



VICTORIA UNIVERSITY
MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA

Tapol bulletin no, 75, May 1986

This is the Published version of the following publication

UNSPECIFIED (1987) Tapol bulletin no, 75, May 1986. Tapol bulletin (75). pp. 1-24. ISSN 1356-1154

The publisher's official version can be found at

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Many severe sentences for Muslims

At least 129 Muslims have been sentenced in Indonesia since December 1984 in connection with political charges. Most were charged under the anti-subversion law. The vast majority of the trials followed the clampdown on Muslim activism in the wake of the Tanjung Priok massacre on 12 September 1984.

TAPOL has records documenting 129 convictions since December 1984, though in the case of 6 of these convictions, we have no record of the sentence passed. TAPOL's research on the Muslim trials is by no means complete; there is hardly any information about trials outside Java, for example.

The breakdown of the 123 sentences known to us is as follows:

Length of sentence	Number of convictions
Under 12 months	3
From 12 to 24 months	39
From 2 to 5 years	9
From 6 to 9 years	26
From 10 to 12 years	14
From 13 to 15 years	16
From 16 to 18 years	6
19 or 20 years	6
Life	2
Death	2

Breakdown by cases

The people sentenced have been charged for alleged involvement in a variety of cases. Our records provide us with the following breakdown:

Tanjung Priok related cases

Four were convicted for spreading "false" reports in advance of the Tanjung Priok demonstration, and received between 18 and 30 months each.

Seven were convicted for alleged crimes at the time of the Tanjung Priok demonstration and received 18 or 20 months each.

Twenty-eight were convicted for participating in the Tanjung Priok demonstration, and received from 12 to 36 months each.

Educational courses/Pesantren Kilat

Seven were convicted in connection with the Pesantren Kilat/Islamic educational course in East Java. Six received from 8 to 20 years each, and one got a life sentence.

Preachers

Twelve were convicted for allegedly subversive preaching. Their sentences varied from 5 to 20 years.

"Illegal" pamphlets and subversive newspapers

Eight were convicted for producing, reproducing or distributing pamphlets branded by the authorities as "illegal". Their sentences varied from 10 months to 15 years. Two were convicted for editing or distributing an "illegal" newspaper; one got 6 years, the other got 13 years.

Lese majeste

Two were convicted for insulting the government or head of state. One got 12 months and the other 14 months.

Subversion/conspiracy

Two were convicted on subversion/conspiracy charges. One got 6 years, the other 7 years.

Bombing incidents

The people convicted of involvement in bombing incidents fall into several groups. Eleven were convicted in connection with the 4 October 1984 bombings in Jakarta. They received between 10 and 19 years each. Seven were convicted in connection with bombing incidents in Central and East Java and received between 8 and 20 years each. Three were convicted for stealing explosives

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and got between 7 and 9 years each.

Other Muslim trials

There have been many other convictions since December

1984 for cases not connected with the Tanjung Priok massacre and subsequent crackdown. They include 5 charged for supporting Darul Islam or NII (Indonesian Islamic State) who got between 9 and 16 years each. One was charged in connection with a congregation under Imron's leadership and got 8 years. Twenty-four were charged for "Holy-War Command" (Komando Jihad) activities; the lowest sentence was 4 years, and the highest sentence was death.

An intrepid preacher gets eight years

On 27 March, the West Jakarta District Court found Professor Oesmany Al Hamidy guilty of subversion and sentenced him to eight years. Although the defendant's "polite demeanour" was one of the contributing factors to the "lightness" of the sentence, Hamidy had lost no opportunity from the outset to pour scorn on the absurdities of the trial, legal as well as procedural.

He resisted court pressure to receive legal aid, arguing: "I face the death sentence so let God be my defence." When the presiding judge insisted that the trial could not proceed without defence lawyers being present because the charges could result in a death sentence, Hamidy said, "That's for you to decide, so do as you like" [Kompas, 23 December 1985]. From then on, defence lawyers sat in on the hearings but, as far as we know, made no interventions throughout. Later, he expressed the opinion that "using defence lawyers is a sure way to get 18 or 20 years" [Kompas, 6 January 1986].

His professorial manner stood him in good stead in holding his own against the judges. On one occasion, he interrupted a judge with "don't cut me short or I'll go on strike against speaking". [Kompas, 24 January].

He was unrelenting in his cynicism about the predetermined nature of trials for subversion, a point he argued cogently in his demurrer at the start of the proceedings. Nor did he have any respect for so-called democratic procedures, especially in summoning witnesses. When one witness was testifying about his alleged criticisms of government policy, Hamidy said he found the testimony incomprehensible. The witness answered B when he should have answered A. After another witness's testimony, his frank response was, "Stop telling fibs!"

When confusion reigned during yet another testimony, his wit was not lost on the public when he remarked: "It would have been far better to send the witness first to the Guntur Military Police Detention Centre to be rehearsed by interrogators. A little torture would have made him tell the truth." [Jakarta Post, 6 and 13 January]. And to those who cared to listen, he offered the advice: "Plug your ears with cotton wool when anyone starts discussing the 'sole-ideology'." In other words, see no evil, hear no evil...!

The 'no-win' pattern of verdicts

He often referred to verdicts passed as "tendencious and harsh", and exposed the capricious way 'light' and 'heavy' sentences were doled out. Thus, one preacher,



Oesmany Al Hamidy in court. [Tempo, 5 April 1986]

Salim Qadar, was told that his elderliness had been taken into account in giving him a 'lighter' sentence of 20 years, while another, Yayan Hendrayana got a 'lighter' sentence of 20 years because of his youth [Tempo, 30 November 1985].

After the prosecutor demanded a sentence of 12 years, Hamidy said this was truly amazing, coming after a lifetime of preaching, "and from you, Sir, who are so young. Surely, you don't expect me last to 1997! And yet, the sentence you demand is so short!" [Berita Buana, 7 February]

After this particular hearing, illness prevent Hamidy from attending any more sessions till mid-March, when he read out his 40-page defence statement from a wheelchair. (Hamidy is crippled with rheumatism.) He asked for exoneration but with no less verve. "Since Ratono (erstwhile student and preacher) has got 8 years, the court would be wise to give me one-eighth of that, not to deny that even that would be totally unjust".

When, on the last day, his eight-year verdict was announced, the time for humour had passed: "I refuse to accept this. It is grossly unjust," and he straight away asked for a form to lodge an appeal [Tempo, 5 April].

Bomber and education-course trials converge

Four men charged with subversion, because of alleged involvement in bombing incidents, were sentenced on 7 May in the East Java mountain town of Malang. The bombing incidents included an explosion at a Catholic community building in Malang on 24 December, 1984, explosions at the Borobudur monument in Central Java on 21 January 1985 when nine stupas were damaged, and an explosion on a Pemudi bus in East Java while it was en route for Bali.

To understand these verdicts, it is necessary to

explain briefly two previous groups of trials, also held in Malang.

The first eventually resulted in convictions for four men who became known as the 'Pesantren Kilat generation' because of their involvement in Muslim education courses interpreted by the government as being the focus for revolutionary Islamic activity. Before and after the trials commenced in July 1985, there was total confusion in the press regarding how many were to be tried and on what charges. It was being suggested that the bombings

would figure in the charges, but in the event, they were not even mentioned. By that stage, several men were already being held for the Borobudur bombings, though they appeared in court not as defendants but as witnesses.

One of these, Achmad Muladawila, testified at all four trials with devastating results not only for the four but also for himself and others named in his depositions. The four were all sentenced to 8 years, though two of these sentences were revised upwards on prosecution appeal, with the final results as follows: **Andi Sukisno, 15 years; Murjoko, 9 years; Faizal Fachri and Sugeng Budiono, both 8 years.**

The 'Borobudur bombing trials'

Characteristically for all the subversion trials, a witness in one trial soon finds himself charged in the next. The second wave of trials were referred to as the 'Borobudur bombing trials' although Achmad Muladawila and the two others in this group were also charged for other bombing incidents in East Java. **Achmad Muladawila, 25,** had already effectively confessed his 'guilt' in earlier testimonies, though his precise role in the Borobudur incident remained unclear.

He denied all knowledge of the explosives that were carried on the Pemudi bus heading for Bali, and which exploded prematurely. The other two on trial were apprehended after this explosion, while three others, also said to be involved, were killed on the bus.

During cross-examination in court, Muladawila denied involvement in other, unspecified incidents in Surabaya, regarding which, to our knowledge, nothing had previously been said.

Whatever the substance of the case against Muladawila, the prosecutor demanded a death sentence, but the court was a little more 'lenient' and gave him 20 years.

The second defendant, who was picked up while he was fleeing from the Pemudi bus, was **Abdul Kadir Ali Al-Habsyi, 25,** who admitted in court that he accompanied the group that planted the bombs in Borobudur, but insisted he had been persuaded to do so by his older brother, enticed by financial considerations because he is unemployed and without any income. In any case, he was not present at the time of the Borobudur explosion as he had been sent back to Malang with a faulty device.

His brother, Husein Ali Al-Habsyi has been "missing" since the Malang trials first commenced. Blind from birth, he is described as a 'fiery' and influential proselytiser, and is alleged to have 'master-minded' both this and other bombings. Another "missing" suspect, Ibrahim (alias Djawad), adds to the mystery. According to rumour, both are said to have made trips to Iran before and after the incidents. Needless to say, the mystery surrounding these two 'key suspects' has led to



Repairing damaged stupas at Borobudur. [Tempo, 29 March 1986]

much speculation, plus unsubstantiated reports of conspiracy. The consequences for the men on trial have been catastrophic. Thus, younger brother Abdul Kadir, for all his reluctance to join in the bombing of Borobudur and his apparently peripheral role, was given a sentence of 20 years.

A third man, **Abdulkadir Baraja, 41,** was charged both in connection with the Pemudi bus explosion and the Borobudur affair. His part allegedly consists of having purchased the explosives. His trial received the most press coverage because of his impassioned rejection of the proceedings and the contentious nature of testimonies regarding the purchase of the explosives. The prosecution charged that he had bought these in Telukbetung, South Sumatra. For his part, the defendant repeatedly explained that explosives are used for fishing in Telukbetung.

Then came contradictory testimony about the money used for the purchase. One witness, Mohammad Achwan, who has since been sentenced to life, claimed that he gave Baraja the money, but Basirun Sinene, a fisherman, hotly contested this, denying that Baraja had anything to do with it. It was he, Basirun, who had obtained the money direct from Achwan. Basirun's testimony in court differed from his testimony under interrogation, and his retraction in court suggests that the earlier evidence incriminating Baraja had been obtained under pressure.

The confusion about who purchased the explosives was compounded because, at one of the earlier Malang trials, Achmad Muladawila had testified that it was a certain 'MA' (Moh. Achwan?) who had done the purchasing. Whatever the case, Baraja got a 13-year sentence.

The four latest sentences

Once these trials were over, the courts launched into so-called "marathon" sessions to deal with the last (?) four "bomber trials". Three of these defendants, whose trials were only briefly mentioned in the press, were given verdicts of 8 years each. One was **Basirun Sinene,** who testified so controversially at Baraja's trial. He was found guilty of having sent explosives to the now "missing" Husein and Ibrahim in Malang via Moh. Achwan. The others were **Sadiq Musawa and Abdul Kadir bin Idrus Al-Hadad,** found guilty among other things of making reconnaissance trips to Bali where the Pemudi bus bombs were supposed to have been planted. In all these cases, meetings at the homes of the "missing" Husein and Ibrahim, were included in the charges. The two were accused of being the "links" with an illegal organisation led by Husein and Ibrahim.

Mohammad Achwan's trial

Mohammad Achwan, a cobbler aged 38, regularly featured in all the Malang "bomber trials" as the key prosecution witness, as well as in trials of several preachers in Surabaya last June. He helped secure convictions in so many cases that his role in all these events seemed very suspect. Yet, he has not been spared. After all the "lesser fry" had been dealt with, his own trial opened in March and he was landed with the heaviest sentence of all.

The charges spanned a wide range of activities, from overall responsibility for the Pesantren Kilat courses, to local bombings in East Java and the bombing in Borobudur. They also included involvement in the alleged assassination plot against Suharto, which appears to be the culmination of the regime's case against Muslim dissidence.

Although reports of his impending trial have appeared in the press since June last year, it is certainly no coincidence that his trial was conducted at the same time as that of Mohammad Sanusi, alleged "godfather" of the assassination plotters. The two trials held together had the effect of dramatising the assassination charges. Everyone convicted in the earlier Malang trials had mentioned meetings attended by Achwan and Sanusi, said to have been held in Jogjakarta in 1982 at the office of

the dissident Muslim publication, **Ar-Risalah**, whose editor, Irfan Suryahadi, got a 13-year sentence earlier this year.

At his own trial, however, Achwan denied that Sanusi had talked about assassinating the president, only that Sanusi had spoken of Suharto as being "not especially Muslim". But while this may have helped Sanusi a bit [though Sanusi denies ever even attending such a meeting], Achwan compared his own Islamic reformism as being like the gentle *krancang* music, as compared to the "hard rock" revolutionary style of Sanusi and his lot.

As with other trials, defence witnesses were notable by their absence, and several prosecution witnesses failed to appear in person, though written depositions were used. In sentencing Achwan to life, the court described Achwan as the "brains" behind the entire movement. After

sentence was passed, Achwan announced that he would not appeal, but would only ask for clemency [**Tempo**, 17 May].

The Sanusi trial

The second trial of Mohammad Sanusi, already serving a 19-year sentence for allegedly funding bombings in Jakarta in October 1984, commenced on 3 April. He stands charged with being the "master-mind" of several alleged plots to assassinate Suharto in 1982 and 1983. The trial will be reported fully in the new issue.

Correction:

Gajah Mada lecturers did take the witness stand in Irfan Suryahadi's trial, contrary to our report in **TAPOL Bulletin**, No 74, March 1986, page 6.

No decision yet on Buyung's right to practise

Moves by the judiciary to bar Adnan Buyung Nasution, the well-known human rights lawyer, from practising as a lawyer appear so far to have led to a stalemate, with no final decision yet in sight. On 19 March, the chairman of the Jakarta District Court issued an Administrative Decision proposing that the Minister of Justice revoke Buyung's practicing licence because he had allegedly been in contempt of court on the final day of the Dharsono trial. [See **TAPOL Bulletin**, No 74, March 1986, page 1.]

Three months after the Court's move, Lieutenant-General (retired) Ismail Saleh, Minister of Justice, indicated that it still might be some time before a decision is taken. The Supreme Court must first make recommendations to the Justice Minister, he said, and before doing so, the Supreme Court would seek the views of the Jakarta District Court. The Justice Minister also said he would hear the views of Ikadin, the Indonesian Bar Association. [**Kompas**, 14 May]

In fact, the impression is being created that the officials involved all wish to evade responsibility for a move that will prove very unpopular at home and abroad. Moreover, the Jakarta District Court chairman was clearly not acting within the law when he issued the 19 March Administrative Decision [*Surat Keputusan Administratif*] and is now trying to wriggle out of his dilemma, by saying that this was not a "decision" but only a "report". [**Tempo**, 26 April]

Going round in circles

The following is a step-by-step account of the story so far:

* On 5 February, the chairman of the Jakarta District Court sent a report of the incident on the last day of the Dharsono trial to the Supreme Court. This was four weeks after the incident. [According to the Procedural Code, the chairman should have reprimanded the lawyer on the spot.]

* On 18 February, the Supreme Court instructed the Jakarta District Court to investigate the complaints against Buyung and make a recommendation regarding the action to be taken.

* On 24 February, Buyung was summoned by the Jakarta District Court chairman and informed of the contempt of court complaint, and was told he would be required to submit a written statement, not later than 10 March, in his own defence. Buyung was refused a copy of the Supreme Court's instruction to the Jakarta District Court, and was therefore not able to discover the legal basis for the instruction.

* On 10 March, Buyung wrote to the chairman of the Jakarta District Court objecting that the procedure being used was without legal foundation. He pointed out that no implementary regulations for Law No 14/1985 on the Supreme Court and Law No 2/1986 on the Courts have

yet been issued. Buyung announced that he was therefore not prepared to submit a written defence.

* On 19 March, Buyung was served a copy of the Jakarta District Court's Administrative Decision recommending that the Minister of Justice revoke his licence to practice. Yet, no formal charges had been made, nor had there been any hearing. The Court gave Buyung one month in which to lodge an appeal.

But since the Court is now saying that the 19 March Decision was not a "decision" but a "report", there is no question of Buyung making an appeal.

Buyung: "It's only a matter of time"

Meanwhile, Buyung himself has no illusions about the threat he now faces. "My suspension in only a matter of time," he said in a recent interview [**Volkscrant**, 2 May]. "It is basically a political matter. The authorities don't want me to function any more as a lawyer."

On the Dharsono trial, he said: "The trial was widely reported...although the press carefully avoided reporting Dharsono's personal attacks on the Palace... The trial created quite an upheaval in society, penetrating into military circles, especially among the younger officers. It was also well reported in the foreign press."

He went on: "Suharto watched the trial on video recordings made by military intelligence. He is now very angry towards (me) because things developed differently than expected. In our feudal military system, when the king gets upset, his subordinates must display even greater anger as proof of their loyalty. Thus everyone, from ministers, the chair of Parliament and of course Armed Forces commander, Benny Murdani down, has issued statements showing disapproval of me."

"The core of the problem is not Muslim fundamentalism. It is the social and economic situation, the political pressure, and the fact that no-one is allowed to express opinions any more."



Adnan Buyung Nasution. [**NRC Handelsblad**, 5 May, 1986]

Pramoedya recalls 14 years of detention

Dutch journalist, John Jansen van Galen, interviewed writer and ex-prisoner Pramoedya Ananta Toer, in Jakarta earlier this year. His efforts to take a look at Buru Island, Pram's place of detention for ten years, proved fruitless, but he did published much of the interview [*Haagse Post*, 5 April], from which the following extracts are taken.

"The maximum results of our freedom is that now we are half free, half tapols - everlasting political prisoners." Pramoedya Ananta Toer.

"Brought to safety"

In October 1965, an excited crowd gathered, and started showering Pramoedya's house with stones. It was the dawning of Suharto's coup and the writer had been branded a left extremist. He had been warned. A friend had told him to leave the area, as a gang of rioters would be bound to make their way to his home, after which the military would put things in order.

But he stayed where he was, with his brother who had just returned from studying in the Soviet Union. Pramoedya put out the lights and armed himself with a ladies' samurai. Stones shattered the glass, and he hurt his thigh. Then suddenly, as if from nowhere, soldiers loomed. He now learned the new meaning for *mengamankan*, or "brought to safety".... Tortured cellmates, filthy jails, bitter hunger.

He was transferred to Nusakambangan, off the south coast of Java, which had been an island for prisoners in the Dutch period. The Dutch had made the prisoners do forced labour on the sugar plantations. In the quartermaster-sargeant's shed, Pram saw a notice on the board saying that 40 per cent of the prisoners on Nusakambangan had died....

Journey to a new life

"On 16 August 1969, we were loaded onto a ship of the Indonesian Army, the ADRI-XV. At 6 pm, we set off in an easterly direction. Over the ship's loudspeakers, we heard: "Gentlemen, we wish you a pleasant journey to a

new life." It seemed like a remarkable new life.

"In the hold where we were kept behind iron doors, altogether 500 of us, a layer of excrement spread over us as we lay on the floor, every time the stern was lifted by the waves. The ADRI-XV was an old vessel of 30,000 tons. She moved badly. Every now and then the engine broke down, which left us bobbing up and down for hours. Most of us were village people, who had never even seen the sea before. Everyone was promptly seasick.

"Then there was a rumour that we were on the way to Buru Island and were due to arrive on 17 August, independence day. I don't think that was a coincidence. The regime intended our shipment as a gift to the population."

Buru Island

"When we reached Buru, there was no-one to be seen. All the houses were closed tight. The outrigger canoes had been left moored at the water's edge. There wasn't a mortal to be seen. Namlea, the capital, was empty, a dead town. Later, we heard that the authorities, alluding to our yellow prison clothes, had told the population, 'The yellow army will soon be coming. They are thieves, murderers and rapists. So clear off!'"

Directly after the tapols arrive in Namlea, they were taken to the Way Apo estuary, where Kaki Air (literally, "the foot of the water") Kampung is situated. From there, they had to continue by foot.

"Just imagine! People who had been in prison four years, suffering from hunger, some of whom had never left

Two more Pramoedya books banned

Two books by Indonesia's foremost writer, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, have been banned by the Attorney General. One is *Jejak Langkah* [Footsteps], the third book in a quartet of novels based on the life of Tirtoadisurjo, the initiator of the tradition of critical journalism in Indonesia. The other is *Sang Pemula* [The Originator], which is a historical account of the same journalist's life.

The two books were published in Jakarta by Hasta Mitra last September, and have been on sale in Indonesia since then.

The ban, which covers possession, sale and distribution of the books, was issued on 1 May by the Attorney-General, Major General (retired) Hari Suharto. However, the letter informing the publishers which was dated 10 May, did not arrive until 14 May.

The reasons given are that the books are based on social disharmony and class conflict, and that the writer practises "sosialisme realis" (sic) or realist socialism which is described as part of the Marxist ideology.

An advertisement for *Sang Pemula* that appeared in *Tempo*, 17 May 1986.

Pramoedya Ananta Toer

SANG PEMULA

HASTA MITRA
penerbit buku baru

HASTA MITRA.
Proyek Senen Blok I, Lt. IV/22,
Jakarta Pusat. Telp: 355956.

their cells. Now, they had to make their way through dense forest where there was no recognisable footpath. Many didn't have the strength to drag their own bodies along. I still remember some who were 160 centimetres in height but weighed less than 30 kilos. Those like me who were reasonably healthy supported the famished.

"The forest was humid and stuffy, the heat unbearable. We got blisters. All around us were trees with scorched crowns, which had obviously been struck by lightning. We could only hear birds, and didn't see a single ape. Someone sighed: 'If apes can't live here, then humans can't either.'"

Life! Yes, we can live here

"We cut across the meanders of the Way Apo where the waters had dried up or where the channels were marshy. Occasionally, we came across pools of clear water with shoals of fish, *mujahir*. And every time I saw them, a voice within me said: "Life! Yes, we can live here."

Only after dark did the miserable procession reach the camp. The distance of less than four kilometres had taken eight hours. The deadly weary men discerned a strange sort of animal on a scarcely cleared plain. These were the huts that would serve as their dwellings. The walls were of fresh sago leaves which at first glance, looked like animal fur. The rest of the camp, which would now have to accommodate 10,000 men and later on, 16,000, had yet to be built by the tapols themselves.

"At roll-call on the first day, someone saw a lizard shoot past. He caught it, roasted it and ate it. You had to catch every living creature because no meat was provided and you could get ill from lack of protein. But we had more meat than in Nusakambangan. We ate cats, dogs and even crocodiles, and an awful lot of mice until one day I slit one open. It was full of worms, underneath its skin, in its belly, and going right into its heart."

Writing without paper

What was the meaning of the strange message, "Buru. Spoken, 1973. Written, 1975" which stood at the end of his two books, *This Earth of Mankind* and *Child of all Nations*?

"It shows the conditions we had to live under on that island, that it was impossible to write. I did try, but it didn't work. The forced labour was incredibly hard and it sapped all my energy. There was no writing equipment. When I could, I would buy some chickens and send off the eggs in exchange for writing material, but this was snatched by the jailers.

"To make sure I kept mentally fit, to train my memory

and to give my friends some diversion, I began to tell them the story of Njai Ontosoroh [principal character in *This Earth of Mankind*]. It was passed from mouth to mouth through the whole camp. It helped give everyone new courage. It gave inspiration to the lads on Buru who had totally withered and faded. 'Just take a look at what a woman like Njai Ontosoroh achieved.' "

For a while, he was kept in solitary confinement. Even then, he succeeded in passing on the daily instalment of his spoken serial via friends at the daily roll-call.

Then, after being on Buru for five years, a new camp-commander arrived. The man was an opportunist. He offered opportunities to prisoners with talents the chance to use their talents in the camps. So Pram seized the opportunity with both hands.

1986: A family wedding

Pram looked slender and frail, older than his sixty or so years. Years in prison obviously count double.

He was the only one in the wedding procession not wearing ceremonial dress. He wore a blue suit and a *peci*, the black cap typical of Muslim men. His daughter had her face painted according to tradition, and at the back of her wedding attire, she had a Javanese *kris* strapped under her sash.

"I don't know anyone who hates the Javanese more than Pram, and yet is so Javanese himself," whispered Jusuf, his publisher.

But as father of the bride, he had consented to a traditional wedding, where he solemnly handed over his daughter to her husband and accepted a symbolic dowry in return.

People crowded together for the congratulations, then afterwards crowded round the tables of food. In an extended, bare room, a rather pompous-looking ice concoction was melting, and the guests sat stiffly in long rows of high-backed chairs, waiting.

"Here in this room," said Pram's publisher, "is gathered hundreds of years of experience of being behind barbed wire and bars." Most of those present were ex-tapols, former political prisoners, many of them journalists, lawyers, publishers.

The conversation was all about extortion. They were now free, but still suspect. Many positions were closed to ex-tapols, and they were rarely chosen even for the jobs that were allowed. It was too much trouble for employers to report to the police every month about their suspect employees. They could only move house with the permission of the authorities. For every trip out of town, they needed official permission, and they weren't allowed to go abroad....

What more does Suharto want to do with them?

From our special correspondent in Java.

It is now about a year since the Army security command, *Kopkamtib* [Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order], through its regional and local commands, the *Kopkamtibda* and *Koramil*, started re-investigating and checking former members of the now-banned leftwing parties and mass organisations, as well as members of their families. These activities are also being undertaken by so-called 'screening teams' in every government department and agency. Their tasks are:

* To check, control and supervise their homes, places of work and activities.

* To carry out new purges of former members of leftwing parties or mass organisations and members of their families, in various civilian and military government bodies.

* To compile data about the number of these people and decide whether to give them 'the right' to vote in the 1987 elections, so as to increase votes for the government's party, Golkar.

* To intimidate them, making them too afraid to do anything that could be regarded as harmful to the government.

Both direct and indirect methods are being used:

Direct control

Summoning all former tapols [*tahanan politik*, or political prisoners] in a sub district [*kecamatan*] and calling their names out one by one, checking where they live, where they sleep at night, where they work, who their friends are, and telling them that checks will be made on them in their homes at any time, without warning.

This happened for instance in Jogjakarta. Rusmi Dahono, who lives in Parakan Kampung, Kecamatan Mergangsan, had a job outside the district so he wasn't at home when his home was checked. He was summoned by the Jogjakarta Kodim [military district command] and punished by being ordered to work for Kodim for about two months without pay. This spread fear among all ex-tapols and their families, binding them to their homes. As a result, their efforts to try to earn a living were severely damaged.

In mid 1985, a number of former members of now-banned

organisations living in Utankayu, East Jakarta, together with members of their families, were all summoned for re-registration. The initials 'ET', which stands for 'ex-tapol', were then marked on their identity cards, even though none of them had ever been in detention.

Indirect control

This form of control is usually employed through the village authorities [*kelurahan*] and koramil at a person's place of work. As a result of this kind of thing, two lecturers at the Malang Institute of Education [IKIP] were dismissed because their parents were alleged to have been 'ex'. [This term is repeatedly used by our correspondent, to mean either former political prisoners or former members of now-banned organisations.] Another person dismissed was the *camat* [sub-district head] of Lumajang, whose father was murdered during the anti-communist massacres in late 1965 when he was still a small child. He was later sent away from home by his mother and was brought up by his uncle.

An army major in the Udayana Military Command which is based in Bali, who had been transferred to Irian Jaya and was about to be appointed as a *bupati* [district head], was dismissed when it was discovered that his parents were 'ex'.

Three pensioners in Jogjakarta who live in Mergangsan sub-district were discovered to have been former members of a leftwing organisation and were ordered to attend roll-calls once a month. In Jogjakarta, roll-calls are held once every two months for all those classified as B-category [the more serious classification for 'non-triable' leftwing political prisoners arrested in the late 1960s]. All those classified as C-category are required to attend a roll-call once every three months. In Semarang, there are roll-calls once a month for all the so-called 'unruly' people among the 35 tapols released in 1979.

In many enterprises the need for redundancies because of the economic recession is being used to justify dismissing people on the basis of investigations by 'screening teams' approved by Kopkamtib and Kopkamtibda. This happened in Caltex several months ago. Former members of the banned seamen's union SBPP, as well as former members of the banned SBPU still working in the Public Works Department, and ex trade unionists in other agencies, were also dismissed like this. When such a blanket justification is used to dismiss people, it becomes impossible for them to protest against their dismissal or fight it in any way.

Others dismissed after being found to be 'ex' were teachers and local government officials in Gunung Kidul district in Central Java.

Nor should we forget the fate of the 'ex' families in villages affected by the Kedong Ombo dam, in Central Java. They are not being permitted to transmigrate. Their fate still hangs in the balance; while others will be helped to move before the waters flood their land, the 'ex' families will be left there, exposed to any potential danger.

Secret Kopkamtib circular

On 4 July last year, Kopkamtib issued a secret circular with an instruction to all Kopkamtibdas and Koramils that ex-tapols were not to be allowed to move to another sub-district, nor even allowed to move homes within the same sub-district, until after the 1987 general elections. This has caused serious problems for many of our friends. Some, for example, had already moved, but were forced to return to their former place of residence where they have no place to live. This kind of difficulty is also being experienced by former members of so-called extreme rightwing organisations.

Anyone applying for a job in government service must complete a form with questions about their family

background, and whether anyone in their family was formerly in a (banned) organisation. If it turns out that the applicant's family includes an 'ex', they are 'advised' to withdraw their application.

All these difficulties come on top of the difficulties caused by government spokesmen, speaking for Kopkamtib, Kopkamtibda and other commands, alleging that ex-tapols are engaging in political activities, even though the authorities know very well that virtually everything the ex-tapols do is connected with their efforts to make a living, to provide for themselves in the remaining years of their lives, and to provide for their wives and children.

Speeches like this are commonplace these days, and are intended to remind people that the present government came to power in the wake of a clampdown on the leftwing movement.

One thousand 'ex-PKI' people have "disappeared"

Lieutenant-Colonel Sonny Soedarsono, Social-Political Directorate Chief in East Kalimantan, claimed recently that one thousand (the exact figure) 'ex-PKI members' have "disappeared" from the province and are unaccounted for. There should have been 6,870 according to previous figures, but when re-registration for the 1987 elections took place, only 5,870 turned up. Surely, he said, not more than a hundred or so could have died in the past five years. So, where are the rest?

Making the whole thing sound as sinister as possible, he suggested that they must have "disguised their identities, moved to new addresses, changed names and altered their appearances". He realised they would have had difficulty getting re-absorbed into society, finding jobs and so on, but said the government is determined to seek them out, wherever they are.

As for the remaining 5,870 people, it had been decided that 309 will not be allowed to vote next year [Sinar Harapan, 12 May]. What it was they had done to lose the right to vote, the lieutenant-colonel did not bother to explain.

Islamic University discussion broken up

Soldiers and police entered and broke up a discussion being held by the Law Faculty of the Indonesian Islamic University (UII) in Jogjakarta. [UII is not a state university, it is run by the Muslim organisation, Muhammadiyah.] The participants were ordered to disperse, and two students were taken away for questioning.

The chair of the Faculty's Student Senate said students had autonomy on campus and had the right to organise campus discussions without external interference. The dissolution of this gathering was therefore very regrettable. About 70 people were attending the discussion. One of the students questioned later said the police had declared that permits were required for such a meeting.

STOP PRESS

West Papuan Deportee returns to Vanimo

One of the 12 West Papuans forcibly deported to Indonesia last October has returned to PNG after being tortured in a Jayapura prison. Aben Pagawak, 31, of Kilila Village, one of the deportees released by the Indonesians after several months in detention, said they had been tortured to get information about the OPM [PNG Times, 31 May]

Bishop John Etheridge, Bishop of Vanimo, criticised the PNG authorities for putting the man on trial for illegal entry, and sentencing him to two months' hard labour.

The Suharto family takes a battering

An article in the *Sydney Morning Herald* on 10 April, describing the business connections and corrupt dealings of the Suharto family brought widespread retribution from Jakarta against Australian interests. The clampdown on Australian journalists even soured the atmosphere during Reagan's visit to Bali. The row that developed between Jakarta and Canberra reveals underlying discord over each country's defence strategies, and could have a profound impact on relations between the two countries. But Jakarta's reaction also signals that unity within the military is under severe strain.

The Suharto family wealth

The article by David Jenkins, foreign editor of the paper, gives details of the "assets of between \$2 and \$3 billion piled up by the family and business associates of President Suharto...who have waxed fat on government capital". Entitled "After Marcos, now for the Soeharto billions", the article focuses particularly on Mrs Suharto (according to one joke, she is in the mining business, "that's mine, that's mine") and sons, daughters and other close relatives. But in fact, it contains little that is new; much of the information has already been published, among others in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* [7 April 1983]. This was summarised in *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 57, May 1983, page 15].

The fury unleashed in Jakarta reveals how much the country's military ruler resents having the truth about himself brought out into the open. The repercussions were wide-ranging:

* A visit to Australia by B.J. Habibie, chief of Indonesia's fast-growing weapons industry, during which he was due to assess the possibility of joint technological ventures, was called off.

* A visit to Australia by Mario Carrascalao, puppet governor of East Timor, which would in any case have been greeted by demonstrations from East Timorese communities in several Australian towns, was indefinitely postponed.

* Further talks on the joint exploitation of oil in the waters between Australia and East Timor - the so-called Timor Gap - were postponed.

* An Australian film crew due to make a film in Bali in late May was unable to proceed as planned and has decided to shift on-location shooting to Thailand.


* Yet more restrictions on Australian journalists working in Indonesia were imposed. They will not be allowed to enter Indonesia for the foreseeable future, and the two journalists still working there are unlikely to have their permits renewed.

* Despite strenuous efforts by the US ambassador to Jakarta, Paul Wolfowitz, two Australian journalists attached to the White House press corps, who were to have covered Reagan's visit to Bali, were refused entry at Bali airport. They were unceremoniously ordered back onto a plane and forced to leave the country, giving the 260 journalists accompanying Reagan on his "winds of freedom" Asia trip a direct insight into press control under military rule.

Petition-of-50 throw down challenge

The Indonesian press has fallen into line, making all manner of accusations against the Australian media and Australians in general. It has also refrained from telling readers what the article was all about. This is not to say that many Indonesians don't know, for the offending article has been widely circulated, having become the most widely-photocopied document in years.

The dissident *Petition-of-50* group responded by issuing a statement (not published in the Indonesia press) challenging the government to tell the public what caused the current row with Australia. The details should be made public, it said, and the government should give



From The *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 April 1986.

its side of the story. If the article is untrue, the paper should be sued for libel [*Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 April].

Whether or not inspired by this advice from some of its most strident critics, a prominent member of the Suharto family announced a few weeks later that he would be suing the writer and has sought advice from British and Indonesian lawyers [*The Australian*, 7 May]. The action, if it ever reaches court, should provide a field-day for those interested in investigating the Suharto billions.

Suharto's step-brother, Probosutedjo, alleged that no comparison could be made between Suharto and the deposed Ferdinand Marcos. His claim that Mrs Suharto "has never sought a 10 per cent commission" (Jenkins having referred to her nick-names, Mrs Ten Per Cent and Mrs Fifi - fifty-fifty) must have caused smiles of derision on many faces in Jakarta.

Army leadership lifts row to new heights

Although everyone in the upper echelons of the regime joined in the chorus of abuse against all things Australian, to prove their undying loyalty to Indonesia's humiliated dictator, it is the Army leadership, taking

its cue from Armed Forces commander, General Benny Murdani, that has pushed the issue the farthest. Their response suggests that, whatever Jenkins' intentions may have been, the article has had a destabilising effect within the Armed Forces. Moreover, their response has brought into the open the underlying distrust between the defence establishments in Indonesia and Australia.

It was on 21 April, just as the chorus of anger seemed to be subsiding, that Murdani refuelled the row by threatening to end defence contacts with Australia, and to put a stop to all military co-operation agreements. He warned that "the Indonesian armed forces feel obliged to defend the honour of the head of State and his family" [Sydney Morning Herald, 22 April].

The way Murdani phrased his defence of Suharto suggests that he was sending warning signals to many ranking officers who are less than happy with Suharto and his family. Inside sources report that many younger-generation generals have adopted the slogan: "We are loyal to the Armed Forces, not to any individual". In other words, Murdani knows that the renewed public interest in Suharto's billions could encourage those now climbing up in the hierarchy of the Armed Forces to criticise the top leadership.

Australian tourists hit

The day after Murdani's intervention, Indonesia suddenly announced that visa-free entry for all Australians was withdrawn. When a planeload of tourists landed in Bali that morning without visas and were ordered to leave immediately, angry scenes ensued. Their much-publicised return home to Sydney lifted the whole issue onto the front pages of the tabloid press.

Back in Indonesia, some ministers were horrified at the implications of this latest twist and rushed to Suharto, pleading for a reversal of this decision. The Great Leader consented, but by now, the Australian Government, up to Prime Minister Hawke himself, had decided that things had gone too far, and criticised Indonesia for its "capricious repudiation of the rights of Australians to visit Indonesia".

Real source of the row

It was now dawning on Australian Labour politicians that, regardless of the climb-down over the visa blunder, the Armed Forces leadership in Jakarta had decided on all-out confrontation with Australia. The signs were not only Murdani's belligerent entry into the fray but a 3,000-word article published in the Armed Forces daily, *Angkatan Bersenjata* on 21 and 22 April accusing Australians of "arrogance and conceit" towards Southeast Asia, and claiming that Australia's national defence thinking is dominated by a "threat from the north" phobia [Sydney Morning Herald, 24 April].

A week later, *Angkatan Bersenjata* further raised the heat with a general attack on Australia's new defence strategy which is to be made public shortly in a special report known as the Dibb Report. This Report assesses Australia's only "security threat" as coming via the island chains to the north and discusses the scenario of an invasion through or from the Indonesian archipelago, with maps identifying parts of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea as being "of direct military interest" to Australia [The Australian, 9 April].

In fact, Canberra has been worried for some time that the Dibb Report will upset the military regime, and sent Defence Minister Beazley to Jakarta at the end of March to soften Jakarta's predictable reaction. Although reports during and after Beazley's visit gave the impression that Suharto and his generals might have been convinced, an article in *Angkatan Bersenjata* on 29 April bluntly accuses Australia of "aiming their arms at Indonesia's back". It argues that Australia is disappointed over Indonesia winning control of East Timor, Irian Jaya (West Papua) and the South Moluccas

"which could have served as Australian fronts" [as quoted in *The Age*, 1 May]. This new conflict puts the Jenkins article dispute into the shade, and signifies that Canberra-Jakarta relations are in for a rough ride for some time to come.

Hawke promises to stop "grovelling"

The ultimate humiliation of Canberra's policy towards Indonesia since the Hawke Government took office came when Prime Minister Hawke declared that his government would not now have a "grovelling relationship" with Indonesia. "I think perhaps there has been a tendency...to overstate the importance of the relationship" [Financial Review, 5 May].

East Timor and West Papua, the victims of Canberra's grovelling

The bitter irony of Canberra's sudden confrontation with Jakarta lies in the despicable way the interests of the East Timorese and West Papuans have been sacrificed. Like all Australian governments before it, the Hawke Government has fallen over itself to appease the generals. The most shocking example is Hawke's proclamation last August, giving unqualified recognition to Indonesia's illegal annexation of East Timor and referring to East Timorese as "citizens of Indonesia", and his government's blind refusal to grant political asylum to West Papuans who have taken refuge in the Torres Straits islands.

Hawke and Hayden are now reported to feel aggrieved that Jakarta has repaid them so thanklessly for their strenuous efforts to reverse Labour Party policy on East Timor two years ago. This is small comfort to the Timorese and Papuan people whose right to self-determination has been traded so cheaply.

There are moves now afoot in the Labour Party to press for a reversal to its former platform of support for East Timor self-determination. With Australian-Indonesian relations in tatters, pressure is expected to grow in the Labour Party for a change. This could mean that the East Timor issue and that of support for West Papua's struggle for self-determination will dominate the Party's national conference in July.

Second FEER correspondent out

The Far Eastern Economic Review has lost its second correspondence in Jakarta in two months. Paul Handley followed Lincoln Kaye in being told to leave last month. The Review (22 May) published an article by Handley, "Coming to the defence of the family business" which provides new disclosures about the Suharto family's business affairs. By this time, however, the journal no longer had anyone in Jakarta, only a phone number!

'Jenkins-style documents' circulating in E. Java

The East Java military commander has ordered the public to hand in to the authorities copies of an "illegal document" now circulating widely in several East Java cities. While not divulging the contents, Major-General Syaiful Sulun said the document, 27 pages long, contains information and analysis regarding economic, social, cultural and political developments under the New Order.

He said it followed the style of the "alcoholic journalism" [a term coined by the Information Minister] practised by David Jenkins in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, except that it contained a lot of opinions as well.

Sinar Harapan [25 April] reports too that anonymous phone-calls have been received, urging people who acquire copies of the 27-page document to make photocopies and spread them further.

Human rights overshadows Reagan-Suharto get-together

Despite strenuous efforts by the US Administration to avoid raising human rights during President Reagan's recent visit to Bali, Indonesian repression dominated press coverage. Both Reagan and Schultz were eventually forced to take up the issue. Violations in East Timor were pushed onto the agenda by nearly 150 members of Congress, while Asia Watch lobbied on a wide range of issues. The expulsion of three foreign journalists from Bali on the day Reagan arrived was the final blow to Washington's hopes of keeping the top-level encounter free of "unpleasant" issues.

The Asia Watch dossier

Shortly before Reagan left Washington to attend the Tokyo summit, visiting Bali on the way to meet President Suharto, the Asia Watch published a comprehensive dossier on Human Rights Concerns in Indonesia. This is the first time such lobbying has been carried out in the US.

The Asia Watch Committee was set up by the Fund for Free Expression in 1985 to promote human rights in Asia, and is affiliated with the Americas Watch and Helsinki Watch Committees. In February this year, the Asia Watch sought permission to send a fact-finding mission to Indonesia but was told no decision would be taken till after the Reagan visit. As a result, the April 1986 dossier is described only as a statement of concerns, and raises a number of questions intended for discussion later with Indonesian officials.

The issues raised in the 31-page dossier include free association and the impact of the repressive Societies' Law imposing the sole-principle obligation, detention without trial and lack of due process, continuing persecution of nearly two million former political prisoners and PKI suspects, the execution in 1985 of four long-term political prisoners, the current spate of subversion trials against Muslims, extra-judicial killings, press control, tightened control on trade union rights, abuses against human rights lawyers, the continuing abuses in East Timor and West Papua (Irian Jaya), and free access for relief and human rights organisations.

[Copies of the dossier are available, price \$3.00, from the Asia Watch, 739 Eighth Street, SE, Washington DC 20003.]

Congressional concern about East Timor

East Timor was placed on the agenda by two letters, one addressed to Secretary of State Schultz from 23 Senators and one addressed to President Reagan from 122 members of the House of Representatives.

The Senators drew attention to the violence and repression that have plagued East Timor since the 1975 Indonesian invasion of the island. They spoke of secret detention centres beyond the reach of international humanitarian organisations, the continued intimidation of the clergy and members of the Catholic Church, and malnutrition and related health problems. They asked Schultz to raise these matters in Bali.

The second congressional letter addressed to Reagan spoke of continuing fighting in East Timor, coupled with persistent reports of human rights abuses. It expressed alarm about the birth control programme in East Timor which, according to authoritative church sources, "is being carried out often without the consent or knowledge of the mostly rural population", and called on the President to ask the Indonesian government to put a halt to such practices. It stated that the US should press "for a fair and peaceful settlement of the East Timor conflict".


Human rights spotlighted in the US media


Many reports appearing in the press across the USA in advance of the Bali encounter drew attention to

Indonesia's record as a human rights violator. These reflected the concerns raised by the Asia Watch and the congressional letters. Comparisons were made with the revelations about the fallen Marcos regime, and many commentators stressed that Reagan's pronouncements about freedom and democracy lost credibility if a close friend like Indonesia was not assessed by the same yardstick used for America's foes.

The article by David Jenkins [see separate item] was quoted in many newspapers, completing the picture of the Suharto regime as both repressive and corrupt.

Well in advance of the Reagan visit, the *New York Times* [23 March] had included Suharto as one of the tyrants in power in Asia, in an article by its editor-in-chief, entitled, "In the Path of Tyrants". A *Washington Post* columnist, Mary McGrory, accused Reagan of abandoning his promise of even-handedness with dictators. She described





This official photograph, of President Reagan and President Suharto when they met in Bali at the beginning of May, was used by most Indonesian newspapers.

Suharto as "a murderous right-winger" who "is as corrupt as Ferdinand Marcos, as repressive as...Pinochet, and... is trying to wipe out what remains of (East Timor's) shrinking population" [Washington Post, 29 April]. In another article [Boston Globe, 30 April], she referred to Suharto as a "world-class fascist".

In fact, Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja had foreseen the very negative publicity that could affect Indonesia's image in the USA when he admitted, just one month earlier, that the Marcos debacle had concentrated people's attention on human rights in other countries. He lamented the fact that "all countries that are close to the US are now in the limelight. This includes Indonesia." [Kompas, 29 March]

In the days prior to the Bali encounter, White House officials insisted that human rights in general and East Timor in particular were regarded as "internal matters" and would not be raised. But events in Bali on the day of Reagan's arrival helped to change that.

Banned journalists steal the limelight

Among the hundreds of journalists accompanying Reagan were two journalists working for the Australian Broadcasting Commission in Washington. The White House had never before encountered moves by a country hosting the President to exclude journalists in his entourage. Suharto's retribution against the press for criticism had now affected the White House press corps and Administration officials were not prepared to accept this. But Indonesia had already refused permission to nine Australian journalists to cover the Bali event and was not going to make an exception just to please the White House.

When the two Washington-based journalists were told they would be excluded, the new US ambassador in Jakarta spared no effort to have the decision reversed. Believing up to the last minute that their chances of admission were good, the two men boarded the special aircraft in Guam. But on arrival in Bali, they were met by police and ordered to leave on the next plane out. Final efforts at Bali airport by US officials failed to win a reversal.

To make matters worse, the Bangkok-based New York Times journalist, Barbara Crossette, was also ordered to leave Bali. Whether this was because of the 29 March NYT article about Asian tyrants or a recent article by her entitled "Remote Suharto rules with Sultan's air" is not clear. But there could hardly have been a less likely victim of Jakarta's wrath. Few foreign journalists have served the regime better than Crossette whose reports about East Timor several months ago made no attempt to investigate anything beyond what she was told by

Indonesian officials during a visit to Dili.

One newspaper commented: "One might expect a nation's government to put its best foot forward in such a sudden global spotlight, but Indonesian President Suharto instead showed the world an all too characteristic jackboot. He welcome (Reagan) by mugging the free press." [Philadelphia Inquirer, 1 May] Another paper quoted US officials in Bali as indicating that "concerns about human rights will be raised by the president with Suharto, though probably more forcefully by Schultz in a separate meeting with Mochtar" [The Sun, 1 May].

The hostile mood among the foreign press corps in Bali grew worse when copies of the International Herald Tribune and the Asia Wall Street Journal turned up with huge black splotches, concealing articles critical of Suharto and revealing abuses in East Timor. As a result, human rights issues and press censorship dominated the press briefing by Mochtar in Bali on 1 May.

According to The Guardian correspondent, Alex Brummer [2 May], Schultz "chastised Indonesia over press censorship and human rights in an unusual public reprimand". Brummer pointed out that before the Reagan-Suharto and other top-level meetings in Bali, White House officials had insisted that human rights would be dealt with privately, so "last night's public reprimand marked a change in position, though it was tempered by praise for 'practice of religious freedom'".

US ambassador's regrets

US ambassador, Paul Wolfowitz later hoped the long-term effects of the Bali events would not be serious. "I very much regret the fact that (the expulsions) received far greater coverage than more comprehensive reporting about Indonesia." Although he refused to reveal what issues had been raised during the top-level talks in Bali, he admitted that human rights had been discussed "in both formal and informal meetings" [Tempo, 10 May].


All in all, most US commentators agree that Reagan's Bali trip was a disaster for Indonesia's image in the West.

[An analysis of the economic and political consequences of the Reagan encounter with Suharto and ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Bali will appear in the next issue.]



EAST TIMOR - the military situation

POSITIONS OF INDONESIAN ARMY AND FALINTIL TROOPS, JANUARY 1986



LEGEND

- FALINTIL/FRETILIN base areas
- More than a company of Indonesian troops plus a company of HANSIPS (militia)
- A company of Indonesian troops
- Tank positions
- Artillery positions
- Zones controlled by Indonesian forces
- Usable tracks
- Unusable tracks
- Borders of military districts

Map: Sang-usa Suttitanakul & Conrad Taylor

Indonesian military map confirms Fretilin resistance

Earlier this year, three maps were smuggled out of East Timor, reaching the Fretilin office in Lisbon in March. One is an Indonesian military map, captured by Fretilin on 3 June 1985. The other two, dated January 1986, are Fretilin maps with notes attached, written in the easily recognisable handwriting of Kay Rala Gusmao Xanana, commander of Falintil, the armed resistance.

The Fretilin maps are in colour. One provides detailed information about the present position and strength of the Indonesian invaders. The other shows the resettlement locations, known to the East Timorese as concentration camps, where most Timorese are now forced to live.

We have reproduced the Indonesian map and the Fretilin map which shows Indonesian military strength, combining them into a single map. As much detail as possible has been retained, without making the map difficult to read. The use of colour in the original Fretilin maps made it impossible to reproduce them as received. The Fretilin map of concentration camps will be reproduced in the next issue.

The Indonesian map

This was received in A4 size, crudely duplicated, with smudges of duplicating ink making some of the text illegible. There is no doubt as to its authenticity. Its style and terminology are typical of Indonesian military documents. In the top left-hand corner, badly smudged, is the name of the Wira Dharma Sub-Regional Military Command [Korem 164 Wira Dharma]. The map is marked *Rahasia* (Secret), top and bottom, indicating that it is part of a military intelligence report. It is dated Dili, March (date illegible) and signed by Major Sukeman Kadir, code number 26681. With that rank, he could well be chief of military intelligence.

The map bears the title, *Lampiran 04/Oleat Situasi*, or Appendix 04, Oleat Situation. The meaning of Oleat is not known. It is clear however that this is the fourth appendix to an intelligence report, but unfortunately, the report and the other appended documents are missing.

It divides East Timor into ten districts or sectors which Indonesian intelligence have identified as the sectors of operation of various Falintil companies. The companies and their commanders are named. When compared with the Fretilin map, much of the Indonesian information proves to be identical, though Xanana has corrected commanders' names in several instances. Details of the ten sectors as given in the Indonesian map, moving from west to east along the south coast (1-8) and from west to east along the north coast (9-10), are:

1. **Ki Gerilya Barat** or **West Guerrilla Company**, commanded by Fenansi Feras. Same is located in this sector.
2. **Ki-B Unidade IV** or **Unit IV Company B**, commanded by Ular/Virgilio. [Due east of 1]
3. **Ki-A Unidade IV** or **Unit IV Company A**, commanded by Falur/Dominggus Raul. [Due east of 2]

According to Xanana's corrections, Unit IV as a whole is commanded by Lere, with Selatu Mau as second in command. Ular is second in command of Company A, while Falur is Political Commissar of Unit IV.

4. **Ki-B Unidade II**, commanded by Sabika. [Due east of 3, along the south coast.] Viqueque is located in this sector.
5. **Ki-A Unidade II** or **Unit II Company A**, commanded by David Alex. This sector includes Baucau, Quelicai and Baguia.
6. **Ki-B Unidade I** or **Unit I Company B**, commanded by (illegible)/Miranda (illegible). [Due east of 5]

7. **Ki-A Unidade I** or **Unit I Company A**, commanded by Falu Txai/Miguel Perera.

Xanana gives Aluk as the commander of Unit I, with Roodak (from Resi Ono Oso Dara Key) as second in command and also commander of Company B.

8. **Ki Gerilya Timur** or **Eastern Guerrilla Company**, commanded by Cuba/Miguel do Santos. Los Palos is located here.

9. **Ki-B Unidade III** or **Unit III Company B**, commanded by Mau Kalu. [Due east of Dili, on the north coast.] The town in this sector is Manatuto

10. **Ki-A Unidade III** or **Unit III Company A**, commanded by Fera Lafaek/Agustino Miranda. [Due east of 9.]

The two names given in the Indonesian map for each of the commanders are their nom de guerre, usually a Tetum name, and their Portuguese name.

Fretilin's presence confirmed

The Indonesian map provides convincing proof of Fretilin's presence throughout East Timor from a line which, according to Indonesian intelligence, runs from the south coast a few kilometres east of Same up to a point on the north coast about 30 kilometres west of Manatuto. Fretilin bases are concentrated throughout the territory east of this line, with the heaviest concentrations in the eastern tip.

It must be assumed that the original of the Indonesian map was in colour. The black-and-white photocopy sent abroad conceals certain important distinctions. In particular, the map contains many blobs, mostly contiguous or overlapping, and the legend distinguishes between some which are called *daerah logistik hutan* (jungle logistic regions) and others which are called *basis klasik* (classic bases). Since these two types cannot now be distinguished, our map shows them simply as Fretilin guerrilla bases covering the same area as the blobs on the Indonesian map. These blobs show where Fretilin forces are concentrated. The territory left white is probably where Fretilin guerrilla units are free to roam.

Old and new commanders

Some commanders' names are familiar. One is Miguel do (dos?) Santos, formerly the rajah of Meara, who has been



Kay Rala Gusmao Xanana, the Fretilin leader. This photograph was taken in 1983, along with many photos from Fretilin-controlled areas smuggled to the outside world.

a Falintil commander since the early stages of the war. David Alex and Falu Txai were both mentioned in the 1982 Indonesian military manuals [See Budiardjo and Liem, *The War Against East Timor*, Zed Books, 1984]. They are among the second generation of Fretilin leaders, the ones who took over after the resurrection of the movement in 1980, under Xanana's leadership. Ular/Virgilio is probably Virgilio dos Anjos who surrendered in 1979 and became a conscript in the Indonesian Army. He later deserted and rejoined Falintil. As a reprisal, his wife and father



One of a large collection of photos of Fretilin guerrillas received in 1983.

were executed by the Indonesians during the tragic Kraras massacre in August 1983.

The presence of many new names among the Falintil commanders suggest that the guerrillas have no problem recruiting new leaders to take command.

Guerrilla mobility

The Indonesian map contains the symbols, A and B, and I, II, III and IV, at the boundaries of the sectors. [These details have been left out of the map reproduced here.] They probably indicate that the guerrilla companies identified operate in sectors on both sides of the boundary in question.

Both Indonesian and Fretilin maps show the stretch of territory east of the border with West Timor as being under Indonesian control. The shape of this territory is the same on both maps, but one detail from the Fretilin map is not included on the map produced here. Fretilin identifies three autonomous guerrilla units as operating in this stretch of country which Xanana calls the "pacified region".

The areas shaded grey, which are controlled by Indonesian forces, are reproduced from the Fretilin map.

Details about roads have been omitted for reasons of clarity. There are several roads, one going 10 kilometres south from Dili, one going along the north coast eastwards from Manatuto, through Baucau to Los Palos and Tutualu, the Baucau-Viqueque road and roads in the vicinity of Los Palos, all of which are shown by Fretilin as being heavily guarded by Indonesian troops, with checkpoints. Other tracks have a lesser security rating, though some in the vicinity of Quelicai and Baguia are shown as being permanently patrolled by Indonesian troops.

Indonesian military presence

Using symbols to distinguish the strength and concentration of Indonesian troops, and the presence of artillery and tank assault car units, the map reproduces

information contained in the Fretilin map regarding the spread and density of Indonesian military presence. The locations confirm earlier Fretilin reports about areas where guerrilla activities have been escalating and where Indonesian troops have had to move in.

Recent military operations

A letter to Mgr Martinhu da Costa Lopes, former Apostolic Administrator of East Timor, dated 20 February 1986, reports heightened guerrilla activities in Los Palos, Baucau, Viqueque, Manatuto, Same and Ainaro during the early months and the last quarter of 1985. The writer also described a two-pronged Indonesian concentration and encirclement operation moving southwards from Baucau to Viqueque early this year. On 6, 7 and 8 February 1986, he writes, the Indonesians launched an encirclement operation aimed at capturing Fretilin leader Xanana who was in the stony mountain range of Matabian, northwest of Viqueque, at the time. They made three attacks, one on each day, with many casualties on the Indonesian side.

Indonesian commander replaced

The present commander of the East Timor Sub-Regional Military Command (*Korem 164 Wira Dharma*), Infantry Colonel Yunus Yosfiah, was appointed to replace Colonel Rahardjo on 18 December 1985. Yusuf previously saw service as a battalion commander in East Timor. His appointment came shortly after a serious defeat for Indonesian troops when a Fretilin ambush near Los Palos caused between 10 and 15 Indonesian soldiers dead.

The incident occurred when Major-General Sutarto, Commander of the IX Regional Military Command, Kodam IX/Udayana, incorporating *Korem 164/Wira Dharma*, was visiting the area. It is not unlikely that this debacle, which was reported by foreign agencies, hastened Rahardjo's removal. He had been in the post less than a year, which is far shorter than the normal tour of duty.

Although Indonesian military commanders have tended to take a back-seat when foreign visitors come, creating the impression of a "province" run by civilians, the new man, Yusuf seems to prefer a higher profile. He made his presence felt when Australian journalists visited East Timor in March 1986, and introduced himself as 'Joe'.

A senior posting to East Timor is normally a boost to an Army officer's career. However, several military careers have been broken by failure to crush Falintil. It remains to be seen long Colonel 'Joe' can stay at his post, following his failure to capture Xanana last February.

UDT - FRETILIN
Joint Statement



occasional reports no.2

 British Campaign for the Defence of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia
 8a Trafalgar Street, London SW18 2SP Phone 01 874-3262

TAPOL's Occasional Reports No 2 contains the 24 March 1986 Joint Statement by UDT and Fretilin, plus statements by Moises da Costa Amaral for UDT, and Abilio Araujo for Fretilin. Copies on request for TAPOL. Kindly add a donation to cover costs when requesting three copies or more.

In support of genocide

When Indonesia lobbies hard this year to 'obliterate' East Timor from the UN agenda, it will be able to rely on the support of the West German government. Close bilateral relations did not commence with the conservative government which came to power in 1982. Under the Social Democrats, cooperation was already well-established; only a handful of leftwing Social Democratic MPs had the courage to speak out against supporting one of the world's most brutal military regimes.

Official German policy is guided by economic and military interests. Bonn regards Indonesia as a major partner in the arms trade and in private investment. Notwithstanding the fact that German law forbids the sale of weapons if they can be used for offensive war, Germany's arms trade with Indonesia has increased dramatically since Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975. In 1977, the Schmidt Government approved the export of two submarines to Indonesia, and in the following years, torpedo-boats, minesweepers and transport aircraft were added to the list of equipment supplied to the Indonesian Armed Forces. Since April 1984, according to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, West Germany has become the second largest supplier of military equipment to Indonesia, after the USA.

Technological transfer

Indonesia is now devoting much attention and resources to building its own armaments industry, and looks to Germany for support. A key figure is Indonesia's Minister for Research and Technology, B.J. Habibie who studied engineering in Aachen and worked as a senior engineer with Messerschmidt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB). Even though he is now a minister, he is still on the pay-roll of MBB, a glaring example of a conflict of interests.

Under Habibie's promotion, MBB was one of the first arms companies to invest in Indonesia. Together with the state aviation company, Nusantara [formerly Nurtanio], it has set up a centre for Indonesian avionics in Bandung. In an interview with a Portuguese television crew in East Timor in 1983, an Indonesian officer admitted that they were using MBB-manufactured BO-105 helicopters in East Timor. The German Ministry of Technology has spent about £2.5 million to support MBB investments in Indonesia.

Other German companies supporting Indonesia's weapons industry are Mercedes, Siemens, AEG, MTU and the Lurrasen-dockyard. In 1984, *The Australian* published a photograph of Indonesian soldiers in Mercedes vehicles on the streets of Dili.

Collaboration in nuclear energy

West Germany is also supporting the nuclear research centre in Serpong, south-west of Jakarta, where a multi-purpose nuclear reactor MPR-30 is being built. The reactor is producing low-concentrate uranium which is suitable for use in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Germany's contribution to this programme has already amounted to £7.5 million.

A criminal cover-up

The only way the German Government can justify all this collaboration is by denying that Indonesia is waging a war against East Timor, and refusing to recognise the dictatorial character of the Indonesian regime. Such distortions do not seem to worry officials in Bonn. On a visit to Jakarta in February 1984, Mr. Carstens, the former president of the German Federal Republic claimed that "Germany and Indonesia are engaged in making peace on earth safer". The official responsible for South and South-east Asia at the Department of Foreign Affairs puts it like this: "Political cooperation with Indonesia is

very important for the Federal Government. In all important international questions, the two countries have similar and often identical views, especially over Afghanistan and Cambodia."

German government efforts to deny the truth about conditions in East Timor started early on. In 1979, when the Association for Endangered People and the Committee Cap Anamur called on the government to support the starving people in East Timor, the Foreign Department denied that there was any need for help. In a letter to the Association dated 7 March, 1980, the Ministry wrote: "We can assure you that the situation of the people in East Timor greatly improved in the last 6 months of 1979.... The Australian and Indonesian governments are, moreover, willing to provide assistance until the situation stabilises."

In an internal letter, Hallier, the German ambassador in Jakarta, made the preposterous claim that "free elections held under UN supervision would see Golkar emerge as the victor because, except for a very small minority, most people would certainly vote for the new rulers."

When a German parliamentary delegation visited East Timor in 1984 (without any MPs from the Greens), Bonn made use of those parts of their report that were favourable to Indonesia for the purposes of lobbying in Indonesia's favour at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. The critical points contained in the report were ignored. When Defence Minister, Worner visited Indonesia in November 1985, 87 Social Democrat and 20 Green MPs urged him to raise the East Timor issue, but he refused, saying that he was going to Jakarta "to discuss security in the region."

Such cynical disregard for the tragedy suffered by the East Timorese since the Indonesian invasion is the hallmark of German official declarations. Thus, in reply to questions tabled by the Greens last year, the Foreign Minister even went so far as to claim that "there is no Indonesian war against East Timor."

With such a record, West German governments of whatever political complexion can only be regarded as accomplices in genocide.

Klemens Ludwig

Rocket attacks in Jakarta

Three buildings housing foreign embassies and businesses in Jakarta were attacked by rockets and bombs on 14 May. None exploded but, according to experts, the launching technique used was successful, the same as was used in Tokyo during the Summit earlier in the month [Tempo, 24 May].

The Japanese embassy was hit by a rocket launched from a hotel room opposite. The second rocket, fired from a nearby street, landed inside the US embassy compound, near the ambassador's office. Then, at Wisma Metropolitan, a car blew up in the car-park. This accommodates two Hongkong companies, two Singapore companies, and three Indonesian companies, among them the Bogasari Flour Milling Company owned by Liem Sioe Liong.

The Indonesian security authorities have made no progress finding the people responsible. A Japanese-based Anti-Imperialist International Brigade has claimed responsibility, describing the attacks as a response to the statement issued by the Tokyo Summit.

Japanese MPs reject solution of convenience

The following is the text of a letter sent to the UN Secretary-General, Peres de Cuellar, by 75 Members of the Japanese House of Representatives and House of Councillors, on 7 December 1986:

Dear Secretary General,

As you are aware, a full decade has now passed since the invasion of East Timor by Indonesian troops. We address you today because we believe in your sincere desire to work toward a just and lasting settlement of the East Timor conflict, a conflict which has already claimed an enormous toll in human life, both East Timorese and Indonesian.

We fully support the mandate given to you in General Assembly Resolution 37/30 "to initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned" with a view to achieving a comprehensive settlement of the East Timor problem. We can also well appreciate the great difficulty and delicacy of your task.

We are disturbed, however, to note that representatives of the East Timorese have yet to be included in these deliberations. Earlier this year you reportedly stated in press conferences in Jakarta and Tokyo that discussions between "both sides" (Indonesia and Portugal) appeared to be moving toward a solution of the fate of the East Timor. Surely you will agree that discussions that do not include the East Timorese, notably Fretilin, could not possibly lead to any meaningful solution of the fate of those same East Timorese.

Understandably you are anxious to work toward a speedy solution of this conflict. However, a cosmetic solution which ignores the fundamental right of the East Timorese to determine their own fate can only prolong the conflict. Furthermore, such a "solution of convenience", in contradiction to the very principles upon which the United Nations was founded, could not but be viewed as an act of cynicism by the peace-loving people of the world.

We therefore urge you to include, at the earliest possible moment, representatives of the East Timorese, notably Fretilin, in the negotiation process.

Finally, as you are aware, since 1975, Japan has consistently voted in the UN General Assembly and the Fourth Sub-Committee against resolutions affirming the right of the East Timorese to self-determination. The fact that the Japanese government has taken this position without an adequate survey of the situation and without any debate in this country is deeply regrettable. (We) pledge to make every effort to widely publicise this

pressing issue, an issue that involves the fate of an entire people, and to actively work to bring about a constructive contribution on the part of Japan.

The signatories include Members of both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. Sixty-three are from the Japanese Socialist Party, and the remaining twelve are from the United Social Democratic Party, the Komei Party, the Democratic Socialist Party, the New Liberal Party, the Salaryman Shintosh, and the Shinsei Club.

Portuguese premier reiterates support for self-determination

Professor Anibal Cavaco Silva, the Prime Minister of Portugal, has re-affirmed his government's support for East Timor's right to self-determination. He was speaking on a BBC World Service and Radio 4 phone-in programme on 11 May.

He said the current consultations between Portugal and Indonesia, being held under UN auspices, were initially seeking "an answer to the humanitarian problems that the people of East Timor are suffering, and to reduce the limitations on freedom for the people living there. We do hope that in the near future, it will be possible to reach an understanding under which the people are given the right to express their desire to be part of Indonesia or to be separate from Indonesia."

The Prime Minister was answering a question from Jean Inglis, a leading East Timor activist in Hiroshima. Asked about the role of world public opinion and of governments such as Japan, he said:

"We think it is very important to maintain strong public opinion pressure on national governments so that they will support the position of Portugal, which is the position which defends the right of the people of East Timor in the United Nations. So, I appreciate everything that is done in Japan to help, not Portugal, but the people of East Timor."

Mochtar aims to "obliterate" East Timor internationally

Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, is making no secret of his determination to "obliterate" East Timor from the UN General Assembly agenda this year. In April, he held meetings with Indonesian ambassadors throughout the world in Geneva and in New York, to map out a strategy "to resolve the East Timor issue once and for all" [Kompas, 29 March].

The last time the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on East Timor was in November 1982. With 50 votes to 46, the Secretary-General was instructed "to initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned, with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem". Since then, the consultations have involved only Indonesia and Portugal, excluding East Timorese representatives. The General Assembly has avoided discussing a resolution each year because the Secretary-General was unable to report

any progress. It is thought unlikely there will be another postponement this year.

Self-determination remains the central issue

Mochtar is obviously upset because, despite all his efforts, East Timor's self-determination remains the central issue. He is trying to downplay this by claiming that, internationally, the emphasis has now shifted to "humanitarian issues", and that activities are being undertaken only by non-governmental organisations. Yet, his much publicised efforts [see, for instance, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 11 April] to secure a decision at the meeting of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Foreign Ministers in New Delhi in April to keep East Timor off the agenda of the Movement's summit conference in Zimbabwe in September this year, ended in failure. All he could achieve from the New Delhi meeting was a claim that 36

NAM member states (less than half the Movement) "have vowed to stand on our side" should Vanuatu, Mozambique and Angola raise the issue at this year's General Assembly [Jakarta Post, 21 April].

There are more than enough countries who will want to raise the question of East Timor's right to self-determination in Zimbabwe. Even if the issue fails to win majority support, it will remain a controversial matter for the Non-Aligned Movement which, for Indonesia, is almost as bad. This alone could persuade Suharto not to attend the 1986 Summit. Yet, only last year, Suharto nurtured hopes of becoming chairman of the Movement.

Mochtar has announced that Indonesia is to open a diplomatic mission in Harare to prepare for the NAM Summit, and has appointed a special envoy to lobby African countries for support on the East Timor issue [Jakarta Post, 16 May].

Twenty thousand orphans

There are no fewer than 20,000 orphans in East Timor, according to Mario Carrascalao, the puppet governor of the Indonesian administration. More than three-quarters are in desperate need of help, he told the visiting Indonesian Minister for Social Affairs.

In addition, there are 13,000 widows, 7,000 people whom he describes as destitute and some 3,000 prostitutes, all of whom are in need of urgent economic assistance. He complained that his administration was not able to cope with the needs of these people, and hopes to obtain assistance from Jakarta. [Kompas, 14 April] He did not bother to explain why it was that getting on for 50,000 people, or about 10 per cent of the surviving population, were in such desperate straits.

Indonesian-run elections are no substitute for a referendum

According to reports from Portugal, the Portuguese Government is seriously considering a proposal that a UN representative should be sent to observe Indonesia's parliamentary election in East Timor to be held in April 1987. Apparently, a high turnout and a huge majority for the army's political wing, Golkar, would justify accepting this as a "legitimate act of self-determination", a sign that the East Timorese have accepted integration.

The Portuguese government should be warned that this manoeuvre would be an inexcusable betrayal of Portugal's obligation to the people of East Timor. First and foremost, it is quite illegal for the Indonesian forces of occupation to conduct elections in East Timor, and there can be no justification for the UN giving the elections the cloak of legality by sending an observer. The UN correctly refused to observe the "People's Assembly" meeting in Dili in July 1976 which Jakarta claims was the occasion when East "chose" integration with Indonesia.

1982 elections, a farce

General elections in Indonesia have long been exposed as a farce. Golkar [*Golongan Karya*, or Functional Groups] enjoys huge privileges over the two other permitted political parties, at every stage of the campaign. The farce is even more cynical in East Timor. All indigenous East Timorese parties were dissolved or banned as soon as the army took control, and Timorese are required to "choose" between three foreign-imposed parties.

The first time Jakarta went through the charade of holding elections in East Timor was in 1982. The security situation in East Timor at the time of the 1977 elections was still deemed unfit for such an event.

The 1982 election results in East Timor were so farcical that even *The Economist*, [8 May 1982] referred to them as being "hard to swallow". In the first place, the East Timor results were declared before any others, within hours after polling had ceased. That alone makes the claimed results suspect, considering the poor state of communications in Indonesia's "youngest province".

The official returns recorded a turnout of 101.05 per cent of the number of voters, with Golkar claiming to receive over 99 per cent of the votes cast. The official results were:


Number of voters	306,507
Number of votes cast	309,734
Votes for Golkar	308,046
Votes for PPP	666
Votes for PDI	1,022

These figures were published, without comment, in many Jakarta dailies on 7 and 8 May, 1982.

Widespread coercion

Coercion is used throughout Indonesia to ensure a high turnout, and to secure a massive majority for Golkar. The level of coercion is far worse in East Timor where the military play an even more decisive role. Prior to the 1982 elections, reports were received from East Timor about troops forcing people to attend Golkar election meetings, or buy T-shirts with Suharto's picture. Refusal meant being accused as Fretilin supporters.

As for Jakarta's claim that the elections were free, direct, universal and secret, this was exposed in an official publication of the Indonesian Department of Information, East Timor after Integration, published in July 1983. A photograph on page 92 shows an election booth in East Timor. Voters are required to place their votes in one of three boxes designated for the three parties. There are six boxes, three for the parliamentary election, three for the local assembly election, all placed, unconcealed, on the floor, while voting proceeds. There was nothing secret about how people voted. No wonder Golkar could claim 99 per cent support!



The GOLKAR Symbol adorned

Subversion trials in Jayapura

Harsh sentences for 1982 flag-raisers

In March, Amnesty International made public the results of investigations about nine university students who were tried for lowering the Indonesian flag in front of the Irian Jaya Provincial Assembly building on 3 July 1982. They hoisted the West Papuan flag in its place and read out a proclamation of the West Papuan state.

Eight men and one woman stood trial. Four of the men, Abraham Hegemur, about 28, David Heremba, about 30, Ismail Patiran and Simon Tuteurup were sentenced to ten years. Three men, Karel Patiran, Gerardus Timang and Thadius Waripang, got seven years. A man, Otto Rumawak, and a woman, Josephine Gewab, the wife of David Heremba, were sentenced to four years. Josephine Gewab, who is in prison together with her daughter, aged three, was charged because she sewed the flag.

On 25 May 1984, four of the men, Abraham Hegemur, David Heremba, Simon Tuteurup and Thadius Waripang, were transferred to Kalisosok Prison in Surabaya, East Java. This means that relatives and friends have no access and cannot provide the supplementary food so crucial for political prisoners whose food supplies in prison are described by Amnesty as "often meagre and inadequate".

According to information reaching TAPOL in April, five of the twelve West Papuans forcibly deported from PNG on 12 October last year were tried in February and sentenced on 1 March. This source names the five as: Isaak Rumpaisum, Lemach Yoafifi, Edison Yakadewa, Sonny Seseray and Amos Sorondanya. Amnesty International meanwhile has unconfirmed information that seven were tried. Their list excludes Sonny Seseray and includes Elias Kareni, Sam Yaro and Lukas Maro. Amnesty also believes that Amos Sorondanya was sentenced to nine years, though our source reports that no information is yet available about the verdicts.

The lack of specifics about a group of prisoners who were visited and interviewed in January this year by a group of Australian parliamentarians [see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 73, March 1986] is symptomatic of the secrecy surrounding the fate of West Papuan political prisoners. The trials were not open to outside observers, nor were the defendants in a position to appoint lawyers of their own choice. There is no reason to believe that these men had anything approaching a fair trial.

OPM operations escalate

News that two OPM guerrilla leaders had surrendered in PNG - James Nyaro in the north border region and Gerardus Thomy in the south - led many to conclude that OPM was in decline. But the opposite appears to be the case.

Since the latter months of 1985, there has been a marked upsurge in guerrilla activity in the north, throughout the district [*kabupaten*] of Jayapura. Operations have also been reported in Fakfak, around the oil installations. It appears that the OPM have directed their operations against foreign companies exploiting the territory's mineral wealth, as well as against military and police command posts.

In September, October and November last year, army and police posts were attacked in various parts of Tor Atas sub-district, well to the west of the provincial capital of Jayapura (see map). Then in Urum Guai, or Urunum Guai, the local army sub-district command [*koramil*] was overrun and a number of soldiers taken prisoner, as well as the sub-district chief [*camat*] and his assistant.

The Urum Guai attack came on 26 January, the day before twelve West Papuans were whisked out of Irian Jaya by Hercules (see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 74, March 1986). It is now known for certain that these men are all in detention at Kalisosok Prison in Surabaya, East Java.

The Waris raid

But the most spectacular operation took place two weeks earlier, when OPM guerrillas attacked and took control of Waris, a post near the border with PNG. Most reports agree that the post was held for up to two weeks. The OPM flag was raised, and bridges and roads were destroyed, preventing Indonesian troops from entering the area to recapture the post [*Niugini Nius*, 15 January]. Bulldozers used to build the Trans Irian Highway were also burned.

Altogether about 900 guerrillas were reportedly involved in the operation, most of them from the region of Wamena, in the highlands to the south-west. Once they had secured hold of Waris, one group moved south in the direction of Ubrub, another moved north-west in the direction of Arso, while a third group stayed behind to

keep hold of Waris.

According to PNG press reports, PNG Defence Force troops were sent 'on routine patrol' to the border area after news of the raid on Waris was received. Although in the early stages, PNG officials in Port Moresby and Vanimo confirmed that the raid had indeed taken place, the PNG government later denied it, as did the authorities in Jakarta. This led Bernard Narokobi, the lawyer who has done so much to help West Papuan refugees in PNG, to make a stinging attack on the PNG government for concealing the truth. His own sources had revealed that two Indonesian soldiers and several Papuans were killed during the Waris fighting [*Niugini Nius*, 20 January].

PNG and Indonesian armies strengthen ties

Not long after this escalation came the visit to Jakarta of Brigadier-General Huai, commander of the PNG Defence Force, the first ever visit of such a senior PNG military officer to Indonesia. On his return home, Brig-Gen. Huai aroused widespread consternation with a statement describing the OPM as "a bunch of terrorists" which he was resolved to "wipe from the face of the earth" [*Niugini Nius*, 27 March].

Speaking at a press conference in Port Moresby, with the Indonesian Charge d'Affaires, Rapius Ishak, seated at his side, Brig-Gen. Huai said it had been agreed, in discussions with Indonesian Armed Forces commander, General Murdani, that PNG and Indonesia would take the same steps on both sides of their common border to ensure the elimination of the OPM.

Protests came from many circles. Some politicians accused him of declaring war on the OPM. Others complained that he was making pronouncements on aspects of government policy which were not within the competence of a military chief, but matters for cabinet ministers. There were calls for his dismissal, among others from Bernard Narokobi. Several community leaders from PNG

border provinces stressed that, whatever the Defence Force Chief may say, PNGians along the border are and will remain deeply sympathetic to the OPM.

During his stay in Indonesia, Brig-Gen. Huai visited many military establishments and academies. He has since talked about the possibility of purchasing weapons from Indonesia and sending officers for training with the Indonesian Army. The two countries will also exchange military attaches. Indonesia's military attache in Port Moresby was ordered to leave in 1984 when Indonesian military aircraft overflew PNG territory and buzzed villages on several occasions.

Prime Minister Wingti has since denied there is any change in government policy towards the OPM, and said that Brig-Gen. Huai's remarks had been "misinterpreted" [Niugini Nius, 7 May].

The OPM's response

OPM spokespeople in PNG were quick to respond to the Defence Force chief's new belligerence. Moses Werror, the acting chair in PNG of the OPM's Revolutionary Council, warned the General to keep out of OPM's struggle against Indonesia. He also warned that guerrillas holding Indonesians prisoners would kill them, because that is what the Indonesians do with the OPM fighters they capture. Ten Indonesians were under threat, five of them captured during a raid on Urungue, some 20 kilometres west of Waris, on 31 March. The other five were captured near Waris, when OPM was still in control of the post [PNG Times, 19 April].

Werror also said guerrillas were waging operations against two other posts in the region, Sabron and Genjem. "The purpose ... is to hold the stations for as long as possible and capture food, ammunition and weapons."

New commander

Meanwhile, the newly appointed commander of OPM forces in the north border region, Commander Bas Mekawa urged Brig-Gen. Huai to stop "trying to destroy the Melanesian race and impose Asians in the Pacific". [PNG Times, 19 April]

A few weeks earlier, a Niugini Nius journalist met and interviewed Mekawa. This 50-year old former district chief [bupati] claimed to be in command of about 7,000 guerrillas in the region. They are armed primarily with axes, bows and arrows, spears and clubs, plus a small number of rifles. OPM carries out mobile warfare, its only viable strategy against a far better equipped enemy. "If they know where we are, they will move in and immediately crush us. That's why we're always moving."

OPM operations against oil installations

Meanwhile, an AFP report from Jakarta [Niugini Nius, 24 April] quotes petroleum industry sources as saying six Indonesians were killed in several incidents from 10 to

20 March, near Sarmi, a town 150 kilometres west of Jayapura. This is the region where the Dutch Shell Oil company has been engaged in seismic studies. According to the same source, six Indonesians were killed, of whom three were soldiers and three civilians working for the State-owned petroleum company, Pertamina. The soldiers were captured when guerrillas surrounded a building and hoisted the OPM flag.

The Podena Shell installation located between Sarmi and Jayapura, was attacked twice, on 10 and 11 March. (It is not clear whether this installation is on-shore, or located on the Podena group of islands.) On the first day, 50 workers and six policemen were surrounded during their evening meal and were taken hostage. The next morning, a similar group including 10 policemen was surrounded. Two policemen were shot dead while another two were injured [PNG Times, 3 May].

AFP reports Shell representatives in Jakarta as saying they had halted exploration in the area because of the attacks.

Yet more attacks occurred later that month in Betaf [Jayapura district] when both the military command (Koramil) and the police headquarters (Kosek) were attacked. OPM claims to have killed 10 soldiers and 5 policemen, as well as capturing firearms.


The most recent attack is reported to have been launched against a police post in Abepura, 15 kilometres from Jayapura. A few weeks earlier, the police post at Arso, 40 kilometres further south, was set on fire. AFP, reporting the incident from Jakarta on 7 May, said the report had been confirmed by religious sources in Irian Jaya.

New Indonesian incursions over the border?


Villagers in three villages in the Fly River valley, Aimbak, Obu and Bosset, in Western Province, fled their villages in fear when two unidentified aircraft flew over at tree-top level. According to reports reaching Port Moresby, the villagers fled into the bush, fearing that this was the start of an Indonesian invasion [Niugini Nius, 15 May]. The same paper reported the next day that the villagers were still refusing to return to their villages, while government officials were not willing to confirm or deny the reports about incursions of PNG airspace.

Another sign of growing tensions on the border is a report that 200 OPM guerrillas crossed into PNG, near Wutung in the north, which led a local official to warn people not to go near the border area until further notice [Niugini Nius, 14 May].

A few days later, Brig-General Huai went to Jayapura for a hastily-convened meeting with General Murdani. The talks were reportedly concerned with security at the border before PNG and the UNHCR begin work to relocate refugee camps away from the border. The meeting was held at Murdani's request [Niugini Nius, 19 May].



Bas Mekawa. [Niugini Nius, 27 March 1986]



Refugee family returns to Vanimo

A woman together with her four children returned to the Blackwater refugee camp in Vanimo in mid May, complaining that they could not cope with living conditions in their village in Jayapura district. The report does not specify when the family was repatriated, but it stated that she appeared before the Vanimo District Court before being taken back to Blackwater Camp [Niugini Nius, 15 May].

PNG accedes to refugees convention

The PNG Parliament accepted a government proposal to accede to the UN 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol on Refugees. This undoubtedly strengthens the position of the UNHCR in the regulation and protection of West Papuan refugee affairs.

Leading members of the opposition parties, which refused to involve the UNHCR when they were in power up to last November, vigorously attacked ratification of the Convention and Protocol, accusing the Wingti Government of "selling PNG's sovereignty and security" [Niugini Nius, 13 May].

IGGI AND TRANSMIGRATION

Western credit likely to increase

The Dutch chair of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), Mrs Eegje Schoo, gave Indonesia a firm assurance, nearly three months ahead of this year's IGGI meeting, that at least \$2.4 billion of financial assistance will be supplied to Indonesia for 1986/87. She hinted that Indonesia might get more than this to tide it over its present economic difficulties. The IGGI would also try, she said, to "improve the quality of its assistance" by providing a higher proportion in non-repayable grants so as to reduce the burden on Indonesia's future debt repayment obligations.

Up to September 1985, Indonesia's external debt had reached \$24.8 billion. To this must be added the \$2.4 billion allocated by the IGGI at its 1985 meeting, which will bring the overall total later this year to around \$27.2 billion.

The IGGI is an international aid consortium of western countries, managed by the World Bank. It was set up in 1967, just as the massacres that followed Suharto's seizure of power, which took the lives of an estimated one million people, were subsiding. The member governments are Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, German Federal Republic, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK and the US. A number of governments attend as observers, including Austria, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The other multilateral agencies involved are the Asian Development Bank, UNDP and the European Community.

Schoo, who is Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation, made her annual, pre-IGGI session visit to Indonesia far earlier than usual. The IGGI meeting is not due until the last week of June. This ties in with Jakarta's acute budgetary problems. The 1986/87 budget, announced in January, cut overall spending by 7 per cent and slashed "development" expenditures by 22 per cent. This was based on an assumed oil price of \$25 a barrel. But with the price now hovering at half that, the military government is going to have to revise the budget drastically.

With the economy in dire straits, foreign economic assistance, for so long an important prop to the system, has now become more crucial than ever. The Indonesian budget is required by law to be balanced, but this is only achieved with the help of substantial foreign aid amounting to about 17 per cent of revenues.

In addition to Indonesia's official foreign debt of \$27.2 billion, there is an estimated \$5-7 billion private-sector debt. The *Far Eastern Economic Review* [27 March 1986] points out that for the first time this year, foreign debt due for repayment is running higher than new credit coming in. "This year, US\$1.16 billion will be paid out for every dollar of credit or aid. Debt service is climbing, estimated at 27-30 per cent based on net exports income."

During the oil boom, oil and natural gas provided 65 to 70 per cent of Indonesia's State revenue and about 70 per cent of its foreign exchange earnings. The current budget cuts oil's share of government income to 55 per cent. It is increasingly apparent that Jakarta's efforts to boost

non-oil exports are foundering. Hence, the hasty consultations with IGGI, to be followed no doubt by strenuous efforts from The Hague to muster greater support in the West for Indonesia's flagging economy. The western powers are well aware that the current economic decline, burgeoning unemployment and rising prices could unleash social unrest in a country regarded as enjoying "sound political stability", to quote the new US ambassador to Jakarta, Paul Wolfowitz. The scale of repression employed to maintain this "sound political stability" was not mentioned.

IGGI and the Indonesian economy

At the outset IGGI funding was essential to the Suharto government. It covered the huge deficit between state income and expenditure and helped finance the running expenses of the Army and the bureaucracy, thus contributing to the consolidation of military rule. It also gave Suharto a breathing space by re-scheduling the \$2.5 billion foreign debt inherited from the Sukarno era.

By the late 1970s, oil revenues had become the mainstay of the regime but IGGI credits continued to increase, supporting a range of "development" projects. In fact, these funds flowed in faster than they could be used up, and current estimates of unused IGGI credits vary from \$2 billion to \$9 billion! This might appear to mean that IGGI funding could be cut, but this simple logic does not apply to western funding institutions faced with debt-crisis countries and collapsing Third World tyrannies. Despite the economic decline, Indonesia's credit rating is still high and the banks can earn plenty of interest from loans to Indonesia.

IGGI enthusiastic about transmigration

The other striking feature about Schoo's visit to Indonesia this year was her strident support for transmigration. She is well aware of the campaign now gathering steam against the programme. Indeed the Dutch Government has been involved in a lengthy correspondence with Survival International, trying to defend itself by denying irrefutable evidence that The Hague has been supportive of the programme in a number of ways.

Her visit to Indonesia culminated in a six-day trip to West Papua, where she saw several model transmigration sites located in Koya Barat, near Jayapura. She used

every opportunity to express admiration for the "contribution transmigration has made to the economic development of Irian Jaya" [Jakarta Post, 9 April].

She made it clear she was not interested in the "issue" of Javanisation. "I understand it very well. The Javanese are the majority, so it is quite proper that they should exert an influence over a wide area. The important thing is, how the government should be running the transmigration programme better" [Tempo, 12 April].

Financial support for transmigration will be on the IGGI agenda this year, according to Schoo. Taking an apparent swipe at the information published in the May 1986 edition of *The Ecologist*, Schoo said "the IGGI considers only authentic information from financial institutions like the World Bank" and is not interested in matters like Javanisation.

Martono defends land-grabbing

Following consultations with the Mrs Schoo, Indonesia's Minister of Transmigration, Martono spoke at length about land acquisition for transmigration sites. He claimed that land used for transmigration must first be converted into "state land" and this is done by traditional communities "voluntarily" surrendering their land to the state. No compensation is paid for land surrendered for transmigration, though the dispossessed communities can become participants in the transmigration programme, and obtain a share of the land [Pelita, 2 April, 1986].

Martono apparently believes that such "voluntary" land seizures are acceptable because they are accompanied by a traditional land-acceptance ceremony. He took part in a ceremony to receive 300,000 hectares surrendered by tribes in Timika district for the transmigration programme. These tribal lands were then distributed to transmigrants as their private property. Some local inhabitants were also given land certificates which meant, he said, that instead of owning the land collectively as before, it was now their private property [Kompas, 2 April]. It is apparently inconceivable to Martono that tribal people might actually prefer to own their land collectively.

[For a full discussion of transmigration as it affects traditional land rights, see Marcus Colchester, "The Struggle for Land: Tribal Peoples in the Face of the Transmigration Programme" in *The Ecologist*, Vol. 16, No. 2/3, 1986.]

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Mrs Eegje Schoo meets a West Papuan. [Tempo, 12 April, 1986]

65 million to be transmigrated in twenty years

The Minister for Transmigration, Martono, has admitted that Indonesia intends to re-settle 65 million people from Java, Bali and Lombok to the outer islands, in the next 20 years. "In fact, we hope to move even more, if we possibly can." [Kompas, 12 May]

Martono was responding to a report from Washington that Marcus Colchester of Survival International had called on the World Bank to stop aiding Indonesia's transmigration programme. The Minister was clearly ruffled by the attack on the programme. He accused Survival of not knowing the problems and of pursuing an 'issue' [a pejorative term in official discourse] in order to discredit the government.

His statement focussed on Survival's criticism of the widespread degradation of Indonesia's tropical forest land and of the destruction of tribal people's lifestyles. In fact, he confirmed both things. He admitted that tropical forests were being cut down because the programme needs huge amounts of land. He justified the undermining of tribal people's lives by claiming that they would, like all other ethnic groups, be fully absorbed into a single Indonesian nation.

He said Survival would be invited to come to Indonesia to see the programme for themselves.

World bank should stop funding transmigration

The current issue of The Ecologist, produced jointly with Survival International and TAPOL, contains six major articles analysing Indonesia's transmigration programme. The editorial takes the form of a letter addressed to the Retiring President and the President Elect of the World Bank, Mr Clausen and Mr Conable. The letter reads as follows:

We are writing to you to express our grave concerns regarding the World Bank's continued funding of the Transmigration Programme in Indonesia.

The programme, which involves the mass movement of millions of landless poor from the central Indonesian islands of Java, Madura, Bali and Lombok to the less densely populated outer islands, has been promoted as a humanitarian exercise with the primary goal of improving living standards. The promotion of regional development through the provision of the necessary manpower to the outer islands, and the strengthening of national unity through increasing ethnic integration are also given as objectives of the programme.

Yet evidence continues to accumulate that even the major humanitarian rationalisations for the programme are flawed. The widespread failure of Transmigration sites and the increasing numbers of settlers engaged in 'second

round flows' testify to this.

Of particular concern to us is the impact that this project is having on the forests and peoples of the outer islands. Transmigration, as it is presently being carried out, is leading to the permanent and effectively irreversible destruction of vast areas of tropical forest. Over 3.3 million hectares of tropical forest will be destroyed by Transmigration during the present five year plan. In addition, the destabilised populations from unsuccessful sites are causing further widespread environmental damage, as the settlers abandon their failed sites and lay waste the surrounding vegetation. Moreover, as the recent Forest Review, carried out by three Indonesian Government Departments and the International Institute for Environment and Development, has emphasised, even where sites are successful, serious environmental problems arise, since these areas serve to

draw less fortunate settlers to them, placing an unsustainable burden on the fragile tropical forest environment.

Current rates of deforestation in Indonesia have become a cause of global concern, estimates placing the overall rate of forest loss at over one million hectares per year. Transmigration exacts a major part of this terrible toll. We would draw your attention to the conclusion of the Forest Review team, where they state:

Given the current objectives and operational procedures of the Transmigration Programme, the Team considers Transmigration as the single sectoral activity with the greatest potential to advance forest destruction - often to no constructive result. Whether a 'success' or 'failure' by present standards, Transmigration, as currently managed, can only have negative implications for forest resources.

[Review of Issues Affecting the Sustainable Development of Indonesia's Forest Lands, GOI/IIED, 1985, Vol II:62]

Such a conclusion makes clear that the Transmigration Programme is entirely incompatible with the World Bank's own environmental policy guidelines, where the Bank states that it:

9p. Endeavours to ensure that each project affecting renewable natural resources (e.g. as sink for residue or as a resource for raw material) does not exceed the regenerative capacities of the environment;

9b. Will not finance projects that cause severe or irreversible environmental deterioration, including species extinctions without mitigatory measures acceptable to the Bank... [Environmental Policies and Procedures of the World Bank, Office of Environmental and Scientific Affairs, May 1984]

Transmigration takes as its starting point the assumption that the outer islands are 'underpopulated' and 'underdeveloped'. Yet, in fact, these areas are the traditional homelands of a large number of viable and vigorous societies which have developed sophisticated systems of resource use subtly adapted to their prevailing environmental circumstances. Transmigration, by alienating these peoples from their traditional lands and forcing them to participate in development projects, many of which are environmentally and economically inappropriate, is destroying the very basis of their ways of life.

Traditional land rights subordinated to state interests

As you will be aware, Indonesian law, while ostensibly recognising traditional [adat] land rights, completely subordinates these rights to State interests [Basic Agrarian Law No 5, 1960]. Special legislation relating to Transmigration further weakens these rights. For example, Clause 17 of the Basic Forestry Act, Clarification Act No 2823 of 1967, states:

The rights of traditional law communities may not be allowed to stand in the way of the establishment of Transmigration sites.

The effect of these and other laws is to deny the land rights of tribal peoples practising non-sedentary forms of land use. Compensation payable to these people is limited to payment for the destruction of their standing crops and buildings but not for loss of their hunting, gathering and fishing territories. Instead of respecting the rights of tribal peoples to their traditional lands and resources, Government policy obliges these peoples to abandon their traditional ways of life, leaving them with no alternative but to integrate into Transmigration settlements where they find themselves outnumbered by outsiders and despised for their 'primitive' customs. In many provinces, Transmigration is leading tribal peoples

to become a minority in their own lands.

The dispossession that is an inevitable part of Transmigration is causing an escalation in inter-ethnic tensions. Particularly in West Papua (Irian Jaya), tribals who have resisted the takeover of their lands have been accused of being members of proscribed secessionist movements and have been subjected to security operations by the Indonesian armed forces. These actions are leading to a bloody escalation of the conflict between tribal people and the military. In West Papua, which, with a total population of 1.2 million, has been designated to receive about 685,000 settlers in the next five years, there have been widespread reports of human rights abuse associated with the programme.

One of the most worrying and evident expressions of the problems Transmigration is causing is the continuing exodus of tribal people from West Papua into neighbouring Papua New Guinea. According to the UN High Commission for Refugees, there are presently 10,500 refugees in camps all along the border, including about 500 new arrivals in the last few months [Refugees, February 1986]. Successive reports from those in direct communication with the refugees have noted that land alienation, resulting primarily from the Transmigration programme, has been a major cause for their flight. Refugees report the bombing of villages, indiscriminate shooting, imprisonment, torture, rape, the burning of settlements and the killing and stealing of livestock [The Status of Border Crossers from Irian Jaya to Papua New Guinea, Report by the International Commission of Jurists, Australian Section, January 1985].

Breaching the World Bank's own guidelines

Taken together, these facts make it abundantly clear that Transmigration as it is being implemented is directly contravening the terms of the World Bank's guidelines for the development of tribal areas [Tribal Peoples and Economic Development: Human Ecological Considerations, World Bank, 1982].

Moreover, it is clear that these violations of human rights are not just the result of poor planning and implementation at the local level but are inherent in the legislation and policy of the programme. The ethnocidal intent of Transmigration was made abundantly clear at the special seminar on Transmigration hosted by the Minister of Transmigration, Martono, on 20 March, 1985, where he stated:

On 28 October 1928, a youth congress was held concluding that we are one nation, the Indonesian nation; we have one native country, Indonesia; one language, the Indonesian language. By way of Transmigration, we will try to realise what has been pledged, to integrate all ethnic groups into one nation, the Indonesian nation... The different ethnic groups will in the long run disappear because of integration... and there will be one kind of man...

[Proceedings of the Meeting between the Department of Transmigration and the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, Jakarta, 20 March 1985: 4.41].

The Bank, in its policy guidelines, has explicitly rejected such integrationist policies towards tribal peoples [World Bank 1982, op.cit: 27], instead insisting on an 'intermediate policy' which 'allows the retention of a large measure of tribal autonomy and cultural choice'. This has nowhere been provided for in the Transmigration programme.

Transmigration and national security

The Indonesian Government has stated that Transmigration is considered of great importance as an exercise in promoting 'national security'. As General Murdani, the commander-in-chief of the Indonesian Armed

Forces made clear in March last year, Transmigration is considered to be 'the only programme in the economic field that must quite categorically be tied in with defence and security considerations... The preparation of sites and the removal of obstacles to land availability need to be given special focus because the choice of locations is related to the concept of territorial management...' [*Sinar Harapan*, 8 March 1985]. In West Papua, these concerns are manifested in the Government's plans to settle a 'cordon sanitaire' of militarised [*saptamarga*] settlements along the border. In November last year, the Minister of Transmigration, Martono, announced that Transmigration was to be given a priority in border areas [*Kompas*, 6 November 1985].

In view of the considerable and steadily growing evidence that widespread environmental and human rights abuses are not only associated with but actually integral to the present manner of the Transmigration Programme's implementation, we strongly urge that the Bank carefully reviews its present policy of supporting the project. While this is being carried out, we also strongly urge that the Bank takes immediate steps to halt funding the programme. Funding for Transmigration should not be renewed until there are guarantees that it is to be carried out in line with the Bank's guidelines for the development of tropical forest regions and areas inhabited by tribal peoples and that it will not lead to the destruction of the environment, the alienation of

tribal peoples from their lands and the abuse of their right to self-determination.

We look forward to learning how you plan to deal with this matter.

The letter was signed by representatives of 35 human rights and environmentalist organisations from countries all over the world.

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SOCIETIES' LAW AND POLITICAL LIFE

The HMI and Pancasila

*The enactment last year of the Societies' Law requiring all social and political organisations to accept Pancasila as their sole ideology has caused profound internal conflict in many organisations. But nowhere has the conflict been as fierce as that still raging in the *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (Federation of Islamic Students).*

At the end of March this year, the HMI ended a gruelling week-long congress in Padang, West Sumatra by formally announcing the adoption of Pancasila as the sole-ideology of the organisation. The HMI was the last leading organisation in the country to comply with the regime's dictat. This proves to have been achieved only as the result of intense and blatant intervention by persons scheming on the government's behalf. At its last national congress in mid 1983 in Medan, delegates unanimously rejected the 'sole-ideology' requirement and passed a resolution retaining the HMI's Muslim identity, despite strong government pressure.

HMI is the largest and by far the most influential students' organisation in Indonesia. Established in 1947, it has always been popular among students, and now has a membership of about 150,000, spread throughout all the main university centres. After a brief period as the student organisation of the former Masyumi party, it relinquished formal links with any of the political parties. Its independence and tradition of steering clear of ties with any government institutions has helped preserve the organisation's autonomy.

The most striking feature about HMI is its *pengkaderan* activities, its focus on the creation of cadres. As an Islamic organisation with a strong modernist outlook, it has never concentrated on Ku'ranic recitations but focussed rather on political discussion and leadership-training. As a result, many prominent Muslim intellectuals today originate from HMI ranks.

HMI and the rulers

In the guided democracy period (1959-1965) of Sukarno's presidency, the HMI came under strong attack from the left, but efforts to have it banned along with Masyumi were unsuccessful. After Suharto seized power in 1965, HMI was in the vanguard of the Student Action Front (KAMI) which rallied support in the major cities for the Army's anti-communist crusade.

But the honeymoon between HMI and the military did not last long. In the seventies, the student protest movements of 1974 and 1978 were led predominantly by HMI student activists. Then, the relative freedom that still existed in those days on university campuses was effectively destroyed by counter-measures. The law on 'Normalisation of Campus Life' [NK K] made it impossible for student organisations to engage in any 'non-educational' actions, thus excluding rallies, protest meetings and demonstrations that had figured so strikingly in the 1974 and 1978 movements.

When the 1983 congress took place, the Societies' Law was still two years away, yet the organisation was already warned that a law on Pancasila-as-the-sole ideology was in the making. The congress nevertheless re-affirmed HMI's Muslim identity. But since then, intimidation and pressure from the government has been relentless. Many branches were forced to succumb or had their elected boards replaced. The star performers in this tour de force were two former HMI activists, long since co-opted by the regime and given very comfortable posts. Abdul Gafur, formerly chairman of HMI-Jakarta, is now Minister for Youth and Sports Affairs. Akbar Tanjung, formerly HMI chairman, is now the deputy Secretary-General of the government party, Golkar. Tanjung recently took over the chief editorship of *Pelita*, until recently the organ of the Muslim rump party, PPP. These two have been instrumental in forcing HMI to submit.

As with other mainstream Muslim organisations, many HMI activists have been 'transformed' into 'Muslim Pancasilaists', serving to give the regime an Islamic image. The process of such transformation varies and usually occurs behind closed doors. It is not difficult to imagine what emoluments must have been offered to 'lubricate' the change of gear. Thus, a fellow known to have resisted government pressure appears a few months later in a very different guise. This happened to Harry Azhar Aziz, elected HMI chairperson in 1983. In those

days, he was adamantly opposed to compliance with the sole-ideology requirement. By the end of his term, he had, by his own admission, been 'mellowed' by Abdul Gafur, and emerged at this year's congress as a loyal support of sole-ideology.

It is now abundantly clear that during 1985, battles raged in HMI between the two poles. As the 1986 congress drew near, the biggest branches in Jakarta, Bandung, Jogjakarta and Ujung Pandang together with five other branches, were still solidly against the transformed Aziz leadership and declared their intention to boycott the Padang congress. The organisation's central board therefore 'disbanded' the dissenting branches and created new ones in their place, to avoid open clashes during the congress.

Despite all the pre-congress rigging, Padang turned out to be a fierce battle-ground. The Pancasila principle was indeed accepted, but many issues were bitterly contested even though the radical wing was not present.

A chairman dropped from outer space

Many sessions were marked by rowdy and furious clashes. But the most extraordinary machinations centred around the election of the organisation's new chairman. Heated controversy had broken out over the candidates, all of them in one way or another acceptable to the regime. Congress however balked over the leading candidate who happened also to be chairman of a provincial branch of the regime's umbrella youth organisation, KNPI. This combination of roles was too much for even pro-regime

Party politics sink to new depths

The Indonesian Democratic Party, or PDI, which ranks as the smallest of the country's three political parties, was recently reduced to pleading with the government to chose its chairman, after its national congress almost broke up in a brawl.

The PDI came into existence through the forced merger in 1973 of three parties, the Nationalist Party, Parkindo (Protestants) and Partai Katolik. From the outset, this unseemly coalition has been ridden with conflict, much of it the result of meddling by military intelligence. But PDI's first two congresses were relatively smooth affairs, for the Minister of the Interior of the time, General Amir Machmud, stage-managed things well ahead of time, hand-picking the delegates to achieved the desired results. Since those halcyon days, however, Amir's ministry has passed into the hands of General Supardjo Rustam, a man who turns out to be less adept at the highly specialised skill of stage-managing parties.

Dog-fighting for the chair

The PDI Congress was concerned with one question, and one question only - the choice of a leader. With more leeway than usual from the military, the several party big-shots all believed they had sufficient 'backing' to romp home with the prize, for the party chairmanship is indeed a prize, even in such a powerless party as the PDI. The chairman is sure to become a member of the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA), a vice-chairman of parliament, and to be appointed to other prestigious positions.

The Congress was opened on 15 April by no less a person than Suharto himself, and was due to last two days. But while the state dignitaries were gathering for the closing session, the dog-fighting was bordering on open warfare. In desperation delegates greeted with undisguised relief a proposal to leave everything to the Government. So, the task of picking a chairman fell to General Supardjo, the one who had failed so dismally to 'fix' the Congress.

Ultimately, the man chosen was Suryadi, a complete outsider, plucked from the shadows. But the approval of

delegates to accept, so it appeared that he was about to be voted down.

Then, completely out of the blue, Akbar Tanjung produced 'his man', M. Saleh Khalid, summoned to the congress from Bogor two days before the congress was due to close. In a straight run with another regime candidate, Tanjung's man was elected. Commentators, aghast at the brazen disregard for procedure, are still talking about this astonishing coup de grace. 'Dropping', by the way, is a well-worn Indonesian expression for the government's imposition of its favoured appointees to keep organisations on the Pancasilaist line.

Dissenting HMI branches

The nine dissenting branches meanwhile took their own counter-measures, creating a new forum called *Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi*, or Council to Save the Organisation. They have occupied the main HMI head office in Jakarta, and appear to be determined not to allow their organisation to be over-run by regime hatchet-men. Speaking on behalf of the new organisation, M. Choiron, chairman of HMI-Jogjakarta said: "We represent the aspirations of 23,000 HMI members."

Dissent is a rare phenomenon on the Indonesian political scene. As a result, the HMI saga is being watched with great interest, even, one may say, with bated breath. Armed Forces commander, General Murdani, warned HMI, just a few days before the Padang congress: "Anyone who rejects the Pancasila might as well pack their bags and leave the country". With such forces arrayed against them, it remains to be seen how long the HMI dissidents will be able to stand their ground.

one general was not enough. His appointment could not be made public until it had obtained the blessings of 'four wise men', Supardjo and three other generals, Golkar chairman Sudharmono, Armed Forces Commander Benny Murdani, and General Moerdiono, Minister/Secretariat of the Cabinet. No-one seems to be very sure who Suryadi is, except that somehow, he represents the infusion of 'new blood', a kind of mini-version of the regeneration now under way in the Armed Forces leadership.

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