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British Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners

TAPOL Bulletin No 35

August 1979

Editorial

“UNPUBLICISED RELEASES” BALANCE THE NUMBERS

The confusion and discrepancy in the number of tapols still due for release (see *Tapol Bulletin* No. 34, June 1979, p. 1) has now officially been blamed on mis-reporting by Indonesia's national news agency, *Antara*, and on “human error”.

The attempt to explain away the discrepancy is made in an article by David Jenkins (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 July 1979) which must be seen as a rejoinder to his own earlier article (*FEER*, 18 May) in which he accused the Indonesian authorities of “obfuscation in numbers”. The *FEER* 27 July issue also publishes a letter from TAPOL, dated 1 June, which analyses the discrepancy in figures and criticises David Jenkins for not going far enough in his criticism of KOPKAMTIB figures.

In his second article, David Jenkins leans entirely on figures and explanations from KOPKAMTIB; the article must therefore be taken as the official response to his and other people's criticisms of KOPKAMTIB figures which were announced by General Yoga Sugama in April this year at the time of the first batch of tapol releases for 1979. The general announced total releases in 1979 amounting to 9,562 whereas the total number of tapols in the A, B, X and Y categories at the end of 1978 had been given as over 12,100, of whom only 527 are now said to be in the A-Category, awaiting trial.

However, the new clarifications, evidently intended to set the record straight, have only added to the confusion. Most remarkable is the fact that a table of tapol figures compiled by David Jenkins (included apparently as a correction to his earlier table published on 18 May) now claims that 11,833 prisoners were released in 1977, and not 10,000, the figure always used by KOPKAMTIB until now for that year. The additional 1,833, said to consist of 933 B-category prisoners and 900 X-category prisoners (‘awaiting classification’), are listed in the table, without any explanation, as having been released in May-October, 1977. The new figure takes care of almost all the 2,000 or more

tapols unaccounted for in KOPKAMTIB's April 1979 figures.

Why did KOPKAMTIB never mention these additional releases at the time? If they really took place, it would certainly have been in their interest to publicise them as proof to the world that they were over-fulfilling their promise to release 10,000 during 1977. (*See p.15, col.1*)

The new Jenkins' article is unconvincing in other respects too. It claims that the confusion arose because *Antara* misquoted General Yoga in virtually all the figures he mentioned last April. (If this is true, why did KOPKAMTIB not insist on an immediate correction?) But this clarification does not help, anyway, because the discrepancy emerges between the figures announced for 1979 releases (which still remain the same) and the figures given by the press and radio in Indonesia in December 1978, which no-one has yet suggested were incorrect.

Jenkins then admits that a figure used by *Antara* for B-category prisoners at the end of 1978 would still be “too many” even if it was assumed that the figure included tapols of all the four categories. How then to solve this mystery? Jenkins writes: ‘In fact, the figures now available show that there were far fewer ‘A’, ‘Y’ and ‘X’ detainees than had been supposed, a programme of unpublicised released having apparently been carried out in the period to December 1978.’ The use of the word “supposed” is odd as the higher figures for these categories actually appeared in the article by Jenkins himself on 18 May, based

Continued on page 4.

‘Tapol’ is an Indonesian contraction for ‘tahanan politik’ meaning political prisoner. It is still widely used although it was banned in 1974 because the military authorities said that all prisoners are ‘criminals’.

Letter to TEMPO: "WHERE CAN I FIND JUSTICE?"

There is a prisoner who is confined in the Surakarta Prison. As a *muezzin* (one who calls the prayers on Fridays), he has a melodious voice—so that mosque officials nearby are moved. He cries the Divine call in a voice full of feeling. For almost fourteen years he has been moved from one place of detention to another, but the longest stay has been in Surakarta.

His name is Roedjito Kartokusumo, aged 53. He was born in 1 January 1926. He held the rank of First Sub-Lieutenant, number 320590. He was in the army Infantry Brigade V, with the rank of Assistant Commander, Company 1, Battalion 'K'. His address is Semanggi RT12, Surakarta. He was educated in a state primary school and continued at the *Schakel Muhammadiyah* until he graduated. He has been detained since 30 October 1965, first in Solo (Surakarta), then Mlaten in Semarang, Ambarawa, Yogyakarta, and then he was brought back to Solo where he still is.

During his interrogation he was accused of being involved with Gestapu PKI. His interrogator was always changed so that his case has not yet been dealt with. The new interrogators would often not have his case notes, so that the interrogation would drift and would start all over again from the beginning. Amongst others his interrogators have been First Sub-Lieutenant Dimiyati, Captain U. Kuncul, Major Darman, First Lieutenant Sugito, Lieutenant-Colonel Parwoko from the High Military Court, and most recently, Captain Haryono from the Central Java and Yogyakarta KOPKAMTIB.

In his interrogation, psychotherapy was used, putting questions which had to be answered quickly. The questions concerned the activities of his unit against Gestapu PKI, and senior officers like Colonel Ashari, First Sub-Lieutenant Markaban (already sentenced). Then there was the matter relating to the kidnapping of the CPM (Military Police) 'Warastratama' Commander, a position held at the time (2 October 1965) by Captain Parwoto.

Roedjito says slowly: "I have said all there is to be said about the accusations hurled at me. Now please, where can I find justice? If I am guilty, what am I guilty of? If there is no further need for me to be detained, I hope I can be released. I have already been separated from my family for

fourteen years".

Indeed the prisoner is unhappy. But in his unhappiness he has been able to approach God. Each night if he is not sick, he recites the evening prayers. "I often cry alone. I repent many bad sins. I believe that here I can atone for them."

In 1945-7 he was in the BPRI (Insurgent Corps of the People of Indonesia) in Solo, and held the rank of Army Captain of Regiment II/Brigade 24 Diponegoro Division after the rationalisation. In 1950, after the Declaration of Independence, he was sent to South Kalimantan, where he was demoted to Second Lieutenant. "But fortunately for me", says Roedjito, "there I met Siti Nurbaya, who until now has loyally sent provisions, food and side dishes twice a week. In prison only enough food is prepared for one meal a day. The rest we obtain ourselves. Fortunately my wife is the head of a primary school. With her pay as an employee, group II/d PGPS, she supports four children and a husband in prison. God is Great and Just, in this distress my wife has been allotted a home in the Perumnas Complex. The rent is Rp 9,500 a month."

In 1965 Roedjito was moved to the Army Department in Jakarta. He has several decorations, *Bintang Gerilya* (Star of a Guerrilla), *Setia Lancana Kemerdekaan* I and II (Badge of Loyalty to Independence), and *Sewindu Kemerdekaan* (Eight Years of Independence).

"I had started to be pensioned in 1966. My wife took the pension until 1975, as an advance payment. When my wife applied for a full pension, the Army Personnel Department of Kodam VII knew that I was still in detention. According to a regulation, pension payments must be stopped while awaiting the court trial. Now I do not receive anything. Before I received about Rp 15,000."

To occupy the time in the prison cell, he makes guitars. His child buys the equipment, and when they are finished, he sells them. Once he was ill with a blood pressure of 200. He plans to continually study the fundamentals of the Koran and then to practise them when he is released. And to build up his family.

Signed. A. Basit Adnan
Kauman V/II RT VIII/RK 1,
Solo.

(Tempo: 30 June, 1979).

Continued from page 7.

were receiving this allowance which they were being refused. As part of their protest, drivers drove empty buses round the square where Jakarta's main bus station is located. Jakarta's Military Commander immediately issued an instruction ordering the workers to halt their action and prepared to bring in a strike-breaking force of drivers, while members of student regiments were brought in as conductors.

The next day, Admiral Sudomo and General Yoga Sugama, commanders of KOPKAMTIB and BAKIN held an emergency meeting with Agus Sudomo, chairman of the

All-Indonesia Federation of Trade Unions to discuss "the growing number of worker actions". (Tempo, 16 June 1979.)

WORTH REPEATING

President Suharto:

"Colonialism, aggression and subversion are contradictory to the morals and ideals of our nation ... this awareness induces us to be tolerant, internally and externally."

(Stated at a recent State dinner during his Papua New Guinea visit. Melbourne Age, 8 June 1979.)

INDONESIA AGAIN CHALLENGED AT ILO

At the 65th session of the International Labour Organisation in Geneva this year, Indonesia's breach of the ILO Convention on Forced Labour was again discussed at length by the Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations.

In a long statement, the Indonesian delegate recalled that last year,

the Government had assured the Committee that detainees would be released or their cases adjudicated in adherence to the programme drawn up in 1976 guaranteeing **unconditional release**, and ensuring **freedom of choice of employment** and the option to join, on a **voluntary basis**, resettlement projects (emphasis added).

It was difficult to find jobs for former prisoners, he said, because of general employment problems. He then made the startling assertion that his government had

appealed to the business world in the country and to the population as a whole to accept these ex-detainees in a brotherly manner to help them overcome the difficulties they encountered on returning to society and to give job opportunities to those who did not opt to join the transmigration project.

With reference to Buru, he said that only 207 families of ex-detainees had applied to join the transmigration areas on the island of Buru. This is obviously a reference to the 207 tapols with families at Savana Jaya camp, who have been compelled to remain on Buru (see box overleaf).

The Indonesian delegate's figures about releases were challenged by a Dutch Workers' member, speaking also for Swedish workers. He pointed to the discrepancy of 2,500 in the official figures and said that

... the Government should again be requested to furnish lists of names of those detained. It was also very desirable that an international mission should make an on-the-spot investigation of the situation.

He also raised the matter of the 6,157 C-Category tapols used as forced labour in North Sumatra (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 31, December-January 1978-79), despite the fact that the Government had claimed that all the C-Category prisoners were released. The member also raised the matter of the government's repeated denials of discrimination against former tapols.

Last year the Committee had also discussed the requirement that ex-detainees show certificates of non-involvement in the 1965 events before they could get jobs. The Government had said last year that this did not occur, but the speaker had seen statements by prominent government officials which said that these certificates both were and were not required. For example, if a person had been over twelve years old in 1965 he might well need such a certificate, particularly for a job in the civil service. The Committee last year had also asked whether detainees lost their right to pensions. The Government had flatly denied this last year. Evidence to the contrary was available however.

In view of these facts and the lack of co-operation from

WHERE FAMILIES MUST BECOME GAOLERS

Families of released prisoners in East Java have been required by KOPKAMTIB, East Java to sign the following declaration:

The Undersigned:

Name:

Age:

Occupation:

Address:

States to the authorities that I am prepared and responsible to accept my husband/wife/child/other relative:

Name:

Age:

Occupation:

Who since (date) has been detained by TEPERDA (District Interrogation Team) East Java, because (s)he has been accused of involvement in G30S/PKI.

When at any time my husband/wife/child/relative is confined by the authorities to house or town arrest, I promise:

1. To supervise my husband/wife/child/relative so that (s)he will not engage in political activities which are forbidden by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia.
2. To prohibit guests from visiting the house except for immediate family.
3. Not to allow my husband/wife/child/relative to leave the house/town without permission from the authorities.

I make this declaration as faithfully as possible, and moreover if in coming days there should arise matters which conflict with/violate this statement/promise, I am prepared to become a substitute (for the ex-tapol -ed.) in any actions which are taken according to the law in force.

A copy of this declaration, with names and details deleted, is in the possession of TAPOL.

A PLEA FROM SAVANA JAYA

I was born in Java. Now I am a teenager, almost grown up. In 1972 I went with mother to join father. When I arrived at Savanajaya on Buru Island, I did not think the way I do now. All I knew was that I was going with mother to meet our beloved father. My father is a tapol.

Now things have changed. Father has been released since November 1978. I do not understand why my family and I and the families of other tapols are not or have not yet been returned to our former homes. Perhaps it is because of being ex-tapols.

But mother and I?

Several friends have managed to get permission to get away to Java. Lately this opportunity has ceased to exist. I cannot get permission, as the way has been closed for the time being. They say it has been suspended. Until when and by whom? It is not for me to know. I am very unhappy. My father has been freed,

my mother is a free person, and I do not feel as if I have done anything wrong. What is our actual status? Am I no longer an ordinary member of society? Must I continue to suffer because my father was involved (-in G30S-ed.)? Why must we ourselves bear a stigma?

I really feel bitter. Youngsters of my age who live freely in Namlea may go anywhere, to trade, or to continue their study anywhere they wish, without hindrance. But me? I hope this letter will come to the attention of the authorities.

Signed: Lilyani S.
Savanajaya
Buru Island

(Translated from the Letters Column of **Tempo**,
28 July 1979)

Continued from page 3.

Indonesia on suggestions about international supervision, the member suggested that .

The only way the Government could gain credibility before this Committee was to issue a decree of abolition and amnesty for all detainees. If it did not do so, the Committee would have no choice but to express its grave concern at the continued failure to implement the Convention and that full information should therefore be supplied on the measures taken to ensure such compliance.

When the Indonesian delegate denied the C-Category prisoners were performing forced labour, and asked where the information had appeared, the workers' member referred him to two Indonesian newspapers, **Merdeka** and **Kompas** (Both are widely read dailies. Translations of these articles are available from TAPOL). The Indonesian delegate rejected international supervision and claimed that the publication of prisoners' names would not be useful. In conclusion the Committee hoped that

... next year the Committee of Experts would be able to report that all B-category prisoners had been released, and that all A-category prisoners had been tried or released, so that the question of the breach of the Forced Labour Convention by Indonesia would no longer be before this Committee.

(All quotations are from **International Labour Conference, Provisional Record**, Sixty-fifth Session, Geneva, 1979, pp. 27-9).

Continued from page 1.

not on suppositions but on figures said to have come from General Yoga. Or are we now to believe that he, too, like Antara, was guilty of misreporting Yoga?

Clearly, the ruse of "unpublicised releases" is being used to eliminate the embarrassing discrepancy.

C-Category Still Exists

Jenkins also reports that it is now officially admitted that "an undisclosed number of political prisoners have been or are being held in category 'C' even though this category was "theoretically abandoned" in 1972. We are now expected to believe that this category is a "holding place" for B-category detainees in the process of release, a statement which Mr Jenkins himself acknowledges as being "somewhat curious".

The authorities have also confirmed that "suspected communists" are still being arrested and interrogated, and add that "the release programme (is) based on humanitarian considerations and (is) not a general amnesty". This is an important formal admission which would justify not only new arrests or re-arrests but the continual harassments and constraints to which released prisoners are being subjected.

Finally, the current figure for A-category prisoners is still given as 527 who should all, on the basis of repeated KOPKAMTIB statements, be tried or released by the end of 1979 (already one year behind earlier KOPKAMTIB pledges regarding the completion of trials). But the fate of the A-category is still open-ended, for Jenkins writes that "officials admit that 150 or so may have to stay in jail a while longer owing to a backlog in court lists".

DEFENCE PLEA BANNED


A book containing the full defence plea of Heri Achmadi, one of the defendants at the student trials currently taking place in Indonesia, has been banned by the Attorney-General. The book was published jointly by the Legal Aid Bureau which co-ordinates defence for the 36 students on trial, and the Student Council of the Bandung Institute of Technology, of which Heri was Chairman when arrested in January 1978.

The plea, entitled **Mendobrak Belenggu Penindasan Rakyat Indonesia** (Smash the Chains of Oppression of the Indonesian People), is a hard-hitting statement about economic mismanagement, corruption and the oppressiveness of Suharto's New Order.

Tempo (28 July 1979) reports a spokesman of the Attorney-General's Office as saying that "there is no ban on the public knowing the contents of the examination and defence in an open court". But its appearance "as a publication" had led to certain objections being raised because additions had been included, notably cartoons. Another objection appears to be that the book only published part of the court proceedings, for when the spokesman was asked why books about the G30S trials had been permitted, he claimed that these had contained the entire proceedings. (One book of more than 200 pages studied recently by TAPOL, entitled **Subandrio—Mati!** or **Subandrio—Death!** contained the complete texts of the prosecution's final statement and the judge's verdict—which are almost identical—while less than 20 pages were devoted to summarising the defence's position.)

Adnan Buyung Nasution, Chairman of the LBH, said that the Bureau would seek a court judgement on the ban which, he said, "threatens the standing of the judiciary". But the judges whose opinions were sought by **Tempo** seemed to take the side of the Attorney-General. Two Jakarta judges said that Heri's defence was not just a de-

fence but was "provocative". Moreover, they said, defence pleas were being made every day in the courts, but no-one bothered to publish them. The chairman of the Centre for Legal Service and Aid, R.O. Tambunan, said Heri's plea "makes my hair stand on end". There is freedom to read a defence made in court, but this freedom "should not be abused". Another Jakarta judge, Soegondo Kartanegara said that there was no ban on the public knowing the contents of a defence; the only thing being banned was "its dissemination".



A cartoon published with Heri Achmadi's defence plea.

Meanwhile a copy of the book has reached Europe, and **TAPOL Bulletin** will publish extracts in its next issue. The Dutch Indonesian Committee is re-printing the full text, **with cartoons**, in Indonesian. Copies can be obtained by writing to the Committee at: Minahassastr. 1, 1094 RS Amsterdam, Netherlands.

Student Verdicts

So far, news has been received of seven verdicts in the student trials. The verdicts, all guilty, range from 15 months to two years. In some cases, they appear to be aimed at legalising the time already spent by the defendant in detention. In others, further terms will have to be spent in prison, unless appeals to higher courts are successful.

Some of the major cases in Bandung and Jakarta are apparently being deliberately dragged out, with long postponements of court sessions. It was originally expected that all the trials would be completed in June; considering that they commenced in January and February, this should have been possible.

Malang Student Defendant Killed

A few days after being sentenced to 15 months by the Malang State Court, Ismail Ghozali, a student leader from Malang, was killed in a road accident.



A cartoon published with Heri Achmadi's defence plea.

STRIKE MOVEMENT SPREADS

Strikes and protest actions by workers in Indonesia continue to gather strength. The groundswell follows the sharp price rises caused by last November's 50 percent devaluation of the rupiah and the 40 percent rise in oil and kerosene prices announced earlier this year. The following are some of the major actions.

* * * * *

Three hundred unskilled workers at the **Goodyear Tyre Factory** carried out actions in support of a wage claim. The climax was the pulling down of the Goodyear flag which flies over the main office. Following this, the police were called in to "restore order". (*Merdeka*, 29 January, 1979.)

* * * * *

1,700 workers employed at the **Daralon Textile Factory**, on the road from Jakarta to Bogor, went on strike for a wage increase. The striking workers demonstrated en masse by squatting outside the factory gates from early morning. The strike took place after the management failed to honour a pledge to pay higher daily rates to the company's many casual labourers. (*Merdeka*, 23 February 1979.)

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Workers at almost all the major foreign banks operating in Indonesia have undertaken actions in support of demands for higher wages. The action started at the US bank, **Citi-bank**, and quickly spread to **Chase Manhattan**, **American Express Bank**, **Bank of America**, **Chartered Bank**, **Algemene Bank Nederland**, **Bank of Tokyo** and **Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation**. The increases demanded vary from bank to bank, depending on turnover and net profits. The lowest rise sought is 21 percent. Workers stuck up posters on outside walls and along bank counters, and many wore stickers with slogans on their clothes. One widely used slogan was: "Big, strong and stingy!" The employees involved are mainly "non-staff personnel" who receive a



A slogan outside one of Jakarta's banks.

monthly wage of roughly \$160. Indonesian staff personnel get an average of \$336 a month, while foreign staff earn up to \$3,200 a month plus vastly superior fringe benefits. (*Tempo*, 17 March, 1979).

181 employees of the **Bank of Tokyo** imposed an overtime ban to support their demand for a 38 percent rise. They presented this demand after Japanese employees were given rises of 35 percent last December soon after the devaluation. (*Merdeka*, 16 March 1979). The Bank's Japanese employees earn eighteen times as much as its Indonesian employees. The management has persistently rejected workers' demands for the conclusion of a Collective Labour Agreement which would define working conditions and wage scales. (*Kompas*, 20 March 1979.)

Workers at the **Chartered Bank** also carried out a work-to-rule in support of their wage demand. (*Merdeka*, 27 March 1979.)

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1,400 workers at the **Japanese Asahi Mas factory** in Ancol, Jakarta threatened to strike in support of their demand for a 20 percent rise. On the day of their action, people arrived at the factory to discover the building covered with posters and slogans. Posters had even been stuck all the way up the factory's 50-metre tall chimney. (*Merdeka*, 27 March 1979) Several hundred day labourers were given a "vacation" by the management in an attempt to avert bigger demonstrations the next day (*Merdeka*, 31 March 1979).

EX-TAPOLS BEWARE!

"The entire state apparatus must intensify vigilance in exercising supervision of the released B-category G30S/PKI prisoners. Do not relax in preventing outlawed ex-PKI aspirations from infiltrating and from mobilising forces," declared General Panggabean, Co-ordinating Minister for Defence and Security. He was speaking at a meeting of co-ordinating ministers chaired by President Suharto, held at the end of June.

Acting Information Minister, General Sudharmono, reporting this stern warning, said that it was directed not only at officials responsible for security and regional government affairs but also those in other sectors. He specifically mentioned the labour sector which "should not be utilised", pointing out that "past events should not be allowed to recur".

Asked whether this warning was being issued because danger signals had been observed, the General said: "Not yet." But generally speaking, he went on, it should always be borne in mind that disturbances continued to occur after thousands of B-category prisoners had been released. The officials concerned should speedily resolve labour problems as they arose, but in so doing firm measures should be taken if there was any evidence of these problems being "manipulated". (*Pelita*, 28 June 1979.)

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156 workers at Jakarta's **Cityhotel** launched a poster campaign and strike in support of a wage claim (**Merdeka**, 31 March 1979.)

Workers at the luxury **Hyatt** and **Sanur Hotels** in Bali went on strike just at a time when the government party, **GOLKAR**, was due to hold its Second Congress on the island. The Governor of Bali described the strike as "regrettable" and said it could have a negative effect on the island's role as a tourist attraction. (**Merdeka**, 4 April 1979.)

* * * * *

1,500 workers at the Canadian-owned **Bata** shoe factory carried out a one-day sit-down strike on the factory premises in support of a demand for a 30 percent wage increase. The action took place as negotiations were being held between workers representatives and the management, but the negotiations ended in deadlock. The strikers ignored repeated appeals to leave the premises. In the afternoon, anti-riot police troops together with armed soldiers from the local military command appeared to disperse the sit-in by force. The strike continued on the next day, though the management claimed that no work took place because it had decided to close the plant for the day.

(**Sinar Harapan**, 18 May 1979.)

* * * * *

Five hundred workers at **Coca Cola**, Jakarta, staged an action to support their demand for a 40 percent rise. Workers demonstrating outside the factory gates sang a popular fighting song from the pre-1965 period, *Maju Tak Gentar* ("Forward Without Fear"). The action occurred spontaneously after the chairman of the trade union organisation at the factory had been beaten up by the son of one of the directors. The man who beat up the union leader had just been appointed to handle the dispute with the workers despite opposition from the trade union. Troops were brought in as the strikers grew more indignant about the way their leader had been treated; the troops had great difficulty quelling the angry workers. (**Sinar Harapan**, 26 May 1979.)

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Hundreds of drivers and conductors working for the **Jakarta Municipal Bus Company** staged a sit-down strike to demand payment of a one-month extra wage as their **Lebaran** allowance. They complained that other government employees

Continued on page 2.

REACTIONS TO THE STRIKES

Government Bans Wage Increases

The Directorate for Labour Protection of the Ministry of Labour has instructed all companies in Indonesia not to grant wage increases "for the time being", despite the sharp price rises since the end of last year. The Head of the Directorate, Oetoyo Oesman, claimed that the ban was introduced to maintain stability and protect the workers' interests. If wages were not held down, he claimed, the government feared that producers would raise their prices in order to finance higher wages. (**Kompas**, 23 February 1979.)

Admiral Sudomo Reaffirms Strike Ban

"Something unusual happened in Jakarta last week", writes **Asiaweek**. "When Admiral Sudomo warned that he would punish workers who flouted the government's long-standing prohibition on strikes, he was greeted by a chorus of 'I-told-you-so's'. The boss of **KOPKAMTIB**, the powerful Internal Security Command, has admonished: 'The ban still stands.' But the signs were that, emboldened by expression of sympathy from very high places, workers were prepared to take up the gauntlet." (**Asiaweek**, 27 April, 1979.)

Agus Sudono, Chairman, All-Indonesia Federation of Trade Unions (FBSI)

"Industrial action is a luxury developing countries can't afford. If a worker is dismissed in Indonesia, ten, even a hundred people are willing to replace him. FBSI has no

strike fund, so strikes are bound to fold sooner or later. It's sad but true that in the Third World, industrial action is a weapon with which workers end up cutting their own throats." (**Asiaweek**, 27 April 1979.)

Harun Zain, Minister of Labour:

"It is true that the labour disputes are launched for economic motives. But the problem is being exaggerated. If (the strikes) are over-reported, others will follow, demanding this, that and the other. This could cause anxieties amongst businessmen already operating here. As a result, they could postpone or call off plans to extend their investments, while others who may be intending to come here will think again. They could switch their capital to other places." (**Tempo**, 16 June 1979.)

Kampus (Student Journal) June-July 1979:

"Workers who take the slightest action can be arrested under the anti-subversion law; they could disturb national security, says the Defence Ministry. Workers who take complaints to Parliament are photographed close up by intelligence agents because they are suspected of pursuing political motives. The intelligence services then borrow data from the personnel department of the worker's company. Who knows? The worker making the complaint may have an uncle who was in the **PKI**, active in the People's Youth or possibly the **CGMI** (now-banned student organisation). If this is the case, **KOPKAMTIB** will then make a major statement: 'There are indications of **PKI** politics in the recent workers actions.'"

Conflicts in the Army

The main chapter in the Defence Plea, entitled "Historical Developments in the Army", recounts the conflicts in the Army from the early days after its establishment in 1945. Even when it succeeded in formulating a comprehensive doctrine, **Tri Ubaya Cakti** (1964) supporting Sukarno's policy of revolution and the united national front, some elements in the Army who feigned support were actually in opposition.

Latief's last appointment in the Army was in 1963 as commander of the newly-formed First Infantry Brigade of the Jakarta Military Command. Besides being responsible for security in the capital, he organised training for the new Brigade and was put in charge of training civilian volunteers for **Dwikora** (Dual Command of the People)³. Meanwhile, the conflicts continued and press reports began to appear about a "council of generals" which would seize power. The Army Commander, General Yani, was called by the President and questioned about this.

... it was on this basis that the accused was given information about a Council of Generals that would seize government power from President Sukarno, using the opportunity of the President's illness. Considering past experiences that had engulfed Sukarno... I responded spontaneously, being ready to take part in safeguarding the President from this attempt to seize power. I had no other motives than this.

He tried to check the information about the Council; this included telling Major General Suharto about it. Suharto told him that he had already received information from a former subordinate.

... then, after further steps were to be taken by Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, to take the Generals and bring them to President Sukarno, I myself directly reported this, on the day before, to Major-General Suharto while he was at the Army Hospital attending his son who had had an accident with a hot plate of soup. By giving this report, I received moral support because there was no reaction from him.

The original plan was that the generals, seven in all, would be taken and handed over to the President. But things did not proceed as planned. The generals were killed. After checking, Lt-Col. Untung took responsibility for this. With regard to the generals who arrived at G30S headquarters still alive, the witness Syam Kamaruzamman, admitted that he ordered the shooting of the generals.

"The death of the generals was beyond my ambit", declared Latief repeatedly in his Defence Plea. He also stressed that the movement reported its actions to President Sukarno, telling him what had happened, whereupon he issued the following order:

'All actions should be stopped and all troops should stand by where they are. All problems will be resolved

COLONEL LATIEF

The full text of the Defence plea of Colonel Latief, sentenced to life imprisonment in June 1965. The plea, which is 210 pages long, plus an introduction, is entitled: "Revealing the True History".

Colonel Latief was tried by the Second Military Criminal Court and was defended by Mr Yap Thiam Hien and Mr...

Central Themes

The central themes of Latief's Defence Plea are:

1. That the aim of the 30 September Movement (G30S) of which he was part, was to safeguard President Sukarno from the plans of the Council of Generals to overthrow him. It was not, as the Prosecution contends, aimed at overthrowing Sukarno or undermining the lawful government.
2. That the existence of the Council of Generals cannot and need not be proven by formal evidence for it was a conspiratorial body. But its existence can be and has been proven by developments in Indonesia since 1965 which represent an unfolding of its plans which the G30S had tried to prevent.
3. That General Suharto, then commander of KOSTRAD, the Strategic Command, and now Indonesia's President, had been informed of G30S plans to act against the

by the Government/President. Avoid any bloodshed.'

We obeyed this order, and immediately ordered the withdrawal of all troops that had been positioned to safeguard Sukarno, and then ordered all troops to return home.

Suharto's Insubordination

Latief then described how General Suharto committed insubordination by refusing to allow Major-General Pranoto, the officer chosen by Sukarno to take over as Caretaker/Minister of Defence, to report to the President as Supreme Commander.

The President's policy was that leadership of the Army would be directly in the hands of the President/Supreme Commander, with day-to-day execution temporarily charged to Major-General Pranoto, while Major-General Suharto was given the task of restoring security in accordance with the policy of the Supreme Commander.

Besides this act of insubordination over the appointment of Pranoto, Suharto also did absolutely nothing to halt the excesses occurring in the regions. His insubordination increased when he took no firm measures against the anti-

DEF'S DEFENCE

Colonel Latief, who was tried and last year, has now been received.¹ nine attachments (mostly protests), is
nd-Region High Military Court, and
d two other lawyers.

Themes

Council of Generals, and that since he took no action to prevent their implementation, he is himself involved in the G30S.²

4. That General Suharto must be held fully responsible for the overthrow of President Sukarno which took place long after Colonel Latief had been thrown into prison and held in appalling conditions under strict isolation.
5. That the court before which he is being tried is not competent to try him, and that it has acted in a way prejudicial to the defendant's interests, particularly in its refusal to call certain witnesses.

Colonel Latief also gave a grim description of the treatment to which he has been subjected while in detention, which has left him badly crippled and with a number of chronic afflictions. He devoted a whole section of his Plea to a condemnation of the treatment of all political prisoners.

Sukarno movements that were organised.

Finally, when troops were used to encircle the President's Palace while a Cabinet meeting was in progress, President Sukarno left the Palace immediately for Bogor with Deputy-Premiers, Dr Subandrio and Chaerul Saleh. After consulting the day before with Suharto who had asked them to get Sukarno to sign over full powers to Suharto, three generals met Sukarno at Bogor, and following a lengthy meeting, got the 11 March Order from the President, conferring powers on Suharto "to take all steps deemed necessary to safeguard security and order". The very next day, Suharto banned the Communist Party and organised a "show of force" by KOSTRAD troops in order to intimidate Sukarno and press him to make speedy cabinet changes. This was unacceptable to Sukarno who announced that ministerial changes could only be made in accord with the provisions of the Constitution. This infuriated Suharto who then, without the President's consent, arrested fifteen Cabinet ministers including two Deputy Premiers, as well as a number of generals including Major-General Pranoto. He then made changes in the composition of Parliament and the People's Assembly. And a new Cabinet was formed, not by Sukarno but by Suharto, followed not long afterwards by an accusation made by the People's Assembly that "Sukarno was involved in the 30 September Movement". It also declared that Sukarno could no longer

fulfil his constitutional responsibilities; it prohibited him from engaging further in political activities and withdrew his mandate. At the same time it appointed Suharto Acting-President. Finally, Sukarno was placed under arrest and remained in detention until his death on 21 June 1970.

All Charges Rejected

In a very detailed examination of the charges made against him, quoting repeatedly from testimony given by witnesses, Latief denied all the charges. He strongly denied having ever had any intentions, still less taking any action, to overthrow Sukarno.

President Sukarno's government remained in office both before my arrest and after I was caged into a tiny cell, in isolation, and treated very badly indeed. Since the Sukarno government continued after I was caged in, who then plotted to overthrow his government? I was in detention suffering torture when Sukarno's government was overthrown by General Suharto and his gang. General Suharto and his gang are the ones who overthrew the government of President Sukarno; they are responsible and should be brought to court. . .

Latief went on:

. . . General Suharto was clearly standing on two legs, he was two-faced. One leg sided with the G30S, the other sided with the Council of Generals. It is clear that after I reported to General Suharto about the Council of Generals and then also reported about the Movement (G30S), he agreed to it and did not issue an order prohibiting it. But after the G30S obeyed President Sukarno's order to stop and to avoid bloodshed, General Suharto took steps, pursued policies to his own advantage, using his other leg that sided with the Council of Generals, disobeying . . . Sukarno's orders, and from that moment began the activities to overthrow Sukarno using formal, constitutional formulations.

Latief also strongly denied the charge that he had ordered the murder of the generals killed on 1 October. The order had come, he said, from Lt-Colonel Untung and from Syam, as witnesses had testified at the trial.

May I in turn ask the *Oditur* (Prosecutor):

Who was responsible for the death of Sukarno?

Who was responsible for the death of Chaerul Saleh who died while in detention without trial?

Who was responsible for the . . . loss of thousands, hundreds of thousands of innocent lives . . . such as has happened in Indonesia since 1965 up to the present day?

Who too was responsible for the loss of the lives of General Yani and the other generals, about which General Suharto already knew beforehand from the report of the accused and also from one of his subordinates. . .

All this was the result of a single order and statement by General Suharto: "Destroy them to the roots!" with horrifyingly widespread consequences, even children and babies in their mothers' wombs being destroyed. And who issued this order? None other than General Suharto.

Latief then explained why formal proof of the existence of the Council of Generals was not necessary—because the proof existed in the developments after 1965. After describing the policies of repression pursued in Indonesia under General Suharto, Latief concluded this section of his Plea as follows:

Where is the justice if I must now stand here before this Court? What about General Suharto? If a person is indicated as G30S, they may not be a member of the Armed Forces, be a civil servant, work for a government enterprise. For these you must have a certificate of non-involvement.

Yet, now, General Suharto, who was clearly involved in the G30S, has become the first man in Indonesia, the President. Doesn't a person need a certificate of non-involvement in the G30S to become President?

No Defence Witnesses Called

In the course of a detailed examination of the testimony presented in court, Latief complained bitterly that the prosecution, determined to secure a death sentence, had been highly selective in calling witnesses. Despite repeated requests, the defence was not allowed to call a single witness. The persons asked for included President and Mrs Suharto and foreign journalists who had interviewed Suharto about his vital meeting with Latief on the night of 30 September 1965. Other witnesses could have corrected false evidence about the accused's actions on 1 October and about his alleged connections with the PKI.

Latief was particularly angered by the court's refusal to call one witness named Pono, whose written testimony was presented by the prosecution and accepted by the court. The prosecution's claim that Pono could not appear in person was ludicrous, said Latief. He was being held in Cipinang Prison, the very prison where other witnesses who had appeared were being held. Latief told the court that he himself had testified at Pono's trial in 1972 and his testimony had been accepted as correct by Pono. But now, Pono's written testimony contradicted this. Moreover, it had been drawn up in 1971, and not signed until 1973; but in 1972, Pono had accepted different evidence from Latief. In face of repeated refusals to call Pono, Latief then asked that his testimony at Pono's trial be read out in court, but this too was refused.

Latief also accused the court of accepting items of evidence (weapons, maps, letters, lists, etc) without insisting on proper compliance with the rules of evidence. One letter purporting to be in his handwriting had been forged. Furthermore, the court had only permitted a few names of members of the "Revolutionary Council" (which G30S had planned to set up) to be read out, including that of the accused. Other names could not be read out as this might

impute guilt on persons not proven guilty, the court argued. But what, asked Latief, of the tens of thousands of people held in detention for many years without being proven guilty?

He also challenged the competence of a high military court to try him as he had already been dismissed from the Army and was no longer entitled to appear in uniform and wear his insignia of rank.

Latief's *Excepsi* Rejoinder Not Allowed

One of the attachments to Latief's Defence Plea is his rejoinder to the prosecution's response to his *excepsi* presented at the beginning of the trial. Latief, it now appears, was not allowed to read out all his *excepsi*; the sections left out included the account of his meetings with General Suharto at the end of September at which he informed the latter of the impending action by the G30S.

Latief's *excepsi* was rejected by the court immediately after the prosecution's reply, without granting Latief his right to reply. This reply, never presented in court, is published together with Latief's Defence Plea. It deals among others with the prosecution's claim that it was not charging Latief with subversion on the basis of the 1963 Anti-Subversion Act, but only with crimes as defined in the Criminal Code. Latief argued that the articles used to charge him were those concerned with subversion (plotting and rebellion) and furthermore, the prosecution had dragged in Law No. 5, 1959 (a law which is concerned with economic subversion and enables a sentence of death).

(Editor's Note: The prosecution may have avoided using the Anti-Subversion Act as this would have meant trying the case either before the Extraordinary Military Court (MAHMILUB) or before a Subversion District Court. A trial before the MAHMILUB would have required committal by Suharto who arguably did not favour Latief being tried at all because of Latief's evidence about his own foreknowledge of the G30S actions. Thus, the only way to keep the trial in military hands was to have it heard before a high military court which can only hear cases in which criminal charges are made.)

1. We apologise for the delay in publishing this summary, initially promised a year ago. The document did not become available as quickly as we had hoped.
2. See also, "Suharto and the Latief Trial: A Painful Revelation" by Professor W. F. Wertheim, in *Tapol Bulletin*, No. 29, August 1978, pp. 6-7.
3. *Dwikora* was the campaigning slogan for Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia which commenced in 1963.

CORRECTION to TAPOL Bulletin No. 34

On page 16, we wrote that the *Mahmilub* had not been used in Sukarno's days.

We now know that the *Mahmilub* was used twice before the military takeover of 1965. Both Ibnu Hadjar and Dr Somoukil were tried in *Mahmilubs*. Previously we had thought that Sukarno never set up or used the *Mahmilub*.

UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

In its 35th session in Geneva from 12 February to 16 March, 1979, the UN Commission on Human Rights recognised Indonesia as one of the worst human rights violators in the world. Along with Bolivia, Burma, Ethiopia, Malawi, Paraguay, South Korea, Uganda and Uruguay, Indonesia was named as a country receiving special consideration under Resolution 1503. This resolution provides a confidential procedure for the consideration of communications which allege "a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights."

Development and Human Rights

Two other items of the agenda of the Session were of particular relevance to Indonesia. The Commission discussed the general question of the right to development, and resolved to proceed to a study of the regional and national dimensions of this right. It expressed "its concern that qualitative and human rights conditions are being imposed in bilateral and multilateral trade policies with the intention and effect of perpetuating the existing structure of world trade." The **Review of the International Commission of Jurists** (No. 22, June 1979, page 19) reporting the meeting, says: "This paragraph was voted on separately to enable most of the western countries to express their disagreement". It was recommended that a seminar be held in 1980 on "the effect of the existing unjust international economic order on the economies of the developing countries and the obstacle that this represents for the implementation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, particularly the right to enjoy adequate standards of living". This is a matter of special concern with respect to Indonesia, and in our last Bulletin, TAPOL discussed how the secure climate required by the foreign investors sought by the Suharto government, automatically militated against the implementation of the most basic human rights, since unemployment, low wages and the denial of trade union rights are desirable preconditions for foreign investment. Since western government members of the UN are amongst those who require these conditions, and also sell arms to repressive regimes like Suharto's in order to ensure this investment climate, it remains to be seen how purposefully this matter of the right to development will be discussed, and what measures will be taken to ensure its implementation.

New Draft Principles

At the session, a **Draft Body of Principles for the Protection of Persons in All Forms of Detention or Imprisonment** was unanimously approved. The draft is to be circulated to all governments with a request for them to submit their comments on it to the Secretary-General before the next meeting of the General Assembly. Indonesia's comments would be very interesting since Indonesia is known to be in major violation of many of the Principles. Some of these important provisions are:

* Detention must be ordered by or be under the effective control of a judicial or "other authority under the law", whose status and tenure should afford the strongest possible guarantee of competence, impartiality and independence (No. 3).

* No person shall be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (No. 6).

* Arresting authorities should be different from investigating authorities and both should be under the control of a judicial or other authority (No. 8).

* Places of detention should be under the supervision of an authority distinct from the one administering the place of detention (No. 24).

* A detainee shall have the right to be heard by a judicial or other authority, to have counsel, and free counsel if (s)he cannot afford her/his own, to receive a copy of the detention order, to be informed at the time of arrest of the reasons for it, to be informed of her/his rights, to receive adequate medical attention, to have no evidence obtained in contravention of these principles to be admitted against her/him (Nos. 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23).

* Family contact shall be allowed and the family shall have the right to know the location of the detainee. As far as possible, minimum support to the dependent members of the detainee's family shall be maintained (Nos. 14, 17, 18, 26).

* A detained person, her/his counsel, family member or a citizen "with reliable knowledge of the case" shall be entitled to take proceedings before a judicial or other authority to prove that (s)he has been the subject of torture or other proscribed treatment, or to challenge the authority, lawfulness or necessity of her/his continued detention (No. 28).

* Whenever a detainee dies in custody or shortly after release, there shall be an investigation by a judicial or another authority, on its own motion or by a motion of the family or a citizen who has reliable knowledge of the case (No. 30).

* The family or the detainee will have the right to compensation for harm done (No. 31).

* The detainee will enjoy the presumption of innocence, a speedy appearance before a judicial or other authority, trial within a reasonable time and access to release on bail (Nos. 32, 32, 34, 35).

(Summarised by the **Review of the International Commission of Jurists**, No. 21, December 1978, p. 22).

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
WEEKLY BANNED

The weekly, **Matahari**, has been withdrawn from circulation by the Department of Information. In the Decision of the Minister, Ali Murtopo, of 25 June, it was stated that "after being given warnings about the destructive nature of the material which was presented, it was clear from further articles that they did not heed the warnings. They used words which exceeded normal politeness, and which were full of cynicism, and hurled insults bordering on libel at senior government officials."

The editor of **Matahari**, Bambang A. S. told **Tempo** (7 July, 1979) that he had not been "warned", but merely "reprimanded". However he did describe the two final issues, numbers 16 and 17, respectively entitled *Cukong Sumber Malapetaka?* ("Are Chinese Businesspeople the Source of Disaster?") and *Bangkrutnya Teknokrat a la Mafia Berkeley* ("The Bankruptcy of the Technocrats, Berkeley Mafia Style"), as "strong-worded". The reprimand which followed the publication of Number 12 (January 1979) was prompted by the publication of a Sibarani cartoon. Sibarani was a cartoonist in the left daily **Bintang Timur** in the period before the coup. The paper was banned in 1965. His cartoons were trenchant, explicit and vigorously attacked US imperialism and its Indonesian servants, particularly at the time of the CIA sponsored Outer Islands rebellions of the late 1950s (see examples below).

Although the Minister for Information earlier this year stated that the Indonesian Journalists' Association (PWI) would be responsible for its members, neither the PWI nor the Press Council was consulted before **Matahari** was banned. An official of PWI, Harmoko, commented that it was a pity that it could not have been done differently, for example by the imposition of a temporary suspension, but the authorities insisted: "There is no other way".

This heavy-handedness is partly explained when **Tempo** comments that some people believe that **Matahari** was the voice of remnants of the former Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). **Tempo** comments that **Matahari** tended to use very long sentences, a lot of foreign words, and attempted to present something of a radical criticism in an emotional style.



A cartoon by Sibarani, showing Indonesia's wealth consumed by foreign capital, with excreta consumed by domestic capital, and the people consuming the remains.

HEAVY HAND AT MULAWARMAN UNIVERSITY

The Rector of the Mulawarman University at Samarinda, East Kalimantan, has invoked the NKK (Campus Normalisation) in order to take action against students who objected to a 50 percent increase in the "Donation for the Development of Education" (SPP) and tuition fees. A letter of protest had been sent to the Rector, Sambas Wirakusumah by five student leaders on behalf of the University's 3,000 students. They objected to a Rector's decision to raise the fees on the grounds that it had no legal basis and was in conflict with a joint Decision of the Ministers of Finance, and Teaching and Education of 27 October 1977, which fixed the size of SPP for each institution. The Rector accused the five student leaders of obstructing the process of campus normalisation and dismissed them from their positions on the new Co-ordinating Body of Students—one of the new 'normalisation' organs which is under strict administration control. However they are still allowed to attend lectures.

In May the student leaders flew to Jakarta to protest at their dismissal to the Department of Teaching and Education. They stressed that they did not want to attack the Rector, but simply to prevent the SPP rise, as some students would be severely affected by it. Sambas says however that the Ministers had agreed with his increase, because university funding had become very difficult, especially since the devaluation of 15 November last year. The Director-General of Higher Education, Dr Doddy Tisna Amijaya sprang to the defence of Sambas, and said that his decision was endorsed by Jakarta. His statement made it clear that the SPP will soon be increased, and that 'normalisation' will readily be used by the authorities to discourage more student protests.

ATTORNEY GENERAL MOVES AGAINST CHINESE MINORITY

The **Canberra Times** (14 June 1979) reports that the Attorney General Ali Said, has announced a ban on the use of video cassettes and records in Mandarin or other Chinese dialects, in order to prevent the spread of Chinese culture.

This follows upon another action against Indonesia's ethnic Chinese by the Attorney General in which they have been compelled to 're-register'. This measure has been explained as being an effort to establish the identity of the 3 million Chinese citizens of Indonesia, as well as being part of the process of de-freezing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Henry Kamm (**New York Times**, 25 May, 1979) reports that all Chinese have been issued with a 29-page questionnaire which costs US \$4. This contains the most detailed questions about business interests, among other things. Additionally all personal documents such as birth, death and marriage certificates, identity cards, name change documents and business licences have to be photocopied and submitted.

PRISONERS IN MALUKU

A former political prisoner from Maluku, Mr D. Sahalessy who was held for several years without trial for pro-RMS activities¹ has published the names of many people held over the past decade or so in Maluku for alleged pro-RMS sympathies or G30S/PKI involvement. His lists include nine pro-RMS activists who are still being held in Ambon; a tenth man died recently in detention. All are being held without charge. Another twenty persons, also allegedly pro-RMS, have been under town arrest since 1974 and are required to report daily to the authorities.

He has also published a list of 87 people who were arrested and held for a month in 1978 after an incident in Ambon involving the expulsion from Indonesia of a Dutch Malukan, Mr Hatumena, who was accused of spreading pro-RMS leaflets during a visit to the region in April 1978. Mr. Sahalessy claims that all these 87 people were subjected to ill-treatment or severe torture during their detention.

He also made public the names of 17 people being held in Ambon as G30S/PKI detainees and referred to many others who have been dismissed from their jobs, only in order to make way for others coming to the region from other parts of Indonesia.

Mr Sahalessy himself was released in 1975 and held under town arrest, but managed to leave the country after obtaining permission to return home to Ceram for the general elections. At a press conference in London, where he had come in order to present his lists to Amnesty International, he explained that one method used by the Army to isolate RMS supporters was to accuse them of G30S/PKI involvement. The local population, he said, would rally to the support of people described as RMS but became too scared to help if the G30S label was used.

He described town arrest conditions as being very severe; for long periods, detainees were required to report to the authorities daily and in many cases to remain there for the best part of the day. It appears to be a method of keeping tight control over people without having to provide any sustenance.

1. RMS: South Malukan Republic, a secessionist movement which dates back to 1950.

CORRECTIONS

(TAPOL Bulletin, No. 34 June 1979)

p. 19. First column, 6 lines from the bottom:
The sentence beginning "This option in fact obviates . . ." should read:

This option in fact obviates the need for recipient governments to tackle an entire system of corruption and inefficiency, by carving out and concentrating upon enclaves where smooth running can be assured by imported managers.

KOMANDO JIHAD IS NO MORE

Through the simple process of arranging a meeting with some respected Moslem leaders, the army has abolished the 'Komando Jihad' which previously, according to army statements had represented a threat to state security, to the extent that hundreds had to be detained. Now the 'Komando Jihad' has been demoted to merely a gang of robbers and murderers. (Komando Jihad = Holy War Command).

Tempo (30 June, 1979) reports that on 18 June, the Commander of the Second Defence Territorial Command met with some 200 *ulamas* (Islamic scholars) and other Moslem intellectuals to resolve former differences. Banners proclaimed "We learn from our past errors for our future benefit". In what seems to be an army initiative, the *ulamas* were presented with a 'gift', the release of 185 former 'Komando Jihad' figures, although it was stated that there are still 51 who are to be tried, and another 37 who are "still being processed". More importantly, Lt.-General Widjojo Sujono stated that the Armed Forces will no longer use the term 'Komando Jihad'.

Widjojo announced that henceforth the term 'Warman's Reign of Terror' would be used, as what they had formerly referred to as 'Komando Jihad' activities had no connection with Islamic teachings, but were plain criminal actions. Warman was accused of crimes in Sumatra and Java including sixteen cases of robbery or murder. He allegedly moved to Java this year with the intent of killing judges and prosecutors involved in 'Komando Jihad' cases, and was implicated in the killing of Parmanto, the Assistant Rector of Solo University on 11 March, and the murder of Hasan Bauw, allegedly an accomplice of his. Now Warman has been captured, it has been declared that his motives were criminal, not political, and therefore the 'Komando Jihad' is no more. However Widjojo did not explain what would happen to those already sentenced under 'Komando Jihad' charges, for example Haji Ismael Pranoto (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 32, February 1979, p. 7), who got life imprisonment for "criminally subversive actions" and attempting to establish an Islamic State by military means. Will he too be demoted from a subversive to a common criminal?

The Moslem leaders were obviously greatly relieved by the announcement that Islam would no longer be associated with the robberies and murders connected with Warman's group. The simple expedient of holding this meeting seems to have been a move by the army to defuse one source of Moslem opposition, and bring Moslem leaders under its protection. Initially when the army proclaimed that a 'Komando Jihad' existed, it was part of the attempt to disperse Islam as a political force, but in recent months the strength of the Islamic opposition in Indonesia and the example of Iran has no doubt been testing the ingenuity of military leaders who have seen the necessity to make some concessions to Islamic leaders in the continuing hope of making Islam docile.

DEFENDANT: DUTCH STATE

A summons is to be brought against the Dutch State with regard to a licence granted on 21 August 1975 for the export of three corvettes to Indonesia. The plaintiffs include representatives of FRETILIN, East Timorese refugees, and members of the Free Papua Movement, through their legal representative, Mr W. J. van Bennekom.

The aim is to prevent the corvettes, now in the final stages of completion, from being delivered to the Indonesian Navy. The summons points out that since the Indonesian invasion of East Timor and the ensuing war of aggression, tens of thousands of people have been killed; despite repeated calls by the UN Security Council for Indonesia to withdraw its troops, the war has continued unabated. Indonesia is clearly engaged in acts of war which are not the consequence of aggression against Indonesia, and the war is of such a nature and scale that Indonesia is certain to use the most modern military equipment at its disposal. Clearly the fast, sophisticated corvettes are ideal for activities in the waters around East Timor.

The licence was granted in violation of the Disarmament and Security Memorandum, presented by the Dutch Foreign Minister to the Second Chamber of the States-General on 19 June 1975. The Memorandum states:

“The Netherlands adheres to a selective arms-export policy, in which considerations with regard to the promotion of peace prevail over purely commercial interests. In practice a great number of export licences are therefore not granted.

Deliveries to sensitive and potentially sensitive regions are carefully judged on their political merits.

This applies especially to exports to countries involved in armed conflict. . .”

Repeated efforts have been made for the revocation of the licence, especially since the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975. In reply to an oral question by representative Fred van der Spek, on 3 March, 1977, the Foreign Minister replied:

“It is obvious that every Dutch cabinet is bound to obligations resulting from international law, which prevail over an export licence that may have been granted. . .

In this connection I have in mind obligations resulting from any resolution of the Security Council e.g. concerning the East Timor question . . . There may also be reasons to reconsider the granting of an export licence if Indonesia becomes involved in acts of war which are not the result of unprovoked aggression against that country. There would be a further reason to reconsider the decision to grant an export licence if there are at the time of delivery of the first corvettes—which, by the way, will not take place before mid-1979—acts of such a nature and on such a scale as to render the use of the corvettes in East Timor. . .”

On 30 November, in reply to Mr van der Spek, the present Foreign Minister upheld the above statement of his predecessor.

Since it is now the middle of 1979, there is presumably no intention of cancellation or reconsideration of the export licence, even though the war in East Timor continues on such a scale as to render the use of the corvettes very likely. The draft summons observes therefore that the Dutch State has failed to observe proclaimed policy resolutions and has neglected to consider facts that could or should mean that the failure to observe policy resolutions is counter to the law.

The lawsuit is expected to reach the court in October or November. Meanwhile, a report monitored by the BBC in August stated that a senior Indonesian navy officer had gone to “commission” one of the corvettes and to arrange for delivery of the other two later this year.



ALARICO FERNANDES — MURDERED?

There are conflicting reports about the fate of Alarico Fernandes, former Minister of Information in the Fretilin government. In *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 34, it was reported that he had been summarily executed. On 1 June, the Australian daily, the *West Australian* reported that a Labour Senator, Ruth Coleman, had accused Indonesia of Fernandes' murder. She stated that some time previously he had been bound and pushed from a helicopter in flight. She also quoted an unnamed source as saying that captured Fretilin cadres were systematically murdered, and that before their deaths they were taunted about the method of murder to be used.

However, *Antara*, the Indonesian News Agency quoted by the *Melbourne Herald* (6 June 1979), stated that Fernandes was alive and well and had given a press conference in Dili. The date of the press conference was not given, nor, it seems, were any foreign journalists invited. It was claimed that Fernandes appealed to his mother to return from Australia to East Timor, and that he had been pleased with the “rapid development” of East Timor.

This week an independent source who contacted TAPOL, has quoted a “reliable source who has just left East Timor”, as confirming Senator Coleman's account of Fernandes' murder, and as saying that Fernandes did not appear at the alleged press conference. Additionally, *Timor News* (No. 57, 19 July, 1979) reports that his relatives in Australia have received no letters from him and they seem convinced that he is dead.

EAST TIMOR AID DIVERTED TO TRADERS

International aid channelled through the Indonesian Red Cross does not reach the starving Timorese for whom it is intended, but is sold by the Indonesian Red Cross or by the army to Dili traders. This was stated by Mr P. Walsh of Action for World Development (*Canberra Times*, 1 June 1979) on the basis of a report prepared by the Catholic church in East Timor.

Speaking of the thousands of people who have been forced by lack of food to come down from the mountains, the report says that

they are in an extremely dire condition, practically naked and starving to death. The food does not materialise. . . many kinds of clothing and medicine are on sale in shops in Dili. What happens to the food?

Since Australia does not export butter and cheese to Indonesia and both are now on sale in Dili, it can only be concluded, says Mr Walsh, that they are part of the aid supplies being sold by the Indonesian occupiers of East Timor.

This report confirms many previous reports that the Indonesian Red Cross is unfit to administer aid in East Timor, and indicates the urgent necessity for international supervision of desperately needed relief programmes.

PKI BLAMED FOR PEASANT PROTEST

“Communist agents” are being blamed for demonstrations by peasants in East Java in July this year during which government property was burnt down and the homes of village heads attacked. The disturbances lasted for three days and centred on the village of Jenggawah. According to *Reuter* (4 August 1979), the peasants were “protesting against unfair land distribution”.

The Military Commander of East Java, Major-General Witarmin held the “underground communist party” responsible, and declared that the village of Jenggawah had been a “stronghold” of the BTI, the outlawed peasants union. If this is true, it also means that it must have been a centre of mass killings in 1965 and possibly too an area where peasants had succeeded in securing implementation of the pre-1965 agrarian reform act, though much of the resulting land distribution was reversed after the military took power.

ADDENDUM TO EDITORIAL

In February 1978 Jusuf Wanandi of Indonesia's Centre for Strategic and International Studies claimed (*FEER*, 10 February 1978) that 1,833 Tapols were released May-November 1977. Then too, he was trying to explain discrepancies in KOPKAMTIB figures. But KOPKAMTIB has continued nevertheless to speak about only 10,000 releases for 1977. Our attention was drawn to Wanandi's February 1977 letter too late to incorporate this point in the editorial.

“RELATIVE SELF-SUFFICIENCY” — AND ABSOLUTE HUNGER

A recent visit to Boston for optical treatment seems to have put Ali Murtopo, the Minister for Information, right out of touch with the reality of food production in Indonesia. *Tempo* (30 June 1979) reports that shortly after his return he stated after a mid-June cabinet meeting, “This year Indonesia has been successful in attaining self-sufficiency in food, as the result of intensification of production within the country.” Glad tidings indeed, but it seems that Ali's calculations were faulty, and the true picture is extremely bleak.

The following day a very different statement was made by the Minister for Agriculture, Professor Sudarsono. He said that more than 200,000 tons of paddy have been destroyed by *wereng* (rice hoppers) in 1978-79. The chronic shortage created by the *wereng* pest is aggravated by an infestation of rats, and the situation is expected to worsen, especially in Central Java. It is estimated that food production will drop by 2-5% from 17.5 million tons last year. Since the population has increased, it is obvious that imports must increase.

In fact, Bustanil Arifin, the head of *Bulog* (the government rice procurement agency) has already contacted Thailand, Taiwan, the United States, Burma, Japan and Pakistan, and has bought 1.7 million tons of rice at \$225 per ton. The total amount required may be 2.5 million tons, which includes a .3 million ton carry-over from last year. The situation is very severe; rice prices may increase, and production in some export countries may fall as a result of the oil crisis and the consequent increase in fertiliser prices, since petroleum products are used in fertiliser manufacture. Indonesia already accounts for well over a quarter of the world rice market.

However some face-saving explanation had to be found for Ali's gaffe. Bustanil discovered two meanings for the term SSB (*Swa-Sembada Beras*—Self-Sufficiency in Rice). One is ‘relative’ and the other ‘absolute’. “The SSB which was calculated to be reached in 1979, was relative, so that Indonesia must still import rice”. According to Bustanil, ‘relative’ SSB does not take account of seeds, depreciation and reserve stocks, etc. He added that when ‘absolute’ SSB was calculated these factors are taken into account!

‘Let Them Eat Rats’

Despite acute distress caused by food shortages, Indonesia's leaders seem incapable of dealing seriously with the problem. On a recent visit to Sumba Island, President Suharto even made a joke of it. Almost the entire rice crop in the region has been destroyed by rats and many people are starving. Yet the suffering there went unreported by local officials for months. The advice Suharto had to offer was that the people should eat the rats. He confided that he had a weight problem and had not eaten rice for four months to deal with it. So, he suggested a deal: the people of Sumba should eat rats and he would try harder to lose weight! *Tribune* (Australia), 6 June 1979.

INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS URGED TO INCREASE VISITS

A plea for intensified visits from the International Red Cross has recently been received from tapols in East Java. In response, TAPOL has written to the International Red Cross, and calls upon readers of the Bulletin to do so, too. (Address: International Committee of the Red Cross, Asia Division, 7, Avenue de la Paix, 1211 Geneva, Switzerland.)

The prisoners point out that the period between International Red Cross visits is too long to guarantee the maintenance of improvements which were forced on the prison staff in preparation for the Red Cross visit. (As is known, it is the practice of prison authorities to improve food, bedding and other facilities when Red Cross missions are due.)

Food Conditions Worsening

TAPOL's source of information also reports that food conditions have worsened recently in some prisons in East Java. **Koblen Prison**, in Surabaya, has been particularly badly affected. Food rations have worsened because the prison budget has been cut just when the price of food, particularly rice, is rising. In addition, the new prison commander of Koblen Prison, who is described as a "fanatic Moslem", has imposed a much stricter system of isolation and no longer allows families to visit prisoners. Family visits are a major source of food, and the result of this ban has greatly aggravated the food problem. Similar factors appear to have affected conditions in other prisons in East Java.

ICRC Financial Assistance

The International Review of the Red Cross (May-June, 1979, p. 164) reports the following:

On 6 and 7 April, an ICRC delegate went to the island of Buru to hand over relief supplies for political detainees who had been visited in December 1978. Consignments of books and medical supplies, worth some 12,500 Swiss francs, were distributed. The medical supplies are sufficient for treating about 6,000 persons a year.

During 1978, some twenty other places of detention in Indonesia also received relief supplies when visited by the delegates. The total amount of assistance provided by the ICRC in places of detention in Indonesia is of the order of 44,000 Swiss francs.

TAPOL appeals to any readers who are in a position to do so to help check whether these grants really benefit the prisoners.

TAPOL campaigns for the release of Indonesian political prisoners and is a humanitarian organisation. It is not associated with any political groups, either in Indonesia or abroad, and is supported by individuals and organisations of many shades of opinion.

SUDOMO'S GOOD NAME BESMIRCHED

The Commander-in-Chief of KOPKAMTIB, Admiral Sudomo is incensed at a story published in the daily, **Sinar Pagi**, which suggests that he is a land grabber. "I am not a criminal nor the thief of other people's land", he said, "As the head of OPSTIB (Operation Against Corruption) would I want to seize land?" The newspaper will be called upon to explain the proper facts.

Tempo relates that Sudomo, along with two other senior officers, Major-General Sukardi and Major-General Sumrahadi, and thirteen others have been accused of the unlawful seizure of land, though not as individuals nor as officers, but as officials of the Jakarta Golf Club. The dispute is a longstanding one and has now been taken to court by the heirs of the original land owner, Raden Kadirun Mangunpurnomo.

However it looks as if Sudomo will be redeemed, not only as a gentleman and an officer, but as a golf club official for his lawyer argues that according to the Agrarian Law of 1961 the claims of farmers had to be listed within five years of its promulgation, and the heirs listed within six months of the original owner's death. None of this was apparently done by Raden Kadirun or his heirs, and so the land will now automatically be returned to the state, and thus its use as a golf course may well be seen in a more sympathetic light.

Or so the defendants hope. But then, we may never know the outcome as Sudomo has warned the press not to publicise the case any further. (**Tempo**, 30 June 1979.)

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