



VICTORIA UNIVERSITY
MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA

Tapol bulletin no, 80, April 1987

This is the Published version of the following publication

UNSPECIFIED (1987) Tapol bulletin no, 80, April 1987. Tapol bulletin (80). pp. 1-20. ISSN 1356-1154

The publisher's official version can be found at

Note that access to this version may require subscription.

Downloaded from VU Research Repository <https://vuir.vu.edu.au/26220/>



East Timorese students still in danger

The four East Timorese students who have been trying since last October to leave Indonesia seem as far as ever from their objective. Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja declared in February that Indonesia cannot allow them to leave with Portuguese passports because this would be tantamount to admitting that East Timor is not part of Indonesia [Kompas, 28 February].

Following Mochtar's statement, the Dutch embassy in Jakarta announced that they were abandoning their efforts to help the students leave though said that they would continue to be in contact with the four.

The Portuguese government have now taken the matter into their own hands and are believed to be discussing the question with Indonesia through contacts at the UN in New York.

Living in a state of fear

A Japanese journalist in Jakarta who has spoken to the students, reports that they continue to be in a state of great anxiety and under the constant watch of the security forces who visit them several times a week. He writes that they are thought to be Fretilin supporters who have sent information about conditions in East Timor to support groups in Lisbon and Australia.

"We were told that corresponding with people abroad is regarded as subversive. We decided to seek refuge abroad because our personal safety is no longer guaranteed."

They visit the Dutch embassy and the International Red Cross office almost every day but feel that there has been no satisfactory progress in their case.

There are about 110 East Timorese studying in Jakarta but they have no organisation to support each other, so the four are alone in their resistance [Yomiuri Shimbun, 10 March].

The right to reject Indonesian citizenship

Speaking at a press conference in Jakarta on 27 February, Mochtar accused the Portuguese government of using the students for political purposes by granting them Portuguese passports [Jakarta Post, 28 February]. He also attacked the Dutch embassy in Jakarta for promising the four that they would be given Portuguese passports [Kompas, 28 February]. This was the second such action by the embassy, he said. The first was when they helped four West Papuans leave in 1984 "by giving them free tickets".

He claimed that the four had forfeited their chance to retain Portuguese citizenship when this was offered to East Timorese under a memorandum of understanding reached between Indonesia and Portugal. But as Mochtar knows very well, this memorandum offered the option of Portuguese citizenship only to those wanting to join families abroad or those who worked for the Portuguese administration before 1975. The students had no such option and are now trying to extricate themselves from enforced Indonesian citizenship over which they were given no choice.

Dutch treachery and Indonesian blackmail

The Dutch government and its embassy in Jakarta must bear primary responsibility for the danger now faced by the students.

In a telex to the Dutch Foreign Minister on 1 March immediately after Mochtar's statement, Lord Avebury, chair of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, urged Holland to give the students Dutch travel documents to make their journey to Lisbon, but this idea has been rejected.

Continued on back page

In this issue

Portugal's diplomatic offensive	p. 2
East Timor: Indonesia's illegal election	p. 4
More debts for a debt-ridden economy	p. 7
The IGGI and Indonesia's poor	p. 8
The screw tightens on hundreds of organisations	p. 10
More usroh sentences in Central Java	p. 12
Disiplin nasional	p. 14
The rights of ex-tapols	p. 16
How faith-healer Mbah Suro was crushed	p. 18
Election Special III	p. 20
West Papuan refugee interviewed I	p. 22

Portugal's diplomatic offensive

The Portuguese government has vetoed a move by the European Community to upgrade its office in Jakarta to embassy level because of Indonesia's illegal occupation of East Timor. As a result the Jakarta office will remain a sub-office of the Community's embassy in Bangkok. Portugal is also to boycott the April meeting in Jakarta of the EEC-ASEAN Joint Commission at which senior officials will discuss trade and economic relations between the two blocs. [*The Guardian*, 6 March 1987]

Portugal boycotted last October's meeting of EEC and ASEAN foreign ministers and is certain to boycott the next ministerial meeting later this year, probably in October. Indonesia is currently ASEAN president which is why all ASEAN meetings at present are being held in Jakarta.

Portugal's latest move is symptomatic of the diplomatic offensive which now characterises Portugal's position internationally on the question of East Timor, and is in contrast to the country's former position which was far less assertive and principled. How is this development to be explained and how sustainable is it likely to be? Many things have come together to bring about this change.

Internal political developments

Up to the 1986 presidential election, the former president, General Antonino Ramalho Eanes was seen as the most principled political figure on East Timor. But he encountered great difficulty implementing his presidential mandate towards East Timor because of the divergence of views between him and the government under Mario Soares. It was feared at the time that the defeat of Mrs Pintasilgo, an independent, who had been President Eanes' special advisor on East Timor, would augur badly for East Timor, losing it a champion at the summit of Portuguese state power, as she had been more sympathetic than Mario Soares when he was prime minister.

However the opposite seems to have happened. Once Mario Soares was elected president he has, if anything, been even more outspoken on East Timor than his predecessor, using every opportunity to press the issue, in international gatherings, at the European Community and in meetings with other heads of state. Moreover, his presidential initiatives are now matched by statements and acts at the government level. The closer political affinity between a president from the Socialist Party and a government which is a coalition of socialists and social democrats has removed the earlier discords that hampered cooperation between the president and the government.

It may be that Mr Soares now sees East Timor as the one major issue on which he, as president, has a special responsibility. But it is also acknowledged in Lisbon that he was deeply impressed by a private conversation he had in Lisbon in the summer of 1985 with Monsignor Carlos Ximenes Belo, head of the Catholic Church in Dili, who told him that Fretilin was not communist but nationalist and enjoyed widespread support [Jill Jolliffe in *The Age*, 4 September 1985].

But former president Eanes whose party is the third largest and holds the balance of power in parliament is just as determined, out of office, to keep East Timor in


the public eye. He declared, in a speech to foreign correspondents in Lisbon on 10 February, that Portugal had a moral obligation to help East Timor achieve independence and he called upon the government to support the independence movement financially. He seems to be trying to push Portuguese politicians even further in support of East Timor.

There is today in Portugal a striking unanimity between parties of the right and left on the question of East Timor. No party, it should be said, has ever opposed the just demand for self-determination for East Timor, but until the early 1980s, East Timor was often less a question of principle than of recrimination between parties. The right-wing parties, not unlike right-wing parties in other former metropolitan countries, have tended to have a paternalistic loyalty towards former colonial people, and blamed the left, in many cases not unjustly, for failing to support East Timor in the early years of the Indonesian invasion. (The Jakarta regime, incidentally, completely distorts the policy of Lisbon's leftwing government in the mid 1970s.)

The impasse in consultations with Indonesia

These internal developments have been encouraged by the current impasse in the UN-sponsored talks between Portugal and Indonesia. A resolution of the UN General Assembly in 1982 called on the UN Secretary-General to initiate consultations on East Timor between the parties directly concerned. These consultations started in 1983 but only Portugal and Indonesia were involved because the Secretary-General ignored persistent demands that the East Timorese people should be drawn in.

The consultations have led only to an agreement on the repatriation to Portugal of East Timorese who formerly




Occasional Reports No. 4 reproduces TAPOL's submission to the UN Decolonisation Committee. It analyses the structure of military control in East Timor, including details about the Army's Security Operations of East Timor.

TAPOL Occasional Reports reproduce documents of interest. Copies cost 50 pence each, 80 pence for two, plus 30 pence for each additional copy, including postage.

worked for the Portuguese colonial administration and refused to adopt Indonesian citizenship. Once this matter had been resolved, there was nowhere for the talks to go other than to discuss the issue of self-determination. But on this, the two sides are diametrically opposed.

No-one has yet publicly declared that the consultations have broken down but the speeches made by the Portuguese and Indonesian representatives at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in February clearly point in that direction. In response to Portugal's condemnation of the illegal elections in East Timor [see separate item], Indonesia's delegate questioned Portugal's "real intention... with regard to the ongoing talks". Jakarta has always seen the talks as a compromise of its claim to have integrated East Timor but hoped to use them to win Portuguese acquiescence. Now that this has turned out to be an empty dream, it wants to place the blame for a breakdown on Lisbon. Indeed, much of Jakarta's propaganda is aimed at maligning and distorting Portuguese policy, even blaming the present democratic regime in Lisbon for what went on in East Timor during the fascist era.

In the past year or so, Portuguese politicians have



seen Indonesian policy for what it is, and with the UN-sponsored consultations on the brink of collapse, no-one in Portugal can see any point any more in exercising caution towards Indonesia, as if it could make the talks more fruitful. This has certainly helped pave the way to the current diplomatic offensive.

Portugal in the European Community

Portugal's accession to the European Community in January 1986 has provided politicians at all levels with an important international forum to fight for East Timor. President Soares has made use of it, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have made use of it, particularly by boycotting EEC events in Jakarta, and Portuguese members of the European Parliament have used the Parliament to particularly good effect. The importance of this forum should not be underestimated as Lisbon now has regular consultations with West European countries two of whom (Greece and Ireland) supported the 1982 UN resolution on East Timor while the other seven abstained.

Portugal can be expected to lobby much harder than hitherto with its EEC partners in the likely event that a resolution is taken this year at the UN. Portuguese membership of the EEC has markedly improve the international prospects for East Timor.

Parliamentary initiatives

Finally, there is Portugal's national parliament. In 1982, a parliamentary commission "to follow up the situation in East Timor" was created. While it appears to have taken few initiatives in its early years, it has recently emerged as a key lobby for East Timor. Its twenty-three members come from all the six parties right across the political spectrum, the social democrats, the socialists, the communists, the Democratic Renewal Party, the Democratic Centre Party and the Democratic Movement.

On 17 July 1986, the Parliament unanimously passed a resolution reasserting East Timor's right to self-determination and rejecting "the integration into Indonesia of this territory against the free will of its people and in notorious violation of the principles of international law". It declared itself to be available to participate in any future initiative seeking a solution that will take into account the legitimate aspirations of the people of East Timor".

In November it produced a unanimous report summarising the events leading to the Indonesian invasion in 1975 and a chronology of events on the international scene since 1975, particularly the actions by Portuguese politicians in favour of East Timor. The final conclusion of this impressive 38-page document is worth quoting in full:

"Portugal, the administering state (of East Timor), has continued to assert the right of the East Timorese to self-determination, and it will, with every means at its disposal, fight unceasingly to ensure that the East Timor people may freely choose their own future, thereby making good the principles in international law, in the UN Charter and (UN) Deliberations, thereby enforcing the contents of Article 297 of the Portuguese Constitution and complying with the wishes of the Portuguese people on the matter, repeatedly asserted unanimously in successive deliberations in the country's Parliament."

This report is intended as a guide not only for Parliament but also for the government and for Portuguese embassies throughout the world. A major initiative planned by the Portuguese Parliament is an international conference of parliamentarians in Lisbon in June this year to consider ways of strengthening the international political and diplomatic campaign in support of the people of East Timor. Portugal now looks set to becoming a major force on the international scene supporting self-determination for East Timor.



223 pages
Price: £6.00 plus P & P

P&P: 75 pence UK and
overseas surface

£2.00 airmail

Indonesia's illegal election

On 23 April Indonesia will conduct an illegal election in East Timor. The Portuguese government told the UN Human Rights Commission in February that Indonesia was able to conduct the election thanks only to its military occupation of the country. It had nothing whatever to do with the exercise of any right to choose by the people of East Timor.

This was a rebuff to Jakarta which intends to portray this event as proof that the people of East Timor accept 'integrasi'. The Indonesian ambassador to the UN, Ali Alatas claimed that the elections "will again prove that the East Timorese have recognised the fact" that they are also part of Indonesia [Jakarta Post, 11 February]. It is not unlikely that western or ASEAN diplomats will be prevailed upon to observe the event, as if to give it legitimacy. No-one doubts that Jakarta will claim a near complete turnout; in the last elections, the number of votes allegedly cast actually exceeded the number of voters. It is well to remember that anyone refusing to vote would be accused of supporting the resistance.

It is instructive to examine the measures being taken to 'safeguard' the conduct of the elections.

Voting procedures

The elections are being held for three assemblies, the central parliament (DPR), the provincial assembly (DPRD-I) and the sub-district assembly (DPRD-II). There are 62 election committees (*panitya pemungutan suara*) in East Timor and the number of registered voters is officially said to be 357,754.

Special voting arrangements have been established for East Timor as well as for West Papua, the other territory where armed resistance against Indonesian rule is being waged. In December 1986, Interior Affairs Minister, retired General Soepardjo Roestam announced that, unlike the 25 provinces in Indonesia where voters will cast their votes for each of the three elections in a single box for each assembly (a yellow box for parliament, a white box for the DPRD-I and a blue box for the DPRD-II), in West Papua and East Timor, there will be three boxes for each of the assemblies, one for each of the parties, hence, a total of nine boxes [Kompas, 22 January 1987]. The same procedure was used in East Timor in 1982.

Voters in East Timor will therefore have to place their voting slips in the box for the 'chosen' party without piercing a party symbol or doing anything to the slip. Besides enabling election officials to check on how people vote, it will eliminate the chance for voters to write words of protest on their voting slips.

Voters will first surrender their 'model-C form' (a special requirement for East Timor) and announce their name to an official who will hand out a yellow voting slip (for parliament) which must immediately be placed in a party box. The voter will then report for the next slip and repeat the process for the other two assemblies.

One can only speculate on the reasons for this special procedure. The authorities certainly regard the West Papuans and East Timorese as too immature to vote like everyone else. But this method enables the authorities to guarantee that Golkar wins a comfortable (huge?) majority as a sign that the East Timorese and the West Papuans accept Indonesian rule. Although under the new rules, the military insist that they do not take sides with Golkar,



A confident John Naro, PPP chairman, poses in front of the PPP office in Dili. [Jakarta Post, 17 July 1986]

in the special cases of East Timor and West Papua they may fear that votes cast for the other parties could be interpreted as being protest votes.

Whatever the reason, Jakarta evidently regards the elections in its two colonial territories as needing far greater control and manipulation than elsewhere.

Security during the elections

The offensive launched last year by the Indonesian army codenamed Operasi Kikis (Operation Extinction) was in part aimed at securing 'successful' elections. In addition to combat and territorial troops, there are several para-military forces consisting primarily of East Timorese whose duties will be intensified during the elections. These forces are collectively known as 'Hansip-Wankamra' and consist of five separate units:

Indonesian thoughts on a referendum in East Timor

Responding to suggestions that this year's general election in East Timor could be regarded as a referendum on self-determination, the governor of East Timor, Mario Carrascalao, recently stated that the people of East Timor do not need any referendum.

He said such a thing would be contrary to the laws and Constitution of the unitary Indonesian Republic and that East Timorese "as Indonesian citizens" would abide by all the laws and regulations concerning the elections. Therefore only three parties, the Golkar, the PPP and the PDI, could take part. All Timorese parties like Fretilin and the UDT [of which he was a member] are banned, he said.

The Indonesian-appointed governor called for vigilance against "libelous reports" in the foreign press that "could harm our political system" [Jakarta Post, 9 March 1987].

Wanra, Kamra, Ratih, Hansip and TBO. The first three are the ones likely to be used for security purposes during the elections.

Wanra or People's Defence and Ratih or Trained People's Force are under army control. Wanra functions under the command of Korem 164/Wira Dharma, the military command for the whole of East Timor, whilst Ratih units function under the 13 kodim or district military commands. Kamra or People's Security units, which are attached to the police, were set up more recently, following the major military operations in 1981. During the 1982 elections, Kamra units were given special tasks in order to give the police a more conspicuous role than the army.

The present-day strength of these units is not known, but figures for 1982 were given in a set of Indonesian

military documents captured by Fretilin on 28 August 1983: 4,800 in Kamra, 7,800 in Ratih and 1,690 in Kamra, giving a total of 14,290 men. Although some members of these units are known to have defected to Fretilin in 1983, it is not unlikely that all three units will have increased in number since then.

The use of special para-military forces during elections is confined to East Timor and West Papua. In Indonesia, security round the polling-booths is largely left to the police and the Hansip (Civil Defence).

Arms sales to Indonesia attacked in House of Lords

In a debate on the arms trade and human rights, initiated in the House of Lords by veteran Labour politician, 97-year old Lord Fenner Brockway, Lord Avebury, chair of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, strongly condemned the British government's promotion of "trade in weapons of mass destruction with evil dictatorships such as those of Indonesia and Chile".

He dealt in particular with the present military situation in East Timor where, according to reports in the second half of 1986, a renewed military offensive had been launched. Lord Avebury quoted from a letter of 16 January he received from the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, which in effect confirmed these reports. The Foreign Secretary wrote: "Military activity continues in both East Timor and Irian Jaya.... We do... believe Indonesian military activity to have been stepped up in those areas where low-level conflict persists."

Lord Avebury accused British governments since 1978 of spreading deception about the level of Indonesian military operations over the years. He quoted from a letter sent in June 1978 by a minister of state at the Foreign Office to Russell Johnston MP who had condemned Britain's decision to sell Hawk aircraft to Indonesia.

The letter claimed that "certain foreign observers who have been allowed to visit the territory have reported that the scale of skirmishing there has been greatly reduced".

"It is not entirely accurate," Lord Avebury continued, "to refer to a war in which at least 100,000, probably 200,000 people died as 'skirmishing'."

Lord Avebury was equally scathing about foreign observers who, with very few exceptions, have visited East Timor since the occupation "as stooges of the regime ... prepared to accept the lies and propaganda fed to them by the Indonesian forces." Requests by the Parliamentary Human Rights Group to visit East Timor had, by contrast, been refused point blank by the Indonesian government. "I suspect the Indonesians would like entirely to prevent the outside world from knowing what they are doing in East Timor. Particularly, they do not want anybody to observe the military operations that are currently taking place in the territory."

[For a copy of Lord Avebury's speech and the government minister's reply, please send 50 pence to TAPOL.]

Letter to the Editor

Dear Editor,

First, I thank you for having reviewed my book, *FUNU: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor*, Red Sea Press Inc, New Jersey (1986) in your bulletin of February 1987 (No 79, page 17).

I take issue with Mr Jeremy Smithers' references such as: "Yet, the book does not do justice to the independence struggle... and Fretilin's resilience." Did Mr Smithers read the last chapter entitled, "The Long March to Freedom"?

He also wrote: "...he gives the curious impression that he has acted on his own in New York. Nowhere is there a sense of working with Fretilin representatives in Lisbon and elsewhere, and the movement inside East Timor." Well, that's the impression Mr Smithers got by reading my book.

However, a more careful reading would show that I was in constant consultation with whoever else from Fretilin (was) present in New York for the UN General Assembly, and with our closest friends, namely the five African Lusophone States. More often than not, yes, I was alone, but acted on the basis of the fundamental guidelines approved by the entire Fretilin leadership.

I did not lose sight of the "broader campaign" but in view of the extreme space and financial limitations, I could not publish a complete "who's who" in the Timor solidarity movement. In the last part of the chapter, "The Quality of Mercy", I referred to the solidarity movement in broad terms.

It is ironic that only TAPOL's review of my book questioned my loyalty to the Fretilin leadership in East Timor. I'll be with Fretilin as long as it remains loyal to the ideals that inspired me and many others in 1974 to seek independence for East Timor. It is regrettable that I had to find more justice in the mainstream media, such as *The New York Times*, *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, and others.

Jose Ramos Horta



Another defence team visits Indonesia

A team of senior executives from leading British arms manufacturers visited Indonesia in February this year to discuss greater cooperation with IPTN, Indonesia's own aerospace industry. The executives were from British Aerospace and Rolls Royce, indicating that these two companies are anxious to become involved in IPTN expansion into the manufacture of aero engines and long-range aircraft for the domestic market. According to some commentators, the mission offered Indonesia cooperation in manufacturing missiles as well as civil and military aircraft.

TAPOL has also learnt that an Indonesian team consisting possibly of officials from the Indonesian air

force and IPTN, will be attending an International Aviation Tattoo to be held in July this year at the US air force base at Fairford in Gloucestershire. Although this tattoo is publicised as an event to raise money for the Royal Air Force Benevolent Fund by giving the public a chance to see new aircraft and spectacular displays of aerobatics, it is also promoted as an occasion where, according to the official prospectus, high-ranking military personnel, senior government officials and executive personnel from around the world can "join an unprecedented gathering of professionals in a military environment and discuss their future requirements, procurement plans and policies."

Duke boosts British trade with Indonesia



The Duke of Kent with President Suharto. "Bright prospects..." [Jakarta Post, 4 February, 1987]

A high-powered British trade and industries mission, headed by the Duke of Kent, vice-chair of the British Overseas Trade Board, visited Indonesia in the first week of February, to give yet more vigour to growing British enthusiasm about trading with and investing in Indonesia.

The Duke told a meeting of the Indonesian-British Association that British industry has made Indonesia a high priority for investments and exports. "Indonesia is one of the brightest longterm prospects as a partner for Britain in the developing world... because it is rich in

natural resources and labour, and has achieved sound financial management, political stability and military security". This statement points to the close connection between trade and investments and Britain's massive arms exports to Indonesia which the Foreign Office says is justified in order to enable Indonesia to build its 'defence' capacity.

During the Trade Board mission's visit it was revealed that Indonesia has now become the UK's sixth largest trading partner worldwide, whereas British investments rank fifth in Indonesia outside the oil sector, after Japan, Hong Kong, the US and Holland. Total British investments in Indonesia since the 1967 Foreign Capital Law amount to well over half a billion dollars in 180 ventures covering banking, insurance and services as well as rubber, palm-oil and tea plantations. According to a recent figure from the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board, British investments since 1967 totalled \$572.1 million, making the UK second only to Holland among the countries of western Europe [Jakarta Post, 2 December 1986].

The Duke said that the Overseas Trade Board had supported eighty British companies to take part in last year's trade fair in Jakarta and had helped ninety-nine companies to take part in trade missions to Indonesia during 1986. [Kompas and Jakarta Post, 3 March 1987]

British exports to Indonesia reached £185 million in 1986 as compared with £170 the previous year. They are expected to expand much faster from 1987 onwards as a result of the British government's decision last year to grant £140 million in soft loans to Indonesia over the coming three years.

US worried about Suharto's monopolies

The US embassy in Jakarta has prepared a report on the extensive business ventures of members of the Suharto family. The report pays attention in particular to the long-term attempt by Suharto's three sons, Bambang, Tommy and Sigit to establish their economic wealth and power. According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (26 February, 1987), "the first family members see this as their way of maintaining power in the country when Suharto is no longer in power".

The FEER two-column report of the embassy's study resulted in the Indonesian authorities banning that issue of the weekly. Normally, an unsavoury report about Indonesia results in the offending item being blacked out. Perhaps, the more punishing measure this time can be accounted for by the fact that the same issue also

carried a highly complimentary review by Robin Osborn of Jose Ramos Horta's book, *Funu*, on Fretilin's eleven-year campaign for support at the United Nations.

News of the US embassy report comes only two months after the *Asian Wall Street Journal* carried three lengthy articles full of details about the Suharto family business empire (see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 79, February 1987). The embassy study which is confidential concludes that most of the Suharto family firms rely on a position of privileged control over an industry or import item. "Without the props provided by the current regulated system, there is a serious question as to the viability of their enterprises. Presumably the risk to the family weighs heavily - and negatively - in any decision to deregulate the economy."

FEER adds that, according to local businessmen, data on the Suharto family is "just the tip of the iceberg and that attention should be focussed on what the offspring of government ministers are doing in business."

More debts for a debt-ridden economy

The sum total of the Indonesian government's foreign debt is now said to be \$30 billion or, according to some sources, \$32 billion, plus about \$7 billion of debts owed by the private sector. Meanwhile, the debt service ratio which measures the amount paid out for interest and the repayment of principle as a proportion of foreign exchange earnings is fast approaching 40 per cent, well above the World Bank's danger threshold of 20 per cent.

Yet, the military regime has pronounced itself to be set against asking its creditors to reschedule its enormous repayment load for fear of damaging its credit-worthiness. It has decided instead to seek even more debts in an attempt to extricate itself from its current economic malaise. In the past two months, it has negotiated loans of \$300 million from the World Bank and \$900 million from the Japanese Exim Bank, in addition to a syndicated, commercial loan of \$350 million from foreign, mainly Japanese, banks which was negotiated in the closing months of 1986.

The World Bank loan

The World Bank loan is described as a trade policy loan. Unlike past World Bank loans, it is not tied to any project but is for the purpose of covering Indonesia's balance of payments crisis as the country attempts to adjust to the drastic fall in its earnings from oil. Normally such a loan would be made available only by the International Monetary Fund. The loan will be available for immediate use and is granted on less concessionary conditions (faster repayment terms and higher interest) than all previous Bank loans to Indonesia.

The loan is basically a reward to Indonesia for the punishing 45 per cent devaluation of the rupiah in September 1986 and the tough budget announced by General Suharto at the beginning of 1987. Other countries might expect widespread political unrest to follow such severe economic retrenchment but Suharto's repressive system of political control has made this almost impossible, at least in the short term.

As an indication of the crisis now engulfing the Indonesian economy, this type of World Bank loan has previously been reserved only for low-achievement economies in Africa and certainly not for economies that enjoyed the benefits of the oil boom.

The Indonesian government is also currently negotiating a standby loan from the International Monetary Fund under its compensatory fund facility, normally reserved for non-oil producing countries suffering from worsening terms of trade. Again, Indonesia stands out as a significant exception to the rule.

The Japanese Exim Bank loan

The Japanese Exim Bank decision to grant Indonesia a special loan of \$900 million aroused much more comment than the World Bank loan. This is the first time, it is repeatedly stressed, that Japan has approved a loan to any country that is not tied to promoting Japanese exports. The loan is to be converted by the Indonesian government into rupiahs, for counterpart funding for World Bank projects which would otherwise have to be abandoned or postponed indefinitely for lack of rupiahs. Altogether twenty-one projects will be supported. The

projects have been selected by the Japanese for their capital-intensive bias and include projects in agriculture, communications, road- and dam-building, plantations and electricity. It is not unlikely that transmigration projects, which are known to be faltering because of lack of rupiahs, are included.

This loan will boost overall Japanese credit to Indonesia by about 20 per cent, from \$4.6 billion to \$5.5 billion. Japan is, in any case, Indonesia's largest bilateral creditor. Commentators point out that the loan directly serves the Exim Bank's own interests as Indonesia is the Bank's largest client and it is well



aware of the repercussions for its own prospects if the Indonesian economy were allowed to go under.

For well over a year, Indonesia has been unable to proceed with many of the projects funded by the World Bank or indeed by other sources of credit because it lacks rupiahs to fund the domestic costs. This is the result of the sharp fall in state revenue, forcing a drastic cutback in the level of government investment, as envisaged in the budget announced last January. Efforts to convince Japan to provide this special loan began in mid 1986. The loan agreement is expected to encourage other member-states of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia to provide more untied loans when it meets in The Hague on 17-18 June to consider the 1987 handout by western states to keep the Indonesian economy afloat.


These latest foreign loans will increase Indonesia's overall indebtedness by more than the amounts directly involved as they will bring into operation projects currently not being built, for which the foreign credit has been agreed in principle but not yet disbursed.

Embassy visits to Irian Jaya obstructed

The Japanese, Australian and Canadian embassies in Jakarta have all faced delays and difficulties in sending missions to Irian Jaya (West Papua). UPI [19 February] reported that diplomats expressed "surprise and anger" at an apparent clampdown on travel to the province. "Maybe they're getting nervous with the election coming up," one diplomat said.

The IGGI and Indonesia's poor

By our special correspondent in Jakarta.



Unemployed workers from Cakung-Cilincing waiting for trucks to dump garbage. They try to make a living from recycling garbage from local factories. [Jakarta Post, 17 March 1987] This is the very location of the report from our special correspondent.

As I write, Piet Bukman, the chairman of the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia) has just met our economic affairs ministers. He met Mr President too who told him a lot though we can be sure he heard nothing about the hardships of Indonesians impoverished by all the corruption. Nor will he have heard stories such as I will tell you because the IGGI exists to help those in power, not the common people.

Government leaders in the advanced countries pose as champions of human rights, yet they preserve regimes that trample human rights underfoot as long as their economic and political interests are protected. Mr Bukman visited IGGI and Dutch projects, and left Indonesia feeling satisfied because the government has stuck by its resolve not to have a deficit budget even though the debt-service ratio now stands at 33.2 per cent. Even though Indonesia must repay Rp 6,800 trillion in the current financial year, the government will not seek any rescheduling of these repayments. Foreign credit has become the decisive factor for Indonesian development, such is the IGGI's success in creating a generation of debtors, a generation whose fate is now at the mercy of the IGGI and similar institutions.

History shows that powerless people who kneel before their colonisers can rise in anger once their innermost feelings explode. The advanced countries must share responsibility for creating this sense of outrage and revenge, for failing to heed the feelings of the people. They are seriously mistaken to regard our parliament (the DPR) as the voice of the Indonesian people. When the President told the DPR on 7 January that the pay of government employees would not go up, the Members actually applauded. Does this represent the views of government employees?

The western powers are making a serious mistake to regard the dozens of clandestine communist groups, the

hundreds of clandestine Muslim and patriotic nationalist groups now in existence as being of no consequence. Only recently, the commander of Kopkamtib, the security forces, admitted that nine tons of books and documents were confiscated in 1986, but what he didn't say was how much more was not confiscated.

Finding alternatives

Despite all the boasts of the government about its development programme and despite the mounting debts, unemployment has worsened, purchasing power has fallen, industry and agriculture have been hit hard and people are being laid off.

In early 1986, hundreds of workers on the Jakarta Industrial Estate Pulogadung (JIEP) were sacked. Two hundred of them live in a kampung near the estate. Living so close together, they shared each others' hardships.

No-one had any savings or anything valuable to sell. Most were casual workers and had received no severance pay. So, what next? The kampung got grubbier, the children got hungrier and many fell ill though their parents could not afford to buy medicine.

When their efforts to find other jobs failed, the two hundred sacked JIEP workers remembered that they used to have to shift garbage from the factories on the estate to dumps nearby. A lot of this garbage was still usable; cardboard, plastic sheets, pieces of aluminium, steel pipes and, last but not least, empty lubricating oil drums. These piles of garbage gave them new hope. Here was something they could do together, sharing the same fate, creating a new livelihood.

Fighting for control

The garbage had been piling up for years. A dozen or so workers had started making a living collecting the garbage but they were few in number so no-one paid much attention. But when two hundred people became involved, things got very lively. As they started collecting and cleaning up hundreds of empty lubricating oil drums and selling the dregs as fuel, their incomes soared. They were each able to earn as much as Rp 5,000 a day, or about \$3.00, much more than they earned as factory workers.

Gradually, conditions in the kampung improved, children started playing again, the smell of cooking spices filled the air and pots were boiling on the cooking stoves. After months of desperation, there was an atmosphere of hope. The piles of garbage would last for at least another six months.

But, as the proverb says, where there are ants, there must be sugar. A local businessman, an Indonesian citizen of Chinese extraction, who had been buying the re-cycled fuel from the kampung people and paying them about Rp 1,500,000 a day for it began to think: Why can't I handle the fuel myself? So, he worked out a strategy. First, he cut down the amount he bought, then he pushed the price down. His next step was to get the collaboration of the local military command, the Koramil.

Along came the Koramil with all kinds of pretexts and took control of the removal of the garbage. People were ordered to stop taking rubbish in or out, in particular oil. At first, some of them tried to sneak in but the Koramil took firm action, terrorising the people. Some were arrested and accused as the ones responsible, or accused of holding illegal meetings, or predictably, accused of being communist remnants.

In the end, the Koramil's real purpose became clear. The people were told they could collect the oil but only on condition that they sold it to a trader approved by the army and at a price fixed by the buyer. At first, these conditions were rejected but the people were powerless and their need for a living desperate. They turned to the local pastor for help. The church was upset anyway because many of its members are Chinese-born citizens. The people in the kampung vented their fury on the Chinese businessman, not on the Koramil who, they believed, had just been used as a tool.

Politics enters the scene

The church became more agitated when it was discovered that one of the people involved in resisting the Chinese businessman was from a group that had been involved in the Cicendo incident in Bandung when Muslims attacked a police station in March 1983. The local military commander soon got wind of this but before he could set his troops on the man's trail, he fled and went into hiding, taking with him several of the former factory workers who had never done anything political but were now political fugitives. And the church became involved in looking after the families of the men now in hiding.

In such a sequence of events - lay-offs caused by the recession, people trying to make a living from re-cycled garbage and ending up as political fugitives - who is to blame?

The events in Cakung-Cilincing are instructive. They show how ordinary people became militant activists simply because they did something to make a living. And the whole thing started not because of any subversive groups getting involved but because a corrupt businessman created the conditions for organised resistance. People are not really interested in whether corrupt government

ECONOMICS

officials are the favoured sons of someone or other, or the pure creatures of capitalism. People will find a million and one ways to stand up to a corrupt government, starting from small, silent, sporadic deeds. There is nothing unusual about that.

Living conditions in Indonesia will not get better in 1987/88 even if the IGGI provides more credit. The people's movement will grow in step with the worsening national economy as the 1980s draw to a close. This is a decisive decade for the Suharto regime.

1 March 1987

New IGGI chairman visits Indonesia

Piet Bukman, the new Dutch minister for Development Aid, made his first visit to Indonesia at the end of February. In this ministerial post, he automatically becomes chairman of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, the international aid consortium which meets annually to decide how much multilateral and bilateral aid will be allocated to Indonesia.


Bukman was formerly chairman of the CDA, the party of the Christian Democrats, now the leading party in Holland's coalition government. He has a reputation as an extreme rightwing politician and had no connections with or interest in Third World affairs until he became development minister a few months ago. His inexperience might explain why he moved cautiously during his visit, unlike his predecessor, the high profile Mrs Schoo.

Before leaving Holland, Bukman made it clear that human rights and the East Timor question were not on his agenda. For the past few years, Dutch governments have rigidly refused to make any connection between foreign aid and human rights, particularly as regards Indonesia.

Although he gave no hint of whether the IGGI would this year grant Indonesia as much as it did last year, just over \$2,500 million, he made it clear that he would press other IGGI members to allow more of their aid to be converted into rupiahs, to help with the domestic funding of projects. He also stressed that the IGGI would support the Indonesian economy as long as necessary.

He announced that Dutch aid to Indonesia this year would increase to Nfl 232 million (\$113.2 million) from Nfl 179 million, an increase of over 35 per cent.

The leading member of the IGGI is the World Bank which provides the framework for decisions each year. The member states are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the USA. Finland attends IGGI meetings as an observer.



426 pages
Price: £10.00 plus P & P
P & P UK, £1.00

Europe and world,
surface, £1.50

Airmail £4.50

The screw tightens on hundreds of organisations

In June this year, the authoritarian and repressive provisions of the Societies Law enacted in June 1985 come into force, giving the government unlimited powers to suspend and ban organisations for threatening national security or for committing numerous other political offences.

The Societies Law was one of five political laws pushed through parliament in 1985 making it obligatory for all political parties and social organisations to adopt the state ideology of Pancasila as their sole ideology and abandon all other principles. Up till now, the main emphasis of the regime has been on bringing the political parties into line and stage-managing the 1987 general elections under the new political rules. Once the elections are out of the way, attention will be directed towards enforcing complete compliance by all other organisations. It is certain that many organisations such as legal aid institutes and environmental groups will find themselves under extreme government scrutiny and control.

The Societies Law provided for a transitional period of two years during which all organisations were required to comply with the provisions of the Law. That period expires on 7 June 1987. In preparation for the new phase of social control, the government last year issued its implementary regulation for the 1985 Societies Law.

The Law applies to literally every kind of organisation: political parties and organisations formally associated with them (such formal associations will no longer be allowed), sectional organisations like trade unions and women's organisations, professional organisations of doctors, lawyers, engineers and the like, single-issue organisations concerned with the environment, population, legal justice and so on, and cultural and recreational organisations.

Regimenting social organisations

We summarise below the most important provisions of Implementary Regulation No 18, April 1986, based on the full text reproduced in *Indonesia Reports - Political Supplement*, No 20, February 1987:

- * All organisations must report their existence to the government. (Article 2).
- * All organisations are required by law to have statutes and to include Pancasila as their sole principle. It is impermissible to include other terms such as basis, foundation, basic orientation or other words obscuring the sense of this principle. (Article 3).
- * All organisations are obliged to "do their utmost" to make members undergo Pancasila indoctrination courses known as P4. They must also preserve national unity by putting national interests above individual and group interests. (Article 6)
- * The arrangements of organisations, their signboards and symbols are all subject to regulation by the Minister of the Interior. (Articles 10 and 11)
- * All financial and other kinds of help from abroad must have government permission. (Articles 12, 18 and 20)
- * Organisations may not give aid to foreign parties which



Home Affairs Minister, General Supardjo Rustam, in Parliament after the Societies Law was passed. [Tempo, 8 June 1985]

is harmful to national interests. (Articles 18 and 21)

- * The government shall undertake guidance of all organisations in the form of "counselling" (this includes giving proposals, guidelines, direction, advice, education and so on) and "safeguarding" by means of protecting an organisation's right in accordance with the laws and regulations.
- * Organisations will be required to become part of a single "vehicle for guidance", in other words to fuse or merge with other organisations of the same sort so as, in the words of the Elucidation to the original Law, "to facilitate matters for the government in providing counselling etc". (Article 14)
- * "General guidance" is conducted by the Minister of the Interior while "technical guidance" is undertaken by ministers or other government officials responsible for the field of activity in which the organisation is engaged. (Articles 15 and 16)

Suspension and dissolution

- * Organisations which disturb security and public order and/or accept help from abroad without government

approval or give aid to foreign parties, are liable to be suspended. "Disturbing security and public order" includes undermining national unity, discrediting the government, obstructing development, and any other activities that disturb political stability. (Article 19)

* If the organisation persists, it will be liable to dissolution. (Articles 25 and 26) Organisations spreading Marxism and other ideologies and teachings contrary to Pancasila will be dissolved. (Article 27) After dissolution, the organisation will be declared a banned organisation.

* All existing organisations must bring themselves into line with the Law by 7 June 1987. If they fail to do so, they will be dissolved. (Article 28)

*

The Implementary Regulation makes no provision for organisations to appeal against arbitrary suspension or dissolution by a minister. The only "concession" made by the executive when the original bill was under discussion in 1985 was that before going ahead with a decision to suspend or dissolve, the opinion of the Supreme Court or other authoritative agencies may be sought.

Legal Aid Institute criticisms

In its testimony submitted to parliament in 1985 when the societies bill was still under discussion, the Indonesian Legal Aid Institutes Foundation (YLBHI) bitterly criticised the new law, decribing it as a move towards regimentation. [The text of the testimony was published in *Indonesia Reports - Human Rights Supplement*, No. 20, February 1987.] It foresaw that the implementary regulation would extinguish the freedom and creativity of social organisations, leading them to carry out self-censorship to avoid being banned.

[Needless to say, this has already happened. Legal aid institutes are already far less disposed to taking actions or making statements which can be interpreted as "political". Likewise, environmentalist organisations have shown great circumspection in becoming publicly involved, for instance, in the widespread criticism of the government's transmigration programme.]

The YLBHI characterised the law as "the expansion of government authority ... to nullify the right to exist of social organisations regarded as threatening the existing socio-political order or acting to spread ideologies other than the dominant one".

It attacks in particular the government's insistence on controlling all assistance from abroad. "It should suffice to require a public financial report audited by an accountant." If government permission is required, this means "that social ... organisations will be increasingly strongly suspected, controlled and supervised. And this could be the beginning of the extinguishing of our freedom and creativity".



International lawyers refused entry

An international mission of lawyers appointed by the Paris-based International League for Human Rights to investigate the situation of Indonesian political prisoners, in particular those now under death sentence, was refused visas by the Indonesian government at the last moment. The decision to send the mission had been prompted by the executions of political prisoners in Indonesia in 1985 and 1986.

The mission was to have included the League's general-secretary, Etienne Jaudel, a British lawyer, David Hallmark, Professor Chamari of the University of Tunis and an Australian lawyer.

Initially, M. Etienne Jaudel was granted a visa to visit Indonesia for the purposes of the mission by the Indonesian embassy in Paris. The mission was to have left for Indonesia on 7 January but David Hallmark was refused a visa. When M. Jaudel wrote to the embassy saying the date was being postponed because other members had been refused visas, he was told that he too would not now be permitted to go ahead with the mission. The embassy accused the League of wanting "to engage in unfriendly activity or to interfere in (Indonesia's) internal affairs".

In reply, M. Jaudel said the mission "would have listened objectively to the arguments the Indonesian government would have put forward in justification for continuing to execute detainees more than twenty years after they had been condemned by special courts".

Violating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

In a press statement issued in Paris on 20 January, the International League noted that "several dozen people are at present detained in Indonesia who are former members of the Indonesian Communist Party and who were condemned to death by military tribunals in circumstances that appear to contravene the right to a fair trial as recognised in Articles 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights". It said that "carrying out death sentences more than twenty years after they were pronounced amounts to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment prohibited under Article 7 of the Declaration".

It called on the United Nations, the Council of Europe and UNESCO with which it has consultative status "to warn General Suharto's government of the political and moral damage which could result from further executions of political prisoners in such abnormal circumstances". It urged them to intercede in favour of a comprehensive amnesty for all those who continue to be detained because of the 1965 events, and in favour of the abrogation of the special laws applied since that date, before the general elections which are due to take place next April".

The International League for Human Rights was set up at the beginning of the century in response to the notorious Dreyfus case in France and has established a reputation for sending impartial missions to observe political trials and examine judicial handling of political cases in a number of countries.



More usroh sentences in Central Java

Following accusations by the former military commander of Central Java, Major General (now Lieutenant-General) Hartas Harsudiono, that usroh activities had spread to the north of the province, the mosques in the harbour city of Semarang have been under close surveillance by the security forces.

The usroh movement is a grassroots Muslim movement centred in the south of Central Java. It advocates a return to piety and organises its adherents in small, home-based groups. [For an assessment of the movement, see TAPOL Bulletin, No 79, February 1987]

Meanwhile trials of alleged usroh activists have continued in many Central Java towns. From the sketchy reports appearing in the regional press, it appears that the trials continue to attract large crowds. Since January 1987, trials have been under way in Magelang, Banyumas, Karanganyar, Bantul, Brebes and Jogjakarta.

In many of the trials, the prosecution has called witnesses who are themselves under detention and are clearly sympathetic to the defence. This could mean that more trials will follow, but it could also mean that one person is being tried to set an example and to prove the regime's political charges against usroh.

Five-year sentence in Bantul

Suyud, 25 years, an employee of the Public Works Department (identified initially as Sy bin R), got five years for sermons in June and July 1985 criticising the government's programme and calling for the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution to be replaced by the Quran and the Hadith, the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. The defendant was accused of opposing the family planning programme and the involvement of male doctors in administering contraceptives.

Another charge was that he possessed copies of banned publications like *Al-Ikhwān* (a Jogjakarta publication whose editor is now serving a 13-year sentence) and *Al-Furqan*. [This is the first time there has been any mention of the latter publication. The name means the "dividing-line between right and wrong"] *Al-Ikhwān* was banned by the Attorney General in May 1985.

The prosecution had demanded a sentence of 15 years and is likely to appeal against the court's 'lenient' verdict. A number of witnesses at this trial could well face indictment soon. [Kedaulatan Rakyat, 5, 8 January and 26 February, and Kompas, 28 February]

Karanganyar and Jogjakarta

Budiman al Solihin, 29 years, who works in a bicycle repair shop, was sentenced to 4 years at the Karanganyar district court on 31 January for attending an usroh course at the Al-Imron mosque in Kale village, Tasikmadu. Since many witnesses in the trial appeared to be in sympathy with the accused, it is likely that more trials will follow [Suara Merdeka, 27 January and 2 March].

Margono bin Syafei, 47, a tailor from the village of Janturan, Umbulharjo, near Jogjakarta, was sentenced to three years in late January. He was accused of distributing copies of *Al-Ikhwān* and of membership of the usroh movement. The court decided that Margono's involvement in usroh was unproven, but distribution of a banned publication alone warranted keeping him behind bars for three years [Kedaulatan Rakyat, 30 January and Kompas, 31 January].

M. Subarin Syakur, a 27-year old university student from Gambiran, also in Umbulharjo, was sentenced to no less than eight years in the Jogjakarta district court for subversion connected with usroh activities. He allegedly organised 'training sessions' for groups of fifty people at various mosques in Jogjakarta and religious schools in Klaten. Copies of *Al-Ikhwān* were found in his possession.

He refused to accept the services of a lawyer and told the court his sermons had been concerned solely with the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. Witnesses confirmed this but the court nevertheless gave him one of the harshest sentences passed against usroh defendants [Suara Merdeka, 22 January].

Brebes and Banyumas

Several Brebes trials are under way, as reported in TAPOL Bulletin No 79 and sentences were expected in mid March. The prosecutor has asked for 15-year sentences against three defendants, Abdullah Somari, 27, 'G', 21, and 'R', 23. All were said to have recruited people to attend usroh training sessions in Brebes.

Evidence in court suggested that usroh courses in Brebes were very well attended by high-school pupils. While some witnesses spoke badly of their sermons, others said they had only touched on various aspects of Islamic teachings concerning fasting, social welfare and so on.

Other trials in Brebes still only identify the defendants by their initials. One is A.R (referred to in our last Bulletin as A.G.). Three others on trial, not previously mentioned, are identified as I.J., W and U.

The court sessions have drawn such huge crowds of school pupils that the local education department has issued an order requiring pupils to obtain permission



Machmud Yusuf Ambari during his trial in Tasikmalaya. [Tempo, 31 January 1987]

from their head-teachers before attending trials. [Suara Merdeka, 5 and 30 January, and 3 March]

The first usroh trial in Banyumas is against M.Z., 25 years, a Gajah Mada University student from Sidamulya village in Banyumas. M.Z. is clearly very popular. Reports from the trial suggest that he gave unauthorised religious lessons to pupils of a nearby madrasah (Islamic school). Bored by their madrasah teachers, the pupils played truant so as to attend the much more interesting and colourful lessons given by M.Z.

A close colleague of M.Z. identified as Arif is said to be in hiding while two others, Fu, 21, and SIm, 23 who were have appeared as witnesses have "disappeared".

The large crowds attending his trial suggest that his incarceration has not diminished his attraction as a local figure.

A furious argument broke out in court between the defendant and two 'expert' witnesses from the Department of Religious Affairs. On 9 March, the prosecutor asked the court to pass a sentence of eighteen years. [Kedaulatan Rakyat, 7, 12, 25 and 26 February, and Kompas, 11 March.

Other Muslim trials

Achmad Zaini, 22, a shrimp trader and teacher of religion, was sentenced in January in the district court of Mungkid, near Magelang, Central Java, for displaying copies of *Ar-Risalah* and *Al-Ikhwān*. He was arrested after asking two of his pupils to display copies of the banned publications on a mosque notice-board. He told the court he received the publications from a friend in Jogjakarta and had no idea they were banned.

It is evident that the security forces treat these publications with the same severity as they treat Marxist publications.

Muslim preacher sentenced in West Java

Machmud Yusuf Ambari, 44, has been found guilty of subversion and sentenced to three-and-a-half years for sermons he gave in July and September 1984, calling on Muslims to have the courage to stand up to the government authorities and not accept any doctrines other than Islam. The defendant is a well-known local preacher and teacher of religion and formerly represented the ex-

MUSLIM TRIALS

Muslim party, the PPP, in the Garut assembly.

According to the indictment, the accused said in a sermon that Pancasila was deficient as a religious doctrine as it had no prophet of its own. He said Pancasila indoctrination courses should be stopped.

As with many preachers tried in Jakarta in the last two years, Machmud Yusuf's sermons were recorded by army spies. The prosecutor called seventeen witnesses to testify against him, most of them military police and civilian officials who had made cassettes of his sermons. The defendant said all his sermons had been duly licenced and supervised by the authorities. He was previously arrested in 1982 on charges connected with the 'Komando Jihad' but was later released for lack of evidence. [Tempo, 31 January, Pikiran Rakyat, 27 January and Kompas, 28 January]

Trials in Malang, East Java

Several verdicts have been passed against alleged members of an organisation said to be called Jamaah Mujahidin/Komando Jihad. This is a new name in the regime's lexicon of subversive threats. The existence of the Komando Jihad has never been convincingly proven so whether this new name is any more reliable remains to be seen.

In separate trials before the Malang district court, Mochammad Socheh, 25, and Imam Ismiarta, 26, were found guilty of subversion for wanting to replace Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Both defendants had been in detention for four years when their trials commenced, and were sentenced to five years each [Kompas, 28 January].

Socheh, a tailor, was charged with concealing a Komando Jihad member named A. Muchsar who is already serving a 10-year sentence. In earlier sessions of his trial, two witnesses appeared, both said to be from the Komando Jihad. One was Idris, already serving a 14-year sentence, and the other was Rasmin Ansori who is serving ten years. All these sentences were passed in 1979.

This is the first time these names have emerged and reveal that many more Muslim trials have occurred since the late 1970s than those included in TAPOL's monitoring.

Indonesia: Muslims on trial

Published by: TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign


Since early 1985, more than 150 Muslims have been tried, convicted and sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment in Indonesia for giving public sermons critical of the government, conducting religious courses not approved by the authorities, or producing leaflets or journals that denounce government policy. Some were held responsible for bombing incidents that were never properly investigated.

The trials followed the army's crackdown on a demonstration of Muslims in September 1984. Dozens, possibly even hundreds, were killed when troops opened fire on the unarmed crowd. The trials took place at a time of deep disquiet in Indonesia about the military government's imposition of total ideological conformity, preventing organisations from proclaiming Islamic or other religious principles.

Indonesia: Muslims on trial analyses the trials, placing them in the context of the continuing conflict between Indonesia's Muslims and the military regime.

"The first genuine attempt in the West to focus on the oppression of Muslims in a state that is more than 90 per cent Muslim, by a regime committed to establishing Western norms and values. The conflict between the political culture of the Muslim masses and their rulers is brought out vividly in *Indonesia: Muslims on trial*. Although it focuses on events in Indonesia, this study will help one understand why Muslim nation states are inherently unstable and are invariably held together by oppression."

Dr. M. Ghayasuddin, Editor, MuslimeMedia



tapol

Publication date: April 1987
128 pp. £4.00 plus p & p.
ISBN 0 9506751 4 8

Disiplin nasional

A new term has entered the vocabulary of Indonesia's military regime - disiplin nasional. It was first coined by the leader himself, General Suharto, and was formally launched at an army seminar last August. Army seminars are infrequent and highly secretive affairs, where national political strategies are worked out and the nation's political agenda for the coming period is set.

From the very sketchy reports that emerged at the time, it is clear that the August 1986 seminar and the annual Armed Forces Leadership meeting held immediately afterwards decided that the only way to safeguard the regime's programme in a time of grave economic crisis was to create a culture of discipline. It was now time for the entire population to emulate the discipline required from all members of the armed forces.

The theme was taken up at a seminar convened in February this year by the Bandung Teachers Training College attended by educationalists, industrial relations specialists, psychologists and a number of senior army officers. In the words of General Benny Murdani, armed forces commander-in-chief, who gave the opening address, "the success of national development is vital to our survival as a nation, but without national discipline, that success cannot be assured". The seminar was asked to find ways to persuade Indonesians "to adopt a more disciplined way of life both in their professional occupations and in their daily lives" [Jakarta Post, 26 February].

Such language has a sinister ring to anyone familiar with the political culture nurtured by the national socialists in Germany and Italy. But in the case of Indonesia, it is more appropriate to refer to the deep and abiding impact of Japanese militarism on the Indonesian army during the Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945. It is no coincidence that the army has recently announced plans to publish a book to honour the tradition and history of Peta [Pembela Tanahair], Defenders of the Motherland, the militia created by the Japanese in 1943. Peta was the breeding ground of Indonesian militarism where most Indonesian generals at the helm of the New Order regime since 1965, including Suharto, gained their military and ideological training.

Flag ceremonies and push-ups

There has long been a tradition in offices and schools for ceremonies to be held at which the national flag is honoured, sometimes on the seventeenth day of each month or more often every Monday morning.

But it was the Rector of Riau University who had the novel idea of punishing a hundred members of staff for failing to attend the ceremony several times. They were required to take part in a run round the campus, watched by students and members of staff. "This will shame them into not repeating their mistake," said Professor Dr H. Muchtar Lufti. Now, we would not claim to know whether this rector is from the army or just an 'ordinary' civilian. Either way, the signs are ominous.

Indeed, some military commanders seem to be positively embarrassed by the "overkill" of zealous bureaucrats and school-heads. The military commander of Central Java actually complained that schools in the province are requiring their pupils to honour the national flag every time they enter and leave the classroom. Such practices,

he said, "could have a negative impact" [Sinar Harapan, 12 September].

From other parts of the country come reports that employees who turn up late for work or fail to attend the weekly flag-raising ceremonies are required to do push-ups and other forms of physical punishment.

No Pancasila certificates for ex-communists and prostitutes

The man in charge of Indonesia's programme of indoctrination has officially declared that prostitutes, convicts and former communist political prisoners are not fit to be issued with certificates confirming that they have successfully concluded a course in Pancasila.

General Sarwo Edhie won notoriety as the man who launched the first mass killings of communist suspects in Central Java in October 1965, and later as commander of the military and intelligence operation in West Papua in 1969 causing many casualties. Today, the general heads the state institute known as BP7 which is responsible for indoctrinating the population.

Under rules adopted in 1983, all citizens are required to attend Pancasila (P4) courses. The courses vary in intensity. People in the higher echelons must attend a two-week course and do a paper at the end in order to qualify for the certificate. The demands on 'commoners' are less arduous for they need only attend a 40-hour course. In the pyramid-shaped programme designed by Sarwo



A BP7 postcard advocates the good life, Pancasila-style. Above: With the nation, state, society and self-control. Below: Please no gamblers, prostitutes, robbers, drug addicts and drinkers.



General Sarwo Edhie, a model of Pancasila excellence.

Edhie, it is now the lower echelons who are the target.

But it recently came to the attention of this upright and crusading general that prostitutes who have taken P4 courses are displaying their certificates on their premises. In Semarang, 1,200 prostitutes have already received P4 certificates. Such things must not be allowed to continue, he told a P4 course of women from the official women's organisation, Dharma Wanita [Jakarta Post, 3 March]. This organisation had apparently thought it could contribute to the drive for ideological purity by encouraging prostitutes to "mend their ways" through Pancasila enlightenment.

The general used the occasion to re-affirm that two other categories of people must also be excluded from the new enlightenment - ex-communist prisoners and convicts. There must be a lot people who are secretly relieved at this welcome exclusion from the obligatory courses!

Restore campus democracy, says former minister

A former Minister for Religious Affairs, Dr. Mukti Ali, has called for the restoration of organisational and political rights on university campuses and for a reversal of the clampdown on student organisations launched in 1978 in response to the student protest movement of that year.

Dr Mukti Ali was Minister for Religious Affairs from 1971 to 1978, an unusually liberal-minded scholar to have been given a position by Suharto. He is from the Muhammadiyah and is now rector of the Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic College (IAIN) in Jogjakarta. In 1978, he was replaced as minister by General Alamsjah Prawiranegara.

He attacked both the NKK or Normalisation of Campus Life imposed by the government in 1978 and the SKS or Semester Credit System introduced later, which have together completely paralysed organised student activity on the campuses. "The time has come for student organisations to be revived so that students can speak. Students must not be silent because silence is obnoxious" [Kompas, 27 February 1987].

The NKK led to the dissolution of democratically elected student councils and placed all student bodies under the supervision and tutelage of the university rector. The SKS imposes rigid requirements on students' academic achievement making it virtually impossible for them to engage in any extra-mural activity.

Dr Mukti said some people are still afraid of allowing students to engage in politics. "Yet politics regulates us all and if we don't engage in politics, other will impose their politics on us."

Students forced to attend Golkar campus meetings

Dr Mukti's warning of politicking on the campuses could hardly have been better confirmed than by a tour of universities at around the same time by retired General Sudharmono, chairman of the government party, Golkar, as part of Golkar's election campaigning. [Although the campaigning period is not officially allowed to start until 24 March, Sudharmono has been touring the country for many months, drumming up support for his party.]


Despite the ban on political activity on campuses since 1978, Sudharmono's meetings took place without hindrance. In fact, attendance was obligatory [Tempo, 7 March 1987]. Although the 2,000 students at his meeting at Pajajaran University in Bandung are said to have cheered when he

boasted of Golkar's role in imposing Pancasila as the sole ideology, Tempo also reported that students at his meeting in Diponegoro University, Semarang challenged this intrusion of Golkar campaigning on their campus. The weekly did not give details of the complaints.

Golkar's General Secretary, Sarwono Kusumaatmaja, in response to Dr Mukti's call, said students must complete their studies before having anything to do with politics. Sarwono was himself in the forefront of student politics in the late 1960s on the side of the army's takeover of power. He said there was no question of student government on campus being restored, claiming that "even the most liberal country" would not buy the idea [Jakarta Post, 7 March].

HMI supports Mukti's call

The Muslim students organisation, HMI has supported the call for the revival of student organisations and attacked the institutionalised role of university rectors who now supervise all activities on campus. Although the



Tebak: Apanya yang sama?

Can you see in what way they are all alike? [Tempo, 7 March 1987]

HMI spoke about the need to re-establish democratic institutions on campus, neither they nor others who have welcomed Dr Mukti's statement have dared point out that the Societies Law blocks the re-emergence of democratic organisations not only on campus but throughout society.

Student demonstrations broken up

There are signs of a revival in student protest though the events reported in the press suggest that the incidents are localised and cannot be regarded as a protest movement.

A crowd of schoolpupils who had assembled to escort a delegation to the Department of Transportation in Jakarta to complain about the recent 33 per cent rise in bus fares was rounded up by troops and taken away for questioning. Three large posters were confiscated.

Meanwhile, in Serang, West Java, students at the Islamic Teachers' Training College (PGA) organised protests against a recent increase in school fees and the price they must pay for certificates issued on completion of courses in the state ideology. Jakarta Post reported on 21 February that 1,500 students protested in their classrooms, causing widespread damage. They then marched to the local police station to demand the release of the

chair and deputy-chair of their inter-school students union (OSIS) who were being held by the police.

Army troops were called in and used watercanon to disperse the demonstrators. According to the paper, a student was wounded in the head by a bayonet.

Four students at the Sarjana Wiyata Taman Siswa University in Jogjakarta have been dismissed and eight others suspended following a dispute with the college directors over school fees and the philosophical direction of the college. The local army command alleges that the students were engaged in "subversive activities" while the college authorities accused the four dismissed students to trying to burn down the campus [Jakarta Post, 18 October 1987].

Central Java threatened by liberalism

Major-General Setiyana, the commander of Central Java's Diponegoro Division has meanwhile complained that intellectuals in the province "have been infiltrated by liberalism". The commander warned that intellectuals are clandestinely promoting liberalism in towns like Solo, Jogjakarta, Salatiga, Semarang and Purwokerto and spreading the evil to small towns and even to villages [Jakarta Post, 14 March 1987].

As usual, Setiyana had a lot to say about "left extremism" and "right extremism", the code for Muslim activism. He apparently regards liberalism as the "extremism of the centre".

The rights of ex-tapols

As the general elections draw nearer, former political prisoners who were held as communist suspects can expect to be the object of continued attention. Whether it is for something they are allowed to do or something they are forbidden to do, the overall effect is the same - to remind the public at large of this ever-present threat to the security of the nation.

Over 40,000 ex prisoners disenfranchised


Since 1985, the regime has said it was checking all former communist political prisoners (tapols) to decide who will be allowed to vote and who not. Regional governments have often released figures of the alleged number of ex-tapols in their area, again with the effect of keeping the "communist presence" on people's minds.

The regime has now announced the final figures which are based, or so it is claimed, on a screening test conducted on 1 May last year. There are now said to be 1,410,333 former political detainees in three categories.

Category A, (tried and convicted)	426
Category B, (detainees under strong suspicion)	34,587
Category C, (the least suspect detainees)	1,375,320

Of these people, 40,103 "failed the screening" and are forbidden to vote. [Merdeka, 20 February]

Even those who "passed the screening" are not entirely free, as social and political affairs chief in Central Java reminds us, for they are not allowed to be nominated as candidates. Moreover during the heightened excitement of the pre-election period, the security authorities will keep an extra close watch on all 300,000 ex tapols in the province. Those who are disenfranchised will not be



"Tell me, my man, have you got a 'political cleanliness certificate'?"

allowed to attend any public meetings at all [Kedaulatan Rakyat, 10 March]

Going on pilgrimage to Mecca

Early in February, it was officially announced that some former PKI political prisoners will now be allowed to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. This special concession excludes anyone in the A and B categories, and even those covered by the new dispensation will have to obtain a special permit from their local military commander [Surabaya Pos, 18 February].

Until recently, ex tapols were officially banned from transmigrating out of Java though many Javanese prisoners



who were exiled to the outer islands in the late 1960s, notably to Buru and Kalimantan, were prevailed on not to return to Java after their release, thus becoming some of the earliest transmigrants to these areas.

But last year the ban turned out to be an obstacle to official policy towards people whose land was being seized for government projects. Whereas the dispossessed families were told that transmigration was their only option, ex-tapol families living on the land were protected from the policy of compulsory transmigration.

A solution has now been conjured up in the form of a decision lifting the ban on transmigration for ex-tapols. The new dispensation is not however really a change in policy. Although it has been announced that ex-tapols of all three categories "may now be transmigrated" [the wording in Indonesian means that transmigration is not the active choice of the families in question], the chief of social and political affairs of the Central Java provincial government made it clear that "this is meant especially for those affected by projects. For those not so affected, it is better that they do not transmigrate" [Suara Merdeka, 11 December 1986].

Indonesian student in West Berlin loses passport

Pipit Rochijat Kartawidjaja, an Indonesian who has been studying in West Berlin for several years, has been deprived of his Indonesian passport. The Indonesian Consulate has given him instead a non-renewable 6-month "document in lieu of passport" valid only for West Berlin and Jakarta. This means he will have to return home to face certain persecution or seek political asylum.

This follows an outspoken interview of Pipit on German television during a programme last October on "The price of New Order stability". Two days before the programme, Pipit was instructed by the Indonesian Consul who happens to be his wife's uncle not to speak during the programme about instability in Indonesia but to say that there was no opposition in Indonesia, only dissidents.

However, in front of the camera, Pipit declared that stability in Indonesia was illusory. He pointed at the Consul who was also appearing in the programme and repeated the instruction he been given two days earlier. The effect was electrifying and caused consternation

Official warnings of "extreme right-left" alliance

The chief public prosecutor in Central Java, Soebardono, has warned that "ex PKI members" who escaped arrest in the 1960s are now conducting "high level operations" and are linking up with "extreme right" forces. Uncoded, this means he is warning that Muslim activists in the usroh movement (see separate item) are attracting people of many political persuasions in areas that were formerly PKI strongholds, in the southern regions of Central Java. He said there was even (shudder the thought!) a former member of Pemuda Rakyat, the PKI youth organisation, who was now a "very powerful and daring" Muslim preacher.

He claimed that the danger of a communist resurgence comes not from the 300,000 ex-tapols in the province who are under constant surveillance but from those who were never caught. There were "large numbers of them" who had shown themselves to be skilled at disguising their identities and "winning the confidence of the community", making it impossible for the authorities to ferret them out, he complained [Kedaulatan Rakyat Minggu, 8 March].

Statements like this could merely be part of the regime's pre-election anti-communist frenzy, but the flood of warnings being made by a variety of provincial officials does suggest that the political situation in Central Java is far from satisfactory for the regime.

Gerwani members arrested

A woman identified only as 'Mrs Har', said to be a former Gerwani member, was arrested along with her three daughters in Tanjung Priok on 14 February. Gerwani was the leftwing women's organisation that was banned in 1965.

The woman allegedly had "concealed her true identity by becoming a newspaper seller" and setting up an agency to handle newspaper distribution. The daughters were also allegedly members of the same 'banned organisation'.

The report of her arrest says that the authorities had been trying "for decades" to find 'Mrs Har' and her husband who has not yet been caught [Berita Buana, 16 February].

A month earlier, the local military command in Metro, Central Lampung announced that they were carrying out "intensive interrogations" of a woman said to be a Gerwani member. She had allegedly "inveigled herself" into the civil service and had only been discovered after a new system of screening government employees had been introduced [Surabaya Pos, 17 January 1987].

among the four Indonesian officials who had turned up to put the government's point of view.

Pipit explains in a letter to TAPOL that the Consulate had earlier tried to persuade the television company, WDR, not to include him in the programme.

Two other Indonesian students, I Gusti Nyoman Aryana and Paul Bambang, are suffering restrictions by the same Consulate and have been given passports needing renewal every six months. A similar restriction was placed on Pipit in 1983.




How faith-healer Mbah Suro was crushed

In March 1967, the army cracked down on a movement in Java led by the popular and widely-respected faith-healer (dukun), Mbah Suro. The movement had allegedly become a safe haven for army deserters and communist suspects at a time when the populations of Central and East Java were still stunned by the post 1965 massacres which killed hundreds of thousands of people. It was also a time when army units in both provinces were being drastically

purged of suspected communist sympathisers.

Hardly anything has been published about the operation, but on 6 March this year, Kompas gave an account of what happened. Although it relies partly on the official version of the affair and uses army rhetoric, it is a revealing document and is reproduced below in slightly abridged form.

* * * * *



heard, not from the attacking forces but from the recalcitrants [this is an awkward word in English but it seems to be the best rendering of *pembangkok*, used throughout the article, Ed. TAPOL] who were apparently in a state of readiness up in the hills, concealed by the dense forest. In a flash, fighting broke out in an isolated hamlet on the bank of the river Solo.

* * * * *

The operation was soon to become history. On 5 March 1967, Operasi Kamtib freed Nginggil Village in Menden sub-district, Blora District from the control of Mbah Suro's followers. By the time the sun rolled over to the west at 5.00 pm, the often postponed clean-up operations were declared to be over. The attacking forces lost three men with five wounded. Mbah Suro's personal guards, Banteng Ulung and Banteng Sarinah, lost about a hundred killed, seven wounded and no fewer than 2,000 arrested. Mbah Suro who was said by his followers to be immune was among those shot dead. It would have been difficult for him to escape because of the army's effective encirclement of the target area. Of the casualties among the recalcitrants, only six of the dead and four of the wounded were local people, proving that Mbah Suro's deviationist teachings had attracted followers from far afield.

Besides putting the recalcitrants out of action, the security forces captured a Vickers pistol, two brenguns, three Chung rifles, an AK-47 automatic, a stengun and a colt pistol. They burned down 117 homes where recalcitrants had taken refuge... To prevent the spread of disease from bodies left lying about, health workers went to Nginggil two days later to vaccinate the population.

On 6 March, at 10.00 am, those of the detainees who were not directly involved in Mbah Suro's adventurism were released. The rest were taken to Korem 073/Salatiga to answer for their deeds. On 8 March, the government appointed Ngasiman of the Menden police force as acting village chief of Nginggil. On 8 April, Major Srinardi, the commander of Operasi Kamtib, was appointed district head of Blora. The Nginggil affair was declared to be over and security re-established.

* * * * *

Twenty years on, it is interesting to read about the crackdown on Mbah Suro and his followers.

"It was a major event in local history and needs to be studied more," said Professor Dr Ibrahim Alfian, Dean of the Faculty of Letters at Gajah Mada University (UGM). In 1980, Heru Pramono Soewardi, a student at UGM, wrote a master's thesis entitled, "The Nginggil faith-healing movement of Mbah Suro, and its causes".

"He did an admirable job collecting data," said Professor Dr Sartono Kartodirdjo, chairman of his thesis

A thick mist hung over the river Solo. The damp morning air at the height of the rainy season made the atmosphere still and heavy. The sun had not yet appeared, making this mountainous teak-forest region located on the border of Central and East Java seem stiller than usual.

But in the silence, troops who had gather two days earlier in Blora, the district capital, moved stealthily towards their target. A company from Battalion 409 and a platoon from Battalion 408, both of the Diponegoro Division, cut the target off from the river Solo approach to the east. A company from Battalion 410 moved in from the north and south, pincering the area. A company of RPKAD (now Kopassus) para-commandos who were to spearhead the attack, kept watch over the target from the west.

These activities had the support of territorial troops from Kodim 0805/Ngawi, in charge of security in the targetted hamlets from the direction of Ngawi district in East Java, while troops from Kodim 0813/Bondonegoro kept watch over all the roads into the region from the east. In addition, fifty forestry officials had been mobilised to assist the operation, as guides for the troops, as couriers and to prepare clearings for helicopters. They also had the task of providing coffins and a public kitchen, to assist the smooth running of the operation.

Major Srinardi, commander of Kodim 0721/Blora, who was in charge of the operation codenamed Operasi Kamtib (Operation Security), had ordered the attack to commence at 5.00 am. It was still dark when all the troops under his command were in place. As the moment for the attack drew near, he left Blora travelling in the direction of the target, together with the RPKAD team commander, Major Kosasih and Major Untung Sridadi, commander of Battalion 410. Brigadier-General Widodo, commander of the VIIth/Diponegoro Division was meanwhile monitoring the operation from Randublatung in the south.

Fifteen minutes before the order to attack, gunfire was

supervisory team.... His only criticism was that Heru Pramono Soewardi did not explained why the government launched Operasi Kamtib against Nginggil. What was it that prompted such a harsh response?

A following of half a million

According to a report of the Blora Public Prosecutor's Office of 6 July 1966, Mbah Suro had a following of half a million people. Explaining why he had so many followers, Sartono said: "In times of upheaval like that, leaders who promise protection, immunity and a feeling of safety will be seen as a 'social umbrella' for groups in deep distress. They await the advent of someone who can take the lead."

The authorities launched this security operation because they could not risk letting the movement survive, further threatening the pillars of society, "especially because PKI and Old Order followers could have used Mbah Suro's spiritual movement for the purposes of regrouping."

* * * * *

Mbah Suro was born on 17 March 1921, named Moeljono, and changed his name to Suro after marrying Sulipah.... He was the grandson of the founder of the village of Nginggil and became an acknowledged speaker and a healer who used traditional methods. In the early 1950s, he was elected Nginggil village chief and in mid 1952, he declared himself a dukun, or faith-healer.

His popularity grew around 1959. Many people came to him for treatment and advice. They were willing to endure the difficult journey to Nginggil (in Javanese nginggil means 'upper')... which is very isolated. To reach the village from any direction, visitors had to go on foot for more than five kilometres through thick forest and up limestone hills.

He practised so successfully as a faith-healer that on 24 April 1962, he resigned as village head... and became simply Mbah Suro. His very isolated settlement was thrown into turmoil after the defeat of the PKI in 1965. More and more people who had been plunged into deep spiritual confusion were drawn to Nginggil. They included not only ordinary villagers coming to pay their respects to Mbah Suro but deserters from certain [army] units as well as PKI survivors. The isolation reinforced the violent nature of people's feelings. In early February 1967, they formed two units, Banteng Ulung and Banteng Sarinah (for women). They wore black from head to toe, and had a flag,

THE 1967 MASSACRE



One of Mbah Suro's followers. [Kompas 6 March 1987]

a fighting march, firearms and sharp implements.

Their recalcitrance intensified. Four people who entered Mbah Suro territory without permission looking for wood were killed. When Mbah Suro was summoned to Blora by the authorities for questioning, he ignored the summons. An instruction issued by the military commander of Central Java on 22 October 1966 ordering his faith-healing practice to close was ignored. In August that year, the East Java provincial military commander banned his troops from visiting Nginggil but this was frequently disregarded. In the end therefore, Operasi Kamtib was launched in order to stamp out these recalcitrants.

Whatever the justification, such recalcitrance could not be allowed to continue. The adventurism of Mbah Suro and his many followers quickly became a thing of the past....

Ikadin and Supreme Court warn Buyung

The noted human rights lawyer, Adnan Buyung Nasution has been given a strong reprimand by the lawyers' association Ikadin and (retired) General Ali Said, chairman of the Supreme Court. This follows earlier charges that he was in contempt of court for interrupting a judge who was reading out the verdict against H.R. Dharsono in January 1986. Buyung rejected the charge that the defence lawyers behaved unethically during Dharsono's trial. [See TAPOL Bulletins 74 and 75, March and May 1986 for details.]

General Ali Said's decision was less severe than the punishment suggested earlier by the Jakarta District Court which first wanted Buyung dismissed then later asked that he be suspended from practising for six months. However, the long-drawn-out public accusations against Buyung have already destroyed his law practice. Many clients and partners have withdrawn from any association with such a controversial figure.

Buyung expressed deep disappointment at the failure of

fellow lawyers to defend him. "I protested in court to defend the position of barristers but Ikadin has judged me purely according to the code of ethics. Their narrow-minded approach ignored the political ramifications of the case."

The final verdict in Buyung's case rests with the Minister of Justice who is in no hurry to decide. He intends to issue an administrative decision on Buyung's future as a practising lawyer. Buyung has protested that lawyers are not government employees and cannot therefore be subject to administrative penalties by a government department. A new law on the courts enacted in 1986 gives the Justice Minister powers to take punitive action against lawyers; the Justice Minister and the Supreme Court chairman are shortly to issue a joint decree on how these powers will be enforced. [Tempo, 14 February]

Buyung recently returned to Holland to complete his doctoral thesis and will remain there till December 1987.

Election Special III

Final preparations are now under way for the general elections on 23 April. Various generals in the armed forces and in the bureaucracy responsible for controlling Indonesia's 'festival of democracy' appear daily in the press with guidelines or assessments of the political position of the three 'contestants'. While they assert that the 1987 elections "will be better than" the 1982 elections because all 'contestants' now accept the same ideology, their statements also reflect a nervousness that things could still go wrong.

The central message from the armed forces is that the three parties, the Golkar, the PDI and the PPP, must abide by the laws and regulations. Campaigning may not commence until 24 March (though Golkar chairman, retired General Sudharmono, has been addressing Golkar meetings all over the country for months), and must end one week before polling day. During the so-called 'quiet period' which will last for a week before and a week after polling day, all public meetings, seminars and gatherings will be banned.

Armed Forces commander-in-chief, General Benny Murdani, continually emphasises that the three parties should refrain from holding mass rallies as they are difficult to control and might create security problems. His favourite formulation is that elections are a routine affair and political agitation must be ruled out.

Armed forces statements regarding security seem to have been carefully orchestrated, with generals at the centre exuded confidence while those in the regions issue dire warnings. Army chief-of-staff General Try Sutrisno gives the impression that overall security is good and there are no signs of activity aimed at foiling the elections. But Major-General Setiana, commander of the Diponegoro Division in Central Java, has warned of efforts "by the extreme left and the extreme right" to foil the election. He even asserted that "PKI leaders have infiltrated everywhere", with "everywhere" even included the armed forces [Kompas, 6 March]. As his statement came on the day the Soviet Foreign Minister, Shevardnadze arrived in Indonesia for an official visit, the message may have had another purpose. The East Java commander, Major-General Saiful Sulun, also warned of security threats from people advocating alternative political concepts [Kompas, 10 March].

Can Golkar's 'victory' be too big?

Armed forces spokesmen continue to insist that, unlike previous elections, the armed forces will not this time favour any of the three parties. Initially Golkar set itself a target of 70 per cent but more recently this was scaled down to 60 per cent so as to appear less greedy. The other two 'contestants' are modest enough not to set themselves targets.

General Murdani who seems worried that a landslide for Golkar could strengthen the hand of his arch-rival, Golkar's chairman, General Sudharmono, often warns that a huge victory for one of the parties (read Golkar) will be unfavourable for the New Order.

Jakarta Post (20 February) is also worried that "Golkar is so well-prepared... and the other political contenders lag so far behind that some have expressed concern over the possibility that the ruling group will gain too large a victory".



Getting ready for the election: "Come along, Mum, no need to cook today. It's Festival of Democracy day."

Curbs on foreign press

There will be sweeping restrictions on foreign journalists wanting to cover the Indonesian general elections. According to The Guardian [18 March], they will not be allowed to visit rural areas under any circumstances and visits to any parts of the country, in the capital and elsewhere, will require special permits and letters of recommendation from the Information ministry.

Additional special permits will be required to visit West Papua and East Timor.

A senior ministry official who announced these restrictions said they were "intended to help correspondents". When asked how it could help journalists to be excluded from rural areas where more than 80 per cent of Indonesians live, the official said it would be enough to visit the main administrative towns.

General Sudharmono has struck back, insisting that Pancasila democracy won't be hampered even if Golkar wins 100 per cent of the votes. "There's nothing wrong with it, and there's no law against it," he said [Jakarta Post, 14 March].

Golkar is fielding a powerful team in New Order terms, with an impressive array of New Order worthies on their election lists as 'vote-getters'. They include all 34 cabinet ministers and eleven governors plus hundreds of wives, sons and daughters of eminent people, in keeping with its high profile as the 'government party'.

The PDI, once the party of nationalists and Christians and now under technocratic leadership, has extricated itself from years of internal rivalry and could conceivably get more votes than in 1982. It has fielded several celebrities from the world of sports and the arts

while its main attraction is Megawati Sukarno, daughter of Indonesia's first president who, although dead, is still popular enough to be a useful 'vote-getter'.

The PPP, once Muslim, is still dogged by internal strife and has in any case lost the support of its former main pillar, the Nahdatul Ulama. Many Muslim communities are switching their loyalties to Golkar. The party's 18 per cent share of the vote in 1982 could shrivel to almost nothing, placing it third after the PDI. PPP chairman John Naro resolved the conflict over candidates by excluding anyone from the group of Sudardji (who heads the PPP group in parliament) but the latter got their own back when eight leading PPP members of parliament resigned from the party and urged their followers not to vote for the PPP.

There have been suggestions in the press that if the PPP and PDI fare too badly, Golkar might actually give them some seats.

Indonesia's 'holy trinity'

Since all three parties now 'contest' the election under the same banner, Pancasila, the military regime has succeeded where other authoritarian regimes have failed. They have created a one-party system with a three-party image, the political re-incarnation of the Holy Trinity.

The problem in this year's election is to make sure that the appearance of plurality is retained. The regime has devoted much effort in the past year trying to keep Golkar's two bedfellows alive. Come election time, it may even have to manipulate votes away from Golkar to secure the two parties some seats in parliament.

OPM mission visits Australia



Jacob Prai (rear) with Otto Ondowame (left) and Nick Messet. [Newcastle Herald, Australia, 25 November 1987]

A mission of the OPM (Free Papua Movement) toured Australia in November and December last year, addressing many meetings about the present state of West Papua's struggle for independence. This OPM mission, the first ever to visit Australia, was sponsored by the Campaign for an Independent East Timor, the West Papua Association, the Food Preservers' Union, the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Group and the Campaign Against Repression in the Pacific and Asia.

The mission consisted of Jacob Prai, Otto Ondowame and Nick Messet who are all political exiles in Sweden. Jacob Prai jointly heads the OPM external organisation with Seth Rumkorem who has political asylum in Greece.

The West Papuans had hoped to lobby the Australian government but Australia's Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, refused to meet them officially. They met Bill Hayden informally at a Labour Party event in Adelaide when the Minister told them a formal meeting would not be possible because "it would cause more trouble than it would be worth" [Canberra Times, 27 November]. Canberra no doubt feels its ties with Jakarta are "troubled" enough without the problems that would follow a meeting with the OPM.

In an interview with Robin Osborne, Jacob Prai said that Indonesia's presence in West Papua "ensures the OPM's continued existence... The behaviour of the military guarantees the growth of the OPM despite the dangers and difficulties of maintaining such an

WEST PAPUA

Papuan PDI members flee to PNG

Two West Papuan families have fled into Papua New Guinea to escape being arrested because of their support for the PDI, one of three parties 'contesting' the elections in April this year.

One family consists of Joss Oyaitou, his wife Oktofina and three sons and a daughter. The father is a teacher at Depapre High School, near the provincial capital, Jayapura. The other family consists of Isaak and Mije Apaserai and their two children from Sarmi district, west of Jayapura.

Joss Oyaitou told Times of Papua New Guinea [March 12-18, 1987] that he was head of the local PDI branch and had been preparing for the election, making posters and submitting news advertisements.

This is the first report of harassment of members of non-Golkar parties. It would confirm the impression [see separate item] that in West Papua and East Timor where special voting methods have been introduced, the regime fears that a strong vote in favour of non-Golkar parties might be interpreted as a vote against Indonesian rule. This does not mean that either the PDI or the PPP promote such views but it may be the only way people in these territories think they can register their views.

organisation. Everyone backs us against the alien Indonesians and we have thousands of active supporters." [The Australian, 25 November]

How Canberra could help

During this visit, the OPM made public several requests to the Australian government, in view of the continuing abuse of human rights in West Papua. They asked the Australian government to:

- * discuss with Indonesia human rights claims by the OPM-FPM, and also put these claims to the United Nations Human Rights Commission,
- * support the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in resettling Irian Jayan/West Papuan refugees,
- * assist refugees in camps with medical, welfare and educational aid, including a scholarship programme,
- * seek at the United Nations a thorough re-examination of the 1969 so-called act of self-determination, with a view to a timetable for independence being determined by the United Nations! Decolonisation Committee.

West Papuan refugee interviewed I

At the end of November three West Papuans arrived by canoe on Boigu, the northernmost island of Australia, and asked for political asylum. Later others followed, bringing the number to eleven. After lengthy efforts and in the face of strong opposition from the Australian government, two of the refugees were granted asylum while the others were granted permission to remain in Australia

until another country was willing to take them in. One of the two is Thomas Agaky Wanda who was also one of the first three West Papuan canoe-people.

Wanda is now living in Cairns, Queensland. He wrote to TAPOL recently offering to give an account of his experiences. The following is the first part of his story which he told in answer to our questions.

* * * * *

Where are you from, where did you go to school and what work did you do in West Papua?

My name is Thomas Agaky Wanda. I'm from Wonti village, sub-district of Lower Waropen in the district of Japen-Waropen (Serui). I was born on 28 June 1949. I attended a community school from 1956 to 1959 in Wonti, still under the Dutch. Then I went to lower middle school in 1960 in Serui and studied there until 1963, when West Papua was under UN administration (UNTEA). From 1964 till 1966 I attended Dok V Technical School in Kotabaru (later Sukarnopura). West Papua was by then under Indonesian rule. [Hollandia, the capital of West Papua under the Dutch, was renamed Kotabaru after Indonesian annexation, then renamed Sukarnopura. After the military took power, it was again renamed Jayapura. Ed. TAPOL]

In 1968, I got a job at the Merauke office of the Irian Jaya Provincial Inspectorate of Traffic and Road Transportation (ILLAJR). In 1980, I attended an afternoon course at the St. Antonius Catholic Church School in Merauke while working in the morning as a government employee. This went on until I was arrested and detained on 30 June 1981.

Say something about the experiences that led to your arrest and detention at the Jayapura military command.


In 1961, before the Dutch left West Papua, I witnessed a ceremony to raise the Morning Star (Kejora) Flag [the flag later adopted by the OPM, the Free Papua Movement, for an independent republic of West Papua]. I was also given small flags and other symbols. From that time on, I had a strong sense of being part of the West Papuan nation.

After arriving in Kotabaru, I was aware of various [pro-independence] events in Sorong, Manokwari, Biak, Nabire-Enarotali, Sarmi and Kotabaru which inspired me to become part of these developments. In 1967, I met Izak M.I. in Abepura, a district of Sukarnopura. He told me many things and I became a member of a group working under his leadership.

In 1968, I got a job in the Irian Jaya Provincial Road Traffic and Transportation Inspectorate (ILLAJR) and moved to Merauke in June that year. It was at this time that I began contacting several people for secret political discussions, in particular the OPM or *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (Free Papua Movement).

Testing West Papuan opinion, Indonesian style

In 1969 a Panitia Pemilihan Dewan Musyawarah Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat (Committee to Choose the Consultative Council for Determining the People's Opinion), known for short as *Papern Demus Pepera*, was set up under Merauke district chief, Gregorius A. Darmowidigdo as chairman. It had a number of sections including a transportation



section run by the ILLAJR. I became a driver for the Committee and saw what the Indonesian government did to West Papuans who wanted to express their opinions and were already taking action against Indonesian rule.

Everyone suspected of opposing the government was arrested, detained, beaten, maltreated and tortured. In fact, even before 1969, opponents of the government were being arrested and put on trial, including government employees, members of the armed forces, and policemen, as well as ordinary people. In response to these pre-1969 arrests, the OPM launched an operation against RPKAD (now Kopassus) paracommandos in Erambu and Janggandur kampungs in the vicinity of the River Maro when about thirty Indonesian soldiers were killed.

Everyone who surrendered was murdered including two who were shot dead by Indonesian troops in K war Kampung, some twenty kilometres inside Papua New Guinea. Even in those days, Indonesia was prepared enter foreign territory. In Sota Kampung, a PNG Papuan was arrested. His eyes were torn from their sockets and he died under torture after his fingers, arms and legs had been mutilated.

How did the Indonesians organise the 1969 act of 'free' choice?

Besides the iron fist, Indonesia used other methods during Pepera. [This was the Indonesian name for the 'act of free choice'.] In Merauke, Pepera began on 14 July 1969 when heads of traditional tribes, war tribes and kampungs from Asmat, Jakai and Auwyu were appointed members of *Papern Demus Pepera* and later became members of the Consultative Council for the Determination of the

People's Opinion. [This was the body composed of 1,025 members which took the unanimous decision in August 1969 to accept Indonesian rule.]

They were all were illiterate, simple-minded men, unable to read or write. Nevertheless, they were told to sign statements pledging their undying loyalty to the slogan, "Indonesia from West to East". Later the slogan was changed to "Indonesia from Sabang to Merauke". [Sabang is on the most westerly tip of Sumatra.] After signing these statements they were given clothes, wrist-watches, radios or bicycles as rewards.

Departmental chiefs, Papuans as well as Indonesians, were also told to sign these statements. Village-heads and public figures in and around Merauke were told to sign, regardless of whether they were Papuans or Indonesians who had lived in West Papua for a long time. Everyone had to sign statements saying they were in favour of Indonesian rule.

When Pepera was completed, everyone who had signed was given a reward in accordance with their status. Villagers got cigarettes, money, radios or bicycles while departmental heads got promotion, extra education, cars, houses and so on. All members of Parliament (DPRGR), the Regional Assembly (DPRD), all district heads throughout the province of West Irian (as it was then called) signed statements and got the same rewards as the departmental chiefs. These were Indonesia's velvet glove methods.

Indonesia adopted its own methods and it did not comply with the agreement regarding a referendum concluded between Indonesia and the Netherlands in August 1962 and ratified by the United Nations. It refused to use the principle of 'one man one vote'.

When did you first become involved with the OPM?

Back in 1970, a man by the name of A. Baudi arrived in Merauke from Jayapura and set up a small group where I was the most active person. In 1975, the 1701 district military command sent two corporals, S. Opur and Daniel Kena, to Merauke with instructions to trap me, but they failed. They arrested a colleague of mine, Alfons Kanggam, a native of Muyu region, who had been a sergeant in the Papuan Volunteers Corps set up by the Dutch when they were still resisting the Indonesians. The corporals were unable to extract any information from him about me. On one occasion they gave him beer to get him drunk and make him talk but this did not work either, so after holding him for a month, they set him free.

In 1978 I was summoned to the Mako Sub Den Pom 172/2-1 (HQ of the Command of the Military Police sub-detachment) in Merauke because of a letter from Fritz M. Kirihio [a West Papuan refugee] in the Netherlands asking for information about living conditions in West Papua. I was summoned because I had promised to answer the letter.

INTERVIEW



Thomas Agaky Wanda, front right, with other West Papuan refugees. [Cairns Post, 23 July 1986]

But I had been summoned earlier as well by the Merauke Public Prosecutor's Office with relatives of mine, Mathias Marey and his wife Den Marey-Anderi, and Jazon Numberi. From May till October 1978, I had to report periodically to the authorities and could not leave Merauke, but they discovered nothing to incriminate me so I was freed from these restrictions.

Others involved in similar cases at the time included Ignatius Malibai and Jarcis Jawa. We knew each other before so after being freed, we decided to continue with our activities as a group. We decided that some of us should leave Merauke and managed to get several people out, Ignatius Malibai, Tarcis Jawa, Melki Salosa, Alex Tumbay and Oscar Wombon, along with four Indian colleagues. They all left Merauke and reached PNG safely where all of them are now living, except Alex Tumbay who has since died.

To be continued in the next issue.

Refugees worried about the future

West Papuan refugees in Blackwater camp, near Vanimo, have told *The Times of Papua New Guinea* [12-18 March] that they are still in the dark about their future despite plans said to be under way to transfer them to a new camp in East Awin, Western Province.

They have not yet been given a date for their transfer to the new camp by the UN High Commission for Refugees. A UNHCR official has told them the government must first compensate the landowners of 100,000 hectares where the camp will be situated. The PNG is planning to spend one million kina to develop the area, but local people are demanding an extra six million kina because the government wants to lease the land for 99 years.

TAPOL understands from independent sources that a small group of refugees has already been sent to East Awin to start building houses, and that others will follow in

WEST PAPUAN REFUGEES

groups of a hundred. This appears to have happened in advance of a final resolution of the land problem.

The refugees in Blackwater may be worried about the slow rate of progress. Ideally, the camp ought to be ready and occupied before the forthcoming general elections in Papua New Guinea. A change of government in Port Moresby might set back the prospects for all West Papuan refugees who now at least seem assured of being allowed to remain in PNG, following the Wingti government's decision last year to accede to the UN Convention on Refugees.



Pramoedya's books are good but....

"Pramoedya's books are indeed good as works of literature, but a society (concerned with) security ought not to be dazzled by their literary quality because we must also take account of their negative aspects."

Thus spoke (retired) General Hari Suharto, Indonesia's Attorney General, when appearing before a parliamentary commission recently.

He was being closely questioned by Mrs Roebiono Kertapati who wanted to know why the books of Pramoedya Ananta Toer had been banned even though they were acknowledged to be literary works of standing. She even wanted to know whether the Attorney General had read any of the books himself before deciding to ban them.

The newspaper which reported this rather unusual exchange did not say how the Attorney General replied but another parliamentarian who was chairing the meeting came to his assistance, saying that if the books had been banned, then of course the Attorney General must have read them first.

The final word was with the general: "We must treat Pramoedya's books with caution because we have for a long time studied the theories of communism and know communism to its very roots. If we know communism to its roots, then naturally communism knows us just as thoroughly. So... it isn't a question of whether Pramoedya's books are good literature. We must deal with communism first and foremost as a question of security...." [Merdeka, 4 December 1987]



Continued from page 1.

Since Mochtar claimed in his statement that "we don't want these people and if they want to go to Portugal, let them" [Kompas, 28 February], Jakarta should have had no objection to the students leaving in this way. However, Mochtar's feigned lack concern about whether the students remain or go conceals the fear that, if allowed to leave, the students could seriously damage Indonesia's case on the international arena.

Joao Loff Bareto, the Portuguese lawyer acting for the students has recently warned that they were being prevented from leaving because they know too much about the war in Timor. He feared they might soon disappear.

Until the latest Indonesian move, it was well established that all parties involved, the Portuguese government, the Dutch government (which represents Portugal's interests in Jakarta) and Indonesia knew that the four would travel on Portuguese passports. Serious problems arose however after the Dutch embassy forced the men to leave the embassy, threatening to call the Indonesian police if they resisted. The students were told agreement had been reached with the Indonesians about arrangements for their departure.

Far from the Portuguese making political capital out of the affair, this is precisely what Jakarta is doing. An Indonesian statement at the UN Human Rights Commission in February foreshadows a breakdown in the shaky talks taking place between Indonesia and Portugal under UN auspices. Indonesia is evidently infuriated at Portugal's current diplomatic offensive regarding East Timor (see separate item) and seems bent on using every opportunity to malign Portugal. The students who thought they could rely on the Dutch to help them leave have now become hostages to Indonesian blackmail.

Indonesian MPs useless, says British MP

A delegation of Indonesian parliamentarians that visited the British House of Commons and had a meeting with the Foreign Affairs Select Committee came under attack by a senior member of the Committee. The veteran Labour MP, Ian Mikardo, said the visiting MPs had "no influence whatever" and were nothing more than appointees of President Suharto and leaders of the armed forces.

According to the diplomatic correspondent of *The Daily Telegraph* [12 March], Mikardo said they were unable to answer a single question about Indonesia "and didn't ask us a single question about Britain".

Interestingly, the Conservative newspaper gave more prominence to Ian Mikardo's remarks than to those of a Conservative MP, Peter Thomas, who thought the MPs were "very representative" and welcomed their visit because Britain is trying to have closer relations with Indonesia.

The mission was led by Hardjantho of the PDI, deputy-chairman of the lower house, the DPR. The other five members consisted of Soebiyono, armed forces fraction, Suyono and Sugianto of Golkar, Tijikan of the PPP and Sutomo of the PDI. Besides the UK, they also visited the Netherlands.

"Crucial" problems

Before the mission left Indonesia, they were given their marching orders by President Suharto who said their task was to convince Dutch and British parliamentarians about Indonesia's human rights record, to explain why political prisoners were being executed, and to clarify the question of East Timor "once and for all". [Ian Mikardo can hardly have realised how apposite his remarks were!]

After receiving these instructions, Hardjantho said the three questions were regarded as very crucial because they were frequently used "to corner Indonesia". It would be the mission's task, he said, to persuade British and Dutch MPs to convince their governments on these matters [Pelita, 3 March 1987].

While in the UK, the mission was the guest of the Central Office of Information, a government agency, spending only a few hours at House of Commons.

A similar DPR mission is also being sent to Australia and New Zealand.

Subscriptions

Annual rates (six issues)	UK, Europe	Overseas airmail
Individuals	£ 8.50	£ 10.00
Institutions	£ 15.00	£ 15.00

Overseas subscribers please add £1.50 on cheques not drawn on a London bank, to cover bank charges.

Rates for Australian subscribers:

	Airmail
Individual	A \$ 22.00
Institutions	A \$ 33.00

Australian subscribers may pay, at these rates, to:

Eleanor Tan
11 Lyric Grove,
Camberwell, Victoria 3124

TAPOL's Giro account no: 56 781 4009

Subscriptions and correspondence to:

TAPOL,
8a Treport Street,
London SW18 2BP
(01) 874 3262