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
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Army Intensifies Surveillance of Ex-Tapols

A "Board of Staff Assistants to Handle the Latent Danger of Communism" has now been installed by the Military Commander in Jakarta. The Board, sworn in on 29th June last and composed of 18 senior military officers and local government officials, was set up in response to an Instruction from KOPKAMTIB stipulating that control and supervision of former "G30S" (30th September 1965 Movement) political prisoners is the responsibility of the local government together with the Military Command (Laksusda) and the Police. As *Tempo* points out (10th July, 1982) these authorities have already, since 1974, been charged with these duties; the creation of this new Board means therefore that this control is now to be further intensified.

Jakarta Military Commander, Brigadier-General Norman Sasano said during the installation ceremony that "communist teachings pose a constant threat... which can explode at any time." Supervision of ex-tapols had up to now been insufficiently effective, a situation which they could use to "make link-ups, to change their names and professions, to form cadres, undertake ideological communication, engage in hidden moves, agitation, propaganda and subversion, like living fungus (*spora*) spreading here, there and everywhere, clinging on, then obliterating their traces."

He said that there were altogether 5,580 tapols released in Jakarta, not including those who had moved into Jakarta from other places. He claimed that there were 36 'hard-core' ex-tapols plus 45 who were still in prison on criminal charges. (This presumably refers to tried political prisoners still serving sentences, *Editor*).

There may, said General Sasano, have been some improvements in exerting control over these people as a result of intensified indoctrination courses and religious education, but vigilance must constantly be raised. "The task of dealing with this latent communist danger is not only the responsibility of the Armed Forces but also of every single citizen."

General Sasano then made the extraordinary statement that "because we are all so full of forgiveness, people have been too quick to forget past events... with the result that society is not vigilant enough and does not react spontaneously

to latent communist dangers."

"Children only just born at the time of the G30S or still just infants, and who are now in their late 'teens understand nothing of the G30S/PKI brutalities. Naturally, they are not in the slightest bit concerned about these dangers. This is a situation that makes it possible for communism to revive in our country."

He was concerned too that many social problems had not been properly tackled, such as land conflicts, disputes involving workers, petty traders and young delinquents; these were all issues that former PKI political prisoners could use for purposes of creating social unrest.

The new Board, said one senior member, would not have any operational functions. Its task would be to detect activities undertaken by PKI remnants and make recommendations to the Military Commander. "For example, if a new organisation is set up and Board members have reason to believe that it is moving in the direction of communist teachings, the Board will then offer advice to the Commander."

Sources: *Tempo* 10th July 1982 and *Sinar Harapan*, 29th June, 1982.

Sudomo Highlights "New Threats" to Stability

Meanwhile, KOPKAMTIB Commander, Admiral Sudomo, has presented a somewhat different analysis of the current
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DEATH SENTENCES MUST BE COMMUTED

There are, according to TAPOL's records, altogether 65 political prisoners under sentence of death in Indonesia. Sixty-two of them were sentenced for activities related to the 30th September, 1965 events; most were sentenced between 1966 and 1973. The other three are Muslim prisoners, tried and sentenced since 1977.

After years of neglecting the fate of these men, many of whom have appealed for clemency to the president, Suharto now appears to have started passing down his final decisions. As we reported in March this year (*TAPOL Bulletin* No.50), Air Force officer, Colonel Sudiono, had his sentence upheld on final appeal, and the death sentence against the Muslim prisoner, Trinsar Zubil, was also upheld. More recently, reports have reached us that another four death sentences have received final confirmation from the president, including those of the two trade unionists Mohammed Munir and Ruslan Wijayasastra (see p.20).

In 1980, the Dutch Foreign Minister was given assurances by members of the Indonesian government that none of the death sentences would be carried out. They obviously realised that a fresh wave of executions could cause 'political embarrassment' for Indonesia in the West. But, as Buyung Nasution, then Director of the Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta, said at the time in an interview with *De Waarheid* (18th December 1980)

That's fine, but I think the important thing is for those death sentences to be formally commuted. It would then no longer be an internal question for the Indonesian authorities.

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threats to Indonesia's stability. In a report appearing in the *New York Times* (5th August, 1982), he says: "Industrial strikes, student demonstrations and urban crime" are the latest dangers threatening security and stability. These threats could be regarded, he said, as the "side effects" of rapid industrialisation.

KOPKAMTIB, he went on, was now in the process of "shifting its focus from threats of political subversion to domestic unrest" since the communists were now no more than remnants and the extreme Islamic movement too had been reduced to insignificance. (Sudomo's distinction between "subversion" and "unrest" is difficult to follow since incidents such as strikes, which presumably fall under the heading "unrest" are frequently branded as "subversive".)

Sudomo also pointed out that the large number of strikes — a hundred in the first six months of this year — showed that the Ministry of Labour has proven unable to deal with the problem. This is why, Sudomo said, KOPKAMTIB "now sits is on negotiations between workers and employers."

Employers of Ex-Tapols warned to be 'On Guard'

"Former G30S/PKI prisoners with special qualifications, such as journalists, doctors and lawyers, can of course return to their professions, but anyone employing them will be warned

Now the sentences are being confirmed, the worthlessness of these assurances is apparent. The final rejection of the clemency pleas means that the lives of these men, and of all the others whose sentences still await final confirmation, are now in grave danger.

Even a convicted criminal is entitled to know whether he will live or die by execution. These men cannot be described as being convicted of any crime, since the 'offences' of which they were accused were political ones, based on Indonesia's vaguely worded but comprehensive Anti-Subversion Law, the evidence against them was of the flimsiest and they were given no real opportunity to defend themselves.

To keep a man in suspense for seventeen years as to whether he will be executed next day or next week is in itself treatment of the most inhuman kind, no matter what his offence. To execute him after that period is a crime against humanity. The execution of a person convicted under the Anti-Subversion law is simply political murder.

Stop Press:

A report reaching us from Indonesia early in September strongly suggests that Colonel Sudiono, the Air Force officer whose death sentence was upheld by President Suharto at the beginning of this year (see *TAPOL Bulletin* No.50, March 1982), may have been executed a couple of months ago.

to be on guard," said Admiral Sudomo, commander of KOPKAMTIB, at a course held in August for government officials who are responsible for "supervising former G30S/PKI prisoners".

And he went on: "Ex-prisoners who are teachers can be re-employed in localities where there is a shortage of teachers, so long as they are placed under supervision and guidance."

The course, which was attended by 130 officials from Regional Military Commands, the Police, the Prosecutor's Office and the Department of the Interior from all parts of Indonesia, is part of the recently-launched programme to "strengthen vigilance against the latent communist danger and against former political prisoners." Participants were given lectures on "the essence of communism", "psychological aspects of communist activity" and "analysis of social structures in Indonesia".

Sudomo said that contractors who employed ex political prisoners could rest assured, provided they were told it was only for humanitarian reasons. "And we will help keep watch on the ones who are employed."

The number of people who would be subjected to this form of supervision, should they manage to secure employment, is, according to Sudomo, a thousand tried and convicted prisoners who have been released, 33,000 B-category prisoners and 540,000 C-category prisoners.

Sudomo refused to be drawn when asked by journalists whether the current emphasis on stepping up vigilance against communism was in any way connected with the forthcoming session of the People's Consultative Assembly, scheduled for March 1983. (*Kompas*, 11th August 1982).

ACTIVISM AND LECTURESHIPS DON'T MIX!

A reader's letter published in *Tempo*, 10th July, 1982

I was expecting a response from the Department of Education to the report (*Tempo*, 20th March 1982)* that prospective Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) lecturers had been turned down by the Department. But so far there has been nothing. I would like to add a few points.

Rejection of prospective lecturers is happening not only at ITB. I happen to be among those turned down for lectureships at the University of Indonesia (UI) Medical Faculty. The reason? It's not clear. All there is is a letter sent last November by the Secretary General of the Department of Education mentioning the names of five lecturers proposed by the Rector of UI, and saying that they do not conform to requirements. Not only that: these five unsuitable candidates are said to be unsuitable to become lecturers at *any state institute of higher education throughout Indonesia*. How fantastic!

Anyone with any experience of higher education in Indonesia will know that not one of the universities has enough teachers. Even UI and ITB suffer shortages, let alone the others. People say the reason for the shortage is that so many of those eligible are unwilling: low wages and a heavy work load make it more attractive to find work elsewhere. An assistant lecturer gets only Rp. 15,000 (about £12.00) a month. What a wage for a graduate!

So, why are all these people being turned down? *Tempo* hints in its article that the ones being rejected are all former activists. What's the connection between being an activist and being a lecturer? Are activists incapable of teaching, incapable of communication, incapable of understanding? Are they all lifelong rebels? I don't believe it! Fancy, the new order turning out like this.

Before the letter of rejection had been sent (mind you, no copy was sent to the person in question – maybe the office clerk at the Department just forgot), I had already heard the gossip. Indonesia is a country with a fertile soil, a soil fertile for gossip. I could hardly believe my ears! Rumour had it that eight prospective lecturers at UI had been turned down, and 15 at ITB, not to speak of other universities. In all cases, it was because the people had once been members of student councils.

I couldn't believe it . . . Is there some close correlation between activism and a low level of scientific qualification? I asked an Education Department official in June how far my efforts to obtain a licence to practice had got. His reply? "Oh, but you're an important fellow!" And it turns out there is a list of important fellows at the Department, so he told me: about 40 altogether, throughout the country, who have been turned down.

When I asked how long it would be before I was told whether I had been accepted, the reply was truly amazing! The decision to turn me down had already been taken. *What was*

still being considered was the reason why. Can it be so? I only hope I'm wrong, for if the Department functions like this what chance is there for a scientific approach on its part?

After a long wait, the letter was finally issued at the end of 1981. The reason was simply that ". . . does not fulfil the necessary requirements to teach at *any state institute of higher education throughout Indonesia*". What requirements? Qualifications? Dedication? Acquiescence? Rebelliousness? One thing is clear, and that is that I was a member of a student council. I once helped run *Media Aesculapius*. I was once on the executive of the HMI (Muslim Students Union). Three of my colleagues, all graduates of UI, were once on the Student Faculty Board (MPM), helped run the campus paper *Salemba* and were HMI activists, while a fourth who graduated from ITB had apparently entered his name as a candidate for the ITB student council.

The colleagues who have been accepted as lecturers indeed never became members of this, that or the other. The ones who have been accepted never turned their attention to such things.

Rumour has it that the Education Department is undergoing a big "clean-up". They say that some tenured lecturers are about to be suspended. Taking after Iran, are we? Making a hobby of dismissing people. Maybe there's a connection between all this and the minister who's a graduate from France. Who knows? Apparently many of those who are dismissing people in Iran are French-educated.

But is it indeed true that people are being turned down because of their activism? As yet, no official clarification has been forthcoming.

Dr. Hasbullah
Cawang II,
East Jakarta.

Military Karyawan in Indonesia's top bureaucracy

The article under this heading contained in TAPOL Bulletin No.50, March 1982 was a summary of a work entitled: "Patterns of Military Control in the Indonesian Higher Central Bureaucracy" by John A. MacDougall.

The full text of that work has now been printed in *Indonesia*, No.33 (April), 1982, published by Cornell Southeast Asia Program. Readers wishing to obtain a copy should enquire to the publishers at: Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853.

* The *Tempo* article referred to above reported that ITB with only 719 lecturers for nearly 11,000 students suffers a continual shortage of teaching staff. It normally absorbs thirty new ITB graduates each year as assistant (honorer) lecturers who subsequently get confirmation as tenured staff. Eight of those who have been employed since 1979 whose names were submitted to the Department of Education for confirmation have been rejected as being "incompetent". The ITB Rector, Hariadi Soepangkat, told *Tempo* that proposals for tenured appointments are submitted to the Department only after careful consideration, with academic qualification being the prime criterion. All proposals are first considered by the Faculty Council which is composed of senior lecturers.

Tempo points out that all eight rejected lecturers were student activists in the heyday of student activism, 1975-1978, prior to and following the 1977 general election.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN WEST PAPUA

Testimony to the 1981 Tribunal in Port Moresby

In May 1981, the Melanesian Solidarity Committee in Papua New Guinea held a Tribunal on the human rights situation in West Papua. Retired Judge Bernard Narakobi, chairman of the Tribunal, explained in his opening remarks that the Tribunal was intended as a "referral hearing", held to determine whether there was a case for Indonesia to answer. Once this had been established, efforts would be made to have the case heard by an international body empowered to consider the charges.

An American law professor, Henk di Suvero, past president of the Lawyers Guild of the USA, acted as Prosecuting Counsel assisted by Nicholas Kiron. A number of witnesses were heard and closely cross-examined by the prosecutors as well as by members of the Tribunal. Some witnesses gave evidence in English, some in pidgin and some in Indonesian.

The complete tapes of the Tribunal have recently been made available to TAPOL and we are now able to publish verbatim reports. Reproduced below is the evidence of two witnesses. Other evidence will be reproduced in later issues.

Public Executions

Necky Salossa, a West Papuan, was employed at a joint venture US-Indonesian oil company in Sorong, Birds Head, from 1973-1978. He testified in Indonesian, with the help of a translator.

What percentage of the work-force were native Papuans?

About 80%, initially, but then it was reduced to 20%. Some were dismissed because it was said that their contracts had expired and others because for example they failed to turn up for work for a day or two. None of the supervisory employees was native.

How did the Papuan workers respond to the sackings?

There had been an instruction for native employees to be dismissed and replaced by Indonesians, so in 1975, the Papuan workers at the company rebelled. They organised an attack on the Indonesian and western managers at 8 in the morning, and they beat them and chased them.

Were you arrested in 1967?

Yes, in Ayamaru, east of Sorong, between Sorong and Manokwari. I was still at school, 16 years old. I was arrested because I helped the OPM (Free-Papua Movement) by supplying them with books in the jungle. I was held for three days. Indonesian soldiers, holding a pistol at my head, interrogated me, then beat me, and I fell to the floor.

Were you arrested again in 1975?

Yes, this time on the island of Salawati. Today, the liberation movement has spread throughout the country right up to the border, but in those days we were active in Sorong, Fak-Fak and Manokwari.

Did you attend meetings of workers at the time, explaining the differences between Papuans and Indonesians?

There weren't any mass meetings, only secret gatherings, where I called on people to oppose the Indonesians and expel them from the country. After my arrest, I was beaten again and taken to military headquarters. This time, they beat me unconscious. I was held for a month, without trial, except for a military hearing.

Did you witness killings in Ayamaru district in 1966 or 1967?

Yes, in those days guerrillas were already operating in the bush. The Indonesian government try to persuade them to surrender but they refused to do so.

Did you witness public executions?

Yes, nine leaders were taken out of the military prison and shot dead in front of a crowd of people, on 3rd February 1967. It happened in Tinabuan. Franz Kaisieppo, a Papuan, who was governor of West Irian at the time, heard about these executions, so he came to Tinabuan three days later. He wept before the Indonesian soldiers, urging them not to kill any more Papuans.

How did the executions take place?

They took the men from prison, then took them to the outskirts of town and shot them there. One man did not die immediately. He fled from there and ran back to his village where he collapsed and died in his mother's arms. Other killings took place at the time in several parts of Sorong. In all, 33 people were shot dead like this by the Indonesians.

Did you witness the murder of the brothers Eli and Adam Tambuaya?¹

Yes, they were shot in Ayamaru township at eight in the morning, in March 1967. I saw it myself and I had to remove the bodies. Eli had his hands tied behind his back and he was shot from the front. Adam was shot from the front, and wasn't blindfolded. They were both killed with the first shot but the soldiers went on firing at the bodies for about two hours, so when we picked them up, flesh and pieces were scattered all over the place. We had to gather them all together to put them in a bag for burial.

Did you see the killing of Yorems?

Yes, that was in Lasut village, also in March 1967. The soldiers came and asked him whether he was in the OPM. As they interrogated him they held a bren-bun to his head. Then, someone fired the gun. All that was left was the body; his head disappeared. He was shot because he was in the OPM.

Did you witness an incident in 1967 between Indonesian soldiers and a Papuan woman?

Yes, in Ayamaru district. The woman, named Isir (I forget her first name), from Chem, 4 kms out of Ayamaru, was arrested by about 60 soldiers. I don't know how many of them raped her, but I heard from others who saw the incident themselves that her legs were tied to posts when they raped her.

Did the executions you described take place in public?

Yes, one on the outskirts of town and the other, the Tambuaya brothers, happened in town.

Were any disciplinary measures taken against the soldiers?

No, never.

Were there instructions from senior officers for soldiers to kill Papuans?

I don't know. I don't think so, but the soldiers were the ones who did it.

Are you a PNG citizen?

No, I've just come (to Port Moresby) from Wabo Camp. I left the camp on 24th April. I crossed the border in October 1978.

Do you want to stay here?

Yes, because it's free here, democratic. Everyone has rights.

Did you come and give evidence of your own free will?

Yes, this is the first time I or any of my countrymen have had the opportunity to express our opinions here, in an open tribunal. I want to ask the Tribunal to give serious consideration to the human rights violations which I and others have testified about, and to consider whether these violations



Barbarina Ikari, one of six women in jail in Jayapura for raising the Papuan flag in 1980. They too have been raped.

we have described are in accordance with the law or not. That is all.

A Papuan School Terrorised

Adolf Henesby was head of a Dutch Reformed Church primary school near Sentani, on the outskirts of Jayapura. He crossed the border into PNG in 1967. He testified in English.

Did something happen at the school in April 1963?

Yes, towards Easter when I was conducting choir practice, we saw tanks belonging to (Indonesian) panzer units. They stopped at the entrance, and certain leaders came out of the tanks and walked to the classrooms. They came to the dining hall and sat at the back of the dining hall while we continued singing hymns. Being a mission school, this was part of our syllabus. They were sitting at the back, so I continued with the singing till one of them came forward, stopped me and asked whether he could talk to me. I stopped and went with him.

He asked whether he could inspect the school. I said, I hadn't heard of your coming, so I'm reluctant to let people come and inspect my teaching. Upon their demanding it I asked them to go to the office and sign the visitors' book. In the meantime, I told the teachers and pupils to go back and wait in the classrooms. One of them tried to stop them (the soldiers) from going into the classrooms because there was a Papuan flag and documents relating to West Papua on the walls, in visible places.

Then suddenly the visitors went to the classes. I started to introduce them to the teachers but they paid no attention to me. They were looking round the walls where flags were displayed. Then they said that when they had passed by (previously) they saw Papuan flags and symbols but now they had disappeared. I said, if they are here, then they should be around. But the visitors said they didn't believe me, and wanted to search the school. They took me out to where the tanks were, and left me there. There were seven tanks in all, each with about 6 or 7 men, so 40 men in all. Then they ransacked the whole school and destroyed everything related to West Papua or in Dutch. They took away all the flags, the symbols, the books, the charts, everything connected with the Papuan people. Then they came and told me to get into no. 4 tank. Then we went to the panzer barracks.

I was led in and questioned about why we were still keeping those flags and symbols. I told them it was because it was still the UN period;² it had not yet expired, it was April then. Then I was questioned about many things, mainly about elite West Papuans who, they said, were the ones hampering the Indonesians in their plans and programmes. I was transferred from there to the military police unit and held for 3 days. Then they took me to a major, for a one-man hearing. He stared at my report, looked up and called me, saw that I was a school teacher, a Christian and told me he couldn't see why I had been brought here.

Did he know you were a well-known soccer player?

Yes. Then I was released. Then in 1965, I was told by our reliable sources that the military were after me, so I didn't stay at home, moved from one hiding-place to another for weeks. I had sleepless nights because of moving from one place to another. And when they raided a house I was in, I was caught, about one in the morning. They almost broke down the doors, knocking. I woke up and opened the door. There stood a friend of mine who was doing part-time studies at the

university, from Sulawesi.

They took me to the police station. There I saw many heads of defence, the police, the military. Then I was taken to a second room, where I saw several Papuans sitting. One was lying down, covered with blood, on the cement floor. I was asked to sit down with the rest, while I tried to figure out what had happened to that person whom I knew very well. Throughout the night, we were questioned by the Indonesian soldiers. They said: you Papuans can't become a nation of your own. Only one of the group was beaten, Junus Mendoan.¹ I was held there for ten months, never charged or tried.

What kind of prison conditions did you live under?

The cell we were in was about 2 metres long and one metre wide. In my time, we were about 6 to 8 in a cell. We took turns to sleep. The toilet was outside. There was no recreation at all. I saw my first visitor after 4 months. After ten months, just before our release, I was asked to give a speech on behalf of the 73 prisoners. I was asked to write a speech, and they had to see it first before I delivered it. The first time, they did not approve it, the second time they did not, and the third time, I wrote the way they wanted, so as not to press them. But when I delivered the speech, I didn't deliver it the way they wanted. I said, we had been held there without trial, that is against human rights. If you hold people like this, put them in prison, then they must be tried.

Towards the latter part of your 10 months in prison, were you brought to classrooms?

Yes, we went back to school, we were indoctrinated. We

were taught that we are one people, the people of Indonesia, one country, the country of Great Indonesia, that we have one language, bahasa Indonesia, that we have one flag, the red-and-white, that we have one constitution, and all that.

Can you tell us how far cultural genocide is being practised in West Papua?

I think the Papuans are forced to accept this new culture, to accept this new situation, the new social and political structure brought in by the Indonesians whether they like it or not. They want to destroy the Papuan culture.

What happened to the other 72 people with you (in detention)?

They were all released at the same time.

What about the others. Are any dead? Where are they?

Some are alive today, some are here in this room. I know of one who was killed about two years ago.

You came to PNG in 1967?

Yes, I came alone. I am now a citizen of PNG.

Footnotes

1. Some names of places and individuals mentioned were difficult to decipher on the tape. There may be mistakes therefore in the spelling.
2. The UN period of administration lasted from 1st October 1962 till 1st May 1963. During this period, the UN had sole jurisdiction over West Papua. Indonesian officials, formally speaking, had no powers and should not have been engaging in security operations.

West Papuans in PNG face deportation

Ten Flee To Escape Repatriation

Ten West Papuan refugees who were taken to Vanimo, a coastal town on the PNG side of the border with Indonesian-occupied West Papua, to await repatriation to Jayapura, escaped and fled just as a boat had arrived from Indonesia to take them back. An Indonesian official was already at the wharf to escort them back when the incident happened.

A Catholic priest, not named but described as a naturalised citizen of PNG, who reportedly helped the men escape, was expected to face charges in a Vanimo court in late July.

The ten men had crossed over into PNG during the past six months. They were arrested and charged with illegal entry. When released on 3rd July, they were served with deportation orders.

The PNG Foreign Ministry has claimed that none of the men has traditional border-crossing rights, nor could they be described as sympathisers of the Free-Papua Movement which would entitle them to refugee status. The provincial government of West Sepik, a province which borders with West Papua, has a different opinion. It has contacted the UN office in Port Moresby asking for assistance for the men who are, it believes, political refugees.

Source: *Post Courier* (PNG), 19th and 22nd July, 1982

Another Held for Deportation

A West Papuan who stormed into the PNG Foreign Affairs

Ministry, armed with an axe, has been jailed and is to be deported to Indonesia.

He is David Zohe Balagaize, described as an "illegal immigrant". He crossed into PNG four years ago, in 1978, to see his twin brother, Janarius, who died a year later in a fire in Waigani. After arriving in PNG, he stayed for a year in Lake Murray, Western Province and was then sent to Port Moresby by Tom Unwin who was UN Resident Representative in PNG at the time. This did not have the approval of the PNG government.

Davis Balagaize appeared in court on 21st July last and was charged with carrying an offensive weapon. He was remanded in custody at Bomana prison, Port Moresby to await travel arrangements for deportation to Indonesia.

It would appear that he is a victim of the PNG government's refusal to help Papuans on the run, for whatever reason, from the Indonesian government. His attack on the Foreign Ministry which he probably regards as the cause for all his problems may well have been provoked by anger, after years of living without the security of any legal status.

TAPOL has written to the UN High Commission for Refugees in Singapore expressing concern about the treatment of West Papuans in PNG and requesting information about these two cases.

Source: *Post Courier* (PNG) 19th and 22nd July 1982.

Thousands of Papuans killed by Indonesian Troops in West Papua

From West Papuan exiles in contact with the resistance movement operating there (the Free Papua Movement) as well as with persons inside the Indonesian Armed Forces, TAPOL has received the following information, dated 3 August 1982:


In the six-month period from mid-October 1981 to mid-March 1982, the death toll of indigenous villagers in West Papua (now Indonesia's unwilling 17th province, Irian Jaya) is 14,000 and of this death list all but one thousand occurred in the area of the Wissel Lakes. At Agimuka and Paniai in particular, aerial bombardment using napalm and chemical weapons has been employed. Many kampungs are now deserted, a result of the killing and subsequent evacuation. This area contains a population exceeding 100,000 and was the scene in April 1969 of an uprising against the Indonesian-controlled plebiscite whereby Papuans are said to have unanimously accepted Indonesian military rule. Attention had been drawn to the bombing and strafing of villages two years before that "act of free choice" by Lord Ogmore, Liberal Party member. On 5 April 1967, he called on the British government to help stop massacres that were occurring under the very eye of the United Nations.

In 1981, "Operasi Galang 11" was launched by the Indonesian Armed Forces, involving retaliatory moves for action by the Free Papua Movement in October that year in kidnapping 50 Indonesian saw-mill employees. Intensified, it was renamed "Operasi Sapu Bersih" — Clean Sweep Operation. Early in 1982, a Dutch television documentary, made in September 1981, showed 3000 Papuans in the highlands chanting "Indonesians go home to Jakarta" and this was soon followed by the report that villagers there had been bombed. Dutch protest did not stop the human destruction. Previously, a Dutch scholar (Lagerberg) who had been a former patrol officer in the period before 1962, revisited his former area on the southern coastline near where the giant Freeport copper/gold mine is now operating, and tallied —

name by name — 5000 deaths as further testimony to the policy of ethnocide. There are signs that resistance has recently intensified in this region. The **National Times** (8-14 August 1982) reports that a raid on a building holding Freeport explosives was followed by the destruction of two bridges in the area. This would be the first time that mining operations have been attacked since the 1977 periodic disruption of the 110km pipeline, carrying copper slurry from 3000m to sea level. Villages then within a radius of 20km of the mining were bombed, and some Papuans were imprisoned in large steel containers which were part of the mining equipment — an act publicised by Amnesty International in mid-1978.

The latest massacres in the Wissel Lakes area (which like the Baliem Valley and the Manokwari area is known for large-scale opposition to military rule) occurred in a locality marked for future development; the project for re-settlement of transmigrants or settlers from other islands in the Indonesian archipelago. This population is being imported as the basis for a future Indonesian state, the concept which spells the death of the Papuan lifestyle in the western half of New Guinea. This large bird-shaped island will be traversed (according to Indonesian strategy with assistance from US and Japanese sources) by the first north-to-south road starting from Nabire, at the nape of the bird's neck where the large pre-World War Two Japanese agricultural concessions are now turning into Indonesian population re-settlement areas, and passing southwards through the Wissel area where Papuan resistance to Indonesian domination remains strong.

As part of the general policy of eliminating opposition, deaths were also reported by Papuan exiles as occurring at Sre-Sre Kampung, 500; at Lereh Kampung near Jayapura, the capital, 346; at Genyem, Abepura, Waris and Sentani, all close to Jayapura, 155. It was noted that a further 38 political prisoners including 6 women are being held in a military prison in Jayapura.



AUSTRALIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA 1972-1981

Details of Australian military assistance to Indonesia since 1972 have been made available following a question asked in the Australian House of Representatives by Mr. Duffy. The reply is published in Australia's *Hansard C*, May 1982.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs was asked for details of all military assistance to Indonesia since 1972, and was also asked what steps the Government had taken to ensure that any military equipment given to Indonesia has not been used in East Timor and if it has been used in that country, what action the Government has taken to prevent continuance of such use. In what was effectively a non-reply to the second question, the Foreign Minister said:

The only restriction placed on the use of military equipment provided under DCP (Defence Co-operation Programme) to other countries including Indonesia, is on the sale or disposal to a third country without prior consent of the Australian Government.

The Minister's reply to the first question reveals a steady rise in annual DCP expenditure in Indonesia, as follows:

Financial Year	Expenditure (A\$ thousands)
1972-73	3,763
1973-74	5,108
1974-75	5,565
1975-76	6,259
1976-77	6,596
1977-78	7,209
1978-79	7,183
1979-80	9,589
1980-81	11,935

Major DCP activities in Indonesia since 1972 have included the following:

A maritime patrol project including provision of 2 ex-Australian Navy Attack Class patrol boats, 6 Australian designed and built 16-metre patrol boats, 18 Australian built Nomad aircraft, advisory teams, and training in Australia.

Provision of 16 Sabre aircraft with associated equipment, training and advisory assistance.

A continuing survey and mapping project in Indonesia,

currently directed towards Irian Jaya (West Papua).

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Provision of 16 Sabre aircraft with associated equipment, training and advisory assistance.

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Provision of 12 ex-Army unarmed Sioux helicopters for basic training, and of 250 military Landrover vehicles for basic training.

A training and study visit programme.

Questions asked of the Foreign Minister in the Australian Senate elicited replies about the many official Indonesian delegations that have visited Australia during the 12-month period to February 1982. A number of these delegations were from the Armed Forces or from defence-related agencies. In February 1981, a delegation of defence and intelligence officials visited Australia to "exchange information and assessments on matters of common interest". Such exchanges between Indonesia and Australia, the Minister said, "have been taking place for some years now". Other Armed Forces delegations from Indonesia included a Combat Instructor Team, a Naval Maintenance Study Visit, a Defence Financial Study Visit, a Regional Support and Supply Seminar (for discussions on defence supply and support issues of mutual concern), a Titan MK III Demonstration Visit (to attend Hawker Marine demonstration of the Riverine Craft Titan MK III), and an Exercise Kangaroo 1981 Study Visit. (See also *Hansard*, May 1982).

Clearly, while Indonesian actions in East Timor continue to attract a great deal of criticism in Australia and Australian journalists are still prevented from carrying out regular news-gathering activities in Indonesia, relations between the two countries at a government-to-government level are proceeding unobstructed.

Fretilin representative denied entry into Australia

Jose Ramos Horta, who has represented Fretilin at the UN since 1975 and who is formally recognised by the UN as the Fretilin representative, has been refused a visa to go to Australia to give oral evidence to the Australian Senate's inquiry on East Timor. The Senate Inquiry Committee extended its invitation to him last July, and he applied for a visa on 2nd August. On 25th August, Australia's Immigration Minister, Hodges, told the Senate that Horta would not be allowed entry into Australia in line with "long-standing government policy on Fretilin leaders".



Jose Ramos Horta

TRIED POLITICAL PRISONER RELEASED 872 DAYS AFTER SENTENCE EXPIRED

A tried political prisoner whose sentence expired, with remission, in 1979 but who was still in prison in Balikpapan more than two years later, has now been released following intervention on his behalf by the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) in Jakarta

The prisoner, Hadi Surono, was arrested on 11th December 1967. Nearly seven years later, in November 1975, he was tried on the basis of the 1963 Anti-Subversion law, found guilty, and sentenced to 13 years with deduction for time already served. In April 1982, his wife wrote to the LBH asking for help in securing his immediate release. (See **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 52, July 1982, page 15.) The LBH took up the case and on 5th May, Hadi Surono was released and reunited with his family.

Reporting the successful outcome, **Kompas** (29th May, 1982) points out that even without remission, the prisoner would have been entitled to release on 10th December 1980. He had however been granted remission which entitled him to release a year earlier, in 1979.

LBH director, Abdulrachman Saleh, told **Kompas** that the LBH, acting on behalf of the family would now sue the state for damages due to the failure of the Balikpapan prison authorities to release the prisoner on schedule. "872 days is not a short period of time", he said, adding that it was to be hoped that Hadi Surono's experience would not be repeated.

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
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Professor W. F. Wertheim, in a Foreword, writes:

"To my knowledge, it is the first time that an attempt has been made to describe the actual power of KOP-KAMTIB in its full impact upon the behaviour of both Indonesian officialdom (including the Armed Forces, the Police and the Judiciary) and the general public—the 'Victims' of propaganda and terror in the terminology of the authors. Their analysis does not start from pre-conceived theoretical stereotypes, either Marxist or of the Dependencia type, about neo-colonial regimes, but is based on a multitude of concrete data about how the 'Legal System' of Indonesia is being actually run—or rather ignored by those appointed to administer it."

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THE RELIGIOUS OF EAST TIMOR:

“ . . . invasion, war, looting, the destr

In a statement, “Reflections of the East Timorese Religious”, submitted to the 1981 Session of MASRI (Majelis Serikat-Serikat Religius Indonesia, the Council of Unions of Indonesian Religious), members of the Catholic orders in East Timor stated their views about the situation in their country. The full text, received in English, is printed below, unedited.

Introduction

We do not intend giving an analysis of the East Timor problem, but only to reflect together on the faith of the East Timorese people in the actual situation. An analysis of that problem has already been put forward in SEM April 1980. We realise that in analysing the problem as such we would not be speaking from heart to heart, our communications would still be shallow. Consequently there easily arises misunderstandings which were not desired, or which give the impression that we are always complaining or begging. It is indeed true that the East Timorese church has many needs which cannot be fulfilled by whatever means, even by the Indonesian church itself.

Before this, it seems that there is a need for a good relationship, mutual understanding in the faith given to us by God. Because of this we felt attracted by the invitation from the Board of MASRI to take part in the General Session of MASRI from the 8th to the 18th of September 1981 in the Klender Retreat House, East Jakarta. We were also very much interested in the main theme of the meeting this year which can be summarised as “The Religious Community in its service to the Faithful”.

In connection with this main theme we organised a reflection together, aware and convinced that only in reflection could we communicate with each other.

We also recognise that a sincere communication demands a long process because of the widely varying backgrounds, despite many similarities in community and faith. Our communication will be successful based on deep reflections from all of us, both in our own groups as well as together, specifically concerning the main theme of MASRI this year.

Our dialogue was successful, and on that basis our cooperation in an atmosphere of togetherness will certainly develop without unnecessary misunderstandings, and will become a positive contribution to the Indonesian religious as well as to the religious of East Timor although there are differences in the history of the church and its government.

We must all realise that the Indonesian National Army which liberated Indonesia from the colonial power in an astonishing manner will never liberate the people of East Timor from their colonial situation towards autonomy and national independence because its situation and reality are very different.

That which has taken place during these five years is most significantly: invasion, war, looting, the destruction of the indigenous population, territorial subjection, colonial exploitation, the expulsion of the indigenous population who are replaced by people from other islands, military occupations, attempts for mass mobilisation of people (from 12 to 55 years) to make war on each other. Actually the wish and desire of the East Timorese people from the beginning has

been the right to determine their own fate and not mass murders such as have been done by their neighbours.

In this reflection we seek a similar understanding of human and spiritual standards rooted in our faith towards God. A reflection and all the experiences of the East Timorese people will bring us, the religious, closer to those people and will deepen the missionary spirit in the service of the faith towards the community. We hope that this seed of faith, which is strong and beautiful, can help the people overcome all the difficulties which now disturb them.

The missionary spirit which is deeply felt by the religious in service to the East Timorese people, is still difficult to formulate, and possibly more difficult to communicate in this session to be later experienced, because it is a new element which can only be found and felt by experimenting the concrete situation of the people.

1. The Situation and Emotional Environment of the People of East Timor

The people of East Timor are suffering. They feel themselves misunderstood, although knowing what is happening and aware that they are being humiliated. But they remain in a position which is very clear concerning their ideals. In the midst of all of this their faith stands firm and is strengthened although it is not always able to be expressed in words, but is seen with the eyes of faith by the religious who accompany the people.

The East Timorese religious feel solidarity with the people and because of that feel obliged to express the people's experience of faith. This is even more so because they are in the midst of the people, in a position which helps to understand and formulate better the faith of the people, particularly because they know the language standards and heart of the people.

That which was not hoped for has truly happened: the

. . . the people's way of life has been turned upside down. Masses forced to shift in large numbers to places far away and unknown. . .

people's way of life has been turned upside down and the basis of the community life has been destroyed. Masses of the population have been forced to shift in large numbers to places far away and unknown. This has already happened several times and in the last few months thousands of East Timorese have been exiled from their own homeland. Consequently, apart from them having lost all their possessions there is alienation and disintegration of families. There are continually new orders from above on “security” which actually destroys and confuses the people. People who have been concentrated in (certain) areas and who live in dire poverty, in an atmosphere of false peace, have been forced to accompany the army to the mountains. A few months ago some villages were noted which were entirely empty of male inhabitants because all of the male work force was forced to leave their families, houses, fields, and work, just to accompany the Indonesian

action of the indigenous population, colonial exploitation . . .”

army morning and night for months on end without any medical care and food at all. They were aged 12 to 55.

The seriousness of the health and the rebellious mood of those who return to their huts can no longer be denied.

In the meantime those who remain at home are the mothers, wives, daughters and older people who live out their faith and sadness in continual prayer.

The people are now experiencing oppression without end, their rights are not acknowledged. The people do not have a voice, and even live in fear. Indeed the people live in a situation of continual war, and thus must be silent, and submissive. The produce of their soil is seized, such as coffee, teak, cattle and even their property rights themselves. The army monopolises everything. Confronted by this situation the people do not get an explanation for any of it. Thus they suffer more and feel their faith more.

The people are aware that their faith comes from God whose Word takes the form of social justice. This justice derives from the justice of God in His relations with His people. This justice must be built by the people themselves

**The people must be silent and submissive.
The produce of their soil is seized. The army
monopolises everything.**

based on faith and cooperation with God and one's fellow man who are still the sacrifices to oppression. For us living the faith without serious endeavours for the building of social justice is the same as making faith merely foreign and mystical. Creating justice together with the present Indonesian government is not possible, or not yet, although the people desire justice greatly. A faith which illumines the minds of the people cannot develop in a Christian action, because social justice has not yet come into being. There is as yet no way out from the oppression from above. Because of that we, the religious, must always be alert and thoughtful that the faith of the people is not trodden on.

Becoming in accord with faith means always finding new forms of endeavour. It means that justice is not something which is individual or the concern of the government.

2. Basic Groups

While these events have been happening the people have developed in their efforts to become the community of God. Certainly there were such efforts earlier, but it is now more realised and strengthened because the need is felt to unite in the faith. Often we hear “only God can make us safe”. This means: the certainty of religious standards faced with the facts of the destruction.

Signs of this sort can be felt in groups of teachers, catechists, the basic groups which consider the efforts of the pastor in social and economic activities in various villages although with many difficulties and dangers. The same thing is experienced in clerical communities which serve the believers. Also becoming clearer is the simplicity and beauty of the faith which gives life to the calling of the community and of the religious.

We now face an endeavour to build, and find again that

which was lost with a loving spirit in the field of housing, food, health, education, clothing, technical skills, agriculture, animal husbandry and trade. Because five years of war have truly damaged and destroyed completely all the existing types of infrastructure. That which is described above is indeed very difficult for the people themselves to do because they still face many robberies, burning of houses, difficulties in travel and more, because of intimidation and terror. We are very concerned that a consequence of all these military operations and population movements in the last few months will be the food and health situation becoming more serious as well as a rise in the numbers of those lost or killed.

There have already been positive initiatives from missionaries and the religious, with charitable contributions from MAWI and other organisations to consider various kinds of difficulties and needs. We are aware that these efforts cannot be realised without participation from the basic groups.

3. Our Faith and hopes for a mutual understanding and cooperation with the Community and Religious of Indonesia

Our connections with the Universal Church with the religious and the wider world were suddenly cut off. We are the religious of East Timor who still together with the people were suddenly thrown into emptiness and alienation for six years until we became the dumb Church of East Timor.

Now we are more aware of the faith, that this experience was very useful because our faith was deepened and more felt in life as a gift from God. This faith says that we are still one with the universal Christian Church. It is precisely the dimensions of that universal faith which are being felt and deepened.

We are aware that we were “persuaded” to have relations with the Indonesian Church which is the nearest Church and which is authorised by the Government and Army to straight away create relations with us. We hope that this “persuasion” develops as a factor in an honest meaning, both from our side, the East Timorese religious as well as from the Indonesian religious, all based on a faith which will help us become one religious fellowship in the Church.

It was just with this aim that we wrote these reflections. Only based on honesty, sincerity and openness without prejudice and underhand behaviour can we build the Christian Church upholding the dignity of our people. We cannot put to one side or consider unimportant the misunderstandings and great difficulties which are a consequence of the actions of the government against the people, against the religious, the faithful and the Bishop.

These wounds must be healed via a long process from the

. . . we do not understand why the Indonesian Church and the Central Catholic Roman Church have not stated their solidarity with the Church, people and religious of East Timor.

EAST TIMOR

two sides on the basis of sincerity in faith, hope and love.

We must also acknowledge that we do not yet understand why the Indonesian Church and the Central Roman Church have up till now not stated openly and officially their solidarity with the Church, people and religious of East Timor. Perhaps this has been the heaviest blow for us. Seeing the extent of the tragedy of the East Timorese people which has been going on for six years with a number of victims more than 200,000 people, otherwise known as an incident already well known throughout the world we felt stunned by this silence which seemed to allow us to die deserted. Because of that we organised this dialogue with a sincerity of heart, hoping that we could be understood or, if needs be, forgiven, in the faith.

We also realise that the Indonesian Church suffers too, extreme actions from the Government or from other groups who oppose us. It is this fact that gives us hope that step by step we will achieve mutual understanding in the same faith. This faith will grow, supporting and healing the wounds if we reflect together on all the evil and the tragedy which befell our people.

Based on a faith which grows from togetherness our cooperation too will develop.

We are convinced in faith that all things are possible if we are loyal to the faith of the community which has an understanding and impression of Pancasila itself.

Certainly we all need to listen to and put into practice the language of faith and the language of the hearts of the community/people. If we do not it is we who will lose the faith, and as a consequence all of our spirituality and service will also lose its meaning. Not recognising and valuing the faith of the people is an injustice on the part of the religious towards the faith of the community. It is the same injustice as wanting to destroy or replace the indigenous cultural standards which have been fostered for centuries in the name of assimilation which for the people of East Timor is merely something which is forced on them. This only demonstrates an excessive ignorance of the history and Christian traditions of the people of East Timor. It is also a challenge and a test for us, the religious, the bloody echo of 80,000 catholic martyrs who fell in

. . . the tragedy of East Timor with more than 200,000 victims. . . the bloody echo of 80,000 catholic martyrs who fell in these last five years. . .

these last five years in East Timor. The Church which lives is only the church which puts into practice the faith of its people and is able to express that which they experience, feel, live and suffer.

4. Our Contribution to the Dialogue on "The Religious Community in its Service to the Faithful"

We feel delighted to be able to seek together a base and a root of faith which at the same time is a base and root for the union of our communities in one Church. The theme of MASRI this year also pleases us greatly because we have for a while now already tried it and begun to put it into practice in our small communities, and in the basic groups of the community. Our faith as religious is being deeply tested, but



we are not afraid because that faith says that the self indeed must be tested in accord with the mystery of salvation, that is that on the cross is found salvation.

This faith which was raised up by God amidst the people, we wish to share with the superiors of the religious societies and congregations in Indonesia. From this dialogue and sharing will emerge new supports for our faith.

We hope that this our communication, can be useful for the religious who are chosen or sent to serve the community in East Timor. And for the fields of labour which we are unable, or have no opportunity to tackle, you tackle them. For our brothers whom we cannot save, whom we cannot reach, it is you who must stretch out your hand and save them as the man of Samaria of good heart did for the sick men, for the prisoners, for the exiles, and for those whose hate is not known . . .

AMDGVM

31st July 1981

The Feast of Saint Ignatius Loyola
Founder of the Society of Jesus

RESETTLEMENT AND RE-RESETTLEMENT IN EAST TIMOR

Under Indonesian occupation, the people of East Timor have been subjected to massive, forced removal from their homelands and villages. The forced re-location of the population is not a once-off shift. It is, as one Timorese has said recently, "an ongoing programme"; another Timorese has referred to the "constant resettlement" in progress. In official jargon, the term now being used is "re-resettlement" (see **Far Eastern Economic Review**, 6th August 1982). The original abuse of the rights of people to choose their own livelihoods and dwelling-places is being compounded by further moves to suit the "production" and "security" requirements of the occupying forces.

Mass resettlement involving well over a third of the population first began in 1978 when saturation bombing in the mountainous interior forced hundreds of thousands of people, plagued by starvation, disease and high death tolls, to leave their highland dwellings and come down to the coastal plains, making them easily accessible to Indonesian military supervision.

The existence of "resettlement camps" or "resettlement villages" has been widely acknowledged. They represent a most serious human rights abuse, and have shattered the social and economic structure of Timorese society while undermining its capacity to provide self-sufficiency in foodstuffs for the people.

Recent information about this on-going, forced resettlement has become available from two sources. The first is a collection of documents—personal statements and interviews—compiled by two Australians who made extensive contacts with Timorese during a visit to Jakarta earlier this year. The second is two articles published in the **Far Eastern Economic Review** on 6th August 1982.

Timorese on Resettlement¹

The following statements, by Timorese, are taken from the collection of documents compiled by the two Australians:

One interviewee, identified as "D", lists among economic problems, "the difficulty of obtaining work", the reasons for which include:

- free movement of the population restricted, (and they are) particularly unable to move from resettlement areas back to previous occupation;
- large numbers of people are brought from outlying villages to be forced to live close to the *kecamatan* (sub-district town);
- many areas are no longer in cultivation, left because of the resettlement programme.

"D" further expands on the resettlement programme as follows:

a) Many resettlement camps still exist throughout East Timor. The programme of continuing to resettle people in East Timor is an ongoing one. It has stopped temporarily because the military feared a possible resurgence of resistance from the East Timorese as a result of the publication of the DPR letter to the President² and other documents/news. The original plan was to begin resettlement in December 1981. The internal resettlement of East Timorese would be followed by forced resettlement in other parts of Indonesia outside Timor. "D" said he obtained this information from an Indonesian government official (in the planning section for East Timor

resettlement).

b) Forced resettlement has been occurring from one *kabupaten*³ to another as well as from outlying villages to towns, eg. from Bacau to Ainaro, from Los Palos—Same and Bobonaro.

c) The reason for resettlement according to "D" is that the military fear that East Timorese will form groups of local resistance (not necessarily armed resistance) to the Indonesian occupation. He also stated that resettlement was a result of continued Fretilin resistance in the mountains.

d) One of the results of resettlement is the disruption of agricultural patterns because the people do not know the new land—ie. how best to cultivate, where to cultivate, etc.

Interviewees "G", "H" and "F" said:

a) Resettlement occurs in all the *kabupatens*. Once the people are in resettlement areas, they are not permitted to return to their own village; eg. also people who returned from the mountains and surrendered in Dili are forced to stay in Dili and can not return to their own village. Houses are being built for them (6 x 6 metres, zinc roof, 3-ply walls, poor construction) in a special area near the airport of Dili (47 houses).

b) People are forced to live in resettlement areas and stay there for some years. They cannot go back to their own houses (villages) for a number of reasons: eg:

- original houses destroyed through lack of maintenance;
- in some areas, there is a danger of Fretilin and Indonesian Army attack;
- some have been destroyed by either Fretilin or the Indonesian Army.

c) The people are promised that they will be able to return to their own land but they have not been able to so far. "F" said the Timorese love their country and don't want to be forced to live here or there by outsiders against their will.

Interviewee "K" said:

He was most struck by the constant resettlement programme when he was there (in East Timor) in January 1982, eg. in Bacau. The results are:

a) Disruption of farming—people are not working, not planting fields. They are not farming in the outlying areas.

b) People don't have enough food because they can't get it from anywhere. They can't buy [food] and they don't get any from crops.

c) People can't leave the resettlement area without special permission which is hard to get and they are not used to asking for it, and it costs money. If they go without permission, they may be shot when they return, being accused of spying for Fretilin.

"K" and his brother and a number of others stress the present resettlement programme as the most disruptive programme as it causes the people to do nothing and to feel that they are forced to live under a tyranny they hate.

Far Eastern Economic Review on Re-Resettlement

In a series of articles which set out to prove that Jakarta's plans to Indonesianise, rehabilitate and develop East Timor are succeeding, the FEER has the following to say about resettlement and re-resettlement:

"The resettlement villages . . . were established at about 150

locations with a total population of some 200,000 . . . Aside from the obvious security advantages . . . (t)hese villages were also meant to become the points of dissemination of Indonesian culture; they were provided with TV sets, and adult classes in the Indonesian language were held in them.

“The trouble with many resettlement villages is that they are not productive, located as they are in areas unsuitable for agriculture. Now that Jakarta is more confident about security in the province, it feels it can relax political control to some extent in the interest of higher production. This is the philosophy behind the latest group of villages which are being established in the highlands. However, the families which return to these areas from the resettlement villages will not be allowed to disperse once again into tiny, scattered units but must stay within the villages and the neighbourhoods, the lowest level of the Indonesian military structure. The families may yearn for the freedom which they enjoyed in the past, freedom to move about and freedom from administrative control.

“ . . . Along the northern coast where the bulk of the resettlement villages stand, the flat land between the mountains and the coast is much narrower than in the south—a band barely a kilometre wide—and it is often white with salt. The bald, dry hills are difficult to cultivate and there is in any case a continuing restriction on movement of people. Officials speak of fishing as a prospect for these villages, but the East Timorese are not experienced sailors and boats are still a

luxury, even for collective ownership . . .

“If it can be assumed that people are now being moved from the least productive resettlement villages . . . then immediate output gains can be expected. In the longer term, productivity in the new highlands villages may decline unless efforts are made to maintain it. Land in East Timor is generally unfertile and the Timorese were shifting cultivators, harvesting a crop in one area for a year or two before moving on to another. With the Indonesian Government discouraging both free movement and the slash-and-burn method of cultivation.⁴ Thus, re-settlement will not exactly become an alternative to agriculture which requires heavy re-investment . . .” (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 6th August, 1982)

Footnotes:

- 1) The Timorese interviewed must, for obvious reasons, remain anonymous. The interviewers stress that each interview represents one person's viewpoint and should be read side-by-side with other accounts. We have therefore reproduced several testimonies on resettlement, regardless of repetition. The FEER articles reinforce much of this testimony in a number of crucial points.
- 2) See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No. 47, September 1981, pages 5-8.
- 3) *Kabupaten*: district.
- 4) Slash-and-burn agriculture, with the right ecological balance between population and terrain, has provided subsistence livelihoods to Timorese for many generations. Discouragement of such methods can only make experienced cultivators dependent on unfamiliar and expensive inputs, all in the interest of security-oriented control of non-mobile rural dwellers.

INTERNATIONAL

THE NATIONAL TIMES, JUNE 6 to 12, 1982



THE TIMOR PAPERS

The *Timor Papers*, briefly summarised in *TAPOL Bulletin* No.52, which were published by *The National Times* (Canberra) two months ago, have been reprinted in full by TAPOL. Copies are available at 50 pence each, or £5.00 for ten, plus postage, from TAPOL, 8a Treport Street, London SW18 2BP

Focus on dissent in Indonesia

The October 1982 issue of *New Internationalist* puts the focus on dissent in Indonesia. The issue, edited by Australian journalist, Bob Hawkins, includes an article by Max Lane on political developments in Indonesia before and since 1965, an article on *Hasta Mitra*, the

company which published Pramoedya Ananta Toer's now banned novels, an article on corruption focussing on Ibnu Sotowo and what *did not* happen to him when Pertamina collapsed, an article on Legal Aid in Indonesia, and much more.

Amended press law will tighten government control

Newly-drafted amendments to Indonesia's press law, which are now before Parliament for enactment, will reinforce government control of the mass media, according to many circles in Jakarta.

At present, the authorities wield ultimate sanction against offending newspapers through their power to withdraw the paper's Publishing Licence (SIT). The latest example of this was the banning of two leading Indonesian publications, the weekly, **Tempo** which was closed down for two months during the crucial period of the election campaign, and the Muslim daily, **Pelita**, which lost its licence immediately after the election and appears to have been closed down for good.

There have been growing demands for the abolition of SIT as an important pre-requisite for restoring some degree of press freedom in Indonesia. The amended press law will indeed abolish SIT but will create in its place a new form of press control which is far more comprehensive and draconian, a Publishing Business Licence (SIUPP). "This can be even more dangerous", said Mulya Lubis, Director of Jakarta's Legal Aid Bureau, and could effectively "slaughter" the press (**Merdeka**, 5th June, 1982). The withdrawal of a company's SIUPP in reprisal for reporting that is unacceptable to the authorities would not only affect the newspaper but would put the whole company out of business, including those operations quite unconnected with the newspaper. (For example, **Sinar Harapan**, the Christian daily, is owned by a company which also runs a major publishing house—*Editor*.)

Mulya Lubis also fears that the new licencing system can lead to greater concentration of press ownership. Strongly financed companies would be in a position, if backed by the authorities with these licencing powers, to force smaller (or, we could add, less desirable) companies out of business.

The criticisms voiced by Mulya Lubis have been expressed by many others. Susumu Awanohara, writing in the **Far Eastern Economic Review** (9th July, 1982), reports:

There is concern in journalistic circles that the proposed amendment to the press law will bring greater government control over the mass media. . . (M)any in the media, comparing the current law and the amendment bill, assume that if there is to be a substantive change, it will tend towards less freedom and greater responsibility for them.

The **FEER** report points out in addition that the amendments will bring government representatives into the Press Council which until now has been an independent body composed solely of media representatives. Penalties for violating the press law have also been stepped up and, although journalists will have a more specified right to protect their sources of information, this right has been rendered ineffective to a considerable extent because it can be waived when "security interests" are involved.

As Mulya Lubis pointed out, too, in his comment on the amendments, it is high time that the "hate-spreading" articles in Indonesia's Criminal Code were repealed, for these provide the authorities with a powerful means of gagging the press.



Minister of Information Ali Moertopo

The Feast that turned sour

A secondary-school pupil caught carrying leaflets which said, "Ali Murtopo and Alamsyah are traitors" was found guilty of "insulting" those in power and sentenced to 40 days imprisonment. The hand-written leaflets had been concealed under his belt, and displayed briefly during a PPP (Muslim Party) election rally in Banda Aceh. The accused, Jailani bin T. Hasan, assured the court that he had produced the leaflets himself without anyone's help.

The defence counsel reminded the court that Jailani had used these leaflets during the "feast of democracy" proclaimed by the government for the period of the election campaign earlier this year. Every citizen has the right, he said, to express opinions about government policy as well as about those in positions of authority. The judge however had a different view of the "feast". Passing judgement, he said:

It is a mistake to think that the feast of democracy was meant as an opening for people to insult and discredit others, particularly to insult and discredit government officials.

Source: **Kompas**, 5th July, 1982.

US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA LIKELY TO INCREASE

The Reagan Administration plans to increase significantly the amount of US military assistance to Indonesia in the coming year. The Foreign Military Sales Financing Programme, estimated at \$40 million for Fiscal 1982, is to rise by 25% in 1983, well above any previous level. (See accompanying table). Commercial military sales have been estimated to reach \$10 million for each of the two years, 1982 and 1983, well above any previous level with the single exception of 1979 when commercial sales reached a record \$17,011,000.

Figures made available in a paper produced in May 1982 by

the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington,¹ show that there has been a steady increase in the supply of US military hardware to Indonesia since 1974. Supplies under the Foreign Military Sales programme rose to an all-time high in 1978 which, together with the very high level of military supplies through commercial sales in 1979, reveals the extent of US support for Indonesia's war of aggression against East Timor which reached a level of particularly brutal intensity precisely during those two years.

US Military Assistance to Indonesia (1974-1983)

(In thousands of dollars)

Fiscal Year	FMS Financing Programme	FMS Agreements	MAP	Commercial Sales	IMET	Total
1974	(3,500)	148	12,270	859	1,698	14,975
1975	(5,000)	51,609	12,585	304	2,401	66,899
1976	(23,100)	3,715	20,707	6,707	2,359	33,488
1977	(40,000)	7,592	14,121	5,295	2,427	29,435
1978	(32,000)	109,630	14,128	3,011	2,649	129,418
1979	(30,000)	37,855	1,997	17,011	1,960	58,823
1980	(30,000)	14,614	1,840	6,221	1,636	24,311
1981	(30,000)	45,116	417	6,673	1,823	54,029
1982	(40,000)	40,000	123	10,000	2,200	52,323
1983	(50,000)	30,000	100	10,000	2,625	42,725
Total 74-83	(283,600)	340,279	78,288	66,081	21,778	506,426

Notes:

FMS — Foreign Military Sales programme

MAP — Military Assistance Programme

IMET — International Military Education and Training

Totals include FMS Agreements, MAP, Commercial Sales and IMET.

The Institute of Policy Studies paper points out that: "In line with the emphasis on the doctrine and practice of counterinsurgency during the 1960s, US military assistance became increasingly oriented towards the development of an effective internal security force in Indonesia."

As for the nature of military support from the USA for Indonesia's war in East Timor, the paper lists the items supplied since 1976, that is to say, as a follow-up of the visit to Indonesia by President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on the eve of Indonesia's invasion of Dili.

"The largest items in the package of Foreign Military Sales Agreements for Fiscal 1976 were 16 OV-10 Bronco aircraft for \$18.5 million, 3 Lockheed C-130 transport aircraft for \$7.7 million and 45 Cadillac-Gage V-150 Commando armoured cars for \$6.3 million (only 36 of which were actually delivered). The V-150 armoured cars, which hold a crew of up to 12 combat troops, can be equipped with machine guns, an 81mm mortar, a 20mm cannon, and smoke and tear gas launchers, are considered to be very effective in counterinsurgency missions where the enemy has only

small arms. In 1975, the United States had also provided Indonesia with some other important weapons, nearly all of which are believed to have been used in East Timor: \$92,000 worth of rifles \$104,000 worth of small arms spare parts, and some communications spare parts."

Suharto to Visit



President Suharto of Indonesia is scheduled for an official visit to the United States this Fall. While the details of Suharto's plans are not yet known, he is to arrive in Washington on October 12th.


It will be the first visit to the United States by the head of state since his military invaded East Timor in December 1975. The day before that invasion former U.S. President Ford and Henry Kissinger visited Indonesia.

As the paper points out, a senior retired US defence expert, Admiral La Roque, has since stressed that the delivery of OV-10 Bronco aircraft in 1976 and 1977 "changed the entire nature of the war". With this equipment, Indonesian forces were able to drive deep into Fretilin-held territory in the interior and force the population into the valley areas and so-called "resettlement centres".²

Then in 1978 with its military inventory depleted by the East Timor war, the Suharto Government launched an extensive rearmament programme which found ready response from the Carter Administration, shielding behind the facade of a human rights policy publicly pushing for the release of tens of thousands of long-term, untried political prisoners. In May 1978, during a visit to Indonesia, Vice-President Walter Mondale agreed to sell Indonesia

"16 A-4 Skyhawk II jet attack planes. The A-4 Skyhawk, a mainstay of the US arsenal during the Vietnam war, is capable of spraying wide areas with weapons-fire and high explosives, causing heavy civilian casualties. Also included in the Carter Administration's FMS package were 16 Bell UH-1H Huey helicopters, a type which also saw heavy action in Vietnam. By fiscal year 1978, total US military assistance to Indonesia reached almost \$130 million, four times the fiscal year 1977 level."

The Institute of Policy Studies paper also lists annual sales since 1975 of selected US policy and paramilitary gear



exported to Indonesia from the USA. It provides details of the type and quantity of arms transfers to Indonesia to the Armed Forces as well as to the Indonesian Police Force. One item of particular significance is Chemical Agent Equipment which rose from insignificant levels in 1975 and 1976, to almost half a million dollars in 1980. The figures are:

US Sales of Chemical Agent Equipment (In thousands of dollars)	
1975	5,177
1976	6,312
1977	26,448
1978	—
1979	—
1980	455,383

A report elsewhere in this Bulletin concerning the use of chemical weapons in West Papua is clearly not unrelated to these figures.

Indonesia Set to Become "Top Priority" Purchaser of US Arms

Following a recent visit to Washington by Indonesia's Defence Minister, General Jusuf, Indonesia's Minister for Research and Technology, B. J. Habibie has also been in Washington to discuss a new "arrangement" which would remove any technical obstacles to a rapid expansion in the sale of US arms and defence-related technology to Indonesia.³ Formally speaking, countries purchasing this must go through a screening process required under the Arms Export Control Act, and the recommendations need executive and congressional approval. The highest priority tends to go to countries that have defence or "mutual security" treaties with the USA, something which Indonesia has avoided in order to protect its image, dating back from pre-1965 days, as a "non-aligned country". The new "arrangement" which will apparently fall short of being an actual treaty will give arms requests from Indonesia a higher priority than they currently have. It will also upgrade Indonesia's status from arms buyer to a licenced producer of certain US military equipment, a privilege enjoyed by US treaty allies such as Japan and NATO members. US press reports which state that Indonesia has recently purchased from the USA A-4E attack aircraft worth \$27 million, add that "aerospace products are high on Mr. Habibie's shopping list" and that he will be given every chance

to see "other kinds of technology that Indonesia could eventually use through partnership with US companies".

No doubt, this "arrangement" and other important arms deals will be finalised in time for the forthcoming visit by President Suharto to Washington, scheduled for October this year. This will be his first visit to the US since 1975.

Footnotes

1. "Background Information on Indonesia, the Invasion of East Timor and US Military Assistance", by Flora E. Montealegre. Institute of Policy Studies, May 1982. Readers interested in receiving a copy of this important paper should enquire to: Institute of Policy Studies, 1901 Que Street NW, Washington DC 20009, USA.
2. See testimony of Retired Admiral Gene R. La Rocque in US Congress, House, **Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1981 (Part 6)**, page 47.
3. This section is based on a press clipping received in August 1982. Unfortunately, the clipping was not given any identification or date but it was certainly from July 1982, and almost certainly from **Washington Post** or **New York Times**.

U.S. ARMS IN USE IN EAST TIMOR

Dossier on East Timor

The following account, translated from Portuguese by Australian interviewers in March 1982, was supplied by an East Timorese who spent three years with the resistance until his surrender in 1978.

"During my time in the mountains which was from 7th December 1975, the day of the invasion, until 23rd November 1978, the day of my surrender, about 20% of the Timorese population died under the effect of the attack from the sea and the air.

. . . During these massacres the Indonesians used all sorts of warlike materials: bombardment air forces, pursuit (hunting) planes such as the OV-10, plus two other types of airplanes just like the ones used by the Americans in the war in Korea, and helicopters with adapted machine guns.

When they attack any zone, in general their air and navy forces work together; sometimes the bombardment is every hour (at one hour intervals); at other times it is non-stop from morning to night and other times it is continuous for days. During the air bombardment they use several types of bombs including the napalm bomb, which is more deadly and burns everything. Their artillery is short, medium and long-range.

All their warlike materials carry American labels. The majority of the Indonesian closed attacks are made against the places where the population is concentrated. For example at the base of Mt. Matabian they dropped about 600-700 bombs daily during the months of October and November 1978 when the majority of the civilian population were still in the mountains; this does not include the land and navy artillery fire. They had four bombing airplanes, each carrying 16 bombs. These planes bombed eight times every day. They also had eight pursuit aircraft (OV-10) plus four other pursuit planes: these last four were much faster than the OV-10. They also had amphibian cars, war tanks, assault cars, etc."

Massacres

Further massacres perpetrated directly by Indonesian military were reported with details as to time, place, manner of death, and numbers involved, and these killings have resulted in an horrific tally now exceeding one in three of the Timorese population.

(a) On 23rd November, 1978 on the Vadaboro mountain (one of the Matabian ridges situated in the east part of East Timor) about 500 people including pregnant women, children of all ages, adults, old men and women, were killed by a blast of machine-gun fire. They had come to surrender, believing the propaganda from the Indonesians that they (the Indonesians) only came to help the people of Timor and work for their progress. The same thing happened in Taipo where 300 people died in the same way; similar things happened in almost all parts of Timor, though in smaller numbers.

(b) The young single women as well as the married ones were isolated in separate huts and forced to practice sexual acts with the Javanese soldiers. Very often there was resistance from the

women; then they would be stripped and burnt with lighted cigarettes, especially on their breasts and their sexual organs. Many of them could not stand the tortures and hence they would be forced to let their bodies be abused; after being abused they were shot.

(c) There are several ways of killing adopted by the Indonesians, such as: shooting, throwing the victims out of a helicopter to the land or the sea, throwing into the sea with rocks attached to the victim's feet, or they take the victims out one night to the outskirts of the city and tell them to run away — they let them get a certain distance and they then send a blast of shots from the machine guns over the victims.

(d) The majority of the young boys and strong men are called together to accompany the soldiers in the hunt for the freedom fighters. Once they are in the middle of the dense bush they are shot. Afterwards the Indonesians would report to their relatives that these poor victims had run away into the mountains. But then, their bodies are found by relatives or acquaintances who recognise them by their clothes or scars in situations where the bodies are not yet rotten.

(e) In Uatolari, a "posto" belonging to the *concelho* of Viqueque, Boys who had a minimum education from grade two upwards were all exterminated. Sometimes these shootings would take place in front of their own relatives, and these same relatives are forbidden to cry or mourn the dead; but very often some of the relatives cannot take any more and therefore start crying and if they are found crying they are killed. Many children are shot in front of their parents and many husbands in front of their wives."

Political Prisoners

"Often they arrest and kill people for no fundamental reason: is it because the Indonesians are of an assassin race or is it that they want to explore the wealth (material resources); this way of exploration is called *untuk roko* throughout the whole Indonesian territory. This word *untuk roko* is known and practised by all the social classes in Indonesia. Nearly all the Timorese prisoners are political prisoners.

(a) From 1975 to July 1980 nearly all the political prisoners were killed but from July 1980 until today it has been verified that the shootings have lessened due to the presence of the International Red Cross. If these prisoners are visited, they are forced to say that they are not political prisoners but criminal prisoners. The ones that tell the truth would be killed after the visitors had left.


When the Indonesians want to kill any prisoner they generally always do it at night. The place preferred by the Indonesians is the lake of Taci-Tola, situated in the west part of the city of Dili. Other times they are put in helicopters and dropped into the sea. The ones destined to die in Taci-Tola are generally transported by a black car belonging to the Intelligence. The black car is named *creta makiki* which in Portuguese means the black eagle car or the assassin car.

(b) Exile: Lately the majority of the prisoners are exiled to the island of Atauro but the whereabouts of many others is not known. This exile has been verified from July 1980 onwards.

At this moment there are about 600 prisoners on Atauro: men, women and old people; lately they have been making plans to exile all the direct families of the liberation fighters."

Methods of Torture

There are several types of tortures, among them: the red-hot iron, the electric chairs, the lighted cigarette ends, the extraction of nails with pliers, cuts made with blades and finally putting the victim's toes under the feet of the table and loading the table with heavy weights.



The OV-10 Bronco in action

When they are actually carrying out these tortures, they have their victims — male or female — standing naked. They burn all parts of the body, especially the sex organs and the breasts if it is a woman. Even today there are still people with scars made by these tortures. These tortures are made with the aim of getting information from people about the patriots or then to force them to denounce others who have firm ideas on patriotism.

The tortures take days, months, etc., until they are able to get information; after this these people are either killed, arrested or set free depending on the conditions I have talked about before: paying the *untuk roko*.

The women prisoners are forced at night to have sexual relations with the soldiers in their security posts, but there were others who preferred to die instead of committing this sin. Among these were the heroic Rosa Bonaparta, Maria Gorete and many others whose names I'm unable to recall just now."

The Courageous Clergy

"Only the clergy have worked, still work and will work for the people of East Timor. . . . There are some very courageous

clergymen who would face up to the deadly weapons of the Indonesian assassins, begging at the feet of these cruel men to save the lives of the hundreds and thousands of innocents who were already under the barrel of the machine guns ready to be shot. There are others who evacuated to the mountains where they helped the people in their suffering.

. . . Many people think that the fight of the people of Timor has ended; the radio, the newspapers, don't seem to talk anymore about the people of East Timor. Despite this, the resistance is still going, the fight will continue . . ."

SUNARDI ON TRIAL

Sunardi, the lawyer who publicly called for investigations into accusations that have been made against President Suharto, charging that he was involved in the 30th September 1965 events, has now gone on trial in Jakarta.

He first made this call last December, linking it with a demand that the election for president should be postponed until Suharto's name "has been cleared". He repeated the call in April this year, and was immediately arrested.

His trial commenced on Monday, 23rd August, when the prosecutor read out the indictment. The basic charge is that of "insulting the President". Sunardi has a team of lawyers defending him, including Yap Thiam Hien who defended Sawito during whose trial the question of Suharto's involvement in the G30S was also raised.

We hope to report in detail on this trial as material becomes available.

DEATH SENTENCES UPHELD:

Executions could take place any time



Mohammad Munir and Ruslan Wijayasastra have been in prison since 14th July, 1968. They were arrested when the Army discovered and destroyed an underground network in South Blitar. Several people were killed and many more arrested, including leading activists from banned

organisations as well as soldiers who had deserted after the Army began its persecution of the Left.

Both Munir and Ruslan were leaders of SOBSI, the All-Indonesian Federation of Trade Unions, Indonesia's largest and most militant trade union organisation until it was banned by the Army in 1965. Munir was General Secretary and Ruslan deputy General Secretary. When the nation-wide persecution of SOBSI members was launched and hundreds of thousands of workers killed, imprisoned or dismissed, they both evaded arrest and went underground.

Mohammed Munir was born in Madura in 1925, the son of a politically-active Muslim father. He joined the underground movement during the Japanese occupation, then after independence joined the Peasants Militia to fight against the restoration of Dutch colonialism. After the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, he helped to build the trade union movement, particularly among motor-vehicle workers and in local trades councils in Jogjakarta and Jakarta. He started working fulltime for SOBSI in 1950 and became a deputy General Secretary in 1952. He represented SOBSI or SOBSI member unions at several international conferences and was elected a member of the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions in 1953.

He was a member of the Indonesian Workers Party which merged with the Communist Party in 1949. He was elected a Member of Parliament in 1955, served briefly on the Constituent Assembly, and represented workers' interests on several state councils including the National Council and the president's Advisory Council.

Ruslan Wijayasastra, now about 65 years old, has had a long life of political activism. Like Munir, he took up arms against the Dutch after the proclamation of independence in 1945, and became a commander of the Pesindo (youth organisation) Troops, the largest of the many non-official corps in existence at the time. After the transfer of sovereignty, he became active in SOBSI, was elected a deputy General Secretary in 1952, and remained in the SOBSI's leadership until it was banned in 1965.

Poor Health Both men have been held at Cipinang Prison, Jakarta for many years. Ruslan is frail and ageing, and was seriously ill in hospital in 1980. Munir developed a number of complaints and spent several months in hospital late last year when he underwent a serious operation.

Death Sentences Upheld Munir was tried in 1973, Ruslan in 1974. Both were sentenced to death for subversion because of

their pre-1965 legal political activity as well as the post-1965 illegal activity to which they resorted after the military had unlawfully banned their organisation. Appeals against their sentences were rejected by the higher courts. Earlier this year, it was reported that their clemency appeals to the president had been turned down. Now, news is being received that their executions may soon be carried out. If so, these would be the first judicial murders of political prisoners in Indonesia since the late 1960s. Trade unions in several countries have appealed to the Indonesian Government not to execute these two men.



British TUC appeals on behalf of Munir and Ruslan

Len Murray, General Secretary of the British Trades Union Congress, sent the following cable to President Suharto on 1st September, 1982:

British trade unions concerned over reports of impending execution of Mohammed Munir and Ruslan Wijayasastra trade unionists imprisoned in Indonesia since 1965 stop we urge you to call off these executions and to renounce use of capital punishment against political prisoners.

Terry Duffy, President of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers, Britain's second largest union with a membership of more than a million, has also written to President Suharto as well as to KOPKAMTIB commander, Admiral Sudomo, urging that the lives of Munir and Ruslan be spared.



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