

Indonesian Democracy: The impact of electoral systems on political parties, 1999–2009

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ABSTRACT

This study analyses the impact of electoral systems and electoral mechanics on political parties and party systems, 1999–2009. Throughout this period, Indonesia conducted nearly 500 elections. These elections have their own systems (proportional representation, SNTV (Single Non-Transferable Vote) and majoritarian systems) and each has different mechanics (ballot structure, electoral threshold, electoral formula and district magnitude). They are conducted in the same political, social and cultural environment and are participated in by the same parties and voters. This study was conducted as qualitative research and involved elite interviews with 75 informants during fieldwork in the provinces of DKI-Jakarta, West Java, East Java, South Sulawesi and Riau Islands.

This study shows that institutions do matter and electoral systems and electoral mechanics are powerful instruments for institutional engineering with far-reaching impacts for parties and party systems. However, institutionalism has difficulty in explaining the various different processes, unforeseen problems and unexpected impacts. It finds that the changes to electoral systems and electoral mechanics since reformasi 1998 have restored the importance of elections, whereby the ruling elite are no longer able to legitimise themselves through methods other than elections. The importance of political parties has been reinstated by granting them exclusive authority in determining who will control the government and dominate the political system. However, this study finds that practices, such as money politics, vote buying and abuse of authority remained; older figures, such as former members of Golkar, senior government officials and retired military officers, dominated electoral results. Moreover, this study also finds that parties tend to focus more on activities related directly to the conduct of elections rather than representing different ideologies and diversity in society. Even though elections and political parties are crucial determinants of Indonesia's politics, they are not sufficient in and of themselves for building Indonesian representative democracy.

Declaration

I, Reni Suwarso, declare that the PhD thesis entitled “Indonesian Democracy: the impact of electoral systems on political parties 1999-2009” is no more than 100,000 words in length including quotes and exclusive of tables, figures, appendices, bibliography, references and footnotes. This thesis contains no material that has been submitted previously, in whole or in part, for the award of any other academic degree or diploma. Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own work.



Reni Suwarso
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List of Publications and Awards

Publications

Suwarso, R. (in press). Indonesia pasca reformasi 1998: 'New Politics' [Indonesia post reformasi 1998: 'New Politics']. Jakarta, Indonesia: Kompas Gramedia.

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Awards

2007-2011, **Australian Leadership Award** recipient, the University of Victoria, Melbourne, Australia, provided by the Australian government.

2003, **Fulbright Scholarship Awardees**, “The rise to globalism: ideas, institutions and American political development.” Summer course program. Graduate centre, City University of New York, New York, USA. Sponsored by Fulbright American Studies Institute.

2003, **Travel Grant Recipient**, The Australia – Indonesia Young Leader’s Dialogue “Mutual Trust and Cooperation in an International, Regional and Local Climate of Fear and Insecurity: Building an Achievable Action Agenda.” Bowral, NSW, Australia. Sponsored by the Habibie Centre, the Asia-Australia Institute, and the Australia-Indonesia Institute.

2003, **Travel Grant Recipient**, “Politics, Strategic and Defence Studies.” School of Strategic and Defence Studies, King’s College, London, United Kingdom. Sponsored by Embassy of the United Kingdom in Jakarta and Political Science Graduate Program, the University of Indonesia

2003 **Travel Grant Recipient**, “Enhancing Indonesia – Canada Partnership: Challenge and Opportunities.” Ottawa, Canada. Sponsored by Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Canada.

1999-2001, **AusAID Scholarship Awardees**, the University Sydney, Australia, provided by the Australian government.

1986 – 1991, **Supersemar Scholarship Awardees**, the University of Indonesia, Indonesia, provided by the Indonesian government.

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Chapter One

Introduction

“Writing about political parties in Indonesia makes one suddenly aware of how little research has been done on the subject” (Lev 1967: 52).

Introduction

This study attempts to analyse the impacts of electoral systems and mechanics on political parties and party systems, with specific reference to Indonesian politics from 1999 to 2009. To illustrate the diverse impacts on electoral systems, this study compares nearly 500 elections, contrasting legislative with executive elections, at national, provincial and regency/city levels. These impacts will be examined with respect to the diverse nature of political regimes. To provide a comprehensive analysis this study also examines elections and parties prior to 1999, when under Old Order and New Order regimes, as many contemporary parties trace their histories, ideals and values to the earlier era. Electoral systems will be discussed in terms of the four most important mechanics: ballot structure, electoral threshold, electoral formula and district magnitude. These above mentioned impacts are examined through the transformation of party organisation, strategy, function and ideology; impacts on party systems will be examined through changes to the number of parties, party size and strength as well as party polarisation and internal dynamics.

This study argues that the adoption of three different electoral systems (Proportional Representation and Single Non-Transferable Vote for legislative elections and Majoritarian for executive elections), each with its own different electoral mechanics (ballot structure, electoral threshold, electoral formula and district magnitude) combined together and applied in one period of time has changed the power contestation significantly in Indonesia. This study argues that the choice of electoral systems and mechanics has changed the dynamics of electoral politics, the characteristics of parties and party systems and the pattern of power relations.

Background

In Indonesia, parties' history began at the beginning of the 20th century after the Dutch colonial authorities introduced the so-called Ethical policy. Around that time, the Dutch-educated Indonesian elite established Western organisations as a prototype of party institutions, but tried to utilise them as political vehicles to oppose Western colonial regimes (Sachsenroder 1998). They adapted Western political ideas of freedom and democracy in order to struggle for an independent state. This began when a youth group named Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavour) was established in 1908, followed by the Indische Partij (Indies Party) and Sarekat Islam (the Islamic Union; hereafter SI) founded in 1912. The Partai Komunis Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist Party; hereafter PKI) in 1920 and Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (the Indonesian Nationalist Party; hereafter PNI) in 1927 followed respectively.

In 1945, Indonesia proclaimed its independence; since then the country has been governed under three different political regimes: the Old Order regime, the New Order regime and the *Reformasi* (Reform) regime. The Old Order regime covers the period of Indonesia's revolt against colonial rule (1945-1949), the period of Parliamentary Democracy (1950-1957) and the period of Guided Democracy (1958-1965). Under the period of Parliamentary Democracy with Sukarno as President, the country held its first national election in 1955 and regional elections in 1957. At least 172 parties and individuals (national and local) competed in the 1955 election, with 28 winning seats (King D. 2003). The election was regarded as the most open and participatory election held in Southeast Asia since World War II (Anderson 1996). But, in 1957, Parliamentary Democracy ended with the imposition of martial law, after which Sukarno introduced Guided Democracy. The latter encompassed a threefold ideology of nationalism, religion and communism which became popularly known as 'Nasionalis Agama Komunis' (Nationalism Religious Communism; hereafter Nasakom). This threefold ideology was intended to accommodate the three main factions in Indonesian politics at that time: the army, Islamic groups and the communists. In 1966, Guided Democracy was replaced by the New Order headed by

President Suharto (Lev 1966). Under the New Order, the party system was simplified. From 1973 until 1998, the government permitted three parties. They were Partai Golongan Karya (Functional Groups Party; hereafter Golkar), established by the government itself, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party; hereafter PPP) and Partai Demokrat Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party; hereafter PDI). Under the New Order, Indonesia conducted six elections in 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997.

In 1998, the New Order Government¹ collapsed. The 32-year-old authoritarian regime toppled and created the opportunity for democratic reform. The reform process, in Indonesian language, is popularly called reformasi 1998. To build on the momentum, President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (hereafter President Habibie), who replaced Suharto as president, introduced several fundamental changes to the political system. The changes were further developed under President Abdurrahman Wahid (hereafter President Wahid), President Megawati Sukarnoputri (hereafter President Megawati) and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (hereafter President Yudhoyono). These changes were framed with high expectations of transforming the authoritarian government, which had restricted people's political freedom and participation in the political process by concentrating power in the hands of selected elite, into a democratic regime open to the people with decentralised powers. The process was endorsed to enable Indonesia to move "...from less accountable to more accountable government, from less competitive to freer and fairer competitive elections, and from weak autonomous associations in civil society to more autonomous and more numerous associations" (Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis 1997: 6).

President Habibie started the constitutional reform process by submitting revisions of three important political bills for Indonesia's representative democracy on: political parties, general elections, and a composition of Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (the People's Consultative Assembly; hereafter MPR), Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (the National House of Representatives; hereafter DPR or DPR national) and Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (the Local House of Representatives; hereafter

¹ In this study, the terms 'government' and 'state' are used synonymously and interchangeably.

DPRD). This was followed by four sets of constitutional amendments during 1999–2002 and administrative decentralisation policies through Law No.22 and No.25 in 1999. Under President Megawati’s leadership, the existing proportional representation (hereafter PR) system of Pemilu Legislatif (legislative election; hereafter Pilleg) was changed from ‘closed-list’ to ‘open-list’. A series of new electoral systems was also introduced; these consisted of Pemilu Presiden (presidential election; hereafter Pilpres) and Pemilu Kepala Daerah (head of local government election; hereafter Pilkada), both held by a ‘majority two-round’ system. In addition an election for members of Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representative Assembly; hereafter DPD) was introduced under SNTV system, while the DPD election was attached to the law on Pilleg. The legal basis for these changes was composed of Laws No. 31/2002 (on political parties), No. 12/2003 (on Pilleg), No.23/2003 (on Pilpres) and No. 32/2004 (on Pilkada). The decentralisation Laws No.22 and No.25/1999 were reviewed and led to Laws No.32/2004 and No.33/2004 respectively.

President Megawati was then replaced by President Yudhoyono through direct presidential election in 2004. The administration of President Yudhoyono did not initiate a new electoral system, but revised some articles of the electoral laws. For the 2009 elections, for example, President Yudhoyono signed Law No.2/2008 (on political parties), Law No.10/2008 (on Pilleg) and Law No.42/2008 (on Pilpres). The impact of these laws on Indonesian politics, particularly parties and party systems, will be a focus of this research.

Since 1999, as previously mentioned, Indonesia has conducted nearly 500 elections. These elections are conducted in the same political, social and cultural environment and are participated in by the same parties and voters. National and local elections for legislatures have been held in 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014. Pilpres have been held in 2004, 2009 and 2014. However, the elections of 2014 are not the focus; this study was completed before the 2014 electoral data was accessible. Pilpres are held following Pilleg, the results of which shape the nomination process for Pilpres. Pilkada also have a five-year cycle, but each province and district has its own schedule, which means that 488 Pilkada elections were held from 2005 to 2009. It

seems that Indonesia never stops voting. On average, an election is held every week. The political dynamics generated by these elections have a long afterlife, as there have been many disputes about election results.

Political parties governed by the laws of the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections are the only legal entities in the elections. All candidates for Pilleg and Pilpres must be part of an eligible party ticket, while independent or individual candidates are not allowed. Until 2007 this requirement also applied to candidates for Pilkada. But, following Decree No.5/2007 of the Indonesian Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi or MK), independent candidates can be nominated, but for Pilkada only. Until 2009, candidates for the DPD had to be independent (without direct links to any political party). But in the 2009 DPD, the regulation was changed so that DPD candidates could acknowledge their party affiliation.

In terms of number of parties, the 1999, 2004 and 2009 party systems are classified as an anomic multi-partyism. It is a situation whereby “the number of parties has no noticeable effect on the system” (Sartori 1976: 126). In the 1999 election 48 parties competed, in the 2004 election 24 parties and in the 2009 election 38 national parties plus six local Aceh parties. It is worth noting that in the 2009 election, for the first time, local parties were allowed, but only participated in local elections in Aceh province. Of all the post 1998 parties, only five passed the electoral threshold in 1999 Pilleg, seven in 2004 and nine in 2009 to win seats in parliament. These parties were thus selected as the focus of this study and called significant parties. They are Golkar, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle; hereafter PDIP), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party; hereafter PKB), PPP, Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party; hereafter Demokrat), Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party; hereafter PKS), Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party; hereafter PAN), Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (People Conscious Party; hereafter Hanura) and Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (The Great Indonesia Movement Party; hereafter Gerindra). Amongst these parties, the highest achiever in 1999 Pilleg was PDIP with 33.74% of votes, in 2004 Golkar with 21.58% and in 2009 Demokrat with 20.85% (See Table 1.1). These three parties accept Pancasilaism as their ideology.

Table 1.1: Parties that passed electoral threshold and their ideologies, Legislative election 1999, 2004 and 2009

No.	Party	Election Year (Votes, %)			Ideology
		1999	2004	2009	
1	PDIP	33.74%	18.53%	14.03%	Pancasilaism
2	Golkar	22.44%	21.58%	14.45%	Pancasilaism
3	PKB	12.61%	10.57%	4.94%	Pancasilaism*
4	PPP	10.71%	8.15%	5.32%	Islamism
5	PAN	7.12%	6.44%	6.01%	Pancasilaism*
6	Demokrat		7.45%	20.85%	Pancasilaism
7	PKS		7.43%	7.88%	Islamism
8	Gerindra			4.46%	Pancasilaism
9	Hanura			3.77%	Pancasilaism
Total number of parties		48	24	38+6	

Sources: assorted party and KPU documents relating to the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections.

* PKB and PAN are Pancasilaist parties that depend on Indonesia's Islamic community as their mass base, and are strongly identified with a particular *aliran* (stream) of Islam. In 1999, PAN acknowledged Pancasilaism as its ideology, but in 2004 the party changed its ideology to Islamism, and in 2009 re-adopted Pancasilaism.

In terms of ideology, the 1999, 2004 and 2009 parties are grouped into two ideologies: Pancasilaism² and Islamism.³ Party competition between these two groups is as intensive as within ideological groups. But parties are obliged to build coalitions because no party has ever secured an overall majority of votes or seats in parliament. They need support from other parties when nominating a President, Governor, Regent or Mayor, when forming a government and when supporting a bill in parliament; but the configuration of the coalitions is different each time.

Coalitions during elections are different from those in government or in parliament.

² In this study, Pancasila is understood more as a symbol of the acknowledgement of religious freedom. This refers to the first of the five principles in Pancasila: belief in the one and only God.

³ In this study, Islamism is perceived more as a spirit to promote an Islamist agenda. As there is no consensus on what comprises the agenda, it refers to any issue related to the establishment of an Islamic state with the formal adoption of Syaria (Islamic Law).

Coalitions in Pilpres are different from those in Pilkada, while coalitions in one Pilkada are different from those in another Pilkada.

Position, assumption and question

This study is conducted within the traditions of an institutional approach. The approach is chosen with all its characteristic virtues and defects. One of its qualities is that it can be regarded as the most constructive one in explaining the focus of this study. However, it is also recognised that institutionalism [including ‘new’ institutionalism ‘introduced’ in the era of behavioralism] has difficulty in explaining various different processes, unforeseen problems and unexpected impacts of an institution. Countries sharing the same electoral system, for example, may generate different types of party systems. Finland and Brazil adopted open-list PR as their electoral system, but Finland’s party system is categorised as an ‘institutionalised party system’, while Brazil’s is an ‘anti-party system’ (Desposato 2006). Differences observed across countries may be attributed to different characteristics in the electoral system itself. But, they may also be a function of other variables too, such as historical legacies, or social, cultural, developmental or other factors. Hence, this study accepts that Indonesia’s electoral system is not the only fundamental causative factor in the development of Indonesian political parties and the dynamics of the party system; there are many other factors influencing the process. Nonetheless, the institutionalist’s proposition remains primary.

Basically, institutionalists claim that institutions do matter (Downs 1957), and “...changing the aspects of political rules may be expected to affect the nature of other institutions and of how politics is conducted” (Ware 2000: 9). In particular, some of the most important rules are electoral rules, “...those which govern the conduct of elections” (Rae 1969: 3). A study by Norris, conducted within the frame of rational-choice institutionalism and cultural modernisation in 32 countries, found “...that electoral systems represent some of the most powerful instruments available for institutional engineering, with far-reaching consequences for party systems, the composition of legislatures, and democratic representation” (Norris 2004: 261). Her

findings corroborated other studies, such as by Sartori (1997), Lijphart and Aitkin (1994), Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth (1993), Lijphart and Grofman (1986), Rae (1969) and Duverger (1964).

Inspired by Norris and others, this study then assumes that "...changing formal electoral rules has a substantial impact upon the strategic incentives facing parties, politicians, and citizens" (Norris 2004: 6). In accordance with this assumption, this study perceives electoral rule as a causative factor that produces consequences. However, because formal electoral rules are made in a specific political context, and they are a product of negotiation among political parties who control the parliament at the time, it is important to study the contextual background of these rules as well. As Harrop and Miller (1987: 42) state, "electoral systems in the real world have three important elements: rules, application and context. We cannot properly assess any system without taking account of all three."

In light of the chosen position and assumption, this study initiates the research by posing the primary question: "How have electoral systems affect political parties and party systems?" In searching for the answer, it is considered helpful to raise subsequent questions on electoral systems and party systems. Firstly, "How have elections and electoral systems changed?" "How have the four most important mechanics—ballot structure, electoral threshold, electoral formula and district magnitude— changed?" and "How do electoral institutions change?" Secondly, "How do parties and party systems change?" "How do the number of parties, party size and strength, and party polarisation and internal dynamics change?" And "How do party organisation, party strategy, party function and party ideology change?"

Methodology

This study is conducted as qualitative research. The word 'qualitative' means that the research is not rigorously examined in terms of numbers or frequency. However, it does not mean that a qualitative researcher cannot use quantitative research to support the study. "Qualitative researchers deploy a wide range of interconnected interpretive practices, hoping always to get a better understanding of the subject

matter at hand” (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 4); thus any research practice which can provide and encourage important insight and knowledge is suitable for this type of research. In fact, there is no particular method or practice that has advantage over any other, and none can be removed from the possibility of exploring the research data (Nelson, Treichler and Grossberg 1992) although there is no correct research method, there are correct ways of using methods, at least within the terms of their own limitations. The most important consideration is how to produce reliable and valid data. The researcher needs to be able to explain and justify how he or she obtains such data.

This study conducted elite interviews as a tool of data generation and analysis. Elite interview is a key research technique for political scientists, as the majority of work by political scientists is concerned with the study of decision-makers (Burham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry 2004). In this study, interviews were conducted individually for approximately one to two hours, and a digital audiotape recorder was used with informants’ permission. In order to build a more natural conversation, whilst at the same time keeping the process on track, I used semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviewing refers to a situation in which an interviewer asks each informant a series of pre-established questions, but leaves the response categories open. An open response category allows for complex motivational influences to be identified. It gave me an opportunity to understand how informants interpreted the issues that arose in the interview, the underlying motivation(s) and the frame of reference informants employed (Foddy 1994). In this type of interview, there is no restriction in the wording or the order of questions. “The interviewer acts freely... formulating questions as and when required and employing neutral probing” (Sarantakos 2005: 247).

The questions within the interview broadly covered issues related to the impact of changing electoral systems and their mechanics. For example, we discussed the following: the process of candidate selection, campaign strategies, electoral strategies, electoral funding/ resources, party coalitions, party ideology, party base, party function, and the role of media and consultants. Not all of these issues were asked of one informant. Instead, I endeavoured to adjust the issues to informants’

knowledge and experience. As Converse and Schuman observe, “there is no single interview style that fits every occasion or all respondents” (1974: 53). With my wish to understand rather than to explain, I let the conversation flow as naturally as possible, so my informant felt comfortable and was willing to talk. Certainly, “interviewing skills are not simple motor skills like riding a bicycle; rather, they involve a high-order combination of observation, emphatic sensitivity, and intellectual judgment” (Gorden 1992: 7). Furthermore, as Fontana and Frey state, “interviewing is inextricably and unavoidably historically, politically, and contextually bound” (2008: 115).

Following the interviews, I listened and identified whether they covered the topics I wanted to address including whether I was allowing the balance of the interview to swing too much in favour of the informant, or whether I was too rigid with the structure. This stage was very important, because in an elite interview the researcher is easily distracted in the interview process. As Burham et al. claim “...elite interviewing is characterized by a situation in which the balance is usually in favour of the informant” (2004: 205). In my case, the distraction occurred not only because of the informants’ high levels of knowledge of the subject matter under discussion and their sound intellectual and expressive abilities, but also their high political, economic and social status. Another limitation was that often informants shortened the length of the interview, because their time was too valuable to spend in long discussions. Since the beginning I understood this situation. Hence, I tried hard to impress them, particularly in the first 15 minutes, by showing that I was knowledgeable, open-minded and empathetic. Usually, this strategy was successful. One of the unenthusiastic informants was even willing to extend the interview to around 1.5 hours. Another approach I used was to define the interview as a chance for informants to step back and reflect on issues raised in this study with someone who is educated but has no direct stake.

The interviews were organised during a field trip in Jakarta/DKI-Jakarta; Bandung and Bogor/West Java; Surabaya, Jember, Probolinggo, Ponorogo, Malang and Situbondo/East Java; Makassar and Gowa South Sulawesi; and Batam, Bintan and Tanjung Pinang/Riau Islands between 16 January and 26 April, 2009. During the

trip, I discussed these issues with 75 people. I interviewed 62 face to face and others in two round table meetings, comprising seven informants in Jember and 6 informants in Situbondo. The informants are mainly members of party elites, such as party leaders, party officials and party candidates for Members of Parliament, and members of the executive—regents and mayors—as well as their deputies. Others were professionals such as academics, researchers, religious leaders, electoral commissioners and government officials. In addition, I also attended several party events (e.g. internal party meetings, party campaigns, party press conferences and party fund-raising).

To select informants, I employed the ‘snowball’ or ‘referral’ technique. I began with a few party leaders who were already in my network of contacts. I asked them to recommend any other persons who met the criteria of my research, and who might be willing to participate. One major criterion in the selection process was the informant’s knowledge and their involvement in the political processes under examination. Thus, characteristics based on gender, occupation, religion and ethnic background is irrelevant in the selection of informants. The other criterion is that the informant be registered as a party official or party candidate of parties being assessed.

To strengthen my arguments, I also use time-series statistical data. Time-series analysis has been used commonly to compare, for example, the strength of political parties in one polity but in different periods of time, particularly in countries where elections have been conducted on a regular basis. Statistical data are used, as this is more powerful evidence compared to the ambiguity of words. The time-series statistical data is from Komisi Pemilihan Umum (National Electoral Commissions; hereafter KPU), Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah (Local Electoral Commissions; hereafter KPUD) and Kementrian Dalam Negeri (Ministry of Home Affairs; hereafter Kemendagri). Officially, the publications are called ‘Indonesian Pilleg and Pilpres in Numbers and Fact Year 1999, 2004 and 2009’ and ‘Report on Indonesian Pilkada Year 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009.’ However, there are two problems with this data. The first is in regard to the level of analysis. The Pilleg is based on electoral districts; Pilpres and Pilkada are based on administrative districts:

province, regency and city. Electoral districts consist of several regencies/cities and the composition of electoral districts is different in each election. As a consequence, I needed to break down the electoral result into the lowest level: regency/city level. There were 396 regencies/cities in the 1999 elections, 440 regencies/cities in the 2004 elections and 456 regencies/cities in the 2009 elections. The second issue concerns the unit of analysis. The Pilleg are based on electoral votes and formulated into parliamentary seats, whereas Pilpres and Pilkada are based solely on electoral votes. Hence, I chose the lowest unit: electoral votes. The findings of the data are presented in the form of tables and figures. In this study, I did not apply mathematical tests, since I did not aim for statistical significance amongst the variables.

Limitations

One major limitation encountered in this study was the process of collecting complete electoral results. The results of Pilleg and Pilpres, for example, are only published as aggregated data for national and provincial levels, without detailed calculation to regency/city levels. Furthermore, the Pilkada results that I obtained in some regencies/cities were having incomplete information about the membership of electoral coalitions for Pilkada, different abbreviations used for a party's name, no detailed information about the candidates and/or the Pilkada processes. To collect the missing data and to clarify the unsure information, I contacted directly the KPUD commissioners, party officials, member of parliaments and/or searched from newspapers and websites. Unfortunately, after all this effort, detailed calculations for some regencies/cities of the 1999 Pilleg and the 2009 Pilpres remain incomplete, despite the cumulative national and provincial data being complete. It should be noted that most of the data could be obtained free of charge, except for Pilkada. This is because the Kemendagri (the only institution in Indonesia, who, according to law, has the responsibility to file the aggregated Pilkada results), has not yet made the Pilkada data public.

Another constraint was the difficulty in keeping informed about the rapid dynamic changes in Indonesian politics in the last three years. It should be recognised here

that sometimes I understood a new development from a secondary rather than primary source. For example, I knew of Decree No.22-24/2008 and No.5/2007 constituted by MK from the media. Decree No.22-24/2008 determined that the winning candidate in Pilleg is the candidate who gains the highest number of votes. Decree No.5/2007 allows for independent candidates to run in Pilkada. These two decrees are very significant because they strengthen my argument that post reformasi, the pragmatic and personality based character of parties has been enhanced.

Contribution to knowledge

Firstly, this study offers an explanation of how electoral systems have impacted on political parties and party systems in Indonesia from the perspective of an institutional approach. This approach becomes highly significant, since it is adopted by Indonesian reformasi governments [and endorsed by international donors] as their basis in dealing with the political transition process following reformasi 1998. Electoral engineering, by changing the electoral rules of 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections, is a process of democratization that can be analysed with an institutional approach. This study becomes more important because in analysing Indonesian politics, the number of scholars who have adopted an institutional approach has increased. For example: Sugiarto wrote about party factionalism in 1998-2005 by focusing on three major political parties: Golkar, PAN and PDIP (2006). King discussed the choices of Indonesian political institutions as part of the constitutional reform process (2004). Johnson analyses party system institutionalization and the consolidation of democracy from independence to 1998 (2002). This study, thus, follows a number of studies of Indonesian politics using an institutional approach, but includes an analysis of the 2009 as well as the earlier elections, and focuses on all parties and the choice of electoral systems.

Secondly, this study enriches the literature on parties and electoral politics based on the Indonesian experience. Sachsenroder contends that much of the literature on the subject outside Western countries remains disappointing (1998: 14). These include Latin America (Norden 1998), Southern, Eastern and Central Europe (Hofferbert

1998; Van Biezen 2003), Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia (Randall 1988), Asia and the Pacific (Fukui 1985) and Southeast Asia (Sachsenroder 1998). A study on the structural evolution of parties in post-communist democracies remains limited as well (Lewis 1996). “While research on Western European party organizations has made significant progress both theoretically and empirically, advance has been much more limited regarding parties in new democracies” (Van Biezen 2003: 6).

One reason why research on political parties outside US and Western European countries has not yet made a significant contribution perhaps is the vicious cycle between theory and practice. Just as Duverger’s statement that “...a general theory of parties will eventually be constructed only upon the preliminary work of many profound studies; but these studies cannot be truly profound so long as there exists no general theory of parties” (1964: xiii). Lack of empirical knowledge, specific methodology and research funding on political parties and party politics has caused difficulties in constructing a general theory of parties arising from outside US and Western European countries’ unique experiences. Besides, “... capricious changes of [party] positions, leaders or even large numbers of the membership, changing alliances through mergers, splits and newly emerging parties in all manner of unlikely coalitions between the strangest bedfellows...” (Sachsenroder 1998: 1) has also challenged researchers and observers who contribute to this area of study.

Thirdly, this study enriches the literature not only based on Indonesian parties and electoral politics experiences but also based on personal experience of Indonesian political scholars. Much of the literature on contemporary Indonesian politics has not been written by Indonesians, but rather by international scholars, even though, Indonesian scholarship has increased significantly since reformasi 1998. Indonesian political scholars have needed almost a decade to detach themselves from the long experience of authoritarian regimes (1957-1998). During the authoritarian regimes Indonesian scholars were not encouraged to study politics. The government used many methods to marginalize critical intellectuals and scholars. This study strengthens literature by Indonesian scholars of politics, following the works of Hadiz (2003), Baswedan (2004), Lanti (2004), Sugiarto (2006), and Mujani (2007).

Fourthly, this study also challenges some of the more conventional ways in which scholars have analysed the Indonesian party system. In analysing the party system in developing countries, scholars have often seen deep divisions between the ‘modern’ western influenced industrialized urban centres, on one hand, and the ‘traditional’ rural hinterland, on the other. Studies of the party system in Indonesia tended to fit into this dichotomy, including the influential works on “streams of political thinking” (*politik aliran*) (Feith and Castles, 1970) and “the religion of Java” (Geertz, 1970). One problem with this mode of analysis is that it tends to freeze group dynamics. Indonesia has changed enormously in the decades since these two studies, influenced by globalization, rapid transformations in information and communication technologies as well as four decades of authoritarian rule. This study argues that the ‘*politik aliran*’ mode of analysis does not inform Indonesian politics after reformasi 1998.

Following the classic party system literature, a sophisticated analysis was presented by Dwight King in 2003. By comparing data from eight elections over forty-four years (1955-1999), King found that even though the electoral system of the 1955 and 1999 elections were different, there was ‘a broad continuity’ between the two elections. Both elections were relatively free from government control. In the 1999 election, parties were more independent with no tight control over party competition, ideology, platform, policy, organization and campaign activities, compared to the elections held under President Suharto. According to King, the 1955 and 1999 elections also demonstrated astonishing continuity in terms of ideology, social and religious bases of party support. This had two aspects. “One being the continued reality of the basic cleavage in the electorate between areas supporting nationalist religiously inclusive parties and areas were supporting Islamic parties. Another dimension was the re-emergence of a division within the Islamic community between traditional and modernist orientations, with the modernist much more divided than in 1955” (King, 2003:224). Another study by Liddle and Mujani in 2000 found religion and ethnic (or regional) differences had an effect on voting choices in 1999 elections as well (Liddle and Mujani, 2000). However, different from King’s analysis, “they did not find a significant influence of class on voting choice and argue that class cleavage was not articulated by the large parties,” In

contrast, King found some influence of class on support for PDIP and PKB. Furthermore, Liddle and Mujani argued that performance and character of candidates was by far the most important factor on voting choice while King's study showed that "social and contextual based influences on voting choice in the 1999 election were at least as important as individual and psychological ones" (King, 2003: 226). There were studies which found that the influence of *aliran* continue to exist while other studies found the opposite. Lanti, for example, found that *aliran* influence was in a state of hibernation during the authoritarian periods under Presidents Sukarno and Suharto, and reappeared like *déjà vu* in the era when political competition was permitted again (2004: 22). In a similar manner, Baswedan (2004b) argued that *aliran politik* still could be found at the grass-roots level and shifts across *aliran politik* rarely happened in the 2004 election. Significantly, these studies were conducted before Indonesia implemented local head of government elections and presidential direct elections. These executive elections held under different electoral systems compared to legislative elections, challenged the arguments of these earlier studies. Nonetheless, already half a century since the first election in 1955, the analysis of Geertz and Feith and Castles needs to be re-examined.

Fifthly, this study enriches and advances some political concepts by presenting a comprehensive analysis of, for example: the concepts of 'celebrity politics' and 'electoral vehicle.' 'Celebrity politics' is a relatively new concept in the literature of electoral politics and has not been adequately clarified. This new consent tend to be used without clarification or assumed that people already understand, such as articles by Chris Rojek (2001), Turner (2004), and Banducci (2008). This thesis elaborates the concept by introducing a clear-cut description, a new typology and presenting many case studies based on Indonesian experience. It comprehends the studies from Buehler and Tan (2007), Clark and Palmer (2008), and Mietzner (2009). While 'electoral vehicle,' even though quoted frequently in the literature, it has also not been clearly defined. One reason is because it is used interchangeably with 'party as machine', which is associated with an organisation dedicated to mobilising votes or demobilising the opposition in order to win political office (Wolfinger 1972). However, detailed examination of these two terms finds that

although there are similarities, they are different and cannot be used interchangeably. 'Party as machine' is attached more to voters/electorates (external party relations), whereas 'party as electoral vehicle' is associated more with founder(s), leader(s), official(s) and candidate(s) (internal party structures).

Sixthly, this study strengthens the experiment of combining qualitative methodology with statistical data. The experiment is successful in testing theories, searching for patterns and generating questions for in-depth research. The statistical data is disaggregated into regency/city level covering the entire country. Data from the large number of new regencies/cities is treated differently and analysed separately. Local variations—differences in political, social, economic and cultural contexts—are preserved, but used to enrich qualitative analysis. Applying this experiment is very time-consuming as the Pilleg and Pilpres data at regency/city level needed to be collected directly from the respective local regency/city authority; and the Pilkada data was from the Kemendagri, but had to be privately gathered due to poor performance of the department. However, these difficulties are compensated by the quality contribution this study makes.

Finally, it is one of the few studies which discuss the influence of the new electoral systems on parties and party system, and compares legislative with executive elections at national and local levels all together in one thorough study. None of the other scholars have studied the impact of three different electoral systems (Proportional Representation and Single Non-Transferable Vote for legislative elections and Majoritarian for executive elections), along with four different electoral mechanics (ballot structure, electoral threshold, electoral formula and district magnitude) on Indonesian electoral politics, the characteristics of parties and party systems and the pattern of power relations. Other studies have focused on specific aspects. For example, studies by Chauvel (1999, 2003), Tomsa (2008) and Mietzner (2008) discussed the impacts on party electoral appeals in different regions. Liddle and Mujani (2000), Dwight King (2003), Baswedan (2004) and Lanti (2004) examined the impacts on voting behaviour in parliamentary elections at national level and in some regions. Choi (2004, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c) examined electoral politics in local elections in selected regions. Paige (2002a, 2002b, 2006)

focused on parties and party systems and also anti-party movements but before the 2005 local head government direct elections and the 2004 direct presidential elections. Mietzner (2007 and 2009b) explored financial aspect of parties and the potentials of democratic consolidation. Mietzner (2008, 2009a) and Slater (2004) both analysed party systems; Mietzner focused on the patterns of electoral competition and Slater on electoral coalition of big parties as cartels. Sherlock (2004, 2009) studied parties and electoral systems in one period of elections.

Statement of significance

Firstly, the significance of this study lies in its ability to explain how power contestation since 1998 is being restructured. It examines the process of changing the locus of power through a discussion of different impacts on the electoral systems, including the party candidate selection process. This process can change the balance of power between party organization and the individual candidate. Studies by Nankyung Choi in Yogyakarta and Riau (2004, 2007), Jacqueline Vel in East and West Sumba (2005), and Michael Buehler and Paige Tan in South Sulawesi (2007), showed that in many local cases, both in Pilleg and Pilkada, many selected candidates were wealthy individuals who had no previous connection with the party. The relationship between candidates and parties most of the time was only “an ad hoc basis, often as a result of personal, not political, bonds and only shortly before the elections” (Buehler and Tan 2007: 65). Their studies also found that this phenomenon has undermined parties’ internal coherence and their ability to carry out basic party functions. This study has confirmed their findings that recruiting candidates from outside the party organization can weaken party organisation. In contrast to their studies, based on one single case in different regions, this study examines many cases across a number of regions and has identified patterns in candidate selection process in party organizations.

Secondly, this study identifies who is controlling Indonesia’s new politics. “The old forces have been able to reinvent themselves through new alliances and vehicles” and is controlling Indonesian politics post 1998 ” (Hadiz2003: 593). The parliament remains dominated by an old chamber of cronies, even though they have no choice

but to be effective representatives of the people argues Sherlock (2010: 177). There is a continuity of the old elites, although the new system has reshuffled the cards, Buehler argues in the case of local elites in South Sulawesi (2007: 119). This study not only learns from these different case studies, but also applies different theories and methodologies to Hadiz and Buehler. Hadiz used a class analysis approach, Buehler adopted a pluralism paradigm. Sherlock shares a similar institutional approach with this study. Nonetheless, regardless of the differences and the similarities with these three studies, this study can verify and update their findings. This study identifies the dominant forces controlling Indonesia post reformasi 1998 and how they gain and retain power by examining the influence of electoral systems and electoral mechanics on the structure of opportunities and on the behaviour of parties and candidates. As Diamond (2002) observes, the introduction of new electoral systems and electoral mechanics almost always has significant political meaning, at a minimum, forcing contending forces to change their strategies and strengthening some, but not all actors.

Finally, I believe the significance of this study will increase in the coming years as the functions and roles of elections and political parties in Indonesia become more crucial. It contrasts to what Anderson (1996) wrote, "... no need ... to spend any time on the series of elections held regularly since 1971... They are carefully managed to produce externally plausible two-thirds majorities for Golkar, the government's electoral machine, and a passive parliament without any genuine representative character" (30-31). This was a plausible argument at the time of the New Order elections, but much less relevant to post 1999 elections. The latter elections have changed the balance of power within the elite and between parties, and changed governments and leaders peacefully. None of these things were possible in the New Order. In a different polity, elections and political parties may have different functions and play different roles, but studying them remains useful "...to clarify some important aspects of political, economic, and social change..." (Taylor 1996: 10). In my view, the study of elections and political parties in Indonesia cannot be ignored anymore, particularly post 1998. The democratic reform process has restored the importance of elections, whereby the ruling elite are no longer able to legitimate themselves through methods other than elections.

Reform has also reinstated the importance of political parties, by granting them exclusive authority in determining who will control the dynamics of Indonesian politics. Nowadays, both institutions—elections and political parties—are crucial determinants of Indonesia's future.

Structure of the dissertation

This study is divided into seven chapters.

The introductory chapter consists of the background to the study, position, assumption and question, methodology, limitations, contribution to knowledge, statement of significance, and the structure of the dissertation. The second chapter establishes the theoretical ground for discussing the impact of electoral systems on political parties between 1955 and 2009. It discusses competing approaches used in this study and defines some of the concepts and terms. It comprises four sections: “introduction”, “regimes and elections”, “elections, electoral systems and electoral institutions”, “parties and party systems.”

The third and fourth chapters respectively explore the development of elections, electoral systems, electoral institutions, parties and party systems from 1955 to 2009. The third chapter, in particular, addresses the following questions: “How do elections and electoral systems change?” “How do the four most important mechanics of an electoral system —ballot structure, electoral threshold, electoral formula and district magnitude—change?” and “How do electoral institutions change?” The fourth chapter further examines: “How do parties and party systems change? “How do the number of parties, party size and strength, and party polarisation and internal dynamics change?” and “How do party organisation, party strategy, party function and party ideology change?” Some of those questions are addressed in detail in these chapters, while others are further unpacked in the following chapters.

The fifth and sixth chapters examine the major question of “How do electoral systems affect political parties and party systems?” by referring mainly to the political dynamics in 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections. Chapter five, in particular, explores the impacts of electoral systems and electoral mechanics on the changes in electoral politics, which led to the development of a *new politics*. Chapter six examines the impacts of electoral systems and electoral mechanics on the changes in party politics, which led to the trend of parties becoming electoral vehicles and to the development of two broad ideological groups.

The final chapter draws the discussion to a conclusion and identifies theoretical implications of the study. This chapter is structured into four sections: “Revisiting the complexities of electoral systems and mechanics,” “Restructuring Indonesian parties and party systems,” “Rethinking Indonesian democracy” and “Postscript: the 2014 elections.”

Chapter Two

Theoretical framework

“There is very little systematic research available on political parties in Asia.”
(Sachsenroder 1998: 14).

Introduction

This chapter constructs a theoretical framework to understand the impact of electoral systems on political parties. The framework is developed in three sections. Firstly, there is a discussion on the classification of regimes in connection with elections and their importance, followed by electoral engineering and its limitations. Secondly, a review of the definition, function, law, regulation, context and different types of electoral systems and mechanics, along with the importance of electoral institutions is discussed. Thirdly, different party concepts, definitions and functions are examined, followed by an analysis of contemporary challenges for parties, and different types and features of party systems.

Regimes and elections

To examine contemporary Indonesian politics, this study follows Andreas Schedler’s four-fold typology of regimes (Schedler 2002). They are: liberal democracy, electoral democracy, electoral authoritarian and closed authoritarian. What is innovative in this typology is that Schedler proposes two new types—‘electoral democracy’ and ‘electoral authoritarian’— which fall between the classic two opposite poles of ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘closed authoritarian.’ These are not originally his ideas, but he advances them to explore a more nuanced differentiation of regime types. Hence, further discussion is not limited to Schedler’s. These two new types are significant for three reasons. Firstly, they provide a scholarly framework to explain how Indonesian polity has transformed, from more accountable and more democratic processes from 1999–2004, and has gradually

taken on many of the characteristics of authoritarian governance—a regime that combines formal democratic institutions with concealed authoritarian ways and practices from 2004–2009. Secondly, they provide guidance in identifying differentiating features of the regimes produced by elections in 1999, 2004 and 2009. Thirdly, they provide a means to examine how regimes have used elections not only as an instrument of democracy but also as a means of authoritarian control.

Nonetheless, Schedler’s typology has some weaknesses. One is that it is too broad. His ‘electoral authoritarian,’ for example, does not reflect the different degrees of authoritarian competitiveness (2006). In contrast, Levitsky and Way’s (2002) and Diamond’s (2002) typologies clearly depict these differences. They are also more developed, particularly in analysing the political rivalry among contending parties in elections. Nevertheless, Schedler’s typology is useful as it captures “...significant variation in the broad area between the poles without abandoning the idea that a meaningful distinction may be drawn between democratic and authoritarian regimes” (2002: 37). Hence, the regime types that fall somewhere between ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘closed authoritarian’ may be classified as either ‘electoral democracy’ or ‘electoral authoritarian.’

Indeed, regime typologies, particularly following the ‘third wave’ of global democratisation, are complex. This is because many new emerging regimes neither fit classic measurements of liberal democracy nor closed authoritarian. Scholars of democratisation have characterised the new trend with a variety of confusing terms: ‘pseudo-democracy’ by Highley and Gunther (1992), ‘proto-democracy’ by Kohli (1993), ‘quasi-democracy’ by Haggard and Kaufman (1992), ‘delegative democracy’ by O’Donnell (1994), and ‘illiberal democracy’ by Zakaria (2003)—the list never ends. In the beginning, it was assumed many new emerging regimes would climb the democracy ladder over time. However, instead of moving closer to democracy, some of them shifted nearer to authoritarian. Just like Armony and Schamis’s finding,

More recently, the study of ‘hybrid’ systems has inspired another taxonomical effort based on qualifying adjectives, though this time applied to authoritarianism. ...this new typological exercise labels them not as

diminished forms of democracy, but instead as ‘electoral,’ ‘competitive,’ or ‘contested’ authoritarianism. Reproducing the logic of qualified democracies, the new classification now highlights ‘enhanced authoritarianism’(2005: 113-114).

The rest were stuck in the grey zone of political transition. In Carothers’ words, “Many countries that policy makers and aid practitioners persist in calling ‘transitional’ are not in transition to democracy, and of the democratic transitions that are under way, more than a few are not following the model” (1999: 6). Hence, basically all regime types that fall somewhere between ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘closed authoritarian’ may be posited into two poles: either closer to liberal democracy or closed-authoritarian.

Principally, Schedler’s typology was developed from David Collier and Steven Levitsky’s comparative research that tried to capture the diverse experiences of the ‘third wave’ countries without ‘stretching’ the concept of democracy (1997). Some of the associated meanings of the terms that Collier and Levitsky used to designate alternative definitions indeed can be retrieved in his explanation. Similar to theirs, Schedler also established his typology on “...the guiding idea that democratic elections are mechanisms of social choice under conditions of freedom and equality. To qualify as democratic, elections must offer an effective choice of political authorities among a community of free and equal citizens” (2002: 39). This idea is grounded in the tradition of Joseph Schumpeter and Robert A. Dahl. It refers to the ‘minimalist standard’ definition that assumes that the principal positions of power in a democratic regime are filled ‘through a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ (Schumpeter 1947). It also refers to the ‘procedural minimum’ definition that assumes that a democratic system requires competitive elections with universal suffrage and the absence of massive fraud, combined with effective guarantees of civil liberties including freedom of speech, assembly and association (Dahl 1971).

Within this framework, Schedler then tries to clarify the complexity and controversial frontier:

The distinction between liberal and electoral democracies derives from the common idea that elections are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for modern democracy. Such a regime cannot exist without elections, but elections alone are not enough. While liberal democracies go beyond the electoral minimum, electoral democracies do not. They manage to ‘get elections right’ but fail to institutionalize other vital dimensions of democratic constitutionalism, such as the rule of law, political accountability, bureaucratic integrity, and public deliberation.

The distinction between electoral democracy and electoral authoritarianism builds upon the common affirmation that democracy requires elections, but not just any kind of elections. The idea of democratic self-government is incompatible with electoral farces. In the common phrasing, elections must be ‘free and fair’ in order to pass as democratic. Under electoral democracy, contests comply with minimal democratic norms; under electoral authoritarianism, they do not.

At present, most authoritarian regimes hold some sort of elections. But not all such contests are created equal. It is the nature of these contests that divides electoral authoritarianism from closed authoritarianism. Some are shams that nobody can take seriously; others are occasions of struggle that nobody can ignore. Moreover, as soon as elections cross a hard-to-specify but real threshold of openness and competitiveness, they tend to take on a life of their own. The threshold may be ill defined and its exact position may vary over time and across cases (2002: 37-38).

Furthermore, to assess whether elections are democratic, Schedler proposes what he calls ‘The Chain of Democratic Choice.’ It is a list of seven conditions that must exist for an election to qualify as democratic. These are:

- 1) Empowerment. Political elections are about citizens wielding power.
- 2) Free supply. The idea of a democratic election presupposes the free formation of alternatives.
- 3) Free demand. Democratic elections presuppose the free formation of voter preferences.
- 4) Inclusion. In the contemporary world, democracy demands universal suffrage. Restrictions of the franchise once commonly applied on the basis of property, education, gender, or ethnicity are not legitimate anymore.
- 5) Insulation. Once citizens have freely formed their preferences, they must be able to express them just as freely.
- 6) Integrity. Once citizens have given free expression to their will at the polls, competent and neutral election management must count their votes honestly and weigh them equally.
- 7) Irreversibility. Like elections that begin without choice, elections that end without consequences are not democratic. The winners must be able to assume office, exercise power, and conclude their terms in accordance with constitutional rules.... Together, these conditions form a metaphorical chain which, like a real chain, holds together only so long as each of its links remains whole and unbroken(2002: 40-41).

However, in spite of Schedler's list being helpful, it is difficult to apply. Furthermore, it is problematical when he asserts that "Elections may be considered democratic *if and only if* they fulfil each item on this list... If the chain of democratic choice is broken anywhere, elections become not less democratic but undemocratic" (2002: 41). As Sartori argues, it is agreed that political systems are 'bounded wholes' (1987: 184). But, if Schedler's chain of democratic choice is applied, most of the regimes in the grey zone will qualify as undemocratic. Yet, this study prefers to see the ideal conditions as noted on the list as a target rather than assessment. Even advanced democratic regimes may at times violate one or more of the links in the chain. For example, who can guarantee that voters are not picking the candidates because of their personal appeal rather than their leadership and/or programs? Or that an election can really offer a range of alternative ideologies, programs and policies, if politics is now characterised by civic apathy, public scepticism and general disinterest in the conventional political process in countries which are categorised as either democracy or authoritarian.

Accordingly, this study needs alternative qualification that is more applicable and less problematic. Parameters developed in the tradition of Dahl, which perceive democracy as a matter of degree, is thus preferable (1971: 2, 8, 231-35). This then leads to what is called a dichotomous approach, such as in the works of O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Huntington (1991), Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and Geddes (1999). Taking their lead, this study considers that normative concerns of democracy are sufficient enough in grading regime types. Thus, to assess the competitiveness and openness of democratic elections, the normative parameters used are the minimum criteria: whether the elections are 'free and fair.' This study draws on Diamond's definition:

Elections are 'free' when the legal barriers to entry into the political arena are low, when there is substantial freedom for candidates and supporters of different political parties to campaign and solicit votes, and when voters experience little or no coercion in exercising their electoral choices. Freedom to campaign requires some considerable freedom of speech, movement, assembly, and association in political life, if not fully in civil society ...

Elections are 'fair' when they are administered by a neutral authority; when the electoral administration is sufficiently competent and resourceful to take

specific precautions against fraud in the voting and vote counting; when the police, military, and courts treat competing candidates and parties impartially throughout the process; when contenders all have access to the public media; when electoral districts and rules do not systematically disadvantage the opposition; when independent monitoring of the voting and vote-counting is allowed at all locations; when the secrecy of the ballot is protected; when virtually all adults can vote; when the procedures for organizing and counting the vote are transparent and known to all; and when there are clear and impartial procedures for resolving complaints and disputes... (2002: 28).

To assess the electoral processes, this study borrows Levitsky and Way's parameter on the degree of violation to minimum values of democracy. Their parameter actually is used for a different name for the regime: 'competitive authoritarian.' But, the parameter remains because in the regime typologies spectrum, 'competitive authoritarian' holds the same spot with 'electoral authoritarian.' It is posited between 'liberal democracy', on the one hand, and 'authoritarianism' on the other. The regime is characterised by frequent violations to the minimum criteria for democracy that are serious enough to create an uneven playing field between government and opposition; but elections are regularly held and are generally free of massive fraud. In competitive authoritarian regimes, formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. However, governments often violate the rules of competitive elections, and

...incumbents routinely abuse state resources, deny the opposition adequate media coverage, harass opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some cases manipulate electoral results. Journalists, opposition politicians, and other government critics may be spied on, threatened, harassed, or arrested. Members of the opposition may be jailed, exiled, or—less frequently—even assaulted or murdered (Levitsky and Way 2002: 53).

Thus, assessments of the difference between 'electoral democracy' and 'electoral authoritarian' "...require careful and nuanced judgments about the scale, pattern, and context of violations" (Diamond 2002: 28) as well.

However, while 'free and fair' parameters are more applicable and less problematic than Schedler's chain of democratic choice, it is still difficult to assess the characteristic of democratic elections. It is always a challenge for example, to find out whether the elections meet the criteria of free and fair for both incumbent and

opposition, for parties and candidates, for public, media, civil society organisations; hereafter CSOs, observers and voters. Also this includes whether every stage in the electoral processes meets the criteria of free and fair: from the Constitution to electoral laws, from registering voters to electoral districting, from the nominating process to campaigning, from casting the ballot to counting votes, from announcing the result to allocating the seats, and from empowering the elected candidates to settling electoral disputes.

It should be admitted that in reality, the assessment on competitive and open elections in distinguishing ‘electoral democracy’ and ‘electoral authoritarian’ can involve differences of opinion. Despite these difficulties, this study assumes it is important to have an illustrative definition to provide theoretical guidance. From the discussion above, it can be deduced that all systems that can hold (more or less) competitive and open elections, but those that fail to defend the political and civil freedoms essential for liberal democracy, can be classified as ‘electoral democracy.’ Similarly, all systems that can hold regular multi-party elections but fail to defend the independence and competence of electoral management institutions can be classified as ‘electoral authoritarian.’

Hence, it can be summarised that elections are not only the central mechanism of democratic governance, but also can be used to enhance authoritarian control. However, the introduction of competitive and open elections almost always has significant political meaning, forcing contending forces to change their strategies and strengthening some, but not all actors (Diamond 2002). Competitive party elections may downplay or even exclude significant parts of the population from contesting power. Competitive elections may also obfuscate the way in which critical arenas of decision making are beyond the control of elected officials. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that introducing elections will produce other institutions of democracy such as independent political parties, representative legislatures, effective government and independent election management authorities.

Nonetheless, holding an election is always regarded as a benchmark of political change leading to a more open political system. This mindset is adopted by

international donors as their basis for assisting political transition following the 'third wave' of global democratisation in the 1980s and 1990s (Norris 2004). Hence, soon after authoritarian regimes were defeated, the contest regarding who governs became a primary concern of all third-wave new democracy countries, as Bozóki (1993) and Schöpflin (1993) observed in Eastern European countries, and Van Biezen (2003) in Southern and East-Central Europe. To start the political reform process, according to Carothers (1999), almost all third-wave countries gained some new provisions concerning elections included in the new reworked constitutions, while some older provisions were removed. These aimed to revise the political rules, assuming that through political engineering certain desirable results may be achieved (Norris 2004). This corroborates North who argues that "Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic" (1990: 2).

However, while optimism about the capacity of institutional engineering to overcome problems of democratic transition arose; in regards to Latin America, Remmer (2008) argues that the sheer instability and difficulties accompanying the process speaks to the limits of such engineering. Not only were many of the deep political difficulties originating in the previous period revealed, but also socio-economic problems, such as a sharp rise in unemployment, bankruptcy of many companies unable to compete on the world market, and a general decline in economic production. A study by Kostelecký (2002) in Poland, Hungarian, Slovakia and the Czech Republic illustrates the complex situations faced by countries in the transition process. Overall, this study showed that while formal rules might administer procedures, the underlying conditions (i.e. social, economic, political and security) were hard to manage. While procedure and substance can be related and can influence each other, they are not the same thing.

Enduring political, social and economic uncertainties, caused by the reform process, in some way give concessions to the old political elites that enable them to maintain or resume their positions. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, Manning and Antia (2003) in their article 'The Limits of Electoral Engineering' showed how the

three wartime nationalist parties—the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and the Bosniak-dominated Party of Democratic Action (SDA)—together won the first post-war election in October 2002, forming a coalition government to keep out the communist and reformist parties. McFaul and Petrov (2004) in their article “What the Elections Tell Us: Russian Democracy in Eclipse” show the same situation is also found in Russia. Although in the early post-Soviet era elections played an influential role in weakening Kremlin politicians by empowering the challengers over time, the old status-quo learned how to use and manipulate elections to seize back political power. The result of the 2003 parliamentary elections and the 2004 presidential elections showed that the re-elected President, Vladimir Putin and his party, United Russia again succeeded in consolidating political support.

In a similar manner, Indonesia has experienced substantial political reform since 1998. However, while today’s politics is different to that under the authoritarian regime, detailed examination has found that many figures with strong attachment to the past authoritarian regime have succeeded in maintaining their power. They have managed to transform themselves as politicians competing in a more open system and succeeded in mobilising popular support, which they never had to do during the authoritarian regime. Their ability to survive and prosper in a more competitive system has given them a vested interest in the new regime. Many of them have been elected as heads of government and members of parliament. Some created new political parties; others have continued leading the old ones. They kept their positions in the ‘reformed’ bureaucracy and maintained their control of corporations. In addition, it is found that many old ways and attitudes have not yet disappeared and new illiberal practices have been developed in the electoral competition. These remnants of the authoritarian past have hampered deeper democratic reform and have raised serious doubts about the extent and success of democratic reform in Indonesia. The bottle may have been changed but the wine remains the same.

Nonetheless, the experience of four decades of authoritarian rule and the political turmoil following the fall of Suharto facilitated amendments to the 1945 Constitution. The amendments sought to address the issues: first, to prevent the re-

emergence of an authoritarian President like Sukarno and Suharto; second, to remove the powers of the MPR to appoint the President and limit its powers to impeach the President; and, third, to clarify the DPR's legislative authority. The amendments had changed the 1945 Constitution significantly, two of the important for this study of which related to the principle of separation of power and the Presidential system. The amendments has granted an executive directly elected by the people and may re-elected for one further term only, a fixed term chief executive not subject to legislative confidence except if it is proven that he/she has violated the law, a limited function of MPR –MPR is no longer exercising the sovereignty of the people as the highest political institution, and a stronger legislative authority of DPR – DPR shall establish laws, DPR shall give approval to President's proposal for declaring war, making peace and concluding treaties with other countries, and appointing ambassadors and consuls.

It can be inferred from above that the amendments both strengthened the legitimacy of the President and limited the powers especially legislation. This makes Indonesia post amendments difficult to move to the Presidential system. At the very least, the drafter claimed that the amendments are ideals. A closer examination shows that the original version of 'the 1945 Constitution is not by any means a purely presidential system. In fact, it enshrines one of the key principles of the parliamentary system by making the President accountable to the MPR; the parliamentary body recognized the supreme council of the nation' argued Asshiddiqi, member of the expert team advising MPR Ad Hoc Committee I (Constitutional amendments committee), later on appointed as the first Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia (2001:98). Indeed, at that time, there were intense debates around the amendments. Many observers advocated that Indonesia adopt both the idea of separation of powers and strengthening the presidential system. The main reason for adopting direct election for president office with majoritarian systems two-round is to strengthen presidential system. However, there was little support for the idea that the principle of separation of powers be explicitly expressed in the revised constitution (International IDEA, 2001).

The principle of separation of power has to be understood in Indonesian political context, as Mahfud MD, a former Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia argues:

First, the legislative, executive and judicial powers have different functions, namely to make laws, to implement laws and to administer courts in order to enforce laws and justice, respectively. Second, it is not allowed to hold concurrent positions in those three branches of power. Third, none of these institutions can intervene in the implementation of their respective functions. Fourth, the principle of checks and balances prevails among the branches of power. Fifth, the branches have equal positions with coordinative function rather than subordinative function (Mahfud, 2011:3).

Thus, the amendments should strengthen both the powers of the executive and the legislature, by providing for direct election of the president and confirming legislative powers for the parliament as well as facilitating checks and balances. However, the idea to purify Indonesian presidential system was not perceived as urgent and applicable. 'In Indonesia, where a multi-party system exists, the presidential system might be considered unsuitable... In the long term, a situation like that of the U.S., where two large parties dominate, may emerge in Indonesia. However, this is by no means certain. Given the complex and varied nature of Indonesian society, it is quite possible that this will never be achieved,' said Asshiddiqie (2001:101). The high degree of pluralism in Indonesian society makes it difficult to have a two-party system like in the U.S. Even though, the number of parties may be engineered through the selection of electoral mechanics, the number of parties in Indonesia will remain high, dominated by more than two large parties.

Nonetheless, "In the Indonesian context, the phenomena of dual legitimacy is not necessarily bad. From another angle, dual legitimacy can be used to establish the position of the executive and the legislature at the same level, so that both can play a role supervising and monitoring the other. Seen in this light, the phenomenon of dual legitimacy is positive" continued Asshiddiqie (2001:102).

Elections, electoral systems and electoral institutions

Among many definitions of an election, this study uses one of the simplest from Harrop and Miller. It is defined as “a formal expression of preferences by the governed, which are then aggregated and transformed into a collective decision about who will govern –who should stay in office, who should be thrown out, who should replace those who have been thrown out” (Harrop and Miller 1987: 2) . The mechanism by which an election is formally structured is termed an electoral system. The most clear-cut definition is from Gallagher and Mitchell, namely “a set of rules that structure how votes are cast at elections for a representative assembly and how these votes are then converted into seats in that assembly. ... an electoral system thus determines the composition of the parliament” (2005: 3). Farrell explained further that electoral systems “...determine the means by which votes are translated into seats in the process of electing politicians into office” (1997: 5).

The working of electoral systems is governed by electoral laws and regulations. Electoral laws are specified by Rae as “...those which govern the processes by which electoral preferences are articulated as votes and by which these votes are translated into distributions of governmental authority (typically parliamentary seats) among the competing parties”(1969: 14). Usually this includes the formal rules which deal with the process of election, the election campaign, and the resource endowments of parties and candidates (their access to money and media) (Janda 2005). For Norris (2004), electoral laws are also comprehended as the legislative framework governing elections, as embodied in official documents, constitutional conventions, legal statutes, and administrative procedures authorised by law and enforceable by courts. Without a doubt, the nomenclature of electoral laws varies from country to country. These variances mostly depend on the specific political context in the country at the time. The most influential is the country’s constitutional structure: whether the executive is presidential or parliamentary, whether the national legislature is bicameral or unicameral, and whether power is centralised in unitary government or more widely decentralised through federal arrangements (Ware 2000).

To support the working of the laws, there are also regulations. According to Gallagher and Mitchell, electoral regulation is a

...set of rules concerning elections. Such rules—concerning for example, ease of access to the ballot for would-be candidates, the right to vote, the fairness of the administration of the election, the transparency of the counting of the votes—are all very important in determining the significance and legitimacy of an election (2005: 3).

These rules may evolve informally. Informal rules are carried on outside of the legal political process, appreciated as assured limitations upon political actors through social norms and social sanctions (Norris 2004). To administer an election, electoral institutions are needed. According to Rose (2000), electoral institutions are authorities who exercise their power to organise the voting process and the vote counting, the whole process concerning transferring votes into seats.

There are a wide variety of electoral systems, and there is no hint of agreement as to which is best, each system having its characteristic virtues and defects. In addition, there are electoral systems which exist on paper, but not in reality. Indeed, "...the only Royal Commission ever appointed in Britain to inquire into electoral systems declared in its report, published in 1910, there were over 300 systems then in existence" (Quoted from Bogdanor and Butler 1983a: 1. A Report by Britain Royal Commission appointed to enquire into electoral systems, Cd.5163, 1910, para.45.). Nonetheless, all 300 electoral systems can actually be grouped into two, three, four, five and more major families, each with their own rationale.

This study follows three major families of electoral systems: majoritarian, proportional representation (hereafter PR) and combined/mixed systems. Two of them are elaborated further because they are adopted in the Indonesian electoral system. The principle of majority/plurality systems is simple. After votes have been cast and totalled, those candidates or parties with the most votes are declared the winners, possibly provided that their support meets additional conditions. There are two electoral formulas employed: winning with absolute majority votes and winning with simple majority (also called as plurality votes). Under the absolute majority system, in order to win a seat, a candidate must gain an overall majority (at least

50% plus one) The simple majority requires only a plurality of votes (more votes than any of the other candidates but not necessarily an overall majority).

Majoritarian systems can be subdivided into: Single Non-Transferable Vote (hereafter SNTV), Two-Round System (TRS), First-Past-The-Post (FPTP), Bloc Vote (BV), Party Block Vote (PBV) and Alternative Vote (AV) systems. Two of them are adopted in the Indonesian electoral system: SNTV and TRS. Under SNTV, each voter casts one vote for a candidate but there are multiple seats to be filled in each district. Those candidates with the highest vote fill these positions. And the TRS (also called two-round ballot, second-ballot, two-ballot, and dual-ballot or run-off system) is a voting procedure in which candidates for a single member district first compete under a plurality election. Any candidate who wins more than half of the votes is elected. Otherwise, a second ballot is held to elect either the first or the second highest candidate in the first ballot. The winner of this second round then is elected.

The rationale underpinning PR systems is the conscious translation of a party's share of the votes into a corresponding proportion of seats. Variants of PR systems can also be differentiated, for example, by assessing the electoral formula applied. The central distinction is between a method based upon preferential voting in multi-member constituencies—the Single Transferable Vote (STV) — and a method of allocation based upon Party Lists. Party List systems can in turn be subdivided according to the methods by which candidates are chosen. A closed-list system requires the electorate to vote solely for a party list, the particular candidates elected being determined by their order on the list, or an open-list system which offers varying degrees of choice of candidate within a party list. (Bogdanor 1983; Lijphart and Aitkin 1994; Farrell 1997; Norris 2004).

These two major families of electoral systems have been found in Indonesia since 2004. Three variants of the majoritarian system are adopted: an SNTV system for DPD elections, an absolute majority two-round system in single-member districts for Pilpres and a simple-majority two-round system in single-member districts for Pilkada. The PR party open-list system in multi-member districts is adopted for Pilleg national, province, and regent/city elections.

The electoral system concerns multiple aspects controlled by electoral mechanics which involve the ballot structure, electoral threshold, electoral formula and district magnitude. These four mechanics appear in diverse forms and allow for many variations. Firstly, 'ballot structure' is a specification of the voter's role when expressing their voice. There are three variants of ballot structure significant for this study. They are party ballot, candidate-ballot and two-round ballot. Party-ballot is a procedure where voters cast a ballot for a party. Each party ranks the order of its candidates within its list, based on the decisions of the party nominating committee. Party ballots may be closed, in which voters can only select which party to support, and the party decides the ranking of their candidates. Party ballots may be open as well, in which voters express preferences for particular candidates within the list. In contrast, candidate-ballot is a procedure where voters cast a ballot for an individual candidate. The candidates who win either a plurality or majority of votes in each district are then elected. (Norris 2004).

Secondly, 'electoral threshold' is the minimum votes needed by a party to secure representation. There is no particular rule in determining the electoral threshold. Among countries, the ceiling to qualify lower-house legislative elections

...ranges from the lowest of 0.67% of the national vote used in the Netherlands, to up to 7% of the vote, used in Poland... one of the highest vote thresholds is in Turkey, with a 10% hurdle, whereas there is no formal threshold in some countries, such as South Africa... (Norris 2004: 51).

Thirdly, 'electoral formula' is a method in the translation of votes to seats. Under PR systems, votes can be allocated based on the highest average method or the largest remainder. The highest average method requires the number of votes for each party to be divided successively by a series of divisors, and seats are allocated to parties that secure the highest resulting quotient, up to the total number of seats available, such as the *d'Hondt* and *Sainte-Laguë* methods. The largest remainder uses a minimum quota, which can be calculated in a number of ways, such as the *Droop* and *Hare* quotas (Rae 1969).

Finally, 'district magnitude' is the number of representatives elected from a given district to the same legislative body. Electoral districts "...are the units within which voting returns are translated into distributions of parliamentary seats. These districts are usually defined territorially, but may also be defined by population groups"(Rae 1969: 19). A single-member district has one representative, while a multi-member district has more than one. Voting systems that seek proportionality (PR system) require multi-member districts, and the larger the district magnitude the more proportional a system will tend to be. An exception is when a multi-member district uses the majoritarian method to select the representative. The geographic distribution of minorities also affects their representation—an unpopular nationwide minority can still secure a seat if they are concentrated in a particular district. District magnitude can sometimes vary within the same system during an election (Norris 2004).

The electoral system may be considered either a dependent or independent variable. As Sartori states, traditionally, literature of electoral systems has concentrated upon two central issues. One issue is about electoral systems as a dependent variable. The proponents of this issue prefer asking "how do electoral systems come about and why are they chosen?" On the other hand, there is also the issue regarding electoral systems as an independent variable. The proponents usually ask "what do electoral systems do?"(2001: 90). In spite of these arguments being common in the literature, the debate actually is not significant as these two issues are equally important and complement each other. It is just like the 'chicken and egg' dispute. It is not the intent of this study to engage in this debate. However, as a consequence of the research question: "what do electoral systems do?" this study posits the electoral system as an independent variable. Nevertheless, electoral system as dependent variable remains discuss in this research, but only as a contextual factor.

The proposition that electoral systems are a dependent variable is held, for example, by Eckstein (1963), North (1990), Kostelecký (2002) and Colomer (2004). They consider electoral systems to be a product of negotiation amongst parties' members in the legislative body. The choice of electoral systems is driven more by shifts in the electoral risks faced by politicians able to control the selection process. North

states they are “...not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power...” (1990: 16). As Kostelecký found in post-Communist countries, parties had an extraordinary opportunity to draft electoral rules which met their interests and tended to design rules that could consolidate, reinforce or enhance their relative strength (2002). The new electoral system in Poland, for example, provided an easy entry for parties wishing to enter parliament, and “...encouraged those with dissenting opinions to solve their conflict by leaving the party to which they belonged and creating their own smaller parties....The electoral law allowed the parallel existence of parties almost identical ideologically and programmatically” (Kostelecký 2002: 140-141). In addition, Benoit (2001) asserts that electoral choice is less the product of a static calculation of partisan self-interest than a reflection of an electoral dynamic.

The proposition that electoral systems are an independent variable is supported by Bogdanor (1983), Nohlen (1984), Lijphart and Grofman (1986) and Despoto (2006). Bogdanor, for example, argues that electoral systems are one of the factors influencing

1) the stability of the political system; 2) the number of parties; 3) the nature of parties: a) the degree of internal cohesion and discipline; b) party alliances and other possibilities of co-operation; 4) the relationships between members of the legislature and constituents; 5) campaign strategy; 6) political recruitment (1983b: 250).

Lijphart and Grofman, based on Western parties' experiences, found that:

...the behavioural pattern of political parties seems to have changed regarding their assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of electoral systems. Disadvantages are usually criticized by those political parties negatively affected by them. They form the stimuli for the public debate on electoral systems. Since advantages and disadvantages are not structurally determined and do not always favour the same political parties –their consequences may vary with the changes in the distribution of votes – political parties that used to be discriminated against, readily accept the situational change and utilize these advantages without putting into practice the reform plans they propagated when they formed the opposition (1986: 223).

The literature on the impact of electoral systems is extensive, but it mainly concentrates on two central concerns: the impact on the number of parties and the political stability of the country. Some of the classics were written by Duverger (1964), Epstein (1967), Rae (1969) and Sartori (1976). The most forceful statement was that of Duverger. He differentiates the effects of electoral system between mechanical and psychological. The term ‘mechanical’ is used to describe the immediate effect of changes in electoral systems and rules, while the psychological explains the long-term consequence of these changes. As the mechanical effect of how electoral rules determine the distribution of votes, Duverger argued that while in plurality systems the distribution disproportionately favoured the major parties and thus towards ‘party dualism,’ proportional representation tends to favour multi-partyism. But, 40 years later, Duverger revised this statement following the evolution of Western parties. He claimed that the plurality method tended to lead to a two-party system; proportional representation tended to lead to a system of many mutually independent parties; and the two-ballot majority system tended to have multi-partyism moderated by alliances (1986).

Nonetheless, many aspects of Duverger’s arguments are still debatable. Ware, for example, found that

...the ‘fit’ between plurality voting and the two-partyism is not perfect. Of the six possible two-party countries, only three (Britain, New Zealand and the United States) use plurality voting; the other three (Colombia, Malta and Venezuela) all use some form of PR for elections to the national legislature. Furthermore, one of the countries that use the plurality voting system, Canada, had two-partyism only until the Second World War. After the war it was generally a two-and-a-half party system but sometimes a two-and-two-halves system. Superficially, therefore, the connection Duverger made seems not to be quite so strong as he was claiming (2000: 191).

Yet, it is not clear whether Duverger’s analysis is at the level of nation, region or district. An example is Canada. The Canadian case is commonly thought not to fit Duverger’s analysis at the national level, but to match its predictions at the regional level (Stewart 1986). An explanation for the Canadian case by Rae found the existence of “intense hostility between overlapping regional, cultural, and linguistic groups produced a strong basis of support for locally strong minority parties” (1969:

94). In addition, Gaines (1999) offered analysis on the complicating factor of federalism, using the example of Canadian provinces that have different provincial party systems and different electoral rules. Regardless of such weaknesses, Duverger was successful in inspiring other scholars to conduct more studies on the impact of electoral systems.

Besides the literature on the impact of electoral systems, the literature on the impact of electoral mechanics is also significant. Mostly it concentrates on two central concerns, the impact on the structure of opportunities of parties and individual politicians. In many studies, for example, ballot structure is repeatedly associated with the candidate nomination process and control of party organisation. Party ballot open-list and candidate ballot are usually assumed to weaken party organisation. As the usual mechanisms of party control over ballot access and rank are absent, it is difficult for party leaders, for example, to control the process of candidate nomination. Hence, the ballot rules stimulate the shift in balance of power from party to candidate (Cain, Ferejohn, and Morris 1987).

Moreover, it is generally believed that electoral threshold gives strategic incentives to limit the number of parties who can participate in the election. In Sartori's words,

...the more the electoral threshold is lowered, the greater the chances of including irrelevant parties. The relevance of a party is a function not only of the relative distribution of power –as is obvious- but also, and especially, of its position value, that is, of its positioning along the left-right dimension.(1976: 121).

In a nutshell, electoral threshold may contribute to the complexity and intricacy of the political system. Electoral threshold is also assumed to have an effect on a party's choice of how it mobilises voters. Norris (2004) found that where there is a lower electoral threshold, which is usually under a PR system in mobilising voters, parties tend to adopt strategies that focus on gaining votes from a particular segment of the electorate. In contrast, where there is a high electoral threshold, which is usually under a majoritarian system, parties tend to adopt strategies designed to gather votes from among diverse sectors of the electorate. Surely, the pressures of a high electoral threshold of majoritarian system in an executive election (where there

is one position to be won) is fundamentally different if the system is applied for a parliamentary election (where multiple seats are at stake). In addition, the impact of the *Hare* quota, like others of the largest remainder system, "...enables a small party to win a seat in a constituency even if its share of the vote is less than a quota, provided that its initial vote is greater than the remainders of parties that have already won a seat" (Mackie 2000: 252).

The effects of district magnitude can be different, depending on the electoral system. Under the PR system, a smaller magnitude tends to have greater disproportionality, and

...when magnitude is low, the magnitude exerts a very strong effect on the party system by under representing smaller parties. When magnitude becomes larger than about twenty, vote and seat shares become very close to one another. Nearly perfect proportionality is obtained by very large districts (Shugart 2000: 67).

The opposite effect occurs for a majoritarian system, in which a smaller magnitude tends to have greater proportionality. Along with that trend, opportunities for small parties are likely to increase.

Exclusively for two-round elections, Norris noted

This system can be seen as encouraging centrist party competition, as well as bolstering the legitimacy of the eventual winner by ensuring that they receive the support of at least half the public. On the other hand, the rules harshly penalize minor parties, and the need for citizens to go to the polls on at least two occasions in rapid succession can induce voters fatigue, thereby depressing turnout (2004: 49).

Under the system of party-ballot open-list PR, the candidates tend to compete with competitors from the same party instead of from other parties, as they prefer to take votes from members of their own party rather than from competing parties. In relations to the Brazilian open-list system, Desposato found that "Given weak partisanship among voters, incumbents with proven vote-drawing ability will still have leverage with party leaders. Proven vote-getters could negotiate with multiple parties for high list spots and switch to the party making the best offer" (2006: 1029).

Another important issue in examining the working of elections relates to electoral institutions. How the election is managed and how the electoral institution is established is equally important to the question of accountability of electoral results. According to Rose, electoral management is “...the organization of the voting process and the counting of votes by authorities exercising power derived from the sovereignty of a state or from an appropriate internal agreement... while the authorities who exercise the power are called electoral institutions” (2000: 6). Understanding the work of electoral institutions in managing the election is of fundamental importance, because through them, we can construe whether those in elected government have legitimacy to be in those positions or not. If people in parliamentary office are elected through a free and fair election, they have legitimate power. Those two concepts—a free and fair election and legitimate power—are fundamental for democracy. The importance becomes greater in a country where democratic practice has not yet been institutionalised. In such a country, Birch argues

Political manipulation is coming to be recognized as being among their most important problems, and although states of this sort are often called ‘electoral democracies’ on the grounds that they have reasonably ‘free and fair’ elections, observation mission reports frequently indicate that their electoral processes are flawed in important ways (2007: 1533-1534).

Parties and party systems

In a modern democratic polity, parties are regarded as *sine qua non* for the organisation of political institutions. This wisdom has been spread around the globe, particularly since the 1940s. The impetus was Schattschneider’s claim that “Parties created democracy” (1942: 1) and by Rossiter who argues “no democracy without politics, no politics without parties” (1960: 216). Sartori offered a similar view of parties as primarily vehicles for expressing and advancing their members' interests—either through control of political office or by less direct influence on government policy” (1976: ix). More recent work also associated parties with democracy. In her study in contemporary Southern and East-Central Europe, Van Biezen found that

parties are the key vehicle for the expression of political participation after Communism and dictatorial regime (2003). Much research on party competition showed that parties are also used to measure the varying progress towards democracy after the second wave in the 1980s.

As parties refer to many different entities and purposes, the questions of what political parties are and are not—and what their functions are—become problematic. The answers to these questions should be related, as the latter is determined by the former. Yet, no scholars have ever satisfactorily answered these normative questions. The attempt to define parties and their functions has often produced more confusion than explanation. If there are answers, they vary over time and place. One of the classic definitions, for example, is by Epstein; a party is “...any group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect government office holders under a given label (1967: 9). Another definition by Schlesinger is “...a group organized to gain control of government in the name of the group by winning election to public office” (1991: 5). In addition, according to Huckshorn, a party is “...an autonomous group of citizens having the purpose of making nominations and contesting elections in hope of gaining control over governmental power through the capture of public offices and the organization of the government” (1984: 10). Ware defines that

A political party is an institution that (*a*) seeks influence in a state, often by attempting to occupy positions in government, and (*b*) usually consists of more than a single interest in the society and so to some degree attempts to ‘aggregate interests’ (2000: 5).

For scholars who support these definitions, the ground for having a political party is mainly an electoral game.

Regardless of whether a party has excessive or modest electoral orientations, all parties can be viewed as organisations that perform certain functions. The list of party functions can be short or long; a careful review of this list indicates that the differences are often largely semantic. Scarrow (1998) argues that one of the reasons is because the term ‘function’ is used interchangeably in the literature to describe the roles played, the contribution made and the activities performed by parties. To define party functions has been especially challenging and beyond the scope of this

study. For practical reasons, this study relies partly on Scott and Hrebemar (1984), who describe party functions as the activities of and contributions made by parties that either directly or indirectly aid the operation of the political system. However, Gunther and Diamond's (2001) classification of party functions is referred to the most. They identify seven basic functions which should be performed by political parties including 'candidate nomination', 'electoral mobilization,' 'forming a government,' 'issue structuring,' 'societal representation,' 'interest aggregation,' and 'social integration'. It should be noted that some of these functions, particularly partisanship, are not exclusively ascribed to parties anymore (Schmitter 2001).

Party functions of partisanship began to diminish shortly after World War II, when parties of Western Europe began to reduce their ideological baggage. To remain competitive as the traditional working-class declined, longstanding social democratic parties had to modify their appeal, searching for votes elsewhere, particularly from the middle class. Kirchheimer notes that

...the mass integration party, product of an age with harder class lines and more sharply protruding denominational structures, is transforming itself into a catch-all 'people's' party... turning more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success (1966: 184).

This trend has prompted many parties on the left to adopt electoral strategies that place less emphasis on ideology. Some right-leaning parties then have pursued similar transformations. Nonetheless, 30 years later, the definition of the left-right spectrum has been rethought. The continuum no longer represents a grand ideological competition between socialism and capitalism as in the 1960s. In Lipset's (2001) words:

...the parties of the left, although still identifying themselves as social democratic or socialist, have largely reconstituted themselves as liberals in the American sense of word, emphasizing post-materialist themes like environmentalism, equality for women and gays, minority rights, and cultural freedoms. The right has moved, in varying degrees, toward classical liberalism or libertarianism.

Hence, the ideological differences between 'left' and 'right' parties have become narrowed and more fluid (Lipset 2001). This change was prompted particularly by the development of social democratic parties of the 1990s such as the British New Labour party, the Australian Labour party, the German Social Democrats party and the Swedish Social Democrats party.

The impetus is more complex in the USA. Party functions shrunk, not only because the traditional working class declined, but also because of the rapid development of 'new politics' and the growth of intermediary organisations in the United States since the 1970s (Scott and Hrebener 1984). Firstly, the 'new politics' is an era where traditional party campaign techniques are replaced with modern ones using mass media, with its attendant pollsters, public-relations consultants and advertising costs. In this environment, Farrell and Webb (2000) find many politicians can afford to act as quasi-independent operators, with relatively few debts or obligations to the party hierarchy. Most of them turn to a 'retail' campaign by passing party organisation in order to reach voters directly. They also prefer to employ professional groups to mobilise voters rather than depend on party activists (Scott and Hrebener 1984). Farrell, Kolodny and Medvic argues

...staff members continuing to become ever more professional –with old-fashioned party bureaucrats being replaced by new-fashioned marketing, public relations, and media professional- there may also be important internal shifts taking place in terms of the balance of loyalties of these new staff. For instance, the phenomenon of the 'leaders' office' has achieved a certain prominence in recent years in a number of countries. Here we find the party leader being surrounded by hand-picked staff working exclusively for him or her. Their fate as party employees is tied directly to the party leaders; loyalty to the party per se is always secondary to loyalty to the party leaders (2001: 21-22).

Thus, the increased availability and reach of mass media has weakened party organisation, boosted the cost of politics, and turned party-centred campaigns into candidate-centred ones. And notably, mass media usage has significantly changed the relationship between parties and the electorate.

Secondly, the rapid growth of intermediary organisations has given people choices in articulating and aggregating their interests. To express concerns on ecology or

energy, for example, they seek out interest groups such as Green Peace, the Sierra Club or Energy-Watch consumer groups. According to Schmitter, "...these intermediaries have become more organized, specialized, and professionalized over time in the roles they perform. And, we shall see, they have recourse to a greater variety of channels of representation and levels of aggregation than in the past" (2001: 70). This situation later compelled American parties to chase voters wherever they could. To capture them, the Democratic and Republican parties, were driven to integrate a wider range of interests. These alterations have encouraged parties to lean more towards the centre of the spectrum and to have more electoral orientation than before, even though both parties are already less ideological and more electoral compared to European parties.

In Indonesia, a number of parties have been established or redeveloped by a politician, retired military officer or business owner, as his or her own vehicle to win an election and exercise power. When a party becomes an electoral vehicle, it manifests the main feature of Kirchheimer's catch-all party, in terms of its overwhelmingly electoral orientation. However, an electoral vehicle is different from what Diamond and Gunther (2001) call a 'personalistic party' or Ignazi's (1996) 'non-partisan party', although the *raison d'être* of this type of party is to provide political means for the leader to advance his or her political ambitions; 'personalistic party' and 'non-partisan party' have an ideology or at least issues, policies or programs they stand for. From international experience, according to Diamond, examples of 'personalistic party' are the Forza Italia of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy, the Cambio 90 of Alberto Fujimori in Peru, and the Thai Rak Thai of Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand.

This study distinguishes electoral vehicle party by exercising three aspects of party life: party organisation, party strategy and party function, as proposed by Diamond and Gunther (2001). Party as electoral vehicle maximises votes, wins elections and governs. To mobilise voters, it applies an electoralist strategy, which seeks to attract as many voters as possible and focuses on a direct relationship between the voter and the party, by means of modern campaign techniques. Its campaign focuses on relatively practical and temporary issues, and depends heavily on the attractiveness

of party leaders, figures and candidates. Its interest aggregation is very inclusive, has considerable discretion in aggregating interest and is less overtly involved with the formulation of any commitments. Whilst its societal representation is heterogeneous, it avoids becoming identified with the interests of any specific social groups. It thus limits the party's potential in representing society. Its organisational structure is usually large, but unprofessional and ineffective. It lacks commitment to a particular ideology or program. Its candidate nomination is largely based on personal electoral appeal and resources rather than organisational criteria, such as years of experience in, or service to, the party. Accordingly, the candidate holds a relatively stronger position *vis-a-vis* the party.

For party system definition, Sartori (1976) argues that parties make for a 'system' only when they are parts (in the plural); and a party system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition. Wolinetz complements Sartori by stating that a party system is the result of party relations which arise:

...From their competition for elective office and interaction between elections in both the formation and support of governments and the legislative process. Parties compete for a share of the vote and, in doing so, try both to shore up their own support and pry votes from their competitors. The strategy and tactics which they employ are influenced by what other parties have done in the past and expectations about what they will do in the future. The ability of parties to cooperate with each other after elections will depend not only on their size and relative strength, but also on their distance from each other on key issues and the ways in which they present themselves during elections. Party systems can vary on any or all of these. Voters, politicians, and political analysts often think of parties divided along a left-right spectrum, but it is not unusual for party systems, at least in their origins, to reflect multiple dimensions of conflict (2006: 52-53).

According to Wolinetz, a number of distinct features emerge which can be referred to from Sartori's definition of party system. Firstly is the number of parties. A party system cannot consist of only one party. A standard classification is between 'two-party systems', on the one hand, and 'multi-party systems' on the other. Secondly is competition and coalition of parties. A party system needs to be examined by the number of parties contesting elections and winning legislative seats; the relative size and strength of parties; the different aspects on which parties compete; the distance that separates parties on key issues; and their willingness to work with each other in

government formation and the process of governing. These attributes, among many, became a concern of Taagepera and Shugart (1989).

To examine Indonesian party systems, this study utilises these elements of party systems: number of parties, party size and strength and party polarisation and internal dynamics. Firstly, the number of parties is significant because it "... [In election]... shapes the menu of choices which voters face when they cast ballots. [in legislative] ...affects the ease with which governments can be formed in the parliamentary system and the ease with which political executives can find support in presidential systems" (Wolinetz 2006: 51). However, even though the number of parties does matter, it is insufficient in itself to comprehend who really has the power. Hence, assessing party size and strength becomes important. This leads to the second variable—the effective number of votes (hereafter EffNv) and effective number of seats (hereafter EffNs) of Laakso and Taagepera (1979). These two indexes have been used to great advantage in analysing the effects of different types of electoral laws. They are very useful in examining the potential of party competition and coalitions. Nonetheless, they cannot explain what matters in party contests and partnerships. This study thus needs to enrich the examination with other variables—party polarisation and internal dynamics. Comprehending them can deliver information about ideological positions, traditions, policies and values. The discussion of the development of party systems leads to the idea of revisiting the classic discourse of Indonesian politics the concept of *aliran* (stream or tendency) by Geertz (1976) and the map of political thinking by Feith and Castle (1970) based on the 1955 election. The discussion will be benefited from the study of Green-Pedersens (2004), Norden (1998), Johnson-Tan (2006) and Mietzner (2008).

Chapter Three

Elections, electoral systems and electoral institutions, 1955–2009

“...*electoral laws* are of special importance for every group and individual in the society, because they help to decide who writes other laws” (Rae 1969: 3)

Introduction

This chapter will explore the development of elections, electoral systems, and electoral institutions from the 1955 to the 2009 legislative and executive elections. It will provide a basis for the discussion of Indonesian party politics and party systems in chapters four, five and six. This chapter will address how elections and electoral systems change, how the four most important mechanics of an electoral system—ballot structure, electoral threshold, electoral formula and district magnitude—change, and how electoral institutions change. A politico-historical approach is taken and will be presented in two sections.

First, ‘Elections and Electoral Systems of 1955–2009’ will explore the dynamics of elections, the changing features of electoral systems and the conflicting character of electoral mechanics. The dynamic processes of choosing electoral systems reflect the nature of political negotiation among parties in the legislature. Because of the complexity of these issues, the enormous differences among elections and diverse socio-political contexts, the discussion will be grouped into three subsections: the 1955 and 1957–1958 elections during the ‘Old Order’ regime; the 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997 elections during the ‘New Order’ regime; and the 1999, 2004, 2005 and 2009 elections during the ‘Reformasi’ regime.

Second, ‘Electoral Institutions of 1955–2009’ will examine the institutions that conducted the elections during this period will be examined, to show that the work of electoral institutions in managing elections is of fundamental importance. It will

also show whether those in elected government office have legitimacy to be in those positions, and whether their position is based on a free and fair election or a politically manipulated one. Particular focus will be given to continuities and discontinuities, similar and different features of electoral management and institutions. This section is very important because electoral management and institutions are the weakest links, which can easily be interfered with by the regime. The importance becomes greater in Indonesia where democratic practice has not yet been institutionalised.

Elections and electoral systems

The discussion below highlights the complexity of electoral politics in Indonesia. It explains continuity and discontinuity lines, and similar and different features of elections and electoral systems. Table 3.1 is a comparison of electoral systems and mechanics and table 3.2 is a comparison of elections during this period. The electoral systems and electoral mechanics are central because they control the possibility of different electoral impacts. For such reasons, parties in the legislature usually have strong pragmatic interest in ensuring that the choice of electoral systems and mechanics benefiting them.

Table 3.1: Comparison of electoral systems and mechanics, 1955–2009

		Election Year											
		1955	1957-1958	1971	1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997	1999	2004	2005-2009		2009			
Type of Election		Legislature, national	Legislature, local	Legislature, national & local	Legislature, national & local	Legislature, national & local	Legislature		Executive, national (President)	Executive, local (Governor, Mayor/Regent)	Legislature		Executive, national (President)
							DPR, national & local	DPD, national			DPR, national & local	DPD, national	
Electoral Law		Law no.7/1953	Law No.1/1957	Law no.15/1969	Law no.15/1969 & amendments	Law no.3/1999	Law no.12/2003	Law no.12/2003	Law no.23/2003	Law no.32/2004	Law no.10/2008	Law no.10/2008	Law no.42/2008
Electoral System		PR, MMD *	PR, MMD *	PR, MMD*	PR, MMD*	PR, MMD*	PR, MMD*	SNTV, MMD*	Majoritarian, two-round, SMD**	Simple Majoritarian, two round, SMD**	PR, MMD*)	SNTV, MMD*	Majoritarian, two-round, SMD**
Electoral Mechanics	Ballot Structure	Party ballot, open-list	Party ballot, open-list	Party ballot, closed-list	Party ballot, closed-list	Party ballot, closed-list	Party ballot, open-list	Candidate ballot	Candidate ballot	Candidate ballot	Party ballot, open-list	Candidate ballot	Candidate ballot
	Threshold	Candidate age & number of referrals 1)	Candidate age & number of referrals 2)	Legal party authorized by government	2% of DPRseats 3)	Number and distribution of offices; and 2% of DPR seats 4)	Number and distribution of offices; and 3% of DPRseats 5)	Depend on the number of population 6)	15% of DPRseats or 20% of DPRelectoral votes 7)	15% of DPRD seats or 15% accumulation of DPRD electoral votes	Number and distribution of offices.8)	Depend on the number of population 9)	20% of DPR seats or 25% of DPR electoral votes
	Parliament	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.5% of DPR electoral votes 10)	-	-
	Electoral Formula	Hare quota	Hare quota	Hare quota	Hare quota	Hare quota	Hare quota	The highest first, second, third, fourth	50% +1	25%+1	Hare quota, multi-stages	The highest first, second, third, fourth	50% +1
	District Magnitude	Varying magnitude	Varying magnitude	Varying magnitude	Varying magnitude	Varying-magnitude	Varying magnitude	Single magnitude	Single magnitude	Single magnitude	Varying magnitude	Single magnitude	Single magnitude

* MMD= Multi Member District; ** SMD=Single Member District; Sources: Law no.7/1953, Law no.15/1969, Law no.3/1999, Law no.12/2003, Law no.23/2003, Law No.32/2004, Law no.10/2008 and Law no.42/2008

- 1) At least 21 years' old and had 25 referrals of registered voters, while candidate ranked number one on party list needed to get 200 referrals of registered voters.
- 2) At least 21 years' old and had 25 referrals of registered voters, while candidate ranked number one on party list needed to get 200 referrals of registered voters.
- 3) 2% of DPR seats or at least 3% of DPR province/regency/city seats in at least half of the total number of province or regency/city.
- 4) Should have offices in more than half of provinces, and offices in more than half of the regencies/ cities in those provinces; 2% of DPR seats and at least 3% of DPR province/regency/city seats in at least half of the total number of province and in at least half of the total number of regency/city.
- 5) Should have offices in two-thirds of provinces, offices in two-thirds of the regencies/ cities in those provinces, at least 1.000 member or 1/1000 of total population in each offices all with member cards; 3% of DPRDPR seats and at least 4% of DPR Province seats in at least half of the total number of province or at least 4% of DPR regency/city seats in at least half of the total number of regency/city.
- 6) A candidate needed support of at least one thousand voters in a province with 1 million population; two thousand voters in a province with 1 to 5 million population; three thousand voters in a province with 5 to 10 million population; four thousand voters in a province with 10 to 15 million population; five thousand voters in a province with more than 15 million population. And, the support needed to come from at least 25% from total number of regency/city in the respective province.
- 7) Exception for 2004 Presidential elections, candidate might be nominated by party/Coalition of parties who had at least 3% of DPRDPR seat or 5% of DPRDPR electoral votes.
- 8) Should have offices in two-thirds of provinces, offices in two-thirds of the regencies/ cities in those provinces, at least 30% women in national party structure, at least 1.000 member or 1/1000 of total population in each offices all with member card. All participants of the previous election might join the next election.
- 9) A candidate needed support of at least one thousand voters in a province with 1 million population; two thousand voters in a province with 1 to 5 million population; three thousand voters in a province with 5 to 10 million population; four thousand voters in a province with 10 to 15 million population; five thousand voters in a province with more than 15 million population. And, the support needed to come from at least 50% from total number of regency/city in the respective province.
- 10) Applied to DPRDPR only; inapplicable to either DPR province or DPR regency/city.

Table 3.2: Comparison of elections, 1955–2009

		Election Year											
		1955	1957-1958	1971	1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997	1999	2004		2005-2009	2009			
Type of Election	Legislative, national	Legislative, local	Legislative, national & local	Legislative, national & local	Legislative, national & local	Legislative		Executive, national (President)	Executive, local (Governor, Mayor/Regent)	Legislative		Executive, national (President)	
						DPR, national & local	DPD, national			DPR, national & local	DPD, national		
Political Competition	Relatively open, fair & inclusive	Under martial law	Tend to regulated	Regulated	Relatively open, fair & inclusive	Relatively open, fair & inclusive	Relatively open, fair & inclusive	Relatively open, fair & inclusive	Relatively open, fair & inclusive	Less open, fair & inclusive	Less open, fair & inclusive	Less open, fair & inclusive	
Electoral Rules	Motivation	Pragmatic	Pragmatic	Pragmatic	Pragmatic	Pragmatic	Pragmatic	Pragmatic	Pragmatic	Pragmatic	Pragmatic	Pragmatic	
	Approach	Inspired to build democratic systems	Inspired to strengthen local government	Inspired to regulate the political systems	Inspired to legitimise the regime	Inspired to re-build democratic systems	Inspired to institutionalised the democratic systems	Inspired to empower the local communities	Inspired to strengthen the Presidential system	Inspired to strengthen local government	Inspired to sustain the incumbent government	Inspired to sustain the incumbent government	
	Dominant party in the parliament that made the electoral laws and regulations	Independent & party, appointed by President	PNI	PNI	Golkar	Golkar	PDIP	PDIP	PDIP	PDIP	Golkar	Golkar	Golkar
Electoral Outcomes	Party with highest votes	PNI	PKI	Golkar	Golkar	PDIP	Golkar	independent	Demokrat	Golkar	Demokrat	Independent with party affiliation	Demokrat
	Parliament	Even more fragmented	Even more fragmented	Concentrated	Even more Concentrated	More fragmented	Fragmented	Fragmented	-	-	Fragmented	Fragmented	-
	Cabinet	Even more fragmented	Even more fragmented	Concentrated	Even more Concentrated	More fragmented	-	-	Relatively concentrated	Relatively fragmented	-	-	Relatively concentrated
	Government	Unstable	Unstable	Relatively stable	Stable	Unstable	-	-	Relatively stable	Relatively unstable	-	-	Relatively stable
Electoral administration	Institution	Administered by MoHA **	Administered by MoHA **	Regulated by MoHA	Regulated by MoHA	Run by parties & government, administered by MoHA	Permanent institution, administered by MoHA	Permanent institution, administered by MoHA	Permanent institution, administered by MoHA	Permanent institution, Regulated by MoHA	Permanent institution, Regulated by MoHA	Permanent institution, Regulated by MoHA	
	Commissioner	Independent, non-partisan, appointed by government	Independent, non-partisan, appointed by government	Dependent, partisan, appointed & controlled by government	Dependent, partisan, appointed & controlled by government	Dependent, partisan, appointed by government	Independent, non-partisan, appointed by government	Independent, non-partisan, appointed by government	Independent, non-partisan, appointed by government	Independent, non-partisan, appointed & controlled by government	Independent, non-partisan, appointed & controlled by government	Independent, non-partisan, appointed & controlled by government	
	Electoral Integrity	Relatively few violations	Many violations	Many violations	Many violations	Relatively few violations	Relatively few violations	Relatively few violations	Relatively few violations	Many violations	Many violations	Many violations	Many violations

* RIS= Republic Indonesia Serikat (Indonesia Republic of Federal); ** MoHA= Ministry of Home Affairs or Kemendagri (Kementrian Dalam Negeri Republik Indonesia)

Old Order regime: from parliamentary democracy to guided democracy

Indonesia held its first national parliamentary election in 1955 and regional elections in 1957–1958. Both elections were carried out under different political circumstances. The 1955 election occurred at a time when the Old Order was in the phase of parliamentary democracy, in which all political elements (parties, politicians and voters) were euphoric over holding a national election for the first time since independence. In contrast, the 1957–1958 elections occurred at a time when the Old Order was in transition to guided democracy, in which all political forces (parties, president and military) were busy recalculating their positions following the imposition of martial law.

The Old Order regime needs to be discussed in terms of three main issues which influenced its politics. Firstly, the regime inherited the ongoing problems of a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious society trying to establish a nation through new national symbols and national slogans (Emmerson 1960).⁴ It also inherited a troubled politics and socio-cultural and economic conditions as a legacy of the nationalist revolution against the Dutch colonial power (Kahin G. 1952; Kahin A. 1985). This followed the decisions of the colonial power, which did not acknowledge *de facto* the Indonesian proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945.⁵ This proclamation “... had called forth much greater enthusiasm than the Dutch expected” (Kahin A. 1985: 12). The revolution ended only after the Dutch transferred sovereignty over Indonesia on 27 December 1949.

Secondly, after Indonesia gained recognition *de facto* and *de jure* of its independence in 1949, lack of agreement about what political, social and economic goals should be pursued became more apparent. This was evident in a series of regional rebellions against the central government based on both religious and regional dissatisfaction. The political elites, for example, could not agree on how

⁴ A nation is a community of people who feel they belong together in the double sense that they share deeply significant elements of common heritage and have a common destiny for the future. See R. Emerson (1960) *From Empire to Nation: the Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

⁵ Until today, the Dutch government has not acknowledged that *de facto* Indonesia was established as an independent country on 17 August 1945.

the country should be governed. They were torn between following the 1945 Constitution which supported a presidential system and the 1950 Provisional Constitution which endorsed a parliamentary system. It was decided that the political system would be structured as a parliamentary system. However, most of the parliamentarians at the time were appointed by the President based on the assumed strength of their party; but they were replaced by elected parliamentarians following the 1955 national parliamentary election.

In the 1955 election, 172 parties and quasi-political groups participated, but four parties dominated the electoral result: the PNI, Masyumi, NU and PKI with 22.3%, 20.9%, 18.4% and 16.4% respectively (KPU 2000). Each of these parties had distinct and seemingly loyal support, reflecting ideological as well as social group divisions that existed at the time. The PNI attracted *priyayi* (aristocracy) and *abangan* (Javanese syncretism) supporters, while PKI worked mostly with *abangan* followers. Most of Masyumi and NU voters came from *santri* (pious Islam) groups.⁶ Party contest as well as rivalry between communal groups became more intense prior to the election. This competition, along with political disputes amongst parties in the parliament and between parliament and cabinet, caused a deadlock in the 1950s political system.

The political system was placed under great stress by tensions between central government and the regions. For example, in Aceh there was a Darul Islam rebellion in September 1953 based on strong Islamic feelings and strong regional dissatisfaction with the central government over political and economic matters. In South Sulawesi in 1951, there had previously been a Darul Islam rebellion, mainly

⁶*Priyayi, abangan, santri* were Javanese social groupings examined by Geertz (1976). The groupings then were developed to establish the concept of a political stream. The streams consisted of radical nationalism, Javanese traditionalism, Islamism, democratic socialism and communism. They were then used to examine parties in 1955. Nationalism was espoused by PNI, communism by PKI and Islam by Masyumi and NU. Masyumi was associated with the modernist Muhammadiyah and NU was a large more traditional Islamic religious organisation based in east and central Java before it became a political party. See *Indonesian Political Thinking* by Feith and Castles (1970).

motivated by the region's dissatisfaction with central government policies. There were also several other movements in Ambon, Minangkabau and West Java, which related to the Darul Islam rebellions in Aceh and South Sulawesi. These regional crises culminated in the PRRI/Permesta rebellion in 1958. Harvey found that the rebellion "...was based on a widespread sense of dissatisfaction with the existing state structure, which was widely criticized for being bureaucratic, inefficient, and corrupt" (1977: 1). Centre–region relations became complicated by the fact that the centre was located on the most densely inhabited Java Island, and dominated by Javanese political beliefs and social culture. The outer islands were less densely populated, politically marginalised and included the major export producing regions, many with plantation agriculture, mining and oil resources. The conduct of the 1957–1958 regional elections aimed to solve these regional problems and to begin the process of devolution of power from central to regional governments—even though elections were held only in Java, South Sumatera and Kalimantan. However, before the devolution of power had taken place, the process was terminated by a decree in 1959 (Kahin A. 1985).

Thirdly, in 1957, the parliamentary system changed to what was called Guided Democracy, when President Sukarno declared the imposition of martial law. Through martial law, the military was given legitimacy to be involved in politics. Following the declaration of martial law, the influence of the military on the country's politics was greatly enhanced. Guided Democracy, according to President Sukarno, was more supportive of Indonesia in achieving national unity. Based on Nasakom, the antagonism amongst the political parties would be harmonised; and the balance between the President and the military would be redressed. The parties' reactions to President Sukarno's ideas were varied. The Masyumi, Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesia Socialist Party; hereafter PSI) and Partai Katholik Indonesia (Indonesia Catholic Party; hereafter Partai Katholik) openly opposed the idea. The NU, Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesia Christian Party; hereafter Parkindo), Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Alliance of supporter for Indonesian Independence; hereafter IPKI) and Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (Indonesia Syarikat Islam Party; hereafter PSII) disagreed, but remained loyal, while PNI and PKI supported Sukarno completely. In 1959, through Government Instruction No.7/

1959, 10 out of 28 political parties which won seats in the 1955 election continued to enjoy legal status: PNI, NU, PKI, Partai Katholik, Partai Indonesia (Partindo), PSII, Parkindo, IPKI, Perti and Murba. But two parties, Masyumi and PSI, were banned because they were accused of involvement in the regional rebellions. Yet, the situation deteriorated, as from 1963, all political forces went in opposite directions. From then on, there was a new 'power triangle' which consisted of President Sukarno, the military and the PKI. In this triangle, Sukarno played the role of serving both, and keeping the balance between the military and the PKI (Feith 1964). Guided Democracy ended in disaster with the attempted *coup d'état* in October 1965, allegedly organised by the PKI, which marked the downfall of President Sukarno and the rise of President Suharto's so-called New Order regime (Lev 1966).

1955 election: the first national parliamentary election after independence

The 1955 election was the first national parliamentary election after independence.⁷ They were conducted under a PR system in multi-member districts by Law no.7/1953. There were 15 electoral districts (at the provincial level) and each district had at least three representatives. These representatives were elected based on a party ballot open-list system. The party ranked the order of candidates within its list, based on the decisions of party committees. But, voters were allowed to cast "...an individual within a candidate list by writing the individual's name on the paper" (Feith 1957: 4), and the process of distribution of seats followed the *Hare* quota.

Within each electoral district seats would be distributed to parties and other candidate bodies in proportion to the number of votes they had received. Remaining votes would be pooled either between different parties within an electoral district (if these had previously given notice of a vote-pooling agreement between them) or amalgamated by one party at the national level (Feith 1957: 3).

⁷In 1955, Indonesia held two elections: in September to select members of Parliament and in December to select members of the Constituent Assembly (an assembly to draft Indonesian permanent constitution). In this thesis, all discussion of the 1955 election refers to the September parliamentary election.

There were 172 parties and quasi-political groups that participated in the election.⁸ They competed for 257 seats in the national parliament. To be elected, a candidate needed to get support from at least 300,000 registered voters (KPU 2000: 48).

The 1955 electoral systems and mechanics were debated with reference to both international and local experiences. Firstly, international experience was learned from the Netherlands. Its influence is through the Indonesian elites, particularly through education in the colony or abroad, as a result of the Dutch ethical policy. As Bogdanor (1983) argues, there is a link between the electoral systems which a colonised country adopts and the electoral system of the colonial ruler. Similar to the Netherlands which has had a PR system since 1917, Indonesia adopted a PR system in 1955. Another similarity is that both countries have a very low electoral threshold. The only threshold in the Netherlands was the electoral quotient, formed by dividing the number of votes cast at an election by the number of seats in parliament, known as *Bilangan Pembagi Pemilih* (hereafter BPP) in Indonesia. But there were differences too. The Netherlands used a party ballot closed-list system; Indonesia, however, used a party ballot open-list system. In the Netherlands, the remaining seats were distributed following the average *d'Hondt* method whereas Indonesia used the *Hare* quota. Interestingly, even though both countries had vastly different social, political and economic characteristics, the electoral systems produced a similar party system: a multi-party system in which no party secures a majority of votes (Andeweg and Irwin 2005).

Secondly, local experience was gained from two experiments carried out in Minahasa, a Christian area at the northern tip of Sulawesi; and in Yogyakarta, a centre of Javanese court culture and the Republican capital through much of the Revolution. These experiments were conducted “to determine the type of election best suited to the Indonesian situation, in which widespread illiteracy, administrative inexperience and difficult communications are balanced against a desire for the most democratic institutions” (Compton 1954a: 63). The first experiment, the Minahasa election, was under a PR direct system, to elect 25 members of the District Representative Council, held on 14 June 1951. For the

⁸ Indeed, the actual number of contenders was 172 parties and individuals. But, only 29 competed at national level, while most of them existed only in one region.

people of Minahasa, this election was their second experience, as in 1948 under the State of East Indonesia; they elected the Minahasa Council, also administered under a PR direct system. The voter turn-out was 79%, with 25 Council seats won by pro-Republic (9 seats), pro-Separatism (9 seats) and the traditional leaders who were secretly pro-Republic (7 seats) (Groen 1979). Long before, there had also been a Minahasaraad (Minahasa Council) established in 1919, as published in the *Staatsblad* (state journal) No. 64/1919 on 1 March 1919. This made Minahasa one of the regions in Indonesia with a long history of electoral politics. The second experiment, the Yogyakarta election, was under a PR indirect system. The election was divided into two stages: voters elected 7,268 electors and electors elected 40 members of the District Representative Council. These two stages were held from 16 July to 15 October 1951. In the end, the Minahasa electoral system was accepted as the national model and incorporated into the laws (Compton 1954b). All Minahasa Councils pre- and post-war was elected on a Proportional direct system.

Prior to these experiments, Indonesia had already experienced regional elections. The elections were for District Representative Councils and District Head of Government, held before the Roundtable Conference at The Hague in 1949 and in the 13 regions of the State of East Indonesia: Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, Sumba, Timor and the surrounding, the South Moluccas, the North Moluccas, Sangihe and Talaud, Minahasa, North Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi and South Sulawesi. Firstly, all elections for District Representative Councils were administered by a PR system. But they were split between a direct system, such as in Lombok and Minahasa, and an indirect system, such as in Bali and South Sulawesi (Agung 1996). An interesting case is the South Moluccas as it adopted both a direct and indirect system of PR. According to Chauvel,

...there were two electoral systems used. In the area of the pre-war *Ambonraad*, Ambon and Lease, the existing indirect system was adapted to a new constituency division. In the other islands of the South Moluccas the village heads alone had the right to elect members. The Dewan Maluku Selatan (the representative body for the lowest level of the federal government structure (hereafter DMS) consisted of 37 members, 28 of whom were elected, the remaining nine being appointed... (2008: 223).

Secondly, all elections for District heads of government were administered by a plural indirect system. According to Agung, in Lombok and Minahasa, for example, the elected members of the District Representative Council "...chose three members from among its rank who were given the task of running the day-to-day government, and were named the Daily Executive Committee; from among those three was chosen a chair who acted as Regional Head..." (1996: 467). In Bali, Sumbawa and Flores, the District head of government was chosen by the Council of Rajas, whereas in South Sulawesi he was chosen among the 15 members of the Regional Executive Committee (Agung 1996).

Nonetheless, choosing an electoral system was not easy. There was much disagreement in the appointed multi-party parliament, with the contending parties seeking to defend their ideology and position. The first draft of election bills was introduced by the Natsir Cabinet in February 1951, but before it was legislated, the Cabinet was replaced. The second draft, mainly concerning voters' registration, was then introduced by the Wilopo Cabinet in February 1952 (Feith 1962). There was a debate between the supporters of a PR multi-member system, mostly government officials, and the proponents of a plural single-member system, mostly parliamentarians. The supporters of a PR multi-member system considered that a plural single-member system would under represent Java; whilst the proponents of a plural single-member system considered that a PR multi-member system would over represent Java (Feith 1957).

In the end, political elites agreed to adopt a PR multi-member system. However, it should be noted that the majority of Members of Parliament were Javanese –the largest ethnic group. Feith argued that rather than the representative issue of Javanese-Non-Javanese, of more concern were: 1) the fact that many nationalists were worried over the growing support of the Islamist parties; and 2) the discomfort of many independent parliamentarians who were in parliament by Presidential appointment, who could lose their seats as they had little popular support (Feith 1957). After being debated for 18 weeks and amended 200 times, the bill passed on April 1, was signed into law on April 4 1953 (Feith 1962).

There were two political compromises resulting from 1955 electoral bargaining that deserve more attention. First, the electoral threshold was set low to encourage participation of individuals, organisations and parties in elections. Hence, people of any socio-cultural, economic and political background were free to participate. To apply as a candidate, they only needed to be 21 years' old before the election and supported by the signature of 25 registered voters; except if they wanted to be listed on top, in which case the applicant needed the signature of 200 registered voters. One popular individual who entered the competition was L.M. Idrus Effendi supported by the Association of Supporters of the Candidate of L.M. Idrus Effendi of Southeast Sulawesi. Many local parties participated even though most of them could only compete in one particular province/region. One significant example was Partai Persatuan Dayak (the United Dayak Party; hereafter PPD) of Kalimantan. The PPD was established mainly as a response of the Dayak ethnic group to their loss of political recognition and representation they had experienced under a Federal system before August 1950. In West Kalimantan, the PPD came second with 33.1%; defeated only by a margin of 2.1% by the national party –Masyumi, but in central Kalimantan, it was only number four (6.2%), after Masyumi, NU and Partai Politik Tarikat Islam (Tarikat Islam Party; hereafter PPTI). Other similar examples were Gerakan Pilihan Sunda (Sundanese Election Movement) of West Java, and Angkatan Komunis Muda (the Young Communist Group; hereafter ACOMA) of Madura (Feith 1957).

Second, the electoral formula was set high to limit participation of individuals, organisations and parties in parliament. Hence, only the 'bold and beautiful' could get a seat in the parliament. With a minimum limit of 300,000 votes, only 28 out of 172 parties and quasi-political groups gained a seat or seats; while four out of those 28 obtained 78% of national votes. They were the PNI, Masyumi, NU and PKI with 22.3%, 20.9%, 18.4% and 16.4% of national votes respectively. The rest were washed out. Most of them were independent candidates, regional/local and ethnic parties which were usually small due to their exclusiveness. They then disbanded, merged or faded away from political activities. Hence, the 1955 electoral system produced a multi-party system with numerous parties in which no party secured an

overall majority of votes (Feith 1957). This has been the pattern of the Reformasi era elections.

The 1955 election was generally viewed as democratic, free and fair. The atmosphere was serious but without much tension. According to Feith, it was “...like that of a national celebration...” (1962: 429). The election was praised as “...the most open and participatory elections held anywhere in Southeast Asia since World War II: full adult suffrage, a competitive press, very little violence and gerrymandering, remarkably little emphasis on money...” (Anderson 1996: 29).

Despite the parliamentary results of the 1955 election being regarded as legitimate and highly acknowledged by the people; the paradox is that the electoral success was followed by political instability. The post-election politics was followed by a sharp ideological dispute between parties, between parliament and cabinet as well as between communal groups. It was characterised by the ideological antagonism between the proponents of a national secular and Islamic state; the primordial polarisation between Java and the outer islands; the opportunist small parties who tried to take concessions from the big parties’ rivalries; and the low standards of government officials’ behaviour. Accordingly, government was difficult to manage and programs difficult to deliver.

All of the major substantive issues of the 1950s, including economic development, administrative reorganization, modernization and rationalization of the armed forces, internal security and decentralization of authority to provincial and local government, were dealt with by ‘a posture of meeting challenges by buying off the hostility of the challengers’ rather than through consistent, problem-oriented policy making (Liddle 1970: 69).

1957–1958 elections: regional elections held under martial law⁹

In 1957–1958 under martial law, Indonesia held its regional elections. In 1957, the elections were held throughout Java, South Sumatra and Riau; and in 1958,

⁹There were only a few studies on the 1957–1958 regional elections, neither in Indonesia nor overseas. One of the reasons was that the turbulent political situation at that time made it difficult to observe these elections. It was difficult to find, for example, the statistics of the elections which were deliberately omitted and not in accordance with the wishes of the power holders. Hence, because lack of data, the discussion of these regional elections was inadequate.

Kalimantan. In other regions, as Lev found, "...political conditions resulting from the regionalist movement precluded them..." (Lev 1966: 84). The conduct of these regional elections in fact indicated the initial process of devolution of power from central to local government (Feith 1962). They were the result of years of debate over the issue of centralisation versus local autonomy in the 1955 national parliament. However, before the devolution of power took place, the process was terminated by a decree in 1959.

The elections were administered by Law No.1/1957. This is the first stipulation designed to increase the power of local DPR and heads of local government. The elections, as Lev explains,

...are for regional representative councils [Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or DPRD] who then select executive councils [Dewan Pemerintahan Daerah or DPD] according to distribution of party strength. The DPRD are also to select a chairman of the DPD to act as regional executive, but her/his appointment is subject to approval by the central government (1966: 84).

In contrast to the 1955 election, regional elections did not draw much attention from either voters or party officials. One of the reasons was that opportunities for voters to be engaged in election activities were constrained. "Everywhere, restrictions were imposed by military authorities on political activities... In East Java...the martial law administration limited the campaign to five days... Political rallies and demonstrations were watched closely" (Lev 1966: 85). Party officials at headquarters had little interest in regional elections, particularly because at the same time they were busy with the political events in Jakarta, struggling to maintain their own position under martial law and Guided Democracy (Lev 1966).

Among the four big parties in 1955, it was the PKI that increased its support in the regional elections. The results raised the fear that if reasonably free and fair elections were allowed to continue the PKI would grow stronger. The regional elections produced a result that threatened the interests of factions of the elite that sought refuge in more authoritarian forms of government that either did not hold elections or staged carefully managed ones. In the Jakarta regional election, PKI (137.305 votes) came second after Masyumi (153.709 votes). It defeated PNI

(124.955 votes) and NU (104.892 votes). In Central Java, including the special district of Yogyakarta, PKI replaced PNI. In regional Central Java elections, PKI won with 3.005.150 votes while PNI received 2.400.282 votes. In the 1955 election, PKI came second with 2.326.108 votes, below PNI with 3.019.568 votes. In regional East Java, PKI (2.704.523 votes) retained its position as second after NU (2.999.785 votes). But, when compared with the 1955 election, there was a significant increase in the number of voters; PKI obtained 2.299.602 votes while NU held 2.999.785 votes (Lev 1966). Overall, in most regional elections, when the results were tabulated, the PKI generated a great leap forward. "...the elections for regional assemblies in Java, Sumatra, and Riau brought the PKI 7.760.000 votes which, with 504.300 votes in other areas, as Chairman Aidit proudly stressed, amounted to an increase of 34% in electoral strength over 1955" (Pauker 1969: 5).

PKI success in regional elections was attributed to many factors. Some ascribed it to the moral support given by Sukarno. Others admitted that the PKI had worked harder while the fighting spirit of other parties had weakened. There were those who argued that economic conditions and dissatisfaction among the people gave PKI more opportunity (Lev 1966). Accordingly, there was an expectation that the PKI would emerge as the strongest party at both national and local levels. "If this happened, the PKI would have been the first Communist party anywhere in the world to gain control of a national government by legal, peaceful means" (Lev 1966: 5). Hence, it is not surprising that quite early on Hindley (1962) was speaking of the 'domestication' of the PKI—a domestication in which electoralism played a central role. But, the electoral success did not last long. It was ended by a Presidential Decree in December 1959 and eroded by the PKI's destruction after October 1965.

New Order regime: from *coup d'état* to strong authoritarianism

Under the New Order regime, led by President Suharto, elections were held regularly. There were six elections with a five-year cycle in 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997. Even though these elections were run by the same regime, actually they had differences in terms of their settings. The 1971 election was held

under circumstances in which the New Order needed political justification for its authority; while for the 1977–1997 elections the New Order needed political opportunity to show off its voluntary and mobilised support.

The regime was in power following the downfall of President Sukarno after a *coup d'état* in October 1965. The regime was supported by two main forces: the military and the bureaucrats who were committed to modernisation and program-oriented rather than ideological politics. According to Nishihara

What makes the New Order distinctive from the Old Order is the new regime's intense concern for political order and national consensus... The military authorities have such a sense of urgency for building a national consensus that they have determined what it should be for themselves, and then pressed the rest of society to conform to it (1972: 56).

This was characterised by the increasing military participation in politics, both through the widespread appointment of military officers to senior positions in government agencies and bureaucracies, and through the strengthening of military commands at each level of the administrative system. It also featured voluntary and mobilised support of those people who supported the principal agenda of the Suharto government: political stability and economic development. The twin pursuits of vigorous anti-communism and enthusiastic work for economic construction earned the regime their pragmatic support, both domestically and internationally. Hence, 1971 was called the 'Year of the Pragmatists' by Western journalists and established scholars, as it introduced Indonesia to the 'Age of Reason' (Allison 1969; Pauker 1968).

Indeed, in term of economics, Indonesia under the New Order was a success story. From 1967 to 1996, the country's average annual growth was about 6.5%, and depending on which base one chooses for the national account series, there was either no, or at most one, year of (slightly) negative growth over this period. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1991–1995 was 7.8%; in 1996 GDP was 8.0% and in 1997 4.7 %. The inflation rate in 1991–1995 was 8.9%, in 1996 declining to 6.5% and then increasing to 11.6 % in 1997 (APEG 1998). However, in term of politics, Indonesia under the New Order has a different story. Even though elections

were held regularly, politics was tightly controlled. To ensure electoral victory for its electoral vehicle—Golkar—the regime restricted political activities, oppressed the media, outlawed much opposition activities, and decreased the number of political parties through the Law on Floating Mass and the Law on Pancasila, as the basic ideology for all Indonesian political organisations. The electoral politics at that time followed what Diamond, Linz and Lipset contend, that “...the effective power of elected officials is so limited, or political party competition so restricted, or the freedom and fairness of elections so compromised that electoral outcomes, while competitive, still deviate significantly from popular preferences” (1989: xvii). From one election to another, particularly post elections in the 1990s, President Suharto became extremely powerful. Even the military, while consistently safeguarding Suharto's position, were more and more sidelined. At the same time, corruption, which was endemic in the New Order from the beginning, grew out of all proportion. Besides, since the 1980s, strong aversion to the domination of central government over many of the provinces became a serious political problem. These were characterised in some provinces by the feeling that they had been unfairly treated by the central government in the allocation of funds and in their ability to make their own decisions for their future, particularly those relating to politics and economics (Kingsbury 2005).

In 1998 the New Order regime was already unable to maintain its control. President Suharto was replaced by his Vice-President, Habibie. Since then, Indonesian politics has transformed from a closed regulated system to an open competitive system. The regime change was influenced by the Asian Financial Crisis of July 1997 (Schwarz 1999), but internal factors, such as the corruption, collusion and nepotism, had undermined the legitimacy and effectiveness of government. The increasingly inefficient economy, unequal distribution of wealth, regional discontent and unbearable political disaffection were critical trigger factors (Kingsbury and Budiman 2001).

1971 election: transitioning towards authoritarian regime

The 1971 election was an opening for political transition towards a more authoritarian regime. It was the second national parliamentary election that was conducted after 16 years of delay. The deterrent to holding an election was the belief that the country was still politically unstable post the Communist coup in 1965 and lack of sufficient finance and technical support. However, the real reason was because there was some fear that the older political parties, permitted to participate in the 1971 election, would be able to mobilise their support base. Hence, President Suharto—by then the elected President—and his supporters, needed more time to build and strengthen Golkar, their electoral vehicle, and to ensure that changes to the electoral laws benefited them (Nishihara 1972).

The election was administered by the same electoral system as in 1955, but the electoral mechanics were different. It was a PR system in multi-member districts based on Law no.15/1969; it was run simultaneously for the three-tiered elections (national, provincial and regency/city). As mentioned previously, there were 25 districts, and each district obtained at least one seat. The number of representatives for each constituency was at least equal to the number of districts in the constituencies concerned. The law stated that all candidates had to be nominated by a legal organisation, and approved participation only to political and functional groups, already represented in the parliament at the time of the elections. To be elected, a candidate had to secure 100,000 votes for national parliament, 20,000 votes for provincial parliament and 10,000 votes for district parliament. To be recognised, a party had to have at least 1.5 million members, as well as branches in at least half of the 25 provinces and in at least half of the more than 200 districts. To remain in existence after the election, a party would also need to win at least 2% of the seats in parliament (Feith 1957; Imawan 1989; KPU 2000).

Two issues should be noted here: 1) former PKI and other banned organisations, plus members of the military were deprived of the right to vote and the right to stand for election; 2) that as a substitute to their right to elect and to be elected, 100 out of 460 seats in national parliament were reserved for military representatives

who were appointed by the President. Nonetheless, on these subjects the decision-making process was not easy. The process was coloured by contending parties who wanted to secure their places. At first, the draft proposed by President Suharto and the Army through the Kemendagri was objected to by parliamentary parties. The parliament strongly opposed the idea of 100 parliament seats being reserved for the military, because it would reduce the democratic principle of the election. However, it was clear that these parties' positions were relatively weak, particularly because of their lack of achievement under parliamentary democracy. In contrast, President Suharto and the Army had a strong bargaining position derived from their remarkable success in crushing the Communist coup in 1965 (Crouch 1978; Imawan 1989; Nishihara 1972). It should be noted here that some members of parliament were elected in 1955 parties and others were appointees of Sukarno. There were no PKI or leftist PNI members. There was also no Masyumi or PSI representation. These two parties had been banned by Sukarno and the ban was not lifted by Suharto.

The disputes over which electoral system should be adopted were similar to those in 1955. President Suharto and the Army continued the idea of appointed parliamentarians, by proposing a plural, single member system with a prerequisite that every candidate had to live for at least one year in the respective district. On the other side, parliamentary parties defended a PR multi-member system. President Suharto and the Army argued that a plural, single member system ensured that every segment of Indonesian society would be represented in parliament. In reply, parties argued that the majority culture (Javanese) could be overrepresented under the newly proposed system (Imawan 1989). Although to some extent their argument was true, the real reason was that President Suharto and the Army were not convinced they could keep their position because they had little support on the ground; while parties were confident with a PR multi-member system, as they had many grassroots loyalists. To mobilise support, the President and the Army set up a new party called Golkar and launched a new development program called the Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five-Year Development Plan; hereafter Repelita). President Suharto and the Army introduced the idea of a PR multi-member districts system (Mackie 1974, Nishihara 1972, Reeve 1985).

The electoral mechanics were very exclusive in contrast with 1955. The 1971 mechanics discouraged participation of parties and individuals by applying multiple limitations to enter the election. Individuals were not permitted to stand as candidates. All candidates had to be nominated by a legal organisation, defined as any party that was already represented in the parliament at the time of elections. In effect, no independent candidates or candidates of a new political organisation played a part. Only 10 parties participated, namely PNI, NU, PSII, Parkindo, Katholik, Perti, Murba, IPKI, Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Party; hereafter Parmusi) and Golkar. Eight of 10 were 1955 established parties including PNI, NU, PSII, Parkindo, Katholik, Perti, Murba and IPKI. The other two were the Parmusi, a successor of Masyumi, and Golkar. The second and fourth ranking parties of the 1955 election—Masyumi and PKI—had already been ousted from politics. Masyumi was banned in 1960 and PKI in 1966 (Mackie 1974; Nishihara 1972). This law, by changing the ballot structure from a party ballot open-list to a party ballot closed-list, marked the process of strengthening the party's grip over candidates. The exclusion of independent candidates in parliamentary elections has persisted. Even though, following the changing of electoral laws, in 2009 independent candidates have been permitted to participate in elections for DPD and Pilkada.

Nonetheless, the electoral system produced a multi-party system in which one party secured a majority of votes. It was Golkar that collected the largest number of parliamentary seats. The party obtained 227 direct seats from 25 provinces and nine indirect seats from West Papua province. In addition, the party also had support from the 100 seats held by military appointed members. Overall, the result was a great victory for Golkar, obtaining 62.80% of the vote. NU came second with 18.67%; PNI and Parmusi were third and fourth with 6.94% and 5.36% respectively (Mackie 1974). It is worth noting that in Indonesia's elections; it is only in the Suharto elections, 1971–1997, that one party has 'won' a majority of votes and seats.

Electoral disputes arose soon after the results were announced. Parties put forward complaints and appealed. They distrusted the fairness of the competition, but their grievances were left unresolved, years after the ballot. The second, third and fourth largest parties (NU, PNI and Parmusi) claimed that the election was unacceptable. They suspected Golkar's victory was fraudulent. They argued the electoral outcome was the result of intimidation. One of these was Government regulation No.60/1970, concerning the political activities of civil servants. This regulation prohibited civil servants from engaging in any political activities and banned top-ranking civil servants, such as cabinet ministers and all military members, from joining political parties. However, the government obliged all its employees to join the civil servants' association affiliated with Golkar, such as Koperasi Karyawan Kementrian Dalam Negeri Republik Indonesia (Cooperation of Civil Servants of Minister of Home Affairs; hereafter Kokarmendagri) for male employees and Persatuan Istri Pegawai Negeri (Association of Female and Wife of Civil Servants; hereafter Pertiwi) for female civil servants and their wives under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Imawan 1989; Nishihara 1972). With such political practices, unquestionably, the parties' criticism that the 1971 electoral outcome was the product of intimidation was reasonable.

1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997 elections: reinforcing the authoritarian regime

The 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997 elections are discussed in one group because their nature was similar. In fact, those five elections followed the electoral pattern established for the 1971 election. These elections, as Anderson said, "...were carefully managed to produce externally plausible two-thirds majorities for Golkar, the government's electoral machine, and a passive parliament without any genuine representative character" (1996: 30-31). In brief, those elections were organised more as a means for strengthening or reinforcing state domination, and were perceived as *pesta demokrasi* (festival of democracy), organised every five years.

The electoral system and mechanics of those five elections, as aforementioned, were similar to 1971 and based on the same law (Law No. 15/1969), though with several amendments. The influential amendments were in 1975, 1980 and 1985.

First, the 1975 amendment aimed to simplify the party system after the 1971 election. All nine parties except for Golkar had contested in the 1971 election and were forced to merge into two parties: PPP, comprising four Muslim parties including NU, Parmusi, PSII and Perti; and PDI including two nationalist, one socialist and two Christian parties—PNI, IPKI, Murba, Parkindo and Partai Katholik. Subsequently, Indonesia only had three political parties permitted to participate in elections. Soon after, the New Order introduced the *masa mengambang* (floating mass) concept, which prohibited villagers from getting involved in party activities. For PPP and PDI, this concept prohibited building grassroots support at village level. For Golkar, this concept provided an opportunity to control the local community through their appointed village officials. In addition, the 1975 amendment revised some of its old provisions to allow some regular members of PKI and its affiliates to vote. Second, the 1980 amendment was intended as a response to PPP and PDI complaints. Both parties asked to be involved in the administration of the elections. Representatives from political parties were then included as regular members of electoral committees at all levels. However, the committee remained chaired by a government official, who together with committee members from Golkar and from the military created a majority. Third, the 1985 amendment, which was the most influential, as it required the ideological requirement that all socio-political forces adhere to Pancasila as their one and only principle along with asking parties to change their symbols. For PPP and PDI this law wiped out their identities as Islamic and Nationalist parties, but for Golkar, this law strengthened its identity as a Pancasila party. Since then, Indonesia only permits parties with the same ideology—Pancasila (King D. 1994;Reeve 1985).

The government violated the rules of competitive elections to create an advantageous playing field for itself, similar to 1971. The fraud was legalised through government guidance on how to conduct the elections. Two examples are discussed here. First, the Penelitian Khusus (the screening of candidates; hereafter Litsus) policy abused the practice of ballot structure. The Litsus policy also deprived the PPP and PDI of their ability to select their candidates. More importantly, the policy deprived the people of their right to choose their

representatives. According to Nishihara, in the 1971 election, Golkar only had 11 of its candidates disqualified as they failed to pass the screening; PNI lost 164, Parmusi lost 131, PSII lost 112, IPKI lost 111 and NU lost 18 candidates. “The PNI was most tightly screened in Java, especially in its strongholds, Central and East Java. In these two constituencies alone, the PNI lost 76 candidates (out of 164); similarly, Parmusi lost 51 (out of 131) candidates” (1972: 27). The *Litsus* policy was originally a special investigation into the involvement of candidates and her/his close relatives with the PKI or any organisation/activity against the regime. But, later on the investigation process was used more to prevent undesirable candidates from running for election, particularly a candidate who had the potential to challenge the regime (Imawan 1989). Second, the cross-district voting policy abused the practice of electoral formula. Following the *Hare* quota, the seats were allocated to parties that secured the highest share, up to the total number of seats available.¹⁰ But the law then allowed the remainder to be summed up across the district. Yet, the remainder of any regency votes might be added to any other regency in the same province and the results might be counted towards their province. A similar process was votes for the remaining provinces which could be counted towards the national level. This practice violated the reason why the country adopted multi-level district elections and multi-member districts. This practice blurred the power structure between national, provincial and regency/city. In addition, this practice also weakened the accountability of Members of Parliament (hereafter MPs) who were a product of cross-district voting, as they did not know which constituency they represented.

However, the government violations did not go unnoticed without some resistance. Even though there were no open electoral disputes, it was clear that parties and voters distrusted the fairness of the electoral competition. In the 1987 election, for example, although Golkar won a majority in all provinces in Indonesia with 73.16% of the vote nationwide, Golkar failed in Aceh province. Acehnese preferred the PPP to Golkar (King D. and Rasjid 1987). Another example is when the government overly intervened in the candidate nominating process. The NU, the largest Muslim organisation and core basis of support for the PPP, showed its disagreement with

¹⁰ The explanation attached to the 1975 amendments.

the government's management of elections and political parties by withdrawing from political activities and returning to the organisation's socio-cultural mission in 1926 (Khittah 1926). Other resistance was expressed by voters submitting blank ballot papers in the ballot box on voting day. This form of protest was popularly known as Golongan Putih (literally: white group; hereafter Golput). Golput voters would submit invalid ballot papers i.e., blank, incorrectly marked or damaged, when voting as an expression against the regime (King D. 1994).

In comparison with the 1955 regional elections and the post-Suharto elections, the size of Golkar's majorities in the New Order elections was a measure of the regime's 'management' of the elections. The electoral system produced a multi-party system in which one party secured an overall majority of votes. From 1971 to 1997, Golkar easily maintained its vote; the average was above 60%, the highest 74.51% in the 1997 election and the lowest being 62.11% in the 1977 election. In contrast, PPP never reached 30% in the six elections of the New Order. The party gained the highest vote, 29.29% in the 1977 election and the lowest vote, 15.97% in the 1987 election. Among the three, PDI was the weakest party; it always gained less than 10% but for the 1992 election, where PDI gained 14.89%. PDI's lowest achievement was in 1997 when it received 3.06% of the vote. See tables 4.3 to 4.8 in chapter four for the 1971–1997 elections result. With a majority vote for Golkar, the legitimacy of the Suharto government was enhanced, and enabled President Suharto to use his authority to maintain political stability and to place economic development as a top priority.

Reformasi regime: in between electoral and authoritarian democracy

Under the Reformasi governments led by Presidents Habibie, Wahid, Megawati and Yudhoyono, elections have been held regularly. There were three Pilleg in 1999, 2004 and 2009; two Pilpres in 2004 and 2009, and 488 Pilkada from 2005 to 2009 in provinces and regencies/cities.¹¹ All the elections have a five year cycle. Pilleg and Pilpres were organised nationally at different times; while Pilkada were organised locally in each province and district with their own five-year timetables.

¹¹ The parliamentary and presidential elections held in 2014 fall outside the scope of this study.

Although these elections were run under the same regime, they had differences in terms of their settings. The 1999 election, for example, occurred during a time when the political stakeholders (i.e. political parties, politicians and voters) were euphoric, having the first election in a democratic atmosphere after 32 years of New Order authoritarian regime. The 2004 elections were conducted when the political forces (i.e. president, political parties, military, bureaucracies, media, universities and business) had a strong desire to consolidate and institutionalise the democratic process. The 2009 national elections were conducted when political figures, previously part of the New Order authoritarian regime, sought to sustain and strengthen their grip over the country's politics. This endeavour was less evident and less successful in Pilkada elections held after 2005.

The Reformasi regime had changed Indonesia into a country with more decentralised power. The country has been run by a government which is the product of free and fair competitive elections, and has autonomous and numerous associations. It was President Habibie who laid the democratic foundations by ratifying three new political laws: Law No.2/1999 on political parties, Law No.3/1999 on general elections and Law No.4/1999 on organisational structure of the MPR, DPR national and DPRD that initiated the process of political institutionalisation. These laws established a strong basis for a multi-party system and by and large, free and fair elections. It should also be noted that the law on general elections provided for the establishment of an independent KPU, the membership of which would include representatives of political parties participating in general elections and five government officials. President Habibie also rescinded Law No. 3 /1985 that made Pancasila the sole ideology for all organisations, including political parties, and assured freedom of press through Law No.40/1999. He also initiated significant decentralisation and regional autonomy through Laws No. 22 and No. 25/1999. Both laws significantly curtailed the previous dominance of the central government in local affairs, by devolving significant powers and revenue to the lowest level of government— regency/city level (M. Turner and Podger 2003).

President Habibie's legislative reforms were strengthened by President Wahid and President Megawati. Comprehensive constitutional and legislative reforms that democratised the structure of representative and executive institutions, as well as the political process, were introduced. Four sets of constitutional amendments were deliberated; the process started in 1999 and finished in 2002. The amendments were intended to clarify the division of power between legislative and executive arms of government by introducing laws on electoral systems. The laws revised some electoral mechanics for the DPR election and initiated DPD, Pilpres and Pilkada elections. One other achievement under President Megawati was that she continuously promoted the return of the military to the barracks. Since the 2004 elections, the military has formally surrendered its dual function and withdrawn from its political role. Thus the military no longer has legislative representation. The police force has also been separated from the military and removed from its control. Military officers are no longer allowed to occupy positions in the bureaucracy, while still in service, and civilians have been appointed as Ministers of Defence.

All presidents under the Reformasi regime have had great success in maintaining national stability and security. Almost all the transitions and transfers of power, both nationally and locally, have taken place peacefully, although the transition from President Wahid to President Megawati was tense because President Wahid's tenure was terminated through a decree. Indeed, there was much political discontent but this never really escalated into national security problem. There were electoral disputes as well, but almost all parties accepted most of the outcomes of elections and legislative deliberations. For example, the Islamic parties and their supporters, who failed in parliament to re-introduce the Jakarta Charter¹² into the Constitution, accepted the decision peacefully without any mass protests.

¹²The Jakarta Charter determined that the Indonesian state is based on the belief in One, Supreme God with the obligation of the adherents of Islam to implement the Syariah. The exclusion of the Jakarta Charter from the Constitution in 1945 remains a matter of contention. See R.E. Elson. (2009), 'Another Look at the Jakarta Charter Controversy of 1945', *Indonesia*, 88 (October), 105-130

1999 election: transitioning towards electoral democracy regime

The 1999 election was the first election held after the resignation of Suharto. The election was considered by Antlöv and Cederroth as “a benchmark for the transition towards democracy” (2004: 1). In general, Kingsbury found that the atmosphere of the election was inclusive, “as many individuals explained they had a sense of ownership, and as if their vote could for the first time in the lives of so many actually change something” (1999: 1). Moreover, the election outcomes were also “...accorded with a high level of legitimacy” (King D. 2003: 222).

The electoral system and mechanics of the 1999 election were similar to the previous elections under the New Order regime. It continued the PR multi-member system, party-ballot closed list, electoral threshold 2% of DPR national seats, or 3% of DPR province or DPR regency/city seats in at least half of the total number of province or regency/city, *Hare* quota, and varying district magnitudes, as established by Law No.3/1999. Despite this continuity in the electoral system, the 1999 election was much more free and fair because many restrictions under the Suharto era were abolished, such as restrictions on freedom of expression and organisation, restrictions on the number and ideological basis of parties.

Nonetheless, the decision-making process to adopt an electoral system and mechanics of the New Order regime was not easy. The parliament, which was a product of the last Suharto-era election in 1997, held long, intense and heated debates. On one side, Golkar supported the idea to revise the existing system. The party supported a mixed electoral system in which some seats in the legislature are allocated by a plurality system while others are allocated by a PR system. The idea had already been suggested in 1995 by a commission from Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (the Indonesian Institute of Sciences; hereafter LIPI), chaired by President Suharto. The commission proposed transforming the existing PR party closed-list system incrementally in three stages, from a ‘refined PR’, to a ‘mixed system’, and to a ‘refined single-member constituency system’; but at that time, the idea was rejected and was considered too radical to be implemented. The idea was reintroduced in 1999 by ‘Tim Tujuh’ (Team of Seven) where some of the

former commissioners were appointed as members Chair of 'Tim Tujuh,' Ryaas Rasyid, explained:

“The process at that time was *rational*, all parties had their arguments. For sure, their arguments were based on their party interest for the sake of their future. You needed to consider, it was the first time for us discussing such important issues relating electoral system openly. And, the reform parties (PDI and PPP) had a stronger bargaining position than the Suharto party (Golkar).”¹³

Golkar supported the idea to revise the existing system, because it believed the party could get advantages from the revised system. On paper, the party predicted it could poll 30% nationwide and would benefit from greater support outside Java and Bali, but when it realise it would be hard to reach agreement on a revised system, Golkar changed its position. The party then supported a PR system, but put forward the idea of using 314 regency/city rather than the 27 provinces as electoral units. This was a really insincere move, as around two-thirds of those regencies/cities had population levels which allowed them to have only one seat in the parliament. Hence, the parliamentary seats would have been allocated as if a plurality system was implemented (Ellis 2000).

On the other side, the PDI and PPP supported retaining the existing electoral system and mechanics. They believed that the modified rules would disadvantage them. They were not confident because they had no organisation reaching down to local levels. This situation was a consequence of the effectiveness of the floating mass policy implemented soon after the 1971 election. They were also wary that the practice of money politics and the buying of votes would increase, particularly if an electoral district was decided at regency/city level. Another claim was that with a smaller district, there was a greater risk of these districts becoming political fiefdoms in which local power structures would be reinforced. Significantly, they were afraid that the new rules would give more opportunity to local power figures dominated by Golkar and government bureaucrats.¹⁴

¹³Interview, Ryaas Rasyid, Jakarta, 8 March 2009.

¹⁴Interview, Suparno of PDIP, Tanjung Pinang, 9 February 2009; Djarot Saiful Hidajat, MS of PDIP, Surabaya, 4 April 2009; Mursyidah Thahir, of PPP, Jakarta, 10 February 2009; Amir Uskara of PPP, Gowa, 18 March 2009.

As a consequence of continuing the New Order electoral system and mechanics, the previous practices continued. First, the control of party headquarters in Jakarta remained central. Ellis (2000) found that

...at least eight instances of candidates who should have been elected for their districts under the full quota provisions being replaced by others on the instruction of party leaderships. Altogether 97 of the 462 elected members of the legislature are not attached to the district for which they are nominated, and two of them even switched province –another clear breach of the regulations, this time to get leaders of small parties elected (2000: 244).

Second, the control of a party over its candidates remained dominant. It was seen, for example, in cases where no candidate met the quota, the party allocated the seat to anyone in the party list; and when candidates failed to reach the quota, the party encouraged the practice of combining votes.¹⁵ These practices are even worse than elections under the New Order regime, because it brings opportunities for bribing party officials and for selling–buying votes among candidates. Accordingly, the candidates who had more funds would have a greater chance to be elected. Third, the control of large national parties remained strong. The rules were designed to discourage small parties; and allow neither local parties nor independent candidates. They required parties contesting the elections to have branches in more than half of the provinces, and sub-branches in more than half of the regency/city in those provinces, except in the 1999 election, when it was permissible if parties had branches in only one-third of total provinces.¹⁶ Thus, “...it is impossible for locally-based parties to participate in the electoral process, and because there were three tiers of election, only large parties could participate at all levels.”¹⁷

The 1999 electoral system produced a multi-party parliament but with no one party with a majority of votes. The PDIP was the most successful with 33.74% of votes or 153 seats. The second and third parties were Golkar with 22.44% of votes or 120 seats and PKB with 12.61% of votes or 51 seats. This was followed by PPP that

¹⁵Law No.3/1999, articles 68 (1-4), 69 (1-2).

¹⁶Law No.3/1999, articles 39 (1.b, c), 82 (a- b).

¹⁷Interview, Ryaas Rasyid, Jakarta, 8 March 2009.

gained 10.71% of votes or 58 seats, then PAN with 7.12% of votes or 34 seats. Hence, 5 out of 48 parties won 90.26% of national votes or 417 out of 462 DPR national seats. Importantly, for the 1999 election, 27 out of 48 parties refused to acknowledge the election result, and most of them failed to reach the threshold (KPU 2000).¹⁸

The paradox is that the electoral successes were followed by political conflicts; nevertheless the 1999 parliament and government were regarded as legitimate by participants and the broader public. The tensions reflected the tendency of parties and politicians to put forward their individual and group interests, to take advantage of the loophole in political rules and to attack each other ruthlessly. One example was when parties in parliament from the 1999 election had to elect the President and Vice-President. Based on the 1945 Constitution, the political system was designed to be a presidential system, one that usually provides for a clear separation of powers between legislative and executive arms of government. However, in practice, it was a parliamentary arrangement with the appointment of the President by the MPR. With only 153 out of 700 MPR seats, it was clear that PDIP, the most successful party in the 1999 election, had to mobilise the necessary votes of MPR members to have its presidential candidate, Megawati Sukarnoputri, elected President. In spite of exploring the possibility of a coalition, Megawati insisted on her right to the presidency. However, Megawati's ambitions were thwarted by the *poros tengah* (central axis), a coalition of smaller parties, including PAN and PKB, and led by Amien Rais (Mietzner 2000).

The political conflict surrounding Megawati and the presidency focused on her intellectual capacity, political experience, religion and gender. These controversies were really damaging to the process of political reform, particularly given the key players—Megawati Sukarnoputri, Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid—were the leaders of the reform movement. The outcome of the '*dagang sapi*' (horse-trading) was that Abdurrahman Wahid of the PKB (the third ranking party in the 1999

¹⁸On 26 July 1999, 27 out of 48 parties refused to sign the result of ballot counting. Those 27 parties were PK, PNU, PBI, PDI, Masyumi, PNI Supeni, Krisna, Partai KAMI, PKD, PAY, MKGR, PIB, SUNI, PNBI, PUDI, PBN, PKM, PND, PADI, PRD, PPI, PID, Murba, SPSI, PUMI, PSP, PARI. Except for PK, the other parties attracted very little support.

election) was elected President, with Megawati Vice-President. After 19 months of controversies and conflicts surrounding the Wahid government the MPR revoked the President's mandate on 23 July 2001 and appointed Megawati Sukarnoputri, chair of PDIP—the largest party in parliament and the winner of a plurality of votes in the 1999 election—as the new President.

2004 elections: a series of new electoral systems established

In the preparation for the 2004 elections changes were made to the electoral system for the national parliament and new electoral systems were created by executive elections at all three levels of government. First, the system for the DPR election was changed from the PR party ballot closed-list system to the open-list. Second, two new types of heads of government elections, Pilpres and Pilkada, were established—both held under a 'majority two-round' system. Third, an elected upper house, DPD was established with SNTV system in multi-member districts at the provincial level. The legal basis for these changes was enacted in Laws No. 12/2003 (on Pilleg), No. 23/2003 (on Pilpres) and No. 32/2004 (on Pilkada).

The 2004 Pilleg and Pilpres were the first bicameral parliamentary elections and the first direct presidential election. They were conducted within a different time span and organised separately, but the outcome of the parliamentary election framed the possible contest for the presidency. Both elections were considered as democratic, free and fair by not only Indonesians but the international community (Carter Center 2005). In fact, they were heralded as a point of reference for the process of institutionalising Indonesian democracy. The historical aspect was that the elections provided a secure social political environment for people to express their aspirations without feeling pressured. According to Dagg, it was the first time in Indonesian history that people voiced their choice freely, "...rebelled against party elites, crossing party lines to vote for whom they wanted, not for whom they were told to support" (2007: 47). This political maturity had not been evident in the 1999 and 1955 elections. For Wanandi, the 2004 elections had moved "...Indonesia's democracy several notches higher" (2004: 115). However, this achievement does not assure that Indonesia will climb the ladder to reach a liberal democracy. Such

liberalisation can abort and repressive rule can return, particularly when one considers that most of the winners of the 2004 Pilleg and Pilpres were figures from the old political elite, nurtured under an authoritarian regime.

“Yes, it was a pity that neither bu Mega nor pak Amin, leaders of reformasi, was elected as president in 2004 Pilpres. If I were not being disqualified, probably I would be the president. I, of course, have better understanding of democracy rather than the elected president... well, President Yudhoyono is authoritarian because he is part of the authoritarian regime,” said former President Wahid.¹⁹

The Pilleg and Pilpres adopted different systems and mechanics. First, the 2004 Pilleg was different to previous parliamentary elections. For the first time, Indonesian voters elected members for two houses of parliament rather than one. The lower house was called DPR, while the newly established upper house was the DPD. The elections were conducted on the same day and under the same Law No. 12/2003. To examine these two elections further, they will be discussed separately.

The DPR election applied a PR system in multi-member districts, using the *Hare* quota. But unlike previous elections (except for 1955), the 2004 DPR election applied a different structure. The party list changed from a closed-list to an open-list. However, even though voters could select the candidate from the party list, the vote would be declared invalid unless the voter also selected the party of the candidate. This requirement made the open-list system difficult to implement, as parties encouraged voters to punch the party name/symbol, rather than the candidate's name.²⁰ Hence in practice Indonesia continued to adopt a closed-list system. The ceiling of electoral threshold was also increased from 2% to 3% of seats in the national DPR and to at least 4% of seats in the provincial DPR, in at least half of Indonesia's provinces. The electoral threshold was also increased to at least 4% of seats in the regencies/cities DPR, in at least half of Indonesia's regencies/cities.²¹

¹⁹Interview, Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 5 February 2009.

²⁰ Law No.12/2003 article 93.

²¹Law No.12/2003 article 9.1

However, if a party was not big enough to meet this criterion, the law stated that it could merge with other eligible or ineligible parties, or transform itself into a new party, with a new name and banner, to fulfil the minimum requirement.²² As a new party, it needed to prove the party had offices in at least two-thirds of Indonesia's provinces and two-thirds of the regencies/cities in those provinces. Also, it needed to have at least 1000 members or 1/1000 of the total population in each office, all with membership cards.²³ In practice, many parties from the 1999 election failed to pass the threshold, instead transforming themselves into new parties, and then confirming they had a certain number of offices and members, and were then eligible to contest in the 2004 elections. It was also the first time that the DPR election employed districts of different magnitudes called Daerah Pemilihan (electoral district; hereafter Dapil). It was regulated that the number of Dapil in each province ranged from 1 to 10, and the number of seats in each Dapil ranged from 3 to 12.²⁴ Hence in 2004, there were 69 Dapil in DPR national, 210 Dapil in DPR provincial and 1.751 of DPR in regency/city (KPU 2004).

The DPD election applied SNTV system in multi-member districts at the provincial level. Each province had four representatives elected.²⁵ In 2004, the election was organised as a competition and all candidates needed to be independent with no direct link to any political party.²⁶ However, the election produced the same old party hacks but in independent guise. Many of the elected representatives were old figures from the authoritarian regime (e.g. Ginandjar Kartasasmita, HM Aksa Mahmud, Aida Zulaika Nasution Ismet and HA Malik Raden). For the 2009 DPD election, the rule was changed so that DPD candidates could acknowledge their party affiliation openly, even though the competition remained among candidates and not parties. A candidate needed the support of at least 1000 voters in a province with a population of 1 million; 2000 voters in a province with 1 to 5 million; 3000 voters in a province with 5 to 10 million; 4000 voters in a province with 10 to 15 million; and 5000 voters in a province with more than 15 million people. The

²²Law No.12/2003 article 9.2.

²³Law No.12/2003 article 7.

²⁴Law No.12/2003 article 46.2.

²⁵Law No.12/2003 article 52.

²⁶Law No.12/2003 article 63.b and 64.

support needed to come from 25% of the total number of regencies/cities in the respective province.²⁷

“This threshold meant that only wealthy candidates were able to compete. It was costly collecting such high number of supporters, particularly when people asked for a payment for their signature and copy of their Kartu Tanda Penduduk (Citizen Identification card; hereafter KTP). Hence, as predicted, most DPD candidates were from Golkar. They were the one who had more capital,” said Didik Prasetyono, candidate for the DPD 2009 from East Java province.²⁸

Second, the 2004 Pilpres was administered by Law No. 23/2003, and held under majoritarian single-member district, candidate ballot structure, and two-round system. The candidate’s ticket for president and vice-president was required to win 50% + 1 votes, and 20% of those votes needed to come from at least 50% + 1 of Indonesia’s provinces.²⁹ If no candidate could obtain an absolute majority of votes in the first round, the two candidates with the highest share of the vote would then contest the second round.³⁰ The candidate had to be nominated by a party or coalition of parties. The presidential ticket had to be supported by 15% seats in the national DPR or 20% of the vote in the previous national DPR election.³¹ In the presidential election, the electoral district was the nation.

Nonetheless, the decision-making process of Law No.23/2003 was highly contested. The negotiation process involved contending parties, who wanted to maximise votes, win the election and ultimately govern. Parliamentary negotiations for Pilpres were closely linked to those for the DPD election, as one was used as a bargaining chip for the other. Both elections were thought of as part of the reformasi process which began in 1998. Pilpres relates to the desire to strengthen presidential power, while the DPD election reflects a commitment to give regional communities a greater voice. At the outset, some parliamentarians, particularly those from PDIP and small parties as well as representatives of Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Military; hereafter TNI)/ Polisi Republik Indonesia (Indonesia

²⁷Law No.12/2003, article 11, 1-2.

²⁸Interview, Didik Prasetyono, Surabaya, 20 March 2009.

²⁹Law No.23/2003, article 66.2.

³⁰Law No.23/2003, article 67.

³¹Law No.23/2003, article 5, 3-4.

National Police; hereafter Polri) in the DPR, did not support the proposal to establish the DPD and create a bicameral parliament. “They argued that there was nothing wrong with the system, saying that those who had put it into practice had not done it correctly.”³² They also believed that bicameralism was an inherent element of federalism and thus inappropriate for a unitary state. This belief was perhaps a result of the fact that Indonesia’s only prior experience with bicameralism was under the federal RUSI Constitution from December 1949 to August 1950.³³ “...PDI-Perjuangan saw the idea to establish a strong bicameral legislature was designed to curtail executive power, and thus against it,” Pramono Anung stated.³⁴ However, this position was taken because at that time the head of the PDIP, Megawati, was President. Thus, there was great interest in maintaining strong executive power.³⁵

On the opposite side, Golkar, PKB and some 130 regional representatives in MPR endorsed the idea. “...Golkar proposed that the DPD had nearly the same powers as the DPR, that is somewhat limited legislative powers and full budgetary and oversight authority,” Akbar Tandjung, chairman of both Golkar and DPR national 1999 stated.³⁶ In the end, PDIP’s strategy changed, with the party supporting the establishment of the DPD and, in return, Golkar had to vote for Pilpres. The PDIP supported direct election in order to reduce the MPR’s power and build presidential power. Initially, the PDIP had not supported the idea, but with Megawati’s bitter experience in 1999 and Wahid’s impeachment in 2001; the PDIP came to believe that the MPR’s constitutional supremacy needed to be curtailed, if President Megawati wished to avoid a similar destiny as Wahid. In addition, direct election meant the President would not have given an annual report and accountability speech in front of MPR delegates, because the president would be accountable to the people not to the MPR. As part of the price, the proponents of DPD had to agree to strip many of DPD’s proposed powers, particularly regarding legislation and

³²This argument was shared by party officials at national and local levels, as stated by both Pramono Anung, secretary general of PDIP and Suparnoto, chair of PAC (sub-branch) PDIP Semboro and EkoWahyudiono, deputy chair of PAC (sub-branch) PDIP Semboro/ East Java.

³³Interview, Firman Jaya Daely, Jakarta, 31 January 2009.

³⁴Interview, Pramono Anung, Jakarta, 3 February 2009.

³⁵Interview, J. Kristiadi, Jakarta, 26 February 2009.

³⁶Interview, Akbar Tandjung, Jakarta, 6 February 2009.

budgets. Reducing the power of the DPD was consistent with the PDIP's commitment to create a strong presidential system, as a strong DPD might lead to additional legislative control of presidential power.³⁷ Even though there was lengthy discussion on the detail of direct presidential election, the support came with few strings attached. It was motivated more by the interests of PDIP politicians (King, B. 2004). However, the result of Pilpres was not as expected. The PDIP's candidate, Megawati, failed to retain her position. Instead, the presidency was won by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. A retired general and a famous figure from the authoritarian regime, and who had held senior positions in both President Wahid's and President Megawati's respective cabinets. His party (Demokrat Party) had not even existed when the Pilpres legislation was debated in parliament, which suggests how difficult it has been for legislators to anticipate and influence the electoral results.

2005 elections: direct elections for governors, regents and mayors introduced

Beginning in 2005, Indonesia held Pilkada at provincial and regency/city levels of administration. Pilkada held simultaneously and continuously. In general, Pilkada have made local governance and local politics more vibrant, responsive and participatory. However, similar to Pilleg, DPD election and Pilpres, the winner of Pilkada included many figures from the Suharto era, such as former members of Golkar, senior government officials and retired military officers, who were among the politicians who used undemocratic practices, such as money politics, vote buying and abuse of authority, to compete in the more open electoral system.

The Pilkada was governed by Law No. 32/2004. Pilkada adopted a simple majoritarian system, two-round and candidate ballot system. All candidates needed to be part of an eligible party ticket, with independent candidates not allowed. But in 2007, articles 56.2 and 50.1,2, 3 of Law No. 32/2004 were cancelled by the Constitutional Court Decree No.5/2007, which granted independent candidates the right to run in local head of government elections. To promote a Pilkada ticket, a party or coalition of parties needed 15% of seats in the current local parliament, or

³⁷Interview, J. Kristiadi, Jakarta, 26 February 2009.

15% of total votes in the previous local parliamentary elections.³⁸The law also stated that a party or coalition of parties might sponsor an individual candidate from outside the party organisation to be head of local government.³⁹ The candidates had to secure at least 50% + 1 of votes to win in one round. However, if no one reached a majority, the candidate who gained 25% + 1 of the vote would win. If more than one candidate had 25% + 1 of the votes, the candidate who represented a larger diversity of districts would win. If no one attained 25% + 1 of the vote, a second round would be organised for the two candidates with the highest number of votes.⁴⁰ The electoral districts follow the administrative entity; for gubernatorial election it is the province, and for regent/mayor election it is the regency/city.

The Pilkada was a product of political compromise among the parliamentarians elected in 2004. “Party leaders of major parties initially appeared intent on maintaining the indirect electoral system, which allowed only party representatives in local assemblies to vote.”⁴¹ However, they had no opportunity to argue their case or to negotiate the issues in detail because, firstly, Pilkada was negotiated as one package with the Pilpres. Support for one meant support for both. And secondly, because the time for debating the Pilkada law was very limited, lasting only a month (September 2004). The controversies over the law emerged after it was enacted, not during the parliamentary debate over the legislation, explained Rafiuddin Hamarung, MP of DPR-RI 2004, founder of PPKD, former governor of central Kalimantan and former regent of Pinrang/ East Sulawesi.⁴²

One of the issues debated related to the decision that Pilkada was not categorised as an election, with the consequence that Pilkada was supervised by Kemendagri and DPRD, while the organisation of Pilkada was the responsibility of the KPUD. The KPUD had to report to the Kemendagri and DPRD, but not to the KPU at national level. This decision appeared to conflict with the 1945 Constitution, as amended in 2001,⁴³ which stipulated the KPU is the only legal entity with the authority to

³⁸Law No.32/2005, article 59.2.

³⁹Law No.32/2005, article 59.3.

⁴⁰Law No.32/2004, article 107, 2-8.

⁴¹Interview, Firman Jaya Daely, Jakarta, 31 January 2009.

⁴²Interview, Rafiuddin Hamarung, Makassar, 16 March 2009.

⁴³Indonesian 1945 Constitution, article 22: E-5.

organise elections. Thus, The Kemendagri and DPRD have no right to supervise elections. The KPU at the local level is subordinate to the national KPU; structurally the local KPU commissioners have to report to the national KPU,⁴⁴ not to the Kemendagri and DPRD. In January 2005, some KPUD, supported by many civil organisations, unsuccessfully submitted these issues to the Constitutional Court.⁴⁵ Deputy chair of Komisi II DPR-RI (Political and Law Commission) 1999–2004 and Deputy Chair of Bapilu DPP PDIP 2004, Firman Jaya Daely, argued:

“The debate over the status of Pilkada was one of my bitter memories. The majority in Komisi II DPR-RI considered that Pilkada was not an election. Even though, some of us realised that Pilkada fulfils all the prerequisites of an election.”⁴⁶

Another controversy was the ambiguity over how to solve electoral disputes. The Pilkada law states that electoral disputes should only concern the results of vote counting. However, disputes over local elections are due to technical problems in the administration of elections rather than the result of vote counting. Chair of KPU Province of South Sulawesi in 2009, Jayadi Nas, recalled:

“Almost half of Pilkada in 2005–2008 ended with a legal dispute. Of these disputes, 14 cases related to elections of Governors, 163 cases to elections of Regents and 33 cases to elections of Mayors. These disputes represented a significant proportion of the 22 elections for Governors, 364 for Regents and 90 for Mayors.”⁴⁷

The law also states that electoral disputes are brought to the Supreme Court, which may delegate the power to resolve cases in the local High Court.⁴⁸ To clarify the Pilkada Law, the Supreme Court then issued a regulation, but failed to provide guidance for judges in making their decisions (Choi 2007: 15).

One of the common issues in these disputes was the voter lists, because of the ambiguous division of labour between the Kemendagri and the KPUD, neither of

⁴⁴Law No. 32/2004, article 57: 1.

⁴⁵Mahkamah Konstitusi, Rebuttal on Law No.32/2004 on Local Head of Government to Indonesian Constitution 1945, Case No 072/PUU-II/2004 and No. 073/PUU-II/2004, 7 January 2005.

⁴⁶Interview, Firman Jaya Daely, Jakarta, 31 January 2009.

⁴⁷Interview, JayadiNas, Makassar, 17 March 2009.

⁴⁸Law No.32/2004, article 164.

whom had full responsibility for ensuring the quality of the voter list. According to Law No. 32/2004, article 74.4, “Daftar pemilih tetap disahkan dan diumumkan oleh PPS (Final voter list was approved and announced by PPS).” PPS (Panitia Pemungutan Suara or Voting Committee) is a casual and temporary committee at regency/city level, established by the local KPU a few months before conducting the election, which means that the PPS is not an official part of any institution. “PPS has no formal attachment or hierarchical structure to any institution. Hence, there is no need for PPS to be accountable to any institution,” argued Chair of KPU Regency of Gowa 2009, Hirsan Bachtiar,⁴⁹ “It is really unreasonable to delegate such critical task to the PPS. The committee is very independent. In fact, they are similar to an anomic group. No strings, no obligation and no responsibility,” explained Ratri Indrawati, KPU Regency of Probolinggo (2003–2008).⁵⁰ The impact of this confusing structure was predicted from the outset, that is, chaotic voter registration and unreliable voter lists. It was also predicted that the process would be easily intervened by the government via the Kemendagri.⁵¹ “This mindset was really incorrect. It was clear that the policy makers in Jakarta intended to create loophole[s] to play dirty politics. Just, similar with the previous authoritarian regime,” said Tenri A. Palallo, KPU Kota Makassar (2003–2008).⁵² The problems of voter registration and unreliable lists have made the conduct of these elections vulnerable to intervention by Kemendagri.

2009 elections: reinforced pragmatics and personality characteristics of parties

The 2009 Pilleg was the second bicameral parliamentary election and the 2009 Pilpres was the second presidential direct election, which reinforced the pragmatism of parties and importance of the candidates’ personalities. It was reported that in general the electoral atmosphere of the Pilleg “...was congenial, even festive in some areas, while in parts of Aceh reports of intimidation and threats to voters were recorded...” (ANFREL 2009: 43). However, there were controversies about many aspects of the electoral system, various disputed results and criticism of the quality

⁴⁹Interview, Hirsan Bachtiar, Gowa, 17 March 2009.

⁵⁰Interview, Ratri Indrawati, Probolinggo, 22 March 2009.

⁵¹Interview, JayadiNas, Makassar, 17 March 2009; EndangWiciSulaksana, Situbondo, 22 March 2009; Imron Rosyidi, Situbondo, 22 March 2009; IndraAbidin, Jakarta, 2 March 2009.

⁵²Interview, Tenri A. Palallo, Makassar, 17 March 2009.

of electoral administration, which caused doubts about the legitimacy of those in the elected parliament and executive positions (Schmidt 2010).

The 2009 electoral systems for DPR, DPD and Pilpres were similar to 2004; but some of their mechanics were different. First, the 2009 DPD election system remained the same as 2004, in that candidates were independent. In the 2009 election, candidates could identify themselves with political parties, but were not nominated by parties. The DPD election remained conducted under SNTV system in multi-member districts at provincial level and each province elected four representatives, but the electoral threshold was tighter. In 2009, the candidate needed the support from 50% of the total number of regencies/cities in the respective province⁵³; instead of 25% in 2004.

Second, the Pilpres was also administered by a similar system to the 2004 election, except there were revisions to the electoral threshold. The presidential ticket was increased to 20% of seats in the national DPR or 25% of the vote in the preceding national DPR election.⁵⁴ It was held under a majoritarian single-member district, candidate ballot structure and two-round system. The candidate had to be nominated by a party or coalition of parties.

Third, the 2009 DPR election remained under a PR system with a party open-list, *Hare* quota and opted for varying magnitudes. However, there was a big revision of electoral thresholds.⁵⁵ The 2009 DPR election introduced a parliamentary threshold for DPR national and multi-stage *Hare* quota for the first time.⁵⁶ As an effect of the 2009 MK Decree, it also applied a popular vote system as its formula. With these changes more parties could participate in the national elections, but fewer parties were able to win seats. These complexities will be discussed further in chapter five. The 2009 DPR election introduced a low electoral threshold, which encouraged parties to participate in electoral competition, but the introduction of parliamentary threshold limited the possibility of small parties to win seats in the DPR national.

⁵³Law No.10/2008, article 13.

⁵⁴Law No. 42/2008, article 9.

⁵⁵Law No. 10/2008, article 202 (1).

⁵⁶Law No.10/2008, chapters XII and XIII.

Thus, the number of parties that participated in the election increased sharply, while the number of parties represented in DPR national DPR-RI dropped significantly. In 2009, there were 38 parties that participated in the national election, but only nine parties won seats in the DPR national; while in 2004, there were 24 parties in the national election and 17 parties with at least one seat in the DPR national. Hence, one of the impacts of this ruling is the removal of small parties from the national parliament, although some still had representatives in local parliaments and could nominate candidates for Pilkada. It shall be noted that all these small parties have national presence, because of the national character of the electoral threshold.

“The question is what kind of principle that we want to build. Are we going to build this country based on the principle of inclusiveness or exclusiveness? The debate began in 1955.... But, it seems that we have not found the answer yet, the answer which can please the majority of Indonesia.”⁵⁷

“For me the question is whether those large parties already represent the diversity of Indonesia? The fact is they do not.... the decision [on electoral and parliamentary threshold] is only a matter of sharing power among them, not more. They just want to demolish small parties from political stage.”⁵⁸

Another example is, on the one hand, the ballot structure strengthened candidate's position over party organisation, but on the other hand, the electoral formula encouraged candidates to continue depending on party support. The party's influence over candidate decreased because candidate's number on the party list was no longer determined the chance of election, as in 2009, seats were allocated according to the number of votes achieved by the candidates. Nevertheless, the process of seat counting and distribution remained to be controlled by party structure. Following the electoral law, a party needs to collect all its votes gained in the Dapil; if the accumulated party's votes pass the BPP and are entitled to seat/s; the seat/s then is distributed to the candidate with the highest number of votes on the party list. However, if the accumulated party's votes do not pass the parliamentary threshold, even if a candidate from that party's list passes BPP in her/his Dapil, she/he will not be granted a seat. There were many cases where

⁵⁷Interview, Amien Rais, Jakarta, 25 February 2009.

⁵⁸Interview, Ryaas Rasyid, Jakarta, 8 March 2009.

candidates of small parties were unable to sit in the DPR national even though they passed BPP in her/his Dapil. These unsuccessful candidates included locally prominent figures such as Laksamana Sukardi (East Java) and Rev. Herman Saud (Jayapura) both from Partai Demokrasi Pembaharuan.⁵⁹

These conflicting changes were a compromise outcome of intense negotiations among the parties in the parliament, based on the pragmatic interests of the politicians. The parliamentary threshold was initiated by the large parties, but the idea was opposed by small parties. Large parties, such as Golkar, PDIP, and Demokrat, proposed to raise the ceiling of the electoral threshold from 3% to 5% and argued for a parliamentary threshold with an upper limit of 2% or 3%. However, opinions were divided between those who supported the practice of either electoral or parliamentary threshold and those who endorsed a combination of both systems. On the other side, small parties objected to this suggestion. Ryaas Rasyid said that the high ceiling would demolish small parties. But, his concern and also concern of others, inside and outside parliament were considered insignificant. The small parties then tried to challenge the new electoral law, but it was rejected by the MK in March 2009. As a concession, small parties accepted a parliamentary threshold, the large parties then agreed to accept a lower electoral threshold. The final negotiations produced a 2.5% parliamentary threshold, applied only for the national parliament.⁶⁰ The attempt to marginalize small parties continued. The large parties intended to modify the quota system. The compromise reached was applying multi-stage *Hare* quota for DPR national and maintaining a simple *Hare* quota for DPR province/regent/city. All these arrangements not only caused the political competition to become more complicated, more fragmented and more fluid, but also shifted electoral completion to the local level.

⁵⁹Interview, J. Kristiadi, Jakarta, 26 February 2009

⁶⁰Interview, Ryaas Rasyid, Jakarta, 8 March 2009.

Electoral institutions

Electoral institutions are responsible for the management and conduct of elections. They are of fundamental importance because through them, we can construe whether those in parliaments and elected executive offices have legitimacy to be in those positions or not. If people in the offices are elected through a free and fair election, they have legitimate power. These two concepts – a free and fair election and legitimate power- are fundamental for democracy. The importance becomes higher in a country where democratic practices have not yet been institutionalized. In such a country “...political manipulation is coming to be recognized as being among their most important problems, and although states of this sort are often called ‘electoral democracies’ on the grounds that they have reasonably ‘free and fair’ elections, observation mission reports frequently indicate that their electoral processes are flawed in important ways” (Birch 2007). Political manipulation is also a major concern In Indonesia, even though the intensity differs across elections. Electoral institutions are vulnerable to political manipulation, engineering the rules and regulating the processes.

In Indonesia, the KPU has the responsibility for the management and conduct elections. From 1955 to 1999, KPU has been placed administratively within the structure of the Kemendagri; since 2004, however, it was reconstituted as a national, permanent and independent institution. The new status was stipulated by the amendment of 2001 of the Indonesian Constitution.⁶¹ However, the administrative work of all the electoral institutions since 1955 has remained the responsibility of the Kemendagri.

The first electoral institution was established for the 1955 election. The 1955 national commissioners consisted of relatively autonomous and non-partisan high profile individuals, but their authority was relatively limited. For example, the law did not stipulate that they had final power to review electoral matters such as voter registration, candidacy and voting. Instead, the law placed the final decisions for such matters at various levels of the executive branch, particularly in the

⁶¹Indonesian 1945 Constitution, article 22: E-5.

Kemendagri. The law also did not provide clear guidance for the control of electoral misconduct. ⁶²“... the honesty of the election procedure is going to depend in large part on the discipline and impartiality of the Indonesian civil service, for it is the civil service which will control the election machinery”(Compton 1954b: 76).

The supremacy of the executive could be observed in the four sub-structures of the electoral institution. First was the area electoral committee, a committee of five to nine members in each of the 16 election areas appointed by the Minister of Justice. Second was the regency election committee, five to nine members appointed by the governor on behalf of the Minister of Home Affairs, with the Kabupaten/okta (regency/city or district) officer as chairman. Third was the kecamatan (sub-district) voting committee, at least five members appointed by the Kabupaten election committee on behalf of the Kemendagri with the kecamatan officer as the chairman. Fourth was the kampong (village non-government administration) registration committee, at least three persons appointed in each kampong by the kecamatan officer, with the kampong chairman as the chairman (Compton 1954a).

In 1969, in order to prepare the 1971 election, the government created Lembaga Pemilihan Umum (General Elections Institute; hereafter LPU). The structure of the institution was similar to that in 1955, except the commissioners were less independent and were not non-partisan persons. Besides, the intrusion of the military in the electoral process was excessive. At national level, the LPU committees were appointed by and accountable to the president. The committees were chaired by a Leadership Council composed of the Minister of Home Affairs, seven other ministers and the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and staffed by civil servants appointed by the Minister of Home Affairs (King, d. 2003). At provincial and regency/city level, the committees were selected by and under the authority of the Minister of Home Affairs; at kecamatan and kelurahan (village government administration) level, they were subject to the camat (kecamatan head) and the lurah (kelurahan head). In each rank, the committee was chaired by the head of the executive for respective levels. In Nishihara's words, “The vertical lines of Indonesia's local government organization under the Kemendagri were thus utilized

⁶²Law No.7/1953.

in setting up the administrative organization for the elections.... These structures no less certainly guaranteed effective governmental intervention and control..." (1972: 13).

Two of the most critical electoral stages, registering the voters and counting the ballots, were also under the control of the Kemendagri. The officials were enlisted as chair and members of the Panitia Pendaftaran Pemilih (Voter Registration Committee; hereafter Pantarlih) were responsible for registering the voters, and the Kelompok Penyelenggara Pemungutan Suara (Voting Implementation Group; hereafter KPPS) were responsible for counting the ballots; they were assigned and discharged by bupati/walikota (district head). It should be noted here that in 1971, 142 out of 281 district heads were former military officers (Nishihara 1972). The military overshadowed the civilian committees, not only at the local level, but also at the national level. In fact, the LPU "...was the whole body of ABRI..." (Nishihara 1972: 14). The same pattern was also found in the structure of the Panitia Pengawasan dan Pelaksanaan (Election Supervisory Committees; hereafter Panwaslak), which had monitoring and supervisory functions (Mallarangeng 1997). With all those qualities, the working of LPU with its apparatus, according to King D, was questionable as "...their neutrality and integrity were doubtful. [Besides] the Armed Forces ... tended over time to favour a certain group and treat other groups as stepchildren during security actions" (King D. 1994: 53). In practice, the government ruled all stages of the electoral processes. These practices became routine under the regime of President Suharto and helped facilitate a comfortable victory for the government's electoral vehicle, Golkar, in each of the elections from 1971 to 1997.

In the 1999 election, the structure of LPU was replaced by a multi-party electoral institution called KPU. The new institution was led politically by representatives of government appointed by the President, together with representatives of political parties who were assigned by their leader. This structure was replicated at all levels of the KPU organisation including Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia (Indonesia Election Working Committee; hereafter PPI). The PPI was an election working committee established by KPU to assist at the implementation level. The KPU chairman was a

retired TNI General Rudini (former Minister of Home Affairs), while PPI chairman was Jacob Tobing of PDIP. The administrative work of both KPU and PPI was managed by the Kemendagri. All KPU and PPI personnel were employed by the Minister of Home Affairs at the national level, by the governor at provincial level and by the regent/mayor at regency/city level.⁶³The new structure proved to be inefficient and impractical, although at the beginning, the spirit in adopting such an arrangement was agreeable. The Kemendagri was engaged because the Ministry had not only the infrastructure and resources but also the experience, while political parties were included because they wished to influence the balance of the Ministry. Political influence from both government and parties was evident. According to Dwight King, the parties' representatives

...turned out to be unwieldy, obstructionist, and corrupt, especially after a majority of the parties (27 parties) on the commission failed to win any seats in the legislature and 42 parties failed to qualify for the next election, relegating them to lame duck status on the commission (2003: 169).

From the beginning, the behaviour of some party representatives had undermined the high expectations of the KPU and PPI, as evidenced by their refusal to attend the induction ceremony of Habibie as President and when they prohibited sitting cabinet ministers from campaigning; but they allowed themselves, as electoral commissioners, to be involved in campaigning. There were also accusations that they brought disrespect upon themselves by engaging in some financial irregularities (King D. 2003). The KPU and PPI's problems were most evident when the representatives of 27 political parties (56.25 % of the participating parties) refused to accept the election results (KPU 2000).

In the 2004 election, in order not to repeat the failure of the KPU and PPI in 1999 and to build public confidence in the neutrality of election administration, as previously mentioned, the KPU was reconstituted as a national, permanent and independent institution. To ensure the independence of the commissioners, the election law of 2004 stated that members of KPU were not allowed to be a board

⁶³Law No. 3/1999, article 20, 1-5.

member, a member of a political party or hold any political position of government.⁶⁴Hence, in contrast with the 1999 election, the commissioners of 2004 had no official connection with any political party participating in the election; most of them had backgrounds such as academic, journalist, activist, humanist and priest. However, similar to 1999, the entire administrative personnel of KPU were still under the control of the Kemendagri. KPU could not appoint or dismiss them under any condition. For its administrative head, KPU might select one out of three candidates nominated by the Kemendagri, who was then appointed and could be dismissed by the president.⁶⁵

“One success story of the 2004 KPU was that it provided electoral transparency and protected the election results from manipulation,” claimed Chusnul Mar’iyah commissioner of KPU 2004 and chair of IT KPU 2004.⁶⁶No challenge could be made when the official final results were announced. The results were presented in less time than previous elections, and importantly, the general public could view the aggregated results from national level down to individual polling stations. This could be achieved because the KPU installed a computer network in 4,167 municipalities, 416 regencies and 32 provinces connecting them through a Virtual Private Network Dial to the KPU Data Centre in Jakarta. To ensure the validity of electoral results, the KPU recruited 28,000 volunteers consisting of university students, vocational students and vocational teachers from across Indonesia to become data entry operators (Mar’iyah 2005). Another achievement was that the KPU returned its budget surplus to the state. For example, in 2003, the KPU returned around US\$ 110 million to the state, and another US\$ 230 million in 2004 (Sjamsuddin 2005).

The paradox is that these successes and political integrity were followed by character assassinations, despite the commissioners’ work ethic being highly acknowledged and the allegations against them, mostly unproven bribery. It started when a high profile lecturer and NGO activist, a member of KPU, Mulyana W. Kusuma, was arrested on charges of bribery on 8 April 2005. A prominent

⁶⁴Law No.12/2003, article 18, points l& k.

⁶⁵Law No.12/2003, article 17, point 2-3.

⁶⁶Interview, Chusnul Mar’iyah, Jakarta, 20 April 2009.

respected professor, an Acehnese and chairman of KPU, Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, was then accused of breaching Presidential Decree No.80/ 2003. Both were outstanding scholars from the University of Indonesia. These incidents turned quickly into a public trial of the entire KPU structure, from national to provincial, regency and city levels, on suspicion of either involvement in bribery and corruption, or violation of administrative procedures. “The humiliation was unbearable...,” recalled Indra Abidin.⁶⁷ “Our belief in democracy and our works in institutionalising democracy for years have been destroyed in front of us, in a minute,” said Tenri A. Palallo.⁶⁸ “The accusations over corruption become deadly weapons, stated Ratri Indrawati.⁶⁹ In the end, these allegations were just mere political drama, because most of the commissioners could prove that they were not involved in what they were accused of.

“The process of accusations had already assassinated the character and integrity of the 2004 commissioners... whoever set the scenario to ruin the reputation of the commissioners has never considered the political sinking cost of their play... or just doesn’t care... the political and economic impacts for the country future are unbearable,” said Chusnul Mariyah.⁷⁰

To understand this political drama, the case of the KPU chairman will be examined in detail here. The case is significant here for two reasons. Firstly, it is because the KPU chairman provided an opening for an attack on the integrity, independence and capacity of the 2004 commissioners, both at KPU national and local levels. Secondly, not only did I have comprehensive data, documents and proceedings, but I attended almost all of the KPU chairman’s trials.⁷¹

The case started when the KPU chairman was accused of breaching the Presidential Decree No.80/ 2003 because he assigned a state insurance company to provide life insurance for the fieldworkers of the 2004 Pilpres without open tender. According

⁶⁷Interview, Indra Abidin, Jakarta, 2 March 2009.

⁶⁸Interview, Tenri A. Palallo, Makassar, 17 March 2009.

⁶⁹Interview, Ratri Indrawati, Probolinggo, 22 March 2009.

⁷⁰Interview, Chusnul Mar'iyah, Jakarta, 20 April 2009.

⁷¹I followed the case closely because the KPU chairman is my senior colleague at the University of Indonesia, where I work as a lecturer. I have known him since 1985, when I was an undergraduate student. And, I helped KPU 2004 organise 28,000 university lectures and students from across Indonesia to become voluntary data entry operators.

to the Presidential Decree, if an open tender could not be conducted because of special circumstances, the head of the institution was allowed to appoint the provider directly. It also stated that the open tender should be released a minimum of 30 working days before the decision.⁷² The institution could not organise an open tender because the time was so limited, given it was only 10 days before the presidential election. The presidential election had to be conducted on 5 July 2004, while the approval by the Department of Finance came on 24 June 2004. Thus, with 10 days remaining, it was impossible to organise an open bid. Therefore, the KPU chairman followed the Presidential Decree No.80/2003 and appointed the insurance provider. Nonetheless, following the allegation, the chairman was accused of defrauding the state of US\$ 1,419 million. This amount was the difference of the total premium subtracted by the total claim. The total premium paid to the state insurance company was US\$ 1,480 million, for 5.5 million electoral field workers, US\$ 5 cents for each worker per month for two rounds of the presidential election (Sjamsuddin 2005). However, even though the chairman could prove his innocence of the bribery accusation, he was sentenced to seven years. Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin argued:

“The accusations against me and others commissioners had more political nuance rather than legal. They had to marginalise us in order to control elections and make sure to get re-elected... They know they cannot bribe us....but, this case was also about destroying potential opposition,”⁷³

It is argued here that the attack on the integrity of the 2004 commissioners created the opportunity for the DPR and the government to limit the independence of the KPU and select less competent commissioners for the following elections.

In the 2009 election, the structure of KPU continued to consist of commissioners who were not members or on the board of political parties, nor did they hold any political position in government, but the selection process and their relevant background were highly questionable. The selection process, following Law No.22/2007, started with the establishment of a selection team by the president, who nominated 21 candidates to the DPR, and seven that gained the most votes in

⁷²Presidential Decree No.80/ 2003 on Goods and Services, article 3.

⁷³Interview, Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, Jakarta, 3 February 2009.

the DPR were chosen. However, none of the selection team members was a specialist on elections. Only two out of seven 2009 KPU members could be identified as having relevant knowledge and skills on politics or elections; three out of seven possessed an unrelated profession such as professor of Islamic studies, teacher of the Madrasah Aliyah (religious school) and senior researcher in the Ministry of Religion.

In short, the national KPU is a weak point because the new commissioners have no knowledge of or experience with elections and thus command little respect for authority. Many are concerned about the KPU's ability to organize elections and to argue its case. Some analysts have criticized the KPU, for example, for its failure to follow the law in responding to an election dispute in North Maluku by ordering a recount and replacing a KPUD member. The quality of election management may therefore depend even more on local KPUDs, some of whom are losing quality people due to frustration with the new KPU (Liddle, Bjornlund, and King, B. 2008: 18).

These concerns on the independence and competence of the 2009 commissioners proved to be well founded when the 2009 Pilleg and 2009 Pilpres were held. One major problem related to voter registration.

The suspect management of the voter registry was the single most contentious issue during the 2009 elections. The wide-scale omission of eligible voters from the lists and the inaccurate recording of details severely hampered Indonesians in their attempts to exercise their fundamental rights to participate in elections.... The poor quality of the voter registry became the basis for complaints by the losing candidates... (Schmidt 2010: 117-18).

Indeed, such failures in many ways fall short of common standards of electoral democracy.

In a democracy, all eligible citizens must be given a genuine opportunity to register to vote including the chance to review and inspect the lists of voters. In essence, the registry of voters is the foundation document for electoral administration. It tells the administrators who is qualified to vote by virtue of having fulfilled residency, age and other requirements, and which citizens are eligible to run as candidates. The election administration body has the critical role of ensuring that voter registration is professionally managed, well understood and conducted in a transparent manner that is open to public observation (Schmidt 2010: 117).

“Both in Pilleg and Pilpres, the problem of voter registry became a controversial issue,” Deputy Secretary of PDIP, Hasto Kristiyanto, stated.⁷⁴ The problem started with the failure of the Kemendagri to update and submit Data Kependudukan (Population Data) to the KPU.⁷⁵ The Data Kependudukan needed to be provided to the KPU 12 months before the election for the verification process.⁷⁶ Instead of Data Kependudukan, the Ministry provided the KPU with Daftar Penduduk Pemilih Potensial Pemilu (a Potential Voters List; hereafter DP4). This list was constructed based on Program Pendaftaran Pemilih dan Pendataan Penduduk Berkelanjutan (Continuous Program for Voter Registration and Census; hereafter P4B). The P4B was a product of KPU 2004. However, the Kemendagri had already modified the original P4B (Suwarso and Prasetiyono 2009).

The DP4 then became the reference to prepare Daftar Pemilih Sementara (Preliminary Voters List; hereafter DPS) and Daftar Pemilih Tetap (Final Voters List; hereafter DPT). The DP4 failed to be verified by the KPU. Firstly, it was because there was no master data (Population Data of 2009) for cross checking. Secondly, because the DP4 was formed in Microsoft Excel; it made it impossible to cross check voter data as a whole. The software could not facilitate the process because Microsoft Excel only provides 64.000 rows, whereas the registered constituents for the 2009 parliamentary election was 171.068.667 voters and for the 2009 presidential election 176.367.056 voters (KPU 2009). The number was then multiplied by five because it also included another five variables: Nomor Induk Kependudukan (National Identity Number; hereafter NIK), name, date of birth, gender and address. Thus, KPU needed software with a capacity of 855,343,335 rows for parliamentary election and 881,835,280 rows for presidential election. Thirdly, because the payment for the optional fund was delayed, the time to clarify DP4, to develop DPS and to establish DPT accurately became less than originally planned.

The same mistake was repeated again during presidential election. It was found from around 70 regencies/cities on Java Island, there were 11.21 million registered

⁷⁴ Interview, Hasto Kristiyanto, Jakarta, 22 April 2009

⁷⁵No.10/2008, article 32:1.

⁷⁶Law No.10/2008, article 32:2.

voters with double identities (Kompas 2009). To reduce the potential crisis, one day before Election Day, the Constitutional Court decreed that all eligible voters who had not yet registered could vote by presenting a valid ID card.⁷⁷ But other problems occurred, as the MK decision was decreed less than two days before the election; this meant that the KPU commissioners had very little time to recruit more workers to examine the voters' ID in polling stations or to provide additional ballot papers. A dilemma also arose with the utilisation of ID cards. In Indonesia, one citizen can have more than one ID card (KTP) and not all citizens have a KTP. This kind of problem meant that the 2009 elections fell short of important basic standards of democratic electoral performance. It showed that

The 2009 election had performed far less well than what could reasonably have been expected based on the performance [of 2004].... If it had not been for the convincing margin of victory achieved by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his Democratic Party in both the legislative and presidential elections, the poor management of the elections could easily have become a catalyst for more serious political disagreements (Schmidt 2010: 100).

Concluding remarks

This chapter has shown that Indonesia had developed a set of complex electoral systems and mechanics since 1955 and especially since 1999. Three electoral systems were adopted: the PR for Pilleg, SNTV for DPD election and majoritarian for Pilpres and Pilkada. These electoral systems have been developed in a process of ad hoc decision making, borne of parliamentary compromises rather than from any grand policy design. While the electoral systems have not changed greatly since they were introduced, the electoral mechanics—ballot structure, electoral formula, electoral threshold and district magnitudes—have been adjusted for each national election. Indonesia has retained a PR system for legislative elections since 1955, even though there has been much debate and differing opinions about the system. The majoritarian system has been used for executive offices since 2004.

⁷⁷Valid KTP with valid Kartu Keluarga (Family Identity Card) or valid passport for voters overseas, presented to electoral workers in the polling booth.

Working with such varied systems and mechanics generated distinctive and countervailing pressures for parties and candidates. The PR system encouraged inclusive and consensual power sharing in the multi-party parliaments the system produced in which no party is likely to win a majority of seats. In contrast, the majoritarian system created an executive dominated by large parties that nevertheless lacked majority support in parliament. These contradictions reflected the negotiations and political compromises among the parties in the parliament that legislate the electoral laws.

It was found that parties were willing to revise the electoral systems and mechanics because they believed that electoral laws and rules influenced their electoral fortunes and electorates' behaviour. This belief issue is discussed further in the following chapter.

This chapter also found that the development of Indonesian electoral institutions, principally the KPU, was controlled too tightly by the executive –President and Kemendagri. The degree of control varied, but was most evident during the 2009 elections. From 1955 to 1999, KPU was placed administratively within the structure of the Kemendagri. Since 2004, it has been reconstituted as a national, permanent and independent institution; but the administrative support remained the responsibility of the Kemendagri. Hence, in practice, the government organized all stages of the electoral processes, which leaves questions about the independence and integrity of KPU.

Chapter Four

Parties and party systems, 1955–2009

“...political parties should not then be seen as hierarchical entities with roots deep in Indonesian society” (Rocamora 1975: 1).

Introduction

This chapter will explore the development of parties and party systems from 1955 to 2009. The analysis of this process is of fundamental importance to understanding contemporary Indonesian political parties, which will be discussed in chapters five and six. This chapter will address how parties and party systems change, how the number of parties, party size and strength, and party polarisation and internal dynamics change, and how party organisation, party strategy, party function and party ideology change. Further discussion of parties and party systems under the reformasi regime will be presented in the following chapters. The discussion in this chapter is structured from a politico-historical approach and divided into two sections.

The two sections are namely: ‘Party beliefs, values and history’ and ‘Parties and party systems from 1955 to 2009.’ The latter section is grouped into four subsections, which discuss 1955, 1971, 1977–1997 and 1999, 2004 and 2009 parties and party systems respectively.

Party beliefs, values and history

Indonesian parties are products of Indonesian beliefs, values and history. Parties are “... not just institutions that respond to the opinions of voters but institutions whose behaviour may also be governed by much older beliefs and values that the party had at its founding” (Ware 2000: 21-22). Ware notes that parties are also “prisoners of their own history as an institution” (Ware 2000: 18). However, the beliefs and

values which influence parties and how the process happens are difficult to differentiate, particularly because they become involutedly and the intensity of change varies from party to party over time. Obviously, beliefs and values may change, but they possibly will be revisited and revitalised. Beliefs, values and history are among many factors influencing parties. However, because they constrain party capacity for adaptation, they should be regarded as critical factors in shaping parties. Whatever parties' decisions, for example, in efforts to perform their functions, to play their roles, to set up their strategies and to develop their organisations, it is likely that beliefs, values and history are influential, at a conscious level or not. As Panebianco argues, the beliefs and values developed at the time of the party's birth are very significant as they are decisive for their organisational development (Panebianco 1988). In Indonesia, the beliefs and values of the parties with long histories were influenced by the anti-colonial struggle and Javanese culture.

Firstly, it was colonialism that instilled nationalistic beliefs and encouraged pragmatism. In Wallerstein's words, "...in a colonial situation, political parties are born to protest and to seek change..." (1967: 497). Party leaders tried to inspire the masses to get their freedom and to establish a free independent nation. For this reason, political parties were often banned or their activities severely restricted by the colonial authorities who considered them subversive. Presidents Sukarno and Suharto continued the practice of their colonial predecessors. In these circumstances, it was understandable that parties were pragmatic. To avoid the law, they started as non-political organisations before turning to political activism. Budi Utomo was founded in 1908⁷⁸, not as a political party, but as a social organisation and pressure group (Nagazuni 1967). Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trade Association; hereafter SDI) was established in 1911 to protect Javanese batik traders from Chinese and Dutch merchants. The association changed its name and reorganised into a political party called Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association; hereafter SI) in 1912, to reflect its increasingly political nature (Ward 1970).

⁷⁸Budi Utomo is acknowledged as the first modern political organisations in Indonesia.

The influence of the anti-colonial struggle was pervasive with “... almost every party in the 1908 to 1955 period adopted Nationalism as a part of their ideology” (Imawan 1989: 71). In fact, the SI and PKI also adopted nationalism from the beginning. According to Ward, some Indonesian Muslim writers even prefer to view the SI as the precursor to subsequent nationalist efforts (1970). To mobilise support and demonstrate nationalist credentials, in 1923, the precursor of PKI, Indies Social Democratic Association (*Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereniging* or ISDV), declared it was no longer affiliated with the Dutch Social Democratic Action Party (*Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij* or SDAP), a Marxist party in the Netherlands, but espoused ISDV interests. The ISDV then changed its name to PKI (McVey 1965).

Secondly, Javanese cultural values were reflected in the early parties’ elitism, and exclusiveness and paternalistic (the idea of the ‘fatherly patron’) outlook. Javanese aristocrats and notables, who had the earliest access to Western education, were prominent among the leaders of early nationalist organisations. The ethical policy made it possible for many young Javanese to study either in the colony or abroad, mostly in Europe and the Middle-East (Ricklefs 1993). These highly educated young people became the first generation of Indonesian nationalists to be involved in political activism. They developed the idea of a free independent Indonesia, engaged in political debates and established political parties. This party history showed that Indonesian parties began as elite creations. In Duverger’s (1964) terms these organisations were parties of the notables, or in Anderson’s (1990) terms, they were organisations of personal cliques.

However, even though Javanese aristocrats and notables plus other highly educated generations that followed were familiar with Western education; they retained a strong faith in their own culture. The nature of Javanese aristocratic culture is exclusive, personalistic and paternalistic, rather than open and democratic. Certainly, they were inspired by the idea of a free independent Indonesia and believed in notions of democracy, but it was doubtful whether they practised democratic values in their everyday lives. Frings remark that no colonial authorities “... had seriously tried to teach [their colonies] either the values of democracy or

the practical skills to organize themselves democratically” (Frings 1998: 38).

Writing of the mostly Javanese political elite in the early 1950s, Ricklefs described them as:

...a tiny layer of urban society and the Jakarta politicians, while proclaiming their democratic ideals, were mostly elitists and self-conscious participants in a new urban super-culture. They were paternalistic towards those less fortunate than themselves and sometimes simply snobbish towards those who, for instance, could not speak fluent Dutch. They had little commitment to the grassroots structure of representative democracy and managed to postpone elections for five more years (1993: 237).

In a different explanation, but still in the same vein, Feith and Castles argued for the existence of unattached intellectuals concentrated in Jakarta and other big cities.

They were a small distinct group who were

...working on the edges of the political arena as writers, journalists, editors, publishers, university lecturers or students who addressed themselves mainly to narrow audiences of highly educated people in the cities or in Djakarta alone.... most of its members had personal knowledge of most other members, directly or indirectly.... [But their] political importance was great. (1970: 4).

Furthermore, Rocamora argued that personalism was dominant in Indonesian politics. He contended that political contestation leading up to the 1955 election was not among political parties competing along ideological lines, but rather “... as factions within a definable national elite divided on the basis of more mundane differences in personal experience and outlook” (1975: 5-6). Undeniably, party leaders had a very strong influence on parties, but George Kahin found that to some extent party structures worked, and party members had some knowledge about party values and programs (Kahin G. 1952). A study by Mortimer (1974) entitled ‘Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959–1965’ and another by Hindley (1966) entitled ‘The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951–1963’ also corroborated George Kahin’s argument.

Parties were organised along paternalistic lines. Feith uses *bapakism* (from Bapak, Indonesian for father) and explains:

The *bapak* or leader is assured of very great respect from his *anak buah*, his followers or literally his children, often also of great affection, and of loyalty and support for whatever action he may take. But, at the same time he has diffuse and far-reaching responsibilities for their protection and welfare and must take full account of their wishes whenever these are strongly felt. If he does not discharge these responsibilities adequately, it is thought proper that his followers should switch loyalties quickly (1962: 127).

Another responsibility of *bapak* is to ensure harmony among his *anak buah* (followers). Living in harmony is an ideal concept of Javanese culture. For the Javanese, the pursuit of harmony is related to the process of synthesising different philosophical and religious beliefs, ideas or practices. The challenge in Javanese thinking is how to harmonise, or at least minimise the antagonism between different religious or political beliefs. In religion, what is called *Kejawen* (Javanese religion) is a syncretism of original Javanese animism with the different religions that followed (e.g. Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam). In politics, it can be perceived that President Sukarno created, as an ideological framework for his authoritarian guided democracy regime, the syncretism concept of Nasakom that endeavoured to accommodate nationalism, religion and communism. Sukarno's ambition to foster ideological harmony was not realised during his presidency.

American anthropologist Clifford Geertz' depiction of Javanese consisting of *aliran* (stream) has influenced the way that many observers understood the ideologies and bases of cultural and religious support for the 1950s parties. Geertz argued there were three *aliran*: *priyayi* (aristocrats), *abangan* (Javanese syncretism) and *santri* (pious Muslim). The majority – (*priyayi* and *abangan*) synthesised animist, Hindu-Buddhist and Islamic beliefs and practises *Kejawen* (Javanese religion). The minority (*santri*), self-identified as Muslims, distinguishing themselves from *priyayi* and *abangan* by more exacting performance of such requirements, for example, the five daily prayers, and abstinence from food and water during the daylight hours of the fasting month (Geertz 1976).

Although Geertz' analysis of Javanese Islam has influenced the way political parties have been analysed, this approach does not adequately explain Islam elsewhere in Indonesia nor the beliefs or basis of party support in the outer Islands. Even though, the dominant religion in the outer Islands is Islam, there are different beliefs and

practices compared to Javanese Muslims. The Acehnese, Minangkabau, Bugis and Makassarese, for example, were more influenced by reformist movements in the Middle East in the mid and late 19th century, which “...stood for a return to what it called the fundamental truths of the Quran, discarding both the accretions of medieval scholasticism and the compromises with local animism, thus clearing the way for a thorough going modernization of Islam” (Steinberg 1987: 299). Hence, it is difficult to explain their religious–cultural ideology through the concept of Javanese syncretism and *aliran*. In addition, besides the considerable diversity within Islam, there are other religions. The Christian (Protestant) and Catholic churches have strong congregations in North Sumatera, North Sulawesi, the Moluccas, East Nusa Tenggara and Papua. The religious and cultural beliefs and practices in the regions outside Java cannot easily be understood through the concept of Javanese syncretism and *aliran*.

However, the explanatory power of Javanese syncretism and *aliran* has diminished as a consequence of socio-economic, cultural and information technology changes generated during the 32 years of the Suharto regime. Javanese syncretism and the Javanese political *aliran*, for example, does not help much in analysing the process of pairing the 2009 candidates for president and vice-president. The political calculations involved in the selection and nomination of presidential tickets were much more influenced by pragmatism and likely electoral outcomes. Two out of three pairs, Yudhoyono-Boediono and Megawati-Prabowo, were pairs of non-santri Javanese. The pairing of the tickets did not seek to broaden ideological appeal by including santri (pious Muslim), non-santri (non-pious Muslim) or Javanese/non-Javanese. However, both these tickets had a civilian ex-military pairing. One of the motives when Yudhoyono picked Boediono or Megawati chose Prabowo was electoral appeal. Boediono could attract support from the business community for Yudhoyono. Prabowo could finance Megawati’s campaign and strengthen her performance in public. The other pair, Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto, made more sense in terms of broadening the ticket’s religious, regional and ethnic appeal, as Jusuf Kalla is santri and non-Javanese while Wiranto is non-santri and Javanese. However, the 2009 elections results showed that Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto gained the lowest vote

(12.41%); Yudhoyono-Boediono and Megawati-Prabowo tickets, had a narrower *aliran* appeal, and were the most successful.

The failure of the older parties to establish well-built organisations has restrained their capacity to develop as modern institutions. Party organisations and their resources are controlled by small party elites. The party may have a massive membership (evidence that the party has significant roots in society and as a source of legitimacy), but the party has never really depended on its membership base. In Feith's words, "Party organization was in general very poorly developed" (Feith 1962: 126). It was partly, according to Johnson, because "...they were not forced to face elections for ten years from 1945, giving the party leadership little incentive to develop the parties' organizational capacities. The parties represented personalities and, to a certain extent, ideas; the organizations lagged far behind" (2002: 74). They had only the vaguest idea of the size of their own membership (Feith 1962). The PKI perhaps was the most successful in recruiting membership. The party tied millions of people to its subsidiary organisations for women, youth, workers, fishermen and farmers (Mortimer 1974). Party organisation under the New Order era was weakened as well through the policies of floating mass, which forced party mergers and intervention in leadership contests. The impacts of these policies post 1998 are still evident. Even though, contemporary parties have sought to establish effective organisations, their organisation remains weak, inefficient and under-developed. Their offices, particularly at district level, were established often only to fulfil the requirement of the electoral laws, which state that parties should have a certain number of branch offices in provinces and sub-branch offices in districts.

Party organisation depends on state subvention.

Dues, though stipulated in the constitution of virtually all parties, were rarely collected except in the higher echelons, though an exception should be made here in the case of the Communist Party. There was probably no party whose financing was based mainly on membership dues (Feith 1962: 126).

Because parties had no self-financing, colonisation of the bureaucracy was one of the easy sources of revenue, particularly for the PNI, Masyumi and PSI during the

1953–1955 periods. This practice was continued in 1971–1997 when the government financed Golkar; and gave only sufficient support for PPP and PDI. Given the powerlessness of party organisations and weak identities, parties in parliament since 1998 have also largely depended on state monies.

Party organisations have a centralistic tendency. Feith observed that

...the main concern of parties was with the political struggle in Djakarta. Where they operated outside the capital, they tended to concentrate their efforts on areas of high national-level political effectiveness, on cities, residency and kabupaten (regency) towns, and the de-traditionalized areas of estate and small-holder production for the world market (1962: 125).

This Jakarta focus remained strong even after 1998 when the politics was more open to the local people through decentralisation policies and Pilkada. In fact, the tendency is strengthened by the provision in the electoral law that requires parties contesting the elections to have branches in more than half of the provinces and sub-branches in more than half of the regencies/cities in those provinces. By imposing such strict requirements, it is impossible for regionally based parties to participate in the electoral process. Even for regional legislative and executive elections the only parties permitted to compete in the polls are national parties, except in Aceh. And because there were three tiers of election (national, provincial and regency/city), only strong parties could succeed electorally at all levels.

Besides the parties' preoccupation with Jakarta-based politics, there has been a focus on internal party politics in the 1950s, as Feith observed:

In fact, much of the energy of party leaders was spent in internal political struggle... Interparty divisions were of great importance and were openly admitted in the case of most parties... At first sight it would seem that parties were dominated by their top leaders, by the small group of men having close personal acquaintance with one another and influence at the highest levels of the government. However, there was active competition between these leaders for the allegiance of followers (1962: 126).

Parties after 1998 in contrast to Feith's 1950s observation of inter-party division became less important. However, parties remained dominated by small groups of

politicians who knew each other well and exercised influence at the highest level of government. Politicians who lost out in intra-party competition often left and joined another party, or established a new one. Elite ‘musical chairs’ that took place around presidential nominations and Pilpres coalitions since 2004 suggest great flexibility, pragmatism and ability to negotiate. One example is Prabowo Subianto, who was a leading figure in Golkar, but left to establish his own party, Gerindra, as it was unlikely that Golkar would nominate him as its presidential candidate. In 2009, Prabowo became a candidate for vice president on a ticket with Megawati Sukarnoputri, the chair of PDIP. Another example among Muslim party leaders is Zainuddin MZ, who departed from PPP and created a new party called PPP-reformasi (reform PPP). He took PPP’s party officers and party supporters with him, who were either sympathisers or after positions in the new party.⁷⁹

Parties and party systems

The discussion below highlights the complexities of party politics in Indonesia. It explains continuity and discontinuity, and similarities and differences regarding party systems and types in different election years. Further, it compares party systems and strengths, ideology, competition and party strategy. This discussion is summarised in table 4.1 below.

⁷⁹Interview, Kyai Fawaid As’ad Syamsul Arifin, Situbondo, 22 March 2009.

Table 4.1: Comparison of party systems, 1955–2009

		Election Year												
		1955	1957–1958	1971	1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997	1999	2004		2005–2009		2009			
Type of Election		Legislature, national	Legislature, local	Legislature, national & local	Legislature, national & local	Legislature, national & local	Legislature		Executive, national (President)	Executive, local (Governor, Mayor/Regent)	Legislature		Executive, national (President)	
							DPR, national & local	DPD, national			DPR, national & local	DPD, national		
Party System	Type	Atomised multi-party1)	Atomised multi-party	Hegemonic2)	Hegemonic	Atomised multi-party	Atomised multi-party	-	Atomised multi-party	Atomised multi-party	Atomised multi-party	-	Atomised multi-party	
	EffNv3)	6.33	-	2.28	Av=1.88	5.06	8.55	-	-	-	9.58	-	-	
	EffNs4)	6.41	-	2.15	Av=1.80	4.71	7.07	-	-	-	6.20***	-	-	
Number of Party	Election	172*	Dominated by 4 parties	10	3	48	24	-	Dominated by 7 parties	Dominated by 7 parties	38**	-	Dominated by 9 parties	
	Parliament	Min 3% votes	4	-	4	3	5	7	-	-	-	9	-	-
		Min 1 seat	28	-	8	3	21	17	-	-	-	9***	-	-
Party Ideology	Election and Parliament	Nationalism, Islamism, Communism, Socialism, Christianity, Catholicism and others	Nationalism, Islamism, Communism, Christianity, Catholicism and others	Nationalism, Islamism, Christianity, Pancasilaism and others	Pancasilaism	Pancasilaism, Islamism and others	Pancasilaism and Islamism	-	-	Pancasilaism and Islamism	Pancasilaism and Islamism	-	Pancasilaism and Islamism	
Party Competition	Election	Highly fragmented and even highly centrifugal	Fragmented and centrifugal	Fragmented and centrifugal	Low fragmented and even highly centripetal	Highly fragmented and highly centrifugal	Fragmented and centrifugal	-	Fragmented but centripetal	Fragmented but highly centripetal	Even highly fragmented but centripetal	-	Even highly fragmented but highly centripetal	
	Parliament	State ideology issues	Led by Nationalist supporters	-	Led by Nationalist supporters	Led by Pancasila supporters	Led by Pancasila supporters	Led by Pancasila supporters	-	-	-	Led by Pancasila supporters	-	-
		Electoral issues	Pragmatic	Pragmatic	More pragmatic	Even more pragmatic	Pragmatic	More pragmatic	-	-	-	Even more pragmatic	-	-
Other issues	Highly fragmented and even highly centrifugal	Fragmented but tend to centripetal	Low fragmented and tend to centripetal	Low fragmented and even highly centripetal	Fragmented and highly centrifugal	Highly fragmented and highly centrifugal	-	-	-	Even highly fragmented but highly centripetal	-	-		
Party Strategy	Election	Partisan	Partisan	Tend to partisan	Highly electoral	Tend to partisan	Tend to electoral	-	Tend to electoral	Electoral	Tend to electoral	-	Highly electoral	
	Parliament	Partisan	Partisan	Tend to partisan	Highly electoral	Electoral	Electoral	-	-	-	-	-	Highly electoral	

1) Atomised multi-party system = A system where the number of parties has no noticeable effect (Sartori, pp.125,126)
 2) Hegemonic party system = Political power is monopolised by one party; other parties exist only as *satellites* (Sartori, p.127)
 3) EffNv=Effective number of parties at electoral level (or ENEP), (Laakso and Taagepera 1979; Lijphart and Aitkin 1994; Taagepera and Shugart 1989)
 4) EffNs=Effective number of parties at parliamentary level (or ENPP), (Laakso and Taagepera 1979; Lijphart and Aitkin 1994; Taagepera and Shugart 1989)
 * Parties and quasi-political groups. ** In addition, there were six local parties operating exclusively in Aceh province. *** Due to parliamentary threshold

1955 parties and party system: atomised multi-party with narrow ideology spectrum

1955 parties conformed to Sartori's (1976) atomised multi-party system. The number of parties participating in the election was high, as the electoral threshold was set very low and ballot structure encouraged independent candidates to participate. There were 172 parties and quasi-political groups participating. Not only old parties, such as PNI, Masyumi, NU, PKI and PSII, but also new parties including regional-based parties, such as Partai Persatuan Dayak (Dayak Unity Party) in Kalimantan. There were also independent candidates, for example, PPPLM Idrus Effendi (Association of Supporters of the Candidate of L.M. Idrus Effendi) in Southeast Sulawesi (KPU 2000). However, in contrast, because the electoral threshold was set high, the number of parties represented in parliament was relatively low. Only 28 parties and quasi-political groups gained a seat or seats in the national parliament. Only four parties obtained more than 10% of votes, but none obtained a majority. The four most successful parties together won 78% of total votes. They were the PNI, Masyumi, NU and PKI with their share of votes being 22.3%, 20.9%, 18.4% and 16.4% respectively (see table 4.2).

Feith and Castles have depicted the 1955 parties and party system in a *five ideologies* matrix. This matrix was inspired by Geertz' depiction of Javanese consisting of three *aliran*: *priyayi* (aristocrats), *abangan* (Javanese syncretism) and *santri* (pious Muslim). Geertz' *aliran* was referred to understand the bases of cultural and religious support for the 1950s parties. Feith and Castles then categorised these five ideologies as: radical nationalism, Islam, communism, Javanese traditionalism and democratic socialism. The first three ideologies were represented by the four largest parties, while the other two were not embedded in the largest parties, although all of them carried some influence. Nationalism was espoused by PNI, Islam by Masyumi and NU and Communism by PKI. Besides those five, there were Christians represented by Parkindo and Catholics by Partai Katholik with 2.66% of votes (8 seats) and 2.04% of votes (6 seats) respectively; but because these two parties obtained only a small portion of votes, their ideology was not incorporated in Feith and Castles' model (1970).

Table 4.2: Legislative election, 1955

N o.	Party Name	Abbreviation	Votes	Votes (%)	Seats	Seats (%)
1	Partai Nasional Indonesia	PNI	8,434,653	22.32	57	22.18
2	Masyumi	Masyumi	7,903,886	20.92	57	22.18
3	Nahdlatul Ulama	NU	6,955,141	18.41	45	17.51
4	Partai Komunis Indonesia	PKI	6,176,914	16.35	39	15.18
5	Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia	PSII	1,091,160	2.89	8	3.11
6	Partai Kristen Indonesia	Parkindo	1,003,325	2.66	8	3.11
7	Partai Katholik	Katholik	770,740	2.04	6	2.33
8	Partai Sosialis Indonesia	PSI	753,191	1.99	5	1.95
9	Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia	IPKI	541,306	1.43	4	1.56
10	Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah	Perti	483,014	1.28	4	1.56
11	Partai Rakyat Nasional	PRN	242,125	0.64	2	0.78
12	Partai Buruh	Buruh	224,167	0.59	2	0.78
13	Gerakan Pembela Pancasila	GPPS	219,985	0.58	2	0.78
14	Partai Rakyat Indonesia	PRI	206,261	0.55	2	0.78
15	Persatuan Pegawai Polisi RI	P3RI	200,419	0.53	2	0.78
16	Musyawaharah Rakyat Banyak	Murba	199,588	0.53	2	0.78
17	Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia	Baperki	178,887	0.47	1	0.39
18	Persatuan Indonesia Raya Wongsonegoro	PIR Wongsonegoro	178,481	0.47	1	0.39
19	Gerakan Indonesia Raya	Gerinda	154,792	0.41	1	0.39
20	Persatuan Rakyat Marhaen Indonesia	Permai	149,287	0.40	1	0.39
21	Persatuan Dayak	PD	146,054	0.39	1	0.39
22	Persatuan Indonesia Raya Hazairin	PIR Hazairin	114,644	0.30	1	0.39
23	Partai Politik Tarikat Islam	PPTI	85,131	0.23	1	0.39
24	AKUI	AKUI	81,454	0.22	1	0.39
25	Persatuan Rakyat Desa	PRD	77,919	0.21	1	0.39
26	Partai Republik Indonesia Merdeka	PRIM	72,523	0.19	1	0.39
27	Angkatan Komunis Muda	Acoma	64,514	0.17	1	0.39
28	R. Soedjono Prawirosoerdarso	R. Soedjono Prawirosoerdarso	53,305	0.14	1	0.39
29	Lain-lain (the rest)		1,022,433	2.71	0	0.00
	Total		37,785,299	100.00	257	100.00

Sources: KPU (2000). Pemilu Indonesia dalam angka dan fakta tahun 1955–1999 [the Indonesian elections in number and facts, 1955-1999]. Jakarta: Biro Humas KPU.

Nonetheless, knowing there were 172 parties and quasi-political groups participating in the election and 28 parties and quasi-political groups gained a seat or seats in the national parliament, this makes it difficult to assess which parties' really exercised power. One formula to answer this question is from Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Utilising their formula of EffN_v and EffN_s to assess party size and strength, it was found that EffN_v and EffN_s were 6.33 and 6.41 respectively. This means that party competition and coalition was fragmented into six parties; both in the election and in parliament. It can be noted in table 4.2 above that the gap between the PKI and smaller parties was significant. More generally, this is the gap between the big four and the rest. On paper, the small parties had no noticeable effect on the political system (Sartori 1976). However, in reality, they had significant influence on party competition and coalition building, as there was no party with a majority of seats. The influence of small parties in the 1955 political system, such as Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (Indonesia Syarikat Islam Party; hereafter PSII) and Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party; hereafter PSI) was significant although on paper they were not expected to have noticeable effect, in reality they could play a role greater than their numbers suggested and obtain concessions from the larger parties. The influences of small parties related to the fact in the 1955 elections, and all the reformation era elections, none of the large parties has secured more than 35% of the seats in the DPR national.

Ideological competition between the 1955 parties was highly centrifugal, as they were not only represented by ideological dichotomy but also social, cultural, geographic and demographic fragmentation in society. The PNI, NU and PKI were strong in Java, each obtaining more than 85% of their votes in Java, and more than 65% in the ethnic Javanese regions of Central and East Java. In contrast, Masyumi gained 48.7% of its votes from the outer islands and only 25.4% from Central and East Java. It is worth noting here that the PNI and PKI also found support among the Hindu Balinese. They also represented different *aliran*. Feith and Castles found that PNI had predominantly *priyayi* and *abangan* supporters, PKI attracted support among traditional *abangan* followers, and most of NU and Masyumi voters came from *santri* groups, with NU in Java and Masyumi in the outer islands (Feith and Castles 1970). Reinforcing these

findings, Liddle (1970) also found that the activism of Indonesian parties in the 1950s represented socio-cultural schisms within society. In addition, the result of the 1955 election showed that support for a party more or less depended on party identification with *aliran* ideology (Liddle 1970). The pattern of voter support for Parkindo and Partai Katholik, largely in North Sumatera, North Sulawesi, the Moluccas, and East Nusa Tenggara, reflected the parties' support in the Catholic and Protestant communities in these regions. Likewise, the ethnic parties' specific to the regions, such as Partai Persatuan Dayak in Kalimantan, Gerakan Pilihan Sunda in West Java and independent candidates, such as PPPLM Idrus Effendi of Southeast Sulawesi, had limited and specific bases of support. Just as with the four large parties, these small parties reflected the socio-cultural schisms within society and Indonesia's cultural and religious diversity.

The way parties competed, among other things, was a serious threat to Indonesia as a nation state. This was evident when Islamist parties, such as Masyumi, PSII and Perti, endorsed the establishment of an Islamic state, while NU's position fluctuated. The latter wanted to (re)incorporate the Jakarta Charter into the Constitution that declared the Indonesian state is based on the belief in One, Supreme God with the obligation of the adherents of Islam to implement Syariah,⁸⁰ that had been removed from the original Constitution of 1945. This idea was opposed by the nationalists, communists, socialists, Catholics and Christian parties, such as the PNI, PKI, PSI, Murba, Parkindo and Partai Katholik, who defended Pancasila as the foundation of the state, while the NU finally accepted the exclusion of the Jakarta Charter. However, because both coalitions held similar levels of support and neither wanted to budge from their positions, the ideological dispute became deadlocked. The conflict was only resolved in 1959 through a Presidential Decree that confirmed Pancasila as the basis of the state and reinstated the 1945 Constitution (Elson 2009).

Mietzner (2008) argued there were two reasons for this deadlock. First, 1955 parties had little interest in gaining votes in the ideological centre of the political spectrum. Among

⁸⁰The phrase is known as 'the seven words' of the Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter).

the 28 parties in parliament, none occupied the ideological centre. The four big parties took positions at both ends of the spectrum, between the Islamist coalition of Masyumi and NU, who together held 39.3%, and the Nationalist-Communist coalition of PNI and PKI with 38.7%. Second, the remaining 24 parties who seized 22% preferred to support one of the factions rather than set up their own camp. They supported the four large parties and tried to get concessions from their rivals. They fuelled the party competition by acting as either political shields or opportunists. One or more small parties shifting their support would not enable one side or the other to gain the two-thirds majority needed to win and revise the Constitution. As Mietzner points out, "...party systems need centrist parties to survive—parties that endorse the existing democratic structures, pragmatically merge the aspirations of various socio-political segments into a broad policy platform and refrain from using divisive ideological issues to pursue their cause" (2008: 435). In the party system that has developed since 1998, the opposite tendency is found: the dominant parties have become increasingly centrist.

Although parties have placed themselves in one of the party blocks—Islamist versus Nationalist-Communist; the rivalry within these blocks was intense. As part of this issue, parties did not get along well with other parties of similar ideology. They were even willing to work with other parties across the ideological divide. For example, Masyumi considered the NU as its major rival and vice versa. Masyumi led the Islamist block at least until NU defected in 1952 to form a separate party, Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (Nahdlatul Ulama Party; hereafter PNU). NU then formed an organisation called Liga Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim League; hereafter Liga Muslimin). The league consisted of the PNU, PSII, PERTI, Darul Da'wah Wal Irsjad and Perserikatan Tionghoa Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Chinese Association). Through Liga Muslimin, NU tried to replace Masyumi as the leader of the Islamist block. Another example was the PKI, who preferred to move closer to PNI rather than, for example, the same aliran called Murba—a radical nationalist, socialist and eclectic Marxist party. Although, the PKI move was driven more by its interest in gaining the support of President Sukarno than the attractiveness of PNI as an organisation. The PKI's dependency on the need for Sukarno's protection against the Army was demonstrated

when the party, together with PNI, became the only two parties who supported President Sukarno's idea of Guided Democracy.

Nonetheless, the party competition ended soon after Guided Democracy was imposed in 1957. Parties remained in existence but needed to work together under the guidance of President Sukarno as the leading figure. Two years later, through the Government Instruction No.7/ 1959, 10 out of 28 political parties which won the 1955 election continued to enjoy legal status—PNI, NU, PKI, Partai Katholik, Partai Indonesia (Partindo), PSII, Partai Kristen Indonesia, IPKI, Perti and Murba. Two parties (Masyumi and PSI) were banned because of their involvement in regional rebellions. These rebellions in 1957–58 based in several provinces in Sumatera and Sulawesi demanded more regional autonomy and more funds for their regions. They were led by local military officers and civilian politicians, reflecting the old conflicts between Java Island and the outer islands. Regional elections were held in 1957 and 1958, but not in the regions where the rebellions were based. In 1958–59, according to Feith and Castles, parties

...were obliged to express enthusiastic support for the President's ideas on all occasions and to put their own ideas forward in the form of glosses on the President's doctrine. Interparty polemic took the form mainly of accusations that one's enemy was unfaithful to the President and Great Leader of the Revolution and hypocritical in adherence to his doctrine (1970: 10).

At the beginning of 1960, the bargaining position of parties increased because the President began to feel threatened by the aggressive political activity of the military, strengthened by its control of nationalised enterprises and senior positions in the civilian bureaucracy and martial law, and he needed party support to consolidate his own position. Of the three surviving big parties, PKI was strongest supporter. Although Sukarno was identified with the PNI of 1926, the PNI post-war version was not 'radical' enough for him. The NU had difficulties with the regime, given the shock of the dissolution of Masyumi and the forced ending of the basic state debate by the President's decree (Reeve 1985). Nonetheless, all parties supported the President's resistance against the military's intrusion into civilian areas. Non-communist parties

were also alarmed with the growing position of PKI and its land reform program. The revival of vigorous party competition was seen not only at a national but local level (Feith and Castles 1970).

President Sukarno proposed the ideological umbrella of Nasakom, with the objective of harmonising the antagonisms among political parties. There was a “power triangle” which consisted of President Sukarno, the military and the PKI. In this triangle, Sukarno played the role of serving both, and keeping the balance between the military and the PKI (Feith 1962). The implication of this depiction of the power constellation of the late Guided Democracy period is that other parties were marginalised. With the exception of the PKI, the party system was greatly weakened. Guided Democracy then ended in disaster with the attempted *coup d'état* in October 1965, according to the New Order government, organised by PKI, which marked the downfall of Sukarno and the rise of General Suharto's so-called New Order Government. The PKI was then prohibited and ousted from politics in 1966. And many of its leaders and members were killed and imprisoned. The issue of agency in the *coup d'état* remains highly contested. And, in particular, the discussion about the elimination, legally and physically, of what was by 1965 probably the largest and best organised of the 1955 parties. Only one of the big four parties increased its support in regional elections to survive the restrictions Sukarno imposed on the other parties.

1971 parties and party system: hegemonic-multi-party with narrow ideology spectrum

1971 parties and party system also conformed to Sartori's (1976) hegemonic-multi-party system. This is because the regime practised the hegemonic principles in dominating society and marginalising parties. To govern, the regime preferred to control political parties rather than used military force, except for the PKI that had been the most significant party in the last years of Guided Democracy. Although the number of parties participating in the 1971 election was not as high as in 1955, it remained high following Sartori's model and can be classified as multi-partyism.

As an impact of the exclusivity of the electoral threshold set for the 1971 election, only 10 parties were able to participate. Eight of the permitted organisations participated in the 1955 election—PNI, NU, PSII, Parkindo, Partai Katholik, Perti, Murba and IPKI. The other two were Parmusi (successor to Masyumi) and Golkar (government and military-backed political vehicle). A significant difference between 1955 and 1971 electoral mechanics is that the ballot structure was revised from party ballot open-list to closed-list. Besides, there were no independent candidates permitted in the 1971 election. Since then, Indonesia has no independent candidates in elections, except for the two new elections—the DPD in 2004 and Pilkada after 2007.

The idea to reduce numbers of parties and create a party to mobilise voters for government was originally that of President Sukarno. A year before the enforcement of martial law, President Sukarno expressed his disappointment with the existing party system in his famous speech entitled “Let Us Bury the Parties.” “The party system is one of complete disruption. ... I hoped the general elections would be able to restore our party system to health... to reduce the number of our parties.” (Sukarno in Feith and Castles 1970: 82-83). The Army leadership under General Nasution shared Sukarno’s criticisms of the party system. “In speeches in 1969 Nasution insisted that Sukarno considered the functional groups as a replacement for the parties....” (Reeve 1985: 143). In June 1957 the Army set up joint civil-military organisations called BKS-Pemuda-Militer (Youth-Military) that pulled together the youth organisations of the four major parties; this was followed by BKS-Buruh-Militer (Labour-Military) in December 1957 from 14 labour organisations and BKS-Tani-Militer (Peasant-Military) in September 1958 as the largest functional group of Indonesian people. Later, these BKS were transformed into Golkar. In July 1959, President Sukarno re-introduced the 1945 Constitution by decree, thereby providing the idea that democracy was not through parties but through functional groups with a new institutional framework. This led to change from party orientation to functional group orientation (Reeve 1985). These ideas were then adopted by President Suharto and the military, once they assumed control of the government after the 1965 Coup.

For the first time a party won the majority of votes. Golkar obtained 62.80% of the votes. NU came second with 18.67%. The PNI saw its support drop from 22.32% in 1955 to 6.94%. Parmusi finished with about 5.36% of the vote. However, although Parmusi got fewer votes in the election compared to the PNI, it gained more seats in parliament. Parmusi held 24 seats while PNI only held 20 seats in the national parliament. In stark contrast was Golkar with 336 seats or 73% of the total seats. Golkar's seats consisted of 227 from direct election in 25 provinces in Indonesia, nine seats from indirect election in West Papua and 100 seats from appointed parliament members (KPU 2000). Furthermore, as a military-backed political vehicle, Golkar had political support from 100 seats reserved for military representatives. These seats were compensation for members of the military, deprived of the right to vote and to stand for election.⁸¹ Hence, even though the 1971 election produced a parliament in which eight parties (Golkar, NU, Parmusi, PNI, PSII, Parkindo, Partai Katholik, and Perti) were represented, the parliament was dominated by one party—Golkar (see table 4.3 below).

Table 4.3: Legislative election, 1971

No.	Party name	Abbreviation	Votes	% of Votes	Seats	% of Seats
1	Golongan Karya	Golkar	34,348,673	62.80	236	65.56
2	Nahdlatul Ulama	NU	10,213,650	18.67	58	16.11
3	Partai Muslimin Indonesia	Parmusi	2,930,746	5.36	24	6.67
4	Partai Nasional Indonesia	PNI	3,793,266	6.93	20	5.56
5	Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia	PSII	1,308,237	2.39	10	2.78
6	Partai Kristen Indonesia	Parkindo	733,359	1.34	7	1.94
7	Partai Katholik	Katholik	603,740	1.10	3	0.83
8	Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah	Perti	381,309	0.70	2	0.56
9	Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia	IPKI	338,403	0.62	0	0.00
10	Musyawaharah Rakyat Banyak	Murba	48,126	0.09	0	0.00
	Total		54,699,509	100.00	360	100.00

Sources: KPU (2000). *Pemilu Indonesia dalam angka dan fakta tahun 1955–1999* [the Indonesian elections in number and facts, 1955-1999]. Jakarta: Biro Humas KPU.

⁸¹Law no.15/1969, articles 11 & 14.

Indeed, party competition both in election and parliament, was dominated by one party. Utilising the formula of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) to measure party size and strength, it was found that the EffNv and EffNs for the 1971 election were 2.28 and 2.15 respectively. This means that party competition was fragmented around two parties—Golkar and NU. However, considering that the votes and seats shared between the two parties constituted a large discrepancy of around 44%; it was only one party that was effective both in the election and in parliament. With more than 60% of the votes/seats share, Golkar dominated the electoral competition.

The party ideological spectrum of the 1971 election was more limited than Feith and Castles' five ideologies matrix in the 1955 election. In 1971, there was nationalism represented by PNI, Murba⁸² and IPKI; Islamism by NU, PSII, Perti and Parmusi; Christianity by Parkindo; Catholicism by Partai Katholik; and Pancasila by Golkar. Three issues should be noted here. First, neither communism nor socialism was represented in the 1971 election because the government had banned the PKI and PSI. Since then, communism and socialism have not been ideological options for modern Indonesian parties. Second, even though Islamism was represented by NU, PSII, Perti and Parmusi, after the 1971 election there were serious attempts by the government and the military to tame Islamism and contain demands for an Islamic state. For example, various attempts to re-create the old Masyumi, one of the strong supporters of an Islamic state in 1955, although in different guises, always failed. Third, Pancasila was adopted as the national ideology in the 1945 Constitution and became the ideology of Golkar and the New Order government. Pancasila was then transformed as the only permitted ideology for all political organisations in the country. Pancasila was perceived as an umbrella for many different ideologies. Pancasila was seen as an umbrella, for example, for religious parties because all religions (Islam, Catholic, Christian, Hindu and Buddha) in the country are acknowledged and translated into the first principle of Pancasila, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (belief in the divinity of God); this was also the case for the nationalist party because the spirit of nationalism is converted into the third

⁸²In the 1971 election, Murba was grouped under "Nationalism" because the "Socialist" characters of the party had already been weakened since PKI and PSI had been banned.

principle of Pancasila, Persatuan Indonesia (The Unity of Indonesia). Since Pancasila was adopted as the national ideology, Indonesia has turned into a Pancasila state. To reduce the intensity of antagonisms of party ideology, parties in parliament were grouped into four factions. The first faction was called “Democracy Development” and included PNI, Parkindo, Partai Katholik and Murba dan IPKI. The second was “Unity Development” and encompassed NU, PSII, Perti and Parmusi. The third and fourth factions included Golkar and the military; although both actually operated under the same roof. This strategy changed the pattern of parliamentary competition from being between parties to among factions. This strategy then followed by the party “simplification” policy imposed in 1973.

The electoral playing field for the 1971 election was not level. Golkar was fully supported by the government and the military; while the other parties were constrained. The government, for example, engineered the electoral laws in such a way as to create a situation in which Golkar gained more advantage. The military, which by law was not allowed to participate in the election, helped Golkar by so-called ‘maintaining security and order’ from national to village level. Together, the government and the military applied a combination of pressure, threats and intimidation to all parties, except Golkar. In Nishihara’s words: “... this constituted an obvious shift in electioneering strategy since 1969, when the government had been willing to maintain cooperative contacts with the parties” (1972: 23).

In order to make other parties than Golkar powerless, the government undermined them by creating party leadership crises, screening candidates, controlling campaign issues and banning civil servants from being actively engaged in political activities, except in support of Golkar. For example, in Parmusi’s first national congress in November 1968, the winning candidate for party chair, Mohammad Rum, a former foreign minister, negotiator of Indonesian independence and leader of Masyumi, was dismissed by the government. He was disqualified because of an accusation of involvement in the 1958 rebellion (Nishihara 1972). Other interference in internal party life involved screening through *Litsus* (Penelitian Khusus or special investigation). This procedure referred to

the involvement of the candidate and his/her close relatives in organisations or activities that opposed the regime. The criteria included involvement in the PKI attempted *coup* of October 1965, lack of positive support for development, and/or lack of support for Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. According to Nishihara (1972), because of this screening, 11 of Golkar's candidates were disqualified, PNI lost 164 of its candidates, Parmusi 131, PSII 112 and IPKI lost 111 candidates (The government also screened campaigns by regulating that all posters, leaflets, slides, slogans, brochures and other campaign materials be submitted in advance to the authorities. Party newspapers were prohibited to be circulated below district level. Even though, in contrast, Golkar's newspaper (*Suara Karya*) was freely distributed at village level. Government Ordinance No.60/1970 prohibited all civil servants from engaging in any political activities and banned top-ranking civil servants, such as cabinet ministers and all military members, from joining any political organisation except those affiliated with Golkar (Nishihara 1972). Ordinance No.1/1970 prohibited any campaigning that might discredit Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (Imawan 1989). However, even though the seven parties were intimidated, there was little evidence that they tried to build cooperation amongst these parties to oppose Golkar, the government and the military.

Yet, the significance of the 1971 situation did not lie just in the creation of Golkar as a powerful party; through Golkar, the military and the government had become participants in the arena of parliamentary politics. This move was important, because it represented a change in strategy from the 1955 election, when the military stayed out of the electoral process and exerted external influence over the parliament instead. This new strategy had opened the possibilities for further direct political involvement by the military. However, before General Suharto became President, the military had already assumed bureaucratic power through the 1957 Martial Law Statute and economic power through control of nationalised Dutch enterprises, which became the *Badan Usaha Milik Negara* (Indonesian state-owned enterprises; hereafter BUMN).

1977–1997 parties and party system: hegemonic-three party with narrow ideology spectrum (1977 & 1982) and with no alternative ideologies (1987–1997)

From 1977 to 1997 parties and party system conformed to Sartori's hegemonic three-party system. The regime dominated the electoral process even more completely than in 1971. The number of parties decreased sharply with the government's policy to "simplify" the party system, from 10 to three. In 1973, all parties except Golkar were forced to fuse into two parties. One was called PPP comprising the NU, PSII, Perti and Parmusi. Another was called PDI comprising PNI, Parkindo, Partai Katholik and Murba dan IPKI.⁸³ Between 1973 and 1997, the number of parties permitted in elections was only three. Thus only three parties were represented in parliament.

For the 1977 and 1982 elections, the number of ideologies permitted was three: Islamism represented by PPP, Nationalism represented by PDI and Pancasilaism represented by Golkar. It was a party system with a narrow ideological spectrum. Whereas for the 1987, 1992 and 1997 elections, the number of ideologies permitted was only one: Pancasila. Thus, it could be called a party system without competing ideologies.

In 1985, through Law No.3/1985, all political organisations were compelled to adopt Pancasila as their "one and only principle." As a consequence of this law, PPP and PDI lost their identities as Islamist and nationalist parties respectively. This made it even more difficult for the two parties to differentiate their identities from each other and from Golkar. The imposition of Pancasila became problematic for the PPP, as there were theological differences amongst its members dating from controversies about the Jakarta Charter in 1945. Even though some party leaders agreed with Pancasila, some of its members, particularly among the rank and file, resisted. They had never considered Pancasila as the party's ideology, but had been too fearful to challenge the policy. For PDI, the imposition of Pancasila was less problematic than for PPP. Some of the nationalist, Catholic and Christian groups within PDI had long had attachments with

⁸³This change was formalised through UU No.3/1973.

Pancasila dating from 1945 and the proclamation. As Pancasila is seen as a formulation of Indonesian nationalism, the old ideological differences within PDI were easier to manage. The law also required all parties to change their symbols. The PPP changed its symbol from the Ka'bah (the holy shrine in Mecca) into the image of a star (symbol of the first principle of belief in one God). The PDI adopted a symbol of a buffalo head (representing the principle of the sovereignty of the people), while Golkar took a banyan tree and a decoration of rice and cotton (representing the principle of the unity of Indonesia and social justice for all Indonesians).

Because the parties were not permitted to reflect any differences in their ideology or outlook, the party ideological competitions became highly centripetal compared to 1971. However, the political competition shifted from inter-party to intra-party. The debates were between factions within party organisations and often involved personal rivalries. One famous example was the election of PDI leaders. Since 1973, PDI had been fractured throughout its history by the process of leadership crises.

During the 1970s and early 1980s, no party congress took place without uproar. There were bitter splits in every party executive, public expulsions and counter expulsions of leading members, occupations and sit-ins in party buildings, and fierce public battles for control of regional branches (Aspinall 2005: 178).

The internal rivalries were used by government officials to justify their interventions, even though some of the internal conflicts were instigated by the government, by preferring one candidate over another. In this way, the government cultivated a constant state of disorder within the party. One such instance was when it attempted to interfere in the PDI when it supported Soerjadi as party chair, elected at an unconstitutional party congress in Medan in June 1996. This was despite the fact that Megawati had held the position since she was elected at the party congress in Surabaya in December 1993. Besides these problems among party leaders, the party was dealing with its supporters as well. The PDI's mass support base among the *pamong praja* (the civil service) and the Javanese peasantry was placed under pressure by the government's support for Golkar (Samson 1974). Thus, although the PDI could develop credible identification as

a Pancasila supporter, the party had problems in selecting its leaders and securing its supporter base.

The PPP also experienced internal party conflicts. The NU, the largest component of the PPP, departed in 1984 to follow the guidelines of 1926 (Khittah 1926), which meant the organisation returned to a purely social and religious orientation. This policy reflected the disappointment of NU politicians who had failed to dominate the leadership of PPP, rather than for ideological reasons (Kuntowijoyo 1997). However, the NU's withdrawal seemed to further weaken Islam as PPP's ideology. Two years after Pancasila was imposed by government, the NU pulled its support for the PPP by releasing its members from an obligation to vote for the party, even though previously the NU leader had issued a statement that voting for PPP was an obligation for NU constituents and for all Muslims. This meant the party's significance to the Muslim community had declined.⁸⁴

Although Golkar had fewer problems compared to PPP and PDI; political identity and party cohesion were problematic. Golkar was established in 1963 with the hope that it would espouse an identity as a developmentalist party, but by the early 1970s, there was considerable doubt about the ability of Golkar to develop this identity. This was one of the reasons

...why the Golkar system cannot work. The Golkar system is very much sustained by aristocratic Javanese perceptions of the state, to which Islamic doctrines and egalitarian, socialist, and popular demands are finally alien. And yet such doctrines and demands may well be a fact of life in future Indonesian events (Reeve 1985: 317).

The party competition was unfair. The government and military had created an electoral system in which the PDI and PPP were systematically and structurally disadvantaged. However, when PDI and PPP showed some resistance to government pressure, post the 1971 election, over the years the parties showed some compromise. Even though, at some party branches, the resistance remained. The outspoken PDI and PPP national and

⁸⁴Interview, Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 5 February 2009.

local leaders had been marginalised and their successors were pragmatists preoccupied with internal matters. If previously they focused on opposing government intimidation, now they concentrated on issues such as candidate selection, election campaigns and acquiring government office. With excessive attention to the issues around elections, the PPP and PDI began to adjust their strategies and positions. However, it was unlikely that they could obtain a larger share of the vote. Besides the involuntary fusion of the parties and the imposition of Pancasila, enforcement of the floating mass policy meant that the PDI and PPP could not mobilise support in villages.

The party electoral and parliamentary competition in the 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997 elections had a low level of fragmentation. Utilising EffN_v and EffN_s to measure parties' size and strength, it was found that they were 1.88 and 1.80 respectively. But, considering the uneven electoral and parliamentary playing field, the two indexes became insignificant. The competition was dominated by one party, Golkar, as the government's party and military back-up party, which created a *de facto* one-party system.

Nonetheless, even though during the 1977 to 1997 elections, Golkar always triumphed with a national average vote above 60%, if the election results are examined more closely, Golkar's victory was not absolute as there were some local areas where it failed to dominate. For example, the result in the 1977 election was that Golkar secured 62.11%, PPP 22.29% and PDI 8.60% of the vote nationwide (see table 4.4 below). At the provincial level, Golkar dominated 22 out of 26 provinces while PPP controlled four provinces: Aceh, South Sumatera, Jakarta and South Kalimantan. At regency/city level, Golkar failed to secure a majority in seven regencies/cities in Aceh provinces, two in West Sumatera, four in South Sumatera, one in Lampung, one in West Java, four in Central Java, eight in East Java, five in South Kalimantan, one in East Kalimantan, one in North Sulawesi and one in West Nusa Tenggara, with Golkar and PPP tied in one district in Central Java (Imawan 1989).

Table 4.4: Legislative election, 1977

No.	Party name	Abbreviation	Votes	% of Votes	Seats	% of Seats
1	Golongan Karya	Golkar	39,750,096	62.11	232	64.44
2	Partai Persatuan Indonesia	PPP	18,743,491	29.29	99	27.50
3	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia	PDI	5,504,757	8.60	29	8.06
	Total		63,998,344	100.00	360	100.00

Sources: KPU (2000). *Pemilu Indonesia dalam angka dan fakta tahun 1955–1999* [the Indonesian elections in number and facts, 1955-1999]. Jakarta: Biro Humas KPU.

In 1982, Golkar's votes increased to 64.34%, and PPP and PDI decreased to 27.78% and 7.88% respectively (see table 4.5). At the provincial level, Golkar dominated all except Aceh. At regency/city level, Golkar failed to dominate in seven regencies/cities in Aceh province, two in West Sumatera, two in South Sumatera, one in Jakarta, three in Central Java, 10 in East Java, and one in South Kalimantan, with Golkar and PPP tied in one district in Central Java (Imawan 1989).

Table 4.5: Legislative election, 1982

No.	Party name	Abbreviation	Votes	% of Votes	Seats	% of Seats
1	Golongan Karya	Golkar	48,334,724	64.34	242	67.22
2	Partai Persatuan Indonesia	PPP	20,871,880	27.78	94	26.11
3	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia	PDI	5,919,702	7.88	24	6.67
	Total		75,126,306	100.00	360	100.00

Sources: KPU (2000). *Pemilu Indonesia dalam angka dan fakta tahun 1955–1999* [the Indonesian elections in number and facts, 1955-1999]. Jakarta: Biro Humas KPU.

The 1987 election was marked by Golkar's improved performance. The party increased its portion of the vote to 73.11% and won, for the first time, a majority in all provinces. However, a study by Dwight King and Rasjid (1987) showed that although Golkar held a majority in Aceh, the party failed to secure a majority in three regencies including Aceh Besar, Pidie and Aceh Utara. And, in two regencies in South Sumatera and one regency in East Java (Imawan 1989). In contrast, PPP votes declined to 15.96% and its domination in provinces where traditionally the Islamist parties had dominated such as Aceh, West Sumatera and East Java. The decline was mostly caused by the New Order

government's imposition of Pancasila on all parties as the only ideology. Besides, in 1984, PPP was abandoned by its biggest component, the NU.⁸⁵ In contrast, the PDI, which was always considered peripheral to politics, was able to increase its votes to 10.93%. And significantly, these votes came from 23 provinces including those traditionally known as clusters for Golkar and PPP (see table 4.6).

Table 4.6: Legislative election, 1987

No.	Party name	Abbreviation	Votes	% of Votes	Seats	% of Seats
1	Golongan Karya	Golkar	62,783,680	73.11	299	74.75
2	Partai Persatuan Indonesia	PPP	13,701,428	15.96	61	15.25
3	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia	PDI	9,384,708	10.93	40	10.00
	Total		85,869,816	100.00	400	100.00

Sources: KPU (2000). *Pemilu Indonesia dalam angka dan fakta tahun 1955–1999* [the Indonesian elections in number and facts, 1955-1999]. Jakarta: Biro Humas KPU.

In the 1992 election, Golkar's support declined to 68.10%. PPP once again lost support to 17% while PDI increased its support to 14.89% (see table 4.7). PDI's rise was because of the party's attempt to "... stand out as a confrontational and largely populist opposition party. The party focused its campaign on critical issues, such as the country's 'sick' democracy, the prevalence of corruption, nepotism and monopolistic practices, and economic and social injustice" (Eklof 2004: 163).

Table 4.7: Legislative election, 1992

No.	Party name	Abbreviation	Votes	% of Votes	Seats	% of Seats
1	Golongan Karya	Golkar	66,599,331	68.10	282	70.50
2	Partai Persatuan Indonesia	PPP	16,624,647	17.00	62	15.50
3	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia	PDI	14,565,556	14.89	56	14.00
	Total		97,789,534	100.00	400	100.00

Sources: KPU (2000). *Pemilu Indonesia dalam angka dan fakta tahun 1955–1999* [the Indonesian elections in number and facts, 1955-1999]. Jakarta: Biro Humas KPU.

⁸⁵Interview, Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 5 February 2009.

In May 1997, Indonesia held its sixth and last election under the New Order. Golkar increased its vote to 74.51%. PPP's vote increased to 22.43%. However, PDI's support declined to 3.07%. The number decreased because PDI supporters chose to vote for PPP, or submit a blank ballot⁸⁶ when voting as an expression against the regime. The blank votes might also have been a show of solidarity with Megawati, elected party chair of the PDI for the period 1993–1998, and who was removed by the New Order government in June 1996 (see table 4.8).

Table 4.8: Legislative election, 1997

No.	Party name	Abbreviation	Votes	% of Votes	Seats	% of Seats
1	Golongan Karya	Golkar	84,187,907	74.51	325	76.47
2	Partai Persatuan Indonesia	PPP	25,340,018	22.43	89	20.94
3	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia	PDI	3,463,225	3.07	11	2.59
	Total		112,991,150	100.00	425	100.00

Sources: KPU (2000). *Pemilu Indonesia dalam angka dan fakta tahun 1955–1999* [the Indonesian elections in number and facts, 1955-1999]. Jakarta: Biro Humas KPU.

1999, 2004 and 2009 parties and party system: atomised multi-party with very narrow ideology spectrum

The reformasi parties and party system has different characteristics from those of the New Order period, because they are created under very different political, economic and social-cultural circumstances. However, their “historical baggage” remains influential in their values, patterns of behaviour and identity.

The context of the political party

The context in which parties (re)emerge critically influences the nature of party organisation. The changing context is often seen as the ultimate source of party organisational change (Katz and Mair 1992). The context in which Indonesian parties (post reformasi in 1998) were established or reconstituted was one of transition from an

⁸⁶The supporters of a blank ballot popular called ‘Golput’, an abbreviation for *Golongan putih* or white group.

authoritarian to a more democratic regime, which was thought of as the only possible trajectory. In this context, almost all parties established post reformasi 1998 shared similar experiences, hopes, challenges and concerns. There are at least four issues that can be identified.

Firstly, the reformasi parties experienced four decades of Sukarno and Suharto's authoritarian regimes where political freedom and justice are suppressed and parties are essentially incompatible; "... the restrictions on dissident political behaviour generally made it impossible for political organizations other than the ruling party to develop or persist" (Van Biezen 2003: 30). There was a strong tendency for parties to distance themselves from the authoritarian regime. The PDI and PPP were successful in symbolising an anti-authoritarian movement. The PKB and PAN were admired because their leaders were leading figures in the reformasi movement. Golkar, previously the ruling party, re-constituted itself with a new identity, and avoided being identified with the Suharto regime. Many other parties that emerged after reformasi also disassociated themselves from the authoritarian regime. Even military-backed parties, whose leaders were part of the authoritarian regime, considered it to be politically advantageous to distance themselves from their past. Almost all parties opposed any restoration of an authoritarian regime and considered there was no other option but to use constitutional means, if they wanted to participate in politics. "Following the Constitution, anybody who wants to involve in politics needs to join a political party. Hence, he or she may participate in an election to get position..." remarked General (ret.) Wiranto, founder of Partai Hanura and former Minister in the Suharto, Habibie and Wahid governments.⁸⁷

Secondly, the reformasi parties have had to contend with ambiguous opinions about widespread political parties in society. On one side, people understand the importance of political parties for a democratic system. They are *sine qua non* for the political organisation of the modern democratic polity. On the other side, people are also pragmatic about the roles and functions of political parties. Much of this sentiment may

⁸⁷Interview, Wiranto, Jakarta, 28 March 2009.

be associated with what many regard as the personal and political failures of previous party leaders, and their pursuit of personal financial gain and political position. More specifically, it may also be associated with problems of the weakened party linkages with society and with parties' inability to create adequate channels of representation. Besides, it is not political parties who were at the forefront of pro-democracy movements in 1998. It was student movements that assumed the leading role, bringing about fundamental political change.

Thirdly, parties post reformasi 1998 shared similar expectations of the new democratic regime. They wanted a new regime which could offer alternatives that were different from the New Order. Indeed, parties worked hard to fulfil the expectations by presenting many alternatives, but the alternatives were poorly articulated. Most of them did not have the organisational capacity to translate their ideals and aspirations into programs and policies. According to Amin Rais, founder of PAN: "The poor organization, indecisive leaders, and the ignorant members make it difficult for parties to perform. It seems that Indonesian parties are just buying time..."⁸⁸

There were parties who tried to present an alternative to the Suharto government's policies and programs, but admittedly the authoritarian regime was better in planning and formulating its policies and programs as well as their implementation. At least until the 1997 financial crisis, the Suharto government successfully addressed the people's immediate needs in improving public services, such as water, food, health, education and transportation, as well as promoting national issues such as trade, industrialisation, employment, technology development, the environment and crime. Suharto had promised and, until the 1997 financial crisis, implemented a program of economic development. In contrast, none of the reformasi parties, including the transformed Golkar, had shown that their policies and programs were as comprehensive and as practical as the authoritarian government. In fact, they tended not to articulate specific policies and programs and, if they existed, they were unclear, partial, exclusive and not

⁸⁸Interview, Amien Rais, Jakarta, 25 February 2009.

far-reaching. The reformasi parties tended not to express their ideologies, either Pancasilaism or Islamism, in a way that related to the parties' policies and programs. There were parties that experimented with different strategies; one was the "politics of anti-politics", facilitated by two particular legacies of the past. First, parties were not seen as trusted political institutions. And, second, they were born in the absence of an effective civil society (Van Biezen 2003). Parties were perceived as negative and societal opposition had come to be seen as a movement against the state. And frequently these anti-regime organisations described themselves as non-political organisations. In 1999, for example, Partai Keadilan (Justice Party; hereafter PK) stated that the party did not seek a seat in parliament. The party was established for *dakwah* (to deliver a religious Islamic message). In 2004, President Yudhoyono portrayed himself as the nominee of the people, not as the nominee of a political party. President Yudhoyono conducted a campaign against the political parties. Paradoxically, he was nominated by the Demokrat Party, which he established in 2001. This "politics of anti-politics" strategy was effective: PK obtained two seats in the 1999 election and Yudhoyono was elected as President in 2004, then re-elected in 2009. Actually, this strategy is not new, as it has echoes of the New Order government's pretence that Golkar was not a party, but a functional organisation.

Fourthly, parties since 1998 shared similar weak organisation, unable to generate income from their members and supporters. To secure their survival, parties depend largely on public money—a practice secured for decades by earlier parties. Since parties are seen as essential political institutions for contemporary democracy, the need to fund them publicly is beyond dispute. Besides, state subventions are relatively accessible and easy to control, especially since parties themselves enjoy the privilege to decide on amounts of money and rules to access. The state's financial support of the parties was both from the Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara (Central Government's Annual Budget; hereafter APBN) and, for party branch and sub-branch offices, from the Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah (Local Government Annual Budget; hereafter APBD). However, state subvention made parties heavily dependent on the state, and encouraged their orientation towards the state. At the same time, the

widespread availability of state funds reduced the incentive to mobilise financial support from membership. In addition, state subvention enhanced parties' electoral orientation, because these subsidies were allocated on the basis of electoral support and parliamentary representation. In this sense, public funding may strengthen the parties' orientation to more ad hoc and short-term interaction with the electorate, rather than on the development of structural and more permanent relationships between party organisation and society. This argument is also true for the new parties established as electoral vehicles, such as Demokrat, Hanura and Gerindra, that had sufficient financial resources to compete with established parties until they won seats and could access government funds. Government funds however were insufficient to cover parties' expenses, particularly the cost of election campaigns.

Nonetheless, in 1999, when parties asked the government to pay a state subvention on a regular basis, the President of the Day, Abdurrahman Wahid, refused. Only in his last days in office did the President accept this request; he then issued PP 51/2001 on financial assistance to political parties. It ruled that each party would annually receive Rp. 1,000 (around 10 US cents) per vote obtained in the 1999 election. The funds were taken from the APBN for parties' central boards and from the APBD for parties' local branches. The approval of this disbursement of state funds was quite easy, because the President could appease parties that were about to impeach him, and many local heads of government needed party support for their re-election. In 2002, under President Megawati's government, the parliament revised the policy to change funding to a vote based on a seat-based formula. The formula, legalised through PP 29/2005 by President Yudhoyono, entitled parties to receive Rp. 21 million (US\$2.300) per seat in the 2004 election, while local governments were authorised to make their own decisions (Mietzner 2007).

The PP 29/2005 led to a drastic drop in party income. To solve their financial problems, parties then asked their representatives, both in DPR and government offices, national and local, to increase their donations to the party. Besides, parties also exploited business institutions as their alternative source of income. Studies by Nankyung Choi in

Yogyakarta and Riau (2004, 2007), Jacqueline Vel in East and West Sumba (2005), and Michael Buehler and Paige Tan in South Sulawesi (2007), showed that in many local cases, both in Pilleg and Pilkada, parties sold the nomination to wealthy individuals who had no previous connection with the party. Mietzner, argued that the:

Cut in state subsidies for parties in 2005 has contributed to a significant increase in their illicit fund-raising efforts. Most importantly, parties have intensified their endeavours to exploit legislative and executive institutions as alternative sources of income. This trend has not only reinforced the public image of parties as rent-seeking and self-serving, but has also undermined their internal coherence and their ability to carry out basic democratic functions(2007: 238).

The inability of parties to solve their financial problems has caused them to become dependent. On one side, state funding has made them heavily dependent on the state and encourages their orientation towards the state. On the other side, business funding has encouraged the parties to adopt a kind of “check book democracy”, such as in USA, where the influence of business money in the political process is intolerably high (West 2000). They are caught in the middle between the control of the state and the power of business. This has put their support of a particular policy or piece of legislation actually has being exchanged for donations. The biggest donation is used to finance their electoral campaigns. Without doubt, coupled with the escalating cost of electoral campaigns, party expenses have escalated to a level that is difficult to imagine. Furthermore, this widespread availability of state and business money has reduced the incentives for parties to mobilise funds from their own supporters. Over time, parties have shifted their position away from society; and only draw closer to the people before the election. After more than a decade post reformasi, political reform has led parties to depend largely on the state and business, instead of being independent; and parties to shift away instead of moving closer to the people. This was acknowledged by the majority of politicians and party officials interviewed.⁸⁹

⁸⁹Interview, Pramono Anung, Jakarta, 3 February 2009; Abdillah Toha, Jakarta, 4 February 2009; Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 5 February 2009; Akbar Tandjung, Jakarta, 6 February 2009; Hj. Suryatati A. Manan, Tanjung Pinang, 8 February 2009; H.M. Soerya Respationo, Batam, 9 February 2009; Ahmad Adib Zain, Bandung, 12 February 2009; Amien Rais, Jakarta, 25 February 2009; Ryaas Rasyid, Jakarta, 8 March 2009; Rafiuddin Hamarung, Makassar, 16 March 2009; Rustam Naba, Gowa, 18 March 2009;

Table 4.9: Legislative election, 1999

No.	Party name	Abbreviation	Votes		Seats	
			No	%	No	%
1	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan	PDIP	35,689,073	33.74	153	33
2	Partai Golongan Karya	Golkar	23,741,749	22.44	120	26
3	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	PKB	13,336,982	12.61	51	11
4	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan	PPP	11,329,905	10.71	58	13
5	Partai Amanat Nasional	PAN	7,528,956	7.12	34	7
6	Partai Bulan Bintang	PBB	2,049,708	1.94	13	3
7	Partai Keadilan	PK	1,436,565	1.36	7	2
8	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan	PKP	1,065,686	1.01	4	1
9	Partai Nahdlatul Umat	PNU	679,179	0.64	5	1
10	Partai Persatuan	PP	551,028	0.52	1	0
11	Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa	PDKB	550,846	0.52	5	1
12	Partai Masyumi	Masyumi	456,718	0.43	1	0
13	Partai Daulat Rakyat	PDR	427,854	0.40	1	0
14	Partai Nasional Indonesia -Supeni	PNI-Supeni	377,137	0.36	0	0
15	Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia	PSII	375,920	0.36	1	0
16	Partai Kristen Nasional Indonesia	Krisna	369,719	0.35	0	0
17	Partai Nasional Indonesia -Front Marhaenis	PNI-FM	365,176	0.35	1	0
18	Partai Bhineka Tunggal Ika Indonesia	PBI	364,291	0.34	1	0
19	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia	PDI	655,052	0.62	2	0
20	Partai Nasional Indonesia -Massa Marhaenis	PNI-MM	345,720	0.33	1	0
21	Partai Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indo	IPKI	328,564	0.31	1	0
22	Partai Republik	Partai Republik	208,157	0.20	0	0
23	Partai Kebangkitan Umat	PKU	300,064	0.28	1	0
24	Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia	KAMI	289,489	0.27	0	0
25	Partai Ummat Islam	PUI	269,309	0.25	0	0
26	Partai Katholik Demokrat	PKD	216,675	0.20	1	0
27	Partai Abul Yatama	PAY	213,979	0.20	0	0
28	Partai Musyawarah Kekeluargaan GR	Partai MKGR	204,204	0.19	0	0
29	Partai Indonesia Baru	PIB	192,712	0.18	0	0
30	Partai Solidaritas Uni Nasional Indonesia	Partai SUNI	180,167	0.17	0	0
31	Partai Cintai Damai	PCD	168,087	0.16	0	0
32	Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia	PSII 1905	152,820	0.14	0	0
33	Partai Masyumi Baru	Masyumi Baru	152,589	0.14	0	0
34	Partai Nasional Bangsa Indonesia	PNBI	149,136	0.14	0	0
35	Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia	PUDI	140,980	0.13	0	0
36	Partai Buruh Nasional	PBN	111,629	0.11	0	0
37	Partai Kebangsaan Merdeka	PKM	104,385	0.10	0	0
38	Partai Nasional Demokrat	PND	96,984	0.09	0	0
39	Partai Aliansi Demokrat Indonesia	PADI	85,838	0.08	0	0
40	Partai Rakyat Demokrat	PRD	78,727	0.07	0	0
41	Partai Pekerja Indonesia	PPI	63,934	0.06	0	0
42	Partai Islam Demokrat	PID	62,901	0.06	0	0
43	Partai Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak	Murba	62,006	0.06	0	0
44	Partai Solidaritas Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia	SPSI	61,105	0.06	0	0
45	Partai Rakyat Indonesia	PARI	54,790	0.05	0	0
46	Partai Umat Muslim Indonesia	PUMI	49,839	0.05	0	0
47	Partai Solidaritas Pekerja	PSP	49,807	0.05	0	0
48	Partai Pilihan Rakyat	PILAR	40,517	0.04	0	0
	Total		105,786,658	100.00	462	100

Sources: KPU (2000). Pemilu Indonesia dalam angka dan fakta tahun 1955–1999 [the Indonesian elections in number and facts, 1955-1999]. Jakarta: Biro Humas KPU.

Wiranto, Jakarta, 28 March 2009; Djarot Saiful Hidajat, Surabaya, 4 April 2009; Sujud Pribadi, Malang, 5 April 2009; Ramadhan Pohan, Jakarta, 8 April 2009.

Table 4.10: Legislative election, 2004

No.	Party name	Abbreviation	Votes	% of Votes	Seats	% of Seats
1	Partai Golongan Karya	Golkar	24,480,757	21.58	128	23
2	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan	PDIP	21,026,629	18.53	109	20
3	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	PKB	11,989,564	10.57	52	9
4	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan	PPP	9,248,764	8.15	58	11
5	Partai Demokrat	Demokrat	8,455,225	7.45	57	10
6	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera	PKS	8,325,020	7.34	45	8
7	Partai Amanat Nasional	PAN	7,303,324	6.44	52	9
8	Partai Bulan Bintang	PBB	2,970,487	2.62	11	2
9	Partai Bintang Reformasi	PBR	2,764,998	2.44	13	2
10	Partai Damai Sejahtera	PDS	2,414,254	2.13	12	2
11	Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa	PKPB	2,399,290	2.11	2	0
12	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia	PKPI	1,424,240	1.26	1	0
13	Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan	PPDK	1,313,654	1.16	5	1
14	Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan	PNBK	1,230,455	1.08	1	0
15	Partai Patriot Pancasila	Pancasila	1,073,139	0.95	0	0
16	Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme	PNI-M	923,159	0.81	1	0
17	Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia	PPNUI	895,610	0.79	0	0
18	Partai Pelopor	Pelopor	878,932	0.77	2	0
19	Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia	PPDI	855,811	0.75	1	0
20	Partai Merdeka	Merdeka	842,541	0.74	0	0
21	Partai Sarikat Indonesia	PSI	679,296	0.60	0	0
22	Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru	PPIB	672,952	0.59	0	0
23	Partai Persatuan Daerah	PPD	657,916	0.58	0	0
24	Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat	PBSD	636,397	0.56	0	0
	Total		113,462,414	100.00	462	84

Sources: KPU (2004a). Kompilasi dokumen pemilu legislatif 2004 [Collected documents of the legislative elections, 2004]. Jakarta, Indonesia: Biro Humas KPU.

Table 4.11: Legislative election, 2009

No.	Party name	Abbreviation	Votes	% of votes	Seats	% of seats
1	Partai Demokrat	Demokrat	21,703,137	20.85	148	26.43
2	Partai Golongan Karya	Golkar	15,037,757	14.45	106	18.93
3	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan	PDIP	14,600,091	14.03	94	16.79
4	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera	PKS	8,206,955	7.88	57	10.18
5	Partai Amanat Nasional	PAN	6,254,580	6.01	46	8.21
6	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan	PPP	5,533,214	5.32	38	6.79
7	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	PKB	5,146,122	4.94	28	5.00
8	Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya	Gerindra	4,646,406	4.46	26	4.64
9	Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat	Hanura	3,922,870	3.77	17	3.04
10	Partai Bulan Bintang	PBB	1,864,752	1.79	0	0.00
11	Partai Damai Sejahtera	PDS	1,541,592	1.48	0	0.00
12	Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama	PKNU	1,527,593	1.47	0	0.00
13	Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa	PKPB	1,461,182	1.40	0	0.00
14	Partai Bintang Reformasi	PBR	1,264,333	1.21	0	0.00
15	Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional	PPRN	1,260,794	1.21	0	0.00
16	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia	PKPI	934,892	0.90	0	0.00
17	Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan	PDP	896,660	0.86	0	0.00
18	Partai Barisan Nasional	Barnas	761,086	0.73	0	0.00
19	Partai Pengusaha dan Pekerja Indonesia	PPPI	745,625	0.72	0	0.00
20	Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan	PDK	671,244	0.64	0	0.00
21	Partai Republika Nusantara	RepublikaN	630,780	0.61	0	0.00
22	Partai Persatuan Daerah	PPD	550,581	0.53	0	0.00
23	Partai Patriot	Patriot	547,351	0.53	0	0.00
24	Partai Nasional Banteng Kerakyatan Indonesia	PNBK	468,696	0.45	0	0.00
25	Partai Kedaulatan	Kedaulatan	437,121	0.42	0	0.00
26	Partai Matahari Bangsa	PMB	414,750	0.40	0	0.00
27	Partai Pemuda Indonesia	PPI	414,043	0.40	0	0.00
28	Partai Karya Perjuangan	Pakar Pangan	351,440	0.34	0	0.00
29	Partai Pelopor	Pelopor	342,914	0.33	0	0.00
30	Partai Kasih Demokrasi Indonesia	PKDI	324,553	0.31	0	0.00
31	Partai Indonesia Sejahtera	PIS	320,665	0.31	0	0.00
32	Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme	PNI-M	316,752	0.30	0	0.00
33	Partai Buruh	Partai Buruh	265,203	0.25	0	0.00
34	Partai Perjuangan Indonesia Baru	PIIB	197,371	0.19	0	0.00
35	Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia	PPNUI	142,841	0.14	0	0.00
36	Partai Sarikat Indonesia	PSI	140,551	0.14	0	0.00
37	Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia	PPDI	137,727	0.13	0	0.00
38	Partai Merdeka	Merdeka	111,623	0.11	0	0.00
	Total		104,095,847	100.00	560	100.00

Sources: KPU (2009a). Kompilasi dokumen pemilu legislatif 2009 [Collected documents of the legislative elections, 2009]. Jakarta, Indonesia: Biro Humas KPU.

The nature of the party system

The reformasi party system shows many paradoxes and sends confusing signals. For example: the party contest is viewed as more open and more competitive, but rather it is more closed and more restricted. The party system seems more fluid because of the more blurred lines of party ideology and the tendency to move to the centre of the ideology spectrum. However, when it is analysed from the vantage point of the ideology blocks – Pancasilaism and Islamism- a different pattern emerges. The analysis below refers to tables 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 above.

Atomised multi-partyism

The 1999, 2004 and 2009 party system conformed to Sartori's atomised multi-partyism category, similar to the 1955 party system, partly due to some features of the electoral system and mechanics, the 1999, 2004 and 2009 party systems were comparable to those of 1955. The electoral thresholds of the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections were made inclusive to encourage participation. As an impact, the actual numbers of parties participating in the elections were high. There were 48 parties in 1999, 24 parties in 2004 and 38 national parties plus 6 Aceh local parties in 2009. The electoral formula of the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections and the parliamentary threshold of the 2009 election were set to discourage participation. As an impact, the actual number of parties participating in the parliament was low. In 1999, only 21 parties gained a seat or seats in the national parliament, 17 parties in 2004, and 9 parties in 2009. Only 6 parties in 1999, 7 in 2004 and 9 in 2009 passed the electoral threshold. They were then categorised as large and significant (see table 4.12).

Table 4.12: Party systems, 1999, 2004 and 2009

Election	1999	2004	2009
Party system	Atomised multi-party	Atomised multi-party	Atomised multi-party
Absolute number of parties in election	48 parties	24 parties	38 parties + 6 Aceh local parties
Absolute number of parties in parliament who obtained at least a seat	21 parties	17 parties	9 parties
Absolute number of parties in parliament who passed electoral threshold	6 parties	7 parties	9 parties (passed electoral and parliamentary threshold)

Sources: assorted party and KPU documents relating to the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections.

Very narrow ideology spectrum

The 1999, 2004 and 2009 party system had a very narrow ideological spectrum of just two ideologies—Pancasilaism and Islamism. Pancasilaism is considered more as a symbol of the acknowledgement of religious freedom as constituted in the first principle of Pancasila—belief in the divinity of God. This is particularly significant because since its inception, the issue of religious freedom has been the subject of disagreement between Nationalist and Islamist supporters. While Islamism is considered not only as a theological construction and religious teaching, but also as a source of guidance in political life, government policies and practices. However, there is no consensus on what comprises an Islamist agenda among parties, particularly relating to the establishment of an Islamic state based on the formal adoption of Syariah (Islamic Law) as the legal system. It should be noted that competition within Pancasilaism and Islamism is intense as. Despite the disagreement on the first principle of Pancasila, all parties, either discreetly or otherwise, support the other four principles of Pancasila: just and civilised humanity; the unity of Indonesia; democracy guided by the inner wisdom

in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives; and social justice for all the people of Indonesia.⁹⁰

Based on parties' self-declared ideology written in their Charters, in the 1999 election, there were 35 parties that adhered to Pancasilaism, 11 parties acknowledged Islamism and two parties adopted other ideologies. In the 2004 election, 18 parties recognised Pancasilaism and 6 parties followed Islamism. In the 2009 election, 31 parties recognised Pancasilaism and 7 parties Islamism (see table 4.13).

Table 4.13: Party ideology, 1999, 2004 and 2009

Election	1999	2004	2009
Pancasilaism	35 parties	18 parties	31 parties
Islamism	11 parties	6 parties	7 parties
Others	2 parties	0 party	0 party
Total	48 parties	18 parties	38 parties

Sources: assorted party and KPU documents relating to the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections.

Nonetheless, there were parties who offered an alternative ideology other than Pancasilaism and Islamism. In the first election post reformasi, however, most of them did not win a seat in Parliament. To survive, they mostly changed their ideology, their name, merged with another party or ceased to operate. Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia (Uni Democracy Party; hereafter PUDI) and Partai Rakyat Demokrat (Democrat People Party; hereafter PRD) were actually very popular among young voters, but still gained no seat in the 1999 election. The PUDI promoted a social-religious democracy and the PRD advocated social democracy. Given Indonesia's political history from the late 1910s until 1965, the failure of socialist parties to re-emerge after Suharto is remarkable.

⁹⁰Interview, Pramono Anung, Jakarta, 3 February 2009; Abdillah Toha, Jakarta, 4 February 2009; Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 5 February 2009; Akbar Tandjung, Jakarta, 6 February 2009; Amien Rais, Jakarta, 25 February 2009.

There were other parties that proposed alternative ideologies, such as labour, Marhaenism, Christianity and Catholicism. However, officially, they all acknowledged Pancasilaism as their party ideology. No parties were associated with labour organisations and advocating workers' rights gained one single seat in parliaments elected in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections, including Partai Solidaritas Pekerja (Workers Solidarity Party; hereafter PSP), Partai Buruh Nasional (National Labour Party; hereafter PBN), Partai Solidaritas Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (All Workers Solidarity Party; hereafter PPSPI), Partai Pekerja Indonesia (Indonesian Workers Party; hereafter PPI) and Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat (Social Democratic Labour Party; hereafter PBSK). Marhaenists understand Marhaenism as Sukarno's ideas on commitment to social welfare for the "little people." Although some observers perceive Marhaenism as a kind of socialist thinking, the philosophy behind these two is different, particularly when compared to a Western understanding of socialist philosophy. Marhaenism is inspired more by belief in the one and only God, social nationalism and social justice thoughts.⁹¹ Marhaenism and Christian parties shared a similar fate to labour parties. However, Catholicism party survived. The only Catholicism party in the 1999 election, Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (Love the Nation Democratic Party; hereafter PDKB), gained one parliamentary seat. The party then changed its name to Partai Damai Sejahtera (Prosperous and Peace Party; hereafter PDS), and participated in the 2004 and 2009 elections. In 2004, the party gained two parliamentary seats, but none in 2009.

There were also parties, either supporters of Pancasilaism or Islamism, who were very creative in naming their ideology. They formed a long phrase that consisted of many different and abstract concepts. However, from the phrase used, it could be inferred that these parties targeted a broad segment of voters. This was obvious for the 1999 parties: PKB called its ideology "Pancasila dengan prinsip Ahli Sunnah" (Pancasilaism based on orthodox law based on teachings and practices of Muhammad); PNI-MM "Pancasila, Marhaenisme: Ketuhanan, Sosio-Nasionalisme, Sosio-Demokrat" (Pancasilaism, Marhaenism: Belief in God, Socio-nationalism and Socio-democrat); PKU "Pancasila

⁹¹Interview, Suparno, Tanjung Pinang, 9 February 2009; Asmara, Ember, 20 March 2009.

akidah Islam Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah” (Pancasilaism based on Islamic teaching of Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah); PCD “Pancasila dan pedoman Islam” (Pancasilaism and Islamic Guidance); KAMI “Al Quran dan Hadist” (Koran and Islamic Guidance) and PSII 1905 and PSII 1905 “Dinul Islam” (Islamic Teaching). In the 2004 election, PAN called its ideology “Akhlik Politik berdasarkan agama” (Political Moral based on Religion); PNBK and PNI-M “Marhaenisme Bung Karno” (President Sukarno Marhaenism); Merdeka “Pancasila, Kekeluargaan, Gotong Royong, Keadilan, Demokrasi; and Kemajemukan” (Pancasilaism, Kinship, Mutual Assistance, Justice, Democracy, Pluralism). In the 2009 election, PNBK and PNI-M called their ideology “Marhaenisme” (Marhaenism).

Supporters of Pancasilaism

Parties who support Pancasilaism are those that acknowledge and support religious freedom, as established in the first principle of Pancasila. However, some of these supporters actually have other orientations in mind. But, for political reasons or strategic purposes, they prefer not to declare openly. Nonetheless, most of these other orientations resemble the values of Pancasila. In fact, they enrich Pancasilaism as an ideology umbrella. Based on these orientations, an examination of party documents and in-depth interviews with party figures, this study thus established the supporters of Pancasilaism that comprise two groups (see table 4.14).

The first group “Pancasilaist parties” acknowledge Pancasila as the only orientation with PDIP, Golkar, PKP, PBI, PDI, PDR, IPKI, Republik, MKGR, PNBI, PKM, PND, PADI, PARI and PILAR in the 1999 election; Golkar, PDIP, Demokrat, Merdeka, PPD, PKPI, PPDI, PKPB, Pancasila, PPD and Pelopor in the 2004 election; and Demokrat, Golkar, PDIP, Gerindra, Hanura, PKPB, PPRN, PKPI, PDP, Barnas, PDK, Republikan, PPD, Patriot, Kedaulatan, PPI, Pakar Pangan, Pelopor, PIS, PPDI and Merdeka in the 2009 election.

The second group “Pancasilaist parties plus other orientation” acknowledge Pancasila as their formal legal ideology written in their Charter, but also embrace other orientations,

for example, religion, ideology, principle, theory and belief. The group consisted of Christian and Catholic orientation parties with PKD, KRISNA and PDKB in the 1999 election; PDS in the 2004 election; and PDS and PKDI in the 2009 election. The socialist orientation parties were PBN and Murba in the 1999 election; and PPIB in the 2004 and 2009 elections. Labour and trade union parties were PSP, PSPSI and PPI in the 1999 election; PBSD in the 2004 election; and PPPI and Partai Buruh in the 2009 election. The Marhaenism orientation parties were PNI-Supeni, PNI-MM and PNI-FM in the 1999 election; and both PNBK and PNI-M in the 2004 and 2009 elections.

Table 4.14: Pancasilaist parties, 1999, 2004 and 2009

Election	1999	2004	2009
Pancasilaist party			
	PDIP, Golkar, PKP, PBI, PDI, PDR, IPKI, Republik, MKGR, PNBI, PKM, PND, PADI, PARI, PILAR	Golkar, PDIP, Demokrat, Merdeka, PPDK, PKPI, PPDI, PKPB, Pancasila, PPD, Pelopor	Demokrat, Golkar, PDIP, Gerindra, Hanura, PKPB, PPRN, PKPI, PDP, Barnas, PDK, RepublikaN, PPD, Patriot, Kedaulatan, PPI, Pakar Pangan, Pelopor, PIS, PPDI, Merdeka
Pancasilaist party plus other orientations			
• Christian and Catholic orientation	PKD, KRISNA, PDKB	PDS	PDS, PKDI
• Socialist orientation	PBN, Murba	PPIB	PPIB
• Labour orientation	PSP, SPSI, PPI	PBSD	PPPI, Partai Buruh
• Marhaenism orientation	PNI-Supeni, PNI-MM, PNI-FM	PNBK, PNI-M	PNBK, PNI-M

Sources: assorted party documents relating to the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections.

Supporters of Islamism

Parties who support Islamism are defined as those parties that acknowledged Islamism as their party ideology. However, if this ideology is considered distinctive in character

that distinguishes one party from another, and as basic principles that constitute shared beliefs, attitudes and assumptions which cause a certain group of people to come together, the supporters of Islamism could be grouped into two parties: Islamic and Islamist. Islamic parties are those that recognise Islam as a theological construction and endorse Islamic universal values but do not promote Islamist agendas, particularly the establishment of Indonesia as an Islamic state. In contrast, the Islamist parties recognise Islam not only as a theological construction but also as guidance in religion, state and society with an objective of promoting an Islamist agenda and establishing an Islamic state. Both groups draw their support from particular communities in Muslim society (see table 4.15).

The first group, “Islamic parties”, was represented by PAN, PKB, PKU, PNU, PID, PIB, SUNI, PCD and PUMI in the 1999 election; PKB and PSI in the 2004 election; and PAN, PKB and PSI in the 2009 election. The second group, “Islamist parties”, is represented by PPP, PBB, PK, PP, PSII, Masyumi, KAMI, PUI, PAY, PSII 1905 and Masyumi Baru in the 1999 election; PBB, PPP, PPNUI, PAN, PKS and PBR in the 2004 election; and PKS, PPP, PBB, PKNU, PBR, PMB and PPNUI in the 2009 election. It should be noted here that PAN in the 1999 and 2009 elections was categorised as an Islamic party, but in the 2004 election, an Islamist party. This is due to parties’ changing ideology. The significance of this dynamic regarding the internal party mechanisms of PAN will be discussed in chapter five.

Table 4.15: Islamic and Islamist parties, 1999, 2004 and 2009

Election	1999	2004	2009
Islamic parties	PAN, PKB, PKU, PNU, PID, PIB, SUNI, PCD, PUMI	PKB, PSI	PKB, PAN, PSI
Islamist parties	PPP, PBB, PK, PP, PSII, Masyumi, KAMI, PUI, PAY, PSII 1905, Masyumi Baru	PBB, PPP, PPNUI, PAN, PKS, PBR	PKS, PPP, PBB, PKNU, PBR, PMB, PPNUI

Sources: assorted party documents relating to the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections.

Parties' size and strength, and the two ideologies

In terms of numbers, the party systems of reformasi era can be categorised high by international standards. However, even though the number of parties does matter, it is insufficient in and of itself to comprehend who really has the power. Hence, assessing parties' size and strength becomes even more important. Utilising EffNv and EffNs of Laakso and Taagepera to measure parties' size and strength, it was found that indexes in 1999 were 5.06 and 4.71; in 2004 they were 8.55 and 7.07 and in 2009 they were 9.58 and 6.20. It could be said that on paper, in 1999, there were 5 (out of 48) parties effective in the election and 4 (out of 21) parties effective in the parliament. In 2004, there were 8 (out of 24) parties effective in the election and 7 (out of 17) parties effective in the parliament. In 2009, there were 9 (out of 38) parties effective in the election and 6 (out of 9) parties effective in the parliament (see table 4.16). These indexes are very useful in examining the potential of party competition and coalitions, which will be discussed in chapter six.

Table 4.16: Effective parties, 1999, 2004 and 2009

Election	1999	2004	2009
EffNv	5.06	8.55	9.58
EffNs	4.7	7.07	6.13*
Parties in election	48 parties	24 parties	38 parties + 6 Aceh local parties
Parties in parliament	21 parties	17 parties	9 parties

Sources: assorted party and KPU documents relating to the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections.

EffNv = Effective Number of Votes; EffNs = Effective Number of Seats

Note: * Parliamentary threshold applied.

Furthermore, it was found that either in the election or in the parliament of 1999, 2004 and 2009, Pancasilaist parties were always dominant. For example, the PDIP and Golkar took control in 1999 with aggregated votes of 66.18% and aggregated seats of 59%. Golkar, PDIP, and Demokrat ruled in 2004 with aggregated votes of 47.56% and aggregated seats of 53%. Golkar, PDIP, and Demokrat once again dominated in 2009

with aggregated votes of 49.33% and aggregated seats of 62%. However, it should be noted that even though on paper their aggregated votes and seats were high, in practice these large Pancasilaist parties, either as individual or combined, never really took majority control. It was difficult for them to build coalitions between and among them. Instead, the rivalry was intense.

Nonetheless, “Pancasilaist parties” together with “Pancasilaist parties plus other orientation” have become increasingly dominant in terms of their share of the national vote and representation in parliament. In 1999, they obtained 62.05% of votes, in 2004 it was 61.05% and in 2009, 70.07% (see table 4.17).

Table 4.17: Vote share of Pancasilaist parties, Legislative election 1999, 2004 and 2009 election

Election	1999	2004	2009
Pancasilaist parties	59.58%	55.88%	67%
Pancasilaist parties plus other orientation	23.73%	16.34%	14.79%
• Catholic/Christianity orientation	1.07%	2.13%	1.79%
• Socialist orientation	0.19%	0.59%	0.19%
• Labour orientation	0.17%	0.56%	0.97%
• Marhaenism orientation	1,04%	1.89%	0.75%
Total Pancasilaist parties	62,05%	61.05%	70.7%

Sources: assorted party and KPU documents relating to the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections.

In contrast, Islamist and Islamic parties have consistently performed poorly, but they remain significant and influential. In 1999, Islamist parties gained 16.43% of the vote; in 2004 their support rose sharply to 27.77%, but in 2009 dropped away to 18.21%. Interestingly, in the 1999 election, the Islamic parties achieved higher results than Islamist parties. They gained 21.26%; almost 5% higher than the total achievement of Islamist parties. However, in 2004, when PAN moved to the Islamist group, the votes of the Islamic parties group collapsed to 11.70%. In 2009, PAN supported the Islamic parties group, which reinstated 6.01% votes. But the popular support of PAN seemed insignificant, because at the same time the other large Islamic party, PKB, lost almost

half of its votes. Hence in 2009, the aggregated share of Islamic parties was only 11.09% (see table 4.18).

Table 4.18: Vote share of Islamist parties, Legislative election 1999, 2004 and 2009

Election	1999	2004	2009
Islamist parties	16.43%	27.77%*	18.21%
Islamic parties	21.26%	11.17%**	11.09%
Total valid vote	105,786,661 (100%)	113,462,414 (100%)	104,095,847 (100%)

Sources: assorted party and KPU documents relating to the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections.

Note: * excluded PAN, the number decreased to 21.33%. ** included PAN, the number increased to 17.61%.

Fluid party system with relatively firm ideology blocks

The fluidity of a party system is assessed by Mainwaring and Scully's indicator—volatility in terms of the electoral vote. Volatility refers to an index for measuring change in aggregate voting patterns between two or more elections. Volatility is calculated as the sum of the absolute values of electoral differences divided by two (Mainwaring and Scully 1995).

Table 4.19 below shows the volatility rate of seven parties in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 national parliamentary elections. Only seven parties (PPP, PBB, PKS, PAN, PKB, PDIP and Golkar) have survived since 1999. They won a significant number of votes and passed the electoral threshold. Two smaller parties also survived, the PNI-M and the PKPI, but they won less than 1% of votes in every election and did not pass the electoral threshold. Hence, the PNI-M and PKPI were of no consequence and they have been excluded from the analysis. This analysis cannot include the new entrants, Demokrat, Gerindra and Hanura because they only exist for one/two election(s), even though the success of these parties may confirm the pattern of electoral volatility.

The volatility rate based on the national parliamentary result shows that the party system has been fluid, with wide swings in support of different parties. In general, all

parties had a downward swing, except PBB and PKS. In the 1999–2004 elections, the party most badly hit was PDIP, while the most successful was PKS. In 2004–2009, the party to suffer the most was Golkar. PDIP performed better while PKS was not as successful as in 1999–2004. PBB had a positive 0.68 rate in 1999–2004, but was a negative 0.83 rate in 2004–2009. PPP had a negative 2.56 rate in 1999–2004, and continued with a negative 2.83 rate in 2004–2009. This dynamic reveals that there is a tendency for many voters to vote inconsistently, as they do not support the same party from election to election.

Table 4.19: Total aggregate volatility parties, Legislative election 1999, 2004 and 2009

Party		Change in vote between elections (%)		Total aggregate volatility*
		1999-2004	2004-2009	
Pancasilaist Parties*	PDIP	-18.53	-4.5	11.51
	Golkar	-0.86	-7.13	3.99
Islamic Parties	PAN	-0.68	-0.43	0.55
	PKB	-2.04	-5.63	3.83
Islamist Parties	PPP	-2.56	-2.83	2.69
	PBB	+0.68	-0.83	0.75
	PKS	+5.98	+0.54	3.26
Total aggregate volatility		15.66	10.94	13.29

Sources: assorted party and KPU documents relating to the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections.

Note: * Demokrat is excluded because it did not exist in the 1999 election.

However, the volatility rate cannot show why voters vote inconsistently and what factors prompt voters to swing. Neither do such results tell us about the background of swinging voters and to where they go. For example, the reasons for PDIP supporters to swing in the 2004 DPR election were different from PPP supporters. It was said that the main reason for swinging PDIP voters was disappointment with President Megawati's government. While the main reason for PPP voters was the departure of Zainuddin MZ, a prominent leader of PPP. PDIP's swinging voters mainly constituted the floating

mass, sympathisers of Megawati when she opposed the government in the last years of Suharto's rule.⁹² While the PPP swing mainly came from party officials, party supporters and party opportunists, who either sympathised with Zainuddin MZ or were after positions in his new party called PPP-reformasi (reform PPP).⁹³

Even though the support for individual parties had been fluid, it remained relatively firm when examined as a block: Pancasilaist parties, Islamic parties and Islamist parties. If voters swing, they just shift their choice to another party within the same block. In table 4.19 above, it is apparent that the electoral volatility rate is higher for Pancasilaist parties and low for Islamic and Islamist parties, which suggests that party loyalty for individual Pancasilaist parties' is relatively fragile, compared to Islamic and Islamist parties.

The average of total aggregate volatility of Pancasilaist parties was 7.75, Islamic parties 2.19, and Islamist parties 2.23. It seems that the voters of Pancasilaist parties swing easily, but they mainly voted for other Pancasilaist parties. Indeed, the Pancasilaist parties' share of the vote increased steadily across three post Suharto elections and the number of Pancasilaist parties increased in every election, including the most successful of the new parties—Demokrat, Hanura and Gerindra. The emergence of these three parties is a good example of fluidity in party support. None of them actually existed in 1999. Demokrat entered in 2001. Hanura and Gerindra joined in 2006 and 2008 respectively. Demokrat grew from nothing to become the most successful party in 2009. Using this logic, this suggests that the mass departure of the 18.53% PDIP supporters in the 1999 election, mostly to Demokrat, or to other Pancasilaist parties, rather than to Islamic or Islamist parties in 2004.⁹⁴

In contrast, these results show that individual Islamist parties have a relatively firm voter base compared to Pancasilaist and Islamic parties. It seems that the supporters of

⁹²Interview, Farman Jaya Daily, Jakarta, 31 January 2009; DJ Zachariah, Bantam, 8 February 2009.

⁹³Interview, Kyai Fawaid As'ad Syamsul Arifin, Situbondo, 22 March 2009.

⁹⁴Interview, Pramono Anung, Jakarta, 3 February 2009; Firman Jaya Daely, Jakarta, 31 January 2009.

Islamist parties are not easily swayed, but, if they do swing, it is likely they will choose either another Islamist or Islamic party. Thus, the increased support for the PKS (5.98%) in 2004 was more likely the result of an exodus of frustrated supporters who were dissatisfied with the work of PPP, PBB, PAN or PKB, rather than from PDIP, Golkar and Demokrat voters.⁹⁵

It is a different story for Islamic parties. The results show that these parties showed greater instability compared to Pancasilaist parties and Islamist parties. Islamic parties lost 10.17% of the votes from the 1999–2004 elections. It is likely that their voters went either to Pancasilaist parties, considering their openness to Islamic values, or Islamist parties offering a clearer Islamic orientation.⁹⁶ However, using the same rationale, it is also easier for Islamic parties to revive support. They tend to become the alternative choice for swinging voters of Pancasilaist and Islamist parties. Hence, if Pancasilaist or Islamist supporters decide to swing; there is a high possibility they will choose Islamic parties as their alternative (see table 4.20).

Table 4.20: Vote share of ideological parties, Legislative election 1999, 2004 and 2009

Election	1999	2004	2009
Total Pancasilaist parties	62.05%	61.05%	70.07%
Total Islamic parties	21.26%	11.17%	11.09%
Total Islamist parties	16.43%	27.77%*	18.21%

Sources: assorted party and KPU documents relating to the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections.
 Note: *excluding PAN, the number decreased to 21.33%.

Weak party roots with the continuity of beliefs, values and history

To examine the parties' roots, usually Mainwaring and Scully's indicator 'party age' is used. It is assumed that the older the party, the stronger the party roots (Mainwaring and Scully 1995a; Mainwaring 1998). If following this indicator, almost all Indonesian

⁹⁵Interview, Amien Rais, Jakarta, 25 February 2009; Andi Zulkifli Muis, Makassar, 17 March 2009.

⁹⁶Interview, Amien Rais, Jakarta, 25 February 2009; Ahmad Adib Zain, Bandung, 12 February. 2009; Rustam Naba, Gowa, 18 March 2009.

parties of 1999, 2004 and 2009 have weak party roots. They could not attribute their strong support to their longevity because they were not old enough to satisfy the standard. They are PAN (founded in 1998), PKB (founded in 1998), PDIP (founded in 1999), Demokrat (founded in 2001), PKS (founded in 2002), Gerindra (founded in 2008) and Hanura (founded in 2006). The only exceptions are Golkar (founded in 1964) and PPP (founded in 1973).

However, if “the continuity of beliefs, values and history,” is used, the picture is different. Almost all Indonesian parties of 1999, 2004 and 2009 actually have strong party roots. Golkar was actually founded in 1957, if the party is traced to the 1950s BKS sipil-militer (joint civil-military organisations). PPP is a fusion of the 1955 parties: NU, Parmusi, PSII and Perti. PAN and PKB have special associations with Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, which have existed since 1912 and 1926 respectively. PDIP is a splinter group of PDI, created in 1973. PDI is also a fusion of the 1955 parties: PNI, IPKI, Murba, Parkindo and Partai Katholik. The PNI can trace its history back to the establishment of the PNI before independence in 1926. PKS is the new name of PK (Partai Keadilan) founded in 1998. Demokrat, Gerindra and Hanura are new parties, but they have historical ties with Golkar, because their founders were senior Golkar officials, while many of their leaders had political careers in Golkar. Hence, these nine parties are not as young as they might seem, as they have roots that can be traced back to the early years of independence and even the pre-war nationalist movement, especially relating to their beliefs and values. Again, the bottle may have changed, but the wine remains the same.

If the continuity of beliefs, values and history is used to exercise the case of Golkar in South Sulawesi, it is found that actually the party has relatively strong roots, even though Golkar supporters seemed to have split their vote. In Pilleg, they voted for Golkar. In Pilpres and Pilkada, they voted for candidates of other parties. However, if the case is examined carefully and placed in the broader political context, that is, Indonesian parties are still searching for their identity and purpose, the case of Golkar in

South Sulawesi demonstrates the complexity. Arguably it is definitely not only about party age.⁹⁷

In the 1999 and 2004 Pilleg, Golkar dominated South Sulawesi. The party led in all 28 regencies/cities. In the 2009 legislative election, Golkar remained in control in 19 out of 23 regencies/ cities; the party failed only in Tana Toraja, Luwu Utara, City of Makassar and City of Palopo. In 1999, Golkar reached 44 out of 65 (67%) seats of DPRD province. In 2004, the party obtained 33 out of 75 (44%) seats of DPRD province. In 2009, it held 18 out of 75 (24%) seats of DPRD province (Kesbang Linmas 2009).

However, in Pilpres 2004, it seemed that Golkar did not dominate South Sulawesi because many of Golkar's supporters in the legislative election voted for Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla of the Demokrat-led coalition rather than supporting candidates of Golkar (Wiranto-Solahuddin Wahid). It should be noted that Jusuf Kalla, previously, was a Golkar senior official at national level, a favoured son of South Sulawesi, where his family businesses are among the strongest in South Sulawesi. Reflecting the shifting sands of party and regional allegiances, less than a year after Jusuf Kalla was sworn in as Yudhoyono's vice president, he was elected as Golkar's national leader. In South Sulawesi, Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla won in 27 out of 28 regencies/cities, both in the first and second round of Pilpres 2004 (see table 4.21 below).

⁹⁷Interview, Ryaas Rasyid, Jakarta, 8 March 2009; Rafiuddin Hamarung, Makassar, 16 March 2009.

Table 4.21: Vote share of Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla in South Sulawesi province, Presidential election 2004

No.	Province/Regency/City	First round (%)	Second round (%)
	Province Sulawesi Selatan	64.17	87.24
1	Kabupaten Selayar	36.12	80.23
2	Kabupaten Bulukumba	77.90	96.09
3	Kabupaten Bantaeng	51.71	88.77
4	Kabupaten Jeneponto	65.87	94.20
5	Kabupaten Takalar	67.78	94.55
6	Kabupaten Gowa	67.48	94.32
7	Kabupaten Sinjai	54.32	81.08
8	Kabupaten Maros	67.65	93.81
9	Kabupaten Pangkajene Kepulauan	81.09	96.84
10	Kabupaten Barru	65.44	94.86
11	Kabupaten Bone	83.44	97.51
12	Kabupaten Soppeng	79.81	95.86
13	Kabupaten Wajo	81.57	97.36
14	Kabupaten Sidenreng Rappang	70.07	95.26
15	Kabupaten Pinrang	66.94	93.57
16	Kabupaten Enrekang	46.50	94.76
17	Kabupaten Luwu	55.37	88.09
18	Kabupaten Tana Toraja	19.31	31.32
19	Kabupaten Polewali Mamasa (Polmas)	62.16	79.44
20	Kabupaten Majene	57.49	80.38
21	Kabupaten Mamuju	64.55	80.92
22	Kabupaten Luwu Utara	58.56	85.42
23	Kabupaten Mamasa	39.78	54.57
24	Kabupaten Luwu Timur	58.86	80.05
25	Kabupaten Mamuju Utara	64.46	70.95
26	Kota Makassar	62.56	86.72
27	Kota Pare-Pare	66.48	91.41
28	Kota Palopo	53.21	85.43

Sources: Kesbang Linmas Provinsi Sulawesi Selatan (2009), Laporan Rekapitulasi Pemilu Tahun 1999, 2004 dan 2009 (Report on Election of 1999, 2004, 2009), (Makassar, Sulawesi Selatan: Kesbang Linmas Provinsi Sulawesi Selatan).

In Pilkada Governor 2007, once again it seemed that Golkar did not dominate South Sulawesi because many Golkar supporters voted for Syahrul Yasin Limpo-Agus Arifin Nu'mang who was nominated by PPKD, PDIP, PDS and PAN rather than supporting candidates of their party (Amin Syam-Mansyur Ramly. On paper, Syahrul Yasin Limpo-Agus Arifin Nu'mang held only 13.69% votes in DPRD province, while their competitor Amin Syam-Mansyur Ramly held 57.09% votes of DPRD province (supported by Golkar, PKS, PKB, PD, PBSB, PKPI) and Aziz Qahhar Mudzakar-Mubyi Handaling held 15.98% votes of DPRD province (supported by PPP, PBB, Merdeka, PSI, PPD, PPNU, PIB, PNBK) (KPUD 2008). Even though, Syahrul Yasin Limpo-Agus Arifin Nu'mang was nominated by coalition of PPKD, PDIP, PDS and PAN both of them were known as Golkar party officials in the province. Syahrul was born in South Sulawesi of a Golkar family. His father was one of the founders of the Golkar branch office in South Sulawesi. His mother was a Member of Parliament for DPR national, and a representative of Golkar in South Sulawesi. Syahrul's older sister is chairwoman of the Golkar sub-branch in Gowa regency. His younger brother is a high official in the Golkar branch office in South Sulawesi province. Agus Arifin Nu'mang was also born in South Sulawesi of a Golkar family. He had different story with Syahrul but their political careers were similar.

In Pilkada for Regents and Mayors of South Sulawesi, a similar picture was evident. Twelve out of 23 Pilkada held in South Sulawesi in 2005–2008 were won by candidates nominated by Golkar with or without coalition. The other successful candidates were nominated by other parties, but many of them had previously been cadres of Golkar⁹⁸(see table 4.22).

⁹⁸Interview, Hirsan Bachtiar, Gowa, 17 March 2009; Jayadi Nas, Makassar, 17 March 2009.

Table 4.22: Head of local government in South Sulawesi province, Head of local government election 2005–2009

No.	Province/Regency/City	Name of head/vice-head of local government	Party/coalition of parties who nominate
	Province Sulawesi Selatan	H. Syahrul Yasin Limpo, SH, Msi. Ir. H. Agus Arifin Nu'man, MS	PAN, PPK, PDIP, PDS
1	Kabupaten Selayar	Drs. H. Syahrir Wahab, MM Hj. Nursyamsina Aroepala	PKB, PPP, PBB
2	Kabupaten Bulukumba	AM Sukri A. Sappewali Drs. H. Padas, Msi	PBB, PDIP, PKB
3	Kabupaten Bantaeng	Dr. Ir. HM Nurdin Abdullah, M.Agr. Drs. H. Andi Asli Mustajab, Msi	PKS, PBB, PKB
4	Kabupaten Jeneponto	Drs. Radjamilo, MP Drs. Burhanuddin Baso Tika, MM	Golkar, PKB
5	Kabupaten Takalar	Drs. H. Ibrahim Rewa, MM Drs. Andi Makmur Andi Sadda	Golkar
6	Kabupaten Gowa	H. Ihsan Yasin Limpo, SH HA. Razak Badjidu, S.Sos	Golkar, PPK, Demokrat
7	Kabupaten Sinjai	Andi Rudyanto Asapa, SH Andi Massalinti Latief	Golkar, PBR, PPK, Merdeka
8	Kabupaten Maros	H.A. Nadjamuddin Aminullah, S.Sos Drs. HA Paharuddin	Golkar
9	Kabupaten Pangkajene Kepulauan	Ir. H. Syafruddin Nur, Msi. HA Kemal Burhanuddin, BSc	Golkar, PKS, PAN, PKB
10	Kabupaten Barru	Drs. H. Andi Muhammad Rum H. Kamrir DG Mallongi, SH	Golkar
11	Kabupaten Bone	HA. Muh. Idris Galigo, SH Drs. HAM Said Pabokori	Golkar
12	Kabupaten Soppeng	Drs. H. Andi Soetomo, Msi. Drs. Andi Sarimin Saransi	PAN, PSI, PPNU, Merdeka, Demokrat
13	Kabupaten Wajo	Drs. H. Andi Burhanuddin Unru, MM Amran Mahmud, S.Sos, Msi.	PSI, PKPI, Merdeka
14	Kabupaten Sidenreng Rappang	H. Rusdi Masse Ir. H. Dollah Mando	PPP
15	Kabupaten Pinrang	HA. Aslam Patonangi, SH, Msi. Drs. HA Kharuddin Machmud	PAN, PPP, PKPI, PBB, PDS, PPIB, PNU, PNI, PNBK, Pancasila
16	Kabupaten Enrekang	Ir. H. La Tinro La Tunrung Drs. Nur Hasan	Golkar
17	Kabupaten Luwu	Ir. H. Andi Muzakar, MH Syukur Bijak	PBB, PBR
18	Kabupaten Tana Toraja	Johanis Amping Situru, SH Drs. A. Palino Popong	PKPI, PPD, Demokrat
19	Kabupaten Luwu Utara	Drs. HM Luthfi A. Mutty, Msi. Drs. Arifin Junaidi, MM	PPK
20	Kabupaten Luwu Timur	Drs. HA Hatta Marakarma, MP H. Saldy Mansyur, SE	Golkar, PAN
21	Kota Makassar	Ir. H. Ilham Arief Sirajuddin, MM Drs. H. Supomo Guntur, MM	Golkar, PDIP, PDS, PBR, PBB, PPD
22	Kota Pare-Pare	H. Moh. Zain Katoe H. Sjamsu Alam	Golkar
23	Kota Palopo	Drs. HAP Tenriadjeng, Msi Ir. H. Rahmat Masri Bandaso, Msi	Golkar, PDIP, PKS, PSI

Sources: KPUD South Sulawesi (2009), Laporan Pilkada Sulawesi Selatan 2005-2009 (Report on 2005-2009 South Sulawesi Local Election) (Makassar, South Sulawesi: KPUD South Sulawesi).

The case of Golkar in South Sulawesi shows the inconsistency of Golkar supporters. At least three points can be inferred. First, there were difficulties in maintaining party support. The party failed to look after its cadres. Second, there were difficulties in the process of nominating candidates. Party nominating committees failed to identify the best potential candidates. Third, there were difficulties in establishing party discipline and the application of its own rules. However, these points do not explain why party indoctrination processes failed to implant party ideas, beliefs and values to their cadres; either that or Golkar's roots in South Sulawesi are weak.

Concluding remarks

This chapter found that the development of parties and party systems were influenced by beliefs, values and history of parties. Among the older parties, established during Sukarno's presidency regime and the New Order regime, their beliefs and values have been revived in the Reformasi era.

This chapter found that parties remained under the domination of their leaders and their organisations were poorly developed and depended heavily on state subvention. Members tended to have weak attachment to parties, which can be related to the effectiveness of the Suharto Regime's policies designed to inhibit the parties' development of cadre and branch networks. Parties had difficulties in implanting party ideas, beliefs and values to their cadres, in establishing party discipline and the application of its own rules and in maintaining party support. Party leaders and activists, who lost out in intra-party conflicts, often left and joined another party or established a new one.

This chapter found Indonesian party systems from 1955 to 2009 conformed to Sartori's atomized-multi-partyism, except for the period 1977 to 1997. The number of parties was always high compared to Western countries, for example, with 172 parties and quasi-political groups competed in 1955 elections, 10 parties in 1971 elections, 3 parties in 1977-1997 elections, 48 parties in 1999 elections, 24 parties in 2004 elections and 38

national parties plus 6 Aceh local parties in 2009 elections. However, the number of effective parties at electoral level ranged from 5 to 9; while the effective number of parties at parliamentary level ranged from 4 to 7.⁹⁹

The party system was highly fragmented, dominated by a few large parties and operating within two relatively stable ideological blocks - Pancasilaism and Islamism. Party ideologies had become simpler from five ideologies (radical nationalism, Islam, communism, Javanese traditionalism and democratic socialism) of parties under Old Order regime to only two ideologies (Pancasilaism and Islamism) of parties during the Reformasi era. Party system since 1998 is also more fluid with more blurred lines delineating party ideologies and the tendency of parties to move to the centre of the ideology spectrum. For example, when building either electoral or governing coalitions, parties work together across ideology blocks in an effort to support their shared goals and interests. However, when it is analysed from the vantage point of the ideology blocks -- a different pattern emerges..Further examination of how party and electoral politics change will be presented in the next chapter.

⁹⁹ The figures under New Order regime are omitted because the number of parties was determined by the regime.

Chapter Five

The development of *new politics*

“...formal electoral rules are not neutral in their impact; instead they systematically benefit some while penalizing others (Norris 2004: 9).”

“...the new politics...has two distinct meanings: first, a particular campaign style; and second, the application of marketing technology to politics” (Scott and Hrebemar 1984: 8-9).

Introduction

This chapter goes to the heart of the study. It addresses how electoral politics has changed post reformasi 1998, which examines how the changing nature of electoral politics has been influenced by electoral systems and electoral mechanics introduced post reformasi 1998. The discussion will focus on both intended and unintended consequences. Nonetheless, the divergent pressures will be treated as paradoxical twists in the development of political parties and party systems. Given that this study is a general treatise on electoral laws and regulations, the analysis will be broad and handled cautiously in recognition of the fact that impacts are limited by other variables including historical, political, economic, social and cultural.

The chapter also examines how the electoral context has changed post reformasi 1998, exploring these changes in the electoral context, which lead to the development of a *new politics* where media, political consultants and polling institutions play important roles and many politicians turn to celebrity politics. The term *new politics* is used to show that post reformasi 1998, Indonesian politics are different from the past. The term is borrowed from the USA, where it was used to describe changes in the political environment in the 1960s and 1970s. The main reason why this study uses the term is because the political environment in Indonesia is heading in the same direction. Certainly, there are discrepancies, not only because the development of new politics in

Indonesia came 30 to 40 years later than in the USA, but also because the political, economic, social, and cultural settings of both countries are different. It is not my intention to compare the direction of the development in these two countries here, but to merely borrow the term.

The chapter consists of two sections. The first section, 'Electoral politics post reformasi 1998', is divided into two subsections: 'The impacts of electoral systems' and 'The impacts of electoral mechanics.' The second section, 'Electoral context post reformasi 1998' is divided into three subsections which discuss significant issues: 'the increasing role of mass media,' 'the increasing role of political consultants and polling institutions' and 'the rising phenomenon of celebrity politics.'

Electoral politics

The nature of electoral politics post reformasi 1998 has changed. It is influenced by the paradoxical characteristics of the three different electoral systems (PR, SNTV and majoritarian systems) with their own electoral mechanics (ballot structure, electoral threshold, electoral formula and district magnitude). These paradoxical characteristics emerged as a consequence of the distinctive impacts of each system and mechanics, which produce countervailing pressures for political parties. It could be argued that these countervailing pressures are part of the democratic process, but the consequence is that electoral politics are caught between the impulses of 'inclusiveness versus exclusiveness,' and 'conflict versus compromise'.

For example, Indonesian electoral laws and regulations during the reformasi era were formulated with the objective to strengthen political parties. These laws grant parties considerable authority to determine who will dominate government and politics. However, paradoxically, the same electoral laws and regulations were also formulated with the intention to strengthen the candidate's relations with constituents. Parties were weakened externally and internally by the electoral systems, as legislated by parliament and interpreted by the courts. Parties were weakened from the outside by different

thresholds (low electoral threshold and high parliamentary threshold for Pilleg and high electoral threshold for Pilpres and Pilkada). Parties were weakened from the inside by the ballot open-list for Pilleg and candidate ballot for Pilpres and Pilkada. Parties were also undermined by the MK decisions stipulating a popular vote system for Pilleg and permitting independent candidates to compete in Pilkada. These two examples confirmed that apart from the intention to strengthen parties, the legislators and court interpretations supported the position of candidates relative to party organisations. These two examples confirmed that apart from the intention to strengthen parties, the legislators and court interpretations supported the position of candidates relative to party organisations.

*The impact of electoral systems*¹⁰⁰

Indonesian parties have found it difficult to deal with the “countervailing” pressures of competing in both PR and majoritarian systems. The PR system is adopted for legislative elections with its inclusive tendencies that enable representation of smaller parties. While majoritarian system is adopted for executive elections with aim to strengthen the electoral legitimacy of the President. With only one position to be won and combined with a high threshold, the majoritarian system tends to marginalise smaller parties by relegating them to be, at best, minor partners in nominating coalitions. The aim of making parliaments more inclusive under PR system was limited by the desire to strengthen the presidency and the executive authority in both national and regional governments by privileging the larger political parties in the nomination process. The PR system’s creation of multi-party representation in parliament has meant no one party is likely to win a majority of seats. The compromise has been the creation of ‘rainbow cabinets’ with some ministers drawn from various parties represented in parliament.

¹⁰⁰Indonesia adopts SNTV system for DPD offices, but because the competition for regional representative offices was not for parties; the discussion of the impacts of SNTV system on parties was minimal.

In the 1999 Pilleg, the PR system had brought Indonesia's politics closer to an inclusive democracy system and produced parliaments that reflected the vote share of the parties. But, over the years, the system has become less inclusive and less consensual, so the opportunity for small parties to participate in politics has been curtailed and the advantages for large parties have been enhanced. The number of parties represented in DPR national was reduced from 21 in 1999, 17 parties in 2004, to nine parties in 2009. Thus, the PR system in the 2009 election produced a less inclusive parliament; even though having nine parties in the parliament is still categorised as inclusive by international standards.

The majoritarian system used for presidential and head of local government elections has succeeded in creating an executive supported by a 'rainbow cabinet' at the national level, which has served to marginalise smaller parties. Plurality systems have contributed to greater political openness and inclusiveness at the local level and produced an electoral outcome after the first round of elections. However, a completely different picture can be obtained when the outcomes of majoritarian and plurality systems are assessed using other indicators, such as the formation of stable and effective government.

Stable and effective government was difficult to achieve. The combination of majoritarian and PR systems has produced a directly elected president with strong electoral legitimacy; his party is highly unlikely to have majority seats in the parliament. This situation has pushed the president to consider the balance of power in parliament to get legislation passed. To mobilise support from different parties in the parliament, as previously mentioned, the president then tended to form a 'rainbow cabinet' in which many party leaders with different orientations can be represented (Aspinall 2014). However, often these party leaders, as members of cabinet, do not have the authority to ensure support for the cabinet among their party members in the parliament. Indonesian rainbow cabinets are formed on the basis of presidential

appointments, as in the US, rather than party representatives, as in The Netherlands.¹⁰¹ With rainbow cabinets of this nature, it has been difficult to establish effective government, which is the aim of the majoritarian system. Hence, the original purpose of creating rainbow cabinets, to strengthen the position of the president in the parliament, has failed. Nonetheless, intentionally or otherwise, this situation has produced a *de facto* check and balance system. Even though, actually, Indonesia does not follow the idea of separation of powers (or checks and balances) such as in the US; but some would argue that constitutional design and electoral mechanisms are an important part of democratic practice, to ensure that government is not dominated by either the executive or legislature.

Nonetheless, electoral systems have a strong influence: at least two can be identified here. The first electoral system is the structure of opportunities for parties and candidates. Post reformasi 1998, cabinet positions, parliamentary offices and party officials, among others, remain dominated by “old elites” from the New Order Government, even though the new systems have become more pluralist. According to Hadiz, his class analysis found that “the old forces have been able to reinvent themselves through new alliances and vehicles” (2003: 593). For example, PDIP became the “house of exile” for retired military officers, Golkar refugees and disobedient business people, such as Arifin Panigoro, who joined the party in 1998. PAN however was supported by Fuad Bawazier, a finance minister under President Suharto. Hadiz argued that other players, both national and local including relative newcomers, had a kind of relationship with the New Order Government. Thus, Hadiz concluded that a “...different concentration of old politico-bureaucratic and business interests have been dispersed within all the major parties, along with typically small bands of reformist liberals whose influence arguably depend on continuing external pressure (i.e. from the IMF) for economic reform” (2003: 598). The old forces achieved a great victory when Yudhoyono, retired military general and close aide of President

¹⁰¹Not all cabinet members are party politicians. Marty Natalegawa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Gamawan Fauzi, the Minister of Home Affairs, were prominent members of President Yudhoyono’s Cabinet in his second period of government, who were not appointed as representatives of political parties. Marty Natalegawa is a diplomat; Gamawan Fauzi was a bureaucrat.

Suharto, was elected Indonesian President through a relatively free and fair competition in the 2004 Pilpres. The success of Yudhoyono inspired other military colleagues, Wiranto and Prabowo Subianto, to enter electoral politics. Since the 2009 election, the “old elites” have re-occupied most of their old strategic political, administrative and business positions at national, provincial and local levels.

The second electoral system is based on the behaviour of parties and candidates. Some political actors have become more democratic, but not all. Some changes have strengthened the democratisation process, others have jeopardised it. Nonetheless, at a minimum, parties and candidates have already changed their behaviour. “The DPR may still be seen as a chamber of cronies. But, these cronies and the parties from whence they come increasingly have no choice but to be effective representatives of the people if they want to stay in the political game” (Sherlock 2010: 177). Buehler’s study in South Sulawesi, conducted under the pluralism paradigm, also found that even though there was a continuance of the “old elites,” “... the new institutional environment has reshuffled the cards for political elites” (2007: 119). Furthermore, Buehler argued that not all “old elites” could maintain their position, only those who had the ability to adjust to the new dynamics and act accordingly, with strong socio-economic backgrounds and personal networks (2007: 120-40).

The discussion thus far has argued that electoral systems have influenced the behaviour of the parties and candidates and thus the dynamics of the party system. Further discussion on the impact of the four most significant electoral mechanics (i.e. ballot structure, electoral threshold, electoral formula and district magnitude) is presented in the following subsection.

The impact of electoral mechanics

It is difficult to identify and distinguish the impacts of electoral mechanics. However, in this analysis, each is discussed separately. The tensions generated have become part of the process through which Indonesia is developing political parties and a party system.

It was found that ballot structure was the most influential, while district magnitude was the least.

The impact of ballot structure

This study found two important impacts of ballot structure. Firstly, ballot structure influenced the development of party organisations. The choice of ballot structure determined the balance of power between parties and candidates. While party ballot open-list and candidate ballots weakened party organisations, they strengthened candidates. Secondly, the election of candidates within party lists on the basis of their personal vote intensified intra-party competition; it became as intense as inter-party rivalry.

The party ballot open-list and candidate ballots system weakened party organisation as evidenced by a decline in the influence of party organisations and leaders, particularly in the candidate nomination process. The systems also encouraged tight intra-party competition, as

...it is widely accepted that in open list systems, personal reputation is more valuable to legislative candidates than in closed list systems. However, there is no systematic, universal model to account for the value of personal reputation under the broad range of electoral rules according to which legislators around the world are elected.... Thus, the national celebrity enjoyed by movie stars or athletes can translate into valuable personal reputation in some electoral systems (Carey and Shugart 1995: 418-19).

The impacts were uneven for each party. This was partly a consequence of unequal political skills and the different political orientations of the party leadership.

Nonetheless,

Parties do not live or die, thrive or wither, because of their structures and procedures. The ideas and the people of the parties are their staples and the ultimate reasons for their strength or weakness. But, the rules do make a difference. They create an environment that can make it easier or more difficult for the parties' people to function and the parties' ideas to be expressed effectively (Campbell 1984: 42).

The influence of party organisation and leaders declined relatively, particularly on the ticket nomination process. The tendency was particularly evident, as mentioned, in the candidate nomination process in Pilleg, Pilpres and Pilkada, although to different degrees. The influence was least evident in the 2009 Pilleg when a popular vote system allocated seats according to the number of votes won by the candidates. The implementation was reinforced by the 2009 MK Decree, strengthening the implementation of the party ballot open-list, which had already been regulated by the 2009 and 2004 electoral laws. In the 2009 Pilleg, voters could support their preferred candidate within the party list, regardless of the party's own ranking of candidates. However, the popular vote regulation was accompanied by a provision stating that the process of vote counting and seat distribution remained controlled by party organisations. As a consequence, regardless of the number of votes they won, candidates were still depended on party policy for the process of transforming votes into seats. Besides, in the 2009 Pilleg, there was also a threshold regulation for parliamentary seats. There were many cases where candidates were unable to sit in the DPR national, even though they passed the BPP, because their party did not pass the parliamentary threshold. Nonetheless, in the nomination process, because party's ranking of candidates had become less significant, the influence of the usual mechanisms of the party in controlling the process was also reduced. Thus party officials could not 'play the old game' any more.

Party organisations have become less crucial for the candidates, except for nomination, most obviously in Pilpres and Pilkada. The trend began in 2004 Pilpres when one of the presidential tickets, Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla, relied more on Yudhoyono's personal campaign teams, called "Tim sukses" (literally: success team) rather than their party organisations. These campaign teams were not part of the Demokrat party structure, but rather worked for and were supervised directly by Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla. They were also supported by many professionals: political consultants, market researchers, television coaches, graphic designers and pollsters. Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla preferred to keep a distance from the Demokrat party as the party image in the public eye was not as

good as expected. This strategy brought success for Yudhoyono in the 2004 and 2009 Pilpres. In 2004, the president, with running mate Jusuf Kalla, obtained 60.69% or 69,364,558 valid votes in a two-round competition. In 2009, the president, with running mate, Boediono, won a strong majority of 60.80% or 73.874.562 valid votes in a one-round competition (KPU Pilpres 2004; 2009). President Yudhoyono won with a substantial majority by international standards. It was far greater than President Obama's victory in the recent US presidential elections.

A similar trend was also found in the 2005 Pilkada in Gowa, South Sulawesi, as Buehler and Tan found: "...several candidates seem to have preferred relying on their personal and family networks to handle campaign duties" (2007: 65). The candidates often mixed the composition of Tim sukses between party officials and outsiders. In other cases, candidates preferred to create a separate team, consisting of party supporters, or supporters from outside the party.¹⁰² Nonetheless, almost all candidates mobilised their family, relatives, peer groups, work groups, friends, and friends of friends and neighbours. The latter are the most effective as they not only dedicate their time and energy voluntarily, but donate money or in-kind support.¹⁰³

The tendency of parties losing their prominence has been evident since parties started to nominate candidates from outside the party organisation, because of their significant contributions, particularly financial. Accordingly, candidates were able to use their financial resources to negotiate their position with a party organisation. The relationship between party and candidate, then, changed into a relation which was "...formed on an ad hoc basis, often as a result of personal, not political, bonds and only shortly before the elections" (Buehler and Tan 2007: 65). This practice brought about a change in sentiment among party officials.

I have dedicated my life and my thought, also invested my money to support my party. But, now they—the candidates from outside party structure— marginalise

¹⁰²Interview, Suparno, Tanjung Pinang, 9 February 2009; Adil Patu, M.Pd, Gowa, 18 March 2009.

¹⁰³Interview, Suryatati A. Manan, Tanjung Pinang, 8 February 2009, Djarot Saiful Hidajat, MS, Surabaya, 4 April 2009; Sujud Pribadi, Malang, 5 April 2009.

and denigrate me and my other fellow party officials. These outsiders do not really understand our history, ideology, programs... Where were they when we lived miserably and oppressed by New Order authoritarian regime? They suddenly come, are nominated, and then get elected... Thus, to whom exactly [is] my dedication and loyalty for?¹⁰⁴

The challenges confronting parties became greater with the 2007 MK decree that allowed independent candidates to participate in Pilkada contests, so parties not only competed with each other, but also with individual candidates, who have the same privileges, rights, status and opportunities. From 2008 to 2009, there were 13 successful independent candidates out of 486 Pilkada. Three cases were held outside Aceh (see table 5.1) while the remaining 10 Pilkada were special cases in Aceh.

Table 5.1: Successful independent candidates, Head of local government election 2008–2009

N o.	Province/Regency/ City	Names of governor/vice; regent/vice; mayor/vice	Votes	Total Valid Votes	% of Votes
1	Kabupaten Batubara, North Sumatera	OK Arya Zulkarnain, SH, MM Drs. H. Gong Matua Siregar	53,456	160,077	33.39 %
2	Kabupaten Kubu Raya, West Kalimantan	Muda Mahendrawan -Andreas Muhretin	124,738	215,076	58.0%
3	Kabupaten Garut, West Java	Aceng HM Fikri, S.Ag. -Rd. Diki Chandra	535,289	958,552	55.84 %

Sources: KPU (2005-9). Laporan hasil pilkada berbagai provinsi, kabupaten dan kota [Reports of the results of the head of local government elections, 2005-2009]. Jakarta, Indonesia: Biro Humas KPU.

One of the winning candidates was based in new regency, Batu Bara, in North Sumatera province. The elected regent/vice-regent OK Arya Zulkarnain, SH, MM/ Drs. H. Gong Matua Siregar won in one round, with 53,456 valid votes (33.39 %). It seems likely that OK Arya Zulkarnain, SH, MM/ Drs. H. Gong Matua Siregar won because of their significant role in the creation of the new regency of Batu Bara, which suggests the exceptional circumstances that enable independent candidates to win. The other exceptional circumstances were in Aceh where there was separate provision for

¹⁰⁴Interview, Ismari, Jember, 20 March 2009.

independent candidates and local parties.¹⁰⁵ As shown in Table 5.2, there were 10 successful independent candidates in Pilkada in Aceh in 2008–2009. In post-conflict Aceh, the ‘independent’ candidates were mostly associated with GAM and its affiliates.

Table 5.2: Successful independent candidates, Aceh Head of local government election 2006–2007

N o.	Province/Regency/ City	Names of governor/vice; regent/vice; mayor/vice	Votes	Total valid Votes	% of Votes
1	Province Aceh	Drh. Irwandi Yusuf, MSc. Moh. Nazar, S.Ag	768,745	2,012,370	38.20
2	Kabupaten Simeulue	Tgk. Husein Yusuf A., MA Daska Aziz, S.Pd. MA	54,921	101,171	54.29
3	Kabupaten Aceh Tenggara	Muslim Hasballah Nasruddin Abubakar, S.Pd.I	53,104	145,866	36.41
4	Kabupaten Aceh Tengah	Ramli, MS Fuadri, S.Si	61,569	80,821	76.18
5	Kabupaten Aceh Besar	Mirza Ismail, S.Sos Nazir Adam, SE	134,459	239,924	56.04
6	Kabupaten Bireuen	Drs. Nurdin Abdul Rahman Drs. Busmadar Ismail	120,603	193,712	62.26
7	Kabupaten Aceh Utara	Ilyas A Hamid TI Syarifudin, SE	163,540	242,803	67.36
8	Kabupaten Aceh Barat Daya	Ir. Hazhar Abdul Rahman Zamzami A Rani	21,883	34,496	63.44
9	Kabupaten Bener Meriah	Munawar Liza Zeinal Islamuddin, ST	5,214	14,653	35.58
10	Kota Langsa	Munir Usman Suaidi Yahya	25,927	66,572	38.95

Sources: KPU (2005-9). Laporan hasil pilkada berbagai provinsi, kabupaten dan kota [Reports of the results of the head of local government elections, 2005-2009]. Jakarta, Indonesia: Biro Humas KPU.

Nonetheless, elsewhere in Indonesia, parties continue to be needed by individual politicians who aspire to elected office. Despite there being a chance to contest as an independent candidate in Pilkada, candidates prefer to be nominated by a party/coalition of parties as “... at least, the burden could be shared.... Although, the party organisation did not work as expected, some party officials still assisted me, from the process of nomination to the process of votes counting....” Suryatati A. Manan, mayor of Tanjung Pinang city, Riau Islands remarked.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Law No.11/2006, articles 67 & 68.

¹⁰⁶Interview, Suryatati A. Manan, Tanjung Pinang, 8 February 2009.

In general, absent in nearly all campaigns, either for legislative or executive positions, was a detailed program of how to develop the country, province or district. Indonesia's values and ideals are clearly articulated in the Constitution; many parties and candidates not only lacked any concrete ideas about how to realise these ideals, but also offered platforms and programs which in many ways were indistinguishable. Their programs mostly addressed such general rhetorical issues such as economic growth, unemployment, corruption, collusion and nepotism, but without clear policy alternatives. This was most noticeable in 2009 and least evident in the 1999 elections. (This issue will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.)

The campaigns were more focused on personalities than programs and policies. According to Dagg, even though "The solutions offered by rival parties and candidates were vague and general, often similar or not identical to each other. [They were actually still distinguishable]...What distinguished many of the parties were the personalities leading them" (Dagg 2007: 52). Choi in his study in Riau province found that

...the campaigns were more focused on personalities, or *sosok*, rather than platforms. By law, candidates were required to lay out their 'mission, vision and program' but their ideas were more or less uniform. Instead, *sosok*, which can be referred to a person's physical appearance or charismatic character, played an important part in the campaigning, given there was very little information available for voters to assess candidates (2007: 336).

Buehler and Tan's research on the Pilkada for the Regent of Gowa came to a similar conclusion: "It was the individual candidates who were the focus of the campaigns.... [and] campaign material hardly referred to the parties or their platforms" (2007: 65). One thing that stands out from the choice of their campaign strategies and issues has perpetuated 'the politics of celebrity'. This will be discussed further in the next subsection.

The key to success "...was the candidates' personal and family networks, along with funds collected from the candidates and their associates that appear to have been

decisive in determining the outcomes of the races” (Buehler and Tan 2007: 65). Indeed, financial resources and popularity are valued as imperatives; shared experience and identification with the electors, like religious belief, ethnicity and region are preferred; and competences, networking, technology and human resources are complementary.¹⁰⁷ In the words of one party official in Gowa, South Sulawesi:

...the competences of candidate are not [the] principle, because voters do not consider it important, except probably a small number of educated voters. Besides, later on if the candidates are elected; they can hire many educated and experienced professionals as staff... if there is candidate who has popularity but has no money; parties probably can help by finding *cukong* (financier/sponsor) to help her/him. And, the number of *cukong* here is very high, particularly business persons who want political insurance for their company.¹⁰⁸

However, personalities and money are not guaranteed success: there are other factors. ‘... One of the factors was because party structure was not working. Party discipline, party loyalty, party cohesiveness were weak ...,’ complained Wiranto, candidate president of 2004 Pilpres.¹⁰⁹ Wiranto-Solahuddin were candidates for president and vice-president of Golkar that was defeated in the first round, with 22.16% of the vote although Golkar was the most successful party in the 2004 Pilleg, with 21.58%. Candidates for head of local government experienced similar difficulties. As Choi found for the 2005 Pilkada Governor of Riau, candidates “...received very limited support from the political machines of parties” (2007: 336). However, Wiranto-Solahuddin Wahid's failure in 2004 Pilpres probably requires a multi factor explanation. Wiranto, for example, had particular political baggage from the Suharto, Habibie and Wahid administration, not least in respect to the separation of East Timor that might not have supported his changes in the 2004 Presidential campaign. Wiranto's own assertion that voter loyalty to Golkar in the 2004 Pilpres was weak is well founded. Golkar was not capable of persuading those who voted for it in the 2004 Pilleg to vote for party nominee, Wiranto, in the Pilpres. In Pilpres, voters choose person over party. They

¹⁰⁷Interview, Amir Uskara, Gowa, 18 March 2009.

¹⁰⁸Interview, Zulkifly Hijaz, Gowa, 18 March 2009.

¹⁰⁹Interview, Wiranto, Jakarta, 28 March 2009. In the 2009 Pilpres, Wiranto was a vice-presidential candidate on a Golkar-led ticket with Jusuf Kalla.

voted for the candidates as figures, not as representatives of parties. The important point to make here is that parties have not been able to translate support in the legislative elections to support for their nominees in head of government elections.

To sum up the discussion, it is found that party ballot open-list and candidate ballots system has enhanced candidates rather than party interests. The party ballot open-list and candidate ballots have meant: 1) the control of party organisations and leaders over access to and rank on ballot decreased significantly; 2) the intra-party competition became tighter. The candidates competed directly with the other candidates from the same party as well as candidates from different parties; and 3) the campaigns were more focused on personalities than parties' programs and policies. This tendency became evident since parties started to nominate candidates from outside the party organisation, because of their significant contributions, particularly financial. These findings confirmed Carey & Shugart's.

The impact of electoral threshold

This study found three main impacts of electoral threshold. First, an electoral threshold limited the number of parties in the election. With a lower electoral threshold, there were more parties participating in the election. Second, electoral threshold determined party strategies. With a lower electoral threshold, there was more chance that a party adopted a partisan strategy designed to mobilise support from particular groups of voters who are homogeneous in certain respects, whether they share faith, ethnic identities, values or ideologies. With a higher electoral threshold, there was more chance that a party adopted an electoralist strategy designed to attract votes from among different groups of voters. Third, a parliamentary threshold limited the number of parties in the parliament. With a higher parliamentary threshold, there were fewer parties represented in the parliament. A parliamentary threshold also limited the opportunity of the candidates to win seats in parliament, and prompted candidates and parties to review their strategy.

The electoral threshold for the 2004 and 2009 elections had differential impacts in the executive and legislative elections. The intent of the regulatory framework of the executive elections was to restrict parties to enter the electoral contest by setting a high electoral threshold. The aim was to prevent executive elections with many candidates, with much fragmentation due to the party competition. On the contrary, the basic idea of legislative elections was to enable as much as opportunity for parties to participate the election. The qualifications for entry into legislative elections were low, with more than 20 parties competing in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections. However, although executive and legislative elections were held on different occasions, the outcome of legislative elections frames the possible contest for the executive positions. And, because of the high ceiling in executive elections, not all parties that participated in legislative elections could compete in executive elections, except when they formed part of coalitions nominating candidates.

Ironically, the spirit of inclusivity in the parliamentary election has led to the creation of splinter parties which have been used as a solution for wealthy and ambitious politicians who want to avoid conflict within a party organisation, or to broaden their chances of standing for election by establishing their own party. For example, a number of parties split off from PDIP including Partai Demokrasi Pembaharuan (Democratic Renewal Party; hereafter PDP) and Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan (National Independence Buffalo Party; hereafter PNBK); the breakaways from Golkar included Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (Justice and Unity Party; hereafter PKPI), Partai Merdeka (Independence Party), Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan (United Democratic Nationhood Party; hereafter PPDK), Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (PKPI), Partai Patriot Pancasila, Partai Demokrat, Partai Hanura, Partai Gerindra and Partai Nasional Demokrat. The splinter parties created different names, symbols and structures, but they supported the same ideology and they sought support from the same voters as the old party. However, it should be noted here that the splinter parties of Golkar were more successful than those of PDIP. Three splinter parties of Golkar – Demokrat, Hanura and Gerindra- passed the parliamentary threshold and their party chairman were nominated as a president or vice-president candidate.

The electoral threshold became one factor in determining party strategy. In Pilleg, it was more obvious in 1999 and 2004, but less evident in 2009; there was a tendency for parties to adopt a partisan strategy that sought to mobilise support from a particular segment of the electorate identified by religious belief, ethnicity or culture. For example, parties such as PKS, PAN, PPP, PKB and PBB sought to appeal to voters among the Muslim communities; parties such as Demokrat, Golkar, PDIP, Gerindra and Hanura however appealed to voters who supported Pancasila. On the contrary, in Pilpres and Pilkada, the threshold tended to encourage cooperation between parties and the building of multi-party electoral alliances. In these elections, parties tended to adopt electoralist strategies that appealed to voters across generations, regions, faiths, ethnic identities, interests and commitments. It was difficult for parties, even for those successful in the parliamentary elections, to nominate candidates without the support of other parties. Almost all candidates for executive positions were nominated by coalitions. And, most of them were established across lines of party ideology.

The different electoral thresholds in executive and legislative elections encourage parties to use different strategies, but this approach is complicated by the short time-span of a couple of months between Pilleg and Pilpres, while Pilkada are conducted somewhere in Indonesia every month. It is difficult for party leaders to maintain anything resembling coherent programs and identities. Over time, parties tended to adopt electoralist strategies for both legislative and executive elections, though to different degrees. In the 2009 election, almost all parties neither differentiated themselves from each other in terms of their ideology, nor directly opposed the policies of their opponents. Parties tended to restrain themselves, stay away from any potential conflict and avoid attacking other parties. In general, their campaigns hardly ever discussed sensitive issues or made commitments about the interests of specific social groups. More contentious commitments were attributed to individual candidates and politicians rather than to the party. This pattern was also found in Islamist parties, such as PKS, PPP, PBB, PKNU, PBR, PMB and PPNUI, which moved towards becoming more open parties. They allowed non-Muslims to be nominated as a 2009 candidate for

Member of Parliament, particularly from non-Muslim regions such as Papua, North Sumatera, Maluku, NTT and Bali. 'We become more open compared to the previous election; but we remain an Islamist party... And, it remains debatable whether our non-Muslim candidates have to learn Koran to understand the basic philosophy of our party...', explained Andi Zulkifli Muis, chair of Public Relation of DPD PKS South Sulawesi.¹¹⁰

The parliamentary threshold was introduced for the first time in 2009. This threshold applied only to DPR national and not provincial and district parliaments. In contrast to the electoral threshold, the objective of the parliamentary threshold was to discourage fragmentation and competition among parties in parliament, with the result that a number of parties in DPR national have reduced as not all parties participating in the election won a seat. In 2009, there were only nine parties in the parliament. Previously, in 2004, there were 17 parties and in 1999, there were 21 parties. Thus, the introduction of parliamentary threshold had significantly curtailed the possibility of small parties winning seats in the DPR national. Even though, some parties who participated in the election did not pass parliamentary threshold for DPR national, they still had representatives in local parliaments and could nominate candidates for Pilkada. It shall be noted that all these small parties have a national presence because of the national character of the electoral threshold.

The parliamentary thresholds also restricted the opportunity for candidates to obtain seats in the parliament and they had to adjust their campaign strategy. It made candidates dependent on their party's fortunes in the election. Candidates from the large parties, with a greater chance of winning seats, competed more intensely with fellow candidates from the same party, but worked less diligently for their party. Candidates from the small parties with a smaller chance of winning a seat, however, competed not only intensely with fellow candidates from the same party, but also worked even harder to make sure that the total votes of her/his party exceeded the quota required for one

¹¹⁰Interview, Andi Zulkifli Muis, Makassar, 17 March 2009.

seat.¹¹¹ Thus even if the candidate passed the electoral formula and was entitled to a seat, but her/his party did not pass the parliamentary threshold, she/he would not be allocated a seat in the DPR national. There were many examples where candidates of small parties were unable to sit in the DPR national, even though they passed the electoral formula.

The impact of electoral formula

This study found three significant impacts. First, in legislative elections, electoral formula could be used as a measure of the distortion factor in an electoral system that compared the percentage of votes a party wins against the percentage of seats a party obtains. The greater the margin between votes and seats, the less democratic the voting system was. A substantial distortion in proportionality of the vote: seat ratio was an indication of poor representation and a lack of inclusiveness. Second, the *Hare* quota allowed a fairer seat distribution, as small parties had a greater possibility of winning parliamentary seats. Third, in executive elections, the absolute majoritarian system with electoral formula 50% + 1, gave the winner strong legitimacy because they obtained support from more than half the public, though the rest of the voters who supported the unsuccessful candidate did not have representation. And, the simple plurality systems with 25%+1 rewarded strong candidates out of all proportion to the size of their margins, by giving the same rewards to candidates with 1% margins.

In legislative elections, the 1999 Pilleg voting system at a national level was the most democratic, as its electoral formula allowed the fairest seat distribution. The party that benefited the most was the second placed Golkar, with a distortion of 3.53%, while the party that least benefited was the third placed PKB with a distortion of minus 1.57%. Golkar was advantaged because its voter based was geographically distributed more evenly. The PKB was disadvantaged because its supporters were concentrated in fewer regions. By contrast, the 2009 Pilleg voting system at a national level was the least

¹¹¹This is a conclusion of the two round table meetings of seven people in Jember, 20 March 2009 and six people in Situbondo, 22 March 2009.

democratic because of the high distortion between votes and seats. The two largest parties, Demokrat and Golkar, benefited from a distortion of 5.58% and 4.48% respectively. These two parties benefited from the votes won by the 29 small parties that failed to reach the parliamentary threshold, obtaining almost 20% of the 2009 votes. The one that least benefited was the ninth placed party, Hanura, with a distortion of minus 0.73%. This shows that the system favours the larger parties (see table 5.3).

Table 5.3: Distortion of party's votes and seats, Legislative election 1999, 2004 and 2009

Party that passed electoral threshold/ Election Year	Distortion of votes and seats (%)			
	2009	2004	1999	2009-1999
1st largest party	5.58	1.70	-0.62	4.96
2nd largest party	4.48	1.29	3.53	0.95
3rd largest party	2.76	-1.11	-1.57	1.19
4th largest party	2.29	2.39	1.84	0.45
5th largest party	2.21	2.91	0.24	1.97
6th largest party	1.47	0.84	0.88	0.59
7th largest party	0.06	3.02		
8th largest party	0.18			
9th largest party	-0.73			

Sources: assorted party and KPU documents relating to the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections.

The *Hare* quota was the mechanism that enabled a small party to win a seat, even if its share was less than a quota. It was found that the Hare quota allowed small parties a bigger possibility of winning parliamentary seats. For example, small parties of 2004 and 1999 still could have representative at DPR national. In 2004 PNI, PNBK, PKPI and PPDI won seats, while in 1999 PP, PDR, PSII, PNI-FM, PNI-MM, IPKI and PKU won minimal representation. However, the impact of the quota was different when in 2009, a multi-stage iteration of *Hare* quota was implemented; and parties needed to meet the 2.5% parliamentary threshold before qualifying for seats in the DPR national.¹¹² Only nine out of 38 parties passed this threshold: Demokrat, Golkar, PDI-Perjuangan, PKS, PAN, PPP, PKB, Gerindra and Hanura collectively, with around 82%

¹¹²Law No. 10/2008, article 202.1.

of valid votes. And, the 29 small parties, with almost 20 million valid votes, were not represented in the DPR national (KPU 2009).

Yet, electoral formula was a factor that strengthened the party's position over party candidates. The law of 2009 Pilleg stipulated that a candidate will not secure a DPR national seat unless her/his party has at least one single seat, even though the candidate attracts more votes than the quota (BPP) in her/his Dapil.¹¹³ Hence, this law on electoral formula limited the effect of the party ballot open-list, even though a candidate's position was supposed to be strengthened by the adoption of party ballot open-list. In 2009 Pilleg for DPR national, in which the *Hare* quota multi-stage system applied, parties needed to pass the 2.5% parliamentary threshold first. If they passed the threshold, then seats were passed to parties based on their shares. Seat(s) were then distributed by parties to their candidate(s) according to the votes individual candidates attracted over the quota. In the case that no candidate achieves the quota, the candidate with 30% of quota or highest votes in the party list wins. For local parliament, the *Hare* quota two-stage applied, but a party needed to win a seat(s) first. If a party holds a seat(s), more seat(s) are distributed to their candidate(s) who reach the quota. In where no candidate achieves the quota, the candidate with 30% of the quota or highest votes in the party list wins. If all seats have not yet been allocated, there is a second stage. The remaining seats are then allocated in strict sequence to the parties with the largest residual number of votes. Seat(s) are distributed to candidate(s) who achieve the quota. In the case that no candidate achieves the quota, the candidate with 30% of the quota or who has the highest votes in the party list wins. Following this procedure, both for national and local parliament, candidates depended much on their party's success in the election.

In executive elections, the candidate ticket for president and vice-president is required to win 50% + 1 of votes, and 20% of those votes shall come from at least 50% + 1 of Indonesia's provinces. If no candidate obtains an absolute majority of votes in the first round, the two candidates with the highest share of the vote will compete in the second

¹¹³Law No.10/2008, articles 202, 203.


round. In 2009, President Yudhoyono, with his running mate, Boediono, won a strong majority of 60.80% or 73,874,562 valid votes in a one-round competition. In 2004, the president, with his running mate Jusuf Kalla, obtained 60.69% or 69,364,558 valid votes in a two-round competition (KPU 2004, 2009). These majorities provided President Yudhoyono with strong legitimacy. He won with substantial majorities by international standards. It was much greater than in President Obama's victories in recent US presidential elections.

In executive elections at provincial and district levels (Pilkada), a candidate ticket for head of local government and vice-head of local government has to obtain at least 25% + 1 of the votes to win. If more than one candidate has 25% + 1 of the votes, the candidate who represents a larger diversity of districts will win. If no one gets 25% + 1 of the votes, a second round is organised for the two candidates with the highest votes.¹¹⁴

In contrast with presidential elections, head of local government elections produced many local government leaders with a plurality of votes. Figure 5.1 below shows almost 36.97% Pilkada contests were won with less than 40% of votes. Successful candidates with less than 40% become debatable in terms of democratic legitimacy, as many UK governments are. Tickets with less than 40% of the vote in round one may not win in a second round. The data was derived from the 449 Pilkada cases during 2005–2008. The Pilkada result was grouped into six categories. There were 33 cases that won by 25-29% of votes, 133 cases by 30-39%, 129 cases by 40-49%, 97 cases by 50-59%, 42 cases by 60-69% and 15 cases by 70-99% of votes. Less than 6% of Pilkada contests were settled in two rounds.

¹¹⁴Law No.32/2004, article 107.2-8.

Figure 5.1: Winning candidates and their vote share, Pilkada 2005-2008



Sources: KPU (2005-9). Laporan hasil pilkada berbagai provinsi, kabupaten dan kota [Reports of the results of the head of local government elections, 2005-2009]. Jakarta, Indonesia: Biro Humas KPU.

The impact of district magnitude

This study found district magnitude had significant impacts for Pilleg and little influence for Pilpres and Pilkada. In Pilleg, a smaller magnitude not only generated greater distortion but also disadvantaged smaller parties. It shall be noted that, in Indonesia, the impact of district magnitude was less than the other electoral mechanics. Indonesia employs different district magnitudes in multi-level electoral competition. For example, there are six different district magnitudes operating under two different electoral systems. These districts are called Daerah Pemilihan (electoral district, hereafter Dapil) in Indonesian.

The Dapil of legislative elections followed the administrative sub-divisions, but the magnitude of any given Dapil is based on population. In 2004 legislative election, it was regulated that the number of Dapil in each province ranged from 1 to 10, and each Dapil

had from 3 to 12 seats.¹¹⁵ In 2004, there were 69 Dapil of DPR national, 210 Dapil of DPR province and 1,751 of DPR regency/city.¹¹⁶ In 2009, the pact was changed. The maximum number of Dapil in each province increased from 10 to 11 seats;¹¹⁷ whereas, the maximum number of seats in each Dapil decreased from 12 to 10 seats.¹¹⁸ Consequently, the 2004 Dapil grouping was adjusted. In 2009, there were 77 Dapil of DPR national, 217 Dapil of DPR provinces and 1.851 Dapil of DPR regencies/cities. Thus, Pilleg have many varying magnitudes. Magnitude (M) may range from one to S, where S is the total number of seats in the legislative body, and is, for any given country, a function of both S and the number of electoral districts (E)... Average magnitude (M') is formulated as $M' = S/E$ (Shugart 2000: 67). In DPR national, the average magnitude in 2004 was $M' = 7.97$, $S = 550$, $E = 69$; while the average magnitude in 2009 was $M' = 7.27$, $S = 560$, $E = 77$.

The Dapil in executive elections used the relevant administrative division. Accordingly, Dapil of Pilpres is the nation; Pilkada Governor is the province; Pilkada Regent is the regency and Pilkada Mayor is the city. In other words, Pilpres and Pilkada have only one Dapil. The number of Dapil nationwide increases with the creation of new provinces, districts or cities. The average number of voters in each provincial Dapil was 3.114.265 voters and 191.564 voters for Regency/City. In Pilpres and Pilkada, a Dapil is in effect a single member constituency, with a President, Governor or Regent/Mayor with their deputy elected. Hence, the degree of magnitude (M) is single as the number of electoral district (E) equivalent with the total number of seats (S); $M = 1$, $S = E$. Yet, the magnitude is insignificant for Pilpres and Pilkada (see table 5.4).

¹¹⁵Law No.12/2003, article 46.2.

¹¹⁶KPU 2004, Booklet & CD-ROM KPU, "Daerah Pemilihan & Hasil Pemilu Legislative Indonesia 2004."

¹¹⁷Law No.10/2008, article 22.2.

¹¹⁸Law No.10/2008, article 22.2.

Table 5.4: Average degree of magnitude, 2004 and 2009

Election	2004			2009		
	Average Magnitude	Number of Seats	Electoral Districts	Average Magnitude	Number of Seats	Electoral Districts
Legislative						
Pilleg National	M'=7.97	S=550	E=69	M'=7.27	S=560	E=77
Pilleg Province	M'=9.01	S=1.894	E=210	M'=9.20	S=1.998	E=217
Pilleg Regency/City	M'=8.05	S=14.113	E=1.751	M'=8.78	S=16.270	E=1.851
Executive						
Pilpres	M'=1	S=1	E=1	M'=1	S=1	E=1
Pilkada Governor	M'=1	S=33	E=33	M'=1	S=33	E=33
Pilkada Regent/Mayor	M'=1	S=440	E=440	M'=1	S=491	E=491

Sources: Law No.12/2003, Law No.10/2008, and KPU (2004). Daerah Pemilihan dan hasil pemilu legislative Indonesia 2004 [Indonesia electoral district and the result of legislative elections, 2004]. CD-rom. Jakarta, Biro Humas KPU.

M' = the average degree of magnitude; S=the total number of seats; E=the number of electoral districts. (M'=S/E); Notes: Excludes 1999 due to lack of data.

From those data above, it was found that in either the 2004 or 2009 election, Dapil of DPR national tended to have smaller proportionality and was not accommodative for small parties. In contrast, Dapil of DPR province and regency/city had a tendency to hold higher proportionality and enabled the election of small parties. Hence, at the local level, Dapil offered greater opportunity for small parties to win seats. In contrast, the 2004 Dapil of DPR national tended to have higher proportionality and was more supportive of small parties than 2009 Dapil. On the contrary, 2004 Dapil of DPR province and regency/city were likely to have lesser proportionality and was a bit less accommodative of small parties than 2009 Dapil. Nonetheless, the impacts of district magnitude should be examined cautiously as the electoral systems employed two different threshold policies. In 2004 DPR national, parties that did not meet the threshold were still allocated seats. Therefore, 2004 DPR national had a greater representation of small parties. In 2009 DPR national, parties that did not meet the threshold were not represented in the DPR national, a consequence of threshold, rather than district magnitude.

The opposite was found in DPRD. Party representation at the local level was more fragmented than at the national level. At the local level, no threshold was implemented, which meant the degree of district magnitude was of more importance. However, although there was a difference between the degree of district magnitude in 2004 and 2009 respectively, the impact on the proportionality and the possibility of small parties were not clearly evident. One of the reasons was because the number of parties competing in 2009 was 50% higher and, as a result of the creation of new districts and cities (proliferation or *pemekaran*), the district magnitude of Dapil decreased. The effect also lessened because the changing policies for the number of Dapil, the number of seats in each Dapil and the number of seats in each DPR province and regency/city.

This study found that the regulations relating to district magnitude had implications for the equity in the value of votes in different Dapil. There were problems in representing voters demographically and/or geographically, with all votes having approximately the same value. Some ethnic, cultural and religious communities were overrepresented and others underrepresented. Some districts were also assumed 'expensive' which meant candidates had to win more votes, work harder and spend much more money for a seat, usually in Java; while others were 'less expensive' in that candidates worked less hard and spent less money for a seat, usually outside Java. In 2004 Pilleg, in an expensive district, for example, a candidate needed to win 259.685 votes in West Java VIII, or 259.200 votes in Central Java IV to win a seat. In less expensive districts, for example, a candidate needed only 95.011 votes in West Papua, or 94.519 votes in Papua to win a seat. In other words, the value of votes in these districts in Papua was higher than votes in districts in West and Central Java. To address this problem, some revisions were made but effectively, as in some cases, the number of votes required to win a seat were lowered.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹Law No.10/2008, article 214.a.

Electoral context

Post reformasi 1998, there have been huge changes in the electoral context. The introduction of the majoritarian system and the candidate ballot for Pilpres and Pilkada has been one of the factors influencing change. The majoritarian system has established high electoral hurdles that compel parties/candidates "...to gather votes promiscuously and indiscriminately wherever campaign support can be found among diverse sectors of the electorate" (Norris 2004: 10). The candidate ballot has the potential to intensify personal competition and to build strong linkages between the candidate and constituents. Along with these changes to the electoral system, there has been a tendency for the greater involvement of mass media, political consultants and polling institutions in electoral campaigns. The expanding media coverage has turned some politicians into celebrities and celebrities from other fields have been attracted to electoral politics.

The increasing role of mass media

Since 2004, particularly in Pilpres and Pilkada, there has been a trend towards parties and candidates using mass media in their campaigns. Through media they can increase their profile and recognition among a larger group of potential voters of different generations, regions, faiths and ethnic groups: cutting across interests and commitments. However, the cost of media campaigns is very expensive. And party organisations cannot afford such expense. Instead, parties seek the assistance of their candidates as they consider this will give them significant more profile and coverage. Most of them are keen to have their opinions, comments, pictures, activities, programs and personal interests published in newspapers and magazines, on television, on radio, on the internet and in social media. The Deputy Governor of Riau province, a PDIP leader, explained the importance of the media: "I prefer a media campaign because the cost is cheaper compared to the travel cost if I have to visit all my constituents, particularly because my Dapil only can be reached by speed boat."¹²⁰ "It is a kind of

¹²⁰Interview, Soerya Respartiono, Batam, 9 February 2009.

symbiosis mutualism between party and candidates. I spend money to help party, and at the same time I promote myself.”¹²¹

Two main impacts have been identified. First, making use of mass media in campaign strategies has created conducive situations to personalise politics. Even though elections should be about political choices, in reality, they are more about a personal and popular contest.

In Pilkada Governor of South Sulawesi 2007, the main supporters of Syahrul Yasin Limpo-Agus Arifin Nu'mang are middle class, middle age, educated and live in the city. Hence, we wanted to campaign about policies and programs. But then, we found that the majority of them saw Pilkada is only as mass personal and popularity contest. We then changed the strategy. We promoted Syahrul and Agus more on their personal image and personal profile; less on their policies and programs, Adil Patu, chair of campaign team of Limpo-Nu'mang for South Sulawesi Pilkada Governor 2007 noted.¹²²

A similar case was noted with Dra. Suryatati A. Manan, the incumbent Mayor of Tanjung Pinang city/ Riau Islands in Pilkada 2007. “Dra. Hj. Suryatati A. Manan-Drs. H. Edward was elected with 84.25% of valid vote; while the other contenders got only 11.65% and 4.10% in Pilkada 5 December 2007”, Suparno, chair of the campaign team of Dra. Hj. Suryatati A. Manan -Drs. H. Edward explained.¹²³ The incumbent Mayor’s victory was cultivated by selling her personal success as a mother of three kids, as a local candidate (*putri daerah*), and founder of Tanjung Pinang City. As a mother, it was very important for Suryatati to show the community that her children were well brought up. All of her kids are successful.¹²⁴ She is also of local Malay royal descent and dedicates her work to preserving Malay culture. Under Suryatati leadership, Tanjung Pinang was proclaimed as a Malay city (Suwarno 2011). Malay culture is very dominant in Tanjung Pinang as Malay constitutes the dominant ethnic group, which distinguishes it from other cities in Riau, such as Batam, which is dominated by

¹²¹Interview, Hari Putri Lestari, Jember, 20 March 2009.

¹²²Interview, Adil Patu, Gowa, 18 March 2009.

¹²³Interview, Suparno, Tanjung Pinang, 9 February 2009.

¹²⁴Interview, Suryatati A. Manan, Tanjung Pinang, 8 February 2009.

migrants, particularly from Java. As a founder of Tanjung Pinang, it is one of her campaign slogans. Indeed, she seeks to promote Tanjung Pinang as a city of autonomy. (Suara Pembaharuan 2009). Second, extensive use of mass media in campaigns has tended to make the individual candidate much more important than the party organisation, which has been bypassed, since the creation of a broad on-the-ground network that is crucial in reaching society.¹²⁵ Previously, candidates needed the party, particularly party officials at branches and sub-branches, to link them to party members, supporters and sympathisers; but with greater use of mass media, candidates do not need the party as an instrument to mobilise voters.¹²⁶ Besides, it has also limited the opportunities for party officials and workers at the local level to earn pocket money during election campaigns every five years.

For us [party activists], it is like an additional income. It's like extra pocket money. We are not paid; we do the work voluntarily. But, if there is *uang rokok* (pocket money), it makes us more enthusiastic. Besides, if media is used as main instrument for campaigning, parties and candidates only make the rich media owners richer. And, we only become spectators.¹²⁷

In sum, with the increasing use of mass media, there are fewer opportunities for local party activists to earn pocket money.

The role of mass media in politics has increased significantly post reformasi 1998. The democratic transition has bequeathed the media significant advantages. This is partly because under the four decades of authoritarian governance, party function has been curbed; parties have failed to develop their function as political communicators. Media has seized the opportunity by taking over the role of party function as a channel of political communication. Besides, parties had been detached from their supporters throughout much of the Guided Democracy and New Order periods, and they found it difficult to redevelop their organisations and networks in broader communities. In

¹²⁵Interview, Tenri A. Palallo, Makassar, 17 March 2009; Didik Prasetyono, Surabaya, 20 March 2009.

¹²⁶Interview, H. LisDarmansyah, Tanjung Pinang, 8 February 2009.

¹²⁷This was the consensus view that emerged from the two round table meetings of seven party activists in Jember, 20 March 2009 and six others in Situbondo, 22 March 2009.

contrast, media had the capacity to communicate to broader society. In addition, over time, parties have lost people's trust; this kind of situation enabled media to play a role as an alternative institution. A robust media was thought to be an instrument of democracy, the *watchdog* of governments and guardian of public interest.

Post reformasi 1998, David Hill has noted:

Public and private communication is now regarded as safer and less subject to active government surveillance....With a more open media, with less oppressive surveillance of most opposition organisations, encrypted communication—both within an organisation and between an organisation and its outside sympathisers—is now less necessary (2003: 526).

In a similar vein, Demokrat politician, Ramadhan Pohan, observed:

Enthusiasm about politics has grown. They [people] are willing to engage more in politics, although mostly as spectators.talking about politics with their peer groups, workmates, schoolmates, neighbours and families.access to political information is relatively easier post reformasi, either from newspapers or television.¹²⁸

Since 1998, the number of print media publications has increased sharply as an impact of Law No.40 of 1999 on press freedom and the cancellation of rules restricting Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan (a Press Publication Business License; hereafter SIUP) and Surat Izin Terbit (Publishing Permit; hereafter SIT). One year following the new law, the government granted 718 new media licenses, an increase from 289 licenses in 53 years since independence (Tesoro 2000: 43). By the end of 2010, there were 1.076 print media in operation, with *Kompas* newspaper leading with 600,000 copies daily, followed by *Jawa Pos*(450,000 copies), *Suara Pembaruan*(350,000 copies), *Republika*(325,000 copies), *Media Indonesia*(250,000 copies) and *Koran Tempo*(240,000 copies) (Lim 2012).

¹²⁸Interview, Ramadhan Pohan, Jakarta, 8 April 2009.

The influence of mass media in politics has grown to be highly significant post reformasi 1998 (Kingsbury 2005). But, there remained

...little initiative shown in undertaking objective investigative analysis of opportunistic greed, mismanagement and the continuing misuse of power, or in providing a rational and responsible forum to help reconcile the cacophony of opposing viewpoints. Some critics have accused the press of relishing the euphoria of free expression while the public is drowning in the world of lawlessness and insecurity. (Kakiailatu 2007: 68-69).

While, others argue there is little initiative for media people to do investigative journalism because reporters "...are likely to give top priority to enhancing their sense of security, both when they go about doing their job and in the terms of employment offered by their companies..." (Heryanto 2001: 327).

Over time the situation becomes more complex with the media under pressure from business figures and politicians. This is due to the tension generated by two new players in the media business. Previously, under the New Order regime, media was controlled directly and solely by the government, through government restrictions and directions. All the other players, including business companies and political parties, were subject to government authority, but post reformasi, the supremacy of government has weakened while the power of business companies and political parties has strengthened. Yet, even though there are fewer restrictions and directions as per the New Order, other different constraints have emerged. First, there is friction between government, political parties and business on one side and media, on the other. Second, there is control by government, political parties and businesses through the ownership of media companies, as will be discussed below.

First, the aforementioned friction surfaced mainly due to investigative journalism. Government, political parties and business feel pressure when the media reports illegal activities and calls for them to be accountable and to act responsibly. For example, in 2009 Pilleg, Edhie Baskoro Yudhoyono (Demokrat, East Java VII), the son of the president, accused the *Jakarta Globe*, *Harian Bangsa*, *Okezone.com* (plus local papers

and online news in Ponorogo, East Java), of defaming him by publishing reports that he was involved in money politics. Although the media had proof—witnesses and confessions of people who received his money and were willing to give testimony—the media still had to go on trial and was found guilty (Patria and Margiyono 2009). In 2004, there was the case of Tommy Winata against *Tempo* magazine. Tommy, a close friend of several military generals and a successful business man, filed a number of lawsuits against *Tempo* for alleged material and non-material losses, because of its investigative article “*Ada Tommy di Tenabang?*” This article reported that Tommy Winata was involved in starting a fire in part of Tanah Abang, Jakarta’s largest textile market, in the hope of being granted the Tanah Abang refurbishment project (*Tempo* 2003). Even though there was a lot of evidence supporting the report, the magazine “...was found guilty of defamation and of ‘inciting unrest’, fined Rp.50 billion (US\$ 6 million) [*sic*] and obliged to pay for full-page apologies in four major newspapers” (Kakiailatu 2007: 68). At the local level, the case of “*Palopo Post*” in Palopo regency, South Sulawesi, is prominent. The editor, a local journalist, had to leave the paper because of the suppression of articles relating to an incumbent regent. The incumbent was accused of corruption and other government wrongdoings; besides he was unpopular with residents because his projects neglected the poor (Morell 2005).

Second, there is control by government, political parties and businesses through the ownership of media companies. This has constrained media independence. Post reformasi, media ownership by private companies is the dominant pattern. There are two features which are imperative.

First, ownership of the private media companies is concentrated in the hands of only a few business groups. A study by Lim (2012) found that for television, at a national level, there are only six business groups that own all eleven TV networks. Among these groups, the highest share is held by MNC Group (*RCTI*, *Global TV* and *MNCTV*). The second is EMTEK (*SCTV* and *Indosiar*); followed by Trans Corp (*Trans TV* and *Trans 7*); a partnership of Bakrie and MM Group (*TV-One* and *AnTV*); the Media Group (*Metro TV*) and the state-owned company (*TVRI*). At the local level, there are more than

10 business groups that own more than 100 local TV stations, but the state-owned *TVRI* is dominant, owning 27 stations spread across 27 different provinces. For print media, there are two leading major players. First is the Kompas Gramedia Group (*Kompas*, *Jakarta Post*, *Warta Kota*, *Intisari* magazine, 11 other local newspapers, 43 magazines and tabloids and 5 book publishers). Second is the Jawa Pos Group (*Jawa Pos*, with 151 other newspapers distributed throughout more than 20 provinces, 11 tabloids and 2 magazines). The rest of the newspaper market is divided between smaller media companies, such as the MNC Group (*Seputar Indonesia*), Mahaka Media Group (*Republika*), Bali Post Group (*Bali Post*), Lippo Group (*Suara Pembaruan*) and Media Group (*Media Indonesia*).

Second, the media oligopoly has brought into question the political neutrality. Almost all private media company owners have a close connection with political parties. These include: Surya Paloh of *Metro TV* and *Media Indonesia*, chairman of the National Democrat Party (former chairman of Golkar); Hary Tanoesoedibjo, owner of television companies (*RCTI*, *Global TV*, *MNC TV*), radio (*Sindo Radio*), printing (*Sindo Newspaper*, *Seputar Indonesia*) and online media (*Okezone.com*) and chairman of the board of experts for the National Democrat Party; Aburizal Bakrie of *TV One* and *ANTV*, chair of Golkar; and Chairul Tanjung of *Trans TV* and *Trans 7* as well as Indonesia's biggest news portal *Detik.com*, a close aide of President Yudhoyono and his Democratic Party. President Yudhoyono, through his personal aides, has also established several print journals including *Nasional* journal, *Arti* Magazine, *Eksplo* magazine and *Kabinet*, a fortnightly tabloid.¹²⁹ While these practices are legal, they are not constructive in terms of media independence. In the previous regime, the media was forced to support the authoritarian government in the name of national security, protection of the rights of individuals and cultural safeguards. Under Reformasi governments, over time, the media once again has tended to become more politically partisan, in deference to the political and business interests of its owners, the affiliated parties and politicians. Government figures, politicians and business leaders have an

¹²⁹Interview, Ramadan Pohan, Jakarta, 8 April 2009.

interest in controlling how the media covers issues in which they have direct interests, as well as in how 'public opinion' can be moulded and policy agendas set.

These developments are detrimental to the process of democratisation. The journalists are always torn between their safety when performing their responsibilities, and their job certainty due to the risk of being laid off by the company. Over time, more and more of them give up and become more pragmatic. Sen and Hill asserts that "...reformasi to date has been the reverse... pulling the media in opposite directions. [And, it] ...is in some ways a continuation of the New Order" (2000: 221). In addition, the media businesses set their charges very high, making media campaigning very expensive. These costs prevent less well-off candidates from broadcasting their campaign messages, but allow rich candidates to *buy* elections.¹³⁰ Yet, this produces an unequal playing field for the electoral process, as the high cost of access to the media inhibits less well-off candidates from competing in elections.

The increasing role of political consultants and polling institutions

Since 2004, particularly in Pilpres and Pilkada, there has been a trend that parties and candidates prefer to rely on political consultants and polling institutions. On the other side of the coin, party officials reported that political consultants and polling institutions have weakened some of their functions.¹³¹ They have pushed party officials aside during the election campaigns that previously were the exclusive domain of party organisations.¹³² They have made electoral campaigns expensive and exclusive¹³³ and have privileged wealthy parties and candidates.¹³⁴ They have no ideology, and their interest is only in profiteering.¹³⁵ They have produced an unfair playing field for the

¹³⁰Interview, Didik Prasetyono, Surabaya, 20 March 2009.

¹³¹This is a conclusion of the two round table meetings of seven people in Jember, 20 March 2009 and six people in Situbondo, 22 March 2009.

¹³²Interview, Husain Djunaid, Gowa, 18 March 2009.

¹³³Interview, Abdul Latif Hafid, Gowa, 18 March 2009.

¹³⁴Interview, Andi Zulkifli Muis, Makassar, 17 March 2009.

¹³⁵Interview, DJ Zakaria, Bintan, 8 February 2009.

electoral process.¹³⁶ In sum, there are covert tensions between parties and consultants/pollsters. In Pilpres 2009, for example,

...there was open conflict between Fox Indonesia, the consultant running the Yudhoyono-Boediono campaign, and the party that had nominated the pair, Demokrat. Fox Indonesia took on a large number of key campaign tasks, including preparing the candidates for the televised debates, organising campaign events, and coordinating and designing campaign advertising, messages and slogans. The scale of the work done by Fox Indonesia created envy and complaints among Demokrat leaders, who felt they had been sidelined (Qodari 2010: 136).

Nonetheless, regardless of their grievances, party officials acknowledged that parties needed professional assistance, particularly because of the more complicated electoral systems.¹³⁷ The seemingly never ending cycle of Pilkada campaigns since 2005 has forced parties to organise campaigns almost on a continuous basis. The processes are time and energy consuming. With so many campaigns to run and, given the lack of skilled party staff, parties have made more use of consultants' services.¹³⁸ Party candidates also disclosed that they need professional assistance because of the changing nature of the competition. They need market researchers to understand voters' opinions, backgrounds and interests; television coaches to build their image on TV; graphic designers to design and print flyers, banners and other advertisements; and polling surveyors to monitor their supporters and evaluate their performance. Regrettably, party officials seldom have the necessary expertise.¹³⁹

The involvement of political consultants and polling organisations can be traced back to the first reformasi election in 1999, when some NGOs acted as pollsters. Their surveys were funded by foreign agencies, such as USAID, the Ford Foundation and the Japan International Cooperation Agency or the mass media, such as *Kompas* newspaper. Two of the prominent NGOs at that time were Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan

¹³⁶Interview, Syaiful Bahri, Situbondo, 22 March 2009.

¹³⁷Interview, Farouk MappaselingBetta, Makassar, 17 March 2009.

¹³⁸Interview, Ramadhan Pohan, Jakarta, 8 April 2009.

¹³⁹Interview, Suryatati A. Manan, Tanjung Pinang, 8 February 2009; Ahmad Adib Zain, Bandung, 12 February 2009; Djarot Saiful Hidajat, Surabaya, 4 April 2009; Sujud Pribadi, Malang, 5 April 2009.

Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information; hereafter LP3ES) and Lembaga Survey Indonesia (Indonesian Survey Institute; hereafter LSI) (Qodari 2010: 124). Polling organisations have since further developed. It is not only NGOs anymore, who are consulting and polling, but also mass media, universities, research organisations and businesses that specialise in campaigning. The pioneer of campaign business was Lingkaran Survey Indonesia (Indonesian Survey Circle; hereafter LSI) which split from the established LSI. Many organisations then followed including Indo Barometer, Fox Indonesia, Charta Politika, Cyrus Surveyor Group, Puskaptis, Publisika, Polmart Consulting, AKSES Riset Indonesia, Lembaga Riset Informasi (LRI), The Indonesian Institute (TII), Lembaga Survei Nasional (LSN), Optima Consulting Network, Pusdeham Surabaya and Surabaya Consulting Group. Their services are comprehensive; in practice, they do all of the jobs that are traditionally handled by party organisations.

Many of them offered the full range of services needed to secure the victory of a candidate, from strategic planning to conceptualizing candidate's vision and mission, from campaigning door to door and designing and organizing media campaigns to providing poll monitors on Election Day (Qodari 2010: 132).

Nonetheless, the nature of political consultants and polling organisations is very diverse in quality and in purpose. There are broad differentiations between academic and commercial, public and private, and non-partisan and partisan. An example of the partisan survey is the case in 2009 Pilpres, when Lembaga Survey Indonesia breached the law by hiding the fact that its surveys were funded by one of the Pilpres candidates (Republika 2009). Lembaga Survey Indonesia and the other five organisations (LP3ES, Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI), Lembaga Survei Nasional (LSN), Cyrus Surveyor Group and Puskaptis) took polling and quick count survey projects offered by Fox Indonesia. Fox Indonesia was the official political consultant of the Yudhoyono-Boediono ticket nominated by the Demokrat-led coalition. Fox Indonesia was given great control over key campaign tasks, including planning strategies, organisations and messages, with the foremost goal of mobilising support for Yudhoyono-

Boediono.¹⁴⁰ Fox Indonesia paid around Rp. 2 billion (US\$ 200,000) to Lembaga Survey Indonesia to run the 2009 Pilpres quick count. In the beginning, Lembaga Survey Indonesia did not admit that its quick count was funded by Fox Indonesia in support of Yudhoyono-Boediono; but after its written contract was leaked to the public, the institution acknowledged the funding and promised to return the money (Dharmasaputra 2009). Nonetheless, at that time, Yudhoyono-Boediono was already elected and the issue was never taken to court. . The case of Lembaga Survey Indonesia and others raises concerns about the integrity and professionalism of Indonesian political consultants and polling organisations.

There are at least two issues raised regarding the increasing role of political consultants and polling institution in Indonesian politics. First, concerns relating to the code of ethics for the profession including transparency about the survey's method and the identity of the sponsor financing it. Transparency is very important, as there is no guarantee that surveys, opinion polls and quick counts, although products of scientific research, are free from manipulation. A study by Larson (2003) showed that almost half of all the polling reports on major US news networks during the 2000 US presidential race were inaccurate and exaggerated. In fact, they can be mismanaged and misused either intentionally or unwittingly. Any disclosure has to include information about the method of selecting the respondents/ informants; sample size; response rates and margin of error; wording of the questions; and name(s) or institution(s) of those who sponsor and finance the survey. For example, when selecting Tempat Pemungutan Suara (polling booth; hereafter TPS) for the sample, the method used deals with demographic, geographic, economic, religious, cultural and social controls in determining representativeness of the sampling TPS. No doubt the character of TPS in urban areas was different to rural ones. Similarly, the character of TPS in areas dominated by modernist or traditionalist Muslims was different to areas dominated by militant Muslims. However, since the 2009 Pilpres, the number of survey/polling institutions disclosing their survey's method, without detailed explanation, is increasing. But, almost all of them have not yet declared the identity of the sponsor financing them.

¹⁴⁰Interview, Ramadhan Pohan, Jakarta, 8 April 2009.

Second, there are concerns about business characters and electoral orientation of the political consultants and polling institutions. Most political consultants and polling organisations are prepared to work for any political party; they tend not to be affiliated with particular parties for ideological or partisan reasons. Accepting many projects from various different parties and candidates, there is the view that conducting consultancies, surveys, polling and quick counts (for paying clients) is the same as any other profit-making activity; however, these campaigning and polling activities are designed to influence electoral outcomes that determine which politicians and parties control government and impact the interests of all voters. These political consultants and polling institutions working for rival political parties/ candidates confront the problem of maintaining their professional credibility. The problem for political parties is whether they have outsourced key party functions to consultants and therefore risk being dominated.

The business characters and electoral orientation of the political consultants and polling institutions are driven by two impetuses. First, most political consultants and polling institutions have no affiliation with or experience in working with parties. “They are mostly political experts, academics, or advertising or public relations professionals” (Qodari 2010: 137). Second, many of their clients (i.e. candidates), particularly in Pilkada, are from outside the party’s structure and bring their own resources and teams. In short, the non-party backgrounds of both consultants and clients make them more comfortable working as business partners.

The rising phenomenon of celebrity politics

Since 2004, particularly in Pilpres and Pilkada, there has been a trend towards celebrity politics. This phenomenon become evident since party ballot open-lists and candidate ballots were adopted for legislative and executive elections at both national and local levels. These new ballot structures have enhanced candidate rather than party interests as discussed previously in sub-chapter ‘the impact of ballot structure’. The phenomenon

becomes more evident since parties started to nominate candidates from outside the party organisation, particularly for Pilkada. Since then, it seems that non-party figures who are nominated as candidates of legislative or executive elections can become celebrity politicians through the electronic and print media or billboards and posters.

Celebrity politics is a relatively new concept. It is derived from the word ‘celebrity’ which refers to “a person who is well-known for their well-knowingness” (Boorstin 1971: 58). To a person who enjoys

...greater presence and a wider scope of activity and agency than are those who make up the rest of the population. They are allowed to move on the public stage while the rest of us watch. They are allowed to express themselves quite individually and idiosyncratically while the rest of the members of the population are constructed as demographic aggregates. (Marshall 1997: ix).

This general definition covers a wide variety of professions, such as movie stars, film makers, models, singers, comedians, sports figures, newsreaders, famous journalists or other entertainers.

The concept of celebrity politics is more easily to comprehend when it refers to the term “celebrity politician.” There are two categories of celebrity politicians, according to John Street in his article “Celebrity Politicians: popular culture and political representation” which draws on UK and USA experiences.

The first refers to the traditional politician—the legitimately elected representative (or the one who aspires to be so)—who engages with the world of popular culture in order to enhance or advance their pre-established political functions and goals... The second refers to the entertainer who pronounces on politics and claims the right to represent peoples and causes, but who does so without seeking or acquiring elected office. Their engagement tends to take the form of public gestures or statements aimed at changing specific policy decisions (2004: 437-38).

These two categories are found in Indonesia as well. Inspired by Street’s article, to frame the discussion, this study defines a celebrity politician as a person who crafts the

status of celebrity to promote her/his political career. There are two variants of the phenomenon. The first is the politician/candidate who chooses to promote her/himself as celebrity. The second is the celebrity who chooses to use her/his celebrity status to speak out on political interests/issues and who sometimes stands for election, either as party or independent candidate. However, different with Street's, this study focuses only on celebrity politicians, regardless of variants, who seek electoral office. And, in Indonesia, the first variant has been more important.

The first and perhaps the most successful Indonesian politician promoted as celebrity is President Yudhoyono. Yudhoyono was a candidate nominated only by small parties but supported by mass media, pollsters and professional campaigners. He was able to defeat the incumbent, President Megawati, in 2004 Pilpres. He was transformed into a celebrity and packaged and sold, like a consumer product of the media industry; a newly developed industry where image and media spectacle are playing an increasingly important role. As Chris Rojek describes, modern celebrity is more "a phenomenon of mass-circulation newspapers, TV, radio and film" (2001: 16). In a different vein, according to Turner,

celebrity is a genre of representation and a discursive effect; it is a commodity traded by the promotions, publicity, and media industries that produce these representations and their effects; and it is a cultural formation that has a social function we can better understand (2004: 9).

The mass media is a rapidly developing industry in Indonesia, in which images and appearances "...have increased in importance relative to text or speech. It is much easier to communicate good looks and sexiness through images than it is character or intellectual sophistication" (Milner 2010: 382). Images and appearances are even more dominant, compared to personality and behaviour. A celebrity with crafted popular images and a glamorous appearance seems to be more likable than a leader who has charisma, and who is honoured because of her/his noble personality and flawless behaviour (Hughes-Freeland 2007). In particular, this understanding is helpful in explaining the new phenomenon in Indonesian electoral politics, as many candidates

seem to have been supported for their celebrity qualities; the outstanding example is President Yudhoyono.

The success of President Yudhoyono has inspired other fellow politicians. The number of politicians/candidates and political parties who use promotions, publicity and media industries for their electoral campaigns is rapidly on the rise. Many candidates, both with high profiles that were already popular and wealthy; and the relatively unknown and less privileged, took part in a popularity contest. The former tried to boost their profile, by utilising expensive, modern means of communication with the help of costly professional campaigners. The latter had to make their way. But their campaign methods, in fact, were similar; the differences were only in quantity and quality, for example, the number and quality of their printed flyers and frequency of appearance on national and/or local TV. A popularity contest became increasingly important “in a context in which direct contact with a politician is lost, voters are more volatile, and parties have to rely on mass media, mainly television, to convey their message to the electorate” (Archetti 2012: 7).

The trend of celebrity politics was strengthened when a number of celebrities (movie stars, singers, comedians, models and sports figures) were nominated as candidates for deputy head of local government in the Pilkada held after 2005. They were recruited as part parties’ electioneering strategy; they were needed as party vote getters. The strategy was compelled by the fact that in the first round of Pilkada held in 2005 and 2006, many candidates of large parties were defeated by those from small parties who had a celebrity profile. These defeats forced parties to reassess their strategies in Pilkada (Buehler and Tan 2007). Nonetheless, according to Mietzner, “...party elites seem determined to deny their famous colleagues more powerful positions” (Mietzner 2009).

One successful example of celebrity-turned-politician was the comedian Dedy “Miing” Gumelar, who was elected as a Member of Parliament in the 2009 election and supported by PDIP (Perdana 2003). Another was the actor, H. Yusuf Macan Effendi, who was elected as vice-governor of West Java province, with the support of a coalition

from PAN and PKS in 2008. However, there were also many who sought to use their celebrity status to seek electoral office, but failed. Among the unsuccessful celebrity candidates were the former model turned movie star, Marissa Hague, who was nominated as Vice-governor of Banten province by PKS in 2006. Helmi Yahya, a famous TV presenter, candidate for Vice-governor of South Sumatera in 2008, and candidate for the Regent of Ogan Ilir in 2010, and Syaiful Jamil, a popular dangdut singer, candidate for Vice-regent of Kabupaten Serang/Banten in 2008. Their failure in the Pilkada showed that candidates with high popularity and recognition do not necessarily become marketable figures in elections. Similar to other candidates competing in elections, the celebrity candidates should also have good knowledge and experience in politics, along with social and economic capital and be supported by an effective party organization.

In addition, there was the perception that that many of these celebrities become involved in electoral politics to boost their position, status and wealth in Indonesia. This is different to the Philippines where celebrities changed their careers from entertainment to politics before they became involved in elections, and then assumed power (Hofileña and Rufo 2004).

The trend of celebrity politics continues. It is common to watch celebrity politicians of the two variants appear on screen along with other movie and sport stars, singers and models. Candidates advertise themselves to be more popular as celebrity in the electronic and print media; while giant billboards, flags and posters with their attractive self-portraits and punchy statements line the streets. Basically, everyone can be celebrity now. They just introduced themselves through portraits and slogans which were intended to show 'who they are' and 'what they had done in the past' (track records).

To introduce 'who they are,' candidates use their self-portrait. Their pictures are usually displayed alongside their name in the campaign materials. Displaying self-portraits is very innovative, particularly because in Indonesia access to information remains difficult and limited; hence, any chance to access more facts about candidates becomes

advantageous. These self-portraits are “an important source of cues for voters and may be the first indication that voters have of the candidate’s appearance” (Banducci, Karp, Thrasher and Colin Rallings 2008: 913). Through their self-portraits, candidates introduce their demographic identities, their political stance and their cultural values. The demographic identities include their gender, age, religion and ethnicity. The political stance includes Pancasilaism and Islamism, and cultural values included modernism, traditionalism, nationalism and localism. These elements are expressed in their physical appearance, fashion, attributes and style, captured in their picture. For example, to get the message across that candidates stood for Islamic values, they had something covering their head or wore Muslim dress to express they supported modern values, but they dressed in Western attire. In Aceh 2006 Pilkada governor, GAM-affiliated candidates

...took every opportunity to emphasise their ideological credentials. Posing in traditional Acehnese dress for the photos that later appeared on the ballots was a key strategy in cultivating an Acehnese image, and contrasted them sharply and visibly from candidates backed by national political parties. (Clark and Palmer 2008: 25).

Although in Aceh the impacts on electoral outcomes needed to be examined further, to some extent; there was confirmation however that the images captured in the pictures succeeded in connecting candidates to their supporters, particularly with the population of the electoral district who have or support similar characteristics with the candidate. By providing this information, candidates allow voters to form first impressions which may be used to build judgments about them. Voters may then choose their candidate accordingly; although their support may be manifested as an effect of potential bias formed by those first impressions. In Banducci’s words:

...attractive candidates are more likely to be attributed the qualities associated with successful politicians and these traits inferences, based on facial appearances, influence the outcome of elections. ...these trait inferences are [also] based on physical characteristics of the candidates, such as age, race and ethnicity, evident from a photograph. Therefore, first impressions can be important determinants of election outcomes, especially in low-information elections. (2008: 903).

A similar study by Amy King and Leigh also found that attractive candidates are more likely to be elected. They assessed self-pictures/ self-photographs of 286 political candidates from major political parties, and then estimated the effect of beauty on vote share for candidates in the Australian 2004 federal election. They found there was:

...a strong positive relationship between our ratters' assessment of beauty and candidates' share of the vote. Holding constant gender, incumbency, and party fixed effects, a one standard deviation increase in a candidate's beauty is associated with a 1.4 percentage point increase in vote share. This effect is not only statistically significant; it is also politically salient. In the four Australian federal elections held between 1996 and 2004, one in ten races was decided by a margin of less than 1.4 percentage points. ... We find that the effects of beauty on vote share are not uniform. The impact of beauty appears to be larger for male candidates and for challengers. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the relationship between beauty and vote share is linear... Given that the media and popular culture devote more attention to feminine beauty than masculine beauty, our finding that the marginal effect of beauty is larger for male candidates than for female candidates may seem surprising. (2009: 591).

To introduce "what they had done in the past" (track records), candidates published a brief biography and short statement. Usually, this biography and/or statement appeared alongside their picture on printed campaign material and verbalised. This idea is ground-breaking in Indonesia's history of election campaigns; previously candidates had not recognised the significance of publicising their past. Incumbents were busy trying to create a successful image by claiming credit for government programs and policies, while non-incumbents spent their energies advertising their previous achievements and experiences.

In the 2009 Pilpres campaign the incumbent President Yudhoyono attempted to claim credit for his 2004 administration's achievements. For example, he claimed he had great concern for his people by initiating policies including Bantuan Langsung Tunai (the cash compensation payments; hereafter BLT), Bantuan Organisasi Sekolah (schooling organisation allowances; hereafter BOS), Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat (health care support; hereafter Jamkesmas) and Kredit Untuk Rakyat (microcredit programs; hereafter KUR).

A different strategy was adopted by non-incumbent candidates, as they tried to capitalise on their past qualifications and experience, verifying that they qualified to assume political office. For example, in the 2004 Pilpres, Yudhoyono crafted an image as a people's president and a symbol of change for reformasi. In fact, he was a retired general from the Suharto era, who rose to importance by defending the authoritarian New Order and the robust armed forces, and resisting the influence of political Islam; he was certainly not well known as a supporter of reformasi. His campaign advisors and teams were dominated by many retired military officers who had never been known as enthusiasts of reformasi. Besides, he had served as the Security Minister under President Wahid and President Megawati; thus had a record as a senior member of the executive. Nonetheless, when the second round entered its final weeks, because of his skilful campaign teams, Yudhoyono was already perceived to be entitled to the position. He turned out to be the champion of the reformist movement and was supported by many conservative Muslim parties. His opponent—the incumbent President Megawati, once the symbol of the reformasi populist movement and representative democracy—was perceived as the defender of the status quo relying for her victory on the support of Golkar, the authoritarian New Order's political machine (Dagg 2007).

Another example of the campaign of ordinary people turned to be local celebrity politicians for a non-incumbent for Pilleg at the local level was Johnny Hidayat from Golkar, the candidate for the DPRD Bandung City/West Java, Dapil 4 and Tjutjung Sungkara from Hanura. Hidayat declared on his billboards that he was the vice chairman of Golkar Bandung City and chairman of Siliwangi Youth Movement, Bandung City. He wanted to show that he was a senior official of Golkar, but he was concerned with the development of the younger generation. Tjutjung Sungkara stated on his billboards that he was a retired military colonel, advisor of the charity organisation for Pesantren Suryalaya Bandung City and a member of the local radio network called "Karees". Through these statements, he tried to build an image as an experienced military officer who was involved in the local society, particularly the Islamic community. Pesantren Suryalaya is one of the biggest Islamic boarding schools in West

Java. Through these statements, they explained, to their potential voters, who they were and why certain segments of voters should support them. Whether these strategies are successful or otherwise remains to be examined further. Regardless, these strategies have encouraged the development of a new phenomenon of celebrity politics.

Concluding remarks

This chapter found electoral politics under reformasi 1998 turned to be more complicated, variegated and fluid, reflecting the need to accommodate the divergent interests of many different political forces. There are two factors identified.

First, working with three different electoral systems (PR, SNTV and majoritarian systems), each with its own electoral mechanics (ballot structure, electoral threshold, electoral formula and district magnitude) has brought a lot of pressure as each system and mechanic has its own distinctive impact and has tended to contradict. For example, the PR system encouraged inclusive and consensual power sharing and produced parliaments with multi-party representation. In contrast, the majoritarian system created exclusive government dominated by large parties (or coalition of parties). It was found that in the 1999 Pilleg, the PR system had brought Indonesia's politics closer to an inclusive democratic system. But, by the 2009 Pilleg, the system had become less inclusive, both at national and local levels. This was caused by the parliamentary threshold which was applied for the first time for 2009 election. Number of parties in parliament decreased from 21 in 1999 election, to 17 parties in 2004 election then 9 parties in 2009 election. While, effective number of seats in the parliament also decreased from 4.7 in 1999 election, to 7.07 parties in 2004 election then 6.13 parties in 2009 election. (See table 4.16) And for local level, out of 171 cases, it was found 73.1 % cases were won by the big two –Golkar and PDIP. (See table 6.7). In contrast, the majoritarian two-round system used for Pilpres marginalised smaller parties. In 2009 Presidential election, there were three presidential pairs nominated by the three large coalitions of parties. While in 2004 Presidential election, there were five presidential pairs nominated. And two out of five presidential pairs were nominated by one single

party. Wiranto and Solahudin Wahid were nominated by Golkar. Also, Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar by PPP. See Table 6.2 and Table 6.3. In other words, the majoritarian system used in Pilpres had made the political system more exclusive. And, the simple majoritarian two-round system used in Pilkada produced more inclusive outcomes. Smaller parties still had the opportunity to nominate candidates for head of local government, either individually or as part of a coalition. It was found that the number of Pilkada won by a small party without coalition 2005-2009 was 12 cases (7.02). See Table 6.7. Besides, it was found that 13 Pilkada were won by independent candidates in 2005-2009 (2.67%). See Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. Yet, there were many heads of local governments elected by plurality votes of less than 40%.' There were 33 cases that won by 25-29% of votes, 133 cases by 30-39%, 129 cases by 40-49%, 97 cases by 50-59%, 42 cases by 60-69% and 15 cases by 70-99% of votes. Less than 6% of Pilkada contests were settled in two rounds. See Figure 5.1

Second is as a consequence of the conflicting choices and inconsistent decisions which political negotiations among parliamentarians produced. For example, Indonesian electoral laws and regulations during the reformasi era were formulated with the objective to strengthen political party. But, the legislators and MK decisions have weakened parties instead by supporting ballot open-lists for Pilleg, candidate ballots for Pilpres and Pilkada, independent candidates for Pilkada, and different thresholds (low electoral threshold and high parliamentary threshold for Pilleg and high electoral threshold for Pilpres and Pilkada). These inconsistent decisions reflected the negotiations among parties in the legislature, as discussed in the previous chapter.

This chapter found that with this pattern of electoral politics, a stable and effective government was more difficult to establish, particularly at a national level, while at the local level it depended on strength of leadership of the head of local government elected. The combination of majoritarian and PR systems has produced a directly elected president with strong electoral legitimacy, but his or her party is highly unlikely to have majority of seats in the parliament. This means the orientation of the political system is unclear as to whether it is a presidential democracy or a parliamentary system.

This chapter found that among the four electoral mechanics, the ballot structure was the most influential, while district magnitude the least. The application of a party ballot open-list and candidate ballot had weakened the influence of party organisations and leaders. The candidate ballot has opened up opportunity to intensify personal competition. Many of the most successful politicians have taken on the persona of celebrities, and their campaigns had made great use of mass media, professional consultants and pollsters. The expanding media coverage had turned some politicians into celebrities and celebrities from other fields had been attracted to electoral politics. The most successful Indonesian politician promoted as celebrity was former President Yudhoyono. Overall, the electoral systems and mechanics have created parties with a pronounced pragmatic approach, with the ability to compromise. Further examination of the impacts of the electoral systems and electoral mechanics on party politics, especially the emergence of parties as electoral vehicles, will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter Six

Electoral vehicles and Indonesian political thinking

“Abandoning attempts at the intellectual and moral *encadrement* of the masses, it [party] is turning more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success” (Kirchheimer 1990: 52).

“...in the long run, *aliran* cleavages can themselves be broken down or blurred or made politically irrelevant by the development of more significant associational ties which cut across primordial loyalties” (Mackie 1974: 60).

Introduction

This chapter is the core of this study concerning parties and their strategies and ideologies. It examines the impacts of electoral systems and electoral mechanics on party politics, which lead to the development of parties as electoral vehicles within political thinking post reformasi 1998. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the ideal type of electoral vehicle depicted in a diagram showing two axes—party ideology and party strategy (see figure 6.1). The diagram and the discussion explain the long journey of Indonesian parties from 1955 to 2009 and identify contemporary trends.

This chapter consists of two sections. The first section discusses the ‘Indonesian parties as electoral vehicles.’ This section comprises two subsections: ‘Pragmatism of parties,’ and ‘Absence of a clear policy and programmatic commitments.’ The second section explores Indonesian political thinking, post reformasi and comprises three subsections: ‘Two ideologies: Pancasilaism and Islamism,’ ‘Two party strategies: electoralist and partisan,’ and ‘Map of party ideologies and party strategies.’

Indonesian parties as electoral vehicles

This study has found that post reformasi 1998, there was a tendency for parties to be created and used as vehicles, so their leaders and candidates could participate in the electoral contest, particularly presidential elections. Partai Demokrat was formed by Yudhoyono to compete in the 2004 elections, and Gerindra was then created by Prabowo and Hanura by Wiranto to contest the 2009 elections. All three have an overwhelming electoral orientation, unclear party ideology, lack of policy and programmatic commitments and strongly influenced by their leaders. These parties have large organisations and claim to have massive memberships, but they have little capability to offer anything substantial in terms of policies and programs. They also have weak links with their members. Hence, to mobilise voters, they promote celebrity qualities in their leaders and candidates.

The leaders of these three electoral vehicles are Yudhoyono, Prabowo and Wiranto. All are retired military generals from the military academy classes of 1973, 1974 and 1968 respectively. They were previously associated with Golkar. With three retired generals involved in the competition, the 2009 rivalry became more vigorous compared to 2004. All of them tried to utilise the benefits of being experienced military officers: employing military strategy, skills and networking, and even taking advantage of military infrastructure and intelligence. Yudhoyono and Prabowo mobilised their military networks and Prabowo, in particular, had a family fortune to draw on. Wiranto preferred to combine military supporters and civilian enthusiasts. It should be noted here that these retired generals exercised strong influence over their parties, but depended more on their personal support team than party organisation.

Reflecting on the history of Indonesian parties; Demokrat, Gerindra and Hanura were not the first parties created to focus on electoral activities. Golkar was established as the New Order representative in the managed elections during the Suharto period. Post reformasi 1998, the influence of Golkar leaders, Akbar Tanjung, Jusuf Kalla and

Aburizal Bakri, has not been as strong as Yudhoyono, Wiranto and Prabowo over their respective parties. For example, they failed to prevent the competing factions inside Golkar from splitting and forming new parties, or joining other parties. However, Golkar leaders have stronger links with their members compared to those of Demokrat, Hanura and Gerindra. The results of the 1999, 2004 and 2009 legislative and executive elections, at national and local levels, showed that Golkar obtained high voter support as either the most successful or second most successful party. This suggests that Golkar supporters have been loyal notwithstanding the party's identification with Suharto and the New Order government. It should be emphasised that in some regions (e.g. South Sulawesi and North Sulawesi), Golkar has been dominated by militant loyalists. Golkar however has the advantage of electoral and organisational experience. The party has a much better party structure. Its functionaries and members are more educated, wealthier and more experienced in politics. Golkar has demonstrated an ability to adjust to the more open and competitive environment of the post Suharto era. However, Golkar's leaders have not successfully used the party as an electoral vehicle for their presidential ambitions. Rather, ambitious Golkar leaders (e.g. Yudhoyono, Wiranto and Prabowo) have left Golkar and established new parties as their electoral vehicles.

The identification of parties through the personalities of their leaders was also apparent, although to a lesser extent with PDIP, PKB, PPP, PAN and PKS. These parties still identify with older beliefs and values that each party had at the outset, which varies from one party to another. This baggage from the past has limited their electoral appeal and they have experienced greater difficulties in adjusting to a new environment. Parties such as PDIP, PAN, PKB, PPP and PKS are now at the cross roads. They understand they have to increase their votes, and therefore they need to broaden their appeal and to target voters from different segments the population. However, by doing so there is a greater possibility that they must sacrifice their loyalists. PDIP and PKS, PAN, PKB and PPP are unwilling to make concessions, if they run the risk of losing their old supporters. Hence, the challenge for these parties is how to control the transformation process of becoming electoral vehicles. They will do well if they can read the shifting beliefs and values of their supporters.

Based on Indonesian parties' experience and inspired by previous studies, this study conceptualised the definition and aspects of electoral vehicles, defined as a party which is constructed or transformed by politicians, or groups of politicians, as their vehicle to win elections and exercise power. Three aspects of party life need to be examined when categorising electoral vehicle parties: organisation, strategy and function. First, party organisation is identified by its main purpose, its organisation, ideology and policies. Electoral vehicle parties have an overwhelming electoral orientation, prioritising the objectives of winning an election and seeking to govern. They have a thin structure, except in election time, with a loose commitment to ideology and prefer to follow the public mood. Second, party strategies developed during election campaigns need to be distinguished from strategies implemented by government. Electoral vehicle parties find it easy to join coalitions, either in elections, parliament or cabinet. They make extensive use of mass media, consultants and pollsters as well as emphasising the attractive personal attributes of leaders, figures and candidates, rather than party ideology, platform and policies. Thirdly, party function can be thought of in terms of how it recruits candidates, aggregates and articulates its voter's interests during election campaigns, and represents voter's aspirations and interests in government. These parties recruit their candidates based on personal electoral appeal and the candidate's own resources. They are inclusive and exercise considerable discretion in aggregating and articulating interests. They also seek to represent heterogeneous groups of voters and have wide latitude to form or join governments.

However, besides the fully fledged electoral vehicle parties described above, there are also established parties, which adopt some of these features. These parties are defined as those which develop some of the characteristics of electoral vehicle parties in order to support leaders' and candidates' ambitions to compete in elections and exercise power. The best examples of this transforming party type are PDIP, PKB, PPP, PAN and PKS. However, in the process, some of the party's older beliefs and values are retained. Transformative parties seek to balance enthusiasm for winning elections with longstanding goals and ideological values. To attract voters, these parties accommodate

both electoral and partisan strategies. And they identify more with the interests of specific social groups (see summary of findings in table 6.1 below).

Table 6.1: Party as electoral vehicle*

Definition		A party which is established or transformed by politicians or groups of politicians as their vehicle to win elections and exercise power.
Party organisation	Main purpose	Maximises votes, wins elections and seeks to govern.
	Structure	Weak, except at election time.
	Ideology	Has vague commitment to ideology.
	Policy	Moderate, easily swings with public mood.
Party strategy	Parliament/cabinet strategy	Mainly easy to create/join party coalitions.
	Electoral campaign	Utilises 'modern' campaign techniques; depends heavily on professional campaigning.
	Campaign issue	Focuses on relatively practical, transient issues, and or the weakness of the opponents.
	Mobilising voters	Emphasising the attractiveness of personal attributes of its leaders, figures and candidates.
Party function	Candidate recruitment	Based on personal electoral appeal and resources of the candidate; candidate has relatively stronger position over party organisation.
	Interest aggregation and articulation	Inclusive; has considerable discretion in aggregating and articulating interest; less overtly involved with the formulation of programmatic/ ideological commitments.
	Societal representation	Heterogeneous; avoids defending the interests of specific social groups; limits their potential to represent society.
	Join a government	Has wide latitude to form or join a government.

* The indicators of parties as electoral vehicles are developed from Kirchheimer, Otto, 'The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems,' in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 177-200; Diamond, Larry and Richard Gunther, *Political Parties and Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University, 2001); Wolinetz, Steven, 'Party System Change: the Catch-all Thesis Revisited,' *West European Politics*, 14 (January 1991): 113-128; Kitschelt, Herberth, *the Logic of Party Formation* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1989); Kitschelt, Herberth, *the Transformation of European Social Democracy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1994); Panebianco, Angelo, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1988).

Pragmatism of parties

The overwhelming electoral orientation of prioritising the objective to win an election and seek to govern have endorsed electoral vehicle parties retained the pragmatism characters. Party pragmatism was most apparent in the 2009 elections, less visible in 2004 and not really noted in 1999. Such pragmatism was obvious in Pilpres, more in Pilkada, but less apparent in Pilleg. It was clear at a national level and even more so at the local level. In the 2009 elections, both Pancasilaist and Islamist parties softened their position and were more flexible with their agendas. They tended to downplay their Pancasilaist and Islamist credentials, which they had emphasised in 1999, but instead focused on cross-ideological issues such as corruption, social welfare and education. They even had a tendency to be more open to the elements of other ideologies. Pancasilaist parties, like Golkar and PDIP, became more sympathetic. Golkar, had already been influenced by Islamism long before reformasi (Baswedan 2004a). PDIP established Baitul Muslimin Indonesia (BMI), a new wing with an Islamic-orientation, in March 2007.¹⁴¹ Like the Pancasilaist parties, Islamist parties, such as PKS, PBB and PBR, also became more pragmatic. They started to accommodate non-Muslim members, particularly in non-Muslim regions such as Papua, North Sumatera, NTT and Bali. These pragmatic tendencies varied from party to party, issue to issue, and region to region over time.

The kernel of pragmatism was nurtured under the New Order government. The starting point was perhaps when parties were forced to amalgamate in 1973. Actually, the idea to have a smaller number of parties had been proposed as early as 1946 (Reeve 1985), raised again in 1959 and imposed in 1973, following the perceived failure of the multi-party system of Parliamentary democracy in the 1950s. This idea to simplify the party system came together with a design to shift party competition from an ideological to a programmatic one. In 1983 all parties were obliged to accept Pancasila as their sole ideology. These rules pushed parties into problematic situations, particularly in

¹⁴¹ However, Baitul Muslimin was not intended to be a rebirth of Jamiatul Muslimin, the Muslim wing of the PDI's predecessor, the PNI. Interview, Pramono Anung, Jakarta, 3 February 2009.

defining political identity. The PPP, for example, seemed to have more opportunity to become a united party because Islam could bring all the elements together; but long held differences in theological orientation and political style limited this approach. While, the PDI seemed relatively successful in defining itself as a nationalist party; the party had problems in securing its supporters, except amongst small minority groups such as Catholic and Christian communities. Yet, the process left parties fraught with internal frictions between different groupings: between those who chose to collaborate and those who didn't. In the end, the groups who were willing to cooperate survived (Rasyid 1994).

This concept was encapsulated in the New Order government's principal slogan, 'economic development and political stability'. It was Golkar that was expected to lead and carry economic development; however, by the early 1980s there was considerable doubt about the ability of Golkar, because the party had become more of an electoral vehicle for President Suharto to win elections and sustain his hold on power (Rasyid 1994). In the 1990s the armed forces, led by General Soemitro, asked Golkar to return to its previous function of being the driving force for development programs; but both Soemitro and Golkar failed in this endeavour. The opportunity then came in the 1998 Congress, in the early reformasi era, for Golkar to consolidate its identification with economic development; but rather the party removed any mention of economic development and political stability in its program in an attempt to disassociate itself from President Suharto's authoritarian government. Instead, the party focused more on seeking control of government, or at least having a position in it. Similar to the time under Suharto, Golkar post reformasi 1998 was used more as an electoral vehicle to win elections and exercise power, but without the ideological commitment to economic development.

The pragmatism of Golkar was followed by other parties to varying degrees and this pattern will be discussed in two subsections: the coalition of parties and regional adaptability of parties.

The coalition of parties

Party pragmatism was evident in forming coalitions for nominating candidates in elections for heads of government. In the Indonesian electoral system, legislative and executive elections are held on separate occasions; but the outcome of the former, frames the possible contest for the latter. Not all parties competing in legislative election can nominate presidential tickets, governor tickets, or regent/mayor tickets. However, they can join a coalition for nominating electoral tickets. Except for the 2009 Pilpres, it is only parties that pass the parliamentary tickets that can create coalitions for nominating presidential tickets. In contrast to some Western countries, Indonesian party coalitions are practical, fluid and short term. Almost all coalitions created for nominating electoral tickets are dissolved soon after electoral results are announced. The parties that form coalitions in elections for heads of government compete in legislative elections. The analysis here will focus on executive elections.

In Pilpres, the pragmatism of parties was apparent in the 2009 elections and less so in the 2004 elections. (All discussion referred to in tables 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 below.) In the 2009, it was only nine parties that had the opportunity to nominate presidential tickets, but no party satisfied electoral threshold; accordingly no party was able to nominate without forming a coalition. In the 2009 Pilpres, there were three party coalitions consisting of Pancasilaist, Islamic and Islamist parties. First, Partai Demokrat formed a coalition supported by PAN, PKS, PKB, PPP, PBB, PDS, PKPB, PBR, PPRN, PKPI, PDP, PPPI, RepublikaN, PPD, Patriot, PNBK, PMB, PPI, Pelopor, PKDI, PIS, PNIB and PPDI. Second, Golkar led a coalition of Hanura, PKNU, Barnas and PDK. Finally, a PDIP coalition was supported by Gerindra, Kedaulatan, PNI-M, Pakar Pangan, Buruh, PPNUI, PSI and Merdeka. The leading parties nominated their party chair as presidential candidate. Demokrat nominated Yudhoyono, Golkar Jusuf Kalla, and PDIP Megawati Sukarnoputri. For vice-president candidate, Yudhoyono asked Boediono, non-party technocrat and former Minister and head of Bank Indonesia; Golkar's Jusuf Kalla was a retired General, former Golkar leader and founder of Hanura, with Wiranto as his vice-presidential running mate. Megawati invited another retired General,

Prabowo Subianto, chairman of Gerindra as her vice-Presidential candidate. Like Wiranto, Prabowo Subianto had been a Golkar leader before establishing his own party. Gerindra and Hanura were newcomers in the 2009 election, but had satisfied 2.5% of the parliamentary threshold.

Table 6.2: Candidates, votes and coalition of parties, Presidential election 2009

No.	Presidential Pair	Valid Votes	% of Total	Electoral Coalition of Political Parties
1	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono - Boediono	73,874,562	60.80%	Demokrat, PAN, PKS, PKB, PPP, PBB, PDS, PKPB, PBR, PPRN, PKPI, PDP, PPPI, RepublikaN, PPD, Patriot, PNBK, PMB, PPI, Pelopor, PKDI, PIS, PNIB, PPDI.
2	Megawati Sukarnoputri - Prabowo Subianto	32,548,105	26.79%	PDIP, Gerindra, Kedaulatan, PNI-M, Pakar Pangan, Buruh, PPNUI, PSI, Merdeka
3	Jusuf Kalla - Wiranto	15,081,814	12.41%	Golkar, Hanura, PKNU, Barnas, PDK

Source: KPU (2009b). Kompilasi dokumen pemilu presiden 2009 [Collected documents of the presidential elections, 2009]. Jakarta, Indonesia: Biro Humas KPU.

Table 6.3: Candidates, votes and coalition of parties, Presidential election 2004, first round

No.	Presidential Pair	Valid Votes	% of Total	Coalition of Political Parties
1	H. Wiranto, SH Ir. Solahuddin Wahid	26,251,444	22.16%	Golkar
2	Hj. Megawati Sukarno Putri KH. Ahmad Hasyim Muzadi	31,526,340	26.61%	PDIP, PDS
3	Prof. DR. H.M. Amien Rais DR. Ir. H. Siswono Yudo Husodo	17,372,599	14.66%	PAN, PKS, PBR, PNBK, PNI-M, PPKD, PSI, PBSB
4	H. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Drs. H. Muhammad Jusuf Kalla	39,761,932	33.56%	Demokrat, PBB, PKPI
5	DR. H. Hamzah Haz H. Agum Gumelar, M.Sc.	3,559,454	3.00%	PPP

Source: KPU (2004b). Kompilasi dokumen pemilu presiden 2004 [Collected documents of the presidential elections, 2004]. Jakarta, Indonesia: Biro Humas KPU.

Table 6.4: Candidates, votes and coalition of parties, Presidential election 2004, second round

No.	Presidential Pair	Valid Votes	% of total	Coalition of Political Parties
1	Hj. Megawati Sukarno Putri KH. Ahmad Hasyim Muzadi	44,933,246	39.31%	PDIP, PDS, Golkar, PPP, PBR, PNI-M, PKPB
2	H. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Drs. H. Muhammad Jusuf Kalla	69,364,558	60.69%	Demokrat, PBB, PKPI, PKB, PKS, PAN, PSI

Source: KPU (2004b). *Kompilasi dokumen pemilu presiden 2004* [Collected documents of the presidential elections, 2004]. Jakarta, Indonesia: Biro Humas KPU.

The pragmatism of parties can also be seen in the process of selecting running mates in the 2009 Pilpres. By way of contrast, in 2004 and 1999 Pilpres, the practice was that presidential tickets reflected some *aliran* and political balance, as explained in chapter four. Jusuf Kalla and Megawati's choice of a vice-presidential running mate was restricted to the leaders of Hanura and Gerindra, as the large Islamic and the Islamist parties—PKS, PAN, PPP and PKB—already supported Yudhoyono. Given their weaker electoral position, they did not have the option of selecting a non-party figure like Boediono. Also, Jusuf Kalla, a *santri* from South Sulawesi, balanced his ticket in *aliran* terms with Wiranto, an *abangan* from Java. The Megawati-Prabowo and Yudhoyono-Boediono tickets were *abangan* and Javanese. Ironically, the Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto ticket, balanced in *aliran* terms, was defeated in the first round. Instead, the pragmatism of Yudhoyono-Boediono, won the election, defeating the other pragmatic ticket of Megawati-Prabowo. It should be noted that each of the tickets had a former general as presidential or vice-presidential candidate.

The pragmatism in the process of selecting running mates was obvious; for example, when Yudhoyono asked Boediono to join the ticket, a modest technocrat politician from Central-Java without party affiliations and a highly educated professor without *santri* training, was completely outside the predicted pattern. Actually, Yudhoyono had other potential running mates who fitted the conventional *aliran politik* rationale. Among them were Akbar Tandjung of Golkar, Hatta Rajasa of PAN and Hidayat Nur Wahid of PKS. Both Akbar Tandjung and Hatta Rajasa are Sumatran and high profile politicians.

Hidayat Nur Wahid was a bit overshadowed because some were afraid if Yudhoyono chose him, Yudhoyono might lose the support of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, given his PKS affiliation. But, how Yudhoyono calculated his electoral support is informative. His decision "...implies an emphasis on policy rather than politics or ideology ..." (Castle 2010: 144). Boediono had been involved in the management of the Indonesian political economy since the transition period post Suharto. He was one of the most powerful figures who determined the destiny of Indonesian businesses in the wake of the 1997/8 financial crisis. He was not only a State Minister of the National Development Planning Agency under President Habibie and Minister of Finance under President Megawati, but also Coordinating Minister of the Economy and Governor of Bank Indonesia (Indonesian Central Bank; hereafter BI) under President Yudhoyono. The choice "... will dilute the Islamist component critics say is too prominent in Yudhoyono's coalition. It also means Yudhoyono has no designated heir in mind for what promises to be a wide open presidential race in 2009" (Castle 2010: 144). Indeed, as a regulator, he was very friendly to Indonesian business, particularly to some heavily indebted Suharto-era conglomerates. One of Boediono's conglomerate friendly policies was when the BI financed some of their business through payments of Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia (Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance; hereafter BLBI). At that time as much as Rp 146 trillion (around US\$11 billion) had been injected by the government to guarantee deposits (Hadiz and Robison 2005). Indeed, Boediono had no political party that could help him to boost votes for Yudhoyono; Yudhoyono, however, needed no help in mobilising votes, because his party had already obtained strong support in the 2009 Pilleg and held the largest number of seats in the parliament. What Yudhoyono needed was support from business communities and someone with experience, highly skilled in handling the Indonesian macro economy. The choice of Boediono suggested that administrator skills are just as useful as those of a solidarity maker who were skilled as mediator between groups at different levels of political effectiveness, as mass organisers and as manipulators of integrative symbols (Feith 1962).

As previously mentioned, party pragmatism in selecting running mates was less visible in the 2004 Pilpres; there were seven parties which had the opportunity to nominate presidential tickets including parties that were able to nominate without coalition. However, not all parties had a suitable candidate. Accordingly, in the 2004 Pilpres, there were three presidential tickets nominated by party coalition and two presidential tickets nominated without party coalition. The presidential tickets reflected a narrower ideological spectrum. First, Golkar nominated Wiranto and Solahuddin Wahid. Second, a coalition of PDIP and PDS supported Megawati and Hasyim Muzadi. Third, an alliance of PAN, PKS, PBR, PNBK, PNI-M, PPD, PSI and PBSI supported Amien Rais and Siswono Yudo Husodo. Fourth, Demokrat supported by PBB and PKPI chose Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla. And finally, PPP selected Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar. In the 2004 Pilpres no ticket gained a majority in the first round. In the second round, the ticket of Megawati, the incumbent President, lost to the ticket of Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla.

In contrast to the 2009 Pilpres, the process of selecting running mates in the 2004 Pilpres was less pragmatic, with considerations of *aliran politik*, political ideology groupings, civil–military tensions and geographical bases of support having greater influence. Geographical support has become a major concern, particularly since 1998, when the controversies about Java and non-Java friction were discussed more openly. Indeed, *aliran politik* had already been bridged when Abdurrahman Wahid asked Megawati to be his vice-president in 1999, Megawati chose Hamzah Haz in 2001, and Yudhoyono chose Jusuf Kalla as his vice-president in 2004 (McIntyre 2005).

The pragmatic non-ideological coalitions become the best option for parties in Pilpres. The new set of electoral systems and mechanics, elaborated in chapter five, has compelled parties to create coalitions if they want to participate in government. Previously, PDIP was unwilling to build an alliance with Golkar, as in 1998 PDIP pushed President Suharto (founder/chair of Golkar) to resign. Yet, in 2004 Pilpres second round, PDIP created a coalition with Golkar. While in 2009 Pilpres, PDIP formed a coalition with Gerindra, a splinter party of Golkar. Megawati (chair of PDIP)

asked Prabowo (chair of Gerindra) to be her vice-presidential candidate, even though Prabowo was a former son-in-law of President Suharto and was suspected of many human rights abuses. On several occasions, the Islamist and Islamic parties stated that they had different ideas about political Islam and the establishment of Indonesia as an Islamic state, and were disinclined to form a coalition. However, in 1999, they formed the *poros tengah* (centre axis) promoting the chair of PKB, Abdurrahman Wahid, to be appointed as president and the chair of PAN, Amien Rais, to be appointed as chairman of MPR, even though their parties had only a small number of parliamentary seats. Moreover, in 2004 and 2009 Pilpres, Islamist and Islamic parties formed a coalition with Demokrat to nominate Yudhoyono. In fact, these parties had no choice other than to join coalitions with Pancasilaist parties, as their electoral support had declined. In the 1955 election, the total share of Islamist and Islamic parties was as high as 43.7%. In 1999 this support was reduced to 36.8%, then 36.2% in 2004 and 29.1% in 2009, including PAN and PKB, or to 18.20%, excluding PAN and PKB (see chapter four for a more detailed discussion). This tendency means that both Islamist and Islamic parties, as an ideological block, have been overshadowed in political competition by the Pancasilaist parties. Nonetheless, it should be noted that party elites, either Pancasilaist, Islamist or Islamic, have engaged in intense rivalry to secure political positions and access economic resources.

The pragmatism of parties was obvious in Pilpres but more so in Pilkada, except in the early rounds in 2005. At that time, there were many candidates nominated without party coalition, particularly from large parties, but most of them failed. The results shocked the parties and made them aware that although the result of local legislative elections enabled the possibility of nominating candidates in Pilkada, it did not ensure their success. Since, parties have become more careful in selecting their candidates and more likely to create coalitions to nominate candidates (Qodari 2010). However, different to Pilpres, the competition in Pilkada is more complicated, reflecting a greater diversity of players, issues, geographical settings and demographic character as well as social, economic and cultural contexts. Also in Pilkada, there is more likely to be intervention by the central (and/or provincial) parties (and/or government). In Pilpres, coalition

building involved Pancasilaist-Islamist and Islamic parties. In Pilkada, it was not only between Pancasilaist-Islamist, but also between Pancasilaist-Pancasilaist, Islamic-Islamic, Islamist-Islamist, Pancasilaist-Islamic, Islamic-Islamist. Besides, there were cases of single party nominations as well as the phenomenon of independent candidates. In sum, the Pilkada coalitions have every conceivable combination.

Out of 486 Pilkada held during the 2005–2009 period, 62.14% were won by a coalition of parties, 35.19% without a coalition and 2.67% by independents (see table 6.5 below). Of the 13 Pilkada won by independents, three cases were in Batu Bara Regency/North Sumatera, Garut Regency /West Java and Kubu Raya Regency /West Kalimantan, while the other 10 cases were in Aceh province, as examined in chapter five.

Table 6.5: Number of Pilkada won by coalition, without coalition and independents, 2005-2009

No.	Won	Number of winning cases	%
1	With coalition	302	62.14
2	Without coalition	171	35.19
3	Independents	13	2.67
	Total Pilkada cases	486	100

Sources: KPU (2005-9). Laporan hasil pilkada berbagai provinsi, kabupaten dan kota [Reports of the results of the head of local government elections, 2005-2009]. Jakarta, Indonesia: Biro Humas KPU.

To simplify analysis, coalitions were grouped into three: Pancasilaist-Islamist, Pancasilaist-Pancasilaist and Islamist-Islamist parties. The classification follows the ideology groupings outlined in chapter four. It was found that of the 302 Pilkada won by coalition, 63.58% was gained by Pancasilaist-Islamist parties, 32.78% by Pancasilaist-Pancasilaist parties, and 3.64% by Islamist-Islamist parties (see table 6.6).

Table 6.6: Number of Pilkada won by coalition, 2005-2009

No.	Coalition of party ideologies	Number of winning cases	%
1	Pancasilaist-Islamist parties	192	63.58
2	Pancasilaist-Pancasilaist parties	99	32.78
3	Islamist-Islamist parties	11	3.64
Total		302	100

Sources: KPU (2005-9). Laporan hasil pilkada berbagai provinsi, kabupaten dan kota [Reports of the results of the head of local government elections, 2005-2009]. Jakarta, Indonesia: Biro Humas KPU.

Of the 171 Pilkada won without coalition, 82.45% won by Pancasilaist parties, 8.80% won by Islamic parties and 8.75% by Islamist parties (see table 6.7).

Table 6.7: Number of Pilkada won without coalition, 2005-2009

No.	Party ideology	Won	Number of winning cases	% of single party victories
1	Pancasilaist parties	Golkar	73	42.70
		PDIP	52	30.40
		Demokrat	4	2.33
		Others	12	7.02
		Sub-total	141	82.45
2	Islamic parties	PAN	5	2.95
		PKB	10	5.85
		Sub-total	15	8.80
3	Islamist parties	PKS	4	2.33
		PPP	9	5.26
		Others	2	1.16
		Sub-total	15	8.75
Total			171	100

Sources: KPU (2005-9). Laporan hasil pilkada berbagai provinsi, kabupaten dan kota [Reports of the results of the head of local government elections, 2005-2009]. Jakarta, Indonesia: Biro Humas KPU.

It was found, from the 486 Pilkada during 2005–2009 and described in tables 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 above, that pragmatic, non-ideological coalitions are the most effective way of participating in local politics. The data showed that pragmatic non-ideological coalition's tendency seemed stronger in Pilkada, and was directly related to the

imperatives of the electoral system. The electoral mechanics, particularly candidate ballot, electoral threshold and electoral formula, had influenced parties to adjust their electoral strategies. Their electoral strategy was very result oriented. The tendency, apparently, was not only with Pancasilaist parties, but also with all other parties, either Islamist or Islamic. They were willing to join in a coalition, even with their traditional opponents. There were many coalitions at local level that seemed improbable at national level. Islamist parties, including the least pragmatic ones, were also becoming electorally pragmatic, particularly after realising they could not work alone. To make it easier to cooperate with Pancasilaist and Islamic parties, the latter downplayed their support for an Islamic state and Syariah Law. Most parties, either Pancasilaist, Islamist or Islamic, preferred to follow the public mood, campaigning on popular issues and thus they avoided defending the interests of specific social groups.

Examples of improbable coalitions include that of PDIP and PKS in Paniai Regency/Papua and a coalition of PDS and PKS in Papua Province. From the perspective of ideology and on the basis of social support, a coalition of PDIP and PDS with PKS seems unlikely, as PDIP and PDS are the strongest Pancasilaist parties opposed to the idea of an Islamic state, while PKS supports the ideal. There were many other parties that could have been included in the coalition, but PDIP and PDS preferred PKS as their partner. The outcome, a coalition of PDIP, PKS, PNBK, PKPB and Merdeka in Paniai Regency won, nominating Naftali Yogi and Derek Pakage who obtained 29.56% or 40.868 votes. While a coalition of PDS and PKS nominated a governor ticket in Papua Province and attained second place with 29.61% or 333.629 votes. Another example was PDIP, whose members were sceptical about Golkar and Demokrat, yet there was a coalition of PDIP and Golkar in Wonogiri Regency/Central Java and a PDIP and Demokrat coalition in Pati Regency/Central-Java. PKB and PAN, who were hesitant to work with PKS at the national level, created a coalition in Pilkada. The coalition of PKB and PKS won in Wonosobo Regency/Central-Java and in Gresik Regency/East-Java; PAN and PKS was in the Pilkada in West Java Province.

It was found that no party won a majority of Pilkada contests. Golkar was most successful, winning in nearly 43% of Pilkada contests won by single party nominations, while PDIP won 30% of these Pilkada contests. The most successful party in the 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections, Demokrat, won less than 3% of these Pilkada contests. Golkar and PDIP proved their electoral machines worked effectively down to the lowest level regencies/cities. On the contrary, Demokrat, even though successful in both Pilpres and Pilleg, did not have strong organisation at the local level. Demokrat and other electoral vehicle parties, such as Hanura and Gerindra, have not had time to develop their organisation in the regions. They had been much more successful in national politics than at provincial or district level. Besides, it seemed that the parties allocated their resources more to supporting their party candidates at the national level. A similar fate was also experienced by Islamist and Islamic parties. Although PKS and PAN performed well at the national level, they were least effective at the local level. Each won less than 3% of Pilkada, won by single party tickets. PPP and PKB achieved better results, winning twice as many Pilkada cases compared to PKS and PAN.

Despite the high electoral threshold that limits smaller parties' electoral performance, a number of them performed well in Pilkada contests in relatively isolated regions, where party organisations, small and large, were relatively weak, for example: PNBK and PIB in Belitung Timur Regency/Bangka Belitung, PDS and Pelopor in Sintang Regency /West Kalimantan, PSI and Pelopor in Mappi Regency /Papua, PPDK and PKPI in Asmat Regency /Papua, PPDI and PNBK in Sorong Selatan Regency /Irijaubar. Other examples of small party victories without coalition included Pelopor in Nias/Sumut, PBB in Ogan Komering Ulu Selatan/Sumsel, PKPI in Seluma/Bengkulu and Bitung/Sulut, PDS in Poso/Sulteng, PPDK in Luwu Utara/Sulsel and PNBK in Kolaka Utara/Sultra.

Regional adaptability of parties

Party pragmatism was also evident in their tendency to adapt to different regional contexts. Regional adaptability of parties to *aliran* cleavages in particular regions became very important, particularly for electoral strategies. How parties, for example, Golkar and PDIP, adjusted their electoral strategies in North Sumatera, Ambon and South Sulawesi provinces became good cases for this study. The adjustment process has enabled parties to revitalise and debate their beliefs, values and history.

Chauvel, Dwight King, Tomsa and Mietzner, who use a more pluralistic and historically grounded approach, are drawn to how parties adjust to and compete in divergent ethnic and religious environments. In North Sumatera and Ambon, for example, Golkar was a *de facto* Islamic party and PDIP turned out to be more Christian, but in North Sulawesi, Golkar built an image as a representative of a predominantly Christian community, while in Bali, PDIP has sustained its dominant position as the representative of Hindu Bali. In 1999 Pilleg in North Sumatera, Chauvel argued that

PDIP found some support among most communities, but the core of its support was among the Christian Bataks, both Karo and Toba. Golkar, like PDIP found some support in all regions, but it preserved its support most effectively in strong Muslim areas, where it shared the vote with PPP (1999: 58).

While in Ambon, “Golkar retained considerable Muslim support, nearly all the PDI-P’s vote came from the Christian community. The sectarian pattern of the vote in Ambon City was clear, with Golkar and PPP dividing the Muslim vote between them and PDI-P winning the Christian vote” (Chauvel 2003: 10). In contrast, Golkar always had strong support among the Christian community in North Sulawesi. And, according to Mietzner, “In the same vein, the Golkar leadership on Bali consisted almost exclusively of Hindus, reflecting the religious composition of the Island” (2008: 445).

Chauvel (2003) argued that in many respects the 1999 elections confirmed the voting pattern of 1955. His argument was corroborated by Dwight King, who found there was some continuity between the 1955 and 1999 elections:

... In 1955 most electors voted on the basis of religion, ethnicity or region, or economic interest (class). But Suharto's New Order government repressed or modified the electoral expression of these cleavages... [However] Research on New Order elections indicated that the religion-based voting did not disappear, with orthodox Muslim (santri) voting disproportionately for the Development Unity Party and syncretists (abangan) and non-Muslim preferring Golkar or PDI (2003: 158).

The continuity of the voting patterns of 1955 could also be found in Ambon in 1999:

Although Parkindo and the Masyumi have long since disappeared, in many respects the 1999 elections confirmed the voting pattern of 1955. PDI-P, Golkar and PPP emerged as the largest parties in Ambon town and Central Maluku... [In fact], 'The PDI-P in Maluku is not the former PNI of Bung Karno, the father of the vice-President, but rather the former Parkindo and Partai Katholik (Chauvel 2003: 10).

In addition, Chauvel found in Tanah Karo that

The PDIP's strong support among Christian Bataks illustrates some continuity in party alignment since 1955. Tanah Karo was a PNI stronghold in 1955. The attachment to Sukarno is much remembered and seems to have been transferred to Megawati. Around Toba and Tapanuli Utara, PDIP seems to have won much of the old Parkindo vote. In 1955 Parkindo secured nearly half the vote in the then larger *kabupaten* of Tapanuli Utara (1999: 58).

It would seem that PDIP in 1999 retained some of the Parkindo vote, dating from the Suharto era fusion of 1972, in which Suharto fused the PNI with Christian and Catholic parties to form PDI; the Megawati factions of PDI becoming PDIP.

In the 2004 and 2009 elections, PDI-P and Golkar remained the largest parties in Ambon City and Central Maluku Regency. In Ambon City, PDIP held 26.30% of votes in 2004 Pilleg for DPR national; Megawati was the preferred candidate with 50.20% of

votes for the first round and 59.99% for the second round of the 2004 Pilpres. However, in 2009 Demokrat was the most successful party in Pilleg for DPR national, and Yudhoyono was the most popular candidate in 2009 Pilpres. Nonetheless, PDIP succeeded in nominating a ticket for mayor of Ambon city without coalition. Marcus Jacob Papilaya and Olivia Latuconsina Salampessy won with 36.12% of plurality vote in 2006. In Central Maluku Regency, Golkar was the largest with 24.96% of votes in 2004 Pilleg for DPR national. Golkar also succeeded to deliver votes for its candidate, Wiranto, for the 2004 election, round one. However, because Wiranto was eliminated in the first round, Megawati of PDIP won 52.21% of votes for 2004 election, round two. Golkar, with supports from other parties, won also in 2007 Pilkada with 34.78% of votes for Abdulah Tuasikal and Imanuel Seipala as regent/vice-regent of Central Maluku. A different picture emerges however with PDIP support in Tanah Karo Regency. In 1999 Pilleg for DPR national, PDIP secured the highest with 67.88%; but in 2004 Pilleg, the PDIP vote declined to 33.48% and in 2009 slipped further down to 20.97%. However, in 2004 and 2009 Pilpres, the presidential ticket of PDIP, Megawati, was always supported with more than 70% of the vote in Tanah Karo Regency. This suggests that Chauvel's statement (1999: 58) that "the attachment to Sukarno is much remembered and seems to have been transferred to Megawati" was probably right. However, in 2005 Pilkada in Tanah Karo, PDIP was defeated by Daulat Daniel Sinulingga and Nelson Sitepu who were nominated by Demokrat, PPDI, PBB and PAN with 27.20% of plural votes.

Another study by Tomsa of the 2004 election in South Sulawesi illustrates how Golkar adopted a more Islamic persona to compete successfully in a regional context. Tomsa argued:

As a matter of fact, Golkar is an open party that welcomes everyone who can enlarge the party's popular appeal. ...the basis for enlarging this appeal can be anything from personnel wealth to regional affiliation to religious credentials. Indeed, in areas where religion is a dominant feature of everyday life, Golkar is more than happy to display a more Islamic image, but it should be noted that the motivation for this Islamicness is not devout piety, but rather opportunistic pragmatism. Significantly, the relation between the party and its Islamic cadres is not one of one-dimensional benefit for the party. On the contrary, it is a

symbiotic relation because on the one hand Golkar gains religious credentials by accommodating Islamic figures, while on the other hand these figures gain political benefits that would be out of reach if they joined smaller Islamic parties (2008: 103).

To strengthen his argument, Tomsa (2008) examined how Golkar approached Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (Preparatory Committee for the Enforcement of Syariah Law; hereafter KPPSI) in South Sulawesi. KPPSI was founded in October 2000 by Abdul Aziz, the charismatic son of local rebel leader, the late Kahar Muzakkar, aiming to gain sympathy for enforcement of Syariah Law in South Sulawesi. In a relatively short time, KPPSI had emerged as a significant local political force. To anticipate further development and prevent being perceived as opposing local aspirations, Golkar supported KPPSI's campaign. Many Golkar leaders, national and local, for example, sponsored and appeared in many KPPSI activities, particularly its 2005 congress held a few months before Pilkada Governor. However, in fact, Golkar thought of KPPSI as a local organisation that could help it attract Islamic voters. While for KPPSI, obtaining support from Golkar, the biggest party in South Sulawesi, strengthened its political position. However, this mutual symbiotic relationship has lost much of its utility a decade on. Golkar no longer considers that its association with KPPSI is necessary to attract Muslim support.

Tomsa's observation of Golkar's ability to identify with the Islamic community in South Sulawesi confirms Chauvel's argument about Golkar's ability to attract Muslim support in multi-faith regions (e.g. North Sumatra and Maluku). The pattern of change in support for the PDIP in Ambon City and Tanah Karo Regency, and Golkar in Central Maluku Regency since 1999; the *aliran* basis of support is also subject to change and varies between Pilleg, Pilpres and Pilkada. In other words, the regional adaptability of parties to local *aliran* cleavages has to be comprehended within the frame of increasing pragmatism of parties as well as the historical basis of support in particular regions. However, the impact on parties' organisations needs to be considered. According to Mietzner,

As a result, the national party board [of Golkar] was inherently prevented from taking partisan stances on religious, ethnic or other controversial issues, even had it wished to do so. Political centrism was therefore not only a short-term choice for Golkar; it was built into its organisational structures (2008: 445).

Nonetheless, the adaptability of parties to divergent regional circumstances is an important feature of successful national parties during the reformasi era.

Absence of a clear policy and programmatic commitments

As mentioned earlier, electoral vehicle parties have a loose commitment to ideology and prefer to follow the public mood, emphasising attractive personal attributes of leaders and candidates, rather than party ideology, platform and policies. However, campaigns were not without issue. Yet, most of them were not followed by clear policy agendas and programmatic commitments, which, upon electoral success, could become government programs. In 2004 Indonesia abolished its national development planning policy making framework. The agendas and commitments of the winning party [and candidate] for president have become a main reference for national government, while the agendas and commitments of the winning party [and candidate] for governor, regent and mayor guide local government. With such a critical function, ideally parties need to have transparent policies and program commitments.

Policy debates among parties about economic issues, corruption and other scandals are mostly conducted in pragmatic terms. However, there remain sensitive issues relating to Pancasilaism and Islamism. Debate about the possibility of rewriting the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution had never been pragmatic, as in 2002 when the Islamist parties campaigned to attach 'the seven words' of the Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter): 'The Indonesian state is based on the belief in the One, Supreme God with the obligation of the adherents of Islam to implement the Syariah,' thus allowing the possible transformation of Indonesia into an Islamic state. However, the Islamist parties' campaign met with intense opposition and was rejected in the annual session of MPR (the People's Constituent Assembly). This disappointment resonated with the failure

of the same campaign in the 1959 MPR constituent. The debates and decisions of 1959 and 2002 reiterated and confirmed the decision of the founders of the Republic in 1945 not to include the Jakarta Charter as part of the Constitution (Elson 2009).

Even though the idea to establish an Islamic state had been rejected at national level; many Syariah inspired regulations were successfully enacted at the local level. Some examples are Perda (local law) Regency of Bulukumba/Sulsel No.04/2003 on Muslim dress code; province of West Sumatera No.11/2001 on the banning and prevention of social ills; and City of Tangerang/Banten No.8/2005 on the banning of prostitution and prevention of social ills such as gambling and the consumption of alcohol; Surat Edaran (regency paper) by Bupati Pamekasan/Jatim No.450/2002 on the ratification of Syariah Islam; and Bupati Cianjur/Jabar No.36/2001 on the establishment of Syariah Islamic Centre (Candraningrum 2008). While some Syariah regulations are probably effective in combating social ills, most of them focus on controlling women's bodies and freedom, by forcing women to follow a particular dress code, such as in Aceh, and prohibiting women from leaving their home between 10pm and 4am, such as in Padang City in West Sumatra.

Nonetheless, some national parliamentarians considered these Syariah inspired regulations as unconstitutional and not consistent with Pancasila. In June 2006, 56 MPs from Pancasilaist parties (PDIP, Golkar, Demokrat, PKB and PDS) signed a petition asking the national government to review these Islamic local regulations, but the request was opposed by Islamist parties (PPP, PKS, PBB and PAN) (Bush 2008). Reflecting the religious sensitivity of this issue, the national government did not review these regulations, despite the fact that under the regional autonomy laws of 1999, as revised in 2004, religion is one of five areas that has remained the sole preserve of the national government. However, the national government persuaded some local governments to postpone their Syariah regulations, arguing they conflicted with higher laws and disturbed the harmony of public life.

Other examples of partisan, sectarian and primordial debates concerned the National education system Bill in June 2003 and the Pornography Bill in October 2008, particularly relating to budget allocation. These controversial bills had been at the centre of intense debate, because they were seen as a step towards introducing Syariah values into Indonesia's legal system. The education bill required that a course on religion be made compulsory in public and private schools and it needed to be taught according to the student's religion and by a teacher of that religious belief. The pornography bill was an effort to require Muslim women to cover their face and body with the *hijab* (veil) and wear long sleeves like the dress code of Saudi Arabian women. Interestingly, Pancasilaist parties were deeply divided; Golkar supported the two bills, while PDIP opposed them. PDIP was the only party against the National Education System Bill. None of the 151 PDIP MPs attended the DPR national Plenary Session when the bill was approved. With the pornography bill, the PDIP was supported by PDS in opposition. These were the only two parties in opposition, while all other parties in the parliament supported the bills.¹⁴²

In contrast to the divisive and partisan debates about issues with religious nuances on issues like the Lapindo mudflow case and the rice imports policy, party pragmatism was foremost. The Lapindo mudflow case in the Sidoarjo Regency /East Java has been ongoing since May 2006. Believed to be the biggest mud volcano eruption in the world, it was created by a blowout from a natural gas well operated by the company PT. Lapindo Brantas, owned by Aburizal Bakri, a Coordinating Minister of Public Affairs, and then chairman of Golkar. Five parties (PDIP, PAN, PDS, PKB and PKS) attempted unsuccessfully to introduce legislation against PT. Lapindo Brantas. Aburizal Bakri's own party, Golkar, opposed the legislation and was supported by Demokrat, PBR, PPP and Fraksi Bintang Pelopor Demokrasi (Faction of Pioneer Star of Democracy, comprising small parties in the DPR national including Partai Bulan Bintang, Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan, Partai Pelopor, Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia and Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaen (hereafter FBPD) (Wordpress 2007). The rice

¹⁴²Interview, Mariani Akib Baramuli, Jakarta, 10 February 2009; Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi, Jakarta, 10 February 2009; Mursyidah Thahir, Jakarta, 10 February 2009; Maria Ulfah Anshor, Jakarta, 10 February 2009.

imports issue began with the government plan to import rice, while some parties in the parliament considered this unnecessary; Indonesia had enough rice stocks and the influx of cheaper imported rice would have a negative impact on the Indonesian agricultural industry. There were attempts in parliament to question the government's rice imports policy in 2005 and 2006. In 2005 this was initiated by PDIP, PKB, PKS and Fraksi PBPD; in 2006 PDIP and PKB took the initiative (Rakyat Merdeka 2005). These issues illustrate that beyond an Islamic state and other issues of religious sensitivity, party attitudes and positions are not determined along ideological lines, but on the basis of pragmatic considerations, as reflected in the flexible alignment of parties on issues like Lapindo, rice imports and UN Security Council sanctions.

The absence of a clear policy and programmatic commitments was most apparent at the national level, but policies and commitments were more salient at the local level, because local issues had a greater direct impact on the daily lives of the people. At the national level, the contest was led by many broader national issues with a greater emphasis on national problems that were complex, abstract and remote. The issues were not defined, and the agendas or commitments were in many ways confusing. At the local level, the contest was led by assorted specific issues related to local needs. In one region, for example, the priority issue was unemployment problems; in another region, community health problems or infrastructure facilities, such as building a community centre and paving roads, were prioritised.

The issue of 'ownership' was also different at national and local levels. A party (and candidate) is said to 'own' an issue when the general feeling is that the party (and candidate) has a longstanding reputation in solving problems relating to an issue. At the national level it was not easy to identify the 'owner' of the issue because of the 'indistinct' nature of many of the issues debated. In contrast, at the local level, it was relatively easy as the parties (and candidates) often supported particular issues, so as to distinguish themselves from their 'rivals.'

At the national level, many prominent leaders could be identified with particular issues because of their remarkable achievements and tireless work. For example, Megawati Sukarnoputri, Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais were highly respected leaders of the democratisation movement. Yudhoyono, the most successful post-Suharto politician, was associated with bringing political equilibrium domestically and developing a profile internationally. Jusuf Kalla was greatly respected as a tough negotiator in building peace in Aceh, Poso and Maluku. Wiranto was a distinguished military general who allowed the democratisation process in 1998 to progress peacefully. Prabowo had the reputation as a successful military commander. Some might argue that both Wiranto's and Prabowo's involvement in military operations in East Timor (and elsewhere) led to accusations of human rights abuse. In the case of East Timor, for example, Prabowo's military success served to alienate sufficient numbers of East Timorese to ultimately make Indonesian rule untenable. Solahuddin Wahid was known for his work on human rights; K.H. Ahmad Hasyim Muzadi for his efforts in modernising the Islamic community; and Siswono Yudo Husodo for his support in developing the agricultural small business sector. However, somehow none of these political leaders can claim to be the 'owners' of the issues mentioned. Instead, they addressed consensual issues such as economic growth, employment, poverty, good governance and corruption. Such issues cannot be owned by one candidate or party, because they are normative and can be attached to almost anybody. The differences then are only in approaches and strategies. Hence, if the candidate wants to own such issues, she/he needs to differentiate her/his policy agendas or programs according to her/his political stance. The problem was that contestants in the 2004 and 2009 elections had difficulties in making clear distinctions regarding their political positions. It was a different situation in the 1999 election, when it was relatively easy to identify of ownership, because the issue was articulated more clearly along ideological lines. At that time, many candidates who were nominated from Islamist parties tended to promote an Islamist agenda; those from Pancasilaist parties preferred to endorse more normative non-religious issues.

At the local level, examples of politicians identifying themselves with issues relating to service delivery include the free garbage collection and free funeral service offered by Abdul Latif Hafid of PKB. According to him, garbage collection was a big problem for the residents of his electorate with an excess of rubbish from the increasing number of shops, stalls and marketplaces nearby. Funeral services were also a dilemma as poor people could not afford the cost, which had rapidly increased since 1998. Abdul Latif Hafid had observed these problems since he was head of the sub-district of Somba Opu (1995–2000).¹⁴³ Another example was social services for urban poor in Batam City, developed by Soerya Respationo. This program was an expansion of his work with Javanese migrants in Batam City, started years before he became involved in politics. His work specifically targeted Javanese urban poor and migrant workers. The problems have become worse, not only relating to socio-economic issues, but also political rivalry. High rates of migration have changed the ethnic and religious composition of Batam City and Riau Islands Province. The Malays, who claim to be the ‘sons of the soil’, comprise around 40% of the total population and no longer constitute the dominant ethnic group. Because of this change, Soerya’s social service is not only limited to Javanese, but all urban poor and migrant workers, regardless of ethnic background. Soerya Respationo is a Javanese migrant who has lived in Batam City for almost 20 years.¹⁴⁴ Currently, he is the deputy-governor of Riau Islands Province, elected with 37.30% of votes in the June 2010 Pilkada.

Another well-known example is Joko Widodo, mayor of Solo City, then Governor of Jakarta and in 2014, elected President. As mayor, he introduced three important programs, which boosted his popularity, as the programs distinguished him from other leaders and his electoral opponents in Jakarta and the presidential campaign. His health care and education programs catered to Solo's poor. Joko Widodo sought to enhance participatory governance and community participation. His leadership and communication style is not elitist and non-bureaucratic (Masudi 2014).

¹⁴³Interview, Abdul Latif Hafid, Gowa, 18 March 2009.

¹⁴⁴Interview, Soerya Respationo, Batam, 9 February 2009.

Other examples are from Aceh Province. Just 16 months after the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding, Aceh held Pilkada for governor and 19 regents/mayors in December 2006 and early 2007. In Aceh, “campaigns and mobilization strategies did not effectively signal the policy priorities of politicians and ensure that politicians were responsive to the needs and priorities of ordinary citizens... Generally absent was any sophisticated discussion of policy innovations or budgetary trade-offs (Clark and Palmer 2008: 23-25).” Nonetheless, local problems had already been discussed openly, including the delays of reintegrated fund payments; the weak implementation of Syariah Law; the incompetence of Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (Aceh Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Institution; hereafter BRR); and other problems related to corruption and nepotism in Aceh’s local bureaucracy. Although sensitive issues, such as separatism and anti-separatism movements, were avoided.¹⁴⁵ In Pilkada Bener Meriah/Aceh, neither the regent tickets of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement; hereafter GAM) (Fauzan Azima and Arhama) nor the regent tickets of the anti-separatist movement (Ir. H. Tagore AB and H. Misradi), raised issues relating to the conflict. They all focused on local economic development, the improvement of religious-education and solidarity with Javanese migrants, who had been residents of Bener Meriah regency for years.¹⁴⁶ Campaign issues, such as ‘improve economy,’ ‘create jobs,’ ‘help the poor,’ and ‘prioritize farmers,’ were very popular. This seemed to confirm the research findings by IFES that economic difficulties, lack of jobs, high prices of goods, lack of good education facilities, lack of infrastructure and lack of good health facilities were the primary focus of the residents of the province (IFES 2007). The issues were not developed much in the following 2012 Pilkada in Bener Meriah.

Before reformasi 1998, political parties, particularly Golkar, already had experience in developing clear policy agendas and program commitments. Golkar’s agendas and commitments were closely related to the government’s economic development strategies. However, Golkar’s platform on national development was thought to be more

¹⁴⁵Interview, Jauharuddin Harmay, Vice Chair of DPD Golkar Aceh province, Jakarta, 21 April 2009.

¹⁴⁶Interview, Yuni Chaidir, Vice Chair of DPRA from Golkar, Chair of DPD Golkar Aceh province, Jakarta, 21 April 2009.

an endeavour to maintain the legitimacy of the Suharto government. Besides, Golkar was identified as the electoral vehicle of the government, rather than the driving force of development programs. After Suharto resigned, the developmental policies or programs disappeared. Almost all parties post reformasi 1998, including Golkar, have tried to differentiate themselves from Suharto, and have not raised national development issues. Among others, reformasi issues, such as 'Anti KKN' (anti-corruption, collusion and nepotism), abolition of the dual functions of the military, the implementation of local autonomy and the judicial process for human rights abuses, replaced the developmentalist agenda. In contrast to President Suharto (who succeeded in translating issues into concrete policies and programs and was powerful enough to control the government), reformasi era presidents have failed to do so. The saliency of these reformasi issues, then, fades away and they become rhetoric. However, while the old policy and program issues have been abandoned, a new set of controversies has not yet emerged. But issues relating to socio-economic problems are still vigorously debated. Gas and fuel subsidies, for example, evoke robust debate but they are not conducted within an ideological or programmatic framework. Contemporary issues, such as environmental protection, women's rights and quality of life, which attracted the attention of a significant number of contemporary voters in Western countries (Dalton 1996), have not engaged many Indonesians, except for a small group of academics and civil society activists.

Indonesian political thinking

This study argues that since reformasi 1998, there have been huge changes in Indonesian political thinking. It began since the 2004 election when a new set of electoral systems with their distinctive mechanics was introduced. The new systems and mechanics have influenced parties to adopt centrist approaches and be pragmatic on almost every issue, except the possibility of rewriting the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution. Parties have adopted an electoralist approach and focused on the election process, making much use of the mass media, and relying on political consultants and pollsters. Parties were also increasingly dominated by their leaders; their campaigns

were organised more on the basis of candidates' personal attributes instead of party ideology, programs and platforms. Parties were also grouped into two main ideologies: Pancasilaism and Islamism.

Throughout the discourse of Indonesian political thinking, the famous study by Feith and Castles (1970) has been influential. As previously explained, they introduced five streams of political thinking to explain party philosophy in the 1955 election: Radical Nationalism, Javanese Traditionalism, Islam, Democratic Socialism and Communism. Three of these streams were represented by the four largest parties in the 1955 election, while the other two were not embedded in any of the four parties but somehow influenced all of them. Nationalism was upheld by PNI, Islam by Masyumi and NU and Communism by PKI (1970b). Each of those four parties had distinct bases of support, reflecting ideological as well as social group divisions that existed at the time. The PNI attracted *priyayi* (aristocrats) and *abangan* (Javanese syncretism) supporters, while PKI worked mostly with *abangan* followers. Most of Masyumi and NU voters came from *santri* (pious Muslim) groups. The categorisation of *priyayi*, *abangan* and *santri* were introduced by Clifford Geertz (1976).

Nonetheless, half a century since the first election in 1955, it is argued that the study by Feith and Castles needs to be reviewed. There were studies which found that the influence of *aliran* continue to exist while other studies found the opposite. Lanti, for example, found that

The *aliran* did not die off but instead were simply in a state of hibernation during the authoritarian periods under Presidents Sukarno and Suharto, and have since resurfaced as political openness has been re-established. Indonesian politics since the fall of Suharto appears like *déjà vu* from the era when political competition was in earnest (2004: 22).

Lanti's findings echo that of other scholars. Dwight King, for example, found there was a broad continuity of *aliran* between the 1955 and 1999 elections.

One [*aliran*] being the continued reality of the basic cleavage in the electorate between areas supporting nationalist, religiously inclusive parties and areas supporting Islamic parties; the other dimension was the re-emergence of a division within the Islamic community between traditional and modernist orientations, with the modernist much more divided than in 1955 (2003: 24).

King's findings were corroborated by Baswedan (2004b), who claimed that *aliran politik* still could be found at the grass-root level and shifts across *aliran politik* was rarely happened in the 2004 election. Baswedan compared partisan support for Islamic parties in regencies/cities in the 1999 and 2004 legislative elections.

In contrast, a study by Liddle and Mujani (2007), based on four national opinion surveys of the 1999 and 2004 Pilleg and 2004 two-round Pilpres, found that *aliran* had very limited impact on today's Indonesian voting behaviour. Furthermore, they argued that sociological explanations, such as religion, ethnic affiliation, rural–urban cleavage and education are less significant, compared to leadership and party identification. Hence, “This finding runs directly counter to the dominant interpretive school in Indonesian studies, begun by Geertz in the 1950s and represented currently by Dwight King and Baswedan” (Liddle and Mujani 2007: 851). In his previous study, Liddle also argued,

Since the 1970s, both sets of categories—*santri* versus *abangan* and modernist versus traditionalist—appear to be breaking down. Many *abangan*, or children and grandchildren of 1950s and 1960s *abangan* [also *priyayi*] are becoming *santri*... The boundary [socio-economic and demographic] between modernism and traditionalism has also blurred (1996: 623).

Indeed, the findings of both groups—those who acknowledge and those who discount the influence of *aliran*—are quite rightly based on their research data. However, their findings cannot be applied to represent or to generalise developments that have occurred regarding the concept of *aliran* post reformasi 1998. This was because their findings contained only part of the change process. Their work was based on an analysis of Pilleg, Pilpres or Pilkada at either national or local levels. In contrast, this study

compares data from nearly 500 elections, both legislative and executive at national and local levels, during the 1955–2009 elections.

The Two ideologies: Pancasilaism and Islamism

This study argues that post reformasi 1998, there is a general pattern of party ideologies that tend to converge into two main ideologies: Pancasilaism and Islamism. The ideological contest seems like a continuation of the 1950s, without socialism and communism, which have not re-emerged after the elimination of PSI and PKI. The nationalism of pre-independence and immediate post-independence eras and the developmentalism of the New Order government have been subsumed under the umbrella of Pancasilaism. Indeed, Golkar, the engine of nationalism and developmentalism during President Suharto's era, also chose to identify Pancasilaism as its ideology rather than nationalism and developmentalism. The destruction of socialism and communism, and the use of Pancasila as a synonym for nationalism and developmentalism, left Pancasilaism and Islamism as the major ideological alternatives, notwithstanding the rescinding of Law No. 3 /1985 that had made Pancasila the sole ideology. The only exception was in 1999 elections when PUDI promoted a socio-religious democracy and PRD advocated social democracy; neither party gained a seat in the parliament.

This study clarifies that Pancasila is not a synonym for secularism. The two terms are not interchangeable. Pancasilaism calls for religious guidance in running the state but does not give priority to any religion. It treats all religions as equal. In contrast, secularism calls for the separation of religion and state, although it is not anti-religious (Berger 1967). Pancasilaism has no intention to eliminate religion from government and public affairs; on the contrary, it strengthens the spirituality of the people. For example, a course on religion is compulsory in public and private schools and such a course is taught by a teacher of that religious belief. Government funds are often allocated for subsidising the construction of various religious places of worship and religious schools from elementary to tertiary level. These policies began under President Suharto and

were continued by all reformasi era presidents. Conversely, secularism has a tendency to remove religion from government and public affairs; and it is characterised by a decline in spirituality in society (Taylor 2007).

Party decisions about ideology were often problematic, particularly for Islamic and Islamist parties, and ideology was highly contested and long debated within the party. A noteworthy example was friction inside PAN when it was torn between Pancasilaism and Islamism at its Yogyakarta Congress in 2000. The conflict weakened the influence of the proponents of Pancasila, led by its secretary-general Faisal Basri, who then left the party. Basri and his supporters were against the proposal to cite the words '*Iman*' (faith) and '*Taqwa*' (piety) in party statutes (AD/ART). The Islamic wing inside the party has since prevailed over the Pancasila wing. In the 2004 election, PAN leaned more towards an Islamist orientation. However, in less than five years, the supporters of Pancasilaism revived their influence and Pancasilaism was re-established as the party's ideology for the 2009 election under the leadership of Soetrisno Bachir, followed by that of Hatta Radjasa.¹⁴⁷ Another example was when PK considered adopting the Madinah Charter as the alternative to the Jakarta Charter proposed by Hidayat Nurwahid, who then chaired PKS in 2002. The Jakarta Charter was a proposed principle for the Indonesian Constitution, which consisted of the statement 'Belief in God with the obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law [Syariah].' The Madinah Charter is a document of Islam that stresses religious pluralism and is widely associated with the Islamic reform movement. At that time, the PK was split between the faction that supported the Jakarta Charter and those who supported the Madinah Charter. The PK finally adopted the Madinah Charter.¹⁴⁸

Pancasilaism and Islamism are different in their orientations. Pancasilaism supporters want Indonesia to remain a Pancasila state. Islamism devotees demand the establishment of an Islamic state. A Pancasila state, according to President Sukarno, is a state "where every person can worship his God as he likes. The whole of the people

¹⁴⁷Interview, Amien Rais, Jakarta, 25 February 2009.

¹⁴⁸Interview, Andi Zulkifli Muis, Makassar, 17 March 2009.

should worship God in a cultured way, that is, without religious egoism. And the state of Indonesia should be a state which has belief in God!" (Sukarno in Herbert Feith and Castles 1970: 47). In other words, he argues that Indonesia is neither an Islamist, nor secular state, but a "belief in God" state. All religious believers would thereby be free to fulfil their respective religious obligations. An Islamic state is a state based on the principle of belief in God, with the obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law [Syariah]. However, it should be noted there is strong disagreement amongst Muslim leaders on what constitutes an Islamic state (Baswedan 2004a).

Muslim leaders, however, regarded the Pancasila's pronouncements on religion as hopelessly vague at best and anti-Islamic at worst. The first principle declared that the Indonesian nation was founded on 'belief in God.' Unspecific as it was, this principle left wiggle room for heretical mystics, apostates, ethnic religionists, Communists and others whom Muslim felt undeserving of recognition (Hefner 2000: 42).

Furthermore, they were also disappointed because there was no statement of state support for Islam. The final compromise was 'Belief in singular God' (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa); but, for those who had hoped for more formal linkage for Islamic teaching and the state, this concession left many dissatisfied, particularly considering the important contributions to Indonesian independence made by Muslim and Islamic organisations. Numerous Islamic cultural and economic organisations were established in the early 20th century such as Sarekat Islam in 1912, Muhammadiyah in 1912 and Nahdlatul Ulama in 1926.

The ideological dispute between Pancasilaism and Islamism reached its peak in the 2002 People's Constituent Assembly. This disagreement reiterated the impasse of the 1959 People's Constituent Assembly. In 2002, the Islamist parties of the reformasi era sought to rewrite the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. The intention was to attach to the Constitution the proposed phrase of the Jakarta Charter, thus allowing the possible transformation of Indonesia into an Islamic state. This endeavour met with intense resistance. Among the three significant Islamist parties, only PPP and PBB voted for the initiative, while PK(S) abstained. The agenda itself was opposed by all Pancasilaist

parties. In 1959, the establishment of an Islamic state was endorsed by almost all Islamist parties at that time including Masyumi, NU, PSII and Perti. The idea itself was opposed by nationalist, communist, socialist, Catholics and Christian parties, such as the PNI, PKI, PSI, Murba, Parkindo and Partai Katholik. The debate led President Sukarno to dissolve the Assembly, and order an end to party disagreement by Presidential Decree, restoring the 1945 Constitution, without the Jakarta Charter. However, the idea to establish an Islamic state was also supported by some outside parliament, and the decree did not persuade many supporters. Some expressed their support through political movements including the Darul Islam revolts under the leadership of Kartosuwirjo in West Java (1949–1962), Daud Beureueh in Aceh (1953–1963) and Kahar Muzakkar in South Sulawesi (1950–1965) (Kahin A. 1985; Ricklefs 1993).

Islamism is not a monolithic phenomenon. Many changes have taken place, particularly after 32 years under the New Order government. One benchmark, for example, was when Muhammadiyah in 1971 and NU in 1984 withdrew from the political arena and advocated the belief that Islamisation should occur in the form of culturalisation. In 1987 the NU enforced the decision by releasing their members and followers from an obligation to vote PPP—the only Islamist party permitted in the Suharto era elections after 1973. However, it should be acknowledged that the decision was not purely ideological, but blended with pragmatic considerations. Because, while the decisions in 1971 and 1984 were more a response to Suharto’s policy; the decision in 1987 was because NU members were excluded from the candidate list of PPP. However, the ideological impact of these decisions was huge, because they started the era of a new political Islam, when an Islamist party lost soul authority to express Muslim aspirations. The change was reflected in the slogan ‘Islam yes, Islamic party no’, which has been popular ever since the 1987 election. The shift was also apparent in the increasing number of former activists: Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic University Students Associations; hereafter HMI) who joined not only PPP (Islamist party), but also Golkar or PDI (Pancasilaist party). In fact, their role in Golkar had become dominant from the early 1990s and reached its peak when Akbar Tanjung, a former leader of HMI, was

elected as party chairman at the party's national convention in August 1998. All these examples show that since the 1990s the Muslim community has widely accepted Pancasilaist parties, Golkar in particular, as their political vehicles.

The more open and inclusive character of Muslim nowadays has been basically triggered by two impetuses. Firstly, Suharto's policies to amalgamate parties in 1973 and impose Pancasila as the sole ideology for all organisations in 1985 forced Muslims to reconsider how they perceived political Islam.¹⁴⁹In the absence of an open political system, it seemed that the majority preferred to avoid dissent, particularly considering Suharto's government was

...a powerful authoritarian government that had never hesitated to use coercion when necessary to achieve its objectives. [And,] ... among these objectives had been strong commitments to making Indonesians both more pious adherents of a formal world religion and more tolerant of the religious beliefs of others (Liddle 1996: 624).

Secondly, Suharto's positive response in the late 1980s and early 1990s to demands from various Islamic organisations to accommodate interests of Islamic communities had brought a new understanding of political Islam: without an Islamic state, Muslim aspirations can still be accomplished. These positive experiences living under the Suharto government plus the increasing number of Muslims with better education had persuaded some Muslims to change their opinion voluntarily. Nonetheless, Suharto's policies on Islam "...had deeply affected the formation and expression of Muslim values, beliefs and attitudes" (Liddle 1996: 631). But, in Wahid's opinion the more friendly approach of Suharto was because he needed Muslim's support. The *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia* (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals; hereafter ICMI), for example, was created to domesticate Muslim conflicts by placing them under the ICMI umbrella. This strategy was similar to 1973 when Suharto simplified the party system.¹⁵⁰ However, Wahid and Amien Rais agreed that the discussion among members of the Islamic community was no longer limited to the issue

¹⁴⁹Interview, Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 5 February 2009.

¹⁵⁰Interview, Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 5 February 2009.

of the Islamic state. Other issues, such as democracy, pluralism, civil society, economic welfare, education and health, had become part of Islamic discourse.¹⁵¹

Pancasila and Islamism in the political arena are perceived more as a legitimating force.

Pancasila appeals constructively to Indonesian citizens to build nation based on human values such as ethnic, religious, and regional tolerance, and social justice.... [But, the] contention over the meaning of Pancasila as the dominant state idea is an acute part of contemporary political discourse. Pancasila also performs the most basic function of any official ideology—it legitimizes authority (Ramage 1995: 185).

On the other side,

All Indonesian governments, including those which have tightly controlled Islamic parties, have been wary of alienating the Islamic community and have carefully cultivated Muslim support. Both Sukarno and Suharto devoted considerable effort and expense to co-opting Muslim leaders to their cause, or at the very least, gaining Muslim approval for government policies (Fealy 2003: 151).

This tradition was continued by all presidents after reformasi 1998, but reformasi Presidents have had to devise complex strategies to mobilise support from the Muslim community. In a different vein, many Muslim leaders also used Islamic teachings to cultivate support from the Islamic community, particularly those involved in the electoral arena.

Nonetheless, Pancasilaism and Islamism are cultivated among supporters who declare Islam as their religion. The majority of these supporters are Muslim. The fact that these groups, either proponents (Islamism) or opponents (Pancasilaism) of Islamic state are Muslims, verifies that essentially ideological struggles are not between Muslims and those of other religious beliefs, but amongst Muslims themselves (Hefner 1993). Since disputes are mostly among Muslims; the wide range of different views and opinions in

¹⁵¹Interview, Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 5 February 2009; Amien Rais, Jakarta, 25 February 2009.

understanding Islam and the many sets of Islamic values and symbols, Muslims are often used by the dissenting parties to defend their position. Thus, the ideological struggle is multifaceted and complex and thus it should be emphasised here that many seemingly ideological differences are often of secondary importance to issues, such as rivalry, over political positions or access to economic resources. Islam is thus repeatedly politicised for these reasons. The tendency for Muslims to be more devout in their public religious practices, the increasing popularity of head coverings among Muslim women and the use of Islamic greetings, for example, cannot necessarily be identified as support for the establishment of an Islamic state. Such strategies also have to accommodate the dynamic changes within the community, such as the widespread adoption of Syariah inspired regulations (*Perda Syariah*) by local governments, although support for an Islamic state seems to have decreased at the national level (Azra 2004).

Two party strategies: electoralist and partisan

This study found that parties (and candidates) applied two different strategies following different electoral systems and electoral mechanics. Parties tended to adopt electoralist strategies in Pilpres and Pilkada held under majoritarian electoral systems. This tendency was found in 2004 and more apparent in 2009 Pilpres as well as 2005–2009 Pilkada. Parties (and candidates) tried to gather votes wherever campaign support could be found. They were also willing to utilise modern campaign techniques, made extensive use of mass media, and relied much on political consultants and pollsters. Another distinctive character of their campaigns was that they were organised more on the basis of candidate's personal attributes than on party ideology, programs and platforms. While in 1999, 2004 and 2009 Pilleg held under PR systems, parties tended to adopt a partisan strategy, although this became weaker from one election to the next. Among the three elections, the 1999 election was marked by the strongest partisan character, whereas the 2009 election was the weakest. In mobilising voters, parties remained focused upon gaining votes from a distinct segment of the electorate. To a certain extent, parties continued to rely on traditional methods, depending on factions

and patron-client networks that had defined Indonesian election campaigns since 1955. Their campaign techniques continued to be ‘traditional electioneering’ (Butler and Ranney 1992). Festival-style meetings, motor parades, performances by local bands and artists were all used in the 1999 and 2004 elections, but the practice decreased drastically in 2009. Instead, the adoption of limited gatherings, face-to-face meetings, dialogue forums and the use of billboards, posters and mass media mushroomed in the 2009 election. With the exception of the utilisation of mass media, these strategies had been used by parties in the 1955 election, conducted by PR party ballot, open-list system, and in multi-member districts, similar to the 2009 electoral system.

This study found that at national elections, either executive or legislative, electoral systems and electoral mechanics give little incentive to parties [and candidates] to distinguish each other’s programs. In contrast, at local elections (province and regency/city), either executive or legislative, electoral systems and electoral mechanics offer strong incentives to parties [and candidates] to distinguish themselves from their competitors (from other parties or within their own party). Parties and candidates were encouraged to offer public services as well as address local problems and community concerns, particularly in their own constituencies at local elections; to a certain extent, parties [and candidates] supported party ideology orientation, party political position and party policies. Nevertheless, programmatic differentiation has become more important than ideological differentiation regarding local electoral competition.

The distinction between electoralist and partisan strategies clearly involves considerable oversimplification, as with any ideal type, particularly taking into account that parties are complex organisations with diverse interests of party leaders, party officers and party candidates. The idea that politicians only seek public office, defend a particular ideology or serve the public, of course, is too simple; given the complex range of motivations driving the pursuit of power. But holding a seat in the legislature or a position in government is very significant in strengthening the economic and political positions of both party and politician. This is mainly because those positions provide access to state resources, financial benefits and business opportunities. To a different

degree, all parties post reformasi 1998 have echoed the strategy of Golkar (the New Order government) and PNI (the Old Order government). The difference is that the practice nowadays is more decentralised and parties compete through elections. Under the New Order government, because all party candidates had to be screened by the government for formal qualifications and ideological correctness, the practice was more centralised and authoritarian; candidates tended to rely on the government's benevolence rather than their electoral capital.


Parties [and politicians] are no doubt capable of shifting from electoralist to partisan strategies at different points in time, or applying both strategies at the same time. According to Norris, which strategy the parties go for depends on their calculation of strategic incentives gained (2004). Parties under majoritarian systems tend to endorse the electoralist strategy, because majoritarian systems encourage higher electoral hurdles. On the other hand, parties under the PR system are likely to adopt partisan strategies as this system has a tendency to produce fewer obstacles to gaining office, as a smaller share of the vote is required.

Nonetheless, the complex party strategies developed post reformasi 1998 persuaded Ufen to conclude that "This is what makes the analysis of Indonesian parties so difficult. More suitable concepts and terms for analysis have yet to be developed" (2010: 9). Indeed, apart from a few notable exceptions, the literature on party strategy in Indonesia is still deficient. For some time, political scholars in Indonesia and overseas believed that Indonesian party strategy was of secondary importance. Nonetheless, since 2004, the structure of electoral competition has changed, and these changes elevate the importance of both long- and short-term factors in winning elections. One reason is that the Indonesian case shows that electoral strategies could be different at parliament and executive elections, and at national and local levels, although it was organised by the same parties, targeted the same voters, and performed within the same socio-political environment.

Map of party ideologies and party strategies

Figure 6.1 is structured based on party ideological position and party electoral strategy with a spatial model, which has two axes. One axis represents a left-right spectrum of political ideology, running from Pancasilaism to Islamism. Pancasilaism promotes religious plurality, while Islamism, as an ideology, has the objective to promote an Islamic state with the formal adoption of Islamic Law (Syariah). The other axis depicts party strategy in mobilising voters flowing from electoralist to partisan. Electoralist strategy is defined as one that attempts to focus more on winning public office by seeking as many voters as possible; partisan strategy however concentrates more on establishing a structural and permanent anchor for the party within a particular group of voters. Although this diagram simplifies political reality, it provides a good picture of the nature of party competition post reformasi 1998.

Figure 6.1: party ideologies and party strategies



In general, parties are not driven to compete for extreme left-right positions; but rather they are likely to fight for the middle ground to maximise votes, win elections and govern. They tend to have centrist characters and be pragmatic on almost every issue, with the notable exception of the discussion about the possibility of rewriting the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution. Over time, both Pancasilaist and Islamist parties have tended to move to the centre of the ideological axis, by syncretising many different, sometimes opposing elements. However, it needs to be emphasised here that because parties always try to adapt and adjust their behaviour to different contexts, their position on the scale is dynamic. They can shift slightly from left to right, up and down, back and forth or vice versa. They shift because they need to respond to different electoral systems and electoral mechanics of Pilleg, Pilpres and Pilkada, from national to local, and cater to different social, cultural, economic, demographic and geographic characteristics of voters.

In figure 6.1 above, all nine large parties which passed electoral and parliamentary thresholds are grouped into three: Pancasilaist, Islamist and Islamic. Pancasilaist parties are Golkar, Demokrat, Hanura, Gerindra and PDIP. Islamist parties are PKS and PPP. And, Islamic parties are PAN and PKB. Four Pancasilaist parties (Golkar, Demokrat, Hanura, and Gerindra) are positioned close to each other, as Demokrat, Gerindra and Hanura were splinter parties from Golkar, and have similar characteristics and values as the parent party. However, Demokrat is located uppermost on the electoralist axis above Gerindra, Hanura and Golkar. PDIP is the most partisan of the Pancasilaist parties in its electoral strategies and the most Pancasilaist in ideological terms. PDIP is placed closer to PKB in its electoral strategies and the most distant from Demokrat in electoral strategies and from the PKS in ideological terms. The two Islamist parties, PKS and PPP, are positioned close to each other on the ideology axis. PKS is the party closest to Islamism and among the most partisan in its electoral strategies. PKS is more aggressive than PPP, while PPP is more electoralist than PKS. PKS and PPP are supported by voters from similar backgrounds and distinct from those who support Islamic parties. The two Islamic parties, PAN and PKB, are situated close to each other. But, PAN is more electoralist and more Islamic than PKB; PKB is more partisan and more

Pancasilaist and more local in support. PAN is mainly supported by Muhammadiyah; while PKB is closely identified with Nahdlatul Ulama.

The Islamic parties, PAN and PKB, are significant because of their bridging role in the ideology equilibrium. Usually, these parties are identified with Islam because of their adoption of Islamic symbolism and the Islamic appeal of their leaders and followers. However, they are fundamentally poles apart from Islamist parties, when one considers their ideological position on the implementation of formal Islamic policies. For example, they are opposed to an Indonesian Islamic state, whereas in contrast, Islamist parties promote the idea. Hence, ideologically they are closer to Pancasilaist rather than Islamist, even though they depend on the Islamic community as their mass base. The political stance of PAN, PKB and other smaller Islamic parties reflect the changes in Indonesian Islamic thinking, which began in the 1970s. At that time, Nurcholish Madjid, a prominent Muslim scholar, caused controversy by arguing that Pancasilaism was compatible with Islamism; and that Indonesia required neither an Islamist state nor an Islamist party (Madjid 1987, 1992). This approach is supported by PAN and PKB, founded by Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid respectively. They agree it is no longer necessary for Indonesia to construct Islam as the basis for the state.¹⁵² Nonetheless, Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid took a more strategic position compared to Nurcholish Madjid, as they had more opportunities, not only in inspiring others, but in translating their ideas into policies. To some extent, both succeeded in leading and positioning PAN and PKB to maintain ideological equilibrium between Islamism and Pancasilaism. Even though Amien Rais no longer has a formal party position and Abdurrahman Wahid has passed away, their influence is still felt by PAN and PKB leaders, functionaries and members, and by the majority of Indonesians.

Both Islamic and Islamist parties are important for the process of democracy. They give alternatives for dissenting voices and vigorous debate of Muslim issues, both within the electoral and parliamentary system as a whole and in individual parties. “Founding an Islamic party [and Islamist party] is perhaps the most crucial idea born in the post-

¹⁵²Interview, Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 5 February 2009; Amien Rais, Jakarta, 25 February 2009

Suharto era. It has greatly occupied santri Muslims, who questioned whether establishing an Islamic party was a necessary and politically strategic step” (Assyaukanie 2009: 184). The decision did not come easily. At least two groups were in opposition. Nurcholish Madjid, Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid, for example, supported the idea, distinguishing “cultural Islam” from “political Islam;” hence perceiving that it was unnecessary in creating a Muslim party. Deliar Noer argued that, “... Islam as a cultural force also includes politics, which cannot easily, separated. Many legal and ethical doctrines of Islam cannot be upheld perfectly in society unless there is involvement by the political authority” (quoted in Assyaukanie 2009: 186). In addition, the chair of PBB, Yuzril Ihza Mahendra, contends that religion-based parties are legitimate and constitutional in a democracy. Creating an Islamic party symbolises democratisation (cited in Assyaukanie 2009: 187). PBB was led by Mahendra in the direction of Masyumi, that is, to become flexible and pragmatic. He claims Masyumi had taken this direction since the party was established (Mahendra 1999). PBB under Mahendra, in the 1999 election, was one of the militant Islamist parties which actively proposed a state based on the principle of belief in God, with the obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law [Syariah] for Indonesia, by revising the preamble of the 1945 Constitution. However, in the 2009 election, PBB failed to pass the parliamentary threshold and won no seats in the national parliament.

Islamist parties remain active but their influence has decreased, particularly since the rejection of their proposal to revive the Jakarta Charter in the 2002 People’s Constituent Assembly, as discussed above. The 1999 election results identified the dilemma confronting the advocates of an Islamic state, the support of the majority of Muslim on the idea of an Islamic state and the adoption of Syariah did not translate in their voting behaviour. In fact, as Baswedan (2004a) argued, they disagree on implementation and do not believe the adoption of Islamic state and Syariah is urgent. And besides, the Islamic discourse had already changed. According to Assyaukanie, “...If in the past (at least until the mid-1980s) the issue of the Islamic state was a central theme in Islamic political thought, at the present time, such an issue no longer creates much discussion” (2009: 182).

While support for Islamic and Islamist parties has declined, Pancasilaist parties have been consistently the most successful in parliamentary elections of 1999, 2004 and 2009. These parties were in a position to nominate candidates for the presidency in the 2004, 2009 and indeed 2014 Pilpres. Pancasilaist parties' domination has been immense. They shared, in every election, almost three-quarters of the vote. However, these changes were possible because of the success of the New Order government's policies in weakening voting patterns based on religion, ethnicity, region and economic interest (class) and thereby enhancing pragmatism.

Concluding remarks

This chapter discussed the impacts of electoral systems and electoral mechanics on the changes in party politics and party systems, which led to the development of parties as electoral vehicles and a new mapping of political thinking post reformasi 1998. It was found that parties since reformasi 1998 have often been used more as electoral vehicles, so their leaders and candidates could participate in the electoral contests, particularly presidential elections. The tendency of parties being used more as electoral vehicles reflects not only the tensions that exist between conflicting elements in the electoral systems and mechanics discussed in previous chapters, but the strong pragmatism of parties and lack of a clear policy and programmatic commitments, the fading influence of ideology and the loose socio-cultural roots of the parties. This study proposed to define electoral vehicles as a party, which is constructed or transformed by politicians as their vehicle to win elections. If successful, they exercise power in government. It has been argued that an electoral vehicle party has particular organisation, strategy and function.

This chapter found that since reformasi 1998, there have been significant changes in Indonesian political thinking, particularly since the 2004 election when a new set of electoral systems were introduced. The new systems and mechanics have influenced parties to adopt centrist approaches and be pragmatic on almost every issue, except for

sensitive religious and identity issues such as the possibility of rewriting the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution. Parties have adopted an electoralist approach and focused on the election process, making much use of the mass media, and relying on political consultants and pollsters. Parties were also increasingly dominated by their leaders; their campaigns were organised more on the basis of candidates' personal attributes instead of party ideology, programs and platforms. Parties were also grouped into only two main ideologies: Pancasilaism and Islamism. However, in general, parties are not driven to compete for extreme left-right positions; but rather they are likely to fight for the middle ground to maximise votes, win elections and govern.

These changes in ideological patterns prompt a questioning of the relevance of Geertz' concept of *aliran*, and Feith and Castles' concept of *aliran politik* as a framework for an understanding reformasi politics. Even though in the 1999 election, some parties remained attached to *aliran politik*, subsequently parties have shifted to a more electoral approach, initially evident in the 2004 Pilpres, more so in the Pilkada, and 2009 Pilleg and Pilpres. Although in the selection of candidate tickets for the 2004 Pilpres, the influence of *aliran politik* considerations were still apparent. Finally, a new diagram of contemporary Indonesian parties was proposed.

Chapter Seven

Conclusion

“...no democracy without politics, no politics without parties, no parties without compromise and moderation”(Rossiter 1960: 216)

Introduction

This concluding chapter addresses the major question of how electoral systems and mechanics have affected political parties and party systems post reformasi 1998. In answering this question, I have argued that the choice of three different electoral systems (PR, SNTV and majoritarian), each with its own electoral mechanics (ballot structure, electoral threshold, electoral formula and district magnitude) in the first five years of the reformasi period was taken in an ad hoc manner, rather than as a coherent and comprehensive strategy. And, it has changed the pattern of power relations significantly.

First, electoral politics have become more complicated, variegated and fluid, reflecting the need to accommodate the divergent interests of the many different political forces. Second, election campaigns, particularly in executive elections, emphasised the attractiveness and personal attributes of candidates with assistance from mass media, political consultants and pollsters, rather than party ideology, programs and policies. Third, political parties have tended to be increasingly dominated by and identified with the personalities of their leaders. Parties have adopted centrist pragmatic approaches on almost every issue, except on such sensitive religious and identity issues as revising the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution. Fourth, the party system has become more fluid with more blurred lines delineating party ideologies and the tendency to move to the centre of the ideology spectrum. Fifth, the combination of majoritarian and PR systems has

produced a directly elected president with strong electoral legitimacy, but his or her party is highly unlikely to have majority in the parliament. The president, thus, has to accommodate the divergent interests represented in a fragmented multi-party parliament to secure the passage of government legislation. Hence, stable and effective government has become far more difficult to establish, particularly at the national level. At the local level, it was found stable and effective government has depended on strength of leadership of the elected head of local government.

I have also argued that the Indonesian Election Commission was controlled too much by the President and Department of Internal Affairs, especially in the 2009 elections. This study also found that all elections during the reformasi era were relatively free, but not all of them were relatively fair. The 1999 election had a few problems regarding fairness. The 2004 elections were relatively fair, while, the 2009 elections were relatively unfair.

This pattern of developments has encouraged me to pose questions about the democratization process in Indonesia. It has been more than a decade since reformasi 1998 but democratic practices have not been institutionalized yet. And, because of the complicated electoral systems and mechanics, the political power become has become more diffuse and fragmented than before. With the PR system it is unlikely that any party will win a majority of seats in parliament. The PDIP was the most successful party when in the 1999 election it won 33.74% of the seats. But, the authority of a directly elected president and vice-president with strong electoral legitimacy has been curtailed by fragmented multi-party parliament. Nonetheless, the elected governments have legitimacy, the electoral institutions are relatively credible and the elections are free although relatively unfair.

To structure the discussion, this chapter is divided into four sections: 'Revisiting the complexities of electoral systems and mechanics,' 'Restructuring Indonesian parties and party systems,' 'Rethinking Indonesian democracy' and 'Postscript: the 2014 Elections.'

Revisiting the complexities of electoral systems and mechanics

This thesis argues that Indonesia has developed one of the most complex electoral systems and mechanics in the world. These systems have been developed consequentially in a series of ad hoc decisions since 1998, rather than by coherent and comprehensive strategy. Following Benoit's finding, they have always involved a calculation of partisan self-interest of parties' members in the legislative body, rather than one reflecting electoral dynamic (2001). Political parties represented in the parliaments that created electoral systems sought to protect and perpetuate their own interests; but the compromises involved in each electoral law contributed to the creation of an electoral system with contradictory pressures. The outcome of subsequent elections also showed that the endeavours of political parties to protect their own specific interests has only been partly successful; although from the perspectives of the broader elite, electoral laws have been successful in maintaining their power and position.

The concessions made in party negotiations in the parliament have meant that three different electoral systems (PR, SNTV and majoritarian systems), each with its own electoral mechanics (ballot structure, electoral threshold, electoral formula and district magnitude) were developed. Working with such varied systems and mechanics together has generated countervailing pressures. For example, the PR system encouraged inclusive and consensual power sharing and produced parliaments with multi-party representation. In contrast, the majoritarian system created exclusive government dominated by large parties (or coalition of parties). Indonesian electoral laws and regulations were formulated with the objective to strengthen political parties, but, in practice, electoral laws and MK decisions have weakened the parties instead by supporting ballot open-list for Pilleg, candidate ballot for Pilpres and Pilkada, individual candidates for competing in Pilkada, and different thresholds (low electoral threshold and high parliamentary threshold for Pilleg and high electoral threshold for Pilpres and Pilkada). Electoral politics have become more complicated, variegated and fluid,

reflecting the need to accommodate the divergent interests of many different political forces.

The process of identifying the middle ground was often thwarted by shifts in electoral risks faced by the dominant parties in the parliament. This situation then meant parties were locked on many essential issues, such as the principle of electoral systems, either supporting the principle of inclusiveness or exclusiveness. Many parties supported the idea that the electoral laws should facilitate a large number of parties to participate in politics. However, they realised that inclusive election laws meant it was unlikely that any one party would secure a majority of votes in a multi-party system, as had been the case in Indonesia since the 1955 election, with the exception of authoritarian regimes. Hence, the parties had to ensure that the electoral laws and regulations would not limit their opportunities in the subsequent election. The compromise was to introduce a low electoral threshold which encouraged parties to participate in the electoral competition, in conjunction with a high parliamentary threshold, which limited the number of parties likely to win seats in parliament. In fact, this echoed the similar compromise made in 1955. These compromises reflected the short-term pragmatic interests of various parties; such interests did not facilitate a consideration of the most appropriate election systems for Indonesia's plural society.

While new electoral regulations have increased opportunities for popular participation in politics at national and local levels, elites have managed to secure their position and thus significant restrictions persist. The decision-making process tended to be framed by the interests of dominant parties in the parliament prior to the election of Golkar, PPP and PDI for the 1999 systems; PDIP, Golkar, PKB, PPP and PAN for the 2004 systems; and Golkar, PDIP, PKB, PPP, Demokrat, PKS and PAN for the 2009 systems.

However, the outcome of subsequent elections showed that parties have only been partly successful in securing their individual interests. And, this makes it difficult to control the electoral process and to predict the electoral result. For example, the party with the highest number of votes in the 1999 election was PDIP, but the party with most seats in the preceding parliament was Golkar. However, the party with the highest vote

in the 2004 election was Golkar, but the party with the most seats in the preceding parliament was PDIP. The party with the highest vote in the 2009 election was Demokrat, but the party with the most seats in the preceding parliament was Golkar.

Nonetheless, parties succeeded to protect their collective interests, even though they had to balance their commitment to political reforms by securing individual party and collective elite interests. It was found that the electoral laws have enabled parties to maintain their exclusive power and their Jakarta based power. The laws have discouraged small parties, and allowed neither local parties (except for Aceh) nor independent candidates (except for Pilkada). The law compelled parties to have a national structure with branches in more than half of the provinces, with sub-branches in more than half of the regencies/cities in those provinces. Besides, the laws and regulations, in some way, give concessions to the old power figures dominated by Golkar, and the military and bureaucrats that make it possible for them to maintain or resume their positions. Many have been elected as heads of government or members of parliament. Some created new political parties; others continued leading the old ones. They kept their positions in the 'reformed' bureaucracy; and they maintained their control of corporations. Yet, the three successful newly established parties, Demokrat, Hanura and Gerindra, had strong associations with Golkar, an electoral vehicle of the New Order regime. Somehow, the laws have not enabled the entry of new parties from outside the established elite. However, the electoral fortunes of the political elite's, old and newly established, have fluctuated and been vulnerable to shifting allegiances of leaders.

However, as Diamond (2002) observes, the introduction of competitive and open elections almost always has significant political meaning, at a minimum, forcing contending forces to change their strategies and strengthening some, but not all actors. Hence, even though there was a continuance of the old elite and the illiberal practices of the New Order regime, "...they could not operate as smoothly and complacently as they once did" (Sherlock 2010: 177). As Buehler (2007) found in South Sulawesi, more competitive and open elections brought about changes in the composition of the elite,

where not all established politicians were able to survive. The elites, either old or new, had no choice but to adjust to the new systems. And the changing of constituents had created the necessity for parties to continually respond to their demand. All parties must transform if they want to survive in this complex system. Golkar needs to find new political capital, as the party no longer has support from the military and the bureaucracy. PDIP has to consolidate with its populist and egalitarian policies and programs as the party claims to represent '*wong cilik*' (literally meaning poor/marginal people). The newly established parties (Demokrat, Hanura and Gerindra) have also identified their target voters as *Wong cilik*, although their campaign strategies have tended to be electoralist. PPP, PKB, PAN and PKS also need to distinguish themselves from each other; otherwise they risk a decline in influence.

Having independent, neutral and trustworthy electoral institutions is essential. The credibility of electoral institutions influences whether or not the elected government has legitimacy, and whether it was based on a free and fair election or a politically manipulated one (Birch 2007). In particular, it is because electoral institutions are the weakest links which can easily be interfered with as Liddle states for the 2009 election (2008: 18). Electoral manipulation remains among Indonesia's most important problems. Undemocratic practices, such as money politics, vote selling, problems to do with voter's registry and abuse of authority reappeared, particularly in many 2005–2008 Pilkada, and the 2009 Pilleg and Pilpres. Without doubt, the manipulations are embedded in complex Indonesian political practices, many of which are extremely difficult to alter. In addition, over time, "The conduct of the [2009] election fell short of important basic standards of democratic electoral performance and they were organised in an ad hoc manner" (Schmidt 2010: 100). Yet, the importance of electoral institutions is greater where democratic practice has not yet been institutionalised, and where no party has ever gained majority in parliament, both at national and local levels.

Restructuring Indonesian parties and party systems

Parties are products of people's beliefs, values and history; while beliefs and values developed at the time of parties' birth are very significant as they are decisive for their

organisational development (Panebianco 1988). These beliefs and values of Indonesian parties were influenced by the anti-colonial struggle and Javanese culture. The former, among others, encouraged pragmatism in parties. The latter shaped the compromise orientation and personalism tendency of parties. The history of parties shows that some old beliefs and values have never entirely disappeared; on the contrary, they survive and have been strengthened and revived by the majority of reformasi parties. They are being “prisoners of their own history as an institution” (Ware 2000: 18).

The pragmatic character and compromise of parties are reflected, for example, in the way parties establish coalitions. Aspinall’s asserted,

In Indonesian politics, it often seems as if no political alliance is principled or based on policy affinity; instead, everything is up for negotiation and ripe for a deal. Most of the cabinets formed by post-Suharto presidents have thus been broad ‘rainbow coalitions’ in which virtually every major party is represented (2014: 3).

Indeed, it is confusing to see President Yudhoyono, a senior military figure in the authoritarian Suharto regime, portray himself in the 2004 Pilpres campaign as a supporter of reformasi 1998; or when Megawati Sukarnoputri of PDIP built a coalition with Akbar Tanjung of Golkar or when Megawati Sukarnoputri built a coalition in the 2009 Pilpres with Prabowo Subianto of Gerindra. In 2014, Prabowo Subianto of Gerindra, one-time-son-in-law of President Suharto, was supported by PAN, PKS and PPP—three reformist Islamic parties who toppled President Suharto in 1998. This pragmatic character and party compromise can also be found at the local level. In fact, regional adaptability of parties to societal cleavages in particular regions is much more important (Tomsa 2008: 103). Golkar, for example, appeared to be more Christian in Christian regions, for example, Toraja/South Sulawesi, but more Islamic in Islamic regions, for example, Situbondo/East Java. This tendency was observed in almost all parties, although with different intensities.

The personalism tendency of parties intensified following Yudhoyono, Wiranto and Prabowo, who established their political vehicle called Demokrat, Hanura and Gerindra

respectively. Even before these three retired military generals took political positions, the role of the individual (party leaders and figures) was already significant. Many well-known parties have been identified with their leaders, such as: PNI with Sukarno; PSI with Syahrir; Golkar with Suharto; PDIP with Megawati Sukarnoputri; PAN with Amien Rais; and PKB with Abdurrahman Wahid. Although the intensity varies among parties, the influence of some party leaders is strong; almost nobody in their party has the courage to oppose their decisions. They controlled and centralised the decision-making processes, the allocation of economic resources, government appointments, party positions and electoral nominations. This was a long-established pattern found in both Sukarno and Suharto governments. The personalism was further reinforced when electoral laws adopted the party-ballot open list for Pilleg and candidate ballots for Pilpres and Pilkada. In fact, since 2008, in Pilkada, as an effect of the 2008 MK Decree, party organisations not only have to compete with other parties but with individual candidates. In the elections for legislatures, and as an effect of the 2009 MK Decree, the candidate with the greatest number of votes rather than the party's preferred candidate is elected; this has strengthened competition among party candidates as well as with candidates nominated by other parties.

The personalism tendency of parties is increasing when candidates [read: individual] develop a strong bargaining position in relation to party organisation and electoral competitions turn into a popularity contest, with the phenomenon of celebrity politicians. Many candidates, particularly those from outside party structure, brought their own resources and networks of financial as well as ethnic, religious support. Candidates, for example, often used mass media and hired professional consultants and pollsters to build their image and develop their campaign strategies. In this sense, the utilisation of mass media and professional consultants has reduced the relevance of party activists in the campaign. And because of the high cost of the media, less well-off candidates have been disadvantaged, while richer candidates can *buy* elections. And this produced an unequal playing field for the electoral process. A celebrity politician is a person who crafts the status of celebrity to promote her/his political career. The first and most successful politician who turned to celebrity was President Yudhoyono. In

contrast, there was also a trend that celebrities (movie stars, singers, comedians, models and sports figures) became politicians. Even though they were recruited as part of parties' electioneering strategy, they were needed as party vote getters.

Over time, parties have tended to be used more as electoral vehicles. This tendency reflects not only the tensions that exist between conflicting elements in electoral systems plus the impact of candidate ballot electoral rules, but also because of the confusion in the party leaders' approach about how to represent their supporters in a dynamic political environment. Other factors, such as the strong influence of party leaders/figures, weak party structures/organisations, party pragmatism, lack of programs/issues, fading influence of ideology and the loose ties of socio-cultural identification of parties, have facilitated this tendency. Electoral vehicles manifest the main feature of Kirchheimer's catch-all party, in terms of its overwhelming electoral orientation (1966). The party as electoral vehicle maximises votes, wins elections and governs. To mobilise voters, it applies an electoralist strategy, which seeks to attract as many voters as possible, and focuses on a direct relationship between the voter and the party by means of modern campaign techniques. Its campaign focuses on relatively practical and temporary issues, and depends heavily on the attractiveness of party leaders, figures and candidates. Its interest aggregation is inclusive, has considerable discretion in aggregating interest and is less overtly involved with the formulation of any policy or program commitments. Whilst its societal representation is heterogeneous, it avoids becoming identified with the interests of any specific social groups. It thus limits the party's potential in representing society. Party organisational structure is usually large, but unprofessional and ineffective. It lacks commitment to a particular ideology or program. Its candidate nomination process is largely based on personal electoral appeal and resources rather than organisational criteria, such as years of experience in, or service to, the party. Accordingly, the candidate holds a relatively stronger position vis-a-vis the party.

The model of the electoral vehicle party was Golkar of the President Suharto New Order government. Golkar continued when Demokrat was created by Yudhoyono to

win the 2004 elections. The difference was that Suharto (re)established Golkar as a government party, at a time when he controlled government. In contrast, Yudhoyono established Demokrat as his vehicle to win the presidency, while he was a member of cabinet. Even though Demokrat failed to dominate the parliament, it won sufficient support to nominate Yudhoyono as President. In the 2009 elections, the pattern became more obvious with the establishment of Hanura by Wiranto and Gerindra by Prabowo. But, both parties were established by politicians when they were not part of the government. It may be coincidence that Yudhoyono, Wiranto and Prabowo are military figures from the Suharto era and previously associated with Golkar. They represent the continuity of the political elite and their adaptability to compete in a more open electoral system. But it should be noted that their parties (Demokrat, Hanura and Gerindra) are difficult to distinguish in ideology, policy or program terms from the party all of the founders had previously been associated—Golkar. The trend of parties being identified with the leader was also apparent, if to a lesser extent with PDIP, PKB, PPP, PAN and PKS. Even though they still identify with partisan values linked to social and cultural divisions in society, values that each party had when it was founded, this varies from one party to another.

Parties have developed a party system which conformed to Sartori's atomised multi-partyism (1976): highly fragmented (between 24 to 48 parties), but dominated by a few (5 to 9) large parties. Parties have created a fluid party system with a narrow ideological spectrum of two ideologies—Pancasilaism and Islamism. The fluidity of the party system was reflected in the volatility rate. Based on national parliamentary elections (results during the first three elections of the reformasi era), the volatility rate shows wide swings in support of different parties. This suggests parties have weak roots in society. In general, all parties but PBB and PKS have experienced a severe downward swing in support, with only seven parties (PDIP, Golkar, PAN, PKB, PPP, PBB and PKS) surviving since 1999. However, even though the party system has been fluid, it has remained relatively stable as swinging voters have tended to shift their support to another party within the same ideology block. This finding corroborated Sartori (1976), Green-Pedersen (2004), and Mietzner (2008) hypotheses, that is, there are other factors

besides the degree of party institutionalisation in determining the stability of the party system.

The number of parties represented in the reformasi era parliaments has been high by international standards. However, even though the number of parties does matter, it is insufficient in and of itself to identify which parties exercise power. Hence, assessing party size and strength becomes important. In utilising EffNv and EffNs of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) to measure parties' size and strength, it was found that the indexes in 1999 were 5.06 and 4.71; in 2004 were 8.55 and 7.07 and in 2009 were 9.58 and 6.20. In 1999 it could be said that on paper there were five effective parties (PDIP, Golkar, PKB, PPP and PAN) in the election and four effective parties (PDIP, Golkar, PKB and PPP) in the parliament. In 2004, there were eight (Golkar, PDIP, PKB, PPP, Demokrat, PKS, PAN and PBB) in the election and seven (Golkar, PDIP, PKB, PPP, Demokrat, PKS and PAN) in the parliament. In 2009, there were nine (Demokrat, Golkar, PDIP, PKS, PAN, PPP, PKB, Gerindra and Hanura) in the election and six (Demokrat, Golkar, PDIP, PKS, PAN and PPP) in the parliament. It should be noted that in 2009, the parliamentary threshold was applied. These indexes are very useful in examining the potential of party competition and coalition (see table 4.17 in chapter four).

Parties have developed different strategies for different electoral competitions and coalitions. Under the PR system for legislatures, for example, parties competed directly with each other, while the majoritarian system for executive positions compels the same parties to form broad coalitions in order to nominate candidates for Pilpres and Pilkada. The result is that inter-party competition in PR elections is not as confrontational as competition between party coalitions in majoritarian elections. The situation then produces a party coalition which is only short term, pragmatic, inclusive and does not carry any expectations of long-term policy consistency. The participation of party leaders in coalition cabinets is also a matter of personal appointment and not party endorsement. Besides, the PR system since 1999 has produced multi-party representation in parliaments, with no party winning a majority of seats. Voters' support has been spread over five to nine parties, irrespective of the number of parties

competing in the election, which has varied between 24 and 48. The combination of PR and majoritarian systems produces a directly elected president with strong electoral legitimacy, but whose own party is highly unlikely to have majority seats in the parliament. Intentionally or otherwise, the electoral systems have produced a *de facto* checks and balances system.

As mentioned, parties in the reformasi era espouse only two ideologies—Pancasilaism and Islamism. Party competition within these two ideologies is as intense as between the parties themselves. However, parties tend not to compete with each other from extreme ideological positions, nor in a confrontational manner. The ideological dynamic of party competition is centrist and pragmatic on almost every issue, with the notable exception of the discussion about the possibility of rewriting the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution. The parties are clustered in the middle of the ideological spectrum. However, there is constant change and fluidity as parties have to respond to different electoral systems and electoral mechanics of Pilleg, Pilpres and Pilkada, from national to local, and to different social, cultural, economic, demographic and geographic characteristics of voters.

These findings show that Geertz's (1976) concept of *aliran*, and Feith and Castles' (1970) concept of *aliran politik* need to be reviewed, as it cannot explain contemporary changes. This study finds that in the 1999 election, to some extent, some parties remained attached to *aliran politik*. However, subsequently parties have shifted to a more electoral approach, initially evident in the 2004 Pilpres, more so in the post 2005 Pilkada, and 2009 Pilleg and Pilpres. Nevertheless, some parties and candidates have resorted to *aliran politik* issues to mobilise their supporters or to attack their competitors, usually without much success, except in some Pilkada campaigns.

This study has found that to understand the complicated party system, greater attention needs to be devoted to the competitive struggle among political elites, both inside and outside party structures. There is an abundance of compelling evidence showing that party elites are stronger than ever. They dominate elected offices in parliament and

government (and also in business, media, auxiliary state agencies and civil organisations) and at all levels to an unprecedented degree in Indonesia's history. With party representatives holding such strategic positions, further democratisation depends largely on their commitment. However, their long-term commitment to further democratisation is open to question, when their top priority is how to be re-elected. Besides, they are dependent financially on both the state and business. Their support for particular policies or legislation is often related to financial support, which inhibits the development of good governance and consistent policy making. In the reformasi era the PR system produced 'rainbow cabinets' with multi-party representation. These cabinets have had difficulties in producing effective government which a majoritarian system is supposed to facilitate, as discussed in chapters three and four.

Yet, the development of parties and party systems, as discussed in this thesis, have challenged "societal representation" theories (Duverger 1964; Lipset 1967 Sartori 1976) that postulate about the function of a political party. Societal representation party theories assume that the party acts as a representative liaison. While this function may be difficult to measure, it is not so difficult to describe. Representative liaison simply means that the parties articulate the views and demands of various social groups, either symbolically or in advancing specific interests. Some theorists claim that because of such a great variety of views and demands, parties should take a certain position, particularly if the issues are contested and linked to social or attitudinal divisions in society. While, the strong electoral focus of Indonesian parties in the reformasi era has forced them to adopt the electoral mobilisation approach. The advocates of "electoral mobilisation" party theories, such as Kirchheimer (1966), Epstein (1967) and Schlesinger (1991) argue that parties mobilise bias. Parties might select which and whose interest will be supported and represented in politics. And, it is not necessary for parties to take a firm position as they might generate support by stimulating concern in public affairs, drawing attention to particular preferences. This means that parties determine the campaign issues of the debate and limit the capacity of civil society to suggest alternatives.

In fact, Indonesian parties' function regarding "societal representation" started to diminish shortly after the 1971 election, particularly when parties were forced to adopt Pancasila as the one and only ideology; and they were detached from their grassroots through the "floating mass" policy. The impact of these policies on parties after 1998 is evident. Parties are still struggling, not only in searching for their identity, but also in representing their supporters. But, the adoption of the three different electoral systems has encouraged parties to adopt an electoral mobilisation approach if they want to compete effectively in elections. In sum, this research suggests that the electoral mobilisation framework offers a better explanation of the development of contemporary parties in Indonesia.

This thesis found that while there was optimism about the capacity of institutional engineering to push the democratisation process in Indonesia, through new electoral laws and regulations, the impacts were limited by history and socio-cultural factors. The objectives of the new electoral laws and regulations, for example, were difficult to realise because of the contradictory pressures, party pragmatism and the propensity to compromise, as well as the personalism of parties and their tendency to be used as electoral vehicles. The electoral laws were formulated with the objective to strengthen political parties by granting them considerable authority to determine who led government and played a dominant role in politics. Accordingly, parties influenced the formation of government as well as made policies and laws. However, increasing pragmatism, the willingness to compromise, and the personalism of parties have weakened their capacity to consolidate their position, envisaged by electoral laws. The emergence of parties like Demokrat, Hanura and Gerindra, established as electoral vehicles for their founder's ambitions to acquire public office, and controlling government and gaining access to state economic resources, has raised questions about socio-economic interests reflected in the policies made and laws enacted by the government these parties dominate. This argument suggests there are limitations to the explanatory powers of the institutional approach, as used in this research.

Nonetheless, the electoral engineering process, as discussed in chapter two, has produced many desirable outcomes, including crucial instruments of the democratisation process. At a minimum, it has restored the importance of elections as the source of the government's legitimacy, as well as the means of determining which sections of the elite form government. The process has also reinstated the importance of political parties in facilitating popular participation in politics. It has changed power relations, political issues, political culture and social demography. For example, in the local politics of Papua province, Chauvel argued:

Electoral politics has turned demographic change and the economic marginalization of Papuans—matters that have long fuelled nationalist sentiment—into heated issues in the realm of open politics. This has the potential both to galvanize Papuans around issues of representation, the meaning of autonomy and the control of local government as well as to channel the energies of Papuan politicians away from nationalist issues (Chauvel 2010: 328).

This study finds that an institutional approach is a very useful way to examine the impacts of the electoral engineering process post reformasi 1998. Usually an institutional approach is associated with developed countries, and stable and established political systems. This study finds that an institutional approach can be utilised in a developing country that has just started the process of democratic reform after a long period of authoritarian rule. An institutional approach is an alternative to the usual socio-cultural approach to understanding Indonesian politics. The many classical study of party are using a socio-cultural approach. They remain useful to understand Indonesian politics, but this thesis shows they are enriched by research using an institutionalism approach.

Rethinking Indonesian democracy

It is time to rethink the democratisation process in Indonesia. Following the thick description and analysis in previous chapters, this study has argued that the entire Indonesian regime in the reformasi era (under President Habibie, Presiden Wahid,

Presiden Megawati and President Yudhoyono) can be categorized as electoral democracy. This typology emanated from Schedler who asserted that the distinction is the quality of elections. 'The elections must be 'free and fair' in order to pass as democratic. Under electoral democracy, contests comply with minimal democratic norms; under electoral authoritarianism, they do not.' (Schedler 2002: 37).

This study finds that all elections during the reformasi era were relatively free. At a minimum, they meet Diamond's standard (2002: 28). But, not all of them were relatively fair. The 1999 election had a few problems regarding fairness, even though the secrecy of the ballot was protected and the vote counting procedures were relatively transparent. Nonetheless some small parties did not want to ratify the electoral result. While, the 2004 elections were relatively fair. The elections were administered by a neutral and competent KPU, which was successful in providing electoral transparency and in protecting the election results from manipulation. The general public could view the aggregated results from the national level to individual polling booths, from the tabulation centre in the Borobudur Hotel during the vote counting period, or on the KPU website. Nonetheless, it was found that the 2009 elections were relatively unfair. The 2009 elections were not administered by a neutral and competent KPU. The KPU failed to demonstrate electoral transparency in the voting registry and vote counting process. The electoral rules systematically disadvantaged parties less supportive of the Yudhoyono government. The procedures for resolving complaints and disputes were not clear. Hence, it could be said that President Yudhoyono had less legitimacy in his second term. Despite the fact that he was elected with a bigger majority of the vote and his Demokrat party won more seats. However, it is important to clarify that the 2009 elections under President Yudhoyono were unlike the elections conducted under President Suharto's authoritarian regime. The 1971 to 1997 elections were designed specifically with the objective to legitimise the established government; the 2009 elections were designed to sustain the incumbent government in power dominated by figures from the authoritarian Suharto era. Besides, the 2009 elections were held under a more decentralised and competitive electoral system than those of the Suharto era.

This study found that parties' characteristics were different before and after the 2004 elections. Before the 2004 elections, under the governments of President Wahid and President Megawati, parties tended to act as a representative liaison. Some parties sought to mobilise support based in particular sections of society. They tried to anchor the party through active recruitment of members and expansion of the party organisation in local communities. Parties with long histories tried to cultivate established bases of support in their affiliated organisations, such as PKB and PAN, which have a special attachment to mass Muslim organisations of NU and Muhammadiyah. In contrast, Golkar, as a creation of a functional group, considered itself above sectional interest. However, there were many new parties that struggled not only to develop a basis of support but also to develop an identity. After the 2004 elections, under President Yudhoyono, some old and new parties adopted a more electoralist approach. Electoralist parties sought to attract as many voters as possible with the objective of acquiring public office. In fact, President Yudhoyono was supported by an electoralist party (i.e. Partai Demokrat). Indeed, General Yudhoyono then established Partai Demokrat as an electoral vehicle for his presidential ambitions. Even parties with an attachment to particular social and cultural groupings and ideological values have sought to mobilise support beyond their traditional base, although their established identity limited their electoral appeal. The ability and willingness to adjust varied from party to party and over time. Nonetheless, it should be noted here that the electoralist approach, as used by Demokrat and President Yudhoyono, was successful in two elections, but was less successful for the Yudhoyono government because it did not facilitate the articulation and representation of interests of social groups in the Indonesian electorate.

Reflecting on the democratisation process and the political nature of the reformasi era, and to close the discussion, I have asked myself the reflective question: Where does Indonesia go from this "electoral democracies"? Following Andreas Schedler's four-fold typology of regimes: liberal democracy, electoral democracy, electoral authoritarian and closed authoritarian (Schedler 2002), my hypothetical answer is "Indonesian democracy will fall in the space between electoral democracy and electoral

authoritarian.” It may move either closer towards electoral democracy or electoral authoritarian; and may go back and forth. It is unlikely that Indonesian democracy will develop to become a liberal democracy, particularly considering the beliefs, values and history of Indonesian parties and governing elites. But, it is unlikely that Indonesian democracy will roll back to closed authoritarian, particularly because in practice Indonesia has established almost all political institutions prerequisites of democracy, such as reasonably free and fair elections, reformed state institutions and a strengthened civil society. Even though, democratic practices have not yet been institutionalized. Certainly, the answer is not satisfying. But, political system is a reflection of a country political history, beliefs, values, and derived from the mode of government formation. I am reminded of the debate between Harry Benda and Herbert Feith about Indonesia’s experience of democracy in the 1950s, as expressed in the following quotations:

Perhaps our basic error all along has been to examine Indonesia with Western eyes; or, to be more precise and more generous, with eyes that, though increasingly trained to see things Indonesian, have continued to look at them selectively, in accordance with preconceived Western models. Most of our questions, so it seems to me, have hitherto resolved around a singularly simple, continuing theme, perhaps best caricatured by the adage. “What’s wrong with Indonesia?” The answers given to this all-pervasive, if usually unstated, questions vary from author to author, from discipline to discipline; but basically they have led—with greater or lesser ingenuity—to the discovery of a *diabolus ex machina* (Benda 1964: 450)

I would concede that a lot of recent research on non-Western societies, inspired by sociological theory and by the passion for macro-sociological comparisons, has taken far too little account of the history of these societies, particularly their pre-colonial history. There has no doubt been too little research, and too much generalizing based on it (or not based on it); the number of rigorous and systematic studies comparing phenomena in different non-Western societies is in fact still tiny. Furthermore many of the theoretical formulations which are being advanced in the whole area of non-Western studies are taken up for ideological utility, and so gain currency to an extent quite unjustified by their analytical value. The notion of ‘traditional society’ is probably one of these. Attractive to liberal internationalists because of its suggestion that “Asians are basically very much like ourselves”— we used to speak of ‘feudalism’ till the historians caught up to us—it has probably done more harm than good by obscuring the great variety of history and historical legacy in different parts of the world (Feith 1965: 312).

Postscript: the 2014 elections

What happened in the 2014 elections? The findings of this study were strengthened in almost all aspects. The contests for the popular vote have continued to push parties toward the centre of the ideological spectrum and identification with the individual candidates has become very much a part of this *zeitgeist*. Parties have also continued to develop different strategies for different electoral competitions. In Pilleg, parties competed directly; while in Pilpres parties created broad coalitions in order to nominate candidates. The combination of PR and majoritarian systems produced a directly elected president, Joko Widodo (hereafter Widodo), with strong electoral legitimacy, but the president's party, PDIP, won less than 20% of seats in the parliament.

Indonesia held the fourth Pilleg on 9 April 2014. Three months later this was followed by the third Pilpres on 9 July 2014. They were administered by Law No. 8 of 2012 on General Elections and Law No. 42 of 2008 on Direct Presidential Elections. The electoral systems and mechanics were similar to previous elections: the PR system for parliamentary elections and majoritarian system for executive positions. For Pilleg the electoral threshold was set very low and the party ballot open-list encouraged candidates to participate. However, the ceiling for parliamentary threshold for the national parliament was raised from 2.5% in the 2009 election to 3.5% in the 2014 election. For Pilpres, according to Law No. 42 of 2008 (article 9), presidential nominations may only be made by a party (or coalition of parties) that has at least 20% of the seats in the national parliament, or received 25% of the national vote in the previous national legislative election. Among other things, the effect of this requirement was likely to limit the number of candidates able to stand for presidency and this was the case in 2014 with only two tickets nominated.

Pragmatism, compromise and the personalism of parties were more evident, as was the use of parties as electoral vehicles. The party system in the 2014 elections continued the pattern of the earlier reformasi era elections: atomised multi-partyism, highly

fragmented (12 parties), but dominated by few large (five) parties. The parties were still grouped in two relatively stable ideology blocks—Pancasilaism and Islamism. The parties' competition within the two ideologies was as intense as between them. Parties tended not to compete from extreme ideological positions. They also avoided open conflict, either as an individual party or as a block.

There were 12 national parties and three Acehnese local parties contesting in the 2014 Pilleg. The Pilleg result for the national parties follows: PDIP won 23.681.471 votes (18.95%), Golkar 18.432.312 votes (14.75%), Gerindra 14.760.371 votes (11.81%), Demokrat 12.728.913 votes (10.19%), PKB 11.298.957 votes (9.04%), PAN 9.481.621 votes (7.59%), PKS 8.480.204 votes (6.79%), Nasdem¹⁵³ 8.402.812 votes (6.72%), PPP 8.157.488 votes (6.53%), Hanura 6.579.498 votes (5.26%), PBB 1.825.750 votes (1.46%) and PKPI 1.143.094 votes (0.91%) (KPU 2014). The notable loser in the 2014 elections was Demokrat, the electoral vehicle of the incumbent President, whose vote fell sharply from 20.85% in 2009 to 10.19% in 2014. It would seem probable that many of those who voted Demokrat in 2009 swung to PDIP, which increased from 14.03% in 2009 to 18.95% in 2014 or to Gerindra, which almost tripled its vote from 4.46% in 2009 to 11.81% in 2014 (KPU (2014a)). Golkar's vote was stable from 14.45% in 2009 to 14.75% in 2014, but compared to 2004 (21.58%) and 1999 (22.44%), the result for 2014 was a big disappointment for the old Suharto era government party. There were 10 parties with seats in the national parliament, with PBB and PKPI having failed to pass the parliamentary threshold of 3.5% of national valid votes. This outcome was at odds with the intention of a high parliamentary threshold, which was to reduce the number of parties in parliament. The number of parties in parliament was: 10 parties (2014), 9 parties (2009), 17 parties (2004), and 21 parties (1999).

In the 2014 election, the four most successful parties together won 55.70% of total votes (PDIP, Golkar, Gerindra and Demokrat). In 2009, the total votes of the four most successful parties were 57.21% (Demokrat, Golkar, PDIP and PKS); in 2004 58.83%

¹⁵³The Nasdem party (Partai Nasional Demokrat or National Democratic Party) was a new electoral vehicle established by Surya Paloh, a former leader of Golkar and a media tycoon.

(Golkar, PDIP, PKB and PPP); and in 1999 79.5% (PDIP, Golkar, PKB and PPP). These results show that the distribution of votes in 2014 was more fragmented compared to the earlier reformasi elections, despite the objective of the high parliamentary threshold and the limitation of only 12 parties permitted to compete in the elections—much smaller numbers than in earlier elections. Of the two large parties that have survived since 1999 (PDIP and Golkar) neither has been able to consolidate its position and become a majority party. Perhaps Golkar could have but for the fragmentation of its support base with the establishment electoral vehicles by Golkar leaders—Demokrat, Hanura, Gerindra and NasDem. Jusuf Kalla, a former leader and presidential candidate of Golkar, who joined the PDIP-led ticket with Widodo, as he had done in 2004 with the Demokrat-led ticket with Yudhoyono. Golkar, its splinter parties and former leaders were to be found in both presidential coalitions in 2014. Collectively, these parties won nearly half the vote in the parliamentary elections.

The Pilleg result revealed that no party won enough votes to field its own presidential ticket. The PDIP won the highest portion of the vote, but still the party was unable to nominate a presidential candidate on its own. Golkar and Gerindra could have formed a coalition to nominate a presidential ticket, but both party chairmen, Aburizal Bakrie and Prabowo Subianto, wanted to be nominated as president and neither was prepared to be nominated as vice-president. The final competition of Pilpres was fought between two presidential tickets. The first presidential ticket was for Prabowo Subianto of Gerindra and Hatta Rajasa of PAN. They were supported by a formidable coalition of six parties, including Gerindra, PAN, Golkar, PPP, PKS and Demokrat, with a combined strength of 63.04% seats in parliament or 59.12% of the popular vote. It should be noted that the chairman of Demokrat, the incumbent President Yudhoyono, took a neutral position and TNI and Polri followed the president's example. The second presidential ticket was for Joko Widodo of PDIP and Jusuf Kalla, a former Golkar leader. This coalition had a smaller representation of four parties, PDIP, Hanura, NasDem and PKB, with 36.96% seats in parliament or 40.88% of the popular vote. The politician who tipped the balance in Prabowo's favour was Aburizal Bakri of Golkar who, in a surprise move, declared his support just before nominations closed on 20 May 2014. It has been argued in this

study that the competition between parties in the two ideological blocks is as intense as between the blocks. For example, the Islamic (PKB and PAN) and the Islamist (PPP and PKS) parties, if they joined a coalition together, would have sufficient votes in parliamentary elections to nominate a presidential ticket. However, instead of creating their own coalition to nominate their own presidential ticket, they ended up divided between the two presidential coalitions. The two Islamic parties supported different presidential coalitions. Nevertheless, PKB almost doubled its vote from 4.94% in 2009 to 9.04% in 2014 and PAN increased its vote from 6.3% in 2009 to 7.59% in 2014. In contrast, PKS and PPP joined the Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Radjasa party coalition.

In the Pilpres result, as announced by KPU on 22 July 2014, Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa achieved 62.576.444 votes (46.85%), while Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla obtained 70.997.85 votes (53.15%) (KPU 2014b). On paper, Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa, who were supported by six parties with 59.12% of the popular vote in the Pilleg, had a better chance of success in the presidential campaign; but, in reality, the parties of the Prabowo Subianto / Hatta Rajasa coalition lost (*kebocoran* to use a Prabowo term) around 12% of their parliamentary vote. Indeed, this study has found that Pilpres (also Pilkada) voters can vote differently in elections for legislative and executive positions; in the latter, voting for candidates rather than a party. At least two points can be inferred here. First, party organisation is unable to mobilise a parliamentary supporter base for their preferred candidates in Pilpres (and also in Pilkada). Parties cannot deliver their supporter base to their coalition partners. Second, the Pilpres results suggest the weakness of voters' loyalty to parties and the weakness of party roots in the society, as well as the difficulty in developing party identification and party discipline.

Nonetheless, Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa were disappointed with the electoral processes and results. To express his dissatisfaction, Prabowo withdrew from the counting process after having claimed victory on the basis of the initial quick counts from some of the more dubious polling organisations that Prabowo's allies own (Hukum-online 2014). It remained a question, whether he pulled out from the tabulation

process, or the presidential election as a whole. Prabowo also urged KPU to delay the announcement by two weeks, which would have allowed his party to investigate alleged manipulations of the voting process. This request was denied. Prabowo then challenged the KPU's results in MK. On 22 August, the MK announced that it did not accept Prabowo's allegations against the KPU. Indeed, electoral manipulations remain among Indonesia's most important election problems. The problems seemed more rampant in 2014 elections compared to the previous elections. Undemocratic practices, such as money politics, vote selling, problems with the voter's registry and abuse of authority returned. Having an independent, neutral and trustworthy electoral institution is a prerequisite for further democratisation.

One of the findings of this study was that celebrity politicians have become a feature of reformasi electoral politics. The leading star of the 2014 Pilpres was Joko Widodo, the governor of Jakarta and the former Mayor of Solo. Prior to his election as Mayor, he was a furniture manufacturer with no history of political activism. He was a local leader with little national or international government experience and with little coverage in the Indonesian or international media. However, by October 2013 various independent polls on potential presidential candidates found that his political support was consistently ahead of his rivals. He used his position as a popular Governor of Jakarta to transform himself into a celebrity politician of national standing. Joko Widodo was successful in translating his personal appeal as a champion of the common man into political support for presidential nomination. Widodo's achievements are perhaps more impressive than the first successful Indonesian celebrity politician, President Yudhoyono. He has demonstrated a capacity to attract voluntary and spontaneous support from outside the party organisation, in a way that was different from Yudhoyono.

In marked contrast to Widodo, Prabowo was a controversial former General and one-time-son-in-law of President Suharto, with aristocratic aspirations. Prabowo, like Yudhoyono, was successful in using the party and Tim Sukses organisations to mobilise supporters. During the Pilpres campaign, Prabowo emerged as a charismatic master and

political campaigner. In rhetorical style, he tried to imitate the first Indonesian President, Sukarno. Prabowo and Widodo represented in their political persona such contrasting styles of leadership, background, political experience and political values—those of an old and new Indonesia. Yet the coalitions that supported them were similar ‘ragtag’ pragmatic coalitions of great ideological diversity and interests. It was difficult to identify what particular interests within the elite or the broader society each coalition represented. Both coalitions had their collections of less desirable retired military characters, oligarchs and media tycoons.

The phenomenon of celebrity politicians increased due to intensified media coverage. The role and influence of media, political consultants and polling institutions became more important and critical in the campaign process. There was a time during the campaign when media outlets competed with each other in partisan electoral coverage: TV One of Aburizal Bakri, RCTI and MNC TV group of Harry Tanoesoedibjo supported Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Rajasa against Metro TV of Surya Paloh who supported Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla. The 2014 elections showed that the media had difficulty playing a role as the ‘guardian’ of democracy. The use of social media in the parties’ campaign strategies became evident as well. Both presidential coalitions used it skilfully. Prabowo-Hatta managed the main social media platforms professionally, while the social media strategy of Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla was organised more organically by their volunteers. In the future, analysing social media content will become an important focus for political analysts to understand the dynamics of online information.

The popularity contest also involved the use of black and negative campaigns. The most shameful case was “Tabloid Obor Rakyat”, published by President Yudhoyono’s close staff (but not with the knowledge of the President). The tabloid’s purpose was to praise Prabowo-Hatta and to slander Widodo- Kalla. “Tabloid Obor Rakyat” was only one of a number of tabloid publications produced for the same purpose. Some of the issues in the character assassination of Joko Widodo were sectarian and ethnic. It was claimed that he was only a puppet of Megawati and PDIP as well as financed by a group of Chinese

conglomerates from China and Jewish capitalists from Israel (Akhir Zaman 2014). He was also accused of corruption when he was mayor of Solo and governor of Jakarta. However, the most significant was the accusation that he and his family were not Muslim and of Chinese descent. This was significant because it might have limited his capacity to reach out to the majority of Muslim voters, particularly because PDIP officials and supporters were seen largely as *abangan* and dominated by non-Muslims, especially Catholics and Christians. These issues had the potential to impact on Joko Widodo's popularity, based on the assumption of those involved in these campaigns, that is, that some Indonesians are influenced by these sectarian sentiments. These campaigns would suggest that the sentiments identified in Geertz's (1976) concept of *aliran* and Feith and Castles' (1970) concept of *aliran politik* have not disappeared entirely, even if they are not openly articulated by parties. However, the electoral result shows that the majority of Indonesian voters were not swayed by these appeals to sectarian and ethnic prejudice.

The 2014 elections confirmed the finding that Indonesian electoral politics is complicated, variegated and fluid, reflecting the need to accommodate the divergent interests of many different political forces. Many new parties have been established and some have become successful in a short timeframe. Despite the reduced number of parties permitted to compete in the legislative elections, the number of parties that won representation did not change much. There has been a tendency for candidates to come from more diverse socio-cultural, economy and political backgrounds, but political parties remain important gatekeepers for participation in elections. Indeed, Joko Widodo's election as President, following his tenure as Mayor of Solo and Governor of Jakarta, suggests that direct elections for executive positions has also broadened the backgrounds of successful candidates. By giving more people the opportunity to enter politics, the process of elite circulation has been encouraged. A more detailed analysis shows that seemingly new political forces or new parties are established, but led and dominated by figures from the Suharto era government, retired military officers and former members of Golkar. Some reformists of the anti-Suharto movement have been co-opted into the parties established by New Order era figures.

And, the retired military officers, the former members of Golkar and the reformists can build alliances and be nominated, for example: Joko Widodo –Jusuf Kalla and Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa. Joko Widodo was the only ‘new’ figure among the candidates for President and vice President in 2014.

The result of the 2014 elections confirmed that the PR and majoritarian systems had created a political situation where no party could control a majority, either in parliament or in cabinet, at the national level. While at the provincial and district levels, power was broadly diffused among parties and coalitions of parties, making it difficult for one party or politician to dominate. Even though, in the 2014 elections, PDIP, Golkar and Gerindra emerged as the biggest parties, their votes were only 18.95%, 14.75% and 11.81% respectively, none of them have chance to either dominate parliament or nominate a presidential ticket without a coalition of parties. The Demokrat party, the largest party in 2009, lost half its support in 2014, with its founder former President Yudhoyono having to retire after two terms. The volatility of individual party fortunes disguises the continuity of the elite. Although, Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla won the popular vote in the presidential election, they confront a parliament dominated by other parties. The authority of a directly elected president with strong electoral legitimacy is curtailed by a fragmented parliament. The Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla government has to accommodate the diverse interests represented in the multi-party parliament to have government legislation passed. A stable and effective government is more difficult to establish since parliament is dominated by a coalition of parties that supported Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa in the 2014 Presidential elections. The 2014 elections once again showed that the orientation of the political system is unclear as to whether it functions as a presidential or a parliamentary democracy. Whether there is a clear separation of powers is a matter of conjecture, but this research demonstrates that, as a result of the adoption of the PR and majoritarian electoral systems, a de facto pattern of checks and balances has emerged.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Abbreviations and glossary

Abangan	Nominal Muslim who do not strictly follow the five pillars of Islam
Aliran	Streams, terms used to differentiate socio-cultural cleavage
APBD	Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah (Regional Budget and Expenditure)
APBN	Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara (National Budget and Expenditure)
BAPPEDA	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Regional Development Planning Board)
BAPPENAS	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Development Planning Board)
BKPM	Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal (Investment Coordination Board)
BKPMD	Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal Daerah (Reg Investment Coordination Board)
BLT	Bantuan Langsung Tunai (the cash compensation payments)
BOS	Bantuan Organisasi Sekolah (Schooling Organisation Allowances)
BPP	Bilangan Pembagi Pemilih (Electoral quotient)
BPS Daerah	Biro Pusat Statistik Daerah (Regional Bureau of Statistic)
BPS	Biro Pusat Statistik (National Bureau of Statistic)
BRR	Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (Aceh Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Board)
Bupati	Head of Kabupaten (Regency/District Chief)
Camat	Head of Kecamatan (Sub-regency/sub-district Chief)
DP4	Daftar Penduduk Pemilih Potensial Pemilu (A Potential Voters List)
DPD	Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representative Assembly)
DPP	Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (Central Leadership Board)
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (National People's Representative Council)
DPRD	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (The Local House of Representatives)
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (The National House of Representatives)
DPS	Daftar Pemilih Sementara (Preliminary Voters List)
DPT	Daftar Pemilih Tetap (Final Voters List)
EffNs	Effective Number of Seats
EffNv	Effective Number of Votes
GBHN	Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara (National Policy Guidelines)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
Gerindra	Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (The Great Indonesian Movement Party)
GoI	Government of Indonesia
Golkar	Golongan Karya (Functional Group Party)
Golput	Golongan putih (Literally: white group)
HAM	Hak Asasi Manusia (Human Right)
Hanura	Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (People Conscious Party)
HMI	Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic Student Association)
ICMI	Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association)
INPRES	Instruksi Presiden (President's Instruction)

IPKI	Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Alliance of Supporter for Indonesian Independence)
Iramasuka	Causus group from Eastern Indonesia (informal faction)
Jamkesmas	Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat (Health Care Support)
Kabupaten	Regency/District
KDH	Kepala Daerah (Head of Regions)
Kejawen	Javanese religion
KEPMEN	Keputusan Menteri (Ministry's Decree)
KEPPRES	Keputusan Presiden (President's Decree)
KK	Kartu Keluarga, <i>Family Card/Identity</i>
KKN	<i>Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme</i> (Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism)
Kota	City
Kokarmendagri	Koperasi Karyawan Kementrian Dalam Negeri Republik Indonesia (Cooperation of Minister of Home Affairs)
Korpri	Korps Pegawai Negeri Indonesia (Indonesian Government Employee's Corporate)
KPPS	Kelompok Penyelenggara Pemungutan Suara (Voting Implementation Group)
KPU	Komisi Pemilihan Umum (General Election Commission)
KTP	Kartu Tanda Penduduk (Citizen Identity Card)
KUR	Kredit Untuk Rakyat (Microcredit Programs)
Kyai	Islamic religious teacher/leader
Liga Muslimin	Indonesian Muslim League
Litsus	Penelitian Khusus (the screening of candidates)
LPU	Lembaga Pemilihan Umum (General Election Agencies)
LSM	Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (Non-governmental Organisations)
Masyumi	Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MOHA	Kementrian Dalam Negeri (Ministry of Home Affairs)
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly)
Munas	Musyawahar Nasional (National Party Congress)
Munaslub	Musyawahar <i>Nasional Luar Biasa</i> (Extraordinary Party Congress)
Muspida	Musyawahar Pimpinan Daerah (Regional Leaders Consultative Forum)
Nasakom	Nasionalis, Agama dan Komunis
NIK	Nomor Induk Kependudukan (National Identity Number)
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama (Awakening of Religious Teacher)
Orba	<i>Orde Baru</i> (New Order)
PAD	Pendapatan Asli Daerah (Regional Own Resources Revenues)
PAN	Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)
Pancasila	Five spirits, the five guiding principles of the Indonesian state
Panja	Panitia kerja (Working committee)
Pansus	Panitia khusus (Special committee)
Pantarlilh	Panitia Pendaftaran Pemilih (Voter Registration Committee)
Panwaslak	Panitia Pengawasan dan Pelaksanaan (Election Supervisory Committees)
Parkindo	Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party)
Parmusi	Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Party)
PBB	Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star and Moon Party)
PBN	Partai Buruh Nasional (National Labour Party)
PBR	Partai Bulan Reformasi (Reform Star Party)
PBSD	Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat (Social Democratic Labour Party)
PCD	Partai Cinta Damai

PD	Partai Demokrat (Democrats Party)
PDI	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party)
PDIP	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)
PDKB	Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (Love the Nation Democratic Party)
PDS	Partai Damai Sejahtera (Prosperous and Peace Party)
Pemekaran	The process of administrative restructuring (proliferation)
Pemilu	Pemilihan Umum (General Election)
Pemkab	Pemerintah Kabupaten (Municipality Administration)
Pemkot	Pemerintah Kota (City Administration)
Pemprov	Pemerintah Provinsi (Province Administration)
Pengajian	Islamic Koran reading group
Perda	Peraturan Daerah (Law at the regional/local level)
Perti	Perserikatan Tionghoa Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Chinese Association)
Pertiwi	Persatuan Istri Pegawai Negeri (Association of Civil Service's wife)
Pesantren	Traditional Islamic boarding school
Pilkada	Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah (Head of Local Government Election)
Pilleg	Pemilihan Umum Legislatif (Legislative Election)
Pilpres	Pemilihan Umum Presiden (Presidential Election)
PK	Partai Keadilan (Justice Party)
PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party)
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
PKMI	Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia
PKP	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (Justice and Unity Party)
PKPB	Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (Concern for the Nation Functional Party)
PKS	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party)
PKU	Partai Kebangkitan Umat
PNBK	Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan
PNI	Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party)
PNI-M	Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme (Indonesian National Party – Marhaenisme)
PNI-MM	Partai Nasional Indonesia- Massa Marhaenis (Indonesian National Party – Marhaenisme Mass)
PNU	Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (Nahdlatul Ulama Party)
Polri	Polisi Republik Indonesia (Indonesia National Police)
PP	Peraturan Pemerintah (Government Regulation)
PPDK	Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan (United Democratic Nationhood Party)
PPI	Partai Pekerja Indonesia (Indonesian Workers Party)
PPI	Panitia Pemilih Indonesia (Indonesia Election Working Committee)
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
PRD	Partai Rakyat Demokrat (Democrat People Party)
Preman	Thugs
Priyayi	Javanese aristocracy
PSI	Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesia socialist Party)
PSII	Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (Indonesia Syarikat Islam Party)
PSP	Partai Solidaritas Pekerja (Workers Solidarity Party)
PSPI	Partai Solidaritas Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (All workers Solidarity Party)
PSPSI	Partai Solidaritas Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (All workers Solidarity Party)

PUDI	Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Union Party)
PWI	Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (Indonesian Journalists Indonesia)
Reformasi	Reform (term associated with the post-Suharto era)
Repelita	Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five-Year Development Plan)
Santri	Pious Muslim
SDI	Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trade Association)
Sekber Golkar	Sekretariat-bersama Golkar (Joint secretariat of Functional Groups)
SI	Sarekat Islam (The Islamic Union)
SIT	Surat Izin Terbit (Publishing Permit)
SIUP	Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers (Press Publication Business License)
SK	Surat Keputusan (Letter of Decision)
SPSI	Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (All Indonesian Workers Union)
Tk	Tingkat (Level)
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces)
Tokoh	Influential or charismatic leader
Ulama	Islamic religious scholar
UU	Undang-Undang (Law at the national level)
Walikota	Mayor Head of Autonomous City
Wong cilik	Poor/marginal people

Appendix B: Issues discussed in interviews

The questions within the interview broadly covered issues related to the impact of the changing electoral systems and their mechanics.

Not all issues were asked of one informant. Instead, I tried to suit the issues to informants' knowledge and experience. With my wish to understand rather than to explain, I let the conversation flow as naturally as possible so my informant felt comfortable and was willing to talk.

Basically we discussed about what, why, when, who and how, some of the following: candidate selection, campaign strategies, electoral strategies, electoral funding/resources, party competition, party coalitions, party identification, party ideology, party base, party function and the role of media and consultants, electoral systems, electoral mechanics, political reformation, changing of social-culture, economic development, information technology, Pancasila, Islam, and democratisation process.

Appendix C: List of interviews

No.	Name	Name of Political Party/ Organisation	Position/ Profession	Position in Parliament	Place/ Date of interview
1	Firman Jaya Daely, SH	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	Chair of DPP; Vice Chair of Badan Pemenangan Pemilu 2009 (Bapilu 2009)	Member of DPR and MPR RI (1999- 2004), Dapil Kep. Nias; Candidate Member of DPR No.1, Dapil Kepulauan Riau	Jakarta, 31 January 2009
2	Prof. Dr. Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin	Indonesian Electoral Commission (KPU), Professor, political scholars of University of Indonesia	Chair of Indonesian Electoral Commission (KPU)		Jakarta, 3 February 2009
3	Dr. Pramono Anung	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	Chair of DPP	Deputy Chair of DPR, 2004-2009	Jakarta, 3 February 2009
4	Dr. Abdillah Toha	Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)	Founder, Chair of Advisory Board	Member of DPR (2004-2009); Candidate Member of DPR No.1, Dapil DKI-Jakarta	Jakarta, 4 February 2009
5	Abdurrahman Wahid	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)	Chair of Dewan Syuro	former Indonesian President (1999- 2000)	Jakarta, 5 February 2009
6	Dr. Akbar Tandjung	Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)	Chair	Chair of DPR (1999-2004)	Jakarta, 6 February 2009
7	DJ Zakaria, SE	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	Chair of DPC PDIP Kab. Bintan	Member of DPRD Kab. Bintan (2004- 2009); Candidate Member of DPRD Kab. Bintan No.1, Dapil Kab. Bintan	Bintan, 8 February 2009
8	Dra. Hj. Suryatati A. Manan		Mayor of Kota Tanjung Pinang, Prov Kepri		Tanjung Pinang, 8 February 2009
9	H. Lis Darmansyah, SH	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	Secretary of DPD Prov Kepri	Member of DPRD Prov. Kepri (2004- 2009); Candidate Member of DPRD Prov. Kepri No.1 Dapil Kota Tanjung Pinang	Tanjung Pinang, 8 February 2009

10	Suparno	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	Chair of Tim Sukses Walikota Tanjung Pinang (coalition of PDIP, Golkar, Demokrat, PKS, PDS, PKB)	Member of DPRD Kota Tanjung Pinang (2004-2009); Candidate Member of DPRD Kota Tanjung Pinang No.1 Dapil Kota Tanjung Pinang	Tanjung Pinang, 9 February 2009
11	Dr. H.M. Soerya Respationo, SH, MH	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	Chair of DPD Prov. Kepri	Deputy Chair of DPRD Province Kepri (2004-2009), Candidate Member of DPRD Provinsi Kepri No.1 Dapil Kota Batam	Batam, 9 February 2009
12	Dra. Hj. Mursyidah Thahir, MA	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)	Deputy Secretary of DPP; Member of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI).	Candidate Member of DPR No.1 Dapil East Java	Jakarta, 10 February 2009
13	Dr. Mariani Akib Baramuli, MM	Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)	Deputy Chair of Department of Social Welfare of DPP (2007-2010); Vice Secretary of DPD Prov Central Sulawesi (1997-1998), Chair of Department of Women of DPD Prov. Central Sulawesi (1998-2000)	Member of DPR (2004-2009), (1999-2004); Member of DPRD Prov Central Sulawesi (1997-1998), (1992-1997), (1987-1992); Candidate Member of DPR No.1 Dapil Central of Sulawesi.	Jakarta, 10 February 2009
14	Hj. Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi	Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)	Deputy Chair of Department of Religion of DPP (2003-2008), (1998-2003)	Member of Parliament DPR from Dapil East Java (2004-2009), (1999-2004), (1997-1999)	Jakarta, 10 February 2009
15	Maria Ulfah Anshor, MSi	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)	Chair Fatayat NU (2005-2009)	Member (PAW) of DPR (2004-2009); Candidate Member of DPR No.1 Dapil Cirebon	Jakarta, 10 February 2009
16	Drs. Ahmad Adib Zain	Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)	Chair of DPW Prov. West Java (2005-2010); Secretary (2000-2005); Vice Chair (1998-2000); Chair of Fraksi PAN DPRD Prov West Java; Chair of Corps HMI alumni (KAHMI).	Member of DPRD Prov. West Java, Dapil Bekasi (2004-2009); Candidate Member of DPR No.1 Dapil kota Bandung and kota Cimahi	Bandung, 12 February 2009
17	Lily Chadidjah Wahid	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)	Chair of PKB	Candidate Member of DPR No.1 Dapil Prov. East Java	Jakarta, 20 February 2009
18	Prof. Dr. H.M.	Partai Amanat Nasional	Founder, Chair of	Chair of MPR RI	Jakarta, 25

	Amien Rais	(PAN)	Advisory Board	(1999-2004)	February 2009
19	Dr. J. Kristiadi		Deputy Chair of CSIS		Jakarta, 26 February 2009
20	Indra Abidin		Member of KPU Prov. Banten		Jakarta, 2 March 2009
21	Prof. Dr. M. Ryaas Rasyid	Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan (PDK)	Founder, Chair of DPP	Member of DPR Dapil South Sulawesi (2004-2009)	Jakarta, 8 March 2009
22	Rafiuddin Hamarung	Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan (PDK)	Founder, Chair of DPP	Member of DPR Prov. South Sulawesi (2004-2009); Bupati of Pinrang, Governor of Central Kalimantan; Candidate Member of DPR No. 1 Dapil Prov. South Sulawesi	Makassar, 16 March 2009
23	Hirsan Bachtiar		Chair of KPU Kab. Gowa		Gowa, 17 March 2009
24	Ir. Farouk Mappaseling Betta, MM	Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)	Secretary of DPC Kota Makassar	Member of DPRD Kota Makassar (2004-2009); Candidate Member of DPRD Kota Makassar No.1 Dapil 1 (Kec. Ujung Pandang, Kec. Rappocini & Kec. Makassar)	Makassar, 17 March 2009
25	Tenri A. Palallo		KPU Kota Makassar		Makassar, 17 March 2009
26	Andi Zulkifli Muis, SE	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)	Chair of Humas of DPW Prov. South Sulawesi		Makassar, 17 March 2009
27	Dr. Jayadi Nas		Chair of KPU Prov. South Sulawesi		Makassar, 17 March 2009
28	Drs. H. Abdul Latif Hafid	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)	Chair of DPC Kab. Gowa	Camat Teladan Kec. Somba Opu (1995-2000), Member of DPRD Kab. Gowa (2004-2009); Candidate Member of DPRD Kab. Gowa Dapil I (Kec. Somba Opu)	Gowa, 18 March 2009
29	HM Amir Uskara	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)	Chair of DPC Kab Gowa (2006-2008); Chair of DPW Prov. South Sulawesi (2008-2010).	Member of DPRD Kab. Gowa (2004-2009); Candidate Member of DPRD Prov. South	Gowa, 18 March 2009

				Sulawesi	
30	Anwar Ngaja, SH, MH	Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)	Vice Chair of DPD Kab. Gowa (2005- 2010)	Member of DPRD Kab. Gowa (2004- 2009); Candidate Member of DPRD Kab. Gowa Dapil VI (Kab. Tinggi Moncong, Kab. Tombalo Pao, Kab. Parigi)	Gowa, 18 March 2009
31	H. Zulkifly Hijaz, SE	Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan (PDK)	Treasure of DPC Kab. Gowa	Member of DPRD Kab Gowa (2004- 2009); Candidate Member of DPRD Kab Gowa No. 4 Dapil 7 (Kab. Bungajaya, Kab. Bontolempangan, Kab. Biringbulu, Kab. Tompobulu)	Gowa, 18 March 2009
32	Rustam Naba, SS	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)	Chair of Departemen Kaderisasi of DPC Kab. Gowa (2005- 2010)	Member of DPRD Kab Gowa (2004- 2009); Candidate Member of DPRD Dapil V (Kab. Bontomarannu, Kab. Pattalassang, Kab. Parangloe, Kab. Manuju)	Gowa, 18 March 2009
33	Husain Djunaid, SH, MH	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	Chair of DPC Kab Gowa	Member of DPRD Prov. South Sulawesi (2004- 2009); Candidate Member of DPRD No. 1 Prov. South Sulawesi Dapil V (Kab. Bone, Kab. Soppeng, Kab. Wajo)	Gowa, 18 March 2009
34	M. Yusuf Bangsawan Daeng Tutu	Partai Demokrat (PD)	Chair of DPC Kab. Gowa	Member of DPRD Kab. Gowa (2004- 2009); Candidate Member of DPRD No. 1 Kab. Gowa Dapil I (Kec. Sumba Opu)	Gowa, 18 March 2009
35	Ir. H.A.M. Adil Patu, M.Pd	Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan (PDK)	Chair of DPC Kota Makassar (2004- 2009); Chair of DPD Prov. South Sulawesi (2009- 2014); Chair of Tim Sukses Pilkada Governor of South Sulawesi (2008)	Member of DPRD Prov. South Sulawesi (2004- 2009); Candidate Member of DPRD Prov. South Sulawesi Dapil I (kota Makassar)	Gowa, 18 March 2009

36	Didik Prasetyono, SE, M.Kom		Member of KPU Provinsi Jatim (2003-2008), Divisi Campaigning	Candidate Member of DPD Prov. East Java No.12	Surabaya, 20 March 2009
37	Hari Putri Lestari, SH, MH	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)		Candidate Member of DPR Dapil IV (Kab. Lumajang, Kab. Jember)	Jember, 20 March 2009
38	Yusuf Iskandar	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	Vice Chair of DPC Kab. Jember, Political Division (2004-2009); Vice Chair of Badan Pemenangan Pemilu 2009 Kab. Jember (2009)		Jember, 20 March 2009
39	Ismari	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	Vice Chair of PAC Ambulu, Jember, Bidang Pemenangan Pemilu		Jember, 20 March 2009
40	Suharsono, SH	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	Vice Chair of PAC Sumpalsari, Jember, Bidang Birokrasi Pemerintahan		Jember, 20 March 2009
41	Slamet Riyadi	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	Vice Chair of PAC Bangsalsari, Jember, Bidang Pemenangan Pemilu		Jember, 20 March 2009
42	Deddy Soepriadi		Non-Struktural; Tim Pilpres PDIP 2004; Sekretaris Kecamatan Bangsalsari, Jember (2004-2009)		Jember, 20 March 2009
43	Jaya Mulyadi S.	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	Chair of PAC Patrang, Jember		Jember, 20 March 2009
44	Eko Wahyudiono	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	Vice Chair of PAC Semboro, Jember		Jember, 20 March 2009
45	Suparnoto	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	Chair of PAC Semboro, Jember		Jember, 20 March 2009
46	Hariyono, Mayor		POLRI, Kasad Intel Kab. Situbondo		Situbondo, 20 March 2009
47	M.A. Sahran	Partai Sarikat Indonesia (PSI)	Chair of DPC Kab. Situbondo (2007-2013)		Situbondo, 20 March 2009
48	Andi Bitu Sidaharta	Partai Demokrat (PD)	Vice Secretary I of DPC Kab Situbondo (2007-2012)		Situbondo, 20 March 2009

49	Drs. R.P. Sjaifullah	Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura)	Chair of DPC Kab. Situbondo		Situbondo, 20 March 2009
50	Joko Satrio Wibowo	Partai Kedaulatan (PK)	Chair of DPC Kab. Situbondo (2008-2013)		Situbondo, 20 March 2009
51	Yaros Subowo, S.Pd.	Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS)	Chair of DPC Kab. Situbondo		Situbondo, 20 March 2009
52	Habib Yahya Assegaf	Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra)	Secretary of DPC Situbondo (2009-2014)	Candidate Member of DPRD Kab Situbondo No.1, Dapil 1	Situbondo, 21 March 2009
53	Mohammad Sunardi	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)	Vice Secretary of DPC Kab. Situbondo		Situbondo, 21 March 2009
54	Maskuri Ismail, M.Pd.	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)	Secretary of DPC Kab. Situbondo (2006-2011)	WaChair DPRD Kab Situbondo (2004-2009); Candidate Member of DPRD Kab. Situbondo Dapil III (Banyuputih, Asem Bagus)	Situbondo, 21 March 2009
55	Fudaili Anshori	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)	Fungsionaris of PAC Kec. Kendit; Chair of Tim Lembaga Pemenangan Pemilu (2008-2009)		Situbondo, 21 March 2009
56	Mohammad Sulaiman, SH	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)	Chair of Dewan Tanfidz PAC Kec. Kendit		Situbondo, 21 March 2009
57	Syaiful Bahri, S. Ag	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)	Chair of Dewan Tanfidz DPC Kab Situbondo (2005-2010)	Candidate Member of DPRD Kab Situbondo No. 1 Dapil 1 (Kec. Situbondo, Kec. Panji)	Situbondo, 22 March 2009
58	Endang Wici Sulaksana, SE, M.Pd.		Member of KPU Kab. Situbondo (2003-2009)		Situbondo, 22 March 2009
59	H. Imron Rosyidi		Member of KPU Kab. Situbondo (2003-2009)		Situbondo, 22 March 2009
60	Imron Rosadi, SH		Ka. Subbag Hukum of KPU Kab. Situbondo		Situbondo, 22 March 2009
61	Kyai Fawaid As'ad Syamsul Arifin	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)	DPC PPP Kab. Situbondo, Chairman; Fired by Gusdur as Chairman of DPC PKB Kab. Situbondo	Chair of Pondok Pesantren Salafiyah Syafiiyah Sukorejo, Asembagus, Situbondo	Situbondo, 22 March 2009

62	Ratri Indrawati, SE		Member of KPU Kab. Probolinggo (2003-2008)		Probolinggo, 22 March 2009
63	Diana Susilowaty (Ning Sus)		Chair of Pondok Pesantren Zainul Hasan Genggong Putri	Little Sister of Kyai Muttawakil Allahal, Little Step Sister of Kyai Syaiful Islam (Ponpes Zainul Hasan Genggong Putra)	Probolinggo, 22 March 2009
64	Rivo Henardus	Partai Demokrat (PD)	Vice Secretary of DPD Prov. Jatim	Member of DPRD Prov. Jatim (2004-2009); Candidate Member of DPRD	Surabaya, 23 March 2009
65	Whisnu Sakti Buana	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	Secretary of DPC Kota Surabaya (2005-2010)	Member of DPRD Prov Jatim (2004-2009); Candidate Member of DPRD Kota Surabaya No.1 Dapil 4	Surabaya, 23 March 2009
66	Wahyudi Purnomo		Chair of KPU Prov Jatim (2003-2008)		Surabaya, 23 March 2009
67	Wiranto, SH	Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura)	Founder, Chair of DPP	Candidate of Vice-President	Jakarta, 28 March 2009
68	Eko Suwanto, SE, M.Dev	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	Fungsionaris of Badan Pemenangan Pemilu 2009 PDIP Dapil 7, East Java; Chair of Tim Sukses Candidate Member of DPR Ir. Heri Akhmadi		Ponorogo, 4 April 2009
69	Drs. H. Djarot Saiful Hidajat, MS	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	Chair of Badan Pendidikan dan Pelatihan Daerah (Badiklatda) of DPD Prov. East Java; Vice Chair of Bidang Idiologi dan Kaderisasi of DPD Prov. East Java; Chair of Panitia Pemenangan Pemilu Daerah (PAPPUDA) for 1999 election	Mayor of Kota Blitar (2000-2005) (2005-2010); Member of DPRD Prov. East Java Dapil kota Malang (1999-2000); Candidate Member of DPR Dapil 1 Kota Surabaya and Kab Sidoarjo	Surabaya, 4 April 2009
70	Sujud Pribadi	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)		Regent of Kab. Malang, East Java	Malang, 5 April 2009
71	Ramadhan Pohan	Partai Demokrat (PD)	Vice Chair of Divisi Communication and Campaign of DPP	Candidate Member of DPR No.1 Dapil VII (Kab. Pacitan, Kab. Magetan, Kab. Ngawi, Kab. Trenggalek, Kab. Ponorogo)	Jakarta, 8 April 2009

72	Chusnul Mar'iyah, Ph.D	Political scholars of University of Indonesia	Member of KPU (2001-2008)		Jakarta, 20 April 2009
73	Jauharuddin Harmay, SH	Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)	Vice Chair of DPD Golkar Aceh province	Candidate Member of DPR national from Aceh province	Jakarta, 21 April 2009
74	Yuni Chaidir, Msi	Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)	Chair of DPD Golkar Aceh province	Vice Chair of DPRA; Candidate Member of DPR province	Jakarta, 21 April 2009
75	Ir. Hasto Kristiyanto	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	Deputy secretary of DPP PDIP (2010-2015)	Member of Parliament 2004-2009, Dapil Jatim VII	Jakarta, 22 April 2009

Appendix D: List of programs observed

Additional Program			
No.	Program/ Agenda	Venue/ Address	Place/ Date
1	Informal gathering with PDIP Candidate Member of DPR Dapil Kepri (Firman Jaya Dealy), DPRD Prov. Kepri (Tawareh, H. Akmal), DPRD Kab. Bintan (Joko Djakaria)	Jl. Tanjung Uban Km 16. Kampung Simpangan, Desa Toapaya Selatan, Kec. Toapaya, kab. Bintan. Riau Islands	Bintan, 8 February 2009
2	Opening ceremony of Pos Pelayanan Banua Niha Keriso Protestan (BNKP) Pulau Bintan	Kel. Tanjung Ayu Sakti, Rt.03/ Rw.08 No.61, Kec. Bukit Bestari, Kota. Tanjung Pinang. (office) Asrama Kodim 0315 - Jl. A. Yani Km.6, Tanjung Pinang, Phone. +628127539124. Riau Islands	Tanjung Pinang, 8 February 2009
3	Party Meeting PDIP Kab. Bogor (PAC and Ranting) with PDIP Candidate Member of DPRD Kab. Bogor Dapil 2	Kampung Loa 3/9, Desa Taman Sari Kelurahan Taman Sari, Kab. Bogor. West Java	Bogor, 17 February 2009
4	Field visit by PDK Candidate Member of DPR Dapil South Sulawesi (Raffiuddin Hamerung) and DPRD Prov. South Sulawesi (HM Adil Patu)	Jl Mamo Raya No.1. RT 13, RW 10, Kel. Mangasa, Kec. Tamalate, Kota Makassar, South Sulawesi	Makassar, 16 March 2009
5	Election Campaign by Megawati Sukarno (chair of PDIP)	Lapangan Mangli, Kel. Mangli, Kec. Kaliwates, Kab. Jember, East Java	Jember, 20 March 2009
6	Silaturahmi Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Chair of Partai Demokrat) with Forum Bersama Indonesia Tionghoa (host Tatiek Murdaya)	Ball room Shangrila Hotel Surabaya, East Java	Surabaya, 3 April 2009
7	Silaturahmi Kader Nasionalis Malang Raya (open for all parties)	Auditorium Nasionalis Center, Ds. Gelanggang, Pakis Aji, kab. Malang, East Java	Malang, 5 April 2009