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A FIGHT FOR LABOR? THE FOUNDATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY

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Summary

The following thesis is about the formation of the Democratic Labor Party(DLP). Its prime aim will be to show that ideology was the overriding factor which brought about the DLP's existence. In attempting to prove this contention the following thesis will be subdivided into three parts.

Firstly, an emphasis will be placed on outlining the lack of historiographical consensus concerning the DLP's formation. Three main schools of thought will be identified. It is hoped the inconsistencies within each group will allow the reader to see the scope that exists for a new argument.

Secondly, this thesis will argue that the DLP's existence was directly related to the Catholic Social Studies Movement (Movement) and ALP Industrial Groups. This connection will be highlighted by drawing together DLP policy, Movement/Industrial Group directives, populist ideals and views from contemporaries associated with Democratic Labor. Issues concerning the family, economics, social decentralisation and patriotism will all be used to illustrate and reinforce this link.

Thirdly, this thesis will introduce some key Catholic activists and discuss their definition of "true" Labor ideals. By bringing forward this final point, the following thesis will seek to complete the argument that ideology was at the heart of the DLP's genesis and existence.

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Introduction

One hundred years of life for any living institution must be heralded as a remarkable achievement. The level of praise surrounding such an occasion can only double when it is discovered that the object of honour has attained this goal after a host of difficulties. The Australian Labor Party (ALP), which celebrated its centenary in 1991, could certainly be described in this manner. Perhaps in spirit Labor is the party of solidarity. In historical terms however, the ALP has often represented disunity and instability. Throughout its one-hundred year lifespan, Labor's ranks have been characterised by internal splits and an inability to establish a clear ideological path. Indeed, it could perhaps be argued that the ALP's existence has been highlighted by an unending search for "true" Labor ideals.

In 1916 Labor governed amidst the turmoil of the First World War. As the conflict continued to rage throughout Europe, the issue of conscription came to dominate public debates. Labor's Prime Minister of the time, W.M Hughes, staunchly advocated that conscription was necessary if Australia was going to comprehensively serve its 'duty' in fighting Germany and her allies.¹ Hughes' commitment to the war resulted in a referendum on conscription taking place. Despite the referendum proposal being defeated and his subsequent role in forming the conservative Nationalist Party², Hughes stressed that he had

¹R.McMullin, The Light On The Hill: The Australian Labor Party 1891-1991, p.106.

²J.T.Lang, I Remember, p.76.

W.M Hughes abandoned the ALP along with twentyfour members on 14 November 1916 and joined the conservative ranks in federal parliament before a no-confidence motion against his position could be exercised. Hughes later became leader of the Nationalist

acted according to "true" Labor traditions. The White Australia Policy- a benchmark of Labor philosophy at the time- was used constantly by Hughes in an effort to promote conscription. As McMullin explains, Hughes was convinced that Labor policy should be aimed towards helping the British empire whilst simultaneously retarding any Japanese plans for expansion in the Pacific region. Hughes' opponents were not so critical of his efforts to promote the White Australia policy. On the contrary, they argued that the introduction of conscription would jeopardise this program and leave the door open for cheap oriental labour to enter Australia's shores.³ Such a stance, argued J.T Lang, was openly supported by the Labor leagues and trade unions who stressed that Hughes had "ratted" on "true" ALP principles.⁴

This simultaneous link between ALP parliamentary splits and the seemingly never ending perennial quest to discover "true" Labor principles became apparent once more during 1931. On this occasion the party, once again in government, split in three during the midst of the economic depression- each side maintaining that its actions were the product of "true" Labor philosophy. On 12 March 1931 seven members of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party stormed out of caucus and formed the Lang Labor Party.⁵ The reason for this schism was delicately interwoven with the East Sydney by-election which had taken place earlier that year. E.J Ward, as the ALP endorsed candidate, promised to campaign according to policies which had been promoted by New South

Party- a force combining the Liberal Party and the members who had followed him out of the ALP.

³McMullin, *op.cit.*, p.107.

⁴Lang, *op.cit.*, pp.77-78.

⁵W.Denning, Caucus Crisis, p.88.

Wales Premier, Lang.⁶ At the same time, Prime Minister J.H Scullin threatened Ward with ALP Federal Parliamentary expulsion if he did not endorse the economic program that had been brought forward by deputy leader, E.G Theodore.⁷ Upon entering parliament, Ward found Scullin was prepared to follow through with his earlier promise. However, Ward was not alone in his belief in the Lang plan, and whilst the bulk of Scullin's supporters stayed loyal to Theodore⁸, the ALP was witnessing another split between two sides who were convinced that their actions corresponded with "true" Labor philosophy.

By May 1931, J.A Lyons, like Hughes before him, found he could not associate himself with the ALP, and crossed over to the conservative ranks of parliament to help form and lead the United Australia Party. Lyons and his supporters refuted both the Theodore and Lang plans for economic recovery, in favour of a scheme centred around deflation.⁹

Twenty-four years later when R. Joshua led six renegade ALP federal parliamentarians out of the Labor Caucus the

⁶McMullin, op.cit, pp.170-171.

Lang's economic plan argued that Australia should abandon the gold standard and refuse to pay British bondholders until Britain worked out a favourable proposal concerning Australia's debt. This plan had been supported by the New South Wales Executive which was dominated by Lang supporters.

⁷ibid, p.165.

Under the Theodore Plan, the Commonwealth Bank would be the main facilitator of credit for expansionary government initiatives. One example of this program was a government plan to provide £20 million for public works programs that would aid the growth of primary and secondary industries.

⁸ibid, p.171.

⁹R.Cooksey, Lang and Socialism, p.3.

Lyons and his supporters favoured an economic plan more in tune with the 18 August 1930 Melbourne Agreement which was centred around the economic notion of deflation. As a prime critic of this practice, Lang contended that the general fall in prices and the subsequent increased purchasing power of the Australian currency would only aid the interests of foreign bondholders.

situation to many contemporary observers could simply have been interpreted as a case of history repeating itself. On the surface, the newly formed ALP(Anti-Communist) represented an extended chapter of Labor's tendency to self-explode during major crises. The Cold War saga dominating post-war Australia certainly corresponded to the respective experiences of the Hughes and Scullin Governments during the First World War and 1930's depression, given that they all effected the country on both a local and international level. As in 1916 and 1931, this 1955 split was also characterised by two warring factions who each claimed they were acting according to "true" Labor principles.

Today, it is not quite so easy to establish a clear link between the splits of 1916 and 1931, and the one which occurred in 1955. The 1955 episode brought about the existence of a unique political force- the Democratic Labor Party(DLP). This "uniqueness" can be measured in three ways. Firstly, the DLP, unlike the Hughes and Lyons factions before it, did not seek to shelter itself in any political alliance involving the conservative parties. Secondly, the DLP remained a political force inside the Senate for nearly twenty years. Thirdly, the DLP continued to fight for its perceived brand of Labor philosophy, and in the process helped keep the ALP out of office for over twenty-three years.

By the same token these three truly unique features governing the DLP's existence in federal parliament have often been overshadowed by simplistic comments labelling the DLP as a reactionary grouping of individuals whose primary aims in politics revolved around frustrating the ALP. Dean Jaensch certainly illustrates this point when he argues that the DLP's *raison-d'etre*

was structured purely around keeping the ALP out of office. In this context, he explains, the DLP "...was obviously a component of the anti-Labor block in the party system".¹⁰

This thesis will seek to revise such comments by explaining that ideology, rather than any one-dimensional focus concerning a sabotage of ALP parliamentary objectives, played the most vital role in bringing about Democratic Labor's existence. This line of argument has been largely ignored in the host of literature dealing with the DLP's formation. This point is illustrated when the three schools of thought concerned with the DLP's formation are examined- all fail to identify ideology as the main reason for the party's existence.

The following thesis will therefore argue that the DLP received its ideological 'fibre' from the Catholic Social Studies Movement (Movement) and ALP Industrial Groups. In tracing this link, an effort will be made to draw together the similarity of purpose surrounding DLP policy and populist-inspired Movement/Industrial Group directives.

This argument, which draws a thread connecting the DLP's formation with ideology, is also linked with a number of Catholic activists and their perception of "true" Labor ideals. Very much like those who followed Hughes and Lyons out of the ALP in the previous two splits, the people who left Labor in 1955 felt that the party could no longer be used to house their political objectives. Contrary to the practice of the other two splits, however, those who left the ALP in 1955 did not find it necessary to join the conservative ranks of politics. The DLP, in these

¹⁰D.Jaensch, The Hawke-Keating Hijack, pp.29-30.

people's eyes, did not represent a breakaway party. More specifically, Democratic Labor was seen by its supporters as a political institution that was responsible for maintaining the "true" Labor ideals which the ALP had relinquished.

The Birth of a New Party : The 1955 ALP Split In Retrospect

Australian political history is dominated by issues that foster debate. One issue that fits easily into this category is the founding of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP). Consensus on the issue is minimal. Various writers, from different backgrounds, have all given reasons as to why the DLP was formed. Events have been brought forward, individuals ridiculed, and opinions expressed- all with the desire of formulating an absolute reason to explain the DLP's birth. A survey of historical literature shows that the discussion is largely dominated by three schools of thought. One group believes that the DLP was a by-product born out of organisational deficiencies within the Australian Labor Party (ALP). The second school of thought argues that the ALP leader, H.V Evatt, via his actions, was responsible for the DLP's existence. A third view contends that the DLP was formed because of actions performed by various interest groups. Even within the three modes of thought, however, inconsistencies prevail. Each school of thought contains writers from different backgrounds; these writers, for purposes of clarity, have been grouped together: historians, politicians, partisan commentators.

Nevertheless, it would be both unfair and simple minded to suggest that the DLP debate is structured solely around a theme of disagreement. Although consensus is negligible, all schools of thought on the subject do share in common much evidence to support their arguments. Most writers tend to agree that the ALP split of 1955 heavily contributed to the formation of the DLP, although division exists over what forces precipitated such an

event. Many also seem to recognise, although not necessarily in identical fashion, that the DLP's existence was also interlocked in some way with the anti-Communist/ALP-endorsed Industrial Groups which existed from the mid 1940s to 1954, the Catholic Social Studies Movement (The Movement) and its leader B.A Santamaria, and the actions of various personalities within the Labor movement.

One school of thought suggests that the DLP was a by-product born from organisational deficiencies within the ALP. Beyond this point however, disunity reigns as writers from different backgrounds offer various definitions of 'ALP organisational deficiencies'.

P.L Reynolds, an historian, defines 'ALP organisational deficiencies' as a two-way process whereby the Labor mainstream and the Grouper faction within it, were both responsible for the DLP's eventual formation. According to Reynolds, the ALP contributed to its own problems in 1945-47, when it formed the Industrial Groups. Originally formed to combat Communist influences within Trade Unions, the Groups' formation was nothing more than a hasty policy directive which offered the barest of objectives. Reynolds reinforces this argument via the following comments: "No thoughts were offered as to whether they [the Groups] should disband,...continue to exist...[or] simply...'fade away' over a period of time".¹¹

In tandem with the first part of his argument, Reynolds contends that 'ALP organisational deficiencies' can also be equated with the Industrial Groups, who were undermining the Labor

¹¹P.L.Reynolds, The Democratic Labor Party, pp.7-8.

structure by threatening to become a party within a party. As the power of the Groups reached new boundaries, so did their desire to influence Labor Policy beyond the anti-Communist platform. Not surprisingly, many within the Labor mainstream felt it necessary to curb their influence. Certainly, such a feeling had triggered the Groupers' disbandment in South Australia, after they had tried to oust loyal ALP officials from the Waterside Workers' Federation. Further signs of the Groups deviation from the Labor cause could be seen in their ideological framework. Indeed, as Reynolds signals, many of these policies were a mirror of distributist, rather than Labor philosophy. Such policies included, wages to equal productivity, decentralisation, a greater emphasis on rural policy, and a defence program orientated around strong allegiances with the United States.¹²

B.A Santamaria, a former director of the Movement and later prominent figurehead of its successor, the National Civic Council (NCC), is another writer who believes 'organisational deficiencies' within the ALP helped create the DLP. However Santamaria's definition of 'organisational deficiencies' is different from the one being brought forward by Reynolds. According to Santamaria, Labor was not acting with Socialist convictions. 'Labor Orthodoxy', in line with Santamaria's line of thinking, stands for a dedication to promote social change according to differing trends in popular thought. In this sense, given the ALP's apparent loss of innovative zeal, Santamaria contends that 'Labor was not being Labor'. The evolution of the Industrial Groups, according to Santamaria, brought forward a fresh agenda, which in many ways

¹²ibid p.13.

sought to revitalise the Labor Movement. Hence whilst Reynolds condemned the Groups for fostering disunity inside the ALP, separate policy initiatives in areas such as land settlement and defence, were seen by Santamaria as a true mirror of Labor dogma.¹³

Frank McManus, an ex-Labor Party member and later DLP Senator, also believes 'ALP organisational deficiencies' were responsible for the DLP's formation. Very much like Santamaria, McManus contends that the 'deficiencies' originated from the mainstream ALP, rather than other influences within the Labor Movement. Indeed, according to McManus, many elements within the ALP hierarchy had lost their grasp on reality, as they remained ignorant of Communist intentions to over-run the Labor Party.

According to McManus, the Industrial Groups were the prime instigators in curbing Communist influences within Labor ranks. Although McManus concedes that the Industrial Groups were formed by the ALP, he refuses to outlay any credit to Labor for the Groups' success beyond this point. The ALP, he alleges, gave the Groups no financial or organisational support. Instead McManus applauds the Movement for its monetary assistance and active support in opposing Communist influences.¹⁴

Paul Ormonde, a journalist and writer, postulates another view which suggests the DLP was born out of 'ALP organisational deficiencies'. According to Ormonde, a lack of solidarity by Labor's internal factions paved the way for the DLP's eventual existence. The tensions between the Right and Left Wing factions of the

¹³H Mayer(Ed). Catholics and the Free Society: An Australian Symposium. p.80.

¹⁴F McManus. The Tumult and the Shouting. p.43.

party, according to Ormonde, were pin-pointed by the Communist issue. Many Right-Wingers believed that Evatt's affiliation with the Communist cause, albeit indirect, was hindering the Party's electoral progress. Indeed, Evatt's successful campaign against the Communist Party Dissolution Act (1951) and the subsequent referendum victory on the same issue, hardly fostered a sense of spontaneous celebration from the Right. Later, the Right became disgruntled further when Evatt involved himself in the Petrov Commission. The idea of him defending Alan Dalziel and Albert Grundeman, two members of his staff, also appalled Right Wingers, especially since the two had been called before the Commission as alleged sources of information in Document J.¹⁵

The Left Wing also brought forward its own adversarial agenda during this time. Many members of the Left felt that the Right-Wing orientated Industrial Groups were acting as a hindering force. According to Ormonde, many within the Left felt that the Groupers tunnel-visioned approach to destroying Communism was stifling the Party from embarking on radical policies. Certainly, Ormonde contends, many Left Wing sympathisers often questioned the actions of various Right Wing members. Such an attitude came to the fore perfectly within Federal parliamentary ranks when many from the Left scrutinised the actions of Keon and Mullens, two Right Wing members whose support for the Communist-Ban Referendum proposal had been, at most, ambivalent.¹⁶

¹⁵p Ormonde, The Movement, pp. 56 and 58.

Document J was part of the data brought forward to the Petrov Commission on Communist espionage activity in Australia.

¹⁶ibid.

The school of thought which equates the DLP's formation with ALP organisational deficiencies certainly has many adherents. However, whilst Reynolds, Santamaria, McManus, and Ormonde shelter under the same umbrella of thought, they are disassociated by varying definitions of 'ALP organisational deficiencies'. Indeed, it is a testament to the wealth of debate surrounding the DLP's formation, that even people within the same school of thought have scope for such variations in their arguments. According to Reynolds, ALP organisational deficiencies were aligned to two factors. Firstly, the ALP gave no forethought when forming the groups. Secondly, the Groups were threatening to become a party within a party. Ormonde, for his part, focuses on a different tangent, and blames the lack of party solidarity for the organisational deficiencies within ALP ranks. Santamaria and McManus offer a distinctly anti-ALP line of argument. Santamaria contends that ALP organisational deficiencies were fostered by mainstream Labor's diminishing ability to comprehend its true obligations as a Socialist-orientated party. Similarly, McManus argued that Labor's deficiencies were a product of an inability to comprehend the magnitude of Communist infiltration taking place within its own ranks.

A second school of thought links the DLP's formation to the role of ALP leader, H.V Evatt. Such a view has been expressed by a number of people, who could be mainly divided into two groups: historians and partisan observers.

Many historians within this second school of thought believe that the actions of Evatt played a decisive role in the DLP's eventual formation. F.G Clarke, an American historian, is convinced that Evatt provided the unifying force that bonded

together Communists, unionists, and members of the ALP against the Industrial Groups and the Movement. Clarke contends that opposition against these two organisations was, at best, sporadic and limited before Evatt entered the scene.¹⁷

According to Clarke, Evatt's comments against perceived subversive forces within ALP ranks on 5 October 1954, had devastating consequences for Labor in the long run. Whilst Evatt's comments set in motion a Federal Executive inquiry, which eventually legitimated the existence of a 'cleansed' Victorian Executive free from 'Grouper' control, the foundations had been laid for a section of the ALP to break away from the mainstream party. Indeed, as Clarke contends, the Federal Executive's decision to impose its authority in Victoria had been directly authorised by Evatt. In conjunction with the October 1954 statement, Clarke uses a telegram sent by Evatt in April 1955 to F.E Chamberlain, the Federal Party President, to illustrate the ALP leader's conscious role in fostering Labor disunity. Certainly, Evatt's scope of influence spilled into New South Wales, where the party Executive suffered the same fate as its Victorian counterpart.¹⁸

Robert Murray, another historian, also belongs to that school of thought which draws a parallel between the actions of Evatt and the subsequent formation of the DLP. Very much like Clarke, he accuses Evatt of self-interest. According to Murray, the Evatt press statement issued in October 1954 was the launching pad for

¹⁷F.G.Clarke, "Towards A Reassessment of Dr.Evatt's Role In the 1954-55 ALP Split", Labor History, pp.55-56.

¹⁸ibid p.58.

Extracts of a telegram sent to F.E.Chamberlain by H.V Evatt: "As you know my written statement to Federal Executive November last dealt primarily with Victorian situation. However the principles and some detail cover the situation in NSW...the NSW is closely parallel to that in Victoria...". Cited in ibid.

the split within ALP ranks and the subsequent formation of the DLP. In Murray's view, at the time of the initial statement, it seemed Evatt was acting on civil libertarian grounds. The message conveyed by Evatt, although lengthy, was quite simple: a force alien to the best interests of the ALP, had infiltrated the Labor Party. In accordance with the Australian popular notion of "fair Play", Evatt was saying that it was time to expose those who were trying to use Labor as a vehicle to accommodate their totalitarian tendencies. On closer examination, however, Murray seems to conclude that Evatt's attacking statement was fuelled primarily by a desire to achieve political mileage. Indeed, Murray seems to indicate that Evatt was looking for political scapegoats to disguise his electoral shortcomings. Murray is convinced that Evatt had become 'obsessed' with obtaining the Prime Ministership, and as a consequence "...adopted dishonest tactics to gain his objective...".¹⁹

According to Murray, Evatt's attack was a miscalculated move. Ultimately the seeds of disenchantment and conflict had not only been sown, they were also ready to spawn their ugly fruits of disunity. Such an outcome eventually brings Murray to say, "Why did Evatt do it?". Perhaps it was because Evatt felt he was "politically lonely and near defeat...".²⁰ The October 1954 statement certainly diverted some of the attention away from the leadership issue, and fuelled the fertile ground of intra-party rivalry. In Murray's view, if the ALP leader were truly dedicated to healing the rifts created in his party, he undoubtedly adopted the wrong method. His views in the press statement were hardly

¹⁹R. Murray, The Split: Australian Labor In The Fifties. pp.181-182.

²⁰ibid p.181.

conciliatory, and invited retaliation from those who had been targeted indirectly.²¹

P.L Reynolds, who also believes that ALP organisational deficiencies can be used to explain the DLP's existence, contends that Evatt's actions played a vital role in Democratic Labor's formation. Unlike Clarke and Murray however, Reynolds is not totally convinced that Evatt consciously went out of his way to breed disharmony between himself and various interest groups within the ALP.

According to Reynolds, Evatt possessed an amicable relationship with the Industrial Groups. However this alliance began to dissolve as Evatt found himself legally defending the Communist Party's right to vote. After proving that the Liberal Government's Communist Party Dissolution Act of 1951 was invalid in the High Court, Evatt tasted success once more when he led the charge against a referendum on the same issue . In Grouper circles, Evatt had committed the ultimate sin by siding with the Communist viewpoint. The consequent disharmony which Evatt seemed to trigger, was felt to a significant extent when certain elements of the Grouper-dominated Victorian Executive expressed their support for the Menzies Government on the issue. The already shaky relationship between Evatt and the Groups deteriorated dramatically in 1954 when the Labor leader appeared before the Petrov Commission. After defending two of his staff members against allegations raised by the Commission, Evatt raised more Movement/Grouper eyebrows by labelling the

²¹ibid.

inquiry a cynical political ploy, designed chiefly to hinder Labor's electoral prospects.²²

Whilst subscribing to the school of thought that equates the DLP's formation with ALP organisational deficiencies, Reynolds also believes that a worthwhile case could be produced by linking Evatt's actions with Democratic Labor's eventual founding. But unlike Clarke and Murray, Reynolds is quick to argue that these actions were not premeditated. Instead they were moves born out of contemporary political events.

Historians are not alone in drawing a parallel between Democratic Labor's formation and the actions of Evatt. Partisan commentators, whose thinking is orientated around an anti-ALP line, have stated that Evatt's actions provided a central cause for the DLP's formation. Frank McManus and B.A Santamaria, find themselves lending views to two different schools of thought. Whilst the two support the theory which links the DLP's formation to ALP organisational deficiencies, both also offer support to the argument which connects Democratic Labor's existence with Evatt's actions. Jack Kane, an ex-DLP Senator, shares a similar view.

According to Santamaria, Evatt's October 1954 attack was mistimed, unnecessary, and fuelled primarily by a desire to secure political survival. Santamaria is indeed convinced that Evatt attempted to use the Movement/Grouper alliance as a scapegoat for obtaining political mileage. Evatt was apparently aware that such a move would cost some Catholic votes, however he believed this loss would be offset by a net gain in Protestant

²²Reynolds, *op.cit.*, page 11.

and anti-Movement/Grouper votes. According to Santamaria, these actions only provided the spark to produce a chain reaction which heralded the unavoidable formation of Democratic Labor.²³

McManus, like Santamaria, also believes that Evatt's actions can be linked with the DLP's eventual formation. According to McManus, Evatt's actions were inspired by a desire to retain the Labor leadership at any cost. McManus highlights this point by suggesting that Evatt even enlisted the support of the Communist Party, which despite antagonism towards him, was quite content to use him as a tool for defeating other enemies within the mainstream ALP. Certainly, McManus seems to suggest that such was the extent of Evatt's blurred vision on the party's well being, that he foolishly used pro-Communist numbers without fully realising the future impact of such an association.²⁴

Jack Kane, a former DLP Senator, reinforces the notion that Evatt's opportunism was instrumental in creating all the turmoil which broke the unity of the Labor Movement, and eventually led to Democratic Labor's formation. Kane confirms the perceived self-interest in Evatt's character during the 1950s outlined by Santamaria and McManus.

As Kane explains, in addition to engineering the split which eventually gave birth to the formation of the Democratic Labor Party, Evatt's own record in the ALP was characterised by self-indulgent actions which were performed primarily to further his own cause. According to Kane, this facet of the Evatt psyche came to the fore as early as 1927. After being defeated for the state seat of Balmain by another Labor candidate, Evatt openly refuted

²³Mayer (Ed.), op.cit, pp.88-91.

²⁴McManus, op.cit, pp.65-66.

ALP rules by standing in the electorate himself as an Independent. In 1942 he returned to Labor ranks as the Federal Member for Barton, after a fifteen year absence which was directly related to his earlier misdemeanour. Kane argues that Evatt broke the rules once more when he returned to the party in 1942. Evatt, according to Kane, in his lust for Federal endorsement was not formally readmitted to the Party and had not fulfilled the desired three year membership rule required to achieve ALP electoral support.²⁵ Evatt, Kane contends, was essentially a 'numbers man', and the fact that he had once supported the Right wing of the ALP, the Groupers and Movement was more a testament to numerical strength than ideological compatibilities. Hence, in Kane's mind, Evatt's October 1954 attack was motivated by two simple interlocking objectives: preservation of the Labor leadership, and attainment of the Prime-Ministership.²⁶

The school of thought which draws a parallel between Evatt's actions and the subsequent formation of the DLP is partly supported by Arthur Calwell. As the ALP's deputy parliamentary leader during Evatt's reign, Calwell is convinced that the 1955 Labor split caused the eventual formation of Democratic Labor. However when allotting blame for the event, Calwell points to two individuals: Evatt and Santamaria.

Calwell contends that Evatt and the Santamaria-inspired Groups and Movement can be blamed equally for the split. After the fiasco surrounding the 1955 Federal Conference in Hobart, Calwell believes that both Evatt and the Groupers had contributed

²⁵J.Kane, *Exploding The Myths: The Political Memoirs of Jack Kane*, p.153.

²⁶*ibid* p.154.

to the Party's new found friction. Calwell, at one stage, called for the resignation of Evatt, after the leader had openly compromised Labor principles for his own political ambitions. According to Calwell, Evatt's previous dealings with the Santamaria inspired Movement were almost un-Labor in nature: "I could not support Evatt in what he had been doing in collaboration with the National Civic Council and I certainly was never a supporter of the NCC in all things they had done".²⁷

According to Calwell, both the Movement and Evatt used each other for their own political well-being. Evatt and Santamaria were supposedly close associates and only the former's association with the Petrov Commission dampened relations. Calwell attempts to galvanise this relationship by stating the following: "I have little doubt that Santamaria expected to have some of his nominees in the cabinet if Labor had won the [1954] election".²⁸

As a consequence of this seemingly irresponsible behaviour by both factions, Calwell argues that the ALP, the only "real" instrument for social reform in Australia, had been gripped by disunity. Calwell contends that Labor is the only mechanism for reform- a view reinforced by his dismissal of the DLP and News Weekly as variations of a fringe ideology. He highlights this belief with the following comment: "It is far better to try to achieve reform from within than try to rebuild on a heap of ruins".²⁹

²⁷ A. A. Calwell. Calwell: Be Just and Fear Not. p.190.

²⁸ *ibid.*

²⁹ *ibid* p.191.

According to Calwell, the split wounded Labor from performing its most crucial task: reforming Australian society according to Social Democratic principles.

Calwell's explanation concerning Evatt's role in the formation of Democratic Labor is certainly unorthodox when compared to the views of others within the same school of thought. Indeed, the fact that Calwell only sees Evatt as a co-participator in the DLP's founding, suggests that he can only be allotted partial "membership" to this school of thought. Calwell argues that Evatt and the Santamaria-inspired Movement were equally to blame for the split which brought about Democratic Labor's existence.

The school of thought which equates Evatt's actions with the DLP's subsequent formation has a host of adherents. Historians, anti-ALP sympathisers and an ALP leader, all bring forward views which can be used to support this perspective. However such is the level of diversity on the DLP debate, that inconsistencies become apparent even within the same school of thought. Historians like Clarke and Murray are convinced that the DLP's existence can be attributed to Evatt's *conscious* actions arising from motives of self-interest. Reynolds, however seems to indicate that Evatt's actions were not altogether premeditated in their nature. Anti-ALP sympathisers are unanimous in condemning Evatt, and labelling him the prime instigator behind the DLP's formation. Santamaria and McManus portray Evatt, through his actions in the 1950s, as a personality totally committed to ensuring his own political survival at any cost. Kane in supporting this view, goes one step further, and offers a chronological account of Evatt's character beyond the time frame associated with the DLP's formation. Calwell, Evatt's deputy during Democratic Labor's founding, offers an unorthodox view in emphasising that both Evatt and Santamaria contributed equally to the DLP's formation.

A third school of thought brings forward the view that outside influences were responsible for the DLP's formation. Once again however, inconsistency is evident amongst those who subscribe to this mode of thinking since diverse definitions of the term, 'outside influences' are offered. Paul Ormonde and B.A Santamaria, who also support other schools of thought on the DLP subject, are both united in suggesting that "outside influences" wanted to manipulate the course of the Labour Movement. Both, however, offer different opinions when defining the "outside influences" whose actions ultimately led to the formation of Democratic Labor.

According to Ormonde, the Movement and the senior Catholic hierarchy were the 'outside influences' which sparked the eventual formation of the DLP. Ormonde suggests that the Movement had a cancerous effect on the ALP. In fact, Ormonde almost goes out of his way to disassociate Evatt from the whole theory which equates the Labor leader's actions with the DLP's eventual formation. According to Ormonde's late father, New South Wales Senator James Ormonde, Evatt had no idea that a secret network funded by the bishops was fully alive within the ALP. Ormonde actually calls the Movement a "...party within a party". Using 'The Movement of Ideas In Australia' speech handed to Evatt by Ormonde Senior, Ormonde contends that efforts were actively made to sabotage ALP policy.³⁰

According to Ormonde, the Australian Catholic hierarchy worked in tandem with lay organisations like the Movement to

³⁰Ormonde, op.cit, p.59.

The aspects of the speech which pin pointed the Movement's desire to implement its own agenda within the ALP framework are detailed on the page cited above.

precipitate an eventual split within the ALP and subsequently bring about the formation of the DLP. This theme is highlighted, contends Ormonde, when one examines the nature of a response by the Archbishop of Melbourne, Dr. Daniel Mannix, one week after the Evatt statement of 5 October 1954. Mannix attacked Evatt for his remarks concerning News Weekly, and stressed that the ALP leader was conducting himself in an un-Labor fashion.³¹

In contrast to Ormonde, Santamaria contends that a diverse range of entities, united only by a mutual dislike for the Movement and Groups, acted as the "outside influences" which engineered Democratic Labor's formation. Santamaria cites firstly the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) as one entity which intentionally used the Groups for its own expedient purposes. According to Santamaria, the ACTU leadership saw the Industrial Group cause by 1954 as a tedious instrument which had outgrown its usefulness; especially since union power had been rested from Communist influences between 1949 and 1953. The Groups were also victims of political powerplays within the union movement. Santamaria claims the Groups had earned themselves a powerful enemy in the Australian Workers Union (AWU), after their calls for stricter ballot regulations. According to Santamaria, "...AWU ballots were not as impeccable as they might have been...".³²

³¹ *ibid*, p.62.

Archbishop Mannix heavily criticised Evatt for his comments on 5 October 1954. Interestingly enough, during the same period, Mannix denied any Evatt allegations that the Catholic Church had a secret desire to control the Labor Party. However, as Ormonde points out, such comments from Mannix were very puzzling, since Evatt had made no such remark during his October 1954 speech.

³² Mayer (Ed.), *op.cit.*, p.86.

Secondly, the 'Establishment' ranks of the parliamentary Labor Party also provided a source of perceived opposition. According to Santamaria, many influential Labor politicians found that the Industrial Group alliance threatened their own power base. The Grouper/Movement association, with its Catholic overtones, stood to take over the much sought "Catholic vote". Many of these politicians also felt that Grouper influence on the Victorian and New South Wales Executives would result in the Labor Party being taken over by people who would transform the entity away from its "...traditional way of life".³³

Thirdly, the printed media, dominated by pro-Liberal tendencies also contributed in fostering resentment towards the Groups. Santamaria claims that the press corps backed Evatt in the midst of the split against the Groupers for two primary reasons. The first reason was to smash the unity of the Catholic vote. The second reason was intermeshed with a blatant desire to create dissension within ALP ranks and give the Liberals an electoral edge.³⁴

Finally, all this opposition was of course complemented by the Groups' traditional foes, the Communists. Santamaria states that Communist publications like Guardian, Tribune, and Communist Review mirrored a popular view within 'Red' ranks: all measures should be taken to destroy the Groups even at the expense of forging alliances with traditionally hostile forces. According to Santamaria, Communist activists like E.F Hill were instrumental in projecting such a view.³⁵

³³ibid.

³⁴ibid.

³⁵ibid p.87.

The debate surrounding the genesis of the DLP is complex. Even amongst those who suggest "outside influences" caused the DLP's formation there exists disagreement. Paul Ormonde and B.A. Santamaria both lend views to this school of thought. However the two find themselves at opposite extremes when defining the term "outside influences". According to Ormonde, the senior Catholic hierarchy and the Movement were the "outside influences" responsible for the split which brought about Democratic Labor's formation. On another extreme, Santamaria argues that a host of entities, united only by a mutual feeling of animosity towards the Groups and Movement, were the "outside influences" responsible for the DLP's emergence.

Within the maze of discussion surrounding the DLP's existence, three main schools of thought have thus far emerged. One group seem to equate the DLP's formation with ALP organisational deficiencies. Another perceives Evatt as the main protagonist, whilst a third highlights "outside influences". Disagreement, however, is not solely confined to the boundaries produced by these three views. Indeed the extent of debate is given a sharper focus when one discovers that there are disparities within the same schools of thought. Reynolds, Ormonde, Santamaria, and McManus all provide various definitions of "ALP organisational deficiencies". Even amongst those who believe Evatt caused the DLP's existence there is disagreement. Historians like Clarke and Murray believe Evatt's conscious actions provided the

See statement by E.F Hill outlining the Communist Party's desire to defeat the Groupers: "With their particular motives (ie.the motives of the Stouts, the Kennellys, etc) we are not for the moment concerned. We are concerned that this struggle does assist the development of unity in the ranks of the working class- does assist the ultimate goal of one Party of the working class". Cited in *ibid.*

impetus for Democratic Labor's formation. Santamaria, McManus, and Kane bring forward similar views. Reynolds however, whilst acknowledging Evatt's role, is not so quick to label the ALP leader's actions as pre-meditated. The level of debate within this school of thought is compounded further when Calwell allots blame to the Santamaria-inspired Groups and Movement, as well as Evatt. On a parallel level, the third school of thought is also overshadowed by inconsistencies as both Ormonde and Santamaria wrestle over different definitions of the term "outside influences".

Indeed, the level of uncertainty on the issue does not end at this point. Such is the level of debate that some contributors find themselves lending views to more than one school of thought. Santamaria finds himself supporting all three views, whilst McManus, Reynolds, and Ormonde give their support to two. Certainly this point, more than any other, suggests that the parameters of debate on this issue are far from fixed.

All three schools of thought on the subject provide an explanation for Democratic Labor's emergence. However all three themes seem to neglect the central focus of the whole argument: ideology. Events, personalities, and organisational deficiencies, whilst important in detail, are all by-products of ideology: the only real variable which is central to constructing and maintaining a political entity's existence. This theme will be the prime focus of discussion in the following two chapters. The Movement, the Industrial Groups, Catholic activists, and conflicting perceptions concerning 'true' Labor philosophy will all be used for one overriding objective: to show that ideology was the quintessential factor governing the DLP's eventual formation.

'Ideologically Based and Motivated' : Origins and Cornerstones of DLP Policy

All countries, democratic or otherwise, are governed by some political force. In Australian terms, this 'force' has usually meant two opposite extremes: Labor or Liberal. These two parties, in ninety-one years since federation, have come to dominate Australian politics. Indeed, most critics will point to the two-party system in Australia as a rigid arrangement which has monopolised the political middle ground and relegated other political organisations to 'fringe' status. The Democratic Labor Party (DLP), born out of the 1955 split which occurred within the Australian Labor Party (ALP), certainly challenged this arrangement for over twenty years. The DLP saw itself as the "true" Labor party. By the same token, however, it was more than a surrogate party which met the needs of a few disgruntled Labor men who had not obtained their aims within the confines of the old ALP. On the other extreme, nor was it a Liberal Party clone. The DLP was a unique political entity throughout its lifespan. Its ideological content, more than any other factor, made such a situation possible. Democratic Labor's views on the family, economy, social organisation, and patriotism were entirely different from the perspectives offered by the two major parties. Initially, however, the DLP would never have come into existence, and maintained itself for so long, without the ideological sustenance originally brought forward by the Movement, and subsequently, the Industrial Groups.

The veracity of this hypothesis has been confirmed by a number of contemporary sources who were once associated with

either the Movement, Industrial Groups, or DLP. Some were linked with all three organisations.

B.A. Santamaria believes that the DLP was part of an ideological evolution which first involved the Movement and Industrial Groups. According to Santamaria, the Movement provided intellectual leadership for the Industrial Groups. The DLP, in his opinion, was formed as a reaction to the Groups' disbandment: "The same people made up both groups- the vehicle changed, but the same ideas were still prevalent".³⁶

Bruno De Lea seems to echo Santamaria's views. In his eyes, the DLP was a continuance of Movement and Industrial Group philosophy: "From my perspective, the DLP would never have come into existence without the ideological base created by the Movement and Industrial Groups. I don't think there's any doubt about that. Certainly, the DLP... could have formed without ideological support from the Movement and Industrial Groups...[however] it would not have been able to sustain itself".³⁷

A.J. Bailey, who joined the Movement, Industrial Groups, and DLP at various stages, also follows the same line of argument brought forward by Santamaria and De Lea. He believes that the three organisations represented a "natural progression" in ideological terms.³⁸ John Maynes, the recently retired President of

³⁶Interview, B.A.Santamaria, 5 June 1992.

Santamaria served as assistant director of Catholic Action. He also led the Movement from its beginning. Although Santamaria did not join the Industrial Groups or DLP, he was very much involved with formulating policies for the two organisations.

³⁷Interview, B.De Lea, 12th June 1992.

De Lea is currently Victorian Secretary of the National Civic Council(NCC). De Lea joined the Movement after 1954, and stood for the DLP on a number of occasions in the State seat of Karra-Karra and the Federal seat of Wimera.

³⁸Interview, A.J.Bailey, 1st July 1992.

the Federated Clerks' Union, agrees that without the initial ideological support brought forward by the Movement and Industrial Groups, the DLP would never have come into existence.³⁹ Father Paul Duffy, who served as Santamaria's personal secretary during 1949 and 1950, shares a similar opinion.⁴⁰

Each of these views, suggest a unanimity of position: the DLP's birth would never have eventuated without the ideological 'fibre' initially brought forward by the Movement, and, later, the Industrial Groups. In order to trace this source of ideological sustenance, four areas need to be explored.

Firstly, no study of DLP ideology can be rendered complete without a review of Democratic Labor policy. In The Democratic Labor Party, P.L. Reynolds described the DLP as an "...ideologically based and motivated..." political entity.⁴¹ As a consequence, argues Reynolds, policy was of great relevance to a party implicitly dedicated to translating its ideological base into reality. Reynolds also points out that the DLP was not a one dimensional political

Bailey was a member of the Victorian Legislative Council from 1952 to 1958, and was initially a member of the Cain(Senior) Labor Government. He was part of the seventeen Victorian Parliamentarians who crossed the floor against the Cain Government in 1955. He served the remainder of his Parliamentary term as a member of the ALP(Anti-Communist) Party.

³⁹Interview, J.P.Maynes, 21 July 1992.

Maynes joined the Industrial Groups in 1946 and later involved himself in the Movement. Before becoming President of the Federated Clerks' Union, Maynes served as Secretary of the Interstate Liason Committee of the Industrial Groups. Maynes belief that the DLP represented the 'true' Labor Party was highlighted through his association, as auditor, with the old Victorian Executive after the split.

⁴⁰Interview, Duffy.P, 15 June 1992.

Before joining the priesthood, Duffy served as Santamaria's secretary during 1949 and 1950. Although he never joined the Industrial Groups, he was active during 1949 and 1950 as an anti-Communist inside the Federated Clerks' Union. Later, when the DLP was formed, he sympathised with Democratic Labor's aims.

⁴¹Reynolds P.L. The Democratic Labor Party, p.46.

entity consumed solely by a desire to defeat Communism. Its agenda was far more complicated. Indeed, had it not been diversified in its aims, the DLP, he contends, would not have commanded twenty years in the political limelight.⁴² Certainly the DLP's 1972 publication, Guidelines To Policy and Attitudes, highlights the multi-dimensional nature of Democratic Labor policy. The family, economics, social organisation, and issues related to patriotism were all given extensive coverage by the Party.⁴³

Secondly, it is necessary to identify a link between DLP policy and populist ideology. The term 'populist', in itself, is difficult to define. The word 'populist' has evolved into an umbrella term used to 'house' a variety of ideologies and political parties.⁴⁴ The American Populist Party, the Russian Narodnichestvo, Peronism, and various independent movements in Africa have all been labelled 'populist'.⁴⁵ All these political entities have articulated their own definitions of populism. Indeed, as Peter Love explains in Labor and the Money Power: Australian Labour Populism 1890-1950, the term remains the subject of debate within the confines of social analysis.⁴⁶ However, despite this obvious web of inconclusiveness, some consistencies do seem to exist within the populist debate. Both Gavin Kitching in Development and Underdevelopment In Historical Perspective and

⁴²ibid p.32.

⁴³J.T.Kane(Ed), Guidelines To Policy And Attitudes. pp.5,8,10,14,22,23,28,29,32.

⁴⁴p Love. Labor And The Money Power: Australian Labour Populism 1890-1950. p.1.

⁴⁵ibid p.2.

⁴⁶ibid p.3.

George Brown Tindall, editor of A Populist Reader, bring forward a definition of 'populist' ideology consistent with DLP policy. Hence in accordance with Kitching's and Tindall's presentations, Democratic Labor's views on the family, economics, social organisation, and patriotism could be classed as 'populist' in nature. Indeed both Santamaria⁴⁷ and F.X. Duffy- who was a member of the Movement, Industrial Groups, and DLP at various stages- agree that DLP policy was an extension of 'populist' ideology.⁴⁸

The ideological link between the Movement, Industrial Groups, and Democratic Labor is extended when DLP policy and populist ideology are married with two other factors. Hence thirdly, Movement and Industrial Group directives throughout the 1940s mirrored the defined populist ideology mentioned above, and the DLP policy which later evolved. Both Freedom and later News-Weekly, which were the mouthpieces of the Movement and the Industrial Groups, consistently projected similar views on the family, economy, society and patriotism. In Santamaria's words, both the Movement and Industrial Groups were made up of the "same people". The Movement, in his opinion, was at the forefront of promoting 'true' Labor principles. The Industrial Groups were an extension of this cause, as they obtained their 'intellectual leadership' from the Movement. Newspapers such as Freedom and

⁴⁷Santamaria, op.cit.

Santamaria believes that DLP policy was fostered very much by populist ideology. Such a line of political thought, in his eyes, was dedicated towards promoting the family, patriotism, and the small unit within the context of economic and social organisation.

⁴⁸Interview, F.X.Duffy, 17 June 1992.

Duffy was a member of all three organisations; his retrospective view is that each had a populist ideological link. Such an association was translated in common goals governing the family, patriotism, and economic and social organisation.

later News Weekly were hence part of this 'intellectual apparatus' which expressed the Movement's and Industrial Groups' mutual thoughts. Furthermore, whilst still taking into account Santamaria's views, it is thus acceptable to see the two bodies, despite any apparent organisational differences, as a 'united front'.⁴⁹ Fourthly, this ideological link is reinforced by many central figures interviewed on the subject who were present at the birth of the DLP.

Certainly this ideological connection is highlighted clearly when one explores the populist-inspired attitudes of the Movement, Industrial Groups, and DLP towards issues like the family, economy, social organisation and patriotism. It is to these four issues that we now turn.

The family, in DLP terms, represented the cornerstone of society. In this context, the family is much more than a collection of individuals. Terms such as 'mother', 'father', and 'children' are seen as inter-dependent units which provide the backbone to any prosperous society. However, whether it was in Movement, Industrial Group, or DLP eyes, the existence of individual families did not, in itself, translate into a 'correct' society. In order to advance, all three organisations believed that the success of the family unit was intricately bound with certain material pursuits. Home ownership was one particular issue all three organisations equated with familial advancement.

The DLP's attitude towards promoting family home ownership, went beyond the realms of election campaign rhetoric.

⁴⁹Santamaria, op.cit.

Santamaria states that both Freedom and later NewsWeekly were the mouthpieces for the Movement and Industrial Groups.

In 1973 the DLP announced that home ownership was paramount if families were to achieve prosperity. Democratic Labor called on the government to become the prime facilitator of home loans. According to the DLP, the funding of such loans would come via special accounts budgeted through the Reserve Bank. The party also vowed to support any system which encouraged lump sum child endowment payments to help with home purchases, and interest free marriage loans. Minimal Commonwealth Bank housing loans, tax deductions, and insurance schemes were also adjoining variables of the DLP's pro-family home ownership policy.⁵⁰

Such policy mirrors certain facets of populist ideology. W. Scott Morgan, although writing on nineteenth century America, certainly champions the same spirit of home ownership postulated by Democratic Labor. Land, contends Morgan, is the principal organ from which a family can obtain wealth. Hence the equitable distribution of land is paramount to a society's success as a unit.⁵¹ Charles H. Otken, writing in the same period, also acknowledged that the family should not be impeded in any way when trying to obtain a home. Indeed, Otken, stressed, in the same way as did the DLP, that the credit system was a tool which prevented home ownership. According to Otken, credit by itself has a limited use. The abuse of such a system can have catastrophic after-effects on the lives of families and individuals. In line with Otken's mode of thought, individuals should be given low interest loans to obtain the family home. Under such a system, credit would not be dictated by market trends. Conversely, supply and demand

⁵⁰Kane(Ed), op.cit, pp.22-23.

⁵¹Tindall Brown George(Ed), A Populist Reader. p.24.

rhetoric would be shelved, and replaced by loans that could be adjusted to suit a family's budget.⁵²

Throughout the 1940s, the Movement and later the Industrial Groups via their paper, Freedom, constantly brought forward a program supporting home ownership for families. Freedom's dedication to the family unit and home ownership was fully outlined in July 1946: "All should be able to possess their own family homes on blocks of land each adequate for normal family needs. The machinery to provide this should ensure that all are able effectively to exercise this right".⁵³ Freedom argued that social welfare via commission houses, were not the answer for promoting "contented family existence". The paper believed that the family home went beyond satisfying material needs. More importantly, it was an area supposed to create and foster a unique sense of moral and emotional sustenance.⁵⁴ These ideas have recently been echoed by B.A. Santamaria, who stressed that the family is infinitely more superior to maintaining society than any form of government bureaucracy or social service.⁵⁵

The Movement's and, later, Industrial Groups' dislike for government bureaucracy in the familial area was spelled out throughout 1946. In June of that year Freedom criticised the Victorian Housing Commission for building homes that were designed only for rental purposes. In accordance with the Movement's and Industrial Groups' belief in the family unit, Freedom called on the government to install programs that would

⁵²ibid p.42.

⁵³Freedom-News Weekly, 24 July 1946, "Point Eleven- Family Homes For All", p.5.

⁵⁴ibid.

⁵⁵Santamaria, op.cit.

aid workers to obtain home ownership.⁵⁶ Indeed, the Movement was very vocal in supporting any politician who implemented its aims in the political arena. Politicians, like Victorian State Parliamentarian W. Barry, were often given editorial support for voicing opinions which coincided with Movement beliefs.⁵⁷ Such a point was certainly highlighted in February 1946, when Freedom congratulated Barry on his pro-housing stance. Indeed, Freedom urged Barry to continue the fight and support policies that promoted a higher rate of home ownership.⁵⁸ This pro-family stance on home ownership was later taken up by the Industrial Groups. According to one contemporary, F.X Duffy, the Industrial Groups aspired to create a housing co-operative where members participated financially. Such an institution would then allow the same people to obtain loans at low levels of interest.⁵⁹

As we have seen, home ownership was an integral part of the DLP's pro-family policy. However, home ownership in itself, argued Democratic Labor, was a meaningless goal without provisions that ensured adequate family wages. Indeed, at all levels of finance, the DLP pushed for a favourable degree of assistance to the family. Indeed, it seemed to follow a persistent line toward promoting the 'family wage'.

⁵⁶Freedom, 19 June 1946, "Workers Must own Their Own Homes", p.1.

⁵⁷R.Murray, The Split: Australian Labor In The Fifties. pp.252-256.

W.P.Barry was part of a group of seventeen Victorian State Parliamentarians who broke away from the mainstream ALP in 1955 to form the Australian Labor Party (Anti-Communist). Barry lost his seat in the breakaway group's first state election during the same year.

⁵⁸Necessity For Home Ownership, Freedom, p.1.

⁵⁹F.X.Duffy, op.cit.

The DLP believed that industrial policy should be linked to a family's needs. As a consequence, it proposed the introduction of a 'minimum wage' model to cater for the family unit.⁶⁰ In further supporting this concept, the DLP believed that child endowment was a necessary part of support for the family unit. This ideal was highlighted in Democratic Labor's 1973 publication, Guidelines To Policy And Attitudes. According to this document, the DLP wished to double child endowment payments for all children born in a family that contained more than two siblings.⁶¹ The DLP's taxation policies were also aligned to promoting the 'family wage'. Democratic Labor's call for a "guaranteed income" served as the cornerstone of its taxation policy. The Party claimed that every family was entitled to receive a 'minimum' amount of funds. Indeed, under this system, a DLP government would be obliged to make the difference of any 'minimum' wage not met through unemployment, sickness, infirmity, age or inadequate work rates.⁶²

This type of policy initiative seemed to be laced with a considerable degree of populist rhetoric. Nelson A. Dunning, in his essay "Introductory History of the Populist Spirit in the U.S", brings forward the notion of equal work for equal pay.⁶³ This view, explains Kitching, is also supported by Ricardian theory.⁶⁴

⁶⁰Kane (Ed), Guidelines To Policy And Attitudes, p.23.

⁶¹ibid, p.32.

⁶²ibid.

⁶³Tindall Brown(Ed), op.cit, p.98.

⁶⁴G.Kitching, Development and Underdevelopment In Historical Perspective, p.34.

Ricardian theory argues that labour is the prime source of all wealth. The only way to repay a person who has contributed a certain amount of labour is to reward him/her with another commodity that reflects equal value.

According to the American National People's Party (NPP) platform, labour is the basis for the creation of wealth. Hence all labour must be rewarded on equal terms with the wealth it has created.⁶⁵ To a similar degree, the DLP's stance on a 'minimum' or 'family' wage was based on rewarding a family's right to survive—given its influential role in preserving Democratic Labor's vision of a civilised society. More specifically, Dunning's views and Ricardian theory prescribe that labour is the basis of wealth. The DLP supported this principle to the extent that it equated society's survival with the family's material needs.

Populist ideology, therefore, can once more be linked to DLP policy. However, whilst populism was used as an inspirational source for DLP policy planning, its ideological 'fibre' was very much closer to home. The Movement and Industrial Groups, throughout the 1940s, had advocated a pro-family stance in the wage and social security arena. B.A Santamaria states that the Movement was dedicated to promoting the family unit in the area of wage policy. According to Santamaria, "...a family was entitled to receive a wage equal to its responsibilities".⁶⁶ F.X Duffy also supports this position by stressing that an ideal family wage would ensure payments were fixed in line with how many children a "...man had to support".⁶⁷ Such a view is also applauded by Father Paul Duffy who stresses that a 'family wage' is "...in accordance with the laws of social justice". Indeed argues Father Duffy, if the family is the cornerstone of society, then such an entity should be fostered and enhanced at all costs.⁶⁸

⁶⁵Tindall Brown(Ed), op.cit, p.93.

⁶⁶Santamaria, op.cit.

⁶⁷F.X.Duffy, op.cit.

⁶⁸P.Duffy, op.cit.

The opinions of such contemporaries were constantly voiced by the Movement's and, later, Industrial Groups' mouthpiece, Freedom. The paper maintained that each employee was entitled to a minimum wage which would let him/her meet his/her obligations on the social sphere.⁶⁹ In essence the paper maintained that a wage should provide the nucleus for families to support themselves, acquire property, obtain health benefits, and enhance their 'cultural conditions'.⁷⁰ The government of course, in Freedom's eyes, was obliged to supplement family income through marriage bonuses and family allowance payments.⁷¹

The pivotal attitudes of past individuals in the Movement and the Industrial Groups plus the residual influence of populist beliefs provided much of the ideological 'fibre' of the DLP's position on the family, and its associated housing and wage policies. These policies, it has been contended, were not merely the product of pragmatic thinking or political opportunism.

The DLP's self-characterisation as a 'family' party was also complemented by an adherence to a decentralist system of economic organisation. This principle, as a result, was aligned to three main beliefs: anti-monopolism, protection of the small business entity, and promotion of co-operatives.

Democratic Labor opposed all forms of monopolistic economic power. Such forms of economic organisation, whether in public or private control, was regarded as an infringement on people's freedom. According to DLP policy, measures were needed to protect the rights of individuals and limit government

⁶⁹Freedom-News Weekly, 17 July 1946, "Point Ten- Equal Pay For Equal Work", p.5.

⁷⁰Freedom, 26 June 1946, "Point Seven- Adequate Income For All", p.5.

⁷¹Freedom, 3 July 1946, "Point Eight- Special Assistance To Family Life", p.5.

participation in areas where people could quite competently conduct themselves without outside interference.⁷²

DLP policy on this point is once again linked with populist ideology. According to Kitching, populist ideology in its nineteenth century variant, held that the economic benefits presented by monopolistic capitalism were outweighed by the huge social and human costs.⁷³ Indeed, Peter Love believes that populist theories of the state are intermeshed with an "...elaborate demonology, which comprise oppressors and predators, their dupes and hirelings". According to Love, the Russians saw the nobility and Tsarist officials as the prime protagonists who fostered a monopolistic system against the best interests of common people. The Americans saw monopolists and industrialists in very much the same light.⁷⁴

B.A Santamaria, the key strategist in both Movement and DLP ranks, echoes the anti-monopoly stance. According to Santamaria, monopolistic economic systems, whether Communist or Capitalist, are the "enemy". He contends that such systems only accommodate the interests of a few people at the top of the socio-economic strata. At the same time, argues Santamaria, the lower and middle classes are being denied their right to obtain certain economic resources.⁷⁵

Certainly, Freedom, as a focal point of Movement and Industrial Group views, consistently displayed its anti-monopolistic position. In 1943, Freedom condemned the Myer department stores chain after it recorded a profit of £218,000.

⁷²Kane(Ed) Guidelines To Policy And Attitudes. pp.10 and 14.

⁷³Kitching, op.cit, p.21.

⁷⁴Love, op.cit, p.8.

⁷⁵Santamaria, op.cit.

Such a profit, contended the paper, had only been achieved because Myer had an overwhelming amount of advertising, buying, and personnel power. Small traders were thus placed in a situation where they could not compete against retail giants who were monopolising the market.⁷⁶ Freedom highlighted this point to a further degree in 1944 when it reported that 77,000 small businesses had closed during the last five years. As Commonwealth statistics showed that only 22,000 self-employed people resided in Australia, the paper stressed that the country was in real economic and social peril. Indeed, Australia's own survival as a democratic country was in jeopardy since the distribution of wealth fell increasingly into the hands of a few select individuals.⁷⁷

As a result of the alleged shortcomings which develop under a monopolistic system, Santamaria contended that only through the small business entity could the individual prosper. Big business, stressed Santamaria, believes in a principle which associates high profits with low labour costs: "Small-business breeds individuality and self esteem...[Therefore] a family can rely on itself, not a board of directors who are based in some distant location".⁷⁸

The same message was projected by DLP policy. In 1973, Democratic Labor reinforced its support for the small business entity ahead of monopolistic enterprises: "The DLP supports the outlawing of restrictive trade practices, and rejects the proposition

⁷⁶Freedom, 23 October 1943, "What of Small Trader? Myer Profits of £218,000", p.1.

⁷⁷Freedom, 27 September 1944, "77,000 Small Businesses Out In 5 Years- Is Big Business To Run Post-War Australia", p.1.

⁷⁸Santamaria, op.cit.

that small businesses must eventually be driven out of existence...".⁷⁹

Such sentiments, once again, resonate in populist ideology. The strong link between populism and DLP policy is implied by Kitching when he labels the former "... a desire either to defend or ...recreate the world of small enterprise".⁸⁰ Such an ideology, as the external springboard for DLP policy, supports small scale individual enterprise in the areas of industry and agriculture.⁸¹ Devotion to small business, central to DLP policy, is also outlined in Simonde de Sismodi's essay, "Political Economy". Sismondi argued that government's should maintain a minimal degree of interference in people's everyday lives, but at the same time promote a healthy source of competition for small producers in both the manufacturing and agricultural sector.⁸²

Throughout the 1940s, the Movement and Industrial Groups reproduced this populist thought by constantly defending and promoting the small business sector. In 1944, Freedom called small business the leading bastion against capitalist and communist oppression. Small businesses, argued Freedom, created men of initiative who were not afraid to steer their own destinies. The domination of big business or government departments in the economic sphere simply created a society of "wage slaves". According to Freedom, the small business owner was "...the real sign that [society had] emerged from feudalism and slavery. Only when every man has his own capital to manoeuvre in society, can

⁷⁹Kane(Ed). Guidelines To Policy And Attitudes. p.14.

⁸⁰Kitching, op.cit, p.20.

⁸¹ibid, p.19.

⁸²ibid, p.22.

he truly be free of the menace associated with tyranny”⁸³ Indeed, Freedom equated the existence of small businesses with “nature”. The role of the government under such a system would be to protect individual property, not enhance a centralist system, whether capitalist or Communist.⁸⁴

The DLP’s defence of small business in the economic arena also translated into a dedication to promote co-operatives. Indeed such entities were used as instruments to foster and promote small business. This perspective can once again be traced back to populist ideology. Co-operatives and industrial councils, argued Nelson A. Dunning, provide the small businessman with a wealth of economic information. In other words such organisations are essential ‘safety nets’ which maximise and protect small-business people’s welfare.⁸⁵ Santamaria agrees that the DLP’s predecessors, the Movement and Industrial Groups, used similar populist traits to develop their opinions on co-operatives.⁸⁶ In August 1945 Freedom applauded the Department of Post-War Reconstruction for installing ten fishermen co-operatives in New South Wales. The paper contended that such a scheme would enhance small business’ chances of survival.⁸⁷ During the same year, the paper called on the government to promote similar schemes in the areas of health⁸⁸ and agriculture.⁸⁹

⁸³Freedom, 22 January 1944, “Small Business”, p.2.

⁸⁴Freedom, 5 June 1946, “Assistance To Small Business Owners”, p.5.

⁸⁵Tindall Brown(Ed), op.cit, p.101.

⁸⁶Santamaria, op.cit.

⁸⁷Freedom-News Weekly, 28 August 1946, “Point 16: Co-operation In Agriculture”, p.5.

⁸⁸Freedom, 21 November 1945, “Community Health and Co-operative Medicine”, p.4.

⁸⁹Freedom, 29 August 1945, “Co-operatives Will Revolutionise Australian Dairying”, p.2.

The Democratic Labor Party was more than just a 'family' party. Economically, it represented a decentralist stance which supported the individual ahead of government and corporate bureaucracy. The pivotal elements in such a policy resided in a deep-rooted dislike of monopolies. This attitude, as a consequence, sought to champion the small businessman and co-operatives. The ideological 'fibre' for such policies was, in turn, provided by the Movement and Industrial Groups who, very much like their Democratic Labor successors, were motivated by populist philosophy. Indeed, commentators of populist thought, including Kitching, Love, de Sismondi, and Dunning, all bring forward notions which ideologically connect the Movement, Industrial Groups, and DLP in the economic arena.

Democratic Labor's decentralised stance was not solely confined to economics. The DLP, throughout its political existence at federal level, persistently promoted a decentralised society. Such a program was primarily made up of two interlocking elements: population growth and the development of rural towns.

In order to develop rural Australia, the DLP proposed a slanted taxation structure which would cater for the decentralisation of industry. In such a situation, industries moving to provincial cities would encounter minimal taxation costs. On a similar parallel, urban industries would face higher taxes, and through this increased levy, would be expected to cover most of the costs incurred by their rural or provincial counterparts. Industries supporting the decentralisation process, under DLP policy, would also be favoured through depreciation allowances, abolition of payroll tax, reductions in telephone charges,

cancellation of bank exchange rates, and the expansion of public utilities in rural areas.⁹⁰

The DLP was also extremely concerned with decentralising the population. Consistent with this objective, the DLP concentrated its efforts on promoting the farmer. According to the DLP, it was the government's responsibility to provide incentives for farmers, since they were at the forefront of promoting the decentralisation ideal. In order to achieve this goal, Democratic Labor proposed the founding of a National Rural Bank. Such an institution would protect farmers by servicing low-interest loans. The DLP also called for a cut in rural costs via favourable adjustments in areas connected to municipal rates, freights and fares, tariff costs, Commonwealth estate duty, and subsidies.⁹¹

The origin of such policies and ideological framework can once again be linked with populist philosophy. Indeed, DLP policy virtually equated living in the countryside with being truly 'Australian'. From Love's research in this area we can detect a strong link between Democratic Labor and populist thought. American populists and the Russian narodniki both used the countryside as a centre point for creating a myth which supported the plight of 'wholesome' people who represented the true essence of being 'American' or 'Russian'. In the American case, the farmer was glorified, whilst in Russia that role was bestowed upon the peasant.⁹² Kitching seems to underline this statement by stating that populism has a 'nostalgia component'. Cities, under this

⁹⁰Kane(Ed.), Guidelines To Policy And Attitudes, p.5.

⁹¹ibid, p.28.

⁹²Love, op.cit, pp.4-5.

doctrine, are seen as the prime vehicles which facilitate the 'proletarianization' of migrating rural populations.⁹³ The DLP's pro-regionalism stance can also be seen in the writings of Cobbett, Proudhon, and Blake. All three, writing in the nineteenth century, expressed a desire to promote the countryside over the city.⁹⁴

As the prime ideological motivators behind DLP policy, both the Movement and, subsequently, the Industrial Groups used this brand of populist theory as a springboard throughout the 1940s. Indeed, during 1943, Freedom (only representing the Movement's attitude at that time since the Industrial Groups had not been formed) unequivocally announced its pro-regionalism stance in no uncertain fashion by arguing the following: "...we are afraid of too much centralisation- a major curse of Australian life. Centralism smooths the path for dictatorship and...kills local initiative and pride".⁹⁵ Following such a statement, Freedom condoned any moves that would see Melbourne evolve into a sprawling metropolis of 3,000,000 people. Big cities, it argued, by using other countries as a barometer, only produced increased crime rates, overcrowding, and instability.⁹⁶ As a result of this attitude, the paper later urged the government to re-embark on a large scale land settlement program in rural areas.⁹⁷

⁹³Kitching, op.cit, p.20.

⁹⁴ibid, p.34.

According to Cobbett, Proudhon, and Blake, urban environment stifled an individual's inner growth. In the city, where the industrialisation process took precedence over everything else, individuals were seen to have only a minimal impact on the production process.

⁹⁵Freedom, 2 October 1943, "What We Think", p.3.

⁹⁶ibid, 16 October 1943, 'City of 3,000,000. Do We Want It?', p.2.

⁹⁷ibid, 1 January 1944, "No Softness In Land Settlement Policies", p.1.

Parallel with its pro-regionalism stance, Freedom expressed favourable sentiments towards the notion of population development. Towards the end of 1943, the paper called on the government to install a Federal Ministry of Population. According to Freedom, Australia needed at least twenty million people to ensure a prosperous future.⁹⁸ Given this attitude, it is no wonder the paper called on the Australian government to absorb 200,000 Polish servicemen who did not wish to return back home after World War Two.⁹⁹

Big cities and urban sprawls did not constitute, in DLP eyes, a 'perfect' society. On the contrary, such a vision presented an "unnatural" environment which stifled an individual's emotional and psychological growth. According to Democratic Labor, society could only prosper under a de-centralised system. In order to make such a program possible, the DLP revolved its policies in this area around developing rural towns and fostering population growth. As seen earlier, such a brand of populist thought had first been used in Australia by the Movement and, later, the Industrial Groups. Throughout the 1940s especially, the Movement was instrumental in translating its populist beliefs into policies that would later mirror Democratic Labor intentions.

The family, economic organisation, and a distinctive view on society were all firm cornerstones of DLP policy. Whilst these three areas were central to Democratic Labor thought, the issue of patriotism seemed to occupy an overwhelming portion of the DLP's time. This patriotic zeal was, in line with contemporary events, structured around a notion of anti-Communism. However

⁹⁸ibid, 11 December 1943, "Ministry of Population", p.1.

⁹⁹ibid, 28 March 1945, "200,000 Polish Soldiers- Where?", p.1.

one would be simple-minded to dismiss this arm of DLP policy as merely a frenzied reaction to international Communist expansion. As with the previous three aspects of Democratic Labor policy which have been explored, the DLP's vision of patriotism was associated with opposition to centralisation and promotion of individual liberty. R.P McManus, who served as President of the DLP Victorian branch during the 1970s, stated that the fight against Communism was merely incidental. The 'fight', in his eyes, could well have been conducted against a world wide force dedicated to an ultra right wing ideology.¹⁰⁰ F.X Duffy certainly reiterates this view.¹⁰¹ As he explains, the battle, in DLP terms, was one which focused itself against hostile forces who wanted to export centralised government into Australia.

The DLP's vision of patriotism was expressed in three closely aligned areas: foreign policy, defence, and unionism. All three fields were seen as areas of 'front line' activity where Australia needed to guard itself from the Communist nemesis.

The DLP's attitude to foreign policy could perhaps be highlighted best by its attitude towards China. In 1960, Senator George Cole, as DLP leader, announced Democratic Labor's opposition to Australia's wheat trade with China. In the 1961 election campaign Cole went one step further, and called on all trade and political relations with China to be severed. He later widened Democratic Labor's anti-Communist sentiments by

¹⁰⁰Interview, R.P.McManus, 3 July 1992.

R.P McManus joined the DLP in the early 1960s. He maintained his membership to the Party up until it folded in 1978. McManus served as the full time President of the Victorian branch during the 1970s.

¹⁰¹F.X.Duffy, op.cit.

According to Duffy the fight against Communism was incidental to the times. Communism was opposed because it bred centrality. In contemporary times, the 'fight' would probably have been conducted against the monopolistic forces of the 'new right'.

announcing that credit trading with all Communist countries should cease.¹⁰²

Anti-Communist sentiment also spilled over into the area of defence. Between 1963 and 1965, Democratic Labor pushed for a confederation of non-Communist states consisting of Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, the Phillipines, India, South Vietnam, Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand. The reason for such a union was connected to two goals related to anti-Communism. Firstly, as such an alliance would bring together 650 million people, according to DLP logic, China's influence could be counterbalanced, and any other Communist threat within the Asia/Pacific region could be combated. Indeed the specifications of such a confederation went beyond formulating integrated military command strategies. Secondly, the DLP also called for co-operation in foreign policy, preferential trade agreements and development aid between member states.¹⁰³ By 1971, Democratic Labor was calling on Australia to be self-reliant in the area of defence.¹⁰⁴ In 1973 the DLP followed this policy statement by calling on the government to enact a Defence Budget that would be financed through a special levy imposed on all Australians income. On a similar note, Democratic Labor wished to amend the Defence Act, so that it would be an offence to give "aid and comfort" to foreign

¹⁰²Reynolds, *op.cit.*, p.34.

¹⁰³*ibid.*, p.35.

¹⁰⁴*ibid.*, p.40.

The DLP's devotion to a system of Australian self-reliance was earmarked in 1971 when the Queensland branch announced a plan connected to \$4000 million in defence spending. It was hoped such a program conducted over a period of ten years, would see Australia purchase forty-two new war ships and 600 fighter planes.

Such a policy was obviously connected to a philosophy of self-determination, allowing the individual to protect his/her sovereignty from outside influences. It is equally aligned to another parametre of thought which stresses the importance of protecting a nation-state that upholds principles associated with individual self determination.

military forces engaged in direct conflict with Australian troops.¹⁰⁵

Yet again DLP policy can be equated with populist ideology. In Kitching's terms, neo-populism seems to be the exact reflection of such a political stance. Populist ideologies, as with many others, are committed to a sense of patriotism: the defence of all that is deemed to be "right" and "pure". Neo-populism is essentially an extension of this philosophy. Neo-populism developed after the First World War as a reactionary concept opposed to socialist thinking. In this context, followers of this philosophy have found themselves constantly undermining the rhetoric which fuelled the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and later Eastern Europe.¹⁰⁶ It is in this area that close links between DLP policy and neo-populist ideology can be discerned. The DLP's foreign relations and defence initiatives were, after all, geared towards a prevention of international Communist expansion.

The DLP's parallel distaste for Communism and centralisation could also be seen in the trade union area. This attitude was certainly pin-pointed in the early 1970s, as Democratic Labor opposed the formation of the Amalgamated Metal Workers Union. The DLP argued that such an organisation would centralise the union bureaucracy. Indeed, such a concentration of union power in few hands would leave the door open for left-wing individuals to dictate industrial policy according to their principles.¹⁰⁷ This view has been confirmed by

¹⁰⁵Kane(Ed.), Guidelines To Policy And Attitudes, p.8.

¹⁰⁶Kitching, op.cit, p.21.

¹⁰⁷Reynolds, op.cit, p.42.

The DLP argued that the Amalgamated Metal Workers Union would swallow the independent status of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, Boilermakers' and Blacksmiths' Society, and Sheet Metal Workers' Union. Indeed, so motivated was the DLP

Bruno De Lea. The DLP, in his eyes, was dedicated towards safeguarding the interests of the working class. By the same token, however, De Lea stresses that Democratic Labor had no interest in supporting a Communist inspired worker revolution that would bring down the rest of society.¹⁰⁸ A.J Bailey, seems to echo De Lea's line of thought as he described the fight against Communism as a patriotic 'crusade'.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, this neo-populist theme was consistently brought forward by the Movement and, later, Industrial Groups, throughout the 1940s.

The Movement, the Industrial Groups, and DLP shared parallel concerns regarding the issue of patriotism. However, the differing chronological context also meant diverse emphases. As mentioned, the DLP's neo-populist stance was earmarked by a concern in foreign affairs, defence, and industrial relations. The Movement, for its part, was much more concerned with Communist activity in Trade Union affairs and influencing ALP policy against pro-Communist sentiment. The formation of the Industrial Groups were seen as an extension of this crusade. Despite the chronological differences all three organisations delivered one distinct message in this area: patriotism equalled anti-Communism.

Throughout the 1940s, the Movement promoted its anti-Communist sentiment throughout the trade unions. Using Freedom

to bring forward its agenda, that it proposed any merger would have to be democratically determined by a rank and file ballot conducted via the Commonwealth Electoral Office. When the proposal was rejected, the DLP went as far as challenging the amalgamation in court. The court action failed, despite DLP claims that the Boilermakers' and Blacksmiths' Society was opposed to any form of amalgamation.

¹⁰⁸De Lea, op.cit.

¹⁰⁹Bailey, op.cit.

as the prime vehicle to channel its ideals, the Movement stressed that trade unions were essentially the major means of maintaining, protecting, and improving workers conditions. The Communists, argued Freedom, were using unions for their own sinister motives. The pro-worker stance which the Communists projected to the general public was, according to Freedom, part of a hidden agenda.¹¹⁰ Individuals like Ernie Thornton, General Secretary of the Federated Ironworkers Association¹¹¹, and Lance Sharkey, President of the Communist Party, were both seen as promoters of a program which sought to transform unions into Communist political tools.¹¹² In order to combat the "un-Australian" Communist threat, Freedom called on politicians and workers alike to be true patriots and support the anti-Red cause.

Within the political arena, Freedom, as an amplifier of the Movement's views, supported parliamentarians like Victorian M.L.A., J.M Mullens.¹¹³ Conversely, it attacked Victorian

¹¹⁰Freedom, 10 January 1945, "Freedom's Trade Union Policy: Win Justice In Industry- Not Political Revolution", p.3.

¹¹¹ibid.

Ernie Thornton described trade unions as "...a necessary school of Communism, a preparatory school for training the proletariat to exercise its dictatorship". Cited in ibid.

¹¹²Freedom, 4 March 1944, "Correspondent Outlines Grim Situation of Unions Under Communist Control", p.3.

Freedom claimed that the Communist Party had no fundamental liking for arbitration and trade union affairs. It used the following quote by Lance Sharkey to prove this point: "The Communists regard State-controlled arbitration system as a pernicious, anti-working class institution, whose objective is to keep the workers shackled to the capitalist state".

¹¹³Freedom, 20 September 1944, "6000 Workers Demand For Union Reforms- Great Stadium Mass Rally Vindicates Mullens' Fight", p.1.

Mullens charged that the trade union movement, for so long the primary bastion of working class desires, was being constantly abused by Communists dedicated to making it the primary vehicle of their own power plays.

parliamentarians like Cain, Pollard, Dedman and Slater, who were seen as conduits for Communist ideals.¹¹⁴

In the union area, the Movement saw the Industrial Groups as an extension of its anti-Communist aims. The Groups, along with the Movement, shared a distinct attitude on the Communist issue. Both organisations firmly supported compulsory unionism, secret voting ballots, and independent returning officers.¹¹⁵ As a consequence of this stance, both organisations worked in tandem to bring about victories in unions like the Food Preservers Union¹¹⁶, Waterside Workers Union¹¹⁷, Federated Clerks Union¹¹⁸, and Tramways Unions.¹¹⁹

Along with being a party which centred its energies around the family, economics, and social organisation, the DLP was also dedicated to patriotism. Although, it could be argued that all political parties have a patriotic dimension in their ideological framework, few matched Democratic Labor's brand of patriotism. Foreign policy, defence, and industrial relations were all focal points of DLP thought. Communism, as the standard bearer for a centralised society that would quash people's democratic

¹¹⁴Freedom, 16 August 1944, "Where Do They Stand?", p.1.

In August 1944 the Movement, via Freedom, questioned the political scruples of Victorian State Labor parliamentarians Cain, Pollard, Dedman, and Slater after they received praise in E.Hills' pro-Communist pamphlet, Crisis In The Labor Party. Indeed, the paper's level of suspicion can be perfectly highlighted through the following question it asked: "What have they (the Labor parliamentarians mentioned) done for the Communist Party that the official apologists of that body should single them out for public praise?"

¹¹⁵Freedom, 24 April 1946, "ALP Declares War On Communism", p.1.

¹¹⁶Freedom-News Weekly, 27 November 1946, "Another Major Victory For ALP Groups", p.3.

¹¹⁷Freedom-News Weekly, 6 August 1947, "Big Labor Win In Waterside Workers", p.1.

¹¹⁸News Weekly, 20 August 1950, "Smashing ALP Win In Clerks' Election", p.1.

¹¹⁹ibid, 1 December 1948, "Coms Annihilated In Tramways Election", p.3.

freedoms, was the prime enemy. However, as contemporaries of the time point out, the patriotic fight was essentially against people who promoted centralised regimes. Hence, in modern terms, the DLP's 'fight' might well have been conducted against a right wing regime which fostered capitalistic monopolies. The ideological motivation for such policy can be found through two prime sources. Firstly, neo-populist ideology, a twentieth century concept which opposed Soviet style government, could be linked to fostering DLP policy. However the second and main protagonists of such thought were the Movement and, subsequently, the Industrial Groups. The Movement and Industrial Groups, argue contemporaries like De Lea and Bailey, provided the ideological backbone for the DLP in this area.

Political parties, despite the endless cleavages which separate them, are united by one political convention: the desire for power. The Democratic Labor Party, born out of the 1950s Australian Labor Party split, was certainly no exception to this rule. The desire to govern was certainly central to the DLP's existence, however it was not the catalyst for its birth. The ALP split, and Democratic Labor's subsequent formation, was centred around ideology. The DLP did not see itself as a 'new' party. Indeed, many of the people who went on to support the DLP in some capacity, argue that Democratic Labor represented the "true" continuation of ALP ideals. This brand of 'Labor' philosophy, argue the same contemporaries, was previously promoted by the Movement and Industrial Groups. It is important to understand, given the close chronological connection, that these two bodies were the primary sources for DLP thought, although populist dogma can be used as a secondary source of inspiration. Hence

Without the initial ideological 'sustenance' provided by these two organisations the DLP would never have materialised into a potent political force. Certainly such a pattern of thought can be validated when exploring the four cornerstones of DLP policy: the family, economics, social organisation, and patriotism. All four components act like a 'sieve' to establish the direct link between DLP policy, and Movement, and Industrial Group philosophy.

This ideological association can also be connected to a small number of Catholic activists who prior to 1955 saw the ALP as a prime vehicle for promoting their political beliefs. The next chapter will endeavour to prove this point by bringing forward two other factors which helped bring about the DLP's formation: Catholicism and conflicting perceptions concerning "true" Labor ideals.

'A Time To Mobilise' :
Catholic Activists and the "True" Labour Tradition

It would be both unfair and incorrect to suggest that the Democratic Labor Party(DLP) was purely a 'Catholic' party. Although Democratic Labor's ranks were partially filled with individuals who previously saw the Australian Labor Party (ALP) as an organisation dedicated to promoting 'Catholic interests', the DLP, it must be remembered, had no direct affiliation with the Catholic church. Its membership too, if one could use prominent individuals like Bob Joshua, George Cole, and Jack Little as yardsticks, was hardly lacking people who followed the Protestant faith. On a similar level, the DLP was not seen by all Australian Catholics as a party in tune with their interests- Arthur Calwell highlighted this point by staying with the ALP after the split of 1955.

Such representations, of course, fuel considerable debate. R.P McManus, for one, is totally opposed to any suggestion that the DLP was a 'Catholic' political party. As McManus explains, "...we[the DLP] were not a Catholic Party- our policies were not just focused towards Catholics. They were initiatives aimed towards the common good of Australia as a whole".¹²⁰ Certainly, nobody is categorising the DLP as a 'Catholic organisation'.

However, one can challenge McManus' view to a certain degree, if one focuses on a group of politically motivated Catholics who joined or supported the DLP after its initial formation. These individuals, despite their differing origins, were united by two

¹²⁰Interview, R.P.McManus, 3 July 1992.

interlocking beliefs. Firstly, the DLP, like the Movement and Industrial Groups, was perceived to be a continuation of "true" Labor traditions: a place where politically motivated Catholics could bring forward their agendas. Secondly, by 1955, it became apparent to these same people that the ALP was no longer an organisation which accommodated 'Catholic' ideological needs: the 'true' ideological spirit behind Labor philosophy had disappeared.

In order to address the first point, the issue of continuity of Labor tradition, it is necessary to centre our thoughts on the individuals who supported the DLP from the ranks of the Movement and Industrial Groups. B.A Santamaria, F.X Duffy, Father Paul Duffy, J.P Maynes, and B. De Lea are all people who classed themselves as true ALP supporters before the split. The Australian Labor Party was hence seen, before 1955, as the only organisation capable of addressing these individuals' political perspectives. Correspondingly, the Movement and Industrial Groups were seen as organisations which were acting in true Labor tradition. According to these same people, there was never any conscious ploy designed to bring about a split within the Labor Party. However once the ALP diverted from its allegedly true ideological path (and attacked the Movement and Industrial Groups), cleavages within Labor were bound to surface. In this context, the DLP's eventual formation was necessary. The DLP's existence, in these people's eyes, was needed as a vehicle that would continue to promote true Labor ideals.

According to B.A Santamaria, there was never any underlying intention "...to form a breakaway party". As Santamaria explains, the Movement and Industrial Groups acted as perfect vehicles to bring forward ideas into the Labor Party.

However when these two organisations were threatened by the Evatt-Chamberlain forces, argues Santamaria, "...it was time to mobilise a force [the DLP] that would keep the ALP out of office until Movement/Industrial Group wishes were met".¹²¹ The Movement and Industrial Groups were in Santamaria's eyes true Labor organisations. Hence any moves to abolish them could be classed as 'anti-Labor' in nature.¹²²

This view is further sustained by B. De Lea who chose to join the DLP after 1955. In De Lea's terms, the people who led the charge "outward" from the ALP were representing true Labor ideals. De Lea affirms that he has always remained a 'Labor' man. At the same time, however, he defines 'Labor' as a political movement which encourages the promotion of Catholic/Christian ideals: "Ideologically it [the DLP] was the true Labor Party, because it vowed to pursue goals aligned to Christian Socialism". Thus, Democratic Labor was, in De Lea's words, an 'extension' of his Christian apostolate: "It was [a party] in which I could, as a Christian, pursue political goals that allowed Christian rules to be the norm, rather than the exception". Since the ALP no longer facilitated this aim, the DLP in De Lea's view "...presented itself as a vehicle for [him] to transform [his] political lay apostles into reality".¹²³

¹²¹B.McKinlay, The ALP- A Short History of the Australian Labor Party, pp.117-118.

Santamaria is referring specifically to the "new" Victorian State Executive which was endorsed by ALP Federal President, J.A Ferguson, and Dr.H.V Evatt at a Special Conference in February 1954. At this meeting, the "old" Victorian State Executive, which was littered with Movement and industrial Group sympathisers, was declared "bogus". On 7 April 1954, the Evatt-Ferguson backed Executive formally expelled a host of parliamentarians (State and Federal), branchmembers, and councilmen who still supported the "old" Executive.

¹²²Santamaria, op.cit.

¹²³De Lea, op.cit.

Hence the DLP was constructed as a vehicle for "true" Labor beliefs only after the ALP was no longer seen as an avenue where Catholic activists could implement their ideas. Father Paul Duffy unequivocally supports these comments. According to Father Duffy, before 1955 the ALP was the 'only' political organisation for Catholics. As Duffy explains, "...the 'natural' party for Catholics was Labor. In other words, the Labor Party was seen as a means for Catholics to obtain social justice". The Movement and Industrial Groups were, in Father Duffy's words, institutions within Labor which helped produce this brand of 'social justice'. After the split within Labor ranks, Father Duffy explains that the DLP assumed the mantle of catering for 'Catholic' political interests.¹²⁴

Such sentiments have also been echoed by J.P Maynes and F.X Duffy. Maynes, very much like Santamaria, De Lea, and Father Duffy, sees himself as a true Laborite. Maynes actually highlights this point by stating that he never rescinded his Labor membership: "The DLP became the real Labor Party. I remained a Labor man". In his eyes it was the ALP which lost its 'Labor' characteristics.¹²⁵ F.X Duffy agrees totally with this argument. In his eyes the DLP only came into existence because the ALP no longer embodied "...a will to bring about a society centred around positive Christian, family policies". The split which eventuated within Labor ranks could thus have been avoided if, in Duffy's words, "...the [Australian Labor] Party had reconciled on our terms".¹²⁶

¹²⁴Father Duffy, *op.cit.*

¹²⁵Maynes, *op.cit.*

¹²⁶F.X.Duffy, *op.cit.*

It is at this point that we see a very obvious connection between Santamaria, De Lea, Father Duffy, F.X Duffy, and J.P Maynes. All five consider themselves 'Labor' people. Moreover, all five equate 'Labor' with Christian ideals. In the years leading up to 1955, the ALP was decreasingly seen by these individuals as an organisation which was both truly 'Christian' and 'Labor'. After the split within ALP ranks, this definition took on a different meaning. The five still saw themselves as 'Labor' people. However they no longer saw the ALP as an organisation which embodied Labor or Christian beliefs. More specifically, the ALP no longer represented itself as a vehicle which allowed politically minded Catholics to express their ideals. It seemed apparent to these same people that a new ideological 'incubine' was necessary for promoting 'Labor' and 'Christian' interests. It is in this context that the DLP's eventual formation became inevitable.

In order to explain the DLP's 'inevitable' formation let us return to the views of Santamaria, De Lea, Father Duffy, F.X Duffy, and Maynes. In interviews, all five argued that the DLP was a continuation of true Labor traditions. In other words, the DLP became the 'real' Labor Party after 1955. What none directly stated, but quite clearly indicated, is that before 1955 the ALP represented a vehicle for them to promote their Catholic principles on a political level.

This process of ideological disagreement was exemplified by both the DLP's future founders, and others within the Labor Movement, as they argued over various definitions of 'patriotism'. This view is supported by Father Paul Duffy. As he explains, arguments over conflicting perceptions of the Labor Party, made a split, whether initiated by the right or left wing, inevitable: a true

Labor Party, in Duffy's eyes, would equate patriotism with anti-Communism. Communism opposed Catholicism, hence any moves by people within the ALP to defend such an ideology would have to be classed as anti-Labor.¹²⁷

The Communist Party Dissolution Bill and Anti-Communist Referendum each presented themselves as opportunities for people within the Labor Movement to articulate their varying definitions of patriotism. Every forum of debate, including press and parliament, was used by individuals to buttress their respective positions. Indeed as time passed, these issues, and the manner in which they were debated, intensified bitterness and divisiveness within the Party.

The Communist Party Dissolution Bill (1950) proposed by the Menzies Government¹²⁸, caused much acrimony and disunity within the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party. Both J.B Chifley and H.V Evatt were vigorously opposed to the Bill, arguing that such a piece of legislation would compromise basic freedoms in Australia.¹²⁹ The proposed Act, it was argued, would allow the Menzies Government to discriminate against any organisation that was perceived to be Communist. Hence in such a situation the onus of proof would reside with the accused, *not* the accuser.¹³⁰

However whilst Chifley and Evatt were outspoken critics of the Menzies proposal, neither centred their fight around

¹²⁷Father Duffy, op.cit.

¹²⁸R.McMullin, op.cit, p.257.

The Communist Party Dissolution Bill was first introduced by the Menzies Liberal Government in 1950. Under such proposed legislation, the Communist Party of Australia would become an illegal organisation. Its membership would become ineligible for union office or employment within the public service.

¹²⁹ibid.

¹³⁰News Weekly, 10 May 1950, "Labour Faces Crisis On Menzies Legislation", p.1

defending or promoting the Communist cause. The battle against the proposed legislation was, in their eyes, all about upholding civil liberties. The Communist Party's involvement was thus incidental, not necessary. Chifley and Evatt were, in fact, staunch anti-Communists. As Kylie Tennant explains, both men had hardly endeared themselves to the Communist movement during the 1949 Coal Strike, when they sponsored legislation which was used to gaoil a number of Miners' Federation and other trade union officials who had 'red' sympathies.¹³¹ According to Robin Gollan, Chifley's and Evatt's intentions were quite clear during that period: "...the Commonwealth [now had] ...powers[that]...[would] limit the ability of the [Communist] union to conduct...[its] strike".¹³² Speaking in the House of Representatives, one year later, during the second reading of the Communist Party Dissolution Bill, Chifley labelled Menzies' proposed legislation "repressive" and a destroyer of justice. However no comment was made supporting Communism as an ideology.¹³³ Evatt, for his part, adopted a different plan of attack, whilst simultaneously supporting Chifley. As Tennant explains, Evatt was certain that, if allowed to pass, the Bill could be defeated in the High Court: "Indeed it filled him with an unholy joy to think what the High

¹³¹K.Tennant, *Evatt: Politics and Justice*, pp.258-259.

Two days after the Miners Federation strike was launched, Chifley and Evatt acted as prime movers in passing the National Emergency Coal Strike Act (1949). The purpose of the National Coal Strike Act was outlined as follows: "An act to prohibit, during the period of the National Emergency caused by the present General Strike in the Coal-mining Industry, the Contribution, Receipt or Use of Funds by Organizations registered under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1948 for the purpose of assisting or encouraging the Continuance of that Strike, and for other purposes".

¹³²R.Gollan, *Revolutionaries and Reformists: Communism and the Australian Labour Movement 1920-1955*, p.240.

¹³³*ibid* p.265.

Court would do to it [the Communist Party Dissolution Bill] Party Dissolution Bill] once it became law".¹³⁴ A successful High Court challenge, believed Evatt, would be a simultaneous triumph for the Labor Movement in defending civil liberties and undermining Menzies' creditability as an astute legislator.¹³⁵

However Chifley's and Evatt's stance on the anti-Communist legislation did not encourage consensus within Federal Labor parliamentary ranks. To some, Chifley's and Evatt's records against the Communist Party were merely relics of the past. Both, by opposing the Communist Party Dissolution Bill, were seen to be supporting a totalitarian organisation which opposed any notion of civil liberties, or true Labor ideals. S.M Keon and J.M Mullens both opposed their leaders, and openly supported the Communist legislation. Mullens was quoted in News-Weekly (24 May 1950), as favouring the "...absolute and entire dissolution of the Communist party as a physical entity".¹³⁶ Keon, went one step further, stating that society as a whole would have to be educated on the Communist menace.¹³⁷ Such actions did not please those who supported Chifley's way of thinking. Certainly, Chifley must have been thinking of people like Keon and Mullens when he issued a statement at the New South Wales State Conference in 1951 (after the election defeat) condemning those who were "...trying to get over as far as possible to the right without becoming opposed to the Labor Party...".¹³⁸

¹³⁴Tennant, op.cit, p.260.

¹³⁵ibid.

¹³⁶News Weekly, 24 May 1950, "Labour Speakers Supported The Anti-Communist Bill", p.2.

¹³⁷ibid.

¹³⁸McMullin, op.cit, pp.261-262.

Evatt's successful attempt in quashing the Communist Party Dissolution Act's validity through the High Court only intensified the level of debate within the Labor Party.¹³⁹ News Weekly, as a supporter of those who equated 'patriotism' with 'anti-Communism', condemned Evatt's actions and Chifley's ambivalence. Both, in the paper's eyes, had shown disrespect towards 'true' Labor principles.¹⁴⁰

The Communist issue and the continuing debate concerning 'correct' Labor conduct was fuelled further by the Communist Referendum campaign throughout 1951. Evatt successfully led the charge against the banning of the Communist Party¹⁴¹, and later reasoned that the referendum result was of more importance than a general election.¹⁴²

Despite a general congratulatory response from the Federal Caucus, Evatt's success over the Referendum was not treated with the same fervour in other quarters of the Labor Movement. Evatt, himself, repeatedly announced throughout the referendum campaign, that he had no intention of defending or promoting the Communist cause. As The Bulletin commented, Evatt had been a

¹³⁹ *ibid* p.259.

According to Evatt, the Communist Party Dissolution Act was an obstruction against civil liberties. It was on this sole premise, contends McMullin, that Evatt supported the Communists in the High Court. At the same time, McMullin also concedes that such a move constituted "politically folly". The Victorian ALP Executive and Federal Parliamentarians like Keon openly voiced their disapproval. Even amongst his own supporters Evatt created havoc. Chifley, perhaps Evatt's greatest ally in opposing the Menzies' Legislation, loyally supported his deputy. However, Chifley himself, had not been made aware of Evatt's initial aims to appear in the High Court.

¹⁴⁰ News Weekly, 1 November 1950, "Evatt Took A Communist Brief: His Colleagues Took Aspirin", p.2.

¹⁴¹ McKinlay, *op.cit*, p.109.

Evatt's campaign against the referendum proposal on 22 September 1951 helped produce a very narrow victory. Victoria, New South Wales, and South Australia, supported his 'No' campaign, along with 51% of the total voting population.

¹⁴² *ibid* p.263.

staunch opponent of the Communists throughout his time in the Chifley Government.¹⁴³ According to Evatt, the referendum was primarily an issue associated with the future of “democracy”. He maintained that if the Communists performed any subversive activities, the Crimes Act would give the government sufficient power to impose justice.¹⁴⁴ On the other extreme, the Victorian ALP State Executive, Keon, and Mullens, did not see the referendum campaign in the same light. In these people's minds, civil liberties represented an important aspect of democratic society. However, unlike Evatt, they stressed that civil liberties would only survive if Communism was suppressed on every front. Such a stance, in their minds, represented a ‘true’ Labor position.¹⁴⁵ It is at this point that the arguments of Evatt's opponents took shape. In these people's eyes, Communists, unlike ‘true Laborites’, were opposed to civil liberties. Hence, Evatt's decision to promote the ‘No’ campaign represented a breach of ‘true’ Labor traditions, since he had allied himself to an organisation which, among other things, did not believe in civil liberties.

News Weekly was in full agreement with this view, and questioned Evatt's reasoning for defending the Communist cause. After all, argued News Weekly, any association (and not merely

¹⁴³The Bulletin, 12 September 1951, “The ‘No’ Twins”, p.6.

This article is referring to Evatt's role in enacting the Defence Projects Act (1947). Kylie Tennant, in Evatt: Politics and Justice (page 212) explains this point further. After various Communist inspired attempts to halt work on the Rocket Range at Woomera in 1947, Evatt stated that the CPA (Communist Party of Australia) was “...fostering animosity against the Australian Defence Plan and a hymn of hate against Labour and against Australia”. Under the Defence Projects Act any individual could be gaoled for up to one year or receive a maximum fine of £5000, or both, for obstructing the programs of Government approved defence plans.

¹⁴⁴The Age, 3 September 1951, “Labor Warning On The Referendum”, p.1.

¹⁴⁵McKinlay, op.cit, p.263.

joint membership) between Labor members and Communists would lead to expulsion of the former after a ruling which had been passed by the Victorian ALP Central Executive on 17 August 1951. The existence of such rules, which according to News Weekly were in line with true Labor ideals, made Evatt's decision simply ludicrous.¹⁴⁶ As a consequence, the 'No' vote supporting Communism was the responsibility of Evatt and his allies. According to News Weekly, the ALP had acted against Labor traditions. A 'true' Labor organisation would have equated anti-Communism with patriotism, and made sure that Australia was defended against such an ideology.¹⁴⁷

People like F.X Duffy and J.P Maynes, as contemporaries of the time, agree totally with the views postulated by News Weekly over forty years ago. According to Duffy, "The [Australian Labor] Party that we and our fathers had supported stabbed true Labor principles in the back". As Duffy explains, the ALP had "...traditionally [been] a Christian Party [with]...a social conscience".¹⁴⁸ Maynes agrees with these comments and adds that many within the ALP could not see that the Communists were "...a band of revolution-minded individuals who were dedicated towards transforming the Labor Movement into a vehicle for achieving political power".¹⁴⁹

Defending Communism, to any degree, according to Maynes and F.X Duffy, was simply unpatriotic. The elections of 1951, 1954, and 1955 served as further vehicles to portray a picture that had

¹⁴⁶News Weekly, 22 August 1951, "Evatt-Ferguson Decision Puts Labor On The Spot", p.1.

¹⁴⁷News Weekly, 26 September 1951, "'No' Vote Makes Communism Labor's Responsibility", p.1.

¹⁴⁸F.X Duffy op.cit.

¹⁴⁹Maynes, op.cit.

become very clear: for a certain section of individuals, the ALP no longer represented the organisational outlet where their political beliefs could be promoted.

However this recognition only partly materialised during the 1951 and 1954 elections before becoming fully evident in 1955. Throughout the course of the 1951 and 1954 election campaigns, periodicals like News Weekly, repeatedly implied, without explicitly stating, that the ALP was not acting in 'true' Labor traditions- especially in areas associated with the Communist issue. In this context, the "Red menace" was consistently used as a launching pad for News Weekly to illustrate the perceived shortcomings of the Federal ALP leadership.¹⁵⁰

Before the 1951 election, News Weekly called on its readers to look beyond their pre-conceived loyalties (towards the ALP) and choose any party that fulfilled its patriotic obligation and attacked Communism. The 'red menace', contended the paper, was no longer a side issue. According to News Weekly, the Western world was locked in a "life and death" struggle against Communism. In light of such a scenario, it was Australia's "duty" to take its place amongst the 'front line'.¹⁵¹ Indeed, after the 1951 election results¹⁵², News Weekly launched a stinging attack

¹⁵⁰Santamaria, op.cit.

According to Santamaria, News Weekly was a real 'Labor' paper. The publication's repeated attacks against Communism were, in Santamaria's words, conducted in "true" Labor tradition.

¹⁵¹NewsWeekly, 4 April 1951, "Australia's Most Critical Election", p.1.

¹⁵²McMullin, op.cit, p.261.

The 1951 election, held on the 28 April 1951, was a disappointing defeat for the ALP. The Coalition convincingly took the House of Representatives by sixty-nine seats to fifty-two-Labor only gained five seats from the previous election, despite polling over 50% of the primary vote. The ALP also lost control of the Senate as the coalition parties obtained thirty-two seats against Labor's twenty-eight.

against Evatt and his supporters. The paper claimed that Evatt's support for the Communists had cost Labor electoral victory.¹⁵³

After another election loss in 1954¹⁵⁴, News Weekly once more attacked Evatt and his supporters for lacking 'true' Labor vision. News Weekly contended that the "quality" of leadership within Labor ranks made it impossible for the majority of the electorate to vote ALP. Evatt, Arthur Calwell, and P.J Kennelly were particularly singled out for blame.¹⁵⁵ These people, argued News Weekly, had abandoned true Labor principles in exchange for Leftist ideals that advocated anti-Americanism and appeasement to Communist forces.¹⁵⁶

By the 1955 election¹⁵⁷, all these events had provided a climax to the ideological disunity which prevailed inside the ALP. On 5 October 1954, three months after the ALP's third successive electoral loss, Evatt attacked a group of people within his own

¹⁵³News Weekly, 2 May 1951, 'Labor Definitely Threw The Game Away!!', p.1.

¹⁵⁴McKinlay, op.cit, p.112.

Despite reducing the Liberals majority from sixty-nine to sixty-four in the House of Representatives, Labor was beaten once more in the 1954 election. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this election result was Dr. Evatt's decreasing popularity in Victoria—the area where many of his opponents were accusing him of acting in an 'unLabor' manner. The ALP made no gains in Victoria federally, and suffered a downturn in many of its marginal electorates.

¹⁵⁵News Weekly, 2 June 1954, "Why Labor Lost The Election", p.1.

¹⁵⁶News Weekly, 3 February 1953, "Australia's Stake In U.S Policy", p.1.

News Weekly urged its readers to support any American foreign policy initiative in Asia. Along with the Eisenhower Administration, News Weekly called on Australia to take an active part in opposing the Communist menace around the Asian region. Indeed, the paper went so far as to say that "the new U.S policy is an Australian policy". Australians should realise, contended News Weekly, that an intimate alliance with the U.S was paramount to the country's well-being. After all, had it not been for U.S aid, the paper believed that the Japanese would have invaded during World War Two. According to News Weekly, any policy associated with protecting Australia against Communism had to transcend party lines.

¹⁵⁷McKinlay, op.cit, p.120.

The 1955 election proved to be even more disastrous for the ALP than the 1951 and 1954 campaigns. Labor lost ten House of Representative seats. The seven parliamentarians who formed the Australian Labor Party (Anti-Communist) were also defeated. In McKinlay's words, Menzies and the Liberals were the "ultimate" victors.

party who were being 'subversive' in their conduct. He particularly voiced his disapproval at a number of 'Victorians' who "...since 1949 [had] become increasingly disloyal to the Labor Movement and Labor leadership".¹⁵⁸ Eight days later, Evatt and his supporters were charged with the same accusations by their opponents. T.P Burke and E.W Peters both condemned their leader's behaviour, whilst G.R Cole, a Tasmanian Senator, went one step further, and called for a spill of all leadership positions within the federal party.¹⁵⁹ Despite retaining his leadership¹⁶⁰, Evatt continued to encounter opposition from Keon and W.B Bourke. Mullens also showed his contempt for Evatt by labelling him a "smear merchant" who possessed a "colossal ego".¹⁶¹

Indeed, the cleavages occurring within the Labor Movement were not solely confined to the ranks of Federal Parliament. People within the rank and file of the party also found themselves taking sides. Laurie McGuire, writing to the Sydney Morning Herald from the Willoughby Branch of the ALP on 14 October 1954, defended the position being taken by people like Keon and Mullens. According to McGuire, "these...men...[had] worked unceasingly for the cause of Labor...[in trying]...to remove the threat of Communism".¹⁶² P.A William, from West Ryde, went one step further by stating that Evatt's actions on the 5 October had

¹⁵⁸Murray, op.cit, pp.180-181.

¹⁵⁹McMullin, op.cit, p.277.

¹⁶⁰ibid.

Evatt helped retain his leadership post by stating that a week's notice was necessary before a vote could take place to decide the vacant leadership positions.

¹⁶¹ibid.

¹⁶²The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 October 1954.

caused him to 'relinquish' his Labor Party membership.¹⁶³ At the other extreme, Evatt's same actions were seen to be representing "true" Labor traditions. According to Kevin Macks of Bondi, Evatt was simply standing up "...against the disruptive [Catholic] sectarian elements in the Labor Party".¹⁶⁴

In light of such disunity, a split within ALP ranks was unavoidable. To the uninformed observer, such personal abuse between members of the same political party may make the 1955 split seem like a war of personalities. This assumption, of course, obscures the real picture. The main issue was ideology. The seven parliamentarians who formed the DLP's predecessor, Australian Labor Party (Anti-Communist), just before the 1955 election, were acting according to their beliefs. For R. Joshua, S.M Keon, T.W Andrews, W.M Bourke, J.L Cremean, J.M Mullens, and E.W Peters the ALP no longer represented "true" Labor ideals. Indeed, one could go a step further, and suggest that the ALP no longer presented itself as a party where Catholic activists could find a congenial political home. Such a comment is perhaps plausible when one considers that all of the ALP (Anti-Communist) members, except Joshua, were Catholic.¹⁶⁵

We have seen in this chapter that Catholicism and conflicting definitions concerning "true" Labor ideals, played a vital role in creating the DLP. This is not to say that the DLP was strictly a Catholic Party. However it did have certain 'Catholic characteristics'. According to people like B.A Santamaria, B. De Lea, F.X Duffy, Father Paul Duffy, and J.P Maynes, the DLP was a "true"

¹⁶³¹⁶³ibid.

¹⁶⁴ibid.

¹⁶⁵News Weekly, 27 April 1955, "Labor Discovers A Fighting Leader", p.2.

Labor Party: a place where certain politically minded Catholics could use the organisation as a focal point for promoting their political beliefs. Before 1955 the Australian Labor Party had been viewed by these individuals as a vehicle which accommodated Catholic political needs. By 1955 the ALP no longer served this purpose. The ALP, in these people's eyes, was no longer acting like a "true" Labor Party. The DLP's formation was therefore necessary to promote the true Labor principles that had once been the cornerstone of ALP philosophy. This 'necessity' to form the DLP can be traced back to the years leading up to the 1955 election. Patriotism can be used as a clear example of these people's belief that the ALP no longer embodied "true" Labor principles. The Communist Party Dissolution Bill and Menzies' Referendum proposal can both be used as issues which underlined the growing rift developing inside the ALP. The 1951, 1954 and 1955 elections only further highlight the most obvious of pictures: the ALP was no longer seen by a proportion of its membership to be acting in true "Labor" tradition.

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