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East Timor resolution adopted by UN

The UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities has this year adopted a resolution on human rights violations in East Timor. This reverses a decision last year when a draft resolution was defeated by a procedural 'no-action' move that was passed by 10 votes to nine with five abstentions. The resolution this year was adopted by 12 votes to 9 with three abstentions; it was co-sponsored by five Sub-Commission members: Erica-Irene Daes (Greece), Asbjorn Eide (Norway), Ribot Hatano (Japan), Claire Palley (UK) and Héctor Fix Zamudio (Mexico).

The adoption of this resolution re-opens the possibility of raising East Timor at the Human Rights Commission next February. The last time the Commission adopted a resolution on East Timor was in 1983. At its 1985 session, the Commission decided, in private session, that East Timor was no longer under its consideration. The reasons for this shameless decision and the voting have never been made public.

The Sub-Commission, known also as the Human Rights Sub-Commission, is composed of 26 experts and meets yearly to prepare the agenda of the UN Commission on Human Rights meeting in February-March. The resolution was adopted this year in the face of intense lobbying from the Indonesian mission in Geneva; on most days, as the voting drew near, there were at least ten diplomats constantly present, in a desperate attempt to prevent the UN body from taking a decision about East Timor. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry is also known to have exerted pressure on the governments of several of the experts from African and Asian countries to instruct 'their' experts to vote against the resolution. In fact, the experts are supposed to be independent of their governments though several are diplomats or government officials and hence vulnerable to pressure.

Besides the submissions from Jan-Erik Forsberg of Sweden, East Timorese refugee Antonio Araujo and Jusfiq Hadjar, reported elsewhere in this Bulletin, Luisa Pereira of the Lisbon-based Commission for the Rights of the Maubere People, speaking for Pax Romana, referred to Amnesty International's most recent statement on human rights abuses at the UN Decolonisation Committee. She stressed the significance of Bishop Belo's call to the UN for a referendum and quoted from a letter just received from the clergy in East Timor, fully supporting the Bishop's call. [See elsewhere for a fuller report of this statement.]

Secret ballot

In a move to protect expert-members from the prying eye of governments and give them the freedom to vote according to conscience regardless of instructions from home, the Sub-Commission adopted a decision to conduct all resolutions critical of governments (these are resolutions under Item 6 of the agenda) by secret ballot. The outrageous pressure exerted on experts by Indonesia last year to sabotage the East Timor resolution [see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 89, October 1988, page 13] was a major factor for this move. As the member from Norway, Asbjorn Eide, said without naming any country, "pressure from governments last year came close to being contempt of court".

As the vote was taken in secret, the breakdown of voting on the East Timor resolution is not known.

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However, contact with the experts in Geneva leads us to believe that all the West European members and three or four of the Latin American members including the member from Argentina supported the resolution. The Argentinean expert, Leandro Despouy, was particularly supportive during lobbying; he took the reverse position to that of his alternate, Maria Teresa Flores, who voted for no action on East Timor last year. The member from Japan was a co-sponsor, while the member from Algeria is thought to have voted in favour, plus one or two other members from Third World countries. The Soviet member almost certainly abstained (he is not in favour of the Sub-Commission taking any country-oriented resolutions except on non-controversial issues like South Africa and the Palestinians). Other East European members, the Chinese member (himself a target because he and his government strongly resisted any move to condemn China for the Tienanmen massacres) also certainly voted against, along with the member from Cuba.

Speaking most vehemently against the resolution was the Sub-Commission member from Somalia, Aidid Abdillahi Ilkahanaf, who attacked it as a "manoeuvre by the Portuguese Government to uphold its fictitious role as the administering power of East Timor". He made no attempt to question the operative clauses of the resolution concerning human rights violations. Although last year, Ilkahanaf initiated the 'no-action'



Luisa Teotónio Pereira of the Commission for the Rights of the Maubere People, addressing the UN Sub-Commission in Geneva. Left, Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL.

procedure, he did not do so this year, making it possible for the Sub-Commission to take a stand.

Support from many NGOs

A statement signed by representatives of eighteen NGOs attending the Sub-Commission was circulated to all Sub-Commission members. It expressed regret that the Sub-Commission failed at its 40th session last year to adopt a resolution on East Timor: "In the light of new, up-to-date information made available to the Sub-Commission at its present session, we appeal to

Resolutions on East Timor

UN Resolution on East Timor

The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,

Guided by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the universally accepted rules of international humanitarian law,

Recalling its resolutions 1982/20 of 8 September 1982, 1983/26 of 6 September 1983, 1984/24 of 29 August 1984 and 1987/13 of 2 September 1987 concerning the situation in East Timor,

Considering the repeated allegations that the people of East Timor continue to be subjected to gross violations of human rights,

1. Welcomes the actions taken by the Secretary-General regarding East Timor,
2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to encourage all parties concerned, that is, the Administering Power, the Indonesian Government and representatives of the East Timorese people, to cooperate fully in order to achieve a durable solution, taking full account of the rights and wishes of the people of East Timor.
3. Takes note of the letter from Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, dated 6 February 1989 (A/AC.109/991) addressed to the Secretary-General calling for a referendum in East Timor.
4. Appreciates the Indonesian Government's new policy of openness in East Timor since January 1989,
5. Regrets however that more arrests, torture and summary executions are alleged to have taken place since the end of 1988,

6. Hopes therefore that the Indonesian Government would go a step further to allow representatives of human rights organisations to visit the territory.

7. Recommends to the Commission on Human Rights that it consider, at its forty-sixth session, the human rights situation and fundamental freedoms in East Timor.

European Parliament Resolution

For the second time in less than a year, the European Parliament, meeting in Strasbourg, adopted a resolution in May this year supporting East Timor's right to self-determination. The resolution refers to the dramatic appeal of Bishop Belo, addressed to the UN Secretary-General, and to the Indonesian Government's refusal to consult the people of East Timor about their future. It then:

1. Repeats its point of view that it is a fundamental right of all peoples freely to choose their own future;
2. Calls again upon the Foreign Ministers meeting in European Political Cooperation to take diplomatic steps in order to achieve the right of self-determination for the people of East Timor;
3. Urges the Commission to provide all possible aid to the refugee camps, in East Timor as well as in Portugal, and to inform Parliament about their action;
4. Requests its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Foreign Ministers meeting in European Political Cooperation, the Secretary-General of the UN, the Government of Indonesia and to the Assembly of Non-Aligned Countries.*

the members to pay proper regard to the situation in East Timor and request the Commission on Human Rights to keep the matter under constant review."

The statement was supported by: International Commission of Jurists; Human Rights Advocates; International Movement for Fraternal Union among Races and Peoples; International Association of Educators for World Peace; Habitat International Coalition; International Organisation for the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination; Pax Christi International; International Federation for the Protection of the Rights, Linguistic, Religious, Ethnic and

Other Minorities; International League for the Rights and Liberation of Peoples; Pax Romana; Minority Rights Group; Liberation; Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; World Student Christian Federation; World University Service; International Commission of Health Professionals; International League for Human Rights; and Indigenous World Association.*

"Indescribable torture" in East Timor

Antonio Maria de Araujo with his mother, his wife and their fourteen children, left Dili for Lisbon at the end of April this year, after waiting ten years for permission to leave East Timor. He testified before the UN Human Rights Sub-Commission at its session in August this year.

Araujo is a trained nurse. After the Indonesian invasion, he told the Sub-Commission, he worked at the radiology department of Dili General Hospital which had been taken over by the Indonesian army. All Timorese patients were removed and placed in a clinic outside the hospital. During the eleven months he worked at the military hospital, he was detained three times for questioning, interrogated and each time subjected to torture. On the third occasion, he was given electric shocks by a doctor of the red-berets paras brigade.

On 8 November 1976 he was arrested by Captain Tarigan and held first by the Military Police then detained at Comarca Prison for a total of 29 months. "The methods of physical and moral torture which I witnessed were indescribable. The torturers competed with each other in their zeal to inflict torture."

After his release from prison, he was appointed head of administration at the Health Department, but was again arrested in June 1980 after resistance fighters attacked radio and television installations on the outskirts of Dili. On this occasion, he was held for 43 days with many others and was this time beaten by a Captain Zamirad. Again he witnessed extraordinary acts of sadism. "I shall not describe here the horrifying scenes, the sexual abuse and acts of sodomy I witnessed, but these scenes will be engraved in my memory and those of many of my fellow citizens for ever. The Indonesians order us to call them 'Bapak' or 'Father', but our sentiments towards them are quite the reverse."

He was expelled from the civil service after being released, so got an administrative job at the Saint Jose School in Dili, the only diocesan school that has preserved a degree of autonomy from Indonesia.

Opening up changes nothing for Timorese

Araujo said that since the 'opening up' of East Timor, only a few tourists have been able to visit, not human rights organisations like Amnesty. Freedom of movement for Timorese is still very restricted; Timorese in Dili who want to visit nearby Manatuto are prevented from doing so if they have no identification papers. In April, a group of public employees at the Education Department wanting to go to Baucau were not only prevented from doing so but were subjected to corporal punishment.

The church is also a victim of repression. Priests

must report to the military commanders about the contents of their sermons. The Catholic Scouts Movement, of which I was a leader, was banned from wearing its badges when our church was consecrated. Some persons arrested in October and November last year were released on condition that they spy on the priests and parish officials.

Araujo also spoke about conditions in the countryside where whole populations were displaced and forced to live in 'strategic villages' under strict army surveillance. Villagers are obliged to mount guard against the Timorese resistance and cannot move more than five kilometres outside the village perimeters, preventing them from tilling the fields.

In conclusion, Araujo said:

*Your indifference or your silence will contribute to the physical, cultural and moral extermination of a small people, simply because they have been denied the right to exercise their right - to their liberty and independence.**



Antonio Maria de Araujo, left, photographed in 1978 with his father when they were both being held without trial in Comarca Prison, Dili. His father was a Fretilin activist in Suai and had come to Dili on 6 December 1975, the day before the Indonesian invasion. He spent two and a half years in prison. He died in 1986.

East Timor at the UN Decolonisation Committee

As in previous years, representatives of a variety of organisations and a number of individuals petitioned the UN Decolonisation Committee on the question of East Timor. Particularly striking was the appearance of seven parliamentarians, from Portugal, Canada, Japan and the UK.

The following are brief summaries of all the petitions. We hope in subsequent issues to more fully summarise of some of the petitions.

Canadian MP, David Kilgour, from the governing Conservative Party and the first Canadian parliamentarian ever to testify, called events in East Timor "the hidden holocaust". Alexander George, for TAPOL, said nothing has changed as East Timor remains under Indonesian occupation. Tamako Nakanishi, a Japanese MP, speaking for the Japanese Diet Forum on East Timor, regretted that East Timor representatives were not included in the UN Secretary-General's consultations with parties concerned with the issue.

Geoffrey Robinson, for Amnesty International, said reports of serious violations, including mass arrests, torture, extrajudicial executions and disappearances, had been received recently. Ann Clwyd, a British MP, speaking for Parliamentarians for East Timor, spoke about her experiences of an official visit to East Timor in March this year [for details, see her interview in *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 93, June 1989] and urged the Committee to consider conditions under which a plebiscite in East Timor should be held. Pedro Pinto Leite, for the Dutch Indonesia Committee, the X min Y Foundation and the Dutch East Timor Group said Indonesia's so-called development of East Timor was just an attempt to consolidate its hegemony and provide a cover for colonial exploitation.

María Luis Franca de Oliveira, International Catholic Movement of Pax Christi, spoke about Bishop Belo's letter to the UN Secretary-General which he had written because, after 14 years of Indonesian occupation, the situation in East Timor remained intolerable. Bishop Aloisius Soma of the Japanese Catholic Council

for Justice and Peace said the tragedy of East Timor was a clear case of genocide; he presented a statement signed by 1,250 cardinals, archbishops, bishops, priests, sisters and the faithful, expressing solidarity with the people of East Timor. Michel Robert, French Association of Solidarity with East Timor condemned the UN for giving Suharto its Population Award, considering the huge loss of life in East Timor since the Indonesian invasion.

Portuguese MP, Jose Pacheco Pereira reiterated his country's special role to guarantee East Timor's right to self-determination, under Portuguese and international supervision. Portuguese MP, Maria Manuela Aguiar condemned Indonesia's attempt to seal East Timor off and called for urgent action to save the Timorese people and their cultural identity. Kiyoko Furusawa, Japanese Free East Timor Coalition focused on protecting the reproductive rights of Timorese women.

Paulo Pires, Union for a Democratic Timor welcomed the many recent international condemnations of human rights violations in East Timor. Elaine Briere, East Timor Alert Network, Canada, said Indonesian aggression in East Timor must not be allowed to succeed and criticised the Canadian government for ignoring Indonesian brutalities to pursue its market-oriented agenda in Indonesia. Jose Luis Guterres of Fretilin said Fretilin was ready to take part in a referendum under UN auspices and would respect Indonesia's territorial integrity and stability in the region.

Sidney Jones, Asia Watch criticised the UN Secretariat's Working Paper for giving the erroneous impression that no killings have occurred in East Timor. Adriano Alevos Moreira, a Portuguese MP, condemned Indonesian genocide. East Timor should revert to Portuguese administration as a step towards self-determination; resistance forces should take part in negotiations to this end. Antonio Jose Monteiro Vidigal Amaro, another Portuguese MP said the climate of terror in East Timor had intensified recently.*

Princen prevented from testifying at UN

Indonesia's leading human rights activist, Haji J.C. Princen, director of the Jakarta-based Institute for the Defence of Human Rights, was refused an exit permit to leave Indonesia to attend the UN Human Rights Sub-Commission in Geneva. He was mandated by the Regional Council on Human Rights in Asia to speak at the Sub-Commission on two issues, the massacre of villagers in Talang Sari, Lampung Province, South Sumatra on 7 February 1989, and the deteriorating human rights situation in East Timor. Princen is the first Indonesian ever to have made an attempt to testify against Indonesia at the UN on its human rights record.

More than twenty non-governmental organisations attending the Sub-Commission meeting, including the Anti-Slavery Society and the International Commission of Jurists, signed a statement addressed to the Indonesian government protesting that Princen was

prevented from testifying in Geneva.

The Regional Council mandated Jusfiq Hadjar to attend the Sub-Commission to deliver the testimony on Princen's behalf. Jusfiq said: "The Indonesian authorities have frequently refused him an exit visa, which means that his situation is no different from about one-and-a-half million ex-political prisoners, as well as many senior politicians who are members of the group of dissidents known as the Petition-of-50. These people have never been charged or brought to trial, no judge has passed any verdict depriving them of the right to leave the country, yet they, like Mr Princen, suffer the same fate."*

Pope to visit East Timor

The Catholic church in East Timor faces serious problems. Bishop Belo's call for a referendum is still reverberating. The Pope is to make a highly controversial visit to East Timor this month. And now Belo is openly hinting that he may soon be removed from his post as head of the Catholic church.

It has been confirmed that Pope John Paul will visit East Timor on 12 October. Although a nation like the East Timorese, 80 per cent Catholic, would be expected to welcome the Pope, they have many misgivings about this visit.

Formally, the Vatican does not recognise Indonesia's annexation of the territory and has made it clear that its stand is determined by the UN which still recognises Portugal as the administering power. Hence the diocese of Dili has not been incorporated into the Indonesian diocese. The Vatican has not appointed a bishop of Dili, running the diocese direct from Rome, with the help of an apostolic administrator, a position occupied by Mgr Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, who was ordained Bishop of Loreum (a diocese in Italy) last year.



Bishop Belo

Until recently, a papal visit to Indonesia had been ruled out because of East Timor. Hence it came as a great surprise to learn earlier this year that Pope John Paul would include Indonesia in a trip to the Far East, following a visit to South Korea to attend the Eucharist conference. The Vatican apparently insisted that the Pope would not go to Indonesia unless East Timor was on the itinerary. It was not difficult for Jakarta to comply, provided the visit was arranged in such a way as to allow Indonesia to interpret it as legitimation by the Vatican of its claim to East Timor. This it has already done in several statements to UN bodies this summer.

The only way to avoid such an interpretation would have been for the Vatican to make it clear that the Pope would visit Indonesia and East Timor, or still better to visit East Timor after completing his itinerary in Indonesia. But now, the Vatican has officially announced the Pope's itinerary which does not even mention East Timor separately from Indonesia. Per-

haps, the Pope plans to couch his message during the mass in East Timor in terms which unmistakably recognise the special rights of the people of East Timor, rendering Indonesia's 'victory' less than total. Be that as it may, the Vatican is venturing along a dangerous path, betraying the East Timorese and assisting Jakarta in its efforts to seal their fate diplomatically.

This is all the more reprehensible since Bishop Belo has made a clarion call for the UN to listen to the wishes of his people by means of a referendum.

Australian journalists interview Belo

Lindsay Murdoch of *The Age*, Melbourne, visited East Timor in late August, along with a journalist from Australian Associated Press. They interviewed Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, the head of the Catholic Church, who reiterated his demand for a referendum, repeating the statement in his 6 February letter to the UN Secretary-General that the Timorese people "was dying every day". He spoke out

because of my experience of seeing people suffering without a voice to speak openly, frankly and freely. Priests and bishops can speak but the ordinary people cannot speak. If they do, they face interrogation or torture. The people are suffering mainly psychological and political pressure. Everybody is obliged to think and do according to the Indonesian political system....that they are an integral part of Indonesia and that there is no other way.

The journalists observed that Bishop Belo's house was guarded by two plainclothes military officers and the Bishop confirmed that he was constantly watched.

Asked what he wanted Pope John Paul to say during his brief visit to East Timor in October, Bishop Belo said: "According to me, it is better to make some statement about human rights and underline again respect for the historical, religious and cultural identity of the people of East Timor."

Foreign missionaries prevented from coming

Belo said Indonesia had stopped at least eight foreign Catholic missionaries from entering East Timor. A senior army officer later denied this, though admitted that their documents "were being processed" which took time. "But if he (the Bishop) asked for priests from another Indonesian province, it would be very easy." [Lindsay Murdoch in *The Age*, 28 August, and AAP, in *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 August 1989.

Bishop Belo to be moved?

Bishop Belo told another journalist, Alain Boebion of AFP, who visited Dili in early September, that he may not remain in East Timor long beyond the Pope's visit (in October); he was "at the disposal of the Vatican and ready to leave for South America or somewhere else". As Boebion recalls, Belo's predecessor, Mgr

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Martinho da Costa Lopes, who accused the armed forces of engaging in torture and carrying out arbitrary arrests, was forced to resign in 1982 and now lives in Portugal.

Boebion also reported that the army is using the Pope's visit to carry out a security sweep. Informed sources told him that several dozen people suspected of links with the armed resistance were arrested in May, June and July this year. While the governor admitted there had been 27 arrests in connection with the Pope's visit, Bishop told him at least 55 people had been arrested "to prevent a possible insurrection". He added: "We are only aware of some cases because the families of many of those arrested are scared to confide in us. People know that if they come to see the bishop, they will have problems." [AFP, 5 September 1989]

Timorese clergy support Belo's referendum call

Confounding senior Indonesian officials backed by Mgr Canalini, the Vatican's ambassador in Jakarta, who claim that Bishop Belo, Apostolic Administrator, spoke purely as an individual when he called for a referendum in February 1989, the clergy of Timor issued a statement in July insisting that the Church is entitled to have its say on a variety of human situations in which the dignity of individuals and society is at stake. "We are not requesting the right to speak, we are requesting the right to be heard."

They said that the Bishop "spoke on his own behalf and as head of the Timorese church... in complete accord with church doctrine and with recent pontifical teachings".

The clergy of Dili reject those pernicious views and suggestions which go against the spirit and doctrine of the Church as manifested by certain ecclesiastical personalities and by those who have been manipulated. The Bishop is the representative of the Church,

theologically, juridically and ecclesiastically, and when he speaks in that capacity, in accordance with the Church and in line with the feelings of the clergy and of the people, he acts with an authority that must be respected and taken into account.

The clergy said they had not signed their names on the statement in order to be able to continue to work at the side of our people. The document was made public by the Lisbon-based organisation, Peace is Possible in East Timor which added that it was obtained through Catholic Church channels whose authenticity is beyond question.

Christian solidarity

The Fifth Christian Consultation on East Timor, held in Brussels from 5 - 9 September 1989 and attended by some thirty Christian organisations from Belgium, France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland and the UK, studied the human rights situation in East Timor. It took note in particular of the call by Bishop Belo, supported by the Timorese clergy, for a referendum in East Timor.

With regard to the Pope's visit to East Timor, it expressed concern that, though legitimate from a pastoral point of view, the visit will be used by the Indonesian government for political ends. The Consultation recalled the Pope's position from 1984 onwards when he told two Indonesian ambassadors of his hope that "the ethnic, religious and cultural identity of the people will receive special attention".

The Consultation deplored the fact that the Pope's visit has been prepared by Indonesian political and religious authorities without consulting the Timorese clergy and faithful. As a result, the language of Timor's people, Tetum is unlikely to be used in the mass which the Pope will celebrate, and the visit itself will last a few hours, too short to permit him or his numerous advisers, or the press corps, to inform themselves about the situation in the territory.

It should also be noted that at Taci-Tolu, the site chosen for celebrating the eucharist, thousands of Timorese were executed by Indonesian soldiers.

It was the hope of the Consultation that the Pope would encourage the organisers of his tour to take more notice of the wishes of the Timorese Church and visit East Timor *after* his visit to Indonesia. The Pope should respond to the cry of the Timorese people, remembering the call to justice contained in the message of the Gospel.

The Consultation sent a message of solidarity to Mgr Belo and the clergy of East Timor and appealed to all those who accompany John Paul II on his pastoral visit to East Timor to bear in mind the tragic situation of the Timorese people and the manipulative use which the Indonesian authorities will almost certainly make of this occasion.

Mass to be celebrated in Indonesian?

Apart from these problems, there is the brevity of the Pope's half-hour visit to Dili to meet privately with the local clergy and consecrate the cathedral opened by President Suharto last November. This cathedral is unpopular with Timorese because it was built with Indonesian funds and military support.

As for the language of the mass, some sources say that, to be 'politically neutral', the Pope may use Latin for the general part of the mass. The Human Rights Office of Australian Council for Overseas Aid says however all the masses in Indonesia and in East Timor will be conducted Indonesian.

The Indonesian church is urging the Pope to kiss the ground only in Jakarta and not in East Timor.*

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
Glasnost, Suharto style

Inspired by democratic openings in some parts of the world, several Indonesian oppositionists and intellectuals have tried to make this global trend an issue in Indonesia. Since June *keterbukaan* (opening-up) has been front-page news, with statements by well-known public figures and political commentators. So, how has *glasnost* Indonesia-style fared?

Keterbukaan in the Indonesian context.

It all started with the now infamous remark in Suharto's autobiography that he might step down in 1993 because of old age. Although nobody who knows anything about Indonesian politics takes Suharto's statement seriously, it was used by his opponents to launch a succession debate and gradually the *keterbukaan* theme started grabbing the headlines.

The first salvo was fired in Parliament (DPR), usually one of the most boring places in the republic. The Second Commission headed by Major-General Samsuddin invited bigshots like General Soemitro and General Murdiono to air their views on *keterbukaan*. Soemitro, regarded in the early 1970s as Indonesia's second most powerful man, propagated a more liberal system in preparation for the post-Suharto period. This retired general, creator of Buru prison-island, now promotes himself as a champion of democracy. Soemitro assumes that Suharto will step down in 1993. He appealed to the DPR to use its legislative powers to control the government. He said the time was ripe for *keterbukaan* and proposed that opposing views should be allowed to exist, and decisions taken by voting.



Soemitro's support for voting would mean rejecting the Javanese concept of *musyawarah*. Though described as consensus, in reality *musyawarah* means that decisions are imposed from above and taken unanimously. *Musyawarah* has been the cornerstone of Indonesian politics since the Sukarno era when he installed the authoritarian Guided Democracy in 1959. He ditched the western principle of majority decision-making and replaced it with *musyawarah*, allegedly unearthed from Indonesia's own traditions. When Suharto took over, the *musyawarah* principle was boosted. Now Soemitro says he favours the voting system, restoring majority decision-making and implicitly advocating the existence of an opposition. There is no place for minority opinion in the corporatist Pancasila model of the Orde Baru.

The *keterbukaan* discussion became more interesting when historian Dr Onghokham joined in, arguing that the existence of an opposition is only natural and the ban on opposition or the right to differ weakens the Indonesian people. [*Media Indonesia*, 19

August 1989] Other academics like MT Arifin and Arief Budiman have discussed the structural imbalance of power. The rulers possess all the power while the people lack political power. *Keterbukaan*, Arief Budiman argues, means balancing the bargaining power of the people and the government. According to Arifin, all affairs in society are in the hands of bureaucrats in coalition with politicians. [*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 30 July 1989].

For a brief moment it seemed that a Parisian or Prague spring was blossoming in Indonesia but then came the response from Suharto and his men.

The empire strikes back

In July, President Suharto and ABRI commander General Try Sutrisno answered the critics to set things straight. One Sunday afternoon in Bali on 23 July, Suharto laid down the guidelines for political openness which must be obeyed by all Indonesians:

* There is no freedom without limits. Freedom of expression should be guided by sound and logical rational thinking.

* The state ideology Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and the GBHN (the Broad Outlines of State Policy) are the guiding principles for anybody wanting to present ideas in the context of political openness.

* Openness in presenting views or proposals should be linked with the public interest. People should therefore think carefully before expressing thoughts in public. Do not speak up only to discover later that these ideas are controversial in the light of the guiding principles.

* National unity should not be endangered by the free presentation of ideas. There should be an awareness of the need to avoid trying to ignite tribal, racial, and religious sensitivities, and sensitivity regarding differing levels of public welfare. If freedom of speech can cause national disintegration, it would be better to control it. (*Jakarta Post*, 25 July 1989).

Suharto had become the abortionist of Indonesian *glasnost*. Moreover, when elaborating the four guidelines, he was not the well-poised Javanese gentleman; he was edgy and bad-tempered. Indeed, political observers note that, lately, he has frequently suffered from fits of anger.

A few days earlier Commander Try Sutrisno spent four hours in Parliament explaining that *keterbukaan* is nothing new, it has existed all the time, regulated in the military doctrine of 1974. He explained that the armed forces seminar in 1974 accepted a doctrine defining the Indonesian state as a *negara kekeluargaan* (state based on the family principle). Open democracy has existed in the villages since the start of the republic. (*Kompas*, 20 July 1989). Whether or not he realises it, the ABRI commander's corporatist, paternalistic model is very close to Hitler's fascist concept.

Those who thought they could take *keterbukaan* seriously were soon to feel the consequences. General Soemitro who has a variety of business interests was suddenly accused of grabbing land for a mushroom factory. General Samsuddin, who had invited him to Parliament, was replaced as chair of Commission II. As

Arief Budiman had warned earlier, keterbukaan is lip service, a safety-valve for critics. Everything depends on what is happening in the higher echelons of the regime.

Conflicts at the top

The *Rapat Pimpinan ABRI (Rapim ABRI)* or Abri's Commanders Call, had its yearly gathering in mid August. This annual event is usually regarded as a major political event when the ABRI leadership together with the regional commanders work out strategy for the coming year. This year's gathering, held for the first time in ABRI's new headquarters in Cilangkap, took place as usual behind closed doors. Only the tip of the iceberg emerged when Try Sutrisno assured the President, in a report-back audience, that the ranks would "focus efforts on ensuring the continuity of the national leadership of the New Order". This has been given two interpretations. One suggests that Suharto still enjoys the support of the ABRI leadership and that the armed forces will back him for a sixth term, almost into the next century. The other suggests that today's ABRI leaders have reached a consensus for Suharto to leave office in 1993, to be replaced by somebody from their own ranks. But as everyone knows, this is largely speculative, as the generals remain tight-lipped.

Try Sutrisno also said that the armed forces will focus strongly on *sospol* and *intel* which means they are expecting more social unrest. The simple message is that there will be even more surveillance and oppression. A series of subversive trials in Jayapura, Lampung, Sumbawa, Jakarta and Bandung have started and the defendants can expect heavy sentences to set an example. (See several trial reports elsewhere in this Bulletin.)

Another reality is that the ABRI top brass often contradict each other and rumours persist of a drastic reshuffle of the ABRI leadership. Both Defence Minister Benny Murdani and Try Sutrisno can be expected to play pivotal roles in the coming months.

Suharto's stern warning

With military leaders appearing more and more at cross purposes with each other, Suharto judged the time had come for a harsh warning. On the plane returning from a state visit to Moscow, he declared angrily: "I can be replaced any time if it's by constitutional means. If not, I'll clobber them (*digebuk*), whoever they are, generals or politicians". This unusually blunt language is reminiscent of his infamous March 1980 Cijantung speech, when he struck back at his foes within ABRI. Speaking off the cuff, Suharto can be much franker than on formal oc-



General Suharto, chatting with his two most trusted generals, Try Sutrisno (left) and Major-General Murdiono, shortly before the recent Commanders' Call. [Photo: *Tempo*, 19 August 1989]

casions. "What do they want? Maybe, they want to replace me quickly. That's okay as long as it is done according to the Constitution."

After the Cijantung speech, Suharto struck mercilessly at his enemies, ousting them and punishing some retired generals by strangulating their business interests and depriving them of government orders. This proved so effective that one general literally crawled in the dust and publicly begged forgiveness. Now again, retired and active officers are showing defiance and again Suharto is retaliating.

One major reason for Suharto's outburst was that the army leaders had convened their own commanders' call while he, the supreme commander of ABRI, and armed forces commander-in-chief Try Sutrisno were visiting the Kremlin. The army summit also took place behind closed doors, but Suharto loyalists are thought to have channelled information to him on his way home.

Glasnost, but only for the military

Indonesian glasnost is only an ABRI phenomenon and is out-of-bounds for civilians. Generally speaking, splits in army ranks do not come into the open; ABRI functions as a compact unit vis-a-vis civilians. At this very time, students in Jogja and Bandung are experiencing the effects of ABRI closing ranks. But a rift is becoming apparent over the succession issue. It is not clear where the lines of division start and end, whether Suharto enjoys enough support for another term, whether he is preparing somebody for the succession or whether the army top brass are determined to decide on the successor themselves.*

BAKORSTANAS STEPS IN

In the face of growing intransigence on the campuses (see page 10), the armed forces are going into action against the students. On 30 August, Bakorstanas, the security agency which replaced Kopkamtib last year but without its sweeping powers except in emergencies, instructed its regional agencies to take action against demonstrations and protests. General Try Sutrisno, 'chair' of Bakorstanas, ordered them to take "rapid, appropriate and comprehensive action to deal with any unrest". [*Suara Pembaruan*, 19/9/89]

On the day this was made public, General Murdani, former Kopkamtib commander, now Defence Minister, called for greater repression by insisting that students who go on the streets "shouting and protesting" must be arrested. "If their purpose is to snarl

STOP PRESS

up the traffic and read poetry, there is no alternative but to arrest them." He warned people not to come to the students' defence. [*Waspada*, 19 September]

A week later, Bakorstanas was formally assigned to end student unrest at ITB. [*Jakarta Post and Kompas*, 29 September] For the first time, Bakorstanas is being used operationally to deal with political unrest. At the same time, five university rectors, including Wiranto Arismunandar of ITB, were sent abroad, leaving the way free for the army to assert its will on the campuses. Education Minister, Fuad Hassan was quoted as saying there was no need for "outside intervention" in the campuses but he appears to have been overruled.

Reining in the NGOs

Lately, President Suharto has been prone to frequent outbursts of anger. Criticism of his policies is growing, both at home and abroad. Efforts to clean up his international image have failed.

His visit to the US to receive the UN Population Award was marred by protest from many non-government organisations (NGOs) from many parts of the world. His visit to President Bush was an occasion for 118 members of Congress to raise human rights concerns about East Timor. On top of this, Bush and US Treasurer Brady reacted coldly to Suharto's pleas for help to solve Indonesia's growing debt burden.

All this was too much for the usually softspoken and well-mannered Javanese general. A leak of the minutes of the 5 July cabinet session shows that Suharto was in a rage, accusing Indonesian NGOs of creating a bad image for Indonesia. Suharto is apparently convinced that mounting criticism abroad is due to information sent by Indonesian NGOs to their counterparts in Europe, the US and Australia.

The 'LSMs', a special breed of NGOs

In the last fifteen years, social, political and religious activities have shifted from formal bodies like parliament or the political parties to new organisations, now called *Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat* (LSM) or 'self-reliant social institutes'. In the mid seventies, NGOs consisted mainly of legal aid bureaus and appropriate technology groups and were known as *organisasi non-pemerintah* (ORNOP) or non-governmental organisations. But gradually ornops grew in number, variety and aims, proliferating like vegetation in a tropical forest. The change in name to LSM is a setback. Using Sanskrit words like *swadaya* is a deliberate form of depoliticisation, like the change from *buruh* (worker) to *karyawan* (functionary). By renaming NGOs as LSMs, their identity as organisations outside government control has been blurred.

Present-day LSMs cannot be put into one basket. In the early days, their motivation was primarily idealistic, raising people's consciousness, equipping them with knowledge to face corrupt officials or improving their livelihood by means of small-scale, self-help projects at the village level. Now, idealism has given way to pragmatism. There are many new LSMs, often indirectly linked with Golkar, the government party.

As in much of the industrialised world, some development aid is channelled through NGOs. Church organisations have a long tradition of channelling money to counterparts in third world countries. At present it is impossible to characterise Indonesian LSMs; some still function like the old NGOs, voicing criticism of government projects and policies. But others are merely community developers, shunning social criticism and functioning more or less as an extension of government.

A new expression, *Bingo*, for 'Big NGO' has emerged. Bingos are based in Jakarta and receive most of their funds from external sources. As the projects are often in rural areas, they sub-contract projects to small NGOs. In the 1980s, "small is beautiful" has given way to "the necessity of growth", nurturing a new caste of BINGO managers, skilled at dealing with western funding agencies. Submitting projects has become a profession in itself. NGO jobs are like any other job; the network of funding agencies, development workers and NGOs have created a world of their own. They

know each other and meet regularly at international conferences and seminars.

INGI, a revolutionary organisation?

One network to emerge in the eighties is the *International NGO Forum on Indonesia*, known as INGI. Established in 1985, it includes many LSMs and a wide range of NGOs from different countries. Its aims are:

- a. To endeavour to ensure that the Inter Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) takes full account of, and positive action on, important issues affecting poor and disadvantaged groups in Indonesia;
- b. To strengthen and broaden peoples' participation in development, especially in Indonesia.

From the start it was clear that sensitive human rights issues like abuses in East Timor or the treatment of ex-political prisoners would be avoided. Some Indonesian BINGOs insisted on this, as it would otherwise mean "delivering us into the hands of the military". Since its birth, INGI has devoted attention to the way development is being implemented; it has met the IGGI chairperson and communicated with the European Community Commission. It has avoided radical language, and aims to give positive input to IGGI governments. Surely nothing could be farther removed from revolutionary ideals.

Hence, it came as quite a shock, for Suharto to start scapegoating INGI, and accusing it of damaging Indonesia's good image abroad. What angered him in particular was a letter sent by the INGI meeting in Brussels this year to the World Bank regarding the Kedung Ombo dam. The letter called on the Bank's president, Barber Conable to seek a comprehensive solution for the victims of the dam. It should be noted that long before this, numerous organisations all over the world, largely at TAPOL's instigation, had already written letters of protests on the same issue.

The leaked minutes of the 5 July cabinet session

*East Timor: to be liberated or
to be exterminated;
that is the question*

by: *Pedro Pinto Leite*

edited by: *XminusY, Komitee Indonesië,
Oost-Timor Groep Nederland*

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noted that before the IGGI meeting, a meeting of NGOs took place (the INGI Brussels meeting) including LSMs, which was "very damaging for Indonesia". The Department of Home Affairs was instructed to approach the LSMs and "make them understand that what they did was reprehensible for the development of the nation". The hunting season for LSMs was on.

"Right or wrong my country"

Armed Forces Commander General Try Sutrisno was one of the first to join the hunt. Indonesians attending seminars overseas, he said, should not paint a dark picture of their own country and take the stand: "Right or wrong my country". Ludicrous though this may sound elsewhere, in nationalistic Indonesia this outdated expression is now official policy.

In hot pursuit came Interior Minister, General Rudini, threatening to ban LSMs or take them to court if they went on tarnishing the name of the country.

The retired general alleged that the Indonesians who attended the INGI conference were influenced by others (read: non-Indonesians) whose understanding of human rights differs from Indonesia's. "The understanding of human rights is determined by the national philosophy of a state," he said. (*Jakarta Post*, 14 August 1989). Rudini should realise that only totalitarian states go in for state philosophies.

Representatives from 23 LSMs were summoned to meet him, but even beforehand, some were showing signs of angst, and publicly apologised. At the meeting, Rudini behaved like a father-figure, insisting that one should not "wash one's dirty linen in public". He proposed the creation of a permanent forum for communication between the government and the LSMs. This seemingly innocuous proposal can mean that non-governmental organisations will soon lose whatever independence they still enjoy.*

STUDENT PROTESTS

Students fight militarisation of campus

The "5 August event" in Bandung is escalating by the day. It started with a student demonstration against the militarisation ('politicisation', as the students call it) of the campus grounds. The military, working closely with the Rector of the ITB (Bandung Institute of Technology), have retaliated harshly.

The P4 Pancasila course and General Rudini

On 5 August the compulsory Pancasila course (P4) was to start for the new batch of students. The day before, students organised in *Forum Komunikasi Himpunan Jurusan, (FKHJ)*, Communication Forum of Faculties, decided in a mass meeting to reject the visit of Interior Minister General Rudini. They were angry that the ITB authorities had not told them that he would officially inaugurate the P4 course.

General Rudini has lately become one of the regime's most notorious and controversial figures. As Interior Minister, heading the most militarised ministry, Rudini holds a key position in the cabinet. Formerly a low profile, professional soldier, he ended his army career as army chief-of-staff in 1985. It was a bit of a surprise for many that two years later, Rudini was taken out of obscurity by Suharto and appointed to this influential post. Rudini soon started to remould his rather drab image and became known as a great communicator. For a while, it seemed that Rudini was backing student protesters and rebellious peasants in Kedung Ombo and Cimacan, but very soon it turned out that Rudini was just using the 'letting off steam' method, so as then to take a firm stand against their just demands. The students realise now that Rudini is functioning as a Suharto front-man. In this light, his visit to the ITB campus was seen as an affront to the neutrality of the campus.

The 5 August demonstration

Although the student action was prepared at very short notice, the effect was devastating. Posters, banners and second-hand tires had been prepared, and just as Rudini was about to ascend the podium, 17 student representatives unfurled posters and demonstratively walked out while a spokesperson read a statement rejecting "outside forces that are trying to use this occasion for unhealthy political interests, as an individual or a group". The statement rejected Rudini's presence on campus and urged the ITB authorities to be more cautious towards manoeuvres

by certain political interests.

Outside, the 17 were cheered and hailed by hundreds of student demonstrators. Posters and banners were unfurled and at strategic spots bonfires were started, using old rubber tires.

Arrests and expulsions

In face of such a protest, ITB Rector Wiranto Arismunandar was furious. Two days later, he issued



This is the most popular T-shirt in Bandung these days. 'D.O.' now means not 'drop-out' but 'dropped-out' or expelled. "No to expulsions."

a circular complaining that he had been disgraced (*dipermalukan*) by the students and would impose severe sanctions, preventing the culprits from attending classes. But his fury may not have been spontaneous. Wiranto is a cousin of Mrs Tien Suharto and his brother, Major-General Wismoyo Arismunandar is commander of the key Central Java division, Diponegoro. It is not unlikely that his response was prompted by a call from the presidential palace.

On the same day, two activists were abducted from their homes by 10 unidentified persons. The next day it was revealed that the plainclothes abductors were *Bakorstanasda* officers. This new security agency, which replaced the infamous *Kopkamtib* last year, was clearly defined then as having no operational capaci-

ties. With the abduction of Arnold Purba and Moh. Jumhur Hidayat, the difference between the two security bodies has been made to look cosmetic.

Even more upsetting, the two students were illegally detained at the Bakorstanasda office. According to KUHAP, the procedural code, suspects can only be detained for interrogation by the police. A student delegation tried to meet the two detainees but was rebuffed by heavily-armed security troops. In the next few days, more students were taken into custody by Bakorstanasda including Bambang SLN, Abdul Subur, Wijaya Santosa and Amarsyah. At the moment of writing 11 students are still in custody. The LBH, the Legal Aid Institute which has been asked to represent the students, has been refused access.

Meanwhile, Rector Wiranto started implementing his threats by expelling nine students. More than 20 students have now been expelled while 11 others have been given severe warnings. The Rector has rather unconventional ways of disciplining his students. As in soccer, students are given yellow and red cards. One yellow card denotes a severe warning and two yellows are equivalent to a red card or expulsion, for which the term is *di-DO* (drop-out).

Solidarity growing

Student activists are now beginning to realise that solidarity actions in favour of ousted peasants in Kedung Ombo or Cimacan, which do not directly confront the military, may not be dealt with violently. But as soon a military man is targeted, ABRI closes ranks and behaves with its customary zeal.

Nearly a month passed before the first solidarity action was launched. Then Theodorus Jacobus Koekerits, known to his friends as Ondos, a geology student in his final year, started a hunger strike on 4 Sep-

STUDENT PROTESTS

tember, followed by Meiyani and Denni. Others who quickly followed were Amarsyah (in detention in Bakorstanasda), Moy-Moy, Jhoni, Erick, Wawan, Haris, Farvita, Lendo, Suprianto, Rachman and Dwito, who went on strike for one or several days. Ondos, the first Indonesian to stage a hunger strike for a social-political issue, continued to refuse food for seventeen days. On 21 September, in a condition of extreme weakness, he was taken to hospital, leaving Meiyani and Denni to continue with their hunger strikes.

On the sixth day of Ondos' strike, a huge rally was held on the ITB basket-ball pitch, the traditional place for student rallies. Ondos was carried to the rally by two students, to address the 1,500 students. "If we let people trample on others' rights, it's the same as being trampled upon ourselves", he told the crowd, gathered to mourn 'the death of democracy at ITB'. For the FKHJ, Saritomo read out a statement "breaking off relations with ITB, suspending learning activities and launching a boycott of classes". So far, 16 of the 24 faculty associations, accounting for about 3,000 of the 7,000 students at ITB, have joined the boycott. Not all ITB students are members of these associations but it is estimated that about half now support the boycott. [Editor, 23 September]

Students in Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi have also launched actions in solidarity with the ITB students. Eleven students started a hunger strike on campus. Student senates from teachers' training colleges (IKIP) in eleven university cities met and issued a statement of solidarity with ITB students and denounced the brutalities of the army and Bakorstanas.

Medieval sentences for Jogja students

The trials of the two Bambang (see Tapol Bulletin no 93 & 94) ended in September with harsh sentences of 7 and 8 years. Bambang Subono, whose only 'crime' was to sell banned books, responded to his 7-year sentence on 7 September by shouting at the judges: "Only for selling books of literature, I'm getting 7 years!" A day later, Bambang Isti Nugroho, whose crime was to lead a study group, was given an 8-year sentence. Both will appeal.

Jogja students protest

Since the start of the trials, student activists in Jogja have used the courtroom as a rallying point. At all the hearings, the court-rooms were packed with students. Reports, leaflets and articles about the trials were produced and circulated to other universities. Showcase trials for the government, the Bambang trials have become a symbol of injustice for many students. A group, *Kelompok Solidaritas Korban Penguasa*, Group of Solidarity with Regime Victims was set up to give the defendants all possible support; it was composed of students from leading university cities in Java: Jakarta, Surabaya, Salatiga, Solo, Bogor, Jogja and Semarang.

Subono's verdict caused uproar, anger and dismay in the public gallery. After the verdict was announced, 150 students conducted a march from Sunan Kalijaga IAIN, a Muslim tertiary college, to the Jogjakarta District Court going through all the major streets in the city.

Another bloody incident

The next day, Friday, a crowd three times as big assembled outside the court building to await Isti Nugroho's verdict. Security forces were fully prepared and a combined force of the police, mobile brigade and army, equipped with semi-automatic



Students protesting against the bloody attack by armed troops on students demonstrating against the sentencing of the two Bambang. Their banner reads: "Commemorating Bloody Jogja." [Editor, 23 September 1989]

rifles, stood guard round the building. At noon, the trial adjourned, and the students said Friday prayers. Halim, a student activist from IAIN Kalijaga, leading the prayers, said judges should use their common sense and mete out justice, while the prosecution and military intelligence should not use dirty methods. Halim was later arrested. In the afternoon, Isti Nugroho's 8-year verdict was announced, again giving vent to emotion and anger.

Some students shouted: "Let's go to the DPRD (local assembly)". As they started marching, security forces trapped them from all directions. The students were encircled and started singing revolutionary songs. The security forces moved in, used tear gas and started striking out at the peaceful protestors with rifles and bayonets, men and women alike. At least fifteen students were arrested, including three women. Bystanders were also beaten and kicked. Many people were injured, five of them seriously.

Later that evening a Student Defence Team was set up to trace the whereabouts of students who had been injured and check up on those who had been arrested. At around midnight, the police announced that 29 students were being held. Three injured students were located in Panti Rapih hospital.

After being interrogated, it seems that all the students were released.*

HUMAN RIGHTS

IPU pressure wins release for jailed MP

Siti Abdulrahman Sundari, Indonesia's longest-serving woman political prisoner, was released from prison on 17 August. Her release was given widespread publicity in the press, suggesting that it came as the result of pressure from abroad. At the time of her release, she was 68 years old.

Siti Sundari had been a political activist since before the war and in 1945, entered a youth organisation in Semarang, later becoming chair of the Semarang Working Women's Association. She was a founding member of the leftwing women's organisation, Gerwis, which later became Gerwani (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia* or Indonesian Women's Movement), one of the many organisations that was banned, along with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), when the military took power in 1965. From 1951, she was a member of Gerwani's Executive Council.

In the 1955 general elections, she stood as a candidate for the Communist Party and was elected to Parliament. She became a member of the party's Central Committee in 1964 and was in its Women's Affairs Department.

Siti Sundari was arrested in 1968 in Lampung, South Sumatra where she was active underground after fleeing from Jakarta in October 1965 at the time of the mass arrests. She was not tried until October 1976 when she received a life sentence; the sentence was later commuted to twenty years.

MPs attend her release ceremony

Sundari's release was given unusually high-profile attention. Four members of Parliament were at the prison to attend the release ceremony, among them Soesatyo Mardi and Theo Sambuaga, the chair and deputy chair of BKSAP, the inter-parliamentary group which handles relations between the Indonesian Parliament and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and parliaments worldwide.

Although high officials were on hand and must have known well in advance of Sundari's release, members of her family who came to greet her and take her home had been taken completely by surprise. They told the press that they heard nothing about her release until the night before. [*Suara Karya*, 22 August 1989]

The Public Relations chief of the armed forces, Brig-General Nurhadi issued a statement insisting that Sundari had been released because "she has properly fulfilled the conditions for release". It was hotly denied that her release had anything to do with pressure from the IPU although Sambuaga admitted that the IPU has been pressing for her release for the past ten years.

Despite all these protestations, it is clear that

international pressure saved Sundari from another six or seven years in prison. In November 1984, when members of Parliament visited Tangerang Prison where she was held, to investigate conditions there, she used the occasion to tell journalists that her 20-year sentence did not permit any deduction for the eight years she spent in detention prior to her trial in 1976. This meant that she was not due for release until 1996, by which time she would be 75 years old. [*Sinar Harapan*, 23 November 1984]

Now however, to confuse matters and conceal the role of international pressure, it is being stated not that her life sentence was commuted to 20 years but that it was changed to "temporary punishment" (*hukuman sementara*), a term that appears to have been specially invented for the occasion, so as not to let it be known that international pressure had any bearing on her case.

Her release came just a couple of weeks before this year's IPU conference in London from 3 till 9 September. As *Tempo* comments: "Sundari's release will lift the pressure on the Indonesian delegation, led by Kharis Suhud, speaker of Parliament, which is leaving for London this month to attend the IPU meeting in London." According to Marzuki Darusman, a Golkar MP who also witnessed Sundari's release at Tangerang, "this is very good for Indonesia's image abroad". [*Tempo*, 2 September 1989]

Death Sentence prisoner dies in prison

Anastsius Buang, a political prisoner arrested on 5 October 1965, who was sentenced to death in November 1969 and has thus spent the past twenty years with a death sentence hanging over him, died in Cipinang Prison in late August. He was 49 years old.

He is understood to have died after contracting angina and passed away while a fellow prisoner was administering a traditional form of medicine. Members of his family are believed to have asked for an autopsy, to determine the cause of death.

Buang was a low-ranking soldier attached to the Cakrabirawa palace guard in 1965, and was a member of one of the units which, acted under orders, kidnapped seven army generals, whose subsequent murders led to the military seizure of power and the crackdown and massacre of hundreds of thousands of communist suspects.*

Indonesia under fire at the UN in Geneva

For the Lampung massacre

Speaking at the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on behalf of the Regional Council on Human Rights in Asia, and deputising for H.J. Princen who was unable to attend (see page 4) Jusfiq Hadjar gave details of the massacre of villagers in Talang Sari, Lampung. The authorities admitted that 27 persons were shot dead (others have put the death toll far higher) though no-one was able to check the facts as the area was closed to outsiders after the massacre. He also spoke about the widespread destruction and burning down of houses and crops in Pulau Panggung last November and again from March till May this year [see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 94, August 1989].

Concluding his statement, Hadjar called on the Sub-Commission:

1. to ask the Indonesian authorities to permit freedom of movement and allow Mr Princen to travel abroad as he wishes, and come to Geneva for future meetings of the Commission and Sub-Commission,
2. to back the request by the Legal Aid Foundation and the Institute for the Defence of Human Rights for an independent commission of inquiry to be set up to investigate the events in Talang Sari in February and the events in Pulau Panggung.

Government's response

The Indonesian observer delegation responded to Hadjar's statement, avoiding any mention of the refusal of the government to permit Princen to come to Geneva. (Any mention of this, whether to admit that he had been refused a permit or to deny it, would only have made matters worse for the government.)

On the Lampung events, the delegation only repeated the government's version of the killings and said: "The Government of Indonesia has completed its full investigation of the so-called Lampung incident. Ten of those responsible are in the process of being brought to trial in an open court and will be dealt with in accordance with due process of law." So much for their response to the call for an independent commission of inquiry!



For discrimination against ex-tapols

Speaking at the Sub-Commission on behalf of the London-based NGO, *Liberation*, Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL once again called attention to the systematic discrimination against 1.4 million former political prisoners and their families. "They are denied their civil rights, the right to a job, to freedom of movement and association and to take part in public life. They are outcasts with no legal redress... Without international action, they will spend the rest of their days as victims of a system that violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," she said.

She gave recent examples of this discrimination:

* Ex-prisoners must carry identity cards marked 'ET' to help local authorities keep track of their whereabouts and activities. Following an announcement by the Jakarta Municipality that there are 8,597 people with 'ET'-coded identity cards in the capital [*Merdeka*, 1 March 1989], J.C. Princen, director of the Institute for the Defence of Human Rights in Jakarta wrote to the Municipality saying: "This amounts to a verdict of guilty without any process in a court of law, in violation of Articles 1 to 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."

* Villagers in Central Java recently complained to the Jogjakarta Legal Aid Institute that, because their own cards are marked 'ET', their children and even their grandchildren "have been refused jobs in government departments and face a bleak future". [*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 16 February 1989]

* Students at a teacher training college in Semarang were required to take a 'clearance test' set by the security agency to vouchsafe their 'clean environment' before completing their course. "It is better to vet them now," said the Rector, "and avoid problems later on when they apply for jobs." [*Tempo*, 8 April 1989]

* Applicants for jobs in the North Sumatra administration were questioned about the political affiliations of their parents and grandparents before being appointed. [*Waspada*, 1 February 1989]

* The West Sumatra Education Department requires all new employees to produce a 'Clean Environment Certificate' (*Surat Keterangan Bersih Lingkungan*) before their appointment can be approved. [See: "Announcement of the West Sumatra Education Department No. 11.635/106.1.2/C-1988"]

* Dozens of employees at the Surabaya Waterworks were dismissed, with more dismissals to come, because they were found to be 'politically unclean' [*Jawa Pos*, 1 February 1989].

* Three film stars have been banned from making any more appearances on television, on suspicion of being 'politically unclean'. [*Jawa Pos*, 1 January 1989] The executive director for seventeen years of the Gajah Mada University Press was forced to resign for the same reason.

* Members of Commission II of Parliament acknowledge that the 'clean environment' criterion has an deleterious effect on the promotion prospects of government employees. [Jawa Pos, 6 July 1989]

She called on the Sub-Commission to appoint a special rapporteur to investigate this discrimination. It should also call on the Indonesian Government,

- to rehabilitate everyone suspected of pre-1965 involvement in organisations banned in 1965,
- to abandon all schemes to classify citizens according to their (alleged) political beliefs, and

- to revoke all regulations which infringe their civil rights.

Government's response

The Indonesian observer delegation claimed in reply that "practically all of those who were suspected and detained following the abortive (sic) coup have been set free and reintegrated into society." Unable to refute the cases mentioned in testimony to the Sub-Commission, the observer delegation then said: "There may however be some over-zealous officials who have interpreted (the screening required for members of the armed forces) to cover the 'clean person' and 'clean environment' concepts, but in no way does this constitute official government policy."*

How the 'sins' of a father destroyed a career

[The following letter was published in *Kompas* on 12 February 1989, in the Personal Advice column of Leila Ch. Budiman.]

Dear Leila,
Because of the *bersih lingkungan* (clean environment) issue, I have experienced a tragic fate. I should have been able to overcome this by myself, but the longer the problem drags on, the more complex things become. I feel more and more isolated, often confused. I feel as if people are distancing themselves from me. I know many sympathise and feel sorry for me. But all they can do is shrug their shoulders.

My father, a WNI (an ethnic Chinese Indonesian citizen), was well off and helped any organisation that came to him for support. My mother says the PKI managed to persuade my father to join the party though he had only been to primary school and didn't fully understand their aims.

In 1965 he was arrested. His business was taken over and our family became destitute. As he was unable to adjust to prison life, he died that year, leaving several young children behind. Fortunately, my mother had never joined anything so she was able to look after us and became a petty trader.

Thanks to her efforts, we all went to school. After leaving school, the older children went to work so as to pay for the younger children's schooling. I was the most fortunate; I completed my education and took a degree.

As a student I was quite innovative, and the university took advantage of my skills. My background made me avoid joining anything, especially organisations with political tendencies, on or off-campus. I only joined the professional organisation associated with my own discipline. I was terrified of supporting anything, in deed or in thought, except for making donations to religious foundations. I shunned politics. My mother, brothers and sisters always urged me to work hard in my own field.

I was very successful in my profession and took charge of several departments. But, because of *bersih lingkungan*, everything has collapsed. Everything I was proud of has faded, it's all just a memory.

I was asked to resign from my chief post, half retaining the other posts. But I submitted my resignation. I calmly faced everything without blaming

anybody, thinking that maybe I would some day get my reward, but when it came, it was totally unexpected. My girl-friend started distancing herself from me. I remained resolute, even proud to be on my own, which spared me all the hypocrisy, including the hypocrisy of my girl-friend. I was still in good spirits but my room for manoeuvre was extremely limited.

I am willing to be tested in Pancasila ideology and the 1945 Constitution. I have attended a 120-hour indoctrination course on Pancasila ideology (P4). Everyone knows that although my father was involved in the PKI, I was only 9 years old when he died. I was never under communist influence because I understood nothing. I didn't even like politics. I never raised any questions. I accepted things as they were.

Leila, the worst thing is that I feel as if I have been cheated. I feel all alone. I feel as if everyone is rejecting me. I was ordered to leave town and find work elsewhere, as if people were afraid of my presence. I felt I was being blamed for something though I blamed no-one for anything. I became confused, afraid to work, afraid to get married, even though I was getting on in years. I cannot forget how my girl-friend left me. Being a civil servant, she was afraid that my difficulties would rub off on her.

I work for a small firm connected with my family but I am sick at heart, because I am not working in my own profession. It's as if I've been told to burn all the books I ever had or read, as if I've been told not to be creative, not to think, only to work hard.

I am confused. I don't blame anyone. Is this right? What should I do? What is it all about?*



Subversion trials, an unending saga

In mid August, Attorney General Sukarton Marmosudjono announced that 46 trials will soon start, all under the Anti-Subversion Law of 1963. As all those previously tried under this draconian law know from their own experience, sentences are invariably severe and defendants face extreme pressure and intimidation, and have no chance of getting a fair trial.


Muslim trials

The majority of the 46 accused will be Muslim defendants, facing trial in places like Bandar Lampung, Jakarta, Bima and Bandung.

In the Lampung case, according to public prosecutor's office, 14 people will be tried. The Lampung massacre, or the *Cihideung* Affair as the government now calls it, was perpetrated last February; it was primarily a land conflict between the military authorities and the local people. The local army commander, Captain Sutiman who was known locally as a man of brutal habits and frequently inflicted physical punishment on villagers, was killed during one of the clashes. The military retaliated, sending in troops from Jakarta and at least 100 villagers were massacred on the spot; others managed to escape. The military have picked on a Muslim group based in the area as the culprits, identifying them as subversives.

Warsidi, a popular local preacher was the leader of the 'plot' otherwise known as *Jamaah Mujahidin Fisabilillah* (for a full account, see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 92) and was apparently killed during the raid. Alleged followers of his who will be tried include Zamzuri bin Moch. Roji, 46, accused of killing Sergeant-Major Soedargo; Marsudi bin Martoprawiro, 50, older brother of Warsidi; Jayus bin Karmo, 38, accused of giving the rebels lodgings; and Fadillah alias Wiryo Sugito, 30, accused of leading the attack on the Military District Office on 9 February, two days after the bloodbath. Two other suspects are M. Mushonif bin Ahmad Marzuki, 24, and Abadi Abdullah Siswomartono, 32, both from a small Muslim pesantren school in Central Java, the Ngruki Pesantren. In the last few years, this school has frequently been branded as the base for an alleged subversive Muslim movement known by the name *Usroh*. Other defendants are Sri Haryadi Sofyan, Harianto bin Yusuf, Sugeng Yulianto bin Harto Irjojo and Nurdiansyah bin Yasak.

In the capital, Jakarta 7 people will be tried, allegedly involved in a group called *Komando Mujahidin Fisabilillah*, led by Nur Hidayat alias Abdullah, an immigration officer and well known as one of Indonesia's finest karate sportsmen. The seven were arrested in late February and accused of planning economic instability by attacking important trade



centres like Glodok and Pasar Pagi. Besides Nur Hidayat, three others names were made public: Fauzi, 22, Abdul Fattah Kasim, 48, and Maulana Abdul Latief, 32.

The third group to go on trial are defendants from the isle of Sumbawa, allegedly involved in a revolt that took place in the same period. The events in Bima, the region where the clash took place, are still shrouded in mystery. Quite important local Muslim leaders will be put on trial: Haji Abdul Gani Masjkur, 63, chair of the Muhammadiyah branch and lecturer in Arabic at the Muhammadiyah University, and M. Nur Husein, 60, Golkar representative in the local DPRD assembly. Two others are Ahmad Husein and Zainal Arifin.

Five suspects will be tried in Bandung: Emeng Abdurrachman, Sofiandi, Burhanuddin, Irin Sobirin and Syaiful Malik accused of involvement in *NIJ* (*Negara Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Muslim State).

The Warsidi trials

On 20 September subversion trials started in the Bandar Lampung District Court against six defendants. The same charges were put against them, being involved in attacks and killings of a police officer a village head and a NCO soldier. Five of the six refused to be defended by a lawyer, only Sugeng Yulianto decided to accept a team of lawyers. The five others: Fadillah, Sri Haryadi, Harianto, Zamzuri and Munjaini alias Munjen commented that Allah and his Prophet would be sufficient to defend their rights.*

Indonesia: Muslims on trial

Published by TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

Since early 1985, more than 150 Muslims have been tried, convicted and sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment in Indonesia for giving public sermons critical of the government, conducting religious courses not approved by the authorities, or producing leaflets or journals that denounce government policy. Some were held responsible for bombing incidents that were never properly investigated.

The trials followed the army's crackdown on a demonstration of Muslims in September 1984. Dozens, possibly even hundreds, were killed when troops opened fire on the unarmed crowd. The trials took place at a time of deep disquiet in Indonesia about the military government's imposition of total ideological conformity, preventing organisations from proclaiming Islamic or other religious principles.

Indonesia: Muslims on trial analyses the trials, placing them in the context of the continuing conflict between Indonesia's Muslims and the military regime.

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West Papuan nationalist gets 20 years

Dr Thomas Wainggai, the West Papuan nationalist who was arrested on 14 December 1989 during a mass act of defiance in Jayapura's sports stadium, has been sentenced to 20 years by the Jayapura District Court. Many of the other thirty-six who were detained with him, including his Japanese-born wife, Teruko, have also been tried and are awaiting sentence. Dr Wainggai is to appeal against this outrageous sentence.

From documents recently received, it is now clear that the flag-raising ceremony on 14 December was intended to be the proclamation of independence of a West Melanesian state. More than seventy West Papuans are known to have taken part in the event, including a number of Protestant ministers. According to the West Papuan People's Front in a statement at the UN (see below), the organisers of the event had sent invitations to the Governor, the military commander and police chief and other authorities to attend. "The Indonesian authorities did not react (to) the invitations and instead arrested many of the participants."

Until now, it has been very difficult to learn anything about the trials. Because of widespread public interest in the hearings which attracted large crowds eager to follow the proceedings outside the courtroom, the location of the trial was moved to a military base on the outskirts of Jayapura. Some 2,000 people tried to attend the earlier hearings; the fifty who were allowed into the courtroom were accompanied by 70 security personnel.

While the trial was in progress, there were no reports of the proceedings in the Indonesian press, only an announcement by the Attorney-General that 'TW' was on trial for subversion. According to *Jakarta*



Dr Thomas Wainggai on trial in Jayapura. [*Tempo*, 16 September 1989]

Post, [11 September], at the end of the trial, the judges decided to destroy evidence in the form of documents containing the text of the constitution for a Free Melanesian state and letters asking for the support of many UN member countries.

No defence documents have yet been received abroad though it is understood that Dr Wainggai and his wife defended West Papua's right to independence by recalling among other things that the preamble to the Indonesian Constitution says that every nation has the right to independence.

The local authorities were so sensitive about press interest in the trial that the BBC correspondent, Juliet Rix, who was in Jayapura when the verdict was announced, was asked to leave the territory because of a report she filed about the verdict. She was told by officials that the story of Tom Wainggai is "very secret" even though the sentencing had been reported by the official news agency and by at least two Jakarta dailies. [BBC report broadcast by the Indonesian-language service, 13 September 1989]

Attempts not to make the verdict public, at least in Jayapura, suggest that the authorities there are acutely embarrassed by the broad sympathy and support among West Papuans for what happened on 14 December. The 37 people who have been detained since 14 December include seven ministers of religion, of whom four are from the Pentecostal church.

Another four West Papuans from Serui were arrested in April this year for allegedly planning to raise the West Melanesian flag in Jayapura. They too are to be charged with subversion and are awaiting trial.

The Auckland-based *Pacific Concerns Resource Centre* issued an action alert on 11 August, calling for support for the West Papuan nationalists facing heavy sentences in Jayapura.

Appeal to the UN

From documents that have just become available, we now know that one month before the flag-raising ceremony on 14 December, Dr Wainggai, as chairman of the *Melanesian Independence Committee*, sent an appeal to the UN Secretary-General making the follow-

West Papua: The Obliteration of a People

The first two editions of this book appeared in 1983 and 1984. This third edition, published in response to continuing demand, has been substantially revised and updated, with new data on military operations, an appendix on the murder of the well-known West Papuan anthropologist, Arnold Ap, and recent information about the exploitation of West Papua's natural resources.

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West Papua: The Obliteration of a People



ing demands:

1. The UN should send a security-keeping force to West Melanesia before 14 December, the day of the proclamation of the independence of West Melanesia.
2. The UN should ask the Indonesian Government to peacefully withdraw all its military forces from West Melanesia before 14 December.
3. The UN should ask the Indonesian Government to repatriate all Indonesians residing and working in West Melanesia before 14 December.

The five-page document, copies of which were sent to 15 governments around the world, argues that West Melanesia is ready for independence; it has enough skilled personnel and enough resources as well as its own Constitution, National Flag, Anthem and development plan. The document is laced with biblical quotations, and proclaims that West Melanesia's State Motto is 'The Lord is my Shepherd'.

Dr Wainggai's background

Thomas Wainggai who was born in Ambal village, Serui, on 5 December 1937, has a distinguished academic background. He has been working for local government in Jayapura since 1959 when it was still a Dutch colony. His most recent post was on the staff of experts at the provincial planning board (Bappeda). He has three degrees, a law degree from Okaya State University, Japan (1969), a degree in Public Administration from New York State University (1981) and a Ph.D. in philosophy from Florida State University (1985).

He was also nominated as a candidate for governor of Irian Jaya when the position became vacant at the

WEST PAPUA

end of 1987 and succeeded in collecting a large number of signatures for his candidacy. [*Tempo*, 16 September]

West Papua at UN Working Group

In a statement to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, held in Geneva in August 1989, a representative of the OPM/West Papuan People's Front said that since 19 November 1969 when the General Assembly accepted the Secretary-General's report on the fraudulent 'plebiscite' in West Papua, the people of West Papua have continued to be colonised by Indonesia. "We have often heard the UN condemning European colonialism and South African racism, but it never seems to think of Asian colonialism and racism... We as Melanesians are being discriminated (against) and colonised by an Asian state, Indonesia."

It drew attention to the economic and cultural exploitation and political oppression of the Asmat people, to the sufferings inflicted on the Amungme people since the UN multinational Freeport copper mine was established in 1967 and warned that the 15,000 Auyu tribal people are likely to meet the same fate when Astra Scott Celulosa sets up eucalyptus plantations on their lands.

The People's Front called on the UN to resume its responsibility for West Papua from which it withdrew twenty years ago, asked for a special rapporteur to be sent to West Papua to investigate how the people's rights can be implemented, and asked for West Papua to be placed on the agenda of the UN Decolonisation Committee.*

Counter-insurgency flop in West Papua

A five month counter-insurgency operation in West Papua code-named *Operasi Rajawali* was launched earlier this year, not long after the present military commander of the region, Major-General Abinowo, took over command of the Cendrawasih Military command last February. This command covers the provinces of Irian Jaya (West Papua) and Maluku (the Moluccas).

On 1 August 1989, Abinowo, in an unusually high-profile statement about the operations, claimed that one OPM leader named as Elyas Awom had surrendered and another, named as Joel Demotokay, had been killed. This suggests that the operation has hardly been crowned with success. Moreover, Abinowo was surprisingly frank about the continued prevalence of what he called "separatist ideologies" not only in West Papua but also in the Moluccas. "We still need to be vigilant of the ideology of separatism which is called the South Moluccan Republic (RMS) and the Free Papua Movement (OPM), along with the latent communist danger." [*Suara Merdeka*, 2 August 1989]

[A claim made earlier that another OPM leader, Philemon Yarisetow, was also killed has since been strongly denied by West Papuan refugees in Papua New Guinea.]

The Abinowo statement has raised eyebrows in Jakarta. He was quoted as saying that *Operasi Rajawali* was aimed at "flushing out OPM units in the area close to the border with PNG". Yet one area mentioned by Abinowo is near Nabire in Paniai district which is nowhere near the border. [*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 August 1989]

PNG denial

Abinowo also claimed that Indonesian and PNG troops had mounted joint patrols along the border to destroy OPM units. This provoked a denial from Port Moresby where a Foreign Affairs official said that although there had been a request from Jakarta for joint patrols, it was rejected as PNG regards the OPM as an internal Indonesian problem. It refused to incorporate a clause about joint patrols when the two countries concluded a treaty of mutual respect in 1987. [*Post Courier*, 8 August 1989] Talks last July between Indonesia and PNG on border issues also failed to reach agreement on joint patrols. [*FEER*, 17 August 1989]*

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Resettlement threatens the Dani people

The authorities in West Papua are using an earthquake in the Baliem Valley as grounds for undertaking a mass re-settlement of Dani tribespeople to low-lying areas, within easy reach of government control.

The earthquake struck the district of Kurima on 1 August causing about 120 deaths with many wounded. Twelve days later, plans were announced to re-settle 4,000 Dani people along the site of the planned road connecting Jayapura and Wamena while the government said also that two geologists had been sent to the area, apparently to confirm that future earthquakes made such re-settlement unavoidable. [*Jakarta Post*, 14 August]

Juliet Rix in *The Observer* [1 October 1989] reports that 3,500 Dani will be re-settled in a programme that will eventually affect 43,000 tribespeople. But people who have been working in the area for many years warn that re-settling the mountainous Dani people in low-lying areas will render them vulnerable to malaria, causing far more deaths than any earthquake. They fear that, like past efforts to 'help' the tribespeople, this resettlement plan could go disastrous wrong. Official pledges to provide malaria prophylactics for the first six months or so can be given little credence, bearing in mind the inadequacy of medical facilities in the West Papuan interior.



Rix also reports that the government wants the Dani to abandon their *honai* for 'healthy houses' (wood and corrugated iron cuboids). Many have already been built but they remain empty because the Dani stick to their own traditional homes.

The governor of Irian Jaya, Bas Suebu, acknowledges that moving the Danis will not go unopposed. "The inhabitants of Kurima have previously been moved but they later returned home," he said. [*Suara Pembaruan*, 14 August 1989]

Frey sentenced in PNG for illegal entry

Theo Frey, the Swiss pilot who created a storm when he escaped from West Papua in a small plane with his wife and daughter in April 1988 [see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 88, August 1988] was arrested in Papua New Guinea in late July this year and tried for illegal entry, having crossed over into the country by foot from West Papua. He was given a two-month sentence with hard labour, which he is serving in Bomana Jail, Port Moresby.

Another Swiss national, Patrick Francis Huber, was convicted for helping Frey and was fined K200.

The court was told that Frey had flown an Australian-registered plane to a remote airstrip in West Papua from Thursday Island on 31 July. There he off-loaded camera equipment for use by others to make a film about conditions in the interior. He remained overnight in a nearby village and was intending to return to Australia the next day, but could not take off because the airstrip had become water-logged and the plane could not take off.

According to PNG press reports, Frey told the court he decided to cross into PNG because he feared that he would be arrested and possibly shot, if caught by the Indonesian authorities. He refused to name the airstrip where he had left the aircraft for fear of retaliation against the local people. [*Times of Papua New Guinea* and *Niugini Nius*, 4 and 15 August 1989]*

DEATH ON DELIVERY:

THE IMPACT OF THE ARMS TRADE ON THE THIRD WORLD

International news coverage is dominated by images of war, poverty and repression. Almost always these images come from somewhere in the Third World and seem far removed from Britain. But are they really so distant from British concerns? Many of the countries racked by conflict are customers of British arms companies. Behind the scenes, Britain is thus deeply implicated, alongside a host of other arms producing countries in both East and West. With annual sales now running into several billions of pounds, Britain is amongst the world's top four arms traders.

Death on Delivery examines the impact of the arms trade on the Third World. It looks not only at the governments and armed forces which buy the weapons but also at the people on the receiving end of arms purchases. Using a series of specific examples, this book assesses the extent to which the arms trade is responsible for the conflict, poverty and state violence haunting so many people's lives. Indonesia, Iran and Iraq are amongst the many cases cited. Also covered are the connections between debt and military purchases, the link between arms transfers and Third World arms production, and the current trends in the global arms trade. The concluding chapter reports on the many initiatives which have been taken against the arms trade, both in Europe and in the Third World.

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How Washington backed the 1965 massacres

At a seminar of the Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies to analyse the birth and the survival powers of Suharto's New Order, US academic Don Emmerson, commenting on the 1965 take-over, "denied that the US had given support to the operation 'to wipe out' the PKI. He acknowledged however that at a time when Washington was having trouble containing communism in Vietnam, it was greatly revitalised by the achievements of the Indonesian armed forces in crushing the PKI." [Editor, 2 September 1989]

A new book by Gabriel Kolko¹ has provided documentary proof of America's role in those bloodthirsty events when an estimated one million 'communist suspects' were killed. On the 24th anniversary of that appalling massacre, we publish the following extract in response to Emmerson's groundless claim.

Indonesia by late 1965 presented US strategy in Southeast Asia with a danger at least as great as Vietnam at a time when its preoccupation there made large-scale intervention in Indonesia impossible. The logic of the domino theory applied to it as much as to Vietnam, but its economic and strategic value was far greater. Relying on peaceful means, the PKI had grown consistently, and could be expected to continue to do so. The US had depended on the military since 1949 to create a barrier to the Communists and it understood well that Sukarno's skilled balance of contending forces to maintain his control would end in the near future with his death. The events of September 30 created a small challenge but also an enormous opportunity to resolve America's dilemmas by directing the military's wrath against the Communists.

The US embassy no later than 3 October thought the crucial issue was whether the army under Suharto would "have the courage to go forward against [the] PKI," an obsession they were to communicate to Washington over the next days without disagreement from the State Department.² There is no doubt either that they informed key Indonesian officers of their opinions on the need to destroy the PKI and the latter had similar thoughts even though they too believed the degree of PKI culpability was still very much a question. On October 5 the army made the decision to "implement plans to crush [the] PKI," the CIA reported, without indicating when they had been drawn up.³ With Sukarno and the PKI on the defensive and Suharto's forces firmly in control and backed by the Muslims, the embassy cabled Washington, the army could move against the PKI - "it's now or never".⁴ Three days later, the first reports of attacks on PKI offices came in, with mainly Muslim youth acting with army encouragement. Marshall Green, who had been ambassador since June 1965, still worried about the military's "determination" to stand up to Sukarno but he was not to be disappointed.⁵ Indeed, the military allowed Sukarno, ever the supreme opportunist, to claim he was the head of state while they began the vast task of destroying the PKI, each seeking to use the other. "We do think [the] army will go on trying, possibly not always as directly as we would like, to keep matters moving in direction we would wish to see..." Green cabled Washington on



October 14. "Their success or failure is going to determine our own in Indonesia for some time to come."⁶ By this point the embassy and the officers were often discussing their mutual needs and plans and there were no doubts whatsoever that the US wished the army to act decisively.

Reports of killings of alleged PKI members arrived at the embassy constantly, and its experts correctly concluded that the PKI, which was now being blamed for the events of September 30, was not likely to resist because it had long since ceased to be revolutionary. Since the PKI had neither the arms nor the will to resist, the tide of destruction began to rise by late October as mainly Muslim and rightwing youth, with aid from the army, began systematically to sweep the cities and countryside. Into their hands fell peasants who had asked for lower rents and alienated their landlords, those who were apolitical and denounced by enemy settling grudges, PKI members and those who were vaguely linked to it, religious elements the Muslims disliked - all suffered the same fate.

Washington received all the details the embassy possessed on the army's support for the massacres and it took consolation that the army had resisted Sukarno's belated efforts at the end of October to stop the slaughter. The cleanup task would go on, Green told Rusk on October 28, and the next day, the secretary of state cabled back that "the campaign against PKI" must continue and that the military "are [the] only force capable of creating order in Indonesia" which they had to continue doing "with or without Sukarno". Meanwhile, the generals could expect United States help for a "major military campaign against PKI".⁷ A week later Green reported back that while the army was aiding the Muslim youth in Java to take care of the PKI, it was assuming the task directly in the outer islands, and it was contemplating a military state in the future. We have "made it clear that embassy and USG generally sympathetic with and admiring of what army doing."⁸ The army was wholly engaged, as Green described it several days later, attacking the PKI "ruthlessly", and "wholesale killings" were occurring.⁹

It was in this context that the Indonesian generals early in November approached the US for equipment "to arm Moslem and nationalist youths in Central Java for use against the PKI..." Most were using knives and primitive means, and communications gear and small arms would expedite the killing. Since "elimination of these elements" was a precondition of better relations, the United States quickly promised covert aid, dubbed "medicines" to prevent embarrassing revelations.¹⁰ At stake in the army's effort was the "destruction", as the CIA called the undertaking, of the PKI, and "carefully placed assistance which will help army cope with PKI" continued, as Green described it, despite the many other problems in Indonesian-US relations that remained to be solved.¹¹

The "final solution" to the Communist problem in Indonesia was certainly one of the most barbaric acts of inhumanity in a century that has seen a great deal of it; it surely ranks as a war crime of the same type as those the Nazis perpetrated. No single American action in the period after 1945 was as bloodthirsty as its role in Indonesia, for it tried to initiate the massacre, and it did everything in its power to encourage Suharto, including equipping his killers, to see that the physical liquidation of the PKI was carried through to its culmination. Not a single one of its officials in Washington or Jakarta questioned the policy either on ethical or political grounds; quite the contrary. "The reversal of the Communist tide in

the great country of Indonesia" was publicly celebrated, in the words of Deputy Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson in October 1966, as "an event that will probably rank along with the Vietnamese war as perhaps the most historic turning point of Asia in this decade."¹²*

1. Gabriel Kolko, *Confronting the Third World, US Foreign Policy 1945-1980*, Pantheon Books, New York, 1989.
2. Cable from Marshall Green, US ambassador to Jakarta, to Dean Rusk, Oct. 3 1965, R:607E.
3. CIA, report, Oct. 8, 1965, R:29A.
4. Green to DS, Oct. 5 1965, R:698A.
5. Green to Rusk, Oct. 9, 1965, R:608E.
6. Ibid, Oct. 14, 1965, R:609A.
7. Rusk to Green, Oct 29, 1965, R:612C. See also Green to Rusk, Oct. 17, 1965, R:609C, Green to Rusk, Oct. 28, 1965, R:612A.
8. Green to Rusk, Nov. 4, 1965, 2nd of 2 cables, 79:434E.
9. *ibid*, Nov. 7, 1965, R613A; *ibid*, Nov. 8, 1965, R:613E.
10. Embassy, Bangkok, to Rusk, Nov. 5, 1965, R:612G. To maintain secrecy, much of the negotiations regarding such aid were done in Bangkok. See also Rusk to embassies, Bangkok and Jakarta, Nov. 6, 1965, R:613B; Green to Rusk, Nov. 7, 1965, embassy, Bangkok, to Rusk, Nov. 11, 1965, R:614E.
11. CIA, memo, Nov. 12, 1965, R:30A; Green to Rusk, Nov. 19, 1965, R:615D.
12. DSB, Oct. 24, 1966, 640.

LAND DISPUTES

World Bank springs another leak

A leaked document prepared by a Bank Mission which visited the Kedung Ombo Dam for 11 days in March this year, reveals that the Bank has resorted to secrecy, prohibited by its own guidelines, in an attempt to resolve the Kedung Ombo dispute.

Delaying tactics

Despite consistent opposition from the oustees, transmigration remains central to the resettlement programme at Kedung Ombo. To encourage more families to transmigrate the Mission proposed that the selection of participants for alternative activities in the dam area be delayed until about mid-1990 when the reservoir should be full again, because indications that the government was making special investments in the reservoir area to enable all remaining families to obtain a sustainable livelihood, would be "counter-productive to the transmigration campaign". [The World Bank/ Resident Staff in Indonesia. Office Memorandum. April 14, 1989,]

According to the Bank, transmigration is promoted as the best option because: "those that remain behind in the near vicinity of the reservoir are likely to have reduced income as occurred in the Saguling reservoir". But this "reduced income" is not inevitable; it is a product of Bank and Government incompetence in resettlement planning and reflects a lack of commitment to finding viable alternatives to transmigration.

Learning a lesson...but not applying it yet

A section entitled *Lessons learned from Kedung Ombo*

Resettlement Experience Which Are Relevant To Future Bank Operations, recommends better consultation in resettlement planning, involving "valid representatives of the population"; the inclusion of all resettlement costs in project costs; the use of NGOs as intermediaries between the government and the displaced community, and finally, the need to address compensation problems "on a countrywide basis" before proceeding with the project. A copy of this document was sent to Minister of the Interior General Rudini, with a letter suggesting that "some significant improvements" could be made in compensation and involuntary resettlement areas".

In April 1988, a consultant was hired by the Bank to assess the resettlement and compensation at Kedung Ombo. In his report, he recommended that in return for Government agreement to review its land acquisition and resettlement policies, the Bank should continue to "turn a blind eye" to the fate of the families who had not accepted compensation. The *Lessons Learned* tell the same story; they are for future application, intended to prevent another Kedung Ombo from happening. Meanwhile, no real attempt is made to apply any of the principles to the current Kedung Ombo dispute, where according to a recent *Kompas* report, families are refusing to move to take up any of the resettlement options on offer. The sites offered are too far away from their land which remains above the water level in the dam, while replacement land promised by the government has not materialised. [*Kompas*, 23 August 1989]

options on offer. The sites offered are too far away from their land which remains above the water level in the dam, while replacement land promised by the government has not materialised. [Kompas, 23/8/89]

Compensation

The inadequate compensation has been central to the Kedung Ombo dispute. The Bank's public explanation for this is:

Although the offered land compensation rates paid were adjusted annually by 10% to 15%, this inflation factor has, of course, not been adequate to allow families which accepted or received compensation, especially in the later years, to purchase land of the same quality and quantity in the near vicinity of the reservoir.

A letter from the Bank to Director of Water Resources Soebandi Wirosoemarto (30 March 1989), admits that compensation was insufficient to permit replacement of land lost, but continues: "...this was not the intention of the compensation payments; compensation was to be complemented in most cases by a transmigration package..." Clearly, the Bank and the Government never entertained the idea of resettling oustees on equivalent land near the dam. Only when it was realised that the resistance to transmigration and the rejection of the compensation was so strong and widespread, were alternatives considered.

The letter also describes how the compensation was further reduced by taxation since the Japanese Exim Bank was involved in the funding, recommending that this be reimbursed to the families, as "...it serves as an additional reason for dissatisfaction with the compensation process and has been interpreted as an illegal deduction on the part of the local authorities by many of the compensated families..."

Secrecy

The Bank's most recent set of guidelines on involuntary resettlement stresses the importance of avoiding secrecy:

LAND DISPUTES



The victims of the Kedung Ombo dam, clinging on to their rights, have been forced to devise new forms of getting around.

Dissemination of information about the impending relocation, about the resettlers' rights, compensation procedures, favourable choices etc is an indispensable premise for participation and requires an organised systematic communication mechanism. [Involuntary Resettlement in Development Projects. Policy Guidelines in World Bank-Financed Projects Michael Cernea, 1988, p 15]

The leaked report reveals that the Bank fails to practise what it preaches.*

Defiant farmers resist golf course

In Cimacan, West Java, farmers are fighting to prevent fertile land they have worked for over 50 years from becoming a golf course, despite an order from the Interior Minister, General Rudini, for the project to go ahead. Most of the farmers have rejected the pittance offered in compensation.

Returning to the land

On August 19, after the property developers, PT BAM had started converting the land, about 100 farmers took up their hoes and started to plant their crops on the 32-ha plot which yields three vegetable harvests a year. Beside the official notice of the company, the farmers put up a placard: "This land is our life. Let us farm it!" Journalists and students witnessed the defiant farmers at work, while security guards watched in the distance. [See *Tapol Bulletin 94* for background].

Although the authorities have said that replacement land is being sought for those who have refused the compensation, most farmers are determined to stay on the disputed land. The compensation is derisory. A "gift" of Rp 30 per square metre has been offered to the Rahrahan farmers - the land is not theirs so they are not entitled to compensation, say the village

authorities. The offer was rejected by the majority of the 200 farmers so the authorities resorted to force. A report in *Suara Pembaruan* [21 August 89] describes how the village secretary and a primary school teacher took hold of one elderly villager and forced him to put his thumb print on an acceptance of compensation document. Villagers who refused to sign were told that their children will find it difficult to get jobs after they leave school.

The village chief, Arifin, thought he could persuade the farmers to give up their land by promising that the golf course will take them on to work as caddies or service personnel; the farmers were unimpressed.

The farmers have described how officials have made door-to-door visits to force them to accept compensation, and have used local religious leaders to try to influence them. The farmers demanded the cancellation of PT BAM's contract, the return of the Rp 90 million

LAND DISPUTES

the company paid the village for the 30-year lease on the land, and the right to cultivate the land.

The farmers refuse to stop planting their crops as the land is still disputed; they will stop only when PT BAM stops work on the golf course.

Arrests

At a meeting which villagers thought had been held to ascertain who was most entitled to the land, they questioned the effectiveness of the team set up to resolve the dispute, because it is dominated by the authorities. The meeting ended in disarray and more than 35 people, including students from Jogjakarta were arrested and held for several hours.

The team has started to work, despite the protests. It has two weeks to come up with a settlement failing which the case will go through the courts. No farmer has ever won a legal battle against the government [Jakarta Post 2 September 89]

The PKI label

The farmers base their claim on a 1961 government regulation that people who have been farming land for over 30 years can apply for a certificate. Their application was encouraged at the time by former village head Arifin, but he changed his mind when PT BAM showed an interest in leasing the land. Arifin then denounced one of the farmers, Dudu, as ex-PKI and the farmers bid for a land certificate duly failed. It was Dudu who was tortured by PT BAM men in September 1988. [See *Tapol Bulletin* 94]

While it is of utmost importance that farmers gain recognition of their right to farm the land, it is also important not to lose sight of several basic issues. First, which is more important in a poverty-stricken, overcrowded island - farming land or a golf course? When hundreds of thousands of Javanese are being shipped away because of the land squeeze, it is the


FORESTRY

Opposition to Scott gathers momentum

The US-based paper transnational Scott is pressing ahead with plans to invest \$650,000 in Merauke, West Papua for a eucalyptus plantation, wood-chipping mill and pulp plant project - Indonesia's biggest foreign investment in the non oil and gas sector to date.

Together with Indonesian partner PT Astra, Scott plans to cultivate 80,000 ha from a reserved area of around 520,000 ha (recently reduced from 790,000 ha) over ten years and a possible further 80,000 ha, after that. The wood-chipping mill (which Scott claims will not make a profit) will be fed by timber from the sites cleared for the eucalyptus, probably in the northern part of the concession area. The pulp mill is scheduled to begin operating at a capacity of 1000 tons a day in 1999. So far 4 ha of land for a nursery and guest house have been acquired from one family and 60 ha has been leased to Scott for the test plantation. This small area alone is the basis for the two year environmental and sociological impact study.

Scott has given repeated assurances to environmental and human rights groups that whether or not the project goes ahead is contingent on the successful outcome of the sociological and environmental impact assessments (SIA, EIA) expected to be finished by the end of 1990. Under increasing pressure in areas where the company's mills are already operating - there is a boycott of Scott products in Nova Scotia -



The upper board says that the farmers' land may not be privately owned and has been rented to developers. The other says "anyone refusing to take compensation and harvest their crops is obstructing development and opposing the government".

height of callousness to build a golf course on fertile, food-producing land.

Second, the forest conservation coalition, SKEPHI argues that the land in question falls within the buffer zone of the Cibodas National Park. Its use for a golf course, as part of a more extensive centre for tourism, would infringe decisions taken to protect one of the few remaining tropical forests in Java which safeguards the water catchment area for Bogor, Jakarta, Cianjur and Sukabumi, from which the major rivers of West Java, the Ciliwung, Cimandiri and Cisadane flow. By disrupting the existing balance between population density, the farming activity now undertaken and the local production of timber for firewood, the tropical forests would be under serious threat. SKEPHI has called for broad participation of the local population in assessing the environmental and social impact of the tourism project now being promoted in the area.*

and watched closely by environmental groups around the globe, Scott has opted for a conciliatory approach. It has met national and local NGO groups in Indonesia and has sent a West Papuan anthropologist (accompanied by a Scott employee) to tour villages in the project area and "inform" the population about the project.

Scepticism

But Indonesian NGOs doubt that discussions with Scott and the Indonesian government will amount to much more than a PR exercise. They have seen how up to now "development" has marginalised the indigenous people of West Papua:

One NGO member active in Merauke says that so far the effects urbanisation on local tribes has been devastating and that they have not yet shown the ability to survive a cash economy. "People there might accept change physically, but culturally and mentally they will be wiped out." (Environesia June 1989).

No NGOs were informed or consulted about the land already acquired for the project, despite Scott's commitment to involving NGOs. When asked recently how much Scott had paid for the land, project director Barry Kotek's memory failed him, saying it was

"substantially more" than the legally required amount.

NGOs are sceptical too that recommendations they have submitted for the terms of reference of the SIA, for involvement of local people at every stage will be genuinely taken into consideration.

Having to face Scott's well-oiled public relations machine is bad enough; NGOs who dare question the style of President Suharto's development too vociferously must fear for their continued existence. Under renewed pressure, (see separate article), NGOs have felt obliged to tone down outright opposition to any project which heralds environmental devastation and social dislocation.

Despite these constraints, there have been calls in Indonesia for a worldwide boycott of Scott products (best known are Andrex toilet paper and Scotties tissues) and demands for community participation with no pressure from the military or government officials. But forestry conservation network SKEPHI is not optimistic: "Public participation is not a favourite issue in Indonesia. In the past 22 years public participation has virtually been non-existent in this country" (*Setiakawan* No 1, July-August 1989).

For the dominant tribal group in the reserved area, the Auwyu, the same pressures apply. Papuans have never been consulted about development projects, including transmigration and there is little likelihood that Scott's "information" tour of remote villages involves genuine consultation. A declaration of support for the government's development programme, bearing the stamps of military and police "witnesses", was signed by civil servants posing as "representatives" of the Auwyu. The real representatives - the traditional tribal leaders - did not sign.


Scott has promised to respect "traditions which protect the land-owning rights of the people". However, these can be legally violated at any time by the Indonesian government. Regulations state that in the interests of national development, *adat* law is subordinate to national law meaning that tribal land can be appropriated for development projects. Still, the Indonesian Government is taking a more subtle approach and has recommended that the acquisition process respect tribal rights "as far as possible". A Ministry of Population and Environment document suggests even that Scott should explore a method "in which tribes have still some right on the land". This reflects Indonesia's recent defensive attitude on tribal issues. Fierce criticism from abroad prompted the government to stage a European tour of Asmat culture in an attempt to convince the world that Indonesia's tribal people are well-treated, while at home, tribal resettlement policies continue unchanged.

Poor pollution performance

Scott too, has its own reputation to consider. The company was recently ranked second worst in a pollution performance survey of fifteen paper companies by the highly respected US-based Council on Economic Priorities. According to the CEP report, Scott, "not a shining example of an environmentally responsible company" refused to provide data for assessment purposes. Last year the Canadian government threatened to take Scott to court unless it provided information on effluent produced at its Canadian operations. Scott has also paid fines for violating health regulations in Canada. In the remote Digul River region of West Papua, it will be easier for Scott to get away with environmental and health violations and harder for people to gain access to information.

Land negotiations

Scott has said that land negotiations are being conducted on a "clan by clan basis". At a recent meeting in London with Survival International and



The shaded area represents the huge region that has been handed over to Astra-Scott Cellulosa for eucalyptus plantations, industrial installations and infrastructure. If Scott goes ahead, roads will also criss-cross the area, destroying irreplaceable rainforests.

Friends of the Earth, company director Kotek confirmed that all land in the concession may be covered by ownership rights but explained that not all of this land was used - and this land could be used to make up the "patchwork" of eucalyptus plantations.

When pressed on the all-important question of whether Scott would pull out if the people were opposed to the project, Kotek replied: Absolutely!... Our principle is that it won't work if the people aren't with us." He then qualified this, saying "it's not a black and white issue" and admitted that he saw no practicable way of assessing whether or not people were in favour of the project.

Before the London meeting, Scott had invited US-based environmental groups for talks and then used this as publicity to influence public opinion, claiming to have "invited the leadership of the Rainforest Action Network .. to participate in the process". RAN promptly denounced Scott's statement as "misleading", reiterating their conviction that the project "will be a cornerstone in the Indonesian government's campaign to colonize sparsely inhabited Irian Jaya..".

Transmigration and local labour

196,000 families are due to be settled in West Papua in the current five year economic plan - almost one million people - in a country where the indigenous people number less than a million. Some of these transmigrants will be settled near the Scott concession as part of the regional development strategy. Indeed their resettlement may depend on Scott going ahead with the project. According to the Ministry of Population and Environment:

The project should be seen as an integral part of regional development, with the project as the major pull factor. [Ministry of Population and Environment statement on PT Astra-Scott Cellulosa project, April 6, 1989]

Further evidence of the link between the project and transmigration comes in a 1988 UNDP report on regional development which reveals that the initial idea was to feed the pulp mill with timber from eucalyptus plantations on transmigration sites. The project which would employ 4,000 workers "...can only be implemented in conjunction with the...transmigration programme..." (Government of Indonesia/UNDP *Regional Development Planning for Irian Jaya*, Vol 2, June 1988).

One year later, Scott is stressing its commitment to using indigenous labour. According to Kotek at the London meeting, President Suharto and Irian Jaya Governor Bas Suebu have emphasised the need for local labour to be employed by the project. Scott has said that "as many as possible" local people who want to work for the project will be given jobs and has already employed 30 local people on the test plot.

But Kotek does not deny that transmigrant labour will be used. PT Astra, Scott's partner, is less reticent, stating that "additional labour" will be brought in in cooperation with the Ministry of Transmigration and that "facilities to accommodate the influx of people will be constructed according to Ministry of Transmigration standards". Transmigrants already

make up one seventh of Merauke's population, mostly in the southern part of the district. Kotek visited transmigration sites in Merauke and stated that transmigrants living in this "economic wasteland" knew about the project and were eager to work for it.

Together with the arrival of new transmigrants, this means that competition for jobs will be formidable. Scott naively believes it can control enough land to prevent transmigrant settlements encroaching into parts of the "reserved area" which the company claims will be left in a natural state. If transmigrants do move into the area, and it seems certain they will, the resource base of the local people will be severely reduced and their marginalisation assured.

Further encroachments into the reserved area over and above the plantations and transmigration are inevitable: according to PT Astra, 100 km of roads per year will be constructed and three satellite towns in addition to Bade will be needed.

The reasons why this project should not go ahead are manifold: eucalyptus has been exposed as environmentally and socially disruptive in other parts of the world; rare species of plant and animal life are threatened with extinction, and more forests will die. The influx of official transmigrants and unofficial migrants will displace and impoverish the indigenous people of the Digul basin, turning them into a minority in their own land.*

Bob Hasan declares war

Timber tycoon Bob Hasan has declared war on Western conservationists who criticize forest destruction in Indonesia by spending US \$2 million on a two year advertising and lobbying campaign in the US and Europe. Hasan showed a copy of a full-page advert which appeared in *The New York Times*, 18 August 1989, to Malaysian Primary Resources Minister Lim Keng Yaik, boasting that it had cost \$46,000. The ad declares that "Indonesia has always recognized the unique natural resource with which it was blessed"; it cites parks and reserves, "strict harvesting regulations" and tough action against logging companies who violate them as means of ensuring that "Indonesia will have tropical forests for ever", while attacking environmental groups who "want Indonesia managed as one big protected park".

Lim Keng Yaik had come to Jakarta to discuss how Indonesia and Malaysia could best cooperate in their joint campaign to counter the conservationists. They will lobby the US and Europe for support of their

timber products and have agreed to market jointly sawn timber products to prevent buyers depressing the prices.

The rosy picture painted by Hasan is not supported by a confidential report on Indonesia's forests by the World Bank: "*Resources such as forests, land and water are now becoming scarce and must be managed more effectively if the benefits derived from such resources are to be sustained.*" The Bank estimates current destruction at 1,000,000 hectares a year and a loss of at least one billion dollars a year from inefficient use of forest land, poor logging methods and fire. Logging companies were accused of felling trees ineptly, returning to logged areas too soon and misreporting their harvests. [*Reuters*, 29 August 1989]*



Security forces confiscating the banner unfurled in front of the US embassy last May, protesting against the destruction of Indonesia rainforests by US multinationals.

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East Timor, the inside story

Two tourists from Sweden, Jan-Erik Forsberg and Eva Vanglund, armed with cameras and tape-recorders, decided during a trip to Indonesia to make a ten-day visit to East Timor in May this year. Taking full advantage of the chance for tourists to go to East Timor under Jakarta's policy of 'openness', they travelled to the eastern part of the country, only to discover, as Forsberg said in a statement to the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights three months later, that East Timor is "a country at war and a nation still living under foreign occupation".



Eva Vanglund and Jan-Erik Forsberg at the UN to lobby the Sub-Commission about East Timor. [Photo: Carmel Budiardjo. The other photos are by Jan-Erik Forsberg.]

Permit

The permit they received in Jakarta mentioned only Dili and they were given names of places in the east that they would not be allowed to visit, including Natarbora, Los Palos, Baucau and Viqueque. In Dili, the police seemed unaware of this and did not prevent them from taking the bus to Baucau after several days in the capital. In Baucau, they found that they were also able to travel on to Viqueque. This suggests that some authorities in East Timor are less concerned than others to limit access to the more sensitive areas of the country.

In Dili, they stayed at Hotel Dili, avoiding the Turismo and Resende hotels which are bristling with security agents. Even so, they received daily visits from immigration and tourism officials. They were able to shake off attempts to organise their itinerary but other hotel guests received a visit from someone called William Blake who said he works for Sospol; he invited them to dinner and bought them bus tickets. 'Sospol' is the social and political section in all government offices always headed by army intelligence agents and responsible for security matters (basically, the political commissar).

A different Dili

Regarding their stay in Dili, Forsberg told the UN Sub-Commission:

Our first impressions seemed to confirm the picture painted by the authorities. We had been told that East Timor was now peaceful, safe and developing. In Dili we saw new buildings, a modern sports arena and well-kept streets. But we also found a different Dili where (Timorese) live in poverty in huts and shacks on the other side of a dried-up river. We talked with people there and with students from the San Jose school and asked, was there any resistance and what they thought about integration. Our questions were met with both sympathy and fear... 'I understand why you are asking but I can't say anything.'

When they took the bus to Baucau, the identity cards of all Timorese passengers had to be handed over to a conductor. Each time the bus stopped at security checkpoints, three times from Baucau and three times from Baucau to Viqueque, the conductor reported to the post and all cards were checked.

As they neared Baucau, the army's presence became more conspicuous. At Laleia heavily-armed soldiers were repairing a bridge destroyed only three years ago; four were on guard while two worked.

As for Baucau, it "looked like a city at war". At the airport, they saw armoured personnel carriers, helicopters and heavily-armed soldiers in combat uniform. Indeed, as Forsberg later told TAPOL, virtually all the soldiers they saw were carrying automatic weapons and wearing combat fatigue. The only place to stay was Flamboyant Hotel, which for years has been used by the paras regiment as an



A security checkpoint outside Dili. Forsberg took this photo from inside the bus taking them to Baucau.

interrogation and torture centre. It is now being refurbished for use as a hotel again. [The Swedes later learnt that the interrogation centre in Baucau has now been shifted to somewhere near the airfield.]

What struck the travellers on their way from Baucau to Viqueque was the huge tracts of land that are devoid of population and uncultivated. This was formerly an important rice-growing region.

Their stay in Viqueque coincided with the Muslim holiday, Idul Fitri, and a visit by armed forces commander-in-chief, General Try Soetrisno. Taking Forsberg for a visiting journalist, the general shook hands with him and allowed him to take close-ups. "School-children had been mobilised to greet him but there were very few adults and they didn't seem to share the excitement of the children," Forsberg later told the UN Sub-Commission.

Military operations

Viqueque, they discovered, is a city surrounded by armed resistance fighters with troops constantly on the move. When they asked about the massive military



On the road to Lihunu. An Indonesian soldier proudly poses with his weapon, as he guards others at work.

presence, they were told the troops were needed for development. "In the evenings however [they spent four nights in Viqueque], we heard grenade-shelling from the surrounding hills and in the mornings we saw trucks returning full of soldiers who were covered in mud."

In discussion with Timorese and Indonesians, civilian and military, they pieced together invaluable information about local, on-going military operations.

While Fretilin fighters are believed to be organised in five units, each of two companies, or about 500 people, the Indonesian army has three or four battalions in the city (more than 3,000 men) plus a reconnaissance unit of Timorese called Team Makatit, or the Hawk Team, whose commander is known as

Lafargue or The Crocodile. Besides combat battalions and a battalion of territorial troops, there are para-commandos, Timorese civil defence troops (hansip) and a Timorese army unit, Battalion 744. In other words, Indonesian troops outnumber resistance fighters by at least six to one. One informant told Forsberg that the Fretilin arm themselves by ambushing army units, killing the troops and running off with their weapons. The hansips carry inferior weapons as they are suspected of pro-Fretilin sentiments with a disposition to defect, taking their weapons with them.

With Fretilin forces on the outskirts, the city is ringed by military posts, making a huge circle to defend the city from Fretilin attacks. Local civilian inhabitants (not hansips) are required to remain on guard at these posts nightly; they each must do guard-duty for seven consecutive nights while the soldiers sleep, ready for combat on the following day.

A similar situation exists in nearby Lakluta where, as Forsberg was told, two men on guard-duty were shot dead last October.

Returning to Dili from Viqueque, Forsberg and Vanglund spent one night at the police station in Ossu. One wall was covered by a huge board with statistics showing how people voted at the 1987 elections, the property and cattle they owned, the regional voting patterns, and so on.

Fretilin-held territory

According to several of their sources, Fretilin forces have launched a number of attacks recently. In July 1987, they attacked Viqueque, Meli-Meloi, killing two soldiers and destroying several houses. In December 1987, they attacked Monumento, south of Viqueque, burning down houses and capturing food, while in late 1988 and early this year, they mounted several attacks on Uaimur, north of Viqueque.

Although as Forsberg discovered, many people in Viqueque have close relatives fighting in the bush, they never dare to express support for the resistance, for fear of being arrested or worse.

According to several well-informed contacts, Fretilin forces control the surrounding mountains and forests, turning these into areas which the Indonesian troops are not able to penetrate. While most civilians are confined to army-supervised villages, there are also civilians in the interior with the resistance.

Concentration camps for villages

Villagers in the district, Forsberg was told, continue to live in concentration camps and are prevented from going more than five kilometres beyond the camp perimeter. Violators are suspected of making contact with the resistance since the army is convinced that these areas are under Fretilin control.



Marina super-market in Dili, an outlet for the army-run company, PT Denok.

"Here, we are concentrated in Viqueque," said one informant. "There, over those mountains, there is no population, only Fretilin, according to the army. Anyone going more than 5 kms could, they suspect, be getting information from Fretilin or telling them how to attack Indonesian positions. Much of the land which is out-of-bounds is fertile and is not under cultivation, hence the shortage of food. Anyone wishing to go, say, to Bibiliao to plant or harvest crops must go in a group of ten to thirty people and return to Viqueque the same day."



Before setting out, the local military command (*kodim*) or NCO (*babinsa*) must inform the battalion commander that a group will be going to gather food. They go under military escort with troops in front and in the rear. Only a month ago, Forsberg was told, two people were shot dead because they went out to gather food without permission.

Health conditions and the war

Forsberg also learnt about the very inadequate medical services facilities in Viqueque. Infant mortality is high because of the prevalence of tuberculosis and a high incidence of stomach disorders, as well as tropical diseases. Doctors are few and far between and as many as sixty localities in the district do not have a single nurse. The doctors who come to East Timor are young graduates with no experience and little interest in helping Timorese.

[Confirming this account with some alarming statistics of his own, Mario Carrascalao, the governor of East Timor, recently told a team of Indonesian MPs who visited Dili that 70 per cent of Timorese suffer from tuberculosis, while only forty out of the sixty-one sub-districts in East Timor have a doctor. (Jakarta Post, 5 August 1989)]

In areas where military operations are under way, there is an added obstacle to medical care, highlighted by an incident described to Forsberg in Viqueque. An army intelligence unit out on reconnaissance to discover Fretilin positions came across a stock of medicine and drew the conclusion that it had been supplied by nearby villagers. This led to house-to-house searches; anyone found to be in possession of medicines was arrested and taken to *kodim* for interrogation. Since then, nurses at the local health centre have been afraid to issue medicine to anyone, lest they are suspected of hoarding up medicines to send to the fighters in the bush.

Birth control

One constant bone of contention for the Timorese people is the government's family planning programme. The Swedish visitors were left in no doubt about the strong resistance to this programme, primarily, as they were told, on religious grounds. They learned that the people who are most vulnerable to pressure are Timorese military personnel and civil servants. "Their commanders and superiors are all Indonesians, mostly from Java and they have no-one to protect them against family-planning exhortations." Moreover, these people only receive child allowances for the first three children.

Discrimination and culture

Visiting localities like Baucau and Viqueque gave the Swedish tourists a unique insight into the education system and cultural discrimination. First, they were told by people connected with local schools that although almost all teachers in the primary schools



are Timorese and hence Tetum speakers, they must do all their teaching in Indonesian. Tetum may not be used or spoken at school. Army officials frequently visit the schools to make sure that everyone speaks Indonesian. This is part of what they proudly boast of as their "social-political role". At lower and upper secondary schools, most teachers are Indonesian.

Besides language teaching, history is the subject most directed towards making school-children 'think like Indonesians'. The two Swedes saw school walls adorned with pictures of Indonesian leaders and were told that the history curriculum is called *Pelajaran Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa* or the History of the National Struggle (Indonesian, not Timorese).

The one place where Tetum may officially be used is in church. The Vatican has authorised a Tetum version of the mass and it is now widely celebrated in that language. [No agreement was reached, however, over a proposal that the Pope celebrate mass in Tetum when he makes his three-hour visit to East Timor on 12 October. He may therefore say it in Latin with a translation into Indonesian.] Timorese priests who are occasionally invited to celebrate mass in Indonesian find that few Timorese come to their services.

There are not enough secondary schools to absorb children who complete primary education. Nearly 1,400 children will be finishing their primary school education this year in Viqueque but there are only 7 schools to absorb them. (A reasonable calculation might be a total of forty new entrants per school.) Moreover, most of the available places will be taken by Indonesian children. There are far more secondary schools in Dili but here too, Indonesian children are

assured places while Timorese children are not. Various methods are used to swing entry in favour of Indonesian children. Most discriminatory of all is the fact that school reports and grades are not enough; children are required to sit entry tests, in Indonesian, to the detriment of Timorese children.

"Army strikes fear", says journalist

Freelancer Danny Gittings wrote, after a week's visit to East Timor in June, that "fear and tension are still widely apparent in this troubled tropical enclave".

Visitors to... Dili now see a pleasant, well-ordered town, apparently untouched by fighting, where the availability of western consumer goods gives a hint of newly-found prosperity. However two-thirds of East Timor is located east of Dili and a week-long journey through these areas on local buses produced a very different picture of life in the enclave. The military presence rapidly became more apparent.

In Los Palos, he was warned not to travel out of town after dark because of guerrilla activity. It was



A wayside stall on the way to Area Branca, Dili. Here, says Forsberg, the people greet you in Portuguese.

fear in villages", *South China Morning Post*, 12 August 1989.]

In another article, Gittings said there are still an estimated 10,000 Indonesian troops stationed in East Timor.

Their presence is all pervasive. The military dominates the local economy and frequent army check-points are strung all along the main roads. Signs of war can be seen almost everywhere. In some areas, patrols of wary soldiers were to be seen moving slowly in the bush, their guns at the ready. Indonesian civilians appeared uneasy travelling in East Timor, often advising against travel after dark.

A minibus full of villagers and lively teenage girls fell suddenly silent when a soldier, dressed in combat fatigues and clutching his rifle, climbed aboard. Several people said they were worried about being interrogated by military intelligence simply for talking to a foreigner.

Gittings also met deputy governor, Lieutenant-Colonel A.B. Saridjo (who has a long career of military and civilian jobs in East Timor), who confirmed that villagers are still being re-settled away from areas of guerrilla activity "to provide better security for them". ["No end to a long-hidden suffering", in *The Scotsman*, 28 August]★




A typical sight in Baucau, where soldiers in military fatigues are everywhere to be seen.

difficult to find anyone to drive him farther east to Tutuila because the region was regarded as dangerous. When someone did agree, he posted a look-out on the roof to watch for guerrillas.

Like many villages in the remoter areas of East Timor, today's Tutuila is a modern settlement built on high ground - in this case seaside cliffs - as part of a government resettlement scheme to isolate the locals from the rebels. A villager said they were forcibly evicted from its former site... in 1982 and those who refused to move were killed. Amid the ruins of the old Tutuila, only gravestones could still be seen standing, a sight almost as common as houses in this part of the enclave, and a sombre reminder of the huge number of victims during the 14-year conflict.

A young man he met in a restaurant loudly extolled the benefits Indonesian rule had brought. "But later, in a deserted barn away from prying eyes, the same Timorese worker added a ... cautionary footnote: 'Indonesia has brought us many good things but we are all still afraid of her army.' ["Army still strikes



Occasional Reports no. 11 contains TAPOL's submission to the 1989 meeting of the UN Decolonisation Committee, focusses on the militarised structure of the Indonesian administration in East Timor and the truth about the 'opening up' of East Timor.

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