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Atrocities in East Timor

Resistance Council compiles report

The violation of human rights in East Timor is the subject of a detailed report compiled by the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance (CRRN) in July 1983. The document has an introduction by Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao, chairman of the Council, in which he says that thick volumes would need to be written and endless lists drawn up to show the extent to which the Indonesian forces of occupation totally ignore internationally-accepted principles of human rights. The conditions of war make it impossible, he points out, to investigate each and every case of murder or atrocity; furthermore, the climate of terror in the concentration camps makes the task of investigation extremely difficult.

For these reasons, the information included in the document is limited in character, and is confined to cases where it has been possible to carry out an investigation and where the victims can be identified. The vast majority of cases involving masses of people cannot be recorded, only a small minority of cases involving Fretilin leaders whose fate it has been easier to record. An attempt has been made, in compiling the document, to distinguish periods and circumstances under which violations have occurred: the period when people were still in their own towns or villages just after the invasion, the period when many people surrendered voluntarily to the enemy (1976 to 1978), the period when people surrendered in response to ‘amnesties’ offered at the time of various military campaigns, and the capture of resistance fighters by the forces of occupation. Xanana stressed the completely false nature of Indonesia’s annual ‘amnesties’ which have proven to be no protection against killings and disappearances.

Xanana lists the types of violations perpetrated as follows:

1. Systematic persecution for the purpose of intimidation: threats, surveillance, provocation, restrictions on the freedom of movement, orders requiring people to report regularly to the authorities, night patrols of people’s homes by armed troops, spreading rumours, utilising false statements and so on. These are daily occurrences, happening everywhere in the country.

2. The torture of people suspected of taking part in clandestine organisations. Even the act of talking to an Indonesian soldier with folded arms (regarded as a political stance) or refusing to hand over something demanded by a soldier (which is taken as meaning that the person still harbours pro-Fretilin ideas) can be the pretext for regarding someone as a suspect. Forms of torture include: shooting people, slapping them in the face, whipping them or beating them with a rifle butt, karate, cutting off an ear, punching people or burning them with lighted cigarettes, stabbing or lacerating the flesh, electric shock and other forms of physical mutilation.

3. The prisons, which were formerly concentrated in the district towns, were always filled to overflowing, but more recently, prisoners have been transferred to Atauro island and other places of detention, including some nearby Indonesian islands. And recently too some prisoners have been concealed in administrative posts after having been interrogated and severely tortured by Kodim officers. Another form of deception is releasing prisoners on condition that the person goes into the bush and brings back the head of a resistance fighter. The ‘released’ detainee is given 7 to 14 days to do this, and if he fails he is sent to Atauro or made to ‘disappear’. Sometimes a prisoner is ‘released’ on condition that he works for Indonesian intelligence by returning to his former resistance group to gather information about Fretilin or to betray members of the group. (Many people have been captured as a result of this kind of thing.) People who serve the enemy in this way are paid money, thus giving them a sense of obligation to their paymasters.

4. People are murdered in a variety of ways: shot down in cold blood, beaten to death with rifles, shot by firing squad, burnt alive, buried alive, starved to death or dropped into the sea from a helicopter. Women die after being savagely raped by a whole company of soldiers. There are also cases of people being poisoned by means of injection; as a result, many Timorese refuse medical treatment because they know of people who died within hours of being injected. As a result of persistent condemnation by international organisations, massacres and killings were replaced by the method of disappearances, with the aim of intimidating the population; there have been countless cases of people disappearing from camps located in the interior.

Xanana then points out that in view of the difficulties mentioned above, the cases recorded in the document are confined to those where the victim can be easily identified. In many cases,
Continued from page one

it has not been possible to provide information because the witnesses were themselves killed or have been placed under close surveillance.

The cases reported in the first part of the CRRN document are as follows:

A. Former members of the Fretilin Central Committee

Anibal de Araujo and Leopoldo Heraldo Joaquim both surrendered to the enemy in 1977. By the beginning of 1979, they were considered to have disappeared. Jooao Silvestre Branco, surrendered in the middle of 1977. He was killed at the end of 1979 together with a group of forty people. Jooao Bosco Soares and Sebastiao Montaliao, part of the ‘Skylight Operation’ (a group within Fretilin that favoured integration), both disappeared a few months after they surrendered.1

B. Members of the Fretilin CC who were taken prisoner during the 1978 campaign

Hata Ulus Timur was burnt alive with petroleum after being tortured. Mau Lear (Antonio Duarte Cervarino) was also burnt alive with petroleum after being tortured. Bi Leir (Maria do Leu Pereira) gave herself up in March 1979 in Venilale, and disappeared some days after arriving in Baucau where she was picked up by Colonel (then Major) Iswanto. Mau Sobu (Inacio da Fonseca), taken prisoner in the vicinity of Builo, Osu in December 1978, was brutally beaten to death in Luka Dala, not far from Queilui.

Oscar Leopoldino de Araujo, arrested in March 1979 in the region of Barike, was taken to Viqueque where he disappeared. Juvenal de Fatima Inacio, captured in the region of Bilieu in March 1979, was first taken to Dili then transferred to Baucau (for reasons that are not clear). Then, while being taken to Dili by helicopter, he was dumped in the sea.

Domino Ribeiro, arrested at the end of 1978 in the Central Region, was in Dili for a while, then disappeared in May 1979.

Venancio Gomes da Silva was arrested at the time of the invasion, then conditionally released, but in July 1980 he was knifed to death.

C. Non members of the Fretilin CC

Lino da Costa, commander of the sector of the Eastern Point, was arrested in the region of Builo, Osu at the end of 1978, and was murdered in Luka Dala, Queilui in 1980. Jooao Baptista, commander of the Southern Border Sector, surrendered at the end of 1977 and then disappeared.

Amadeu Araujo Santos, commander of the North-Central Sector, one of the ‘Skylight’ group, disappeared in Dili. Afonso Moniz, commander of a shock-brigade, was arrested at the end of 1978, then disappeared from Comarca Prison, Dili, after being tortured following the June 1980 operation launched by Fretilin in Dili (an attack on the Indonesian television transmitter).

These cases provide concrete proof of what the successive, annual ‘amenities’ offered by Jakarta have really meant. Nangala troops (soldiers armed with knives) especially those in Battalion 745, constantly assisted and encouraged by Lieutenant-Colonel Iswanto, are the butchers responsible for the most sadistic crimes. Such butchery exists at all levels of the occupation forces, from the Koramil officers and police down to the lowest village level; it exists among the hansiip and raih commanders, and among the civilian officials in posts such as the DPR and subdistrict heads. This systematic butchery proceeds under the constant supervision of the Kasi Satu (Section Head/Intelligence officer) in each of the regional capitals (district military commands).

In East Timor, annual promotion for Indonesian officers is determined by the degree of crime they commit and the techniques of torture they apply. There are Koramil officers who were promoted from sergeant-major to sub-lieutenant for such reasons.3 There is the case of Major Wilhem da Costa, the intelligence officer who was only a sub-lieutenant in 1979 and achieved such rapid promotion because of the crimes he committed during the period of surrenders in 1978 and 1979 in the region of Same. There is the case of Lieutenant-Colonel Iswanto who started off only as a sub-lieutenant in 1979. There are cases of Kodim officers who arrived in East Timor with the rank of captain or major and returned home with the rank of lieutenant-colonel. They themselves publicly declare it was this system that made it so easy for them to obtain promotion.

Footnotes:

1. ‘Skylight’ was an intelligence operation to penetrate Fretilin leadership ranks and provoke defections. The leading defector was Afroso Fernandes who surrendered in September 1978, taking many others with him. Of all those who surrendered under the Skylight Operation, Fernandes is the only one known to have survived. He is now a prisoner on Sumba island.

2. Nangala (probably nanggala) is frequently used in CRRN documents as the name for Indonesian troops responsible for killings. The secret Army documents (see Supplement to TAPOL Bulletin No. 58, July 1983) also use the term, though without explanation. This term has not been previously encountered in Indonesian Army terminology. The only word which may provide a hint as to its origin is mangala which is the Sanskrit name for a disc-shaped, sharply-perforated weapon used by the Pandawa brothers in the Mahabarata epic. The Pandawas were men of noble intentions, part of the Javanese pantheon of heroes. The Army often borrows from such sources to give its murderous activities the gloss of tradition. Help from readers regarding this term would be appreciated.

3. Promotion from sergeant-major, the top NCO rank, to commissioned officer rank is generally speaking unheard of, except at times of retirement.

4. Such rapid promotion in four years would mean rising no fewer than five ranks: to second-lieutenant, first lieutenant, captain, major, then lieutenant-colonel.

Cases from the CRRN report

In 1979, Alberto who was deputy-secretary of the Fretilin zone of Maubisse gave himself up in Hatubutubliku. He was brutally beaten up by military personnel, then sent to the town of Maubisse. On the way, the soldiers who were escorting him continually burnt his body with lit cigarettes. At the Maubisse Koramil, the officer in charge did nothing to protect him from such violence. On the contrary, the maltreatment continued after which he was driven to the town cemetery and shot with an MU-2. Not yet dead, Alberto shouted: “You may kill me but other comrades will continue the struggle.” This infuriated the Koramil officer who then ordered hansiip troops to cut him up. Even while there were still signs of life, Alberto was burnt.

On 24 August 1982, a guerilla also named Alberto was captured by Indonesian troops in Dare region, Bohaha-Hatububliku. He was taken to the Dare concentration camp where the Koramil officer ordered his troops to kill him. When he was dead, the officer ordered his body to be cut up, like the carcasses of animals are cut up by butchers. The Koramil officer ate the flesh from Alberto’s body for a week, telling people as he did so: “This is what we do to Fretilin people.” The inhabitants at the Dare concentration camp are the witnesses of this barbaric crime.

Francisco Barros, deputy-secretary of the Fretilin Zone, and Antonio Adakay, a health officer, were captured in Barike, Cassoohan on 3 September 1978. They were taken to Laku and tied to trees with their legs apart and their
From the CRRN report (continued)

arms outstretched. They were burnt with lit cigarettes, then with red-hot irons. Then their penises were cut off and they were left to die in the sun.

On a Friday night in September 1979, two companies of Indonesian troops from Quelique arrived in Laléia, and camped for the night on the Vemasse bank of the river Laléia. The soldiers asked their Timorese carriers to go and find two women. Two women were brought to them: Melinda da Costa and Ana Vicente da Costa. They were brutally violated by all the soldiers throughout the night. By morning, the women who were both in very bad shape tried to escape, but they were caught. The raping was resumed till 12 noon that day. All this occurred by the roadside; people going along the road to market in Laléia could see what was going on.

Felicidado dois Santos Gandera, from Liquica (Ossu), had studied at the Medical Faculty in Lisbon. She was a member of the Commissariat of the support base in the Ponta Leste Sector (Los Palos region) until its destruction by Indonesian troops in November 1978. She was arrested together with her husband Victor after the destruction of the base. Her husband was killed and dumped in the river Lura, at Txino. She was then dragged away by about half a dozen soldiers to the village of Lausepo, and violently raped. She was then shot dead with an UZI machine-gun.

Mariano de Sousa, Clementino Joes Branco Ximenes, Joao de Brito Ximenes, all of them platoon commanders; Gregorio Soares, Antonio Rufino de Costa, both section commanders; Felisberto Viegas, deputy-secretary of the Zone; Joao Viegas, in charge of the OPJT of the Zone; Sebastiao Gusmou, secretary of the suco; Mario Ximenes, in charge of a village; the fighters Domingos Barto Ximenes, Sergio da Costa Gusmou, Felipe da Costa, Filomeno Gusmou, Jose Bento, Jose Von and others, all surrendered and were taken prisoner in January 1979. After being tortured, they were released. Two weeks later, they were summoned to report and ordered to join harsip. After a week's training, they were summoned for "night training" on 11 February 1979. The whole group was shot dead by soldiers of Battalion 745. Domingos Mau-Ximenes whose name was also on the list of people to be shot had heard about the planned shooting, so he managed to survive. He and other inhabitants are witnesses of this crime. (The precise location of this incident is not mentioned, but it comes under the section headed Laléia.)

Miguel Montiero, a native of Mehara/Tutuala, Los Palos, was commander of the Tutuula Zone. He was captured in 1977 and held, then released. In 1979, he was captured again by Battalion 745 because he had taken part in clandestine activities of the armed resistance. After several days in captivity he was taken to a Battalion post at the former Catholic mission in Fuloro where he was tortured and then killed. One of the Indonesian commanders of the Battalion ordered his chest to be cut open and his heart to be taken out. The soldiers were told to grill the heart and serve it up for him to eat. The commander then ate the heart with relish, making sure that the people from the surroundings were gathered there to watch this spectacle. After finishing this barbaric meal, he told the crowd who were standing around that whenever a Fretilin member was captured the same thing should be done because, he said, human flesh is very tasty, especially when it's the flesh of a member of Fretilin.

*suco: a group of villages according to Timorese administrative practice
MPs call for arms embargo against Indonesia

An Early Day Motion calling for an arms embargo against Indonesia because of its renewed military operations in East Timor obtained the support of 118 Members of Parliament soon after it was tabled in the House of Commons. The Motion reads as follows:

That this House, concerned at the new military offensive launched in August by Indonesia in East Timor which has been under illegal Indonesian occupation since 1975, and distressed that the International Red Cross had to suspend its much-needed food relief operations in East Timor a month before the offensive began because the Indonesian authorities had withdrawn the necessary facilities, calls upon Her Majesty's Government to halt the sale of arms and military equipment to Indonesia and to take other urgent steps to press Indonesia to halt military operations.

The signatories were still coming in as we went to press. They include MPs from the Labour Party, the Liberal-Party, the Conservative Party and Plaid Cymru (Welsh Nationalists).

Mr Robert Parry
Mr Paddy Ashdown
Mr Alfred Dubs
Mr Ron Davies
Mr Allan Rogers
Mr Frank Cook
Mr Eddie Loyden
Mr Sydney Bidwell
Mr Robert Kilroy-Silk
Mr Ernie Ross
Mr Allan Roberts
Mr Bob Litherland
Mr Ian Campbell
Mr Robert C. Brown
Mr Jeremy Corbyn
Mr Terry Patchett
Mr Martin Flannery
Mr Ron Brown
Mr Sean Hughes
Mr Ernie Roberts
Mr Charles Irving
Mr Alex Edie
Mr Simon Hughes
Mr Harry Ewing
Miss Betty Boothroyd
Mr Dennis Canavan
Mr Robert Wareing
Mr Harry Gourlay
Mr Michael Martin
Mr Ted Leadbetter
Mr Mark Fisher
Mr James White
Mr Gerald Birmingham
Mr John McWilliam
Mr Terry Fields
Mr Bob McCartney
Mr William McKelvey
Mr Ray Powell
Mr Gordon Oakes
Mr Robert Edwards
Mr Gordon A.T. Bagier
Mr Bob Clay
Mr Ron Lewis
Mr Alec Woodall
Mr John David Taylor
Mr Ken Weetch
Mr Ian Mikardo
Mr Greville Janner
Mr Eric S. Heffer
Mr Ken Eastham
Mr Doug Hoyle
Mr Harry Cowans
Mr Chris Smith
Mrs Martin J. O'Neill
Mrs M. Beckett
Mr Kevin McNamara
Jo Richardson
Mr Kevin Barrow
Mr Bernard Conlan
Mr Roland Boyes
Mr Richard Caborn
Mr John Marek
Mr Russell Johnston
Sir Bernard Braine
Mr Allen Adams
Mr Harry Cohen
Mr Norman Atkinson
Mr Terry Davis
Mr Stephen Ross
Mr James Wallace
Ms Harriet Harman
Mr Tony Lloyd
Mr James Tinn
Mr Peter Pike
Mr Bill Michie
Mr Geoffrey Lofthouse
Mr David Knox
Mr Dafydd Wigley
Mr Ron Leonighton
Mr Michael Welsh
Mr Tom Torney
Mr Dafydd Thomas
Mr J.W. Rooker
Mr Alfred Morris
Mr Tony Banks
Mr A.E.P. Duffy
Mr Stan Thorne
Mr Terry Lewis
Mr Ioan Evans
Mr Dave Nellist
Mr Andrew Bennett
Mr Barry Sheerman
Mr Malcolm Bruce
Mr Charles Kennedy
Ms Harriet Harman
Mr Tony Lloyd
Mr James Tinn
Mr Peter Pike
Mr Bill Michie
Mr Geoffrey Lofthouse
Mr David Knox
Mr Dafydd Wigley
Mr Ron Leonighton
Mr Michael Welsh
Mr Tom Torney
Mr Dafydd Thomas
Mr J.W. Rooker
Mr Alfred Morris
Mr Tony Banks
Mr A.E.P. Duffy
Mr Stan Thorne
Mr Terry Lewis
Mr Ioan Evans
Mr Dave Nellist
Mr Andrew Bennett
Mr Barry Sheerman
Mr Malcolm Bruce
Mr Charles Kennedy
Mr Laurie Pavitt
Mr John Evans
Mr Barry Jones
Mr Don Dixon
Mr James Lamond
Mr Ray Ellis
Mr Denzil Davies
Mr Allen McKay
Mr Michael McGuire
Mr William O'Brien
Mr David Alton
Mr Frank Field
Mr Alan Beith
Mr Michael Meadowcroft
Mr John Forrester
Mr Eric Deakins
Mr John Fraser
Mr Gareth Wardell
Mr Richard Wainwright
Ms Joan Maynard
Dame Judith Hart
Mr Jim Callaghan

Buyung Nasution

INDONESIANS FIND INCORPORATION OF EAST TIMOR “SHAMEFUL AND SAD”

The following is an extract from Appendix 3 of the Australian Parliamentary Delegation’s report on its visit to Indonesia. Appendix 3 is the Record of the Delegation’s Meeting with Buyung Nasution (Chairman), H. J. C. Princen (Secretary), Yap Thiam Hien and Suryadi of the Legal Aid Institute, in Jakarta on 23 July, 1983.

Mr Nasution then turned to East Timor on which he said his views were well known, and had been made at home and abroad. He said, forcefully, that Indonesia had no historical claim to the province of East Timor and, as an intellectual, he could not agree that Indonesia had the right to invade or incorporate East Timor. He said that East Timor was different from, for example, Irian Jaya and Aceh, which had always been part of Indonesia. He commented that if there was an open debate on the subject in Indonesia the intellectuals, at least, would reject the incorporation of East Timor, which they found shameful and sad. Mr Morrison asked what options the intellectuals had for expressing this view. Mr Nasution answered that the options of Indonesians would be wider if their friends abroad, for example in IGGI countries, would take a firm stand on the subject. He was afraid, however, that they became involved with economic development and their response became ambiguous. He likened the situation to the American response to Sukarno which resulted in the parlous situation of 1965. If countries like the United States had not supported Sukarno in his excesses, this would not have happened. He said he was extremely critical of Mr Whitlam’s statement of 1982 on East Timor and he had rung Peter Hasting’s of the Sydney Morning Herald to express this view. He said that Mr Whitlam was wrong to have doubted the credibility of the two DPRD members who had signed a document criticising the government. * They had brought the document to Jakarta — despite the government leaks that they had not done so — and had come to the LBH where they had been photographed. He re-emphasised that it was necessary to maintain a strong moral standpoint. This view was supported by Senator McIntosh who commented that there must be a limit to good relations if the price of these relations was so high. Haji Princen said that countries should not be looking at the short term benefits of relations, and he said, the treatment of the people of East Timor was so shameful, and Indonesians were so unable to express criticism. Others should therefore look at it.

* For the text of the DPRD (East Timor Regional Assembly) report, see TAPOL Bulletin No 47, September 1981. See also TAPOL Bulletin No 50, March 1982, page 19, for the Hasting’s claim that the DPRD document was “a forgery” and that the DPRD members had signed “without knowing its purport”.

TAPOL Bulletin No. 60 November 1983
Halt the offensive in East Timor! Impose an arms embargo on Indonesia!

The following statement, supported by organisations in the UK, Holland, Germany, Sweden and Portugal was issued on 29 September in London, Amsterdam, Stockholm, Frankfurt and Lisbon:

The people of East Timor who have for nearly eight years been the victims of a genocidal war of annexation by Indonesia, are today engulfed in renewed all-out warfare. At least 20,000 crack Indonesian troops have launched a new invasion of their country. OV10 Broncos supplied by the USA are once again operating in East Timor; these are the aircraft which wrought such havoc in 1977 and 1978, killing tens of thousands and destroying food production, causing tens of thousands more deaths from starvation and disease. US-supplied Hercules transport planes are ferrying in troops, helicopters supplied by West European countries are transporting heavy military equipment manufactured in western countries.

The military have tightened their grip on East Timor: all Indonesian civilians have been evacuated from East Timor, the puppet Timorese governor has been removed, mass arrests have taken place, a dusk-to-dawn curfew is in force, the International Red Cross which has been running a food-relief programme has been required to leave the country. The Indonesian Armed Forces have been set the task of annihilating the Fretilin resistance movement, which is supported by the entire people, before the end of September.

The war of annexation which has been in progress since the first Indonesian invasion in 1975 could not have been launched or continued without the support of military equipment supplied by many western countries. Arms supplies from the West have been greatly stepped up since 1975 and have included frigates and corvettes, submarines, counter-insurgency aircraft, transport planes, armoured vehicles, machine-guns and communications equipment. The very governments that licence and finance these exports openly admit that no act of self-determination has taken place in East Timor. They know that Indonesia's "integration" of East Timor is totally illegal and fundamentally conflicts with the wishes of the people of East Timor. Moreover, the UN does not accept the annexation and continues to adopt annual resolutions upholding the right of the Timorese people to self-determination.

The people of East Timor are engaged in a life-and-death struggle to uphold their right to independence. Every effort must be made to alert public opinion in western Europe of the catastrophe now engulfing East Timor. Western governments must take action to stop this bloodshed by:

- imposing an arms embargo on Indonesia without delay;
- halting economic support for Indonesia until the offensive is stopped;
- calling on the UN Secretary-General to press Indonesia to halt the offensive.

Stop arms exports to Indonesia! Suspend economic aid to Indonesian aggressors! Support the people of East Timor!

Supported by:

**United Kingdom**
TAPOL, the British Campaign for the Defence of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia
COBRA, the Conference for Basic Human and Democratic Rights in the ASEAN Alliance

**Holland**
Dutch Indonesia Committee
Gerakan untuk Hak-Hak Azasi dan Demokrasi (Movement for Basic Human Rights and Democracy in Indonesia)
Pattimura Movement (Moluccan)
Moluccan Education Collective
20 May Youth Organisation (Moluccan)
Music-Theatre Collective (Moluccan)

**Sweden**
East Timor Committee
Free Papua Organisation (representative in Europe)

**Portugal**
CIDAC, Amilcar Cabral Information and Documentation Centre

**West Germany**
East Timor Solidarity Committee
IMBAS, Human Rights Group for ASEAN Alliance countries

TAPOL Bulletin No. 60 November 1983
The racist overtones of transmigration in West Papua

Whatever the facts and figures about the speed at which transmigration is now taking place in West Papua, it is clear that the process is leading to growing disquiet among Papuans themselves. Transmigration is the term used for the resettlement of people from the densely-populated islands of Indonesia, principally Java, to sparsely-populated parts of the community. Papuans regard transmigration as a process of Javanisation, a conclusion that has been reinforced by statements emanating recently from Isaac Hindom, the Papuan who was appointed early this year as the governor of Indonesia's province of Irian Jaya.

He has for some time been actively promoting the idea that Papuans must assimilate themselves as quickly as possible with the settler-Javanese. (The word 'Papuan' is banned, so Papuans may only be referred to as 'putera-putera daerah' — 'sons of the region' — or Irianese. No other ethnic group has been subjected to such a prohibition by the central government.) In a statement late last year, Hindom claimed that since 'Irianese' food producers are "so backward", it is essential to bring in as many transmigrants from Java as possible to ensure development. The policy of "mixed transmigration" according to which every transmigration site should include 25 per cent of "locals" is completely justified, said Hindom, because local farmers are so lacking in technical skills. He went even further, strongly advocating mixed marriages between Papuans and Javanese. "This will give birth to a new generation of people without curly hair, sowing the seeds for greater beauty." Not content with these racist remarks, he also blamed the Papuans for "being so neglectful of their surroundings and thinking only of themselves and their group." He also rounded on the "separatists" for whom "the government and the people of Indonesia will show no mercy". (Kompas, 26 October 1982)

Contempt for Papuan traditions

These remarks caused widespread resentment in West Papua. According to independent sources, press clippings reporting Hindom's speech have circulated widely and led to feelings of pent-up anger because transmigration is having such harmful effects on the people in areas where the major projects have been located. The whole policy of transmigration is focussed on introducing an alien form of food production and shows nothing but contempt for the agricultural methods developed through the generations by the Papuan people. Transmigration also ignores the whole concept of land tenure which is so fundamental to Papuan life. "Land tenure problems are explosive," writes Peter Hastings in an article in the Far Eastern Economic Review, (6 October 1983):

Indonesians give no sign of understanding, or caring about in many instances, the realities of Melanesian land concepts. They tend to believe that having paid for compulsorily acquired or negotiated land, they have bought it in perpetuity. The Melanesian view is that the land has been rented for use only, that it is inalienable, belongs to the clan and is held in trust for future generations.

The injustices perpetrated on the land question certainly go even farther than Hastings admits (see, for instance, the statement from Japen/Waporen, page 9). According to Hastings, the forthcoming five-year plan (1984-1988) envisages the resettlement of no fewer than one million Javanese in Irian Jaya. So far, he estimates that there are already 60,000 sponsored settlers in the region, plus 160,000 unsponsored settlers who are now living in the urban centres and who largely control commerce and business. Irian Jaya has a total population of 1.2 million. Although Hastings doubts whether the five-year plan target will be achieved because of technical and organisational problems as well as lack of funds, he believes that it "is not unreasonable to expect that Irian Jaya will get its one million Javanese — but within ten to twelve years rather than the next five."

"Irian Java"

Governor Hindom meanwhile has recently been even more explicit about his visions of the future. He has now started promoting the idea that Irian Jaya (Greater Irian) will soon become Irian Java, or Javanese Irian. The remark caused the Jakarta daily, Merdeka, to publish an article entitled, "What's all this talk about Irian Java?" (Merdeka, 19 August 1983). Hindom appears to foresee the total eclipse of the "Irianese" as they assimilate with the Javanese. But, according to Merdeka, this is not an idea welcomed by many others from the region. They see the Hindom concept of "Irian Java" as a process of steam-rolling the ethnic and cultural values of the people. "They regard the idea as meaning the eclipse of one ethnic group by another ethnic group which would result in the obliteration of the customs, culture and life-styles of the people of Irian Jaya."

Irian Java is a term that epitomises the whole idea of "Javanisation". To quote Hastings again:

...there is a crucial element in all transmigration planning which is unmistakable — Indonesianisation. This used to be called Javanisation, but the Javanese do not like the word. But Java is the heartland of Indonesia, the engine that drives it. By spreading the Javanese throughout the islands, Indonesians are made more aware of their national identity. It is not a process non-Javanese entirely enjoy.

The very idea that Indonesianisation is synonymous with Javanisation takes us to the heart of the cultural and regional policy currently being pursued by Indonesia's military regime. People like Isaac Hindom have surely been appointed to positions of prominence in order to give currency and legitimacy to such a policy of racial discrimination and obliteration. The military government's slogan for eliminating political diversity is the concept of azas tunggal, the requirement that all political parties and organisations adhere to the single ideology of the Panca Sila. Similarly in cultural and regional affairs, diversity has to be eliminated, and the concept that has been chosen is that of Javanisation. The process inevitably arouses resentment particularly in a place like West Papua where the whole saga of incorporation into the Republic was fought with so much force and violence. (See West Papua, The Obliteration of a People, published this year by TAPOL.)

To criticise the concept of Javanisation does not mean accusing the Javanese of being expansionist. This is a concept that serves the interests of the military regime which knows very well that if the people of West Papua were untramelled by political restrictions and granted freedom of expression, the demand for the right to self-determination would be overwhelming. The best way to eliminate such a source of unrest once and for all is by enforced assimilation, and the impoverished and land-hungry Javanese peasants are simply being used as the means to attain that objective. It is a welcome sign that a Jakarta newspaper like Merdeka has raised the issue, albeit within what might be regarded as "safe" limits. Papuans themselves, given the chance to speak their minds freely, would deal with the racist outpourings of Hindom in far more strident terms. But for the time being, we must rely on smuggled documents, such as the one that reached us recently from Japen. (See page 9.)

West Papua
"Let's Learn", proclaims a poster of the 'Social Guidance' Directorate, widely displayed in West Papua.


Disappearances in West Papua

A former Papuan political prisoner in Jayapura, Celsius Wapai, who is now a refugee in Papua New Guinea recently sent information to TAPOL about prisoners who disappeared in West Papua while being held in custody by the Indonesian authorities. Celsius Wapai was himself detained for three years by the military authorities in Irian Jaya and held by the Intelligence Detachment of the Cendrawasih Military Command from 10 July 1979 until June 1982 when he managed to escape from detention and fled with his wife and five children to Papua New Guinea. They escaped from Irian Jaya in a rowing boat, landing on the PNG coast after being at sea for 2 days and one night.

Celsius Wapai reports as follows:

"Marthin Gusibius TABU disappeared from the Kodim/1701 Jayapura prison at (Upper) Dok II some time between 17 September and the beginning of October 1981. I last saw him being driven off in an army-owned Toyota car of the Irian Jaya Regional Military Command (Kodam), in the company of a lieutenant named Balubun, together with another soldier who was driving. Two other soldiers were in the vehicle, a Javanese captain and someone else I could not identify.

"I was told by an officer that Marthin Tabu had been moved from Jayapura to Biak on the joint initiative of Kodam Jayapura and the Commander of the IVth Territorial Region of Irian Jaya and the Moluccas (Kowihan IV) in order to keep him from any contact with his followers who had earlier tried to break into his place of detention.

"From that time up to my own escape from prison, I heard nothing more about Marthin Tabu. I cannot say for sure that he was killed because I have myself seen no evidence of this, but I consider his disappearance as being very mysterious. There were frequent occasions when the Indonesian authorities deliberately hid Marthin Tabu as part of their war of nerves with the mass media, and to impress people into thinking that they are civilised.

"Marthin Tabu was arrested on 19 April 1980 at the ABRI Post in Waris, not far from the border with PNG. Two or three hundred of his men watched it from a radius of 150-200 metres. He was trapped by Lieutenant-Colonel Soetarno, First Assistant/Intelligence at KODAM XVIII. (Lt. Soetarno was formerly in Kalimantan and was recently sent to Bali to help crush Fretilin in East Timor).

"On 15 April 1980, the military command of Irian Jaya and OPM, represented respectively by Lt. Col. Soetarno and the Arso leader Marthin Tabu reached a bilateral accord to meet for discussions about the security situation. They had agreed to meet at the ABRI post in Waris, just the two of them without their men. But Marthin had unfortunately neglected to consider his own previous experience of kidnapping and holding hostage high-ranking military officers and government officials in the mid 1970s. Four minutes after the helicopter bringing Lt. Col. Soetarno touched down, two more ABRI helicopters arrived disrupting the view surrounding the OPM leader. His men who were standing some distance away reacted too slowly. They were stunned to see how their commander had been tricked, and watched helpless as he was handcuffed and led away by Sgt. Abdullah, an intelligence officer from Sulawesi.

"Ferdinana BALIBA, a native of Genyem, subdistrict of Nimboran, was shot dead on the Grime Bridge. He was an immigration official and was shot dead in an ABRI operation. He was disembowelled and his remains strewn along the bridge. He was shot by men of KOREM 752 (Military Resort Command 752) in a joint operation with other ABRI forces. At the time of his death Baliba was still quite young, with a wife and one or two small children.

"David MASSA, from Nimboran, was murdered in a most inhuman fashion, in December 1981 or January 1982. He was killed after being in ABRI custody for just a few days. Shortly after his arrest he was taken by a soldier from the nearby ABRI post and driven to Doyolama, district of Sentani, in Jayapura district. In a place 50-70 metres from the road where the victim had first been ordered to dig his own grave, he was hit twice in the nape of his neck with a crowbar. Because there were still some signs of life, a soldier drew his bayonet and thrust it into the victim's stomach. He fell into the grave and was buried there at between 10 and 11 that night."

Massacres in 1981

"In the period from September to December 1981 more than 2,500 people were murdered in joint operations to combat the guerrilla activities of the OPM. The people massacred were inhabitants of the interior regions of Kellia, Oksibil, Wagheti, Enarotali and Kota Perak. The massacres were carried out during the Operasi Sapuh Bersih I and II (Clean Sweep Operations) which were launched on the orders of Brig. Gen. C.I. Santoso as KODAM XVII commander, together with Lt. Col. Armijn Siregar, KODAM first Assistant/Intelligence.

"As part of the same operations, twenty human heads were buried in the vicinity of the office of the Intelligence Unit of KODAM XVII, which is where I was being detained at the time. The burial of these heads occurred on 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 September 1981. I myself saw these heads of OPM members. One of them, as I recollect, was the head of someone who was blind in one eye."
Illegal land seizures

A report from the district of Yapen-Waropen (two islands in the Cendrawasih Bay) just received by the Free Papua Movement in Holland provides information about land expropriation by the military authorities without regard for the rights of the owners or users of the land in question. The following details are given:

- The Yapen-Waropen (Yawa) *bupati’s*' office was built on land expropriated in 1969. Demands for the restoration of these land rights have been completely ignored.

- In 1970, nine houses for administration officials were built on land owned by the Tanawani family, and ten were built on land owned by the Burumi family. Not a cent of compensation has been paid till now (1983).

- In 1970, the regional Education Department office was built on a cocoa estate owned by the Manderi family. The cocoa bushes were destroyed, but no compensation has been paid till now.

- The Indonesian colonialists in Yawa have bought up people's land at dirt-cheap prices. The *camat* of South Yapan paid 100 sheets of zinc for land measuring 30 by 40 metres, then resold the land for eight million rupiahs. Lieutenant Tarwan, a Koramil officer in South Yapan, cheated many people in the villages of Kando, Famboaman and Menawi out of a great deal of land, making use of his powers as a member of the Indonesian Armed Forces.

- The Leprosy Hospital was built in 1956 on land owned by the Tanawani family, which had been contracted by the Dutch colonial government for 25 years. The contract expired in 1981, but the Indonesian government has decided that the contract was invalid and has expropriated the land without compensation.

- From 1970 onwards many people were driven from their kampungs which were re-established as Famboaman and Kando villages. To the west, the Kodim was set up, and to the east, houses for government administrators were built. No compensation was paid either for the land or for the homes that were demolished. All this happened when the post of *bupati* was occupied by Drs Sarwoto, then J.L Worumi, then Drs A. Ismail.

- The local administration has forbidden the people to sell their land privately. Yet officials of the administration secretly buy up people’s land and re-sell it at extremely profitable prices.

The impact of transmigration

A statement warning of the harmful effects of transmigration on people living in those parts of West Papua where resettlement is under way has come from a document compiled by representatives of the people of Japen-Waropen, in the Cendrawasih Bay. The statement which is addressed to the United Nations makes the following points:

- Thousands of settler (transmigrant) families are arriving annually in West Papua. Many are the families of soldiers who are expected to play a role in protecting transmigration sites against possible challenge from local Papuan groups who resent their presence. The settlers from outside are given generous facilities: land, free housing and seeds, proper health facilities and so on, whilst the needs of the Papuans living in the locality are ignored.

- Inter-marriage is being strongly encouraged, to speed up the process of assimilation. Many marriages are polygamous (settler men taking Papuan women as their second or third wives) and lead to abortions, desertions and a variety of moral problems.

- The settlers all come from Java; the transmigration programme is thus part of the process of the Javanisation of West Papua.

- Transmigrants enjoy far better job opportunities, thus restricting even further the jobs locally available for the local inhabitants. This is being felt right across the job market, from unskilled work to the civil service. The school system is also being overwhelmed by the influx of non-Papuan children making it more difficult for Papuan children to find places or make progress in what is becoming an alien environment.

- The government-sponsored programme of family planning seems to be intent upon cutting down the number of Papuans, and is thus part of a plan leading to their eventual elimination as a people.

*bupati*: district head

*camat*: sub-district head

“For your children’s future, take part in the family planning programme.” Papuans see this as part of the campaign to further reduce their numbers.

TAPOL Bulletin No. 60  November 1983 9
Police close down Bung Karno University

The Minister of Education, Dr Nugroho Notosusanto, has refused to allow the establishment of a private university named as Bung Kama. The university campus has been placed under lock and key for the remainder of the 1983/84 academic year. It already has over 4,000 registered students and 350 lecturers on the staff.

The director of Bung Karno University, Rachmawati Sukarno, daughter of the late president, says that efforts to launch the university have been obstructed right from the start. Plans to hold entrance exams at the Senayan Conference Centre had to be called off after the Jakarta police refused permission for this event to take place. When police then banned exams at the university’s own campus, the academic board decided to dispense with the idea of holding entrance exams and accept all those who had enrolled.

The Education Department’s ban gives as the reasons the University’s “failure to comply with technical, academic and administrative requirements”, but Rachmawati Sukarno insists that all requirements have been met. She has tried to meet the Minister of Education to discuss the ban, only to be fobbed off by officials who claim he is “too busy”. A letter from her to President Suharto has remained unanswered.

According to press reports, other private universities in Jakarta which have not yet been granted permits have not been prevented from operating by the kind of police action taken against the Bung Karno University. TEMPO suggests that the government has taken strong exception to the use of the late president’s name. Whatever the reason for the ban, 4,000 students have been thwarted in their efforts to continue their studies at a time when existing universities are unable to absorb the very large number of school-leavers looking for university places.

Sources: Topi, 1 November and Tempo, 29 October, 1983

Army killings continue

Three thousand people have already been killed by Army death squads in the past six months. The killings are still very much in progress, with the worst areas being West Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi. Mulya Lubis, chairman of the Legal Aid Institute’s Foundation gave these facts in a statement reported by the Dutch press (Volkskrant, 24 October 1983). The Institute in a statement on 11th November stressed that the killings had intensified since the government banned press coverage of murders (Guardian 12th November 1983).

Since August, the Indonesian press has been prohibited from reporting the killings, but there has been no let-up in the death-squad campaign. The victims are said to be known criminals, referred to as gali-gali (youth gangs) many of whom are easily identifiable because they have vivid tattoos on their bodies. Most victims are shot at point-blank range, knifed or strangled with plastic cord. Mulya Lubis also said that the government has received protests about the killings from many countries including the USA, Japan, West Germany, the UK, France, Holland, Australia and Switzerland.

Mass Execution

From contacts in Jakarta, TAPOL has received news of a mass execution of “gali-gali” in the village of Rengas-Dengklok, West Java, in September. No fewer than forty people were put to death at one go by an Army firing-squad. A villager who fled to Jakarta soon after the incident explained that, early one morning, the village head (lurah) assembled the villagers and ordered them to watch the executions. He introduced the soldiers in the firing-squad as “mysterious killers”, the term by which the soldiers of the death squads are known because no one dares to identify them as being members of the Army.

Killer Squads consist of East Timor War Veterans

According to David Jenkins (Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 September 1983), the death squads are drawn from the paracommando unit, KOPASSANDHA (formerly known as RPKAD), who are “veterans of the bitter war in East Timor”:

Typically, a team of four powerfully built young men arrive in a jeep at the home or hideout of a known criminal, and either gun the man down in front of his screaming wife and children, or kidnap him; in the latter case, the man’s body is generally found floating face-down in a nearby stream.

Jenkins also reports that the campaign “looks set to continue until the authorities have reached their countrywide target, reliably put at 4,000 extra-judicial murders”. The writer believes that the order to prohibit further news coverage of the murder campaign issued in August was intended to head off growing international condemnation. (This may have been the government’s way of responding to the international protests referred to by Mulya Lubis above.)

Intimidation

TAPOL’s own sources in Jakarta add that intimidation and terror are clear objectives of the campaign. For instance on 2nd August, the body of a murdered victim was thrown onto the porch of a house in the village of Kenayan, in the region of Borobudur, Central Java. Kenayan is the centre of the struggle still being waged to prevent villagers from being removed from their homes and land to make way for the tourism and recreation project now under construction in the vicinity of the Borobudur Buddhist temple (see TAPOL Bulletin, No 54, November 1982).

Borobudur cries out

Residents in Borobudur Temple, an historic shrine in Central Java, have appealed for international support in their contest with Indonesian Java (sic) security forces.

Terror tactics and intimidation by the military have caused almost all of the remaining population around the Temple to move away. They have gone to make way for a tourist park built with Japanese capital.

The Borobudur Temple was recently restored with UNESCO assistance. Subsequently a decision was made by the Indonesian Government Tourist Association to build an extensive tourist park around the Temple. Minimal compensation was offered to the residents of surrounding villages to move away from the temple area.*

For some months many of the families especially from the villages of Krajan and Kenayan have resisted by refusing to move from their homes. They have argued that they are part of the temple and that their lives are bound up with its cultural heritage.

If they move they will not only lose their ancestral association with the temple, but will also be replaced by others coming as the residents and servants of the temple.

The present residents ask only to be an integral part of the renovations that are taking place around the temple and not to be cast out. They claim their heritage makes them as much a part of the temple as the stone carvings now restored.

Security forces and the Department of Agrarian Affairs think otherwise. They have used intimidation and terrorist tactics to remove the people forcibly from their houses.

Matters came to a head on July 31 during a meeting of 30 heads of families. On that and the following day the villagers
were accused of holding illegal and subversive meetings. Some were arrested. Others were given an option of taking one of three cards. A choice of red card if they refused to move, green card if they moved but wanted to continue discussions and a white card if they took the compensation offered and moved. A red card would put them in the category of an undesirable criminal, the same category as hundreds of others who have been mysteriously shot dead during the past few months in several parts of Indonesia.

One of those who refused to move was Mr Setro Wikromo. On the following day he awoke to find a dead body shot in the head close range across his doorstep. Authorities refused to remove it for almost 24 hours. It was a crude terrorist warning of what might happen to any further resisters.

Although most of the residents of Krajan have now moved, there are still 80 families whose fate is undetermined. Urgent assistance is needed in the form of letters and telegrams of appeal for these people of Krajan and Kenayan villages. Letters and telegrams should be sent immediately to: Ismael Gubernur Kepala Daerah Tingkat I, Semarang, Jawa Tengah, Indonesia and to: Bupati, Kepala Dati II, Kabupaten Magelang, Jawa Tengah, Indonesia.

These protests are intended to stop further harassment of the local people and to request they be given an opportunity to be part of the renovations at Borobudur Temple.

From Asian Bureau Australia, August 1983.

1974 student leaders lose appeal to Supreme Court

Two student leaders of the 1974 protest movement, Hariman Siregar and Syahrir, could soon be returned to prison to serve the remainder of prison sentences passed in 1974 and 1975, following a Supreme Court rejection of their pleas for clemency. The two men made their pleas in 1976, but it took the Court seven years to pass its verdict, in November this year.

They immediately lodged grasi pleas to the President. Under existing laws, they could be returned to prison whilst grasi pleas are considered but the Public Prosecutor decided on a last-minute stay of execution.

The 1974 student protest movement culminated in a huge demonstration on the streets of Jakarta on 15 January 1974 in protest against the visit to Indonesia of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka. Many students were arrested after the demonstration, of whom three were later brought to trial, Hariman Siregar, Syahrir and Moh. Aini Chalid. Others arrested at the time and held for around two years without trial included well-known human rights activists and lawyers such as Buyung Nasution, Yap Thiam Hien and H.C. Princen.

Hariman Siregar, a medical student, was chairman of the Students Council of the University of Indonesia. He was tried under the Anti-Subversion Law, found guilty and sentenced to six years. On appeal, the High Court reduced this sentence to 4½ years in April 1976. In its decision, the Supreme Court not only rejected Hariman’s appeal, but accepted an appeal by the prosecution for the restoration of Hariman’s original sentence of six years, annuling the High Court decision. Hariman spent two years and seven months in prison—from January 1974 until August 1976—and was released “on humanitarian grounds”. He must therefore serve another three years and five months of his original sentence. Since his release in 1976 he has graduated and practised for several years as a doctor.

Syahrir was secretary of the University of Indonesia Discussion Group which held a number of debates in the months prior to the January protest movement. He had just completed his studies at the University of Indonesia’s Economics Faculty at the time the protests occurred. Syahrir was tried early in 1975, also under the Anti-Subversion Law; it was charged that the Discussion Group had been the “brains” behind the protest and had “instigated” the students. He was found guilty and sentenced to

TAPOL Bulletin No. 60 November 1983
6½ years. This sentence was reduced on appeal to the High Court to six years in May 1975. The Supreme Court has now confirmed the High Court’s decision. Since Syahrir was held in detention from January 1974 until November 1977, a total of three years and ten months, he still has two years and two months to serve. He has recently returned to Indonesia after completing a Ph.D. thesis at Harvard University.

The sentence of the third man tried in connection with the 1974 protests, Moh Aini Chalid, was also upheld by the Supreme Court. But since he had already served the period fixed, he was not required to go back to prison. Aini Chalid adopted a very non-cooperative attitude during his trial. He refused to brief a defence lawyer, refused to call witnesses and offered no defence plea. He had intended using his trial to expose the role of General Ali Murtopo in provoking riots and looting during the 15 January demonstration, but the court obstructed any mention of General Murtopo. A fourth defendant, Ramadi, died in detention in mysterious circumstances after he had revealed to other detainees that Murtopo supplied Rp. 35 million to organise the provocations. It was the death of Ramadi and the obstructions he encountered during his own trial that led Aini Chalid to condemn the proceedings as a farce and to refuse to cooperate. Aini was sentenced to four years, which was reduced to two years and three months on appeal to the High Court. He was released after serving the full term.

**Why now?**

For an appraisal of the reasons for the sudden re-emergence of these 1974 cases, it is worth noting that the 1974 student leaders were the first major “trouble-makers” of the post-1965 New Order era, the first generation of dissidents to be tried under the Anti-Subversion Law. The charges against them included “undermining government authority”, “attempting to subvert the basic guidelines of the State” and “challenging the position of the Head of State”. The Supreme Court’s decision, which is undoubtedly politically motivated, may be intended as a public display of the military government’s determination to exact full retribution from those who have dared to challenge its supremacy. With the government focussing hard on its “single ideology” policy against the opposition of Muslim youth groups, it may wish to remind dissidents of what could befall them if they persist.

*The “single ideology” (azas tunggal) decision requires all political parties and organisations to abandon all beliefs or political programmes and adhere only to the State ideology of the Pancasila.

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**Muslim journal and books seized**

Ten thousand copies of the monthly journal of a Jogjakarta-based Muslim youth organisation were seized and confiscated by troops of Jogjakarta KOREM 072 (Military Resort Command). They also confiscated fifty copies of a book (see below) and some 200 copies of a bulletin published by the Iranian Embassy. Four persons were arrested; they were identified only by their initials, as MAF, RZ, NJB and HZ. The latter person is a student at a private university in Jogjakarta.

**AR-RISALAH**, the journal that was seized, is published by the Communication Body for Youth of the Mosques (BKBM). Major Wahyoe Soemantri, head of intelligence of the Jogja Military Command accused the journal of “undermining the authorities”, of “depicting the government as infidels”, and of “smuggling revolutionary concepts into the country from abroad”.

“They are calling on people to engage in revolution, in opposition to the Pancasila. That is subversive,” said Major Soemantri. “It is even suspected that the journal is receiving funds from the Middle East”.

Irfan, the journal’s editor, said that it aims at propagating Muslim thoughts, struggling for these ideas and providing a means of communication for young people active in mosque affairs. It started off in 1981 as a small four-page tabloid printing 2,000 copies, but has grown quickly to twelve pages, with 10,000 copies. The readership has grown fast and many readers provide hefty contributions to keep it going. The October issue which was seized by the Army contained the 1983 statement of the Petition-of-50 group (a group which launched a petition criticising the government in 1981), an article about Ayatollah Khomeini and one about the headscarves controversy. (Muslim schoolgirls are being prohibited from wearing headscarves at school. See TAPOL Bulletin No. 59, September 1983).

As far as is known, Ar-Risalah has not yet been banned by the government.

**Defence Pleas also seized**

Fifty copies of a book entitled *Perjalanan Hukum Indonesia, Sebuah Gugatan* (Indonesian Law, A Challenge) were also seized at the Ar-Risalah office. The book reproduces the defence pleas of two Muslim defendants who were tried for political activities, Abdullah Sungkar and Abubakar Ba’asyir. The book carries an introduction by the human rights lawyer, Buyung Nasution and was published by the BKPM. “We published it,” said Irfan “because no newspapers were prepared to give these documents any coverage”.

Sources: Tempo, 22 October, and Sinar Harapan, 15 October 1983

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**Government obstructing publication of LBH 1983 report**

The 1983 Annual Report of the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) which is understood to be ready for publication is facing difficulties because of government obstructions.

The former chairman of the LBH Foundation, Buyung Nasution, told the Australian Parliamentary Delegation which visited Jakarta in July this year that the government was exerting pressure on the publisher not to publish the Report “unless there were changes in the nature of the report”. (See Australian Parliamentary Delegation Report, page 92.)

The Report is normally published by the Sinar Harapan publishing house, publishers of the large Christian Jakarta daily of the same name. Past reports have provided a wide-ranging account of the state of human rights in Indonesia. The last report drew attention among other things to the many political disappearances that have occurred and also included a section of human rights abuse in East Timor.
Life during the resistance 1975–1978

Neobere, an East Timorese who left Dili in January this year and is now living as a refugee in Portugal, spent three years fighting with the resistance. Until his capture in November 1978, he gained wide experience of the conditions under which people fought against the Indonesian occupation, in particular the devastating bombardments by Indonesian aircraft and naval vessels, causing a huge loss of life. After spending several months as a captive with an Indonesian military unit in the south eastern region of Matebian, he escaped to Dili and remained there until his departure for Lisbon this year.

On a visit to London in May, Neobere was interviewed at length by TAPOL. Part of this interview, dealing with the current situation was published in TAPOL Bulletin No 58.

*Could you describe your personal experiences of Indonesian military operations, the invasion and the resistance, going back to the time of the UDT coup in August 1975?*

In 1975 I was working as a nurse for the Portuguese colonial administration in Suai, a town near the south coast about 20 kms from the border with West Timor. Well before the Indonesians invaded Dili in December, war was raging in this southern border region. I should explain that when the UDT launched the coup in Dili in August, they also tried to control Suai and other places. The UDT killed many people in Suai as well as in the countryside, and during that time the Indonesian troops across the border did nothing. They just watched.

On 20 August, Fretilin launched its counter-offensive against the UDT in Dili, and spontaneous actions happened elsewhere too, including Suai. Everyone joined forces with Fretilin, including members of the Portuguese army. Then the UDT people fled, some across the border, some to Baucau in the north. Some tried to hold out in Balibo, but they were outnumbered by Fretilin supporters, and defeated.

In these months before December, there was a great deal of fighting and many people wanted to leave the country, including my own family, so I went with them to Dili, then to Balibo. Many people went across the border, including my wife, but I didn't want to leave because I was a Fretilin supporter, so I went back to Dili then to Suai. Already in September, Indonesian troops were coming across the border. They used bazookas and hand-grenades, and burnt down houses. They entered the towns — Tilumar for instance — and shot people. Some Fretilin soldiers, members of Falintil, were shot dead in these encounters. The Indonesians came across at night and returned to Indonesian territory the next morning. A man I knew, named Manuel, was killed on 18 September. In fact, I even remember an incident in the area before the beginning of September when some Indonesians were killed. I captured documents from an Indonesian soldier at the time. In that encounter two Fretilin soldiers and four Indonesians were killed. So you see, throughout September and October, there was heavy fighting.

*Were you yourself fighting with Fretilin troops, in Falintil?*

No, not really, because I was working as a nurse. When Indonesian paratroops invaded Dili on 7 December, their troops also tried to cross the border and take control but we resisted them and they made little headway. In February, Indonesian paratroops were dropped on Suai and tried to spread into the interior. At the same time, their troops advanced across the border. We resisted them from both these directions, but by March it was too much for us so we retreated to the hills. And people in the towns, in Suai and Tilumar, also left for the hills. They had heard how Indonesians committed atrocities, stole people's possessions, raped the women, how they had shot many people, even Apodeti members who supported integration with Indonesia. So everyone wanted to leave, to go to the hills and resist the invaders.

After the UDT was defeated and the Portuguese withdrew to

*Atauro island, was Fretilin able to set up an administration from September to December 1975?*

Fretilin sent political representatives to all districts and sub-districts to explain their policy, so there were local people who received advice and instructions from Fretilin. But it isn't possible to speak of any effective administration because so much fighting was going on in our region. There were still some UDT people around, the Indonesians were making incursions across the border and there were Indonesian naval vessels just off the coast.

*What experiences of the resistance did you have in the years following the invasion?*

Because of the work I was doing as a nurse I travelled round a great deal. In 1976 I travelled all along the coastal areas, north and south. In 1977 I travelled extensively in the mountainous regions, and I was in the central region in 1978. This was up to November 1978, after the Indonesians had taken Uatocarabau in the Matabian region, though the areas outside the town were still in Fretilin hands. After Uatocarabau was taken in February 1979, many people fled to the mountains. The Indonesians had 13 battalions there. When they tried to gain control of the mountain regions many of their men were killed, so they started the bombing raids, with OV10 Broncos as well as supersonic jets. The jets caused many fires.

Life goes on as usual. From a collection of photos taken in Fretilin-controlled areas in early 1983.

*What type of jets were they?*

I don't know.* They approached so fast that we had to take cover immediately. It was different with the OV10s, which approached much more slowly and made a lot of noise. We could

*TAPOL Bulletin No. 60  November 1983*
identifying them and had plenty of time to take cover. But the jets were far more dangerous and we never hung around long enough to see the markings. Many people died in Matabian and earlier in Suai, though generally speaking not the guerrillas. The guerrillas used tactics to escape extinction. For instance, they would often get up close to Indonesian troop positions to avoid being bombed. But many other people were killed. Many were killed when they took shelter in caves because the cave entrance became blocked so they died inside from lack of oxygen. Some were caught under boulders. Here in the eastern central region there were large concentrations of Timorese, up in the Matabian mountains, in Uatulari, Utocarabau, Kelikai, and farther east in Los Palos. By 1978, Indonesian troops had entered these towns. Then, they managed to penetrate into the mountain regions and drove the people down, forcing them into the towns under their control. These operations took place after periods of intense bombing.

People were forced into confined areas, and had to remain there. Initially these areas were surrounded by troops because they were afraid the people would escape and go back to the mountains or make contact with the resistance. I reckon that in those days the Indonesians must have had fifty or sixty battalions in East Timor. Later, these areas of population concentration were fenced in.

Resistance continued all through 1978, 1979 and 1980, but the guerrilla movement had become widely dispersed and the groups were separated from each other. In 1980, Falintil was able to re-group and re-organise, and the level of resistance again intensified. There has been a lot of bitter fighting since then, in 1981 and 1982. Only shortly before I left, some time last November, a battle occurred in Los Palos; an Indonesian sub-lieutenant and many other soldiers were killed. Because of this, the Indonesians brought more troops into the country, altogether six extra battalions, and deployed them in Same and Ainaru where the fighting had taken place. In late 1982, a battle also took place to the east of Dili when a Timorese named Abilio da Silva, fighting on the side of the Indonesians, was killed.

There are many Timorese fighting with the Indonesians. They have been forced to join the army and are put right in the frontline. If they refuse to carry out orders, they are accused of being Fretilin supporters and can be shot. This is their Timorisation of the war — giving Timorese weapons, putting them in uniforms. I think they do this because the Indonesian soldiers are afraid of fighting us, so they use Timorese instead. There are two Indonesian battalions, composed entirely of Timorese, Battalions 744 and 745. They have the hansip (civil guard) as well, who are all Timorese; they have to fight in the frontline and can be shot dead if they refuse to fight Fretilin. Quite a few Timorese have been killed like this.

Have the Indonesians used chemical weapons or napalm?

It’s very possible though I can’t say for sure, as I have no personal experience of it. What I do know is that in some places that were bombed, everything got burnt as a result, gardens as well as houses. In some places, a day or two after a bombing raid, a plague of maggots would come and destroy the crops . . . "

When we first retreated to the hills we had no idea the struggle would last so long. We had taken food with us and lived on that. But then we had to start producing food. Much the same pattern developed everywhere. The main crops grown were maize, cassava, potatoes and rice. Where I was we couldn’t grow much rice because it has to be grown on hill-slopes and we were too high up the mountains. Around Suai we were very restricted in the kinds of food we could grow, so we got rice by exchanging things with people in other regions. We developed a system of exchange in the interior. We could grow coffee and exchanged it for other things. We also transported it to areas occupied by the enemy, for exchange. As for soap, clothing and so on, the things we had wore out. To replenish our stocks we attacked enemy positions and often captured money, then found ways of using this money with the help of people living in the occupied areas. Anyone caught doing this kind of thing would be shot immediately, so we had to be very careful.

What about the medical services during that period of the resistance?

At first, things were extremely difficult. I hadn’t been able to take any medical supplies or equipment when I left Suai because the Indonesians had landed already. So we used roots, herbs and so on as medicines. Then we had to rely on supplies we managed to capture from the enemy. We got bandages and medicines this way, and sometimes even surgical instruments. I continue to work as a nurse, caring for the sick.

What was the health situation like?

Well, we knew we were completely on our own and that we could expect help from no one. The will to fight was very strong and that helped us to survive and keep strong. As you can imagine, it wasn’t easy but we knew that we had nothing to hope for but fighting the enemy or death, and this helped us to survive.

What about food production during those years of resistance up to 1978?
Did you manufacture medicines?

Yes, we had two centres for making medicines, in Lakluta and in the Matabian region. We developed a method of drying potatoes and maize, then grinding this into a fine powder. Then we boiled medicinal leaves and mixed the extract with this powder. Later we developed a better method; we constructed rudimentary distilleries and distilled the extract we obtained from the boiled leaves and roots. This improved the quality of the medicines we produced. We also discovered a way of producing soap. At first we used ash which contains potash, but we soon realised that this quickly damaged our clothes. Then we discovered that the fruit of a tree widely found in Timor was very useful for producing soap. We boiled the fruit, burning it into a fine ash; then we boiled the seeds of the fruit separately which produced an oily substance. We mixed these two substances together, left the mixture to set for several days in shapes, and got bars of soap.

We also discovered a way of re-charging batteries for our radios. At first we did this by using energy produced from pedalling bikes very fast and for a long time, but as you can imagine, this was extremely tiring. So then we thought of creating energy with water. There aren't any waterfalls in Timor, so we had to use pipes to create our own falls with water from a high elevation. These falls were used to turn wheels which was how we created energy to charge our batteries. We also thought of ways to make explosives to blow up enemy tanks.

What was the role of the priests?

They just continued to function normally, performing marriages, christenings. I was once the best man at my friend's wedding. Fretilin used to capture wine for mass. The Church's task is basically to care for people's souls, but the priests see daily the inhumanity of the Indonesian occupants and have to speak out against it. This has aroused the displeasure of the Indonesians who accuse the church of collaborating with Fretilin. It's no secret that this is why the Indonesians want to get rid of the Bishop.*

What about church services? Do the priests express views about the situation in their sermons?

People in Timor are very religious, and they have built their own places of worship in many settlements, but the occupying soldiers often harass church-goers. People sometimes go to their church for mass, only to find it filthy with human excrement. This is the work of the soldiers who also sometimes damage the statues. In Lacolo, they destroyed a statue of St Vincent. The soldiers don't actually break up services, but they go in for this kind of desecration which creates an atmosphere of intimidation and contempt for the people's beliefs.

As far as I know, the priests don't openly comment on the situation in their sermons; they just limit themselves to describing a Christian's duty, which is a way of conveying messages about justice to the congregation. The one who does this kind of thing more openly is Mgr da Costa Lopez, the Bishop. When the massacres occurred in Lakluta in 1981 he openly condemned them though he fell short of actually mentioning the perpetrators.

Can we return now to your own experiences in 1978. How were you captured?

*This refers to Mgr Martinhu da Costa Lopez. In fact, shortly after this interview, information was received that he had been forced to resign. He is now living in Lisbon.
In 1977, the Indonesians brought 13 battalions to the region of Matabian, which is where I was at the time. I know for sure the number of battalions because an Indonesian soldier later told me. The first time the occupants tried to capture Matabian, their troops were decimated. We destroyed two whole battalions.

By this time in 1978, we were encircled by enemy troops. Their tactic was to gain control of the water sources. At first we managed to survive, living on plants which we knew had a high liquid content. We studied ways of cutting plants to drain as much liquid as possible from them. But clearly this couldn't last long so I and another fellow decided to go in search of water. We went down into the valley, well camouflaged, but soon found ourselves near Indonesian troops. We stood there actually watching them attack our forces. Then we went on our way, looking for water, but as we turned a corner we came face to face with an Indonesian soldier. He made a sign to show that he wanted us to surrender.

I spent the next four months with these enemy troops, treated like a slave, carrying their weapons and other equipment. We weren't wearing uniform when I was caught so they didn't realise we were with the guerrillas. The work they made me do was very arduous, so one day I had the idea of borrowing a horse from a nearby village. But soon afterwards, an Indonesian took this horse and wanted to sell it. I told him I had only borrowed it and that I would pay for it. He accused me of having stolen it. This made me absolutely furious. I hadn't stolen it, I shouted, but even if I had, I hadn't stolen it from a Javanese but from one of my own people. This made the soldier very angry, and he started beating me, and knocked me hard against a rock. I managed to escape and fled to the nearby village. Then I managed to get a safe-conduct pass from a soldier who had befriended me, so I went to Uatocarabau and later to Dili. After some time I managed to get a job working as a nurse. In Dili, I was able to contact my wife in Lisbon, with the help of the Red Cross.

While you were a prisoner, what did you see of how Indonesians waged war against Fretilin?

I was kept mostly among the medical staff, always in the centre of the encampment, so I never really saw any fighting. I did see a lot of wounded men, though, and we were required to treat these wounded Indonesians. I could see that there were many Timorese badly in need of medical treatment, but we were not allowed to treat them at all. Most of these Timorese were old people or children who hadn't been able to flee with the community when the Indonesians came. It was so heartless of the Indonesians not to allow us to treat them, even though many were in a bad state of health.

From then on, you weren't with the resistance any more, but can you tell us something about organisation and tactics from 1980 onwards?

Well, up to 1980, guerrilla groups fought many engagements, but they were scattered and widely dispersed. Each group had to work out its own tactics. But around the time of the Indonesian offensive in 1981, the Operasi Keamanan, Fretilin felt the time had come to bring their people together and discuss tactics thoroughly. A conference was held though it isn't possible for me to say what strategy was worked out. We have no support at all from outside, but we do have the people's support. For instance, people in Dili send information to those in the bush and get it back to us. This wouldn't be possible without the people's support. And they supply not only information but also food, medicine etc. People in the settlements try to cultivate plots of land as far from the town as possible because this brings them nearer to Fretilin in the bush. The Indonesians realise this and try to stop people leaving the settlements. During the 1981 enemy operations, the people's support for Fretilin was very obvious. Everyday people were involved in enemy attacks, Fretilin was informed and held its fire. On the other hand, the people knew where Fretilin forces were concentrated and tried to send enemy troops in the opposite direction.

Are people allowed to leave the settlements at all?

Yes, but not beyond a certain point or they will be accused of trying to contact Fretilin. They need a travel pass or a 'surat jalan', which must be matched with their identity card. And they have to pay for these documents. When they travel, the documents must be stamped at military posts, and bribes have to be paid for this. These stamps then show the route you have taken, and it's very difficult not to return the same way. The pass says where you are allowed to go and it always has a time limit.

The Indonesians claim they are investing a lot of money in East Timor and are treating the Timorese very generously. People don't have to pay taxes, they say, and get water and electricity free, no TV licences, free schooling, free phones, and so on. How do the Timorese see this?

Yes, it's true. People don't pay taxes or electricity bills. As for water, the supply is very difficult because of the effects of the war. But the point is this: if the Indonesians were to require payment for all these things, the people would in any case refuse to pay. In the first place, they don't have the money to pay, and secondly, they would regard paying taxes as a form of collaboration with the enemy.
From *Dibawah Sepatu Lars* (Under the Jackboot), the defence plea of Indro Tjahyono.

Reproduced from INDOC publication No 5, March 1983, on press freedom.

TAPOL Bulletin No. 60 November 1983
House of Lords debates East Timor

The following debate, reproduced from Hansard, took place in the House of Lords on 15th November 1983. Lord Glenarthur was speaking for the Government.

East Timor: Military Operations

3.2 p.m.

Lord Avebury: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government what reports they have received about the build-up of Indonesian troops in East Timor since the middle of August, and the military operations which have been undertaken there by Indonesia.

Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, firm information is hard to come by. But it is clear that the ceasefire in East Timor which had been in effect since the beginning of the year has come to an end.

Lord Avebury: My Lords, has not the Foreign Secretary said in correspondence with a number of people that there was a substantial build-up of Indonesian troops in East Timor? Has the noble Lord studied reports that the number of such troops may amount to between 10,000 and 20,000, and that helicopters and planes are being deployed in the attack on the people of East Timor which—does the noble Lord agree?—was clearly premeditated. Will he bear in mind the fact that the International Committee of the Red Cross was prevented from operating in the territory from July onwards, just before the attack took place?

Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, Indonesia has certainly sent extra troops to East Timor; but, as the noble Lord himself made clear, estimates of the number vary. It seems unlikely that operations have been extensive, given the small number of active Fretilin guerrillas involved, and we would expect that military operations will have to end shortly when the rainy season begins. As regards relief organisations, yes I am aware, and I am aware that my right honourable friend is aware, of the situation concerning the ICRC, but it seems that a number of other relief organisations continue to operate in East Timor and these include the United States Catholic Relief and UNICEF.

Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, in view of this unprovoked aggression and virtual annexation of East Timor, which I understand the Government have condemned, and the appalling violations of human rights—again, I understand that over 100,000 people in East Timor have been killed—why are the Government failed to support the United Nations Resolution supporting self-determination for East Timor?

Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, the figures to which the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, refers are his figures. They are speculative. Of course, we will continue to watch the situation closely but no grounds exist at present for formal representation. The noble Lord may like to know that we are in touch with the Indonesian Government and they are fully aware of our interest in this matter. As regards arms sales, this is a difficult matter. Many factors must be taken into account, including the effect of such sales on employment in the United Kingdom. As the noble Lord knows, all sales require an export licence and each application is carefully considered.

Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, the noble Lord referred to my figures as speculative. Does he not agree however that serious violations of human rights have taken place in East Timor? In those circumstances how does he justify the sale of armaments by Great Britain to Indonesia, which is guilty of these violations?

Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, it would not be appropriate to adopt any arms embargo against Indonesia. We have excellent relations with Indonesia. Furthermore, there is no mandatory United Nations arms embargo against Indonesia.

Lord Avebury: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the total number of people who have perished in East Timor since the occupation by Indonesia in 1975 is estimated by competent authorities at between 150,000 and 200,000. Bearing in mind this enormous carnage committed by an aggressor nation on this tiny territory, does not the noble Lord think that reasons of economic self-interest pale into insignificance? Will he reflect on the remarks that he has just made to the House when next the question of American arms sales to Argentina occurs, because surely there is a parallel there? In both cases aggression was committed on a small and defenceless people; but in one case the Government are saying that the Americans should not supply arms to the aggressor but are busily supplying arms to the aggressor in the other situation.

Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I certainly do not intend getting involved in any discussion about Argentina which is the subject of another question altogether. I have nothing to add to what I said earlier.

Lord Leatherland: My Lords, would the Minister agree that he is probably a little optimistic in suggesting that the rainy season will stop these operations? Is he further aware that those of us who were in the Somme in 1915 were standing up to our waists in water for weeks on end and that did not stop operations?

Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I am interested to hear the noble Lord's anecdotes; but I think there is evidence to support what I said, that the coming of the rainy season should end these operations.
The intense public debate in Australia this year on the question of East Timor came to a climax with the publication of two official reports which take diametrically opposed positions. That the two groups are chaired by parliamentarians from the same party, the Australian Labour Party, only shows that even the party whose programme upholds the principle of self-determination and its proper application in the case of East Timor is in fact represented by many people who treat principle with contempt.

How else can one interpret the remark that sets the tone of the Australian Parliamentary Delegation's report, that: "The Indonesians certainly regard the East Timor question as a critical test of Australian-Indonesian relations indicating that if differences persist the whole relationship will suffer.

Why strain the relationship, the Report argues, because in any case, "Australia's position does not count . . . How Australia votes in the UN will make no difference to the situation in East Timor. Indonesia . . . regards the incorporation of East Timor into the Republic of Indonesia as final and irreversible." Inspired by such thoughts, the delegation had no need to go to East Timor. Whatever they saw or heard was clearly not going to make any difference, unless of course it was an exercise undertaken just to give their conclusion greater "validity" because they had been there and seen things for themselves.

Their Report, though, should be read carefully, in particular the Appendices, to get an idea of what the delegation saw but did not probe, to appreciate its abysmal failure to pursue clear signs that it was being conned, of its almost sole reliance on the information and explanations of Indonesian army officers or Indonesian-appointed Timorese officials.

"The administration in East Timor appears to be in effective control of all settled areas", claims the Report (p.77), yet when the Delegation landed in Same, "police guards . . . chased away the would-be interested" and "rushed the Delegation up the hill to the Bupati's office at an apparently needless reckless speed" (p.45). What clearer sign could one have that people were trying to breach the security surrounding the visitors?

Or, why was the Dilor settlement area "uncannily empty when the Delegation arrived" and "the few people to be found, mostly old, appeared reserved, if not afraid"? Dilor, the Report explains, is a resettlement area for former inhabitants of Lacluta. But, why the move? "Lacluta had apparently been the site of some serious clashes in the war where casualties had been high" (p.46). Is that all they could discover? If they had met those "uncannily" absent inhabitants, they might have heard about the Lacluta massacres of September 1981 when "Indonesian soldiers took hold of the legs of small children and . . . smashed their heads against a rock" and when "twenty trucks were needed to take the bodies away", according to eye witnesses. (See Dossier on East Timor, 1982, compiled by ACFOA.) But then, the last place one would expect to hear such accounts would be in East Timor with Indonesians officials constantly at your side.

Or, take this exchange during the delegation's conversation with officials in Ainaro:

Mr Morrison (Chairman of the Delegation) . . . stated that he believed that there was some Fretilin activity in this area last year. What was the scale of those operations? There was some debate among the Indonesians . . . then the Military Commander replied that he had been in Ainaro for one year only and that there had been no action in that time. Mr Morrison asked, what about reports of trouble last August? Mr Nurdahah (senior official of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry) intervened at this point to say that the trouble was not actually caused by Fretilin, but by people who robbed. The Military Commander added that he only deals with the situation at the moment. He does not know about the past (p.180).

Senator McIntosh, in his dissenting note, describes the official report as "tendentious, superficial and at times misleading". Yes, it is all of that, but still worse, it ignores its own publicly recorded evidence that Honourable Parliamentarians were taken for a ride, and have the gall to think that Honourable Parliamentarians were taken for a ride, and have the gall to think that the rest of us will not see them as cynical apologists for an aggressive and barbaric regime.

The main recommendations of the Senate Inquiry Report are based on the irrefutable fact that Indonesia's occupation of East Timor was an illegal act and that there must be an internationally recognised act of self-determination in East Timor. From this follows the logical conclusion that Australian recognition of any Indonesian claim must be conditional upon the people exercising their right to self-determination. The Report presents evidence to show how baseless is the claim made by Indonesia that the Timorese people have freely opted to become Indonesia's 27th province. The lack of civil and political rights is described in some detail based not only on the 1,773 pages of published, written and oral evidence that accompanies the Report but also on the many testimonies heard by the Inquiry in camera from East Timorese refugees who feared for the safety of relatives at home and chose to testify in secret.

It is difficult though to accept the Inquiry's belief that "the worst abuses have been moderated as the internal situation has stabilised" (p.37). This is hardly tenable in view of the fact that hundreds of thousands of Timorese are now forced to live in "resettlement areas" in order to suit Indonesia's counter-insurgency strategy, and that many thousands of people are in detention in Atauro and elsewhere. There is nothing moderate about a system of repression if mass murders on the scale that occurred most recently in 1981 temporarily cease. Indeed, even as the Report appeared in print, new savagery was being wrought on the people of East Timor — villages burnt down, villagers shot to death and prisoners removed to goodness knows where.

The Report devotes much space to Indonesia's "development" plans and even states that the government is "making a concerted effort to develop and increase agricultural productivity". It gives credence to the idea that the resettlement centres "provide people with relief and development services". Yet detailed testimony was submitted (pp.715-738), based on quotations from a variety of sources, showing that the forced resettlement of hundreds of thousands of Timorese "drastically disrupted the fragile subsistence economy on which most Timorese depended" (p.736). Resettlement is indeed the backbone of Indonesia's strategy in East Timor, and to mention it in the same breath as "relief" and "development services" only helps to justify that strategy.

The inadequacy of the Senate Inquiry findings on the nature of Indonesia's economic and social policies in East Timor points to the need for a thorough-going analysis of the "development" now taking place in East Timor.
Tony Ardie, whose trial commenced in Jakarta on 12 November 1983. He is accused of “spreading hatred” for publicly condemning government persecution of Muslims at a halal bi halal celebration which turned into a protest against the ban on Muslim schoolgirls wearing headscarves at school.

(Below) The meeting at the Al-Azhar mosque, attended by 30,000 people.
Photos: Tempo, 19 November 1983

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