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British Campaign for the

Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners

No. 15

April, 1976

EDITORIAL

SPOTLIGHT ON THE MASSACRES

The Indonesian invasion of East Timor, now almost totally ignored in the world press, has brought in its trail widespread killings and political persecution.

The Melbourne Age (16 February) quotes Francisco Lopez da Cruz, newly appointed by the Indonesia government as 'Deputy Governor' of East Timor, as saying in Jakarta on 13 February that 50,000 to 60,000 people have been killed since the invasion. 'Red Beret' (RPKAD) and 'Black Beret' (military police) troops are reportedly mainly responsible. They killed thousands of villagers in Same and Maubisse, for example, who refused to pay 'taxes'. A grave act of genocide is under way, all in the name of 'eliminating Fretilin'.

With East Timor now sealed off from all contact with the outside world, it is virtually impossible to obtain any information about the way in which Indonesian troops are attempting to pacify the population. But as these events proceed, it is as well to recall the methods used in Indonesia in the wake of the October events of 1965 when an entire political movement was subjected to physical extermination, laying the foundation for the system of repression that now prevails.

Said Brigadier-General Kemal Idris, then commanding troops in North Sumatra: "I told my men to seize members of the Communist Party before I had any authority to do so. Their initial orders were to clean up communists within a five-kilometer radius of their positions. But they completed the assignment so fast that they spread outwards, still farther afield." Said Colonel Sarwo Edhy, commanding para-commandos (RPKAD) in Central Java: "We decided to encourage the anti-Communist civilians to help with the job. In Solo we gathered together the youth, nationalist groups, the religious organisations. We gave them two or three days' training, then sent them out to kill the communists." (Quotations from *The End of Sukarno*, by John Hughes, p. 141 and p. 151.)

TAPOL has decided to devote a major portion of this issue to some recently received documents on the 1965-66 massacres. One is a mimeographed publication of stories that have

appeared in two literary Indonesian journals, written by people, some of whom appear to have had direct experience of the massacres on the side of the perpetrators. The other is a collection of reminiscences from people who managed to escape from the holocaust. The similarity between these accounts, written from totally different political perspectives, is horrifyingly apparent.

TAPOL needs no justification for giving prominence to this material. The relationship between extermination and repression is clear. We hope that the publication of this material will not only impress on our readers the gravity of the present situation in East Timor but will help them gain a better understanding of the way in which Indonesia's present system of repression was born. ◀

● stop press

OEI TJU TAT GETS 13 YEARS

A Jakarta Court has sentenced Oei Tju Tat, Minister in Sukarno's last Cabinet, to thirteen years imprisonment for drafting a statement that was 'in line with the PKI's line' (see page 7). As the prisoner has already served ten years in prison, he still has another three years to serve. In our next issue, we will publish a detailed analysis of this trial which starkly reveals the baselessness of charges made in political trials.

Human Rights Cover-up at U.N.

The London *Sunday Times* in a major article on 14 March 1976 strongly criticised the U.N. Human Rights Commission for being "more concerned to cover up than expose human rights violations".

The article, prepared by a team of journalists, came following the conclusion of the Commission's annual session in Geneva in February this year at which "all of the allegations of gross violations of human rights that were before the Commission had, as usual, been dismissed."

The article had biting comment to make on the Commission's work since its establishment in 1946 and particularly since a new mechanism, defined in Resolution 1503 of the UN Economic and Social Council, had been devised in 1970, making it possible for any organisation or individual to submit "communications" on situations that "reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably-attested violations of human rights". Despite the fact that the new procedures were to be implemented in conditions of total secrecy (the 'communicants' would receive an acknowledgement and nothing more), the *Sunday Times* continues, almost all independent organisations concerned with human rights welcomed the Resolution. "Enormous hopes were vested in the procedure. Mistakenly."

The paper does not mince its words: "... it is perhaps the most poignant and disgraceful of false international pretences that the governments of the world have yet had the temerity to devise. To millions of people its name offers a glimmer of hope for justice — that hope is founded on, quite literally, nothing. The Commission is an almost total lie. It plays a vital

part in what Sean McBride, UN Commissioner for Namibia and 1974 Nobel Prize Winner, has described as "the conspiracy of governments to deprive the people of their rights."

The Indonesian Case Cited

One of the most glaring cases brought to its attention but nevertheless "dismissed" is that of Indonesia which the *Sunday Times* article describes in some detail as follows: "Amnesty International first 'communicated' with the UN about the conditions of Indonesian political prisoners in February 1973. By spring 1974 Amnesty had heard nothing and so Martin Ennals, its Secretary General, sent the UN further evidence. Again silence for over a year until Ennals received a letter from the Indonesian Ambassador to London informing him that 'the United Nations has regarded the matter of detainees in Indonesia as closed'.

"The Ambassador announced that the prisoners 'are guilty of committing gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the overwhelming majority of the Indonesian people'. (our emphasis)

"Nigel Rodney of Amnesty International described the Commission's action in 1975 as 'an ignominious abdication of the Commission's authority to promote respect for and protection of human rights and individual freedoms . . . the present rules of confidentiality are an undisguised stratagem for using the UN not as an instrument for . . . exposing large-scale violations of human rights but rather for concealing their occurrence."

LAWYER URGES RELEASE OF '74 TAPOLS

Adnan Buyung Nasution, Director of Indonesia's Legal Aid Bureau, who was himself a political prisoner for about twenty months following the 15 January event in 1974, has expressed his disappointment that the cases of the 13 remaining January 1974 detainees were not resolved by the end of 1975 and the persons all released.

The Jakarta daily, *Kompas* (8.1.1976) reported that he had written a letter to the *KOPKAMTIB* urging the immediate release of HC Princen and others still being held. He said also that the Attorney-General, Ali Said had pledged to resolve the cases within the present working year (1975/76). If the persons concerned are not going to be brought to trial, he said, it is surely not necessary to wait till the end of the working year before releasing these people. For a detainee, every extra day in detention is felt, and even every extra hour.

Meanwhile, an official of the Attorney General's office responded to Buyung Nasution's opinion by repeating that the cases would be resolved within the current working year, which gives his Office another 2½ months' time (up to the end of March 1976). He refused to indicate how many of the Malari detainees still being held would be brought to trial. (Antara, 13.1.1976).

On the other hand, the Attorney General speaking a few days earlier had said that "certainly more than one" Malari prisoner would be brought to trial.

It is also reported that Adnan Buyung Nasution, who was requested to help defend Oei Tju Tat, the former Minister now on trial (see separate item) has decided not to work on this case. He felt that the other lawyers appointed were quite

adequate and that he needed to devote his energies to working for the release of all the other political prisoners now being held, and to help people who were too poor to employ the services of a lawyer through the normal channels.

* * *

STUDENTS DEMAND DEMOCRATIC FREEDOMS

Moves in the student community seem now to be under way calling on the Education Minister, Major General Syarif Thayeb, to withdraw the very restrictive Instruction, SK 028, issued in 1974 which places all student activity under the control of university authorities.

This pressure has been renewed following a last-minute decision to ban a student march planned by the Students Council of the University of Indonesia, Jakarta, for 21 February which had already obtained police and university permission. The last-minute decision came, according to a report in *Tempo* on 6 March, as a result of pressure from the Education Minister who informed the Rector that the Summit meeting of ASEAN governments in Bali held at the end of February made it essential that no events that might cause disturbances should be allowed to proceed.

At the same time, *Tempo* reports that nine student councils from Bandung, West Java, went to Parliament on a deputation demanding that the Government take steps to guarantee a democratic life for society, and urging that press freedoms be guaranteed and society be given the freedom to express opinion.

Massacres in East Java

A long report collating reminiscences by Indonesians abroad and in Indonesia of incidents during the 1965-66 massacres was received recently by TAPOL. All the incidents discussed took place in East Java where the massacres spread during November 1965 after having taken hold in Central Java in the previous month. From East Java, they spread to Bali, generally believed to be the worst-hit region of all, and to other parts of the country.

The following report has been abridged for publication.

1. Lawang, Kabupaten¹ of Malang

Members and sympathisers of the PKI . . . had their hands tied. They were led by members of Ansor² under the protection of the Armed Forces (Zipur V, or sappers unit) . . . to the village of Sentong and the Purwodadi Park. Holes had been prepared and they were led one by one to these holes. Nooses were placed round their heads and pulled so that the victims fell prostrate. They they were beaten with rods and other weapons.

2. Singosari, Kabupaten of Malang

Most murders in this region were committed by means of beheading the victim. The bodies were then buried in plantations and trees (mostly banana trees) were planted on the graves.

4. Kabupaten of Jember

The killings were committed by Armed III (Field Artillery) Unit. Most of the victims were shot. The murders were committed on the Winowiri rubber plantation in Glantangan and on the Nglangan coconut plantation. Over a period of two or three months people who were to be shot were transported for this purpose by trucks belonging to the state-owned PN Perkebunan (State Plantations Co.)

10. Kabupaten of Banyuwangi

The mass killings in Banyuwangi started on 20 November 1965 and continued until 25 December. There were more killings from 1 till 5 October 1966, and again from May till December 1968. The following methods were used:

- a. shooting by firing squads of the local military command (Kodim 08325);
- b. assaults by members of Ansor and the local nationalist youth organisation (Pemuda Demokrat), led by Raiders (of the Army). The victims were beaten to death.
- d. Some of the victims had been under arrest and they were 'loaned out' (*dibon*) then dumped one at a time along the road where toughs were waiting for them.
- e. In one place a large hole had been dug, big enough for bodies. The victims were killed one by one, with their hands tied behind their bodies.

Besides Colonel Sumadi, Commander of Korem 083 (military command), the instructions to kill in the Kabupaten of Banyuwangi were issued by Lieutenant-Colonel Djoko Supaat Slamet, Korem 083 commander, Dja'far Marut, chairman of the local branch of the PNI (Nationalist Party), Hadji Abdul Latif, chairman of the local branch of the Moslem party, Nahdlatul Ulama and Captain Saimin Suprpto, Section 1 chief at Kodim 08325 . . . helped by other Army officers especially entrusted to do this work.

In the *kecamatan*, the murders were perpetrated by the lower military units (*koramil*) on orders from their commanders and staff, and members of the local parties.

Most murders were committed in quiet places: plantations, public cemeteries or along river banks . . . These are some of the places where mass killings are known to have occurred:

4. Tjurahdjati, a teak-wood forest in the *kecamatan* of Benculuk. A large hole was dug for victims who had been brought there from custody at the Banyuwangi Prison and the Kalibaru Detention Camp.

5. The villages of Bulusan and Ketapang, located on the coast. Victims killed here had been taken from Banyuwangi where they had been in the custody of the local *Koramil* and the local police station. Holes had been dug for the victims along the seashore.

6. The Chinese cemetery located in Giri village in the *kecamatan* of Giri. Here, people who had been kidnapped by members of local Army units from Kodim and *Koramil* were slain.

7. Disused wells on the outskirts of villages. With their hands tied behind their backs, the victims were thrown down wells which were then filled in with rocks thrown in from above. In many cases, the victims had been taken from local *Koramil* where they had been under detention.

Footnotes

1. *Kabupaten*: second-level local government unit, immediately below the province.
2. *Ansor*: the youth organisation of the Moslem party, Nahdlatul Ulama.



DID YOU KNOW?

- that there are 33 million unemployed people and vagrants in Indonesia, according to the Director for Rehabilitation and Social Service at the Department for Social Affairs?
- that Collective Labour Agreements have been concluded in only 50 out of the 50,000 registered businesses in Indonesia? Agus Sudono, chairman of the government-sponsored trade union federation (FBSI) says this is because workers do not have trade unions to represent their interests.

DID YOU KNOW?

- that it now costs Rp. 30,000, Rp. 80,000 and Rp.200,000 respectively to enter 'free' State elementary, junior middle and senior middle schools in Jakarta?
- that Jakarta's Governor has now decided to 'solve' this problem by legalising these illegal levies and fixing them at Rp. 7,500, Rp. 12,500 and Rp. 17,500 respectively?

To provide the reader with some frame of reference about the occurrences so graphically portrayed in the stories included in this publication, one analysis of the massacres, contained in *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1st Coup in Indonesia* by Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey (Cornell University, New York, 1971) is of value. This analysis is limited in several respects, particularly as its account of the massacres is restricted to Central Java where the first killings occurred. But the pattern described there is essentially the same for most parts of the country.

It describes the influx of RPKAD (crack troops) and units of the Siliwangi (West Java) Division of the Indonesian Army into Central Java countryside starting on 19 October 1965 and says: "With the knowledge that the military balance of power was now suddenly heavily in their favour, the Moslems began to attack the local PKI cadres..." The arrival of these troops, say Anderson and McVey, acted as a "catalyst for a wave of murder, torture, arson and revenge . . ." (p. 62).

And further on they say: "In the cities, the PKI was rapidly rounded up and destroyed. In the countryside the process took a little longer, but followed essentially the same course. The struggle was completely one-sided, as the local PKI had never been trained for combat and had virtually no arms. Moreover, the Army immediately began training and arming vigilante bands of Nationalist and Islamic youths to scour the villages for those suspected of Communist sympathies. Effective resistance was over very quickly, and peace - of a kind - was restored to Central Java. In spite of the end of the 'fighting', such as it was, the massacres continued, indeed spread rapidly and even more violently to East Java, and also to Atjeh, North Sumatra and Menado." (p. 63).

niscences of the events which followed that momentous night; the night when six generals were abducted, killed and their bodies dumped in a well at Lubang Buaya during an alleged attempt by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) to seize power in Jakarta.

"As soon as the radio announced what had happened at Lubang Buaya, people started hunting down the PKI like they were rats. They dug their own holes - big holes, small holes - and filled them all. It was an in-between time'. Everyone seemed to be killing everyone else. People were so scared that they started putting party symbols on their houses. If you had stood at your door and said you were a human being, no one would have been interested. The mobs were only concerned which party you belonged to.⁴"

The victims of the hurricane of fury unleashed on Indonesians were members of the PKI, of the communist women's movement Gerwani, and the communist youth movement Pemuda Rakyat. But there were others too, members of student organisations, of intellectual groups and of labour organisations allegedly sympathetic to the PKI. And there were the families of alleged communists, and others who were denounced by their enemies and summarily executed without any attempt to establish 'guilt'. After a while political persuasion didn't really seem to matter any more.

"The people don't discriminate at a time like this. They have borne their anger and bitterness a long time. When it finally explodes, one cannot expect them to be rational. We can both understand that. When anger and bitterness are king, intellect goes under. They were all killed. Partini, her mother, the other children, were hiding their uncle; he was a communist. The families of communists in other areas have disappeared as well, you know. The fact that Mrs Mulyo couldn't read and that her children knew nothing about politics made no difference. Politics is blind. They all went into the river."⁵

The anti-communist zeal which ravaged Indonesia during those months knew no barriers. Obstacles of kin and of friendship were demolished in its wake. Many of the characters in the stories reveal misgivings about what they have to do. In one story,⁶ A, an interrogator in Solo, tells of his interrogation of Dr X.:

"He was my aunt's family doctor and had attended my aunt, my cousins and even myself. I still had to go back to his hospital for more injections. He greeted me by reminding me of this. He was the friendliest doctor I had ever known. But he

THE GREAT INDONESIAN

Nobody knows quite how many people died in the massacre which followed the 1965 attempted coup in Indonesia. Estimates range from 60,000 to one-million with 200,000 to 400,000 the most widely quoted figures.¹ A new book collects together stories of the massacre. They are stories of senseless killing, likened in one, "Cain's Lamb" by Kipandjikusmin² to the killing of the lamb by Adam's son Cain. "He slaughtered it, divided and burned it. For nothing. God hated Cain's evil and would have nothing to do with his offering. We, the children of Cain, do as our ancestors did."

This and other stories are published together as Gestapu: Indonesian Short Stories on the Abortive Communist Coup of 30 September 1965³. They are based on personal remi-

was also the leading figure of the Indonesian Scholar Association, H.S.I., of the Chinese Baperki University, a generous donor to PKI funds, a member of the Surakarta Revolutionary Council, and he had said that 'the generals deserved to die' because they were 'corrupt'. His friendly smile upset my routine."

"It was not as easy interrogating Dr X. as it had been with the others. He denied every accusation, without giving any explanation. I wanted to be unsentimental, but he was the family doctor, he had cured my aunt's chronic asthma, I had been to him and needed his care. But I found it difficult to play my role calmly. I suggested to my superior that he appoint someone more scientifically-minded to work on the doctor. The

commander misunderstood me and sent a torturer. I watched the familiar gangland scene without being able to do anything to stop it. He screamed for mercy as the belt buckle rained blows down upon him. The Smersh-like unpleasantness of it all upset me and my stomach started playing up again. I was terrified that if the doctor persisted he would have to be executed.

"When I returned I learned in the corridor that the doctor had been taken somewhere quieter to be tranquilized. It was the first time I had heard the expression and to this day I do not really know what it means."

A also found himself forced into involvement with the death of a young woman, Sri, who had been in his class at school.

"Some of the soldiers went with me. I had only to call the names, like a teacher calling pupils out of a classroom. It was not hard to call those whom I did not know. But in the Second Camp I panicked: Sri and Mrs. Y were on the list. I thought of cheating the soldiers by substituting other women but I was scared because they were checking the list by asking the prisoners their names. Finally I forced myself to call the two women last of all.

"Mrs. Y bowed and passed me in silence. Sri said in Javanese: 'How could you do this, Us? You don't even know whether I'm guilty or not.'

"I felt very weak. Her voice was very controlled. She knew where they were taking her. I said nothing. She probably thought that I was very cruel. Fortunately the soldiers hadn't heard her. What could I say? There wasn't time: I was only a sentry doing his duty. No doubt she felt bitter. I wanted to shout out and tell her that I wanted to call Kijem, the prostitute, and Gerwani, instead of her. But the soldiers were watching me. I was scared. Perhaps they would think I was in cahoots with her. Perhaps I did shout but no one heard me. I didn't dare. I couldn't bear picking out my friends so they could be executed.

"My 'friends' wanted to kill fourteen prisoners. It was a *fait accompli*. I was surrounded by soldiers as the truckload of fourteen future corpses drove away. In Mojo, a village in the west of Solo, we stopped briefly. Some of the soldiers were drunk. They shouted abuse at the women and made speeches in the Sukarno style. They were genuinely angry at his violation of their mourning. These things happen in war, morality had nothing to do with it. Their shouts grew more hysterical and reverberated throughout the village as the fourteen prisoners walked slowly to the river's edge.

MASSACRE

"Sri cried as soon as she was taken off the truck. Mrs. Y was calm, although her face was as bitter as a dry lemon.

"They were lined up in rows at the steep bank of the river. I can still hear them weeping. Then I hear nothing. The world seemed to spin under my eyelids and I felt either sleepy or dizzy, God only knows which.

"At one o'clock I was returned to my post and I telephoned my report to the commandant. He was apparently used to such things, for he merely asked me to send him a statement in writing.

"That was the end, I couldn't take any more. It was war, and had the PKI won, what happened to Sri might have happened to me. Such things may have been necessary and common, but



Awaiting Death

I couldn't watch them happen. No one was to blame. Throughout these notes I have deliberately altered names. Without the commandant, the team, the soldiers who taught the communists the same lesson they taught Sri, Mrs Y. and Mr. X, we might still be fighting the 30th September Movement. Solo in particular, and central Java in general, could have become another Da Nang and Vietnam. If all men behaved as I did, the situation might have been reversed. The communists could have taken the initiative. I decided to leave. I had to get out of Solo.

"For five hours I tried to draw up a report showing why what had happened was necessary. I couldn't. I couldn't put the blame on Mrs. Y and Sri, nor could I objectively report that Sri had been imprisoned and executed without even being interrogated first. I decided to absent myself from further duties, without informing the commandant. The report was never finished; I never saw the commandant again.

"My aunt was the only person I told that I was going back to Pekalongan. On the night bus I felt that I was leaving all my cares far behind me. I didn't give a damn what anyone might think or do. I was bored and I couldn't lie to myself any longer.

"None of my friends knew that I was going. Was I running away? Yes, I was. They would talk about me and say that I was a coward, although they had no right to do so. I didn't care, I had to rest. Perhaps I was trying to answer Sri. I hadn't wanted her to die mistrusting and hating me, as she probably did. Her death depressed me. I swear God I couldn't have watched it."

In another story⁷ the narrator presides over the execution of his classmate.

"Baidi had been in my class at school. He always failed arithmetic and geography. We studied chanting together at Kyai Kamdani's *surau*.

(continued on p. 6)

(continued from p. 5)

"There wasn't much time to be sad. We were quickly ordered to get the prisoners down one by one and take them to a certain place about fifty meters from the road.

"Don't be worried: They're tied up and they've got sticking plaster over their eyes," the commandant said. He was a small man, whose voice was heavy with authority. He looked rather smart in his badly cut lieutenant's uniform. He left us. A few of us looked at each other for emotional reassurance.

"Don't feel so bad. Imagine it's a wild bull you're getting rid of. Let's drag them there," Malabar said.

"Finally we did as we were ordered: took them down one by one and led them into the rice field. There were two large holes there. I looked for Baidi but it was too dark to see him.

"Tuhri and I led a tall man dressed in a sarong and pyjama top. We held his arms tightly. I wanted to do the decent thing and ask him his name and where he came from, but repressed the thought at once. The answer would have made me sentimental. I doubted if they knew what next lay in store for them. Suddenly he asked softly: "Where are you taking me, sirs?"

"I looked at Tuhri and wondered what to do. For a moment Tuhri was silent. Then he said: "We're taking you to another prison, father."

"Why is the ground so muddy?"

"There was nothing we could say. We felt sorry for him.

"At last they were ready. Each hole was about one and a half meters deep. We lined ten men up at each hole and sat them with their feet inside. A squad of soldiers in camouflage jackets and five policemen from our subdistrict stood about twelve paces behind them.

"Ready!" the commandant shouted, snatching his pistol and pointing it into the air.

"I shivered. The wind seemed to flow over my body and the presence of death was very real. We clenched our fists and held our breath; everyone was very hot. I was still looking for Baidi. The pistol shot was followed immediately by a loud volley and a bright flash of rifle fire. Twenty human beings screamed and fell into the holes. It was horrible. I shivered again, aware that if I didn't try to control myself I would faint. I had never seen men kill each other before, nor so many dead all at the one time.

'CRUEL, RUTHLESS, UNTHINKING'

In these stories the question arises again and again: why did it happen like this? Why did these people allow themselves to be caught up, against their better instincts, in the hysteria of vengeance? In one story from Bali⁸, where the massacre assumed a particularly horrendous dimension, a comet is blamed. It had been sighted before the holy war of Puputan and the Great War of Klungkung, and then again before the PKI coup. "Those who saw it tasted death. They felt threatened: they had to kill before others killed them, and they became fierce, cruel, ruthless, unthinking and suspicious. Blood flowed. Finally they were killed." In another story⁹ justification is drawn from the example of the prophet Muhammad whom, the superior officer tells us, "destroyed the enemies of Islam without any hesitation at all" and in doing so "showed us the way to heaven."

Beneath it all is a basic helplessness; an inability to halt what

forces stronger than man have put in motion. "One man can't stop the lava pouring out of a volcano. The lava from Lubang Buaya, full of cause-and-effect and action-and-reaction. It was all unplanned. The hole spewed up the lava, it spread in a chain-reaction pattern like an atomic bomb."

"The public attitude to communism was extreme. A communist was the lowest form of human filth, fit only for extermination. It was proclaimed throughout the land that those who did not believe in God should die." 8

But what of those who are left, the children shunned for the 'sins' of their fathers and mothers. Is their fate any less cruel? One of the most compelling stories tells of a loyal friend's search for sympathetic homes for the children of a mother widowed in the frenzy. The friend, A, will care for one child and asks a neighbouring family if they will take one too:

"The woman was moved, and her eyes misted over. Her husband was unaffected. "There's something I think you should know," he said. "We are no longer people here — we're political animals. We have to consider the possible political repercussions."

"Hush," his wife insisted. "Don't talk about politics. Talk about the children."

"This concerns them too. People have changed. They belong to a collectivity called a 'party' and everything the party does is legal. I hope things will change soon. Really, I'm sorry. We're frightened. It's a small town. People know if you take a cat in. Imagine what it could be like sheltering the child of a member of the 30th September Movement. An angry crowd can be a very ugly thing."

"A stood up. He had failed. He excused himself and quickly returned home.

"The waiter met him at the hotel with a smile and offered him dinner. A refused. He went to his room, trying to think of another solution. First he sat, then he stood and walked around his room, the lounge, and finally the grounds of the hotel. At last he went back inside and rang another friend, a doctor who had worked in the town for a very long time. It was no good. The doctor said he was a physician, not a social worker. A insisted, but the doctor was afraid to look after the child of a communist before the fuss had completely died away. His attitude irked A. There had been a shipwreck and drowning people were killing each other over the few planks available.

(continued on p. 8)

Footnotes

1. For a discussion of the numbers see John Hughes' Indonesian Upheaval.

2. Originally published in Sastra, May 1968.

3. Edited and translated by Harry Aveling, published by the Southeast Asian Studies Program, University of Hawaii, 1975.

4. "A Woman and Her Children" by Gerson Poyk, originally published in Horison, November 1966.

5. "Dark Night" by Martin Aleida, first published in Horison, February 1970.

6. "War and Humanity" by Usamah, published in Horison, August 1969.

7. "Death" by Mohammad Sjoekoer, first published in Sastra in October 1969.

8. "Star of Death" by Kipandjakusmin, published in Sastra November 1967.

9. "The Climax" by Satyagraha Hoerip, first published in Horison, September 1966.

U.S. Congress Discusses Aid Cut

On 3 March 1976, Congressman Tom Harkin (Iowa, Dem.) proposed in a debate on the 1976 Foreign Military Assistance Act on the floor of the House of Representatives that grant military assistance to Indonesia for 1976 amounting to £19.4 million be eliminated. It is the first time that such a proposal had been raised and discussed on the floor of the House and reflects the gradually growing awareness among U.S. Congressmen of the situation in Indonesia.

Congressman Harkin based his proposal on three points. Firstly, Indonesia's invasion of East Timor and the widespread killings that were now under way there. "The question to be answered," he said, "is whether the Congress condones Indonesia's acts of aggression."

His second point was that "Indonesia is one of the most repressive governments in the world." Giving details of the repression and condemning the Indonesian Government's release of 1,300 last year as meaning that "it will take another 27 years at this rate to bring about the release of the 35,000 (the government's official figure)". Mr Harkin went on:

"Each year, the U.S. Government becomes more and more of an accomplice to this disregard for civil and democratic rights. To date, the military government has not been verbally admonished, let alone slapped on the hand through a token aid cut. For Congress to double the military assistance program to Indonesia this year would be a green light to continue repression and inhumane treatment of tens of thousands of political prisoners."

The third reason was related to Indonesia's membership of OPEC and its compliance with policies that had so sharply raised oil prices. Mr Harkin also referred to the disastrous corruption and mismanagement in the Indonesian oil company, *Pertamina*.

The amendment was strongly opposed by several Congressmen who in the main stressed that retaining the present Indonesian Government in power was in the national interests of the United States.

The amendment won the support of 26 Congressmen but was opposed by 46 and was therefore rejected.

FILM ON TAPOLS

A film on Indonesia's 100,000 *tapols*, produced by the German Section of Amnesty International, is now nearing completion. Entitled *More Than a Million Years* (English version) and *Indonesiens Schattenreich* (German version), this 16 mm film runs for about 27 minutes and is in black and white.

The narrator for the English version is the English actor, Albert Finney, and for the German version, the German actor, Carl Duering.

The film includes much newly-acquired documentary footage of political persecution and arrests, and also highlights the support given to Indonesia's military regime by western governments in complete disregard for the country's appalling human rights record.

Prints will soon be available priced at about £150 (to cover the cost of printing plus production costs for making the film). This price is certainly prohibitive for small groups but if you wish to ensure that you and others in your country have access to this film, you should urge the Amnesty National Section or other likely organisations in your country to purchase a copy and make it available to groups for a small fee. You could also help ensure the film's wide distribution by bringing it to the attention of specialised film distributors who may be interested.

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Silke Spliedt,
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West Germany.

Ex-Minister on Trial

Oei Tju Tat, who was Minister of State in the last Sukarno Cabinet, has been on trial in Jakarta since February. He is charged with subversion for having allegedly drafted a statement issued early in October 1965 by Partindo, the nationalist party of which he was a deputy-chairman, which stated the opinion that the October event was 'an internal affair of the Army'. The Prosecution argues that this supported the viewpoint of the PKI and therefore represents an act of subversion. A sentence of twenty years was demanded.

But in summing-up speeches by the defendant and by his defence lawyers, it is clear that the Prosecution failed even to prove that Oei Tju Tat had been responsible for the drafting of this statement. On the contrary, all witnesses concurred that he had not been an active participant in the meeting at which this statement was discussed, that moreover, the actual text of the statement was finalised after the meeting, and that Oei Tju Tat himself had indicated that he did not agree with the formulation for he regarded the October event as an event of national proportions.

Oei Tju Tat, in a very impressive defence, shows how for many years since he was arrested in 1966, there have been sharp changes of mind on whether he should be brought to trial or not, as some people involved in interrogating him realised that there was no substantial case against him.

He is being defended by three defence lawyers who, in their summing up, demanded that the court acquit him of all charges as none of the allegations had been proven in law. At the time of going to press, we had not received news of the final verdict.

EDITOR FORCED TO EAT HIS WORDS

A debate which erupted in the columns of a Jakarta daily, *Merdeka* whose editor, B.M.Diah has been a prominent figure in Indonesian politics for many years, was effectively squashed by the *KOPKAMTIB* acting in the name of 'preventing disturbances to the national stability'.

The newspaper in a series of articles on 13,14 and 15 January stongly criticised government policy over East Timor, which it said had led to Indonesia being 'isolated at the UN Security Council' with 'no-one to defend it'. It complained also of the government's inclination to regard all nationalist movements, such as for instance the Fretilin movement in East Timor, as being communist. "We are drugged with the feelings we have brought to life since the G.30. S Movement."

Another issue taken up by *Merdeka's* editor was that Indonesia was now 'tied by loans', and was developing too great a dependency upon the western states. It should rather, said B.M. Diah, step up relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist states, with the People's Republic of China, and improve the 'cold relations' with Asian and African countries.

'BLIND OR A TRAITOR . . .'

The article immediately aroused the anger of Indonesia's Foreign Minister, *Adam Malik*, against whom it was clearly aimed. In a statement issued to the press by the Foreign Ministry on 14 January, he declared that "anyone who thinks Indonesia's foreign policy is a failure . . . must be blind or is a traitor to the nation". Suggesting that anyone who proposed the recognition of Fretilin in East Timor was favouring the return of communism to Indonesia, the Foreign Minister continued with a clear threat: "If anyone dares to do such a thing, let them try: they will certainly make the people very angry or that paper will certainly be banned."

Within days, as reported in *Berita Buana* (19 January), the Jakarta Military Command, acting as the Jakarta special executor of *KOPKAMTIB*, announced that the *Merdeka* articles were 'being given serious attention'. Indicating that measures against the paper were under consideration, a spokesman for the Command warned that such matters as were raised in the articles should not be discussed in the mass media for this could only mean that subversive groups could utilise such debates in their own interests.

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It is more than a decade now since the first mass arrests in Indonesia, but the *tapol* problem is still as far as ever from solution.

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On 24 January, Admiral Sudomo, Chief-of-Staff of *KOPKAMTIB*, announced after meeting President Suharto, that B.M. Diah had made an apology to him (Admiral Sudomo) for publishing these articles. At the same time, Admiral Sudomo issued a strong warning to *Merdeka* and said that as an apology had been made, "we will see how things go further". If such things were to happen again, the paper could be closed down, he added. He also said that the public should raise no further questions about this matter. (*Sinar Harapan*, 24 January 1976)



(continued from p. 6)

"He left the hotel and went by horse-drawn carriage to the various orphanages. The superintendants told him that their religious foundations had recently begun building schools and had no more money for orphanages. Disappointed, he went back to the hotel again.

"The next day he visited Hadijah and was consoled by the bright eyes of the children. They were eating yam.

"No one wants to help," he told her. "The civil servants claim they don't earn enough. People like the doctor and the contractor are afraid of the political recriminations. The religious groups are building schools and have no spare funds for orphanages."

"She laughed bitterly. "It doesn't matter. Not everyone is afraid of children."4

This collection of stories bears frightening witness to what can happen when man's humanity is overtaken by politico-religious fervour.

DID YOU KNOW?

- that Indonesia's total foreign debt repayment in 1976/77 will amount to nearly \$500 million, which is 172% higher than in 1975/76, according to the Financial Note attached to this year's budget?
- that future payments will increase drastically because of the enormous debts incurred by Pertamina?

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