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Papuans captured in border raids

Indonesian troops violate PNG territory

On August 11-12, Indonesian troops raided a West Papuan refugee camp in Papua New Guinea, killed five people, and captured several Papuans believed to be members of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM). Troops burned down this and other refugee camps, prompting hundreds of Papuans, in fear for their lives, to take refuge at a PNG government post. The lives of West Papuans and Papua New Guineans are under threat from Indonesian attacks, violating PNG's territorial integrity.

A few days after the attack on the Imnai refugee camp, in West Sepik province of PNG, the Indonesian authorities announced the capture of eleven OPM suspects - avoiding any mention of where they were captured. The West Papuans, now in custody in Jayapura, are evidently the men who were captured in the Imnai refugee camp. The previous month, the Indonesian Trikora command announced the arrest of OPM leader Mecky Salosa. He had been deported - in effect extradited - to West Papua on July 22, by the PNG authorities. Now, with the capture of the eleven, the military appears to be taking PNG's law into its own hands, by crossing the border and helping itself to OPM suspects.

The attack was reported in a PNG newspaper, the *Post Courier* [16/8/90]. Quoting a "senior official", the *Courier* states that on August 11, there was a fierce mortar and gun battle between Indonesian troops and OPM at Ok Bago, 1.5 km into PNG, after which Indonesian troops burned down Imnai camp and captured several OPM suspects. Men who escaped the clash said that several other camps had also been torched.

Deaths and abductions along border

Reports indicate that Indonesian troops have killed at least 15 Papuans during frequent border violations and clashes with OPM guerillas in the past months. In August, incursions became an almost daily occurrence. PNG civilians as well as West Papuan refugees have suffered gross abuse at the hands of the Indonesian troops. A chronology of the most serious incidents is given below:

June 14, a West Papuan woman and her child living at Yapsei refugee camp were killed at point blank range by Indonesian soldiers. They had been attending their gardens at the time of the attack. [PNG Times 23/8/90]

June 20, two West Papuan brothers also living at the

Yapsei camp were abducted by Indonesian troops: one was released on condition he identify OPM bases in PNG; the whereabouts of his 17-year old brother are unknown. [PNG Times 23/8/90]

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June 20, PNG authorities say people 5 villages on the PNG side and from Batum village on Indonesian side have been streaming into Yapsei government station during the past week in fear of Indonesian forces. Provincial police chief says he has received a report from one of his men, saying OPM has killed 3 Indonesian troops. [*Post Courier* 20/6/90]

June 24, Indonesian platoon attempts to invade Yapsei station, but PNG troops arrive in time to prevent an attack. Three puma helicopters believed to be in use by Indonesian forces. [*Post Courier* 5/7/90]

July 15, ten Indonesian soldiers walk in to Scotchio village, 8km inside PNG and hold two women at gun-point telling them to lead the way to nearby villages. Ten others raid Popo village, 1km west of Scotchio, destroying property and gardens. [*PNG Times* 19/7/90 & *Post Courier* 25/7/90]

July 25, PNG deputy prime minister Ted Diro told parliament he was investigating reports that 7 Papua New Guineans had been captured by Indonesian troops in West Sepik province, taken across the border and shot dead. [*Post Courier* 26/7/90]

August 11/12, according to a "senior official", Indonesian troops killed 5 people, captured OPM suspects and burned down buildings at Imnai refugee camp. 650 refugees from camps flooded into Yapsei government station. More than 150 troops estimated in the area. [*Post Courier* 16/8/90]

August 14, Indonesian troops reported to be massing on the border and many people fleeing border villages. West Sepik premier calls for help from PNG government.

August 22, reports of more Indonesian troops moving towards Okma and Oksil areas in West Sepik province [*Post-Courier* 23/8/90]



West Papuan refugees in PNG.

Better alive than dead

Fears for Mecky Salosa, the OPM's commander for the Sorong-Manokwari region, are fuelled by a report that the representative from the recently established International Red Cross office in Jayapura has been refused permission to visit him. Some reports claim he is dead, but the signs are that the authorities will attempt to satisfy international opinion by being seen to act in accordance with "due process" in bringing Salosa to trial [all the more so, given

President Suharto's new "concern" for human rights - see separate item]. A trial would set a precedent for future extraditions from PNG, placing the fate of West Papuan refugees now in Papua New Guinea in jeopardy from the PNG authorities as well as from attacks by Indonesian troops.

Similarly, the eleven captured in August, appear to be more valuable alive than dead to the Indonesian government, who has announced that there is enough evidence against to bring them to trial. All are accused of involvement in killings at Arso transmigration site and in the independence flag-raising ceremony of December 1988. This way, the Indonesian government can present itself as a state which is based on the rule of law.

However there is grave concern for their safety for, like Salosa, they have been subjected to "intense interrogation" which can only mean torture.

PNG announces new moves against OPM

It was not until August 14 that the Port Moresby government could bring itself to issue a protest to Indonesia. The letter protesting Indonesian troop incursions over the previous three days, but saying nothing of the deaths, came from an administration beset with its own problems and clearly reluctant to antagonise Indonesia. Appeasement rather than protest has been the PNG's government's policy of late, borne out by the extradition of Mecky Salosa, which was recently described by Foreign Minister Michael Somare as "a start". And far outweighing the protest to Indonesia has been the announcement of new moves to cooperate with Indonesia in wiping out the OPM. On 30 July, border discussions between the two governments were held in Jayapura where, it is thought, the Indonesians requested firmer action by PNG against the OPM.

Just over a fortnight later, in what amounts to a green light for the worst kind of abuse by both Indonesian and PNG troops, Somare announced that PNG defence forces had been sent to the border with orders to destroy rebel camps and arrest, prosecute and deport rebels found in PNG. The same action applied to "permissive residents" known to be actively supporting the OPM cause. All border-crossers will be screened by government officials to sort out genuine refugees from illegal border crossers, he said. [*PNG Times* August 20, 1990] A government patrol was duly sent in to close down the Yapsei refugee camp, bring "genuine" refugees to the only camp which is officially recognised at East Awin, and send the rest back to West Papua. PNG defence minister Ben Sabumei, said the new measures were part of a coordinated plan with Indonesia. He had this to say of the OPM "I'd like to talk to them and tell them they are fighting a battle they will never win". [*The Age*, August 20, 1990]

Mecky Salosa: deported or extradited?

Mecky Salosa's "deportation" would be more accurately described as an extradition, although there is no extradition treaty between Jakarta and Port Moresby. Salosa had served a short jail term in PNG for illegal possession of arms, and on his release, had been re-arrested on charges of illegal entry. The charge was dropped when it became clear he had entered the country on the invitation of PNG's security forces but three days later, he was "deported". "Deportation" would mean that Salosa committed a crime in PNG for which forcible repatriation was the punishment, but since the charges were dropped, there was no apparent

justification for this. Instead he was taken to the border and immediately taken into custody by the Indonesians, as a criminal - extradited - probably on Indonesian request, for his OPM activities.

International protest

The extradition of Mecky Salosa aroused a storm of protest from international human rights groups. OPM headquarters sent a letter of protest to PNG Prime Minister Rabbi Namaliu accusing PNG of failing to honour human rights and of breaking their own law on political asylum; TAPOL wrote a strongly-worded letter to the prime minister, accusing PNG of condemning Mecky Salosa "...to face certain maltreatment, punishment, or even death..." at the hands of the Indonesians and holding the government responsible for any harm that may befall Salosa. The Anti-

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Slavery Society called on the prime minister to use his good offices to secure Salosa's immediate release. In a letter to Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, the Australian West Papua Association asked the Australian government to seek an explanation of the deportation and its implications for other West Papuan OPM supporters living in PNG. In PNG, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace challenged the PNG government on the legality of Salosa's deportation, pointed out that international solicitors in the PNG Foreign Affairs department had advised against deporting Salosa, and asked why the UN High Commission for Refugees was not involved in the discussion. *

THE 1965 AFFAIR

The 1965 massacres More on US embassy collusion

Kathy Kadane's carefully researched article documenting US collusion in the massacres presided over by General Suharto in late 1965 and early 1966 [see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 100, August 1990] has been challenged in many quarters. Several Indonesian generals have poured scorn on the idea that they needed help from anyone to track down and eliminate hundreds of thousands of communists.

After keeping silent for more than two months, the *New York Times* [12 July 1990] tried to discredit Kadane's claim, in articles in the *Washington Post* and many other US dailies in May this year, that senior US embassy officials were privy to the activities of embassy official Robert Martens who gave some 5,000 names of communists to the Indonesian army, and that they approved of this at a time when the Indonesian army was engaged in a campaign of mass extermination.

Kadane's response has been to make available to many editors in the US transcripts of sections of her interviews to back up her conclusions. [TAPOL also has a copy.] She has placed a copy of her tapes in the National Security Archives, for access by the general public. [*Tempo*, 4 August 1990]

US collusion

There is no disputing the capacity of Indonesian army intelligence to track down communists; the scale of the killings (at least a quarter of a million, even according to the CIA) can hardly have been affected much by the provision of some five thousand names by the US embassy. But US collusion is the point at issue and Kadane has proven this beyond doubt. Her transcripts show that the embassy believed, rightly or wrongly, that their contribution was crucial to the outcome. Her persistent interviewing also showed that the US embassy was pre-occupied during the last quarter of 1965 with the killings and wanted to be certain that the PKI had been physically eliminated.

Proof of US collusion does not rest only with the Kadane

Tapes. Declassified cable traffic between the US embassy and the State Department during the months from 1 October 1965 shows how the embassy aided and abetted the army's death squads. According to an embassy cable to the State Department on 4 November 1965, "DCM [deputy chief of mission, Jack Lydman] made clear that embassy and USG generally sympathetic with and admiring of what army doing". A collection of some of the more revealing cables



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has been circulated, along with a Memo, by Gabriel Kolko, historian and author of *Confronting the Third World: US Foreign Policy 1945-1980*. [Lengthy extracts from his chapter on Indonesia were published in *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 95, October 1989]

Yet, the declassified cables are only part of the story; many cables from the post September 1965 period have not been declassified and as Kolko states in his Memo of 13 August 1990,

All accounts of the US role in the period before September 30 suffer greatly from the fact that the relevant files covering US assessments and policy during July-September 1965 have been closed completely to researchers. I, and other researchers I have consulted, know of no topic or period for the 1945-68 era that has been treated in such a systematic fashion to conceal essential information.

There is, for example, no hint in the cables declassified so far of the covert operation the CIA was engaged in, to which attention has been drawn on many occasions by former CIA agent, Ralph McGehee.

The Embassy's 'who's who' of the PKI

The following excerpts from Kadane's interview of Jack Lydman, deputy chief of the US embassy at the time, give some idea of the activities of US embassy personnel at a time when Suharto's death squads were annihilating the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Talking to Kadane on 14 May 1990, Lydman made no secret of the embassy's support for the army's campaign of extermination:

Lydman: But one thing you do expect is that you're aware, particularly if you're the ambassador or his deputy, that you're aware of all the reporting that's going out of that embassy, because you're in charge of that embassy.

Kadane: I've had some long and very fruitful talks with Bob [Martens] as well as others. He was the PKI expert par excellence, it seems to me [Lydman: Right!] of anyone maybe who ever lived. One of the things he told me he did was fill up many, many, many gaps in the biographical reporting of who was who in the PKI.

Lydman: Yes, I think he did.

Kadane: And it appears also that Joe Lazarsky [deputy CIA station chief at the embassy] and others have said that on occasion, the CIA added some of their information. [Lydman: Yes.]

Kadane: It was a sort of pooled effort. [Lydman: Yeah.]

Kadane: And the names had been sent back to Washington [L: Right.] because there had not really been a clear idea of who were the active members of the party.

Lydman: I think this was true and also that, you know, as this scene developed in Indonesia and undeveloped after the coup itself, a lot of fresh information, new information about personalities came up, that we probably hadn't been aware of before, because a lot of these PKI people at regional level may in fact have been the new names... that we hadn't tracked before. And Bob did a major job in identifying these people.

Kadane: Some have gone so far as to say that he had identified the infrastructure of the PKI, that is to say, the committees --

Lydman: I think he was pretty good at that. [K: Going down to the lower levels.] He probably did more to clarify



PKI building ransacked in 1965.

that than anybody. There is no question about it, he did.

Kadane: Going down to the regional and city organisations, SOBSI [the trade unions], Gerwani [the women's organisation].

Lydman: Oh yes, absolutely. Well, you must remember that there were three and a half million members of PKI and its affiliated organisations. That's a lot of people... It's amazing, the job that Bob and all the people he worked with did. Absolutely remarkable... (A) fantastic job. I don't know of any officer in a time of crisis who performed more brilliantly than Bob Martens.

Kadane: Well, it turned out to be useful, it seems, because one of the things he told me was that these names were disseminated to Kim Adhyatman [aide to Adam Malik] [L: Yes.] who then gave them to Malik and Suharto's people so that they had some way of identifying who these people were.

Lydman: I am sure we helped a great deal in this, that Bob Martens with his analytical mind, probably provided a great service.

Kadane: In addition to that, others have told me that names came back from Suharto from Murtopo who was gathering...

Lydman: Well, Ali (Murtopo) of course was the intelligence chief -- I know of course that there were relations and networking going on on that, but I can't remember how this one came out. I don't know for example who was the principal contact with Ali, whether it was Will Ethel [the US defence attache, now dead] or somebody else.

Kadane: Joe Lazarsky said he met with him quite a bit.

Lydman: I think Joe maybe did and I think maybe Bob too had direct relations with him, it's quite possible. I just can't remember it.

Kadane: Well, Ali was the guy who was in charge of gathering up in Suharto's HQ the names of people who had been caught or killed. [L: Yes.] And those names were then given back [L: Yeah.] to the embassy and -- they were

able to check off those names against Bob's list.

Lydman: I don't remember that exact sequence but it's quite plausible. I did not focus on that. I was not an expert on these [word unclear] at all and had no intention of trying to become one.

Kadane: Well, Ed Masters [chief, political section and third man in the embassy] has said that there was cooperation at the top of the embassy in focusing on this or supervising the whole activity [checking off the names of victims] [L: Oh, yes.] And that you all had discussed -- these names were given out with the agreement of [L: Oh, yes.] the top people of the embassy [L: Oh yes.] And that included you.

Lydman: Oh, absolutely. Oh, yes.

[Later, the New York Times interviewed Lydman on this damning exchange, quoted in Kadane's article. He tried to tone down his remarks to Kadane, saying that this response was "absolutely not what I intended... I certainly wasn't focusing on the impact". The Times saw this as an example of Kadane's 'ambiguity'.

Watching the PKI being 'dismantled'

After Lydman described how reporting at the embassy was coordinated at daily, early morning staff meetings, the exchange went on:

Kadane: So the bottom line is this, it seems to me. Bob Martens and his group in the political section and maybe some of the CIA people were able to -- as a result of the names going out [L: Yeah.] and the names coming back in, were able to report that the organisation of the PKI was being dismantled, over time. Was that right? Do you recall that?

Lydman: Well, I don't recall that but I think it's perfectly plausible.... Of course, we knew that, due to Bob's work. And a lot of other inputs that were coming, and things that we were learning from the Indonesians constantly. We had an idea where the cracks were, and we knew where the fall-outs were, in the PKI. We knew, for example, when the PKI almost collapsed in East Java. We knew when it collapsed in Central Java.

Kadane: Oh, I see. That's fantastic!

Lydman: We knew when Aidit [PKI chairman] was killed and when Njoto [PKI second deputy chairman] was killed. We knew all of this.

Kadane: But you're talking about the main organisation [L: That's right.] when you say, 'It almost collapsed.'

Lydman: Well, the regional structures collapsed.

Kadane: And you knew when that happened.

Lydman: Of course you did. Well, you weren't entirely sure that there weren't still some operating remnants, but you knew that the main infrastructure had collapsed.... Now I don't know how much Bob could follow on what one could call -- uh -- casualty figures and identifications. I think that there was a lot that he could get from the reports that were coming in. But whether you could completely document that process, I rather doubt that, because a lot of these, sort of, local PKI collapses were not that precisely identified as to who the precise casualties were. [K: The names of the individuals?] That's right, these were not all that...

Kadane: You might have, such as, three Gerwani were arrested and executed but you didn't know who the Gerwani were. Is that what you mean by that?

Lydman: Well, that's possible. That's it. Certainly there were a lot of Gerwani who were eliminated and nobody really knew who they were. They just disappeared off the

screen. A lot of PKI did. But the names of the well-known people, I think, Bob managed to track. Well, you talked to him, so he could tell you whether or not he felt that he was tracking --

Kadane: He said he experienced some frustrations. [L: I'm sure he did.] But at the same time others in the embassy have said that over time, they were able to calculate that the infrastructure had been destroyed.

Lydman: I think that that's true. [K: It was not immediate.] I think that that was true. But it took a long time. It took three or four months.

Kadane: Yes, that's right. That's exactly what people have said. [L: They couldn't do it right away.] Well, it took them a while to get to everybody.

Lydman: That's right.

Recording the slaughter

A cable from the US embassy to the State Department on 14 November 1965, of which only the first page has been declassified, includes an account of the killing of some 3,500 people in Kediri, East Java. These are the kind of people who, as Lydman put it, "disappeared off the screen".

2. Slaughter at Kediri [East Java]. American missionary from Baptist Hospital Kediri told us that 3460 (photocopy unclear, could be 3400) PKI activists were killed by Ansor [youth wing of the Muslim Nahdhatul Ulama party] with probable assistance from Marhaenist [nationalist party, PNI] youths over period Nov 4 -- Nov 9. According source, youth leaders had prepared list of victims. After seizing victim concerned, they took him to river banks, where PKI had allegedly prepared mass graves prior Oct 1, and cut his throat. Night of Nov 7, youth groups came to hospital and took away man being treated for throat cut. Hospital personnel tried to save victim, but told if they would not rpt not allow him to be taken away, he would be killed in front of hospital. Source also stated same slaughter took place at Pares, 30 kilometers northeast of Kediri; 300 communists reported killed there.

*A. Armed forces did nothing to stop slaughter and in fact apparently colluded with anti-PKI youths and perhaps instigated them. Col. Welly Soedjono, commander for Madiun-Kediri area, reported by source to have been in Kediri at time and to have told youths he sure they could find more than 3500 communists in Kediri if they really looked. Soedjono reportedly relative one of six murdered generals and press has reported him as giving hard-line anti-PKI briefings various areas his jurisdiction. **



The de-Suharto-ization of Suharto

Drastic changes seem to be occurring in Jakarta. Suharto's speech on 16 August, advocating democracy and pluralism has excited politicians, academics, students and the press. It looks as if the helmsman of the Indonesian state has fired the opening shot towards a new era, an era of democracy. What lies behind these latest moves of the cunning fox?

During the 25 years of Suharto's rule, his style of governing has changed from time to time while the personal aides serving him have also changed. Suharto's most important asset as a dictator is his ability to switch policies, adjust to new situations and anticipate the dangers from opponents, coup threats and so on. Suharto has eschewed rigidity, observing the changes around him and acting accordingly. Most dictators in recent history have fallen because of arrogance of power. This flaw in human nature results in mental flabbiness, making the ruler less alert. Failing to anticipate economic and political developments, many dictators have been swept aside by history. But Suharto is still on top, perhaps even stronger than ever. He has turned the *Orde Baru* regime from a military regime into a regime with a strong Suharto trademark.

From a military regime to a Suharto regime

In 1965, at the beginning of the *Orde Baru*, Suharto needed all the support he could get to seize and consolidate power. The common theme with other groups in the army was hatred for the PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party. A tightly knit group of officers served him brilliantly while his main political rival, the PKI, was obliterated and his group enjoyed the support of the other generals. This kind of military junta did not last long. Already in 1968, civilian groups like the banned political parties, PSI and Masyumi, soon realised they had been misused by the military. The same thing happened with the students; their so-called coalition with ABRI, the armed forces, turned out to be an illusion. The group of generals who became known as the *Orde Baru* radicals, like Dharsono, Kemal Idris and Sarwo



The transformation of Suharto: from military to civilian dictator.

Edhie, were soon in conflict with Suharto who had no intention of going along with their proposal to overhaul the political structures; the destruction of the PKI and the unions was sufficient for the kind of law and order he wanted. Through years of setbacks and achievements, Suharto managed to get rid of every other group of generals.

In 1974 another major clash occurred, this time with the high-profile General Soemitro, the second most powerful man in the country. Soemitro lost the battle, was publicly humiliated and stripped of all his positions. Recently, Soemitro emerged from obscurity to head the conservative wing of army opposition to Suharto. Then in the late 1970s, a powerful new group of dissident generals emerged, known as *FOSKO TNI*, backed by General Widodo, the army chief of staff. The *FOSKO* group was heterogeneous; though powerful as individuals, it did not stand a chance against the determined and ruthless Suharto.

The period of restructuring

His infamous 1980 speeches in Pakanbaru and Cijantung officially ended the consolidation period of his rule. All competing groups of officers were sidestepped and Suharto began the Herculean task of overhauling the political and ideological structures. By 1985 the formal political infrastructure of the country was finalised – all institutions and political entities were standardised, unified and *Pancasila*-ized. The three political parties had to conform to the same set of principles, along with all trade unions, and women and youth organisations. Political restructuring proceeded relatively smoothly; criticism was suppressed by the new generation of officers under General Murdani. The most difficult task now was restructuring the economy.

From an oil to a non-oil economy

Up to 1985 Indonesia was a typical third world country, relying primarily on its natural resources. As a major oil and gas producer, Indonesia's national income relied heavily on these two products. The 1985 slump in oil prices hit Indonesia hard while efforts to develop an economy with a broader base were not entirely successful. Suharto and his team of technocrats paved the way for an export economy which required a major overhaul of the economy. The economy was like a parasite, dependent on oil revenues and foreign aid. In order to boost market forces, many obstacles had to be removed, primarily bureaucratic obstacles and regulations. From 1987 on, deregulatory liberalisation measures were introduced, followed by a boom. For the first time in Indonesian history, accumulation of capital occurred on a large scale. But the government's policy of easy credit for small traders and businessmen was a fiasco and many small ventures collapsed.

The present boom is very different; free range has been

given to huge conglomerates which, together with a number of new banks, have a stranglehold on the economy. From a free-enterprise point of view, the Indonesian economy is functioning well, even becoming overheated. Having got through the restructuring of the economy, Suharto has had to prepare himself for a new era. Let us call it the period of the benefactor.

Suharto, the benefactor?

A comparison is often made with South Korea's emergence as an industrial giant. It took three dictators, Park Chung Hee, the rigid law and order man (Suharto of the seventies), Chun Do Hwan, who streamlined the state apparatus for the take-off to industrialisation (Suharto of the eighties, restructuring the political institutions and economy) and the enlightened dictator, Roh Tae Woo running a flourishing industrial nation (Suharto of the nineties, reducing authoritarian pressures by granting a few freedoms and trying to redistribute wealth). What took Korea three dictators to accomplish, Suharto is determined to do single-handed as Indonesia joins the ranks of industrial nations. A lot has changed in the last 25 years. A snapshot comparison of 1965 and 1990 will reveal stark differences, particularly in the economy. Suharto inherited an economy in tatters, with an inflation rate of 650%. Indonesia now enjoys economic growth of around 7%. The Gulf crisis could boost growth even further though Indonesia's present heavy reliance on the export of manufactured consumer goods could suffer badly from a Gulf-crisis induced world recession. Three years of economic boom have already brought drastic social changes in the big cities. Top corporate managers and bankers appear weekly on the front pages of glossy magazines. The public is exhorted to admire the corporate supremos, a trend noticeable during the days of the 'casino economy' eighties of the US and the UK. The traditional view that getting-rich-quick was only for criminals and corruptors is fading. Success stories of people like Tanri Abeng and Prajogo Pangestu are part of the reality for middle class teenagers. A flood of white collar jobs with the new corporations has created a new class of professionals. More than 10,000 Indonesians are attending courses and classes in the US, many in banking, business administration and computer practice. A new middle class is emerging with lifestyles similar to their counterparts in Tokyo, New York or London.

Four of Suharto's children have joined the ranks of corporate tycoons. In many important business deals, from the building of toll-highways, the media business, shopping centres, petrochemicals, plywood and the clove monopoly, the Suharto kids are up front and always in the news.

But there is a dark side in the story. The swift growth of the conglomerates has created a deep cleavage in society. The gap between rich and poor has never been greater and the big city *sandal-jepit* (the Indonesian sub-class) is growing at an explosive rate. The cynicism and bitterness of the poor is obvious; the new consumer-minded middle class daily parade their wealth in the busy streets of Jakarta. The greed of the Suharto family is a matter of bitter resentment among the emerging middle class. The gossip at cocktail parties in Jakarta is primarily about the wrongdoings of the First Family. There are signs of a new economic stratum, the 'management class', able to take a stand independently of the executive and able to move the economy forward or hold it back. The grip of the First family on the economy is still relatively tight but the development of a free enterprise capitalist society will

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Members of the elite club: Pangestu Prayogo with Ibu Tien and her eldest daughter, Mbak Tutut.

create new relations between the corporate class and the executive.

The first signs of 'corporate independence' emerged when Suharto came up with his master-stroke to instruct the major conglomerates to hand over 25% of their shares to cooperatives. This gesture caught the headlines for weeks, but the 31 tycoons summoned to Suharto's Tapos ranch were only prepared to offer 1% of their shares. Interest in this gesture has faded and it is doubtful whether it has in the end made Suharto more popular.

The Bank Duta fiasco

The Bank Duta crash could have quite an impact on Suharto in the next few months. Bank Duta is one of the chief economic pillars of Suharto's empire. Seventy-five per cent of the shares are held by three foundations, Yayasan Supersemar, Yayasan Dharmais and Yayasan Dakab, all chaired by Suharto. Through them Suharto channels his charitable largesse and, where necessary, buys loyalties from individuals and organisations.

In September, the news broke that Bank Duta had collapsed due to mismanagement, speculation and corruption. In a flash, Suharto sacked the entire board of directors, including president-commissioner General Bustanil Arifin. Arifin, the Minister of Cooperatives, is a close Suharto trusty, a member of the Family and for many years has been in charge of the State Logistics Board. The Bank is said to have lost \$200 million in foreign currency speculation though commentators believe this is just the tip of the iceberg. A rescue has been mounted by Radius Prawiro, the financial supremo, who was appointed to replace Bustanil Arifin. The scandal is the topic of the day and comparisons are already being made with the 1974 Pertamina debacle when \$10,000 million was lost. One newspaper even believes that "nothing less than the New Order's credibility is at stake." [*Jakarta Post*, 15.9.1990]

Political reform

It has been argued in several seminars recently that new openings in the economy should be accompanied by a political thaw. Economic democracy should go hand in hand with political democracy. It could be argued that at present, the government is less heavy-handed than before. The PPP conference in 1989 was allowed to choose its own board and chairman. A more recent example is the conflict within IKADIN (Indonesian Lawyers Association) ended in humiliating defeat for the group endorsed by the Minister of Justice, General Ismael Saleh. The apparent relaxation for the press is another indication. The most recent thaw came with the announcement by Home Minister General Rudini and Coordinating Minister Admiral Sudomo that the press was permitted to mention the 'Group of 50' (now 58). This green light led several papers to give front page headlines to members of the Group when they greeted General Dharsono, the country's best-known dissident, when he was released from prison.

It is arguable whether the new political openings are

really meant to last. It is undeniably true that Suharto is gradually losing his grip on sections of the armed forces and sections of Golkar, the two pillars of his rule. The present political openings could well be the result of bickering at the top, but they do give more leeway for reforms. Some argue that Suharto is still in control and is planning to make more economic and political openings. It is argued that in Suharto's cunning calculation, the current power pyramid could easily lead to his downfall, following in the footsteps of Nicolai Ceausescu and Samuel Doe. Suharto has probably been observing the low profile taken by General Chatichai Choonhavan of Thailand, where free enterprise has become the credo of the nation. But he is still far removed from Chatichai's posture and many doubt whether Suharto genuinely wants to pave the way to a more democratic society.

The best way for him to preserve his empire, the wealth the Family acquired over the years, is the de-Suharto-ization of himself. The process of dismantling 'Suharto' by Suharto means a gradual shift towards image change. But knowing his capacity for cunning, his is unlikely to allow the pro-democracy movement to push things too far. *

HUMAN RIGHTS

Tinkering with human rights

In his Proclamation Day speech on 16 August, President Suharto spoke about the need for more open dialogue. "There is no need to fear differences of opinion", he said, arguing that with the state ideology, Pancasila, now firmly established as the sole ideology, there was room for differences of opinion to emerge. He even spoke about the need "to promote human rights", adding that this should not be interpreted as referring to "the rights of individuals which ignore the interests of society, the nation and the state".

The mention of human rights has set commentators wondering whether the Suharto regime is about to pursue a policy of openness, raising hopes that human rights abuses will now be on the political agenda. However, recent developments do not encourage these hopes.

Strike ban lifted?

The first hint of some rights being restored came with an announcement from Manpower Minister Cosmos Batubara that a 1963 decree banning strikes has been repealed. This led to press reports asserting that the ban on strikes has been lifted. Yet Batubara was quick to add that this did not mean that workers could now go on strike. He said Pancasila Industrial Relations have not been abandoned, which means that disputes must be resolved by consultation and consensus, not by strikes. [*Kompas*, 28 August 1990]

The strike ban which Batubara lifted was contained in presidential decision No 123 of 1963 outlawing strikes at 'vital government projects'. Lifting the ban makes no difference since these projects have long been completed.

A lawyer experienced in the operation of Indonesia's labour laws said the latest decision would make no difference to workers' rights. Syaniar Mahnida said that even though there is now no law or decree banning strikes, a

1957 law still in force makes it virtually impossible for workers to go on strike. They are required by law to explain in writing to their employers and to the regional board for the resolution of labour disputes their reason for planning strike action; they must also confirm that they have had negotiations. She said one-day strikes often occur but not all-out strikes in the meaning of the law. [*Kompas*, 31 August 1990]

The decision to lift the 1963 ban is almost certainly the result of pressure from the US where the AFL\CIO has for years argued that labour laws in Indonesia are an obstacle to continuing GSP [Generalised System of Preferences] status for Indonesian goods. A government delegation was recently in Washington for discussions with members of Congress about workers' rights. As if to curry favour with world opinion and protect foreign trade, Batubara claimed that revoking the 1963 ban is proof that "Indonesia respects universal workers' rights". [*Editor*, 8.9.1990]

Censorship relaxed?

Admiral Sudomo, Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs recently said that from now on, there will be no more inking out of items in publications from overseas. He admitted that the practice only makes people curious to find out what has been censored which can then

be photocopied and circulated.

Sudomo also promised an end to what has become known as the 'telephone culture', the system whereby officials from the Information Department or the security forces phone editors with 'advice' on what not to publish.

Information Minister Harmoko did not share Sudomo's enthusiasm for greater press freedom. For him, the 'telephone culture' (described by *Tempo* as "almost 100% effective"), is a form of "interaction" between the government and the press. "We don't practice censorship," he declared, adding, "We don't need it as the press has learned to censor itself."

Press coverage of the Sudomo promise was sceptical. One weekly referred to laws and regulations which prohibit the publication of information deemed to be in conflict with Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, government policy and anything considered as "disrupting public order". The head of public relations at the Public Prosecutor's Office said a 'clearing house' of officials from BAKIN and BAIS (the two intelligence agencies) and the Department of Information, examines what print material may and may not be circulated in Indonesia. The armed forces public relations chief, Brig. Gen. Nurhadi Purwosaputro was more blunt: "As long as the regulations in force have not been repealed, censorship will continue." [*Tempo*, 1 September]

Pages 17 and 18 of a mid-August issue of *The Economist* with an article about Suharto's relations with the new army commanders, had been torn out, and a similar item was removed from a recent issue of the Hong Kong-based *Far Eastern Economic Review*.

Unreported events

At least two recent incidents have not been reported anywhere in the Indonesian press. They are:

* A demonstration of dozens of young people outside the presidential palace on 17 August carrying banners calling for an end to the Suharto presidency, an end to nepotism and the introduction of democratic rights.

* A pro-independence demonstration in Dili on 4 September, at the end of a Catholic Mass attended by tens of thousands of people [see separate item]. *

Re-examining the ex-tapols...again!

Two years before Indonesia next goes to the polls, more than 1.4 million 'ex-PKI' suspects are to undergo re-investigation to determine their fitness to take part in the country's 'Festival of Democracy'. As we pointed out two issues ago [*TAPOL Bulletin* No. 99, June 1990], the government announcement in February that restrictions on 'ex-PKI' enfranchisement would be lifted was nothing more than a smoke-screen.

All people classified as A, B or C1, C2 and C3 will be investigated starting September this year. An idea of how the system will work nation-wide has been given by the authorities in East Java, where 461,500 people will be re-examined. The examination will take place at the village level and the results will be passed up through the various levels of regional government to the regional stability agency, *Bakorstanasda* (of which the regional military commander is chair), and thence to the provincial governor, the Minister of the Interior and the General Elections Institute (LBU).

TWO BOOKS ON 1965 BANNED

Two weeks after Singgih, the newly-appointed Attorney-General took office (following the sudden death of the previous incumbent), he announced that four more books have been banned. Two of the books are about the events of 1965 which brought Suharto to power.

One is the Indonesian translation of an article by Peter Dale Scott, arguing that Suharto was responsible for the so-called abortive coup of 1 October 1965. Dale Scott also produced evidence that financial links between major US companies like Lockheed and Indonesia's former president, Sukarno, were switched to the Suharto group some time before the October 1965 events, indicating that circles in the US were promoting his plans to seize power. The article, entitled "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967" was published in *Pacific Affairs* Vol.58, No. 2, Summer 1985.

The other banned 1965 book is *The Devious Dalang, Sukarno and the So-called Untung Putsch* which contains the alleged verbatim record of the interrogation of a former personal aide of the late President Sukarno, Colonel Bambang S. Widjanarko, implicating Sukarno in the October 1965 affair. The authenticity of the verbatim record has long been challenged in the Netherlands, where the book was first published. Colonel Widjanarko has also condemned the book as a fraud and has since published his own memoirs about his period of service with Sukarno.

The two other books outlawed are press clipping collections by Petrus Bambang Siswoyo. *Heboh Ayat-Ayat Setan* covers the response in the Indonesian press to Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*, while *Geger Lampung dan Kaum Sempalan* collates press reporting on the Lampung atrocity in February 1989. Siswoyo has published many collections of press clippings about important incidents, all of which have been banned. *

The fact that a 'PKI suspect' was permitted to vote in a previous election is not taken into account. "If there are indications that the person has not complied with the provisions, the fact that she/he could vote last time round will be re-considered," said Hari Sugiman, social and political affairs chief at the Interior Department. The national and regional agencies in charge of re-screening 'PKI' suspects' include the police force, the public prosecutor's office and *Bakorstanasda*.

While the new *litsus* regulation places ideological control in the hands of government departments, control over 'PKI suspects' remains in the hands of the army's national stability agency. What it boils down to is that the general elections have become the pretext for the security forces to carry out five-yearly screening of anyone suspected of PKI membership or sympathies dating back 25 years.

Source: *Jawa Pos* 31.8.1990 and *Surabaya Post*, 29.8.1990.

Meanwhile, simultaneously with the start of the screening of 'ex-PKI' in East Java, the *litsus* investigation of

Continued on p.19

Campus life to be liberalised?

A government attempt to pacify students who have for years been shackled by a ban on democratically-elected student bodies has boomeranged. In August the government announced a new regulation on student senates, presenting this as a move allowing the existence of bodies "of the students, for the students and by the students". But the new policy has already been widely rejected.

The regulation will replace the policy introduced in 1978, after student unrest, when the government enacted its Normalisation of Campus Life (NKK), outlawing political activities on campus, banning the existence of democratically-elected students councils and placing all student bodies under the control of the university administration.



The regulation provides for student senates to be set up at university level (at present they are only permitted at faculty level), composed of a variety of student bodies on campus. In effect, the senates will only coordinate the activities and interests of disparate bodies and not be representative at all. Moreover, the senates will still be under the university administration, with responsibility for their activities in the hands of the rector.

Rejected by students

Already several representative meetings of students have condemned the new regulation as the old policy dressed up in new clothes. The first to come out against the policy was the Communications Forum of Student Senates at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta, which issued a statement signed by all but two of the persons chairing the various faculty senates. [*Kompas*, 24.8.1990] A few days after the statement had been widely reported in the press, a 'correction' was circulated by the university, alleging that the statement was not legitimate because it had not been cleared with the rector. [*Kompas*, 27.8.1990]

At Pajajaran University, Bandung, eleven senates also condemned the regulation for failing "to accommodate (the principle of) student independence" and as "a government attempt at political manipulation". [*Kompas*, 29.8.1990]

Hariman Siregar, a 1978 student leader, called the new policy "irrelevant". It is not for government to regulate student organisations. "There is no need for government interference. Students should be left to set up bodies as they wish." Harsh words also came from Koekeritsz (Ondos), a student of the Bandung Institute of Technology who went on hunger-strike last year in protest against expulsions of many ITB students in August. "Students may elect members of these (new) senates yet supreme control is with the rector. So, what about the students' right to control things?" He saw the new move as proof that "the government is afraid of students becoming political". [*Kompas*, 8.8.1990]*

Move to Nusakambangan reversed

At the beginning of September, eight students serving prison sentences in Bandung and Yogyakarta were secretly moved from their prisons late at night and transferred to the notorious Nusakambangan Prison Island in Central Java. News of the transfer aroused a storm of protest. The prisoners in Bandung were removed so quickly that they had no time to take a change of clothing or a toothbrush. Neither their lawyers nor their families knew anything about the move. Student colleagues in Bandung quickly took solidarity action, demanding the return of the prisoners to Kebon Waru Prison. The two Yogyakarta students were hand-cuffed for the transfer.

The Bandung students are from the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) and were sentenced to three years each for participating in a protest against a visit to their campus

by Interior Minister, General Rudini on 5 August 1989. [*See TAPOL Bulletin* No. 98, April 1990] Their sentences have now been upheld by the Supreme Court. The two from Yogyakarta, Bambang Subomo and Bambang Isti Nugroho, are serving seven years and eight years for possessing leftwing literature and being members of a study group. Their sentences have also been upheld by the appeal courts.

News of the transfer provoked such angry reactions that a senior prison official at the Justice Department, Baharuddin Lopa, ordered the immediate return of the students. He said Nusakambangan is intended for convicted prisoners serving more than five years. In any case, only so-called 'high security prisoners' are supposed to be sent to Nusakambangan, although as a deterrent, the government announced some time ago that people charged for corrup-

tion under the subversion law would have to serve their sentences there. Located off the south coast of Central Java, Nusakambangan was used to hold thousands of communist suspects held without trial, after the 1965 crackdown.

No official explanation for the move has been forthcoming though the prison official in charge of the transfer from Bandung alleged that the six were involved in scuffles inside Kebon Waru Prison and were responsible for the destruction of prison furniture. According to our sources, Arnold Purba told friends that he caused a fracas in prison, as a protest because prisoners were getting food worth Rp. 900 a day, instead of the Rp. 1,350 allocated. Another possible explanation is that at Kebon Waru, they maintained close links with their student colleagues outside. According to one source, the transfer was a warning to students outside, as opposition to the new government regulation on student senates gathers pace.

More than a dozen students from the Coordination Body of Jakarta Students, went to Parliament to call on MPs to take action to reverse the move.

The return of the prisoners is undoubtedly a victory, but the six in Bandung have not been returned to their original prison where visiting conditions were quite lax, but have been split into two groups in separate prisons. The where-

abouts of the Yogyakarta students following their return from Nusakambangan is not known.

Who gave the order?

Although the transfer was quickly reversed, the incident has become a topic of great speculation. Initially, it was assumed that the Justice Minister, Ismail Saleh had secretly issued the order. Later, more persistent reports suggest that the military command in Bandung, under orders from *Bakorstanas* in Jakarta, was behind the move. Whatever the motive, a cover-up is now under way. A Justice Department official in Yogyakarta has claimed that the decision to move the two Bambang happened quite independently; it was 'pure coincidence' that it happened on the same night. Colleagues of the prisoners say that *Bakorstanasda* is responsible for issuing permits if the prisoners want to make short home visits. This means that the army most probably ordered their transfer but now refuses to say why.

On 18 September, students in Jakarta made a second visit to Parliament demanding a full investigation. *

A trial about books and talks

The trial of the Yogyakarta student activist, **Bonar Tigor Naipospos**, known to his friends as Coki, who faces charges of subversion, shows the prosecution in a belligerent mood over the books he read, borrowed or lent and the articles he used as topics for discussion in seminars and study group meetings. There is nothing else of substance in the case.

At an early hearing, the judges ordered one of the defence lawyers, J.C. Princen to withdraw from the defence team as he was registered as a lawyer only in Jakarta.

The prosecution called as witnesses colleagues of the accused in the Palagan Study Group, including the two Bambang who are now serving heavy sentences for similar 'crimes'. (Bambang Subono refused to testify because of ill-health.) Coki had no objection to most of this evidence. What for the accused is normal intellectual activity is being dished up by the prosecution as a dangerous act of subversion. Some prosecution evidence has been pretty ineffectual. Take the writer and essayist Emha Ainun Najib, called by the prosecution. He spoke of discussions on several topics which the accused had attended but he, Emha, could not recollect much about him. He referred to a discussion at the Hatta Foundation Library in Yogyakarta on the topic of nationalism. "In my opinion, what (the accused) said was nothing out of the ordinary, much like what the other students said." [*Kompas*, 25.8.1990]

Commenting on published articles used by the accused in discussion groups, Coki asked, why, if he was being accused for using the articles, were the writers not in the dock as well?

Another prosecution witness was Hasyim Rahman, a director of Hasta Mitra, the company which publishes the works of Pramoedya Ananta Toer. He denied ever meeting either Coki or Bambang Subono. The most he could say

was that he had 'answered an inquiry from Bambang Subono about books'. [*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 21.8.1990]



Bonar Tigor Naipospos (right) with his two comrades-in-arms, Bambang Isti Nugroho (left) and Bambang Subono.

While no limit was placed on the number of prosecution witnesses, the court would allow only 5 out of 18 defence witnesses to appear. Three were lecturers in political science at Gadjah Mada University who all testified that the study group discussions were useful as a way of broadening people's outlooks. One, the dean of the social and political sciences faculty, told the court the accused played an active role in campus life and was above average as a student.

One wonders what sentence the prosecution will demand, on the basis of such a flimsy case. *

UN resolution on human rights

For the second year running, on 30 August, the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities adopted a resolution on East Timor. Noting an international situation "conducive to dialogue and negotiations as the most adequate means of resolving local, national and inter-state disputes", considering "that the people of East Timor continue to be subjected to gross violations of human rights", and regretting "restrictions imposed by the local military authorities upon the activities of specialised non-governmental organisations", the Sub-Commission:

1. **Welcomes** and encourages the exercise by the Secretary-General of his good offices as mandated by General Assembly resolution 37/30 of 23 November 1982 with a view to exploring the avenues for finding a comprehensive solution to the problem of East Timor.
2. **Requests** the Indonesian authorities to facilitate the access to the territory of international humanitarian and development organisations.
3. **Appeals** to all sides to exercise restraint and, guided by the spirit of dialogue and negotiations, to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in the exercise of his good offices with a view to finding a durable settlement of the conflict.
4. **Recommends** to the Commission that it consider, at its forty-seventh session, the situation pertaining to human rights and fundamental freedoms in East Timor and to this purpose asks the Secretariat to transmit to the Commission all the reliable information received.

Point 4 contains the most important addition to previous UN resolutions. Readers who obtain any well-documented information about human rights abuses in East Timor should send it to the UN Secretariat in Geneva, UN Office at Geneva, Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva, Switzerland.

Despite frantic lobbying by Indonesian diplomats who attended the session as observers, the Sub-Commission which is composed of 26 independent experts from all over the world, adopted the resolution by 14 votes to 9, with 1 abstention, two votes more in favour than last year. The breakdown of the voting is not known as the decision was adopted by secret ballot.

Socialist International Resolution

The Socialist International Council Meeting, held in Cairo on 22-23 May this year, adopted the following resolution on East Timor:


East Timor remains an internationally unsolved problem. The occupation of East Timor has been condemned not only by the United Nations General Assembly Security Council but by many other international organisations.

Human rights are daily violated: arbitrary imprisonment, deportation, forced resettlement, torture, summary executions, the absence of the right of association and of freedom of expression.

The Final Declaration of the Dublin EEC Foreign Ministers meeting last February recalls again the "disquieting reports of human rights violations" in East Timor.

The Socialist International condemns the continuing violation of human rights and the destruction of the cultural identity of the people of East Timor.

The Socialist International supports the right of self-determination of the people of East Timor. *



*Jose Ramos Horta:
persistent East Timorese lobbyist at UN.*



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Testimony from refugees

Several Timorese refugees, from Portugal and Australia, were in Geneva to give testimony at the UN human rights sub-commission. Among them was Eduardo da Costa who left East Timor in June this year with the help of the International Red Cross. From Melbourne, Emilia Pires, president of the Timorese Association of Victoria, was also present.

Eduardo da Costa's experiences since the Indonesian invasion have been bitter and painful:

* As a soldier in the Portuguese army, he fled to the mountains when the invasion took place but was captured, along with his parents and three sisters, in 1979.

* His sisters were raped by Indonesian soldiers and he was forced to serve the troops as a bearer and a spy.

* On a visit to Ainaro in 1982, he saw twenty persons being killed, among them a close friend whose widow was later raped. Another friend's body was dragged round the town behind an army vehicle and later burnt.

* Horrified by what he saw, he joined an underground group but was caught in August 1983 along with about five hundred others.

* After interrogation and torture in Bali, all the captives were returned to a prison in Dili; two colleagues had died from the maltreatment which included electric shocks, cigarette burns on the genitals and beatings.

* On 2 March 1984, he was tried with 42 others. The trial was a farce; the defendants were told to answer all questions only with one word, 'Yes'. He was sentenced to seven years and transferred to Cipinang Prison, Jakarta, to serve the sentence there.

* On 11 March 1988, he was returned to a prison in Dili. On two occasions, 7 April and 8 June that year, foreign

journalists visited the prison. The first time, he was afraid to say anything because the German journalist was surrounded by intelligence officers, yet even so, he was later beaten. On the second occasion, he was removed from the prison to avoid meeting an Australian journalist.

* After his release on 11 July 1988, he continued to witness gross violations and his home was checked three times a week by troops. He was refused permission to return home to Alas to visit his parents whom he had not seen for seven years.

* In conclusion, he told the Sub-Commission that his village of Debu-Ain of about a thousand inhabitants, has been completely destroyed; the survivors now live in new villages built according to the Indonesian army's orders.

Why no sanctions against Jakarta?

Emilia Pires spoke under the item concerning South Africa, commenting on a report about sanctions. She noted that sanctions had played a major role in forcing the white minority to rethink its policies. The imposition of sanctions against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait was also essential.

*It is only regrettable that in the past and in other circumstances, the major industrial powers did not take swift and effective measures that would have discouraged other aggressions... (The invasion and occupation of East Timor, though condemned by the UN Security Council, were not followed by punitive measures that would have encouraged Indonesia to desist from further aggression. **

Indonesia under pressure

For the first time ever, a human rights activist came to Geneva from Indonesia to condemn human rights violations at home. Jaka Gumilar is an activist from the forestry conservation network, SKEPHI, and the new human rights organisation, INFIGHT. Besides speaking in Geneva, he was also interviewed by the media. We also reproduce an interview he gave to Radio Netherlands programme, Suara Maluku.

Speaking under the item agenda, on 'the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights', Gumilar said:

Basic human rights are violated through the enactment of unjust laws restricting the right to organise, the right of assembly, freedom of speech, and the right to decent social services. These rights are systematically violated by an apparatus of repression, with laws that exclude people's participation and benefit the ruling powers. A false consciousness has been created, based not on an awareness of

rights but only on obedience and duty. The militarisation of society has resulted in rigidity and authoritarianism, producing a system that is bureaucratic, repressive and fascist.

Referring in particular to the infringement of people's collective and traditional rights, Gumilar said Javanese transmigrants' homes and coffee plantations had been burnt down in Pulau Panggung, South Sumatra, peasants in Cibodas, West Java were defending their land from being converted into a golf-course, and similar struggles were taking

HUMAN RIGHTS



Haji "Poncke" Princen, staunch defender of human rights in Indonesia.

factory on their land, were tried and given 6-month sentences. In July this year, hundreds of peasants, most of them elderly women, were fired upon by troops when they tried to re-occupy land which was illegally seized 23 years ago.

He also spoke about the violation of land rights by the World Bank-funded Kedung Ombo dam and urged the sub-commission to study this case as part of a general study it has undertaken regarding human rights violations resulting from World Bank practices.

Along with the victims of these abuses, human rights activists, many of them students, are intimidated, beaten and taken to court for defending the rights of oppressed peasants. These included the six Bandung Institute of Technology students sentenced to three years earlier this year and to the two Bambang in Yogyakarta now serving seven- and eight-year sentences for participating in study groups to discuss the rights protected in the International

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In conclusion, he said:

This is what our rulers call DEMOKRASI PANCASILA... This is a 'democracy' where exercising basic rights like freedom of thought and free speech lands you in prison!

Persecution of ex-tapols condemned

Another submission at the Sub-Commission drew attention to the violation of the civil rights of former, allegedly communist political prisoners. It was, said Jusfiq Hadjar, the fourth time this question has been raised with the UN in Geneva. Conditions for these victims had not improved; on the contrary, a new regulation issued in July this year [see separate item on page 16] had further broadened the scope of these abuses. Said Hadjar, who is an activist of the Netherlands-based Movement for Basic Human Rights in Indonesia:

As things now stand, one does not even have to be suspected of having been a member (or the relative of a member) of the PKI (banned since 1966) to be said now to be 'under its influence'. One does not need to have read a single line of Marx, Lenin, Gramsci, Mao, Guevara, Castro or whoever, to be labelled a communist in Indonesia. All you need do is express criticism of the government to get the label and lose your rights.

He told the Sub-commission that an Indonesian diplomat present at the session had warned himself and the other Indonesian present that if they "continue to support the East Timorese cause, our passports will be withdrawn". Hadjar called on the Sub-Commission:

1. to rehabilitate unconditionally all those who are suspected as communists or suspected of being under alleged communist influence, and
2. to end the witch-hunt.

Princen again prevented from attending

Indonesia's foremost human rights activist, Haji J.C Princen was once again prevented from leaving Indonesia to attend the 1990 session of the UN human rights sub-commission. He had been accredited to attend by the Manila-based Regional Council for Human Rights in Southeast Asia. *

INTERVIEW

INFIGHT explained

The following is Gumilar's interview on *Suara Maluku*:

There are various human rights bodies in Indonesia, the Legal Aid Institute and others, working on human rights. What do you in Infight think about them?

They have done far less recently than before, very little of substance, to defend human rights. This is why we decided to set up Infight. Take for instance, INGI [International NGO Forum on Indonesia] which was set up by 13 large NGOs. They said they wanted to take a critical look at IGGI aid to Indonesia. But they have never gone so far as to raise human rights issues. They've held five annual meetings so far but not once have they discussed issues like political prisoners, the rights of minority peoples, the Lampung Affair, Tanjung Priok and East Timor.

The Legal Aid Institute is well known as an NGO that defends human rights. But I've not seen them defending PKI people, West Papuans and others. Is that true?

Some of these cases were defended by the late Yap Thiam Hien. He took on these cases as defence lawyer, and did so quite

fearlessly. But such things haven't happening recently. I refer not only to people like communists but also to Muslim fundamentalists, West Papuans, East Timorese and so on.

What is the composition of Infight?

One component consists of NGOs like the forestry conservation organisation, SKEPHI, Princen's Institute for the Defence of Human Rights, and others. Another consists of student and non-student activists in Bandung, Jakarta, Central and East Java, and now also in Bali. These people staunchly defend the human rights of many groups. The third component consists of basic groups, peasants and others in the countryside, whose land and other rights are being violated.

The people we know best are Buyung Nasution and Mochtar Lubis. What do they think about Infight?

I don't know but what I do know is that there is a lot of competition between NGOs, especially in Jakarta. What I find strange is that they compete not about who can best defend human rights but about political interests, personal interests and about money. Their behaviour is little better than the law of the jungle. They try to discredit groups we helped form, asserting that we have strong links with the Left in Europe. They say this everywhere, to discredit us. The effect is also to divert funds that might come our way. This is unfair and wrong. If we are supposed to be fighting for democracy, surely we should cooperate with people of different outlooks. I don't know whether the people who originally set INGI up go along with all this.

Does Infight have an ideology of its own?

We avoid this because it would narrow our appeal and close us off from other groups. We don't have a political line; our attitude in fighting for human rights must be open-minded and universal. We want to defend the rights of everyone, regardless of their beliefs, political convictions or whatever.

You are, I believe, the first Indonesian with an Indonesian passport to have spoken at a UN human rights commission in Geneva and attacked Indonesia. Do you think you will be able to return home?

First, a correction. I went to Geneva not to attack Indonesia. That's a negative approach. What I tried to do was to give the facts. What we feel we must do is speak out, speak the truth and be prepared to take the consequences. If the government sees this as condemnation, so be it. I went to Geneva to talk about things that have actually happened.

What did you talk about in Geneva?

I spoke under Item 8 about Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. I spoke about traditional rights and about the political rights of activists who have defended the rights of others. What do I mean by traditional rights? In Indonesia, there are various types of law related to the means of production of the peasants, in particular, land. There are various kinds of traditional law, known in some places as *ulayat*; in other places they go by a different name. These laws perform a specific function, and should be fully respected. But the government never takes such things into account. When it wants to take people's land, it just drives the occupants off and tells them to transmigrate. Often it gives compensation far below the value of the land. Under traditional law, these people have a very strong legal case. Things owned under traditional law are usually owned collectively. There is also village land which is cultivated by village communes, not by individuals.

What was the reaction in Geneva?

Though they didn't say so explicitly, it was obvious that Indonesian embassy people were not at all happy with what I did. In discussions with me, they used arguments which I candidly regard as threats. But I stuck to the principle that what I was saying is true. I know this means taking risks, but there's no struggle without risks. For instance - this was before I had spoken - they apparently thought I would say something about East Timor, so they said: "You'd better not say anything about East Timor. It's a very sensitive question. If you talk about that, you run the risk of not being able to return home."

What are your hopes for the future?

There is more space for democratic activity in Indonesia today than before. No doubt this is primarily because of international developments and also because of pressures from the outside. The Portuguese ambassador in Geneva told me the US has begun to press Indonesia to respect human rights. So we want to work much more energetically to bring about democratic change in Indonesia. I think the greater space internally and pressure from abroad means that our friends overseas who are concerned about democratic rights in Indonesia should take advantage of all this.

*

"I'm going back to my home village. I've had enough of this terrible city life. Street hawkers are being squeezed out by conglomerates!"

"But I want to go to the city. A farmer's life is wretched. The land is grabbed for all kinds of projects.....!"



Pikiran Rakyat 11 May 1990

"Clean environment" out! "Under the influence of" in!

New regulations have been adopted by the military authorities regarding the screening and supervision of alleged 'communist suspects'. The regulations now affect not only persons alleged to have been involved in the 'G30S/PKI' or to have 'fallen under the influence' of such people, but also people alleged to be involved in other kinds of activities which conflict with Pancasila, the Constitution, the state and the government'.

The 'G30S/PKI' label is used for many millions of Indonesians deemed to have been members or sympathisers of the PKI or the many mass organisations outlawed in 1965. The regime alleges that the PKI was responsible for the 30 September 1965 Movement known as the G30S. Hence, by association, all these millions are deemed to have been 'involved' [*terlibat*] in the G30S. When making the new regulations public, several senior army officers stressed that the authorities had so far been able to track down 'only 2 million' (according to some accounts, 'only 1.6 million') of the 20 million people who were in the PKI or related mass organisations, so another 18 million must still be found. [Jakarta Post, 20 July 1990]



General Try Sutrisno -- ABRI Commander in Chief and Bakorstanas chief (right).

Casting the net even wider

The new regulations revise some aspects of the anti-PKI persecution measures in force since Suharto came to power in 1965. General Try Sutrisno, chair of Bakorstanas, the Coordinating Body for Maintaining National Stability which is responsible for drafting and implementing the new

regulations, said:

* The concepts of 'clean self' (*bersih diri*) and 'clean environment' (*bersih lingkungan*) which caused so much confusion, have now been scrapped and all suspects will be investigated 'case-by-case', regardless of their family connections;

* A new concept has been devised, namely 'under the influence of' (*keterpengaruhan*). People would now be checked for their *keterlibatan* ('involvement') in the G30S/PKI or their *keterpengaruhan*;

* Screening would no longer be called 'screening' (the English word has until now been used) but would be called 'special investigation' (*penelitian khusus*), abbreviated to *litsus*;

* 'Special investigations' would now be conducted not by the security agency (*Kopkamtib* in the days before *Bakorstanas*) but by heads of government departments and other government offices. All employees would be affected, some 3.6 million people in all. Departmental heads would also be responsible for screening people within their sphere of interest (lawyers in the case of the Justice Department, journalists in the case of the Information Department, teachers in the case of the Education and Culture Department and so on) as well as the relevant professional bodies;

* Although *Kopkamtib* regulations have now been repealed, its decision regarding the classification of communist suspects as A, B or C category still apply.

The following extracts are taken from the official English translation of the *Bakorstanas* press release issued on 19 July 1990, on the occasion of a meeting of *litsus* officials from all government departments. The release is an elucidation of Presidential Decision No 16, 1990 of 17 April 1990 and contains an implementary instruction issued by *Bakorstanas* in July. It says that special investigation would be conducted

to determine the degree of loyalty and obedience... (and would) include studying different aspects of an individual's personal character, that is, his/her life history, attitude, activities, opinions and the influence G30S/PKI has had on him/her. Should evidence be obtained that indicates G30S/PKI involvement or influence, further steps will be

arranged by the relevant Bakorstanas-related units. Also, should the special investigation reveal indicators of any influence by any other kinds of activities which conflict with Pancasila, the Constitution, the state and the government, sanctions will be applied as specified in the relevant laws and regulations....

Basically, all humans are affected by those with whom they interact in their environment. For this reason, a Special Review [litsus] of each civil servant will be undertaken to check for interaction with persons involved in the G30S/PKI incident and with supporters of communism, as such interaction can influence a person's own attitude, opinions and way of thinking such that an overall negative influence is effected on his/her sense of loyalty and obedience to Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, State and Government.

Basically, any person who has at any time through speech, action or writing an attitude or belief, expressed favour for the one-time PKI, for participants in the G30S/PKI or for the political convictions and strategies of the PKI or the G30S/PKI incident can be said to be involved in the G30S/PKI.

Alarm

Although standard reaction in Indonesia to official pronouncements against communists is usually enthusiastic, the new regulation has alarmed many people. The chief of the Civil Service Administration Board wanted to know whether all the millions of civil servants would now have to be 're-screened'. The answer apparently is that screening will apply to job applicants and government employees about to be promoted. The three parliamentary political groups fear that the new regulation could act as a 'stone-wall' against freedom of thought. [They ignore the fact that the old one did precisely that, for anyone suspected of leftwing views.]

The weekly *Editor* warned that being related to ex-communists or having oneself been involved during the G30S or during the 'epilogue' was no longer the only issue. People born after 1965 could now be suspect; moreover, the 'epilogue' of the G30S now stretches to the present day. The weekly pressed Colonel Saleh, chief Bakorstanas officer for screening, to say what would happen about people who study Marxism. "They can study it at a library for purposes of comparison. But afterwards we will check to see whether they have been influenced." What about Bambang Isti Nugroho, sentenced to 8 years for reading the books of Pramoedya Ananta Toer? When he has served his sentence, will he then be considered 'clean'? "In legal terms, yes, but ideologically, no," said Saleh. Would this be for life? "Not necessarily, unlike people who have been classified as a B-category prisoner [tens of thousands of political prisoners were given this classification after 1965, meaning that they were deemed to have been indirectly involved in the G30S but never tried for lack of evidence]. The B-category will stick with them whatever they do."

Saleh said the first stage of screening would be a 'clearance test' [English term used] followed by an interview. "In making our assessment, we will not just consider whether the answers are right or wrong but discover why people answer as they do. If they say it's because of their father, we will have to find out more about the father. Maybe he was away from home from 1965 till 1970, so we will have to investigate whether he was 'involved'. That's when we classify the person as have been 'influenced'. [Editor, 28 July]

A young women, identified only as 'Sisha', told *Editor*

that her father had been classified as 'PKI'. "The new regulation makes no difference; I will still be classified as Group III [a new expression; perhaps she meant C3], meaning you've been influenced by the G30S/PKI after the event (in the epilogue). That's why I'm just a housewife and have no intention of becoming a civil servant." Couldn't she apply for a job in the private sector? "If company managers are afraid to take on people like me, I will never get a job."

So how does General Try Sutrisno explain it all? Asked by *Editor* how 'influence' can be measured, he said: "No problem! There will be methods and criteria. If children at school get poor marks, they don't go up.... It's just a question of maintaining vigilance." What about a young fellow who reads and keeps communist books; would he be suspect? "This depends on whether he discusses it with others. We can't afford to be careless, so books like this will continue to be censored...."

One organisation that is not bothered by the new regulation is the PWI (journalists' association). "We have been checking up on journalists like this for years already, with data from their editors," said PWI chair, Major-General (retired) M Soegeng Widjaja. If a journalist has a PWI membership card, her/his background is already clear. What about articles 'that have been influenced'? How would that be assessed? "By whether they cause public unrest", said Widjaja. The Journalists' Code obliges PWI members to consider whether or not to publish an item and the decision hinges on whether it could disturb people and whether it is true. Editorial chiefs cannot evade responsibility, he said. [*Suara Karya*, 28 July]

Criticism

Criticism has been voiced by the Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) chair, Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara, who said that Bakorstanas had been given powers that belong only to the courts. The regulation is 'too flexible' and can result in charges of subversion against people merely for being critical. The regulation should be reviewed, he said, along with many other laws restricting political rights.

Arief Budiman, a lecturer in sociology at Satya Wacana University, said nothing has changed in essence; only the wording is different. "Anyone can be hit now. The criterion 'clean-environment' was at least specific; 'having been influenced by' is very unclear." Rizal Mallarangeng, a lecturer at Gadjah Mada University, was more blunt: "Our happiness has been short-lived. Nothing has changed. The new regulation merely reflects the continuing trauma about communism. It's this trauma that preserves the legitimacy of those in power." [*Editor*, 28 July 1990.]

"Not everyone may study communism"

The chief of the state indoctrination agency, BP-7, Oetoyo Oesman believes that not all members of society may study Marxism-Leninism. It should only be studied in order to understand it as something dangerous, with all its characteristics, but not as a 'teaching'. Its study should be restricted to institutes of higher learning and certain other forums. He would have no truck with the idea that, with *glasnost* and *perestroika*, Marxism had basically changed. Nor would he agree that the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe meant that Marxism is now bankrupt. Great vigilance was still required because the changes had not affected its ideological content, only its "ideo-praxis". [*Suara Karya* 8.8.1990] *

Petition calls on Suharto to retire in 1993

Dissident general released

Two recent events, a Petition signed by 58 people, calling on Suharto not to stand for a sixth term, and the release of Lieut. Gen. (retired) HR Dharsono after serving more than five years on subversion charges, are likely to raise the temperature of political debate in Indonesia in the period leading to the 1992 general election and the presidential election in 1993. They will undoubtedly affect the prospects of the pro-democracy movement which is now taking shape.

The Petition signatories include ten of the original signatories of the Petition-of-50 statement which first criticised Suharto in 1980. All the 1980 signatories were blacklisted and a total press ban was placed on their statements. Now the group which goes by the name, *Petisi 50* has branches in several cities and can be seen as being a political party in embryo. Several members or associates were tried following the Tanjung Priok massacre in September 1984, most of whom are still in prison. Dharsono, who was released from prison on 16 September, was not a signatory in 1980 but he drew close to the group and was charged with subversion because of his involvement in drafting the Group's White Paper published in the wake of the Tanjung Priok Affair.

In its latest statement issued on 14 August, the Group says that "since President Suharto has held his position for five consecutive terms which will add up to a quarter of a century in 1993, this should be considered more than enough, to pave the way for renewal efforts; further, it should be stipulated that future presidents may hold the post for no more than two terms".

The statement calls for a speedy end to all extra-constitutional emergency powers and insists that all representative bodies [the people's consultative assembly - MPR - and the national and regional legislative assemblies] should consist

only of members chosen at general elections [which would end the presence of presidential appointees]. All laws and regulations which do not conform with basic human rights and the principle of people's sovereignty should be replaced, it says.

The 58 signatories includes academics, several retired armed forces officers, former political party leaders as well as a few well-known human rights activists and student leaders.

In praise of liberal democracy

Lieut. General (retired) Ali Sadikin, the leading exponent of the *Petisi* group, speaking at the launch of the 14 August statement, called for a close examination of the political structure during the period of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia (1950 - 1959). That this was a period of crisis was nothing unusual for a country learning to run an independent political system. But the crisis situation has been used to discredit the liberal multi-party system. Setting the tone for a campaign to press for a pluralist political structure, Sadikin said that the problems that arose led to the imposition of centralised leadership. He challenged the belief that nothing had been achieved during Indonesia's brief experience of liberal democracy. Identifying this period as one of frequent cabinet changes was beside the point. Countries in Europe (Italy, for instance) have had to cope with numerous cabinet changes but have managed to build very successful economies.

Although Indonesia's Constituent Assembly was near to completing its work in 1959, it was made to appear as if it had failed because of the unsatisfactory nature of the multi-party system. The responsibility for this rests with civilian and military groups which pushed for the establishment of Guided Democracy in July 1959 which lasted till 1965.

Nasution's conversion?

Although Sadikin named no names, the two men most responsible for foisting Guided Democracy on the country in 1959 were President Sukarno and General Nasution, then army chief-of-staff. Yet, Nasution, now retired, is one of three senior figures who drew up a document used as the basis for the Petition-of-58's recent statement. The document, signed by Nasution, Mohamad Natsir, former Masyumi (Muslim party) leader and H.M. Sanusi Hardjadinata, formerly of the Nationalist Party (PNI) deals at some length with the iniquities of the present party system and the composition of representative bodies under Suharto. Only 40 per cent of MPR members, the body which formulates state policy and elects the president, are elected; 33 per cent



Dharsono (left) just before his release, with Oesman al Hamidy, 76 years (centre) serving an 8-year sentence, and H.M. Sanusi, 68 years, serving 20 years. Both were arrested and tried following the Tanjung Priok massacre.

are presidential appointees and the remainder are chosen *ex officio*. The three men are highly critical of the present party system which allows the existence of only three parties, and the requirement that all election candidates must be screened by the security apparatus. Many groups in society are not represented at all. Although the idea is not spelt out in as many words, the document presents arguments for the restoration of a multi-party system. This is a remarkable reversal for a man like Nasution who, as army leader in 1952, tried on 17 October of that year to force Sukarno to dissolve parliament and who, in 1959, put pressure on Sukarno to dissolve the Constituent Assembly and adopt the 1945 Constitution instead of the draft Constitution which the Assembly, a body elected by universal franchise, had almost completed.

Huge crowds welcome Dharsono

A huge crowd, several thousand strong, led by Ali Sadikin and other members of the *Petisi* group, was outside Cipinang Prison to welcome Dharsono on his release. Among the many banners unfurled, some hailed him as "Indonesia's next president". Another crowd gathered in Bandung outside his home.

Among the welcoming crowd were students from Bandung representing the recently-formed Students Solidarity in Defence of Human rights. Some groups carried anti-government banners which were confiscated by security forces and one student was taken away for questioning.

In an attempt to sabotage the welcome, the prison authorities ordered Dharsono to leave the prison four hours earlier than planned but he refused to comply.

The Jakarta military command had issued a warning against big street demonstrations to welcome Dharsono and called on the public 'not to politicise' the occasion. The warning was given prominence in the armed forces newspaper, *Angkatan Bersenjata*. Army leaders are well aware that Dharsono, a former commander of the Siliwangi Division, one of Indonesia's most prestigious military divisions, still enjoys the respect of many officers.

Dharsono served 5 years and eight months of a seven-year sentence, having been given regular remission entitlement and a little extra "for good behaviour". His ten-year sentence was reduced on appeal to seven years.

Dharsono and the pro-democracy movement

Dharsono's conversion from repressive army commander to pro-democracy leader came about following his dismissal by Suharto because of a disagreement over the re-structuring of the political party system in the late 1960s. While Suharto wanted to retain the existing political parties (minus the PKI), treating them, in the Guided Democracy tradition, to a further dose of 'simplification' by forcing them to merge into two parties [the PPP and the PDI], Dharsono favoured the dismantlement of all the parties, to be replaced by a US-style two party system. Many other army commanders besides Dharsono, who contributed significantly to the bloody anti-left crackdown in 1965 which brought Suharto to power, fell foul of the New Order dictator and joined the ranks of what became known as *Barisan Sakti Hati*, 'the disgruntled brigade'.

Dharsono was one of four army commanders in Java who made up the core of anti-left armed militancy; their troops helped Suharto gain control of Jakarta on 1 October 1965 and helped him crush the rebellious Untung group at its base in Halim on the following day. Dharsono and other army commanders like Sarwo Edhie (commander of the

RPKAD red-beret commandos), Brig. General Yasin, commander of the East Java military command, Brig. General Amir Machmud, Jakarta military commander, and Brig. General Kemal Idris from Kostrad, the army's Strategic Reserve corps, all sent out their troops to destroy the communist party and associated mass organisations by means of round-ups and mass killings. They soon became known as the *Orde Baru* Hard-Liners, pressing Suharto to take firm action against Sukarno (which he, being a more subtle politician, refused to do).

After losing his job as Siliwangi commander, Dharsono was shunted off as ambassador to Bangkok and then Seoul; in the mid-1970s, he was appointed Secretary General of ASEAN but was fired for speaking at a meeting of students during the 1978 student movement. Later, he threw in his lot with the *Petisi* group. With the help of a powerful team of lawyers, led by Adnan Buyung Nasution, he conducted a vigorous defence at his trial in 1985, attempting unsuccessfully to expose the provocations of the army which preceded the shooting down of many dozens of Muslim protesters in Tanjung Priok. The trial added considerably to his standing as a popular figure and a victim of New Order injustice.

With such antecedents, Dharsono enjoys much credibility in the army and could prove a formidable rival to Suharto were he to become the *Petisi's* alternative to Suharto's candidacy in the 1993 presidential election. *

Protest against arms sales

On June 19, a number of concerned human rights organisations based in the UK including TAPOL, wrote to British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, to protest against the new arms deals concluded between British companies and Indonesia [see *TAPOL Bulletin* No 99]. The letter argued that such weapons could only reinforce the capability of Indonesian forces and their operations in West Papua and East Timor - insurgencies admitted to exist by the British government. R.C. Cook of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office responded by first stating that the government's arms export policy is based on the right of other countries, as sovereign states, to protect their independence [ignoring the fact that Indonesia uses such arms in its suppression of a territory that even the UK government does not officially recognise as a part of the Indonesian sovereign state], and then goes on to make the claim that "the government do not, and would not, allow the export of arms and equipment which are likely to be used against the civilian population" and that "this is a policy that applies wherever violation of human rights takes place". *

Continued from page 9

government employees was also started. A briefing session for *litsus* controllers in the province was held by the regional military commander, Maj. Gen. R. Hartono. The target for these investigations includes job applicants, new appointees, people holding certain positions, and employees who have not previously been screened, as well as employees of some private enterprises. [*Surabaya Post* 28.8.1990] (See separate item for more about *litsus*.) *

Dili Mass ends in protest

For the third time in less than a year, young East Timorese have demonstrated in favour of independence in Dili, in the presence of outsiders. The occasion this time was an anniversary Mass attended by the Apostolic Nuncio from Jakarta.

On 4 September, hundreds of East Timorese unfurled banners saying, "Independence for East Timor!", "Long Live Fretilin!", "Long Live the Maubere People" and "Long Live Xanana!" The demonstration occurred at the end of a Catholic Mass in Lecideri, held to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Dili Diocese. A number of senior officials were present, including Mgr Canalini, the Apostolic Nuncio in Jakarta, Bishop Belo, head of the diocese, 'provincial' governor Mario Carascalao and many military and non-military officials.

As the Mass drew to a close at 5.30 pm, the demonstrators began their action, with the support of many people among the more than 20,000 people attending the Mass. The demonstrators made a determined effort to press Mgr Canalini to make a statement clarifying the Vatican's stand on East Timor. [There are strong rumours in East Timor that the Vatican may shortly switch its position and support East Timor's integration into Indonesia.] The demonstration continued for about half an hour, during which time Governor Carascalao prevailed on the police not to make any arrests.

When Canalini left the scene at about 6.00 pm, the demonstrators left in defiant mood. On their way home, scuffles broke out between demonstrators and Indonesians whom they encountered on the streets. When troops arrived to push the demonstrators back, they were pelted with stones.

In several places after getting home, the demonstrators continued their anti-Indonesia activities until late that night, attacking Indonesians in the vicinity and mocking them with "*Kapan pulang?*" ["When are you going home?"]

Arrests

The demonstration led to a crackdown. The first arrests occurred on 6 September, with more following on 10 and

13 September. Sources in Dili say that the situation in Dili is very tense, with Indonesian soldiers in civilian clothing, roaming the streets wielding batons, iron bars and other implements, beating up people. Things were so bad by mid September that Timorese were afraid to venture out after dark.*



Wounded East Timorese students tended by Red Cross nurses in the garden of Mgr. Belo.

Parliamentary mission unlikely

Preparations under way for several years for a Portuguese parliamentary mission to visit East Timor appear to have come to a halt. Until mid 1990, the Portuguese government was exuding confidence that the visit would take place this year, agreement having been reached between Portugal and Indonesia about travel and protocol arrangements. The mission's visit to East Timor has for years been the only talking point in the negotiations between the two countries held in New York under the aegis of the UN Secretary General.

Whatever Indonesian diplomats may have been saying in New York however, it is now clear that the generals in

control on the ground have had no intention of allowing the visit to take place. It was reported in July that the Australian ambassador, Philip Flood, was told during a visit to Dili, that the military anticipate that a visit by Portuguese parliamentarians would lead to widespread "social unrest", so they could not contemplate such an event taking place for two or three years. [*Diario Noticias*, 16.7.1990]

Portuguese passivity criticised

Five Portuguese solidarity groups, including the Commission for the Rights of the Maubere People and Peace is Possible in East Timor are strongly critical of the

Portuguese government for its passivity on East Timor. In a joint statement in July, they said the planned visit of the parliamentary delegation to East Timor has been used to justify such passivity and lack of political will. They criticised the government in particular for inactivity on the Timor Gap Treaty and for not proceeding with proposals to convene an international parliamentary conference on East Timor and paid tribute to the East Timorese people who have shown more and more courage in refusing to accept colonial occupation. [*East Timor News* No. 37, 8 August 1990]

Recent incidents in Dili, culminating in the demonstration on 4 September, show that despite repeated crackdowns and dire threats from Minister of Defence, General Benny Murdani, in a speech in Dili on 3 February [see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 99, June 1990], East Timorese are taking every opportunity to demonstrate against the Indonesian occupation. Whatever the Portuguese authorities thought the visit would achieve, it was awaited with great expectation in East Timor as an occasion to press their demand for self-determination.

UN motives unclear

The true aims of the visit were thrown into confusion when Achmed Rafeuddin, UN Under Secretary-General with responsibility for East Timor, told a Japanese MP on 8 August that if the parliamentary mission took place, this would lead to the solution of the issue and the removal of East Timor from the UN agenda. Takemura Yasuko met Achmed Rafeuddin while in New York to speak at the UN Decolonisation Committee on the question of East Timor. She asked for the meeting to seek clarification about a report in the Indonesian press claiming that UN Secretary-General, Peres de Cuellar had written to President Suharto expressing the hope "that East Timor would soon cease to be an issue at the world organisation". He also allegedly "referred to the vast improvements in international relations, opening up opportunities for the removal of East Timor from the UN agenda". [*Jakarta Post*, 26 July 1990] While Rafeuddin described this report as 'Indonesia's interpretation', his remark about the mission seemed to confirm that this might also be the UN's interpretation.

Lisbon on Kuwait and East Timor

It is difficult to believe that while the UN Security Council is passing a stream of resolutions condemning Iraq's

EAST TIMOR

annexation of Kuwait, the General Assembly could at its session this year endorse Indonesia's invasion and occupation of East Timor.


In a statement on 14 September, Portugal's Prime Minister, Dr Cavaco Silva, said Portugal would continue to campaign for international pressure on Indonesia, using the Gulf crisis to remind the world of its still unsettled dispute over East Timor.

We have to go on putting pressure on the international community so that the people of Timor can have some hope of being able to decide their own future. All our ambassadors have clear instructions on how to proceed in making the connection between this violation of international law, of which the world is fully aware, and that other violation which it sometimes wants to forget.

Murdani deplores annexation ... of Kuwait!

Of all Indonesian government ministers, General Benny Murdani, Minister for Defence and Security, the man most closely identified with the invasion and occupation of East Timor, has been most explicit towards Iraq. Asked in Parliament why the government's policy on the Gulf crisis was unclear, he disagreed and said that Indonesia officially deplores "the annexation of a small country by a big one". [*Jakarta Post*, 12.9.1990]

Indonesian government policy towards Iraq is influenced by several considerations; steering a course that will not alienate the Muslim community, not adopting a position that will boomerang unfavourably on Indonesia's own forcible annexations of West Papua and East Timor, and weighing up the impact of oil price rises on the Indonesian economy. There is a split within the Muslim community; some Muslims sympathise with Saddam's expansionist nationalism, some are more sympathetic to Saudi Arabia, while others reject the US occupation of Saudi Arabia, the site of the most holy shrines of Islam. With thousands volunteering to fight for Iraq, the government has warned that anyone taking up arms in a foreign country risks losing their Indonesian citizenship. The government has rejected a call from Saudi Arabia to send troops to the Gulf, saying that Indonesian troops can only be deployed overseas at the request of the United Nations. *



Occasional Reports no.13 contains TAPOL's submission to the 1990 meeting of the UN Decolonisation Committee.

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Indonesia slammed at UN Decolonisation Committee

Twenty-two petitioners attending this year's session of the UN Decolonisation Committee on August 9 called for East Timor's right to self-determination to be exercised. A summary of some of these statements is given below. The remainder will follow in the next issue.

Indonesia's continued occupation, exploitation and oppression of East Timor was the main theme of submissions by non-governmental organisations. Petitioners detected no improvement in Indonesia's record of human rights violations and no let up in the killing and torture of East Timorese. Many statements referred to the Gadjah Mada University sociologists' report on the situation in the country, such an indictment of the occupation that last minute attempts were made to hush it up in Indonesia.

To illustrate the regime's attempt to crush the independence movement, many petitioners quoted from Defence Minister General Benny Murdani's speech to officials in Dili, while Bishop Belo's appeal to the UN for a referendum found continued support. [For details of the Gadjah Mada report and Murdani's speech see *TAPOL Bulletin* Nos 99 and 100, June and August 1990.] The UN's reaction to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was compared with its failure to follow-up the Security Council's unanimous condemnation of the invasion of East Timor in 1975. This year, for the first time, an Indonesian national was among the East Timorese, Japanese, Canadian, Australian and European voices calling on the UN to expedite the decolonisation of East Timor.

One big concentration camp

Alexander George, TAPOL, described how the same basic military oppression remained in East Timor and how recent changes, such as the promotion of tourism, were cosmetic: East Timorese refugees arriving recently in Australia and Portugal confirmed that East Timor was "one big concentration camp". He described the recent military build-up and outlined new forms of resistance by the younger generation, to cope with Indonesia's "hearts and minds" strategy. He cast doubt on claims by Indonesia that the special military command for East Timor, *Koopskam TimTim* had been disbanded. Gadjah Mada findings were "one of the most searing indictments of Indonesian rule in East Timor to date"; he commended the report for careful consideration by the Decolonisation Committee.

Jose Luis Guterres, FRETILIN, recalled how his movement had resisted the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975. After 15 years of terror, when approximately a third of the population had died, Indonesian military forces still occupied the country. Over the past year, the youth of East Timor has been encouraged by the victories of FALINTIL the liberation army, and by changes in the international situation, to demonstrate peacefully against the foreign occupation, but the demonstrations were brutally suppressed by Indonesian troops. Sixty people were injured after demonstrations when US Ambassador John Monjo visited



Jose Luis Guterres at UN

East Timor. He appealed to Indonesia to stop further operations; FRETILIN is prepared to talk with Indonesia without pre-conditions, and ready to participate in a referendum or free election supervised by the UN. He appealed to multinationals not to exploit East Timor's oil until a political settlement had been achieved.

Parliamentarians speak out for East Timor

Several submissions were made by members of Parliamentarians for East Timor (PET).

Yasuko Takemura, one of 87 PET members in the Japanese Diet, said the East Timorese, as the "primary party", should be included in UN talks. She drew attention to Indonesia's population control programme in East Timor, which "is forcibly carried out, in spite of the fact that one-third of the population there have died under the Indonesian occupation" and which Timorese women regard as "a form of genocide". Japanese PET members regret Japan's invasion of East Timor in the 1940s so she felt compelled to attend the UN on the anniversary of the bombing of Nagasaki, when she would normally be at the nation-wide prayer for peace, because "Indonesia is repeating the same sin as we committed in the past." Japan has not recognised the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia, she said. All maps and globes in the Japanese Foreign Ministry have a line separating East Timor from Indonesia, thanks to the efforts of herself and others.

Ray Funk, Canadian MP, asked why, when East Timor's desire for self-determination was undeniable, nations

"silently acquiesced" to Indonesia's occupation. Too few were aware of the plight of East Timor while economic and geopolitical considerations took precedence over the rights of the East Timorese. He referred to Canada's disappointing record as the third largest investor in Indonesia, and attacked Western governments for being "only too happy" to sell arms and loan money to Indonesia, while there is little doubt that "these funds and these weapons have assisted Indonesia to maintain the military occupation of East Timor". Comparing East Timorese and native Canadians, both discriminated against in a colonial relationship, he said the "spirit of colonialism" will live on so long as humanity continues to subordinate human rights and conserving the environment to economic gain.

As a model for talks to establish a mechanism whereby East Timorese freely express their will, he suggested the West Sahara negotiations for UN supervision of the decision-making process. Canadian PET members will contribute to global efforts for justice in East Timor "with renewed vigour", to reverse Canada's "hypocritical" stance.

Laurie Ferguson, Australian Labour MP, said he was speaking in an unofficial capacity. He dwelt on the massive loss of population. If the population had grown by the 2% of 1975, when the population was 690,000, today's population should be more than 930,000; in fact there are less than 650,000 people - including outsiders - in East Timor. "In relative terms this is a loss of population without equal in world trouble spots since the end of World War II".

East Timor has not prospered under Indonesia; the wealth is controlled by Indonesians, not East Timorese. He disagreed that East Timor was too small to be independent and mentioned many smaller independent nations. The agreement between Indonesia and Australia to exploit Timor Gap oil has no provision to share revenues with East Timor. As an independent country, taking advantage of its resources, East Timor could by now be of similar economic standing to the small state of Brunei.

Rui Jose Santos Silva, Portuguese MP, said the aims of the 16-year old democracy in Portugal had not been entirely fulfilled. Portugal's African colonies had exercised self-determination but the rights of the East Timorese are still being violated, their lives taken and their future curtailed. They refuse to give up their identity, despite Indonesian atrocities. He said Portugal would remain bound by its responsibility to safeguard East Timor's self-determination. Portugal had no wish to reoccupy East Timor, only to help the East Timorese freely determine their future.

Antonia Maria Pereira, Portuguese MP, said Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was a "carbon-copy" of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, with both aggressors giving the same justifications. In 1975, the Security Council had adopted a resolution ordering Indonesia to withdraw its troops, as it has done in the case of Kuwait. How could some countries look benevolently on the Indonesian action, but condemn Iraq?

Raul Fernando Souselo de Brito, Portuguese MP, condemned the denial of self-determination and the violation of other human rights in East Timor. The Portuguese-Indonesian talks under UN auspices were aimed at finding a just solution to the problem of East Timor.

Rui Quartin-Santos, for the Portuguese government, said Portugal was not trying to "put back the clock of history";

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Portugal's rule of East Timor was over, but it had the duty to uphold the fundamental rights of East Timor's people. It firmly believed that East Timor constituted one of the most serious challenges to the application of the decolonisation principles of General Assembly resolution 1514. Portugal would cooperate to achieve a settlement and in that spirit, he was participating in talks aimed at reaching the terms of reference for the visit of a Portuguese Parliamentary delegation to East Timor. A better atmosphere could be created at the talks if the respect for human rights and basic freedoms in East Timor showed signs of improvement, which seemed not to be the case. The Timor Gap Treaty was a serious breach of international law in contempt of the UN and of the sovereign rights of the East Timorese over their natural resources. Portugal reserved the right to resort to any legal means deemed appropriate to uphold these rights.*

[To be continued next issue.]

STOP PRESS!

Latest reports from East Timor say that 80 persons have been arrested since the 4 September protest; 50 have been taken to Liquica district while the rest are in Dili. Indonesian troops roaming the streets at night, dressed as civilians, beat up and in some cases kill anyone they find. **Domingos Mau Rati** was stabbed to death on 10 September outside the Chinese school. The next day, **Alexo Laca**, 22, and 25 schoolmates were captured and tortured at the police station, and accused of killing Domingos Mau Rati.

On 19 September, 25 soldiers stormed a kiosk frequented by young East Timorese but found none of them there. The next day, they arrested **Agostinho Pereira**, 21, a student, tortured him at the kiosk, then took him away.

Our source in East Timor believes army atrocities have intensified following Bishop Belo's departure from Dili on 9 September, for a working visit to the Vatican. *

West Papuan Peoples Front at UN

The Netherlands-based West Papuan Peoples Front spoke out against the Indonesian exploitation and colonisation of West Papua at both the UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples and at the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in Geneva, July and August. Representative **Victor Kaisiepo** focused on the pro-independence demonstrations of December 1989, after which eight Papuans were refused asylum in neighbouring PNG when Indonesia, Australia and PNG "conspired to deprive indigenous Papuans of their right to safety"; on continuing military operations against OPM at the PNG border; on the extradition of **Mecky Salosa**; on the colonial nature of Indonesian rule and transmigration; on the environmentally destructive nature of so-called development projects eg. the Freeport copper mine and logging on **Yapen** island; and on the general problem of dispossession of tribal lands. The Front also attacked World Wide Fund for Nature's park projects in West Papua for imposing restrictions on the traditional life of West Papuans. The Front called on the UN to acknowledge that West Papuans have been denied their right to self-determination and to put forward demand for this right to the Decolonisation Committee; to investigate human rights abuses, pressure the Indonesian government to legislate against further immigration into West Papua and to prohibit the exploitation of natural resources until Papuans are in a position to determine their national heritage. *

Loyalty enforced in Aceh

The Indonesian government has staged a series of propaganda exercises in Aceh, aimed at convincing a restive and deeply dissatisfied population that they should remain loyal to the Indonesian Republic and assist Indonesian troops in their efforts to crush the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

In recent months, tensions in Aceh have mounted; GAM supporters have killed more than 70 members of the security forces, troops have shot civilians, transmigrants have abandoned their sites and work in northern Aceh's industrial zone is being held up as Javanese engineers are too frightened to return to work. In July, the governor announced that more troops would be sent in to tackle the unrest. [See *TAPOL Bulletin* No 100 for background.]

Over the last two months the authorities have tried coercing, pleading and bribing Acehnese to support them. On August 5, 655 villagers from Seuneudon sub-district in North Aceh were brought by truck to Lhokseumawe, where they read out pledges of allegiance to the Republic and *Pancasila* state before military and government officials. They were then made to parade around the town, waving red and white Indonesian flags. Their villages were accused of harbouring GAM leaders. A siege of one of the villages in July reportedly ended in the arrest of GAM leaders. Other reports speak of "hundreds" of villagers, including two GAM commanders, voluntarily returning to "the lap of the Indonesian motherland". They wrote confessions and accepted they would be punished under the law if they broke their pledge of allegiance. Similar allegiance ceremonies have been held in at least two other sub-districts. The so-called surrenders are said to be in response to Governor of Aceh Ibrahim Hasan's appeal to GAM adherents to give themselves up peacefully and they will be "welcomed with open arms" by the government.

Flying the flag

In August, the Indonesian flag was used in another heavy-handed attempt to intimidate the population to pledge loyalty. In August, Governor Hasan instructed Acehnese families and institutions to display the national flag outside their homes from August 4-10 though independence day is on the 17th, warning that those who fail to do so "shall not be regarded as republicans". [*Jakarta Post* August 6, 1990]

Aceh's *ulamas* [teachers of Islam] are among those targeted in the loyalty game. In August, regiment commander Colonel Muhammed Chan asked the *ulamas* to help ABRI and later, Abdurrahman Wahid, Chair of Nadhatul Ulama, offered to help bring the *ulamas* round to the concept of Indonesian nationalism and *Pancasila*.

In East Aceh, the district head has offered to buy the loyalty of the population. At an allegiance-swearing ceremony in Langsa, he offered Rp 1 million [US \$540] for every rebel weapon turned in. This is no small amount: as noted by the *Economist* [September 8, 1990] it amounts to a year's income for the average Acehnese.

Everything under control?

Most government spokesmen continue to play down to the serious situation in Aceh. After a one-day visit to the province, cooperatives minister Bustanil Arifin said only one village was not secure and that Aceh was suffering a

little disturbance from army deserters and "peace disturbing gangs" (GPK). Armed Forces chief-of-staff Edi Sudradjat went so far as to claim that the problems in Aceh were over. [*Suara Merdeka* August 6, 1990], a claim out of step with the regional commander's announcement that the armed forces would be able to wipe out the group by the end of the year.

True, there have been fewer reports of GAM attacks over the last two months, but this does not necessarily reflect the situation on the ground. While domestic reporting is largely confined to official propaganda, the foreign press is less inhibited. Major business publications such as the *Financial Times* [August 2, 1990] have reported the army effort in terms of "winning back" the support of the Acehnese people, and spoke of majority support for the GAM among the local people. According to the *Economist* which doubts the GAM will be finished by the end of the year, "the signs are that the activities of the Front [GAM] are increasing"*



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