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~~TAPOL~~

The Indonesia ~~Human Rights Campaign~~

TAPOL Bulletin No. 81

June 1987

Human rights lawyer suspended

Indonesia's leading human rights lawyer, Adnan Buyung Nasution has been suspended from practising as a lawyer for a year. The decision was taken by the Justice Minister, Lieutenant-General Ismail Saleh, on 11 May, fifteen months after the first moves were made in Jakarta to have Buyung disbarred for alleged contempt of court.

Mulya Lubis, chair of the Indonesian Foundation of Legal Aid Institutes (YLBHI), condemned the decision as being without basis in law. "This is a serious matter and a threat to the legal profession. Not only does it violate the law but it is also an excess because the Bar Association (Ikadin), Buyung's professional organisation, has already passed judgement on him". Mulya was referring to a decision by the central Board of Honour of Ikadin to reprimand Buyung strongly for interrupting the court proceedings during the trial of retired Lieutenant-General H.R. Dharsono which ended in January 1986.

Lubis said there is as yet no basis in Indonesian law for contempt of court proceedings against anyone [Kompas, 16 May 1987].

Moves to have Buyung disbarred began in February 1986, a month after Buyung protested in court when the panel of judges, in their verdict against his client, Dharsono, accused his lawyers of unethical behaviour [See TAPOL Bulletins, No 74 and 75, March and May 1986].

Buyung's practice already severely hit

The long drawn out moves to disbar Buyung have already caused irreparable damage to his practice in Jakarta. Other lawyers have withdrawn from his office while clients have shifted their business elsewhere.

Buyung is currently in Holland completing a law dissertation on Indonesian constitutional law, supported by a grant from the Dutch Government. Buyung did not learn of his suspension until the news appeared in the Dutch press almost a week later.

In April this year, Buyung received a letter from the Indonesian ambassador in Holland informing him that the Minister of Justice was intending to take administrative action against him, and giving him two weeks to defend himself.

Buyung accuses minister of violating the law

In an outspoken reply to the minister, made public in Indonesia and Holland, Buyung accused Ismail Saleh of violating four legal principles and seeking to promote the political interests of those in power instead of upholding the rule of law. Buyung's four points were:

* The notification about the minister's intention to take administrative action failed to specify the deed for which he was to be punished, or explain the nature of the action to be taken. Nor did the minister clarify the legal grounds for giving Buyung only two weeks to defend himself.

* Laws in force at the time of Buyung's alleged offence did not allow the minister to take action against a lawyer for his conduct in a court of law. A subsequent piece of legislation, Law No 2, 1986 on the Courts of Law, does give the justice minister powers to act against lawyers but it specifies that this must not violate the principle of the independence of the judiciary which therefore excludes interference by the Executive in the conduct of trials. In any case this law was enacted after the alleged offence.

* No deed may be tried and punished more than once. Buyung's alleged offence has already been penalised by the Court of Honour of the lawyers' association, Ikadin, and by the Supreme Court which both decided to issue stern warnings to Buyung for his action during the final session of the Dharsono trial. Buyung said he regarded such a penalty as a "realistic compromise" in the current political climate between protecting the rule of law and upholding the independence of the judiciary on the one hand, and pressure from those in power for him to be punished on the other. Please turn to the back page.

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Election: The shifting sands of the 'New Order'

As everyone agrees, the election held on 23 April had nothing to do with democracy. A landslide victory for the government party, Golkar, was never in doubt. Nor is there any doubt about the government that will replace the present one in March 1988, as all three parties have already pledged to support General Suharto as the sole presidential candidate next year.

For Indonesian voters, elections have become a meaningless exercise, the only advantage being that for the few weeks when campaigning is allowed, people can let off steam in rallies and parades.

All three 'contestants', Golkar or the functional groups, the PPP or the development unity party and the PDI or the Indonesian democracy party, fully back government policies. They adopted the Pancasila as their sole doctrine and received funding from the government while all their candidates were screened by army intelligence. The word 'contestant' was banned; the parties were referred to instead as 'OPP' or organisations participating in the election).

But this election did serve as a barometer of the political climate, giving signs of underlying trends as reflected in the behaviour of the three parties and the campaign tactics they adopted.



The new share-out of seats

The new DPR or parliament will have 500 seats, 40 more than at present. One hundred will go to armed forces appointees. Golkar, with 73 per cent of the votes, will get 298 seats (242 at present), the PPP, with 16 per cent of the votes, will be down from 94 to 63, and the PDI, with 11 per cent, will go up from 24 to 39 seats.

The results will also affect the composition of the upper house or MPR (Consultative Congress), the body which elects the president and sets the broad lines of government policy. Half of the MPR's 1,000 seats will go to the members of the DPR and the rest will be shared out as follows:

Functional groups	100 seats
Regional seats	147 seats
The armed forces	51 seats
Golkar	151 seats
PPP	32 seats
PDI	19 seats

The final results of the provincial and local assembly elections held on 23 April have not yet been announced but the share-out of seats will certainly follow the pattern established in the DPR elections.



The armed forces and Golkar in contest

The indications are that this time round there were not many major incidents. Poll rigging and manipulation certainly occurred but the army was not directly involved except in places where armed resistance is being waged like West Papua, East Timor and Aceh. [More of this below.]

Long before the elections took place, the armed forces announced that this time they would not side with Golkar. Indeed, there was no need as all the parties fully back the regime. But there may be deeper reasons for the change. It is widely recognised that the commander-in-chief, General Benny Murdani was instrumental in bringing about the PDI's re-emergence last year as a virtually new party. One of the more obvious reasons for the army's professed neutrality was that once all parties had been forced to accept Pancasila as their sole principle, Golkar's standing would grow, threatening the pre-eminence of the armed forces. Lurking behind this competition is the rivalry between Golkar's chairman, General Sudharmono, and General Murdani who both want to become vice-president in 1988.

The PPP's continuing strength

The nine per cent increase in Golkar's share of the votes, from 64 per cent in 1982 to 73 per cent, is not as spectacular as it appears. These were mainly the votes of the followers of the Nahdatul Ulama which, until 1985, was the main component of the PPP. After the Nahdatul Ulama withdrew from the PPP, its leaders did everything possible to spike their former party, advising their followers to vote for Golkar. As a result this segment of the Muslim vote abandoned the PPP, as is clear from the results in NU strongholds like East Java and South Kalimantan where the PPP suffered a big fall in votes.

But despite the odium widely felt for the PPP chairman,

John Naro, a well-known former intelligence operative, devout Muslim voters elsewhere did not desert the PPP. Surprisingly, the party still retains a residual Islamic image despite the adoption of Pancasila and the enforced replacement of the sacred Ka'bah stone as its election symbol.

Of the three parties, the PPP alone lacked a newspaper promoting its campaign. Golkar could rely on *Suara Karya*, *Berita Buana*, and *Pelita*, recently snatched from PPP control, while the PDI was reasonably well supported by *Kompas*, *Suara Pembaruan* and *Prioritas*. As for speakers, Golkar fielded government ministers ready to promise the earth while the PDI had speakers with a populist appeal in the cities as compared with the colourless, discredited men appearing on PPP platforms. Against such odds, it is surprising how well the PPP vote held up.

Golkar's 'victory' in Aceh

Already months ahead of the election, it was clear that Golkar regarded Aceh in North Sumatra as the key test of its virility. In the 1982 election, the PPP won 59 per cent of the votes. Moreover, Aceh has long been the centre for anti-Indonesian movements, the latest being the Aceh Liberation Front set up in the 1970s.

Responsibility for boosting Golkar's position fell to the newly-appointed governor, Ibrahim Hassan, who comes from a devout Muslim background. Unlike previous governors, he is not military nor is he one of the much-despised Java-based Acehnese bureaucrats, having spent all his professional career as an academic in Aceh. Here for the first time was a credible Muslim figure advocating the Golkar cause. He travelled widely for six months, praying in different mosques almost every day to spread the Golkar message, despite the ban on party campaigning until four weeks before polling day.

Helped along by Hassan's presence, Golkar was able to field highly-placed Acehnese bureaucrats like Major-General Bustanil Arifin, minister of cooperatives and chairman of Bulog, the state food purchasing monopoly, and Major-General Abdul Rahman Ramly, president-director of the state oil company, Pertamina, both members of Suharto's palace clique with plenty to offer the voters. Arifin gave a promise that if Golkar won, every sub-district in the province would receive fifty million rupiahs as a reward [Kompas, 27 April].



John Naro, the chairman of the PPP, campaigning in Aceh. [Tempo, 18 April 1987]

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Yet with all Hassan's efforts, Golkar ended up with only 51 per cent of the votes while the PPP share fell to 44 per cent. Even this result appears to have been the result of widespread cheating, if the many complaints made by PPP officials are to be believed. Nevertheless, Golkar's 'victory' has been acclaimed in Jakarta as an outstanding achievement. Not only is it seen as a defeat for Islam but as a sign that anti-Indonesian sentiments are in retreat. This is revealed in a comment by an American observer who claimed that the election results show that Aceh "is increasingly taking its place as a part of Indonesia" [William Liddle in *Tempo*, 2 May 1987]. Such a remark is not unlike the claims being made about the election result in East Timor!

The Golkar campaign

Important changes have occurred in Golkar since the last election. At its congress in 1983, it abandoned its federal structure. It became a membership party and quickly began to train millions of party functionaries. With General Suharto as chairman of its honorary board and General Sudharmono, the State Secretary and head of the bureaucracy, as its general chairman, it also set out to 'civilianise' its image by appointing a well-known former student leader, Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, as secretary-general. It is no longer a party that exists only for election purposes, and its position as the bureaucrats' party has been greatly enhanced.

These changes have lost it the support of an older generation of generals who still control former Golkar organisations like Soksi and Kosgoro; men like General Suhardiman and General Sugandhi took no part in this year's campaign. [General Suhardiman is now reportedly making a bid to replace Naro as PPP chairman.]

Other well-known public figures also kept their distance. The Sultan of Jogja, Indonesia's vice-president from 1972 to 1979, seemed to be sending out signals to anyone who understands Javanese mannerisms when he absented himself from a Golkar rally by showing a doctor's certificate. Not long afterwards, he looked surprisingly fit touring polling stations on polling day.

Another conspicuous absentee was General Moh. Jusuf, armed forces commander-in-chief from 1978 to 1983, an officer with something of a populist appeal as a general who 'cared about' the living conditions of rank-and-file soldiers. He also led the vicious onslaught against Fretilin in East Timor in the late 1970s.

Being the party of the bureaucracy with its own party machine more than made up for the loss of all-out armed forces support. Golkar was still able to benefit from the 'floating masses' policy which bans the other parties from setting up branches anywhere in the countryside below the district capitals. Although the PPP and the PDI were for the first time allowed to hold rallies during the campaign down to the sub-district capitals, rural Indonesia was still a virtual Golkar bastion. Village heads were able to cajole or pressure villagers into voting for Golkar, the only party capable of promising material rewards or threaten the withdrawal of government funds.

But the current stalemate in relations between the Golkar and armed forces leaderships which became increasingly apparent during the election could cause cracks in the regime as the question of Suharto's successor looms ever larger. General Sudharmono now sees the advantage in presenting Golkar as a fully-fledged political party [*Tempo*, 2 May 1987] which means accepting equal status with the other parties. It is not yet clear whether this means that members of Korpri, the association which all civil servants are obliged to join,

are to be free to join other parties if they wish. A big shift away from Golkar among civil servants could have major consequences for the party in the next elections.

Murdani for his part has been able to place generals loyal to him in some vital posts in the bureaucracy, as general secretaries at the departments of transmigration, education and defence. At the same time, he has taken steps to ensure that all officers who become members of parliament or of local assemblies will do so strictly within their military career structure. He seems anxious to prevent a haemorrhage of well-trained officers into civilian affairs, reinforcing the current estrangement between Golkar and the armed forces. Most military personnel now in the bureaucracy come from older generations and, as things stand at present, there is unlikely to be an infusion of new blood from the generation now taking over the leadership of the armed forces.



The reborn PDI

The PDI which campaigned in the 1987 election emerged as something very different from its former self. Saved from extinction in 1986 by several powerful generals including Murdani, the PDI campaign clearly enjoyed the backing of the armed forces. As the party chairman, Soeryadi, himself admitted, "This party exists by the grace of initiatives of the rulers" [Kompas, 11 May 1987].

Excluded like the PPP from the rural areas, the PDI was nevertheless able to attract a big following in the cities. Its rallies in Central Java were far bigger than Golkar's and in Jakarta, it surprised all observers by attracting some two million people to its final rally, a political event unequalled since the military came to power in 1965. The rallies were particularly well attended by young people, many carrying portraits of Sukarno, Indonesia's first president. The emergence of Sukarno as a rallying symbol was reinforced by the presence on the platform of the late president's daughter, Megawati, the party's leading 'vote-catcher', though she was not permitted to speak for more than three minutes.

The PDI's sudden surge in popularity led commentators to see this as a sign of the desire for change. It would be wrong however to regard the PDI as a reincarnation of Sukarno's early political creation, the nationalist PNI. It is very unlikely that Sukarno's politics are familiar to the younger generation. Displaying his portrait seemed rather to be a way of showing discontent for the present leadership, a cheer for Sukarno being safer than a boo for Suharto.

Since the election, Soeryadi has been at pains to

reject charges of a return to Sukarnoism, focusing on his party's appeal to the urban elite. Indeed the PDI seems to have attracted the so-called 'Mercedes-Volvo' brigade along with their offspring, plus traders from the informal sector in the cities and those loosely referred to as 'orang sandal jepit', the people who wear cheap Japanese sandals. Many who attended PDI rallies were still too young to vote; in Jakarta, 1.1 million votes were cast for the party giving it a 28 per cent share, well above its showing in 1982 but little more than half the number of people who filled the streets of the capital on the day of the PDI rally.

It is still too early to gauge the PDI's future apart from saying that it could become the platform for business interests who are discontented with the privileges enjoyed by members of Suharto's palace clique and their sons and daughters. The fact that this party also has the backing of the armed forces leadership says a lot about the current disenchantment among the new generation of senior officers towards the cronies now supported and protected by Suharto.


Incidents and manipulations

Although major incidents did not occur during the 1987 elections, they were far from being without complaints of cheating and irregularities. On the whole, the army was under orders to play a 'preventive role', whilst the police were in charge of guarding polling stations.

But there is no lack of stories about over-zealous officials producing manipulated results:

- * In Sidoarjo, East Java registered voters numbered half a million, but no fewer than 966,000 votes were cast, leading PPP officials to make a formal complain though with no hope of any redress.
- * In Aceh, PPP officials in several regions complained that many voters did not receive their voting cards.
- * In the Pasir district of East Kalimantan, the turnout represented 568.39 per cent of registered voters, surely worth a mention in the Guiness Book of Records!

There are instances of clashes between local officials pushing for Golkar and villagers with other ideas. The mayor of Solo had to intervene in the village of Sangkrah, Pasar Kliwon when villagers, the majority of whom had voted for the PDI, started boozing the village head, a Golkar supporter. In Banjarnegara, Central Java the Golkar head of district was furious because of the



Megawati Sukarno addressing the huge PDI election rally in Jakarta. [Jakarta Post, 18 April 1987]

PDI's rising popularity. He punished ten PDI activists by locking them up in his office. The police intervened against the district head who now seems likely to lose his job. Such a report would never have appeared in the press in previous elections.

In Madiun, where the PPP and the PDI have both had large followings in the past, the local bureaucracy decided to claim total victory for Golkar and announced that neither of the other two parties had got any votes though many people insisted that they had voted for one of these parties.

The 'golput' vote

The idea of voting golput, the so-called "white group", first emerged in 1971. This is a form of boycott. It advocates the spoiling of voting slips by not piercing any of the symbols or piercing all three. In Jogjakarta, Central Java no fewer than eleven per cent of votes were made invalid in this way, according to a survey carried out after the election by students at Gajah Mada university [Kompas, 11 May]. Who knows what similar surveys elsewhere would have revealed?

Needless to say, reports of rigging or of golput support has been sketchy. The actual scale of rigging is likely to be far more widespread than the published accounts suggest.

Laying Sukarno's ghost

The dramatic re-emergence of the PDI in Jakarta and the sight of such huge crowds carrying banners eulogising the president whom Suharto deposed in 1966 has clearly upset the country's military leader. Thoughts about the 1986 uprising in Manila, responding to the memory of Benino Aquino, cannot have been far from people's minds as some two million people thronged the streets of the capital on 15 April, although it would be wrong to compare Cory Aquino's emergence to lead the popular revolt against Marcos with Megawati, Sukarno's daughter, whose role in the PDI campaign was never allowed to be anything more than symbolic.

Jakarta's voters have always been a problem for Golkar and Suharto. The capital has a population that is fast approaching eight million and accounts for over eighty per cent of the money circulating in the Indonesian economy. Being under closer scrutiny by foreign journalists and diplomats, the regime has never been able to manipulate the voting in Jakarta on the same scale as elsewhere. In 1982 Golkar's share of the votes was less than half at 45 per cent, with the PPP accounting for 39 per cent though this was the first time the PPP failed to take a majority of the votes.

Even this time round, the Golkar vote was less than half, at 49.6 per cent. The PDI's share rose sharply from 16 per cent in 1982 to a remarkable 28.76 per cent, while the PPP share fell to 21.65 per cent.

Re-writing history to downgrade Sukarno

After more than 22 years in power General Suharto is still unable to lay to rest the charisma of Indonesia's former president. In recent years he has taken moves to institutionalise Sukarno's memory, granting him formal recognition as a national hero and agreeing to name the country's main international airport after the Sukarno-Hatta duo as proclamators of the Republic. Such moves have only helped draw attention to a figure regarding whose politics the younger generation cannot have more than the vaguest conception.

Now it appears that Suharto wants to lay Sukarno's

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ghost once and for all. He has handed down several instructions in traditionally regal style, speaking through the mouths of his ministerial underlings. The first to emerge from Bina Graha, the president's office, with an instruction from above was coordinator-minister for people's welfare, General Alamsyah who told reporters that the president had ordered a complete re-writing of Indonesian history from 1950 to 1965. The dual purpose was to correct the younger generation's image of Sukarno and to provide a more convincing account of the bloody events of 1 October 1965 which Suharto has blamed squarely on the Indonesian Communist Party [Jakarta Post, 4 May 1987].

Several of the country's leading historians responded with warnings about the unreliability of court-inspired histories. A few days later, Fuad Hassan, the minister of education, emerged from Bina Graha to assure the press that the president had no plans to replace the history books now being used in the schools [Kompas, 8 May].



The men described by Jakarta Post as "the Big Three... of the general elections". Left to right: Interior Minister General Soepardjo Rustam, Commander-in-Chief General Murdani and Golkar chairman, General Sudharmono.

Maybe the contradiction between Alamsyah and Fuad can be explained by Suharto's changing moods or maybe it reflects a serious rift among Suharto's advisers on how to deal with Sukarno's ghost. Only time will tell.

The second move to downgrade Sukarno came through the mouth of Martono, the minister of transmigration; one of the 1945 generation of politicians who see themselves as protectors of Indonesia's nationalistic heritage. Martono emerged from Bina Graha to deny a report that Suharto would attend a rally in Jakarta on 1 June to commemorate the day in 1945 when Sukarno delivered his speech first expounding the Pancasila as the basic ideology for a future Indonesian state.

Since the rally was to have been held under the auspices of a group recently set up by Suharto to write a history glorifying the Peta Indonesian militia created in 1943 by the Japanese army of occupation, Martono's denial further confused the signals coming from Suharto.

In Martono's account, the habit of seeing Sukarno as the first exponent of the state's ideology must be replaced by stressing that Pancasila has existed on Indonesian soil since time immemorial. If a day of commemoration must be set, it should be 18 August, 1945 when the constitution now used by Suharto to cling to power was proclaimed [Kompas, 10 May 1987]. But this too was Sukarno's initiative so it is hard to see how the regime can shake itself free of the ghost of Sukarno.

Indonesian church leaders pave the way for 'second integration'

Leaders of both the Catholic and Protestant churches of Indonesia are actively involved in moves to persuade the Vatican to integrate the Catholic Church in East Timor into the Indonesian diocese. This is being seen as the "second integration" of East Timor and would be a major boost for the Indonesian government's efforts to remove the question of East Timor from the agenda of the United Nations, ending the UN's continued recognition of Portugal as the administering power of East Timor.

Until 1975, the Catholic Church in East Timor was part of the Portuguese Church, but was then removed from Portuguese control and placed under the Vatican's direct supervision. The Vatican's refusal till now to pronounce the East Timorese Church part of the Indonesian diocese is seen in Jakarta as a major obstacle to its endeavours to end international support for the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination.

Several documents have been circulated by Indonesian church leaders in the past few months in favour of the "second integration". One document was produced by Frans Seda, a member of the Pontifical Justice and Peace Commission of the Vatican. It is currently circulating among Catholic justice and peace commissions in several countries. Some members of the Commission in Rome were apparently aghast at its pro-integrationist stance.

Frans Seda is one of Indonesia's leading Catholic politicians, formerly chairman of the Partai Katolik before it accepted enforced fusion with other Christian and nationalist parties to become the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia in 1973. He is also a well-known businessman in the textile industry and has recently concluded an agreement with Japanese financiers for the exploitation of several islands in the Jakarta Bay as tourist attractions.

The second document was produced by the Indonesian Council of Churches (Persekutuan Gereja Indonesia) and is apparently still in draft form. It is dated October 1986 and presents a detailed and maliciously inaccurate account of events in East Timor since 1974. The PGI

brazenly interprets the Vatican's decision to shift responsibility for the East Timor Church from Portugal to the Vatican as a kind of acknowledgement that East Timor is an integral part of Indonesia. It is not yet clear how widely this document has been circulated internationally though national councils of churches in several countries are known to be aware of its existence.

The PGI has for many years been trying to establish a Protestant presence among the East Timorese and claims that there has been a 5-fold increase in the number of Protestants there in the past decade. It claims that whereas in 1977 there were 4,000 Protestants in East Timor, by 1986 there were 65 Protestant congregations with a membership of 19,579 people. The PGI is also involved in a number of welfare projects in East Timor and has the support of several European and Australian church funding agencies to run its "national project" for the distribution of aid to East Timorese.

Catholic students' organisation plea to the Pope

The third document is a letter from the Indonesian Catholic students' organisation, PMKRI to the Pope. The letter was handed to the Papal Nuncio in Jakarta, Mgr Francisco Canalini, on 25 November last year by a PMKRI delegation headed by the chairperson of its presidium, Paulus Januar.

The document openly calls for the immediate integration of the Catholic Church in East Timor into the Indonesian church. It has the effrontery to allege that the resistance movement in East Timor under Fretilin's leadership is a tool of Portuguese colonialism. The following quotations are taken from a report of the letter in the Catholic journal, *Hidup*, No. 4, 1987:

"Up to now, the Catholic Church in East Timor has not yet joined up with the Catholic Church in Indonesia. The PMKRI continues to be conscious of the real situation in East Timor and the struggle of the people of East Timor



Paul Barbara, a London cab-driver, attempted to cross the Channel to France on a raft made in the shape of a cross. He was protesting against the continued Indonesian occupation of East Timor.

Here he is, leaving St Katherine's Dock, London on Good Friday. He reached the Thames estuary two days later on 19 April and abandoned the attempt as his engine was too weak. The slogan on the side of his 'cabin' reads: "Why is the world silent? 100,000 - 200,000 East Timorese have died. Stop aiding genocidal Indonesian invaders."

as an integral part of the Indonesian nation. The East Timorese people who feel themselves part of the Indonesian nation have manifested their determination to integrate with the Republic of Indonesia. The East Timor people's longing to integrate with Indonesia did not emerge overnight; it has lain buried for a long time. It is based not only on political factors but also on psychological and sociological factors."

"The long drawn out crisis in East Timor is the consequence of efforts by the Portuguese government to preserve colonialism in East Timor in a new form. It utilised a local political force there, Fretilin, to support its project for a new form of colonialism under the guise of decolonisation."

After accusing Fretilin of terrorising its political opponents "who represent the majority of the people", the letter requests the Pope to take the necessary steps to unite the church in East Timor with its brothers and sisters (in Indonesia).

This is not the first time the PMKRI has allowed itself to be used to undermine international support for East Timor. It was heavily defeated at the international assembly of Catholic students meeting in Belgium last summer when the conference overwhelmingly adopted a resolution condemning Indonesia's occupation of East Timor. The PMKRI delegation, headed by Paulus Januar, refused to discuss the issue and walked out.

Jesuits to be expelled from East Timor

Meanwhile, two Jesuits who have been working in East

Jakarta uses illegal election to back ‘integration’

On the day of Indonesia's illegal election in East Timor, virtually everyone was forced to travel long distances to cast their votes. Although the 725 polling booths did not open until 8 am, many people left home before dawn to make sure they arrived in time to vote.

All East Timorese people were issued with C voting vouchers, which require people to vote in their 'place of origin'. Because of the massive resettlement and re-settlement that has taken place since the late 1970s, 'place of origin' apparently means the place where people were first registered as camp dwellers. Hence, voting day was a day of major upheaval.

"Because everyone entitled to vote had to leave home for several hours, they all had to lock up their houses and take their children to the polling booths." Normal life was virtually at a standstill, with offices and markets closed. Public transport was at a standstill which meant that many people had to cover long distances by foot, carrying food and drink with them for the long, gruelling day. [Expedito Dias Ximenes in *Suara Pembaruan*, 30 April 1987].

Last-minute security check-up

Two days before polling day, armed forces commander-in-chief General Murdani arrived in Dili with top-ranking officers to carry out a so-called 'sidak' or 'on-the-spot inspection' to check security arrangements. The group included Lieutenant-General Edy Sudradjat, deputy chief-of-staff, Lieutenant-General Soegiarto, chief-of-staff for social and political affairs, and Major-General Rajaaauak, commander of the IXth Udayana Military Command.

EAST TIMOR

Timor since the early 1970s are on the verge of being expelled from East Timor. They are Father Felgueras, the rector of the seminary in Dili, and Father Martens, a lecturer at the seminary, who are together seen by the Indonesians as "the main block to integrating the East Timorese and Indonesian churches" [The Australian, 23 April 1987]. According to the same source, some seminarians strongly denounced the Indonesian military in the presence of Leo Soekoto, the Archbishop of Jakarta, also a Jesuit, when he was visiting Dili in January this year.

Father Felgueras is currently on a visit to Portugal and has been told not to return to Dili. It is expected that Father Martens will soon be told to leave. The Dili seminary is the one educational institute in East Timor which still maintains a non-Indonesian curriculum and continues to use both Portuguese and Tetum as languages of instruction.


Another move that appears to be aimed among other things at undermining support for East Timor's self-determination is the widely-condemned decision of the Australian Bishops' Conference a few weeks ago to disband the Australian Commission of Justice and Peace. The Commission has taken a stand on many human rights issues, among them human rights abuses in East Timor.

based in Bali whose territory of command includes East Timor. Rajaguguk was military commander of East Timor for several years in the early 1980s.

Before returning to Jakarta, Murdani made a speech to the troops recalling the contribution of the armed forces to East Timor's welfare, including the 44.3-kilometre road to Los Palos and the eleven churches constructed by the 'voluntary labour of the troops'. He also had some harsh words, apparently for people in the administration: "Don't waste time day-dreaming, but work hard for development" [*Pelita*, 24 April 1987].

Manipulated results used to support integration

As already reported in previous bulletins, the method of casting votes in East Timor was exceptional. Instead of using one ballot box for each of the three assemblies being elected - the DPR in Jakarta, the 'provincial' assembly and district assemblies - there were three for each election (one for each party), or nine ballot boxes. Voting slips were not pierced but had to be placed in the appropriate party box, making it possible to see how each person voted.



East Timorese waiting their turn to vote in the election on 23 April. It is not difficult to guess why there is not a happy face in sight. [Kompas, 27 April 1987]

As in 1982, the election results in East Timor were among the first to be announced in Jakarta, showing a turnout of 362,507 votes, or 100.52 per cent of the 360,144 registered voters announced before the election:

	1987	1982
PPP	2,654 (0.73%)	675 (0.22%)
Golkar	339,231 (93.7%)	309,608 (99.45%)
PDI	20,163 (5.57%)	1,044 (0.34%)

The excess of voters obliged the Interior Minister, General Rustam Soepardjo to deny suspicions of foul play in the vote counting. He claimed that the excess was due to the number of Indonesian sailors, civil servants and construction workers in East Timor at the time who voted with AB-vouchers for 'absentees' voting away from home [Jakarta Post, 27 April]. The general made no attempt to explain why, in four regencies, in Dili and three inland regions, the turnout was well above one hundred per cent, with a turnout of no less than 327.26 per cent in Aileu [The Guardian, 28 April].

These oddities apart, the regime seemed happy with the results. East Timor's governor, Mario Carrascalao was positively overcome. "I don't know how to express my joy and emotion over the outcome of the elections which was just as I had expected" [Suara Merdeka, 24 April]. In particular he regarded the twenty-fold increase in PDI votes as proof that the elections were free:

"The two (sic) previous elections were considered by the international world, especially the countries that side with Portugal, as not being an expression of the wishes of the East Timorese people themselves. This is

especially so of the 1982 election when Golkar received 99.45 per cent of the votes cast. Therefore, now that the PDI has succeeded in getting 20,163 votes in this year's election, the international world can see that there was freedom for the East Timorese people to cast their votes" [Kompas, 27 April].

Both Carrascalao and Foreign Minister Mochtar continually stress that there have been three elections in East Timor, the first in 1976 in support of integration [at a time when Indonesian troops only controlled Dili and a few coastal areas and war was raging everywhere], the second in 1982 and the third in 1987. No-one has ever explained why the occupation authorities failed to conduct an election in East Timor in 1977 [Suara Pembaruan, 14 April 1987]. There is no substance at all to the claim about an election in 1976.

Carrascalao was not happy about special method of voting used in East Timor, with nine boxes instead of

three, but alleged it was due to the high illiteracy rate. [In fact, the method of piercing voting slips used throughout Indonesia is always explained in terms of the level of illiteracy in Indonesia. The only other place where the special voting method was used was in West Papua.]

The PDI's improved position

The big increase in votes for the PDI had nothing to do with 'free choice'. It can be explained primarily by the support given to this party by General Murdani. The Suara Pembaruan report of 30 April written by a Timorese journalist explains that the PDI began to campaign long before the elections, whilst Golkar was active only during the campaign. This is a mark of the special efforts made by the armed forces on the PDI's behalf for it is normally only Golkar that can cheat by campaigning well in advance of the three weeks officially set aside for campaigning.

The highly manipulated result had to avoid the pitfall of cutting too deep into the Golkar vote. A high anti-Golkar vote might have been interpreted abroad as a rejection of integration. A five per cent share for PDI was apparently also intended as a warning to Indonesian bureaucrats whose performance in East Timor is often criticised as woeful.

All the seats for East Timor seats in the DPR will go to Golkar but in the 'provincial' assembly, the PDI will have two seats as compared with 34 for Golkar and nine appointees from the armed forces. Golkar occupied all the 'contested' seats in the assembly elected in 1982.*

Mochtar's road-show gets a knock



It was Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, who had the honour of being Golkar's main candidate in East Timor. Since this was just a stunt to impress world opinion, it is doubtful whether Mochtar will now represent East Timor in the DPR.

As Golkar candidate, Mochtar took a party of foreign diplomats and journalists on a three-day

jaunt to East Timor to take part in a road-show which included rock groups, marching bands, hundreds of Timorese horsemen and traditional dancers including Balinese dancers from a transmigration site in East Timor. A high turnout, Mochtar claimed, would mean it could no longer be denied "that East Timor is part of the big family of the Republic of Indonesia" [Sydney Morning Herald, 17 April].

Of the many ambassadors in Jakarta invited to join his party, only three went, from Canada, Nigeria and East Germany. Most refused as they felt it would be diplomatically embarrassing to be supporting the minister as a Golkar candidate [Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 April]. The Canadian ambassador later complained: "I did feel like I was being used. I only agreed to join this trip if my name and position was not mentioned, because it's standard diplomatic procedure that ambassadors do not get involved in domestic politics" [SMH, 17 April].

More to the point, Portugal's Prime Minister said: "We cannot accept these elections. They are pre-prepared: we know the result in advance" [SMH, 17 April]. In a forthcoming document, the Parliamentary Human Rights Group says that "having illegally invaded and annexed East Timor, Indonesia cannot subsequently validate its illegal acquisition by conducting elections. In this sense, whether the elections are free or not is entirely irrelevant." *

Army officers appointed as assistant governors

Three army officers were sworn in as assistant governors in East Timor on 1 April. Colonel Otto Daryono, chairman of the East Timor Planning Board, was installed as the assistant governor for Wilayah I (Region I) which covers the districts of Baucau, Viqueque, Lautem and Manatuto and is based in Baucau. Lieutenant-Colonel Hidayat, currently military commander of Ermera, was installed as assistant governor for Wilayah II which is based in Ermera and covers the districts of Ermera, Liquica, Aileu and Manufahi. Lieutenant-Colonel R. Ginting, currently Assistant II of the East Timor Regional Military Command, was installed as assistant governor for Wilayah III based in Maliana which includes the districts of Bobonaro, Ambeno [Oe Cussi], Ainaro and Kovalima [Suara Pembaruan, 30 March 1987].

These appointments reflect a heightened level of militarisation of East Timor's civil administration. It also suggests dissatisfaction in the armed forces with the performance of the territory's administrators as reflected in an angry outburst by General Murdani during a visit to Dili on 21 April when he accused the people of "wasting time day-dreaming about useless things" (Jakarta Post, 25 April 1987),

Carrascalao's position on the line

Mario Viegas Carrascalao, the governor of East Timor who has served Jakarta well since his appointment in 1982, faces the possibility of replacement when his term of office expires on 19 September. Since he has served for only one term, however, the Interior Minister has mentioned him as one of several serving governors who might be appointed to serve a second term.

Carrascalao has meanwhile become embroiled in a dispute about East Timor's "special status" which was recently defended by Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja. One consequence of "special status" is that imports come into the territory duty-free, the idea being to keep prices down. However, import prices in the shops in East Timor are considerably higher than in Indonesia.

"Special status" keeps E. Timor closed

"Special status" in fact relates to much more than economic 'benefits'. It is the basis for wide-ranging restrictions on access to East Timor for foreign visitors as well as for Indonesians. While Carrascalao is pushing for the abolition of privileged economic status which benefits traders and no-one else, he has admitted that although "we are heading for abolition of this status... don't take this to mean that East Timor will be totally open" [Jakarta Post, 2 May 1987].

Carrascalao has also complained recently of serious unemployment in East Timor. While the local government is not able to absorb more than fifty new civil servants each year, the private sector where Indonesian companies are active is not willing to employ Timorese.

He also said that East Timorese graduates were refusing to work in other parts of the country because their 'national orientation' did not support them in that goal" [Jakarta Post, 2 May 1987]. It would appear that Carrascalao was complaining about discrimination against the many East Timorese who have been encouraged to pursue studies in Indonesian colleges and universities. *

The privatisation of transmigration

It was Indonesia's minister of the environment, Emil Salim, who delivered the classic assessment of the transmigration programme when he compared it to "sailing in a boat. Some of the passengers are nailing down the timber, others are ladling out the water while yet others are still trying to decide where the boat is supposed to be going" [Sinar Harapan, 21 February 1984].

A year after TAPOL, along with Survival International and Friends of the Earth, launched a campaign to expose the transmigration programme and call for an end to international funding, the programme is fast changing shape. It is time therefore to look at some basics and examine where the programme is now heading.

A jungle of types and categories

Lampung in South Sumatra was one of the earliest sites for transmigrants from Java. In the days before the

Transmigration Department was born, there were no fewer than twenty-one types of transmigration sites. Virtually every office and department had its own project, social affairs, youth affairs, the boy scouts movement, security and defence, and many more [Merdeka, 30 April 1987].

It was one of Minister Martono's major achievements to rationalise this into seven types: agricultural, garden produce, people's nucleus estates (PIR), cattle-rearing, mining and industry, forestry and sampa marga [Kompas, 11 March 1987]. The types were now identified by the economic activity involved, except for sites set up for members of the armed forces, the 'sampa marga' sites.

The objectives of the programme have also, over the years, taken many turns. In the early beginnings, it was seen primarily as the solution to poverty, improving welfare by shifting poor people from Java. As the programme grew, consultants, economists, social scientists, local government officials and last but not least, the military, sought to beautify the programme by giving it high-sounding objectives.



From concentration camp to transmigration site

Earlier this year a decision was taken at a meeting of provincial governors to transfer responsibility for nine transmigration sites from the Transmigration Department to the governor of the Moluccas. The nine units are located on Buru, the island where many thousands of political prisoners were held for more than ten years.



Longterm, untried political prisoners working at the Buru concentration camp

Four years after the military took power in 1965, the army started shipping thousands of untried political prisoners from Java to what became known as Indonesia's devil's island. Others came from Ambon and Sulawesi. Thousands of trade unionists, teachers, journalists, peasants and workers were exiled, along with some of the country's foremost writers like Pramoedya Ananta Toer and academics like Professor Soeprapto. These were the men whose blood and sweat turned an inhospitable and infertile island into one of Indonesia's most successful agricultural projects, a model transmigration site.

The prisoners had no alternative but to produce or perish. Many dozens perished - from starvation, disease and mal-treatment, and during escape attempts. But after years of slave labour, Buru prison camp began to produce a food surplus which was seized by prison commanders and guards and used to enrich themselves.

By 1979 however, most prisoners had been returned to Java and little more was heard of Buru. Now it appears that even as the prisoners were departing, transmigrants were being shipped in, many of them retired soldiers from East Java's Brawijaya Division and their families.

By the time the sites were transferred to the local government last month, 4,342 families, a total of 18,030 people, were living in the former prison camp. The local head of the transmigration office spoke with great enthusiasm about the good life of transmigrants on Buru. He praised the government for building excellent facilities - bridges, irrigation canals, roads and harbours to transport produce to other parts of the Moluccas [Suara Merdeka, 11 March 1987]. Not a word was said about the prisoners whose forced labour created this wealth.

All that remains of Buru's prison past is the name of the administrative centre. It is still called Mako which is short for Markas Komando. This is the name by which the command headquarters from which the prison camp was run was known.

These days, the most popular descriptions of its aims are "equalising the achievements of development", "evening out incomes", "achieving national unity" and "reinforcing people's defence".

The bureaucrats also became obsessed with classifying the transmigrants: transmigran umum (general transmigrants); transmigran swakarsa PIR (spontaneous transmigrants for PIR projects); transmigran swakara murni (pure spontaneous transmigrants); transmigran swakarsa TBB (spontaneous transmigrants without state help); transmigran swakarsa DBB (spontaneous transmigrants with state help); transmigran liposos (urban vagrants and beggars); and transmigran famili (people joining relatives entirely at their own expence); and many more.

All this classification inevitably clouded the issue but mounting economic difficulties in the past few years have at least forced those in charge to re-define the objectives... again!

Relieving poverty and supplying cheap labour

The Dutch colonial "transmigration" programme consisted of two types, with Sumatra the main target area. On the one hand, contract coolies, mainly Javanese and Chinese, were forcibly transported to provide plantation owners with cheap labour on rubber and tobacco estates and the tin mines. They were bound by irksome conditions and forced into arduous labour. The other type developed in Lampung where impoverished Javanese fleeing from densely populated Java were resettled.

Reducing population pressure in Java continued to hold the bureaucrats' attention, but even with the hundreds of thousands moved out in the past decade and a half, transmigration has proven woefully inadequate. According to figures released recently, the population of Java is now 98.7 million and rising by 2.32 million a year. Although the third five-year plan (1979 - 1983) exceeded its target of resettling 500,000 families, this absorbed only 25 per cent of the natural increase. Even the target set for the present five-year plan - 750,000 families - can only have a marginal impact on alleviating poverty and reducing the population in Java.

But with the rise in the number of failed sites, on top of the economic crisis now gripping Indonesia, emphasis has shifted away from quantity to quality. This coincided with a shift in favour of nucleus estates or "PIR-Trans" which also serves the government's aim of raising the level of non-oil exports.

TRANSMIGRATION

The formula for PIR-Trans sites is very different from the old-style transmigration sites. Transmigrants have their own garden plots to cultivate while working as wage labour on the nucleus estate. After a few years of applying this new concept, the results have been no better than the old, discredited system. Case studies in Sumatra and Sulawesi have shown results just as disastrous as the agricultural sites. The list of complaints is depressingly familiar. Poor or unsuitable soils, lack of roads, unreliability of facilities, and so on.




In many PIR sites, the transmigrants are reduced to relying on their gardens in order to survive, or becoming full-time labourers, or still worse, they drift into nearby towns in search of a livelihood. One group decided to return to Temanggung, Central Java. Responding to their description of the dreadful conditions on the PIR site they had abandoned, Martono accused them of being "workshy" [Kedaulatan Rakyat, 2 April 1987].

The new phase - agribusiness

Gradually, it has dawned on the authorities, including Martono, that transmigration is not the solution. Recently there has been a perceptible change in the discussion about transmigration. In seminars held in the past few months, speakers have called for a switch away from the centre-periphery concept, pushing people out and building the facilities around them. The idea now is to create the facilities and infra-structure first so as to attract people away from over-crowded Java. More and more, the system is geared to this approach. Martono even seems to be implying that general (ie. state-sponsored) transmigration is a dying breed, which is now being replaced by spontaneous transmigration.

The focus is now on appeals to businessmen to invest in plantations, fish and shrimp ponds and business ventures to produce cash crops. More responsibility is being placed on provincial governments to create new centres of 'multi-purpose' activity, for agriculture, industry, mining and commerce. As Sukamdani Gitosardjono, chairman of the Chamber of Industry (Kadin) puts it: "satellite towns" providing support in an integrated fashion to transmigration sites, in order to make optimal use of the economic potentials of that particular region [Kompas, 20 April 1987]. The satellite towns would provide all the necessary infra-structure like roads, harbours, airports and telecommunications. This, according to Sukamdani is the best way to convince private capital to invest in



plantations and other productive activity.

The investors best placed to grasp such opportunities are members of the Suharto group who control a huge chunk of the economy. Sukardani is himself part of the group. To these people with vast amounts of accumulated wealth, the new outlets in agribusiness are a godsend. A glance at the list of agribusinesses set up in the past year or so points to the predominance of the three Suharto sons, the so-called 'Tosiba brothers'.

Is Martono digging his own grave?

This new trend means a declining role for the Transmigration Department. Martono already foresees drastic cutbacks, people taking early retirement, no new employees being taken on, and local offices being closed down. Yet there is no slowdown in the flow of transmigrants. In 1986/87, 158,333 families were moved, exceeding the target by 8,333 families. Of these, 103,928 families were swakarsa or spontaneous transmigrants [Merdeka and Suara Merdeka, 13 March 1987]. Martono's revised target for the current year is 160,000 families,

higher than the annual target in the five-year plan.


But won't the 65 per cent cutback in government funding for transmigration affect this flow? Apparently not, for as one academic remarked recently, this amount could be saved by stopping "leakages" of funds. "I estimated that leaks account for about 50 per cent of the Department's budget," said Sri Bintang Pamungkas. The leaks occur at every level, surveying, preparation of sites, erection of housing compounds, recruitment and transportation of transmigrants, and supplying them with their supplies for the first year [Surabaya Pos, 2 April 1987].

Pamungkas is very much in favour of privatising transmigration. He advocates an end to what he calls "old-style transmigration". Under the "new-style" programme, the buzz words will be regional development, private investment and privately-run plantations.

But in all the talk about optimal use of regional resources, not a word is said about respecting the rights of the local populations, protecting the environment or safeguarding human rights. Indeed it is not difficult to forecast that privately-run profit-making enterprises will cause far more havoc for the indigenous people and their habitat than poverty-stricken transmigrants hoping to eke out an existence in poorly prepared sites or from nearby forest-lands.

But as the programme is transformed and agribusiness takes over, the one permanent feature will be its role in serving the interests of national defence. *

International PEN honours Pramoedya



An international meeting of writers in Lugano, Switzerland has called for the release from city arrest of one of Indonesia's foremost writers, Pramoedya Ananta Toer. Pramoedya had been invited to attend the conference of International PEN but his restricted status made it impossible for him to leave the country.

Shortly before the meeting, Pramoedya drafted the following list of demands for consideration by the writers' organisation:

- * The return of my manuscripts that were stolen in Buru Island just before I returned to Java.
- * The return of my manuscripts stolen from my home.
- * The return of my manuscripts, collection of books, journals and newspapers stolen on 13 October 1965 [the day on which Pramoedya was arrested].
- * The restoration of my civil rights (and for all other former prisoners):
 - a. the return of my house, its contents, and my land, and at least ten years of forced labour without having been convicted by a court of law,
 - b. the ending of the unconstitutional obligation to

report regularly to the authorities imposed since the end of 1979 on former prisoners; the restoration of voting rights to people whose franchise rights have never been constitutionally suspended; the lifting of the ban on the right to express opinions orally or in writing when it has not been proven that such opinions would lead to disorder; the restoration of the right to reply to slanders and attacks made against us in the press; the restoration of the right to reply to slanders made by the rulers.

Because of communications problems, the demands did not reach the meeting in time for consideration.

International PEN resolution

The following resolution was adopted by the writers meeting in Lugano:

"The Assembly of Delegates gathered at the International PEN congress in Lugano in May 1987 regrets that the new generation in Indonesia has no knowledge of its nation's greatest writer, Pramoedya Ananta Toer. Although internationally acclaimed, Toer's fiction and non-fiction were officially banned from 1965 to 1979; in 1981, after the publication of his two best-selling historical novels, *Man's World* and *A Child of all Nations*, all of his works were once again banned. Toer continues to write without hope of an audience in his own country.

"The Assembly of Delegates expresses concern for Toer who, after spending fourteen years, from 1965-1979, in Buru prison, is now under city arrest, and it appeals to the Indonesian Government to release him from police surveillance, to allow him to move about freely and travel and to permit the publication of his works."*

Heaviest usroh sentences to date

Since the last TAPOL Bulletin when we reported six more convictions of Muslims active in the usroh movement, another seven sentences have been passed down with sentences ranging from seven to fifteen years.

The usroh movement is a grassroots Muslim movement with many followers in Central Java which advocates a return to piety and organises its members in small home-based groups. [See Chapter 7 of *Indonesia, Muslims on Trial*, published by TAPOL in April 1987, price £4.00.]

As these trials were proceeding, the chief prosecutor for Central Java warned people against dreaming about establishing a state with communist, liberal or religious principles [Kedaulatan Rakyat, 20 March 1987].

Two groups of men were sentenced in Brebes, on the north coast of Central Java, and have been given the heaviest sentences yet inflicted on usroh members. Achmad Syafei, 29, a cobbler (mistakenly referred to in TAPOL Bulletin, No 80, page 12 as Abdullah Somari), Gazali, 23, and Ramdhon, 23, who are both traders, were all given sentences of fourteen years for being members of usroh and giving lectures at usroh courses.

A fourth man tried in Brebes, Agil Riyanto bin Darmowiyoto, 25, a student of sociology, was sentenced to fifteen years because he ran an usroh training course at a campus mosque in Gajah Mada university, Jogjakarta. Two friends who are said to have helped run this course, identified only as 'ASS' and 'MhD', are described as still being at large [Suara Merdeka, 17 March 1987].

A few weeks later, three high school pupils were sentenced at the same court in Brebes and given seven years each for attending usroh training sessions and giving lectures. They are Ibnu Zahir, 22, Wahyudi, 18, and Untung Slamet Prihatin, 18. In addition Untung was charged with plotting to murder a local administrator after hearing a lecture by Ibnu at an usroh meeting [Suara Merdeka, 10 April]. The prosecutor, who had demanded fifteen years for the three youngsters, announced that he would appeal against the sentences.

Meanwhile in Banyumas, south of Central Java, another usroh trial came to an end with a 25-year old student at Gajah Mada university, Mahasin Zaini, being sentenced to twelve years for usroh lecturing in Jogjakarta, Brebes, Muntilan and Banyumas. Like other defendants in these usroh trials, Mahasin did not deny his part in the movement, but he did reject the constructions put on the movement by the authorities.

Mahasin's teacher identified only by the initial F was said to be the man who introduced Mahasin into usroh. There are still many people being referred to at the trials only by their initials, suggesting that usroh trials are likely to continue for some time to come.

Air force major found guilty of subversion

A report in Kompas [3 April 1987] mentions for the first time the trial of a major in the Indonesian air force which ended with a sentence of eleven years. Major Ir. Yakub Ishak, 51 was charged with subversion on the grounds that he knew about the activities of the Jemaah Islam, the group held responsible for the hijack of a Garuda plane in March 1981 and for an attack on a police station in Cicendo, West Java a few weeks earlier. He was not held to be a member of the group.

It appears that a pistol used by the hijackers belonged to Major Yakub although he maintains that it was stolen

from his house while he was not at home. The court suggested that he was further implicated in the incident because his cousin, Amrin Nur was a member of the Jemaah Islam.

Arrests in Banda Aceh

Indonesian clippings on recent Muslim trials so far available to TAPOL have been confined to Java-based newspapers. However, a cover story on the Indonesian elections in the Far Eastern Economic Review [23 April 1987] refers to trials that have also taken place in Banda Aceh, North Sumatra. The journal makes a brief reference to Samsul Ambiya, 23, a student at Syah Kuala university who was given a one-year sentence along with a friend and "an undetermined number of radicals arrested in May 1986 on suspicion of subversion". *


Muslims march on Sigli


There are signs that the election has left many Acehnese with a sense of grievance. Groups of Muslims clad in long robes and bearing swords are reported to have marched into several towns in Aceh, North Sumatra, distributing leaflets and carrying huge banners proclaiming Islamic slogans.

A group of thirty men entered the town of Sigli in Pidie District, shouting "Allahu Akbar". They had walked for several hours, setting out after dawn prayers at their mosque twelve kilometres away, and reaching the outskirts of the town at 7.30 am. They were prevented from entering the town by armed troops. After an angry confrontation during which the troops fired shots into the air, the men were taken to the headquarters of kodim, the local military command and held for questioning. Thousands of people surrounded the kodim premises, "anxious to see what was going on". A similar march also took place in Meulaboh, West Aceh.

One of the leaders of the group arrested in Sigli said they were not members of the PPP, nor were they supporters of the Aceh Liberation Front. "We are Muslims who are struggling for justice and truth," he told journalists.

The men are not described as poor villagers but people "of substance" who are well-known community leaders [Kompas, 16 May 1987].





International Commission of Jurists, Indonesia and the Rule of Law: Twenty Years of 'New Order' Government, Francis Pinter (Publishers) Ltd, London, 1987. Hardback: £25.00.

The chapter on civil and political rights includes what is probably the most comprehensive account of press censorship in Indonesia, examining the history of press control, the current laws governing censorship, the system of not-to-publish instructions which haunts every section of the media and strict controls over the foreign press. The section on the absence of trade union rights relies heavily on the publications produced for several years by INDOC, the Indonesian Documentation Centre in Leiden, Holland. In fact, the strength of this account only reinforces the sense of loss caused by INDOC's decision in 1986 to discontinue the annual updates of its seminal 1981 book, *Indonesian Workers and the Right to Organise*. Is it not time for that decision to be revised?

The ICJ's account of the ILO's consideration of forced labour in Indonesia is mistaken to say that this was initially focused on the plight of contract labourers in North Sumatra, among whom were many former trade unionist political prisoners (p. 134). In fact, the ILO first accused Indonesia of violating the ILO Convention prohibiting forced labour when it took up, early in the 1970s, the plight of the 13,000 or so political prisoners exiled to Buru who were made to work on the army's agricultural project. The complaints voiced throughout the 1970s in Geneva certainly helped convince the regime to abandon the Buru project and release the prisoners.

It is also very disappointing to see that the section on freedom of movement and residence completely overlooks the massive re-settlement of hundreds of thousands of East Timorese. Yet nowhere has the Jakarta regime taken the control of movement and residence to such extremes as in East Timor. The account mentions East Timor but only because of restricted access for outside observers, a matter which properly belongs to another section of the book.

Elsewhere, while strong support is expressed for East Timor's right to self-determination (p. 15-21), West Papua's equally profound right is spurned on the grounds of "the absence of more firm rules about how to exercise the right to self-determination" (p. 23). There are plenty of UN resolutions setting down rules for the exercise of self-determination, regardless of the General Assembly's shameful acceptance of the farcical 'act of free choice' in West Papua in 1969.

Criminal justice and human rights

The third main area of examination deals with the system of criminal justice, looking in detail at the Criminal Procedures Code known as KUHAP [Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana], enacted in December 1981. This chapter, written by a Dutch lawyer J. t'Hart, has already appeared in Indonesian under the title *Hukum Acara Pidana Dalam Perspektif Hak Asasi Manusia* [Criminal Procedures Code from a Human Rights Perspective].

t'Hart explains the KUHAP provisions to safeguard the rights of people under arrest and detention, during interrogation and on trial, comparing them with the treatment suffered by anyone who falls into the hands of Indonesia's law enforcement agencies. This chapter is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the realities of the show-trials being conducted in Indonesia today. Many of KUHAP's provisions are fine but lack the backing of legal sanctions. When you add to this a

Martial law in perpetuity

The examination of Indonesia's institutionalised repression is divided into three chapters - one on constitutional law and the legal framework, one on civil and political rights and one on criminal justice.

Certainly, the crux of the first of these core chapters is the section on Kopkamtib, Suharto's Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, set up at the beginning of October 1965 and correctly presented here as the key instrument to maintain the government's authority, exercising virtually unlimited power (p. 72).

As Kopkamtib itself admits in a 1977 publication quoted by the ICJ, its powers to deal with every threat to internal security and order makes it unnecessary to resort to proclamations of martial law or states of emergency. In other words, Kopkamtib's existence is akin to a system of martial law in perpetuity.

judiciary that is nothing more than an arm of the executive, doing the bidding of national and local military administrators, it is easy to see why the very idea of a fair trial in Indonesia, especially for the regime's political opponents, is out of the question.

Nor does t'Hart believe that reopening political discussion on KUHAP, the contents of which reflect persistent lobbying by human rights lawyers, would reinforce its human rights content. "The structural conditions for realising improvements remain unfavourable.... In the present climate of increasing and overwhelming executive power, a change to a real independence of the judiciary as a forceful counter-balance is hardly to be expected," he concludes (p. 204).

Ideological basis overlooked

This conclusion brings us back to the damaging flaw in this publication, its failure to understand the ideology of Suharto's 'New Order' which is rooted in anti-communism, anti-liberalism, rejection of political activism, extreme authoritarianism and an undying belief in the army's eternal right to govern.

Failure to understand this leads to misleading remarks about the initial drive of the New Order being for the re-establishment of the Rule of Law (p. 76). The ICJ has been taken in by Suharto's early professions of wanting to redress the constitutional improprieties of his predecessor, Sukarno. No-one who looks at the atrocities committed by the army under Suharto's direct command in the very first days of the 'New Order' can possibly believe this.

Still worse, the book accepts the Suharto version of the 1 October 1965 events as an abortive communist coup, relegating mention of accounts that dispute this to a footnote. It describes Suharto as a "relatively unknown general (sic)... who escaped the attack" which led to the murder of six generals (p. 7). Yet it is well recognised

BOOK REVIEW

that Suharto was never a target of the kidnap squads, was a close associate of all the main plotters and even met one of them three hours before the kidnap squads set out. Rather than repeat allegations that President Sukarno might himself have been involved in this 'abortive coup' (p. 7), the ICJ could have mentioned, if only briefly, the many arguments pointing to Suharto's own involvement in what turned out to be a highly successful coup that ushered in the New Order.

The terror unleashed against millions of alleged communists is barely mentioned yet the New Order's claim to legitimacy uses the alleged communist threat as its main, indeed only, justification. The two instruments of repression, Kopkamtib and the anti-subversion law, rest on claims of a continued threat from the left.

Nor is it correct to describe the government's decision to release tens of thousands of political prisoners "detained following the abortive (sic) coup of 1965" as "an important step towards reconciliation and respect for human rights" (p. 29). The release programme was guided by concern for international pressure and anxiety that President Carter might find it difficult to supply aircraft with which to bomb East Timor into oblivion while tens of thousands of untried tapols remained behind bars. To talk of reconciliation glosses over the continuing persecution of more than a million communist suspects. Nor does the book deal properly with the systematic curtailment of their civil and political rights.

The book can be faulted for many errors in Indonesian spellings. A glossary would have helped the reader sort out the many acronyms and a bibliography would have enhanced the value of this book as a source of reference.

Carmel Budiardjo

Indonesia: Muslims on trial

Published by: TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign


Since early 1985, more than 150 Muslims have been tried, convicted and sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment in Indonesia for giving public sermons critical of the government, conducting religious courses not approved by the authorities, or producing leaflets or journals that denounce government policy. Some were held responsible for bombing incidents that were never properly investigated.

The trials followed the army's crackdown on a demonstration of Muslims in September 1984. Dozens, possibly even hundreds, were killed when troops opened fire on the unarmed crowd. The trials took place at a time of deep disquiet in Indonesia about the military government's imposition of total ideological conformity, preventing organisations from proclaiming Islamic or other religious principles.

Indonesia: Muslims on trial analyses the trials, placing them in the context of the continuing conflict between Indonesia's Muslims and the military regime.

"The first genuine attempt in the West to focus on the oppression of Muslims in a state that is more than 90 per cent Muslim, by a regime committed to establishing Western norms and values. The conflict between the political culture of the Muslim masses and their rulers is brought out vividly in Indonesia: Muslims on trial. Although it focuses on events in Indonesia, this study will help one understand why Muslim nation states are inherently unstable and are invariably held together by oppression."

Dr. M. Ghayasuddin, Editor, Muslimmedia



tapol

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West Papuan refugee interviewed II

In November, 1985, three West Papuan refugees reached the Australian island of Boigu by canoe and asked for political asylum. Later, others followed, bringing the number of eleven.

Could we go back for a moment to the period before the so-called act of free choice in 1969? What was happening in the way of political activities and armed operations?

After the Dutch left West Papua in 1962, political activities spread gradually to all parts of the country, to Kotabaru [now Jayapura], Biak, Manokwari, Sorong, Paniai, Fak-fak and Merauke. Already before I arrived in Merauke in 1968, Papuans there had been arrested and detained. They included two well-known leaders, Chris Passo Gebze and Johanis Tamberan, as well as people working at the government health department in Merauke, former members of the Dutch police force and men formerly of the Papuan Volunteers Corps who were by then in the (Indonesian) armed forces. [The names provided in the interview are withheld.] *) The people involved came from all walks of life, the armed forces, the police, government employees, villagers, fishermen, students, unemployed, men, women and youngsters.

Some were tried but others weren't because of lack of evidence and were eventually released. Among those convicted were Sergeant Pulalo, Corporal Bimaro and Corporal Taurui who, along with other friends, were sent to Jayapura and imprisoned there by the Military Police.

A detainee in Merauke named Napet died in his cell as a result of his treatment at Korem (military command) 172 Merauke. [Korem 172 is now in Abepura.] Napet fell ill and died from a poisonous injection by the Indonesians.

I should also mention Aloysius Kendau Gebze, formerly a member of the Dutch-sponsored New Guinea Assembly. He wanted to meet Fernando Ortiz-Sanz, the UN observer sent to oversee the act of free choice [known in Indonesian as 'Pepera']. But when the Indonesians found out, they arrested him and held him in detention till after Pepera. He later died in 1983 at Merauke General Hospital after an injection of poison by an Indonesian doctor.

Chris Passo Gebze who I mentioned earlier died in hospital in 1979. He went there for treatment and died from poison injected by an Indonesian doctor. Johanis Tamberan also died at the Merauke General Hospital from an attack of asthma.

OPM [Free Papua Movement] operations against the para-commandos [then called RPKAD] were in response to these arrests. Many people fled and formed a unit which attacked an army post in Erambu village, Kali Moro. OPM troops armed with knives, choppers and bows and arrows, killed two Indonesian soldiers and a government employee.

Bren guns captured during this first OPM attack were used in a second attack on Janggandur when some thirty Indonesian soldiers were killed. They were buried at the Trikora Heroes' Cemetery in Merauke as heroes of the Trikora Operation [launched by Indonesia against the Dutch before 1962] but this is a lie. They were killed in a battle between the OPM and Indonesian troops.

The para-commandos were led at the time by Lieutenant Wismoyo [Wismoyo is now a major-general and is commander of the Trikora Military Command for Irian Jaya and Eastern Indonesia.] The OPM forces were led by Sergeant Joku and Corporal Flasi, both formerly of the Volunteer Corps.

One of the first three, Thomas Agaky Wanda, recently contacted TAPOL offering to give an account of his experiences. The first part appeared in TAPOL Bulletin No 80. The final installment will appear in No. 82.

The 1977 and 1982 elections in West Papua

How were the 1977 general elections conducted in West Papua? Did Papuans take part voluntarily or was compulsion used by the authorities?

A lot of compulsion was used in the 1977 election. One proof is that villagers from Erambu fled across the border to PNG after being punished for placing their voting slips in the PDI box, not in the Golkar box. Indonesian soldiers were forcing people to put their slips in the Golkar box but people didn't want to do this so they were beaten and mal-treated as a result. [It is not widely known that the method of placing voting-slips in separate party boxes has been used in the elections in West Papua since 1977. This system was also used in East Timor in 1982 and 1987. See separate item.]

'Erambu villagers fled to PNG after being punished for placing their voting slips in the PDI box, not in the Golkar box.'

The authorities checked on how people voted by making a hole in the back of the place where the different party boxes were placed so that officials could easily see where people put their slips. Anyone using the PDI box was summoned and beaten up. This is why villagers from Erambu fled to PNG. All the talk about the elections being free, direct and secret is rubbish.

At the time of the 1982 election, I was in detention but after I was released, I heard from friends that it was just the same as in 1977. If persuasion failed to make people vote the right way, the iron fist was used. One fellow I know named Chris Gilauw was arrested with several others and ordered to support Golkar.

Sometimes, Golkar members sabotaged the other parties by taking voting slips from their boxes and putting them in Golkar's box. Civil servants were questioned before the elections so that the authorities could find out who was not intending to support Golkar.

Arrest and detention

So, what about your own detention?

On 30 June 1981, I was summoned by the Mako Sub Den Pom 172/2-1 Merauke (Merauke military police headquarters) and questioned about the escape of Akhtaruzzaman Khan, a Bangladeshi sympathetic to the OPM. Two weeks earlier two friends, Joseph Renrusum and Herman Woei, were arrested. We three and two others, Heronimus Ngillaime Gebze and Aloysius Basik-Basik, were all involved in this escape.

This time, I was arrested by Lieutenant Musta 'Id and Sergeant Arief Selmuri of the intelligence unit of the 17th Cendrawasih Military Command who were part of the

*) Remarks added in square brackets are from TAPOL.

special-tasks intelligence unit under the regional Kopkamtib [the army's security command] officer. Before finding out about our group, they had arrested people in Mindiptanah and Waropko, including government employees - teachers, nurses and even village-heads.

Some time earlier, Pangkodap V, OPM regional commander Gorry Tomi [Gerardus Thomy] had arrived in Merauke after walking from the interior of Jayapura. After passing through the regions of Mindiptanah and Waropko, various activities began there, flag-raising ceremonies and so on. One person involved in these activities, David Kopok, took his younger brother to Jayapura in 1981 for medical treatment. After reaching Jayapura, his wife wrote to the military reporting on his activities. So as he left Jayapura for home, he was arrested at Sentani airport.

During interrogation, David was unable to deny the charges made by his wife. This led to the arrest of many people working in Mindiptanah and Waropko by two officers sent there from Merauke. It was while interrogating these people that the army got wind of our activities. My two friends Herman Woei and Joseph Renrusun were arrested and forced to make confessions which led to my arrest.

I was arrested on 30 June 1981 and, after being stripped of my official uniform and thrown into a cell, I was interrogated about the escape of Akhtaruzzaman Khan. My briefcase was seized from my office. Some letters from Alex Tombay and Tarcis Jawa were discovered, along with headed notepaper of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of West Papua New Guinea which I had received from Henk Joku via my network in Maro River region.

A week later Musta 'Id and Arief left Merauke, and from about 17 July, I was subjected to three nights of interrogation when I was kicked and beaten. Herman Woei, Joseph Renrusun and Fransiskus Walek suffered the same treatment. Others involved in this case included several service chiefs and government employees. [Names and positions withheld].

On 24 July, I was flown by a Hercules air force plane from Merauke to Jayapura under the escort of Sergeant-Major Soegiono and taken to the headquarters of the intelligence unit of the 17th Military Command [Kodam 17]. After being registered, I was taken to the guard post and put in a cell. For several days, I was not allowed out to wash or use the toilet. I was given only one packet of rice and a banana leaf each day. On the third day, the rice tasted odd and gave me a splitting headache. I examined it and found some powder which I took to be poison. I noticed that each rice packet for me was given a special marker, a piece of onion skin tied to the outer leaf. This happened for several days. So, for several days, I ate and drank nothing and could not wash or relieve myself.

‘the rice tasted odd
and gave me a splitting headache.
I found some powder
which I took to be poison.
I noticed that each rice packet
for me was marked...’

INTERVIEW



Thomas Agaky Wanda on the canoe that carried him and his two West Papuan friends from Papua New Guinea to Bolgul island, Australia.

special cell of the Laksusa [executive officer for Kopkamtib, the special security command] which was located in the rear of Wisma Pati, the senior officers' mess at Dok V. The front of this building was used for guests of Kodam 17 or for senior officers from Jakarta, while the rear was used for OPM prisoners, known as 'tahanan Laksusa Irja'. This is typical of the deceit practised by the Indonesian government. The prisoners here were [some names withheld] along with Bob Kubia, Fred Pieger and Wellem Jebleb who had been repatriated from PNG. In September 1981, several friends were transferred to the Regional Interrogation Team of the Military Police 17 [names withheld].

Our treatment during August and September was somewhat better. Our cell-doors were left open until 8 pm but there was no improvement in the food as compared with Kodam 17.

A new clampdown

On 8 October 1981, a morning-star flag-raising incident occurred near Tiba-Tiba kampung in Abepura, Jayapura, after which there was some shooting by OPM guerrillas. This led to numerous arrests of Papuans from many walks of life - the unemployed, farmers, fishermen, government employees, members of the armed forces, university students, school-pupils, young and old, men and women, the well-known and the unknown, the deaf, the dumb and the blind. These arrests were quite indiscriminate. Here are some of the names that I can still remember: Jonas Tuu, Paulus Tabisu, Wellem Joku, Agus Elly, Markus Velba, police officer Elson Nero, police officer Semuel Isage, Johannis Gentho Rumanium, Arnold Kiryar, Daud Anison, Jimmy Arnold Velba and police officer Jowea.

A week after the flag-raising incident, we were rushed away from our cells and hidden in Wisma Kartika near the office of the Kodam 17 chief-of-staff because the guerrillas were planning to rescue the detainees. From that time on, combat troops armed with automatic rifles and machine-guns were used to guard the prisoners. In mid-November, we were moved back to Wisma Pati where we continued to be guarded by combat troops.

It was around that time that the relatives of six of the prisoners made enquiries about their whereabouts. Our cells were kept locked up from 8 November till 31 December 1981. In the afternoons, the troops were

In any case, the food was far from enough, only a few spoonfuls of rice which was often bad, with moldy tempe [soyabean cake] and raw spinach. I got food twice a day, at 2 pm and 6 pm. If a kind-hearted Papuan was on duty, he would bring me water and take me to the bathroom and toilet. But when Indonesians or unfriendly Papuans were on duty, my bowels and bladder felt as if they would burst, and I could only pass very little urine or faeces.

The other prisoners had the same treatment and some had a much worse time than me. I often heard cell doors being opened to let in new prisoners or move others elsewhere. This went on for about a week.

On 5 August 1981, I was transferred from Kodam 17 to a

withdrawn leaving only Laksus officers on guard, and during all this time, the treatment was the same as at Kodam 17. We were not allowed to wash. Food and drink was very bad and when we were praying, officers on duty would throw stones at us through the cell windows. But the deputy commander of the Kodam intelligence unit, Lt-Col Soebagiyo allowed us to celebrate Christmas and New Year.

From 1 January 1982, the prisoners were gradually released till only three were left, police corporal Jowea, second police sergeant Semual Isage and me.

In February 1982, I was transferred to the Regional Interrogation Team which functioned under the 17th Military Police Corps. Here, I met a number of prisoners who had been in detention since 1979: Justinus Toto, Christian Jakadewa, Selgius Paul Watori, Tholpinus Toto, Gerson Sorondanya, Luthers Waisimon, Jan Piet Norotouw,

Menase Demotouw, Terianus Joku, Suriel Jimmy Tauruy, Abner Maay, Eddy Auparay-Aronggear, Soter Boryamar, Saul Bomay, Jowel Worumi, Ringgo Suwae, Jeret Wayoi, Paulus Psakor-Kuntui, Paulus Kenop, Budiman Kogoya, Herman Mirip, Onesimus Ompe, Elly Jaboisembut, Joseph Mami, Celcius Wapay, Jance Numbery, and six women who raised a flag in the forecourt of the governor's office in 1980. They were: Persila Jakadewa, Florida (Fonny) Jakadewa, Domingas (Minggas) Pisirewa, Marriyones (Marry) Jakadewa, Regina (Regy) Jakadewa and Barbalina (Lina) Ikari.

Our treatment here was a little better because the officers tried to make it possible for prisoners to get their own food from outside and not depend on food from the Satgas Intel kitchen.

The six women told me that after they raised the flag, they were arrested by the 1701 Jayapura police and later handed over to the special intelligence unit of Kodam 17. They were treated the same as the men. Unsuccessful attempts were made to force secrets out of them about their activities. In the end, the Indonesian officers used black magic and gave them areca nuts and betel leaf. In this way, some of their secrets did come out.

The woman mainly responsible for their activities was Persila Jakadewa and her husband Palus Kenop, from the Maudobo-Tanah Merah Digul, Merauke tribe. Their daughter, Dolly was also in detention for some time and held by the Kodam and military police.

While we were in prison, we were given the opportunity to vote in the July 1982 general elections.

During this period of Pomdam-17 detention, another incident occurred. A group of students and government employees raised a flag in the forecourt of the Irian Jaya regional assembly (DPRD) building. The names I can still remember are Abraham Hegemur, David Heremba, Ismael Pattiran, Simon Tuturop, Karel Pattiran, Gerardus Timang, Thadius Waripang, Otto Rumawok and Josephine Gewab. [Several of these are now in prison in Surabaya.]

**'After being released,
I went back to my old job
but I was not given any work to do.'**

Some time after I was moved to the regional interrogation team, I was interrogated. I denied all the accusations against me. In the end, I was released on 29 October 1982 without being charged or tried. On 9 November, I returned to Merauke and went back to my old job but I was not given any work or responsibilities. I was, as we used to say, 'unemployed in the office'.

The group involved in the flag-raising incident of 3 July 1982 was detained by the police and tried straight from the Abepura prison without being held by the regional military command. Maybe this was because the Criminal Procedures Code (KUHAP) had just been enacted.

Just before I was freed, a group of prisoners arrived from Biak. There were four people in the group under the leadership of Hegemur, the sub-district chief of Biak and a man called Wompere.

To be continued in the next issue.

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Suharto family involved in scandals

Two major scandals have broken out in Indonesia, both involving members of the Suharto family.

National defence council issues worthless promissory notes

The first, and potentially the most damaging scandal internationally, involves promissory notes valued at \$3.5 billion which were issued in 1985 by the National Defence Security Council, a body which falls under the Defence and Security Department. The notes have proved worthless, regardless of the money paid to council officials for them. However five European businessmen are being indicted in a New York court for trying to sell some of these worthless notes. The case is described by US investigators as "the biggest attempted securities fraud ever" [Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 May 1987].

Responsibility rests with three NSDC officials who signed the notes, Lieut-Gen. Achmad Wiranatakusumah, then secretary-general of the council, and two deputies, Ibnu Hartomo and Soebagyo Soedewo. Ibnu Hartomo is the brother of the president's wife, Tien Suharto. No-one is saying what happened to the money paid over to NSDC officials.

In an attempt to extricate the government and the armed forces from the scandal, the present NSDC leadership has disclaimed responsibility, asserting that the notes were the responsibility of the three signatories. But it did not deny that the three were officials of the council. However, the FEER claims to have documents which suggest

that the council may have more explaining to do.

The notes were issued to a Middle Eastern businessman who used them to purchase commodities. The Indonesian ambassador in Damascus formally endorsed the signatories as officials of the NDSC. Businessmen who were tricked into accepting them and later tried offloading them on others now face charges, while the real culprits in Indonesia are not likely to be charged by anyone.

Ibnu Hartomo has said the notes were issued to finance purchases and housing for the armed forces and that Suharto was kept informed [Tempo, 28 February 1987].

\$24 million profit on sale of government satellite

The other scandal involves a deal that will earn the president's son Bambang Trihatmodjo, and son-in-law, Indra Kowara, a cool \$24 million profit for purchasing an Indonesian communications satellite launched in 1984 into a faulty orbit, and selling it back to the Indonesian government. The orbit became the property of an insurance company which later sold it to a California-based company in which Bambang and Indra's company, Elektrindo Nusantara, has a controlling interest. By the time the satellite is re-launched in 1989, Elektrindo will have incurred costs of \$48 million, but is negotiating to sell it back to the Indonesian state telecommunications company, Perumtel, for \$72 million.

* Source FEER, 30 April, and Jakarta Post, 1 May 1987.

New foreign loans since December 1986 exceed \$2.25 billion

Faced with a huge foreign debt problem and with a debt service ratio already approaching forty per cent of foreign exchange earnings from exports, Indonesia has incurred additional debts of more than \$2.25 billion since last December. This is in addition to the credit which is expected to be approved by the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia at its meeting on 17-18 June. The IGGI is likely to grant at least \$2.5 billion, the amount agreed by the IGGI at its meeting last June.

The new credit granted in the past six months includes \$300 million from the World Bank, \$350 million from a syndicate of Japanese banks, \$900 million from the Japanese government, \$609 million from the International Monetary Fund and \$100 million from the US Eximbank.

Such a massive expansion of foreign debt temporarily extricates Indonesia from a situation in which it would be paying abroad in interest and principle more than it receives in new credit. However, the effect on the future debt-service ratio is certain to be disastrous.

The new credit will bring Indonesia's overall foreign indebtedness to more than \$45 billion, if private debts and publicly-guaranteed private debts are included.

Government refuses to consider debt-rescheduling

The rapid growth in the country's debt burden has been

exacerbated by the sharp fall in oil prices and the fall in the rate of the dollar against the Japanese yen and European currencies. Most export earnings are in dollars but most foreign debt must be repaid in these other currencies.

Recent developments have led to growing pressure from economists and businessmen for the government to reschedule its debt repayments. There is no sign that the government will even consider such a proposal. Government spokesmen insist that the recent influx of foreign credit is proof that Indonesia's creditors have confidence in the economy but Kompas [7 May 1987] sees it as a sign of the depth of the country's economic woes.

Professor Widjaya Nitisastra, the architect of the Suharto regime's economic policy up to 1983, has warned that further loans could spell serious difficulties for the economy. Frans Seda who represents manufacturing interests has called specifically for the government to negotiate the re-scheduling of debts falling due in the next two years [Kompas, 9 May 1987].

What businessmen and economists fear is that burgeoning debt and rising debt-service obligations will reduce the foreign currency available for imports needed to keep industrial activity going. This threat to the level of business activity, already severely hit by budget retrenchment, will further reduce jobs in a country where the labour force is rising by more than 1.5 million people a year.



More British weapons for Indonesia

British Aerospace has announced a new order from Indonesia for 5 Battery Command Post Processor systems (BCPP). The order, worth £500,000, is part of the recently-announced Indonesian contract for further supplies of the British Aerospace Rapier low-level air-defence system [British Aerospace News, March 1987]

Although originally developed with Rapier air defence missiles in mind, British Aerospace stresses in its announcement the wide variety of tasks it can undertake. It is suitable "for helicopter support, data-based management and a wide variety of other logistics-based tasks... enabling a battery commander to automate the planning, deployment and management of his units in the field". The system can process masses of information from many sources, "enabling tasks that formerly took hours to be completed in a few minutes". The system can be fitted in a landrover or similar vehicle and can be supplied "in kit form".

As described by BAe, the BCPP system is eminently suitable for use by the Indonesian army and air force for troop deployment and military operations against the resistance in East Timor and West Papua. Its sale to Indonesia, which is known to have launched military operations in both these territories in the past year, should under no circumstances be allowed.

British government's narrow interpretation

By contrast with BAe propaganda emphasising the versatility of the BCPP, the British government told David Nellist MP, in a written reply on 6 April, that it is "a non-critical part of the Rapier System and has no use outside the context of the Rapier". The London-based Campaign Against Arms Trade has written to British Aerospace asking it to comment on the discrepancy between its description of the BCPP's uses and that of the British government.

Information was received last year of a new military offensive code-named Operation Extinction in East Timor. Operations are known to have proceeded for several months

Continued from page 1.

* Action by the justice minister would undermine the independence of the legal profession in the conduct of advocacy. Such an action, which moreover lacks legal grounds, would be seen as a response not to Buyung's move to interrupt the judge but to the independence he displayed in the conduct of Dharsono's defence.*)

Finally Buyung reminded the justice minister that the judge presiding over the Dharsono trial did not reprimand him at the time and did not even mention the incident in the records of the trial. The matter was completely ignored for a whole month until a move to charge Buyung with contempt of court was suddenly made public in February 1986, with the government clearly playing an active role in the move.

Buyung has made it known that he intends to fight the government's decision "to the bitter end". The three lawyers acting in Buyung's defence in an attempt to reverse the minister's decision are: Yap Thiam Hien, Mulya Lubis and Albert Hasibuan. *

*) For details of this trial, see *Indonesia: Muslims on Trial*, published by TAPOL, April 1987, price £4.00 plus postage.

in the second half of 1986, and may then have been halted because of the rains. On 24 March this year, The Independent quoted Reuters as saying that Indonesian troops "have launched new attacks against rebels (in East Timor)" ahead of the illegal elections due on 23 April 1987.

The British Government has argued, in defence of the export of Hawk ground-attack aircraft and Rapier missiles, that these are part of a country's legitimate defence needs, claiming that they are not suitable for use in East Timor. This ignores the fact that the supply of such equipment will support the armed forces of a regime that has flouted basic principles in the UN Charter concerning armed aggression and self-determination.



UK prefabricated bridges for Indonesia

Indonesia has also placed a £10.7 million order for 397 prefabricated bailey bridges from the British firm, Mabey and Johnson. This order is the first to be financed under the £140 million soft loan commitment for Indonesia announced by the UK in 1986.

These bailey bridges are described as being for the use of Bina Marga, a state company in charge of building, supervising and managing road development in Indonesia [Jakarta Post, 8 April 1987]. This gives the deal a non-military sounding purpose, but it is clear that prefabricated bridges are a critical part of military operations in places like East Timor and West Papua where the terrain is difficult and there are hardly any surfaced roads and bridges. *

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