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TAPOL

British Campaign for the Defence

of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

TAPOL Bulletin No. 58

July 1983

Army killer squads spread terror in the cities

General Benny Murdani, Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces and commander of the army's security command, KOPKAMTIB, has publicly acknowledged that the security forces are responsible for hundreds of killings that have occurred recently in many Indonesian cities. He made it perfectly clear, after a coordination meeting to discuss policy held in Jakarta at the end of June, that the security forces are engaged in a nation-wide operation 'to combat crime'.

The operations have led to a curtailment in the areas of operation available to street gangs, he said. It is possible therefore that some of the deaths that have occurred may be the result of inter-gang rivalries. As if expecting not to be believed, he added: "I'm not making this up, you know".

More than three hundred are known to have died as a result of the activities of the death squads. Bandung leads with more than 120 victims, then Central Java with 70, Jogjakarta with 60 and Jakarta with 55. Murdani pointed out however that the actual number of victims is certainly much higher than this because the figures given only account for those victims whose bodies have been taken to hospitals for autopsies.

Reporting Murdani's statement, *Tempo* says that many victims are known to have disappeared without trace. In Jogjakarta for instance, bodies are known to have been dumped in wells leading to tunnels that go out to the ocean.

Sources: *Topik*, 5th July, and *Tempo*, 2nd July, 1983.

Yap Thiam Hien:

GO AHEAD AND SHOOT 20 MILLION

"Perhaps I should suggest, as a way to make our country secure, that all the twenty million poor people should be murdered," said Yap Thiam Hien, a lawyer, speaking at a seminar held in May to discuss the death squads. He referred earlier to the theologian, Bishop D. McDonald Tamara, who has written that poverty is a cause of violence and crime.

Mr. Yap recalled a statement made recently by Ali Said, Minister of Justice, that it is better to shoot a hundred criminals in order to protect the safety of a hundred thousand other citizens.

"I'm surely not the only one who was upset to hear such a statement, coming from a minister, a jurist who is in charge of legal affairs. It not only conflicts with the Pancasila, the law on the Judiciary and the Criminal Procedural Code. It is also diametrically opposed to the oath of office taken by all government officials, not to infringe the Pancasila or the 1945 Constitution."

**Bandung Group: ABRI MUST
GET OUT OF POLITICS** pages 9-12

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(Indonesian press avoids naming names)

Death squads in action

★ The body of Giot (18 years) was found on 4th May by the roadside; there were two bullet wounds in the head which had also been struck by two heavy blows. Giot worked at Kramat Jati Market, his brother said. The night before he was found dead, he was dragged away from the Hawaii Bar in Cisalak, on the outskirts of Jakarta, by five men, four of them armed with pistols. "He was shot dead while being driven in a vehicle to Cibubur," said one official. "He must have been trying to resist." (*Tempo*, 21 May, 1983)

★ On 11th May at around 8.30pm, the body of Joko Sulisno was found in Aldiron Plaza Shopping Arcade, Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta. He had been shot twice in the chest. An hour later, the body of Baginda Siregar was found near the Blok M bus terminal, also in Kebayoran Baru. He had been shot through the head. The bodies of two other men, also with gunshot wounds, were found in other parts of South Jakarta on the same night. (*Tempo*, 21 May 1983)

★ Bodies of known criminals with bullet wounds have been discovered in many places. In Indramayu, Purwakarta and Cianjur, bodies have been found hidden in sacks. . . On one night alone, four bodies were found in sacks under Kalianyur Bridge in Indramayu. (*Tempo*, 4 June 1983)

★ At a discussion forum about the recent wave of deaths, held at the LBH office in Jakarta, forensic expert Dr. Abdul Mun'in said: "The bodies have generally been shot at close range, from a

distance of 25-60cms. Sometimes, the pistol has been fired right close to the skin. Many bodies have several gunshot wounds, which means that the killer wanted to make sure his victim was dead. In most cases, shots were fired from in front of the victim, not from behind, which means that the assassin and victim were face to face. Some bodies have bullets from more than one weapon." It is not difficult to conclude, he is reported to have said, where these 'mysterious killers' come from and for whom they are working. (*Tempo*, 4 June 1983)

★ At 2am, the body of Madadi was found near a bridge at Cakung junction, North Jakarta. The victim had been taken from his home the previous night. . . Almost simultaneously, another murder took place in Tanjungpriok, Jakarta. Ramil bin Sardi was taken from his home by four armed men whose faces were covered with handkerchiefs. Within yards of their home, Ramil's brother Eddi saw him being struck on the head with a pistol. Then a man shouted: "Don't waste time. Shoot him." Eddi then saw a pistol being aimed at his brother's head, just below the ear. He heard a shot, not very loud, then the four men jumped into the jeep and drove away. (*Tempo*, 18 June 1983)

★ Records at the University of Indonesia Criminology Institute show that 48 bodies with gunshot wounds have been found in Jakarta since January this year. 21 were discovered in May alone, and by the beginning of the second week of June, another ten bodies had been found. . . In Bandung, more than 20 bodies have been found. . . The number of deaths from gunshot wounds in Central Java has reached 70, of which 60 occurred in Jogjakarta. . . (*Tempo*, 18 June 1983)

★ Police Chief, Lieutenant-General Anton Sajarwo refused to make any comment when asked about the killings, except to say: "As far as I'm concerned, the main thing is security. . ." Some people link the wave of killings to a statement made early last year by Admiral Sudomo, then commander of KOPKAMTIB. He said, when speaking of the need to combat bus piracy, that "specially-trained *killer squads* (emphasis from *Tempo*) will be formed." That's what now seems to have happened, said one observer. . . (*Tempo*, 18 June 1983)

★ The killer squads operate with a high degree of efficiency. Having received information, presumably from the police, the 'mysterious killers' make straight for their victim. He is kidnapped from his home or from wherever he happens to be at the time. . . then dragged to a waiting vehicle. What happens inside is not clear, but the vehicle makes for some deserted spot, and not long after, the body is found lying in the street.

The killers are men with athletic bodies, they take action with firm deliberation, and appear to be trained for anything. A squad usually consists of four men. The shots are aimed at parts of the body which are certain to prove fatal. "Shots elsewhere in the body are a kind of bonus" said forensic expert Dr. Abdul Mun'in. "Most of the bullets being used are shiny, as if they have just been taken from the place where they were manufactured." What does this all mean? asked *Tempo*. "You can draw your own conclusion," he replied. (*Tempo*, 18 June 1983)

★ In Medan, five deaths have been reported, as the operations of death squads spread to North Sumatra. In April, as killer operations commenced in Jakarta, it is known that the police in Medan were instructed to compile a list of people known to be 'potential prison inmates'. A list of no fewer than 900 names was drawn up, complete with photographs, addresses, and other details, involving people in Medan, Labuhanbatu, Lasngkat and Asahan. "This means," said one *Tempo* source, "that the killers are unlikely to miss their targets". (*Tempo*, 2nd July, 1983.)

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Killings in Java

For reasons unknown to me, major news organizations are not printing the full story about what is happening in Indonesia. Recent press reports said that 400 people had been mysteriously killed in Indonesia, and the commander of the armed forces was quoted as saying it might be the work of rival gangs. All of this is misleading.

The fact is that the military itself is solely responsible for these killings. Under the guise of cleaning up crime in Java's streets, the military is bypassing Indonesia's constitutional guarantees of due process and right to trial.

In Jogjakarta alone, Indonesia's second city, where I live, more than 250 bodies have found their way to the basement of Sardjito Hospital, a large government hospital; and hundreds of others have reportedly been thrown in the rivers around the city. Some people apparently in the know say the death total exceeds 600 — and this is just in Jogjakarta. The killing is taking place in cities throughout Java.

I have witnessed two of these killings. In one instance six men, all clearly military, dragged a suspect to a garbage dump, drew knives and methodically stabbed him to death while hundreds of people watched from the road above and listened to the man's screams.

In another instance, in the southern part of the city, military men

looked on as a mob they had inspired clubbed a man to death.

The victims are accused of being *galis*, or members of protection rackets. In the early days of this crackdown, about two months ago, the most common method was to arrest them, tell them to run and shoot them in the back. As happens in situations like this, there have been some mistakes made and innocent people have been killed. Many others who were only small-time thieves have been killed.

Everyone I know in Jogjakarta, whether Indonesian or foreign, has either seen one of these killings or heard a firsthand account. For weeks this has been the hottest topic of conversation in town.

There is no secret. People are being murdered by the hundreds and yet for some reason no one seems to have written an accurate account in the international press.

Name withheld by request.
Jogjakarta, Indonesia.


TAPOL

SPECIAL
SUPPLEMENT

British Campaign for the Defence of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

Special Supplement

July 1983



On 30 December 1982, 82 pages of military documents containing instructions to the Indonesian troops in East Timor were captured by Fretilin, the resistance movement. The documents were contained in a folder marked "KODIM 1628/06 BAKAU TIMTIM" and "BAURAH 1628/06" which stands for Military District Command, Baucau, East Timor.

There are eight documents in the folder, seven of which are marked 'secret' at the top and bottom of each page. The eighth is marked 'restricted'.

A complete set of these documents has been made available to TAPOL. We reproduce in this supplement translated sections from five of these documents. Care has been taken to stick closely to the original texts. Headings in italics, and sentences in italics and within square brackets are not taken direct from the original text.

How to Cope with 'Troublesome' Villages

Military Resort Command (Korem) 164 Wira Dharma Intelligence Section

Instruction Manual

Subject: The Way for Babinsa or Team Pembina Desa to Expose/Dismantle (Membongkar) GPK Support Networks

I Introduction

In Instruction Manual no. JUKNIS, dated 30-8-82 on the activities of the Babinsa in territorial intelligence, it was stated that there are "Degrees of Troublesome-ness (kerawanan)* of Villages" which are determined by several factors, including:

1. Villages that are birth-places of GPK leaders. For instance, Saelari is the native village of Mauk Muruk, Bualale/Laosorolai is the native village of David Alex.
2. Villages whose liurai have sons or daughters who are still in the bush.
3. Villages many of whose inhabitants are still in the bush. For example, there are still 91 from Maluro, 84 from Saelari, 66 from Atelari, 18 from Samalari, 28 from Tekinomata, and so on.
4. Villages where most of the inhabitants have just come down from the bush. For example, villages where many of the people come down in 1979 and 1980 are certain to be more troublesome than villages whose inhabitants came down in 1977.
5. Villages most of whose inhabitants consist of ex-GPK and who came down on the basis of plans to destroy ABRI/TNI from within.
6. Villages many of whose inhabitants are disgruntled because of past deeds on the part of ABRI-TNI.
7. Villages that are not yet able to provide sufficient foodstuff for their own inhabitants. For instance, villages in the kecamatan of Laga, Baguia and Queliqai.
8. Villages the composition of whose population is (completely) heterogenous, and there is no unity or harmony within the village.
9. Villages whose entire population consists of people from other villages that have not yet been rebuilt, so that the land which they are now cultivating is not their own. For instance, villages whose inhabitants still live in the kecamatan (town).

Such villages are 'troublesome' because there is a greater possibility for "GPK support networks" to exist. Even so, this does not mean that other villages are clean of GPK support networks. Every possibility still remains. Therefore, the Babinsa and Team Pembina Desa (TPD) who work in villages in general as well as those who work in "troublesome" villages must be able to expose/dismantle (*membongkar*) support-networks in their villages. Until these GPK support networks have been exposed/dismantled, the efforts to eradicate the GPK remnants will not succeed. What is the way to do this? This will be explained in this Instruction Manual.

II The structure of GPK support networks

1. The division into regions by the GPK

The GPK divides East Timor into three military regions which they call:

- a. the Funu Sei Hafatin Military Region (the region of Baucau-Viqueque and Los Palos).

- b. The Nakroman Military Region (the region of Manatuto).
- c. The Haksolok Military Region (the western sector).

2. The Funu Sei Hafatin Military Region

- a. Their region commander is Marcur (Rubeleki) who comes from Ualili.
- b. Their Political Commissar is Tito Ililawa (Loro Timur Anan) who comes from Iliomar.
- c. This Military Region is sub-divided into two sub-regions:
 - i. The Funuk sub-region (to the east of Matabean Mountain).
 - ii. The Nafatin sub-region (to the west of Matabean Mountain).
- d. The Ki-I Red Brigade, led by Falo Chai (Iliomar Komlek) is located in the Funuk sub-region. In addition to Ki-I, the Red Brigade commander, Mauk Muruk (who comes from Saelari village) together with his bodyguard, is also in this region (the Saelari complex).
- e. The Ki-II Red Brigade, led by David Alex (who comes from the Bualale village/Laosorolai), is located in the Nafatin sub-region. In addition to Ki-II, the Ki-III Red Brigade which is led by Kalisa together with Ologari (deputy of Mauk Muruk), often operates in this sub-region (Uaibobo-Builo complex).

3. Cernak (Celula)

- a. Each of these sub-regions is further divided into districts which they call Cernak, or Centro de Resistancia Nacional (Centres of National Resistance) which is a body that collects data from several Nurep.
- b. The Cernak or Celula in some regions of the Funuk sub-region have been exposed/dismantled; these are Celula 111, 112, 113, 114 and 115.
- c. Those in the Nafatin sub-region still have to be exposed/dismantled by both the Babinsa and the TPD.

[A page from this Manual is missing at this point]

1. Nurep members in the settlements (they include ordinary people, Hansip/Ratih members and even community leaders; they are motivated by family ties, because they feel disgruntled towards ABRI/TNI, they fear being intimidated, and so on) look for and collect anything needed by the GPK (information, clothing, food and so on), and these things are given to Nurep members outside the village or settlement. These meetings can take place in gardens, in forests or places agreed by them.

2. The Nurep who are outside the settlement then report the information or hand over the clothing or food to the OC (Orgao Coordinator) who is a member of the Cernak and operates as a Political Assistant (ajunto). The OC members and Cernak members are in the GPK and they are the ones who are in the bush.

3. With the help of this information, clothing and food, the GPK is able to continue with its guerilla activities.

4. If GPK members fell ill and are no longer able to carry weapons, they are appointed to become Nurep.

**kerawanan*: carries the idea of restlessness, instability, cause of trouble. The closest English word to the meaning here intended is the adjective 'troublesome'. To retain this meaning, the derived abstract noun 'troublesome-ness' is used in these translations.

5. Conversely, if a Nurep is restored to health, or if there is a cadre (someone in the settlement who has been influenced), that person returns to operate as a troop member of GPK.

III How do the Babinsa or TPD expose/dismantle these GPK support networks?

1. By investigating each of the persons from the village who are still in the bush, together with their relatives.

[There follows a table setting out the kind of information needed about such people. The columns record age, sex, education, occupation, firearms, family and other remarks, such as whether any relative is now in Atauro]

2. Try to capture a Nurep or GPK member by making investigations about the GPK family still in the village or by making patrols around the settlement, or by asking those GPK who have surrendered or been captured and who come from the village in question.

3. Interrogate/investigate the person in question to find out who it is who helps them in the settlement, to find out who his comrades in Nurep or GPK are in the Cernak.

Instructions regarding interrogations

- a. Use a native-born interpreter who can be trusted.
- b. Prove to the person (under interrogation) that his friends are still alive because they made honest confessions and were prepared to help ABRI/TNI for the early restoration of security.
- c. Avoid using violence that would result in the person under interrogation sealing his/her lips or giving false information and creating anxiety in the community.
- d. Questions should be asked about the following
 - who is still helping them in the settlement;
 - who is the Nurep operating outside the settlement
 - who is still a member of GPK in the Cernak or with the troops;
 - the organisation and method of operation of the above three. For instance, who is the commander, chairman, person in charge, the one who issues orders. Where and how do these people meet their members.

4. Transfer to Atauro or to other places designated for this purpose those in the GPK support network who are still in the settlement and the relatives of GPK who have not yet been sent away. In this way, we

can cut the ties between the support networks in the settlements and the Nurep.

5. Try to capture the Nurep and the GPK members who are outside the settlement:

- a. Nurep and GPK members who surrender or are captured should be asked to bring down their comrades who are still outside the settlement with the movement.
- b. Those Nurep or GPK who surrender or are captured should be told to call to their comrades through loud-speakers.
- c. Hold *tebe-tebe* (traditional dance) festivals so as to make the Nurep still outside the settlement feel a longing for their village and then come down.
- d. Disseminate information to show that those who genuinely come down will be well received (won't be murdered).
- e. Other methods can be cultivated by the Babinsa or TPD.

Those Nurep or GPK members who come down must be put in places that are separated from other people so as to prevent any contact. Even so, they must continue to be 'guided' as well as possible so as to give them a better picture of things, and ensure on the one hand that they don't try to take to the bush again, whilst on the other hand bringing over their comrades who are still in the bush.

6. In order to break the link between the Nurep and the armed GPK members as well as bringing the Nurep down, patrols should be organised round the settlements particularly round the people's gardens which are suspected of being meeting places.

7. Whilst exposing the GPK support networks, simultaneously carry out efforts to draw the sympathy of the village. Remember that people's sympathy is based first and foremost on the stomach, on their customs and on giving them a picture of a better life.

- a. Help people tend their gardens or fields.
- b. Help overcome food shortages (report to the Kodim commander if food supplies are indeed needed).
- c. Help set up cooperatives if possible.
- d. Show respect for local customs.
- e. Build the village by setting up sanitary facilities, schools, village halls or other facilities needed by the people to give them a better picture of life.
- f. Other activities that can be developed by the Babinsa or TPD which are basically aimed at attracting people's sympathy.

[The remainder of this Manual is missing]

The Eight Documents

<i>Title</i>	<i>Reference No.</i>	<i>Date of Issue</i>
Babinsa/TPD's role in exposing/dismantling GPK support networks	—	Last page is missing ¹
System of security in towns and settlement areas.	JUKNIS/05/I/1982	Not given. ²
The village as focal point of attention and how to 'guide' it comprehensively	JUKNIS/01-A/IV/1982	September 10, 1982
How to protect the community from the influences of GPK propaganda	JUKNIS/04-B/IV/1982	September 10, 1982
Babinsa/TPD activity in promoting and phasing out trained people's resistance forces	JUKNIS/06/IV/1982	September 10, 1982
Established Procedure for razzias in settlement areas	PROTAP/01/VII/1982	July 8, 1982
Established Procedure for interrogation of prisoners	PROTAP/01-B/VII/1982	July 8(?), 1982
Plans for the promotion of trained people's (Ratih) units.	—	September 10, 1982.

1. Although the date is therefore not available, it is clear from references made in the text that this document was issued after August 1982
 2. The reference number makes it clear that this document was issued in 1982.

How to Prevent Contact Between Fretilin and the Community

Military Region Command (Korem) 164 Wira Dharma Intelligence Section

Instruction Manual No: JUKNIS/04-B/IV/1982 Subject: How to Protect the Community from the Influences of GPK Propaganda

[The first two sections of this Manual give a description of how the 'GPK' establishes links with people living in the settlements (pemukiman). This is said to take place when the inhabitants go out to tend their fields; while there, they are contacted by a 'GPK' member known as a Nurep. After several contact meetings like this, a 'GPK support-network' is set up inside the settlement. One specific example is given. In this case, the 'support network' was headed by a primary school pupil. Then, a 'GPK' member deliberately surrendered, became an accepted part of the community, and eventually took command of the 'support network'. The schoolboy then became second-in-command.]

III Ways to protect people from the influences of GPK propaganda

An experience like the above, based on actual fact, must not be allowed to occur again in any settlement or town. In order to prevent this happening, the Kodim, Koramil and in particular the Team Pembina Desa (TPD) and Babinsa must carry out various activities, including:

1. Intensifying control of the population.

Every single activity of the population must be known exactly, in the following ways:

- a. Appoint reliable people as *Katuas* to help neighbourhood chiefs (RT). Arrange it in such a way that each *Katuas* takes responsibility for 10-15 families. Each *katuas* must be able to know exactly the activities of the families under his guidance; for example, when they go to their field, go to collect wood, go to another village, go to tend flocks, go to market and so on.
- b. Appoint an 'informant' in each group of 10-15 families led by one *Katuas*. This informant should be able to follow, secretly, all the activities of these 10-15 families.
- c. Every time anyone goes out of the village, he/she must have a travel pass (*surat jalan*), and every person who comes into the village from another village must report.
- d. Inspection posts must be set up to keep a check on everyone who enters or leaves the village.
- e. Maintain an element of surprise (*pendadakan*) by holding extraordinary roll-calls, or by having check-ups on the population by the *Katuas*, to check whether anyone has left without permission or whether anyone has arrived from another village without reporting.
- f. Take other actions, according to circumstances in each village, for the purpose of intensifying control over the population. For instance, house-to-house visits, and patrols inside the village to prevent illegal meetings from taking place there.

2. Re-arrange the location of gardens and fields of the population.

- a. There should be no gardens or fields of the people located far from the settlement or village.

- b. No garden or field of anyone in the village should be isolated (situated far from the others). Arrange preferably for all the gardens and fields to be close to each other.
- c. When people go to their gardens or fields, no-one should go alone; they should go and return together.

3. Organise patrols round the village.

- a. Organise patrols round the village particularly in the vicinity of the gardens and fields of the people, so as to prevent any meetings between the *Nurep/GPK* and the population.
- b. Go round during the night stealthily, particularly to the people's gardens and fields.
- c. In addition to these patrols, send 'satellites' to places round the village where it is suspected that meetings between *Nurep/GPK* and the population might take place.
- d. Guard the population's gardens and fields from disturbances/thefts/attacks by the GPK.

4. Consolidate Hansip and Ratih.

- a. Get to know the members of Hansip and Raith and their families one by one.
- b. Carry out activities listed in Instruction Manual No. JUKNIS/06/IV/1982, April 2, 1982 regarding the activities of the Babinsa/TPD in promoting and phasing out trained people's resistance forces, under point 9 c.2, namely:
 - (i) by establishing a high standard of discipline, like the discipline in ABRI:
 - (ii) give constant indoctrination to establish consciousness regarding the need to defend the state and prevent infiltration of negative influences from GPK remnants. Explain that everything the GPK says is untrue. This will ensure that Hansip and Raith are not influenced by their propaganda.
 - (iii) Keep strict control of weapons.
 - (iv) Re-check so as to make sure that there are no GPK sympathisers among members of the Hansip and Raith.
 - (v) Appoint those of their leaders (Ru, Ton, and Ki commanders) who can be one hundred per cent trusted by us.
 - (vi) Show appreciation to those who have achievements to their credit.
- c. Provide opportunities for Hansip and Ratih to rest, so as to give them a chance to tend a garden or field.
- d. Provide them with the opportunity for recreation, such as sports and so on.

5. Organise information work to neutralise GPK propaganda.

- a. Kodim will try to send information consisting of community leaders and ex-GPK people who are now helping us, to provide information in the village, to explain that all the GPK propaganda is untrue.
- b. In addition, efforts will be made to send films showing the government's efforts to develop East Timor.
- c. Efforts will also be made to provide a Map of Indonesia, showing East Timor located in the territory of Indonesia.

- d. Whilst waiting for the above three points to materialise, each Babinsa/TPD will give information to Hansip and Ratih members, to the ex-GPK in the village, as well as to the inhabitants. The ways to do this include:
- (i) Supply information about the things that are to be explained to community leaders and ex-GPK who are now helping us. For example:
 - That GPK propaganda is untrue.
 - That the government, together with the entire people of East Timor, is now trying hard to develop East Timor so that the living conditions of the community improve.
 - (ii) Train community leaders and ex-GPK to become information experts, and get them to explain these matters in the presence of an interpreter who can be trusted.
 - (iii) Gather the people together and instruct this information person to give a talk, and instruct the interpreter to check that the person says the right things.
 - (iv) Besides giving direct information in this way, carry out indirect information work by giving people who can be trusted the task of making home visits to the people of the village.
 - (v) Give the best possible 'guidance' to those ex-GPK people who have come down from the bush:
 - keep them under special supervision;
 - give them things to do to keep them busy;
 - consider their living circumstances so that they get a better picture of life; for instance, consider providing them with a home, a garden or field, and so on.
 - hold frequent discussions with them to fill their minds with the correctness of integration, so as to eliminate any remaining ideas from the time they were in the bush.
 - tell them about the efforts being made by their comrades still in the bush to influence them, so that they remain vigilant and don't allow themselves to be influenced.

IV Conclusion

This Instruction Manual is issued to complement earlier Manuals, particularly regarding territorial intelligence. Because the Babinsa and TPD are the most 'advanced' territorial element, the success or otherwise of our efforts to protect people from the influence of GPK propaganda depends to a very great extent upon these Babinsa and TPD. Therefore, these instructions must be implemented as well as possible.


All success to you in the performance of your duty, because God is on our side.

Issued in Dili, on 10th September 1982

Intelligence Officer
Williem da Costa
Infantry Major No. 24293

Glossary

ABRI/TNI:	Indonesian Armed Forces/Indonesian Army.
Babinsa:	<i>Badan pembinaan desa</i> , or village 'guidance' body; formally, a branch of civilian authority but in East Timor the post is invariably occupied by military personnel. As the documents show, <i>babinsa</i> is directly subject to army instructions.
Ba Intel:	Intelligence Agency (military).
Bater:	Territorial Agency (military).
Binpolda:	Not clear. The 'pol' indicates it is part of the police force.
Cernak:	A term used in the resistance military structure, according to these documents.
GPK:	<i>Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan</i> or 'security-disruption gangs', the term officially used for Fretilin, the East Timor resistance movement.
Hansip:	Civil guard.
Katuas:	People appointed to supervise groups of families; they are presumably 'trustworthy' Timorese.
Kecamatan:	Sub-district administrative unit. The term is also used for the administrative centre of the Kecamatan.
Kodim:	Military District Command. A sub-division of military command, immediately under <i>Korem</i> , which stands for Military Resort Command. East Timor is <i>Korem 1628</i> , a military sector of the Udayana Military Command, based in Den Pasar.
Koramil:	Military Rayon Command, the commands under the Kodim.
Liurai:	Timorese traditional chieftain.
Nurep:	According to these documents, the contact persons between the resistance and the population living in Indonesian-occupied territory. The derivation of this word is not clear from the documents.
Ratih:	Trained people's units (of Timorese), which are apparently to replace the <i>Hansip</i> .
Ru-Ton-Ki:	Military sub-units in Fretilin's command structure, according to these documents.
Satgas Intel:	Special Tasks Intelligence Unit.
TBO:	<i>Tenaga Bantuan Operasi</i> , apparently auxiliary operational units, consisting of Timorese.
Team Pembina Desa (TPD):	Village 'Guidance' Team.
Wanra:	Another term used for Hansip, derived from 'sukarelawan rakyat' meaning 'people's volunteers'.
Yon 745:	Battalion 745, one of the battalions that has regularly operated in East Timor.



Legend: *laporan* = report
surat jalan = travel pass
kebun = garden

desa lain = another village
mengembala = tending flocks

How to Win the War in the Villages

Military Resort Command (Korem) 164 Wira Dharma Intelligence Section

Instruction Manual No: JUKNIS/01-A/IV/1982
Subject: The Village as Focal Point of Attention
and How to 'Guide' it Comprehensively

I Introduction

[This first section explains the necessity for abandoning the previous approach and adopting the one outlined below.]

II Why the village as the focal point of attention?

A previous instruction manual has explained how the remaining GPK are trying to "wrest control of the village" by establishing support networks via the Nurep. Conversely, we too are trying to gain control of the village via the Babinsa, so as to immunise it against such GPK influence. In other words, every village will become the object of a contest (*perebutan*) between ourselves and the GPK—and whoever wins that will also win the guerilla/anti-guerilla war.

That is why every level of the territorial apparatus must focus its attention upon the village in this way. This is why Team Pembina Desa (TPD) have lately been sent into those villages specially thought to be troublesome (*rawan*).

How to 'guide' the village comprehensively

By "comprehensively" is meant knowing the village inside-out, in its entirety—its conditions, problems faced by its inhabitants—and also 'guiding' it in the sense of painting a better picture of life.

Activities to be carried out for this purpose:

1. Looking at the "inner workings" (*isi perut*) of every village:
Instruction Manual No. JUKNIS/01/XI/1981, of 15-11-1981 concerning the keeping of a book for the Babinsa's data and events, explains that in order to know a village well, it is essential to have data and notes on events within the village. These include:

- a. Sketch map of the old village (pre-upheaval).
- b. Sketch map of the present village;
- c. Village security system.
- d. Genealogy of the chieftain.
- e. List of village government officials.
- f. List of catechists.
- g. List of other community figures.
- h. Others (refer to the above-mentioned manual).

It is not only the Babinsa who needs to have such data, but also the Koramil and Kodim. Thus every level of the territorial apparatus will know for certain the inner workings of the villages.

Example of looking at the inner workings of Bualale village:

- a. Bualale consists of two kampung, Lia Lura and Ossomeca. In the time of the Portuguese, the inhabitants were spread between the two kampung. With the upheavals, they fled into the bush. Once they had returned, they were resettled in the present location—the kecamatan town of Quelicai—in May 1979. But this led to their being unable to grow food on their own land, so that food shortages have occurred. Thus efforts are currently being made to get the people back to their original lands—about 4km. to the south of Quelicai—as part of a settlement programme of 30 villages.

- b. Bualale is the native village of the GPK figure David Alex (Commander of Ki-II Red Brigade), and thus has always been an area in which he operates. Moreover the area is extremely fertile—another reason for the move back to the original lands. While the people will be able to grow food, thus preventing further shortages, the move will also cut down the GPK's area of operations, especially that of the David Alex group.
- c. Inhabitants number 413: 206 male, 207 female.
- d. Those of the village still in the bush number 15, including David Alex.
- e. Of relatives of villagers still in the bush:
 - i. 13 have been sent to Atauro
 - ii. 2 have not yet been sent
 - iii. None have yet returned.
- f. Ex-GPK's currently living in the village number 17 persons.
- g. The former kepala desa (village head), Francisco Freitas, is at present in Buibao, while the new one, Bartolomeus, carries a fair amount of authority with the inhabitants and is assisting the operation for the restoration of security.
- h. Apart from the kepala desa, there are two community figures with quite a lot of influence, i.e. a religious teacher (catechist) and an elder. If they are properly 'guided', they should both be very useful.
- i. The people's participation in security and development is fairly good, even though it is believed that there is still a GPK support network, either because they are afraid, are being forced, or for other reasons.
- j. Hansip/Wanra strength stands at 10 persons with 7 weapons.
- k. A Ratih of one squad with 10 weapons has been set up.
- l. There are four Hansip/Wanra/Ratih widows requiring special attention.
- m. The number of people outside Hansip/Wanra/Ratih who could be mobilised at any time is 50.
- n. Additional data which could be compiled and which would essentially depict the condition of the village.

2. Identifying problems faced by the villagers:

Bring together the local community figures—kepala desa, kepala kampung, teachers and any other influential figures—and invite them to discussions identifying the problems the community faces in security and/or development. The results of such discussions will complete the picture of the village's inner workings obtained from the earlier data.

This kind of discussion should be carried out not only by the Babinsa/TPD, but also by Koramil and Kodim when they go to the village. Thus each level will really get to know the conditions and problems faced by the village concerned.

These discussions are most important, so that 'guidance' plans really accord with the needs of the local people. We often have plans which are in our own opinion good, but what is good for us is not necessarily good for the local people. That is why the opinions of the local community figures have to be listened to. If a plan is drawn up jointly, the easier its subsequent implementation will be, because the people will feel they have been involved.

*In addition to the basic meaning of guiding, "membina" in Indonesian carries a strong sense of moulding, shaping—as with figures from clay. Hence the quotation marks used throughout these translations.

On Torture, and How to Keep it Secret

Military Region Command XVI Udayana Military Resort Command (Korem) 164 Wira Dharma

Established Procedure No. PROTAP/01-B/VII/1982
Subject: Method of Interrogating Prisoners

[The first four sections of this document set out the reasons why prisoners need to be interrogated, namely in order to obtain information about the whereabouts and methods of operation of the people fighting in the bush.]

V Things that must be avoided

11. To prevent the collection of inaccurate information through interrogations, there follows an account of some things that must be avoided during the course of interrogations.

- forcing the wishes of the interrogator;
- the use of violence and threats
- drawing conclusions too hastily.

12. Forcing the wishes of the interrogator

A frequent mistake committed by interrogators is that, at the very start of the interrogation, the interrogator has already placed the person being interrogated in the position of being guilty. And consequently every question asked by the interrogator only remains to be answered, yes or no.

Such methods must stop since the person being interrogated is (not) given the chance to speak freely because all the questions are loaded, meaning that if he says anything else, no notice will be taken, especially if such questioning is accompanied by violence.

13. The use of violence and threats.

Hopefully, interrogation accompanied by the use of violence will not take place except in certain circumstances when the person being interrogated is having difficulty telling the truth (gives evasive replies).

continued from opposite page

Example of conducting a discussion:

Bring up a few points, e.g. How do the community figures think security could soonest be restored? What do they think could be done to deprive the GDK of local assistance? What do they think is the best way to get remaining GDK back in from the bush? What type of development do they think the village needs?

A variety of questions like these will produce opinions we had not previously thought of. If these are parallel to our planned operations, so much the better, and we can go ahead as planned. If not, eg. if they request the return of relatives from Atauro, then we will have to explain once again the reasons for their relatives' having been removed to Atauro.

3. Drawing up 'guidance' plans:

Based on the outcome of the aforementioned discussions, draw up a good 'guidance' plan dealing with security and/or development. Because such a plan is the result of consultation, it will obviously gain the people's support in its implementation. In this way the people will not just feel that they are being dictated to. A plan of this type must basically paint a better picture of life for the people.

4. Carry out evaluation (reassessment):

Once a plan has been implemented, carry out reassessment. Have things gone as planned? What were the shortcomings, what was the outcome? etc. This is important as source material for further planning.

If it proves necessary to use violence, make sure that there are no people around (members of TBO, Hansip, Ratih or other people) to see what is happening, so as not to arouse people's antipathy. The use of violence often results in the person under interrogation being forced to admit guilt because of fear, and thereafter he/she will just comply with all the wishes of the interrogator. Avoid taking photographs showing torture in progress (people being photographed at times when they are being subjected to electric current, when they have been stripped naked, etc). Remember not to have such photographic documentation developed outside/Den Pasar which could then be made available to the public by irresponsible elements.

It is better to make attractive photographs, such as shots taken while eating together with the prisoner, or shaking hands with those who have just come down from the bush, showing them in front of a house, and so on. If such photos are circulated in the bush, this is a classic way of assuredly undermining their morale and fighting spirits. And if such photos are shown to the priests, this can draw the church into supporting operations to restore security.

14. Drawing conclusions too hastily.

Interrogators must not draw hasty conclusions about the results of the interrogation. If necessary the interrogation should be repeated over and over again using a variety of questions so that, eventually, the correct conclusion can be drawn from all these different replies.

[After another two sections, this Established Procedure concludes.]

Issued in Dili on (date not legible) July, 1982


Commander:

A. Sahala Rajagukguk.
Infantry Colonel, index number 18805.

III Village control command must also be comprehensive.

There may be a variety of officials in the village, eg. Babinsa and Binpolda; members of Yon 745 charged with 'guiding' the Ratih; Bater from other units; Ba Intel from the Satgas Intel or other units, and the Team Pembina Desa. All these officials must be able to coordinate so as to form a "comprehensvie team".

[The remainder of the text sets out rules prescribing seniority in the appointment of team commander.]



How to Raid Villages Before, During and After Armed Operations Against Fretilin

XVIth Military Region Command Udayana Military Resort Command 164/WIRA DHARMA

Established Procedure No. PROTAP/01-A/VII/1982
Subject: Procedure for Razzias on Settlement Areas

[The first two sections explain how 'GPK' guerillas have succeeded in past operations to avoid capture by relying on support networks within the community, by obtaining sanctuary in villages and by merging with the population.]

III Techniques for dealing with the GPK

9. General

In dealing with the guerillas, the best thing is to wage anti guerilla operations in which the basic activity is aimed at separating the guerillas from the People supporting them.

In order to separate the GPK from the People supporting them, one way is to guard against or prevent the GPK from entering settlement areas to hide. A good way of dealing with their efforts to hide in settlement areas is to conduct razzias on kp [kampung?], and these razzias can be conducted by:

- Conducting repeated razzias but at irregular intervals (irregular razzias).
- Conducting razzias in settlement areas located in the vicinity where the target for an *Operasi Kikis* (Eradication Operation) is located.
- Conducting razzias in kp (kampung?) which lie close to the place where armed contact occurs.

10. Irregular razzias

By irregular razzias is meant conducting razzias suddenly and not according to a fixed time schedule, and conducting razzias on targets that have not been fixed in advance. These razzias can be conducted as follows:

a. *Partial method*

Conducted against villages one by one, in turn.

Example: In Quiliqai kecamatan there are seven villages of which four are suspected as hiding places for the GPK. Razzias can be conducted against each of these four villages in turn and at irregular times.

b. *Simultaneous method*

Conducted simultaneously against all the villages in a kecamatan which are suspected as hiding places for the GPK, with the objective of ensuring that the GPK is not able to move from one place to another while the razzia is in progress.

11. Razzias conducted whilst an *Operasi Kikis* is in progress
In conducting a razzia of this kind, it is hoped that the GPK will not be able to hide in villages in the area which is the target of the *Operasi Kikis*.

12. Razzias in villages near the location of an enemy attack
This razzia is conducted after the GPK has waged an attack against a patrol (convoy) of ours, in cases where this attack was launch close to kampungs that can be used as hiding places. The purpose of this kind of razzia is to cut off the GPK's line of retreat.

13. Razzia techniques

In order to secure the maximum results, the following techniques can be used in conducting razzias:

- The units which are to conduct the razzia should be taken from those troops not involved in the *Operasi (Kikis)*.
- The razzia plan should be known only to the Regional Unit Commander and the Intelligence Operation Staff Officer so that the plan does not leak to the community.
- If the razzia takes place at night, all the people are ordered not to leave their homes while the razzia is in progress; anyone who goes out of a house is regarded as being a GPK who is trying to run away.
- If the razzia takes place in the daytime, all the men and women are gathered in one place to listen to a lecture whilst officers conduct the razzia by entering the homes where the razzia is taking place. Steps should be taken to prevent people's property from being lost as a result of the razzia; if property is lost, this can be used by the enemy and their supporters for propaganda purposes.
- While the razzia is in progress, people are not allowed to enter or leave the settlement. Anyone moving around will be regarded as the enemy.
- Place patrol posts round the settlement in question, particularly at night.


14. Other techniques

Another method for conducting a razzia in a kampung is for the kampung in question to be encircled first, particularly closing off the roads leading into and out of the kampung, and thereafter the razzia is conducted only against those houses that are under suspicion.

[This Established Procedure concludes with a further seven points regarding the need for tight cooperation between the fighting units, and some administrative rules.]

Razia dilaksanakan secara serentak didesa-desa

Legend: *Razia dilaksanakan secara serentak didesa-desa* = simultaneous razzias on villages
desa = village
SAS OPS KIKIS = target of eradication operation.



LBH chairman speaks out on death squads

The following interview of Adnan Buyung Nasution, chairman of the Foundation of Legal Aid Institutes (LBH), carried out in Holland on 4th June by Liem S. L. of the Indonesian Movement for Basic Human Rights and Democracy, and Willy van Rooijen, of Onze Wereld, has been made available for publication by TAPOL.

During your last visit here last November, you mentioned killings in E. Java. But for most people these current killings have appeared out of the blue. Is that true? Can you explain the situation?

The current killings started in Jogjakarta almost two months ago, when the commanding officer of the military garrison launched a military operation against so-called criminals. It was publicly and officially announced that this operation had started, and then, every day people were picked up, taken from their homes or wherever they happened to be at the time — in the market, on the street — and were later found dead. Bodies were left lying in the streets or thrown into the river; then later, a report would appear that a body had been found and that on checking, it was confirmed that it was a criminal who had been caught and shot trying to run away or for attacking the authorities. This kind of thing was happening every day.

We protested about this but the killings continued. Then later on, the army commander of the whole of Java (the KOWILHAN commander, General Yogie Memet) announced that the operation had been very successful and he was therefore planning to extend it all over Indonesia. I took that statement as being firstly a reaction to our criticism, but then also it revealed a determination by the authorities to continue these actions. So we protested again and put out another statement; we called on others to support us.

But the shocking thing was that, a couple of weeks after the general's statement, we realised that the same kind of operation had been launched in Jakarta, and was already in progress. The difference is that whereas in Jogjakarta, the military authorities

had officially announced the operation and given it a name, in Jakarta, it was a silent operation, with no name and without any statement being made.

What is the name of the operation?

The 'operation to clean up criminals' or 'to combat criminality'. (*Operasi Penanggulangan Banditisme*). In Jakarta, they didn't give it a name nor did they even announce it, but I heard from reliable sources that oral instructions had been given to operate in the same way as in Jogjakarta.

It is quite obvious from your explanations that the military are directly involved in the killings. What kind of people perpetrate the killings? What kind of squads?

We have heard that they are special squads. They are not ordinary militarymen or policemen but people who have been given what they call anti-terrorist training.

Are they part of the Armed Forces?

Yes, but they are special troops who have been trained for special tasks. This operation is apparently the first task they have been given, which is why we believe it is a kind of exercise for them. They have chosen criminals as their victims which makes the whole thing a popular action, something that people can support. It makes me very sad to see that people don't realise the impact of these actions. The man on the street feels pleased because quick and resolute action is being taken.



Lieutenant-General Yogie Suardi Memet, newly-appointed Commander of KOWILHAN II (Java and Madura):

"It is highly likely that the Operation to Combat Criminality which is still in force in Jogjakarta, will be extended to other cities

within the territory of my KOWILHAN. The operation, which is of great significance, is in the hands of the Jogjakarta garrison." Pointing out that there had been a marked fall in the number of crimes since the operation was launched, he said: "The aim of the operation is to create an atmosphere of calm in society, which is why it's not a bad idea to launch it in other cities." (Kompas, 29th April, 1983)

★★★

Lieutenant-General Yogie S. Memet took over as Commander of KOWILHAN II in February, just two months before the death squad operation was launched in Jogjakarta.

Prior to his recent appointment, he spent eleven years in top command positions in KOPASSANDHA, (Komando Pasukan Sandi Yudha), the paratroop command formerly known as the RPKAD, the "red berets". He was Deputy Commander for nearly four years, then Commander for another seven. While Commander of KOPASSANDHA he was for several years concurrently commander of the VIth (West Java) Siliwangi Division.


Speaking with great enthusiasm of the years he spent in KOPASSANDHA, he said that it stood at the very pinnacle of the Indonesian army. "KOPASSANDHA

troops function at a particularly high level of discipline, they create no fuss and never complain. To serve with such a troop, you need a strong nerve, a great deal of skill and a lot of advanced scientific knowledge, as well as having first-rate physique, spirit and morale."

★★★



General Ali Said, Minister of Justice: "It is better to have a hundred dead criminals than a hundred thousand anxious citizens."



Buyung Nasution

And how are these actions being carried out in practice?

Even worse in Jakarta than in Jogjakarta. In Jakarta they pick people up sometimes during the day but also sometimes at night. Those picked up during the day are taken to quiet streets or to places which are not very crowded. Then they beat the man up and shoot him. Many eye-witnesses who have seen the killings have said that they are carried out in a very demonstrative way, in public, without due process of the law.

I have heard that the LBH has set up a task force to investigate all these cases. Can you tell us more about that?

We heard that these things were happening in Jakarta and we also read about them in the press. Every morning, newspapers were reporting that bodies had been found, that people had been shot dead by unknown persons. The way the cases were reported in the press showed that they were prepared statements using similar language: a body had been found, killed by an unknown assailant and after checking, it had been discovered that it was a body of a criminal or recidivist being sought by the police who was shot as he tried to escape or because he attacked the military authorities.

Why do you think the operation took on such a demonstrative character?

In the first place, I think that there has been a steady rise in crime, not only in quantity but also in quality. It is also a fact that our law enforcement agencies, the police, haven't been able to cope with the situation. This is an embarrassment for the government because it is a challenge to its authority, and means that it is not able to maintain law and order or safeguard people's security. Yet, the former commander of KOPKAMTIB, Admiral Sudomo said repeatedly that Indonesia is the safest country in the world. Yet what is now happening is different; the rate of crime has risen. I think this might be a kind of desperation being felt by

some people in the army who want to show that the army still exists and is determined to clean up the criminals and emerge once again as the hero and protector of society. That can be the motive, but naturally we don't agree that such extreme measures are taken, that people can be simply bumped off like that. These killings are the beginning of a series of arbitrary actions by the authorities who think they can do whatever they like even if it goes against the principle of law as long as it is done for the sake of preserving their authority. It is very important to understand this way of thinking. They want to show that they have the right, the complete right to take people's lives if these people are regarded as a threat, or as something that undermines their authority.

So the question must now be, who next?

Yes, that's what I'm getting at. If we tolerate their actions this time because it so happens that their chosen victims are criminals — mind you, they are not all criminals — then it is only a question of time before they decide to pick on, say, political dissidents or political opponents, or anyone they dislike.

My second point about the reasons for their operation is that these actions create a precedent which can develop into a culture of violence. Those in power want society to accept the values of violence as a means, they want to teach people to accept violence as a norm or a value-system. Once society accepts this, we can get nowhere.

You said just now that criminality has increased not only in quantity but also in quality. The crime rate is surely linked with poverty. The latest devaluation has placed poor people in a very bad situation, and it's quite logical for crime to increase in such circumstances. Why do the authorities never mention this and deal with crime as a symptom?

It's that which brings me to my third point. If you talk about the crime rate and the little people involved, I think they are only the victims of a system of injustice, the product of injustice that has been going on for years, particularly after the various devaluations. Living standards have deteriorated, and all those in power want to do is wash their hands by killing these people. And besides, if we talk about criminality as a disease or threat to society, we can also ask: who is it who should be wiped out first, the little people or the large-scale corruptors who are a far greater threat not only to the economy but to the whole nation. But nothing is being done about these people; again it's the little people who have been chosen as the victims.

Are the criminals who are being picked up people who operate individually or are they involved in gangs?

There is no evidence that they are organised in gangs.

Your colleague Abdulrachman Saleh of the LBH was reported by AFP as saying that he didn't see any ties between these operations and political activities.

Yet, as yet there is no evidence of any political motivation (on the side of the authorities) but nobody knows about the future. The fact is that the operations that took place last year against bandits in East Java were directed not only against bandits but also against Muslim leaders.

Can you tell us more about that?

That operation took place last year. It was directed against bandits who rob people's homes, and it later developed into killings of informal leaders in the villages. We received reports at the time but we couldn't establish any facts because all we had was hearsay evidence. The problem was that when we sent people out to collect evidence, nobody dared to speak up, they were so afraid. Also, the news reached us very late and the killings were not so conspicuously carried out. The killings occurred in remote places, not like now in urban regions. The impact was different.

Volkskrant quotes General Benny Murdani as saying that these operations against bandits are good because Indonesia is now promoting tourism and they make Indonesia a safe country. What

is your comment?

That just shows that these people have not the slightest idea what the rule of law means. All I can say is that generals, soldiers, are used to thinking that the end justifies the means.

Is there any attempt by the authorities to justify the killings within any legal framework? They haven't declared a state of emergency, have they?

There are absolutely no legal grounds whatsoever for these barbaric killings. They have never mentioned any legal basis. They haven't even thought of it.

You once referred to this kind of thing as 'the arrogance of power'.

Yes, indeed, the arrogance of power. It is a fascist way of thinking which is very dangerous. It's a pattern of thinking that I really hate because people in power who think like that can do anything without the slightest regard for human life.

There is another thing I'd like to stress: these killings also violate our new Procedural Code (KUHAP) enacted in 1981. The adoption of that Law was a masterly achievement, the result of a twenty-year struggle, a great step forward in our fight for human rights. But these new developments show that some people in authority have no intention of applying this Code, they have absolutely no respect for it. They are dealing with things in their own way, by killing people. The Code says that no-one may be arrested without a warrant, and when arrested, people should be interrogated fairly, in accordance with the principles of justice and human rights, then tried in a free, impartial court. But now, these principles seem to have no value at all. At the very least we can say there is hypocrisy in the regime: on the one hand, they have taken steps to improve the law and human rights but on the other hand, they go around killing people.

Prisma

*Indonesian Journal of Social
and Economic Affairs*

Social sciences monthly rebuked

The following letter was sent to the editors of the leading social sciences journal *Prisma*, by an official of the Indonesian Department of Information on 2nd March, 1983:

After examining several issues of *Prisma* sent to the Department of Information as samples, some things were discovered which in our opinion, should have your serious attention. In a series on LEADERS, certain leaders are discussed such as Amir Syarifuddin, Aidit and Cornel Simanjuntak. In our opinion, giving the limelight to these people is a form of Communist Political Struggle so as to encourage the public, through the pages of *Prisma*, to accept once again the presence of the PKI in society or endeavouring to revive the PKI in Indonesia. The *Prisma* issues in question are:

1. *Prisma* No.2, February 1982 containing an article entitled "*Cornel Simanjuntak Cahaya Datanglah*" written by Hersri S.
2. *Prisma* No.5 containing an article entitled: "*S.M. Kartosuwiryo, Orang Seiring Bertukar Jalan*", written by Hersri S. and Joebar Ajoeb. These writers are former PKI political prisoners from Buru Island.
3. *Prisma* No.7, July 1982 containing an article entitled "*Aidit dan Partai Pada Tahun 1950*" written by Jacques Leclerc.

Report or be shot

People in Jogjakarta who are regarded as being *gali-gali* now have only two choices: to be shot dead on the spot or to report regularly to their local military commands. So far, 450 are now under obligatory reporting requirements in the city whereas a total of sixty have been shot dead. "They must continue to report until we decide that they have reformed," said Lieutenant-Colonel M. Hasbi, commander of the Jogjakarta Garrison.

The 'lighter' cases are required to report to their local *Koramil* whilst the 'heavier' cases must report to their *Kodim*. Artidjo Alkostar, a lawyer and director of the Jogjakarta Legal Aid Institute, who is acting on behalf of one of the 'heavier' cases, has protested publicly that his client is deadly scared of leaving his home for a single moment for fear of being shot at. A colleague of his was shot dead recently while out at work simply because he had missed a day's reporting.

When people present themselves for the first time to a military command, they are required to answer questions, recording the names of their family and relatives as well as their friends. They are also required to sign a statement pledging not to engage in crime, and declaring: "If I violate this pledge, I am willing to have firm action taken against me by the (state) apparatus".

Does 'firm action' include being shot dead, asked Artidjo Alkostar, in an interview with *Tempo*. When the question was raised with the garrison commander he said: "That's for us to decide. If anyone starts anything, they'll soon see what we mean by firm action". Nor would Lt-Col. Hasbi explain the army's criteria for deciding which cases are 'heavy' and which are 'light'. "That's our business."

But whatever people say, reports *Tempo*, the army in Jogjakarta will continue with its policy. "We can be thankful," said Lt-Col. Hasbi, "that security was well kept both before and after the recent eclipse of the sun". (The eclipse was a major attraction for tourists from all parts of the world.)

Source: *Tempo*, 25th June, 1983

4. *Prisma* No.8, September 1982, containing an article entitled "*Oerip Soemohardjo Kebungkaman Yang Ampuh*" written by S.I. Poeradisastira.

5. *Prisma* No.12, December 1982, written by Jacques Leclerc. Publication of the above articles is in conflict with MPRS decisions No. XXV. . . (etc, etc) concerning "Dissolution of the Indonesian Communist Party and its Declaration as a Prohibited Organisation throughout the territory of the Republic of Indonesia and Prohibition of all activities to spread and develop Communist/Marxist/Leninist Ideas or Teachings".

In relation to Law No.21, 1982 revising Law No.11, 1966 on Basic Provisions for the Press, the aforesaid articles can be considered to be leading towards spreading Communist teachings, which can result in action being taken to close down your journal.

We hope that *Prisma* will be more careful in future and will avoid publishing such articles. We shall be grateful for your attention.

Director for Journalistic Guidance
Drs Daan S. Sahusilawane.

MUNIR'S SUPREME COURT APPEAL NEVER HEARD

Mohammed Munir who was chairman of the National Council of SOBSI, the All-Indonesia Federation of Labour until it was banned in 1965, and who is now under sentence of death, lost his chance to appeal to the Supreme Court because the time for doing so was said to have 'lapsed'. The last remaining chance for his sentence to be commuted now rests with a plea for clemency to President Suharto. The report in *TAPOL* Bulletin No 57 that the Supreme Court had turned down his appeal was incorrect.)

Indonesia negotiates with Fretilin

On the initiative of Indonesia, negotiations were held in East Timor with Fretilin in March this year. The first talks were held on 21st March when three Indonesian officials — two army officers including the East Timor intelligence chief, and the Timorese governor Mario Carrascalao — met the Fretilin commander Xanana. Two days later, the talks were resumed. This time, Indonesia was represented by its senior military officer in East Timor, Colonel Purwanto.

The venue for the talks was Lari Guto, near Ossu, a village in the southern part of central East Timor, which is Fretilin-controlled territory. An Indonesian proposal that the talks should take place at their Baucau air-base, with Fretilin forces being allowed to hold Indonesian officers as hostages, was turned down. Fretilin's counter-proposal was accepted.

Agreement for a ceasefire was reached at the talks, and Fretilin apparently accepted Indonesian offers to transport sick and wounded guerillas to Dili for treatment, and to provide food, clothing and medicines to Fretilin forces in the bush. Xanana handed Purwanto a letter for President Suharto containing Fretilin's demands. As set forth in a Fretilin publication issued in Gusmao Xanana, commander of Fretilin's armed forces



Lisbon in June, these are:

1. The unconditional withdrawal of the Indonesian occupying forces from East Timor.
2. The entry of a United Nations peace-keeping force.
3. The holding of free consultations with the people of East Timor.
4. The maintaining of Falintil (the resistance armed forces) in the mountains in order to keep the people free from any pressure.

Xanana's condition for the resumption of talks with Indonesia was that Indonesia should officially inform the UN of the ceasefire.

Indonesia denies agreeing to a ceasefire

News that negotiations had taken place first broke in an AFP report from Jakarta on 10th June. Several weeks later, Fretilin representatives abroad announced that they had received photographs and tapes of the negotiations. At the same time, Mgr Martinhu da Costa Lopez, former Bishop of Dili who is now in

Lisbon, stated that the Indonesians had failed to honour an undertaking to publicise the ceasefire agreement internationally. This was denied by chief of Armed Forces Intelligence, Major-General Subiyakto (recently appointed director of the National Defence Academy) who claimed that no concessions had been given to Fretilin and that the term ceasefire could not be used since "Indonesia is not involved in any war against an enemy". Nor was there any question of the UN being informed since Indonesia regards East Timor as "an internal affair".

Shortly afterwards, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja took over as official spokesman and said that talks had been held but they were concerned solely with the question of an amnesty. "We have offered them a total amnesty," he declared. (TAPOL Bulletin readers will be well aware of what has happened in the past to Fretilin fighters who surrender to the Indonesian forces.)

Mochtar has made no effort to deny the validity of the photos and tapes published or mentioned by Fretilin, which according to Fretilin confirm that a ceasefire agreement was concluded.

Why did Indonesia initiate the talks?

What are the motives behind Indonesia's negotiation initiative? There can be no doubt that Fretilin's military operations have greatly intensified since last year. In a message sent out late last year (see TAPOL Bulletin No.55, January 1983), Xanana announced that Fretilin now has 6,800 people under arms, reorganised under a Revolutionary Council of National Resistance. According to one source, the most recent Fretilin offensive was launched in February this year when a large troop of guerrillas temporarily occupied five villages (Chris Huinder, in *De Groene Amsterdammer*, 29 June 1983).


However, it should also be noted that Indonesia's new negotiation initiative was taken two weeks after March 5th, the day on which the Australian Labour Party took office in Canberra. That government is bound by a policy of full support for E. Timor's right to self-determination, a policy which implicitly means de-recognition of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor.

Since the news of the negotiations broke in June, news commentators in Australia have concluded that Foreign Minister Bill Hayden must have been informed of the new development when he visited Indonesia in April. In any case, writes one commentator, Australian intelligence services would certainly have intercepted messages that were being relayed between Dili and Jakarta at the time of the talks. Some commentators have therefore drawn the conclusion that this was the "changed situation" to which Bob Hawke referred during his June visit to Jakarta, which at the time seemed to have no basis in fact. (He argued then that his government could depart from ALP policy because conditions had changed since the policy was adopted in July last year.)

The past and coming months up to October are decisive for the East Timor resolution at this year's UN General Assembly. The resolution passed by a narrow majority (50 to 46, with 50 abstentions) last year. A decision by the Australian government to stand by ALP policy and switch from opposing to supporting the resolution would put back Indonesia's strenuous efforts to have the resolution removed from the agenda. The Indonesian government obviously calculates that an atmosphere of negotiations will undermine support for East Timor and

Stop Press

An unofficial report received as we were going to press suggested that fighting had been resumed in the eastern part of E. Timor.



Indonesian military commander, Colonel Purwanto, with Gusmao Xanana, on March 23, 1983.

strengthen Indonesia's claim that the question of East Timor can be resolved 'internally'. Indeed, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (14 July 1983) quoted Foreign Minister Mochtar as saying that the talks were "aimed at pre-empting any foreign involvement in the settlement of the dispute".

There are signs already that the Indonesian ploy is bearing fruit. Ken Fry, ALP Member of Parliament, who a few weeks earlier was expressing confidence that the parliamentary Labour Party would support moves to hold the Hawke government to the party's policy on East Timor, has now said that reports about the talks had been a setback for these efforts; he expressed doubts whether there would be enough members even to raise the issue in Caucus. (*The Australian*, 1 July 1983).

Indonesia's 'Smiling Policy'

Indonesia's decision to initiate negotiations is aimed at achieving two objectives: to undermine international lobbying in East Timor's favour so as to knock the question off the UN General Assembly this year, and to extricate itself from a hard-pressed military situation inside East Timor. Certainly, operations to send in supplies for the guerrillas and to ferry out wounded resistance fighters must be giving them useful information about Falintil's positions.

In West Papua, Indonesian troops have several times offered talks with resistance leaders — the Mandatjan brothers in the 1960s, and Martin Tabu in 1980 — only to betray and murder them. Since the stakes were so high in this case, there was no immediate threat to the lives of Xanana and the other Falintil leaders who met Purwanto in March. But the longterm effects of

the 'smiling policy' could be far more devastating. One thing is clear: whatever talks may be taking place, efforts internationally to increase support for East Timor at the UN must continue, while at the same time warning everyone concerned of the pitfalls of Indonesia's 'smiling' strategy.

Carmel Budiardjo

Catholic institute prevented from visiting E. Timor

The London-based Catholic Institute of International Relations (CIIR) which early last year was invited by the Indonesian Embassy in London to send a mission to East Timor, has now been prevented from making the visit. The invitation followed the publication by the CIIR of a *Comment on East Timor*, warmly welcomed in a *Times* editorial, which the Embassy claimed was based on inaccurate information.

In May last year, the CIIR informed the Embassy of its wish to accept the invitation. Preparations to send a team of experts in a variety of fields were started, and the Embassy was kept informed throughout. In addition to a CIIR representative, the team would have included an expert in South East Asian law, experts in health and agriculture in the region, the OXFAM field officer in Indonesia, and linguists familiar with several East Timor languages as well as Portuguese and Indonesian. It would have been accompanied by a television team led by the well known journalist, Jon Snow.

The CIIR kept the Embassy informed throughout that it planned to send the mission in July this year, for a period of at least eleven days with additional days in Jakarta. But the Embassy's invitation was never formally confirmed by Jakarta.

In July this year, with all preparations finalised and the members having set aside time, the Embassy informed the CIIR that the mission would not now be allowed to visit in July, and that a later date, November this year, might be possible. The CIIR regards this as a refusal as the carefully-selected members could not have been requested to rearrange busy schedules again. Nor was the CIIR sure that this time, the invitation would be formally confirmed by Jakarta. In addition, the time suggested was unsuitable, coming in the rainy season when road travel is very difficult and the chances of visiting all parts of the country are very limited.

TAPOL understands that the CIIR, which accepted the Embassy's invitation in good faith and devoted considerable time and effort to organise a well-qualified team, and sent a staff person to Jakarta for consultations with Catholic representatives and with the Centre for Strategic International Studies, very much regrets the lack of cooperation by the Indonesian government. It regards this as evidence that the government is not prepared to allow a team of qualified independent observers to visit East Timor in order to obtain an objective view of conditions there.

Photos recently received from liberated areas of E. Timor



A play in progress



Guerrilla troops

Hawke reneges on ALP's East Timor policy

Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke has already reneged on major aspects of Australian Labour Party policy towards East Timor, and appears to be in the process of abandoning the entire programme unless opposition to this betrayal now developing inside the ALP can force a reversal. (For details of ALP policy on East Timor, adopted in July 1982, please see **TAPOL Bulletin** No.56, March 1983, page 8.)

While on a visit to Jakarta in early June, Prime Minister Hawke announced that Australian defence aid to Indonesia, currently running at about A\$10 million a year, would continue. This violates his party's policy which states that all defence aid to Indonesia should stop until Indonesian occupation troops have been withdrawn from East Timor. He compounded the betrayal by declaring that in the interest of preserving relations with Indonesia "we should put E. Timor behind us".

Furthermore, though ALP policy categorically rejects the previous Australian government's recognition of the Indonesian takeover and supports self-determination for E. Timor, which means supporting the UN resolution on E. Timor, Prime Minister Hawke has refused to commit his government to supporting the UN resolution later this year. (For the past four years, Australia has voted against the resolution, and last year lobbied heavily to pressure Pacific nations to vote with it.) On the resolution, Hawke insists that a final decision on Australia's vote can only be taken after an Australian Parliamentary delegation visits E. Timor in July, when it will be possible to hold an "informed debate" on the issue.

Parliamentary visit seen as a 'concession'

The decision by the Indonesian government to allow an Australian parliamentary delegation to visit E. Timor for three days during a ten-day visit to Indonesia was described by Australia's Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, as a 'concession' won from the Indonesian government during his visit to Jakarta in April. He claimed to have won other concessions, namely agreement to allow Australian Associated Press to set up an office in Jakarta — ending Indonesia's total rejection of the presence of any Australian journalists — and agreement to permit family reunification for Timorese whose families are now in Australia. Thus, the Australian government is trading concessions like these, which in fact are what Indonesia ought to have been doing all along, for ALP policy on the principle of self-determination.

As for the parliamentary delegation's visit to E. Timor, it remains to be seen whether the team will be able to examine actual conditions, especially since Indonesian officials are insisting that this will not be a fact-finding mission. In addition, a

restricted and very brief examination of conditions in E. Timor cannot affect the question of self-determination one way or the other. Whatever the team sees, and it is hardly likely to get a chance to assess Timorese opposition to the Indonesian takeover, the question of E. Timor's right to self-determination remains a matter of principle.

"Assessing the Cost" of ALP policy

Foreign Minister Bill Hayden told a group of E. Timor activists who visited him in June to register their protest at any reversal of ALP policy, that by supporting the UN resolution on East Timor, Australian business interests stand to lose A\$160 million. The Foreign Department had calculated this figure from losses Qantas Airways might suffer if Indonesia went ahead with threats to cancel Qantas flying rights to and through Indonesian air-space. Commercial shipping companies also stand to lose earnings if they are refused permission to sail to or through Indonesian waters.

Gordon Bryant, formerly a minister in the Whitlam government, who was among those on the protest visit to Hayden, described as "provocative" any attempt by Indonesia to pressurise Australia over the way it votes at the UN.

State ALP conferences discuss E. Timor

The moves by Bob Hawke and Bill Hayden to renege on party policy about E. Timor came just as ALP state organisations were about to hold their annual conferences. Under the circumstances, E. Timor has become one of the major issues discussed in these conferences, with South Australia and Victoria vigorously supporting official policy and New South Wales supporting the government.

One of the most outspoken ALP parliamentarians, Ken Fry, a long-standing supporter of self-determination in E. Timor, accused the Labour government of "sacrificing principle for expediency" and warned that the dispute now developing in the party could split it. Another Labour parliamentarian, Senator Gordon McIntosh, who has been named as one of the five to visit E. Timor this month, was angry at suggestions made by PM Hawke that the delegation would return with a report favouring recognition. Senator McIntosh, who is a member of the Senate Inquiry Committee on East Timor, said the new Labour government was in danger of losing international credibility over its about-face. "Do we sweep 200,000 bodies under the carpet and accept Indonesia's idea that we continue this de jure recognition of their occupation?"

Sources: A wide variety of Australian press clippings.



Photos of Indonesian atrocities have just been received from East Timor. See also pages 13 and 16.

ABRI MUST GET OUT OF POLITICS!


A discussion group in Bandung, West Java, which includes a number of former students who led the 1978 movement of protest, issued a statement last year in response to the adoption of the Defence and Security Law passed by Parliament in September. As a political statement, it represents a new departure in outspoken criticism of the military regime. It summarises the step-by-step advance of militarisation and provides a useful guide to the present power structure of the "politician generals".

The statement is now circulating in dissident circles in Indonesia, and has been sent abroad for publication. We reproduce it below, slightly abridged, as an important document on militarisation. The copy of the document received abroad bears altogether 31 signatures.

On 6th September 1982, Parliament adopted a new law on basic provisions of State Defence and Security. The drafting and adoption of this Law took place with unusual haste and secrecy, and without hearing the opinions or proposals of many people. It includes the following provisions:

- The Armed Forces (ABRI) shall be the principal element in the national defence force, and shall at the same time be a social force.
- ABRI shall be in charge of supervising all human and natural resources.
- ABRI shall control the national infra- and super-structures, and shall do this by ensuring and safeguarding the efficient use of the mental and material infrastructure.
- As the President's assistant in charge of implementing the "People's Defence Strategy" (HANRARI), the Minister of Defence shall determine the policy for implementing ABRI's rôle as a social force.
- Working in collaboration with all other government departments, the Defence Department shall formulate and implement the HANRARI strategy in accordance with the policy already formulated.
- The Commander-in-Chief of ABRI shall be the President's assistant in exercising the powers of command of HANRARI.
- ABRI shall be a political force, supervising social forces in accordance with its own doctrine in all domains of national life (ideological, political, economic, social and cultural - abbreviated to IPOLEKSOSBUD).
- ABRI shall be the authentic interpreter of the philosophy and world-view of the Indonesian nation in state affairs and defence strategy, and in identifying internal and external enemies.
- In developing and maintaining HANRARI forces, a trained population shall be the basic component, ABRI the principal component, the protection of society a special component and the national resources a supportive component.
- The new law replaces Defence Law 29/1954 as well as Law 13/1963 on the Police Force. The most important change is the consolidation of ABRI's rôle as a social force in the national defence and security system.

In March 1982, the Bandung Youth and Student Action Group issued an open call for "the exclusion of ABRI from politics", which made the following points:



—that ABRI should dedicate itself only to the interests of the people and the state and should immediately end its involvement in social and political affairs;

—that KOPKAMTIB, a non-constitutional body, should be abolished;

—that ABRI should be freed from the misconduct of the politician generals who have, in the eyes of the Indonesian people, tarnished ABRI's image, its unity with the people and its authority and respect.

It is very clear that the new law is nothing less than a move to legalise ABRI's continued interference in political affairs. This not only represents acknowledgement in theory of ABRI's dual function; it goes so far as to legitimise ABRI's Multi-Function in Indonesian state affairs. This Group therefore wishes to make known its opinion of this law, with particular attention to the following:



I. THE DEVELOPING ROLE OF THE POLITICIAN GENERALS

In developing their rôle, the political generals have exploited ABRI for their own purposes so as to secure a political position, with the result that ABRI no longer serves the people's interests. The steps taken have included the following:

Under the 1945 Constitution, ABRI should occupy a neutral position as a national defence force, serving the interests of the majority; it should not become a social and political force. When Law no. 3 was adopted in 1948, streamlining military organisation, some politician generals opposed this, so as to secure a political position. Their ploy reached a climax with the coup attempt of October 1952 which failed to get Parliament dissolved.

In March 1957, the President declared a state of war and set up a National Council in May that year as the supreme body of the state. The politician generals brought ABRI into the Council with the result that it was no longer neutral. These same men were responsible for getting ABRI acknowledged as a functional body so that it could be represented in Parliament.

On 12th November 1958, the same generals devised a 'middle-road policy', seeking positions in the political domain, in government and in Parliament. As a result, on 23rd November 1958, the National Council acknowledged ABRI as a functional body thus ensuring it a rôle in Parliament. This led to the formulation of ABRI's Tri Ubaya Sakti Doctrine, also known as ABRI's Dual-Function Doctrine.

With the pronouncement of the 5th July 1959 Presidential Decree, ABRI automatically became a non-neutral political force, thus confirming its position as a functional group in Parliament. As a functional group with political clout, ABRI then set up the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (*Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya*) on 20th October 1964.

When, after the events of 30th September 1965, Suharto replaced Sukarno as President, on behalf of those in power in ABRI, the greater part of ABRI's efforts to secure political authority in government had been accomplished.

In 1966, these politician generals succeeded in forcing the

People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) to adopt TAP 24/1966 [TAP is the designation for MPR decisions] which recognised ABRI as a system of both material and technological as well as political might. Then General Suharto engaged in horse-trading with the political parties, insisting that ABRI get an allocation of a hundred seats in Parliament; the parties gained nothing in return. Furthermore, the President was granted the *right* to appoint one-third of the members of the MPR. This was called the 'National Consensus' which was later pushed through as another TAP.

In 1971, *Golongan Karya* (GOLKAR), the mouthpiece of the politician generals, contested and won the general elections by trickery. Then General Suharto pushed Parliament into adopting a law simplifying the political parties which enhanced the political clout of GOLKAR by ensuring implementation of a number of regulations: Interior Minister Regulation No. 12, 1969 which prevents GOLKAR people in regional assemblies from joining political parties; Government Regulation No. 6, 1970 which prevents members of ABRI and civil servants from joining political parties; and Law No. 3, 1975 concerning the 'floating masses'.

In 1978, after winning the 1977 general election, the same group pushed the MPR into adopting TAP No. 4 which confirmed ABRI as both a defence and a social force. As a result, political affairs had fallen completely into the hands of the politician generals who were then easily able to utilise the entire ABRI network for the purpose of safeguarding their political interests. This secured victory for them in the 1982 elections so as to perpetuate the position of General Suharto and his confederate politician generals. Then, in September 1982, Parliament was driven into adopting the Defence Law which not merely confirms ABRI as a defence and social force; ABRI has emerged as an absolute power with its claws wrapped firmly around the Republic of Indonesia. This Law transformed ABRI's Dual Function into the Multi-Function of ABRI, which means the supremacy of ABRI.



II. THE PRESENT ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ABRI

As the political role of ABRI has evolved under the politician generals, so has its organisation structure changed. ABRI has become the political force within GOLKAR as is evident from the functional principles of ABRI. It has been incorporated into the GOLKAR fraternity, alongside civil servants and other functional or professional groupings.

Each *Territorial Defence Commander* (KOWILHAN) assists the President as special executive officer of KOPKAMTIB (the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) in his territory (Presidential Decision No 9, 1974).

The President has placed the *Provincial Defence Commands* (KODAM) under the command of the KOWILHAN Commanders who are empowered to formulate political policy together with the President (Presidential Decision No. 79, 1969/70).

The President is Supreme Commander of ABRI; the position

of individual Force commanders has been abolished and they have been reduced to chiefs-of-staff of the Forces. Operational duties have been transferred to the Minister for Defence and Security who is also answerable to the President (Presidential Decision No. 79, 1969 and the 1982 Defence Law).

KOWILHAN commanders exercise authority over all the constituent arms of the forces in the regions, over joint commands, special joint commands and special-operations units.

The KOWILHAN commanders are also chairmen of the ABRI Functionaries' Councils which supervise ABRI personnel who occupy civil or political positions so as to control national policy. They also co-ordinate the Provincial Leadership Teams which are known as the MUSPIDA (combining civil, military and police chiefs).

KOPKAMTIB is a non-constitutional body which perpetuates the Anti-Subversion Law of 1963, and it has unlimited powers to carry out repressive measures against any individual, group or body which incurs the disfavour of the politician generals. (Details of other ABRI organisms are given in Appendix I.)



III. THE POWER OF THE POLITICIAN GENERALS

With TAP No. 4 in force legalising ABRI's role as a social force in addition to being a defence force, the Dual-Function came to fruition. Then, the KOWILHANS were set up, with the Defence Ministry in charge of formulating ABRI's policy as a social and political force. As a result, various critical positions in government and other institutions are filled by politician generals, including the position of president and many ministerial positions, as well as top positions in other supreme state organs and agencies.


A complete list of positions occupied by ABRI personnel is given. It is excluded here for reasons of space.




IV. GOLKAR AS THE TOOL OF THE POLITICIAN GENERALS, AND THEIR POLITICAL MANŒUVRING TO CONTROL OTHER POLITICAL SPHERES

Golongan Karya was created by the politician generals as their political front; it grew out of the *Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya* set up in 1964. GOLKAR is the base from which ABRI has enhanced its political role and represents realisation of the 1978 TAP which defined ABRI as a social force. The politician generals have manipulated GOLKAR as their political tool to support their interests and positions.

The main organs in GOLKAR are the Advisory Council (*Dewan Pembina*) the Central Advisory Council and *Fraksi Karya*, GOLKAR's grouping in Parliament. The Dewan Pembina is the key body; its members include the President,





Development Cabinet 1983-1988

cabinet ministers and representatives of GOLKAR Units, including ABRI. As for the key positions within GOLKAR, ABRI occupies all the top slots in the three organs mentioned above. Since the Dewan Pembina also includes cabinet ministers, state policy, including defence and security as well as all government affairs, are firmly in GOLKAR hands. Everything is ultimately determined by the chairman of the Dewan Pembina, General (retired) Suharto as president of the Republic. The Dewan's role at the GOLKAR National Conference is crucial, and moreover it has the power to convene national consultations which is tantamount to giving it the right of veto.

As for the power of the politician generals to steamroll their wishes through Parliament and the MPR, it should be stated that the two political parties — PPP (Muslim) and PDI (Nationalist and Christian) — have to try to match their forces against the Fraksi Karya and the ABRI Fraksi, both of which are tools of the politician generals. GOLKAR unfailingly wins general elections because of the various regulations mentioned above; these regulations have been directed specifically against the political parties.

Every single law enacted since 1966 has been adopted on the orders of the politician generals because Parliament has since then been under their control. Since the MPR consists of all the members of Parliament plus regional delegates and groups appointed by General Suharto (empowered, as he is, to appoint a third of the members of the MPR), it is clear that MPR decisions reflect the wishes of the politician generals. Thus, political power is concentrated in their hands. To summarise, the politician generals have placed Parliament and the MPR under the control of Suharto and his confederates, won the elections by deceit, fractionalised the social and political forces, and succeeded, by means of the General Elections Law, in driving the political parties into a corner. They have succeeded in occupying key positions in government and the state, in monopolising the appointment of officials, and dismissing any officials opposed to the politician generals. They have abolished people's participation through the 'floating masses' policy, by threatening people against joining parties, by prohibiting political activity by students and workers, by combatting ideology and religion as political principles, by carrying out compulsory indoctrination of citizens and intimidating civil servants into participating in indoctrination courses, by exploiting the bureaucracy and the security apparatus in order to perpetuate their own power, and by preserving KOPKAMTIB in violation of basic civil rights. They have also abused ABRI by using it as a tool to eradicate elements undesirable to the politician generals, using such methods as torture, intimidation, interrogation, imprisonment and other forms of military operations.



V. THE POLITICIAN GENERALS' INVOLVEMENT IN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Thanks to their unlimited powers — free from the control of the people — the politician generals have also exploited their positions to promote personal economic interests. The powers vested in them enable them to make laws, and to issue presidential decrees, directives and instructions, government regulations, ministerial regulations and decisions, bank credit authorisations, import and export licences, rights and franchises for businessmen, exclusive rights and so on. These powers have been misused to serve the economic advancement of companies controlled by the politician generals either in their own name or on behalf of members of their families, their military units, departments or cronies. All this stems from the fact that economic measures adopted by them in relation to ownership and policy invariably favour their own companies. The ones to gain from their policies are the generals' supporters, cronies and immediate family members. Import and export licences, rights, franchises, exclusive rights and licences for foreign capital investment are all awarded for the benefit of companies owned by the politician generals.

The Foreign Investment Law of 1967 granted tax and import duty concessions to foreign companies. These facilities have been used as a device to establish cooperation between foreign companies and the generals. It comes as no surprise that all foreign capital investment is dominated by such cooperation. Up to 1973, the Foreign Investment Law was highly favourable to foreign entrepreneurs who secured the following percentage share in business sectors: agriculture and fisheries, 33.5%; forestry, 59.3%; infrastructure, 75%; construction, 19%; mining, 96%; industry, 35%; hotels and tourism, 47%; real estate, 32%. Bureaucratic authority has also been exploited to raise tactical funds for the political activities of organisations such as GOLKAR.

As President, General Suharto also takes decisions allowing only the giant companies, most of which are owned by the politician generals, to run projects valued in excess of 500 million rupiahs (Presidential Decision No 10, 1980).

Economic policy in general has no regard any more for the vast majority of the population. Economic development is heavily oriented towards growth and is not based on national resources. 'Equitable distribution' is a rhetoric used to build up a capitalist economic system.



VI CONCLUSIONS

ABRI has been abused by the politician generals in order to secure political and economic positions.

ABRI represents a non-neutral defence and security force with political power concentrated in the hands of General Suharto.

All positions in government and state, whether in the cabinet, the state institutions, further education institutes and so on, have been exploited by the politician generals, with the result that General Suharto's power is virtually absolute.

GOLKAR is the political tool of General Suharto and the other politician generals and is used to support their authority.

All sectors of the economy are under the control of the politician generals along with big entrepreneurs, non-indigenous and foreign, who are together creating a capitalist economic system.

Political and economic policy serve only to bolster the position and aims of General Suharto and his confederates.

For these reasons, the new Defence Law represents a device to expand and perpetuate the absolute power in the political and economic spheres of General Suharto and his confederates, who are thus jeopardising the future of the nation and the state while at

Continued on next page

Ex-KOPKAMTIB commander takes control of labour

Since becoming Minister of Labour, Admiral Sudomo, former commander of KOPKAMTIB, has proven to be one of the most active ministers. "Hardly a day passes," reports *Tempo*, "without something about him being reported in the press."

When he shifted jobs, Sudomo took with him most of his top-level staff from KOPKAMTIB, reinforcing predictions that the style of labour control developed by the security command would now characterise operations of the Department of Labour. Sudomo's moves to introduce far more effective management of the labour force have included:

- ★★ the re-opening of government labour exchanges for the registration and supervision of the unemployed;
- ★★ streamlining departmental monitoring of the labour force and industrial disputes;
- ★★ the promise to set up a number of new vocational training centres;
- ★★ warnings that if the government-sponsored union, FBSI fails to prevent strikes by unions under its wing, it could be disbanded;
- ★★ hints that existing labour laws which reflect 'liberal democratic tendencies' are soon to be revised.
- ★★ a declaration that the word *buruh* may no longer be used for 'worker' because of its 'class connotations' and that *pekerja* or *karyawan* must be used instead;
- ★★ a hint at the suspension of collective bargaining, to be replaced by tripartite negotiations which incorporate the government/security apparatus into the process.

Many of the ideas being promoted by Sudomo are in fact a continuation of the policy he launched at KOPKAMTIB, centred chiefly round the setting up of special teams in the regions to monitor and intervene in industrial disputes in order to forestall the outbreak of strikes, and to involve the army directly in these teams. In fact, 'tripartite councils' was a term already in use for some of these teams last year. According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review* view, some foreign observers have warned that "any mishandling of the labour unions by Sudomo would invite

strong reaction particularly from international labour federations and Western labour party governments."

All sources confirm that there has been a marked rise in militancy among the workforce, largely in response to the sharp fall in real wages; FBSI chairman, Agus Sudono recently declared that a 14% rise in wages would be needed to compensate wage-earners for the effect of the cut in oil subsidies last January and the rupiah devaluation in March.

Sources: *Tempo*, 14 May, *FEER* 30 June and *March 1983 Update of Indonesian Workers and their Right to Organise* (INDOC).

Labour Minister Tells Employers to Ignore Labour Laws

The Minister of Labour, Admiral Sudomo, has publicly told employers that they need not comply with labour laws if this proves profitable to them. Our labour laws do not have to be rigidly adhered to, he said. Some examples of laws that could be ignored were those concerning the minimum age (which would open the way to officially sanctioned employment of child labour) and those concerning the number of working hours. (*Tempo*, 9th July 1983)

Even without such encouragement from the Minister, many employers already ignore the labour laws. But for Sudomo to have made the point publicly can only mean that he is in the process of making preparations for a comprehensive overhaul of Indonesia's labour laws. He has already given this impression by remarks suggesting that the laws are 'outmoded' and reflect 'liberal-democratic tendencies'.

Sudomo has also announced that judges should now sit on the regional and central labour arbitration boards, even though this would infringe the legal provisions governing the composition of these boards.

Continued from page 11

the same time acting in violation of the 1945 Constitution.

VII DECLARATION

We the undersigned:

1. Declare that we do not recognise the legitimacy of the Defence and Security Law and for this reason reject its enforcement within the Republic.
2. Declare that the armed forces of a democratic state must not under any circumstances interfere with the politics of that state. The role of all politician generals in politics must therefore be immediately brought to an end.
3. Condemn attempts to divert ABRI from its exclusive function as the instrument of defence of the state.
4. Insist that the defence of the state be organised in accordance with the 1945 Constitution.

Bandung, 10th September 1983.

APPENDIX I

I. Other organisms set up to reinforce the political position of the generals:

- *National Defence Institute* (LEHMANNAS): cultivates on a national scale the concept of ABRI's political role as an integral part of the national defence effort..
- SESKO-ABRI: the education of senior ABRI officers

especially with an eye to the formation of cadres for the political supervision of ABRI.

— *Institute of ABRI History*: for the purpose of manipulating historical data in order to provide support for ABRI's role in politics.

— Other organisms such as charitable foundations, legions, communication forums, cooperative agencies and mass organisations.

— *Special Operations* (OPSUS): functions according to need.



The politician generals.

The situation in East Timor today

Neobere, an East Timorese who left Dili in January this year and is now living as a refugee in Portugal, spent three years fighting with the resistance. Until his capture in November 1978, he gained wide experience of the conditions under which people fought against the Indonesian occupation, in particular the devastating bombardments by Indonesian aircraft and naval vessels, causing a huge loss of life. After spending several months as a captive with an Indonesian military unit in the south eastern region of Matebian, he escaped to Dili and remained there until his departure for Lisbon this year.

On a visit to London in May, Neobere was interviewed at length by TAPOL. Part of this interview, dealing with the current situation, is published below. The rest of the interview, dealing with the resistance period, will be published in the next issue of TAPOL Bulletin.

We have heard how the Indonesian occupation forces set up strategic centres for the Timorese forced down from the mountains by the heavy bombardment. Can you describe them?

The places to which people were driven were centred around the *Postes*, the administrative centres that existed during Portuguese colonial times. People are not free in these centres; they live in a state of constant fear, knowing that if they were to try to leave and were then caught by Indonesian soldiers, they could be shot dead. Women have been caught, detained and tortured for this; the soldiers try to force them to say they wanted to make contact with Fretilin (the resistance movement). Then the women are brutally tortured — with cigarette burns on the breast or sexual organs. It is difficult to find words to describe the barbarous methods used by Indonesian troops against Timorese women; and these things are still happening today. Some people who try to leave the centres are shot dead, and the soldiers then say they thought they had seen a 'wild boar' and shot it.

What about the activities of the Catholic Relief Services which has distributed food relief aid intended for people in these centres? We understand you have some experience of the CRS because you worked for them for a while.

My experience with the CRS dates from 1980 when I started working for them in Dili. What I know is that when they took food to the strategic centres and wanted to distribute it direct to the population, they were always prevented from doing so by the military. The local officers from the *Koramil* (sub-district military command) never allow food to be distributed by anyone but themselves. Then what they do is to hand out very small quantities of food, just a glass of cornflour, for example, and keep most of the relief food for themselves, to sell it for profit or to use it to force Timorese people to collaborate with them. CRS and other food aid can only be distributed in this way.

When the CRS first started relief operations, they compared conditions to those in Kampuchea and Biafra. What are your own impressions of conditions when the centres were first set up, in 1979?

Conditions were extremely bad though of course I can't make comparisons with those other places. I saw many cases of extreme malnutrition and witnessed terrible scenes. People often wandered in search of food. I remember seeing someone (I was in Matebian at the time) who had found an edible root. When someone else tried to take it from him, the first man started running away, but after running about 10 metres, he fell down dead. I often saw people trying to walk, then falling and dying on the spot. Sometimes people just made it to an Army post, then dropped dead because they were starving. I can't give figures, but certainly huge numbers of people died of starvation.

But you should realise that these things are still happening today. Conditions haven't really improved much. People are still dying for lack of food, for instance in Uatocarabau, Laga and elsewhere. It's not difficult to see such things. If observers go to these places, they will see it for themselves: many people are just skin and bones.

We often receive reports about famine, but observers are not able to go and see for themselves. Only last month, an Australian

journalist, John Hamilton, writing for the *West Australian*, gave a glowing report of conditions in E. Timor, saying he saw no cases of famine at all.

Of course, you are right. It's extremely difficult to produce evidence of famine conditions because the places where it exists are controlled by the Indonesians, and they will try to prevent anyone from finding out. But any journalist who is genuinely keen to get a balanced picture of conditions can surely do so even if the Indonesians confine them to very restricted areas. It's quite certain that some of these journalists have been bought over by the Indonesians; they're prepared to accept whatever the Indonesians tell them as the truth. If a journalist knows the places where severe deprivation is occurring, he or she should find ways of discovering the truth.

What's your own estimate of the number of deaths in E. Timor since the Indonesian invasion?

I think the estimate of a third of the population is fairly accurate. But I want to stress that even now, with the population concentrated in the so-called settlements, people are still dying in considerable numbers.



Mario Carrascalao, Governor of E. Timor, said recently that most of the deaths occurred in August and September 1975, at the time of the civil war. What is your comment?

It's blatantly untrue to claim that many people died during the fighting between Fretilin and the UDT. The only weapons both sides had were G3 rifles and Mausers. How could they possibly have killed so many people? It's utter nonsense. I travelled extensively throughout the country from 1976-78, while I was with the resistance, and I know it to be absolutely true that most of the people who died, died as a result of the bombings by sea and by air. Another reason for many of the deaths is the fact that when the Indonesians invaded, people fled to the mountains and few remained in the lowlands, so very little food was produced there. When the people were forced back down from the mountains, there was hardly any food being produced there, and the Indonesians provided absolutely nothing in the way of food. There was nothing to eat, which is why so many died from starvation. And epidemics spread among the hungry people who had no resistance. Many died of a gastric ailment of epidemic proportions which caused violent diarrhoea. This spread throughout the country. People were so feeble, and there was no proper sanitation: resistance to such ailments was very low. If, under conditions of peace, people could go to places where such things happened, they would see evidence of what I am saying.

But the Indonesians are still killing many people in the settlements. They regard every Timorese as a Fretilin supporter, so from time to time they round them up. Of course, most people aren't directly involved in any fighting, but because they can see how people suffer under the Indonesians, they are very sympathetic to the struggle. They have no arms, but they support the struggle, which is why the Indonesians set about decimating people. If they go on like they are doing now, there soon won't be any Timorese people left. It's not a question of how many people died in the past; people are still dying today.

I know of some incidents that occurred just before I left E. Timor. In one case, in Vemassee, a place on the road to Manututu, a teacher was killed. Then a primary school teacher, Jose Viegas, was murdered because he was suspected of being a member of Fretilin. He was taken from his home late at night with three other men, two of whom were nurses. Relatives managed to rescue the other three but the teacher was lost. His wife and father-in-law are still in Vemassee, so this report can be checked with them. The other three managed to escape to Dili, then they were arrested there, and are being kept under surveillance. Another incident I know of happened in Venilale, in the eastern central region of Viqueque. The man in question was Joao Brito who had been summoned by the military. When he returned home, his wife told him soldiers had come to the house and tried to rape her; she struggled and prevented this from happening. Brito went back to the military command and complained that the officer had allowed his men to do such a thing. He got very angry and attacked the officer. The other soldiers saw this, so late that night, they went back to Brito's home, took him away and killed him.

What are the main causes for the continuing starvation and the possibility of famines?

Formerly Timorese people cultivated a great deal of land. They produced enough to sell part of their crops so as to buy the things they needed, and could consume the rest of their crop. Now, confined to the settlements, they can only cultivate very tiny plots of land; they don't even have enough for their own consumption let alone anything left over to sell. Added to that, the people have lost most of their possessions; they have no wealth and can't buy anything.

The food supplied by foreign relief agencies is distributed by the army. They give it out in very small portions, about 300 grams for a family. A lot of the food intended for relief is sold by the soldiers, but most Timorese don't have the money to buy it. When people are very hungry, the army uses the food to 'buy' collaboration. I once joined a queue for food — flour from America with vitamins added. But the portion I got was so small, it wasn't even enough for a meal for the family. All we could do

was mix it with water and drink it. It was never the custom for Timorese people to tell others of their difficulties, to talk about how hungry they were, but now they have to do it, they even have to beg for food.

Strategic Settlements and Land Shortage

An American professor, Donald E. Weatherbee, who visited E. Timor in 1980 and subsequently published reports wholly favourable to Indonesian annexation, nevertheless warned of the consequences of land shortage which Neobere so graphically describes. He wrote:

"There is a basic problem that will not be easily overcome. The agricultural foundation of these large resettlement centres is inadequate to provide for them. The restrictions imposed on access to land away from the centres means that larger populations have to be supported on less land.

"The situation in Quelicai is illustrative of the problem in the east and south. Most of the people came down from the mountains in October, 1978. They are only able to work fields that can be reached and returned from in a single day. There is no fertiliser. Rodents destroy a substantial percentage of the crops in the fields. There is no regular water supply and they are wholly dependent on rainfall. The land they are working cannot supply the population, but they are not permitted to move out to open up other land. In 1979, and now, the deficit is partially made up by CRS feedings, distributed through the Catholic pastor. As CRS and ICRC phase out their programs, however, what will happen? When I asked a *lurah desa* (village head) that, his answer was: "I don't know. The KODIM* will help us."

"Flying over East Timor by helicopter, one is impressed by the thousands of acres of fields — for corn, dry rice, wet rice, and pasture — now going back to waste: land whose utilisation was absolutely essential to support the population at a minimal subsistence level of existence."

From: "The Situation in East Timor" by Donald E. Weatherbee, Institute of International Studies, University of South Carolina (1980).

*KODIM: District Military Command.

It's not true to say that Timorese aren't producing food any more, but they produce very little indeed. Because of this, they face the prospect of famine. Such crops as maize, rice and coconuts used to be widely produced in the east but now they're produced only in very small quantities. This is firstly because the Indonesians have destroyed so much land and driven people from their land. And many coconut trees have been destroyed too. In the west, coffee was the main crop, but now coffee growers are not allowed to sell their produce to traders on the free market. They have to sell it to Indonesians at ridiculously low prices, and fear very much what could happen if they refused to sell it to them. They could get killed for this. In Portuguese days, the Chinese were the ones who came round and bought the coffee; the peasants could bargain to get a good price. Nowadays, food-crop producers have nothing to sell, whereas coffee-growers are compelled to sell to the Indonesians.

The problem is that people have been uprooted from their traditional practices and from their traditional lands. Where they are now, they can till very little land, the land isn't fertile and it's a different kind of soil from what they know. In the mountains, there wasn't any need to use fertilisers. The land they cultivate now is not only very restricted; it's also not fertile.

Shifting agriculture was widespread in former days, wasn't it? Do you think the Indonesians have forced people to stay in the strategic areas because of the military's preference for settled communities, and because shifting agriculture makes it more difficult to control people?

No, that isn't the rationale behind Indonesian policy. The main

reason why they have forced people to resettle around these former Portuguese *Postes* is to prevent them from moving around and coming in contact with the resistance. Once the population is under control, it isn't possible for them to go far. The troops then consider that security can be safeguarded in this way, and no contact with Fretilin is possible. Of course, this policy disrupts agricultural methods and traditions, but the chief reason is the security consideration.

Which parts of the country are now under Fretilin control?

Actually, Indonesian control is really only limited to the towns and settlements. People are not permitted to go more than 15 kilometres or so from these places. Anyone going farther is accused of trying to contact Fretilin to bring them letters or supplies of medicine. People get arrested and tortured for this; many of those who are now in Atauro were captured for doing this kind of thing.

When we were in the bush there was no food shortage; there was always plenty of food. One of the reasons why the resistance in the mountains could last so long was the favourable food situation. There was always plenty of fruit, bananas, coconuts, potatoes and so on. The soil there is very fertile.

What happens when foreign visitors come to E. Timor? Do people there know about these visits and try to make contact?

It's very difficult to find out things like that, though word does get around. All foreign visitors have to stay at Resende Hotel. This hotel is situated at a crossroads in Dili and there are military police guarding the junction at all four corners. Just across the road from the hotel there is a police station so they can control everything. It is very easy for the Indonesians to see who goes in and out of the hotel, so people don't dare go there because it's too risky.

Could you tell us something about the attitude of Indonesian soldiers in E. Timor?

The army has been fighting there for about seven years without achieving the victory they hoped for. Many of the troops have become frustrated and they often go berserk out of revenge. When this happens, any woman they find is tortured. There was the case of a pregnant woman whose body was completely disembowelled and her head was smashed against a wall; this incident occurred in Aitama. That's a particular incident I know about, but things like that often happen.

What about the composition of the urban population? Has there been a big influx from Indonesia? The authorities talk about agricultural projects they say have been set up. Who is working on these projects?

The Indonesians have been bringing people in from everywhere. As for Dili, many newcomers have been brought in. In Maliana (in the west, near the border with West Timor), 200 families have been brought from Indonesia to 'fill the gap', as they say, in the population. This is their tactic, to show the world that the population level is being maintained, but what people don't know is that many people are not Timorese but Indonesians. Many of the newcomers have come of their own will, but those in Maliana were brought in by the government. That happened not long ago, altogether about 200 families. Recently there were reports of groups being taken to other regions, though I don't know the exact amounts. And just before I left, I heard that the government is planning to populate the plains of Oelaluhu and Matubore on the south coast with transmigrants. Transmigrants are given plots of land and facilities to settle down. These are people who don't come of their own free will, vagrants, unemployed or landless people who are picked up and brought to populate regions in E. Timor.

The occupying forces claim now that there are 90,000 to 100,000 children at school. Do you think that is true?

I can't confirm or deny that figure, but it sounds a great exaggeration to me. There are so many children outside the main

towns who are very unlikely to be at school. It can't really be in the interest of the colonisers to educate our people. They may well have set up some primary schools but they really don't have the means to set up secondary schools. I'm sure those figures are just for propaganda purposes.

Besides that, so many people who got good education under the Portuguese and are very well qualified can't get jobs. I myself am a qualified professional but I couldn't get a paid job for years.

Is there discrimination against Timorese in employment?

Yes, and it's very widespread. Nurses who formerly worked for the Portuguese administration were kept on but at minimal salaries, only 15,000 rupiahs a month. But male nurses brought in from Indonesia receive 200,000 rupiahs a month. It's the same in other professions too. Many Timorese (including me) were employed up to 1981 without any pay at all. This very low pay is a cause of great frustration: if people refuse to work for such a salary they are accused of refusing to collaborate and supporting Fretilin and for this they can be sent to prison. There are many graduates from the Catholic seminaries — very well-educated men with a high proficiency in languages — who simply can't get jobs.

Who are the teachers in the schools?

Almost all are Indonesians, and of course they teach in Indonesian. The percentage of Timorese teachers is very small; they get what's called a 'premium' of 45,000 a month but the Indonesian teachers get 70,000 or 75,000 rupiahs. But you know, there are still some Timorese working in government offices who aren't paid anything at all. They are forced to work like this; if they refuse, they're accused of being pro-Fretilin which means they could be arrested. To make ends meet, these people try to cultivate tiny plots of land, but they're not allowed to go far afield to do this; if they did, they would be accused of trying to contact the resistance.

What about Fretilin people who have been detained then released? Are they under surveillance?

Yes. The Indonesians impose a system of so-called indoctrination on those who have come down from the mountains. As part of this, they are required to work, mostly very menial tasks, without pay, and live in semi-freedom.

Would you say that there are any schools in the villages?

What I must stress is that villages as we knew them before the invasion simply don't exist any more. All village life has stopped. Everyone has been brought together in the settlements, around the *Postes*. Just to explain the difference, I should explain that before the invasion, there was the capital (Dili) and some medium-sized towns, and then the small towns or 'Postes'. These *Postes* were the administrative centre of large areas which included many widely scattered villages. But now, the villages have ceased to exist, and the people are all required to live around the *Postes*.

Aren't there any villages at all in the mountains?

If you talk about the mountains, what I must stress is that it is very dangerous for people to go there because those are the areas where Fretilin is still active. If the Indonesians find anyone in the mountains they can immediately be arrested or killed. That's why no-one ventures into the mountains.

I'm afraid I must be conveying a very pessimistic and sad picture. I only wish I could speak more optimistically, but these are the realities. I can't invent things that don't exist. Sure, a lot of roads have been built around Dili, and a lot of new buildings have gone up, but the development the Indonesians talk about is nothing more, so I really can't speak of any improvements. I can't invent things.

We have heard reports that prisoners on Atauro are now being moved away. Is this true?

Yes, indeed, some have been moved away, according to the



'gravity' of their 'case'. Some of these people never re-appear; no-one knows what happened to them.

Some reports speak about Atauro prisoners being sent back to a place near Maliana. Can you tell us about this?

Many of these transfers take place in preparation for visits to Atauro by journalists, to make sure the journalists don't meet them. In Maliana, they are kept under strict surveillance, in a concentration camp. Atauro being an island surrounded by sea can easily be controlled by a small number of men, but in Maliana the prisoners are confined to one place. These transfers are part of an Indonesian stratagem to convince people that prisoners on Atauro are being released. The fact is though that they're still under detention.

There have been reports of prisoners being disposed of by being thrown out of helicopters. What do you know about this?

The Indonesian military often take Fretilin prisoners by helicopter to various parts of the country on propaganda trips. They call meetings of local people to tell them how bad Fretilin is and good Indonesia is. After such propaganda meetings, many of these prisoners are exterminated. One favourite method of disposing of prisoners is that they are taken to a coastal region known as a *pastol*, where there are several sea inlets or small bays. The prisoners are horribly beaten up and tortured. Some of them are even skinned and decapitated. The bodies are then left in the shallow sea, tied to heavy rocks to prevent them from floating away. Of course, there is a great deal of blood which discolours the sea-water. One place where this happened very frequently is a coastal region known as *Areia Branca* or White Sands. It's situated along the coast, not far from Dili. It's why this place came to be called the 'sea of blood'. I should add that most of the people disposed of in this way had been taken from Comarca prison in Dili. It happened a great deal up to 1981, but less so since then because the Bishop and the priests have been on the lookout, so the Indonesians have developed other ways of exterminating people.

What methods of torture do the troops use in E. Timor?

I should first explain that I myself was never tortured, except for a heavy beating I got while I was still detained by a military unit in Matebian. Women are tortured with cigarette burns on the breasts and genitals. Electric shock is widely used. People are badly beaten up. Their hands are placed under chair-legs then the torturers stand on the chairs.

What about water torture, or water-cells?

Yes, that is a method used. In Dili prison, they use bath-tubs full of water. The water is full of dangerous insects, human excrement and urine and other very unpleasant things. The prisoner is forced to remain in the tub for a long period, until he confesses. The RPKAD (paratroops) unit has a special torture centre in Dili, in a place called Mandarin. Many people have disappeared from there.

Would you explain how the general elections were conducted in E. Timor in May last year?

Long before polling day, the government sent military officers out to all areas to tell people that they had to take part in the election, and that they must vote for GOLKAR, not for either of the other parties. I myself attended such a meeting where a soldier told us how we must vote. We were told that if we didn't vote, we would be branded as Fretilin. This meant that voting was compulsory. So our people thought: well, if we have to vote, we shall try to do it not in the way they want, so as not to give the impression that they have the support of the Timorese. But the point is that people felt they had to vote, otherwise they could be killed.

At the polling stations, there were three ballot boxes, one for each of the parties. The GOLKAR box was in the middle (No.2) and the PPP and PDI boxes were on each side. In front of where the polling booth was there was a small hall with military police on guard. The three boxes were concealed behind a curtain but the curtain didn't come down to the floor, only to knee height, so the guard could see, by watching people's feet, which box they went to. People knew what was happening, so they tried to keep their feet in front of the middle box but put their voting slip into one of the other boxes.

What about the birth control programme in E. Timor. A Portuguese TV journalist who visited there in February has written that the objective is 'to reduce hardship' and prevent 'overpopulation'. He also wrote about the use of Depo Provera injections, a method that is widely criticised and opposed in many countries. Please tell us everything you know about this.

This birth control programme is strongly opposed by the population. In the first place, it's absolutely new for us. People are unwilling to have sex discussed in public and don't like attending meetings where this is done. Very few people go to such meetings voluntarily, only if they are forced to. When women go, they often

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Highlights from LBH report on human rights

The 1981 Report on the State of Human Rights in Indonesia, published by the Legal Aid Institute (LBH), appeared recently after unavoidable delays. This is the third in LBH's series of annual reports, and provides important reference material, a chronology and detailed case histories of five industrial disputes that occurred in 1981.

We reproduce below some highlights from the Report. Readers wishing to have copies should write to the LBH (Jalan Diponegoro, 74 Jakarta Pusat) or await information about an English translation which, we understand, is now in preparation.

** In his preface, Adnan Buyung Nasution, chairman of the LBH Foundation, warns that "an accommodating tendency on the part of the perpetrators of human rights is becoming part of a grander strategy to preserve or perpetuate today's social distortions. We must therefore be very careful how we use the term basic human rights." As an example Nasution mentions the new Procedural Code (KUHAP) which introduces many improvements yet perpetuates the Anti-Subversive Law which completely disregards human rights.

** The editors, Mulya Lubis and Fauzi Abdullah, state in their Introduction that conditions are basically the same as in the previous year, when they were described as "heavily overcast". They welcome the fact, however, that the space still exists for them to write and publish this Report. "Small as it is, we can at least use this valuable space to record developments"

** Chapter Three provides an analysis of the relationship between authoritarianism and the current style of economic development:

The (present) economic policy requires a centralist political power so that decision-making can be centralised for the purposes of security and efficiency. It needs an executive and bureaucratic apparatus that is, politically, relatively homogenous so that political disturbances can be kept to a minimum. It needs a long period of time to realise systematic change in the economy, with the result that efforts to preserve power relations become an integral part of the planned economic transformation. It also needs . . . 'political stability' so that only very limited political action can be tolerated. But the power-holders need political legitimacy from the people to continue their policy and obtain support from (the West). The middle-road taken — if indeed it can be called a middle-road — is that of obliterating political centers that have potential to become strong . . . while on the other hand creating and preserving tightly-controlled channels of communication through which to organise mass mobilisation when the need arises. This is done to impress external forces that democracy exists and at the same time provide strong safeguards to ensure that those in power cannot be undermined from below

The chapter then provides examples of efforts made by small, organised groups to break out of these constraints, but with no long-standing results. It describes 1981 as "the darkest period so far in the history of political party life in Indonesia".

** In view of the current wave of organised terror and extra-judicial murders now under way in Indonesia, under the guise of fighting crime (see pages 1-5) the Report's comments about the rising level of crime as a sign of growing social dissatisfaction and spreading feelings of contempt for the law, are particularly apposite.

Many feel that justifiable material improvements are receding farther and farther whilst human rights abuses get worse, the forms of power become more exploitative, and the gap between excessive affluence and poverty widens.

** Reporting on political imprisonment, it refers to cases of political disappearances leading to political, or extra-judicial, executions which have occurred in relation to the persecution and arrest of Muslims following the 1981 hijack. Details of these disappearances are not given in the Report, but they have been mentioned in TAPOL Bulletin reports (see Nos. 52 and 55) (This

is the first time that LBH has referred publicly to disappearances and extra-judicial killings.)

** The Report refers in several places to conditions in West Papua and East Timor, conveying a sense of frustration over extreme difficulties in obtaining factual information. The Report for the first time includes a section on East Timor which deals with reported famine, the problem of family re-unification, and the report submitting to the central government in 1981 by members of the East Timor Provincial Assembly.

** The chapter on education provides a wealth of useful information about the lack of facilities, the number of children who fail to complete elementary education and the number who never go to school at all. It makes a strong point about gross inequalities resulting from the impoverished backgrounds of such a high percentage of children at school.

** 1981 is described as a "disaster year" for academic life in Indonesia. Some of the facts given to support this are:

— at the Bandung Institute of Technology almost a hundred warnings of expulsion and suspension were issued, with nearly ten actual expulsions and a smaller number of suspensions;

— the Indonesian Academy of Sciences (LIPI) 1981 Congress was forced to withdraw invitations to a number of well-known speakers because of a government ban. In fact, the sessions of the Congress were declared 'off the record' by the authorities, meaning they could not be publicly reported. LIPI sources complain of surveillance of their activities over a long period of time. They are required to accept the presence of 'security officers' even at internal meetings. This, writes the Report, "is the first time the government has legally interfered in LIPI activities, a dangerous precedent";

— the expulsion of students at University of Indonesia who convened a meeting that was addressed by the writer Pramoedy Ananta Toer; (The Report also contains a full account elsewhere of the banning and burning of Pramoedy's two Buru novels.)

— numerous occasions on which students and lecturers have been prevented from going abroad to attend academic conferences. On one occasion, a student who was going to Japan after winning an essay competition was forced off the plane just as he was about to leave;

— the ban on former student activists obtaining lecturerships or jobs in government service;

— a particularly brutal example of organised terror against a secondary school in North Aceh after some pupils had participated in demonstrations in November 1981. The headmaster and several teachers were arrested and called to account. Children were dragged from their classrooms, beaten, kicked and tortured. A very large number of them required hospital treatment, and the headmaster was badly beaten about the face with a rifle, kicked and mal-treated in other ways. Altogether two hundred pupils and teachers were subsequently taken to another region in North Aceh where they were subjected to the most appalling torture, forced to crawl on their knees and to grovel naked on the ground. Many spent weeks in hospital with broken limbs, concussion and broken ribs.

Red light for PNG and Pacific

The Republic of Indonesia is currently planning to split West PNG/Irian Jaya into three provinces. Bearing in mind that West PNG/Irian Jaya is 3½ times the size of Java and Madura, the plan is understandable. The number of inhabitants will be increased by bringing in more from outside — in other words by resettling people from Java, Madura and Bali. It is estimated that the population of West PNG/Irian Jaya will reach 10-15 million by the year 2000, since Indonesia will continue to concern itself with and oversee the growth of population in PNG and the Pacific in general, in an attempt to establish a ratio of 3:1 (ie. three in West PNG/Irian Jaya to one in PNG and other Pacific areas).

This division into three provinces will entail the introduction of three "Komando Daerah Militer" (Military Commands), which will in turn mean the installation of three army divisions. The main idea is not just to crush any local freedom movements: it is part of a planned political and military expansion into PNG and the Pacific in general. Reliable sources have indicated that by 1980, Indonesia had already planted some 3,000 spies throughout the Pacific, including PNG.

The "Wawasan Nusantara" policy currently being implemented by the military regime in Indonesia brings to mind the ideals of the late President Sukarno: that Indonesia must gain control of the area from Madagascar to Hawaii, in accordance with the PALAPA oath of Gajah Mada, a prime minister in the Mojopahit kingdom of old. This ideal is still cherished in the heart of every Javanese, and the Javanese firmly believe that it will, sooner or later, be attained. The resettlement of people from Java, Madura and Bali on other islands, including West PNG/Irian Jaya, is intended to further that cause because Indonesians outside of Java are held in suspicion, ie. not trusted to provide full support. It is well known that nearly all regions of Indonesia have risen at some time or another to liberate themselves from the Republic of Indonesia, which is dominated by the Javanese. These include the RMS in the South Moluccas, PARAKU in Borneo, PRRI in Sumatra, PERMESTA in the North Celebes, DI/TII in the South Celebes and West Java, FPM/OPM in West PNG/Irian Jaya, and the Republic of Aceh in North Sumatra, which proclaimed its independence for the second time on 4th November 1976. All these freedom movements would appear to have been wiped out by the military, but underground movements are still thriving. Repression and eradication of freedom movements by military force is not the only effective method adopted by the Indonesian government. There is also the current method of "smiling policy", involving the resettlement on

other islands of people from Java, Madura and Bali, with the following objectives:

1. To disseminate Javanese culture to other islands in Indonesia.
2. To occupy and gain control of fertile lands outside Java for the cultivation of foodstuffs, especially rice, not only for domestic consumption but also for use as a military supply in the event of an emergency war situation.
3. To remain alert to and spy on separatist movements outside Java.
4. Resettled people would at the same time form potential reserve forces outside Java in the event of a general mobilisation in a war situation or wartime emergency, with war in the sense of a war of territorial expansion, and nothing else.

The 'Tri', 'Dwi' and 'Eka' Commands

The Republic of Indonesia once issued the "Tri Komando Rakyat" (the Triple People's Command) to seize control of Dutch New Guinea from Holland in 1961. With the "Dwi Komando Rakyat" (the Double People's Command) in 1964, Indonesia attempted to do the same with North Borneo, a former British colony, but failed. One more "Komando Rakyat" has yet to be issued, ie. "Eka Komando Rakyat" (the Single People's Command). It was originally thought that this would be used to gain control of East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, but events proved otherwise: Indonesia quietly invaded and occupied East Timor on 7th December, 1975 — the same day on which the American president Gerald Ford and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger left Indonesia to return to their own country. It was quite clear that the Indonesian invasion of East Timor was masterminded by the US as a reward to Indonesia, which had engineered the formation of ASEAN to replace the old SEATO, once the US had withdrawn from Vietnam. PNG was Indonesia's first target before East Timor, but Indonesia exploited the opportunity occurring at a time when Port-

ugal was undergoing domestic upheavals.

It is no secret that in 1973, Indonesia changed the name Irian Barat (West Irian) to Irian Jaya (Great Irian), as it was desired that there be only one Irian, and the designations East and West — after the examples of North and South Vietnam, East and West Germany, North and South Korea — were not to be used. The 'Jaya' after 'Irian' was to suggest that the time would come when the whole island would fall under Indonesian jurisdiction. If the military regime in Indonesia wishes to follow Sukarno's example, then the "Eka Komando Rakyat" will probably sound something like "Invade and occupy". The matter now becomes even clearer: if West PNG/Irian Jaya is to be split into three provinces, which automatically become three Military Commands, and because it is customary in Indonesia for each province to have one army division, then the next target for military expansion in Indonesia after East Timor can be predicted even now. The time will come when the world will be shocked by the news that Indonesia has invaded eastwards from West PNG/Irian Jaya. Australia and New Zealand will do nothing to protect the South Pacific, for two reasons. Firstly, both countries are inhabited by Europeans who came exploring and then settled a continent and island situated within the Asian sphere of influence, and who are obliged to seek protection. These people see Indonesia as continuing to function as a bulwark for them. Secondly, it profits their economy more to maintain friendly relations with 150 million people in Indonesia than with about 5 million in the South Pacific, in the same way that the Dutch gave up West PNG/Irian Jaya because of their interests in Indonesia. There is a kind of standing joke in Indonesia, which says that it was in fact Indonesians who first discovered the Australian continent, before the advent of the Europeans, because the name 'Australia' is derived from Moluccan dialect, "Ose tara lia".

Whatever happens next, the responsibility must lie with those countries which are members of Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), because they are indirectly assisting Indonesia in implementing its political and military expansion.

E.J. Bonay, former Indonesian Governor of West Irian



A troopship with several thousand troops arrives in Jayapura harbour, June 3, 1983

Film and book review

The Year of Living Dangerously, an MGM film directed by Peter Weir, based on a book of the same name by C.J. Koch, published by Sphere Books (London), 1983. (First published in 1978.)

Fiction and the film can always be expected to reach a far wider audience than books providing political analysis or campaign publications like *TAPOL Bulletin*. Decisive events in the modern history of some countries have been powerfully and persuasively portrayed in such films as Pontecorvo's "Battle of Algiers" and Costa Gavros' "Missing". These are films that have informed a very large number of people about the scheming brutality of French colonialism in Algeria and the sinister involvement of Washington in the overthrow of Allende in Chile.

"The Year of Living Dangerously" takes as its piece of history the events leading up to the G30S, the 30th September affair in Jakarta, 1965, an event that was to place Indonesia under absolute military rule as hundreds of thousands were murdered and hundreds of thousands more were thrown into prison, many for a decade or more. Search as you may, though, for a glimmer of understanding as to how this really happened, but you will find nothing to enlighten you except for a re-hash of the myths that have become the official version propagated by the Suharto regime. Indeed, one wonders why the film had to be shot in Manila, unless the Suharto government would have balked at scenes of Jakarta street demonstrations. There is not the slightest hint of the extent to which the army had already, well before the G30S, usurped political and military power. The forces of evil driving the country to ruin are the communists (Nasakom is not mentioned) mobbing foreign embassies – armed with firearms, mind you – and terrorising foreign journalists, and Sukarno betraying his Marhaen, populist principles as he grovels in debauchery and corruption.

The special twist of this westerner's view of contemporary Indonesian history is that it presumes to penetrate the depths of the Javanese soul as depicted in the *wayang*. The central figure, Billy Kwan, is a Chinese-Australian dwarf whose patron-saint is Semar, the god-incarnate, the wise and popular *wayang* figure, advising and remonstrating with the good but wayward Arjuna, a prince, personified here as Guy Hamilton, a successful, British-born Australian journalist, a good, clean man of integrity and a cut above the other news hacks who share gossip in the Hotel Indonesia's Wayang Bar. He falls in love with Jill Bryant; Billy brings them together like a *dalang* or *wayang* puppeteer because his own love for both of them cannot be consummated. She is the princess, Srikandi, to Hamilton's Arjuna, but what is more important to the plot is that she is a British embassy official, special assistant to the British military intelligence officer, Colonel Hen-

derson, the man who "discovers" that the Chinese have dispatched a shipload of weapons to arm the PKI in preparation for their takeover. Many of the *wayang* allusions are surely too subtle and esoteric to hit most people who see the film. Indeed one has to read the book on which the film is based to appreciate the extent to which "The Year of Living Dangerously" is intended to be a westerner's version of the Javanese shadow-play.

But what does come across clearly is the film's portrayal of the 1965 affair, presented as a PKI attempt at insurrection, backed with those mythical arms from China. The only forces said to be opposing the PKI's rise to power are "Muslims". Then, when the G30S is crushed, the victors are described as "Muslim generals". Suharto gets not a mention in the film, though in the book, we discover that Suharto is the man the British favour, a "good chap" and a "cool customer", according to Colonel Henderson. Henderson himself is pretty "cool" for in the film version, he appears as the man who, dressed in kilt, encircles the British embassy building playing the bagpipes as (communist) mobs besiege and destroy it, a neat contrast of western culture and oriental violence.

Woven into Hamilton's romance with Jill is the fact that she tells him of the

Chinese cargo just about to reach a secret destination which unintentionally spurs him to get his greatest scoop, even at the risk of threatening their affair. It also secures Hamilton a place on the PKI's "death list" because, as it turns out, his Indonesian assistance, Kumar, is a PKI agent, a cold, hollow creature whose only expression of political faith is his conviction that the ends justify the means, or in other words, the (PKI-planned) G30S killings are justified by the poverty and oppression of the Indonesian people. Kumar is allowed a spark of humanity however for he informs Hamilton that his life is in danger "if we win". False reports about PKI "death lists" were in fact deliberately started by the military as a justification for their own killing of hundreds of thousands of people in 1965 and 1966.

Side by side with the distortions and half-truths about the G30S is an essentially racist portrait of Indonesians. For the most part, they appear as nothing more than shadows lurking, in most cases menacingly, in the background, while Anglo-Saxons dominate the screen. Those who do appear in more coherent form are a pretty despicable lot. For women, we have Tiger Lily, Hamilton's other assistant, so sinister-looking in the flesh that she appears in his dreams as the would-be PKI assassin; or a gang of screaming prostitutes who mob Hamilton and friend as they drive to a cemetery on the outskirts of Jakarta for a "night of pleasure"; or Ibu, the personification of In-

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Linda Hunt as cameraman Billy Kwan and Nel Gibson as Guy Hamilton.

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face rows with the family when they return home. According to the government, the ideal size of a family is three children, but you know, Timorese families are by tradition very large, on an average ten children, and they deeply resent being told to have small families. But this idea of having only three children is hammered in all the time. I can assure you that the women who get the Depo Provera injections don't know what it is for. And I know that there are cases of women being sterilised without their consent. I know the case of a woman, Mrs. Galhas, who went to hospital to have an appendix removed, but while she was under anaesthetic, the doctor also tied up her fallopian tubes without her consent. The point is that she already had ten children and the authorities apparently decided that she should be sterilised.

What about medical treatment. What are the hospitals and clinics like?

Clinics have indeed been set up; they're called *puskesmas* (social health centres), but there's very little in the way of medicine. When people go to the *puskesmas* in the Postes, they'll be lucky to get a few pills. For more serious complaints requiring hospital treatment, the only way is to pay for it. This can be as much as 60,000 to 80,000 rupiahs, or even as much as 100,000

rupiahs. If you can't afford that, you don't get treated.

Outside Dili, in the Postes, there's little to be had in the way of medical treatment, but people there are not allowed to go to Dili for treatment. The result is that people often die for lack of treatment. In any case, treatment in the hospitals and clinics is very unsatisfactory, given without care or attention; it's such a contrast to Portuguese times when hospitals were well-staffed and treatment was qualified and good. Some of the Indonesian doctors are poorly qualified. Others are well qualified, but they only want to treat people properly in their private practices, and for high fees.

The birth control programme, you know, is part of a stratagem being pursued by the Indonesians. Before the invasion, under the Portuguese, there was never any attempt to force such things on people; people could have as many children as they wanted. In those days, the population was about 650,000, and considering the size of the country, it was far from being over-populated. Now, after at least 200,000 people have been killed off during the war, any talk of over-population is even more ludicrous. There's absolutely no need for any family planning. On the contrary. But it's quite clear that the reason why the Indonesians are resorting to this kind of thing is because they want to kill off the Timorese, and to re-populate our country with their own people.

<p>West Papua: The Obliteration of a People</p> 	<p>Price: £2.50 plus postage 40 pence, or £2 air</p>	<p>INDONESIA Law, Propaganda and Terror</p>  <p>Julie Southwood Patrick Flanagan</p>	<p>Price: £5.95 plus postage 50 pence, £3 air</p>
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TAPOL welcomes letters from readers and hopes to continue its series of Guest Column articles. Signed articles do not necessarily express views with which TAPOL can agree; they are published in order to promote discussion of issues relevant to developments in Indonesia today. Readers' letters must be kept reasonably short, otherwise cuts will have to be made because space is limited. All letters should be related to human rights problems with which TAPOL is concerned.

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onesia's poor, befriended by the dwarf, who is too stupid to realise that the canal water she uses to bathe her child is polluted enough to kill him. For men, in addition to the creepy Kumar, we have a constantly petrified chauffeur, a lot of grim-looking troops who keep blocking Hamilton in his search for news, and servants who pad about in the bars and homes of westerners. No wonder the dwarf so strongly believes that only "Anglo-Saxons are good in the tropics".

Just in case the fact of political murder is overlooked, there is a scene right at the end showing a line of (communist?) men and women being shot dead by the military. But, having been told all along that communists have no regard for life, we can hardly be expected to sympathise with them.

One could deal at some length with the numerous historical inaccuracies. There was, for instance, no curfew in Jakarta in 1965 until after 1st October though the westerners keep referring to one throughout the film; Hamilton and Jill even crush through a curfew blockade, and get shot at for good measure. Nor did street demonstrators wear red head-bands, a tradition from the 1940s, not the 1960s; the redness, though, did help reinforce the impression of communist presence. But the main trouble with a film or book like this is that they come across as skilfully-written, well-produced and competently-acted works of "faction", leading the uninformed viewer or reader to believe that this is what really happened in Indonesia in 1965. It's a tragedy that the first novel and film to depict that period should have been done with such disregard for the truth.

Carmel Budiardjo



This and other cartoons from INDOC, Leiden

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