Tapol bulletin no, 85, February 1988

This is the Published version of the following publication


The publisher's official version can be found at

Note that access to this version may require subscription.

Downloaded from VU Research Repository  https://vuir.vu.edu.au/26215/
Renewed attack on World Bank’s support for transmigration

Survival International, Friends of the Earth and The Ecologist, along with TAPOL, have renewed their criticism of World Bank support for Indonesia’s transmigration programme. In a letter to Barber Conable, president of the Bank, on 22 January, they urged the Bank to withhold funding for the programme until Indonesia provides guarantees that transmigration will be carried out in line with Bank policies on the environment, the alienation of tribal peoples and the abuse of their right to self-determination.

They also called for a detailed evaluation of Indonesia’s policy towards tribal peoples, as part of the Bank’s Country Environmental Study currently being undertaken in Indonesia.

The four signatories are concerned that transmigration, particularly as applied in remote tribal areas, is in direct breach of Bank policy because it separates tribal people from their cultural identity which is a form of extinction known as ethnocide.

The Bank’s Transmigration Sector Review, published in October 1986, recognises that the Department of Transmigration has “limited capacity to influence policies on land compensation, to resolve land disputes, to determine appropriate parallel benefits or to monitor treatment of isolated and ethnically distinct people”. But, as the letter points out, nothing has been done to overcome this deficiency. Still less is the Department of Home Affairs capable of safeguarding Bank policy yet the Sector Review recommends that this Department should “organise seminars to sensitle provincial staff to the special problems of less assimilated people”. As the letter states, the home affairs department is dominated by appointees from the armed forces whose overriding concern is ‘national security’.

The letter also focuses on the shifting emphasis in the transmigration programme from food crop sites to plantation agriculture, notably to PIR (Smallholders Nucleus Estate) sites, and quotes WALHI, the Indonesian Environmental Forum, as warning that moves “to turn transmigration sites into mono-crop production farms could prove to have even worse economic and environmental consequences than transmigration” and that PIR projects “in areas where there is no history of sedentary farming will benefit only the migrants at the expense of traditional users and owners” [Environesia, Year 1, No. 2, 1987].

It calls on the Bank to undertake an immediate review of the PIR programme from the social and environmental points of view, and urges the suspension of a Bank loan of $170 million for a Tree Crop Processing Project due to be agreed early this year, until the Indonesian government provides proper institutional safeguards to protect both local inhabitants and transmigrants.

The letter draws attention to the forest fires raging unchecked particularly in Kalimantan where, according to one estimate, some two million hectares had been destroyed by October in addition to the 3.6 million ha lost in 1982/83, the result primarily of uncontrolled logging. By increasing the burden on the fragile ecology, transmigration has played a major contributory role. In such circumstances, the promotion of more transmigration would seem highly irresponsible. The Bank is therefore urged to prevent further migration into Kalimantan so as not to compound the environmental problems.

The text of this letter to the World Bank is reproduced in Occasional Reports No 8. For price and other details, please turn to page 11.
A rather heated debate is currently taking place among senior military figures in Indonesia, signaling growing unease in some circles about the survivability of the Suharto regime. While it is obvious that political and economic uncertainties provide the basis for this unease, none of the protagonists is concerned with the restoration of democracy. The point at issue is how to safeguard the dwi fungsi or dual function, the doctrine of Indonesian militarism, which proclaims the army's incontestable right to take charge of defence as well as the political and social running of the state.

The present debate is reminiscent of the controversy over military doctrine that flared up in the late 1970s and was finally halted with an angry speech by Suharto in Pakanbaru in April 1980. On that occasion, Suharto ordered the dispute to end and reaffirmed his own line of rigid adherence to the dwi fungsi doctrine. Those who had expressed dissenting views were removed. The most influential dissenting faction was the 'Hankam group' most of whom were senior generals in Hankam, the Department of Defence and Security, including several chiefs-of-staff like General Surono and General Widodo.

At that time, little was heard in public about the debate and it was only after Suharto's crusade against some of the dissenters that people began to realise how deep the rift had become. That controversy was analysed at length in Suharto and His Generals, by David Jenkins (Cornel University Press, 1984).

The dissenting views

Until he was sacked after the student demonstrations in January 1974, General Sumitro was second in command in the armed forces and concurrently commander of Kopkamtib, the notorious body in charge of security. Unlike others in the group, Sumitro rejected Suharto's offer of an ambassadorship and stuck it out, keeping a low profile as an outspoken protagonist in the current public debate, using the prestige of his former position to the full.

His most forthright statement came in an article [Kompas, 11 November 1987] outlining proposals for the March 1988 session of the DPR (the upper chamber) which will define the Broad Lines of State Policy and reappoint Suharto as the head of state. He put forward a number of controversial ideas. First, he suggested that the name 'Orde Baru' (New Order) used to identify the Suharto years has outlived its usefulness and should be replaced by 'Orde Pembangunan' (Development Order) because it is now time for national reconciliation. 'Orde Baru' was born after the events of 30 October 1965 and has negative overtones, still disliked by many people after twenty years. It is time to develop what he calls 'a healthy democracy'.

He then turned to the regeneration of the armed forces begun in 1983, involving the retirement of 1945 generation officers (Suharto's generation) and their replacement by younger generals who graduated from the army academy in the early 1960s. Sumitro, himself of the 1945 generation, says many of his generation "display weaknesses and shortcomings as the result of natural ageing (ketuaan ulang)" and should vacate the positions they still hold in the bureaucracy to make way for the young. They should however continue to hold crucial posts like "the national leadership [ie, the presidency], leadership of the institutions of democracy [meaning, presumably, parliament], the leadership of the Department of Defence and Security so as to safeguard domestic political stability, only the Supreme Court chairmanship."

He then assessed the leadership of the republic since 1945, arguing that both Sukarno, president for the first twenty years, and Suharto have had failings as well as achievements. (One would need to delve far back into the archives to find any other publicly expressed view...
Imputing shortcomings to Suharto.) But Sumitro chose his words carefully. As we prepare for take-off (a favourite catchphrase of Suharto's), he says, we need to introduce a system in all spheres, a "system free from subjective influences, a leadership far removed from the domination of the personal preferences of the leaders". He also called for a clear demarcation between political functions and the bureaucracy. A professional bureaucracy is needed so as to give the world of business the confidence that economic development will continue regardless of political changes.

Here again is a thinly veiled criticism of Suharto's style of leadership. Although Sumitro makes no mention of civilians in his article, his aim is to give non-military participants in the bureaucracy a more structured role.

Lieutenant-General Sayidiman has for years been a regular contributor to the press but his articles are now appearing more frequently than before. A former governor of Lembas, the National Defence Institute, a military think tank, he is seen as one of the few army intellectuals. During his stint as ambassador to Japan, he was inspired by its technological achievements and would like Indonesians to emulate the discipline of the Japanese.

Besides writing for the press, he frequently addresses seminars. It was at a seminar in October that he launched his proposal for a conscript army, deviating sharply from the present structure of ABRI (the Indonesian Armed Forces) which consists only of carefully selected professionals. A chorus of generals lashed out against the idea, as if Sayidiman had committed a cardinal sin. Conscription would dilute the vanguard role of the army, the only entity that "stands above everybody", they warned. Without conscription, the army could enter the hallowed ranks. Minister of Defence General Ponimtan argued more pragmatically that Indonesia can afford conscription which would mean training hundreds of thousands of recruits every year.

Sayidiman later modified his proposal, saying he was keen to see productivity boosted by giving military training to larger groups of people, first and foremost the work force in the government sector and in the private enterprise. Now the idea was less about enhancing the role of civilians in the armed forces and more about boosting the government's writ over people's private lives (see the article on "National Discipline" in TAPOL Bulletin, No. 80). But he also came up with the idea of creating an army of reservists, composed of people who have had nine months' military training. This too was vociferously attacked. General Ponimtan compared it to the policy of the leftist politician Amir Sjarifuddin, minister of defence in the late 1940s, who "created an army called the TNI-Masyarakat (the People's TNI) to compete with and reject the TNI (Indonesian National Army) and its supreme commander, General Sudirman. (This) was the army that was later used by the communist in its attempt to seize power in Madiun in 1948", claimed Ponimtan (Kompas, 24 November 1987).

But the idea of boosting national discipline is widely approved; indeed this is the latest rage in Jakarta, the topic of many seminars and conferences and lengthy articles in the press.

The third dissent is Lieutenant-General Hasnan Habib, also something of a highbrow. Following a stint as ambassador in Washington following his fall from grace, he now serves as a special adviser to B.J. Habibie, Minister of Technology and Research and the supremo of Indonesia's military-industrial complex. In the seventies, he held a position of immense importance as assistant chief-of-staff at the Defence Department, in charge of assigning military officers of all ranks to jobs in the bureaucracy, the crux of the dwi fungi. He believes it is better for the armed forces and the civilians each to run their own affairs. Hasnan Habib was one of the speakers who had to address a seminar that was ordered to close in November for failing to have a permit (see TAPOL Bulletin, No. 84, page 13).

**Suharto and his generals**

The dissenters have yet to make a dent in Suharto's position. He knows that certain changes are necessary but, as in the past twenty years, he alone will decide on the pace of change. In his speech to the troops this year on Army Day, 5 October, he too spoke of the need to modernise and professionalise the armed forces and accepted the necessity to revise some military doctrines. But he cautioned that this is a time of economic difficulty. He is known to be a slow but steady mover, not in the habit of taking unpredictable measures.

His trusted armed forces commander, Murdani is likely to remain in place for some time to come; in October this year, Suharto granted him a one-year extension of active service, postponing retirement that should have occurred on his 55th birthday. When the Soldiers Bill (UUP Prajakti) which was discussed in parliament last December becomes law, senior officers like Murdani will be allowed to retire at sixty. So he will in fact be able to serve till October 1992.

Suharto shows no sign of slackening the implementation of the dwi fungi. On the contrary, four of the six chairmen of parliament and the upper chamber (DPR/MPR) are military, three retired and one, Major-General Safitul Sulun, still on active service. Many senior positions in the bureaucracy have again been filled with military appointees and the recent new batch of provincial governors shows no shift to civilians. Indeed, in his speech to the troops on 5 October, Suharto reiterated that the dwi fungi role must increase because the armed forces "have a particularly important mission to fulfill as Indonesia launches into the industrial era".

Three weeks later, the annual Commanders' Coll (Rapim) took a decision to amend the infamous doctrine adopted by
ABRI's new wing

The military seizure of power took place almost a generation ago. People who are now in their late teens and early twenties did not experience the events of 1965. They have only one point of reference - military rule which is known in Indonesia as Pancasila democracy. Today, a new phenomenon has appeared, the rapidly burgeoning political role of the 'offspring of ABRI', the sons and daughters of the men in power. Whereas in the early seventies they were content to get their kicks from the latest in cars or disco dancing, they are now becoming a powerful political force with a sizable share in the Indonesian economy.

The best-known example of 'ABRI offspring' power are the sons and daughters of Suharto, Tommy, Sigit and Bambang [see TAPOL Bulletin No. 79, February 1987], but others like Ponco and Adigunga, the sons of General Ibin Sutowo, and Surya Paloh, son of a North Sumatran police officer, David Poloh, are also members of the new elite along with many, many more. What is striking is that, by and large, the sons of yesterday's and today's senior generals have not gone in for military careers but have chosen instead to enter the business world. Having fathers in positions of great influence, their business ventures are bound to succeed, with success generally measured in terms of access to Cendana, Suharto's private residence, or Bina Graha, his presidential office. Many of these second-generation power-holders once focussed on the ownership of sports teams or pop groups but more recently, they have channelled their energies into a number of organisations, the FKPPI (Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan Indonesia, or Communications Forum for Sons and Daughters of Retired Officers), the KNPI (the Indonesian National Youth Congress) and the young businessmen's association, HIPMI. This is not the first time ABRI offspring have shown their organisational muscle. In earlier times, there were a number of organisations such as AMD (Angkatan Muda Diponegoro) and AMS (Angkatan Muda Siliwangi) which operated like little more than street gangs, giving support to Golkar during general elections. They were directly linked to one or other of the regional military commands - AMD with the Diponegoro Division, AMS with the Siliwangi Division. They were recruited from youngsters living in army barracks. After the 1983 reorganisation of Golkar, when it ceased to be a federation, the importance of these organisations diminished. Only one of these organisations has maintained an independent existence, Pemuda Pancasila or Pancasila Youth, a gangster-type organisation.
Pancasila ( = street-gang) youth

Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth) was set up in the early sixties as one of many ABRI front organisations set up to fight the Indonesian communist party. Consisting of the offspring of lower-ranking soldiers, it played a particularly vicious role in the red drive after October 1965, joining mobs that raided and looted the homes of communist suspects. For many years now, the organisation has been run by Yaptto Surya Sumarno, the son of a retired general and a notorious figure in the Jakarta underworld. He is widely believed to have been behind the murder two years ago of Dica, a model who had become the mistress of one of Suharto's sons-in-law.

The main activity of this 'youth' association appears to be running protection rackets in shopping precincts and industrial centres. When gambling casinos were still legally operating in the seventies, Pemuda Pancasila supplied the security personnel and became a semi-legal mafia network. Yaptto recently sought nomination as chairman of the KNPI, but lost out under pressure from leading generals in the government.

The chairmanship of the KNPI which is the 'sole umbrella' for youth, was fiercely contested at the organisation's congress in November 1987. Once the ABRI-associated youth organisation Pepabri entered the fray, the outcome was a forgone conclusion. Yaptto was forced to give way to Didiet Hayadi Pryohutomo, a leading member of the FKPPPI.

The FKPPPI: 'juniors in battledress'

FKPPI first started life as a local youth organisation in Medan in 1968, set up on the initiative of Suryo Paloh, proprietor of the ill-fated daily, Prioritas. It officially became the youth wing of the retired soldiers' association, Pepabri in 1978. After the adoption of the Societies Law (UU Ormas) in 1985 which prohibited sectional organisations from being formally associated with other social or political organisations, the FKPPPI detached itself from the Pepabri and became part of the Keluarga Besar ABRI or Extended ABRI Family. This consists of ABRI-associated organisations like Pepabri, the veterans' association and the various organisations of officers' wives. FKPPI members today consist of the offspring not only of retired soldiers but of serving soldiers as well.

At its most recent conference in November, its new central board included a dazzling array of names. The new chairman was Indra Bambang Oetoyo, son of the late Lieutenant-General Bambang Oetoyo, army chief-of-staff in the 1950s, replacing Djoko Moersito, son of the late General Sudjono Humardani, a right-hand man and mystic guru of Suharto. The new FKPPI chairman is a member of parliament; indeed the organisation proudly boasts that eighty-one of its members have seats in the national and regional legislative assemblies. Others have been appointed as bupati (district heads), while several FKPPI members hold senior positions in ABRI itself. One example is Lieutenant-General Soegiarto, armed forces chief-of-staff for social and political affairs, whose father was an officer.

General Benny Mursiandi told the FKPPI national conference in Magelang not to abandon the fighting spirit of your parents'. The organisation decided to reinforce its links with ABRI by pledging loyalty to Sapa Marga, the oath taken by every soldier before entering the armed forces. The FKPPI which was hardly ever mentioned until recently, has now become one of the most prestigious organisations in the country. Its advisory council chairman is Bambang Trihatmodjo, the second son of Suharto and a leading 'ABRI offspring', while Ponco Ibu Sutowo, son of the former president-director of the state oil company, Pertamina, and Ciepel Sutardjo, currently chairman of HIPMI, the association of young business men, are its two vice-chairmen. Ponco's younger brother Adiguna is treasurer while people like Bambang Rijadi, son of General Yoga Sugomo, chief of Bakin, the intelligence coordination body, and Harris Ali Moerfi, son of the late General Ali Mustopo, were elected members of the board.

HIPMI: Young businessmen in battledress

HIPMI (Himpunan Pemuda Muda Indonesia, or Young Businessmen's Association) is the fourth organisation where the so-called 'loreng-loreng muda' (juniors in battle-dress) have taken control. It was set up to compete with the dominance of Indonesian Chinese in the world of business. For a generation or more, the Javanese priyayi (aristocratic class) in senior army positions have relied on Chinese businessmen to handle their business affairs. But now the offspring of first-generation ABRI leaders, no doubt encouraged by their parents, have sought to transform these business alliances and set up businesses of their own, establishing a dynastic tradition and consolidating the position of leading ABRI families. In the process, ABRI families are becoming the leading social caste in Indonesia.

In the mid-seventies, HIPMI members were satisfied with the crumbs of the oil boom, and made their fortunes in the construction industry that mushroomed at the time, but today they are pushing ahead in many directions, grabbing huge chunks of the economy. As a sign of their enormous wealth, Ibu Sutowo recently received a hotel worth $30 million as a birthday gift from his son Ponco. Helped along by the privileges made available to them, these ABRI offspring have now emerged as a new and

TAPOL Occasional Reports No 7 reproduces in full the statement issued by the Indonesian Bar Association, Ikadin, categorically rejecting the Joint Decision of the Chairman of the Supreme Court and the Minister of Justice of July 1987 which imposed punitive supervision on members of the legal profession.

Price: 50 pence per copy, 80 pence for two copies, plus 30 pence for each additional copy. Add 50 pence for airmail postage.
powerful segment of the ABRI Extended Family. They don’t have military rank or wear uniform but they have become an integral part of the military who now rule Indonesia. As distinct from military castes that have emerged in other countries under military rule, Indonesia has

produced a different pattern. Rather than enter the armed forces, the sons and daughters (but primarily the sons) have opted to enter the world of business under the wing of military protection, taking their place as part of the ruling elite.

* * *

**MILITARY PROFILE**

**New Kostrad chief Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk**

Another East Timor veteran has made it to the top of ABRI, the Indonesian armed forces. This time it is 48-year-old Major-General Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk. On 21 August 1987, a few days after the celebration of independence day, he was appointed commander of Kostrad (Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat), the Army Strategic Command, one of the most prestigious military posts in the country. The present ruler, Suharto, launched his military takeover when he was Kostrad commander in 1965, and ever since, the post has been reserved for those who have executed duties and enjoy sound credentials including loyalty.

Rajagukguk's credentials are indeed excellent and he as had all the necessary schooling. He was a 1961 graduate of the military academy, AMN, was sent to Britain in 1972/73 to attend its Army Staff College. In 1983, he took the course at Lemhanas, the National Defence Institute.

But it was during his lengthy stint in East Timor that he attracted the attention of people like General Murdani for whom the continuing military operations against Fretilin have always been of particular importance. When Murdani rose to become commander-in-chief of the armed forces in 1983, Rajagukguk's career was assured.

It is not clear how many years he served in East Timor, but his name first came to our attention as the signatory of some of the military documents that were captured by Fretilin in 31 December 1982 [see Budiardjo and Liem, *The War Against East Timor*, ZED Books, 1984]. At the time, Rajagukguk was commander of Korem 164 Wira Dharma, the sub-regional military command for East Timor.

But this was near the end of his posting in East Timor as by early 1983 another officer was in charge of Korem 164. Rajagukguk is likely therefore to have been there since 1980 or earlier, and to have been in charge of the devastating aerial bombardment that forced hundreds of thousands of East Timor down to the coastal plains and into the strategic hamlets that have become the core of military strategy in East Timor.

Yet, whatever Rajagukguk's achievements, this was also the time when Fretilin successfully regrouped itself, causing new difficulties for the forces of occupation. It was his successor, however, Colonel Purwanto who tried to pursue a 'hearts and minds' policy which included initiating negotiations with Fretilin who took the blame for the turn of events in East Timor. Purwanto has disappeared from the scene, the one East Timor veteran whose stint in East Timor appears to have put an end to his military career.

Before serving in East Timor as an infantry officer, Rajagukguk served with combat troops in South Kalimantan and was later transferred to North Sulawesi. He is the first Batak, the ethnic group from Tapanuli in North Sumatra, to have become Kostrad commander but due to many territorial postings, he has become multilingual in regional languages. Particularly his fluent command of Javanese has helped him greatly to communicate with other senior officers, most of whom are Javanese. From his name Adolf, it is clear that he is a Christian like many people from Tapanuli.

Major-General Sahala Rajagukguk full of smiles after being installed as Kostrad commander

After serving in East Timor, he returned to North Sulawesi, this time as chief-of-staff of the regional military command, Kodam XIII/Merdaka. Not longer afterwards, he became commander of the same command. Following the re-organisation of the armed forces in 1984, he went to Lemhanas while functioning as vice-commander of Seskoad, the Army Staff and Command School in Bandung. The vast majority of officers taking Seskoad courses have a period of service in East Timor.

In 1985, Rajagukguk was drawn by General Murdani to armed forces headquarters, to become Assistant for Operations. Less than two years later, he was promoted to the rank of major-general and took command of the Udayana military command. This command, with its headquarters in Den Pasar, Bali covers a vast region east of Java known as Nusa Tenggara, including East Timor. But he did not stay long at this post before his new assignment, as commander of Kostrad, was announced.

Kostrad has always been the assembly point of the army's best-trained and best-equipped soldiers. As part of the recent re-organisation, Kostrad was streamlined into two infantry divisions, each of which has a full complement of tanks, field artillery, air-defence units plus considerable sea and air power, including marine units. The commander of the first of these infantry divisions is concurrently commander of Kapaskam Timtim, the operational security command which is in overall charge of military operations in East Timor.

It is thought likely that during his stint as Kostrad's chief, Rajagukguk will have the task of beefing up the army's rapid deployment force, known as PPRC (Pasukan Gerak Reaksi Cepat).
Bandung students call for shootings enquiry

Following the incident in Ujung Pandang last October when troops fired and shot demonstrating students who were protesting against regulations enforcing the wearing of helmets [see TAPOL Bulletin, No 84, December 1987], a delegation representing students of ten higher institutes of learning in Bandung made representations to parliament in Jakarta and called for an inquiry into the incident.

According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, the students rejected the official figure of three dead, believing that nine had been killed in Indonesia. Instead, demonstrations are coiled and troops fired and shot demonstrating students who were 'unjuk raso' or 'show-of-feeling'.

A delegation representing students of ten higher institutes of learning in Bandung made representations to parliament in Jakarta and called for an inquiry into the incident. Following the incident in Ujung Pandang, only six were permitted by security guards to enter parliament where they were received by deputy-chairman, Major-General Saiful Sulun who, until his appointment to parliament last October, was military commander of East Java. Saiful Sulun made a vicious attempt to browbeat the students.

The general who became a member of parliament by presidential appointment, questioned whether the students represented all the students in Bandung. He accused them of "committing a violation" because they were conducting off-campus activities without their rectors' permission. He alleged they were ill-informed about the facts and launched into a tirade of abuse against the students in Ujung Pandang for unruly behaviour on the streets. "The incident made a motorcyclist finds his own solution to the compulsory helmet rule... and saves himself a lot of money. [Tempo, 2 January 1988]

The Minister of Education and Culture, Fuad Hasan said on the other hand that it was "O.K." if the students had not reported to their rectors, but he said they should have found "respectable" ways of expressing their views. [Jawa Pos, 18 November, in Indonesia News Service, No 54]

The students submitted a document entitled "Declaration of Opinion by the Bandung Family of Students". The full text, which was published in Berita Tanah Air, (West Berlin), VIth year, No 2, 7 January, reads as follows:

Students’ declaration

The way of dealing with the show-of-feeling (aksi unjuk rasa)*) against helmetisation in Ujung Pandang, involving students and other members of the public, on 31 October and 2 November 1987, resulted in the death of several persons who took part. Prompted by feelings of deep anxiety and notwithstanding the background of the incident, we feel we should express our opinion on the matter.

Based on the results of a meeting of student bodies in Bandung on Friday, 13 November 1987 on the campus of the Bandung Institute of Technology, and taking account of the aspirations of members of the student community in Bandung, we agreed to issue the following statement:

1. We regret the methods used by the security forces in handling the manifestation of aspirations and ideas by our fellow-students in Ujung Pandang. These methods were not in accord with legal procedures and resulted in lives being lost.

2. We regret that, at a time when the 1988 Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly is fast approaching, when the aspirations of all sections of the community should be being heeded, the aspirations of the students in Ujung Pandang were dealt with in a hasty and uncompromising manner, with the result that the show-of-feeling spread and turned into a riot.

3. We also regret the statement made by the commander of the Central Java Regional Military Command clearly insulting the students of Ujung Pandang who are a part of the community and of the student community in general.

4. In view of this, we call on the authorities, in particular the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, to clarify things, to carry out an inquiry into the affair and take steps against all those who acted in a high-handed fashion during that incident.

We are fully conscious, and take full responsibility for the statement we have made, bearing in mind that, as part of Indonesian society, we are receiving education from that society, and want to play a part in protecting democratic life in this country.

Bandung, 13 November 1987

Signed by:

Bandung Accountancy Academy
Bandung Institute of Technology
Indonesian Institute of Technology
Foreign Languages College
Bandung Economics College
Bandung Raya University
Nusantara Islamic University
Maranatha Christian University
Pajajaran (State) University
Pasundan University

*) The word 'demonstrasi' for demonstration is never used any more in Indonesia. Instead, demonstrations are called 'unjuk rasa' or 'show-of-feeling'.
There are currently two sets of Muslim trials under way, a series of trials of Jemaah Islam defendants in Cirebon, West Java, and a series of trials of NII (Negara Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic State) defendants in Jakarta. 'NII' charges are also being made against the Cirebon defendants. The names are little more than convenient handles, as the charges appear to be very much the same.

Considering that in both places, many more people have been identified as 'awaiting trial', both sets of trials are likely to continue for many months to come.

The Cirebon trials

The defendant Lukman Hakim [see TAPOL Bulletin, No 84, December 1987] was sentenced to fourteen years after being accused, under the anti-subversion law, of trying to establish an Islamic state to replace the State doctrine of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution with the Qu'ran and Hadith. He was also accused of carrying out a series of robberies to raise money for the movement. Lukman Hakim was said to be the NII 'chief-of-staff' in West Java.

While his four-month trial was in progress, it was announced that ten more alleged leaders of the Jemaah Islam would stand trial. These are collectively referred to as the 'Jemaah Islam' trials.

Lukman's lawyer, Ricky Umar S, later announced that his client would not appeal to the high court but would ask for presidential clemency (grasi). This meant he was not challenging the verdict as such. But Kompas quoted Lukman Hakim himself as saying, from his Kosambi prison in Cirebon, that he was convinced he had been tried for involvement in the NII and not because of any alleged involvement in robberies.

The first four to appear after Lukman was sentenced were Dodo Widodo, Asep Jodi, Dalis Burhanudin and Beny Achmad, all allegedly involved in a robbery at a gas station to raise money for the Jemaah Islam. On 24 December, they were all found guilty and each sentenced to nine years. According to press reports, they all accepted their verdicts and had no intention of appealing [Kompas, 2 December 1987 and 4 January 1988].

The Jakarta trials

In all, twelve persons are due to go on trial in Jakarta on charges of NII involvement. In former days, the term more commonly used to incriminate Muslim radicals was the Darul Islam (House of Islam), but the authorities have now switched to using NII, making more obvious the allegedly subversive nature of the cases as being a threat to the Pancasila state. The 'NII trials' are taking place in three courts, the South Jakarta, North Jakarta and East Jakarta district courts.

Bambang Supriyono, 21 years, a petty trader, was the first to appear at the East Jakarta court, accused of chauffeuring Imam Bahri, the leader of the movement, to various places to give lectures. The defendant admitted that he had driven Imam Bahri around but did not see anything wrong with that, and denied all the other charges. He was sentenced to 7 years.

Sakfi Suval Huda, 21, and Sachroni alias Amar Hikmat bin Abas, 40, (mentioned in Bulletin 84 as Syahroni alias Mamat Hikmat) were each found guilty and sentenced respectively to life and to 15 years. Both were accused of being responsible for several robberies, on behalf of the organisation. As with the Cirebon cases, common criminal cases have increasingly been given a Muslim tag.

Explaining why Sakfi, who during the trial appeared to be the less prominent of the two men, received the heavier sentence, the judge asserted that his statements in court had "complicated court proceedings"; Sachroni had been given a lighter sentence because he revealed

Indonesia: Muslims on trial

Published by: TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

Since early 1985, more than 150 Muslims have been tried, convicted and sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment in Indonesia for giving public sermons critical of the government, conducting religious courses not approved by the authorities, or producing leaflets or journals that denounce government policy. Some were held responsible for bombing incidents that were never properly investigated.

The trials followed the army's crackdown on a demonstration of Muslims in September 1984. Dozens, possibly even hundreds, were killed when troops opened fire on the unarmed crowd. The trials took place at a time of deep disquiet in Indonesia about the military government's imposition of total ideological conformity, preventing organisations from proclaiming Islamic or other religious principles.

Indonesia: Muslims on trial analyses the trials, placing them in the context of the continuing conflict between Indonesia's Muslims and the military regime.

"The first genuine attempt in the West to focus on the oppression of Muslims in a state that is more than 90 per cent Muslim, by a regime committed to establishing Western norms and values. The conflict between the political culture of the Muslim masses and their rulers is brought out vividly in Indonesia: Muslims on trial. Although it focuses on events in Indonesia, it will help one understand why Muslim nation states are inherently unstable and are invariably held together by oppression."

Dr. M. Ghayasuddin, Editor, Muslmedia

128 pp. £4.00 plus p & p. 
ISBN 0 9506751 4 8
In North Jakarta, the first NII trial commenced on 10 December, with Tjipto Aryono alias Iyon alias Ibnu Ichsan, 28, in the dock. He is a junior high school teacher in Cakung, and lives in Tanjung Priok. The charges are that he was trying to set up an Islamic state and had given lectures urging people to stand up to the government. Tjipto Aryono was also accused of being an activist in a youth organisation at the Ass hollihin mosque on Jalan Walang Baru, in Tanjung Priok dockland.

Another defendant is Jumoni Adnan, 37, a baker, who allegedly entered Malaysia illegally, along with other NII members who were wanted by the government. His trial is taking place at the South Jakarta district court. He is said to have been actively involved in efforts to topple the government from 1980 to 1986, when he was arrested. His crimes also included officiating marriages and had given lectures urging people to stand up to the government. Tjipto Aryono was also accused of being an activist in a youth organisation at the Asshollihin mosque on Jalon Wolang Baru, in Tanjung Priok dockland.

Yet another anti-subversion trial commenced in South Jakarta on 9 December, with Syahrial Zakaria alias Zaki alias Jecky, 28, a senior high school teacher, in the dock. Together with Jumoni Adnan, Adnan Tjipto, Sudjono bin Salamun and fifteen others, he was accused of attending courses on Aqidah, Al Furqon and Silah Rosul (since when has attending religious courses been allowed as an act of subversion?). The defendant is also said to have been chairman of the Badan Musyawarah Wilayah (Regional Consultative Board) of the NII.

In another trial hardly mentioned in the press, 'NII' defendant, Sarjono alias Harun, 33, a student, faces a possible 20-year sentence, if the prosecutor has his way. His main crime seems to have been delivering lectures which focused on the need for an Islamic state, in accordance with Islamic teachings. But the prosecutor added a twist when he said these lectures "could have brought disgrace upon the teachings of Islam". The trials of two others have also commenced, but little more has been mentioned other than their initials.


West Papuans appeal against six-year sentences

Four West Papuans who have each been sentenced to six years for activities in support of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) are to appeal to the Supreme Court to have their guilty verdicts annulled. The prosecutor has announced that he too will appeal in the hope of getting stiffer sentences for the men.

The accused are being held in Doom Son prison, in the western region of West Papua, (now called the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya). The four men are:

- Nico Karet, 32 years, an employee of the Salawati sub-district administration. He was sentenced to six years by the Son District Court; this verdict was upheld on appeal by the High Court.

- Adrianus Usoy, 37 years, an employee of the Son Excise and Customs Department, who was also sentenced to six years. His sentence was also upheld on appeal by the High Court.

- Saul Way, 19 years, an employee of Petromer Trend Corporation in Sele, who was sentenced initially to three years. On appeal to the high court, his sentence was increased to six years.

- Izoac Abisay, 30 years, also an employee of Petromer Trend Corporation. His initial sentence was five years but this was increased on appeal to six years.

The four men were tried under the anti-subversion law and accused of engaging in activities aimed at bringing about the creation of an independent Papuan state incorporating what is now the 'province of Irian Jaya'. They are said to have taken part in illegal meetings together with members of the OPM on a number of occasions in 1983, 1984 and 1986.

Saul Way had, according to the Indictment, arrived in
Will Governor Hindom stay or go?

There are clear signs that the Indonesian administration in Irian Jaya is at a stalemate, following the resignation last year of Izaak Hindom as governor and his re-appointment shortly afterwards as 'acting-governor'. The following comment by Joh P. Rumbia in *West Papua Courier*, December 1987, helps to shed light on the reasons for the stalemate.

"During the coming term, the work and responsibilities of the governor of Irian Jaya will be heavier than before. The job will be much more demanding, mentally and physically. This is why I have withdrawn from candidacy for the governorship" [Kompas, 27 October 1987]. Thus spoke Izaak Hindom, the governor of Irian Jaya from 1982 to 1987.

For political observers who understand the political system and situation in Indonesia, news of Hindom's resignation did not come as a surprise. Hindom resigned after he had been proposed (not elected) by 32 members of the regional assembly (DPRD), who were all themselves appointed, not elected by the people.

Hindom's withdrawal raises many questions. Was it his personal wish, or did he feel obliged to resign? Or was he forced to resign? The same paper quoted above reported a day earlier that Hindom's re-nomination for a second term as governor from 1987-1992 led to protests from the Irian Jaya community in Java. They criticised the DPRD for not finding a more suitable candidate.

A month earlier, tribal chiefs from Irian Jaya went to Jakarta to protest to the Minister of the Interior about Hindom's re-nomination. They felt that Hindom lacked conviction, authority and ability. His slogan, 'Irian Java' (Javanised Irian), which he has popularised ever since becoming governor in place of Major-General Busiri Suryowinoto after his death, has aroused strong criticism and protests from many sections of the people in Irian Jaya. Hindom is seen as wanting to hasten the process of obliterating the Melanesian people and culture by speeding up the arrival of more transmigrants from Java into Irian Jaya, or to call it by its proper name, West Papua, part of Melanesia which is located in the South Pacific.

Hindom's rejection by Irian Jayan communities in Java and in Irian Jaya shows that the people in the territory do not like him or his policies which have only brought disaster for the people of the region.

Hindom is regarded as the mouthpiece of the Indonesian colonial government in Jakarta, always advocating Indonesia's colonial policies in Irian Jaya. They reject Hindom or indeed any military officer who might be appointed as governor, but they have absolutely no say in electing their governor. The right to appoint a governor rests solely with (ret'd) General Suharto and no-one can intervene. The regulation granting this absolute right is laid down in article 11 of Regulation 10/1974 which states: 'In appointing a head of region from the candidates submitted by the DPRD, the president is not bound by the number of votes obtained by the respective candidates' [Tempo, 14 September 1985].

A strange kind of democracy

On the strength of this regulation, Suharto has always appointed the people he wants as governor, people who are loyal to him and his family, over and above anyone favoured and selected by the people. The DPRD can do nothing but give their consent and accept Suharto's choice. DPRDs are responsible only to the president and not to the people they are supposed to represent. This is indeed a strange kind of democracy, totally different from that practised in many parts of the world.

Indonesian democracy can be called 'demokrasi menjilat' (a 'bum-licking democracy'), a system greatly influenced by the culture and life-style of the Javanese. 'Demokrasi menjilat' stresses the importance of undying loyalty and obedience to the leader, free from opposition, criticism or protest. Such a system of democracy makes it possible for corruption worth thousands of millions of rupiah to thrive, it encourages moral degeneration among government officials, military as well as civilian, it promotes intrigue, and it ensures that the yawning gap between rich and poor in Indonesia gets wider and wider. Without a word of protest, criticism or opposition, the Indonesian people are oppressed; they are forced to accept their fate, good or bad.

Such a situation has caused stirrings of resistance and unrest, which forced Suharto to announce a few years ago that steps would be taken to create a clean and authoritative government. Who would not be amazed to hear such a thing! Indonesia's 'demokrasi menjilat' is now so deeply entrenched that it has become part of people's flesh and bones. This is the kind of democracy that is implemented in Irian Jaya, also for the nomination of the governor. The views and wishes of the people are of no consequence; the only thing that matters is the wishes of the Indonesian colonial rulers. These wishes will be imposed by force if necessary.

Governor Izaak Hindom, Indonesianised to the hilt, with a group of Papuans who have their own ideas of how to dress. [Kompas, 1 March 1987]

Irian Jaya gets a new deputy-governor

While confusion was still raging over Hindom's resignation followed by his appointment as 'acting governor', thus delaying a resolution of the conflict over who should be governor, a new deputy-governor was appointed. The former deputy-governor, Brigadier-General Soegiyono, had been removed in August 1987 amid rumours of bitter conflict between him and Hindom.
The new deputy-governor, Colonel Poedjono Pranyoto, like his predecessor, is not new to a ‘civilian’ job. He was previously district head (bupati) of Cilacap, a harbour city on the south coast of Central Java which must be a difficult place to run with all the smuggling and corruption there. It also covers Nusakembangan, the prison island where political prisoners were held for many years. But Jayapura is likely to be much more of a hardship post than Cilacap!

At the installation of the new deputy-governor, the Interior Minister, General Supardjo Rustam, stressed the need for the the deputy and all the staff (who are predominantly Javanese) to collaborate closely with the governor.

Hindom apparently has strong support at the highest level to remain in the post, and there are hints that he may again be nominated as governor for a second term. He has recently spoken out in favour of a new plan to bring 400,000 Javanese families into Irion Joya under the transmigration programme. He supports more intensive exploitation of the rainforests, following an announcement by the Forestry Minister that logging firms (which have visited disaster on the rainforests of Kalimantan) should now turn their attention to Irion Joya. There are also plans to turn 1.5 million hectares of land there over to plantation investment.

But Hindom is not only intensely disliked by Papuans for his advocacy of Javanisation. He also has numerous conflicts with the Javanese staff who actually run the ‘provincial government’. It would appear that Supardjo Rustam’s plea for better collaboration was an attempt to resolve these conflicts. Once Colonel Pudjono has settled into his new job, the next step may be for Hindom to be re-appointed as full governor for another five-year term. This will leave only the conflict between him and the Papuan people to be resolved, which is likely to be a far more difficult proposition altogether.

* * *

Land and subversion in Irion Jaya

"Is there any justice for us?"
"Give us what is ours by right!"
"Let our sago trees grow!"

These slogans adorned banners that were carried by fifteen women from the village of Injos in the Bay of Yotefa, who went to the office of the bupeti of Jayapura, demanding that their rights to sago stands in Abepura be protected [Tifa Irion, 15 October 1987]. They were angry because their sago trees located between Acai river and Kei camp, Abepura had been cut down by the inhabitants of Nafri, with the consent of Albert Sitorus, the comat (sub-district chief) of Abepura.

The women and other inhabitants of Injos say the sago trees are theirs by inheritance and have been their main source of staple food for generations.

Following their protest, the women were all summoned to appear before the sub-district chief, the village head of Asano, the Abepura police chief and the military commander of Abepura (korami I) to discuss their demand. At first, they thought this discussion would investigate their claim, but they were soon to be disappointed. They were accused of engaging in an act of subversion and bluntly told, "You are supporters of the OPM." So much for the efforts of a group of simple women to defend their rights.


TAPOL Bulletin No. 85, February 1988 11
How monopolies control an Indonesian colony

The East Timor economy is now being run largely for the benefit of a number of Indonesian monopolies, many of them owned by generals or members of their families. A recent account of the companies now operating in East Timor is contained in a document compiled by the Clandestine Commission of National Resistance consisting of East Timorese Catholic students in Indonesia and East Timor. The document reached the Fretilin Office of Information in Lisbon last October.

Taken together with information available from other sources about these companies, the report reveals the extent to which the country is being run as an Indonesian colony.

While a number of export products are being produced, including copra, cummin, sandalwood and cloves, coffee is still the prime source of profit. Soon after the Indonesian army had gained control of the coffee-growing regions bordering on West Timor, coffee became the monopoly of the generals who had led the invasion. All military commands - from the sub-regional military command (korem) based in Dili, down through the kodims or district commands, koramlis or sub-district commands to the village-based NGOs or babinas - are employed to control the production and movement of coffee on behalf of P.T. Denok, the company owned by the leading East Timor veteran generals, Benny Murdani, Dading Kalbuadi and Sahala Rajagukguk. The company is managed by a group of Chinese businessmen, with Hartarto as the director.

Not long ago, several powerful business interests, with backing from President Suharto, made bids to penetrate the Denok monopoly. According to the Clandestine Commission, the businessmen involved in the bid were Bakrie Brothers, a company set up in 1951 by Achmad Bakrie, Probosutedjo, the president's half-brother, and Sigit Suharto, Suharto's eldest son.

Bakrie Brothers, which was set up in 1951 by an Arab-Indonesian family, is now run by Abu Rizal (popularly known as Ical), a son of one of the company's founding fathers. Ical had the good fortune to be a school-mate of Sigit Suharto, Suharto's eldest son, and the two men have combined their business interests in a number of ways.

One of the key areas for the Bakrie and Probosutedjo enterprises is the export of cash crops; this led them, in August 1987, to make bids to control the export of East Timor's coffee and clove crops. Deals have now apparently been struck according to which Denok, aided by the local military commands, will continue to monopolise the purchase of the two crops from local Timorese while Bakrie and Probosutedjo, each with well-established networks in trading centres like Singapore, take charge of the exporting. Probosutedjo has held the monopoly of Indonesia's clove trade since the early 1970s.

The Denok generals are hardly likely to have resisted these bids; on the contrary, such business tie-ups with Suharto family interests are bound to strengthen Denok politically, as well as extricating it from an up-front position in world trading markets.

Denok's domestic coffee prices have risen, from Rp 600 a kilo in the late 1970s to Rp 1,750 in July 1987, though prices paid to local producers are always far below the selling price in Singapore. Towards the end of 1987, the price fell to Rp 1,250, at a time when coffee was fetching Rp 3,500 a kilo in Singapore.

A market in one of East Timor's urban centres. Even petty trading is now in the hands of migrants from Indonesia.

The construction monopolies

In the past few years, there have been huge government investments in East Timor. The so-called 'development' projects have resulted in several major construction firms winning monopolies in certain sectors. P.T. Waskita Karya, which mostly relies on orders placed by the Department of Public Works, has a monopoly over building construction, while bridge building is the monopoly of P.T. Hutama Karya.

Road construction however is the sole responsibility of the army's Special Engineers Corps, known as Zeni Zipur. This Corps recently completed construction of a road from Los Palos to the newly-constructed harbour at Com, on the eastern tip of the territory. Although this is being presented as a major economic development project, it serves military interests. The latest deployment of troops from Java, in October 1987, landed at the harbour of Com. This is a typical example of the army's 'dual function'. Murdani ordered the construction of the harbour and the road, in his role as chief of the Central Implementation Team for the Development of East Timor; he then used troops to build the project, and made use of the two facilities for military operations.

Another company named P.T. Astakona, which was owned by Murdani, Dading Kalbuadi and Rajagukguk, was badly hit by
a corruption scandal. The man in charge was Major Azis, an 'intel' (army spy) who, from 1976 to 1982, was a senior regional government official as head of the agricultural office and deputy regional secretary (sekwalka). For years, Astakona controlled the allocation of about a third of the East Timor budget and handled the supply of raw materials to the agricultural sector.

But rumours about corruption in the company were so persistent that Azis was eventually arrested in 1982, apparently on the orders of Murdani, and the company has since gone into decline.

Details about the ownership of other companies operating in East Timor read like a who's who of the military oligarchy that now runs Indonesia. They include:

* P.T. Nusa Bhakti, owned by Madame Tien Suharto and run by a Javanese director,
* P.T. Liarbau, owned by Major Prabowo, Suharto's son-in-law, and deputy commander of a special army unit called Brigade 81. Prabowo is a member of the red-beret Kopassus corps. This is the first mention of any business venture of his. The director of his company is a Timorese, Abilio Osorio, a leading member of Golkar.

### Indonesia's image problem

A recurring theme in Jakarta these days is that Indonesia is the victim of distorted reporting and unwarranted accusations, variously blamed on the foreign media, Amnesty International, PKI 'remnants' who are living abroad and even TAPOL.

President Suharto recently urged the national news agency, Antara, "to neutralise any distorted reports about Indonesia by the foreign press". He also told the agency to "distribute good and accurate reports", adding: "Every news item, regardless of source, should be censored carefully before being published." [Jakarta Post, 11 December 1987].

The former Director-General for Social, Cultural and Media Relations at the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, Major-General (ret'd) R. Adenan (replaced in October 1987 by Brigadier-General Pieter Damanik who is concurrently spokesperson for the armed forces), felt that accusations against Indonesia, emanating among others from Amnesty, were the result of Indonesia's "lack of openness". Indonesia should invite more foreigners in positions of influence to see conditions for themselves, in the hope they would later correct these distortions. Greater use should also be made of foreign journalists working in Indonesia [those who are lucky enough not to be ordered to leave].

The problem is, he said, that Amnesty International, one of the many organisations that "persistently condemns Indonesia, year in, year out" is highly respected abroad, meaning that its attacks could influence the opinions of states in the West as well as Japan.

Adenan's call for "openness" does not of course apply to independent observers wishing to investigate conditions in East Timor or West Papua, or to examine the position of political prisoners under sentence of death or still serving long prison sentences. Jakarta's refusal to allow a host of organisations to send missions of investigation does much to blacken the regime's image, revealing how much it needs to hide from outside scrutiny.

### IPU resolution infuriates Jakarta

It has just been revealed in the Indonesian press that the conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union held in Bangkok last October adopted a resolution on the question of East Timor, despite efforts by the Indonesian delegation to oppose any discussion of the question. The resolution calls on Indonesia and Portugal to collaborate with the UN Secretary-General in seeking a solution to the East Timor question.

According to the head of Indonesia's delegation, the move to have a resolution on East Timor came after the Portuguese delegation, in a speech to the plenary session, called on Indonesia to get out of East Timor. Initially there was no draft resolution but following Portugal's intervention, the Angolan delegation proposed a text to the drafting committee. The Indonesian delegation opposed this but Cuba supported Angola while Algeria and four other countries abstained [Pikiran Rakyat, 14 December 1987].

What the Indonesian delegation did not reveal was that the resolution was overwhelmingly adopted by 791 votes to 122, with 207 abstentions.
Pope concerned about East Timor

A brief but pointed reference to East Timor made by Pope John Paul II when accepting the credentials of the new Indonesian ambassador in December has sent shock-waves through the government in Jakarta.

He said: "The Church's universal mission of service leads her to hope that particular consideration will be given to the protection of the ethnic, religious and cultural character of the people of East Timor" [UCA News, 23 December 1987]. These words were almost identical with the remark the Pope made when accepting the credentials of the previous Indonesian ambassador three years ago.

[Apart from the English-language Jakarta Post, only one Indonesian paper, Suara Pembaruan, reported the Pope's remarks, but not till two weeks afterwards, on 29 December. This kind of news is apparently deemed unsuitable for Indonesians to read.]

Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja responded by calling a press conference at which he accused the Pope of being "misinformed" and "one-sided". It was all the more galling a remark by the fact that the number of Catholics in East Timor has increased since the start of Indonesian rule, yet the Pope's condemnation has been so unsuccessful. In a paper on East Timor presented to the General Assembly of the Pontifical Commission in November 1985, Seda complained about "excessive, improper, negative international press-coverage" (original, Eng.). Admitting that there have been killings, political imprisonment, torture and sufferings, he went on: "(This is) because there was war. In a war there are two parties involved. In the international, especially Catholic, coverages, only Indonesia is accused" (page 5).

Where does the Pope's information come from?

The Catholic Church in East Timor is still directly administered by the Vatican, despite efforts by Indonesia to have it incorporated into the Indonesian Church. The point was reiterated by the Papal Nuncio in Jakarta, Mgr Francesco Canclini, who declared recently that as long as the international dispute over East Timor's status is unresolved, the Vatican cannot transfer the East Timor Church to its Asia department "as this would imply recognising the Indonesian dimension". The Vatican can only act in accordance with international law and "cannot pre-empt" any decisions taken on the matter [Suara Pembaruan, 21 September 1987].

Mgr Canclini also praised Indonesia's "development efforts" in East Timor. He recalled that the Vatican had in the past expressed concern about human rights but claimed, after some hesitation, that things had now improved. Yet however pleasing these words may have sounded in Jakarta, the Vatican's refusal to recognise Indonesia's annexation of East Timor is galling in the extreme, not least because it enables the Vatican to keep open direct lines of communication with Church personnel working in East Timor.

East Timor Church pleads for freedom of movement

The Vatican is certain to be aware of a document summarising a submission made by a senior Jesuit, P.J. Dijkstra, on behalf of Mgr Belo, head of the Catholic Church in East Timor to MASPI, the Council of Indonesian Religious Superiors, at its meeting last August. The document summarising the submission and the discussion which followed, presented Mgr Belo's views on the political situation in East Timor in the following bleak terms:

"Since East Timor's integration into Indonesia, major and rapid changes have taken place in the economic and social-cultural systems of society. The
most prominent social change is the shift away from the
ecommunity. The domination of religion and religious leaders who
originally had a decisive influence in the
community. The fact is that now another religion is growing alongside the changes that are taking place, and the influence of religious leaders long established in
society has gradually been dissipated (memurud).

"There is a change in attitude of state officials
towards society, whilst for its part, the community
does not yet have the courage openly to articulate its
opinions and wishes to the government or to Church
leaders, all of which makes life increasingly oppressive
(memuruk).

"Certain officials do not take account of conditions
in the area and behave in a disrespectful manner; some
pursue private missions all of which offends and hurts
the community."

The document makes a plea for freedom of movement for
Catholic pastors, brothers, sisters and lay-people in the
performance of their pastoral activities, so as to enable
the Church to play its role in resolving problems and
restoring a sense of peace. It hopes that the local
government apparatus will be allowed to function smoothly
and separately.

The document conveys a sense of urgency about the
Church's need for more personnel. It states that 34
Muslim preachers coming direct from Saudi Arabia and graduates of the state Islamic university, IAIN, are soon
to be permanently located in East Timor, with more to
follow.

Considering the caution invariably used in Catholic
discourse, these words reveal profound disquiet within the
Church in East Timor and probably go a long way to
explaining the concern conveyed in the Pope's message.

The impending influx of Muslim teachers and preachers
signifies a possible move by the regime to dilute the
role of Catholicism in East Timor, in the special
circumstances of a persecuted population for whom the

EASTTIMOR

Church has become the sole institution affording
protection to Timorese living in those parts of East
Timor under Indonesian occupation against the brutalities
committed by the forces of occupation.

Jesuit Superior-General countermands the
Indonesian Provincial

Father P. Felgueiras, the rector of the Seminary in Dili,
whose return to East Timor had been blocked after
visiting his family in Portugal last year, now has been
authorised to return to Dili although whether he will
resume his duties as rector is not clear.

Although no-one in Indonesia would take responsibility
for preventing Father Felgueiras' return, the Lisbon
daily, Diario de Noticias reports that the decision was
reversed by Father Kolvenbach, the Superior-General of
the Society of Jesus in Rome. This suggests that the
attempt to block his return came from the Indonesian
Jesuits.

The Superior-General also reversed an earlier decision
which had placed Jesuits working in East Timor under the
supervision of Indonesian Jesuits; they have now been
restored to the supervision of the Society of Jesus in
Portugal [Em Timor-Leste a Paz e Possivel, No. 23, Jan-Feb
1988]. The earlier decision was seen as implying support
for 'integration'. The reversal is a clear defeat for
Indonesian policy.

Father Felgueiras will go to Rome in April to present
his case and that of Jesuits in East Timor to the Curia
General [Diario de Noticias, 28 October 1987].

Murdani’s latest assessment of Fretelin

General Benny Murdani, commander-in-chief of the
Indonesian armed forces, has publicly acknowledged that
it will still take years to end armed resistance to
Indonesia's occupation of East Timor. But he said he
thought that "only around five hundred Fretelin fighters"
are still operating in East Timor as compared with
10,000
some years ago and dismissed Fretelin as having no impact
apart from "attacking the population, burning crops and
stealing cattle" [Kompas, 31 December 1987].

He said most were armed but outmoded weapons
though they were also armed with weapons seized from
Indonesian troops. He strongly denied that East Timor was
an Indonesian colony; in so doing he revealed how much he
regards Indonesia being called a colonial power.

Asked about Fretelin's international links, Murdani
said their radio has not functioned for a year and
insisted that no supplies were reaching them from abroad
[Merdeka, 31 December 1987].

It is instructive to compare Murdani's latest
assessment with an assessment he made in December 1984,
when he claimed that Fretelin had between 500 and 700
fighters under arms. He said then that Indonesia had
opted to pursue a "hearts and minds policy" which "is not
something you can achieve in one or two years" [Reuters,
17 December 1984]. Now, three years on, even according to
official claims, the challenge from Fretelin has hardly
changed.

This latest statement shows Murdani on the defensive,
not even trying to explain why a few hundred guerrillas
(if his figures are to be believed) can hold down tens of
thousands of Indonesian troops for years. It seems the

A recent photo from East Timor of guerrillas in the bush,
some of Murdani's "five hundred fighters".
his end-of-year foreign affairs report, Mochtar said the fact that the issue had not been voted on at the UN for the fifth year running "shows that international interest is flagging." Jakarta Post [5 January], and welcomed this as a "diplomatic boom". Even so, vigilance was necessary because "anti-Indonesian elements are always using every opportunity to raise the issue internationally." [Kompas, 5 January 1988]

Intelligence report

Murdani’s downbeat report probably has its origins in an intelligence report compiled a few months earlier about attitudes of the Timorese people. According to a document dated 2 October and sent to the Fretilin Information Office (GIF) in Lisbon by the Clandestine Commission of Resistance of Catholic Timorese Students in Indonesia and East Timor, Murdani’s Strategic Intelligence agency, BAIS (Badan Inteligen Strategis) and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies carried out an investigation of Timorese attitudes during the first eight months of 1987 and reported that the East Timorese people "totally reject" Indonesia’s presence in East Timor. Students even speak out openly and fearlessly against Indonesia. According to the Clandestine Commission’s contacts in Jakarta, Murdani was greatly discouraged by the intelligence report which convinced him of the need to persuade the Timorese that Indonesia is the only power that can guarantee freedom, not Portugal or Fretilin or the UDT.

Murdani spends Christmas in East Timor

In accordance with well-established ritual, Murdani went to East Timor for Christmas and used his visit to make yet another appeal "to those still wandering in the forests and mountains" to stop resisting Indonesia and come down” [Jakarta Post, 28 December].

Murdani is responsible both for military operations and ‘development’ activities in East Timor. The Security Operations Command for East Timor (Kopskam Timtim) is directly accountable to the armed forces central command under Murdani; he is also chairman of the Team Pelaksana Pembangunan Pusat Timor Timor, or Central Implementation Team for the Development of East Timor. More than anyone else, his political reputation is closely tied to the success or failure of Indonesian policies in East Timor.

Khmer Rouge expert now US consul in Jakarta

The US consul in Jakarta, Tim Carney, has been identified by Indonesia News Service as an “acknowledged scholar on the Khmer Rouge” [INS, No. 40, 17 October 1987]. During a working visit to Central Java, Carney slipped out a remark that he considers development in East Timor to be proceeding smoothly [Kedaulatan Rakyat, 3 October 1987]. This suggests that Carney may hold the reporting brief on East Timor in the US Jakarta embassy which would be an interesting clue to the importance Washington attaches to obtaining its own assessment of Fretilin.

Indonesia to get seat on UN human rights sub-commission?

Indonesia is making a bid to win a place on the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The sub-commission, which is composed of experts in human rights affairs who should operate independently of their governments, is the body which considers and prepares the agenda of the UN Commission on Human Rights. Some members of the sub-committee will come up for re-election at the Commission meeting in Geneva in February this year, an opportunity Jakarta hopes to use to turn the whole UN human rights apparatus into a mockery.

Indonesia’s candidate for the post is Yusuf Wanandi, director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, the body responsible for supervising all international visits to East Timor. The CSIS has been involved in the annexation of East Timor since the very start and assists the armed forces command in numerous ways to counter-act international pressure for an act of self-determination in East Timor.

Jakarta is clearly rattled by the sub-committee’s resolution last August recommending that this year’s Commission should again investigate human rights abuses in East Timor. As a sub-committee member, Wanandi’s primary task will be to sabotage any moves to protect any of the victims of the Indonesian military regime.
Could you say something about your own background?
I was born in the mountains in the south-eastern part of East Timor and was educated after the Second World War in Solbada, then I studied at the seminary in Dili from 1954 to 1959. I went to Macao where I studied theology up to the fifth year, after which I returned to East Timor to do my military service.

I was sent to Lisbon to train as an officer. I was sent to Mozambique as a lieutenant, in command of thirty men. After my military service, I entered government service in Mozambique and worked there for six years, from 1969 till 1974. But in 1973, I entered university to study history, as a working student. I did the first year of my studies in Mozambique and in 1974, I went to Lisbon to continue my studies there, graduating in 1978. Since then I have worked as a teacher in Lisbon. I have all the time been involved in political and social organisations to grapple with the political and social problems of my people. I have always felt this was important. In 1976, about three thousand East Timorese came to Portugal as refugees, and in 1979, another batch arrived. I asked several countries to receive East Timorese refugees, but only Australia agreed. More than 4,000 went to Australia.

As you see, I was not in East Timor at the time of the Indonesian invasion. This was because, when I left my country, I pledged that I would not return until I had obtained a good qualification.

Did you keep in touch with your family all that time?
After the invasion, I got in touch with the Red Cross in Portugal and the International Red Cross in Geneva for information, but it wasn't until 1979 that I heard anything.

My parents had twelve children, of whom three died many years ago. Of the nine surviving brothers and sisters (including myself), I discovered that five died following the invasion so there were only three left apart from me, a sister in East Timor, a sister in Australia and a brother in East Timor. Also, only six nephews have survived. I also lost two half-brothers and many nephews and nieces.

Do you know how they died?
I know that my father died of starvation. I also know that my youngest brother was killed together with his wife. My mother also died because of the famine. A younger sister died because she refused to surrender to the Indonesian soldiers. She was only 22. Her name was Teresa. Two other brothers wanted to surrender but when she refused to surrender, they refused as well. As for my father, he became weak and hungry. So he decided to try and reach a village to ask for help. He had one of his grand-daughters with him. But he did not have the strength to finish the journey so he sat down on a stone and they both died, there by the road. That was in 1978. After that, my brother surrendered in 1979, and then he was killed.

Some of my relatives had been fighting. Our region was inhabited by many thousands of people. Some of them later came to Portugal. They can testify about what happened. In 1976 and 1977, my brother took in many people who had fled from their homes when the Indonesians came.

What about the fate of your clan? Do you have any information?
In Portuguese times, the authorities carried out a census every two or three years. At the last census before the invasion, my clan consisted of almost six hundred persons, and there were about two thousand five hundred people in our tribe, the Fatuberliu tribe. My father was a lual (clan chief).

Almost the entire clan has been wiped out. Only a few dozen people have survived. Some are living in some and some in Dili. But many other clans from Fatuberliu have also completely disappeared. I think the reason for the heavy death-toll is that in the early years of the occupation, from 1976 to 1979, many people from other parts of the country fled to this region and took refuge there. Because of this, the Indonesians regarded our clan as highly suspect, people who should all be wiped out.

The region was also heavily bombed in the years up to 1979, so by 1980, there was almost no-one left. At that time, I asked the Red Cross if they could trace any of my relatives. They were not able to, and it was only later, when people from the region arrived in Portugal that I heard what had happened.

What a terrible tragedy for you! When did you join the UDT?
I joined in 1974. After the Indonesian invasion, I continued to fight with my party for the East Timorese people.

The Indonesians say the UDT was one of the parties that petitioned for integration in late 1975. Is that true?
No, it isn't. The two UDT people who signed the petition in West Timor did not represent our party. In any case, all the four who signed the petition demanded certain conditions, but these conditions were never met.
so the petition is not valid.

What are your views about East Timor's future?
The Indonesians have asked Portugal to recognise integration, but Portugal cannot do this because this must be based on the will of the people, and the people will not accept integration. After twelve years of political and military fighting against Indonesia, there can be no moral justification for Portugal to accept Indonesia's military takeover.

What do you feel about the recent statement by the Portuguese government, no longer mentioning the question of self-determination for East Timor?
Although it sounds more ambiguous, I don't think the position of this government is any different from that of previous Portuguese governments because it says that it will seek "an honorable solution". This can only mean a solution that is in accord with UN principles, as laid down in the UN Charter. Some people here in Portugal are trying to influence public opinion to press the government to accept integration, but we must fight against that.

What do you think about the Portuguese journalist, Nuno Rocha whose articles strongly support integration?
I know quite a lot about that but I cannot mention some of the things I know. Rocha believes Portugal will have to accept integration and he wants to reap some benefits. I believe Rocha knows the truth about conditions in East Timor but he only uses those bits that serve his purpose.

You went to the UN this year for the meeting of the Fourth Committee. Was it the first time you went?
No, I also went in 1980. This was the fourth time the UDT attended the Committee. Our party also attended in 1979, 1980 and 1981. It is very important for small countries to have a forum where they can speak out against big countries.

Your representative, Joao Carascaloo, said that people tried to silence him. Did he mean the Indonesians?
Yes, the Indonesians lobbied hard in the corridors saying that, because the UDT signed the petition for integration, we have no right to speak against it.

You were the UDT representative who signed the declaration of national convergence with Fretilin in March 1986. What are your views about that?
That document was very important a year ago but it is even more important today. Already in 1985 and 1986, we saw that such a convergence would be important for the future. Recent developments in Portugal such as the more ambiguous position of the Portuguese government and the articles by Nuno Rocha give it even greater importance today. Such things could modify public opinion here in Portugal about East Timor. The convergence has made it much easier for us to respond to Rocha's articles.

How strong is the UDT inside East Timor?
I think there is a great thirst among our people for liberty, for human dignity, for rights, greater freedom of expression, more access to economic activity, and social equality. We in UDT agree with all this.

What solution does your party favour?
We think the Portuguese should return to East Timor and resume control, so as to give the people time to prepare themselves for independence. We have asked the Portuguese government to do this. It is fully in accord with the UN Charter. All UN documents about East Timor recognise Portugal as the administering power. Portugal cannot seize this power in the face of Indonesian integration, but it can look for another solution. One solution is the one I have just mentioned.

If Portugal does not do this but instead recognises integration, we should ask what benefit would that bring for Portugal, for the UN and for the East Timorese people.

What does your party think about the political system in an Independent East Timor?
In our statement on national convergence, we say that there must be a parliamentary system, that we must have elections and proportional representation so as to ensure a position for all parties in parliament.

Do you think it's still true to say there are three parties in East Timor, Fretilin, the UDT and Apodeti?
Yes. Indonesia gave more positions to the Apodeti. There is an old Apodeti and a new Apodeti. Those who, like us, have retained their nationalist sentiments have suffered more than the new and the old Apodeti. These feelings have remained very deep among our people.

Yes, that is very striking, despite all the sufferings they've gone through. Your people's struggle is like a beacon. Many people in Indonesia suffer grave injustices, and there is some struggle going on, but East Timor is like a beacon.

Yes, the idea of resistance is very strong indeed in the minds of the people.

What do you think about the armed resistance?
I believe that this armed resistance will never end because all the mountainous areas have been depopulated so resistance fighters can wander around and the Indonesian army will never be able to find them.

Do you agree that the armed struggle should continue?
No, I don't, but if the Indonesians go on refusing to recognising our right to independence, then armed struggle is the only way. Anyone who surrenders is killed in spite of the presidential amnesty in 1982. It's not just that people are fighting for independence, but because they know that if they surrender, they will be killed.

Photograph by Elaine Briere.
I think it would be much easier if the Indonesian government were to contribute to achieving such a solution. Indonesia is a great power in the region. Therefore, nothing can succeed in East Timor without the consent of the Indonesian government. But also, we know that Indonesia's only goal is the annexation of East Timor. Therefore, only if Indonesia changes its attitude will there be a solution in favour of self-determination and independence.

How do you think that could happen?

One way is by international pressure. But that cannot happen if Portugal takes the position that they appear to be taking today.

Also the role of international public opinion, the solidarity organisations, Amnesty International and other human rights organisations, as well as the churches, is very important. There must be pressure for greater liberties inside the country, wider contacts between families. And I would also ask TAPOL to continue to denounce Indonesian policy, and call for a proper solution. Until we reach a political solution, we must at least try to make some progress on human rights.

(To Vincente Gutteres) When did you leave East Timor?

I left in 1975, and later came to Lisbon with the help of the Portuguese government. My parents are in Baucau, a brother and a sister are in the eastern part and another brother is studying at a seminary in Java. My family has been lucky because no-one died during the war. Eight of them escaped to Atambua during the conflict (between Fretilin and the UDT) in 1975.

My father and brothers were arrested by Fretilin in 1975. Later during the invasion, some of the Fretilin people wanted to kill them but a friend managed to protect them, and they were told, "Each one must decide for him/herself what to do".

(Moises do Amaral) In 1977, Nicolau Lobato (leader of Fretilin who was murdered by the Indonesians in December 1978) said that those people who were formerly Fretilin prisoners could join Fretilin; those who didn't want to, could go and join the Indonesians. I must also say that Indonesian propaganda which claims that many people died during the UDT-Fretilin conflict in 1975 is not true. The vast majority of deaths occurred from 1977 to 1979 because of the bombing and from hunger and disease. In my region, where there were so many casualties, there was no fighting at all between Fretilin and the UDT.

(Vincente Gutteres) Even in Baucau, there was no fighting between the two parties. And when the Indonesian invasion occurred, this was a good opportunity for them to be united.

It was Indonesian policy, wasn't it, to incite conflict between the UDT and Fretilin?

(Moises do Amaral) Yes, indeed. Unfortunately, the Portuguese also tried to do this, by giving weapons to Fretilin. Had they wanted to, they could have stopped the fighting between the two parties.

In his articles, Nuno Rocha says that Fretilin were the killers, but who gave them the weapons? Herein lies the importance of the convergence - to show that, on our own, we have been able to reach an accord between our two parties, thus reaching a peaceful solution to our problem.

* *

Four ITB students held for questioning

Four students of the Bandung Institute of Technology were held for questioning after a New Year's Eve cultural event. The arrests were announced by Lt-Col Syarwan Hamid, information chief of the West Java Regional Military Command. The evening was entitled: "1988, the year of jointly considering (menyimak) the dark clouds enveloping the country". He alleged that the event took place without permission.

Although the evening was publicised as a musical event, he said, there had been speeches and poetry readings discrediting and insulting the head of state and other officials, and inciting people to carry out shows of feeling (unjuk rasa) on the streets. Lt-Col Hamid said two had been allowed home but the others were undergoing "intensive interrogation" [Kompas, 13 January 1988].

Eleven Jehovah Witnesses arrested, including 'ex-PKiers'

Eleven Jehovah Witnesses, including four married couples, have been arrested in East Java. Another fourteen are "under supervision". Some are likely to be formally charged for promoting "misleading" (sosial) religious teachings, in violation of a ban of the Jehovah Witnesses introduced in December 1976. Among those under arrest are persons (not clear whether one or more) said to be former members of the communist party.

The sect is said to be very active in several East Java cities and to have spread to East Kalimantan. Since it operates 'illegally' and surreptitiously (sembunyi-sembunyi), it has proved difficult for the security forces to find out how many people are involved [Surabaya Bulletin No. 85, February 1988].
Compulsory transmigration

To what extent do the authorities rely on pressure and compulsion to fill their transmigration targets? The deepening poverty in Java is certainly the main "incentive" forcing people to leave for what they hope will be a better life in the outer islands.

Now, as land disputes throughout Java spread at an alarming rate, compulsory evictions are providing officials with the opportunity to force dispossessed peasants to transmigrate. This is most glaringly apparent in the case of the thousands dispossessed by the Kedung Ombo dam (see separate item). Other cases are less well documented, but from press reports it is possible to identify instances where people have been forced to leave home for an uncertain future as transmigrants.

The urban poor as transmigrants

Families in Semarang whose homes were described as "unsightly" (kumuh) and built without approval (liar) were ordered to vacate their homes by 1 October 1987 and given no alternative accommodation or compensation.

The city government left their rehousing to a Catholic agency, the Sugijopranata Social Foundation (YSS), one of the private foundations collaborating with the government to implement the transmigration programme. Soon after the families had been evicted, YSS chairman, Br Servatius FIC said it would be wrong "to force them to transmigrate as this could be fatal" but they must speedily be "given the motivation to decide to go of their own volition" [Suara Merdeka, 5 October 1987]. He said transmigration was "the only safe alternative" if they returned to the villages whence they fled in search of a better life in the city, they would not be able to survive for long. This meant that the transmigration programme must be "intensified".

Two months later, forty-nine families were setting out on the journey to Kumai in Central Kalimantan as nongovernment-funded transmigrants (transmigran swakarsa) with expenses paid by the YSS. In their new home, they will occupy houses built for prospective transmigrants two years ago which have since stood vacant and are certainly in a state of disrepair. One transmigration official welcomed the use of these vacant houses as it "will mean saving state funds" [Kompas, 12 December].

The inhabitants of 232 houses situated along a road in Semarang which was being widened for access to an amusement centre were ordered to vacate their homes and told that if they did not do so by the deadline, they would be driven out and their homes demolished along with the contents. They were low-paid factory workers, refuse collectors, parking attendants and street vendors with no funds to buy a house or travel anywhere. But they were offered no compensation as they were 'squatters'. They had in fact paid for the land but had no documents to prove it. Most had come to Semarang years ago from the surrounding countryside and had nowhere to go. So when local officials including people from the transmigration office "gave them guidance" about their future, there was little they could do but accept the offer of transmigration [Suara Merdeka, 11 June 1987].

The urban poor are classified by acronyms. The crudest term now used is 'gepeng', abbreviated from gelandangan (vagrants) and pengemis (beggars). The word 'gepeng' also means 'flattened'. 'PGOT' (for pengemis, gelandangan dan orang terlantar or beggars, vagrants and homeless) is another term by which the urban poor are now known.

According to the authorities in Central Java, 214 'gepeng' families were transmigrated from the province in 1986/87 [Kedaulaton Rakyat, 6 November 1987]. Yet it is well known that the urban poor do not take to being transmigrants. One group from Jakarta who were transmigrated to a site along the River Merdeka in East Kalimantan have almost all left the site, having first stolen a march on the authorities by selling off their homes and plots to business interests in Balikpapan.

Meanwhile, families who made their homes along railway tracks in several parts of Jakarta have been evicted to make way for the tracks to be widened. The number of families involved is not clear but they have all been told, after 'consultations', to transmigrate. Fifteen of the families were recently dispatched to a site in South Sumatra [Merdeka, 8 October 1987].

From Surabaya comes a report that four hundred urban poor families, some living along railway tracks, others with homes in kampungs, and others living on the streets, were ordered by the city government to transmigrate. In this case however, the transmigration authorities have so far failed to provide sites, leaving the families uncertain about their future two years after being ordered to leave [Surabaya Post, 5 December 1987].
Dam victims forced to transmigrate

In mid-December, fifty families from Genongsari, Ngrokum and Wonoharjo villages in the district of Boyolali, Central Java were bundled onto buses with all their personal possessions, and sent to South Sumatra to "start a new life" as transmigrants. Many were weeping.

Presiding over the departure was Lieutenant-Colonel Mohammad Hasbi, Boyolali district head and former commander of the Jogjakarta garrison who, more than any other official, has been responsible for hounding the villagers in their efforts to resist dispossession and enforced transmigration. Hasbi advised the departing families to adjust speedily to their new surroundings and follow diligently the orders of their superiors. "Wherever we are," he said generously, "we must obey the regulations if we want to live a quiet life." [Suara Merdeka, 17 December 1987]

Of the 1,854 families in Boyolali targeted for transmigration, 1,160 have already left while the remainder will reportedly soon follow.

Altogether, 3,236 families have been sent away as transmigrants from the districts of Boyolali, Sragen and Grobogan. Another 1,259 families are to be transmigrated; the delay is said to be due to lack of funds for moving sponsored transmigrants [Suara Merdeka, 30 December].

**Boyolali: A campaign of intimidation and harassment**

The long-drawn-out struggle of Boyolali peasants to resist dispossession has been widely reported in the press [see TAPOL Bulletins, Nos 82, 83 and 84]. Documents have become available revealing systematic intimidation against villagers whose land has been seized for the dam. Stiffest resistance has come from peasants living in a dozen or so villages in sub-district Kemusu, Boyolali district. Of the 2,654 families who were told to move, only thirty per cent accepted the pitiful compensation offered by the provincial government without a fight. Significantly, these were civil servants, village officials and alleged former members of outlawed organisations, all of whom have apparently since moved away or been transmigrated to other parts.

From the documents, we now know that pressure on the peasants began way back in 1982 when the Kedung Ombo dam was still at the planning stage. After a series of bitter experiences, the Boyolali peasants, with the help of a legal aid institute and other NGOs in Solo, organised meetings in late 1985 to discuss their rights as citizens and decided to make a stand.

**Chronology of trouble**

One document is a chronology of events from 1982 to September 1986. Before the general elections in 1982, the inhabitants had been told that, if they voted for Golkar, no-one would be driven off their land for the dam, but if Golkar lost, access to nearby forests would be stopped. Fearing that their land rights were in jeopardy, many peasants applied in 1984 for land-tight certificates. The fees were paid but the certificates were never issued.

The following year, local officials made surveys of the land in Kemusu but the villagers refused to counter-sign the survey reports, fearing that their thumb-prints would be used as proof that they agreed to the compensation being offered for their land. Officials claimed that confirming surveys did not imply accepting the rates of compensation, but resistance to the surveys continued.

In January 1986, villagers were ordered to attend a meeting with local government leaders to 'be given guidance'. Anyone failing to attend would face sanctions under Article 224 of the Penal Code. This meeting was convened primarily to order members of outlawed organisations to thumb-print land surveys and leave the region as transmigrants. However, not all the people at the meeting were former members of outlawed organisations. While former members agreed to sign (they could hardly have refused), the others refused. Later that month those who had refused were again summoned, this time by koramil, the local military command, and ordered to thumb-print the surveys. They still refused.

In February, other villagers were summoned to meetings and again put under pressure.

Two months later, the former members of outlawed organisations were again summoned and confronted by an array of high-ranking local civilian and military officials who gave them two days to register for transmigration to Nabire (West Papua). Anyone failing to do so would be confined within their village boundaries. Seventeen people attending this meeting had not been members of outlawed organisations but they later discovered that their identity cards were marked with the letters ET (for 'ex-tapol') implying that they were.

From then on, summonses to meetings became a regular form of intimidation. At one such meeting for Kemusu villagers on 30 April, they were given a lecture about outlawed organisations. On 1 May, the villagers of Ngrokum village were summoned to a meeting, the third to be held in their village, and advised to transmigrate. (These villagers are among those who eventually left in December 1987: see above.) From 6 May, villagers in Genengsari village were summoned in groups of ten to a series of daily meetings at which they were ordered to thumb-print documents. Many refused, asking for...
consultations about the rate of compensation. On 17 July, the Kemusu village head wrote to his sub-district chief complaining that several villagers, including a man named Jaswadi, were "spreading disaffection." A week later, on 23 July, a number of inhabitants in the sub-district of Nglandi formally complained to the police about malpractices regarding the payment of compensation; some had received less than half the amount promised, while others who had not agreed to accept compensation had nevertheless been forced to accept money.

Then on 5 August, the Semarang daily, Suara Merdeka, a Golkar paper, accused "elements" in Boyolali of "trying to corner their village heads" by refusing to sign compensation agreements and demanding to have their land certificates. Four days later, Jaswadi of Nglandi village was detained for the night and questioned by several local officials about the complaints made to the police.

Following a supportive local journalist's report later that month, Suara Merdeka again attacked the villagers, especially Jaswadi, accusing them of retarding development activities. On the same day, villagers sought the help of the Legal Aid Institute in Jogjakarta, and a day later, Suara Merdeka warned that "certain elements" were trying to politicise the dam dispute. The LBH took immediate action on the villagers' behalf. Then on 6 September, Jaswadi was again summoned and told that legal proceedings were being taken against him. [The Chronology ends at this point.]

Methods used to seize land

Another document dated 17 February 1987 describes official moves to take over the land needed for the Kedung Ombo dam. The land acquisition team of government officials and project managers:

- never consulted the inhabitants about either collection of data (surveying) or fixing the rate of compensation,
- intimidated inhabitants who were not willing to accept compensation,
- branded people as members of outlawed organisations,
- falsified people's signatures or thumb-prints on documents accepting compensation,
- made it difficult for people to obtain documents needed for various purposes,
- exerted pressure on people to agree to transmigrate,
- promised that people willing to accept compensation would be transmigrated at the government's expense but then charged them Rp. 220,000 a family when they left,
- arrested people on trumped-up charges,
- circulated inaccurate information to confuse people.

The villagers are not opposed to the dam being built, the document continues. But what they do object to are the Team's way of seizing land. Most villagers in Kemusu sub-district were unwilling to accept cash compensation and wanted other land near the dam instead. Land surveys were rejected because there had been no consultation.

Terror and intimidation

The Jakarta daily, Suara Pembaruan reported on 24 July 1987 that dozens of villagers in several sub-districts of Boyolali had been arrested and held by the local police or military for refusing to accept government offers of compensation. A policeman had held the thumb of one elderly man and forced him to put his thumb-print on a document the contents of which were unknown to him.

With such coercion to persuade villagers to attend meetings with officials, there was widespread fear, causing people to flee from their homes and take shelter in nearby forests. Faced with strong pressure to transmigrate, many men said their wives were so vehemently opposed that they feared transmigration would lead to a spate of divorces. Their dislike for transmigration was based on the bad reports about transmigration sites where former neighbours were now living. They insisted that they would only be satisfied with land-for-land compensation.

Workshop on Kedung Ombo dam cancelled

A workshop on the Kedung Ombo dam project convened by the Jogjakarta Legal Aid Institute (LBH) at Gajah Mada University campus was "indefinitely postponed" on the orders of the Jogjakarta police.

The panel of speakers included well-known experts on environmental problems and land rights including Dr. Loekman Soetjipto, Dr. Nico L. Kana, Profesor Otto Soemarwoto and representatives from WALHI, the Indonesian Environmental Forum and the LBH. Many Indonesian NGOs had been invited as well as the World Bank and the district heads of Sragen and Boyolali.

LBH officials running the workshop said they did not apply for police permission because the workshop was to have been an academic discussion held in cooperation with Gajah Mada University. [Kedaulatan Rakyat, 31 October 1987, reported in Indonesia News Service, No 49, 18 November 1987.]

The decision to prevent the workshop shows how sensitive the authorities are about any discussion of the issues raised by dam construction.

Sragen

In Sragen, another of the districts affected by the dam, the local authorities have managed to impose their will through intimidation, assisted by what appears to be a local kebatinan (Javanese mystics) organisation.

In Soka, Miri sub-district, where land sells for around Rp. 5,000 per square meter, 229 families rejected the government's offer of Rp. 750 (now further reduced to Rp 730). Ten of them were chosen to make representations to the second-level regional assembly and to ask the LBH to fight their case. But nine were summoned by the Sragen police and questioned about their backgrounds. Then, the peasants were put in touch with an organisation called Sarana Duta Perdamaian Indonesia (Sadupi), possibly a kebatinan organisation promoting conflict resolution. It was not long before Sadupi had persuaded the peasants to accept the money on offer and agree to transmigrate, a complete climb-down. The only "concession" from Sadupi was a promise to press for the rehabilitation of the nine men who had been branded as 'extremists' and an undertaking from the police to stop investigating their backgrounds, [Kompas, 28 December 1987].
Dayaks ruined by plantation economy

The following is a slightly abridged translation of an article in Kompas, on 27 December 1987, describing the impact of a Nucleus Estate (PIR) project in Central Kalimantan on what was once a thriving Dayak community. The item is unusual, in the current extensive reporting on transmigration failures, because it focusses on the bitter experiences of the local, tribal people.

The inhabitants of Dusun Tengah sub-district used to live a tranquil and peaceful life. Up to mid-1981 when the South Barito district government (Central Kalimantan) and PTP XVIII started investigating the possibility of setting up a Special Nucleus Estate (PIR-Khusus) project in the area, living conditions were fine.

But in 1982 and 1983, the PIR project run by PTP XVIII began to operate. The inhabitants were told by the local government that their land would be affected by the project and they should be conscious (diminta wasadaran) of the need to give up their land voluntarily, in the interests of the project, along with all their standing crops.

It wasn't difficult to persuade the Manyan tribespeople to agree even though they surrendered their land by signing empty sheets of paper. Altogether at least 229 family-heads in the villages of Ulu Sewu, Ulu Jaman, Gagutar, Agung Sayu, Batuah and Baruyan "contributed* ) land to the project.

*) The quotation marks around this and several other single words are retained from the original, giving the word a tinge of irony. Longer quotes are remarks made by villagers.

Not long afterwards, anxieties began to plague the villagers. "We were promised that if we handed over our land, at least two persons per family would be employed by PIR as day-labourers and get Rp. 2,500 a day. In fact, only the family-head was allowed to work and the wage was Rp 1,200 a day," said Agepson, 38, who had allowed his one hectare of rubber and fruit trees to be mowed down by the tractor. For four years, the families tried surviving on Rp. 1,200 a day. "It was a bitter disappointment," said Kilon, 34, whose 1.5 hectares of rubber and durian trees were turned as if by magic (disulap) into PIR land.

They are also bitter about the terms of participation in the project. "Is it not the limit for us now to be in debt to PIR, considering that the land we use is our ancestral land which was previously our main source of livelihood?" complained Indin, 48, head of the Manyan tribal council, whose three hectares of rubber trees were "gobbled up" (dimangsa) by the project.

This is why most of the families do not want to live in the houses provided and have refused to join up as participants; of the 229 families, only 27 have joined. "We've already made our contribution to the government," said Kilon bitterly.

"Of course, the PIR project has brought benefits but for the villagers, these are out-weighed by the damage we've suffered," said Bager Sugan, 50, head of Gagutar village. The region has benefited from the creation of job opportunities with many newcomers [transmigrants] arriving to work as day-labourers. But against this, the rubber and other crops cultivated for so many years at considerable cost have simply been expropriated. "That's what we lived from for generations, giving us Dayaks prosperity," he said.

As things got worse, people had to cut short their children's education or not give them any schooling at all. Formerly some families were able to send their kids to school in Palangkaraya, 265 kms to the east in Central Kalimantan or to Banjarmasin, 385 kms to the west in South Kalimantan. "It's not just that we can't give our children an education any more; it's even hard to feed the family on Rp. 1,200 a day," said Kutin. To make matters worse, other sources of income have dried up.

Before the project came, the entire sub-district was covered by small-holders rubber-trees and fruit orchards. People could tap 10 to 15 kilos of rubber a day at Rp. 200 to 300 a kilo. Since the 1987 devaluation, the rubber price has risen to Rp 900 a kilo and fruit prices have risen as well. "It's really hard to work for a month and see no result," said Sayu, 34, whose 1.5 hectares of rubber and durian trees were planted in 1981.

In the project, there has been confusion over the allocation of rubber-tree stands so that participants do not know what their rights and responsibilities are. In the plasma part of the project, tree maintenance is confined to strips along the road or around the plasma office in Village 3. Trees located further in have been left to wither and are over-run by weeds. But things are very different in the nucleus part of the project, giving the impression that funds to care for trees in the plasma areas have been cut to the bone. There may well have been leaks, yet even so, everything worked on by the participants has to be paid for in their credit-packet and repaid to the company.

Of the 22,000 hectares planned, as yet only 1,000 hectares for the nucleus and 2,000 hectares for the plasma have been planted. After five years, there is still no sign of a new life of prosperity. One of the project foremen, Tamberin, 32, admits that few of the 850 family-heads working for the project expect it to bring them a decent living. Almost every day, people leave to find work elsewhere. "So far, 70 people have left," he said.

He was once asked to find ten day-labourers but in actual fact, only eight workers were needed; the other two wages were fictional and went into someone's private purse. Because he objected to such goings-on, Tamberin has since been prevented from doing overtime.

The sub-district area secretary (sekwilcam), Derlin, regards the anxieties of the villagers as natural. Any large-scale project affecting many people is bound to have its victims. "That happens everywhere," he said. According to Derlin, no promises were made by local government officials when the land was surrendered. Nor was anyone forced; everything was left to people's consciousness. "If they didn't want to give up their land, that was that," he said.

The economic difficulties were also described by Derlin as natural. "I'm sure that if they stay with the project until the rubber-trees are six or seven years old, their income could reach $1,500 a year as planned," he said.
Four villagers from Kertaharjo Cimerak village in the district of Ciamis, West Java who each spent a total of 235 days in detention without charge in 1984 are suing the government for wrongful arrest. The men are being assisted in their action by Amartiwi Saleh of the Bandung Legal Aid Institute.

The four men were holding a discussion in a mosque about a government decision to use their land for a nucleus estate when the village head entered the mosque and told them that any gathering of more than three persons was illegal. He ordered them all to leave. The villagers refused to obey so the village head pulled out a pistol and forced them to disperse.

Later they were arrested and held for more than eight months until a high court decided that they were innocent and should be released. [Jakarta Post, 20 November 1987]

[For an account of the nucleus estate project in Cimerak, which is probably the project they were discussing, see TAPOL Bulletin, No. 83, October 1987.]

Peasants flee from officials

More than a hundred peasants who protested about the sale without their consent of their land by the village chief, fled from their villages after receiving threats from village officials.

The 113 peasants are from Aek Korsik in Aek sub-district, Labuhan Batu district, North Sumatra. They were protesting against a deal struck as long ago as 1980 by the village chief to sell 450 hectares of land to three businessmen in Rantaprat.

The peasants insisted that the land, formerly belonging to the forestry department, was legitimately theirs, having been given to them by local officials in 1972. Six years later they obtained land certificates, confirming their ownership. However, the village chief sold the land to businessmen, claiming that the peasants had failed to cultivate the land properly and it could be put to better use if sold to the businessmen. In fact, the land had been in constant cultivation since the owners acquired it fifteen years ago.

After failing to get the sale reversed, a peasant named Pandeman Panjaitan was delegated to go to Jakarta to make representations to parliament. Members of parliament gave him a letter to deliver to the governor of North Sumatra, but when he delivered the letter, police seized him and he was held for five days. It was after this incident that the other peasants involved in the dispute felt threatened and decided to flee their village for safety. [Jakarta Post, 31 October 1987]

Death-sentence prisoner dies after 22 years in prison

Sergeant Raswad, one of the many political prisoners held since 1965, who was sentenced to death for his alleged role in the kidnap of members of the Indonesian general staff on 1 October 1965, died in custody in early November 1987. He was 67 years old.

He had been suffering from tuberculosis for many years, and died in the hospital wing of Cipinang Prison shortly after his lung started to haemorrhage.

Raswad was a member of the Cakrabirawa Palace Guard at the time of his arrest on 5 October 1965. He was tried by the Jakarta Military Tribunal in 1968 and given a death sentence on 6 April of that year. It was once reported that he had made a plea for clemency to the president but nothing was ever heard about the results.

Friends of the family say that the execution of many long-term political prisoners in 1985 and 1986 came as a great shock to him and seriously aggravated his health.