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British Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners

TAPOL Bulletin No 32

Feb 1979

TAPOL CAMPAIGN INTENSIFIES

“What does TAPOL intend to do,” asked one of our supporters recently, “now that all the tapols are being released?”

As this question may also have occurred to others, we feel that a number of points need to be made to correct the mistaken impression that human rights campaigning about Indonesia is no longer necessary.

In the first place, it is unfortunately not true that all tapols are being released, even if KOPKAMTIB keeps its promise to release all B-category prisoners. And General **Yoga Sugama** has publicly hinted that this will not happen without pressure. In his interview with KRO, he put it quite plainly when asked about plans to force released tapols to go to transmigration camps: “We are going to have reactions abroad . . . if we force them” (TAPOL Bulletin No 31, page 9). The dangers which now threaten “hard-core” tapols like **Pramoedya Ananta Toer** as well as a number of prisoners now being held at Buru’s ‘penal’ Ancol unit, the agriculturalists and engineers needed to keep the Buru project going (see page 6) and the Savana Jaya tapol families need to be continually spotlighted. Also letters from Indonesia reveal that other prisoners are held “informally” as chauffeurs, domestic servants, etc.

In the second place, there is the major problem of released tapols, so many of whom are finding it enormously difficult to contend with life as a result of the many discriminations and prejudices they face. So pressing have these problems become that a new expression has begun to emerge to describe their plight: they are ‘civic corpses’, effectively enjoying little more in the way of civil rights than they did when they were in detention. Most serious of all are the problems they face in trying to earn a livelihood.

Then there are the A-Category prisoners. Some have already been tried (according to official figures about 900 but probably much more than that), and those still awaiting trial (officially about 1,200). Much needs to be done to expose the vicious abuses which those already tried have been subjected: they include arbitrary trial procedures, judges functioning under strong pressure from the military, inadequate facilities for a proper defence and

the use of illegal laws to bring extremely harsh sentences (see page 7 for the results of a preliminary survey of sentences).

Furthermore, we have the new problem of C-category people being held against their will as contract-workers on plantations (see page 2 as well as the cover story in our last issue).

And then there is a new generation of political prisoners emerging as the government continues to clamp down on student dissidents, Moslem opponents and many others.

Finally, there is the grotesque situation in East Timor where annexation by Indonesia has left a ghastly trail of death, starvation and large-scale incarceration, as well as the persecution being perpetrated in places like West Irian in an attempt to stamp out a movement in favour of secession.

So, to our friends who asked the question and to the many others who may have thought of it, we say: TAPOL intends to work just as hard or even harder in pursuance of the aims which it was set up to achieve.

IGGI: FOREIGN AID LIKELY TO INCREASE

The 1979 annual meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia is due to meet in the Netherlands from 3-5 April.

This is an excellent time to draw the attention of IGGI member-governments to the continuing widespread abuse of human rights in Indonesia, and to press them to re-consider their continuing support for the country’s repressive military regime. This is all the more necessary in view of the fact that there is likely to be a sharp increase in the amount of foreign aid supplied by IGGI during the next five years.

Figures published in January concerning Indonesia’s third Five-Year Plan (1979-1984) envisage a heavy dependence on foreign aid which will amount to \$15,000 million over the 5-year period (FEER, 2 February 1979). This compares with \$2,500 million agreed upon at the 1978 IGGI meeting which represented an increase of almost 20% over the previous year’s amount of \$ 2,100 million.

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NORTH SUMATRA CONTRACT WORKERS

A statement put out by the Public Relations Section of the Ministry of Agriculture has confirmed that several thousand C-category persons are among the contract workers on plantations in North Sumatra not being allowed to return home to Java. (See TAPOL Bulletin No 31).

The purpose of the statement was to 'deny' earlier reports about this problem, but the 'denial' only amounted to giving a different figure for the number of persons involved. The official gave a figure of 4,659 for the C-category people involved by comparison with the figure of 6,157 given in the Kompas report on 21 October 1978. He confirmed however, that these C-category people did indeed require the consent of the local military commander before being allowed to return home (Kompas Minggu, 5 November 1978).

TAPOL readers will be well-accustomed to the unreliability of official figures in Indonesia. There is no reason to believe that the Kompas figure is not correct, but even if the lower figure is right, it is clear that KOPKAMTIB statements over the past few years asserting that there are no longer any C-category detainees are simply not true.

Kompas Minggu of 5 November also published a detailed report by one of its reporters who was sent to North Sumatra to investigate the whole question. The report contains detailed information about the terms of the

contracts and the facilities which plantation companies are required to provide to workers. But from on-the-spot investigations, the report clearly shows that the companies fail to comply with these undertakings in many ways. The picture he gives is of a situation that is closely reminiscent of the colonial-style indentured labour. Even the language used—'coolie' and 'tuan' (master)—has not changed.

An interview with the head of the North Sumatra Labour Protection Office also reveals that officials have their own interpretation of the law, and insist, for instance, that contract renewals can be for any length of time, whereas the law specifically limits renewals to one year.

One worker whom the reporter was able to interview briefly (until a foreman came along and cut the conversation off) told him that he had signed a contract in 1963. When his contract expired in 1969 (presumably after a one-year renewal), he sought permission to return home. This was granted but he was informed that his wife would not be permitted to return as she was regarded as being 'involved with the PKI'. Of course, the man decided to remain with his wife and they have now therefore overstayed their contract by nine years.

Comprehensive translations of the above-mentioned press reports are available from TAPOL at 25 pence, plus postage. We ask overseas readers to allow for airmail postage if required.

NEW ADDRESS

We appeal to readers and friends of TAPOL to address all correspondence to our new address:

8a Treport Street,
London SW18 2BP

Correspondence is still being sent to our former address and unfortunately our forwarding arrangement is due to expire very soon.

INDONESIANS RETURNING HOME, BEWARE!

Indonesians working or studying abroad have recently been reminded that there are strict bans against bringing certain types of subversive literature into Indonesia. One such reminder was circulated just before the New Year by the Indonesian Embassy in Canada. The circular quotes a letter issued on 28 June 1978 by the Attorney-General which lists the following categories of banned literature:

- a. Material containing Communist/Marxist/Leninist/Maoist teachings in all their forms and manifestations.
- b. Pornographic literature.
- c. Writings, photographs or tapes which insult the Head of State, government officials or leading personalities in society, or members of their families.
- d. Writings, photographs or tapes which could disturb members of the community or disrupt the public order.

For purposes of control, persons returning home from abroad are required to keep all literature and other printed material separate from the rest of their belongings, and to compile a complete list of all such items, giving the name of the writer, and the title and publisher.

The only exception to this ban is for material of a "clearly scientific nature" required for the purposes of study.

—P.S. Indonesians abroad: Make sure you leave your TAPOL bulletins behind.

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At the time of this agreement David Jenkins of the Far Eastern Economic Review (9 June 1978) observed that Indonesia's debt service ratio could be expected to rise to the 'danger' level of around 20%.

One country, the Netherlands, has already announced its intention of increasing economic aid to Indonesia while at the same time cutting aid to most other recipient countries. A sum of 150 million guilders will be provided (64 million in outright grant), which is 10% more than the amount supplied last year. (NRC-Handelsblad 2 February 1979)

KOPKAMTIB LAYS DOWN THE LAW

In the last issue of the **TAPOL Bulletin** we reported with some scepticism the joint statement issued in early November by Indonesia's six top law enforcement officers claiming to safeguard the principles of humanitarianism in the processes of arrest, detention and interrogation. The statement had come in response to growing concern about widespread abuses and the failure to enact an implementary code regarded such processes as a follow-up to the 1970 Basic Law on the Judiciary.

This scepticism has been vindicated more quickly than we realised at the time, for on 27 November KOPKAMTIB took it upon itself to be the sole arbiter in determining the nature of these processes by issuing an Instruction to all law enforcement agencies regulating the treatment of detainees and the accessibility of legal aid. Quite apart from the illegality of KOPKAMTIB assuming such a role, a fact which some lawyers have not hesitated to point out, the Instruction seriously erodes the safeguards upheld in the 1970 law.

The lawyer, Mr Thiam Djoe Kiam, has commented that the Instruction can have "no judicial effect" (**Tempo** 23 December 1978). The question of legal aid and detention is regulated by an Act of Parliament and cannot be curbed by regulations having lower juridical status. "Not even KOPKAMTIB can issue an Instruction regulating the implementation of an organic law," he said.

Peradin, the lawyers' association has also sharply criticised both the joint statement and the KOPKAMTIB Instruction. It pointed out in a statement issued to commemorate Human Rights Day on 10 December, that the Instruction decrees that instead of the accused having legal advice from the time of arrest, he may only take advantage of this *before* and *after* preliminary investigation. During this interrogation, the legal advisor is not permitted to be physically present. The discussion between the accused and his/her legal advisor must be witnessed by the investigating official, and the accused is only permitted to discuss family matters, and matters relating to arrest and detention. The case itself may not be discussed.

Peradin also points out that, far from upholding "humane" procedures, the Instruction violates a basic principle of justice, the presumption of innocence of any person until found guilty, because the procedures now formally laid down treat the detainees as an object of the law with virtually no rights. "The KOPKAMTIB Instruction still firmly upholds the inquisitorial nature of preliminary investigations," it says. While the 1970 Law states that legal advice for the accused is a *right*, the KOPKAMTIB Instruction merely states that the accused *may* obtain this advice.

Kompas (14 November) observes that not many people are able to pay the fees of legal advisors. *Peradin* goes further to say that the ability of the accused to obtain legal aid, as defined by the law enforcers, is "as if it merely depends on the generosity of the investigating official, and not according to the rights of the accused." (**Tempo** 23

December 1978)

Peradin has also reasserted the right of the accused to freely discuss his/her arrest with a legal advisor. The stipulation that the investigator must be present has been denounced by *Peradin* as a violation of the right of 'privileged communication'. The denial of the physical presence of a legal advisor during interrogation has also caused concern, and **Tempo** (23 December 1978) has also observed that this is one area of the joint statement that has "special significance" as the presence of a witness inhibits the investigator who is tempted to work "beyond the limits".

KOPKAMTIB has attempted to allay these fears. "People need not worry," said Admiral Sudomo, the Commander of KOPKAMTIB (**Kompas** 14 November 1978), "the six law enforcers who signed [the joint statement] will supervise the apparatus of implementation." That KOPKAMTIB operates beyond the limits of the rule of law has again been highlighted by the fact that it has now been decreed that the subject is closed, and there will be no debate. **Tempo** (23 December 1978) reports: "For law enforcers, the problem now remains of implementing the KOPKAMTIB Instructions. There is to be no debate. Comments and criticisms of lawyers, for the time being, must cease. 'I shall not make any further comment' said General Kanter, the head of the Legal Department of the Army, who clearly was not prepared to engage in any further polemic."



Law Enforcer: General Yoga Sugama, KOPKAMTIB Chief-of-Staff.

BANNED! BANNED! BANNED!

CHRISTMAS FESTIVAL FOR HOMELESS

The annual Ecumenical Christmas festivities, usually held at the Senayan Sports Stadium, were unceremoniously banned at the eleventh hour last Christmas. Although the Jakarta Police Command had issued a permit for the event on 12 December, it was withdrawn three days later, "after instructions had been received from the Regional Military Officer" (*Tempo*, 23 December 1978).

This festival has in the past provided an opportunity of distributing food packets and gift bundles, including a sarong and toothpaste to some of Jakarta's large population of homeless people. Four thousand people had travelled to the stadium only to find the gates locked with troops on guard; their disappointment was intense. Many had come long distances on foot or by bus for the event. Disappointment was mixed with confusion about the complex processes which had led them to being deprived of some small comfort at Christmas time. Mat Djadi, a shoeshine said, "Why on earth can't I have the gift?" (*Tempo*, 23 December 1978).

According to the *Tempo* account, the withdrawal of permission seems to be the result of religious rivalries, apart from the usual concern of the government with "security and order". In fact the homeless of Jakarta may be seen as amongst the first victims of the Ministerial Decisions (SK 70/1978 and SK 77/1978) which, as reported in our last issue, have severely curtailed religious freedoms in Indonesia. The Jakarta Governor, **Tjokropranolo**, is said to have objected to the event. It seems that his objections were prompted by the intervention of the Minister of Religion who refused to be a patron of the gathering, and who hinted that it contravened Ministerial Decision SK70/1978. He said that only Christian homeless people should have been invited.

It is likely that the Indonesian *Ulamas* Council (Council of traditionalist Islamic scholars) was instrumental in the cancellation. This council suggested on December 15, that the festivities had the negative effect of drawing attention to poverty in Indonesia, and Amiruddin Siregar, Secretary of the Council, expressed doubts about the "good intentions" of the organisers, since he suggested that it would be a way in which Christian churches could proselytise amongst poverty-stricken Moslems. After the cancellation had been announced, Amiruddin expressed gratitude that the displeasure of the wider Moslem community had not been incurred.

YOUTH COMMEMORATION

Plans to hold a non-government-sponsored commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of Indonesia's Youth Pledge Day (28 October) were thwarted by an Army ban. The ban came as the result of a decision adopted by Indonesia's Minister for Youth Affairs, Dr Abdul Gafur, that no commemorations were to be held outside the framework of those organised by the Government.

Reporting this, Gadis Rasid, writing for the Dutch newspaper, *NRC Handelsblad* (4 November, 1978), said that this decision had entirely eliminated what waning popularity this Youth Affairs Minister still enjoyed. "This Minister was appointed," wrote Gadis Rasid, "in an attempt to forestall repetition of past events (in which the youth played a leading part). . . But he has gone about his work so energetically that people are wondering whether his efforts will not prove counter-productive. He tackles his task from the position that anything emanating from the youth must automatically be considered as potential opposition. All activities that are not within the framework of the government programme and that do not adhere to its rules, must be regarded with suspicion."

Youth Pledge Day commemorates the day in 1928 when youth from all parts of Indonesia representing many ethnic groups came together to affirm their united opposition to Dutch colonialism and confirm their support for the slogan: "One nation. One motherland. One language." The government-sponsored commemoration was planned as a demonstration of youth loyalty, with parades and meetings held in Jakarta. The largest of these meetings was addressed by President Suharto.

The banned meeting was to have been addressed by elderly personalities who were themselves involved in the 1928 event and would have emphasised the need to keep alive the militant traditions of that event.

Gadis Rasid also reported that although it may appear on the surface that there is no apparent opposition to these efforts by the government to bring the youth under control, the government has not yet been able to stem the unrest, cynicism and apathy among young people. Unrest sometimes expressed itself in local issues which, at first glance, appeared not to be of any political significance. For example, the Minister for Education recently announced that the present school year was to be prolonged by six months. This decision has led to a great deal of dissatisfaction in the schools, and generalised antipathy towards the Ministry.

SUDOMO APOLOGISES

Last-minute withdrawals of military permits for two public events in Jakarta late last year resulted in the sorry spectacle of many invited guests arriving at the meeting-place only to find the doors locked and scribbled notices telling them to go home.

The first time this happened was in the case of the non-official Youth Pledge Day celebration, planned for 28 October, with a number of well-

known elder statesmen among the guests. The cancellation of this meeting caused enough embarrassment for KOPKAMTIB's chief, Admiral **Sudomo** to make a public apology three days later. (*Kompas*, 2 January 1979)

But only a few weeks later, the same cavalier method was used against the ecumenical Christmas festivities leaving thousands of Jakarta's poor and homeless disappointed and confused. There has been no report yet of any public apology.

ARE YOU STILL ALIVE FATHER?

The following letter appeared in the readers' column of **Sinar Harapan** on 11 January 1979:

Dear Sirs,

Our father, Hasan Subekti, was employed as non-government teacher in Sukabumi. On 13 December 1965, he was arrested by the Sukabumi Military Police because he was said to be involved in the G30S/PKI. He was released in June 1966, but re-arrested by the local police, then transferred to the Bogor Military Resort (*Korem*) on 11 December 1966

From then on, our mother, Mrs Sumintaning Hasan Subekti was not able to meet father, except by letter. We seven were small children, and now the oldest of us are still at high school and at the Surabaya Technical School.

The last letter from father in detention was received by mother on 26 February 1967. After that, *Korem* officers forbade mother from sending any more letters or food because, they said, father had been moved. They did not say where.

Since March 1967, our mother has tried in great sorrow to get some explanation about where father is [being held]. This has now been going on for some ten years.

Tirelessly, mother has sought information, in Sukabumi (the Army Prosecutor's Office, *Kodam's*—Provincial Military Command—Interrogation Team, *Kodim* Section I). Then she went to Nusakambangan, and to Bogor *Korem*, to *Korem* and *Koramil* Surabaya, to South Jakarta *Kodim*, to the *Bapreru* [Buru Administration] office at the Attorney General's Office in Jakarta, to the Bandung

Laksusda [*Kopkamtib* officer] and most recently to *Kodim* Sukabumi Section V.

Although she has visited so many places, mother has not received any clear answer. Where is our father being held or is he now dead? The problem is that mother is still convinced that he is alive, because she believes that the Government's intentions were to safeguard [*mengamankan*] and straighten out those who had taken the wrong path.

Each time releases of G30S/PKI prisoners take place, mother watches and hopes that she will meet father. Although it is very difficult for her, she has herself travelled to the places where prisoners were released recently—to Surabaya, Semarang, Bandung and Jakarta. But God has not yet granted us a re-union with father. All this time, we have been like a brood of chickens without our protector.

We hope, through this letter, to request the Bogor *Korem* officer, the Attorney-General Ali Said, General Yoga Sugama and in particular the Government, to respond to our anxieties, so that we can obtain clear information about whether our father is still alive or has already passed on. Thank you.

For: Family Hasan Subekti,
Apriandani (his son)
Jalan Darmawangsa IV/8, Surabaya:

A few days later, Sinar Harapan wrote an editorial commenting in very moving terms on this reader's letter, and calling upon General Yoga Sugama and other government officials to respond to the family's appeal for help.

The DISAPPEARED

A letter, published on 11 January this year in **Sinar Harapan** which we reproduce on this page, draws attention to the problem of people who have disappeared since 1965, either from prisons or immediately after being arrested.

TAPOL recently received a letter from a newly-released tapol in Indonesia which gives more information on this subject, and calls for the establishment of an international commission of investigation. The letter provides a few names but there must be hundreds or perhaps even thousands more. The relevant part of the letter reads as follows:

"There is first the mysterious disappearance of a number of PKI leaders, including D.N.Aidit, Moh.Lukman, Njoto and Sakirman. It is known for certain, particularly regarding the first three, that they were arrested by the authorities. Since then they are being held responsible for so-called abortive coup, the G30S/PKI, those who uphold the rule of law would expect that they are brought to trial. But strangely, none of them has been tried. Neither has there ever been any explanation from the government about what happened to them. Are they still alive? If so, where are they being held? If they are dead, how did they

die? Under torture? If so, the officials responsible should be charged. But up to now no one has been charged with torturing them and causing their deaths. If they have disappeared without trace, this must surely be recognised as proof that Indonesia does not uphold the rule of law, and has abused their human rights.

"The second problem is the disappearance of detainees who were 'borrowed' [*dibon*], then disappeared without trace. *Dibon* is the term used when a detainee is transferred from a place of detention for interrogation. Afterwards, the person should be sent back or allowed to go home. But thousands who were *dibon* have in fact disappeared. The following few names can be given: Drs Tan Hwie Liong, Kow Bian Tjay and Goei Poo An from Malang, East Java; Koo Yong Tjay, Phoa Tjong Hoo, Liem Tjin Lay and Sujok from Surabaya. The authorities have never given any explanation regarding the fate of these people. This has caused much suffering as well as innumerable legal problems for relatives—regarding inheritance, and for wives who wish to re-marry and need official confirmation of their husband's death."



T R I

BURU: WILL THEY ALL GO HOME?

A contact in Indonesia has written to TAPOL recently drawing attention to concern now being felt about the release prospects of some tapols still remaining in Buru, despite government assurances that all of them will be released by the end of this year.

He writes that one of the reasons why the Buru prison camp was so "successful" as an agricultural project (see **TAPOL Bulletin No 31**) was that almost all prisoners were without families and therefore had "no unproductive mouths apart from the old and the sick, and of course the guards". A second reason was that there were agriculturalists and engineers among the prisoners, which would never be the case with general transmigration projects.

In an attempt to maintain production levels as the tapols leave and the hoped-for transmigrants appear to take their place, it is feared, he writes, that "the agriculturalists and engineers will be among the last to be released or . . . may even be asked to stay on voluntarily to help the government with the project".

Our contact further points out that the strong determination shown by the military to keep the Savana Jaya prisoners with families on Buru is also related to their efforts to keep Buru going as a successful agricultural project. "If they were to leave," he writes, "this could discourage prospective transmigrants."

Readers of our last issue will recall the Savana Jaya demonstration which forced Attorney-General Ali Said to announce that the families there would now be allowed to decide whether to stay or leave. He said at the time (in December) that they would be given ten days to decide though added that they would have to pay their own fares to their home villages. Up to now, nothing has yet been heard about any of these families returning home to Java.

Our contact concluded his letter with the following appeal: "Let foreign opinion not spare its criticism [so that] we may hope that Savana Jaya families too will eventually return to Java."

'Tapol' is an Indonesian contraction for 'tahanan politik' meaning political prisoner. It is still widely used although it was banned in 1974 because the military authorities said that all prisoners are 'criminals'.

DEATH CELL TAPOLS

A statement made last December by the Director-General of the Prisons Division of the Justice Ministry revealed that there are 31 persons under sentence of death in Indonesia's civil prisons, found guilty of political ("G30S/PKI") crimes. The official added that others under death sentences for political crimes were being held in military prisons and camps (**Tempo**, 9 December 1978).

In fact, the number of death sentences already passed certainly exceeds 200. KOPKAMTIB's Chief, **Admiral Sudomo**, as long ago as July 1975, vaguely referred to "between 200 and 250 death sentences" when he said that a total of 856 people had already been tried for alleged involvement in the G30S/PKI affair. (AFP dispatch, 30 June 1975, quoted in Van der Kroef, "Indonesia's Political Prisoners", **Pacific Affairs**, Winter 1976/77)

A campaign on behalf of the many people now under sentence of death in Indonesia is long overdue. Most of them are known to have appealed against sentence, but the process of dealing with these appeals is painfully slow. Many who submitted clemency appeals to the President many years ago have still received no reply.

In an effort to campaign more effectively on behalf of Indonesia's many hundreds of tried political prisoners, TAPOL has initiated a study of trial data in its possession. The data is far from complete; press clippings for some years are fairly plentiful while for others we have almost nothing. So far, we have been able to record data about sentence passed in only 206 cases. No fewer than 50 were given death sentences. Another 42 were given sentences of life imprisonment, while 17 got 20-year sentences. In other words, our investigation so far reveals that nearly one in four tried prisoners have been given death sentences, with a slightly lower proportion of life sentences. Those with 'lighter' sentences, mostly ranging from 10 to 18 years, account for less than half.



A L S

1965 TAPOLS

Trials of political prisoners continue to take place. The following information has reached TAPOL, based only on a limited number of clippings from a Surabaya newspaper:

● **Soehono** was found guilty by the Surabaya State Court of subversion. He was sentenced to 15 years with deduction for time served, but 'time served' was dated back only to 1 April 1978 when his provisional detention "officially" commenced, although he was arrested in 1969 and has been held since then. (*Surabaya Pos*, 20 November 1978)

● **Anwar Moro** was found guilty by the Medan State Court of attempts to revive the PKI and was sentenced to 17 years. In this case, deduction for time served was granted, dating back to 1967, presumably the time when the prisoner was arrested. (*Surabaya Pos*, 5 December 1978)

● **Soeparno** was found guilty by the Gresik State Court of efforts to revive the PKI. He was given a sentence of 20 years with deduction for time served, counting back to 20 February 1969. But **Djoko Walujo** who was also tried on the same charges, having allegedly collaborated with Soeparno, was found guilty by the same court and given a sentence of 15 years without deduction for time spent. He has already been in detention for ten years. (*Surabaya Post* 5 October 1978 and *Surabaya Pos* end November 1978)

● The trial of **S. Ngadi** commenced in Medan. He is being charged with carrying out pro-PKI activities within the Army. He has denied all the charges. (*Surabaya Pos* 15 December 1978)

ISLAMIC DISSIDENTS

Life Sentence for Haji Ismael Pranoto

A life sentence was passed against an Islamic figure, **Haji Ismael Pranoto bin Haji Suleman** in the State Court at



Student trials have finally commenced. The first trial opened in Palembang on 22 January 1979.

Pictured: Heri Akhmadi and defence lawyers, including Buyung Nasution, at the first hearing in Bandung, 31 January.

Surabaya on 21 September 1978. (*Suara Karya* 21 September 1978). He was also ordered to pay costs.

Haji Ismael Pranoto was found guilty of "criminally subversive actions" and of attempting to establish an Islamic State, with the support of a military formation similar to that of *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (the army of the Darul Islam movement of West Java which caused great problems for the Republic in the early independence period). He was accused of being the "brains" of the *Komando Jihad* (Holy War Command) which was claimed to have 'undermined the Republic of Indonesia' and damaged the image of Islam. It was also alleged that he had set up "parishes" in East and Central Java and a "sabotage gang" in Blitar.

The Prosecutor, Effendy, had demanded a death sentence. He said that he would consider the verdict for a week before he decided whether to appeal. The Defence Counsel was reported to be consulting other lawyers.

Islamic Fundamentalist Sentenced to Five Years

In June 1978 Fahmi Basya, an Islamic fundamentalist was sentenced to five years for "criminally subversive actions", and for storing explosives. The account in *Angkatan Bersenjata* (22 June 1978) relates that in 1976 he and several friends planned to blow up, with 'Molotov cocktails', several establishments which they saw as immoral. The account mentions gambling places. Furthermore Fahmi Basya was accused of giving lectures which were intended to incite listeners at the school of theology where he taught, as well as in other places.

The Public Prosecutor had demanded a ten-year sentence, and announced that he would appeal against the sentence passed. (*Kompas*, 22 August 1978). Throughout the proceedings, Fahmi Basya remained silent, and did not want to accept legal assistance as he refused to recognise the state court. After the court decision, he too announced that he would appeal against the verdict, but later it was reported (*Kompas*, 22 August 1978) that he had withdrawn his appeal.

POSTPONMENT ILLEGAL SAYS YAP THIAM HIEN

In the last TAPOL bulletin (p5) we reported that the trials of students for alleged offences during student protests in January 1979 were postponed in several centres. In Jakarta the trials were to begin on 29 November, but the first trial was postponed by means of a notice pinned on the door of the court to the effect that the court was "too busy". We have since been informed by someone who was amongst the people who were turned away from the court that Mr Yap, on seeing the notice, stood outside the court and told the gathering that the postponement was illegal. It is evident that he was referring to the fact that the postponement should have been granted through the proper procedures for adjournment.

CIVILIANISATION

— WITH A CATCH

Several times in the past when the Indonesian government has gone through the motions of genuflecting to notions of democracy and human rights, a peculiar sort of logic has prevailed which has invariably ended in a paradox. The recent steps to "civilianise" the government "party" GOLKAR (a group of loosely co-ordinated functional bodies which masquerades as a party and successfully serves the army as an electoral vehicle) is no exception.

David Jenkins reports in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (3rd November 1978) that the claim to "civilianisation" arises from the results of the second national congress of GOLKAR in October. Firstly President (incidentally, also General) Suharto was elected chairman of the all-powerful GOLKAR advisory board. Again, it was decided to withdraw up to 80 senior officials who, from positions of power within GOLKAR had considerably influenced GOLKAR's provincial affairs. It was also stated that another 200 serving military men would be withdrawn from regional GOLKAR boards.

However these apparently straightforward steps are not all they seem to be. David Jenkins points out that Suharto's appointment places him in an unassailable position of controlling the selection of his successor in 1983. If indeed there is to be a successor, it may be assumed that he will be a trusted military man. Further Suharto may now choose the men who will serve under him on the advisory board, and amongst these twenty or so, there will undoubtedly be those intractable army hawks, Generals **Panggabean**, **Amir Machmud** and **Ali Murtopo**. In their present ministries (respectively Co-ordinating Minister for Defence and Security, Minister of the Interior, and Minister of Information) these three represent a considerable military impingement on civilian life. David Jenkins points out that these three men represent different military factions, which sometimes represent rival interests. This enhances Suharto's position. "An accomplished politician whose skills are sometimes underrated, Suharto gains strength from rivalry between cliques", Jenkins writes.

Another catch is that the military officers who will be withdrawn from regional GOLKAR boards will be replaced by loyal retired army officers, who will further consolidate the control of Suharto's military faction. David Jenkins aptly remarks: "As the conference wound up, Indonesians were pondering the paradox that moves to civilianise GOLKAR had left the grouping more under the military thumb than ever."

However, what Jenkins does not point out is that there have been numerous attempts in the past to give GOLKAR an aura of respectability as a legitimate political party, notably through the holding of carefully orchestrated elections. The fact that "civilianisation" has this time meant an actual tightening of the military grip on GOLKAR is not merely a quaint example of convoluted logic. The more sinister implication is that Suharto's ruling

military faction is now in a stronger position to manipulate politics, so that in the future there might well be less need for even lip service to democracy.



Child labourers on a North Sumatra rubber plantation

CHILD LABOUR IN CIGARETTE FACTORIES

Between 25,000 and 75,000 children under fifteen years of age are employed in 282 cigarette factories in Central and East Java. They account for about 10-30% of the total workforce in these factories and it is estimated that they earn 20-40% of their family income, although they only receive about 40-200 rupiah per day (or 3-16 pence) for more than seven hours' work.

This was revealed in a speech by **Oetojo Oesman SH**, (the Director-General of *Perawatan*—Protection and Safety of the Workforce, an arm of the Department of Labour), which was reported in *Kompas* (24 October 1978). He also revealed that although there are guidelines which are supposed to limit the use of child labour and protect children from conditions which could damage their physical health and normal development, these guidelines have not yet been effective.

He indicated that it is unlikely that the children can be relieved of this work as many people are so poor that they are dependent on income earned by their children for their survival.

WORKERS' GRIEVANCES MET WITH FORCE

LACK OF PROTECTION FOR INDONESIAN WORKERS HIGHLIGHTED BY RECENT UNREST

In recent months there have been a number of well-documented cases of abuses of workers' rights in Indonesia. While there is considerable variation in the nature of the abuses, one thing is common to all the cases: the workers have no redress.

The army-controlled union, FBSI (*Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia*—All Indonesian Workers' Federation) has proved incapable of ensuring justice for the workers, but this is not surprising since FBSI is little more than yet another instrument of control. The fact that FBSI merely masquerades at representing workers was spelt out in the army daily, *Berita Yudha* (2 September 1978). The Chief-of-Staff of KOPKAMTIB (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), General **Yoga Sugama** has pronounced that FBSI appointees would *no longer* be subject to military screening, since all employees throughout the state sector are automatically required to have "certificates of non-involvement in G30S/PKI". The announcement was hailed by **Agus Sodono**, the head of FBSI, who said that it would now be easier to set up FBSI branches. However, Agus Sodono's recognition of continuing military control was apparent when he urged workers to be "cautious" in appointments of FBSI leaders at all levels, and urged them to inform their local district military commander, (who is currently the KOPKAMTIB executive officer—LAKSUS) as well as district military and police officials of all FBSI appointments.

The true nature of the FBSI is recognised clearly by workers. One forestry worker in East Kalimantan said that FBSI district officials could not believably represent workers. "Those people are appointed. They are not chosen by their members. How can they possibly improve the lot of workers? On the other hand the leaders of the workers' associations [FBSI units at 'shop floor' level—ed] in the [forestry] camps are chosen directly by the members. As workers' leaders they are constantly under threat of dismissal. However, the district level FBSI officials, like the Labour Office (NAKER) officials, are always treated like kings by the personnel managers." (*Benita Yudha* 15 August 1978)

The FBSI has been severely criticised by **Yuswat Marzuki**, the director of the Bureau of Labour Consultancy, which was established in May 1978 to try and improve the situation of workers. He observes that FBSI is incapable of assisting workers as its orders and demands come from the top, and that in practice FBSI benefits the managers and pressures the workers who are in a very weak position (*Kompas* 30 August 1978). He believes that the powerlessness of workers is mainly caused by the refusal of the government to take any concrete steps which would protect workers' rights.

One such measure could be the introduction of a Collective Labour Agreement. The government has approved of this in principle but has taken no steps to

implement it. *Tempo* (29 July 1978) points out that where Collective Labour Agreements exist in some companies improvements have been made with the establishment of a minimum wage and health benefits. Arbitration has been easier where there are Collective Labour Agreement guidelines to follow. Nonetheless, only 1,600 of Indonesia's 110,000 companies use the Collective Labour Agreement principle. The lack of concern and ineffectuality of FBSI is again demonstrated by the fact that so few companies use this principle, although FBSI is represented in 60,000 of the companies.

Show of Force

Generally most companies resort to a show of force against workers' claims and in the absence of any effective system of redress, most workers are forced to accept poor conditions, arbitrary punishments and no job security as great poverty ensures that they will continue to work under these bad conditions. The following examples provide ample illustrations of arbitrary treatment of workers, and of the fact that when workers do protest, the companies take the law into their own hands without fear of legal sanction:

- At the Vespa factory, Pulo Gadung, a worker was beaten after he had been accused of "hampering" production. (*Tempo*, 29 July 1978)
- At PT General Foods Industry (brand name **van Houten**), near Bogor, 34 men and women were locked in a room for seven hours without food, drink or toilet facilities after they had attempted to make the company honour a promise for better conditions made a year previously. They were accused of "PKI agitation", and FBSI in Bogor would not support them, although later the head of FBSI, Agus Sodono, accused the company of "criminal actions" (*Tempo* 29 July 1978).
- Following the closure of some railway services in Aceh, 1500 employees are without work. *Tempo* (23 December 1978) reports: "About 1000 of these are unemployed because the railway has ceased to operate, the rest have the status *dirumahkan* [sent home], as it is believed that they were formerly involved with SOBSI/PKI" (the trade union and Communist Party which existed before 1965).
It is interesting that the charge of involvement with SOBSI/PKI has been made only now when the State Railway has laid off workers, who, according to *Tempo*, have yet to be paid.
- In January 1978 the **Jawah Building Indah** and Co., of North Jakarta suddenly stopped food and medical allowances for its workers. Later in March, 30 workers were dismissed, and another 150 were sent home indefinitely on half pay, and the company refused to give references to those who were forced to seek new employment. Although no action was taken on behalf of the workers, it is worthy of note that the managing director of the company has been under investigation as he has been accused of misappropriating Rp 22 million from state funds (*Kompas* 30 August 1978).

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DIPLOMATIC TRADE-OFFS

The Indonesian Foreign Minister **Dr Mochtar Kusumaatmaja** has recently returned from Australia where his talks with his counterpart, **Mr Andrew Peacock**, have once again demonstrated the ability of pragmatic politics and economics to ride roughshod over human rights considerations.

Far Eastern Economic Review (29 December, 1978) reports that Peacock has announced that Australia now accords full recognition to the Indonesian takeover of East Timor. This has been timed to precede next year's negotiations for settling the seabed boundary between East Timor and Australia. As if this were not cynical enough, the **Far Eastern Economic Review** suggests that Mr Peacock might have done better if he had withheld recognition as a bargaining point for the forthcoming boundary talks.

Mochtar's bargaining point in the recently concluded talks seems to have been that he has promised to allow 650 relatives of East Timorese refugees in Australia to reunite with them. This promise may be considered as a dubious "victory" for Australia, as in the past Australia itself has been accused of actively delaying applications to reunite East Timorese refugees with their families (**Age**, 12.9.78). For the refugees and their families the concession may be regarded as a hollow one as in the past there have been numerous unfulfilled promises to bring about the reunions from both the Indonesian and Australian governments. The recent "concession" of Mochtar seems to be related to the concern expressed about refugees by the Australian

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● Last July six workers were dismissed by PT Star Metalware Industry in South Jakarta without severance pay for taking part in a strike and demonstration. Previously another six workers had been dismissed without severance pay (**Kompas** 28 August 1978).

● In a series of articles last August, **Berita Yudha**¹ exposed the extreme contrast between living conditions of workers and management in American-managed timber camps in East Kalimantan. The contrast was likened to "colonial times". While the management lives in great luxury, workers labour for 14, and sometimes 18, or 20 hours a day for Rp 65 (10 US Cents) an hour. When workers at Camp Senari of International Timber Corporation Indonesia staged a "slow down" in protest at their low wages and at the sacking of workmates, four of their leaders were arrested.

● In another camp, the office of the manager of Georgia Pacific was surrounded by angry workers who brandished swords. One of their fellow workers had been beaten by a security guard. The management brought in a BRIMOB (police) patrol to disperse the workers (**Berita Yudha** 14 August 1978).

Military intervention was also used against PT Cidatin/Cita workers. A security patrol arrested a worker who had allegedly left his work-place in the forest, and the validity

of the arrest was questioned by a workers' leader. Several days later security forces fired shots near the workers' representative as he worked at the logging ponds. **Berita Yudha** claimed in this account (14 August 1978) that (police) security forces receive Rp 30,000 a month from the company.

Although the timber workers merely asked for job security and better conditions and pay, they were accused by the manager of PT Cita Timber of being PKI inspired, while the Labour Department in Balikpapan even accused the FBSI central office of "inciting" the workers (**Berita Yudha**, 15 August 1978).

As long as the much-abused PKI scapegoat continues to be used there is little hope of justice for the workers, who may become 'subversives' as soon as they attempt to secure their most basic rights. This creates an environment in which the suppression of workers, and the most extreme exploitation, which has rightly been compared with colonial times, flourishes. The abuse of workers' rights not just a practice peculiar to Indonesian companies. Foreign owned and foreign controlled companies, mainly based in Western democracies, are in many cases making full use of the conditions which conspire against workers receiving due consideration of their claims.

1. It is interesting to note that **Berita Yudha** is the army daily. The articles may have been written with less concern for the workers than desire to attack the police.

TIMOR

REVIEW:

East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism,

by Jill Jolliffe

Jill Jolliffe, an Australian writer and journalist, spent several months in East Timor before the Indonesian invasion, when the country was administered by the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (Fretilin). In *East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism*, her accounts of this period are placed in their context; she traces the emergence of Timorese nationalism in a society whose development was restricted and distorted by four and a half centuries of Portuguese colonial rule. The political parties emerging during the last years of colonialism are analysed, the development of Fretilin traced and its policies outlined, together with the results of their implementation. Other chapters document Indonesian involvement and invasion, and the reactions of the Australian government.

Although many pamphlets and articles have been published on East Timor, this is the first full-length work devoted to an analysis of recent events. As such, it fills an important gap in our knowledge, and is indispensable reading for anyone concerned with Indonesia and East Timor.

The chapter of the book containing the author's account of the period of Fretilin control prior to the final full-scale Indonesian invasion, is particularly impressive. Jill Jolliffe gives an excellent account of the implementation of Fretilin's literacy schemes, its programme of agricultural co-operativisation, and its participation in local elections. Her discussion of Fretilin's political structure and military organisation provides us with a much more detailed knowledge than previously.

Commentaries on East Timor often give the impression that the Indonesian military invaded 'as a last resort': *East Timor*... finally buries this myth by documenting Indonesian involvement from 1974 onwards, showing how, through a long-term plan—*Operasi Komodo*—the military sought to achieve political annexation by progressively founding, financing and arming opposition parties, by thwarting all serious attempts at international negotiation, by promoting an internal coup, directing border incursions, and through finally invading at the end of 1975.

As is well known, Jill Jolliffe worked for several months trying to piece together the events surrounding the deaths of the three Australian and two British journalists who died while covering Indonesian border incursions at Balibo in mid-October, 1975. Combining the absurd ambiguities and conflicting statements of Indonesian ministers and pro-Indonesian party representatives, together with reports from Timorese in Dili who heard eye-witness accounts (as did refugees at a later stage in Lisbon), there seems little doubt that the journalists were shot (at least three being

executed) by Indonesian soldiers. The subsequent claims of the Australian and British governments to be able to investigate these deaths are shown to be untenable—a component part of the acquiescence-assistance role played by the Indonesian military's allies.

In briefly assessing the reasons for the attempted Indonesian occupation, the author makes an important point which is omitted in many commentaries. Attempts to explain the Indonesian invasion by referring it simply to economic interests, to US strategic requirements, or to Indonesian military splits whose effects could be lessened by a successful military campaign, always overlook a crucial point: the threat that a successful implementation of Fretilin's policies would pose to the military, haunted as they are by the fear of a balkanisation of the Indonesian archipelago. Already the contrast between what was achieved during the period of Fretilin administration and conditions in the Indonesian half of Timor has not gone unnoticed by the latter's inhabitants. With a secessionist movement growing in importance in West Papua (Irian Jaya), and a history of prolonged armed opposition from separatist movements since the founding of the Republic, it was undoubtedly the potential effects of Fretilin being able to implement its programmes in a sustained way over a period of time that rendered any form of national co-existence untenable for the Indonesian military.

Since the Indonesian army, navy and air force began their attempted occupation three years ago, at least 60,000 people—or one tenth of the population—have been slaughtered. Many of them, often comprising entire villages—have been murdered in the most brutal manner. In documenting these events, in placing them in their historical context, and in outlining the process whereby a people began to hesitatingly construct an independent nation through their own efforts, only to see it temporarily denied by the most blatant act of military aggression, Jill Jolliffe has made a substantial contribution to our knowledge of East Timor.



TAPOL campaigns for the release of Indonesian political prisoners and is a humanitarian organisation. It is not associated with any political groups, either in Indonesia or abroad, and is supported by individuals and organisations of many shades of opinion.

CENSORSHIP ON THE CAMPUSES

A number of university campus newspapers have gradually begun to re-appear following the ban imposed by the military in January 1978 at the time of widespread unrest in the universities. But they are suffering under the impact of tight censorship exerted by university rectors.

Tempo (13 January 1979) reports that there are now about twenty campus newspapers being published but they must all conform with strictures imposed by the rectors. It refers to the case of *Derap Mahasiswa*, the newspaper published on the Jogjakarta Pedagogical Institute (IKIP) campus. "After refusing to have 'consultation' on the paper's contents—in other words, to be censored—the paper's 21 October issue was confiscated by the rector's office. There was really nothing much in it. It was mostly about educational affairs, actually favourable to the government," **Tempo** quotes one student as saying.

One problem faced by campus newspapers is the conflict that has arisen over the government's prohibition of all Student Councils whereas most campus newspapers are the organs of such councils. In some universities, students are still standing firm against government attempts to replace Student Councils by other, de-politicised campus bodies. This is the situation at the Surabaya Institute of Technology where the campus organ *Media ITS* has still failed to appear because of deadlock over the structure of the student body. The same fate has also befallen the campus journal of the Bogor Institute of Agriculture, *Alma Mater*.

But students at Airlangga University, Surabaya, decided to swallow the bitter pill of authoritarian control. "At first, we just did not want to, but after agonising over it for a long time, I decided to accept this condition," said one of the paper's editors. The paper has since appeared five times, and has already been warned over an item entitled: "Leaders, Set the Example", a rather modest account about 'simple living' and the consequences of the 15 November devaluation [which led to a sharp rise in domestic prices—ed. TAPOL]. "If such a thing happens here," wrote the Rector's Assistant, "you will be subjected to administrative and curricula sanctions."

On the University of Indonesia campus, Jakarta, the campus paper, *Salemba* is having great difficulty keeping going, mainly for financial reasons. Only 12,000 copies are now being printed and if all copies are sold, this will cover less than half of the costs. There was a time, before the paper was banned in February 1978, when 30,000 copies were printed and sales extended far beyond the confines of the campus. But such times have gone, never to return, says **Tempo** ruefully.

Efforts to De-politicise the Student Movement

The problems confronted by campus journals reflect the general situation in universities after almost one year of government pressure to de-politicise the student movement. University rectors who, in the past, have frequently sided with the students are now being compelled to conform with government wishes, and find themselves in the unfortunate

position of becoming the instrument through which government pressures are being exerted. In most universities, the government has now pushed through a demand that all Student Councils be replaced by Senate organs involving faculty as well as students and tightly under the control of a specially-designated rector's assistant. But student bodies at the Badung Institute of Technology (ITB) and in Surabaya are still holding out against this so-called system of "normalisation". One result has been that the Minister for Education, Daud Jusuf announced on 29 September last that he would not give his consent for the election of the new Rector of ITB to go ahead until students had conformed with the government's "normalisation" plans. (Until now, the ITB is run by a government-appointed Rector's collegium, following the dismissal in February 1978 of the Rector who had shown too much sympathy for the students.)

The students have been placed in the difficult position of jeopardising the Rectors' positions if they oppose government pressures because the government has threatened that rectors at universities where "normalisation" fails to be implemented will be dismissed. But although Student Councils, the bodies through which past student campaigns have been organised, have now been largely eliminated, there are again signs of student political activity developing. For example, students in Bandung and Jogjakarta sent delegations to their regional government assemblies on 27 November last to submit complaints about sharply-rising prices following the devaluation and demanding effective price control. (*Indonesia Feiten en Meningen*, January 1979).

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