a variety of goods but mainly concentrates on manufacturing many brands of watches. About 70 per cent of output is exported. It has a workforce of five hundred, of whom three hundred are women. They are paid a basic wage of Rp 1,700 [less than US$1] a day plus Rp 200 an hour for compulsory overtime. They are required to pay for some of the working tools they use and the protective gloves they wear. There is no polyclinic on the premises and pay is deducted whenever a worker visits a nearby clinic in case of illness while at work.

The workers have twelve demands, the first being an increase in the basic wage from Rp 1,700 to Rp 2,250 an hour. Others include increased allowances for transport and meals and the provision of medical treatment, paid menstrual leave according to government regulations, as well as a guarantee that workers involved in actions will not be dismissed. The workers also want the factory branch of the SPSI, the government-sponsored union, to be disbanded.

The Surabaya Legal Aid Institute has found that 71 per cent of factories in and around Surabaya pay less than the official minimum wage, while only 13 per cent of companies throughout East Java have collective agreements with their workforce. Unable to press their demands for improved wages and working conditions, more and more workers are going on strike. [Surya, 17.VI.1993]

Solidarity campaign gathers momentum
The murder of Marsinah sent shock-waves through the human rights network in Indonesia and has rallied solidarity actions on an unprecedented scale for workers. The murder has been widely reported in the local and national press, some newspapers even publishing editorial comments on the affair.

Dozens of non-governmental organisations (NGO) and leading human rights activists have joined the Solidarity Committee for Marsinah (KSUM) in a campaign for (1) the establishment of an independent team to investigate her murder and make its findings public, (2) firm measures against anyone involved in her murder and (3) guarantees from the authorities that no pressure will be exerted on her family during their investigations into her death.

The Arek Foundation in Surabaya is planning a series of major actions in many cities throughout Java as well as in Bali and Sulawesi during July and August. These will include protest statements, boycotts and street demonstrations.

On the 40th day after her death, a huge gathering took part in a solemn and emotion-charged ceremony.

The campaign has also taken up the fate of the thirteen workers who were summoned by the military on the day Marsinah disappeared. The thirteen have been dismissed by the company, apparently at the insistence of the army. The KSUM has called for the re-instatement of the thirteen and has called for a ministerial regulation promulgated by the Minister of Manpower in 1986 [Kep.342/MEN/1986] which allows the military and the police to intervene in labour disputes to be withdrawn.

The provincial police and military have initiated a murder inquiry and claim to have tracked down the vehicle that was used to transport her body to the place where it was discovered. However, they have refused to contemplate any independent investigation. The involvement of the security forces in her killing is widely suspected.★

See also, "We'll make mince-meat of them" on page 15.
Aceh's tragedy exposed by Amnesty


At a time when analysts are suggesting that the Suharto regime is becoming more open, discarding its militarist image and assuming a 'gentler' mien, it is salutary to read this account of what has happened in Aceh during one of the most blood-thirsty campaigns waged by the Indonesian army since it took power in 1965. With Suharto these days being depicted as more conciliatory towards dissidents, it is sometimes forgotten that the Indonesian armed forces have not changed. They can be unleashed at any time on a region that dares to challenge army rule from the centre.

The publication of this report, at a time when news from Aceh is even rarer than usual, should come as a reminder to the international community of the horrors through which the Acehnese have lived since the army went on the rampage in the most northerly tip of the regime's far-flung empire to crush the liberation movement there.

This is the first major report Amnesty has produced about Aceh and it must rank as one of the best documents it has produced on Indonesia's many crimes. Coming to the issue for the first time, the report provides an excellent summary of the historical, political and social roots of the emergence of a liberation struggle that has provoked the unbridled wrath of the Indonesian armed forces. The measured tone in which it discusses Aceh Merdeka leaves the reader with no doubt that Acehnese people have wed their sense of historic destiny to the many grievances they harbour against a regime that exploits their natural resources with scant regard for the interests of the local population.

The account of the army's operation against Aceh, directed not only against the armed guerrillas but in particular against defenceless civilians, is a powerful indictment of Indonesian militarism at its most brutal. The counter-insurgency campaign launched in 1989 and intensified in the latter part of 1990, subjected the region to an orgy of killings, 'disappearances', torture, mass arrests, enforced recruitment of the population, the use of 'vigilante' thugs and forced confessions, that have succeeded in terrorising the population. If anyone has doubts about the militaristic character of the Suharto regime, let them reflect on what the Acehnese have suffered.

Much of the evidence for this assessment comes in statements made by army officers themselves. "If they don't do as you order them, shoot them on the spot or butcher them," said regional military commander Major-General H.R. Pramono, "I tell members of the community... (if you meet a terrorist, kill him)." The same officer also denied reports of a mass grave with two hundred bodies. "The grave certainly exists but I don't think it could have been 200 bodies. It's hard to tell with arms and legs all mixed up."

The use of shock therapy in the title of the report comes from no less an authority than President Suharto himself. This was the term he used to explain the objective of the 'mysterious killings' carried out by death squads in 1983 and 1984. By drawing a comparison with that gruesome campaign and also with the killings that swept through Indonesia in 1965 and 1966, Amnesty portrays the Suharto regime as having a deep-rooted killer instinct, whenever it feels that the 'national stability' of its unitarian state is under threat. Officers like Major-General H.R. Pramono and those under him who have terrorised the people of Aceh abound among the present crop of senior officers who now occupy positions as regional commanders and commanders of special units like Kostrad and Kopassus.

Although the level of killings in Aceh has fallen in the last year or so, Amnesty argues that this is no cause for complacency. The relative "peace and order" which now prevails in Aceh and the decline in the overall number of human rights violations reported, does not reflect any significant change in the policies or practices of the Indonesian security forces. On the contrary, it appears to reflect a continuing and pervasive fear of government retribution... Under the circumstances, a pattern of grave and widespread violations may quickly re-emerge in the event of renewed opposition to Indonesian rule."

Continued on page 15