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The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

TAPOL Bulletin No. 78

December 1986

New Indonesian offensive in East Timor

A major new Indonesian offensive has been under way in East Timor since August, though news of the operation has only recently been received. Two letters dated 19 and 26 September reached Lisbon in October. One report says:

"The enemy have increased their military presence in East Timor to fifty battalions, or about 40,000 men. Twelve battalions have been dispatched to Viqueque and Lospalos, in the eastern sector, to search for Fretilin commander-in-chief, Gusmao Xanana. They have the support of four fighter planes and two mini-jets."

The new offensive, code-named *Operasi Kikis* (Operation Extinction), is concentrated in the central and eastern sectors. News of the offensive coincides with reports of many arrests and disappearances (see page 15).

At a press conference in Lisbon, a Fretilin spokesman said the Indonesians are trying to wipe out Fretilin. "They think that, by capturing the leader, they will put an end to us. They cannot, as long as there is one Timorese alive." [The Independent, 6 November]

Fence-of-leg operations

In several regions in the east around Lospalos, as well as in Same in the central sector, civilians have been forced to join in operations to hunt down the guerrillas. Also in other eastern towns, Baguia, Quelicai, Baucau and Venilale, people have been ordered to join fence-of-leg operations to flush out guerrillas controlling territory in the south. The objective of this operation is to gain control of Fretilin bases. A major aim of the Indonesian strategists is to encircle guerrillas based around Mount Matebian and further south towards the coast.

With the food production so precarious (see page 18), this will exacerbate the food shortages as many able-bodied men are forced to leave their homes.

In the central sector, the offensive appears to have the character of a classical military operation. Six battalions have been thrown in around Soibada, Barique, Bubur Laran and Weberec, and four armoured troop vehicles are known to be operating in the area. One battalion with six armoured vehicles is being deployed in Maubisse, four battalions in the bay of Tibar, west of Dili, four battalions in Aipelo, four in Bemos, two in Areia Branca, two in Hera, two in Metinaro, and two in Beban.

The focus on the eastern sector supports the widely-held belief that this sector continues to be a Fretilin stronghold. At the same time, the major concentration of troops in the central sector confirms recent reports that the guerrillas have, since 1984, been stepping up their activities in this part of the country. The Indonesian army now seems bent on reversing that trend.

Some of the newly-deployed troops were landed by

warship on secluded beaches along the north coast, in the bay of Tibar, west of Dili, fanning out into the rugged mountain interior south of the capital. Others deployed inland may have been dropped by parachute.

The 26 September letter reports that on 15 September three more battalions arrived in Dili in armoured vehicles. The writer points to a marked increase in the number of military vehicles bearing civilian number-plates.

The Independent [6 November] quotes western diplomats as confirming that the Indonesian army has been stepping up activities in East Timor for several months.

British military equipment and the offensive

The offensive is making use of small jets, warships, armoured cars and parachutes, the very type of military equipment that has been supplied to Indonesia in the last few years by the UK. The small jets are more than likely to be Hawks, manufactured by British Aerospace. This must reinforce the demand that the British Government should immediately impose an embargo on all arms sales to Indonesia.



Hawk ground-attack aircraft

We are not yet able to assess the effects of the latest operations on the population and the guerrilla forces. Writing from Dili, one source says that Dili hospital is full of Indonesian casualties. During one operation in Same, in the central zone, four Indonesian soldiers and two Timorese *hansips* (civil guards) were killed.

Chico Tai Na, a commander in Falintil, Fretilin's armed wing, was killed in battle in the Matebian region.

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Nine long-term political prisoners executed

Nine long-term political prisoners, all of them sentenced to death for alleged involvement in the events of October 1965, which President Suharto claims were instigated by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), were executed by firing squad in late September or early October. With the exception of two who were sentenced in 1972 and 1973, they had all been under sentence of death for 18, 19 or 20 years.

The victims of this latest round of judicial killings were:

Abdullah Alihamy, 64 years, arrested in March 1967 and sentenced to death by a Special Military Tribunal in Riau in 1968. Alihamy was secretary of the Riau PKI provincial committee and became a full member of the PKI Central Committee in 1964. For a time, reports were circulating that his death sentence had been commuted to life.

Throughout his imprisonment, he was held in Padang, West Sumatra while his family lives in Pekanbaru.

Amar Hanafiah, 62 years, arrested in late 1965 and sentenced to death by a Special Military Tribunal in Banjarmasin some time in 1967. He was secretary of the South Kalimantan PKI provincial committee. As with Alihamy, it was thought at one time that his sentence had been commuted to life. Although Hanafiah became an Amnesty 'investigation' case, nothing more was ever discovered about his case or the circumstances of his imprisonment, until his name appeared on the list of prisoners executed this year.

Syam Kamaruzzaman, 60 years, was detained in March 1967 and sentenced to death by Special Military Tribunal in March 1968. He was held for much of the time in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta or at the Jakarta Military Prison. He is reported to have been transferred from Cipinang Prison at his own request because other political prisoners refused to associate with him.

He was known as a trade unionist in the 1940s. He later became a confidant of D.N. Aidit, chairman of the PKI, and eventually became chairman of Aidit's Special Bureau. During the years before 1965, he was playing a double role, within PKI intelligence and in army intelligence. [See separate item.]

Lieutenant Kamil, 58 years, arrested in October 1965 in Jogjakarta, Central Java. By the time of the 1965 events, he was platoon security commander and deputy intelligence officer in Battalion L. He was found guilty of taking part in the murder of two army officers in Jogjakarta at the beginning of October 1965. At his trial, he said he had been acting on his commander's orders and that he and his family were under threat. He was not from any political party.

He was sentenced to death by a military court in Jogjakarta in May 1967. He spent most of his imprisonment in Semarang or on the prison island of Nusakambangan, Central Java.

Subano alias Waluyo alias Mulyono, 58 years, was arrested in August 1967 and sentenced to death by Special Military Court in October 1968. In his trial, he was described as the 'third man' in Aidit's Special Bureau. He spent virtually all his imprisonment in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta.

Air Force Colonel Sudiono, 63 years, arrested in mid 1966. He was sentenced to death by Special Military Court in March 1973. In early 1982, when his request for presidential clemency was turned down, his wife was told



On 6 October, about two thousand people demonstrated outside the Indonesian Embassy in Paris to protest against the executions. Photo: Joel Lumien, l'Humanite.

his execution was imminent. In fact, it was another four and a half years before he came before the firing squad.

Supono Marsudiyono, 65 years, was arrested in February 1969 and sentenced to death by a Special Military Court in March 1972. He was said by Syam to be the second man in Aidit's Special Bureau, but virtually nothing more is known about him except for testimony given about him by Syam. He spent virtually his entire imprisonment in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta.

Tamuri Hidayat, 61 years, was sentenced to death probably by a Special Military Court in Bali in September 1967. The date of his arrest is not known. He was in the army but was demobilised in 1964, apparently because of ill-health. In 1965, he was working as a security officer at a Bali hotel. At one time, it was thought that his sentence had been commuted to life imprisonment.

Suyono Wiryoatmojo, 66 years, was sentenced to death by Special Military Court in Medan, North Sumatra in October 1966. The date of his arrest is not known. In the late 1950s, he was a member of the PKI Central Java provincial committee, but later apparently became involved in security and intelligence work.

Although there was no official confirmation of these executions until 8 October, reports that executions had taken place were received from Indonesia soon after the first of the victims were taken from Cipinang Prison in Jakarta and executed by firing squad in Cimanggis on 26 September. The Dutch, Australian and British governments made several enquiries about the reported executions. West European governments showed their concern especially because the executions came just weeks before a joint European Community/ASEAN meeting of foreign ministers was due to take place in Jakarta on 20 and 21 October.

As the foreign ministers gathered for the meeting, several made formal complaints to the Indonesian government, stressing that the executed men had been in prison for so many years. Sir Geoffrey Howe, British Foreign Secretary and currently chairman of the European Community, expressed concern, while France's European Affairs Minister, Bernard Bosson, said that, from a humanitarian point of view, the French government and people "were shocked and overwhelmed", considering it "inhumane to execute nine people in jail for fifteen years [AFP, 21 October 1986]

The Indonesian authorities rebuffed these complaints by claiming that the executed men had been dealt with "according to the law". Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, himself a lawyer by profession, asserted that the time lag was the result of "lengthy appeals procedures". This is grossly misleading since most if not all nine men had no right to any appeal against their sentence. Our records show that eight and possibly all nine were tried before special military tribunals which are courts of first and last resort. This means that their only recourse was to plead for presidential clemency.

Haji Princen, a well-known Indonesian human rights activist working in Jakarta, rejected government claims about "lengthy procedures". He described the execution as inhuman and barbaric, and said: "You don't leave 20 years to ask the President for a pardon. It is immensely cruel to keep people in prison and in uncertainty about their fate that long." [Guardian, 10 October 1986]

Cruel deception

The Army went out of its way to deceive the death sentence prisoners just days before the first executions took place. Reports have reached TAPOL of a visit on 19 September to Cipinang Prison by Brigadier-General Pieter Damanik, official spokesman of the Department of Defence. All the death sentence prisoners were gathered to hear Brig-General Damanik say:

"I have come to see for myself how you all are. Apart from that, I want to ask you for information about the addresses of your families, and to know what plans you have and what work you intend to do after you make your return to society. It seems many of you are not able to say for sure what address you will go to, once you return to society, so we want to help you find temporary accommodation. We may also be able to help you re-enter whatever profession you wish to choose." Brig-General Damanik also implied that the men could expect to be released after the general elections to be held in April next year.

Some of the prisoners appear to have been taken in by Damanik's assurances. Air Force Sudiono responded by saying that he was hoping to find work as a translator.

The effect of the Defence Department spokesman's visit was to create an atmosphere of calm, and may have resulted in not much attention initially being paid when three of the four Cipinang prisoners who were executed,



were taken from their cells on 23 September, three days before their execution. A week later, on 30 September, Col. Sudiono was taken from his cell. He was executed on 3 October.

It was the same Brig-Gen. Damanik who later, on 9 October, confirmed that nine men had been executed.

European Parliament condemns executions

On 10 October, the European Parliament adopted a resolution by 84 votes to 38 asserting that it is "a flagrant violation of human rights to execute a person almost 20 years after death sentence was passed". It called on EEC Foreign Ministers to condemn the executions and to call upon the Indonesian Government to treat the other prisoners in accordance with international conventions relating to basic human rights. It also called for a comprehensive report from the Commission on relations between the Community and Indonesia and asked the Commission "to review those relations in the light of the report and the recent executions".

Many more prisoners at risk of execution

According to TAPOL's records, there are twenty-six political prisoners still under death sentence on charges of involvement in the events of October 1965. Fourteen are members of the armed forces, in most cases, the army. Nine were in the Cakrabirawa Palace Guard and were tried for having been members of kidnap squads sent to capture six army generals, the incident that sparked the events of October 1965. Eleven were PKI activists or leading members of the All-Indonesia Trade Union Federation (SOBSI) or the youth organisation, Pemuda Rakyat, both of which were outlawed by Suharto, together with the PKI. The identity of the twenty-sixth man on the list is not known.

Announcement

TAPOL's full name is now changed to:

TAPOL
the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

We take this opportunity
of wishing all our readers and supporters
A Happy New Year for 1987!

Today, a new certificate has been devised, the *Surat Keterangan Bersih Diri (SKBD)* or Certificate of Personal Cleanliness. This new security check has evolved from the requirement already imposed on people for several years to prove that they have a 'clean environment' ('bersih lingkungan'). Screening now extends far beyond a person's own involvement in organisations that have already been banned for more than 20 years. It is now necessary to prove that you have no blood relatives or in-laws who were 'involved'.

Already for several years, reports have appeared in the press of people being rejected for jobs or being dismissed because an aunt, mother-in-law or other close or more distant relative was suspected of 'involvement'. Often, proof of such involvement rests in the fact that the suspect relative was killed during the massacres which inflicted such heavy losses on communities in many parts of the country.

Ironically, the SKBD requirement is now causing problems for quite a few candidates on the lists nominated by the three parties, Golkar, PPP and PDI for the forthcoming general elections. The lists are closely scrutinised by the security forces and many names have been excluded because of the alleged unreliability of their SKBD. Lack of a 'clean environment' is also being used to unseat and discredit rivals in the internal bickering that besets all three parties.

All members of the national and provincial assemblies were recently subjected to lightning tests by Kopkamtib, to see whether their spouses, parents, grandparents, in-laws or siblings were 'involved in the PKI'. If so, they cannot obtain an SKBD and may not be nominated in next year's elections [*Tempo*, 11 October 1986].

'Intelligence' tests for workers

Meanwhile, Kopkamtib last year produced a questionnaire which all employees in state and privately-run vital

industries throughout Indonesia are required to answer. The questionnaire involves giving written answers as well as being interviewed by a member of the management or a local security (Kopkamtib) officer. The following are some of the questions employees are required to answer. [The complete questionnaire is published in *Inside Indonesia*, No 8, October 1986, p. 8.]:

- * Describe your family background and that of your spouse, starting with your grandparents and those of your spouse. Mention the religion(s) and organisations or parties they followed.... Give the names of your closest acquaintances during the last three years.
- * Explain the basis of your convictions or religion. Do you practice them diligently?
- * Say which national or world heroes you admire and why.
- * Recite Pancasila and explain your attitude towards it.
- * What is your view of the October 1965/PKI events? Were any members of your family involved? Do you agree that communism is a latent danger?
- * What is your attitude towards protest demonstrations with banners?
- * Explain your attitude towards the dual function of the Armed Forces. [This is the regime's principle of the Armed Forces having both a military and civilian role, the basis of Indonesian militarism.]
- * What is your attitude towards the New Order [set up by Suharto in 1965]?
- * What is your attitude towards citizens who do not vote in general elections?

The questionnaire ends ominously with the words:

"These questions are for you alone. If as a consequence of this, you are dismissed from your company, what would your attitude be?

Be prepared to accept the risks if you make any erroneous statements."

According to *Inside Indonesia*, the questionnaire was first used last year in companies in the oil sector, and led to mass sackings in the industry at the end of 1985.

Human rights lawyer on computerised blacklist

Mulya Lubis, the national director of the network of legal aid institutes, YLBHI, is on the black-list of people not permitted to go abroad. This became public when Ismael Saleh, Minister of Justice, was checking the




Mulya Lubis

new computer recently installed at the Sukarno-Hatta international airport in Jakarta.

Almost by way of a joke and in the company of a merry band of journalists, Saleh asked the computer operator to give a display of how the computer works, telling him to feed in the name, Mulya Lubis. The lawyer's name soon flashed onto the screen with the explanation that he was not allowed to go abroad "for political reasons" [*Pelita*, 31 October 1986].

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The War Against East Timor analyses Indonesia's military and political strategy to subjugate and integrate East Timor since General Suharto's invasion of this former Portuguese colony in 1975. The authors, Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, present for the first time a comprehensive account of the current resurgence of Fretilin, which is the national liberation movement of the people of East Timor, following its earlier defeat in 1977-78.

Suharto and the 1965 affair

The execution of nine men found guilty in connection with the October 1965 affair has aroused new interest in the events which brought General Suharto to power. Among those facing the firing squad was Syam Kamaruzzaman, chairman of the so-called Special Bureau, a highly secretive body created by D.N. Aidit, chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). This was the body in charge of Aidit's clandestine links with officers in the Armed Forces, the body alleged by Suharto to have been responsible for the kidnap and murder of six army generals on 1 October 1965, the event that unleashed a backlash resulting in the massacre of hundreds of thousands of leftwingers throughout the country. The PKI was smashed and President Sukarno was quickly isolated, paving the way for Suharto to take power and establish a system of repression that, over the years, has undermined and destroyed all the remaining political parties.

It was Syam's evidence about the role of the Special Bureau that was used by the regime to justify its annihilation of the PKI. Indeed, Syam was the only source of information about his dealings with Aidit, for the PKI chairman had been murdered by troops in November 1965, acting on the orders of Suharto, then still commander of the army's strategic reserve, KOSTRAD. The story of Aidit's murder has been told by the officer in charge, Colonel Yasir Hadibroto, now governor of the province of Lampung. [See TAPOL Bulletin, No 72, November 1985.]

Syam's execution came as a surprise

It was widely believed by people trying to unravel the truth about October 1965, as well as by those in touch with tried prisoners still in prison, that Syam's death sentence would not be carried out. Since his own trial, he had served the regime well by testifying in numerous trials and incriminating many people. Such betrayals had so angered other prisoners that he asked for transfer from Cipinang Prison, because of the hostility he experienced.

Syam's role in the 1965 events was discussed in a CIA report on the affair, *Indonesia-1965: The Coup that Backfired*, which described Syam as "the most cooperative of witnesses. Once the Army got Syam to talk, it seems that he was almost anxious to tell everything he knew about the coup -- almost out of a sense of pride" [pages 76 and 76a, footnote]. The CIA also revealed that Syam worked for ten years as a professional informer for Indonesian military intelligence, reporting on the doings of the PKI and other parties [p. 107]. In the CIA's opinion, these facts show the extent of the PKI's penetration of the military apparatus but, as Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey have commented, "it is surely not the only way they can be read" [*New York Review of Books*, 1 June 1978].

By all accounts, Syam's Special Bureau was the link between Aidit and the army officers who staged the kidnappings that occurred around 3 am on 1 October 1965. According to Syam, the plans implemented by a group of three middle-ranking officers originated in the Bureau, working on Aidit's instructions. But the regime in Jakarta has understandably never allowed any discussion of the links which Suharto himself, the man who emerged the victor, had with the affair.

In all, six generals were kidnapped and murdered. Seven were targeted, but General Nasution, then Armed Forces

chief-of-staff, escaped, though his infant daughter was fatally wounded in the assault on his house. All were generals on the army's general staff, the most important being General Yani, Army chief-of-staff, known as an anti-communist but also an admirer and loyal follower of President Sukarno. The officers who plotted the kidnappings, Lieutenant-Colonel Untung (already executed), Lieutenant-Colonel Latief (serving a life sentence), and Brigadier-General Supardjo (already executed) insisted at their trials that they had not meant the victims to be murdered, but to be brought before President Sukarno to answer for plans they were allegedly making to launch a coup against him.

The kidnappings were followed within hours by the occupation of several buildings, including the central radio station and the main telecommunications centre,



Syam Kamaruzzaman, on trial. [*Tempo*, 11 October 1986]

both located on Merdeka Square in the centre of Jakarta. The troops which occupied these buildings were from two battalions from Central and East Java, in town for the celebration of Armed Forces Day on 5 October. Logistical support turned out to be perfunctory; the troops lacked commitment to the rebellion they were supposed to be spear-heading, and it was easy for officers under Suharto's command, later that day, to order them back to their barracks.

But the plotters' far more serious blunder lay in their failure to include among their victims the general who would so speedily strike back and crush their moves to pre-empt a coup. That general was Suharto, KOSTRAD commander. Nor did they bother to occupy his headquarters, located on the same square as the other occupied buildings. Both Untung and Latief knew Suharto well, had served long under him when he was commander of the Central Java Diponegoro Division, and had since retained close personal ties with the Suharto family. Supardjo had also served under Suharto.

Latief in particular, then commander of a Jakarta infantry battalion, knew the strategic importance of



Suharto in 1965.

KOSTRAD headquarters as he had recently led combined-service exercises to test the capital's defences, and certainly knew that the most highly sophisticated communications system in Indonesia, recently purchased from the US, was located not at the telecommunications centre but across the square at KOSTRAD HQ [Anderson and McVey, *ibid*].

Not long after the kidnappings, Suharto left home and drove unmolested to his headquarters, passed buildings occupied by rebel troops, enjoying a free hand to launch his counter-offensive. KOSTRAD was supremely well equipped to surround the rebels' headquarters at Halim airbase on the outskirts of Jakarta, to end the perfunctory occupations in Jakarta, and to launch an offensive against the PKI. Suharto ignored a decision by Sukarno later that day to appoint another general as caretaker of the army, in place of the murdered Yani, and himself took command of the army. In terms of hierarchy, Suharto might have expected Sukarno to put him in command (and so, incidentally, would Untung, Latief and Supardjo) but Sukarno did not do so. This did not deter Suharto who immediately launched a political and military offensive to demolish, step by step, the power base of Indonesia's first president.

At the time, however, Suharto was not seen as a likely initiator of such drastic moves against Sukarno and the PKI. He had not cut his mark as an avowed anti-communist. Indeed, while divisional commander in Central Java, one of the PKI's strongest areas, he was not unsympathetic to the PKI and its mass organisations, occasionally lavishing gifts on them. Only later, after he had got himself appointed president did it emerge that, as KOSTRAD commander and commander of the campaign against Malaysia, he was sabotaging the campaign and working systematically against Sukarno's interests.


While other generals made no secret of their anti-PKI sentiments, Suharto kept his feelings to himself, steadily building up his base in the army, with both a strike force and an intelligence network at his disposal. As the ultimate beneficiary of what happened in October 1965, he is not unnaturally the prime suspect. The men standing in his way to reach the top were his close colleagues on the army general staff, above all General Yani, whose loyalty to Sukarno made him reluctant to join any anti-PKI crusade. Suharto therefore had plenty of reasons to liquidate the general staff, especially if he could contrive to place the blame on the PKI.

Suharto's midnight meeting with Latief

There is plenty of damning evidence of Suharto's collusion with the army plotters. Around midnight on 1 October, a few hours before the kidnap squads set out, Suharto met Latief at the bedside of Suharto's son who was being treated for burns, a strange time for either men to visit a small boy in hospital. Suharto has acknowledged that this encounter took place, and was even the first to mention it in public, in an interview with US journalist, Arnold Brackman, he said Latief had come to the hospital to make sure he, Suharto, was too preoccupied with his son's health to respond to any move against the generals [Arnold Brackman, *The Communist Collapse in Indonesia, 1969*, page 100]. A year later, Suharto again mentioned the midnight meeting, claiming this time that Latief had come to the hospital to kill him but got scared at the last moment [Der Spiegel, No. 27, June 1970, page 98].

Why did Suharto feel the need to draw attention to this meeting? He knew that many people were asking why he was not included on the list of kidnap victims, a fact that cast suspicion on him. He also knew that Latief was alive, locked up, and in the hands of generals with ambitions of their own, who might one day let Latief talk about the meeting.

That was precisely what happened in 1978, when Latief was brought to trial. In a defence document, a copy of which was later smuggled abroad, Latief spoke at length about several meetings he had with Suharto and his wife,



Jakarta's Merdeka Square. The Radio Station and Post Office telecommunications centre were occupied by 'rebel' troops on 1 October, but Kostrad headquarters was not.

just prior to 1 October. In fact, Latief asked for the two of them to be called as witnesses, but this was refused. In Latief's words, he went to the hospital that night "not only to see his (Suharto's) son who had had an accident, but also to report that a movement would be launched on the following morning to prevent a coup d'etat by the Council of Generals, which he already knew about beforehand". Latief went no further than this in implicating Suharto though he added that, since hundreds of thousands of people had been incarcerated without trial for years for alleged involvement merely because they "must have known something" about the events of 1 October, surely Suharto should have got at least the same punishment.

Why did the PKI need a coup?

Any analysis of the events of October 1965 would need to consider the broader political implications of what happened. Why, for instance, should the PKI, which enjoyed such widespread and growing popularity along with the protection of President Sukarno, have wanted to become involved in a coup? A possible answer is that the party believed Sukarno was in failing health and was about to be deposed. This meant they wanted to head off such a calamity. Certainly, PKI leaders relied heavily on Sukarno, and had confidence in what they regarded as "progressive officers" in the army, hoping perhaps that an inner-army struggle for power might demolish the anti-communist element and release the party from the wave of repression waged against the party by some army officers.

Although hardly anyone in the party, except for a few politbureau members, all of whom were murdered by the army soon after October 1965, knew anything about Aidit and Syam's Special Bureau, it does indeed seem that such a body existed. This was little short of playing with fire for a party that pinned its hopes on winning power through the ballot box, and had an excellent chance of doing so. But the crucial question is: was Aidit sending instructions through the Bureau and Syam to the "progressive officers" or was Syam feeding information to Aidit to convince him that "progressive officers" were preparing a strike against the general staff which it would be in Aidit's advantage to support? And if the latter is true, which part of army intelligence was feeding the information to Syam? Suharto had his own intelligence apparatus, the unit known as Opsus (Special Operations) which had been operating under General Ali Murtopo, his intelligence officer since the days he commanded the Central Java division.

Is Suharto's version coming unstuck?

It is undeniably true that much of history is dictated by people like Suharto who emerge as victors. No effort has been spared in Indonesia to support Suharto's version of what happened in 1965. People have been murdered, imprisoned, and judicially executed, to uphold that version. But there are signs that doubts are spreading. There are even signs, as we shall show below, that some factions in the military may be trying to discredit the Suharto version.

A writer in *Solusi*, a Jogjakarta journal published earlier this year by the local branch of HMI, the Muslim Students Association, wrote that "it is difficult to answer the question, who was responsible for the (October 1965) movement". Suparman Marzuki was reviewing *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* by Harold Crouch, the



Political prisoners in Buru island prison camp, clearing the forest when the forced labour project was first opened.

Indonesian translation of which was recently banned by the Attorney-General. Crouch cast doubt on the official version. According to Marzuki, Crouch succeeded in showing that "one should not put the PKI in the dock, and should at the very least re-examine this profoundly shattering event". The reviewer goes on: "One conclusion of the many analyses made of that coup attempt is that it was in fact only an internal army conflict, in pursuit of objectives that became evident in subsequent political manoeuvres".

Turning from this genuine search for truth, there are signs that top men in the regime may also be doing their bit to discredit Suharto over the October 1965 affair. It was in *Sinar Harapan*, less than two weeks before its demise, that an interview of three army generals appeared, discussing the evidence which, they say, led the army to believe the PKI was involved. The three officers, all retired, are General Ali Said, now chairman of the Supreme Court who in 1965 was an army prosecutor and later chaired several military tribunals; Major-General Tahir, now Inspector-General of Development who in 1965 was deputy chairman of the army's Central Interrogation Team; and Durmawel Achmad, now living in retirement, who in 1965 was an army prosecutor and interrogator.

Strange to say, they did not focus on the testimony of Syam who was executed three days earlier. In fact, Syam was not even mentioned until the last two paragraphs of the final article reporting the interview. [*Sinar Harapan*, 29 and 30 September 1986, and 1 October 1986] The evidence they chose to highlight was that of Nyono,



Nyono, the first PKI leader to be tried. [*Tempo*, 11 October 1986]



General Ali Said, chairman of the Supreme Court.

the first PKI leader to be tried after October 1965. They took as their centre-piece a hand-written confession made by Nyono under interrogation by Durmawel, admitting that Aidit agreed to launch a movement to pre-empt a coup against Sukarno and that Aidit was given responsibility for 'military preparations'.

Yet, the Ali Said-Tahir-Durmawel trio had a few confessions of their own to make, firstly that Nyono's 'data' only "reinforced their belief or, more precisely,

THE 1965 AFFAIR

their intuition that the PKI masterminded the rebellion". They also admitted that Nyono's testimony gave the impression that the army plotters had acted on their own initiative. Thirdly, and most damaging for Suharto, they admitted that, in court, Nyono retracted the whole confession, saying instead that the PKI had decided to leave the entire matter of coup and counter-coup to President Sukarno. They even went to the trouble of spelling out Nyono's testimony in court.

Having done nothing to conceal the controversial nature of Nyono's evidence, one can only conclude that the three law officers intended to convey a message contradicting the stated aim of the interview. How does one interpret this rather strange twist? And is there reason to believe that by publishing the interview, Sinar Harapan drove another nail into its own coffin?

Ali Said, recognised for many years as an ally of General Sudharmono, and part of what is loosely called the AHM (Military Law Academy) faction, has been suspected in the past of causing Suharto quite a few headaches through the law courts. He was responsible for bringing Latief to trial in 1978. In the same year, damning evidence was produced in another trial about Ali Said's so-called dossier on Suharto. So, is Ali Said stirring up trouble again?



Two repatriated refugees feared killed in Merauke

An alarming report has been received of the murder in detention of two West Papuans who returned to Merauke after living for nearly 2 years in refugee camps in PNG.

The two men are Anselmus Katua, formerly headmaster of Mindiptanah secondary school, said to be an OPM supporter, and Clemens Andomenen, a school-teacher from Imko village, Mindiptanah, who previously fought with the OPM.

According to a letter from Bernard Mawen, OPM leader in the Merauke region, the two men returned with their families in June this year under a repatriation scheme backed by the UN High Commission for Refugees. Katua had been in Komopkin refugee camp and Andomenen in Kuiu camp. Mawen said the men were arrested within weeks of their return and held at the 1707 military command in Merauke where they were severely tortured, eventually dying as the result of electric shock. [Weekend Australian, 8-9 November 1986].

Any chance of obtaining independent confirmation of the two men's torture and death is remote. Indonesia refuses to allow either the UNHCR or the International Red Cross access to areas where repatriated refugees are living, for purposes of monitoring their circumstances. Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja reiterated this refusal while visiting Port Moresby for the signing of the Indonesian-PNG Friendship Treaty [Australian Financial Review, 30 October].


229 more refugees repatriated

According to Indonesian press reports, 229 West Papuan refugees returned to Indonesia at the end of October, from Kungmi and Atkamba refugee camps. Kompas, 8

WEST PAPUAN REFUGEES

November, reports that those originating from Merauke will be placed in transmigration sites around Merauke, while those from Mindiptanah and Waropka will go back to their villages.

Indonesian officials from Mochtar down consistently claim that 5,000 West Papuan refugees have returned home, leaving only 5,000 in PNG camps. These figures are refuted by all other sources.



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Military operations in West Papua

More reports of clashes between Indonesian troops and OPM (Free Papua Movement) guerrillas have recently been received, confirming earlier reports, published by TAPGL, of a major Indonesian operation, code-named Operasi Sate, now under way. The latest reports come from the OPM and are verified by an independent source which cannot be identified.

In March 1986, Brigadier-General Setiyana was appointed commander of the VIIIth/Trikora Military Command, replacing Major-General Simanjuntak who held the post little more than a year. Setiyana was previously chief-of-staff of the Vth/Brawijaya Military Command in East Java. Under the re-organisation of the army, the Trikora Military Command covers Maluku as well as Irian Jaya.

Operations in north-east Jayapura district

According to the OPM, troop reinforcements from the Pattimura Division in Maluku, from the Engineers Corps and from the Brawijaya Division in East Java, were moved into the district in March 1986, to cope with escalating OPM operations.

Fierce fighting occurred in March 1986, with four men of a Pattimura battalion being killed. The bodies were flown out by helicopter, while OPM seized their weapons. The location of this clash is not given.

Also in March, a fierce battle took place in Pantai Timur sub-district. OPM claim to have killed 36 soldiers but do not mention their own casualties.

Not long afterwards, the koramil (military command) post and police post of Betaf, on the north coast, were destroyed and occupied for one hour by OPM guerrillas. Seven Indonesian soldiers escaped and hid in a house. They were later discovered by the OPM and shot dead. Their weapons were confiscated.

On 28 April, the security forces initiated an *Operasi Tumpas* in the provincial capital, Jayapura, during which Papuan government employees were rounded up, detained and interrogated. Some were severely beaten up.

In early May, another fierce battle occurred during which no fewer than 60 Indonesian soldiers are said to have lost their lives. A sub-district official and staff member were taken hostage by the OPM.

Flag-raising

On two occasions, the West Papuan flag was raised in Jayapura city. The first was on Sunday 4 May, when the flag was raised in front of Loka Budaya Building, formerly the New Guinea Council building. The flag remained in place for several hours. People on their way to morning service at Harapan Church saw the incident.

The second flag-raising was late at night on 14 May, in front of the Radio Indonesia building. The flag remained up till next morning. In both cases, the groups who raised the flags got away.

In May, armed clashes took place between the OPM and Indonesian troops in an area close to the PNG border. An army truck carrying troops was fired on, and soldiers were killed as they jumped out. Following the incident, local inhabitants were taken away for interrogation. Several people disappeared and two are known to have died: Jantelogo (Jan Telogo?) and John Tabuni.

More clashes have since occurred. Medical staff at the Jayapura General Hospital say that many bodies of

Indonesian soldiers have arrived at the morgue. Wounded soldiers are quickly returned to their units and replaced by other troops.

In mid-August, F-5 Tiger aircraft carried out a series of aerial attacks lasting four days, to smash Markas Victoria, the OPM headquarters. [Markas Victoria is mobile.] The target was not hit but widespread damage was inflicted on the surrounding countryside.

A kampung named Olmape (exact location not clear) was burnt down, destroying 65 homes and the local church. The villagers fled into the bush, chased by troops. Some were shot dead while others took refuge in the jungle.

Strategic village control

The OPM report describes restrictions on villagers throughout the northern coastal region, strikingly similar to those imposed on the inhabitants of strategic villages in East Timor (see page 18).

As operations intensified earlier this year, all kampungs and villages along the north coast and inland were inundated with Indonesian troops. This move cut the OPM's lines of communications, making it more difficult to keep abreast of developments. Many villagers, including village officials, were arrested and questioned for information about OPM positions. Many were beaten up or tortured; the women were raped.


With a strong army presence, villagers and kampung dwellers throughout the district have been subjected to constant harassment and control, restricting their access to food production and gathering. When supplies run out, they are allowed out of their kampungs only under escort, to gather sweet potato and sago, and have to return home fast. People wishing to go to town by boat or road can only go under guard. Even family visits have been curbed because of restrictions on freedom of assembly and speech. Troops insist on being present, and require people to converse only in Indonesian.

Operations in Merauke district

Several clashes have also been reported in Waropka sub-district, Merauke. This is far inland and borders with Papua New Guinea. On 17 July, OPM guerrillas were fired on by Indonesian troops as they were out gathering food outside a kampung named Mangkubun Tua. They were not able to return to base until 6 August.

On 23 August, there was a five-hour battle between OPM and Indonesian forces. One Indonesian soldier was killed but all OPM fighters escaped without serious injury though some were grazed by bullets. Six days later, on 29 August, there was a ten-hour battle in Mongkubun Lama. Once most of the guerrillas' bows and arrows had been destroyed by gunfire, they dispersed without loss.

In an incident on 29 September, a guerrilla named Stephan Baket was shot and mortally wounded. Other incidents around this time include helicopter sorties against the guerrillas in Waropka. In some instances, the



Fisor Yarisetouw, who was arrested in Papua New Guinea in November this year. He is described by *PNG Times* [14 November 1986] as "the longest-serving OPM guerrilla".

OPM claim, helicopters flew over the PNG border.

The area of these engagements is close to Wiwirok, where a Catholic catechist was beheaded and five men were shot dead in March this year, leading to an exodus from the area. Around 750 West Papuans later crossed the border into PNG and were given refuge in Yapsiei camp.

Foreign journalists miss an OPM attack by minutes

Foreign correspondents on a guided tour of Irian Jaya province (West Papua) were unexpectedly able to report on an attack on the Indonesian military by the Free Papua Movement (OPM) which happened only minutes before they arrived at the village of Arso Kota, east of the provincial capital, Jayapura. An Indonesian was killed and another injured in the attack.

At official briefings before setting out for Arso Kota, the journalists had been told the OPM was "finished" and

Village pastor severely wounded

A village pastor named Yafeth Suri was shot and severely wounded by Indonesian troops during a military operation in the sub-district of Sarmi in August this year.

The shooting occurred on 15 August, as Pastor Suri was paddling his canoe across a 15-metre wide river. He was returning home to Muaif Kampung, Denta, after going to visit to another section of his congregation, to take the Sunday collection from the deacon.

On that day, military operations were under way in Muaif, as part of operations in Donggo, in the Sarmi sub-district. Houses were searched for OPM guerrillas or sympathisers. Soldiers confiscated suspect items like kitchen knives, bush knives, axes and bows and arrows.

As Pastor Suri was rowing back, soldiers standing on the bank yelled out, saying: "Where are you going? Come over here." He rowed towards them, shouting to explain that he was a teacher of religion at Muaif Kampung. When he was about 7 metres from the bank, a soldier opened fire, hitting him in the upper arm.

had launched no attacks since 1984.

Peter Hiett of the BBC said local officials were thrown into confusion by the attack. Asked how frequently attacks took place, the local police chief at first said, "often", but changed his reply to "not often" after consulting other officials. Hiett said the station they visited was well fortified and armed. "Such facts suggest that the OPM is a substantially greater force in these areas near the border with Papua New Guinea - where the OPM is believed to have its bases - than the authorities would have us believe." [BBC Despatch, 28 October]

The main aim of the trip by 13 foreign correspondents was to give them a guided tour of transmigration sites in West Papua, attempting to contradict foreign criticism of the transmigration programme. Hiett added that after the attack, Indonesian officials were reluctant to take them to a second transmigration site and "there was one particular village on the way back to Jayapura that they did not want to pass through in the dark".

Famine strikes again in Jayawijaya

According to official Indonesian reports, 84 people have died recently in the Kurima district, in the central highlands of West Papua as a result of food shortages. Most of the dead are said to be children under 5 and elderly people. The region has been hit by a severe drought, according to Albert Dien, district head of Jayawijaya. He admits that the area affected has a population of about 17 thousand people.

Antara reports say that relief efforts "are hampered by the remoteness of the area, the lack of transportation and suitable personnel".

The BBC's Peter Hiett reported the news from Jakarta, a few weeks after his trip to the area, along with other foreign journalists, during which he heard nothing of the disaster.

This is third time in the past four years that famine and death has struck the district of Kurima, In November 1984, at least 200 people died of starvation and disease, while two years previously, at least a hundred died of similar causes. [TAPOL Bulletin, No 66, November 1984, page 12] On those occasions, only the briefest of news was received about the disaster, nor was there any attempt to investigate the real causes of starvation in a region which, prior to Indonesian administration, was undisturbed by such calamities.

According to witnesses, the soldiers stood laughing as the wounded churchman fell back into his canoe, which began to sink. Villagers who were near the river rushed to his assistance, and dragged him out of the water. They reported the incident to the local military command. On 17 August, two of the Pastor's children went to Jayapura to report the incident. But it was not till 19 August that arrangements were made to take him to Jayapura Hospital, by which time his wound was badly infested.

According to Robin Osborne in *PNG Times*, 24 October, Pastor Suri died five days later, though other sources which provided most of the above information could not confirm that.

It is understood a formal complaint resulted in a promise by the army to take proceedings against the soldier responsible for shooting the churchman. Whether anyone is punished for this crime, the fact remains that Pastor Suri was a victim of the military operations now under way in Irian Jaya.

East Timorese students stranded in Jakarta

Four East Timorese students who entered the Dutch Embassy in Jakarta on 20 October, asked for political asylum and applied for documents to go to Portugal, were forced to leave the Embassy three days later. They are still in Jakarta, at the mercy of the Indonesian authorities, waiting for the necessary documents and air-tickets to be able to leave Indonesia.

Two of the students were among three students who were picked up in September by elite Kopassus troops, and held for about a month. They are Antonino Goncalves and Joao da Camara, arrested on 3 and 16 September respectively. They were released on 11 October. Both are students of law at the Catholic Atma Jaya University in Jakarta. The other two who sought asylum are Fernando Soares, also an Atma Jaya student, and Abilio Sereno, who studies at the Pancasila University. They share the same house as Goncalves and da Camara, and were questioned by security forces at the time of their friends' detention.

Dutch betrayal

The four entered the Dutch Embassy, believing the Dutch authorities would grant them temporary asylum while arrangements were made for them to obtain Portuguese passports and leave the country. Since Portugal broke off diplomatic relations with Jakarta when Indonesia invaded East Timor in December 1975, the Dutch Embassy has handled consular affairs for Portugal and has issued around 3,000 Portuguese passports to East Timorese wanting to leave the country.

In 1984, the Dutch Embassy granted protection to four West Papuan students who had sought asylum, and arranged their departure to Holland. Even so, the Dutch Government has avoided granting them political refugee status, as this would acknowledge that political persecution of Papuans exists in Indonesia.

This time, the Dutch succumbed more easily to Indonesian pressure. After negotiations between the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, and the Dutch Foreign Minister, Hans van der Broek, who was



Four West Papuans who took refuge in the Dutch Embassy in February 1984 were safely escorted to the airport by Dutch diplomats. [*Sinar Harapan*, 14 March 1984]

delighted to have extricated themselves from an "embarrassing" incident. The Dutch Government wrote to the Indonesian Government thanking them for "peacefully settling the case" [*Jakarta Post*, 25 October]. According to both Dutch and Indonesian officials, there is no need for the students to seek political asylum.

Portugal's response

For several weeks, the Portuguese government avoided saying whether or not they would issue passports to the students. Following a letter on 10 November to the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Pires de Miranda, who was on a visit to London, TAPOL was told by the Portuguese Embassy in London that Portugal instructed the Dutch Embassy on 25 October to issue passports and purchase air-tickets. The Embassy said the stumbling-block preventing the students' departure is Indonesia's insistence that they need exit visas to leave Indonesia.

In a second letter to the Foreign Minister Pires de Miranda on 12 November, TAPOL called this exit visa requirement unacceptable. People who hold EEC passports, which now include the Portuguese, do not need entry or exit visas. Moreover, "the students are leaving Indonesia to evade persecution and are seeking political asylum.... There surely can be no precedent for such an incongruous situation, where persons wishing to flee their country of persecution are dependent on the goodwill of the government of that country in order to be able to leave..."

Background to the students' persecution

According to the Indonesian press, Goncalves and da Camara were arrested in September for possessing firearms, and were released because the security authorities had decided not to bring any charges. The men are said to be former Portuguese soldiers who went over to Fretilin in 1975 and fought with the resistance until they surrendered in the late 1970s. They subsequently got jobs with the East Timor provincial administration and obtained scholarships to study law in Jakarta.

In Indonesia to attend a meeting of EEC and ASEAN foreign ministers, the Embassy staff warned the students that if they did not leave 'voluntarily', the Indonesian police would be called to take them out.

The four students were removed with the assistance of Gerard Bonang, Rector of Atma Jaya University, whose appearance at the Embassy reinforced the impression Mochtar was determined to create, that the students had nothing to fear, and that they could return to their studies without hindrance.

A week later, the students made two more attempts to enter the Embassy but were kept out by Indonesian police on guard outside. On their second attempt, a Dutch diplomat met them at the door but did not allow them to enter. They are now staying at the home of a former Indonesian-appointed governor of East Timor, Guilherme Goncalves, Antonino's uncle, where they have received a number of threatening phone-calls.

Meanwhile, the Dutch and Indonesian governments are

Their release would not necessarily mean that they have nothing more to fear. It is most unlikely that people publicly spoken of as former Fretilin supporters can expect to live, either in Jakarta or Dili, free of constant political harassment, if not re-arrest.

There are hundreds of East Timorese now studying in Java and only recently, several were praised as model students in the Indonesian press [Jakarta Post, 30 July]. This was around the time of the tenth anniversary of integration when the East Timor Student Association was put in charge of 'celebrations' in Jakarta to mark the anniversary.

The impression that the military are suspicious of East Timorese students is reinforced by the arrest of two students home on leave in Dili, along with about 100 other arrests in East Timor. The two had returned to Dili, with many other students, to take part in the government-sponsored celebration of the 10th anniversary of integration.

The two students are: Domingos Sequeira Sarmiento, a law student at UKI, the Christian University of Indonesia, and Germano da Silva, a student at LAN, the Public Administration Institute. After being incommunicado, then in Comarca Prison, Dili, Sarmiento was released and returned to Jakarta. Da Silva is still in detention.



Visits allowed and disallowed

The Indonesian military authorities are extremely selective about the people they allow to visit East Timor. They have turned down a request from the UK Parliamentary Human Rights Group and the Australian Parliament's Amnesty Section to visit East Timor, even though in July this year, a Portuguese parliamentarian, Miguel Anacoreta Correia, was given permission to enter the territory and provided with facilities to visit nine locations, travelling most of the time by helicopter.

Anacoreta Correia of the Christian Democrat party, CDS, is vice-chairperson of the Parliamentary Commission on East Timor. He visited East Timor in July on the invitation of Indonesian Armed Forces commander, General Benny Murdani. The visit did not get the official backing of the Portuguese Parliament and went ahead only as a private visit, not representing Parliament.

Anacoreta Correia strongly favours the preservation of Portuguese cultural traditions in East Timor. He has business interests in Macao, the other remaining Portuguese territory in Asia. Generally speaking, parties on the right in Portugal, including the CDS, have opposed Indonesia's takeover of East Timor and retain a paternal interest in Portugal's former colonial subjects. Before his departure for Indonesia and East Timor, the parliamentarian said one of his aims was to help improve relations between Portugal and Indonesia. He also wanted to see what had become of Portuguese monuments (sic) and other vestiges of Portuguese culture.

A face-saving device for Portugal

The more interesting thing about the visit is to assess General Murdani's aims in encouraging Anacoreta Correia to go, the first time a Portuguese MP has been allowed in. Murdani held two one-hour discussions with Anacoreta Correia, one before and one after his East Timor trip. On the first occasion, Murdani complained about the highly



critical 1983 visit by Portuguese TV journalist, Rui Araujo which, he said, had closed the door to dialogue. (Araujo published a plea for help and a list of names from the prisoners in Atauro island which was secretly handed to him. See TAPOL Bulletin, No 57, May 1983, p 1.)

Later, the East Timor governor, Mario Carrascalao was also frank about the regime's selectivity on visitors. Future visits will be allowed, he told Correia, if the previous visits produce "something positive" towards the solution of the East Timor problem, especially regarding the position of Portugal. Future visits will be impossible if previous visits produce "bad results".

The main point that emerged from the first Correia-Murdani meeting was Murdani's offer to Portugal of a "face-saving device", given the fact that Portugal administered East Timor for almost 500 years. When, at their second meeting, Anacoreta Correia said Portugal's position takes into account that the population of East Timor must be consulted about their future, Murdani stressed that elections will be held next year and that Indonesia is planning to invite UN observers and other personalities to witness the elections. This presumably is Murdani's "face-saving device", not a referendum but a show that the Timorese, by voting in the elections, have thrown in their lot with Indonesia.

Throughout his five-day visit, Anacoreta Correia was accompanied by naval Captain Yusuf Efendi, a member of Murdani's special cabinet, who never left his side.

"A traumatized population"

The Portuguese parliamentarian issued a lengthy report on his visit. Sizeable sections represent little more than an uncritical repetition of what Indonesian officials told him, yet occasionally, he gives a picture of an unhappy population, unwilling to accept Indonesian control. Negative remarks are quickly followed by



The man in charge of operations in East Timor, General Benny Murdani.

something more positive, however, as if there is a conscious attempt at achieving "balance".

The following are some points from the report:

* He complains of excessive security forces surrounding him, which intimidated people who would have liked to talk but dare not do so. Yet, he says that he was not hindered and there were no restrictions.

* He described Dili as a thriving town, with plenty of goods available in the markets. Money flows freely and Dili is a duty-free zone with goods directly shipped in from Singapore. Javanese occupy all important positions while Timorese cannot compete "because of their passivity". He describes the population as being "traumatized" by the civil war (sic) from 1974 and 1976, and says he heard many stories of persecution.

* Lospalos is described as "peaceful", and its churches overflowing though he was there only a few hours. [Lospalos is an area of frequent guerrilla attacks.]

* Outside Dili, he saw almost no men of medium age, but he does not attempt to give any explanation for this disturbing fact.

* Observing that Portuguese monuments are intact, that Portuguese street names have been preserved and that East Timorese continue to practice Portuguese folklore, he drew the conclusion that there is no cultural genocide.

* His complaints about the absence of normal postal links with East Timor led Governor Carrascalao to admit there were problems, though he did not know the cause. The best solution, said Carrascalao, is to tell people to send letters to him and he will forward them.

* Statistics show that more than 100,000 Timorese have died due to armed action or its direct consequences. He said he did not meet anyone who had not lost family members.

* The International Red Cross has had only one representative in East Timor for the past 18 months. She told him that for considerable periods she was not allowed to go anywhere outside Dili and Atauro.

* He obtained information about the military situation only from the military commander, Colonel Yosfiah, who told him the guerrillas only attack civilians at night to obtain food. Yet the Portuguese MP was not permitted to contact the resistance "for security reasons".

* He said General Murdani had told him he was in charge of operations in East Timor

No apparent effect

Anacoreta Correia's report to Parliament appears to have had no effect on Portugal's position. It may be, however, that his personal view of conditions which offers little criticism of Indonesia's record, could affect Portuguese official thinking and win support for Murdani's "face-saving" solution. If Murdani has succeeded in convincing the MP that Portuguese traditions are safe in his hands, the question of self-determination could be allowed to take second place.




Military censorship in West Timor

A Jakarta-based Japanese journalist who visited West Timor recently came face to face with military censorship in West Timor. On a visit to Kupang, the capital of West Timor, he decided to visit Atambua, near the border with East Timor. He made the 200-km trip from Kupang by bus, took a room in a small hotel, and was soon warned by the hotel owner that, according to military regulations, "foreigners are permitted to move about only within a five kilometer radius of the centre of the town". Two days earlier, an English couple had been detained by the army for going outside the town and ordered to return to Kupang.

"Sure enough, the next morning, a man showed up at the hotel who appeared to be a plainclothes security officer and took me to the district command. After being asked a number of questions by the military, I was ordered to leave immediately." [Yomiuri Shimbun, 11 September 1986]



Statement on EAST TIMOR
to the UN Committee of 24
August 1986



occasional reports no. 4

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Fretilin report on human rights abuses

The following is a slightly abridged version of a report compiled in April this year by Kay Rala Gusmao Xanana, chairman of the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance. The document reached Lisbon in mid July.

While Indonesia systematically attempts to deny it, the persecution of the people of East Timor continues. Our people are in shackles. They compare themselves to chickens threatened with the knife, knowing that their throats could be slit any minute.

Any lists we supply on massacres, disappearances, imprisonment and torture will necessarily be incomplete. With the population under constant surveillance, it is difficult to ascertain the exact number of victims. Moreover, some people are constantly being summoned, going in and out of prison.

The difficulty of maintaining contact with the outside world and problems regarding internal communications mean that our denunciations always lag behind events. This obliges us to be selective, using only incidents of the greatest interest, involving a large number of people.

Murders, arrests and beatings

1. On 14 December 1985, troops of the 516th Battalion in Kaikoli/Venilale murdered Armindo, 55 and Marcos, 17, both from Lua-chi village in the district of Uatohako.

2. On 19 January 1986, *nanggala* troops (men of the elite corps, Kopassus) in Kelikai captured Luis Maria da Silva, 44, a village head, and three others, all from Mu-Mana/Wai-Tame, as well as six villagers from Abafala. They were all subjected to brutal violence at the Kelikai military command until 2 February, when they were moved to Comarca prison in Dili, where they are still held.

3. Members of the 643rd Battalion detached to Nahareka have violently persecuted people in the region. On 8 February, four people from the village of Rai La'a and five people from the village of Dare Nau, were brutally beaten up in front of the rest of the population.

4. On 20 January, the local military officer (*babinsa*) of Salaman/Baucau, a soldier named Otamy from the 411th Battalion, brutally beat up seven people from the village of Ossu Luga.

5. In reprisal for two guerrilla operations in the vicinity of Vikeke and Nahareka, troops of Company 4 *nanggalas* captured four people from the villages of Samarago, Dare Nau and Rai La'a; 12 people, including two children aged 10 and 3, and a 7-month old baby, from the village of Karau Balu; ten people from the sub-district of Uma' in Kraik; as well as a 2-year old child from the sub-district of Monumento.

All except three were transferred to Baucau district command on 19 March. The three were subjected to violent interrogation, including electric shock treatment. They were held in one room, sleeping on the floor without sleeping-mats or blankets, with no change of clothing as they were picked up from their fields and had nothing except the rags they were wearing. Sudden arrests like this prevent people from fleeing into the bush.

For food, they get a conch-ful of rice, but because they get rice, the Indonesians claim the prisoners are eating better than at home. This is true because people



Para-commandos of the Kopassus unit arriving for one of their numerous special operations.

in the villages can only eat 'maek' which is usually food only fit for pigs.

Disappearances

In August last year, *nanggala* troops and Vikeke district command (*kodim*) troops carried out sweeps in a number of sub-districts in Vikeke, causing consternation among the population. They raided many homes late at night and captured a number of people, whisking them all away to unknown destinations. By the end of February this year, no contact had yet been made, and they were then regarded as 'missing'. (The report lists the names of 12 missing people. Three people on the list are residential chiefs (RK or RT) and one is a member of the police.)

Death from starvation

The report also provides data about the spread of disease, an indication of the economic state of people living under Indonesian occupation:

1. From December 1985 to February 1986, there were more than 500 cases of influenza in Baucau affecting primarily children aged 1 - 5. There were many deaths.

2. In February 1986, there was over 80 cases of ulcers in Baguia, affecting children, adults and the aged. The

number of cases increased because of lack of treatment. When people asked for medicine, the troops retorted: "Don't bother us, our soldiers are dying in the jungle."


Measles epidemic

3. The report lists a number of people who died from starvation and/or disease. In Kelikai, 15 men, 25 women and 29 children died in January and February this year. Eight men, 7 women and 25 children died in Samalan Baucau. Seventy people, adults and children died in Gari Uai, Baucau, from December 1985 to February 1986. Five people in Lere Loho, Lospalos died of measles, including a one-month old child. In Irara, Lospalos, four died in the same month of measles. Not long ago, there were 20 victims of the same disease in the same sub-district, so the disease had evidently spread because of lack of counter-measures.

In Baduro, Serelau and Maina II, there were 35 deaths from measles in December last year, and many more may have died since, including children, as, when data for the report was collected, many people were close to death.

In Maluro, Lore, the level of starvation got so bad that the Indonesian occupiers felt obliged to distribute food. But some of it was moldy, with the result that a man aged 41, a woman aged 29 and her three-month old baby, and another woman aged 42, died of food poisoning.

* * * * *



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'Released' from Atauro but detained again

More information has been received in Lisbon about the fate of political deportees who were 'released' from Atauro island after being held there for four years. In 1982, around 4,000 people were deported to the island from various parts of East Timor at the height of the 1981-82 campaign against the resistance. Many of the Atauro deportees were family groups.

The authorities frequently claim that Atauro is due to be closed down, and claim that many of the deportees have already been allowed home. Information from East Timor shows that to be a fabrication:

* A list of 149 ex-Atauro deportees has been received. Forty are now being held in Aiserimou, and the other 109 are being held in Mano Tani. Both places are in Aileu, south of Dili.

* In Halikou, between Cailaco and Maliana, near the border with West Timor, there are now known to be eighty out of 132 people who were arrested in Maliana in 1983-84. The other fifty were shot dead. Halikou prison camp is believed to accommodate between two and three thousand detainees.

* Ex-Atauro detainees originally from Same and Ainaro who have been allowed to return home from Atauro now find themselves worse off than before, under the pressure of military officers charged to keep control of them.

* Many former detainees from Atauro were rearrested in August this year in Ainaro, then taken to Dili. Some have disappeared, including Jose Ramos, Joao Xavier, Moises Xavier and Manuel Araujo.

* Another group of ex-Atauro prisoners were arrested in Aileu, were also taken to Dili, and have disappeared.

* An ex-prisoner named Antonio Malae was severely beaten by an Indonesian soldier on the Laao Meiro bridge in Dili. He died later in hospital.

* In the last week of August, Indonesian troops encircled a church in Atsabe, near the border with West Timor, as the congregation were at prayer. Six were arrested and alleged to have received a letter from Antonino Goncalves, a student in Jakarta (see separate item), urging them "to take up arms and rejoin the guerrillas". They were taken to Jogjakarta in Central Java and interrogated under torture. Only one of these has been identified, Mario da Silva, formerly in the Indonesian police force.

* On 13 September at 9 am, military vehicles arrived in Dili from the east and delivered 17 prisoners to Comarca. More prisoners arrived there the same afternoon.

* Political detainees who have recently been released from Comarca Prison are required to report to their local military command once a week. Others who were released in 1984, must report once a month.

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
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Fretilin's map of Lautem



Map: Lem Soa Long

Fretilin's map of Lautem

In the last TAPOL Bulletin, we published details of the situation in and around Lospalos, reproduced from a map received earlier this year from the Fretilin leadership inside East Timor. Fretilin had superimposed the details onto a topographical map of the eastern sector captured from the Indonesian army in December last year.

This time, we have taken another section of the map showing the area along the road from Lautem in the west to Tutualu in the east. The map, to a scale of 1 centimetre to 500 metres, provides very information about concentration camps, food gathering and growing areas and Fretilin guerrilla bases, as well as information about guerrilla attacks during the 29 months from August 1983 to December 1985.

Fretilin leaders have nicknamed the area the 'Talisman Sub-region', for it has always been a stronghold of the resistance movement. As the area where Fretilin commander Xanana Gusmao is believed to operate, it is now a focus of the current Indonesian offensive, with 12 battalions now under instructions to capture Xanana.

The strategic villages

Our present map identifies 16 inhabited areas which the inhabitants call concentration camps. They are in effect strategic villages and are all heavily guarded by troops.


The 16 camps are each inhabited by people who were uprooted from their native regions where they lived in widely dispersed hamlets. The map describes in detail which people live in which camps (numbered as in map):

- 1, for people from Tei Moro and Titi Laxi.
- 2 and 3, for people from Assalaino.
- 4, for people from Luarai, though largely abandoned since November 1983.
- 5, for people from Txai Luturo.
- 6, for people from Bauro.
- 7, also for people from Bauro. Largely abandoned since August 1984.
- 8, for people from Iralafai.
- 9, for people from Sepelata and Lai Kara.
- 10, for people from Somotxo.
- 11, for people from Poros and Meara.
- 12 and 13, for people from Mehara.
- 14 and 15, for people from Porlamano.
- 16, for people from Luarai.

The camps have been set up along the road, conforming with Indonesia's strategic needs. The camps consist of housing for the inhabitants and gardens to grow food. The garden areas vary greatly, in some cases extending for about 1 kilometre, in others just a few hundred metres. Some camps have land where food-gathering is possible.

To make up for the lack of food, inhabitants in some camps are allowed to go out once a month, under armed escort, to areas where food was formerly cultivated, and where certain fruits and edible roots can still be gathered. When food shortages are particularly severe, the military may allow camp-dwellers a second trip in the month. Conversely, when guerrilla activities intensify, the monthly trip may be cancelled.

The four external food-gathering sites available to camps in the area of our map are marked A (for camps 5, 6 and 7), B (for camp 8), C (for camp 9) and D (for camp



Civilians living in an area of East Timor which is under Fretilin control. This is one of many photos received from Fretilin earlier this year.

11). Thus, people living in the other ten camps have nothing but what they can grow or gather within the boundaries of their camp.

The food grown or gathered by villagers is largely confined to the following: coconuts, kumbili (sweet potatoes), mangos, kuan (an edible root), koto moruk (beans), kulu (bread fruit) and a few vegetables.

The villagers are occasionally allowed to go in groups under military escort to a nearby town for the purposes of selling garden products for cash, to buy clothes and other necessities.

The confinement of East Timorese villagers to camps has drastically reduced their access to land, making food production precarious. As one analyst of the Fretilin map has pointed out, speaking of the map as a whole, the population in this region which was dispersed over an area of 1,700 square kilometres before the Indonesian invasion, is now confined to about 70 square kilometres, less than 5 per cent of the total land area [*Em Timor-Leste a Paz e Possivel*, No 17, October 1986].

Guerrilla operations

Most of the guerrilla units in this sector are from the First Autonomous Company. They operate from five areas or bases, shown in our map as unshaded ovals, four in the north and one in the south. Three are named - Sakalo, Puluro and Nana Foe - while the other two have no names. Two regular Falintil companies, the Eastern Guerrilla Company and Unit I of Company A, also operate in this sector. Their positions lie in the south, while the autonomous units are mainly in the north.

Autonomous units are composed of guerrillas who recently defected from Indonesian armed units, and are under the direct command of Fretilin commander, Xanana. Regular units are composed of guerrillas who have been in the resistance for many years, and form the armed wing, Falintil.

Since the latest Indonesian offensive was launched (see page 1), concentrating heavily on this eastern sector, it is more than likely that the guerrilla bases have shifted locations. Operating in such a small territory, Fretilin has learnt from bitter experience in the late 1970s that permanent guerrilla bases are difficult to defend against Indonesian attack, so they have learnt to become highly mobile.

Along the road, units of Falintil, the armed wing of Fretilin, launched several attacks on military convoys, while the military posts guarding some of the camps were attacked. In total, the map reports 15 attacks on camps and 7 ambushes on military convoys in this particular sector during the 29 months to December 1985.

Following the numbering in our map, attacks 1, 2 and 3 occurred in November 1983, February 1984 and July 1984. After the third attack, the inhabitants were told to abandon the camp and move to camps 5 and 6. Attack 4 was launched in August 1984. After attack 5 in November 1983, camp 4 was abandoned. Attacks 6 and 7 were launched in June and August 1984, after which most camp inhabitants were moved to camp 2.

Attack 8 occurred on 8 November, followed by attack 9 four days later, launched simultaneously with an ambush of a military convoy. Attacks 10 and 11 occurred on 24 November 1983 and in August 1984. Attacks 12 and 15 occurred on 12 and 24 October, while attack 13 was launched against the heavily guarded Mehara-Portlamano village in August 1984. Attack 14 was in December 1983.

An entire village massacred

The entire population of the village of Fo-Mano was wiped out by Indonesian troops in a reprisal raid, according to a press communique of the UDT Political Commission in Lisbon, issued on 10 September. The massacre occurred on 3 August and is believed to have been in reprisal for a successful Fretilin ambush on an Indonesian military convoy a few days earlier near the river Be-Bui, when a company of soldiers, including the commanding officer, was killed.

Fo-Mano is in the sub-district of Xana, Uatolari, which lies due south of Baucau, near the south coast.

According to *The Guardian* [21 November 1986], the UDI says it has first-hand evidence of the massacre.

In its communique, the UDT warns that the policy being pursued by Indonesia, in refusing to acknowledge East Timor's right to self-determination, leaves only two alternatives: a unending war or the total liquidation of the East Timorese people. "The second alternative does not seem to be far from the horizon."

Indonesia and PNG sign Friendship Treaty

After months of negotiation, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have signed a Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Co-operation. The Treaty pledges non-interference in each other's internal affairs. It states that the signatories agree "to conduct their respective nations' affairs along the mutual border bearing in mind the interests of the other" and vow not to cooperate with others "in hostile or unlawful acts against each other or allow territory to be used for such acts" [*The Australian*, 28 October].

The Treaty means that PNG formally accepts that it can no longer show any concern for human rights violations in West Papua, nor question Indonesia's programme of swamping the indigenous population by means of massive re-settlement of transmigrants from Java and elsewhere in the west.

At the same time, the two countries' Joint Border Committee (JBC) has been meeting to finalise new border accords covering the question of "border-crossers" (Indonesia insists that the refugees now in Papua New Guinea are "border crossers"), joint survey and mapping of the border area, ways to improve communications, and a memorandum on Search and Rescue (SAR) operations.

The PNG Foreign Minister has reportedly proposed that SAR teams should be allowed to operate up to within 10 kilometres of both sides of the border. PNG however insists that SAR should not include hot pursuit of armed groups fighting against the Indonesian military. The most recent JBC meeting in October, held in Bandung, was unable to reach agreement on the SAR memorandum [*Jakarta Post*, 23 October].

Foreign Minister Mochtar made it clear while in Port Moresby that Indonesia is pressing for agreement on joint military actions with PNG. Asked whether SAR operations could be used to disguise search and destroy operations against the OPM, he said that if Indonesia wanted joint military action "we would be frank about it. There may come a time when we have such co-operation" [*Sydney*

Morning Herald, 29 October].


PNG lawyer condemns Treaty

PNG lawyer, Bernard Narokobi, known for his outspoken support for West Papuan refugees and condemnation of Indonesia's annexation of West Papua, has strongly attacked the Treaty, saying it would have the effect of silencing the voice of the PNG people, if they choose to take the illegal and immoral annexation of West Papua to the UN.

He warned that Indonesia has never agreed to be bound by decisions of the International Court of Justice, and in the event that Indonesia breached provisions of the Treaty, PNG would find it difficult to obtain redress by going to the Court [*PNG Times*, 31 October - 6 November].



The Foreign Minister of PNG,
Legu Vagi.



Bernard Narokobi

News of the transmigration programme

Public statements by officials responsible for the transmigration programme continue to reflect a defensiveness against international criticism. Over the past few months, officials, ministers and the press have continued to proclaim that foreigners are wilfully misrepresenting transmigration. Critics are portrayed as ignorant or politically motivated, while no-one has attempted to answer the criticisms made in a series of articles published in the May 1986 issue of *The Ecologist* [Vol. 16, No 2/3, 1986], devoted to transmigration.

A meeting to discuss the programme that should have taken place between representatives of the World Bank, the Indonesian government and Indonesian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) was suddenly cancelled after Emil Salim, Minister for Population and the Environment, announced somewhat vaguely that "informal discussions" had taken place instead, and that "since this dialogue has already taken place, the meeting is no longer relevant. We have already given a rational explanation of transmigration" [Kompas, 1 October 1986].



Salim announced that the President had approved the creation of a "communications forum on population and development to further improve co-ordination of the transmigration programme". This is to consist of government agencies, members of parliament and representatives of NGOs. It appears to be a move to institutionalise and thus stifle domestic discussion of the programme.

The Transmigration Minister has promoted several more organised tours of transmigration sites, following the large group of western diplomats who were given a guided tour in July [see TAPOL Bulletin No 77, September 1986].

Journalists from Papua New Guinea were shown round sites, as was a group of fifteen foreign journalists who visited Irian Jaya. [For a report on their encounter with the OPM, see page 11.]

Press told to cooperate

Meanwhile, there are blatant efforts to curb press interest and critical reporting of the programme. The Transmigration Minister, Martono, used the rather subtle Javanese approach of suggesting that the press is one of the sectors involved in making the programme a success. It must be part of the "non-governmental implementation apparatus" of the programme. The press should concentrate on disseminating information that is "objective, well-aimed and useful" to transmigration as a programme that promotes the people's welfare. "This doesn't mean I don't want to be criticised. But criticism should be educative and informative, and support and develop the programme, and not talk a lot of misguided nonsense [ngawur]."

Significantly, these remarks were addressed to a group of journalists from Irian Jaya (West Papua), on a trip to see transmigration projects in other parts of the country. With reference to Irian Jaya which, as Martono recognised, is a focus of world attention, he said that journalists should strive for "balance" and explain the positive aspects of the programme in Irian Jaya" [Kompas, 5 August 1986].

Meanwhile, the journal of the Irian Jaya Community Development Foundation (YPMD-Irian Jaya), *Kabar dari Kampung*, has ceased publication, having apparently lost its publishing permit. In the past, it has been the only publication in Indonesia to produce well-researched reports on the damaging effects of transmigration and other programmes in the territory.

Dispossessed peasants warned by local officials

People in Central Java who are holding out for fairer compensation for their land and refusing to become transmigrants, have been threatened with firm action by local officials. This follows moves by villagers, who have been forced to relinquish their land in favour of a hydro-electric plant, to take their complaints to the Jogjakarta Legal Aid Institute (LBH).

The Kedung Ombo dam, part of the project, has displaced 3,774 families from three agricultural areas, Grobogan, Boyolali and Sragen. The price offered for their land, Rp. 633 per square metre, is well below the market price. Of the 3,774 families, over 2,000 succumbed to official pressure and agreed to transmigrate to Irian Jaya, Central and South Sumatra. But others are refusing to go.

The head of the Boyolali office for social and political affairs told journalists there is no way the compensation offer will be increased, claiming that the price was agreed after consultation. With intelligence officers from the local police and army looking on, he alleged that outsiders were manipulating the villagers, alleging that their activities had "criminal tendencies" or "smacked of politics". His evidence for these sweeping statements rested on the observation that, when

questioned about terms used in a letter to petition for higher compensation, some villagers were "confused" and could not explain what the phrases meant.

LBH warned to keep out

So far, he said, the local authorities had confined themselves to taking repressive (sic) measures but if the situation dragged on, they would adopt firm measures. [The borderline between 'repressive' and 'firm' measures is not explained.] The authorities would do everything to prevent the LBH getting involved, he said.

Five people from Boyolali representing 775 people in three villages have visited the LBH office in Jogjakarta. They said they want adequate compensation to buy land nearby, stressing that "there is no need to transmigrate us". [Suara Merdeka, 4 September and Jakarta Post, 21 September 1986]

This case should be viewed in the context of political and social circumstances in Central Java. Boyolali is one of the most densely populated and impoverished areas of Java. Nevertheless, local people are loathe to leave and resettle outside Java. The low acceptance rate for transmigration in this area has concerned officials for some time. Not surprisingly, pre-1965 support for land reform was strong and the now-banned communist party (PKI) had a huge following in Boyolali. This was an area where the post-October 1965 massacres took a huge toll of life.

The military regime is keen to stamp out any signs of community action. This is where several hundred "ex-PKI" families displaced by the dam, were told they could not transmigrate because of a decree denying "ex-PKI" people access to transmigration anywhere in the country.

Misleading figures

Officials still persist in claiming that only 2,000 transmigrant families have abandoned sites [Kompas, 14 October, 1986]. Yet, in the self-same month that this claim was repeated, the press reported that 3,301 transmigrants who were forced to leave their homes in Galunggung, district of Tasikmalaya, West Java because of a volcanic eruption and thick ash-fall in 1982, have returned home. This is particularly striking because Galunggung is still covered in ash and is officially regarded as being too dangerous to inhabit.

Officials say that nothing could prevail upon the transmigrants to remain where they were. The villagers from Galunggung complained that many promises made to them had never been kept. The returnees were warned that if new disaster befalls them, they will not again be allowed to transmigrate.

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TRANSMIGRATION

In fact, local officials have taken to warning transmigrants, in speeches to departing villagers, not to return home, even in face of hardship. Thus, the district head of Tangerang told departing transmigrants: "If any among you people can't adapt to life on a transmigration site, don't come back to Tangerang. I don't need people like you here" [Berita Buana, 30 August 1986].

No Javanisation

The charge that transmigration is a vehicle for colonisation of the outer islands, East Timor and West Papua by the Javanese has stung the administration into making cosmetic changes to transmigration policy. People are now saying that transmigration should not be spoken of in terms of Javanese issues [Sinar Harapan, 22, 26 and 30 September].

Sri Edi Swasono, a lecturer at the University of Indonesia, caused a stir when he suggested that charges of Javanisation could be avoided if the Javanese stopped naming sites, roads and houses with Javanese names and became more sensitive to the lifestyles of the indigenous people [Kompas, 23 September]. This led to allegations of Java-phobia. Said one Javanologist, the Javanese were making great sacrifices by uprooting themselves, and should not be blamed if they want to retain their identity by the use of their own names [Sinar Harapan, 26 September].

Another development is the emphasis now being given to the eastern string of islands, Nusatenggara Timur (NTT) and Nusatenggara Barat (NTB) as sources of transmigrants, in particular for resettlement in Irian Jaya. The switch came about with a presidential decree in October, opening up NTT and NTB to the outflow of transmigrants. Most of these islands, excepting Lombok, have low population



A typical Javanese transmigrant family. How much better off are they than when they were at home in Java?

densities and are under-developed as compared with Java. It is hard to see what purpose these new settlers will serve, apart from diverting attention from the issue of Javanisation. Indeed when NTT governor, retired Major-General Ben Mboi announced the new decree, he denied charges from abroad that transmigration means colonisation and Javanisation.

Mboi was also able to announce, within a month of the decree, that no fewer than 50,000 families or about a quarter of a million people, have agreed to leave these under-populated islands.

Lampung now reversing the flow of transmigrants

Lampung, the most important transmigration area in Sumatra, has become so over-crowded that provincial planners have decided to reverse the region's role, from receiving to sending out transmigrants. The turnaround is caused primarily by the belated acknowledgement that transmigration has caused havoc to the province's forest reserves. Things have been exacerbated by serious floods that swept parts of South Lampung in November, in which around one hundred people lost their lives, with thousands more being made homeless.

The floods are themselves the result of a huge influx of people into protected forest lands, who have cut down trees indiscriminately for purposes of cultivation [Kompas, 5 November 1986].

Non-government sponsored transmigrants are entering Lampung at a rate of about 1,000 a day, many of them settling in protected forest lands or nature reserves. According to Minister Martono, the government now faces a serious dilemma: the shortage of cash has forced it to reduce the number of official transmigrants and rely instead on spontaneous transmigrants to help achieve targets. But, he complains, the spontaneous transmigrants are the ones who settle anywhere they like, and have wrought havoc in Lampung's forest-lands [Kompas, 11 November]. More and more forest lands have become critical, and it is estimated that some 400,000 hectares of forest land in Lampung are being illegally tilled.

The decision to start moving out the province's 'surplus' population followed the discovery that plans to shift 42,000 families now living in protected forest lands in South Lampung to North Lampung, had to be abandoned because the land intended for them was occupied

by settlers from other parts of Indonesia. Now, the province's transmigration officials will have to start looking elsewhere to re-settle close on half a million people. [Kompas, 7 November 1986]

The crisis currently facing Lampung is a grim foretaste of the problems that await other transmigration areas as more and more forest-land is cleared to make way for settlers from Java.

New scheme of land dispossession

Meanwhile, the Transmigration Minister has thought up a new scheme to dispossess tribal people in West Papua and Kalimantan of their ancestral lands. The scheme is called "renovating (*pemugaran*) villages".

The government has been forced to admit that tribal people have resisted government plans to incorporate them into transmigration sites, so plans have now been devised to reconstruct native villages alongside transmigration sites located on tribal land. The offer of renovation - including building roads, schools and the like - will be made in exchange for agreement by tribal leaders to allow their ancestral lands to be converted into state land. Some of the land will then be 'given' to the tribal people as plots of private land, and the rest used for transmigrants.

Martono claims he has the agreement of tribal chiefs and local government officers for the scheme [Kompas, 5 November 1986]. This disregards the fact that conversion of tribal land into private property, even for members of the tribe, is in direct conflict with the traditional ties between land and tribals who have lived on it for generations. It will also disrupt people's lifestyles and cause just as much havoc as forcing the people to live on transmigration sites.



NEW BOOKS

Suharto on Trial, General H.R. Dharsono's Defence Plea. Lembaga Merah Putih, Amsterdam, 1986.
Price: £3.75 including postage, or £5.25 airmail.


The publication, in English translation, of the defence plea of retired Lieutenant-General H.R. Dharsono, delivered in court on 3 January this year, is a useful contribution to an understanding of the army's clampdown on dissidence since 1984.

Dharsono was found guilty of subversion and given a 10-year sentence on 8 January. The sentence was later reduced to 7 years on appeal to the High Court. An appeal to the Supreme Court upheld the 7-year verdict, after which Dharsono announced that he would not ask for presidential clemency.

The book includes several documents on the 1984 Tanjung Priok massacre -- the White Book, two testimonies in court of victims injured in the shooting, and detailed notes about other victims. Dharsono went to considerable lengths to use the court-room to attack General Murdani's official version of what happened in Tanjung Priok by examining the provocative events leading to the massacre.

The retired general, once a staunch supporter of the New Order created in 1965 following another massacre, when around a million people were slaughtered, gradually became disillusioned with the course Suharto was taking, and turned into one of Suharto's leading critics in the 1980s. His argument with Suharto is a prime example of the controversy that has developed among military factions in the past two decades. All are strongly anti-communist, but offer conflicting ideas of how the Indonesian military should run the country.

By its very nature, this is not a political biography of the writer; rather it is his political testament. Bred in the same tradition as Suharto, and sharing many political ideas, one can question Dharsono's genuine commitment to democracy. However, his defence plea must certainly rank as one of Indonesia's most important political documents of 1986.



Funu, the Unfinished Saga of East Timor, by Jose Ramos Horta who has represented Fretilin at the UN since 1975, gives a compelling account of the successes and frustrations of working on behalf of East Timor on the world stage. We shall publish a review in the next issue, with details about the price.


'Usroh' prosecutions spread

Members of the so-called Usroh network continue to be persecuted in towns and villages across Central Java. All are charged with subversion and an alleged plot to overthrow the Indonesian Republic and replace it with an Indonesian Islamic State. Since the first four sentences reported in TAPOL Bulletin No 77, page 4, many of the first group of 16 to be tried have been sentenced.

The press also reports that in Brebes, East Java, five men are being interrogated in connection with Usroh teachings, and in Jogjakarta, 2 men have gone on trial for alleged Usroh activities.

The following have been sentenced since our last report:

Sugiman al Yulianto, 29, was sentenced to 10 years in Karanganyar. His lawyers condemned the manipulation of witnesses, the false construction of evidence and the illusory nature of the Usroh plot [Kedaulatan Rakyat, 24 September].



In Surakarta, **Wiyono al M. Sidik**, 31, a goldsmith and one of the first to be charged, got 11 years, the longest Usroh sentence to date. Wiyono, who broke down when the sentence was announced, was alleged to have coordinated Usroh throughout Surakarta and its environs [Kedaulatan Rakyat, 20 October].

In Boyolali, **Mualit**, 36, a teacher of religion, and his brother, **Nur Falah**, 38, a farmer, were sentenced on the same day to 7 years each [Suara Merdeka, 26 October].

The largest number of Usroh cases have been heard in Klaten, Central Java:

Slamet Riyadi, 35, and most recently, **Parto Sulur**, 34, both got 8 years.

Sarjoko, whose trial was hardly reported at all, got 7 years.

M. Bakir, 43, a teacher of religion and alleged coordinator of Usroh in Klaten, got 9 years. Bakir's eagerness to agree with statements by the prosecution and judges may have raised suspicions about his role. During his trial, however, the prosecutor berated the defendant for allegedly communicating with a German member of Amnesty International, that "false, hypocritical and inciteful organisation" [Suara Merdeka, 17 September]. Like other Usroh defendants Bakir served a previous term for alleged involvement in the so-called 'Warman Terror'.

Three other defendants have been sentenced: **Budi Santosa** and **Rusdi** got 8 years, and **Marsidi** got 5 years. There is no news about the trials of **M. Salim** and 'MR'.

Concocting links with other networks

A sinister development in the more recent Usroh trials is the attempt to link them with other Muslim groupings already found guilty of subversion. This became apparent in two trials in Jogjakarta where 'MSS', 27, a student at Gajah Mada University, and 'MAR' (Mgn bin Syaf), 42, a tailor, have both been charged with subversion because of Usroh connections. 'MSS' is alleged to have conducted 'training sessions' and criticised the sole-ideology law, while 'MAR' was accused of distributing the banned *Al-Ikhwah* publication. This way, alleged Usroh members are being linked with seditious activities already proven as subversive in other courts. 'MSS' and his friends are also said to have been attempting a revival of the Darul Islam and NII movement. Rejecting these preposterous charges, 'MSS' said: "How can a young man like me, on the basis of having listened to a single lecture, be said to have decided to found a new state, under whatever name?" He also denied links with anything called Usroh [Kedaulatan Rakyat, 21 October].

The Muslim arrests have spreading further afield to Bojonegara, East Java, where three men have been taken in for questioning. There is no mention yet of Usroh, but their cases are related to Islamic teachings and interpretations.

Another two are being questioned in Surabaya, also East Java. These cases appear to relate not to Islamic teachings but to Javanese mysticism (*kebatinan*). Whether this indicates a widening of the Usroh net to cover a diversity of opinions, or whether new fields are about to be ploughed can only be determined by the course of events.




Syarifin Maloko goes on trial

Syarifin Maloko, one of the Muslim preachers who spoke at a rally in Tanjung Priok on 12 September 1984, hours before troops shot down demonstrators, has been charged in a Jakarta court, following his arrest in West Java, in June this year.

The trial started amid controversy, when the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) announced that it could not supply a defence team for the trial. Although the refusal was said to be because of a lack of lawyers, Buyung Nasution was more frank when he explained that there were doubts whether the defendant was genuinely fighting for his beliefs. "We don't care what the beliefs are, but we only defend genuine people," said Nasution, who coordinates defence work for subversive trials. His remarks recall strong suspicions, expressed during the Dharsono trial when Nasution led the team of defence lawyers, that Maloko and another preacher, M. Nasir, played a provocative role on the night of 12 September.

After LBH refused to defend Maloko, a team of lawyers was supplied by the lawyers' organisation, Ikadin.

Election Special II



The three contestants, with Golkar in the middle, take the 'sole-ideology' road.
[*Sinar Harapan*, 16 February 1986]

The Presidency

On 21 October, General Suharto told a Golkar rally that he would stand for another 5-year term as president. This will be his fifth term, outstripping Sukarno who served for 20 years. As the sole candidate, Suharto's election in 1988, a year after the April 1987 general elections, will be a pure formality.

His acceptance announcement followed months of calls from many organisations and all three political parties, queuing up to proclaim their support for yet another term for Suharto. All this might be taken as signalling overwhelming support for Suharto, but superficial observations can be deceptive. As compared with previous elections, Suharto's position has recently undergone quite a battering. Apart from the stories circulating about his corruption, more and more people are beginning to question his role in the October 1965 events (see item on Suharto and the 1965 affair). Moreover, his attempt to glorify his role in the 1 March 1949 general attack on Jogjakarta, which was then under Dutch occupation, is not proving very successful.

It is apposite to compare for a moment the later years of Suharto's presidency with those of his predecessor, Sukarno. It was at the height of his popularity in the early 1960s that Sukarno was appointed president for life and numerous honorific titles were showered on him, greatly boosting his ego. But the men responsible for this elevation to god-like status, among them some of his closest aides, had no intention of strengthening his position. On the contrary, although presidential powers remained firmly in his hands, the seeds of his own downfall were sown by these sycophants, some of whom later helped the military to discredit their former boss.

Suharto too has now attained something approaching god-like status, but being aware of the mistakes of his predecessor, he has avoided life-presidency and shunned

titles like 'father of development'. The image he projects is humility, a stickler for constitutionality, having made sure of the support of all those permitted to take part in political processes.

The succession

Yet, even so, battles are raging between his closest associates, and the stakes are high, namely, the succession. General Benny Murdani, commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, is openly building his own framework, complete with think-tank, strategic appointments within the bureaucracy and a base of his own in the political parties. General Sudharmono, State Secretary and chairman of Golkar, the other contestant, is doing exactly the same, with a greater power base in the bureaucracy though virtually nothing among combat troops.

Moreover, time is running out for Suharto. The stories circulating about his ailing health, whether true or not, have made the succession battle more intense, especially since Suharto suggested during his acceptance speech that he might need to be replaced in mid-term. Perhaps he did this deliberately to intensify the rivalry, for the fact is that he is becoming more and more lonely at the top. There is little left of his 'inner core' group, no-one to replace such close associates as General Ali Murtopo and General Sudjano Humardani, both now dead. None of the new generation of officers now in top positions of command show any signs of 'inner core' eligibility.

It was Suharto himself who stated publicly that he did not want to become president for life. His acceptance speech was humble to a fault. But Suharto was clearly infuriated by suggestions earlier this year that a constitutional limit should be placed on the number of terms a president can serve. It was General Suhardiman, a member of Golkar's contingent in parliament, the very man who master-minded Sukarno's appointment as president for

life, who first questioned unlimited presidential terms. This indiscretion may have cost Suhardiman his seat in Parliament, but he has not let the matter rest. In a more recent remark, he said that by the end of the next presidential term in 1993, a younger generation should take over the leadership, hinting that 1987-1992 must be Suharto's last term.

So, as the issue of the presidency dies down, the issue of vice-presidency is likely to emerge as a focus for political manoeuvring. Retired General Amir Machmud, chairman of Parliament, recently declaring that there is no ban on suggesting candidates for the post [Kompas, 13 November], a way perhaps of getting the various factions to show their cards. Barring major social upheavals, the post of vice-president will be the path along which the regime's next leader will be chosen.

Screening the candidates

Enforced acceptance by all parties of Pancasila as their sole-ideology might have been thought enough to ensure the regime a thumping majority. Nowadays, which ever party 'wins', Parliament will be packed with loyalists. However, the regime is leaving nothing to chance and will impose tight control over election procedures at all stages. For the purposes of supervision, it has created two powerful bodies, a screening committee, and a committee to control election campaigning.



General Murdani

Ever since the first post-1965 general elections in 1971, the military regime has given itself special powers to screen party lists of candidates. This time round, a new element has been introduced, the Certificate of Personal Cleanliness (SKBD). [See page 4.] The Screening Committee charged with checking election lists and ordering the exclusion of candidates deemed unsuitable, is a high-power intelligence group, chaired by Major-General Hari Sugiman, head of Social and Political Affairs at the Interior Ministry. This Central Investigation Committee (*Panitia Penelitian Pusat*), along with its regional network of committees, includes the state intelligence agencies - Bais and Bakin - the security agency, Kopkamtib, the Armed Forces headquarters and the Veterans Association.

Already the press has reported the elimination of many names, and it appears that more Golkar candidates than candidates of the other parties have failed to come up to the criteria set by this inquisition.

Controlling the campaign

State control of the election campaign is in the hands of a *Panitia Pengawas Pelaksanaan Pemilu Pusat* (Central Committee to Supervise the Conduct of the Election). It has laid down rules which effectively exclude any political campaigning by the 'contesting' parties. The Attorney-General chairs the Committee, but the key figure is the vice-chairman, Major-General Nugroho, Armed Forces representative on the Committee and prosecutor in charge of intelligence affairs at the Attorney-General's Office. Nugroho is also a man long associated with General Benny Murdani's intelligence network.

The conditions under which the 1987 campaign will be conducted are set out in an interview of Nugroho by Tempo [4 October 1986], from which we take the following extracts:

Tempo: Will anyone who breaches the rules lose their right to vote?

Nugroho: That hasn't been regulated. It will be discussed by the Committee.

Tempo: Can people be accused of subversion?



General Sudharmono

Nugroho: Subversion relates to the material used in the campaign. People are prohibited from making attacks. Anyone attacking Pancasila or inciting others to hate the government will be charged under the Anti-Subversion Law.

Tempo: What about if people assess government policy?

Nugroho: That's not allowed either. That could endanger national unity. That has to be fenced off (*dipagari*). Let people confine themselves to saying, "If I win, I'll build you a house". Yes, there are limits. If not, ethnic or religious matters could emerge...

Tempo: The elections will choose Parliament and hence also the MPR (People's Assembly). It's the MPR that will choose the next government and it is legally entitled to assess the present government's performance.

Nugroho: Oh yes, that's legal. But as for the elections, this is a matter of the nation's interests. So, there are general laws, and there are also limits required by the

situation and conditions. People can say things like that in America because when people say things there, it doesn't matter. But here, religious and ethnic questions are sensitive.

Tempo: But the security situation is stable, isn't it?
Nugroho: Yes, but we don't want there to be victims. That's to do with the conditions. Each country has its own rules according to the conditions. So we need to fence things off....

Tempo: What about preaching in the mosques?
Nugroho: If sermons smack of campaigning and they are delivered during the campaign, that's forbidden. If it's not during the campaign, then it's a matter for the security forces.

Tempo: How far will the counting of votes be reliable?
Nugroho: Well, there's our Committee and there are witnesses. And also, we have a free press in Indonesia, don't we?

* * * * *

It has also been announced that all campaign speeches will be vetted by a special committee under the Ministry of the Interior with representatives of the police and other security agencies [Jakarta Post, 21 August 1986]. The announcement suggests that all speeches will have to be handed in, in advance, for vetting.

In his Tempo interview, Nugroho also said that, to make sure campaign speeches come within the rules, "there will be people listening to speeches, so as to report (breaches)". As our readers will know, much of the evidence used in the current Muslim trials was based on the reports of army spies monitoring public speeches.

Armed Forces loosens ties with Golkar

Lieutenant-General Bambang Triantoro, assistant for social and political affairs at the Armed Forces HQ, has announced that the Armed Forces will loosen its ties with Golkar [Tempo 20 September 1986]. This is a departure from earlier elections when the Armed Forces gave massive support to Golkar. Now that all parties have complied with the sole-ideology law, making Pancasila their only



Lieutenant-General Bambang Triantoro

principle, Triantoro sees no reason why retired military officers, for example, should not throw in their lot with the PDI or the PPP, something unheard-of in previous elections. In fact, he said the Armed Forces should help the two smaller parties perform well at the elections.

Triantoro's statement is in line with General Benny Murdani's recent pronouncements, pleading for the non-Golkar 'contestants' to be helped along in their campaigns. As explained in our earlier Election Special, Murdani played quite a role in rescuing the PDI from collapse.

The PDI, once the rump party composed of the old nationalist party, PNI, and the two Christian parties, Parkindo and Partai Katolik, has now been re-born, becoming more like a business enterprise than a political party. Indeed, Hardjantho, a PDI veteran and still PDI vice-chairman of Parliament, is so disgusted with the new-style PDI which he compared to a "veem" (a harbour company) that he has announced he will not accept nomination for it in the coming elections.

There are shifting patterns of loyalty towards the non-Golkar parties. Whereas Christians previously tended to see Golkar as the safe party to support, rather than the old-style PDI which was supposed to have been 'their party', they now appear to be turning back to the PDI which, under new management, can be regarded as a safe haven and well-regarded in army circles. Muslims on the other hand have lost any sense of identity with the PPP and are enlisting with Golkar, especially in Central and East Java.

The Armed Forces Fraction

The Armed Forces fraction has also undergone change. This is the parliamentary group consisting of military appointees. In the new, enlarged parliament of 500 seats, they will get 100 seats, 25 more than at present. Up to now, Armed Forces MPs have mostly come from the ranks of retired colonels or generals. Now, the Armed Forces will choose their MPs from officers still on active service, causing a major overhaul in the composition of their fraction. The majority of their present MPs will be retired from parliament, with 23 being shifted over to Golkar. They will expect to be high enough up on Golkar lists to be sure of retaining a seat in 1987.

The Armed Forces leadership now regard a stint in parliament as an essential element in the career of higher-ranking officers. In August this year, many carefully selected officers attended a special course on "how to be a parliamentarian". Most were lieutenant-colonels, colonels and brigadier-generals with a spattering of majors. They were drilled not only for parliament but also for the provincial and district assemblies.

An example of this new-style integration between military and political duties is Major-General Saiful Sulun, now commander of the prestigious East Java Division who has already served a term in parliament.

The army sees this integration as one way to safeguard its constant meddling in social and political affairs, the non-military side of the dual-function. The key message conveyed to the men at the recent seminar was that a seat in parliament is a good place "to mingle with society".

The Armed Forces fraction acts as the watchdog of government policies in parliament. As parliamentarians, they do not lose their military zeal. Should any wayward MP dare to express a dissenting voice, the military MPs will be there to bark them down. All the talk about 'mingling with society' does not detract from the deep-rooted military contempt for civilian politicians. There is no sign that this tradition will change among the new crop of officers who will be putting away their uniforms for a while, to play a role in Indonesia's 'People's Representative Council'.

Sinar Harapan closed for good

Sinar Harapan, one of Indonesia's two independent newspapers, has been closed down for good. The paper's publishing permit was annulled on 9 October, and on 30 October, Minister of Information Harmoko announced, following a meeting with President Suharto, that the paper would never be allowed to appear again [*Kompas*, 30 October].

SH had the second largest circulation in the country, around 350,000 copies, second only to the Catholic paper, *Kompas*. It was an evening paper, competing successfully with the only other evening paper in the capital, *Terbit*, a sensational paper owned by the Pos Kota group of which Information Minister Harmoko was formerly managing-director.

The edict banning the paper accused it of publishing "speculative" reports which "might fuel unrest among the people... no matter whether there is any truth in the reports". The paper was therefore accused of posing a "threat to national stability".



Sinar Harapan, 11 February 1984.

Meanwhile, a Semarang, Central Java daily, *Suara Merdeka*, and three North Sumatra dailies, *Analisa*, *Sinar Indonesia* and *Waspada*, were given "stern warnings" for publishing the report on import regulations that led to SH's closure.

Suharto business interests involved

The item which led to *Sinar*'s demise was a report that the Trade Ministry was planning to revoke forty-four regulations which confer monopolies on a number of companies for the import of industrial materials. Following the 12 September devaluation of the rupiah, many commentators had stressed the need to remove these monopolies which are a primary factor in keeping domestic production costs high. [See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 77, September 1986.]

The controversy directly affects Suharto's closest business associates. Some monopolies are held by Liem Sioe Liong companies while others are held by his sons,

Sigit, Bambang and Tommy. According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review* [30 October], these three are now known in Jakarta business circles as the 'Tosiba Group', apeing the name of the huge Japanese electronics monopoly. (Needless to say, the FEER article was expunged from the journal. The page was torn out of all copies before the issue was distributed in Indonesia.)

In early October, pressure for these regulations to be lifted was intensifying and it appears that top-level circles pushing for this used the paper to reinforce their campaign.

However, the paper and its publishing house has been annoying the regime for some time. In recent months, it published comments suggesting that in future, Indonesian presidents should not be allowed to serve for more than two five-year terms. (Suharto has recently announced his intention to stand for a fifth term.) It was also the *Sinar* publishing group that published the Indonesian translation of Harold Crouch's *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, which was recently banned [see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 76, July 1986].

A take-over battle?

Sinar's closure could open the way for a battle to take over this major publishing house and all its extensive printing facilities. Already as long ago as February this year, General Murdani was hinting, soon after Golkar had taken control of another Jakarta daily, *Pelita*, formerly a paper representing the views of the then Muslim party, PPP, that it might be *Sinar*'s turn next [*FEER*, 6 March 1986. See also *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 74, March 1986.]

It would not be in Murdani's interest to promote a Golkar takeover of the paper, however. His interests lie these days in promoting the re-vamped PDI which he is trying to use to clip the wings of his arch-rival, General Sudharmono, Golkar chairman. *Sinar Harapan*, as a matter of fact, was the publication of the protestant churches whose party formerly merged into PDI. The paper has long ceased to be regarded as the mouthpiece of any party. Murdani may now wish to provide his favourite party with a media vehicle to bolster its image in the run-up to the April 1987 general elections.

When announcing that *Sinar Harapan* had been closed down for good, Harmoko said that another paper could of course appear in its stead, provided "its ideological, juridical, strategic and social basis" was acceptable.

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SOEHARTO ON TRIAL

Habibie seeks new openings in the US

Indonesia's decision to purchase 12 F-16 fighter planes from the US has opened up new opportunities for B.J. Habibie, head of Indonesia's military-industrial complex. His earlier image as a European ally has been modified overnight, and the doors of US arms manufacturers have been opened wide.

He was clearly delighted with the red-carpet welcome accorded to him when he visited Washington in October. His main purpose was to seek openings for the transfer of technology now made possible by the 35 per cent 'offset' written in to the F-16 deal, obliging the manufacturers, General Dynamics, to purchase components from Habibie's company, IPTN.

It is common knowledge that America's exports of hi-tech equipment and know-how is controlled by the Departments of Defence and Trade. Such transfers are normally allowed only to America's closest allies, primarily the NATO countries. But Defence Secretary of State, Caspar Weinberger expressed support, during Habibie's visit, for the promotion of Indonesia's arms industry.

US Air Force chief-of-staff, General Lawrence D. Welch told Habibie the US does not rule on the possible use of IPTN-made aircraft by the US Air Force, while Assistant Secretary of Defence, Everett Pyatt expressed great interest in the 30-year plan of Indonesia's shipbuilding company, PT PAL, to build 23 frigates.

But Habibie's biggest prize of the trip, however, was an agreement in principle to buy a 'super-computer' worth \$4 million, designed especially for defence and security purposes and for the aerospace industry.

In between his heavy schedule, Habibie was awarded a special honour by the US National Academy of Engineering.



Can Indonesia afford it?

While Habibie's image got yet another boost from his Washington trip, questions have arisen as to whether these ambitious plans can be implemented. Indonesia's Defence Minister, General Poniman, has recently stressed the need for strict austerity in his Department. The fall in oil prices and the 12 September devaluation of 45 per cent have made it difficult for Indonesia to keep up with many defence contracts under negotiation.

According to Poniman, several deals now pending will have to be reviewed. This could include a \$60 million deal with the Netherlands for 4 Van Speijk frigates. But Poniman stressed that deals already signed, such as the purchase of Rapier missiles from the UK, will not be affected.

Poniman was careful to stress that austerity measures would not affect the operational activities of the Armed Forces. [Kompas, 19 September 1986] In other words, the Indonesian military can be sure of getting all the cash it needs to pursue the offensive in East Timor and the heightened level of military operations in West Papua.

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