Timoroan: One Land, One Nation, One Future

30 August – A Day For All Timoroan

Timoroan

National Identity in Timor-Leste

A thesis submitted for the degree of

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by

Emanuel António de Araújo Braz

School of Social Sciences

Victoria University

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Abstract

This thesis explores the multidimensionality of contemporary Timoroan as reflection of the narratives of politics and history that engulfed Timor-Leste since the 1500s and that in many respects continues to this day to inform who the Timoroan are and what Timor-Leste is. Timor-Leste is a proud nation and the Timoroan have every right to be proud, there is much to be proud of, but unfortunately this confidence and pride has been chipped away by almost 500 years of occupation, pillage, manipulation, oppression and death. That contemporary literature continues to perpetuate the Timoroan as conflict prone, or poor, or fragile, and underdeveloped shows how history serves the strong and the dominant rather than the less strong and more accepting. Timor-Leste is shaped by its history that has taken over the lives of the Timoroan for half a millennium and distracted the Timoroan from its destiny and purpose still being defined today and into the future. One cannot look at the Timoroan and Timor-Leste today without deconstructing what close to 500 years of forced occupation does to a people and the spiritual, ideological, physical and environmental ecology of an island. This thesis approaches the narratives of the Timoroan and Timor-Leste from a purely Timoroan academic perspective and in this regard this thesis looks at the history of colonialism and invasion and its impacts on the Timoroan from the other side of the fence, that is from the side of the Timoroan, from inside-out. This thesis also (de)constructs the Timoroan from the lived experiences and worldviews expressed by the respondents of this research study about what is like to live in cultural context and in contemporary Timor-Leste society and as part of the Timor-Leste Nation-State into the future.

Statement of Originality

I, Emanuel António de Araújo Braz, declare that the PhD thesis entitled *Timoroan: National Identity in Timor-Leste* is no more than 100,000 words in length including quotes and exclusive of tables, figures, appendices, bibliography, references and footnotes. This thesis contains no material that has been submitted previously, in whole or in part, for the award of any other academic degree or diploma. Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own work.

Acknowledgements

I pay respect and acknowledge the ingenuity and the perseverance of the Timoroan; the innate resilience and willingness to self-preserve and to resist; and for having the courage and foresight to take each opportunity as it came and never be afraid to dream and demand that which is ours. Timoroan exist and Timor-Leste is today a nation-state. Greater achievement could not have been possible without the Timoroan in the first place.

I acknowledge and thank all the Timoroan who contributed to this research project in particular the respondents both formal and informal. The Timoroan I met for a coffee and whom I asked *How do you know you are Timoroan*?; and who kindly and honestly answered *Because I Am Timoroan;* were equally important to me as the Timoroan I formally interviewed and quoted here. I tapped into the Timoroan collective that is both formal and informal, it is rational and *lulik*[1], it is culturally aware, raw and honest.

I thank my family, friends, colleagues who also greatly assisted me in this long journey as respondents, as confidants and as supporters. No one ever told me I could not do a PhD, so I always believed I could and would do it on the Timoroan and about Timor-Leste.

I thank my supervisors: Dr Helen Hill for believing in the Timoroan and always providing us with opportunities to engage with academia and for being a repository of knowledge and a driving force for over 30 years of the solidarity and great friendship that to this day exists between the Timoroan and the Ema Australia[2]; Dr Les Terry for telling me this is my work and it is whatever I want it to be whilst at the same time keeping me within the narrative; this being the right approach with the Timoroan and it is much appreciated; and Dr Russell Wright for his assistance during my PhD candidature process; for pushing me through the line so I was able to continue on to see it through.

The PhD contains much about the Timoroan but still too little to be a complete representation. The Timoroan have been Timoroan since a *Labarik (Boy)* struck an honorous friendship with a Lafaek (*Crocodile)* and together they grew old and saw the wonders of the world and felt the evils of human character. The Timoroan to this day continue to live off the body of the grandfather Lafaek, Timor-Leste.

To the Timoroan, the Children of the Crocodile, *Resistir É Vencer!*[3]

[1] *Lulik - Sacred*
[2] *Ema – People*
[3] *Resistir É Vencer! – To Resist Is To Win!*

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADITLA	Associação Democrática Integração Timor-Leste-Australia / Association for Democratic Integration of Timor-Leste-Australia
APODETI	Associação Popular Democrática Timorense / Timorese Popular Democratic Association
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASDT	Associação Social Democrática Timorense / Timorese Association of Social Democrats
BNU	Banco Nacional Ultramarino / National Overseas Bank
CAVR	Comissão Acolhimento, Verdade e Recepção / Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation
CEDAW	Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CELCOM	Célula de Comunidade/Community Cells
CNRM	Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere / National Council of Maubere Resistance
CNRT	Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorense / National Council of the Timorese Resistance
CPA	Casa de Produção Audiovisual / Audio and Video Production House
CPLP	Comunidade de Países de Língua Portuguesa / Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries
CT	Companhia de Timor / Timor Company
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DHS	Timor-Leste Demographic and Health Survey
DIT	Dili Institute of Technology
FRETILIN	Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente / Revolutionary Front of Independent Timor-Leste
FALINTIL	Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste / The Armed Forces for the National Liberation of Timor-Leste
F-FDTL	FALINTIL-Força de Defeza de Timor-Leste / FALINTIL-Timor-Leste Defence Force
GMPT	Grupu Mulher Parlamentar Timor / Women in Parliament Group
GoTL	Government of Timor-Leste
HRE	Human Research Ethics
INL	National Linguistics Institute, in Dili, Timor-Leste
ISSP	International Social Survey Programme
IRASEC	Research Institute of Contemporary Southeast Asia, Bangkok, Thailand
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
KOTA	Association of Children of the Timorese Heroes / Klibur Oan Timor Aswain
MPLA	Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola / People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NUREP	Núcleos de Resistencia Popular/Nuclei of Popular Resistance
OPMT	Organização Popular da Mulher Timorense / Popular Organisation of Timorese Women
OPE	Office for the Promotion of Equality
PKI	Indonesia Communist Party
PNTL	Polícia National Timor-Leste / Timor-Leste National Police Service
PRD	Peoples' Democratic Party
PT	Partido Trabalhista / Labour Party
RAF	Royal Australian Forces
RDTL	République Democrática de Timor-Leste / Timor-Leste Democratic Republic
RRI	Indonesian National Radio Broadcaster
RTTL	Radio Televizaun Timor-Leste / Timor-Leste Radio and Television Broadcaster
RTPI	Radio Television Portugal International
SAPT	Sociedade Agrícola Pátria e Trabalho / Agriculture Society Motherland and Labour

SCAIT	Sociedade Comercial Agricola e Industrial de Timor / Commercial Agriculture and Industrial Company of Timor
SDP	Strategic Development Plan
TMR	Taur Matan Ruak (President)
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia / Indonesian National Armed Forces
TVTL	Televizaun Timor-Leste / Timor-Leste Television Station
UDT	União Democrática Timorense, Timorese Democratic Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMET	United Nations Assistance Mission for East Timor
UNDIL	University of Dili
UNOTIL	United Nations Office in Timor-Leste
UNPAZ	Universidade da Paz / University of Peace
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration of East Timor
UNTL	Univercidade Nacional Timor Lorosa'e / National University of Timor Lorosa'e
USA	United States of America
VOC	Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, Dutch East India Company
WWII	World War Two

List of Tetum and Other Non-English Terms

A	A'an	Self
	Abut	Roots
	Adat	Tradition, Culture
	Aforramento (Portuguese)	Tenure
	Aldeia (Portuguese)	Village
	Aman	Father
	Amo	Priest
	Atan	Servants
	Atu	In Order to (verb)
B	Barlake	Man-Woman Family Traditional Union
	Barlakeada-o	Refers to a traditional de facto union (in modern times)
	Bealan	Ancestors
	Bee	Water
	Belak	Traditional Golden disk
	Biti Bo'ot	Traditional Mat (Big)
	Bua malus	Betel Nut
D	Datos	Liurai relatives who occupied positions of authority
	Deportados (Portuguese)	Political exiles
	Doben	Beloved
E	Ema	People
	É (Portuguese)	Is (verb)
F	Fatin	Place
	Fakar	Spill
	Feto	Woman
	Fintas (Portuguese)	Taxes (during colonial times)
	Foho	Mountain
	Foinsa'e	Youth
	Folin	Value, price
H	Hakarak	Want (verb)
	Halo	To Do (verb)
	Hamulak	Pray, Call upon the spirits
	Hanesan	Like, Same
	Hau	I
	Hatene	To Know
	Hena	Cloth
	Hosi	From
	Husun	Requested
I	Identidade (Portuguese)	Identity
	Iha	In
	Inan	Mother
	Inan-Aman	Parents
J	Jeito (Portuguese)	Way of being
K	Ka	Or
	Kesi	Tie
	Klamar	Soul
	Klosan	Youth, Not yet married
	Kolegas	Friends, peers, colleagues
	Knua	Hamlet
	Kultura	Culture
L	La	Not (negation)
	Labarik	Child
	Lafaek	Crocodile

	Lakohi	Does not want
	Laran	Inside
	Lia	Ceremony, Ritual
	Lian	Language
	Lian Lokal	Local Language
	Liurai	Traditional King
	Lisan	Culture, History
	Lorico	Lyrebird
	Lorosa'e	East (from)
	Loromonu	West (from)
	Luhu	Small basket
	Lulik	Sacred, Forbidden, Holy
M	Mala'e	Foreigner
	Mama-Kolo	Wet-nurse
	Mane	Man
	Masin	Salt
	Metan	Black
	Moris	To live, To be Born (verb)
	Morten	Traditional Necklace
	Movimento (Portuguese)	Movement
N	Nain	Owner
	Nanis	Original, Indigenous
	Nian	Belongs to
	Nudar	As, Like
	Nurak	Young, Green
O	Oan	Son, Daughter
	Otas	Mentality, Maturity
P	Português	Portuguese
R	Rai	Land, Country, Nation
	Raksaasa (Sanskrit)	Demon
	Ran	Blood
	Rasik	Own
	Reinu	People
	Resistir	To Resist
S	Sasan	Things
	Saida	What
	Senti	To Feel (verb)
	Sidadaun	Citizen
	Sidadania	Citizenship
	Sira	They
	Suku	Village
	Surik	Traditional Sword
T	Tais	Traditional Cloth
	Timoroan	Timorese
	Timur (Indonesian)	East
	Transmigrasi (Indonesian)	Population resettlement program
	Tuir	To follow
U	Uma	House
	Uma-Kain	Home, Household
	Uma-Lulik	Sacred House
V	Vencer (Portuguese)	To Win (verb)

Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis was elaborated based on qualitative research conducted primarily in Timor-Leste (Dili and Districts) but also in Portugal (Lisbon) and in Australia (Melbourne) between 2008 and 2013. It is also based on lived experience on the field with the subject matter of the research project, a journey that started even before the enquiry into Timoroan national identity became the topic of academic enquiry for the researcher.

This thesis focuses on the historical, ideological, political and personal-collective transitions of Timor-Leste for approximately 500 years culminating in it becoming a fully-fledged sovereign, and the first 'new' nation-state of the 21st Century, and that are still ongoing as the country undertakes these transitions within a globalised context.

The transition of Timor-Leste to independence and nationhood is the result of a long process marked by events, in their majority violent and culturally degrading, yet the Timorese or Timoroan core, or the invisible thread that unites a community of ethnically diverse indigenous people persisted and matured. It is this invisible thread this thesis refers to as the core of the Timoroan, that which defines all East Timorese as being such with much conviction and fervour.

Timor-Leste is often referred to as the first new nation of the new millennium after it was officially declared by the United Nations as the 191st nation of the world in 2002. Or is it? This thesis will argue and demonstrate throughout that Timor-Leste may be a very recent sovereign State, notwithstanding when referring to it as a Nation, it is of much greater vintage, because it was almost 500 years ago that its, albeit imagined, geographical and social boundaries and fabricated national identity began being concocted by the colonial mind and imposed on the indigenous fabric of those inhabiting the Timor Island.

As an academic and researcher, but foremost as a Timoroan who left Timor-Leste at six days old, on the day of the Indonesian invasion on 7 December 1975 only to return 24 years later a few months after the violent aftermath of the Popular Referendum on 30 August 1999; it was interesting and at times confronting to work on this PhD thesis. To read the literature that continues to be so influential in attempting to define the origins of the Timoroan from 1512 until 1999 and since then has been both enlightening and challenging. As a Timoroan who is as much an 'insider' as an 'outsider' often I questioned and then worked on this thesis as a reflection of whether Timoroan national identity and history, and whether the way these two topics have been written about are appropriate or merely appropriated in particular by the writers, very few of whom are Timoroan.

As a departing point this research project has to acknowledge that not much is known about the Timor Island and the indigenous people that already inhabited it prior to European arrival because the 'outside' world did not perceive it to be civilised.

Prior to Portuguese and Dutch occupation, traders from the Persian Gold, from Java and from China already visited the island, in particular the coastal areas in today's West Timor to trade with the local kings; but these traders never settled. In fact prior to European arrival, Timor and the other islands east of Bali were deemed 'the Lo-ch'a Region', a Chinese translation of the Sanskrit word *raksaasa* meaning demon. From the view of Chinese traders Java was the limit of the civilised world (Jannisa, 1997). Various Chinese texts mention Timor, the oldest of which, the Chu-Fan-Chi dated circa 1250 provide the following description of the island, in particular the kingdoms in the western and the north-western coast of the Timor Island:

> In its mountains only sandalwood grows, in abundance. We exchange it for silver, iron, porcelain, cloths made of cotton and coloured taffeta.
>
> In all there are two locations that act as ports. They possess a local chief. The soil is adequate for the planting of cereals. The climate is irregular; it is hot during the day but cold at night. Men and women cut their hair and use short shirts made of cotton. The price of alcohol and food in the markets are not too high.
>
> Whoever disembarks in Timor gets sick and many end up dying. To avoid this, it is preferred, as much as possible, to remain onboard. Anyone exposed to the wind and the rain will contract a disease that provokes bouts of high fever. This disease affects the vital spirits and will inevitably lead to death.
>
> (Durand, 2009, p. 36)

This possibly helps explain why prior to European arrival not much is documented or known about the Island of Timor and the indigenous people that already inhabited it.

The Arab, Javanese, Malay and Chinese traders did not try to settle in Timor for fear of the *uncivilised demons* inhabiting the island and also for fear of getting sick and dying. On the other hand civilising-efforts, evangelisation, profit and ethnic subjugation were the basis upon which the first contacts between the European powers or the *mala'e* (foreigner) and the Timoroan were made. With these intents came also the hierarchy of ethnicity, that is, European whiteness is superior, any other grading of ethnic skin colour is gradually and hierarchically inferior. Aesthetically also, it was about what the *mala'e* saw and perceived according to European views at the time. For example women showing their

breasts=primitive; living in thatched-roof dwellings=primitive; eating with bare hands=primitive; ultimately the Timoroan they could not understand=primitive.

> We can consider as primitive the Timorese people when the Portuguese first landed in the island, although, before us, it [the island] was dominated by peoples of high civilization and culture.
>
> (Martinho, 1943, p. 2)

It was the carving of colonial boundaries that separated the island into East and West and that separated the Timoroan[4], to the East in being part of Portugal until 1975, from the rest of the Ema Timor (People of Timor) that live in the contemporary western half of the Timor Island that was under Dutch East Indies until 1949 and that since then became part of the Indonesian Republic.

Nevertheless, literature demonstrates there are two fundamental ways in which new nation-states coming from a colonial experience have emerged or become-nations in the late twentieth century and even in the twenty-first century as recent world events continue to demonstrate. The first fundamental way is an expansionist one, in which (new) nations grow in size by absorbing territories rather than breaking into smaller nations such as Indonesia and more recently Russia. The second is through a reductionist way, in which out of larger nations, new nations emerge as separate stand-alone sovereign entities, such as the case of Timor-Leste. This research project demonstrates Timor-Leste has emerged from both the expansionist (Colonialism and Illegal Occupation) and reductionist (Post Independence Referendum) models in its process of nation becoming.

This thesis also looks at and questions the types of historical viewpoints and ideologies that are merging, meshing and moulding the Timoroan and Timor-Leste into the future. An overview of the history of Timor-Leste will be offered and re-interpreted beginning from what was already there pre-European arrival, during colonial times, through Indonesian occupation and during the United Nations presence. Over two chapters, this research project

[4] Timoroan/Timor Oan/Ema Timor/Ema Timor Oan – Even though throughout the thesis the preferred term to refer to the East Timorese is Timoroan and despite a distinction being made between the Timoroan and the Ema Timor, both terms and variations of its spelling are used contemporarily to refer to the East Timorese in Timor-Leste. This thesis opted for using Timoroan rather than Ema Timor because Timoroan is the term most commonly used by the respondents and in general in Timor-Leste to describe the East Timorese. It may be that in future one or the other term or even a new term is co-opted as the official denominator for the East Timorese but currently the term most commonly used by the Timorese is Timoroan.

will provide a re-interpretation of key historical events and ideological rationalizations marking the close to 500 years of foreign occupation of Timor-Leste.

The thesis then sheds light on who the Timoroan are from the Timoroan participants and respondents perspectives and worldviews and debate whether academia has moved away from those earlier narratives of the *exotic* Timoroan; and how and where did it move away from that first name-calling, that is, the first reference to the indigenous of the Timor island.

This thesis and its analysis augments understanding on how the Timoroan learns to be Timoroan and the socialisation processes that accompany such identity development, but paying particular focus to the socialisation processes around Timoroan national identity development. This thesis looks in particular at the experiences of those Timoroan the Constitution of Timor-Leste, in Section 3 qualifies as *sidadaun nanis* (indigenous citizens) of Timor-Leste, rather than the *sidadaun husun* (citizens of acquired/requested citizenship).

Indigenous Timoroan citizens are in essence ethnic citizens belonging to the communities of descent that compose Timorese society. Thus this thesis looks at what it means to be an *Timoroan nanis* (Indigenous Timoroan) in regards to his or her learning and socialisation processes, identity (self-collective and national) and particular elements of Timoroan national identity (Section 6.1, p.163) - emotional (to 'feel' Timoroan (Section 6.2, p.169), cultural (lisan and Uma Lulik (Sections 6.3 and 6.4, p.178-190), symbolic (national symbols (Section 6.5, p. 197), religious (Section 6.6, p.202), and linguistic (national, official and working languages, (Section 6.7, p.207-240).

This research study does not purport to be a comprehensive handbook on these issues, merely a glimpse into a whole area of research that is still being undertaken. Nevertheless this academic glimpse represents a good start and a road map that points and alerts future researchers to look at the experience of the Timoroan through their lived experiences and their particular worldviews rather that imposing preconceived notions, thus running the risk of further diluting and damaging original indigenous knowledge.

1.1 Research Overview

This project examines the experience of Timor-Leste as one of the world's *newest* (newest being a contested notion in this thesis) nation and the complex process of nation formation, including, in particular, the complex task of defining the new citizenry of contemporary Timor-Leste. The thesis will look and discuss the key agents of socialisation of Timoroan national identity.

Timor-Leste was initially imagined and formed for the most part not out of an indigenous national project but as the result of imposed historical, colonial modern nation-building exercises. It was created by a long process, in part by a legacy of close to five hundred years of Portuguese colonisation and indirect administration; by 24 years of brutal Indonesian Military Occupation; and finally through three years of United Nations (UN) Transitional Administration before an indigenous State finally took over the affairs of Timor-Leste as a sovereign Nation-State.

Timor-Leste is considered by the international community as one of the youngest nations in the world; however, this research project argues that Timor-Leste is a by-product of the colonial imagination. It was because and due also to the colonial imagination, it could conceive of itself as a much older nation. It was also the colonial imagination that was initially responsible for uniting disparate ethnic kingdoms with distinct cultures and languages; forced to unite through strategic allegiances towards common goals. This was manifest in the expression and attempts that finally allowed Timor-Leste to become a sovereign nation in its own right.

This thesis demonstrates Timor-Leste did not just become a nation in 2002, but it was an entity operating as a nation, as later defined by the west post World War II, almost half a century ago, when its geographical and social borders were first demarcated by imperial and colonial design and when its people were separated and to the East the Timorese were given an albeit imposed and abstract, new identity, of being European by virtue of being the Portuguese of Oceania. In 2002 Timor-Leste became a sovereign new Nation-State, thus since then Timor-Leste has been nation-state building which is precisely why this thesis does not use the term nation building for the process Timor-Leste is currently going through.

It was close to half a millennium ago the inhabitants of modern Timor-Leste were first given a collective imagined identity, that of being *Português* or Portuguese. Then, in 1975, after a brief moment of independence, Timor-Leste once again was illegally and brutally annexed into Indonesia and given an imposed new identity, of being *Orang Indonesia* or Indonesian.

Thus contemporary Timoroan were at one point or another during the course of their history imagined and constructed as either Portuguese or Indonesian, and sometimes both and even contested by both, before becoming fully-fledged Timoroan. This has, in turn, had a significant impact on attitudes toward the Nation and collective notions of Timoroan national identity.

If there is now an identifiable nation that is The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (RDTL), then presumably there must also be Timoroan endowed with a Timorese national identity.

This thesis examines the process of learning and becoming Timoroan.

This research thesis aims to cast light on these matters, and in doing so demonstrate how Timor-Leste has its own distinctive national collective identity around the notion of *Timoroan* that offer challenges to current discourses and narratives of nation and state building and national identity formation in Timor-Leste.

1.2 Scope

This academic inquiry, then, examines the complexities of national-identity within the broader narratives and discourses of the nation by making particular reference to the experience of Timor-Leste. Specifically, it examines the socialisation processes involved in creating national identity and the role of crafting a national identity that supposedly embraces all Timoroan regardless of geographical or social location or notions of ethnic identity entitlement. Even thought this research project only deals with *sidadaun nanis* (indigenous citizens) it acknowledges the ethnic diversity of the Timoroan, in particular in reference to those Timorese whom by acquired citizenship, may not have any ethnic links to the indigenous fabric of Timorese society but who nonetheless are constitutionally recognized as being Timorese, albeit at this stage not Timoroan. This thesis also does not make any distinction between the different ethnic mixes of indigenous Timoroan. The Timoroan are a very mixed people that is, not only mixed between different ethnic indigenous groups of the Island of Timor but also mixed with Chinese, Portuguese, Indian, Arab and Indonesians, whom historically have had a significant presence also in the Island. But in what regards *sidadania nanis* (indigenous citizenship), according to Sections 3, Article 2a) as long as one-parent of the person claiming to be Timoroan, is born in Timor, indigenous citizenship can be claimed.

There is no doubt Timor-Leste needs a cohesive and uniting national identity in order to overcome divisions (including ethnic) that are the source of much anxiety in the country and to be able to operate as a pluralistic democratic nation. Such a nation must be able to embrace and accommodate political and ethnic differences while at the same time being capable of working toward common goals.

To date no such study exists of the relationship between nation formation, national identity and the socialisation processes inherent to this in the Timor-Leste context. The study will, therefore, be the first of its kind and will mark an original contribution to knowledge.

The specific research questions this body of research work will address and discuss in the last part of the thesis are thus:

- *What role does the historical narrative of Timor-Leste play in formulating and providing Timor-Leste (the nation) with a distinctive Timoroan (national identity)?*
- *How does the Timoroan learn to be and from whom?*
- *How might we best understand the emotional, cultural, religious, symbolic and linguistic markers and processes 'constructing' Timoroan national identity in contemporary Timor-Leste?*

1.3 Thesis Outline

The thesis is divided into two main parts with each part including chapters with introductions and sub-sections and ending in final remarks. The thesis has been structured in a logical manner. An overview of the way in which the thesis has been structure is provided below.



Figure 1.: Thesis Structure.

Chapters 1 and 2 outline the intention of the thesis and the contribution to expansion of knowledge on nation formation, national identity and the socialisation processes of national identity formation within the Timor-Leste context. Chapter 1 also offers an insight into how the thesis is structured for easier readability. Chapter 2 discusses the process of design and the research undertaken and how the data of was collected, transcribed, coded and analysed.

This thesis is then divided in two Parts, each containing additional chapters. Part 1 contextualises the experiences and path taken by Timor-Leste as a nation. It positions our understanding of the circumstances that marked the long process of nation-becoming that Timor-Leste went through. The process of nation-becoming of Timor-Leste took almost 500 years to complete and it can be said to have occurred between circa 1512-2002. It is crucial to understand what this almost 500-year long process of nation-becoming consisted of in order to understand the debates offered by Part 2 of this thesis. Part 2 advances our understanding of the Timorese/Timoroan contextualised by the experience of the respondents of this thesis of the topic at hand; Timoroan national identity.

Part 1 of the thesis is composed of Chapters 3 and 4. These two chapters will offer what I refer to as the perpectivation of Timor-Leste that is putting into academic and historical perspective the nation of Timor-Leste and its national identity.

In Chapter 3 the theoretical frameworks of the nation are explored in relation to the emergence of Timor-Leste as a nation. The nation is explored from its imaginary and historic perspectives. In particular a discussion is made about the imagination of the Portuguese that allowed it to expand its land border beyond the seas. The thesis also discusses the colonial imagination that fuelled the newly established Republic of Indonesia to imagine it could take-over Timor-Leste. The thesis reflects on the fact these two typologies of sociological imagination served only to fuel the imagination of the Timoroan that one day they could be an independent nation and people with a sovereign land. The chapter then discusses the role of the United Nations in constructing post-conflict and post-colonial nations such as Timor-Leste and the dialectics and discourses around this influence on nation building. The thesis then alludes to the notion of Timor-Leste as a new nation within its theoretical contextualisation. The thesis finally moves to the ethnic contextualisation of the nation of Timor-Leste and explores the nation in regard its ethnic dimension.

Chapter 4 re-interprets the narration of the history of Timor-Leste from a Timoroan perspective.

In Part Two of this Thesis starting in Chapter 5, focus is shifted to the socialisation and learning processes existing in Timor-Leste that assist the Timoroan to learn and to become a functioning member of society. From this chapter onwards the respondents of this research project are called in to assist in our understanding of key issues.

Chapter 6 addresses the notions of Timoroan identity, social identity, self and national identity in context.

Chapter 7 contextualises and allows the data to contest other salient elements of national identity such as feeling Timoroan, culture, the role of the sacred and sacred houses and the language situation in Timor-Leste.

Chapter 8 closes more so than concludes the efforts of this research project and points ways forward in relation to Timoroan national identity.

1.4 Research Contribution

This research project contributes to an expansion of the body of knowledge on the topic of nation-becoming, nation-building and national identity construction in nations with similar experience to that of Timor-Leste. It also presents and outlines the paradigms of nation-hood and national-identity formation present in the country.

This research project has two overarching goals. The first is to shed light on how the Timoroan learns about him or herself as a national being regardless of ethnic make-up or individual characteristics. In doing this, the thesis will attempt to contribute and expand on the work done by Leach's (2002) (Leach, 2012) (Leach, Scambary, Clarke, Feeny, & Wallace, 2013) on East Timorese attitudes towards national identity.

This research study will also augment understanding of the development of Timoroan national identity by attempting to link the efforts of different agents of socialisation such as the Family, Peers, Educational Institutions (including the Church), the Media and the Timorese State, in asserting and facilitating the personality or identity of the nation; and will increase understanding of particular elements of national identity.

Chapter 2: Research Design

Part One of this thesis (Chapters 3 and 4) explores the particular historical perspectives and narratives of nation formation present and emergent in Timor-Leste since the arrival of the first fleet of Europeans to the Island of Timor in 1512 and their continued presence until 1975, after which the half island was once again occupied for 24 years until 1999 by Indonesian forces, and from 1999 until 2002 under total administration by the United Nations.

Part Two (Chapters 5 and 6) seeks to empirically advance the understanding of Timoroan national identity in contemporary Timor-Leste with the empirical component of this research project designed to seek to encourage and in many respects challenge respondents to actively participate in the discussion so a better understanding of the issue can developed. The aim of the field research work was to seek the particular views of a selection of Timoroan respondents about notions of Timoroan or Timorese national identity in Timor-Leste. This thesis did not attempt to research the views of Timoroan in Diaspora or Timoroan under the age of 18 or over the age of 50 years old.

This chapter outlines the methodology employed and the methods used to elicit the data gathered through the process of collection that took place between 2008 until 2013.

Qualitative research methods were used to conduct over 100 interviews during my regular presence, as the researcher, in Timor-Leste from 2008 until 2013. I decided the research project would focus in a particular age grouping of Timoroan, that is, those aged between 18-29 years old (76% of respondents), even though some were aged between 30-49 (24% of respondents), and one respondent was over 50. Having a larger percentage of respondents under 29 years old allows for a greater understanding of the issue of Timoroan national identity that will be more relevant for a contemporary Timor-Leste given that more than half of Timor-Leste's population is under 25 years old according to the Population and Housing Census of Timor-Leste (2010).

Despite the high number of informal and formal interviews conducted for this research project (over 100 included), at the end of the data collection process, 75 respondents were formally interviewed qualitatively through in-depth interviews and through focus-group discussions. Out of these 75 interviews 62 interviews were transcribed for subsequent analysis; and 13 interviews were used for initial guidance, testing and validation of concepts and ideas but not transcrided for use in the final analysis.

2.1 Field Research Preparation

Much preparation for the interviews and field work was conducted in Melbourne prior to the regular trips and residence in Timor-Leste from 2008 until 2013.

An extensive body of literature was reviewed to develop the focus of the empirical component of the research. The process to develop an interview guide (Appendix 1) to assist me in the semi-structured interviews was crucial so the research process could be conducted with minimal degree of control over the answers of the respondents whilst at the same time in-keeping with the main areas of focus to be researched.

The questions were asked in the semi-structured interviews. The information provided by the literature provided was tested and validated against information provided by the respondents, formal and informal, through informal guiding interviews or pilot interviews, in the field, and the research methods were adapted and developed in accordance with new and relevant information, and as the research process was underway.

A literature review of qualitative research methods and advice from the supervisors of this research project were used to inform and develop the format and coherent style of the semi-structured interviews and the question guide crucial to the success of the research project.

This section explains the choices and rationale taken in developing approaches to the research process.

2.2 Methodology

This thesis incorporates two modes of inquiry.

Part One of this thesis uses a critically interpretive approach to the narration of Timor-Leste's history from a Timoroan perspective. The theoretical framework used to interpret the narrative of Timor-Leste is simply from the perspective of the Timoroan. Timor-Leste's history has thus far been written not by the Timoroan even though it is our history. Our history, from our birth to our destiny has been largely appropriated by the coloniser and the invaders and even by development workers and academic researchers and historians who have come to our shores and told our history with particular truths. But whose interest does the narration of our history serves? And how appropriate is it to continue to do so now that Timor-Leste is a sovereign nation-state? Even historian Durand (2009), a French historian who wrote Timor-Leste's history book in French that was subsequently translated into

Portuguese and Tetum to make it more accessible to the Timoroan; in his introduction makes it clear that his hope is that his history book on Timor-Leste will encourage the Timorese to write their own history.

This is precisely also one of aims of this thesis and of this critically interpretive approach to the narration of Timor-Leste history from a Timoroan perspective that is to attempt to inspire future Timoroan historians to do what authors such as Australian historian Henry Reynolds (1981) in the classic 'The Other Side of the Frontier: Aboriginal Resistance to the European invasion of Australia' and Dee Brown (1970) in his classic book on the History of American West 'Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: an Indian history of the American West' do. The authors were able to reinterpret and re-write known history from the other side, from the side of the indigene and in doing so shift the focus of historical accounts from the coloniser and the occupiers to the indigene.

What is attempted in Part One of this thesis is more along the vein of ideological (necessary and morally justifiable) revisionism rather historical (rigorous and sound scholarship in historiography) revisionism of Timor-Leste's history (Carter, 2011).

The sources and the facts of Timorese history re-interpreted in this thesis are virtually the same as those used by non-Timoroan to tell our history but what is attempted is the writing of a re-interpreted narrative of Timorese history as the Timoroan may have experienced it. It is intended also that in doing this, another version of known history that is also plausible emerges and that adds a new dimension to what type of Nation Timor-Leste is and that will inform the type of Timoroan national identity discussed in the second part of this thesis.

Part Two uses a qualitative research methods approach, employed to generate data that is used in the empirical chapters of this thesis. This research project uses qualitative research methodology – in-depth interviews and focus group discussions – to explore the elements of Timoroan national identity and the ways in which national identity is learnt and socialised in Timor-Leste; in essence where and how Timorese learn to be in relation to the supra or national level rather than the micro and macro or local levels.

The qualitative method also allowed me to construct, through an interactive process between interviewer and interviewees, the social reality of the audiences (Newman, 1997). This was done in order to obtain an emic perspective based on the respondent's viewpoints and thus ensuring their voices are represented (Lapan, Quartaroli, & Riemer, 2012).

Qualitative research methods aim to allow the researcher to discover and understand a particular topic, and for this research project the topic of Timoroan national identity and the socialisation processes around it, through immersion in the data (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006).

The generalised data I expected to gather was on Timoroan (national identity) and was part of a calculated research effort, in that by immersing myself in the data and the topic does not entail I was researching arbitratirly much to the contrary the research conducted was calculated because from the onset, I made reference to established research procedures on national identity such as using the ISSP National Identity Questionnaire and the Constitution of Timor-Leste as the basis for developing the interview guide referred to previously. This guide assisted me greatly in the data collection process. I used rigorous techniques in the way I approached respondents, and gave then the Human Research Ethics Information Sheet (Appendix 2) and the Human Research Ethics Consent Form (Appendix 3) prior to commencing the interviews. All interviews used in this thesis were recorded and transcribed so that what respondents said was turned into text that could be subsequently coded for analysis.

It was important for this research project to enable the interviewees to speak (Kvale, 1996). This was particularly needed when making reference to certain more challenging topics such as Portuguese language given that most of the respondents did not have an active participating voice in deciding to make Portuguese the co-official language, alongside Tetum, of Timor-Leste as enshrined in the 2002 Constitution.

The use of the qualitative research method enabled the respondents to speak openly about the ways in which they experience Timoroan national identity and to share both positive and negative insights about such experiences; and also for the researcher as a Timoroan to be part of the interview process.

To ensure the authenticity of the project, it was imperative to qualitatively interview Timoroan in Timor-Leste (as opposed to Diaspora Timoroan communities) and in the most spoken official language (Tetum) to obtain what is referred to as the *actor's point of view* (Lewis-Back, 2004, p. 983).

It was important to use qualitative research methods in this research project given the five key features of qualitative research is that it allows researchers to study the meaning of people's lives, under real-world conditions; to represent the views and perspectives of the respondents of this study; to cover the contextual conditions within which the respondents live; to contribute insights into existing or emerging concepts that may help to form Timoroan

human social behaviour; and to use multiple sources rather than relying on a single source of evidence (Yin, 2010).

The formal interviewing process was conducted using a semi-structured interviewing situation based on a clear plan kept constantly in mind but characterised by minimum control over the respondent's responses (Bernard, 2011). This is a particularly important consideration I had to take into account given I was not only the researcher but also a Timoroan who being older than the respondents, having a different demeanour and who is undertaking my PhD studies, attracts an almost instant level of authority within the Timoroan context. Thus there was a cautionary level of discretion exercised during the research process to ensure any question and comments by me as the researcher did not influence or lead the respondents' answers, opinions and thoughts. A purposeful non-control demeanour over the responses of respondents was exercised during the whole interviewing and research process.

The informal interviewing process to 25 respondents was conducted using an unstructured interviewing situation that went on all the time (Bernard, 2011). These were made in coffee shops, in markets, at church, during family gathering, in essence sporadically and ad-hoc, where the opportunity arouse to talk about the topic of Timoroan national identity. These individuals, at a precise moment or through casual and unstructured encounters contributed towards a better understanding of the nuances of the topic without there being necessarily the prerequisite for them to become formal respondents of the research process.

The semi-structured interviews were open-ended, but followed a general interview-guide covering a list of questions around particular topics with possibility of new questions being formulated as the interviews unfolded (Bernard, 2011). An interview guide was used during the in-depth interviews and focus group discussions to guide me in maintaining a linear line of questioning and to serve as a reminder of the themes the research project wished to explore.

The data gathered through this research process derived from qualitative research methods from four field-based activities: interviewing, observing, collecting and examining (materials), and feeling (Yin, 2010).

It is important to highlight feeling or my own intuition in the undertaking of this research project because as a Timoroan researcher who grew up in the Diaspora I had to use my intuition and feeling to be able to neutrally navigate the research process and not in any way jeopardise and influence the answers gathered. Intuition and feeling allowed me to at times sense when respondents were answering questions a certain way because I am also

Timoroan and so that I could go back and reformulate the same question(s) to obtain an honest representation or answer to specific questions asked.

A good example of this pertained to a question about the way Timorese look physically where I as the researcher had to distance myself from the research process and rephrase several times the same question as to not elicit answers from respondents that discounted (as much as possible) their empathy towards me as a Timoroan who in essence did not correspond to their perceptions of what a *real* Timorese or Timoroan looks like physically. As Liamputtong and Ezzy (2006) note, qualitative research should also be reflexive in that the researcher should take constant stock of his or her actions and role in the research process and subject these to the same critical scrutiny as the rest of the data.

2.3 Analysis of Qualitative Data

There exists a number of ways in which researchers analyse qualitative data. This research project employed qualitative methods for collecting data and the analysis of the data gathered was achieved through in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. The analysis of the data collected was done using an interpretative approach.

The interpretative approach was used because qualitative researchers treat social action and human activity as text; as such the social action and human activity that was gathered throughout this research project through interviews and observational data was transcribed into written text to enable its subsequent analysis (Berg, 2004).

After the data (interviews and observational) of 63 formal interviews was transcribed and written into text, the first or initial step was to identify the main units of analysis. Due to the fact an interview guide was developed to help guide the interview process, I was able to identify the codes or units or criteria prior to searching for this in the data, which constitutes a feature of content analysis. Nine units of analysis or criteria of selection were identified against which the data was sorted and coded for analysis. By identifying the units of analysis, during the process of reading the data, I was able to identify the units as they appeared throughout the data and code these accordingly (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006).

After the units of analysis were identified and the data coded and sorted into blocks of text, these were analysed using discourse analysis to produce the social reality of the respondents; made real through discourses.

Discourse analysis can be defined as a way of writing or speaking that constructs a particular type of knowledge with practical and rhetorical implications (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006).

Discourse analysis has been defined and used across many disciplines including sociology, psychology, communications, linguistics and education and despite it not being a unified body of research and theory, there are a number of central themes in the approach that are shared. Some authors think of discourse analysis as having four main themes. First it has a concern with discourse itself, that is, all forms of talk and text. Second there is the view of language as constructive and constructed, that is, discourse describes and constructs reality. Third discourse analysis puts an emphasis upon discourse as a form of action, that is, discourse has a social 'doing' function. Finally, fourth it has conviction in the rhetorical organisation of discourse, that is, discourse establishes one version of the world in the face of competing or conflicting versions (Gill, 2000).

Discourse Analysis has also been described as the study of language-in-action (Gee, 2011). Delving more into the notion of Discourse Analysis, the data was analysed using an interactional discourse analysis approach that is concerned with how social reality is accomplished through every day talk. Interactional discourse analysis begins with the assumption that language is essentially social action and aims to empirically demonstrate how discourses in everyday talk can assist accomplish reality (Marvasti, 2004). The author also defines the word discourse as a way of knowing and speaking that constructs a particular version of reality, including also enabling the way in which the discourses themselves are interpreted.

The second part of the concept refers to analysis, that is, the search for patterns in data and for ideas that help explain the patterns (Barnard R. , 2011). Discourses about Timor and the Timoroan have since colonial times, during Indonesian times and even during the United Nations times, in the minds and rationales of the colonisers and the occupiers, been tainted in what Focault terms the politics of discourse: what political interests it serves, how it participates in the politics of truth, what the speaker's benefit is, who speaks on behalf of whom and what particular subject positions emerge from it (Barker, 1998).

Discourses about Timor have also always been about power, in particular those who held the power over Timor-Leste and over the fate of the Timoroan, that is, the power to subjugate, to manipulate, to punish, even to kill, and to re-construct. But power and its deepest effects everywhere is inequality, as power differentiates and selects, includes and excludes (Blommaert, 2005). Thus Timor-Leste's and the Timoroan history have been largely

about the power the mala'e (foreigners) had to differentiate and select and include and exclude the reality and fate of the Timoroan.

Following in the Focaultian tradition, discourse comprises all forms of meaningful semiotic human activity seen in connection with social, cultural, and historical patterns and development of use (Blommaert, 2005). Authors on Discourse Theory, including Bloommaert, look at discourse as language-in-action and thus give due attention to both language and to action, that is the use of language in discourse and the social nature of discourse.

From a post-structuralist feminist perspective, discourse(s) produce meaning and subjectivity rather than reflecting them and it is more than linguistic meaning. It is material and is located in institutions and practices which define difference and shape the material world, including bodies (Weedon, 1999). Thus discourses constitute the social but also reproduce social structures that are based around power.

As Chouliarake and Fairclough (1999), from a Critical Discourse Analysis perspective note, people stand in different relationships to discourse depending on their position in social structures. The position of the Timoroan during colonial structures was in essence as the primitive and during Indonesian times, or at least to provide justification for the invasion to the western powers in 1975 as the communist. During this research project though the Timoroan respondents' perspectives and discourse were given by a sovereign people and perhaps this helps explain much of the conviction and nationalistic sentiment of the responses and the overall tone of this thesis.

Nevertheless discourse is not merely about power and those who yield such power; not even just about historical power such as the types in question throughout Part One of this thesis. One particular criticism of discourse is that it is also not just about the western or advanced society discourse and it must also be seen through a cultural approach or lens which is the purpose of the Cultural Discourse Approach (Shi-xu, 2005).

Siu-xu (2005) argues that discourse theory at the international level is largely western in perspective and universalised to the detriment of indigenous or native discourses whereby relevant concepts from non-western and Third World nations are virtually excluded.

At this stage and to conclude, there is not one uniform and single 'right way' to analyse discourse because any discourse analytical project establishes its own connections between the researcher's assumptions about the world (theory), the topic being investigated, the interpretation of 'discourse' which is adopted, the materials to be analysed (data) and the relevance of those materials to the topic (Taylor, 2013).

For the purposes to this study the above reviewed literature will suffice to demonstrate the importance of using discourse analysis that is contextualized to reflect the sovereign perspectives of the Timoroan respondents of this study as the basis for the analysis of the data generated here.

The overall topic of the research conducted was on Timoroan national identity through the perspectives and understanding of respondents whom in their majority were young Timoroan. For all of the respondents, young and older, this was the first time they had broached the topic of Timoroan national identity and had to answer questions about what they thought or believed about the abstract notion of the national identity of all Timorese.

In this sense, discourse analysis was an appropriate methodology used to analyse the data collected because the aim here is then to (de)construct the social reality of Timoroan national identity. Thus this thesis attempts to reposition and bring in the sovereign perspective of the Timoroan in the discursive narration of history and culture and in the discursive construction of the Timoroan national identity.

I am mindful this is a particular version of this reality, that is, that of the respondents of this research project nevertheless by analysing the narratives offered by both the literature and the discourse of the respondents on the different themes identified from the within the overall topic of Timoroan national identity, a clearer picture about the national identity of the Timoroan slowly emerges that will be further completed with future research to be conducted on the subject.

2.4 Participant Sampling

A departing point here is that this study was not interested in validating or merely recording Stuart Hall's (1997) hegemonic viewpoint that is the dominant viewpoint of what and who is a Timoroan. The intention was never to find out what the fathers of the nation[5] or what other political leaders think about Timoroan national identity or the reasoning behind decisions such as turning the colonial language Portuguese, into one of the official languages of a sovereign Timor-Leste. Had this research project taken that trajectory it would be replete with political grandstanding and reflect political strategy rather than worldviews of what it is to be Timoroan from the viewpoint of the generation who did not have any apparent and real power over the decisions made on their behalf in the lead up to independence in 2002.

[5] The 1975 leaders of the first political parties and the resistance leaders who have since transitioned into politics post-independence are often refered to as the *fathers of the nation*.

This research project used a mixed sampling method of qualitative research. The selection of respondents was achieved through a *snowball sampling method*. The Timoroan are tightly connected and one of the most reliable ways of getting access to the Timoroan is through some kind of personal referral. As such, the use of snowball sampling (also called network, chain referral, or reputation sampling) was an adequate method (Newman, 1997). The process consisted of interviewing respondents and subsequently requesting respondents to refer me to others in their networks that they believe would be willing to participate in the in-depth and focus group discussions. Respondents were also picked through other referrals.

The goal of qualitative research methods is to ensure the sample of respondents is statistically representative and that the findings can be confidently generalised to the population from which the sample is taken (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006).

In order to determine my sample of respondents I initially conducted 25 pilot or guiding interviews to respondents using unstructured interviews. Through these guiding interviews it became apparent that interviewing respondents from different generations and varied backgrounds or social and professional categories entailed interviewing respondents from very different age ranges with often disparate views of the research topic. For instance interviewing university students entailed interviewing respondents whose ages were below 25 years old whom were too young to have taken active participation in the 24 years of resistance against the Indonesian occupation of the country. On the other hand interviewing politicians and farmers and clergy involved interviewing respondents aged above 40 which also caused problems because their views had either been shaped by colonial upbringing or resistance fighting or both.

It was necessary for this research project to be effective and valid to focus on researching respondents who were aged between 18 to 30 (new generation) in their majority even though some respondents were aged between 31 to 39 (middle generation), and a smaller number of other Timoroan older than 40 years old (old generation).

During the 24 years of occupation of Timor-Leste by Indonesia an estimated more than 200,000 Timoroan died from starvation, disease and murder. The bulk of the deceased were women and children. Thus a large chunk of the 30 year olds generation of Timoroan is unaccounted for and helps to explain why more than 60 per cent of Timor-Leste's population is less than 25 years of age, whilst only a bit over 10 per cent of the population is between 30 and 39 years old (Timor-Leste, Population and Housing Census of Timor-Leste , 2010).

Therefore to have equal numbers of respondents for each generation would not have enabled this research project to generalise to a specific population and made the nature of this

research project too broad. As such and in order to make the scope of this research project more focussed I subsequently decided on a more specific sampling frame composed by respondents who fell in their majority in the broad classification of being a 'Youth'.

The Timor-Leste National Youth Policy (2007) defines youth as those aged from 16 to 30 years. According to the same policy other Tetum terms are commonly used to refer to young people. The terms 'foinsa'e ',' otas nurak 'and' klosan 'are used in Tetum language to describe young people. The term 'foinsa'e' can be translated literally as 'grown recently and might, or might not, be married' or is referred to as 'still an adolescent'. 'Otas nurak' or 'young age' has a meaning similar to 'foinsa'e', referring particularly to adolescents and young people. The word 'klosan' refers to a young unmarried person.

Another sampling bias aside from focussing in a particular age group is that most of the respondents of this research study were university students or employed Timoroan residing mainly in Dili, the capital, all of whom are in one way or another part of the new non-subsistence economy. Nonetheless as will be discussed in later sections, this reality was reflected on by the respondents in that most feel more closely attached to their place of birth, which for most of the respondents of this research was in the districts.

Thus the first sampling frame for respondents of this research project was determined by age. All 62 formal respondents were over the age of 18. The majority or 76% (47 respondents) were Youth aged between 18 and 29. A smaller section 16% (10 respondents) was aged between 30 and 39. An even smaller section 6% (4 respondents) was aged between 40 and 49. Only 2% (1 respondent) was over the age of 50:



Figure 2: Respondents per age composition.

All of the respondents were given and read the HRE Information Sheet and filled and signed the HRE Consent Form that allowed them the option to agree or not to their identity being used in this project; being given a pseudonym; the interviews being recorded/videotaped; and to any or part of the recording being reproduced and published. Both documents were produced in English and Tetum. All of the respondents agreed in the positive to the above options offered, thus below is a matrix of the respondents of this research project.

	Name	Origins	YOB	Occupation
R1	Agostinho da Cruz e Silva	Ossu, Viqueque	1989	University Student
R2	Natalino de C. Sarmento	Bazartere, Liquiça	1989	University Student
R3	Antonio Soares	Ossu, Viqueque	1979	Employed (NGO)
R4	Bendita dos Santos	Watucarbau, Viqueque	1971	Employed (NGO)
R5	Carolino Gonzaga Marques	Mehara, Los Palos, Lautem	1972	Employed (NGO)
R6	Febriana da Costa	Tirilolo, Baucau, Baucau	1983	Employed (NGO)
R7	Fernando Silva	Fatuberlihu/Maubisse, Aileu	1978	Employed (NGO)
R8	Filomena Soares Guterres	Dili, Baucau, Viqueque	1958	Employed (Radio)
R9	Gradiana M. do Carmo	Fatumea, Maukatar, Suai, Covalima	198?	Volunteer
R10	Ivete M. P. Sarmento	Dili, Ermera	1969	Employed (Local Leadership)
R11	Jemito Amaral	Lokona, Suai, Covalima	1986	Volunteer
R12	Joao Magno	Dili, Zumalai, Ainaro	1978	Employed (International Agency)
R13	Juvita Belo	Baucau Kota Lama, Baucau	1971	Employed (NGO)
R14	Lino da Costa	Mehara, Los Palos, Lauten	1983	Employed (PNTL-UIR)
R15	Manuel Correia	Santa Cruz, Dili, Watulari, Makadiki, Viqueque	1963	Employed (Chefe Suku)
R16	Manuel Ximenes	Aloua, Baguia, Baucau, Los Palos, Dili	197?	Employed (NGO)
R17	Martinho	Watulari, Viqueque	197?	Employed (Lecturer)
R18	Rita Pereira	Dili, Baucau, Aileu	1962	Employed (Domestic Worker)
R19	Teresa S.	Los Palos, Buruma, Wailili, Baucau	1965	Employed (Domestic Worker)
R20	Zofimo Corbafo	Dili, Oe-cusse	1985	Employed (Consultant)
R21	Miguel Gonçalves	Liquiça	198?	University Student
R22	Efrem Guterres	Venilale, Baucau	198?	University Student
R23	Maria Isabel	Baucau	198?	University Student
R24	Marciano Hornai	Manufahi	198?	University Student
R25	Quitéria Belo	Baucau	198?	University Student
R26	Maria Auxiliadora	Baucau	198?	University Student
R27	Salvador Carlos	Maliana, Bobonaro, Baucau	1986	Employed (Private)
R28	Isabel Ermelita	Maliana, Bobonaro	1977	Employed (Private)
R29	Ezequiel Freitas	Fatumaka, Baucau	1986	Employed (Private)

R30	Marcelino Correia	Vemassi, Baucau	1987	Employed (Private)
R31	Venidora Oliveira	Los Palos, Lauten	1988	Employed (Private)
R32	Paulina Quintão	Watucarbau, Viqueque	1988	Employed (Private)
R33	Dianto da Conceição	Dili, Los Palos	1985	Employed (Private)
R34	Florina Barreto	Dili, Aileu	1983	Employed (Private)
R35	Aquelino Carceres	Laclo, Manatuto	1988	Employed (Private)
R36	Yustina Atok	Bidau, Dili, Baucau	1988	Employed (Private)
R37	Faustina Pereira	Venilale, Baucau	1989	Employed (Private)
R38	Manuel Batista Soares da Silva	Ossu, Viqueque	1988	Employed (Private)
R39	D. Conceição	Los Palos, Lauten	1991	Employed (Private)
R40	RX	Bobonaro	1991	University Student
R41	Januario Maia	Balibo, Bobonaro	1989	University Student
R42	Filomeno Martins	Ermera	1985	University Student
R43	Natalicia da Conceição Belo dos Santos	Tutuala, Lauten	198?	University Student
R44	Domingas Soares Pereira	Dili, Turiscai, Same, Kelikai, Baucau	1990	University Student
R45	Bernardo Soares Sarmento Cortereal	Dili, Soibada, Same	1989	University Student
R46	Feliciano de Jesus Gonçalves Aleixo	Baucau, Ermera	1988	Employed (NGO)
R47	Carlos da Silva Soares Gonçalves	Bobonaro	1984	Employed (NGO)
R48	Inasia Markes de Jesus Sarmento	Bobonaro	1992	Employed (NGO)
R49	Lurdes de Jesus Godinho	Bobonaro, Dili	1991	Employed (Private)
R50	Leoneto Sarmento	Dili, Aileu	1984	Employed (NGO)
R51	Denancio dos Santos	Lauten	1991	Employed (NGO)
R52	Juliana da Silva	Baucau	1986	Employed (NGO)
R53	Raul Soares	Viqueque, Dili	1984	Employed (NGO)
R54	Carlito Gonçalves	Bobonaro	1980	Employed (NGO)
R55	Maria de Jesus	Ermera	1986	Employed (NGO)
R56	Florencio David Lopes	Baucau, Los Palos	1991	University Student
R57	Isaias Carceres Mendonça	Remexio, Aileu	1991	University Student
R58	Gabriel Cristino Guterres	Venilale, Baucau	1988	University Student
R59	Olivia Leonor de Souza	Fatukuda, Balibo, Bobonaro	1988	University Student
R60	Filisia Do Rego Guterres	Venilale, Baucau	1989	University Student
R61	Jucelina Xavier Guterres	Venilale, Baucau	1990	University Student
R62	Fernando Pires	Same, Dili, Australia	1966	Employed (NGO)
R63 R75		**Interviews recorded but lost and/or not transcribed**		
	R76-R100+ **Informal Guiding Interviews, Not Recorded**			

Table 1: Matrix of the respondents

In terms of gender composition of respondents, this research project made all attempts to interview as many female respondents as male respondents. In this regard, even though slightly more male respondents were interviewed, the research project has an adequate gender balance.

Sampling Size:

- **In-depth Interviews:** total of 25 respondents (13 male respondents and 12 female respondents)



Figure 3: In-depth Interviews (Male/Female).

- **Focus-Group Discussions:** total of six focus groups, total of 50 respondents (30 male respondents and 20 female respondents)



Figure 4: Focus Group Discussions (Male/Female).

- **Informal Guiding Interviews** (or Pilot Interviews): interviews conducted to 25 respondents, ad-hoc and in an unstructured format, to test and validate information gathered through the literature.



Figure 5: Total Respondents.

2.5 In-Depth Interviews and Focus Group Discussions

In all the formal in-depth interviews a voice recorder was used, with the signed consent from the respondents, and it was important for this research project to voice record the interviews because the interviews are a permanent archive of primary information to be used in this research project and in future may be passed on to other researchers exploring the same topic.

It was also important to record the interviews because all interviews were done in Tetum language, which is a language that is not yet developed to the point of facilitating understanding. In order to capture meaning and increase understanding of the data it was crucial to record the interviews so responses could be heard several times and so meaning and intonation could be transcribed more accurately that made interpreting data in Tetum more accurate too. In Chapter 6 in Section 6.5 an analysis on the language situation in Timor-Leste is discussed in greater length.

As a Timoroan researcher and a Tetum speaker I used my own markers and codes to interpret the data offered but I am conscious that interpreting meaning resulting from data that is open for interpretation makes my interpretation even more subjective. With this in mind I

proceeded with strategic caution and conscious of having to be cautious in the way I handled, translated and analysed the data of this research project.

2.6 Analysis of In-Depth Interviews and Focus Group Discussions

This research projects identified eight key units of identification of themes for analysis against which the data was coded and subsequently analysed.

The key units of identification of themes for analysis were:

1. National Symbols	
2. Languages	2.1 Portuguese
	2.2 English
	2.3 Tetum
	2.4 Indonesian
	2.5 Local Languages
3. Religion	
4. Sources of 'Self'	4.1 National Identity
	4.2 Local Identity/Moris Fatin/Ran Fakar
	4.3 Culture/Lisan/Adat
	4.4 Citizenship
	4.5 Participation in the Resistance
	4.6 Lorosa'e/Loromonu
5. Proud to be Timoroan	5.1 Proudest
	5.2 Less Proud
6. Timoroan is Not	
7. Jeito Timor (Timor Behaviour)	7.1 Lori nia a'an hanesan Timoroan
8. Intergenerational Timoroan	

Figure 6: Key units of identification of themes for analysis.

These key units of analyses served two key objectives of this research thesis. First they paint a realistic and generalised to a point picture of the way in which Timoroan born in between the 1970s and the early 1990s perceive and construct national identity. Second the units of anlysis enabled me as the researcher to discover and then critically interpret the way in which national identity is being learnt and socialised in contemporary Timor-Leste by indigenous Timoroan.

Part One: Contextualising Rai Doben (Beloved Land) Timor-Leste

Chapter 3: Becoming-Nation Timor-Leste

A discussion about Timor-Leste as a nation and of the people who currently inhabit the half-island nation, the *Timoroan or Timor Oan,* cannot begin without first a critically interpretive analysis of the literature on the formation of nations and how these theoretical approaches intersect and apply to the Timor-Leste case.

In particular this thesis argues the point of *becoming-nation* because Timor-Leste became a nation rather than going through a concerted or strategic nation-building exercise. The notion Timor-Leste became a nation is more suited to describe the close to 500 years of colonial and illegal occupation of the territory that inspired and forced the successive collective attempts of the Timoroan to self-preserve and ensure the continuity of their indigenous existence. At some point in the course of its history, Timor-Leste began thinking as a nation but it did not yet possess the means to build the nation; instead it built a national identity-in-waiting to take its place in a sovereign Timor-Leste nation in an unforeseeable future.

By understanding how nations come about and the theoretical framework surrounding *nation-becoming* one can try to understand the factors and circumstances, strategic and circumstantial, tangible and intangible that enabled a half island to imagine and think itself a nation and in doing so go against massive odds to become a fully-fledged nation-state.

It is important to make the distinction between Nation-building and State-building.

> Nation-building is the deliberate interest- and ideology-based formation of a national format which creates collective identity and affiliation of the population with the nation-state. State-building is of a rather technical nature and refers to the factual construction of the State system.
>
> (Borgerhoff, 2006, p. 131)

Nation-building, thus, despite being deliberate is more of an ideological awakening that may lead disparate ethnic identities, converging into a collective identity – the Timoroan – occupying the imaginary boundaries of a prospective nation – Timor-Leste. There is no set evidence for when the process of nation-building began in Timor-Leste although State-building is what has been taking place since the country attained its independence in 2002.

Nevertheless and contrary to what (Borgerhoff, 2006) claims; that Indonesia's oppressive occupation from 1975 to 1999 led to the unification of the Timoroan into a nation, this thesis argues this process of nation-becoming started much earlier. As will be argued in

the next chapter, by the time Timor-Leste became an Indonesian province, the Timoroan were already united and unified and imagining themselves part of a nation that was going through a process of becoming.

This discussion only concerns the East part of the Timor-Leste island given the western part of the island belongs to Timor-Leste's largest neighbour, the Republic of Indonesia, one of the regional giants of South East Asia's ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations).



Figure 7: (Above) Regional Map of Timor-Leste.

Figure 8: (Right) Territorial Map of Timor-Leste.

Timor-Leste was perhaps never meant to be, especially because as the name suggests when referring to Timor-Leste one is quite literally talking about the Eastern part only of the Timor Island plus two small islands (Ataúro Island and Jaco Island) and the enclave of Oe-cusse sitting inside West Timor (see map above, dark pink areas).

By reviewing, exploring and critically analysing and interpreting the ways in which nations come to exist and the narratives of history and politics of Timor-Leste, the specific conditions of nation becoming and formation present in the Timorese context can be better understood. The aim of this chapter is not only to draw on but provide a useful critique in so far as appropriate, of some of the leading authors in the area of contemporary nation analysis.

As discussed earlier, narratives about Timor-Leste have always been about power, in particular those who held the power over Timor; power to subjugate, to manipulate, to punish, even to kill, to re-construct and also the power to write history to suit particular needs.

Thus in this regard, was the narrative action of the Portuguese first fleet of possibly documenting the Island of *Timor* and its people the *Timorese* that created Timor within the narrative of Portuguese mythology of giving *new worlds to the world* (a popular discourse of

Portugal's Discoveries Period)? History seems to believe so, in fact that was the exact context in which Timor came to 'exist'. Timor was singled out and commented on and possibly even named as Timor. It was 'discovered' because it had not existed in the imagination of the European prior to European expansion. And during the following 450 years Timor was conceived only as part of Portugal and/or as Dutch.

Timor-Leste narratives have been mainly seen through the perspectives of those in or with power whereby these narratives were in the early days of the colonisation period about the Timoroan as 'primitive and dominated by people of higher civilization and culture' (Martinho, 1943) and 'communist' at the start of the Indonesian occupation in 1975, which then positioned the Timoroan in a different, diametrically opposed and lower relationship to that of the Portuguese and of the Indonesian. This narrative then continued even post-Independence Referendum in 1999 with the United Nations attempting to 'democratize' the Timoroan.

Thus this thesis attempts to reposition and bring in the perspective of the Timoroan in the narration of history and in the construction of the Timoroan national identity. From the onset though this research proposes that nations with a similar experience to that of Timor-Leste, because it would be altogether too ambitious to generalise this claim to encompass all nations, are the product of the imagination because they occur against odds that are greater than the 'impractical' imagination itself. Nonetheless Timor-Leste, in the present day, exists as a fully sovereign 191st nation of the world and in the Timor-Leste case, as will be discussed; imagination became reality, albeit after almost 500 years of attempted subjugation and cultural integration into foreign powers and ideologies.

The concept of an imagined nation is crux to this thesis and will be explored in greater detail in the section that follows, but this research project despite asserting Timor-Leste as it was initially conceived was an imagined nation, this argument will not hold without also acknowledging the other approaches to nation formation that are also applicable to the Timor-Leste context. The thesis acknowledges the colonial and contemporary tools that allowed it to promote itself as such and the decolonization process that gave way to the emergence of the first Indigenous political movements and parties. It also notes the reconstruction effort of building a 'democratic' nation, led by a United Nations Transitional Administration with an unprecedented mandate to fix from the ground up after most of the country was left scorched in 1999. And this thesis also notes in particular the ethnic and indigenous cultural instrumentality that fuelled the imagination of Timor-Leste.

The diagram below helps to illustrate the types of approaches of nation-formation that are applicable to the Timor-Leste case. Each approach will be discussed in greater length in the sections that follow.



Figure 9: The multi-dimensionality of the Timor-Leste Nation-State.

Timor-Leste imagined itself a nation and such an imagination was fuelled by adopted notions of shared race and ethnicity, blood, language(s), religion, culture and political determination that made the Timoroan feel different to the different occupiers – first the Portuguese and then the Indonesians. The Timoroan, by circumstance and by violent events, were lumped together and situated diametrically opposed to the Portuguese and the Indonesians, and anyone who may threaten the Timoroan existential fabric and cosmology.

Timor-Leste's convoluted and violent history is interesting to note and worthy of closer research. Timor-Leste is an imagined nation, in as much as it is a colonial and postcolonial nation. It is also a United Nations and international community rebuilt nation. It is also a contemporary modern as well as an ethnic nation.

Different conceptual and ideological approaches separate writers on the theorisation of the concept of what constitutes a nation, nationalism and national identity topics. Although there is a vast body of literature pertaining to the emergence of nations, authors have

nonetheless struggled to present a universal theorisation on how nations evolve and emerge and what and who exactly constitutes a nation.

The case of Timor-Leste can serve to demonstrate the difficulty in presenting a universal theorisation of nation formation given its tumultuous history can be used to present cases in support of and against any proposed sole theorisation. A literature review of the topic of national emergence and formation is quickly halted by a myriad of ideological variations on the topic. This debate has been raging for some time now.

Due to there not being one universally accepted viewpoint of the emergence of nations and because in later chapters this project will discuss the issue of Timor-Leste and the process it went through in order to be considered a legitimate sovereign nation, it renders a necessity the review of the existing literature on the topic and approaches to nation-formation, in order to begin understanding the type of nation, if any particular type can be ascribed, Timor-Leste was imagined as and became just a little bit over a decade on since independence.

3.1 Imagining Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste did not emerge in 2002 as a sovereign modern nation-state out of a void. Rather, it was the culmination of close to 500 years of *nation-becoming*, even if it was only in the imagination of the Timoroan or the imaginary colonial design of the Portuguese as well as of the Indonesians and that of the United Nations.

This section of the thesis will then discuss the imagination of Timor-Leste that permeated much of its history, initially as part of the Portuguese Empire and Nation, then as the 27th Province of Indonesia; then the imagination the United Nations had for the type of nation Timor-Leste should become. In particular though, this section refers to the imagination of the Timoroan that fuelled the ardent desire to be a fully-fledged Nation-State.

The discussion of the type(s) of imagination that lead to the creation of Timor-Leste take note and refer to two key and influential texts by Eric Hobsbawn (1983) and Benedict Anderson (1983). Particular reference to the two authors, given the influential status of their books, allows for arguments about whose imagination (or invention) came first; that of the coloniser or occupier or that of the Timoroan.

Anderson's book *Imagined Communities* (1983) is very pertinent to the interpretation of Timor-Leste as an imagined nation. Anderson argues that the nation, and perhaps any nation, is an imagined and limited political community:

> The nation is an imagined political community – doubly imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, never meet them, nor even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. The nation is imagined as *limited* because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations.
>
> Anderson (1983, pp. 6-7)

This is a crucial definition of the nation, in particular in what regards the abstract or imaginary notion of it, and also its common-sense logic, but once read, one is automatically drawn to the same logic. No one necessarily knows all the fellow-members of one's nation and will never meet them all. In the case of the Timoroan, and this was something that came through clearly in the research conducted for this thesis, knowing other Timoroan personally, although important, was not preclusive to there being a sense of Timoroan communion, of being Timoroan. And this familiarity was not so much bound or limited by the geographical land boundaries that define the nation due to its history, but more by a sense of imagined self-collective awareness.

It is not so much the point of nationalism or nation that is pertinent here but the notion of *imagination* itself and the role it plays in the formation of nations and national identity, in particular for nations with similar experience to that of Timor-Leste. Even though this thesis does not offer a comprehensive discussion of the term imagination it is important to look at how different authors deal with the concept.

For Jean Paul Sartre (1963) imagination, or knowledge of the image, comes from the understanding of the image; and it is the understanding of the image applied to the material impression produced in the brain, that provides us with a consciousness of the image.

> It possesses this strange property of being able to motivate the actions of the soul. The motions of the brain, caused by the external objects, although they do not resemble the latter, awaken ideas in the soul. The ideas do not come from the motions; they are innate in man. But it is on the occasion of the motions that the ideas appear in consciousness.
>
> (Sartre, 1963, pp. 9-10)

This sense of image with attributed significance is important in the context of Timor-Leste because as is discussed later, all those interviewed in this project have an assertive image of the Timoroan as a national being.

This is clearly the example Timoroan offers because despite there being Timoroan, there were not Timoroan-citizens by virtue of there not being a Timorese nation-state during

the Portuguese colonisation of the island for close to 500 years. There were merely Portuguese citizens. Likewise, there were no Timoroan-citizens during 24 years of Indonesian occupation, merely Indonesian citizens, but this is not to say there were no Timoroan during this period.

As this thesis demonstrates 'Hau Timoroan' (I am Timoroan) a collective-identity has been echoed for centuries, nonetheless, this has not been adequately researched. This reality was voiced by the Timoroan in Diaspora in the early 1990s and documented by Patricia Thatcher when she interviewed refugees from Timor-Leste in Australia for the Master's thesis about their individual identity perception. Her research showed that before 1974 only a 'handful of people' of those able to seek refuge in Australian had been identified strongly as East Timorese. Most had seen themselves as either Portuguese, as Hakka or Chinese, or as members of the many indigenous ethno-linguistic groups (Thatcher, 1992).

This finding even though important reflects mostly the composition of the groups that were able to flee Timor-Leste just before or soon after Indonesia's invasion in 1975: the class of mestizos (half-casts Timorese-Portuguese), the commercial class of Dili or the Hakka-speaking Chinese Community, and the indigenous educated class, whom had access or the means to make the crossing. Most Timoroan stayed behind, locked in the island for the better part of 24 years under the Indonesian occupation. But Thatcher's finding is somewhat logical, of course the Timoroan did not see themselves as East Timorese, there was not an East Timor nation-state they had fled from. They had fled from a Portuguese colony, where they were Portuguese citizens or Chinese commercial traders residing in a Portuguese colony or they were indigenous people belonging to specific clans. How could the Timoroan claim a national identity that did not formally exist and had been denied existence for close to 500 years? Timoroan means more than just East Timorese, Timoroan literally translates as Son or Daughter of Timor. East Timorese is a political State-identity and as is demonstrated in Part 2 and in later chapters of this thesis; Timor-Leste without a State could not have had politically recognised East Timorese but Timor-Leste as a Nation-in-waiting without a State already held a collective national consciousness, that of the Timoroan.

It was this self-reflective image or soul of the Timoroan, subjugated and oppressed for close to 500 years, that was able to motivate the actions of the indigenous multi-ethnic and racially mixed people of Timor-Leste to rebel against the Portuguese presence in the territory (as is discussed in the next chapter) and also resist against Indonesia's 24 year long illegal occupation of the territory. Whether the Timoroan could imagine a Timor-Leste Nation-State with its own citizenry is somewhat immaterial, the crux of the matter here is that the

Timoroan could imagine being 'themselves' into the future, rather being Portuguese or Indonesian. The eventual fact the future included a Timor-Leste nation-state endowed with political Timorese-citizens was possibly beyond the imagination of most Timoroan but a welcomed end-result at the end of almost 500 years of self-preserving and imagined existence.

It is an historical fact the Timoroan, some if not most at some deeper level, were already imagining themselves as a Nation prior to the Indonesian invasion in 1975. FRETILIN, one of the earliest political parties to be established, in fact, declared the independence of Timor-Leste a few days prior to the invasion. Prior to this and as is argued in the next chapter, more than 100 wars and uprisings were waged against the Portuguese. These facts support the claim this thesis makes the Timoroan were imaging themselves operating as a collective far longer than has been noted but for at least 300 years.

In his article *Imagining East Timor*, Benedict Anderson (1993) asked a very pertinent question that helps to support the above. Why did Indonesia's attempt to absorb East Timor fail? One of his conclusions was the deep inability of Indonesia to imagine East Timor as Indonesian and an unacknowledged feeling that the Timorese were basically foreign. The Timoroan had known this and this feeling was acknowledge publicly all along and in fact as is discussed later, this was one of the points of differentiation that strengthened the resolve of the Timoroan armed, clandestine and diplomatic resistance for 24 years.

It is also within this context that Hobsbawm's text *The Invention of Tradition* (1983) becomes pertinent to the arguments put forward in this section, because as the author points out:

> Invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.
>
> (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983, p. 1)

Understanding the history of Timor-Leste is crucial to understanding the role of imagination and invention and the role of culture in the creation of the Timor-Leste nation and Timoroan national identity for close to 500 years of foreign occupation and the types of imagination that are discussed here began. This is why this thesis will dedicate the whole Chapter 4 to re-interpreting Timor-Leste's historical narrative from a Timoroan perspective.

The first type of imagination that was promoted was that Timor-Leste was part of the Portuguese empire. This reality existed primarily in the colonial imagination, as Timor-Leste

was left to rule itself, for the most part at least, according to its own indigenous social and political power structures. Two distinct colonial imaginations prevailed until the 1960-1970s, after which, even though temporarily, nationalist movements found roots in Timor-Leste, but not long before a new distinct notion of neo-colonialism found roots back again in Timor-Leste.

Up until the 1970s the Portuguese alone, in the context of Portuguese Imperialism and subsequent colonialism *imagined* Timor-Leste as a part of the Portuguese Empire and then of the Portuguese *Ultramar*[6] Nation. And in order to fuel that imagination the Portuguese mind invented a tradition of communion, and language was instrumental to this, between the motherland and its colonies beyond the seas. The other colonial imagination belonged to those other European nations who believed in the colonial design and who saw it fit to divide the globe into imaginary geographical extensions of their own homelands.

The above imagination was not of the indigenous Timoroan but that of the colonising Portuguese and the sense of Portuguese communion lived mostly in their minds (although also in the minds of a minority of Timorese) for the duration of their presence and administration of the island. Whilst these colonial imaginations spanned the globe for the better part of half a millennium, the inhabitants of the Timor Island, on the other hand, made up of distinct indigenous, ethnic and socio-linguistic 'clans', merely saw themselves as belonging to those confined communities that defined their existence. These communities where self-contained entities and intimate knowledge of those around them was a cultural imperative that ensured continuity. But then, mainly driven by necessity and when needed over time these communities came together against the expanding influence of the colonising forces.

In this reality, there was no such thing as a political East Timorese. Only when dealing with the Portuguese colonial system did the Timoroan assume a national self, or a hybrid self of cultural juxtaposition. Yet this self was not a Timoroan self, rather it was as an institutionalized and forced self-awareness, an imposed *imaginary* identity that of being a Portuguese citizen, that allowed the Timoroan, as someone who is from Timor, to communicate with the colonial administration and be able to enjoy what little benefits such interaction brought to them.

What allowed the Timoroan to engage the Portuguese at this level was the notion of instrumental hybridism (Bhabha, 1990) that enabled the colonised that is the Timoroan to, if only momentarily, break imperialistic control over Timoroan culture by addressing the

[6] Ultramar—Overseas.

coloniser in Portuguese language and culture. Once this utilitarian and instrumental contact was done, the Timoroan soon retracted back to his or her own indigenous cultural environment.

So in this regard this *imagined* social self-awareness was instrumentalist and strategic in nature rather than ancestrally indigenous or divine. This is not to say the Portuguese did not attempt to in-deed create Portuguese in the *além-mar* (beyond the seas/overseas), including in Timor-Leste. Nevertheless, this reality was true for the majority of East Timorese, except for a small minority of Timorese who developed strong allegiances to Portugal by virtue of descent, intermarriage or for socio-political or economic advancement, in other words, the elites.

As Tarling (2001) noted, with particular reference to the European presence in South East Asia, the hope of great wealth was certainly a stimulus, for both the State and the individuals; referring here to the way in which the European states of the 15th and 16th Century were behind the European expansion across large parts of the globe. The European expansion in particular into Southeast Asia (and Asia in general) was about taking and exerting control over the commercial routs and links between Asia and Europe and then across Asia that had long existed before the Europeans sailed their fleets into the region. As it was with the taking of Melaka by the Portuguese in 1511, one year before their arrival in the Timor Island, as pointed by Commander Afonso de Albuquerque, the reasons for the attack of that particular commercial port were:

> The first is the great service which we shall perform to Our Lord in casting the Moors out of this country. …And the other is the service we shall render to the King D. Manuel in taking this city, because it is the source of all the spiceries and drugs which the Moors carry every year hence to the Straits [of Bab-el-Mandeb]. …Cairo and Mekka will be entirely ruined, and Venice will receive no spiceries unless her merchants go and buy them in Portugal.
>
> Tarling (2001, p. 21)

For much of the European expansion, through colonialism, the aim was to profit rather than to rule. This was very true in what concerns the experience of Timor-Leste of Portuguese colonialism from 1512-1975.

The islands of Timor, Sunda and Solor back in the 1500s were famous for the highest quality of white sandalwood much in demand by the traders as a luxury item bought from the local rulers down in the coastal areas, transported to the Malacca straits area and then to India, China and Europe (Gunn, 1999). This trade was conducted until the sandalwood resources

were almost depleted by the end of the nineteenth century. Thus the stimulus of Portugal's Imperial colonialism was until the nineteenth century mostly economic rather than administrative and this continued until 1951, after which the Portuguese colonial empire ceased to exist and the Portuguese republic attempted to exercise greater administration over its provinces, including the province of Timor-Leste.

Despite arriving on the island in 1512, it was not until 1701 Portugal formally claimed Timor by placing its first Governor, Antonio Coelho Guerreiro, who made Lifau (the capital of the enclave of Oe-cusse) the official capital of the Timor Island in 1702 (Kingsbury, 2009). And it was not until 1769 that the City of Dili was founded, to replace Lifau as the capital of Portuguese Timor. Until then, the island was visited rather than administered by traders from Portugal and from the region and by Portuguese missionaries. The traders sought to make a profit out of the sandalwood trade and the missionaries, mainly Dominican, were engaged in the mission of evangelisation of the indigenous people.

The colonization of the territory started only slowly from the 1860s but was marred with frequent resistance and local revolts. It was only after the end of the Manufahi War in 1912 that colonial administration started to spread in the colony. But even then, the administration of Portuguese Timor, rather than an economic administration with the development of colony in mind, served rather as a political colony where exiled political opponents and rebels from the Portuguese African colonies were sent to wither away, because of the distance of the Timor Island to the metropolis (Sousa I. C., 2001).

This remained until the mid-nineteen fifties when Portugal began developing a greater awareness of the political as well as economic need to consolidate its political unity to include its colonies under the *Nação Una* (One Nation) or face the dismantling of the Portuguese nation and provinces given increased pressure from the international community and the United Nations from late 1955 onwards for it to relinquish its former colonies.

Prior to 1951 Portugal had two constitutional laws (1) the *Political Constitution of 1933* that applied exclusively to the metropolis and (2) the *Colonial Act* that contained the statutes for the administration of the colonies, including the colony of Timor-Leste. It was on June 11, 1952 with the Revision of the Constitution of 1933 and the revoking on the Colonial Act, incorporated into the new Constitution of 1951 under Chapter VII – On Portugal's Ultramar – the Portuguese colonial empire came to an end and the colonies were renamed overseas provinces (Provincias Ultramarinas) (Marques & Borges, 2008).

A lengthier account of the Portuguese colonial presence in Timor-Leste, including an account of the division of the island into East and West Timor and the role and influence of other colonial powers of the time namely the Dutch and the British is made in Chapter 4.

Throughout five centuries of Portuguese presence, only in its imagined dominance over its colonies, did Portugal rule over Timor-Leste. Thus while in the colonial Portuguese mind, the Timoroan were seen as loyal subjects to Portugal, the Timoroan may always have had a different idea about themselves.

This assumption is attested by the many indigenous revolts that took place across the territory from the moment the Portuguese colonial administrations tried to exert greater control over the affairs of the indigenous rulers.

According to Engel (2005) the social bonds in a nation are inculcated in people's ideas about themselves. In this sense self-identification is achieved not out of a personal connection to others but more so because imagination instils a sense of shared purpose with them.

Whilst on the one hand the Portuguese colonisers believed or imagined they shared their notion of the Portugal beyond the seas with all those they colonised, the Timorese imagined themselves united in revolt against that same imagination. This notion certainly helps to understand the discussion of Timoroan national identity contemporarily in Chapters 5 and 6. This is a logical and natural assumption because the system of colonialism was an exclusive system at the expense of those who were colonised. This was most apparent in the way colonial education was administered.

The imagination of the Timoroan as a Portuguese subject was grounded in its education policy and it concerns the reality of colonial education (as opposed to non-colonial education if and where this was possible). Colonial education removed students from the social and cultural fabric in which they grew up, thus colonially established schools aimed to detach students from indigenous cultures, language and social values. The schools that emerged in the colonies reflected the power and the education needs of the colonizers and the objective was the reproduction of generations in their image. When colonial administrators took an interest in education they were more concerned with training literate clerks who could staff the lower ranks of the civil service rather than leaders who could hold managerial positions. The same can be said about colonial missionaries and their interest in education, the emphasis was on moral education and on training new catechists, clergy, and auxiliaries that could drive forward the evangelisation process of the colony (Altbach & Kelly, 1978).

This was the reality during colonial Timor-Leste and helps to explain the dearth of Timorese human resources up to the 1970s. Most Timoroan that could access an education

attended mostly four years of primary schooling attaining in the end the *Quarta Classe* that was regarded as a normal minimum requirement to many of the types of employment offered to the Timoroan (Hill, 2002). Even though demographic data is not easily available on the number of Timorese who were educated under the Portuguese colonial system and their respective ranks or positions, with *quarta classe,* some, including my parents went on to become teachers, serve in the army and even become administrators.

The Timorese who went on to study in high schools and at universities in Portugal were few through most of the Portuguese presence in Timor-Leste and at least after the 1950s when a handful of mostly elite Timorese were allowed to further their studies in the metropolis.

Nevertheless, despite the literature referring to the role of these educated Timoroan in the 1970s upon their return to Timor-Leste in starting political associations and then parties in the territory, as the catalyst for the first rumouring of nationalistic movements in Timor-Leste, this mostly likely had taken hold of the Timoroan imagination many centuries earlier at the point when the traditional rulers of the Timor Island first started gathering around the *biti bo'ot*[7] (big straw mat) to discuss and rally one another to join forces to revolt against the Portuguese colonisers.

These pre-nationalist movements can only be described as imaginary because back then Timor-Leste as a nation-state (nor even the idea of Timor as a unified nation) did not yet exist, nonetheless the ardent desire to be left alone and to rule itself under the leaderships of a dominant indigenous leader, started to take hold of the social fabric of the territory. It is these pre-nationalist movements and intentions that Terence Ranger (1968) calls 'primary resistance' movements that subsequently help shape the environment in which political nationalistic intentions takes place. As the next chapter outlines, the close to 500 years of foreign occupation of Timor-Leste were resisted against by the Timoroan.

In the Timor-Leste context the colonial imagination was far from subtle or harmless rather it was backed by force, coercion and strategies around the notion of building a uniform identity in the image of the coloniser. On the other hand the imagination of the Timoroan was much more subversive and strategic. This imagination prevailed until 1974 when it took shape through the establishment of the first indigenous political parties – FRETILIN, UDT, APODETI, KOTA, Trabalhista – and continued on during the Indonesian illegal annexation of the territory from 1975-1999.

[7] Biti bo'ot – Big straw woven mat used for meeting or to address disputes or concerns.

During this period, in fact the imagination of Timor-Leste as a sovereign nation not only prevailed but further fuelled and united the Timoroan into assuming an even stronger self-awareness of themselves.

Whilst on the one hand the Indonesian Government tried to instil a yet new national identity on the Timorese, that of being Indonesian, and despite its attempts to make Timor-Leste its 27th Province, the Timorese continued imagining their communion, against a new foreign intruder. This was an imagination hardened by almost 500 years of communion against the imagination of the Portuguese colonial master that was then transferred to the neo-colonial masters, the Indonesian.

Thus this imagination perhaps helps to understand why during the Independence Referendum of 1999, with some 97 per cent voter turnout and resulting in 78.5 per cent of the Timoroan registered to vote chose to vote for Independence, not only because of the injustice, violence and genocides that took place during the 24 years of Indonesian occupation of the territory but also because the Timoroan had been imagining an independent Timor-Leste since at least the 1800s (perhaps even earlier) when the traditional kings of the island first united to revolt against foreign occupation and interference in the Timorese way of life.

This imagination that was in essence the driving force of the psyche of the Timoroan can be attributed to what Rousseau coined as *amour de soi* or the natural source of the human being's passions or love for oneself which "is a natural sentiment which inclines every animal to watch over its own preservation" (Engel, 2005).

Thus the imagination of Timor-Leste by the indigenous mind was fuelled by a very natural instinct or *amour de soi;* the love for oneself and for self-preservation.

3.2 (Post)Colonial Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste as a nation has to be considered not only from its imagined, modern-contemporary or ethnic perspectives but also from its colonial past that moulded and shaped it and endowed it with European and subsequently western systems of governance and imposed mind-sets that were built to ensure the dominance of the colonisers over the colonised and that discarded the indigenous systems and worldview deeming them too primitive and uncivilised.

It is important to refer to the works of Franz Fanon (1961) (1986), Edward Said (1985) and Homi Bhabha (1990) in reference to their experience and reflections on colonialism and postcolonialism and their effects and legacy for nations like Timor-Leste because these authors challenged earlier rationalizations, narratives and discourses about nation formation

and the race relations between coloniser and colonised and its impacts on the psyche and post-colonial lives of the colonised.

Colonisation and the narrative of colonialism was about two key notions: the superiority of the European race and about Euro-centrism, or the notion the world had as a centre Europe and its nations; and that Europeans were masters of the art of civilising the savage soul and mind.

On the other hand post colonialism narratives focuses on the ways particular groups of people in particular because of notions of race were excluded, marginalized, and represented in ways that devalued or even dehumanized them. According to Julian Go (2013) postcolonial theory attempts to understand the persistent relations of power and the cultures of imperialism that underpinned them; as well as attending to the legacies of colonialism.

For Said (1985), the colonisers used what he termed the strategy of repetition. The discourse of colonialism was represented mainly at the time as text that was reproduced en masse, and then repeated en masse. The key notion is that this repetition endowed the text with worldliness which imposes then constraints upon the interpretation of the text, in essence making the text true (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 2001, P.14).

Thus the colonised were excluded, marginalised through his or her representation as text that positioned the colonised in a diametrically inferior connoted polarity to that of the coloniser and that transferred meaning: white-good; black-bad; European-civilised; non-European-primitive; modern society-advanced; traditional society-backwards; and so forth.

Colonial and postcolonial theorists such as Fanon, Said and Bhabha, also analysed the impact that the process and narratives of colonialism had on those people who benefited from colonial acts such as dispossession, violence, and the promotion of racist ideology (Sherry, 2008), thus the dialectic between the coloniser and the colonised that still informs and permeates contemporary society.

This is precisely the biggest criticism of the extant literature on nation formation from a postcolonial theoretical framework in that earlier conceptualisations of nations and national identity were frequently Eurocentric and faith-based. This means the frames of reference merely re-validated, if not replicated, the colonial experience from their hegemonic viewpoint rather than from a colonised or indigenous worldview perspective.

These notions fuelled and validated the necessity in the minds of the colonisers for the pillage, by force and/or deceit, of the colonised territories later ‘nations’ to build the grandeur of the colonial empires and later on the European and Western nations during the

Enlightenment era, where new worlds were being discovered and civilised to mirror the western civilizations.

Colonialism also entailed the imposition of systems (of governance, judicial and of education in particular) enforcing the superiority of the Europeans and the employment, subservience and allocation of the colonised accordingly within the system but never in parallel or in equal footing with the coloniser.

Colonialism separated the world both geographically and socially and created the Occident (West) and as well as the Orient (East). The line that separated the Occident from the Orient, as put forward by Said (1985) is less a fact of nature than it is a fact of human production, which he called *imaginative geography* because both concepts were human products.

Colonial experience and postcolonial structures and systems reflect what Budd Hall (2014) refers to as the domination of the Western knowledge system that both excludes the ways of knowing, the cultures and the stories of the majority of the people of the world and it has also disabled the west from learning, and in fact experience the non-west in non-colonial terms. In his paper Hall (2014, p. 9) asks a very pertinent question 'Is the global North stuck in a rut in histories' path that do not allow for the existence of histories other than the universal history of the West?'

Despite the bleakness of this aspect of history, the repetitive subservience in the end also served as a powerful instrument or ideological and discursive tool purposefully employed in the ultimate liberation and emergence of the Timor-Leste nation in opposition to another postcolonial nation attempting to absorb it into its own, that is, the Indonesian Republic after being freed from its own Dutch colonial master in 1945.

Timor-Leste is still reeling from the effects of this overbearing domination that spanned the best part of 500 years of Portuguese presence in the Timor Island and that greatly also influenced and lead to the Indonesian occupation of the territory in 1975 just as Portugal embarked in the decolonisation process of Timor-Leste.

These same colonial systems and raison-d'être, imposed and infused into the Indonesian rationalisation of the world that fuelled it to continue to use a western framework of violent dominance and imposed assimilation rather than acknowledging the existence of a kindred community(-ies) sharing a geographic region with a shared history of European dominance and oppression.

The crucial notion introduced by the leading authors mentioned earlier on postcolonial studies is that European colonialism, despite the ideological assertions to the contrary, was a

system of forceful exclusiveness by the negation of the indigenous and the adopting of the colonisers imagination of what the colonised should be and act like.

Despite the rhetoric of unity and solidarity, such as the notion of *Portugal Una,* and to the other extreme, the *Terra Nullis* in Australian history, Christianity, Enlightenment, Civilisation rationality and modern nationhood remained *proponents* of exclusion and conflict always at the expense of the colonised, or as Bhabha (1990, p. 295) notes the diametrically opposed worldviews of *master* and *slave* "which between them account for the major and philosophical dialectic of modern time".

This thesis will not make reference here to the notion of the inner-group (who was in) and outer-group (who was out) rationale of colonialism, even though such an inference could be made retrospectively, because this came much later and given that in the colonial framework, the inner-group and the outer-group were both determined by the colonising forces by direct control or careful manipulation or both.

> …what I said in Orientalism had been said before me by A.L. Tibawi, by Abdullah Laroui, by Anwar Abdel Malek, by Talal Asad, by S.H. Alatas, by Frantz Fanon and Aime Csaire, by Sardar K.M. Pannikar and Romila Thapar, all of whom had suffered the ravages of imperialism and colonialism, and who, in challenging the authority, provenance, and institutions of the science that represented them to Europe, were also understanding themselves as something more than what this science said they were.
>
> (Said, 1985, p. 4)

So in this regard, Timor-Leste was never part of Portugal, rather *it* and *its* people were given an un-attainable and impossible proverbial carrot they would never be able to reach and *truly* enjoy.

Fanon (1986), regardless of the tone of his narrative, points out the reality that the majority of Timoroan only got to experience and faced upon arriving in Portugal after the Indonesian invasion in late 1975 through to the 1990s.

> The Antillean does not think of himself as a black man;…the Negro lives in Africa. Subjectively, intellectually, the Antillean conducts himself like a white man. But he is a Negro. That he will learn once he goes to Europe.
>
> (Fanon, 1986, p. 148)

It was only after setting foot in Portugal in 1975, as refugees rather than *brothers and sisters*, fleeing the brutal invasion of Timor-Leste, and literally after being dumped in the *Quinta dos Balteiros*, in the *Vale do Jamor*, in the town of Linda-Velha, in the outskirts of the

Portuguese capital of Lisbon, in squalid sub-human conditions, amidst rats, mud and in shanty-town type accommodation, the Timoroan must have realized he and she had never been a Portuguese, and would never be one, despite his or her national or citizen status and despite being told for centuries to regard the colonial motherland as their own home. This was very apparent to me during countless summers I spent in Balteiros in communion with my relatives and family friends.

It is in this regard that Postcolonial Theory, and the historical narratives of the East or the Orient, are pertinent to this thesis.

The framework being used in the emergence of Timor-Leste is still based on as much as its recent violent history under the Indonesian regime as it is as much about the close to 500 years of Portuguese colonial occupation that preceded the 24 years of Indonesian occupation.

Despite Portugal's conceptualizations or imaginations of what it hoped to be in relation to the nations it colonized, the truth of the matter was that Portugal was, and still likes to believe it is, at the helm of the empire, if not in reality at least in its intrinsic and imaginary view of the world, when it alludes to the grandeur of its nostalgic past. This is particularly felt in relation to the issue of *Lusophony* for the reconfiguring of a Portuguese global identity that arose in the Portuguese postcolonial period and after Portugal became part of the European Union in 1986 (Almeida M. , 2004). Where this is most noted also is in the debate surrounding the standardisation of the Portuguese language among the Portuguese speaking nations and the resistance mainly from the *desacordistas* (anti-orthographic accord) in Portugal to accept the orthographic accord that makes Portuguese 'feel' more like Brazilian-Portuguese rather than Portuguese from Portugal (Zuquete, 2009).

3.3 Constructed Timor-Leste

Nations, in particular post-conflict nations such as Timor-Leste are also constructed, or at the very least re-constructed nations, part of international nation rebuilding efforts.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the international community, after establishing the United Nations, affirmed its intention to help avoid future international conflicts by focussing its collective-efforts on peacekeeping missions. The UN deployed 13 operations between 1948 and 1988 (Mignst & Karns, 2012).

Apart from a peacekeeping role, since its inception the UN also played a key role in the decolonisation process that led to the emergence of new nation-states. Some 25 years after the UN Charter was signed in 1946, most of the former colonies of the world achieved

independence. In 1945 the UN was composed by 50 member-nations, by 2000 this number more than tripled to over 190 member-nations, with Timor-Leste becoming the 191st in 2002.

The 1946 UN Charter endorsed the principle of self-determination and the UN was used as a forum to advocate an end to colonialism and urged independence for territories ruled by the colonial nations of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Portugal. By 1960, through General Assembly Resolution 1514, the UN condemned the continuation of colonial rule, outlined preconditions for granting independence and called for annual reports on the progress toward independence through a process of decolonisation for all remaining colonial territories (Mignst & Karns, 2012).

In 1961 the General Assembly adopted a 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples' and set up a Decolonization Committee, popularly known as the 'Committee of 24'. Timor was already on the Agenda of the Committee of 24, when the process was interrupted by the 1975 illegal invasion of the territory by Indonesia. This was condemned by the UN General Assembly on 12 December and by the Security Council on 22 December 1975. The Committee of 24 and the General Assembly's fourth committee then became the main arena where Timor-Leste was debated in the UN for seven years. The General Assembly called for immediate withdrawal and upheld the right of the Timoroan to an act of self-determination through a resolution every year until 1982. That year it requested Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, 'to initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem' (Marker, 2003).

The negotiation outlived three Secretaries General and it was only in 1997 with the arrival of Kofi Annan, who was determined to solve 'the problem of Timor' that systematic action was begun. He appointed as his representative Pakistani diplomat Jamsheed Marker, who organised regular tripartite negotiations between the UN, Indonesia and Portugal (Marker, 2003).

By this time the influence of the clandestine front and the diplomatic front was considerable and Indonesia was losing diplomatic support from its traditional allies. Eventually, after the downfall of President Suarto due to internal political pressure, an agreement was made on May 5th 1999 for a Popular Consultation, supervised by the UN, but with security the responsibility of Indonesia. This established the United Nations Administrative Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). This mission was mandated to conduct a ballot and implement the decision of the Timorese people – either to remain in the Republic of Indonesia with limited self-government or become an independent nation. The UN's role

in the process of achieving independence for Timor-Leste would not be completed until 2002 (Marker, 2003).

By 1995 the early post-Cold War optimism about the role of the UN in nation-building faded with peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda failing. The UN faced a deep financial crisis and had many weaknesses that reflected the need for significant structural and administrative reforms (Mignst & Karns, 2012). These structural and administrative weaknesses made UN interventions rather hit and miss in terms of being successful at nation-building.

In terms of its weaknesses Dobbins et al. (2005) note that UN mission components (military, police and civil administrative) are slow to be deployed and to arrive at the mission area; the quality of its components are uneven; missions are underfunded and do not match ambitious mandates; and the UN's withdrawal from mission areas is at times premature.

The UN has been involved in the nation-building efforts in several nations, namely Belgian Congo, Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slovenia, Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Kosovo and Timor-Leste and more recently in South Sudan (Dobbins, et al., 2005).

It is within this world politics and the UN's role and mandate context that the role of the UN in Timor-Leste needs to be discussed. In the case of Timor-Leste and also Kosovo, the UN was empowered and responsible for all branches of government, rather than just focussing on peacekeeping operations. From 1999-2002, the United Nations assumed an all-encompassing mandate with dual responsibilities: on the one hand it was mandated to rebuild Timor-Leste during the transitional period; whilst on the other hand it had to also govern Timor-Leste through 20 May 2002, when Timor-Leste became independent.

According to Dobbins et al. (2005) and thanks to a favourable international climate, the natural resources of Timor-Leste that enable it to have its own funds, as well as high-quality leadership of the country, the UN was able to maintain security, restore governance, begin reconstruction, hold democratic elections, and turn power over to the representative government of an independent Timor-Leste. By its own standards, Timor-Leste has been lauded at its most successful intervention in a post-conflict nation in the UN's history.

In the next chapter, in the interpretative section of the three-years of UN full administration of Timor-Leste a more in-depth contextualised account of this particular period in the Timorese history will be given. In particular the section will focus on the UN's mandate from a critically interpretative analysis of the narratives of UN-led democratisation of nations such as Timor-Leste.

3.4 Modern Nation-State Timor-Leste

To the world, Timor-Leste is often qualified as a new and contemporary nation just over ten years old. In this section of the thesis an interpretive analysis of the narrative of modernity around the formation of Timor-Leste Nation-State will be elaborated.

Whilst this chapter on the multidimensionality of Timor-Leste will conclude with an interpretative discussion of the concept of ethnicity that still influences contemporary authors about the ethnic nature of the nation; for modernist theorists the absence of the *ethnie* by no means hinders the process of nation formation.

Modernist authors prescribe to the notion that nations are dynamic and long-term historical collectives that structure the forms of modernity (Hutchinson, 2010). The late nineteenth century and into the twentieth century saw authors debating over when the nations first formed within modern contexts. Authors rather than racially or ethnic classifying the evolution of nations, started looking at nation formation as a processes of social-cultural evolution (Jones S. , 1997).

It is useful to discuss here also the notion of modernity and nationhood. Modernity is a break or a passing of the mantle from narratives of nationhood based on race and ethnicity to narratives based on the belief of the equality of all citizens and the mass dissemination of such belief through the education system and/or by the mass media. For Hutchinson (2010) according to the modernist perspective, nations are outgrowths of modernization as exemplified in the rise of the bureaucratic state, industrial economy, and secular concepts of human autonomy.

But the idea for modernity:

> ...rests on rupture. It brings into view a monumental narrative — the breaching of magical covenants, the surpassing of medieval superstitions, and the undoing of hierarchical traditions. The advent of modernity, then, insinuates the disenchantment of the world: the progressive control of nature through scientific procedures of technology; and the inexorable demystification of enchantments through powerful techniques of reason. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the privileged dispensation of legislative reason within regimes of modernity gathers together nature.
>
> (Dube, 2009, p. 1)

In the case of Timor-Leste, this rupture never really fully occurred because as will be discussed later, despite it being considered and imagined as part of the Portuguese empire and nation, the colonial influence never truly overpowered or destroyed the indigenous superstitions, hierarchical traditions and cultural bonds of pre-European Timoroan society.

Rather a duality emerged in which the modern and the pre-modern co-existed in a purposeful, strategic but non-competing manner.

In the modernist perspective of the narrative of nations, it is not the ethnically dominant but the intellectual few and their followers that lead to the formation of nations. These intellectual few, endowed with free and individual minds and aided by modern instruments such as enshrined liberal democratic civic duty, the printing machine (later on mass media technology) and the State-sponsored national education system put together the various ingredients – history, symbols, myths, languages – that allows en masse socialisations that lead to the formation of modern nations.

Thus modern nations are, above all, 'rational' political organizations, and though they may use selectively ethnic symbols, this is for decorative rather than substantive purposes (Hutchinson, 2010). Modern nations are in theory if not always in practice composed of equal citizens.

From authors such as Renan (1882), Setton-Watson (1977), Gellner (1983), Anderson (1983), and Hobsbawn (1995) the nation is the product of the modern world and modernity thus is a novel phenomenon. Therefore Timor-Leste could be said to be a contemporary modern nation rather than an already existing ethnic nation.

Hobsbawm (1995) noted it is within modernity narratives the elites and activists manipulate ethnic-symbolism in the creation of a culture-ideology of community, through a series of emotive symbols and myths, communicated by print and media and also inculcated into the minds of citizens by national education curriculums. Renan (1882) earlier proposed history and its events fuse together populations of a territory into a nation whose citizens share *a soul* and *memories* of endeavours, sacrifice, and devotion that foster the common will to live and die together.

Thus it was this sense of shared history, soul and memories that enabled the Timorese to also claim their otherness to the invader, Indonesia, after all by the time it was invaded in 1975 Timor-Leste already had close to 500 years of historical events, including several rebellions against the Portuguese colonial administration.

For Renan (1882) nations are relatively new in history. For him the antiquity of ethnicity in this regards did not exist in what concerns the formation of nations.

> Antiquity was unfamiliar with them; Egypt, China and ancient Chaldea were in no way nations. They were flocks led by a Son of the Sun or by a Son of Heaven. Neither in Egypt nor in China were there citizens as such. Classical antiquity had republics, municipal kingdoms, confederations of local

> republics and empires, yet it can hardly be said to have had nations in our understanding of the term.
>
> (Renan, 1882, p. 2)

Thus for Renan (1882) the understanding of nation has to be viewed as a modern concept as it is history that creates nations and he focuses on the particular violent historical deeds that gave way to political formations united by means of brutality, of massacres and terror.

Using Renan's *raison d'être* then Timor-Leste could well be said to be a new nation because prior to the Portuguese arrival it did not 'exist' as a nation and it was brought about by several episodes of brutal action during 500 years that will be discussed later such as the Pacification Wars and indigenous rebellions during colonial times, the Timorese civil war and Timor-Leste's brutal annexation by Indonesia in 1975 and the bloody Independence Referendum 24 years later. It can be said this convergence of brutal facts effected the formation of the Timor-Leste nation in an historical process that took almost five centuries.

The oppression, massacres, deaths and destruction since the first Portuguese fleet arrived in the Island of Timor in 1512 then allowed Timorese groups to, as author Gellner's (1983) definition that could be applied in this instance, will themselves into a community that persisted over the centuries until a convergence of other factors brought its membership into the world of sovereign nations.

For Gellner and other authors, nationalism or the political will of a community willing itself to persist is at the core of nation formation rather than ethnicity. Gellner (1983) suggested that ethnicity is not necessarily an element in the formation of nations rather the nation depends upon political and intellectual elites and the strategic ways in which they impose shared national culture.

Another important qualification of the concept of modernity is that when looking at its origins in what pertains the narratives of the world and of nations; it can also be defined primarily as an Eurocentric phenomenon at first and then a western(-ized) conceptualisation in that it refers to what (Wagner, 2013) qualifies as a novel kind of society that emerged out of industrial and democratic revolutions and social transformations that took place from the sixteenth century to the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe and North America.

It was from this point onwards the West started diffusing to the rest of the world its narratives and discourses of superiority and *raison-d'être*. Thus a modern nation was that which was modelled on a 'democratic' and 'industrialised' European nation first, then used to

describe western nations, or what Max Weber defined as 'Occidental rationalism' (Wagner, 2013).

Later on this kind of occidental rationalism was challenged and tested and transformed into a more global and more encompassing notion of modernity with the entrance into the world arena of Japan and China (Shih, 2012).

So by virtue of these two arguments Timor-Leste can loosely be qualified as a modern nation-state. Loosely only because despite a gradual departure from ethnic rationalizations, the ethnic origins of Timor-Leste are still all prevalent in current day society in the country, as will be discussed later.

Also because it was Portuguese rationality that endowed Timor-Leste with a personality far removed from its neighbouring nations but closely attached to the Portuguese Empire and subsequently the Portuguese nation and that allowed it to be perceived and accepted, at least by the eyes of the international community, as a part of Portugal's overseas imperial dominion.

In the case of Timor-Leste it was this rationalization that allowed it to formulate arguments against the Indonesian occupation. If according to western narratives Timor-Leste had been part of Portugal for close to 500 years how could it just be absorbed into the Indonesian Republic? The Timoroan leadership had a strategic trump-card it could use to push the notion of difference between the Timoroan and the Indonesians, and one it believed in as well.

In 2003, former Timorese resistance leader and then President of Timor-Leste, Xanana Gusmão, speaking at a conference in Portugal on the promotion and defence of the Portuguese language as an official language of Timor-Leste again said the 'controversial' decision to pick Portuguese was necessary because it represented part of the nation's heritage and communion with Portugal and the Portuguese speaking countries in Africa, Brazil and Asia. Then President Xanana Gusmão was quoted as saying "Timor`s retention of Portuguese after its breakaway from Indonesia`s quarter-century occupation made the world`s newest nation 'different' among the thousands of other islands that form the Indonesian archipelago" (Lusa, 2003).

This instrumental and strategic affinity to Portugal, to the Portuguese speaking nations and with the Portuguese language was referred by the leadership of the Timoroan during the resistance years from 1975-1999. Even after Timor-Leste's independence in 2002, it was again provided as one of the justifications as to how Portuguese came to be one of the co-official languages of the country. Other major explanations for this include the fact most of

the leadership that assumed responsibility over the State in 2002, had been educated during Portuguese times under an education system with assimilation philosophies designed to educate elites who would then go on to develop strong affinities to Portugal and the Portuguese language.

Nevertheless modern nations are also nations bound by liberal democratic civic duty to the State. Modern nations are based and infused with (often contested) notions of civic nationalism whereby the State and its public institutions and policies remain at the core of civic duty. Thus citizens, deemed equal, under the umbrella of the State, rather than under their own ethno cultural associations, are largely, if not uniformly, integrated into a society that represents them all at an overarching level with a basis on contract, commitment, loyalty and love for the national values (Brown D. , 2000).

In this regard, modern nations are also endowed with modern States which according to Mann (1988), in his classical definition of the 'modern' state, distinguished between four elements: (1) A differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying (2) centrality in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a centre to cover (3) a territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises (4) a monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence.

And this is the Timor-Leste that emerged after the end of the United Nations transitional administration in 2002, a Nation-State endowed with modern institutions, albeit set up largely by the international community of nations, under a parliamentary republic.

3.5 Ethnic Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste still has at its core, at the end of close to 500 years of foreign dominance, occupation and rule, a distinct ethnic dimension that permeates the nation. The ethnic and indigenous cultural bonds (*abut)* that bind (*kesi*) the nation to the Timoroan and vice-versa are still paramount to the functioning of and within Timorese society, this despite Timor-Leste emerging in 2002 as the newest nation of the new millennium. In Chapter 6, in section 6.3 the concepts of *abut* and *kesi,* and how traditional culture binds the Timoroan unto themselves and the nation will be discussed.

It is easy then to see why ethnicity is a departing point for the majority of authors prescribing to the ethnic origins of the nation. As far as ethnic nations are concerned, the

notion of the nation cannot be separate from the people who live and die in it and call it their own both by descent, desire and/or possession.

Scholars prescribing to the ethnic origins of nations, argue nations always existed because of an invisible thread that unites individuals and the groups these compose and makes them relate to one another by race, blood, language, religion or ethnicity (Jones, Jones, & Woods, 2004).

Ethnicity has been a major factor in the thinking of the origins of nations. Ethnic nations or ethno-nations can be seen in the Timor-Leste context as essentially *be-alan*[8] (ancestral) nations whereby reference to a particular geographically demarcated territory, sovereign or not, cannot be detached from the people that 'always' lived and continue to live in and died on it and for it and who for the modern-day inhabitants can still make their presence and pleasure or displeasure felt through the sacred houses (*Uma Lulik)* or the sacred objects *(Sasan Lulik)* of its animist beliefs and the invisible threads (*abut)* that weave through the family collective and networks operating in Timor-Leste (see Chapter 6, Section 6.4).

As such ethno-nations refer to the notion of primordiality, perenniality, immutability and originality of the nation.

Thus Timor-Leste is also a primordial ethnic nation, immutable and original because of the oral history and living culture that has kept alive the stories and wisdom of the *be-alan* of the time immemorial, which in turn protected the Timoroan against the foreign dominance.

For an insight of the ritual and social order of Timorese society, with particular reference to the Mambai People, the work and research conducted by Traube (1986), is very interesting and enlightening for non-Timorese and for Timorese who may have grown outside the culture or have engaged more with the formal Portuguese or Indonesian education system rather than the traditional informal education processes.

As a Timorese researcher who belongs to the Kemak people of Atsabe and even though I cannot specifically speak for all Timoroan it can be safely generalized that the majority of Timorese are brought up knowing the Timorese society is highly hierarchical, even in the present day. Timoroan are also aware the traditional power structures have not given way totally or been supplanted by the modern democratic power structures. If anything traditional and modern power structures and dynamics co-exist today, as they did during almost 500 years of Portuguese and Indonesian occupation and for the most part this occurred not in direct-competition.

[8] Be-alan – the ancestors

Even when they seemed to be disappearing, traditional power structures keep re-emerging within the national narratives, in particular around times of uncertainty or in moments of traditional nostalgia, and in moments when contemporary conflict or dispute resolution mechanisms cannot be used to solve development challenges. This notion will become apparent in the empirical chapters that will follow.

It is these types of Timorese dyadic, or dualism, that is interesting for anthropologists and here the PhD thesis of Timorese scholar and current Minister for Justice, Dionisio Babo Soares (2003), is very interesting to read and reflect on as it gives very useful insights from the perspective of the Timorese researching into their own culture.

In the next chapter a fuller account of the traditional power structure of the Timorese society will be discussed in a section pertaining to the pre-European settlement of the island in the 1500s and the kinds of social and political structures already existing prior to the Portuguese first fleet's arrival on the island.

Nevertheless, the core of the Timorese social and political (traditional) structure is the *uma-lulik*[9] (sacred house) and the extended families and the system of *uma* (houses) that are attached to it with a traditional king or ruler or head of clan, the *liurai*[10] (mostly male/liurai-mane but in some matrilineal lineages of Timor-Leste also female/liurai-feto), at the head of the extended family. With the family then divided according to the tasks and roles performed by individuals or groups of individuals within it, such as the keepers of the ritualistic voice (*lia-nain*[11]), the people (*ema*[12]) and those living in a Timoroan household (uma-kain[13]).

The traditional positions, as opposed to contemporary political positions, are determined by blood-lines, much like modern day European monarchies whereby the oldest son (in patrilineal lineages) of the oldest brother of the family is the obvious if not always direct heir to the title.

The recent published book by Bishop D. Ximenes Belo (2013) on the old kingdoms of Timor-Leste is quite instructive in this regard and insightful of the role of the traditional kings (liurai) of Timor-Leste and their role in the emergence of the nation of Timor-Leste throughout European history and settlement of the island and also during the Indonesian occupation.

[9] Uma lulik- Sacred house
[10] Liurai – traditional king and in some regions traditional queen
[11] Lia-nain – Keeper of the oral traditions and rituals (=literally owner of rituals/ceremonies)
[12] Ema - people
[13] Uma-Kain – tranditional household.

The Liurai, as referred previously, is still a source of traditional power in Timor-Leste that is highly respected, whether the Timorese State and the International community cares to recognize its traditional authority and legitimacy or not. This person and the collective he or she belongs too is still an important source of traditional power and still has great influence on day to day affairs, in particular in the Districts or rural areas of the country where more than 70 per cent of Timorese still reside.

According to Ospina and Hohe (2001) on the traditional power structures in modern Timorese society, the authors validate this notion and indicate that at least at the very local level (at the hamlet and village levels), traditional powers are still very strong.

> The traditional division between ritual and political authority, in accordance with the hierarchical system of extended families, is still an important concept in rural areas. On the higher levels (sub-districts and above) the ritual authorities are still acknowledged but the political authorities seem to split into two groups. There are traditional political powers that are given a symbolic and informal power, while other traditional political powers are actually still integrated into the formal power structure. In Timor's rural areas, traditional political concepts are still very present and dominate the power structure. These concepts are only starting to be challenged by international influences and the introduction of modern ideas.
>
> (Ospina & Hohe, 2001, pp. 8-9)

From a Timorese researcher's perspective these traditional power structures are also still available and in use even at capital and urban levels although not in direct competition with the formal democratic power structures, but nonetheless they are still highly influential.

For authors who then emphasise the origins and authenticity of the cultural communities that compose a nation, ethnicity, which they describe is the core of these communities, is incorruptible, ever present, innate, and as such does not disappear regardless of whether a nation has been through many stages of transition or transformation. This can certainly be said is the case of the Timor-Leste as an ethnic nation.

Ethnicity is also not a characteristic that can be chosen or decided on, ethnicity is almost synonymous to a birth-right and serves as identification for which there is no grey area; one belongs (in-group) or does not (out-group) and this is the particular case of Timor-Leste's immutable ethnicity.

The results of this research project validate this claim, and will be discussed in greater details in later chapters. All the respondents interviewed for this thesis pointed out when asked who can claim him or herself to be Timoroan, responded, without hesitation, that a Timoroan or a Timorese person is anyone born in Timor-Leste, from Timorese parents,

whose blood was shed into the land (said one respondent referring to the cutting of the umbilical cord and burial on the ground), who knows and practices culture and speaks Tetum as well as their own maternal language.

So based on this view, Timor-Leste is clearly and foremost a community of descent.

Of the ethno-nationalist authors, the main contemporary author is Anthony Smith (1991) who has over the years defended exhaustively any attempt at explaining how nations emerge having as a starting point its ethnic ties and identities.

Scholars such as Bauer (1996), like Smith, claim the ethno-nation is first and foremost a cultural community of destiny, where communities share a common experience of the same fate (past, present and future and inter-generational) and are in constant communication and ongoing interaction over the same fate; a fate that is immutable and not temporal.

Whilst in the section pertaining to the modern roots of the Timor-Leste nation, civic nationalism was discussed, in ethno-nations, ethno cultural nationalism is based on the belief of common ancestry, and of inherited ownership of an ancestral homeland (Brown D. , 2000).

Timor-Leste is mostly an ethnic nation, albeit not with a homogeneous ethnic community but delineated and still interconnected along ethnic lines and alliances that were pushed or forced to converge and co-exist more or less peacefully by foreign occupation for almost half a millennium.

So it is for Smith's (1991) that the ethnicity of a nation is what endows it with what is common to a group of people, either a majority or not, in a legitimate geographically demarcated space or not, that forges strong ethnic ties and identities and have commonly formed the cultural basis relied upon by the 'natives of the land' or the *rai-nain (owners of the land)* thus playing a key role in the formation of the 'original' nation that supersedes any subsequent nations that may follow.

Smith (1991) traces two routes by which different kinds of ethnic community(-ies) were transformed into nations. The first route is state-sponsored and the second route is popular.

State-sponsored nations are those whereby the State plays a key role in unifying different ethnic groups into one single political community. Using this maxim though one can assume the first State to do this in the case of Timor-Leste was the Portuguese State and then followed by the Indonesian State. This is true also for Timor-Leste State whereby it recognises first that Timor-Leste is a multi-ethnic nation. One of the objectives of the Timorese State, as stated in Article 6 of the Constitution, Section (g) is to "To assert and value the personality and the cultural heritage of the East Timorese people".

The best illustration of State-sponsorship of ethnic nations in reference to the experience of Timor-Leste are in what concerns the Portuguese Ultramar (Overseas) Imperial notion or subsequent Portuguese overseas policy about its colonies around the globe to ensure the unity of the Portuguese Empire, and subsequently the Portuguese Nation, composed by different ethnic people's – from all corners of the globe – the *Portugal Una*.

This was achieved in great part by centuries of missionisation through the Portuguese education system that stretched the definition of Portugal and what is to be Portuguese well beyond its geographical southern European borders to include other extensions of itself in the Americas, in Africa, in Asia and Southeast Asia (to include Timor-Leste).

The notion of Portugal stretching from Minho (the northern most regional part of Portugal) to Timor-Leste was not just an ideal but a constitutional imperative with full Imperial and subsequently State sponsorship. The colonies as Portugal (not just part of) are enshrined in Portuguese constitutional history for example in Article 20 of the 1882 Constitution, in the 1911 Constitution and in the 1933 Constitution (Marques & Borges, 2008).

It was through the education system and its assimilation philosophies delivered mainly by the religious missionary orders both in continental Portugal and also throughout the colonies that a sense of national unity with Portugal as the standard was ever present. This was done through a unified education which was the responsibility of educators, in the Portuguese metropolis or in the colonies, based on educational unity, one system of education for all, the same type of schools, basically education that is Portuguese (Almeida J. M., 1965).

This policy and attitude prevailed and was diffused during the close to 500 years of Portuguese colonial administration of Timor-Leste all the way to the 1970s[14].

Interestingly Portugal in what concerned its regional and global position also had a very different image of itself back then to their contemporary view of themselves whereby up to the late 1950s it did not even regard itself as an European nation.

[14] It is commonly referred among the older Timorese (including my own parents and older generation Timorese who often reflect on their experiences with the education system during the colonial times) who experienced a colonial education on their reflections that they knew all the rivers and mountains of Portugal whilst remaining virtually ignorant of Timor-Leste's own mountains and rivers.

> We are not a European nation. We are equally African and Asian. We are a maritime nation that has been increasing all type of values to its European heritage.
>
> (Marques & Borges, 2008, p. 229)

Ethnicity has always been highly political (Gat & Yakobson, 2013). As such States and even before the birth of the modern states, ethnicity has been used to unify, if not necessarily unite, different groups living in a shared geographical space, especially if there is one group that is ethnic-dominant.

In this regard, the Timor-Leste case is not the best to help us understand how state-sponsored nations come about because the State that sponsored such unification was not indigenous but *Mala'e* that is Portuguese and subsequently driven by the Indonesian State. In this instance, reflecting also on the Indonesian experience of State-sponsorship is useful.

A clearer example of the State-sponsorship of nations is the case of the Indonesian Republic post-1954 independence from the Dutch, after 300 years of colonial administration. As the Indonesia became more organized and 'bureaucratic' the stronger was the need and desire to unite the populations inhabiting all the islands that were handed over to its care after independence. There was a need to encourage them to form a single political community, the Indonesian Republic, around the *Pancasila* (Five Guiding Principles) Dream, a lingua Franca, the Bahasa Indonesia, but based on the cultural heritage of the dominant ethnic core of the people of Java. Indonesia is a large nation-state composed of over 240 million inhabitants living in some 4,000 islands and more than 700 linguistic-ethnic groups. The vast majority of these groups number only in the thousands; less than twenty groups have a population of 1 million or more; only three of them comprise 10 million and more; and one, Javanese, heads the list by a wide margin with 86 million speakers and about 40 per cent of the population of Indonesia (Gat & Yakobson, 2013).

The Javanese people, 86 million strong making up 40 per cent of the population, were able to establish the dominant or hegemonic viewpoint and once they attained enough political power were able to promote and manipulate its dominant culture and turn it into the supra-culture the Republic of Indonesia leadership of the time deemed to be needed so the new nation could function as a nation-state.

As pointed out by Kingsbury (2005) the Indonesian government maintains that Indonesia is focussed on Java and also that the values at the core of the Indonesian political thinking mirror Javanese thinking. It was through Indonesian language that the idea of nation was developed where one had not previously existed.

> It was also through the state language that education and propaganda took root in establishing a common history or set of shared experience – regardless of the fact that much of this sense of history sprang as much from imagination as it did from historical fact.
>
> (Kingsbury, 2005, p. 39)

The same argument was used to attempt to justify the invasion of Timor-Leste by Indonesia in 1975, as it was going through a process of decolonisation from its colonial master, Portugal. Following the invasion of Timor-Leste, subsequent Indonesian regimes, and to an extent part of the international community; mainly US and Australia governments, attempted to justify the invasion of Timor-Leste as part of a simple process of uniting kin-people, East and West Timorese, who had been separated from the main nucleus of the archipelago since 1512 by the Portuguese and whom were just being brought into the ethnic fold of the Indonesian Archipelago. Another of the key arguments also promoted was to stop a rogue communist nation from emerging in the region.

This is a mindset that still persists even today by some academics who continue to justify the brutal invasion of Timor-Leste by Indonesia in 1975 as an opportunity. The extract below was taken from an opinion piece written by Gerald Fry (2013) from the University of Minnesota:

> In 1974 Portugal decided to give up its colonies including Portuguese Timor. Seeing this as an opportunity to unite West and East Timor, realising that Timor had valuable natural resources, and hoping to develop an area neglected by Portugal, Indonesia invaded in 1975 and made East Timor its 27th province.

But Dutch colonisation of the East Indies was done via settlement of the islands in the Indonesian Archipelago not as one colony attached to the power base of Javanese key actors. In the case of the Republic of Indonesian, Indonesians are defined by the State Ideology of the Pancasila's Five Principles of social justice, a just and civilised humanity, belief in one God, Indonesian unity, and the government by deliberation and consent (Kingsbury, 2005).

It is on this front the notion of ethno-nation argued by Anthony Smith draws loose connections with Benedict Anderson's notion of the imagined-nation. In scenarios such as the one of Indonesia, the culture of one dominant majority, in their case that of the Javanese, is dispersed and promoted as common to everyone else, the minorities, but only when that dominant group gets into power and is able to promote and if needs be violently enforce its dominant viewpoint over the subservient communities.

For Smith, the second route toward the transformation of different kinds of ethnicities into a nation took a more popular path. In this scenario, communities and their ethno-religious self-conceptions were exchanged for more activist, political ones. The key to this transformation was the process of vernacular mobilization where the intellectual masses, as opposed to the politically motivated few, were intent on purifying and mobilizing 'the people' through an appeal to the community's alleged ethnic past.

> Ethnic distinctiveness remains a *sine qua non* of the nation, and that means shared ancestry myths, common historical memories, unique cultural markers, and a sense of difference, if not election – all the elements that marked off ethnic communities in pre-modern eras. In the modern nation they must be preserved, indeed cultivated, if the nation is not to become invisible.
>
> Smith (1991, p. 70)

For Smith (1991), ethnicity is very much at the core of the origin of nations. He defines nations in human terms, as a population of individuals sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all its members and need to have the political dominance to make their conception of reality, space and geography that of everyone else as well.

Nonetheless and while Smith's focus on ethnicity pushes forward a more primordial and raw sense of belonging and being, for Conversi (2004) primordiality must be removed from the approach whereby rather than looking at ethnicity as primordial and ancestral in what concerns the formation of a nation, ethnicity is rather an instrument that can be manipulated to enable nations to emerge.

For Instrumentalists like Conversi (2004) ethnicity is an instrument or tool of power that can be harnessed and used to create nations. Instrumentalists also conceive ethnicity as an instrument with a strategic value for a particular situation.

The Timor-Leste case may be a good example of this and how ethnicity, with a particular historical twist, has served as the instrument that made Timoroan or Timorese so different from the 700 linguistic-ethnic groups residing in the thousands of islands composing the Indonesian archipelago, including also those living on the western side of the Timor Island under the Dutch and subsequently as Indonesians.

The ethnicity instrumental for this claim of ethnic differentiation was not the ethnic self of the Timorese per say but ethnic variance influenced and shaped by 500 years of Portuguese colonial administration, used to make the Timoroan ethnically 'different' from the occupying Indonesians.

Indonesia had expressed interest in making Timor-Leste part of its "Greater Indonesia" republic as early as 1945 (Haodley, 1977).

In the case of Timor-Leste, during the time of the Indonesian occupation from 1975-1999, a borrowed ethnicity was instrumental for its leaders to be able to make claims against the illegal annexation into Indonesia. The instrument was not so much a Timorese ethnicity but the advantageous reflections of Portuguese-heritage that influenced, motivated and allowed the Timorese to think and to be ethnically different to the Indonesian by virtue of their Eurocentric heritage. The fact Timorese spoke Portuguese made them different to the Indonesians, it made the Timoroan culturally different, it validated the ethnic separation, and so forth.

Further Remarks

Alternative ideological approaches to the formation of nations can be seen in the case of Timor-Leste and its transition to a new nation-state. Timor-Leste is as much a modern new nation-state as it is imagined, it is (post)colonial and it is under construction. And it is ethnic.

This chapter approached the narrative and alternatives of nation-building and their applicability to the context and reality of Timor-Leste. These alternatives are based on competing rather than separate approaches to the narratives of nation-formation. At the end of this discussion one is not closer to be able to say which alternative best applies to the Timor-Leste case, or if many or all of them apply concurrently. It is open to subjective interpretation, which is in essence the debate about the emergence of nations that will continue to rage on.

The chapter that follows looks at the historical narratives of Timor-Leste and it is a re-interpretation of the narratives according to the perspective of the Timoroan.

Chapter 4: Becoming-Nation: Timor-Leste, History, and War

This chapter will interpretatively and critically map the history and birth of Timor-Leste as a contemporary nation-state. The departure point here are the times prior to European presence; then through the indigenous rebellions against Portuguese colonial administration for 500 years; through the resistance struggle against Indonesia's violent occupation for 24 years; and argue about the ideological democratisation influence of the United Nations administration and set up of the nation's democratic institutions during a three year period.

The discussion of the narration of the history of Timor-Leste is seen in particular by making reference to the rebellions or wars, both ideological and physical, which have been a constant companion of the development of Timor-Leste as a contemporary nation. This has been a journey into nationhood that took close to 500 years to materialize.

For the purposes of this thesis the term war will be used to describe even what different authors term as rebellions, conflicts and uprisings in a wide sense:

> War is organized violence by voluntary, conscripted, or mercenary armed forces; planned by the leaders of a nation or a group; involves the use of weapons; aimed at an enemy; and may be offensive or defensive. In the narrow sense, war is waged by the armed forces of one nation against the armed forces of another nation. In the wide sense, war may also be waged by clandestine resistance fighters, guerrillas, partisans, terrorists, crime syndicates, warlords and their followers; it may be civil, religious, ethnic, or tribal; it may take the form of terrorism, genocide, and massacres; it may be waged by armed forces against a group of fellow citizens or against some transnational group; the enemy aimed at may or may not be armed or organized and may or may not include civilians; and the violence involves killing, disabling, and generally subduing the enemy.
>
> (Kekes, 2010, pp. 201-218)

Reflecting on the history of Timor-Leste and in hindsight, since the European settlement of the island, war has been its constant companion. War has also been at the same time a uniting as well as divisive factor for the Timoroan over the past 500 years. This is not to say prior to European occupation of the island the indigenous clans already inhabiting the island did not war with one another, but a point needs to be made here that war and violent conquest marked the full extent of European expansion and colonialism and in fact contemporary history of Timor-Leste as a nation.

It was war that opened the way for Portugal's presence in the island of Timor; drawn by the prospect of bountiful white sandalwood and other natural resources that could be exploited and taken back and traded to further Portugal's economic prosperity.

This chapter of the thesis, in addition to being an historical account of the last 500 years of foreign occupation of the Timor Island is also an interpretative analysis of the narration of the history of Timor-Leste through the wars it and its people waged at different points in time against foreign dominance.

This chapter begins with an interpretation of the kind of society that was present at the time the Portuguese laid claim to it. The thesis will then look at particular key periods in time of the past 500 years of Portuguese colonial administration, Indonesian occupation, United Nations administration that led to the full sovereignty of Timor-Leste in 2002.

This chapter is not a mere chronological account of the history of Timor-Leste since 5012, rather, history and literature is used to demonstrate how for much of this time, the Timoroan, have been used and carefully manipulated one way or another to wage war in the defence of the interests of the foreigner.

In the previous chapter, it was established that Timor-Leste as a nation can be interpreted using a range of models and approaches to nation formation – imagined, post-colonial, UN constructed, modern-contemporary, and ethnic – and that no single approach can be used to describe it fully.

Despite earlier accounts of the encounters of the first Europeans with the Timorese mentioning them as primitives, this notion is at the same time contradicted by accounts of cultural communities highly structured and organized as will later be discussed.

For historians like Thomaz (2008) the Timorese Island is an old Austronesian nation with its own identity.

> Man had abandoned the bush and nomadic life and settled in farming lands. The tribe became a village and the village established relationships with its neighbours, forming a State. Small and miserable States but each with all the elements that constitute a Nation.[15]
>
> (De Castro, 1867, pp. 17-18)

How thus can the assertion that Timor-Leste is an old Austronesian entity operating as a nation be demonstrated? That Timor-Leste was already a highly structured nation-like entity when the Portuguese first arrived on its shores can be demonstrated by the literature and the accounts of many Portuguese scholars who travelled to, studied and wrote about their

[15] Translated from the original version in Portuguese.

encounters with the Timorese, over the centuries, buried in Portuguese archives and libraries, some of which I was able to access while researching in Portugal.

Unlike the experience of indigenous peoples of Australia, Timor-Leste was never declared *Terra Nullius* (Empty Land), void of people. The first accounts recorded by the Portuguese, indicated a human presence in the Timor Island, albeit constructed as primitive and uncivilised by the colonisers' standards at the time, but nonetheless, as will be later demonstrated human beings both cultural and highly organized.

A logical departing point then is to look at what structures and systems were already in place, and who were the people already inhabiting the Timor Island prior to the arrival of the first fleet of Portuguese in 1512; then look at the contact made between Portugal and the island; and move forward in time through the literature and witness the many becomings of the Timor nation; a nation of multiple identities but a nation nonetheless.

The only safe assertion is to say here the process of nation formation of Timor-Leste begun half a millennium ago, continued during the colonial era, endured the Indonesian occupation and is ongoing today and into the future.

4.1 Pre – 1512 Timor

Possibly the first observation by anyone arriving for the first time in Timor-Leste is the ethnic diversity of the Timor people. Not one look can be said to accurately describe all the indigenous people of the Timor Island. This heterogeneity was documented even before the first fleet of Portuguese landed on the island, by the Arab, Javanese, Malay and Chinese traders who visited the island's coastal areas to trade with the local inhabitants prior to European settlement prior to the 1500s.

When looking at the ethnic diversity of the Timoroan, a quick reflection of human settlement of the region, in particular South East Asia is necessary. Human settlement of South East Asia is believed to have occurred during the upper Pleistocene Epoch of geological time (c.1.8 million to 10,000 years ago). According to Bellwood and Glover (2004) South East Asia must have served as the proximal source over 60,000 years ago for all the populations of Australasia and the Pacific Islands, from the Aboriginal Tasmanians to the Hawaiians and Easter Islanders (see Map in Figure 10 below).



(Bellwood & Glover, 2004, p. 8)

Figure 10: Pleistocene movement and colonisations across land and sea in Southeast Asia.

According to the same authors, the first crossings from Roti or Timor to Australia's north-western areas must have taken place between 40,000 and 60,000 Before Present (BP). Glover (1969) notes that some 4,500 to 5,500 BP, pigs, pottery and probably agriculture were introduced into Timor and the next 4,500 years show the progressive introduction of other domesticates (dog, goat, buffalo, horse) and wild Asian and Australian faunal species (monkey, civet cat, deer and cuscus). The first evidence of early agriculture in the island of Timor dates back to 3,000 BP (Fox, 2003).

For Fox (2003) seafaring Austronesia peoples have been continuously travelling to and settling on Timor Island for at least 5,000 years. After the Austronesia peoples arrived in the island, a second group of Trans-New Guinea phylum language speakers arrived and settled.

All the languages of Timor belong to one or the two major language groupings: the Austronesian languages family or the Trans-New Guinea phylum of languages. The main

Austronesian languages of Timor are: Baikenu (also known as Uab Meto or Dawan), Tetum, Mambai, Galoli, Tokodede, Kemak, Uaimua, Kairui-Midiki, Habu, Idate, Lakalei and Naueti. The main Trans-New Guinea languages are: Bunak, Makassae, Fataluku (or Dagada), Adabe. There are more than 30 different languages and dialects spoken throughout the Central and Eastern regions of the Island of Timor compared to only three in the West (Fox, 2003).



Ethno-linguistic map of Timor

The Australian National University, Carto-GIS

(Fox, 2003, p.10)

Figure 11: Ethno-linguistic map of Timor

It is also useful to explore the name given to the island – Timor. Where and how the name Timor came about may well never be known to modern history but for some academics the name Timor originated from the Malay word Timur, meaning Orient or East (Matos, 1974, p. 15) and the fact that geographically the island sits in relation to other islands of the Sunda archipelago the furthest to the east (Martinho, 1943, p. 1).

Given the tendency to emphasize extremes in the Malay language by repeating the same adjective twice, Timur-Timur (East-East), or the island furthest to the east when referring to an island of unknown name, seems like a plausible assertion.

For historian Durand (2009), 'Timor' means East in Austronesian languages and according to Arab texts dating to 1462 and 1511, the word corresponded not just to the Timor

Island but to a group of islands southeast of Java that were divided into two sub-groups: Timor Lor (Timor of the North) and Timor Kidul (Timor of the South). Each of the subgroups divided into four or five islands, one of which is the Timor Island.

It will perhaps be possible in future with further anthropological and ethnographic studies of the people of Timor to ascertain whether there was an indigenous name for what is known as the island of Timor prior to foreign settlement, and perhaps the real name (or names given to the island by the different indigenous ethnic groups) remains buried in the legends of the people enveloped with ritual and sacred significance only available to a rare few. In one of the interviews conducted for this research project, one of the respondent's claims to know the indigenous name of the island but that such knowledge could not be shared out of respect of the *lulik* (sacred).

Nonetheless the name Timor seems to have been first recorded by the Europeans in Portuguese documentation on 6 January 1514 in documents sent to King Manuel in Portugal relating the tour of the Maluka Islands, Timor and Solor by Rui de Brito Patalim (Gunn, 1999). The documentation referred to above dates the earliest written accounts of European contact with the peoples of the Timor Island even though there is no exact fixed date for the first encounter despite 1512 being the year recorded in the monument erected in the landing site in Lifau, in the Oe-cusse enclave.

It is documented prior to the first Europeans arriving in the island, Asian traders already visited regularly. Gunn (1999) refers to the work of Dutch historian Roderick Ptak who from his readings of Chinese documentation was able to discover a Chinese description of Timor was contained in a document entitled *Tao-I chin-lueh* dated approximately 1350.

Asian historical literature claims that by the beginning of the 14th Century, the Timor Island was under the rule of the Indo-Javanese Kingdom of the Majapati under the rule of King Angha Vigaya who is claimed to have ruled over parts of the islands of Sumatra, Timor, Ternate e Luzon. By the end of the century, circa 1478 the Majapati kingdom was destroyed by the Malay Empire and Timor came under its dominion (Martinho, 1943). The assertion the Timor Island was under the Kingdom of the Majapati is controversial though, with some research on the Majapati demonstrating its political control was frequently exaggerated and that is extended only to the eastern parts of the islands of Java and Madura (Durand, 2009).

When the Portuguese arrived in the Timor Island some four decades later by the early 1500s, they did not document finding much influence of the Malay culture over the local inhabitants.

According to Matos (1974) and Gunn (1999) Muslim and Malay traders already frequented the islands of the East, including Timor, but did not settle only remaining long enough on land as needed to cut or trade sandalwood trees and transport them to the markets of Malacca where they were traded again and transported to India and China.

It is suffice to say prior to European settlement of the island of Timor in the early 1500s, the indigenous inhabitants of Timor already had much history that up until today remains un-decoded by Western academics and with the likely only written references to it possibly buried in the historical literature and archives of the Javanese, Malay or Chinese archival records and in the oral history and knowledge of the elder Timoroan awaiting to be translated and made relevant once more through anthropological, ethnographic and archaeological studies.

Upon their arrival in the Timor Island, the Portuguese identified two main confederations dividing the island into East and West. To the West they identified the Confederation of Servião and to the East the Confederation of the Belos. The peoples of the West were under the rule of a Senobai (Emperor) and to the East the peoples were ruled by politically independent autonomous *liurai* whom would come together to defend common interests or war one another at times (Figueiredo, 2004). Other literature accounts refer that up until the sixteenth century, the inhabitants of the Timor Island were united under the one kingdom of Waiwuki-Wehale and that through European and colonial contact the kingdom splits into two: Servião to the West and Belos to the East.

The existence of one supra-kingdom or two separate major kingdoms in the Timor Island serves to validate the point that is done in colonial literature in a somewhat contradictory manner, that is, prior to European settlement in the island of Timor, socio-political and administrative structures were already in place. The socio political structure of Timorese society found by the Portuguese in the 1500s still endures today, albeit in a diluted form and in a non-competing form with modern state structures. The traditional political structure of Timorese society included at the top the Liurai (traditional king) who held the ancestral power and exerted his authority over the rai (land) and the people who inhabited it. This is a generalised view of the authority of the Liurai and further studies on traditional power structures across the whole island are needed as they may differ from region to region.



Figure 12: Hierarchical stratification of traditional Timorese society.

Portuguese literature identifies in traditional Timorese society three main levels of stratification or classes composed at the top of the hierarchy the Liurai (traditional king) and included the Datos (royal relatives who occupied positions of authority), followed by the Reinu (people); and at the bottom of the pyramid the Atan (servants) (Figueiredo, 2004).

Even though Portuguese literature says the liurai were *elected* by the *datos* and others from the royal family, starting from the oldest son (Duarte, 1982), this was not and is not so much an election but an acceptance of the way in which traditionally a liurai comes to hold such a position. This could take many forms but in particular by descent or acquiescence and in the majority of cases through the marriage alliances between families. Speaking of an election takes away from the collective and natural manner in which decisions are made in traditional Timorese society and the way in which decisions of fate are taken for granted rather than going through a democratic process of selection.

This social, political and administrative stratification endured at least until the last major indigenous revolt against the Portuguese in 1911-1912, after which, following defeat a noted incorporation of indigenous administration into colonial administration of the island was introduced, diluting the *liurai* powers and indigenous social structures that had co-existed alongside Portuguese colonial rule during the previous four centuries of Portuguese and Dutch European presence in the island.



Figure 13: Socio-political division of the island of Timor found by the Portuguese on their arrival in 1512.

The socio-political unit found by the Portuguese was the *Rai* (kingdom) composed by *Sukus* (princedoms/village), ruled by a liurai. The sukus consisted of knuas inhabited by the clans belonging to the kingdom and each lead by a village chief. In this socio-political unit the concept of *Uma* (house/home) is very important and integrated into the structured composition of each of the sections of the socio-politic unit. Four to ten *uma* would compose a *knua* (hamlet), the grouping of *knua* containing numerous uma composed the *Suku* and a grouping of *Suku* composed the *Reinu*. Each Suku could have two *uma lulik* (sacred houses) (Durand, 2009).

By 1943 as noted by Martinho (1943) more pro-active colonial occupation and administration of Timor-Leste caused the undermining of the traditional power relations, thus levelling the traditional class system causing the disappearance of two of the classes mentioned above, the Datos and the Atans, remaining only today in traditional culture the classes of Liurai and Reinu. During Portuguese colonialism and through a policy of integration, the kingdoms and liurai became mere symbolic figures as far as the Portuguese colonial administration was concerned.

It is estimated though that at the time of Portuguese arrival, in the eastern part of the Timor island there were sixty-two kingdoms, and in the western part there were sixteen (Dunn, 1993).

For Fox (1996, pp. 10-11) what is most remarkable is the four main kingdoms of Timor identified by the first European voyage in 1522 persisted through the entire colonial period which for the author suggests an extraordinary capacity of the Timoroan to persist, to endure, and to maintain links with the land.

4.2 1512-1975 – Portuguese Colonialism

At the time of Portuguese arrival in the island of Timor circa 1512 the political borders separating the island and its people into East and West Timor did not exist; these borders are colonial borders. As discussed later, the colonial borders were defined only during the in-land expansion of the European interests. It was not until centuries after the first fleet arrived and in 1859, through a long process of border negotiations that took some 50 years that a colonial border was drawn between the two colonial powers of the time – the Dutch and the Portuguese – who claimed ownership of parts of the island for the duration of their presence in the region (Durand, 2009).

It is important to reflect on the relationship between the Dutch and the Portuguese and their influence and manipulation of local affairs to suit their own needs and ambitions towards the trade and delivery of sandalwood, gold, beeswax and slaves.

Despite the commemorated date of 1512 as marking the first arrival of the Portuguese to the coastal town of Lifau in the enclave of Oe-cusse, within the western part of the Timor Island, regular Portuguese and Dutch settlement and active administration of the main Timorese coastal areas did not take place until the mid-seventeenth century, approximately around the 1670s. Much of earlier administration or rule of the Timor Island by those powers also constituted for the most part what authors such as Hägerdal (2012) term more a case of indirect rule mostly based in the coastal settlements to manage the trade with rather than govern the Timorese, leaving the traditional leaders, the *liurai,* to continue to directly rule their people outside the settlement areas.

Thus what took place in the initial first centuries consisted of what Matos (1974) noted as three key periods of the administrative evolution of the Solor and Timor islands: the first phase occurred between 1512 and 1641; the second phase occurred between 1641 and 1702; and the third phase occurred between 1702 and 1769.

For the author the first period took place between the years of 1512 until 1641 and consisted of intensive missionisation where civil authority over the islands was mainly carried through the religious and missionary work of the Dominican Order. During this

period, control over the spiritual realm of Timor was done out of the Solor Island Fortress. The first two centuries of European presence in the region also represented a period of time of mainly coastal power struggles between the two European masters, the Dutch and the Portuguese, over control of the islands.

By the time the Portuguese arrived in the Island of Timor circa 1512 (some authors claim arrival took place three years later in 1515), Portugal was attempting to establish a system of forts and local alliances throughout South East Asia to increase its ability to administer its claims to parts of the East Indian coastline during the sixteenth century in relation to other European colonial competitors.

Despite this, Portugal of the sixteenth century was also not a European Empire powerhouse having a small population and limited resources to effectively administer its colonial possessions, thus opting for the indirect rule of the Timor Island. This system of rule hardly served as an agent of change; rather it necessarily empowered the traditional hierarchies and elites to rule on its behalf (Gerring, Ziblatt, Van Gorp, & Arevalo, 2011). Portuguese administrative power was centred in Goa, India, and was hardly centralised, rather Portuguese administration was shared between the commanders of the forts it built. Its administration was, as mentioned earlier in particular in the earlier centuries of occupation through local congregations such as the Leal Senado in Macao, and the Dominican priests such as in the Island of Solor (Hägerdal, 2012).

The biggest European threat to Portuguese administration of its possessions in South East Asia were the Dutch, a rivalry that started almost a century after Portugal embarked on its journeys of *Discovery*. The first Dutch expedition departed Amsterdam in 1595 to attempt to explore trade possibilities with the East Indies. Trade for the Dutch crown was organized through a joint-stock enterprise; the *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (VOC, Dutch East India Company). The VOC was administered through a Governor General who answered to a representative board in the Netherlands. In contrast to its Portuguese counterparts, who administered their possessions though a system of shared localised administration, the Dutch administered through the various posts their economic accounts that reported on local affairs each year to the board in the Netherlands that then allocated resources which gave the VOC financial resources to be able to wage and sustain local wars on its competition (Hägerdal, 2012).

By 1605 the Portuguese had already lost control over the coastal ports of Ambon in Maluku and Tidore, then the port of Solor in 1613. Batavia fell under Dutch dominion in 1619 and by 1623 the VOC had been able to evict the English from most of its dominions in

South East Asia. By 1636 the Dutch Governor General of the VOC turned its attention towards control over the Portuguese possessions in the region but was only successful in doing so following the separation of the Portuguese and Spanish crowns in 1640, after which Portugal lost the forts of Malacca, Lanka and Cochin (Hägerdal, 2012).

The second period started in 1641 and ended in 1702. This period was characterised by a renewed interest in the control over the island of Timor, not only because the island was the main source of sandalwood, beeswax and slaves, but also because Portugal was losing its possessions to the Dutch (Matos, 1974).

During this second phase the attention of the Dominicans shifted towards the Timor Island, through the influence of Father António de S. Jacinto, and the order was able to sign with the Kings of Kupang in West Timor a treaty of allegiance to the Portuguese Crown. It was after this shift that the Kupang Fortress was built starting in 1646, and according to Matos (1974) perhaps to close the only door of access to the Island of Timor to the Dutch.

The VOC launched a surprise attack on Kupang in 1652 and took possession of the fortress and the bay and port and from there started fomenting local revolts and incursions from Dutch West Timor controlled areas against the Portuguese dominion over the Timor Island, mainly to the East (Matos, 1974).

According to the author the King of Behale, whom is said to have represented most of the Western kingdoms, influenced by the Dutch VOC and even supported by Muslim kings from the neighbouring island of Macaçar launched consecutive attacks against the Portuguese growing catholic influence over the kingdoms of the centre and eastern areas of the island. In 1663 peace was called between the Dutch and the Portuguese crowns but by then Portuguese jurisdiction in the Southeast Asian region was limited to the Timor Island and Atauro and Jaco Islands.

It was within this context of threat to Portuguese dominion over the Timor Island that the third period begins, with the arrival in 1702, in Lifau, in the Island of Timor, of Portuguese Governor, António Coelho Guerreiro, who governed the island for three years until 1705 out of Lifau, in Oe-cusse. Up until such time, the governor with oversight over the Timor Island was the Viceroy of Goa, in India (Matos, 1974).

It is only after this third period of evolution of the administration of the Timor Island that the new governor and those after him display a real intent over the dominion of the islands of Solor and Timor, rather than the ‘indirect’ administration of the coastal areas to ensure the trade of sandalwood, beeswax and slaves.

Whilst in the centuries preceding the appointment of the first governor to Timor-Leste, the conquest of the island of Timor was done through the missionisation actions of the Dominican Order, who through the doctrine or the word of God only managed to baptise a few indigenous leaders and their communities. The Timorese were hospitable and did not object to their presence and the establishment of a political and military structure to ensure their boats were able to load sandalwood and wait out the monsoon season in relative safety until they could once again navigate the seas back to Europe to sell their precious cargo.

What had been largely a relatively pacific effort up until this third period led by the Dominicans then became a more strategic and militaristic effort, which then marks the start of the warring period for the Timoroan against foreign violent dominion both by the Portuguese and also against violent incursions from the west of the island influence by the Dutch.

This third period of direct governance started with the arrival of Portuguese Governor Guerreiro in 1702 and ended around 1769 with the transfer of the capital from the landing site of Lifau, in Oe-cusse, to Dili.

This chronology, even though it is not an in-depth description of all the events taking place during the first couple of centuries of European presence in the Island of Timor, is nonetheless important to frame the next argument being put forward.

While during the first two centuries of European, Portuguese and Dutch, presence in the Island of Timor saw back and forth battles between the two colonial powers, these were essentially sea-based and coastal battles where the fortresses were based because the true intent was to control the forts that protected the trade routes out of Timor, to Solor, to Malacca, all the way back to Europe.

This is a very important aspect of the battles that were fought up until the early eighteenth century, in that, with the exception of the few indigenous inhabitants that traded with the European, the majority of the indigenous inhabitants of the Timor Island were left in relative peace to continue managing their own affairs.

The importance of the third period between 1702 until 1769 is that it essentially marks the colonially constructed involvement of indigenous populations in the affairs of the European colonial administrators. And this involvement was invariably constructed through war.

While the Dutch VOC established their presence in the fort of Kupang, the capital of West Timor, the Portuguese retained dominion over the rest of the island, and more regularly had to fend off attacks from the west.

Nonetheless, few were the battles fought directly between the Dutch and the Portuguese because the Dutch used the local inhabitants, manipulating them so they would battle against the Portuguese (Matos, 1974). The Dutch and the Portuguese took advantage of ethnic divisions of the Island of Timor, between the lords of the Servião to the West and the lords of the Belos to the East and were able to successfully manipulate local rivalries to suit their own needs and trade-driven pursuits.

It is also during this third period, between the years of 1734 until 1739 a system of *fintas* or tribute payment to be paid *en natura* by the kingdoms deemed loyal to the Portuguese crown were actively introduced. Previously and despite tribute payment being required it was not enough to create revolts among the local leaders. The *fintas* included sandalwood oil and wheat (Gunn, 1999).

It is against this historical backdrop that the rise of *Topasse*s takes place and is very important to mention in this section as this community of Timorese individuals and their contribution to contemporary Timorese history has been sidelined and kept for the most part hidden by history whilst being deserving of greater research and analysis.

According to Gunn (Gunn, 1999) the *Topasses*, known also as *Schawartz Portuguese (Black Portuguese) or Larantuqueiros*, were part of a creolised and Catholicized Portuguese-Speaking Eurasian group, the product of mixed Portuguese, Chinese, Dutch and Indigenous, including Timorese, intermarriages or liaisons.

The *Topasses* were multi-lingual; they spoke and prayed in Portuguese, traded in Malay, as well as spoke their mother-tongue of Flores or Timor. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they exerted dominance over the region, dominating the coastal areas as well as the sandalwood-trade out of the Timor Island. Despite Dutch and Portuguese literature of the time claiming dominance and control over parts of the island, in reality, neither the Dutch nor the Portuguese were able to exert any substantial control over the *Topasses* and the areas controlled by them until the early 1900s. During this time the influence of the *Topasses* exerted itself also to the Timor Island. An example of such a period of Topass influence over the Timor Island took place in 1642 after a successful raid on the Wehale kingdom by Francisco Fernandes, which established the *Topasses* as the new power on the island even ahead of the Portuguese (Gunn, 1999).

Over the two hundred years of *Topasse* presence, it can be presumed they became part of the Timorese social fabric, by virtue of their Timorese ethnic-mix. Not much is known about the *Topasses* and this community of Timorese deserves to be more adequately researched so their place in history is not sidelined.

At this juncture of the thesis it is important to briefly describe here the ancient ritual of the kinship-alliance between families known as the *barlake*. The *barlake* has been defined through western academia as indigenous customary practices that surround marriage and relations between the families and clans of the bride and groom. The *barlake* is a cornerstone of East Timorese indigenous culture (Niner, 2012).

This thesis will not dedicate much time to the deconstruction of the *barlake* system or even trying to define the concept and institution within narratives of Timorese family (uma-kain) formation and wider clan social relations. Nevertheless *barlake* still takes place in contemporary Timorese society in fact it is still practiced even though it may be declining in its full traditional rigour as Timorese society transitions towards modernity. In contemporary popular parlance, the term *Barlakeada/o* is even used to describe someone who is living in what would be considered a *de facto* partnership and not yet married by the Catholic Church or by another religious denomination.

In very general terms the *barlake* represents a union not only between two individuals, a man and a woman, but it also represents an acknowledged or sanctioned union between the families or clans of both parties. It is within this context of alliances of family and clans that the particular historical significance of the *Topasses* of the Island of Timor must be addressed.

Unfortunately much of the indigenous history of the *Topasses* of Timor is yet to be written. The accounts of the Topasses community we have today are contained in western publications, whom a product of their time, always addressed them as not being European by virtue of their mix with indigenous people, but by the same token also not part of indigenous society, by virtue of their ability and strength to be able to battle and keep at bay the European forces for centuries. In a way the Topasses were too good to be considered 'truly' Timorese. Thus history has consistently narrated this community of Timorese as foreign to Timorese society and social-fabric, and again demonstrating how often western academia disregards traditional culture. The arguments that follow demonstrate this point.

The literature speaks of two key *Topasses* families who played a crucial role in Timorese history, the Hornai and the da Costa.

The Hornai surname, still in existence today all over the Timor Island, is one such example of the influence of the Topasses in the history of the island. In 1629, the Dutch Commander of Fort Henricus of Solor, Jan de Hornay, having embezzled large quantities of money from the VOC, deserted to Larantuca, in Flores Island, converted to Catholicism and married a Timorese woman who had been a slave to the Dominican order. He spent the

remainder of his life as a merchant within the Portuguese trade sphere. Upon his death in 1644, he had at least three children, one daughter and two sons: Sara, António and Francisco (Hägerdal, 2012).

João de Hornay, through his sons, António and Francisco, gave rise to one of the dynasties, the *de Hornay* that provided the leadership to the *Topasses* community on Timor.

The other dynastic founder was Mateus da Costa, a rival companion in arms of Antonio de Hornay. Mateus married a princess of Timor (by one account, the daughter of the ruler of Amanuban; by another account the daughter of the ruler of Ambenu (Oe-cusse). His son, Domingos, continued the *da Costa* dynasty on Timor.

These two families fought and feuded, intermarried and succeeded one another and established in the process Timorese clans that continue to this day (both in the East and West). Dutch literature reveals there was marital exchange with local aristocracies.

> The Larantuqueiros could take the role of wife-receivers, receiving high-status brides, which entailed a commitment to support their in-laws. If later Timorese pedigrees can be trusted, they could also act as wife-givers, obviously on the condition that the local king was, or became, a Catholic in name.
>
> (Hägerdal, 2012, p. 134)

The fact the Larantuqueiros could take the roles of wife-receivers and wife-givers further supports the argument they became part of the Timorese social fabric. As referred to previously in the context of the barlake, it was crucial for the creation, ordering and/or maintaining of strategic relations between clans or families through the union to two individuals representing each of the clans. During the barlake, gifts are exchanged between the two social groups or families. Once the barlake is agreed upon the two families become known as the Fetosa-Umane. The amount of gifts exchanged during the barlake depends on the negotiations and on the esteem for and status of the bride. This social exchange of gifts takes place during the barlake. The wife-taking family usually pay the *folin* (value) placed on the possibility of wife-taking from the other clan. Wife-takers give horses, buffaloes, goats, chicken, golden *belak* (pectoral plate), *surik* (war sword), money and gold. Wife-givers reciprocate with *tais* (traditional cloth), pigs, rice, *morten* (coral necklaces) (Hicks, 2012). For the family of the bride (wife-giver), the brothers, cousins, uncles and relatives of the groom are known as the Fetosan after the barlake is complete. For the family of the groom (wife-taker/receiver), the brothers, cousins, uncles and relatives are called Umane (Belo D. X., 2013).

The fact the Dutch literature acknowledge the participation of the Larantuqueiros in the barlake and ability to become Fetosa-Umane is of great importance for the history of Timor-Leste, especially in what concerns the Larantuqueiros ability to deflect both Dutch and Portuguese complete domination over the Timor Island from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century.

Using contemporary Timor-Leste constitutional analysis of the Topasses, in order to prove a point, in a contemporary Timor-Leste, according to Timor's Constitution, Section 3.2.a (GoTL, 2002) on Citizenship, the *de Hornay* and *da Costa* would be considered *indigenous* Timorese citizens by virtue of their blood ancestry, involving a parent who is Timorese.

This blood affinity should not be easily discarded or thought of as far-fetched because that is the composition of Timorese society. Timorese are communities of descent as through the barlake union/marriage system, families are united and strategically strengthened.

Even though little has been written about the marriage patterns of the *Topasses* during the two centuries they exerted such an influence over the affairs of the Island of Timor, the little that is registered about the two dominant families of *Topasses* notes they intermarried with local and even local *liurai* families that connected them to the indigenous realm of the island; a connection that is attested to this day by the many Hornai and da Costa families, some still with links to traditional aristocratic families, in Timor-Leste.

In fact according Joliffe (1978) noted many centuries later, in 1974, a group claiming to represent *liurai* who traced their ancestry to the *Topasses* and claiming to be the tribal aristocracy of Timor-Leste, established the political association or movement KOTA (Klibur Oan Timur Aswain) that then became a political party and as recently as during the 2007 Parliamentary Elections in Timor-Leste managed to secure one parliamentary seat.

The community or communion of descent affinity is something that is often misunderstood by western thinking, in that, in what concerns the identity of a Timoroan, thus the purpose of this thesis, the Timoroan is first that, a Timoroan, and then other identities come into play, reflecting an European, Asian or African ancestor, or even a local differentiated ancestry i.e. lorosaé-loromonu[16] is always secondary to the self-awareness one is a Timoroan.

[16] Lorosa'e is the popular reference given to the Timoroan from the eastern districts with Loromonu being the name given to the Timoroan from the western districts of Timor-Leste. For the range of identitary and political markers attributed to the terms lorosa'e and loromonu read Hicks (2009).

The Timoroan is also a sociogeospatial-identitary status, that is, it is equally as much about having indigenous or blood heritage as it is about where in terms of in which space or territory or geographical land area one was born and which sacred house (uma lulik) one feels and belongs and is attached to.

For instance one is an original Timoroan because one has Timoroan blood and because one was born in Atsabe or one's parent was born in Atsabe where the Uma Lulik is located, the traditional language is spoken, and where one's ancestors originated, and where one is most likely (both willingly or due to cultural obligation) to go and visit during key dates.

Thus when speaking about the *Topasses* of Timor one is in actual fact referring to a community of extraordinary Timoroan individuals that history has not adequately recorded, documented or acknowledged and if anything the colonial powers eventually managed to dismantle and pacify, alongside the other local aristocratic powers, through warfare, domination and cultural and ethnic manipulation.

The Topasses just like all the other great traditional leaders of the Timorese society were left largely unacknowledged by the narration of the Timorese history that by virtue of not being written by the Timoroan purposefully played out in greater detail the grandeur of the colonial civilising efforts in the lands beyond the seas, including in Timor-Leste.

The descents of the *Topasses or Larantuqueiros* leaders were able to drive away from Timor the first Portuguese Governor to the island, António de Mesquita Pimentel and prevented the second governor from even disembarking. It was only in 1702 that Governor António Coelho Guerreiro, was able to finally disembark in Lifau. Upon his arrival he faced an island that was void of any Portuguese political-administrative structure, lacking in means, able to assist him in affirming Portuguese sovereignty over the Island of Timor. Even though he was able to try and administer Timor from his seat in Lifau for two years he too was driven away back to Goa in 1705. His successors were not much more fortuitous with *Topasses* forces continuing their siege of the Lifau fortress whilst at the same time controlling the trade in sandalwood from Timor (Matos, 1974).

It was not only the *Topasses* to the West that attempted to drive away the Portuguese from the island. Each of the Portuguese governors attempted to activate the *finta* or tributary system, whereby every kingdom had to pay a tribute to the Portuguese crown were at one point or another challenged locally.

Unhappy with the arbitrary charging of the *fintas*, led by the king of Kamnasa, the traditional kings both from west and the east of the island, including of Sanir, Atsabe, Lolotoi, Cailaco, Lameão, Ermera, and others, in 1726, engaged the Portuguese forces in the

biggest indigenous revolt of the eighteenth century. The local rebellion of Cailaco ended with the capture of the King of Cailaco and by 1734 Timor was once again governed by a Portuguese Governor, António Moniz de Macedo (Matos, 1974)

The Topasses also turned their attention to the Dutch and tried in 1735, 1745 and 1749, unsuccessfully to drive them from Kupang. Despite being able to secure the first capital of Lifau a few more decades finally in 1769 Portuguese governor António José Telles de Menezes flees Lifau, sailing eastwards and establishing a new Portuguese settlement in Dili, thus keeping his distance from the *Topasses* and VOC forces reach. Whilst Governor de Menezes tended to the affairs of establishing a new Portuguese capital in Dili, the Dutch continued incursion in the western regions of the island gaining terrain.

The Topasses throughout their history in the island did not pay vassalage to either the Dutch or the Portuguese authority and in that sense they were not only relatively independent but also tried to become sovereign by warring and battling at the different times during the eighteenth century both the forces of the Portuguese and the VOC. Both Portuguese and Dutch literature also laid blame on another for during this time supporting the Topasses in their incursions against one another. By the end of the eighteenth century as well, the sandalwood trade also dwindled and with it perhaps also the power of the *Topasses* of West Timor power that depended largely on their ability to trade the precious cargo. During this time the Dutch were able to take over the western regions of the Island portion by portion. By this time also the *Topasses* must have fully assimilated into the community in Lifau and elsewhere in the island through ongoing indigenization so that by the nineteenth century the term *Topasses* fell into disuse (Hägerdal, 2012).

With the transfer of the capital from Lifau to Dili in 1769, the Portuguese focussed on making their presence felt in the Eastern regions of the Timor Island while the Dutch focussed on regaining control over the Western areas of the island.

Despite claims that the lords of the eastern regions of Timor were accepting of the Portuguese rule, this is proven fallacious with the number of indigenous rebellions waged against Portuguese encroachment over the Eastern regions of the island and the imposition of taxes or *fintas* over the kingdoms.

The second half of the nineteenth century is also marked by successive wars (indigenous rebellions/uprisings) and Portuguese military campaigns. This period is also known as the pacification wars period:

- Ermera in 1848

- Faturó, Saráu and Suai in 1851
- Ulmera and Lacló in 1861
- Laga in 1863
- Failacor, Maubara and Leimeã in 1867
- Cová, Cotubaba, Balibó and Sanir in 1868-1870
- Laleia in 1878-1879
- Lautem in 1889
- Matebian and Quelicai in 1892
- Maubara in 1893
- Lamaquito in 1894
- Obulo, Marobo, Atabae and Balibo in 1895
- Manufahi in 1895
- Liciba and Cotubaba in 1896
- Sanir and Cová in 1896
- Aileu and Moatel in 1900
- Ataúro Island in 1905
- Funar in 1905 and 1907
- Manufahi 1911-1912
- Oe-cussi-Ambeno in 1912,

(Pelissier, 1996, p. 249)

This period of close to 50 years also coincides with maturing of the Portuguese policy of forced occupation of the territory under the rule of Governor José Celestino da Silva from 1849-1908, which ultimately changed the face and fate of the area contemporarily known as Timor-Leste. While in the previous two centuries up until the shift of the Portuguese capital from Lifau in the Oe-cusse enclave to Dili in 1769, wars were waged mainly in the western and central regions of the island, the eastern regions were pretty much left in relative peace and with poorly managed taxes by the Portuguese crown.

Despite a reduced garrison Governor Celestino da Silva, started to conduct warfare much more strategically and increasingly by increased exploitation of the natural rivalries between the Timorese clans. The Governor fought rebellions by putting Timorese rivals into conflict with each other, with the Governor lending his armed support to the faction that most advanced Portugal's interests for domination of the Central and East regions of Timor.

In total, Governor da Silva fought up to eighteen military campaigns against the Timorese factions from 1897 until 1908. Unlike his predecessors the Governor was also more methodical in the occupation of the territories conquered by establishing a network of military posts linked by a radio network extending over approximately 300 kilometres. The posts were then headed by indigenous kings, or at least those loyal to the Portuguese cause, sidelining and deposing kings opposed to the Portuguese rule and replacing them with lower ranked relatives promoted to the role of *liurai*, attributing them the honorific title of Dom, giving them Portuguese family surnames and military ranks and forcing them to use European clothes and making them educate their children in mission schools (Pelissier, 1996).

A brief mention is necessary here about the great Revolution of Manufahi of 1911-1912 and the events in Portugal the preceding year of 1910 that may have served as the catalyst for the final big uprising against Portuguese administration over Timor-Leste.

In October 1910, the Portuguese monarchy was abolished and the Portuguese Republic proclaimed. By then, the District of Timor was already an autonomous district, having been granted autonomy from the province of Macau in 1896.

The Manufahi Revolution of 1911-1912 according to Pélisser (1996), may have been the result of the approach Governor da Celestino da Silva took during the previous 50 years of military campaigns against the Timorese.

> In a sense we can say that if Celestino da Silva caused the Timorese lava to enter the colonial mould and compressed it for years by force, the eruption of 1911-192 was the last expression of traditional society against the *malai.* But this is also, in the end, the stimulus of an awakening of consciousness of a luso-timorese identity, wanting to differentiate itself not only from the colonial model but also from the rest of the island...With its own schools, its own missionaries, its own military-commanders, its own labour norms...
>
> (Pelissier, 1996, p. 340)

It is useful also to reflect on the events taking place in Portugal in 1910, one year prior to the Manufahi War.

Portugal of the late 1800s was in serious deficit, had a large illiterate rural population not in a position to take part in political and civic activities and it is within this context that social organizations – socialists, Marxists, Anarchists – began to emerge alongside a vocal lower-to-middle class Republican Party emphasising Portuguese nationalism, promoting universal suffrage the abolition or aristocratic titles. In 1908 an attempt at a military coup against the monarchy supported by the Republicans sees its principal leaders arrested and

ordered to be exiled. Then, two Republican activists assassinate King Carlos I and his eldest son Luis Felipe in Lisbon; and wounding his other son Manuel who later becomes the king. King Manuel II then assumes the throne but is unfit to rule. Following two years of failed attempts at reuniting the country, followed by the revolts of the Lisbon garrison supported by navy warships and with the support also of armed civilians, King Manuel II abdicates the throne and is exiled to England. Thus after 800 years of monarchical rule, the Portuguese Republic is proclaimed on 3 October 1910 (Anderson J. M., 2000, pp. 138-140).

It is against this context the last great indigenous uprising, the Manufahi War takes place from 1911-1912. In Portugal the regime transitioned from a Monarchy to a Republic and with this a shift so did its approach in relation to the Portuguese colonies.

It is also useful to remember that until such point Timor-Leste was only administered by the Portuguese powers of the time in the imagination, despite their earlier claims to the contrary. Up until this point the European powers had also been kept at bay for the best part of two centuries by the *Topasse,* a hybrid mix of Timorese with blood links to the local traditional kingdoms who had been up to fifty years earlier largely responsible for their own affairs fighting to keep the Portuguese active administration at bay.

By this time also Portugal had successfully but unilaterally crowned one local *Liurai*, D. Afonso Corte-Real, deemed by the Portuguese Crown to represent all the kingdoms of Timor-Leste and with whom they could speak directly to, rather than a number of kingdoms who often revolted against the Portuguese crown. The extent to which the real influence of this Timorese king over the other kingdoms of the island is contested; nevertheless and in essence at the end of the monarchy in Portugal, Timor-Leste was operating under a Monarchical regime which was more familiar to the different peoples in Timor.

Following the change of regime in Portugal, vassalage was not expected to the monarchy but to the newly established Portuguese Republic. It is important to note also that traditionally the local *liurai* were paid contributions (equivalent to a tax) by the people. With the establishment of the new Republic a more concerted effort was made to administer the colonies of Portugal, including Timor-Leste, and with this new reinvigorated administration, the reintroduction of a more rigorous taxation system the Timorese were now expected to provide to the Republic. From 1908, this new tax replaced completely the traditional tax system angering the local kings. Other prohibitions imposed by the new regime included the prohibition of the cutting of the sandalwood tree, punishable with a fine, the registration of coconut trees and livestock, and the creation of a fine imposed for each head of livestock killed to be used in traditional rituals (Figueiredo, 2004).

It is within this context of change of regime in Portugal and changes in the way the administration, in particular of taxes, and the restrictions on traditional *liurai* power and rule the Manufahi Revolution takes place in 1911. The central figure of the Manufahi Revolution was Dom Boaventura. For Abilio Araújo, one of the first Timorese nationalist historians, the 1912 Manufahi Revolution was the end of the first phase of anti-colonial resistance that was led by the *liurai* and represented the safeguarding of their kingdoms (Hill, 2002).

Figure 14: Photograph (left) of Liurai Dom Boaventura and Monument/ Monument (right) of Liurai Dom Boaventura inaugurated in the District of Manufahi during the 100th anniversary of the death of the Liurai.

On 28 November 2012, the celebrations of the 37th Anniversary of the Proclamation of Independence were held, for the first time since independence in 2002 outside the capital Dili, in Manufahi, the birthplace of Liurai Dom Boaventura to mark the 100th anniversary of his death. At this historical ceremony were also present the elders of the 13 Districts of Timor-Leste gathered together to pay homage to this important figure in the history of Timor-Leste.

Current President of the Republic, Taur Matan Ruak (TMR), himself a living historic figure of the resistance movement, during his speech to mark the occasion of the Manufahi War led by Liurai Dom Boaventura said that this leader had "great importance in shaping the identity of the Timorese nation" (President TMR, 2012).

President TMR's speech was not just a reflection of the historical significance of the Liurai Dom Boaventura, but it was also an acknowledgement and recognition of the Manufahi War, as an expression of Timorese aspiration for freedom from foreign occupation and the role it had in inspiring the leadership of FRETILIN in 1975 to declare the unilateral

proclamation of the independence of Timor-Leste under the imminent threat of Indonesian occupation. Below is the most poignant excerpt of President TMR's speech:

> …
> We evoke the struggle of Liurai Dom Boaventura against the colonial power. Although his fight launched a powerful challenge to the colonial administration, it did not achieve the consensus of the kingdoms at the time and ultimately turned out to be the first step of a long journey.
>
> Our society's aspiration of freedom did not die with Dom Boaventura and it fell to our own generation the sacred duty of finally achieving this ancient dream of ours.
>
> In 1974, the Fretilin leadership came here to visit and listen to the widow of Dom Boaventura - a gesture those sixty-two years after his death shows the strength of this liurai's ideas. It is reported that the elderly widow commented to her visitors that "the loricos[17] are singing again" meaning the renaissance of hope and the joy that the new nationalism brought to Timorese hearts.
>
> In fact, we had to fight yet another 24 years before the loricos could sing in freedom. But the people were now united and firm in this struggle. Those were 24 years to reclaim a victory already attained – 24 years we set out to regain our independence. The posthumous award of the Order of Dom Boaventura to our sorely missed Nicolau Lobato is a tribute to his decisive leadership and the inspiration he is for our generation and future generations.[18]
>
> (President TMR, 2012, p. 5)

At the end of the Manufahi War, some 289 casualties were registered among those loyal to the Portuguese Republic and 500 reported injured. On the side of the traditional kingdoms, some 3,424 Timorese were killed and 12,567 taken prisoner (Figueiredo, 2004).

Also at the end of the Manufahi War the Portuguese Republic was then able to spread its colonial administration throughout the whole territory. From the late 1800s and early 1900s, in the years preceding the fall of the monarchy in Portugal, and after the Republican Revolution in Portugal in 1910, through the disruptive effects of the global Economic Depression of the 1930s until the advent of the Second World War in the late 1930s that history relates the overarching role of the new Portuguese Republican State over the affairs of the Timor-Leste as one of its overseas colonies.

During this period of time, the Portuguese State intervened in Timor-Leste in areas such as modern banking services in the island with the establishment of the BNU *Banco Nacional Ultramarino* (National Overseas Bank) in 1912 in Dili and money circulation, in the collection of taxes and imposts. Approximately around this time also history notes the establishment of corporate structures and monopolies in Timor-Leste such as the *Sociedade*

[17] Loricos – lyrebirds.
[18] Translation done by the student from the original in Portuguese.

Agrícola Pátria e Trabalho[19] in 1897 and then after a new law on overseas land concessions passed in 1901 the establishment of the *Companhia de Timor*[20] in 1904 and four other plantation companies, by 1910, the most important of which was the *Sociedade Comercial Agricola e Industrial de Timor*[21] (Gunn, 1999) (Hill, 2002).

It is important to reflect on the role of this period in history because from this particular period in time one can begin to understand the land issues that contemporarily are the root-cause of many of the disputes and conflicts in Timor-Leste.

Thus far this thesis has highlighted the Timoroan were left to administer their own affairs until the attempt at pacification wars that took place in the last part of the 1800s but prevailed until long after the fall of the Portuguese monarchy regime in 1910. This thesis also argues that the administrative influence of the Portuguese or Dutch was exaggerated to the extent that it was only felt around the coastal areas but in particular the in-land sandalwood trade routes. It did not necessary compete with the traditional administrative systems of the local kingdoms.

It is after 1910 the new Portuguese Republican State intervened most strongly in Timor-Leste to encourage a plantation sector based on migrant labour and at the same time force by violence the regulation of local production and taxation. The institution of slavery that had marked centuries of monarchic rule gave way to State-based forced labour, which perhaps may help explain the disappearance of the traditional *Atan* (slaves/servants) class. Timor-Leste remained around this time an economic drain on the Portuguese State (Gunn, 1999, pp. 192-193).

Unlike other Portuguese colonies that at the end of the 1800s started to be looked at as a potential sources of foreign market outlets, Timor for the duration of its colonial history remained pretty much seen as a likely source of revenue to develop the metropolis, even though due to poor administration, lack of investment, scientific knowledge and geographical distance remained more of an economic drain on the Portuguese State never delivering on the promise. Having that said it was not by lack of trying but more due to poor design and because Portugal was not ever able to hold on to its world power status and develop as an economic powerhouse unlike its Northern European neighbours.

However, the colony being far away served another strategic purpose as Portugal walked its path as a new republican nation and in the way it dealt with those who opposed its

[19] *Sociedade Agrícola Pátria e Trabalho – Agriculture Society Motherland and Labour*
[20] *Companhia de Timor – Timor Company*
[21] *Sociedade Comercial Agricola e Industrial de Timor – Commercial Agriculture and Industrial Company of Timor*

new and subsequent regimes. Thus Timor-Leste became also a place where political opponents and rebels from the Portuguese African colonies could be exiled to Sousa (2001, p. 183).

Governor Celestino da Silva, the grand engineer of the pacification wars that engulfed as mentioned previously Timor-Leste from 1897-1908 was also successful in laying the foundations for a functioning plantation system during this time that greatly benefitted his family and created powerful agro-business monopolies (Clarence-Smith, 1992) (Gunn, 1999).

Thus this time also saw the imposition of a colonial land regime with the passing of a special decree law on 5 December 1910 giving powers to the governor of the colony over the exclusive responsibility for all grants of land on a *quit-rent* or *aforramento* tenure and for transfers of property up to 2,500 hectares. District administrators were also empowered to make grants of *unoccupied land* up to 100 hectares, under certain conditions, to Portuguese subjects or foreigners taking up residence in the colony. In the case of traditional land claims, transfers of land had to be approved by the governor and to establish rights to his property 'the native occupier must cultivate or build upon at least half its area, and must have possessed it for a certain number of years, or have acquired it by legal transfer' (Gunn, 1999).

What this new colonial land regime did was do away with traditional concepts of usufruct, that is, the right to use and enjoy the right to communal land for private use without necessarily owning it, and replaced with a colonial definition of land as belonging to individuals and administered by the State.

Thus by 1910 an additional 6,000 hectares of land had been granted to other individual Portuguese planters (Clarence-Smith, 1992). By 1911 the most noteworthy agricultural production and exports were dominated by sandalwood (although this declined by the end of the 1920s due to overcutting), coffee copra, wax and cocoa. However, at a later stage the Great Depression of the 1930s derails plans to make Timor a profitable colony, leaving Portugal almost bankrupt causing it to leave its colonies neglected. It is also around this time that Dr. Antonio Oliveira Salazar rises to power in Portugal in 1926 and then on 27 April 1928, becomes the Minister of Finance and the *Dictator of Portugal*, a dictatorship that lasted some 48 years until it was brought down by the Carnation Revolution on 25 April 1974.

At this point is necessary to quickly divert to an earlier period in Timor-Leste's history quickly to reflect on the experiences of the Timoroan during the Second World War period.

4.2.1 1942-45 WWI and Three Years of Occupation and Leaflets

During the three year period of 1942-45, Timor-Leste suffered two invasions that once again saw the Timoroan sacrificed and used for the purposes of foreign forces. During this period both Allied and Japanese forces engaged and used the Timoroan to wage war against one another in the defence of their national interests.

The first invasion, by the Allied Australian and Dutch forces, took place when their military forces disembarked in the vicinity of the capital Dili on 17 December 1941. This invasion went against the expressed protests by the then Portuguese Dili Administrator, Lourenço de Oliveira Aguiar, towards the "aggression that the Portuguese territory was falling victim to by the Dutch and Australian forces", according to the accounts of the then secretary for Administration of the Dili Municipality, José Duarte Sousa (Santa, 1997).

The Allied forces were being pushed out of West Timor by the Japanese forces so they started retreating gradually seeking to establish an Allied forces strong hold in Portuguese Timor, a neutral territory; which they did with total disregard to protests by the Portuguese Dili Administrator who sent the Japanese Consul a communiqué informing him that "without authorization and without the agreement from the Government of the Portuguese Republic, Dutch and Australian troops were practicing an aggression against the neutrality of the territory, by disembarking and protected by planes and battle ships" (Santa, 1997) (Gunn, 1999).

By disembarking in the capital Dili, the Australian and Dutch forces breached the neutral status of then Portuguese Timor and put in question the neutrality of the Portuguese Governor Manuel de Abreu Ferreira de Carvalho in the eyes of the Japanese forces. Even though Japan's war propaganda promoted it would eradicate European and American colonialism in Asia and restore Asia to the Asians, the Japanese occupation of Timor-Leste was not to incorporate it into Greater East Asia but to expel Australian and Dutch troops (Frei, 1996).

The Japanese invasion of Timor-Leste took place on 19 February 1942. On the day after, the motives were made known to the Timoroan by way of leaflets dropped over the capital Dili. The leaflets read that Japan was at war with both the Netherlands and Australia and that the invasion was needed in response to the stationing of Dutch and Australian forces in Portuguese Timor (Gunn, 1999).

By August 1942 the Japanese forces began implementing a plan for the destruction of the Portuguese administration in Timor-Leste by:

> …the systematic bombing of Portuguese *postos,* the importing and training of Timorese from Dutch Timor, propaganda directed at the Timorese, elimination of pro-Australian Timorese, the killing of pro-Australian Portuguese officials, the gradual elimination of Portuguese administration culminating in the transfer of Portuguese officials to Liquisa in December 1942, the introduction of paper currency, and the acceleration of military campaign in the eastern sector of the island in order to eliminate the Australian threat.
>
> (Gunn, 1999, p. 224)

Between March 1942 and January 1943, the Allied forces, some 800 soldiers in total, under the code name Lancer or Sparrow Force, comprised by the Australian troops of the 2/2 Independent Company and the 2/4 Commandos Company joined by detachments of the Royal Netherland East Indies Army, withdrew to the hills of Timor-Leste where they were aided by members of the International or Red Brigade comprising Portuguese *deportados* (political exiles) and Timoroan to undertake guerrilla warfare against the approximately 15,000 strong Japanese forces aided by the Black Columns comprising mainly West but also some East Timorese (Gunn, 1999).

By December 1942, the 2/2 Company withdrew from Timor-Leste to Australia followed by the 2/4 Company in January 1943. Once again leaflets were dropped over Timor-Lese, with the Royal Australian Forces (RAF) planes dropping leaflets saying: *Your friends will not forget you*.

Even though this section is not meant to provide a detailed account of the events that took place during this period of World War II History in Timor-Leste, the few details provided above are illustrative of the types of events that engulfed and took over the fate of the Timoroan. World War II came to an end after the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, on 6 August and following the surrender by the Japanese on 15 August 1945. On 5 September 1945 the Japanese war authorities informed the Portuguese authorities it could resume its rule over Timor-Leste (Gunn, 1999).

The main victims of the this war were the many Timoroan women who were forced to serve as *comfort women,* the civilian population who suffered under the regime of terror imposed by the Japanese forces, and the 40,000-70,000 Timoroan who died during the war for allegedly supporting the Australian guerrillas and as a direct consequence of the Allied Forces war on the Japanese during World War II in Timor-Leste from 1941-1945. And it was because of the Allied invasion that Timor-Leste became one of the great catastrophes of World War II in terms of relative loss of life (Frei, 1996).

Thus by 1945 Portugal once again regained its rule over Timor-Leste. This was not openly disputed by the Timoran, in part due to the increased militarisation of the new Portuguese administration after the war. The militarisation of Timor-Leste that followed the end of World War II was also in response to the failed 1959 Uprising. The uprising, lead by the *Movimento de 1959* (Movement of 1959) was intent on conducting an attack to the seat of Portuguese administrative power in Dili as part of a colony-wide plan to take all members of the Portuguese administration hostage and demand a new government from Lisbon (Gunter, 2007). The Portuguese became aware of the conspiracy based in Dili, with ties Baucau and Viqueque and some ties also to Aileu, Liquiça and Ermera and the leaders of the various groups were immediately arrested and the uprising failed. One of the outcomes was that some 58 Timoroan were exiled to Mozambique, Angola and Lisbon (Hill, 2002).

In a subsequent ideological twist, the significance of the Movimento 1959 was overshadowed by the pro-Indonesian stance of some of those aligned and connected to the uprising. In particular in Viqueque, during the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste from 1978-1999, some promoted the history of the uprising as an early call for 'integration' with Indonesia. This more recent history lead to the development of an extremely negative view of the 1959 uprising post-independence in 2002 and the event remains largely unacknowledged by younger generations of Timoroan (Gunter, 2007).

4.3 1974-1975 Political Parties and Independence

The thirty years or so that followed the end of World War II for authors such as Timoroan Ramos-Horta (1987), Jolliffe (1978) and Hill (2002) mark the defining years whereby stirrings of not merely imagined but materialised nationalism started to take hold of the Timoroan in Portugal and in Timor-Leste. This nationalism quickly formalized into recognisable Associations and political movements in 1974 that were led for the first time by Timoroan.

It was also during these 30 years that more Timoroan started leaving the colony of Timor-Leste and be exposed to outside ideological influences; be it the 58 Timoroan exiled to Mozambique, Angola and Lisbon after the 1959 uprising or Francisco Xavier do Amaral, training to become a Jesuit priest in Macau in the 1960s, or José Gonçalves who completed a PhD in Belgium, or the 39 Timoroan students such as Marii Alkatiri and João Carrascalão studying in Angolan and Portuguese universities in the 1970s (Hill, 2002).

Thus this mass of Timoroan elites in Lisbon or in the other Portuguese colonies during this period between the 1950s and the 1970s left their isolated existence in Timor-Leste and were in immediate contact with revolutionary theories; as attested by Timoroan Leonel Andrade who attended his studies at the University of Lisbon between 1968/69:

> The first among us who went to Lisbon immediately came into contact with revolutionary theories and developed joint actions with patriots from other colonies and with antifascist Portuguese patriots. From that moment on we were no longer isolated. We could understand the just struggle of the peoples for national independence for we had assimilated the thinking of the great revolutionary leaders.
>
> (Hill, 2002, p. 52)

It is within this context, that Timoroan nationalism must be considered. The wars and uprisings undertaken by the Timoroan against the Portuguese in Timor-Leste prior to this period had taken place as indigenous expression of opposition to the presence and abuses of power of the Portuguese rather than political revolutionary movements.

The full expression of nationalistic organisations and movements can be said started taking place from the first contacts between the Timoroan with other revolutionary theories and joint actions with other colonised peoples and Portuguese against the fascist regime in Portugal during this period. In his book Funu, Ramos-Horta (1987) attests to this reflecting on the early stirrings of nationalism of this time saying that Timor-Leste did not experience a war of national liberation.

Nevertheless there was growing discontent with the way Timor-Leste was being administered by the Portuguese which lead to the establishing of a nationalist organization in Timor-Leste in early 1970. It is relevant to add here that this nationalist organization was not a political party; given the Portuguese fascist regime that persisted under Portuguese Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano at the time forbade the formation of political parties in the colonies.

Only after the *Carnation Revolution* in Portugal and news of the coup that overthrew the Caetano regime on 25 April 1974 first reached Dili through Radio Australia that three options were given to the Timoroan as part of the hastened decolonisation process by the Portuguese administration: continued links with Portugal; integration with Indonesia; or complete independence (Jolliffe, 1978).

Several political initiatives followed the news of the coup in Portugal that overthrew the Caetano regime. The first was the creation of the first political party, the Timorese

Democratic Union or UDT (União Democrática Timorense) on 11 May 1974, followed by the creation of the Timorese Association of Social Democrats or ASDT (Associação Social Democratica Timorense) soon after in May 1974 that subsequently became the Revolutionary Front of Independent Timor-Leste or FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente) on 12 September 1974; and the Timorese Popular Democratic Association or APODETI (Associação Popular Democrática Timorense) established on 27 May 1974 (Dunn, 1993) (Taylor J. G., 1995).

Apart from these three main political formations, three other smaller political manifestations also emerged in the later parts of that year; on 20 November 1974 the Association of Children of the Timorese Heroes or KOTA (Klibur Oan Timor Aswain); the Labour Party or PT (Partido Trabalhista); and the Association for Democratic Integration of Timor-Leste-Australia or ADITLA (Associação Democrática Integração Timor-Leste-Australia) (Jolliffe, 1978).

Even though the purpose of this section is not an in-depth analysis of the first Timorese political movements and parties founded in 1974 it can be generally stated that different political ideologies and aspirations separated these parties (at least the three main parties UDT, FRETILIN and UDT) along the lines of the three options offered by the Portuguese administration as part of the process of decolonisation for Timor-Leste referred to previously. In general terms; UDT prescribed for a progressive autonomy ahead of full independence for Timor-Leste with continued links with Portugal; APODETI prescribed for an autonomous integration of Timor-Leste with Indonesia; and FRETILIN prescribed complete independence for Timor-Leste.

It is important at this juncture to look at the background of the fathers of the nation that created these political movements and point out these Timoroan were part of the elites who had more access to the upper levels of Portuguese colonial society than the average Timoroan. In fact; the background of many of the leaders of UDT and FRETILIN (and APODETI for that matter) is familiar: from the *liurai* family, primary school educated at the Jesuit College in Soibada (Manatuto District), some attended higher education in the seminary at Dare which gave them generally entrance to the Portuguese Civil Service; or 'half-caste' children of Portuguese *deportados* (Jolliffe, 1978); or descendants of the commercial Chinese and Arab communities.

Another important demographic aspect is that these leaders were in their late teens but not older than their 20s (Hill, 2002); with the exception of Francisco Xavier do Amaral one of the founders of ASDT and FRETILIN who was 38 years old (Jolliffe, 1978).

It is within this context of global revolutionary theories and movements, the political regime changeover in Portugal and initial steps towards the decolonisation of Timor-Leste, the formation of the first ever political movements and parties in Timor-Leste, and the elite background of the leaders of the political parties, and the young age of these leaders that the civil war between the Timoroan that engulfed Timor-Leste in 1975 must be considered.

4.3.1 'Civil War' between Timoroan

Civil war among the Timoroan must be also considered in terms of the political sense of the definition of civil war, for there have been many instances be those during pre-colonial times, or during colonial times, or during World War II, where the Timoroan warred against each other. The civil war referred to in this section refers to an event whereby Timoroan turned on other Timoroan along political allegiances and foreign influences and elite power relations rather than it being a civil war in terms of an ethnic conflict (Denny & Walter, 2014).

Thus by the end of December 1974 six main parties and political groupings emerged within the political sphere of Timor-Leste – UDT, FRETILIN, ASDP, KOTA, PT, and ADITLA – all with differing ideologies in terms of political direction for Timor-Leste.

Considering the leaders where so young both in actual age and also in political maturity this must have been a daunting task to try and conceptualise the decisions that needed to be made and rationalise the full implications of such decisions.

By the end of December 1974 there was political uncertainly of the direction Timor-Leste was to take, but this was quickly altered by a coalition established between two of the three key political parties, UDT and FRETILIN. After weeks of negotiations, in January 1975, the two parties reached agreement and formed a coalition, albeit fragile, of national independence. On the other hand, APODETI continued its position with support from Indonesia who did not passively watched on as this coalition took place. In fact, Indonesia stepped up its own attempts at sabotaging the process of decolonisation that seemed to be heading in favour of independence for Timor-Leste, through bribes to the leadership of the other political parties (Ramos-Horta, 1987).

On 25 January 1975 Xavier do Amaral announced over the radio, in a speech, the coalition between FRETILIN and UDT:

> People of Timor-Leste, brother *maubere,* militants, comrades, armed forces of Timor-Leste, Timorese women, young Timorese students – all united we

> shall win...People of Timor-Leste, brother maubere, the time has arrived – the time for unity. People of Timor-Leste, from Jaco to Oecusse, we must unite all together to conquer our independence....During 500 years we lived alone. The colonialism oppressed and exploited our people. Many people were sacrificed. We were always alone. Thousands of our brothers poured their blood and gave their lives for our holy mother country. In the struggles like Kamnassa, Kotubaba, Ulmere, Manufahi and Uatolari. Nobody came to help us. The neighbouring countries were indifferent to our situation. But now that the Armed Forces Overthrows the dictators' regime of Salazar-Marcello, a small group of Timorese, corrupted traitors, intend to sell our country to a foreign power...At the moment, we are three big movements: the armed forces, FRETILIN and UDT. We have established a coalition to gain independence....People of Timor-Leste, from the border to the eastern end, from Oecusse to Jaco. We are the mother country. One nation. One flag. One people. One mind. One will – national independence.
>
> (Nicol, 1978, p. 106)

And on 21 February 1975, FRETILIN and UDT issued a joint communiqué and other propaganda material announcing the coalition.

It is important to contextualise that this particular period in time, in global politic context, anti-communism sentiment was at heightened levels. Indonesia was masterfully playing the propaganda and misinformation strategic game through broadcasts from Radio Kupang and Radio Atambua describing FRETILIN in particular, and the coalition between UDT and FRETILIN, as 'communist' (Hill, 2002).

The 'communist' narrative was used by the Indonesian government from the onset and as a way of sabotaging the Portuguese decolonisation process for Timor-Leste, to quash the nationalistic attitudes of the Timoroan, and to try and persuade anyone that would listen, in particular western powers, of its attempts to annex Timor-Leste.

Part of this intention was also reflected by the Indonesias training of a small group of Timoroan from APODETI in commando techniques to, according to media reports of the time, fight against parties opposing the annexation of Timor-Leste into Indonesia (Jolliffe, 1978).

While inside Timor-Leste there was hope and celebration due to the coalition between UDT and FRETILIN, this unlikely alliance soon deteriorated, to what extent remains to be empirically tested and the foreign policy influence of Portugal and Indonesia and the extent of the involvement by Australia and the United States remains to be proven.

Despite attempts to muster support from foreign nations for the independence of Timor-Leste by both UDT and FRETILIN representatives between May and August 1975,

foreign policy was already playing against the Timoroans' aspirations to being a sovereign nation.

> Portugal's private delivering up of their former colony to Indonesia in the 'London Agreement' as one of a series of Portuguese-Indonesian-Australian connivances from April 1975 to August 1975 to determine East Timor's future above the heads of its people.
>
> (Jolliffe, 1978, p. 113)

Despite decolonisation talks held in Dili and supposed to be held in Macau, the fate of the Timoroan seemed sealed by the intentions of foreign policy encouraging Indonesia's annexation of Timor-Leste. Perhaps due to political immaturity and caught in the euphoria of for the first time the Timoroan being able to think of themselves as a sovereign people and nation, by the time the young leaders became aware of the political machinations of foreign politic towards Timor-Leste and its future, it was too late.

Fuelled by Indonesian rumours and propaganda towards FRETILIN as communist-maoist extremists and increased diplomatic pressure from all sides to be against a left-leaning arm of FRETILIN, by the end of May 1975 UDT withdrew from its independence coalition with FRETILIN accusing it of distorting the principles of the coalition agreement (Jolliffe, 1978).

According to Dunn (1993), the collapse of the coalition between UDT and FRETILIN created a tense situation that reached a peak perhaps when:

> Early in July [1975] President Suharto was reported in the Jakarta press as having declared that East Timor could not really become independent because it lacked the conditions for economic viability. The President was also reported to have expressed some opposition to the continuation of Portuguese rule.
>
> (Dunn, 1993, p. 147)

The message from Indonesia, and to some extent of other leaders in the region, was made clear to the leadership of UDT, that is, they would act if FRETILIN whom it considered a communist movement gained power in Timor-Leste and would not accept nor allow a leftist regime in the region.

The Indonesians were successful in instilling mistrust among the Timoroan leadership. In Timor-Leste growing tensions were fuelled by speculation on the part of FRETILIN that UDT had struck a deal with Indonesia and the narrative turned into pre-

emptive strike between the two parties for power. According to Dunn (1993) the pre-emptive strike was never in the context of a civil war but more as a show of force on the part of the UDT leadership against a more radical left wing of FRETILIN and to placate Indonesia. An impossible mission at the time given that as history now shows, the aim of Indonesia was to never allow Timor-Leste to become an independent nation, so through manipulation, misinformation and influence they were part and parcel of the engineering of the conditions that led to the UDT Coup in August 1975.

The other contributing factor was the political immaturity and the lack of capacity of the Timor-Leste leaders who allowed this to happen and failing to fully grasp the impact of foreign policy and global politic in the fate of Timor-Leste.

The Timoroan imagined themselves liberated and sovereign but this imagination contravened the imagination of its closest neighbours Indonesia and Australia. Also Portugal facing problems in its own country wanted to get rid of Timor-Leste as quickly as possible.

Thus UDT organized a coup against FRETILIN on 11 August 1975 and a few days later UDT forces armed with weapons ceased from the Portuguese authorities, started rounding up and imprisoning FRETILIN supporters, while most of the leaders had already retreated into the hills upon hearing the coup by UDT was to take place. The Central Committee of FRETILIN had by this stage decided it would undertake armed confrontation with the UDT forces. According to the *Chega!* Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste – (CAVR, 2005), both UDT and FRETILIN committed unlawful killings and enforced disappearances of civilian, members and supporters during the brief period of the civil war.

On 27 August 1975, Portuguese Governor Mário Lemos Pires and some 100 Portuguese members of his administration left Dili by boat towards Atauro Island (Hill, 2002).

By the time of the Portuguese Administrator and administration staff withdrawal to Atauro, the civil war had just about ended. By the 28 of August the main UDT forces were forced out of the capital Dili by the FRETILIN forces and withdrew to Liquica and other UDT remnants headed towards the Indonesian border.

According to Dunn (1993, pp. 157-158) the conflict caused some 400 casualties in the capital and light damage to buildings and homes, despite inflated media reports in Australia and Indonesia about Dili being on fire and huge life loss and thousands of refugees seeking shelter in West Timor. For Ramos-Horta (1987, p. 55) the number of casualties in the whole territory was higher between 2,000 and 3,000 quoting a survey carried out by the

International Committee of the Red Cross, but he attested the civil war did not last more than three weeks and by mid-September 1975 FRETILIN gained complete control of the territory.

Whether 400 or 3,000 Timoroan died during the weeks of civil war in Timor-Leste in August of 1975, the loss of Timoroan life had a great impact on both sides probably because this was the first time modern and virtually-free political Timoroan, as opposed to clan-based Timoroan under colonial or foreign domination, had faced one another and taken each other's lives.

The civil war played right into the strategic manoeuvrings of the Indonesian regime and provided the context it needed to take action on the situation of Timor-Leste. By mid-September 1975 Indonesian forces had already made several incursions into Timor-Leste territory reaching as far in-land as Ermera District. On 8 October 1975 Balibó, in Bobonaro District, a border town, fell to the Indonesian troops.

It was around and after this time, between 8-20 October 1975 that five Australian reporters covering the events unfolding in Timor-Leste were killed in the border town of Balibó, with the circumstances around their deaths still shrouded by political secrecy to this day, but with general understanding from eyewitnesses at the time the five reporters were murdered by Indonesian troops. After the fall of Balibó and the murder of the five Australian reporters the Timoroan knew and expected a full Indonesian incursion of the territory would follow and by the 27 October 1975, the capital Dili was placed on full alert (Jolliffe, 1978, p. 210).

The weeks that followed in November paved the way forward for FRETILIN, following on the footsteps and inspired by Angola's MPLA[22] Declaration of Independence Day on 11 November 1975.

While this event unfolded in Angola, in Timor-Leste, in the capital Dili, FRETILIN held a demonstration with speeches from the FRETILIN leaders that according to Joliffe (1978), was perhaps a turning point on the road to the declaration of independence that took place on 28 November 1975 with the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. With no other choice but to declare Independence, the FRETILIN leadership tried one last attempt legitimise Timor-Leste's independence from Portugal as well as to try prevent Indonesia's annexation. It was on 28 November 1975 that Xavier do Amaral, the oldest of the FRETILIN leaders read the Independence Declaration:

[22] MPLA stands for Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola / People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola. Timorese President Nicolao Lobato was present at the MPLA's declaration of independence in Angola.

> Expressing the highest aspirations of the people of East Timor and to safeguard the most legitimate interests of national sovereignty, the Central Committee of FRETILIN decrees by proclamation, unilaterally, the independence of East Timor, from 00.00 hours today, declaring the state of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist.
> Long live the Democratic Republic of East Timor!
> Long live the people of East Timor, free and independence!
> Long live FRETILIN!
>
> (Jolliffe, 1978, p. 212)

While in the capital Dili, on 1 December 1975 FRETILIN swore in the Cabinet in which Xavier do Amaral became the first President of Timor-Leste, the Indonesians on the other hand presented its own Declaration of Integration of Timor-Leste into Indonesia endorsed by representatives of APODETI, UDT, KOTA and PT. Despite claims by Indonesia the declaration had been signed in Balibó on 26 November 1975, it later came to be known that the document was drafted in the Capital of Indonesia, in Jakarta, and signed in Bali.

By early December 1975 Indonesia's intentions to invade Timor-Leste were made clear to western diplomats, including the American and Australian governments. American Intelligence was closely monitoring the situation in Dili and was successful in its efforts to ensure the invasion of Timor-Leste did not take place until after US President Ford left Indonesia after an official visit.

> An attack on Dili was to have been made on 5 December, the day US President Gerald Ford and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, were due to arrive in Jakarta from China. American intelligence learnt of this highly compromising timetable and successfully demanded that the operation be postponed until after Ford left on 6 December.
>
> (Dunn, 1993, pp. 243-244)

On 7 December 1975 Indonesian forces launched a full scale attack and invaded Timor-Leste.

4.4 1975 – 1999 Timoroan Resistance to Indonesian Occupation

Despite a valiant attempt at breaking away from its Portuguese colonial history and imagining themselves as free and sovereign Timoroan, over the next 24 years, from 1975-1999, Timor-Leste was to be under intensive and brutal Indonesian control and occupation. An estimated one quarter of the population or more than 200,000 Timoroan, perished during

this dark period in the history of Timor-Leste of starvation, disease, torture and assassinations.

The focus of this section on the particulars of the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste from 1975-1999 will be generally on three periods of the Indonesian occupation of the territory: the imagination for a Greater Indonesia; the Resistance Movement of Timoroan against the Indonesian regime; and the events that led to the fall of the Suharto Indonesian regime and allowed for the Popular Referendum of 30 August 1999 that set Timor-Leste free from Indonesian control and ended almost five centuries of colonialism.

4.4.1 Greater Indonesia

Despite Timor-Leste and Indonesia sharing a colonial past, this is where the similarity between the two nation-states is closest. The two countries are vastly different including the imagination of the nation as a national cultural project.

The Indonesian nation-project was an expansionist one of transitioning a federation of 16 states into a unitary republic, the Indonesia Raya (Great Indonesia) around the Pancasila (Five Principles) dream. Timor-Leste's nation-project was a reductionist one that included decolonisation and the break away from Portugal's imperial and colonial legacy as well as breaking away also from annexation into the Indonesian dream, thus becoming a sovereign nation-state.

Unfortunately for Timor-Leste in the context of world politic of the 1970s, it might have been imagining too soon that it would be accepted as a fully-fledged nation-state. Portugal had fallen under the pressures of the communist left and its colonies emerged as independent under the same banner. There was deep paranoia in the west, in particular US foreign policy about all things left as being communist. This anxiety of the west is not surprising given that in 1972 American troops were still engaged in Vietnam supposedly trying to prevent the spread of Communism. It is within this context that the relative ease of Indonesia in getting positive acknowledgement from western countries about its intentions to integrate Timor-Leste into the Indonesian Republic must be considered.

The Indonesia of the second part of the 1960s onwards was very much anti-communist. President Suharto came into power in 1966 after crushing the Indonesia Communist Party (PKI) in 1965 that resulted in massacres that cost between 500,000 to one million Indonesian lives. This violent change-over from President Sukarno's Guided

Democracy that favoured attaining Indonesian national unity and integration through symbolic attachments and revolution; to Suharto's New Order favouring political stability, order and economic development was welcomed by the west. The west had been alarmed since the late 1950s at the growth of the influence of the PKI and Soviet supply of sophisticated weaponry to Indonesia. The anxiety of the west toward communism was so strong that it turned a blind eye to Suharto's preference for the State's military dominance of Indonesian society under the New Order regime (Jannisa, 1997) (Dunn, 1993).

Thus when Suharto asked the western powers whether it should leave Timor-Leste to become an independent nation-state with a *communist* government or annex it, the answer was obviously described in the previous section by US President Ford; let his delegation leave Indonesia and go ahead and invade.

The invasion of Timor-Leste took place on 7 December 1975, starting a 24 year long process of trying to turn the Timoroan into *Orang Indonesia* (Indonesians). As history proves it failed dismally, at least in political and identity terms, but in trying to do so, rather than creating Orang Indonesia, the Indonesian regime merely created an Indonesian-speaking Timoroan. By the time the Indonesians went into Timor-Leste the Timoroan already had close to 500 years of *pretending* to be Portuguese so in this regard, it was not difficult to assume another pretend national identity whilst at the same time continue working towards the ultimate goal of becoming sovereign Timoroan. This aspiration by the time of the invasion was well underway and already proven to be possible by FRETILIN's unilateral declaration of independence on 28 November 1975.

4.4.2 The Resistance Movement: Armed, Clandestine and Diplomatic

It is within the above context that the resistance movement against the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste must be considered. The war waged against the Indonesian regime was an identity war not just a merely ideological or political war.

The Timoroan were on their way to finally establishing a fully-fledged national identity in 1975, be it FRETILIN's Maubere[23] or UDT's Timorense, when this ambition was

[23] Refer to Chapter 5, Section 5.4 for a detailed discussion about Timoroan National Identity in regards to the political ideology of *Maubereismo* developed around the term *Maubere* that used during colonial times by the Portuguese to describe the Timoroan as uneducated and backwards. The term was subsequently co-opted by Jose Ramos-Horta as a symbol for FRETILIN and became one of the most potent symbols of the Timorese resistance.

thwarted by the nationalist designs of Indonesia, with diplomatic pressure from western nations, to annex Timor-Leste into its fold.

Despite being yet to become politically mature, the leadership of FRETILIN, days before the invasion of Timor-Leste was nonetheless conscious that it would have to gain diplomatic support if it were to become a legitimate government and attain the same type of recognition given to Angola after it declared its independence on 11 November 1975 by some 30 nations that immediately recognised it..

Thus on 4 December 1975, José Ramos-Horta, Marii Alkatiri and Rogério Lobato, three historical figures of the independence movement and history of Timor-Leste, on orders by the Central Committee of the FRETILIN newly appointed cabinet, were sent out of Timor-Leste to attempt to gain further diplomatic support for the declaration of independence of Timor-Leste (Jolliffe, 1978). Ramos-Horta was to travel to New York to put the Timor-Leste case before the United Nations because he was already known for his diplomatic ability and had international experience. Alkatiri had strategic skills and being of Arab descent would be able to gain support from Middle Eastern countries. Lobato had army experience and was to obtain military support overseas (Scott D. , 2005).

Following the Indonesian invasion on 7 December 1975, the FRETILIN leadership proceeded to re-adapt their circumstances to face a new form of institutionalised Indonesian neo-imperialism. FRETILIN established the FALINTIL (Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste/Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor) to fight a guerrilla war from the hills of Timor-Leste. At the same time and during the years of the war, but in particular following the first National Conference of the resistance inside occupied Timor-Leste in 1981 the clandestine became more structured under a new strategy that saw the establishment of a system of clandestine organization at the village level through the NUREP (Núcleos de Resistencia Popular/Nuclei of Popular Resistance) and the CELCOM (Célula de Comunidade/Community Cells) at the suku or hamlet level. It was during this conference also the first unified resistance coalition was established; the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance (CRRN) that in 1987 became the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) and in 1998 transitioned into the National Council of the Timorese Resistance (CNRT) (Durand, 2009) (CAVR, 2005).

Thus from the 1980s until the end of the war, Timoroan resistance was organised into three strategic fronts; armed, clandestine and diplomatic: armed to flight in the hills and mountains of Timor-Leste; clandestine to live among the waves of transmigrant civilian and military Indonesians that came to live in Timor-Leste and at the same time work to shelter,

hide and feed the fighters and smuggling letters, information and medicines to the fighters in the hills; and diplomatic to push the Timor-Leste cause in the Diaspora.

Much more so than modern politics; operating guerrilla, clandestine and diplomatic underground networks and warfare possibly came more easily to the Timoroan of time, after all this system of networks resembled the collective system of networks and affiliations that were crucial for the maintenance of the Timoroan way of life during the latter part of the Portuguese colonial rule. When looked at in this light, the Timoroan were particularly apt at undertaking resistance, and did this remarkably well.

This ability does not mean it was done without careful planning and control because it required an in-depth knowledge and insight into the character and psyche of the Timoroan. In particular the aptitude to self-preserve came at a great cost for the Timoroan whom at the end of the war had lost one-third of its indigenous population but managed to gain freedom.

Thus for the greater part of the 24 years of Indonesian occupation the Timoroan actively and strategically reverted back to a state of collective-identity existence it had grown accustomed over the period of close to 500 years of Portuguese colonial occupation.

Nevertheless and even though the Indonesian occupation was shorter compared to the Portuguese occupation it was brutally intense through a process of Rapid *Indonesianisation*:

> Rapid *Indonesianisation* – cultural, political and linguistic –was at all times a paramount government objective. It was to be achieved as quickly as possible through a range of measures such as control of mass media, ideologisation through education, military and economic implantation, forced population control, massive in-migration, and elimination of Portuguese (openly stigmatised as a 'colonial language').
>
> (Hajek, 2000, p. 405)

Despite the intention of rapid *Indonesianisation* and the pervasive ways in which this was implemented in the end it proved unsuccessful. Even though the Indonesian presence left obvious indentations in contemporary Timoroan culture, the core of the Timoroan remained intact and was able to self-preserve, in great part because the Indonesian regime, much like the Portuguese regime before it, and much like the United Nations Administration that followed, failed to truly understand the nature, character and context of the Timoroan.

This Timoroan character and spirit that took the Indonesian regime by surprise came to shine its brightest during the 30 August 1999 Popular Independence Referendum in Timor-Leste.

4.4.3 Suharto's fall and the 30 August 1999 Popular Referendum

It is ironic that 'anti-communist' mentality and excuses were used by Indonesia to invade Timor-Leste in 1975 but some 20 years later Indonesia's own students radicalized into forming a political party, the Peoples' Democratic Party (PRD), inspired by Marxist ideas of class struggle politics and especially Lenin's writings on the democratic revolution, were seen as the instigating agent of the various sections of the population that comprised the majority of the mass protests that swept the Indonesian Republic in the mid-1990s and that ultimately forced President Suharto to resign on 21 May 1998 (Lane, 2010).

Upon his resignation, Suharto appointed his vice president Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie to succeed him. A defining change in Indonesian politics was taking place and this also had a defining impact on Timor-Leste's plight for independence.

Among President Habibies' reforms in Indonesia, such as freeing the news media, allowing nongovernment trade unions and political parties and civil society group's greater mobility and under growing international pressure, in particular after the 1991 St. Cruz Massacre, in the Timorese capital, Dili, he also turned to resolving the pebble that Timor-Leste had become in the shoe of Indonesia, through an act of self-determination. President Habibie's perhaps naïve intention being for Timor-Leste to, and that it would, accept 'special autonomy' status within Indonesia similar to that granted to the Province of Aceh (Kingsbury, 2009).

Following negotiations between the United Nations, Indonesia and Portugal starting in March, by May 1998 the parties reached agreement that the Timoroan would participate in a 'Popular Referendum' to decide to accept or reject Indonesia's special autonomy option. After further negotiations in early 1999 President Habibie announced that if the majority of the Timoroan rejected autonomy in favour of independence through the referendum, Indonesia would grant Timor-Leste independence (Kingsbury, 2009). President Habibie's advisers assumed his offer of autonomy would appease the Timoroan and that most would actually vote to remain with Indonesia (Dunn, 2003).

Recalling the few years' preceding the 1999 Popular Referendum that allowed Timor-Leste to break away from Indonesia and declare some four years later in 2002 independence, this golden opportunity came with much apprehension, surprise and no certainty that it was really going to happen. There was a running joke amongst us the Timoroan in Diaspora who used to rally and protest in particular in the streets and in front of the Indonesian Consulate in

Melbourne and used to chant "What do you want? Freedom! When do you want it? Now!", and after 1998 at the end of the chant someone would whisper "What are you going to do with it?" and we would smile at the apparent lack of a follow up chant.

The above anecdote serves to illustrate the state of mind of some of the Timoroan, at least in Diaspora at the time. How do a people become independent after almost 500 years of occupation and where and how does the nation-state building process happen?

Four key poignant events took place leading up to the referendum. First on 25 April 1998 through the East Timorese National Convention in the Diaspora, in Peniche, Portugal, the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) made up of all three fronts; armed, clandestine and diplomatic and the political parties FRETILIN, UDT and also independents; transformed into the National Council of Timorese Resistance CNRT (Concelho Nacional da Resistência Timorense), a genuine internationally-recognised representative of all the Timoroan and a nationally accepted front organization. Secondly the Magna Carta concerning the Freedoms, Rights, Duties and Guarantees for the People of East Timor, was adopted at the congress by acclamation and it contained many of the key points of the Constitution adopted in 2002 including the separation of Church and State, between the Army and the Police forces, and gender rights. Thirdly, Kairala Xanana Gusmão, the leader of the resistance, was unanimously elected as the President of CNRT, and José Ramos-Horta, whom for 24 years pushed the Timor-Leste agenda at the United Nations, was elected as vice president. Fourthly, in April 1999, the Strategic Development Conference, was held in Melbourne bringing Timoroan human resources from all over the world, including from inside Timor-Leste, to produce a basic strategic development plan for an Independent Timor-Leste, in the areas of government, health, education, economy, agriculture and environment.

Xanana Gusmão, who was at the time jailed in Indonesia, sent out a video message to be played at the conference. In it he uttered Timoroan ingenuity and character (as will be noted in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis). The following are extracts of his message to the Timoroan participants of the conference:

> Dear Compatriots, this is the first time in the history of East Timor that its children are gathered together for a real analysis and to plan a development strategy for the first years of independence, full of our yearning and toil.
> …
> Finally, I wish to appeal to all Timorese to be prudent in our actions and behaviour. We must learn to be tolerant and patient, given that there may be others who have not yet been called upon to contribute better ideas. Let us try to construct our nation collectively and, although I respect political parties, I

> appeal to everyone to consider this first effort as essentially a technical and professional task.
> …
>
> (Gusmão, 2000, pp. 226-242)

Inside Timor-Leste the Timoroan did not wait passively. The winds of change that were sweeping Indonesia gave the Timoroan a new openness to more actively engage in demonstrations and the first took place only three weeks after President Habibie took office in 1998. Some 15,000 students demonstrated in Dili, demanding Xanana's release from prison and for the referendum to be held (Dunn, 2003).

The United Nations seized the opportunities presented and passed Resolution 1246 to set up a UN mission to organise and conduct the popular consultation referendum, and established the United Nations Assistance Mission for East Timor (UNAMET) on 11 June 1999 amidst unprecedented support by the international community namely Australia and the US for Timor-Leste's self-determination.

UNAMET had a massive task, to in little over two months first register those eligible to vote, prepare the balloting arrangements and ensure a secure environment that would allow the vote to be free and fair. This was not an easy task for UNAMET given the Indonesian TNI (National Armed Forces) had been leading militia operations all over the country to intimidate voters and sabotage the referendum (Dunn, 2003).

Nevertheless on the day of the vote, 30 August 1999, the Timoroan spoke with the nail rather than with a pen. Voters were given a nail with which to vote and pierce their option. On the day of the ballot, 98 percent of registered voters presented themselves to vote, in Timor-Leste and in Diaspora. On 4 September 1999 the results were made known, 78.5 percent of voters rejected the autonomy option ending 24 years of Indonesian occupation and marking the tangible end to an interrupted decolonisation process that also put an end to close to 500 years of Portuguese colonial presence on the island of Timor.

The Indonesians left Timor-Leste in the months after but not before causing havoc, destruction and countless crimes against humanity including mass killings and massive infrastructure destruction as they left. Hundreds of cases of wounding, torture, sexual assault and rape and abduction have been reported to include also the forced deportation of some 250,000 Timoroan to West Timor so their houses could be ransacked and destroyed. Timor-Leste was left destroyed and burnt in the wake of Indonesia's withdrawal.

On 28 September 1999, President Habibie agreed to Timor-Leste's formal transition to a formal UN mandate. One day later, out of a meeting on 29 September 1999 of donor

organizations, Xanana Gusmão and Ramos-Horta sent a strong message out to the donors, in that, as Timor-Leste was about to receive international support and assistance for its reconstruction, this should be well co-ordinated through a joint process with each Timoroan representative pairing with an international member. Thus the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) for the reconstruction of East Timor was established, coordinated by the World Bank. JAM addressed and made recommendations on eight sectors: community empowerment, macroeconomic management, civil service, judiciary, agriculture, education, health and infrastructure (Cliffe, 2000).

JAM also conducted an assessment to the country straight after Indonesia left, and the results demonstrated the devastating effect of the Indonesian withdrawal from Timor-Leste. Some of the findings spoke of the return of the Indonesians causing a shortage of skilled personnel because the Timoroan were often excluded from holding technical and professional positions. There was a total collapse of the civil service and over 70 per cent of administrative buildings were partially or completely destroyed. On a more positive note and central to arguments made throughout thesis, JAM also concluded that institutional capacity at the local level had been less damaged than at the central level with traditional and resistance local structures still functioning (Cliffe, 2000).

Thus the JAM assessment further validates the point and argument that central throughout the almost 500 years of foreign occupation was the core of Timoroan traditional and local resistance structures which self-preserved and endured in the face of much adversity. And as it will be discussed in following chapters it is within this traditional core that the Timoroan learnt and still learns nowadays to operate with Timoroan national identity.

4.5 1999 – 2002 The "Democratisation" of Timor Lorosa'e by the United Nations

This section is a quick reflective snapshot of the attempt of the United Nations to *democratise* Timor-Leste during the three-years of UN administration from December 1999 to May 2002.

By the time the United Nations came into Timor-Leste and as preceding sections of this chapter demonstrate, the Timoroan already had gone through many stages of development, be it from the civilising attempts of the colonial Portuguese administration and missionisation and the failed attempts of the Indonesian regime's rapid approach to making Timor-Leste Indonesians. It was then up to the United Nations turn to try and democratise the Timoroan and the new Timor-Leste Nation-State.

The United Nations Transitional Administration of East Timor (UNTAET) mission that replaced UNAMET was established and given a very broad mandate by UN Security Council Resolution 1272 on 25 October 1999. This mandate represented the UN's attempt at rapid democratisation of Timor-Leste through a governance or nation-building mission (Suhrke, 2007).

This process consisted of three key steps towards building of the country's democratic institutions: first the election of a Constituent Assembly; second the elaboration of a Constitution; and third the holding of presidential elections. UNTAET also had a key Defence and Security mandate to: provide security and maintain law and order throughout East Timor; to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate ex-combatants (FALINTIL soldiers); to assist in the construction of an East Timor Defence Force (F-FDTL); and to help in the development of the East Timor Police Service (PNTL) (Dobbins, et al., 2005).

From the onset in late 1999, UNTAET's mandate was flawed in that it contradicted the UN's own structure because UNTAET was established according to operational procedures of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), with little government experience, which was clearly demonstrated by the absence of any Timoroan in the planning and structuring of the mission in Timor-Leste (Gorjão, 2004).

A number of assessments both within the UN and other organisation have been conducted since the end of the UNTAET's mandate in 2002, but familiar shortcomings of the UN presence in Timor-Leste include: failure to prepare for the outbreak of violence following the Referendum on 30 August 1999; slowness in recruiting civil administrators and police and the variable quality of those deployed; reluctance to cede authority, once acquired, to local actors; and inability to effective coordinate assistance from bilateral and international financial institution donors (Dobbins, et al., 2005).

Perhaps the biggest shortcoming of the United Nations presence in Timor-Leste was that it attempted to democratise and construct an ideal Timorese-State according to its own definition of what that democracy and State ought to be and with almost complete disregard for the local Timorese context. In fact as was UN standard practice, the civilian and military components administration staff was internationally recruited disregarding local expertise and there was not room within its structures for the Timorese to be able to participate (Suhrke, 2007). If democracy in its classical sense is simply power by the people, this is one of the areas in which the UN committed its gravest error.

Working through several UN missions in Timor-Leste from 1999 to 2004, in public information my general impressions and observations were that UNTAET and its staff did

not really want to get to know the Timoroan. For most UN staff Timor-Leste was just another UN Mission and the Timoroan, lived mainly on the other side of UN Compound walls.

It was also ill-equipped and poorly staffed and suffered from confusion arising from its dual role as the transitional administration and as a mission tasked with preparing Timor-Leste for democratic self-governance (Martin & Mayer-Rieckh, 2007).

If in many respects this was an unprecedented mission for the United Nations; it learnt many important lessons that will inform future missions. Despite the UN considering the Timor-Leste mission a success, ironically the positive lessons were learnt at the expense once again of the Timoroan as it failed to attempt to understand the Timoroan prior to trying to (re)construct the Timor-Leste nation-state.

Further Remarks

This chapter was needed because the narratives of the history of Timor-Leste have largely been told not by the Timoroan but by foreign or mala'e experts. This chapter interpreted what has been narrated as Timor-Leste's history, though the framework of ideological revisionism, so that the Timoroan perspective of the same facts and timeline could be woven into the narrative.

Despite the different narratives of Timorese history one aspect that has been kept relatively absent and invisible over the past almost 500 years was the Timoroan voice or perspective. The Timoran was subjected to 'civilisation', then to 'indonesianisation', then to 'democratisation' but one thing was constant; the Timoroan and what he or she knows has been largely disregarded and ignored by history. In a contemporary development context this continues to be so, even though on the part of the Timoroan as part of a Nation-State, more attempts are being made to bring in indigenous knowledge and ingenuity into the big picture of nation-state building. Nonetheless more challenges are needed by the Timoroan to the ongoing narrative that continue to dominate the contemporary existence of the Timoroan and of Timor-Leste.

Part Two: Advancing the Understanding of Timoroan

Chapter 5: Learning and Timoroan (National) Identity

In earlier chapters the notion of Timor-Leste as a nation was discussed at length. The chapters discussed the topic from the different approaches of nation-formation – imagined, (post)colonial, constructed, modern, ethnic – and also the historical narratives of how the nation-state of Timor-Leste came to exist or became sovereign.

Timor-Leste in this new century stands as a Nation-State amidst a world of nation-states. As such now there is a Timor-Leste with its own State and there are also Timoroan (Timorese), a group of individuals bound together by a collective identity and culture working together to develop the nation into the future.

One of the first questions I had to ask myself when I embarked on this research project was to question why the topic of identity was and is so important to me; not just my identity as Emanuel, but more importantly my identity as a *Timoroan*. The question may have been less important had I not been a Timoroan who grew up in Diaspora. Maybe the question would have been less pertinent and defining had I been a Timoroan who was born, grew up and lived most of his life in Timor-Leste.

As a Timoroan who was born in Timor-Leste but left at six days old to go to Portugal in 1975, then migrated to Australia at 17 years old in 1993, then finally went back to Timor-Leste at 24 years old in 1999 for the first time since leaving, the question of who is Timoroan and how does he or she learn to be a Timoroan always interested me personally during my own development and later on became the focus of this research project.

As a communications professional also I was interested to look in particular at how the question of Timoroan national identity is communicated especially among Timoroan post Timor-Leste as an independent Nation-State after 2002.

This chapter will look at the literature around the main academic themes that will then inform the subsequent analysis of the data gathered through the qualitative component of the thesis. First this chapter will review the specific aspect of theories of development looking in particular at learning-in-culture in collective societies such as Timor-Leste. The second topic to be reviewed is the process(-es) of socialisation that occurs in an individual through his or her life cycle. Here the focus will be on early childhood and adolescent socialisation given the respondents of this research project stated that they learn to be Timoroan and their culture from their mother-father and others (*husi inan-aman*). Reviewing the literature on the socialisation processes will enable a better understanding of the role of the socialisers or the key agents of socialisation in the learning to be Timoroan. This chapter's discussion and

review of the socialisation processes will focus on the process of learning within the family, through peer networks, through educational institutions (including religious institutions, schools and media), and state-sponsored learning. The chapter will then review pertinent literature on identity and social identity leading up to a detailed discussion of literature on the topic of national identity. Subsequently a discussion of the notion of ideological *Mauberismo* around the *Maubere/Buibere* identity as the expression of a political national identity will be made. Finally this chapter will discuss national identity and gender in Timor-Leste.

This study uses a multi-method theoretical approach drawing from the fields of psychology, sociology and anthropology to consider what is likely to happen in the socialisation and learning processes of the Timoroan.

5.1 Learning to Be Ema[24] in Cultural Context

Even though the field of developmental learning has been researched extensively in western nations and more advanced societies and there are increasingly more studies in non-westerns nations, such research conducted in Timor-Leste is still limited and sparsely available.

For the Timoroan, it can be generalised that much of the learning done is still done within Timoran cultural context. This section was written after a thorough examination of the body of literature that emerged as societies developed and more attention started being given not just to the environment surrounding human development but in particular to culture and the role it plays in developmental stages, in children in particular.

This section starts with a universal maxim, that is, that one of the most important aims of teaching and learning is the transmission and preservation of culture from one generation to the next, including training for specific roles in specific occupations within any society. Culture is a very complex term that has occupied the minds of many academics philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists and other great thinkers.

For this thesis, a simple (yet this does not remove the complexity of attempting to define the term) will be used; and that is the definition of culture by Raymond Williams:

> Where *culture* meant a state or habit of the mind, or the body of intellectual and moral activities, it means now, also, a whole way of life.
>
> (Williams, 1990, p. xviii)

[24] Ema - can be translated from Tetum as meaning as person (individual) or as people (collective) depending on the context.

If one takes the concept of culture to mean 'a whole way of life' without trying to define its parts and particularities, the intricacies and nuances of such an all-encompassing concept, then one is left with attempting to deconstruct how a whole way of life is transmitted from generation to generation in a Timorese cultural context.

Perhaps a sociological and anthropological general definition of culture can also be considered, that the concept of culture directs us to a consideration of all that which is symbolic: the learned, ideational aspects of human society (Jenks, 1993, p. 8).

Another way of looking at culture is to look at its attributes, that is, culture is learned; culture is shared; culture is acquired as a member of society; and that culture is a system (Whiteman, 1990, pp. 4-8). The author discussed culture in reference to Melanesian cultures which then makes it pertinent to the discussion of Timoroan culture. In his analysis of Melanesian cultures, Whiteman looked in particular at the way in which individuals participate within their culture. This is also one of the purposes of this research project as stated previously and through the in-depth discussion done in this chapter and in chapter 6, to determine how the Timoroan participates in his or her culture towards the (de)construction of Timoroan national identity.

Vygotsky (1978) highlighted two key notions: first that the socio-cultural background of a child is a key component of his or her environment and influences learning; and second that theories of developmental learning that describe individualistic learning models in western societies cannot be simply applied to learning models in non-individualistic societies, such as in the Timorese context. Vygotskian theory introduced the concept of the socio-cultural approach to the study of cognitive development, in that, the socio-cultural background of a child is a key component of his or her environment and the learning of the abilities, skills, and behaviours needed to function as a member of society (Galotti, 2011).

Most of the key earlier theories of development that have influenced developmental research in the Western tradition viewed the child as separate from his or her social and physical environment. The socio-cultural approach of Vygotskian theory challenged such a view of the learning of the individual child because humans are invariably embedded in a socio-cultural matrix and human behaviour cannot be understood independently of this ever-present matrix (Miller, 2011).

For the purposes of this thesis Vygotsky is a key author, because Vygotsky theoretical work positions a person's social and cultural context in a central position to the learning processes and development that every person goes through; which Like Erik Erikson (1959) did earlier on with his definition and contribution to the understanding of the different

psychological stages of human development. The key concept to be reviewed then is the notion of the child-in-context, and the learning for a child-in-context, where context refers to both the larger culture in which child lives and its expression in the immediate setting (Miller, 2011).

This particular section reviews socio-cultural theory to understand how individuals learn in cultural context and also how learning is achieved in informal contexts such as is the reality in Timor-Leste given the deficiencies of the formal education system as a reliable source for learning about concepts of self and identity, social identity and national identity. By context also; in that it refers (apart from Miller's context reviewed previously) to the physical and social (at home, and interactions with peers and teachers) and linguistic (socialisation) context of learning (Maynard & Martini, 2005, p. 2). The authors identify two other paradigms important to the learning process(-ess): the socially distributed cognition paradigm and the situated learning paradigm. This research project further delves into the notion of the division of the cognitive labour (socially distributed paradigm), in particular in children, in societies such as that of Timor-Leste.

Gauvain (2005, pp. 11-12) notes that a socio-cultural approach to children's learning emphasises the role social and cultural experiences play in the acquisition, organisation and use of knowledge. In this regard then, this helps to understand what the Timoroan child learns about his or her own world (Timorese society) and develop his or her worldview through a coordinated opportunity to learn from the context (social and cultural) in which he or she is placed and is a living part of.

For Gauvain (2005, p. 12), the three main assumptions of a socio-cultural approach are first that learning and cognitive development rely on the child's participation in the activities and practices in the settings in which the child grows; second these activities and practices are largely organised by culture; and third more experienced cultural members play vital roles in determining the nature and timing of children's participation in these activities and practices.

This is why the socio-cultural approach is very pertinent to a subsequent discussion of the ways in which Timoroan children learn.

Cultural psychologists view is that children's cognitive development takes place in the context of a structured socio-cultural environment full of material and symbolic artefacts including language, structured social interactions such as rituals and cultural institutions such as families and religions (Tomasello, 2000, p. 37).

Socio-culturalists such as Rogoff (2003, pp. 7-9) do not agree with developmental authors such as Erikson that speak about the concept of age-grading and associated practices in the ordering of lives, in particular of cultural communities. Rogoff speaks in particular about this in relation to the experience of age-grading in middle-class U.S families and that are then generalised to all other cultural communities unlike their own.

For Rogoff (2003) cultural research is necessary to dispel overgeneralisations that assume human development everywhere is equal to the researcher's own communities and that these have historically tended to be mainly the particular perspectives of middle-class white western researchers.

Thus this research project can be seen as a particular way of undertaking cultural research about the Timoroan by a Timoroan researcher.

According to Gauvin (2005, p. 13) some social processes directly involve other people through direct social interaction and instruction while other social processes are less direct and transmitted from more to less experienced members of the group such as siblings and peers.

The socio-cultural approach looks in particular at how children acquire, develop and practice cognitive skills in the course of everyday experiences with social processes.

5.2 Socialisation and Learning to be Timoroan

This section of the thesis will review the notions and theory behind the processes of socialisation and learning from toddlerhood to adolescence into adulthood. It also deals with the role of socialisation in the teaching of norms and behaviours that allows the Timoroan to become functioning members of society. This section seeks to contextualise socialisation theory to the particular context of Timoroan society.

In the section above socio-culturalist or learning-in-culture theory and notions examined provide useful information on the processes of learning and its applicability to the understanding of how the Timoroan learn and develop their particular worldview.

Given that the majority of respondents of this research study were Timoroan between the ages of 18 and 35 and identified the first stage of learning to be Timoroan as being through their mother-father and others (*inan-aman sira*) and within the family home context (*iha uma laran*), followed by the peer environment, then the formal education environment and followed by an understanding of the media and State environment (see Figure 15), it can be safely generalised most of the learning to be Timoroan not only starts but develops and

matures early on in the lifecycle, which in itself is not exclusive to the experience of the Timoroan in Timor-Leste.

A question pertinent to this study was then, in the developmental or learning process, who is responsible for teaching or at the very least facilitating the development of cognition about one's culture (as referring to the notion here of a complete way of life).

In a person's development context, socialisation is a concept used to describe and explain the processes by which individuals from childhood and throughout their lifecycle (from birth to death) acquire the behaviours necessary to enable them to fit in with their culture and operate or function within their society. It is through socialisation processes, a child acquires the rules of behaviour and the systems of belief and attitudes of a given society or social group, so that he or she can function within it (Birch, 1997, p. 17).

Departing from this maxim then the Timoroan child is mostly likely to have been socialised from toddlerhood until they reach puberty about the behaviours necessary to enable him or her to fit and function as a Timoroan within Timorese culture and society. In this regard it is important to look at the concept of socialisation in the developmental process of children and through the lifecycle in general and also in non-western societies given they are more closely related to the Timor-Leste context.

For Maccoby (2006, p. 13) the concept of socialisation deals with processes whereby naïve individuals, that is, young children are taught and learn the skills, behaviour patterns, values, and motivations needed so he or she can competently function in culture. Even though the socialisation process leaves the most lasting effect when occurring in childhood, socialisation processes occur throughout the lifecycle and are not static or linear or unidirectional, that is, they continue as people have become more mobile and globalized and need to adapt to new social settings all the time.

There are many agents of socialisation in any given society involved in shaping and moulding an individual from birth to death but despite myriad agents involved in the socialisation process it is generally accepted that parents (and religious teachers in some societies), are regarded as being the primary agents responsible for the broad moral socialisation of the growing child (Maccoby, 2006, p. 13).

The child's family of origin is the first stage of development and in many cases the most enduring. For the author, socialising institutions, joined by peer groups, schools, religious institutions, and, in adulthood, employers and intimate partners as sources of norms for social behaviour too. For her too, a person depending on how he or she develops

according to the norms and behaviours of society can then be said to be said to be either well or poorly socialised (Maccoby, 2006).

Nevertheless cultural variation is importance in the study of the process of socialisation in cultures such as Timor-Leste's.

The bulk of earlier research conducted on socialisation focussed on western traditional family environments. Such research is the source of contemporary controversy because the traditional family is no longer composed by two married, heterosexual adults raising children to whom they are biologically related which was for the most part of the 20th Century the normative and ideal family context for socialisation, that is the mother-father and 2.5 children family model. In the western world also diversity of family is rapidly on the rise. According to Raj and Raval (2013) research undertaken in the field of developmental psychology on parenting has generally focused on the experiences of middle class white families in United States (US) and other Western countries such as the United Kingdom (UK). For the same authors, culturally diverse parenting and family socialisation practices falling outside this middle class white and western norm have tended to be compared unfavourably.

In the particular case of Timor-Leste then the collective nature of the Timorese family and the roles of the extended family would certainly fall outside the norm. In more collectivist cultures, such as Timoroan culture, child rearing emphasizes conformity, obedience, security, and reliability as opposed to individualist cultures where child rearing emphasizes independence, exploration, creativity, and self-reliance (Triandis, 2001).

Some statistical notes on the composition of the Timorese family highlight the point of it being necessary to take into account the context of the Timoroan family for the analysis of these types of issues.

According to the 2009–2010 Timor-Leste Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), 17.7 percent of Timorese children either do not live with their parents or live with only one parent. The same report highlights another important factor in that the mean household size in Timor-Leste is 6 persons; with 15 percent of households having 9 or more usual members. According to the same report, urban households are slightly more likely to be larger than rural households as they accommodate relatives who move from the rural areas to seek opportunities for employment and study in the urban centres. Another important factor that needs to be considered is the fact that 23 percent of households in Timor-Leste have orphans or foster children under the age of 18 (GoTL, 2010). Thus the standard Timoroan household is much larger than a standard household in an advanced capitalist county.

Triandis (2001) definition of collective cultures are easily discernible within Timorese cultural practices whereby the Timoroan often conforms to the constraints of reality such as younger generations conforming to having to learn Portuguese as an official language, they learn to obey without questioning authority figures, lack of security is the source of much anxiety; and rely on each other and on others greatly. These are traits that are very noticeable in Timorese culture. Such traits are socialised in Timor-Leste primarily in childhood.

Data gathered in this research project indicates the type of socialisation in Timor-Leste discussed below, occurs primarily in toddlerhood with the child's (extended) family of origin being first and then joined by peer groups, with schools, religious institutions, the media and the State playing a lesser role at this point in the socialisation of the Timorese child as sources of norms for social behaviour.

As discussed earlier and according to socialisation theory there are several agents of socialisation, that is, individuals but also groups or institutions that are highly influential in teaching other individuals throughout the lifecycle about the culture and norms of a particular society he or she lives in that allows a particular individual to function as a member of society.

Some of the most powerful agents of socialisation in contemporary and more advanced capitalist societies are: parents or guardians, peers and siblings, the media, teachers (including coaches and youth leaders) and religious leaders. These agents of socialisation exist in most societies although the process which these agents use to socialise differs from one cultural context to the other.

For Triandis (2001, p. 907) the most significant cultural difference among cultures appears to be what the author terms the individualism-collectivism cultural syndrome. As discussed earlier the socialisation process in Timor-Leste is done in a way that reflects the more collective nature of the extended family and social networks that exist in Timor-Leste. The most powerful agents of socialisation in Timor-Leste are the *inan-aman sira* (mother-father and other caregivers) as will be discussed in the research analysis sections of this thesis. The key word here is *sira* (meaning *they* but in this context *others).* The *others* concept is crux here because the parental role is not in the exclusive domain of the biological parents rather it is a communal and shared responsibility.

A child's first major contact and influences are the parents or guardians. Gradually, this child comes in contact with other adults such as day-care providers or grandparents or *mama-kolo* (wet-nurses) who teach different skills, values, and cultural knowledge. Later the child is likely to form friendships, and this means contact with peers as well as peer's parents

and other family members. Gradually, the number of interactions grows and the child is exposed to media, teachers, coaches, religious leaders, and other adults and children (Grauerholz & Swart, 2012, pp. 21-22).

Socialisation Theory recognises that a child's first major contact and influence are the parents or guardians. It is from parents and those who assume and share parental and nurturing roles that a child receives substantial amounts of discreet cultural knowledge that allows him or her to understand the world. The theory also points out that in most societies; women still tend to be the primary caretakers of children. This entails mothers and other female guardians often play a particularly powerful role in shaping children's beliefs and behaviours (Grauerholz & Swart, 2012).

In contemporary societies this is no longer the strict norm given the concept of 'traditional families' has changed and will continue to change rapidly. No longer are children being raised by two parents biologically gender different; many are being raised by same-sex parents; some are raised by a single parent, some are raised by one biological parent and one non-biological parent, some are being raised by their grandparents as both parents concentrate on their careers. The concept of family is not as clear cut as it was when the studies in the field of socialisation begun. Also children are socialised within culture; in the same way culture is now playing such an important role in the cognitive development of children (as discussed previously).

It is also no longer the norm that all children are raised the same way, rather in different cultures, children are raised differently.

> Men who share an ethnic area, a historical era, or an economic pursuit are guided by common images of good and evil. Infinitely varied, these images reflect the elusive nature of historical change; prototypes of good and evil, they assume decisive concreteness in every individual's ego development.
>
> (Erikson E. H., 1959, p. 17).

The immediate social networks children are exposed to vary from one culture to another. Thus it follows that cultural variation also exerts significant and differential influences over mental, emotional, and social development of children (Bornstein, 1991, p. 3).

It is now widely recognised that peers and friends also play a profound influencing role in the way an individual learns his or her behaviours and values. In contemporary

societies this peer socialisation may not even occur face-to-face anymore and can be achieved through digital social networks such as Facebook or Instagram or Twitter.

Several key findings were made through this research project that will greatly assist in our understanding of where and how Timoroan is socialised and learns to be.

The Timoroan learns to be Timoroan (self-collective, person identity, social identity, and national identity) within the cultural extended family context and is primarily socialised by ***inan-aman sira***[25] (mother-father and other caregivers) in the ***uma laran***[26] (within the home).

Thus some of the core attributes socialised and that children are exposed to in the family context reflect primarily the ethnic background, a series of relationships, attitudes towards education and social status, and family dynamics. It is within the family also that definite rituals, habits and attitudes are established. At this level also children receive the validation they are accepted by a primary group and how they are able then to operate within that group and within society (Spodek & Saracho, 2008).

The Timoroan self is also much more aware of being a self-collective or a having self-in-relation-to-others than as a self-individual. In Timorese traditional structure, this self-collective is often determined in culture through rituals such as the *barlake* (traditional union) of two self-collective Timoroan persons whereby the ceremony represents both the union of man-woman Timoroan but principally a union of their collectives or families. With the barlake comes the expectation that two families are united and conceivably share common but now expanded purposes through the *lia*[27]. It is within this cultural context then that the *uma laran* must be considered because the Uma Laran in this context represents the Inan-Aman Sira's (Mother-Father and Others) Home (in the unlikely event the parents separate to

[25] Inan-Aman sira = literally translates as Mother-Father and others which can be contextualised into meaning that the parental role is a shared role in Timorese society in that parenting duties are exercised not only by the biological parents but also by other members of the extended traditional Timoroan family: parents, grandparents, siblings and other first-cousins, uncles and aunties and including also the traditional wet-nurses.

[26] Uma-Laran= literally translates as inside the home but in a cultural context uma-laran also refers to all the persons who have access (granted and implied) to the real of the traditional Timorese household and this includes the clan. The uma-laran can represent all the social spaces, although primarily the home, frequented by the cultural extended family a Timoroan belongs to by descent or marriage-alliance.

[27] Lia – lia can be seen as sets of family and clan commitments that require by cultural obligation the collective to come together so for example the burden of someone who belongs to that same collective is shared, such as during a *lia-mate* (death). The important aspect of a *lia* is that participation is more a matter of obligation than a matter of choice and it helps to bind members of the same collective to one another and to the collective as a whole.

either the family of the man or the woman depending on *barlake* arrangements) and also the households of the clans to which they belong to.

Such as it takes place in Timorese society and as noted by Miller (2011, p. 211) who suggested that in societies, community members may share the socialisation of the young, and even reprimand misbehaviour in children other than their own. But this is possible because these children are encouraged to participate in daily activities within the community, in contrast to the segregation of children from community work and social activities in middle-class European and American communities.

Thus the socialisation processes in Timor-Leste occur at different stages as illustrated below and in comparison to the stages of the socialisation process in western and more advanced societies.



a. Timoroan Process of Socialisation. *b. Western Process of Socialisation.*

Figure 15: The socialisation of Timoroan National Identity compared to the socialisation process of National Identity in mostly western and advanced societies.

There is another likely reason why the major agents of socialisation in Timor-Leste in particular of Timoroan national identity are still the parents and other immediate relatives, and the *kolegas* (peers) rather than the formal education system or even the media, such as in more advanced capitalist societies.

The socialisation processes referred to in this section are not new to Timor, in particular in regards to the socialisation of a political national identity. In fact, the Timoroan as stated previously have been socialised at one point or another during the 500 years of foreign occupation to be either Portuguese or Indonesian.

The major agent of socialisation during the occupation periods was the formal education system. Initially and during Portuguese presence in Timor-Leste, the Portuguese education system with assimilation philosophies was designed to educate elites who would then go on to develop strong affinities to Portugal and the Portuguese language. The Indonesian soon became aware of this reality after the invasion and implemented a large-scale educational system as the cornerstone of its assimilationist policy to re-socialise the Timoroan to let go of both their Portuguese legacy and embrace becoming Indonesian.

> It knew that through education the Indonesian government could resocialise the younger generations. Through the imposition of the Indonesian language, the national Pancasila ideology, the respect for typical Indonesian symbols of patriotism such as the flag and the national anthem, and the dissemination of a new version of history, Indonesia sought to ensure that young Timorese could eventually come to view themselves as full-fledged Indonesian citizens. Moreover, schools would become the main sites of interaction between Timorese and the children of transmigrant workers – Indonesians who voluntarily decide to migrate to East Timor in search of better economic opportunities. The Indonesian government hoped that through close contact among students, potential animosity between the different ethnic and religious groups would dissipate over time.
>
> (Arenas, 1998, p. 131)

The types of socialisation processes employed by the Portuguese colonial administration but more assertively and pervasively by the Indonesian regime during the occupation were achieved through the formal education system. This is likely to have caused the Timoroan to develop great distrust in the education system. This then helps explain why most of the socialisation of the Timoroan takes place at home and is done by the parents and other close relatives.

In the context of the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste, socialisation took a much more aggressive integrationist agenda promoted through the education curriculum. This was done to help facilitate the integration of the newly made 27th Province of Indonesia and of the Timoroan as Indonesians to the rest of the Republic. And again mirroring what the Portuguese colonial education system had attempted to do previously, the education that the Timoroan received in Indonesia meant to civilise them and instil in them a sense of being Indonesians through a concerted effort to make *them* Indonesian (Van Klinken, 2013). Even though these socialisation attempts failed, it was not by lack of trying, but in the case of Indonesia, as Bennedict Anderson noted, the failure may have been also on the part of the Indonesian regime whom never really regarded the Timoroan as truly Indonesians. In fact in all the Indonesian official speeches about Timor-Leste during the occupation, Suharto or the generals

always referred to the people of Timor-Leste as anything but 'East Timorese' (Anderson, 1993, p.23).

A number of findings on the socialisation of the Timoroan emerged from the analysis of the data generated by this research project that will be discussed in greater length subsequently:

1. The Timoroan learns to be Timoroan (self-collective, social identity, and national identity) within the cultural context of the extended family context and is primarily socialised by ***inan-aman sira*** (parents and other nurturers) ***iha uma laran*** (within the home);
2. The second key agent of socialisation of the Timoroan are the ***peers*** (kolega sira) to include friends and their extended families and other social relations.
3. The ***schools*** and the ***media*** presently play an only nominal role in socialising the Timoroan Identity (person and national), despite there being an acknowledgement that they should play a greater role in the socialisation process;
4. The Timoroan from birth has a ***self-collective identity*** rather than a self-individual identity.
5. By the time the Timoroan reaches ***early adulthood*** his and her Timoroan national identity is already well grounded and defined.
6. It is feasible that only after ***early adulthood*** will the Timoroan begin developing a more ***self-individualistic identity*** but only if exposed to certain social situations requiring him or her to move away from established community networks or place of birth e.g. from the Districts to attend university in the capital Dili. But the Timoroan will always come back to it.
7. The Timoroan has been a ***heterogeneous group operating as a homogeneous group*** for at least 300 years.

The initial aim of this research project was to look at the role of communications, in particular media socialisation to the emerging of Timoroan national identity in Timor-Leste. Nevertheless the focus of the research on the socialisation process quickly changed from the media to the reality of the context of Timor-Leste, where agents of socialisation and the process of socialisation occur different to more advanced societies contexts of socialisation.

Respondents of this research project were asked several questions about their Timoroan national identity. They were then asked principally about where they learn to be Timoroan at

the national level. An initial assumption of this study was that the Timorese State and the Timorese mass media play a greater and more defining role in this regard. This notion was invalidated by the data generated by the answers given by the respondents of this research project.

One way of trying to determine the agents of socialisation in Timor-Leste was to ask respondents whose responsibility it is to get them to learn or induce the learning of Timoroan national identity and culture. The same questions were framed differently and repetitively throughout the interview process to elicit greater depth in the types of answers provided by respondents.

Almost all respondents identified clearly that the responsibility for socialising Timoroan rests with the *inan-aman sira* (mother-father and others). The extract below from respondent ***R4 [BD]*** is telling in discussing this finding in that it positions the responsibility with the Timoroan self-collective in the first instance. This response is in line with responses gathered through this study in that there is a great sense of duty that falls on the Timoroan to be the source of his or her learning and promotion of the Timoroan national identity.

[EB]: Whose responsibility do you think it is to keep our culture and our national identity alive? Who should be doing this?

[BD]: I think it the responsibility of all of us to sustain our own identity. Everyone arrives with their own identity, from the 442 sukus and 13 Districts but as one it is all of our responsibility to do this. So we can hold-on to our culture as Timor Oan, to behave as Timor Oan, and to carry oneself as a real Timor Oan.

Thus for ***R4 [BD]*** the responsibility rests on all Timoroan, that is the collective, to hold-on to Timoroan Culture and to live as an authentic Timoroan.

When looking at sources of learning Timoroan national identity two considerations were taken; first who is the key or main agent of socialisation of Timoroan national identity and second where that agency takes places within Timoroan society.

All of the respondents when reflecting on the first part of the questions noted that the key agent of socialisation is in fact the *pai ho mae sira*[28] (inan-aman sira) within the extended family context of the *uma laran*. This social space also includes the friends who are often also related or have strong bonds with the family or Timoroan. Friends in the Timoroan context are often also considered as family members.

[28] Inan-aman sira or Pae ho Mae sira are used interchangeably for some respondents when speaking about their parents and others in the immediate extended family.

[EB]: Where did you Fernando receive the knowledge that you are Timoroan? Who validated this to you?

[FS]: Father and mother and the others told us stories that I was born in Timor, in such-and-such place. I also learnt from other friends and they taught me more about Timor.

[FS]: From very little father and mother and the others showed where our family generation came from (village); they told us stories about where we were born and such. Then if there was a lia[29] I would be included and would meet the big family, the uncles. These types of relationships are what tie us to one another. I would not be able to leave Timor behind under any circumstances. This is what is needed at a basic level: through our culture, within our families made me feel I was present. Then through my friends and through the resistance then the history of what happened. All of these things strengthened and tied my resolve.

Thus respondent ***R7 [FS]***, voiced in very clear terms what the other respondents of this study noted as well in their reflections, that is, the role of father-mother and others in telling them stories about being born in the island of Timor and in which district, sub-district, village and suku. The parents and other immediate caregivers are the first and fundamental sources of identity-knowledge.

The parents and caregivers serve also as an important bridge for the newborn into the culture of the collective into which the Timoroan is born. Part of this introduction starts at a very young age, even before the Timoroan child has developed enough cognitive ability to fully grasp the world around it, the collective already laid claim to the child through ritualised ceremonies/rituals or *lia*. Thus in the first instance the child is absorbed into the fold, and within that fold, and still with the agent-of-socialisation role of the parents and immediate caregivers the children is introduced to the extended family. This social introduction is made as part of the *lia* rituals, which serves the dual purpose of introducing kin and also embed the new Timoroan into behavioural, normative and cognitive cultural processes that will accompany the Timoroan through his or her lifecycle and allow him or her to function within culture.

[EB]: Where do you learn to be Timoroan?

[AN]: Like for me, learning from the environment especially within the family. When we are born into a family we adopt the characteristics and do not stray so we learn from the environment.

[29] Lia=Traditional ceremony or gathering to address or resolve an issue that affects the extended family. Usually Lias are used to resolve difficult situations; other times Lias are used to celebrate particular events.

And as it was for respondent ***R1 [AN]*** learning within the family environment offers a place where the Timoroan feels safe and develops thrust. The Timoroan develops and learns from those around him or her, thus prescribing to what social learning theory claims and was discussed previously, that norms and behaviours of people are largely shaped by their environment. In the case of the Timoroan, not just largely but the norms and behaviours are fundamentally shaped by the Timorese environment.

The Timoroan family environment is thus the main education setting for passing down and learning about Timoroan national identity as noted in the extract below by ***R4 [BD]*** whom in her 30s is mother to six children. She notes that learning to become Timoroan depends largely on the education given by the family and within the household context. It is from and in here her children learn the traditions and customs.

[EB]: Where do you learn to be Timoroan?

[BD]: This depends on the education from the family itself; if taught at home then he or she will carry on using the customs of the family context. I believe this. For example if he or she lives with Portuguese customs, their children will speak Portuguese, if the parents never speak Tetum, speaks their language then the child will follow the parents.

Likewise for respondent ***R6 [FD]*** the main source of learning to be Timoroan came from his parents and also from his friends. It is from them he learnt how to conduct himself as a Timor Oan; by speaking to them and by listening to his elders how life is.

[EB]: Where do you learn to define yourself as a Timoroan?

[FD]: I learn from my mother and my father, and also from my other friends. We learn how to be like other Timor Oan. We talk to one another, 'This is what it is like to be Timor Oan' this our grandparents speak, this is this, this is that.

[EB]: Where do you learn about what is Timoroan, what demonstrates to you that this is Timoroan and that is Timorese?

[FD]: Within the community; for example when I go to the market. This one is Timor Oan; that one is not Timor Oan, that person is from abroad. If we really want to know we have to attend a function, or go to the market, or we have to go to Church. It will always be pointed put, this one is Timoroan, that one is not Timoroan.

Even though throughout this chapter the role of the inan-aman sira (mother-father and others) has been highlighted, of particular importance also is the role of the grandparents. It is

from them respondents claimed they had access to stories about their origins and about their ancestors, and learnt to place themselves accordingly in Timorese society.

For the ***R9 [GM]*** reflecting on her own personal story of how she was raised; it was through her parents she learnt where she came from and from her grandparents she heard the stories of the ancestors and those who came before them. Through the stories as told by her grandparents she discovered her identity as Timoroan.

[EB]: You feel you are Timoroan, but where did you learn to be Timoroan?

[GM]: I know of myself as Timoroan from my grandparents and father and mother. I see from culture, I see from nationalism, from culture, that I am really Timor.

[GM]: Learnt to be Timoroan, like I said first, learnt by asking after father and mothers' name, then my grandparents told me stories, after this I started to realize my identity comes from there.

As this point it is necessary to mention the role of the grandparents, thus the extended family, in Timorese traditional society to illustrate how culture and cultural practices are fluid and flexible.

In Timorese society, it is not uncommon to hear stories of children being re-allocated from their inan-aman (mother-father) to be raised by the grandparents, even though the parents are still alive. The reasons can be many, based on cultural practice and belief or by circumstantial or financial needs, but in the case of the respondent below ***R6 [FD]***, just like in other cases, a child can be removed from her biological parents and be placed and raised by the grandparents and the child's social status can be elevated traditionally and socially from that of being a daughter or son to being a sister or brother. He or she will then become an uncle or an aunt to the biological siblings and cultural norms then dictate the parents of the child treat their daughter or son as a sibling rather than a biological child.

[FD]: From small, when I was still inside the body my father went away. I was still inside my mother's body, I was six months. After I was born I was living with my mother and we went to live with my grandparents. I was born and my grandmother took me and made me her youngest daughter. When my grandparents went to do my RDTL Certificate[30] they gave me my grandfather and grandmothers name because they raised me as their own child.

[30] RDTL (Republica Democrática de Timor-Leste) Certificate is the official birth certificate.

Thus family relations and bonds also have to be considered according to the Timoroan cultural context. This area of enquiry also needs to be further researched so greater understandings about the ways in which relationships between Timoroan are established and take place and how they affect all other parts of Timorese society.

Following on from the context above mentioned, the example of another respondent ***R7 [FS]*** is also illustrative of family dynamics in Timoroan society and the socialisation process that occurs within this cultural context.

The respondent is originally from Maubisse (Central Western Subdistrict, Ainaro District) but lives and works in Dili (Capital) with his wife who is originally from Baucau (Eastern District). The two of them, being a young couple still do not have their own biological children, nevertheless possess the means to be able to raise children already. In this sense and in the spirit of collectiveness they have been entrusted with raising many other children from both his and her collective extended family. This is something that happens quite often in Timorese culture and it is not seen so much as a burden but as the collective responsibility towards child rearing that is shared between the extended family systems of relationships and networks.

For the respondent socialisation of the Timoroan occurs initially within the family environment, learning about the members of the extended family, the place of origin, the history and stories that define the clan. The respondent then noted the role of socialisation occurs between friends at the peer level.

Given the respondent's knowledge about the media he was asked to reflect on the role of the media in the socialisation process of the Timoroan. In particular the question was asked because he had been part of the clandestine movement in his region from a very young age (mid-teens) and he remembered the media broadcasts during Indonesian times.

What was poignant about his response was the fact socialisation at the peer level it allowed him to counter the socialisation agency role of the Indonesian media what was used during the Independence struggle to validate the Indonesian invation and attempt to discredit the Timorese clandestine movement.

The media in Timor-Leste during the Indonesian occupation was censored and as senior reporters have told me, the Censoring Department checked and verified and vetoed all information that disseminated and socialised to the Timoroan to ensure it did not contradict the agenda of the Indonesian government in Timor-Leste.

This reality was attested to by respondent ***R8 [FG]*** a veteran and senior journalist in Timor-Leste. She reflected on the time she worked for the Indonesian National Radio

Broadcaster (RRI) during the Indonesian times and when she was told to encourage the people to go vote in the Referendum Election on 30 August 1999 and how she had soldiers with machineguns inside the studio locked on her to ensure her broadcasts did not encourage the Timorese to vote for Independence.

Thus for respondent ***R7 [FSJ]***, he learnt that the media also has a role to play in the socialisation of the Timoroan. In particular he was able to learn that it can be used both to positively socialise the community and also to negatively manipulate society.

Reflecting on the post-independence period the respondent agrees that there is a role for the media in contemporary Timor-Leste to socialise the Timoroan, in particular his children, nevertheless this is not being done efficiently given the programming is not adequate, the language used is not effective and the media in Timor-Leste is still beyond the financial reach for most Timoroan.

[EB]: So there two ways one from the family and uncles; another one was through the resistance. In terms of history, do you learn this from the media or not, for example from television or radio or newspapers, how did you learn before and now?

[FS]: One is from my friends, when we were at school, my friends were from different groups. From the media yes, we used to get information but this information always contradicted the history I listened to.

[EB]: So now Fernando is teaching other children who live with you to understand who is Timoroan, what is the Timoroan identity?

[FS]: One of the ways should be through the media, but this is a bit difficult for me in that Television, or Radio or newspapers are always late. And then it is expensive for me to buy. TVTL programmes should be made to attract people to watch it. There aren't any attractive programmes so I find it difficult, so many of them just watch Sinetron [Indonesian soap operas]….even if they don't know Bahasa Indonesia, they'll watch it and they are learning Bahasa Indonesia from TV.

This is a problem for me because I don't have a lot of time to be at home. There are lots of people at home and I cannot control them so this should be role for the Radio and TV to make programmes that interest the children.

[EB]: So in 1999, and only looking at programming from 1999 until 2009 did you Fernando watch TVTL? Did you see you TVTL any references about Timoroan or not? Through TVTL can children nowadays and those who were still small in 1999 until now find references about Timoroan, according to your opinion?

[FS]: Not very effectively but I can say we have not yet reached the 10 percent mark because CPA[31] programming tell stories about the struggle, these are only some programs. About Nationality and actual Nationalism not yet.

[31] CPA - Casa de Produção Audiovisual / Audio and Video Production House run by a religious order in Dili and tend to focus on religion and history of Timor-Leste.

Thus in contemporary Timor-Leste the Media's role in the socialisation of the Timoroan still does not have the influential, informative and educational role it has in more advanced societies. And whilst in a sovereign Timor-Leste, a society on the move and changing, where parents like Fernando are spending less time at home with their children, and more time at work working on development time (eight hours a day at work), there may be a challenge emerging for future generations of Timoroan and these challenges may pose a real threat to the way in which the Timoroan learns about him or herself.

There is a general awareness demonstrated by the respondents of this study about the role and importance of the media in helping to socialise the Timoroan national identity. This can be explained given most respondents have had some contact with and exposure to the media or studied it and have been living in the capital Dili long enough to be exposed to the many media output in the capital.

Most respondents were aware the media has an important role to play and what that role is. In the extract below the respondent understands the role of the media and learning that is done through the media, and how mass media contributes to social learning, which is the basis of Albert Bandura's Social Learning Theory (Bandura, 1977). Bandura's constructivist approach or theory noted that much learning can take place through observing the behaviours of others, so for respondent ***R11 [JA]*** he believes despite being from Ermera District and never having travelled to the other Districts of Bobonaro, Lospalos (Lautem) and Viqueque that by watching TV programming about these districts enables him to develop an understanding about these districts that is not hampered by distance or mobility constraints and enables him to be able to in turn educate or at least share that knowledge with his friends.

[EB]: Growing up in the past do you think the media played a role in teaching you about being Timoroan? Today you say you learnt to be Timoroan from what your grandparents taught you. Do you think Television, Radio, and Newspapers also taught you or not yet?

[JA]: The Media can also through Radio and TVTL (Timor-Leste Television). Through them we can learn many things, like if we haven't been to Bobonaro, we can go there through Television, to Lospalos, to Viqueque. We can get this from television and then we can tell our friends that Lospalos is like so, Viqueque is like so.

Nevertheless despite this generalised understanding about the power and effects of the mass media in socialising Timoroan national identity, all respondents of Focus Group 1 ***[FG1]*** also reflected on their uses of the media and noted the mass media in Timor-Leste is not at a stage in its development whereby it can play such a role.

Discussing media habits actually ended up in the majority of respondents reflecting on how the media fails on most counts to play a role in socialisation. In the extract below, one respondent was very clear in expressing her displeasure with the programming broadcast through the State sponsored public television channel TVTL and the fact a large percentage of its daytime programming is dedicated to re-broadcasts from RTPI (Radio Televisão Portugal Internacional). Her complaint was that by watching TVTL she was learning about Portuguese culture rather than Timoroan culture.

Two other respondents in the same Focus Group reflected on the role of the community radios in their own districts and how people are still not tuning in or may not even be aware the radio stations exists. Two reasons for this may be that the radio broadcast is only available in the capital area and does not reach most rural communities who do not live within the radio's broadcast radius; and the lack of availability of cheap, quality wind-up radios in the community.

[EB]: But through the media can you all learn about Timor Oan or not yet?

[FG1]: Speaking about the media is difficult to learn about Timor culture because sometimes we might watch TVTL, we can say, but only at night. During the whole day we are learning about Portuguese culture only. So we don't get much from them.

[EB]: And the radio stations because there are many community radio stations in the district. So they contribute to this or not yet?

[FG1]: Not yet. For example in my own district, the people sometimes don't even know the name of the community radio station. The community does not even know the frequency of the radio. I can say not yet, even though one or two people might, but generally most people don't.

[EB]: In Liquisa what is the impact of Radio Tokodede in your learning how to be Timoroan, or not?

[FG1]: For me only in the capital because the area of [radio] coverage is centralised in the capital.

For the Respondents of the same focus group, reflecting on a question posed to them as media consumers, they still highlighted the main source of learning emanates from their own families, despite being aware of the importance of the media. For them the issue is the quality of programming and news coverage that is not representative and of enough quality to make them feel they can learn from it. For these respondents learning about Timoroan national identity takes place within the family context, through the interpersonal communication that takes places between members of the same family context.

For these respondents the formal education, through schools, already plays more of a socialising role than that of the mass media.

[EB]: You all as media consumers do you feel the media helps you to understand what is Timor Oan or do you understand more about what is Timor Oan from your family, or what?

[FG1]: Personally I learn mostly from my family, from history at school, more so than through the media. For example on TVTL we have to wait for the news. Some of the programming we watch makes us stressed, meaning they don't tell what the public wants to know. Sometimes the news are about what 25 people were trained on, this is the news. I don't really like it so it is difficult for the media. I read the print media but not yet. We learn more from school. I become Timor Oan with my family. Yes through interpersonal communication mostly, from school, rather than from the media.

Another concern, as noted previously, for some of the respondents of this research project is the type of cultural socialisation that is taking place through the mass media in Timor-Leste. For one of the respondents of Focus Group 2 ***[FG2]*** the culture that is being socialised is not traditional or Timoroan culture, it is mostly modern culture and most likely from other nations. The respondent mentions *kizomba*, that is a type of dancing that originated in Africa and that is popular in Portugal and has become popular also in Timor-Leste.

[EB]: So let's talk about the media now. Do you feel the media plays a role in promoting these things, first do you feel it is important or not, second do you feel this is its role or not, or you don't feel anything from the media about being Timoroan?

[FG2]: I see the media as not covering about culture. They tend to focus more on modernity. We see children appreciating kizomba, and dancing disco.

Despite the limited amount of Timorese cultural media output and its quality, the little programming that exists is enough to make the respondents acknowledge and indicate that it has an important role is helping the Timoroan understand and learn about his or her own cultural heritage.

The extract below reinforces the notion the media can have a negative impact on traditional Timoroan culture, as noted previously, but the salience of the extract below from Focus Group 4 ***[FG4]*** is that it provides a glimpse in the psyche of the Timoroan when he or she feels the traditional or indigenous culture and identity is under a perceived threat.

Again the respondent is able to remove herself from the capital Dili context that is very internationalised and exposed to global culture to find comfort and refuge in the knowledge that traditional culture is still being preserved outside the capital.

[EB]: Now another question is about the media. Do you believe the media has a role in teaching about national identity Timor Oan or has the media already played this role or not yet?

[FG4]: We can see, if I can talk about the role of the media, I believe there is some because on the weekends they show cultural activities for example people building a sacred house, the tarabandu ceremony. TVTL and newspapers sometimes they write about it. Events like these are covered in the newspapers, and the radio also broadcasts it. I think this is a very important role of the media. They have broadcast the building of a sacred house in Ainaro on the weekends. They show Timor is already independent. In the city maybe some think our culture is getting lost but in the mountains and in the districts, the inan-aman (mothers-fathers) who live in the districts they still hold culture in high regards.

There is also distrust in the media about being able to play its role as an agent of socialisation and that can also be linked to what was already expressed by another respondent above that is the role of the media during Indonesian times in disseminating propaganda and misinformation and education about Indonesian culture rather than Timor culture.

This lack of trust may have been socialised back to the respondents from their *inan-aman sira* (mother-father and others) given the struggle for independence is still fresh in the minds of the Timoroan and given the key role they play in the socialisation process of Timoroan national identity.

Another agent of socialisation are teachers (to include religious leaders). This research project also enquired about the ability of the formal education system, that is, the school system to construct Timoroan national identity.

In the extracts above about the media role, respondents identified that learning about Timoroan national identity takes place first in the family context, followed by the peers context, then through the education context and finally by the mass media context.

The extracts of responses that follow will focus on the role of formal education in socialising the Timoroan about their national identity.

In this regard, all the respondents acknowledged also the important role of the formal education system in socialising them about being and having Timoroan national identity. The respondent below ***R1 [AN]*** is very pragmatic in his rationalisation about how he learns about the Timoroan. He acknowledged the role of the education system and the mass media in encouraging the Timoroan to uphold traditional culture, but for him this is needed to counter modern and foreign cultures that are impinging and threatening traditional culture. For him

the education system and the media are important tools to rather than overtake traditional culture, to encourage the Timoroan to assume greater ownership over their own culture.

[EB]: Culture binds you and the cultural value, where do you learn them? Who teaches you? I don't know about it. Did they teach you at school or only at home?

[AN]: For me it is also through education, it encourages us. Also from the media about how to keep respecting our culture in our nation. Because in modern times, culture from outside comes to influence us. So we need the media and education to keep encouraging us to hold on.

The challenges faced by the formal education system in Timor-Leste are many as the Timoroan educated inside the country are well aware of, which then makes it not surprising the general reactions of the respondents of this study when asked whether the formal education system in Timor-Leste assists in the Timoroan learning of national identity. Despite recognising and acknowledging the important role of the formal education sector in the socialising of the Timoroan, general feelings are that it falls short of this purpose.

Apart from language of instruction challenges and a sensitive language policy that will be discussed in greater length in Chapter 6, many other challenges continue to plague the education sector in Timor-Leste. Challenges include the poor quality of education (teacher capability, teacher qualifications and the curriculum); the high levels of absenteeism of teachers and students; high attrition rates; high repetition rates; high adult illiteracy; gender imbalances with females student more likely to not attend or abandon formal education and with only 30 per cent of teachers in primary schools being women, poor classroom facilities, teacher: student ratios typically about 1:40, and about one-third of the population being of school age (Macpherson, 2011, p. 189).

Another challenge is the apparent lack of involvement of parents in the learning process of their children through the formal education system. In the extract below ***R12 [JM]*** was asked whether he was aware of what his children's school teaches about culture in their curriculum. He was unaware whether his children were learning about Timoroan national identity at school, having never asked but as far as he knows, no.

His answer may also be reflective of the point being made in this thesis about the key agent of socialisation of the Timoroan being the inan-aman sira (mother-father and others). So perhaps for the respondent the question was not relevant.

[EB]: At the schools, I am not sure what happens in the schools, but do they learn about these concepts at

school?

[JM]: In the schools, about culture, I have not enquired much about it but I don't think they do.

For the respondents of Focus Group 6 ***[FG6]*** some socialisation is being done at schools, nevertheless these efforts need to be increased, in particular given the threat of foreign cultures and the need to strengthen traditional culture learning in schools.

For another of the respondents of the focus group, the government needs to take greater ownership in the teaching of Timoroan national identity and he clearly identified the State as having the mandate or duty to ensure the promotion of traditional Timoroan culture, and that this effort is a State-sponsored one rather than an individual one.

For the respondent then, the main problem for the inability of the formal education sector in socialising the Timoroan is the weak education system in place in Timor-Leste. For him the priority is to fix the education system.

[EB]: Do you fell this type of education [formal] about national identity already exists, or yes but not enough, or not at all, or is it good, or?

[FG6]: I think there is but it needs to be promoted because there is but we are not promoting it. Because we can get influenced by other cultures if we ourselves don't pay attention to this. There is but it needs to be strengthened. We must strengthen it so that it can become stronger.

[FG6]: On the other hand I can say that our small part, as regular youth, we have ideas on how to develop our culture but we cannot, we cannot just lisan (customs/culture), but this is a decision for the Government to make the culture deeper, this identity. On our own we cannot because we live under a nation. We cannot decide to do whatever we want. Only the government can make the decision, our government creates and promotes our culture. We cannot do it on our own.

[FG6]: I believe our education system is still very weak compared to other nations and the systems are also weak that is why we need to fix so they improve and so we can strengthen our education system especially in some areas that we can say are areas that are difficult because we are little so we are dependent. We need to fix it so it can improve.

Learning about Timoroan national identity through the formal education system is a very new concept in Timor-Leste and it only started occurring at any formal length since 1999. Prior to this and during both Portuguese and Indonesian times, for close to 500 years, the impetus was to construct good abiding *Português* (Portuguese) and then good abiding *Orang Indonesia* (Indonesians).

Great part of this construction of the Timoroan as either Português or Orang Indonesia was attempted through a myriad of subversive political strategies including through the

education system through the control of the content of school curriculums to inculcate in subsequent generations of Timoroan children respect and admiration for the Portuguese or Indonesian values, beliefs, and practices.

In the case of Indonesia other strategies were used as well to quell any political dissent or general manifestation deemed as a threat to the integrationist agenda of Jakarta (the Capital of the Republic of Indonesia):

> The strategies have included heavy military repression, the transfer of thousands of Javanese and Balinese "transmigrant" workers to East Timor, the implementation of large development projects, and the establishment of a widespread educational system designed to inculcate in children respect and admiration for Indonesia's values, beliefs, and practices.
>
> (Arenas, 1998, p. 131)

This reality did not escape the Timoroan who was educated during Indonesian times or the collective memory that has been passed down even to younger generations of Timoroan who have grown up during independent times as the two extracts of responses below illustrate.

[EB]: You grew up during Indonesian times; during that time at school did they teach you about whom a Timoroan is?

[IM]: Before what was the life of a Timor, I remember before we spoke in Bahasa Indonesia and they didn't really teach us about Timor. They taught about themselves only because they were governing us. Indonesia was in charge so everything was about what was theirs. They didn't really teach anything about Timor or us. This is what I think.

Respondent ***R10 [IM]*** above still remembers how education was conducted during Indonesian times and the type of education the Timoroan was provided with about him or herself. The Timoroan was socialised only in reference and in subservience to the identity of the Indonesian and to the ideal of the Indonesian National Motto *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity) (Weatherbee, 1981) which in essence meant integration and subservience of ethnically plural populations, including of the Timoroan, to the central authority of Jakarta.

Thus as respondent ***R10 [IM]*** notes the entire education was about Indonesia and its people and not much about Timor-Leste history or the Timoroan.

Likewise for the respondents of Focus Group 5 ***[FG5]*** despite having grown up and done most, if not all of their schooling, after independence in 1999, whom are also aware of

the type of education given during Indonesian times. It is poignant that despite not having been educated through the Indonesian education system itself, this group of young adults in their late teens or early 20s is aware of the type of education provided, in particular Indonesian history, Indonesia's independence from the Dutch, about the five founding principles of the Pancacila and the promotion of Bahasa Indonesia as the National Language.

[EB]: So more informally. When you think about school and inside the school, did you learn something about this there or not, the Timor Oan context?

[FG5]: I don't know much about Indonesian times and how they taught history about Timor-Leste. They taught mostly about integration. Most of history taught was Indonesian history. When did Indonesia start governing us? When did Indonesia become independent? What is Pancasila? They spoke mainly about this.

[EB]: And you all today, you went to school after independence, did you learn about Timor Oan or not?

[FG5]: No, they only teach about Timor. For example like today I spoke about Indonesian independence in what year. We, during our turn, we learnt about the year Timor-Leste became independent, and we spoke about who are the presidents.

Thus going back to the point of the socialisation role of formal education in the learning of Timoroan, based on the data gathered, despite having a greater socialising role when compared with the mass media in Timor-Leste, because of the many challenges the Education Sector in Timor-Leste still faces, this role is still limited in its scope and tends to be about citizenship and political history of Timor-Leste rather than around notions of Timoroan national identity.

5.3 Self and National Identity

According to Shweder (1991), the self in indigenous societies and non-Western cultures tends to be context-based and is defined in terms of the self-in-relation-to-others such as family and community, thus self-collective. In these contexts, a person learns to harmonise the self with the collective rather than to the individual.

It is precisely this the context within which issues of self, identity, social identity and national identity must be studied and discussed in Timor-Leste, and indigenous cultural psychologists need to conduct research in their own contexts. Mkhize (2004) calls for a more critical and emancipatory psychology that take into account indigenous people's languages,

philosophies and worldviews that gives voice and empowers marginalised communities as active participants in the knowledge-generation process, rather than just as spectators.

The self of this research project is not a western or advanced capitalist society self. Rather the self here is viewed as interdependent with the surrounding context of family and community, the focus of which is the 'self-in-relation-to-the-other' (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Thus then the self that is referred to in this research project is the Timoroan-self as socialised and constructed in language, according to Timorese philosophies and worldviews. In this research project the Timoroan self-collective speaks as an active participant of the research process and in the generation of the knowledge herein offered.

For Smith (1991, pp. 8-15) there are five fundamental features of national identity: an historic territory or homeland; common myths and historical moments; a common, mass public culture; common legal rights and duties for all members; and a common economy with territorial mobility for members. The outlined features and elements of national identity are not being questioned in the case of Timor-Leste's national identity in this thesis. The main purpose of Chapter 4 was in fact to support these and contextualise them to the particular identity of Timor-Leste as a nation-state.

National identity is more about the politics of identity recognition than the notion of identity itself, even though identity plays a crucial role. Nonetheless, according to (Guibernau, 2013) national identity has two fundamental elements to it. The first is the element of continuity in that national identity grounds the nation is a historical timeline that only those who belong to it can understand and relate to. The second element is that of differentiation, in that, having a national identity allows for the forming of a distinct community with a shared culture, past and traditions attached to a limited territory. The convergence of both continuity and differentiation as core elements of national identity lead to the distinction between those who share the same ethos that is the Timoroan, from the *mala'e* or foreigners and in the case of Timor-Leste the colonisers and occupying enemy.

As Chapter 4 illustrates, the point of continuity is well made through successive acts of defiance against the Portuguese colonial administration and Indonesia occupation over almost 500 years. And the element that allowed for sustained and continual defiance was precisely the point of differentiation that the Timoroan has always been able to maintain in relation to the Portuguese but more specifically against the Indonesian.

This section does not look in-depth at the general concept of the national identity of nations because the crux of this thesis and of Chapter 6 is to deconstruct some of the elements that make up Timoroan national identity, or the national identity of those who self-categorize

and self-identity with the nation of Timor-Leste and about the Timoroan as a distinct community with a shared homeland, a shared supra-culture (despite its indigenous ethnic and local diversity), a shared tragic past marked by subsequent invasions, and a shared acknowledgement of destiny.

5.4 National Identity and *Maubere(-ismo)*

This thesis cannot examine the topic of national identity without making reference to the term *maubere* and the sense of *mauberismo* ideology that defined the struggle against the Indonesian regime over 24 years. This section will also look at the meaning of the term *maubere* for younger generations of Timoroan in contemporary Timor-Leste, represented here by the respondents of this research study, who grew up mainly or were born just before or just after the 1999 independence referendum.

Antero da Silva, in his PhD thesis, argues that Maubere was a political and popular education symbol for mass mobilisation and that FRETILIN developed a distinctive Pedagogy of the Maubere Revolution in order to liberate Timor-Leste and to liberate the people (Silva, 2011). The so called Maubere Revolution was built around the concept of *mauberismo*, a political philosophy developed by Jose Ramos Horta in the 1970s that was used to inspire the Timoroan to support FRETILIN. On *mauberismo* and *maubere* Ramos Horta in an interview transcribed by Bill Nicol (1978) defined the ideology and the term as:

> This philosophy is called *mauberismo.* This comes from the name *maubere*. It is a name of the common Timorese. Most of the people in Timor are poor. They cannot read and write. They hardly get food to eat. This name *maubere* is also used as an insult. If a person cannot read or write, he is a *maubere.* If he is poor and is dressed very badly and so on, you know he is a *maubere*. And of course if you see the Timorese society we are led to the conclusion that almost the whole population are *maubere.*
>
> Then what should be our struggle? To liberate *maubere* from hunger, from illiteracy; [to] finish with the exploitation – he is exploited by his traditional chief.
>
> In Timor we cannot say there is a proletariat, because most of the population are subsistence farmers. They are not selling their labour to anyone. Also, there is no very distinct bourgeoisie, because [this] is such an underdeveloped, backward country with no factory, no industry. So selling our own labour is not a day-to-day activity for most people.

> What we have here is influence of classes. One class is formed by the chiefs, the *rajas*, and the people have to work for them without pay. This is the first class. Another class is the government civil servants who form the so-called colonial elite. And the colonial elite is the instrument of the dominating power who oppress their own people. Then, you see, this colonial elite were the ones who formed UDT.
>
> The followers [of FRETILIN] accept it [*maubere*] as the name of the followers.
>
> (Nicol, 1978, pp. 90-105)

Based on this interview, Ramos Horta's definition of *mauberismo* philosophy and of the word *maubere* as noted above must have been initially an exclusive political identity used to mobilise and rally those Timoroan he classified as *maubere* to support the FRETILIN political party. It was not meant to be an inclusive identity that attempted to define all Timoroan as *maubere.* Ramos Horta was quite prescriptive as to who was *maubere*: common, poor, cannot read or write, dressed very badly, subsistence farmers, and exploited through a class system first by the traditional chiefs and then by the Timorese who were part of the Portuguese colonial elite. And he made it obvious that UDT followers were not *maubere.* Thus and at least initially, the term *maubere* and *mauberismo* ideology were political instruments that one political party – FRETILIN – used to build its intended membership, that is, the majority of Timoroan living in poverty, gravely illiterate and oppressed under a traditional and colonial class system.

Before the ideology of *mauberismo* could be fully developed, Timor-Leste was invaded by Indonesia and the term *maubere* and its female counterpart *buibere* can be seen as taking on a more national political identity as one of the symbols of resistance against occupation. Unfortunately this vision was never truly realized because the first ten years of occupation were marked by Timorese leadership disunion. After the Indonesian invasion in 1975 and until 1986, the resistance was divided except for a brief attempt by FRETILIN, UDT, KOTA and Partido Trabalhista to form an umbrella body known as the *Convergência Nacional Timorense* (National Timorese Pact). The pact did not last and gradually all parties disengaged from the body. The resistance again remained divided until then leader of the Timorese resistance Commander Xanana Gusmão and Jose Ramos-Horta after quitting FRETILIN in 1987, formed the National Council of *Maubere* Resistance (CNRM) attempting to bring together all the different resistance leadership (armed, clandestine, diplomatic and political). CNRM claimed to be open to all Timorese seeking self-determination and independence regardless of any political party affiliations. Despite the way in which CNRM viewed itself and even though it featured the word Maubere in its name, the term *maubere*

itself cannot be simply generalised to have represented all Timoroan all the time. The UDT party rejected the legitimacy of CNRM because of the term *maubere* and claiming CNRM was just another name for FRETILIN. KOTA party also rejected the word *maubere* (Soares, 2000). Going back to the origins of *maubere* as a political identity, it was too closely associated with belonging to FRETILIN and as it was initially designed it looks as if it was meant to exclude those belonging to the UDT political party and also those belonging to the traditional *liurai* families whom KOTA claimed to represent.

Even though there was ample empathy and affinity with the use of the term *maubere* and *buibere* as symbols of the struggle against Indonesian occupation; this was more because the focus was not on defining who was a *maubere* or a *buibere* and who was not. Rather the crux of the struggle was on showing a homogeneous identity resisting Indonesian occupation. As an activist who started taking part in rallies and political protests in Diaspora from a young age, I can still remember the use of the word *maubere* during the rallies and meetings. Even though using the word *maubere* when demonstrating and chanting slogans or when speaking in public forums was generally not rejected, in internal meetings and discussions among the Timorese it was clear who was more entitled to be a *maubere*. The stereotypical *maubere* was a FRETILIN supporter. This was one of the reasons many Timoroan remained politically independent. Thus even though there was much empathy and affinity toward the terms *maubere* and *buibere* as a symbol of Timoroan resistance this was never an identity that can be said to have represented all Timoroan. It remained during the struggle too closely associated to FRETILIN party, an image that despite some attempts, it was not able to distance itself from. This was why in 1998, the delegates to the second Timorese Resistance Conference held in Peniche, Portugal, representing all factions of Timorese politics including UDT, FRETILIN and independents by consensus agreed to replace the term *maubere* in CNRM with Timorese/Timorense and thus become the National Council of Timorese Resistance, CNRT. Only after the change in the name did the council represent all Timoroan wanting independence as Timor-Leste headed towards the independence referendum. I was an independent delegate at this Peniche conference in Portugal.

This reality also explains why after independence the term *maubere* despite still being a popular term currently has lost much of its political meaning in particular among younger generations of Timoroan. During a focus groups discussion with Focus Group 5 **[FG5]** and even though this research project did not intend to survey contemporary attitudes toward the concept of *maubere*, the term came up during the discussion with this group. This presented an opportunity to quickly broach the topic.

[EB]: This maubere notion when did it occur, is this something new or something you strongly believe in?

[FG5]: Maubere appeared recently during Indonesia. During Portuguese times, for our grandparents this was a new code and we were called maubere. This new code in Timor did not allow Indonesia to take over. So now when you say maubere, only Timoroan can say they are maubere.

[EB]: You all look like you are young. Is this still relevant to you because you grew up after independence. You were born in Indonesian times but grew up after the liberation. What happened to the *maubere*?

[FG5]: The crocodile is our true identity. If we talk about maubere we are talking about our struggle for independence, in particular about FRETILIN using it since 1975. Maubere and mountains were used to represent our independence.

[FG5]: I believe this word is correct because by using this word we told Indonesia that tried to govern us that we did not want anyone to govern us. We wanted our own identity; with a word that gathered us all so we contributed for our independence. This is why we used the word maubere as our national identity.

[EB]: How about for you as the generation from the independence onwards; do you feel the same when you hear about maubere or buibere. Do you respect it or do you just say it?

[FG5]: We only know the history but we did not feel it. Maubere is related to the struggle but we don't know about it. We were born, and even though we were little, I understood what the Timoroan wanted. In 1998 I finished primary school and was about to go to secondary school. I was 13 years old I believe. So I already knew we used the word maubere to push us towards independence. So this is what Timoroan everywhere heard. I was also involved in the jungle, in demonstrations we said maubere so I believe this word also represents the Timoroan.

[FG5]: OK because when we say the word maubere someone can asks us to tell its history and about the war. For our generation if we say 'I am maubere'; I can say I am maubere if the context is general. But this question is about the struggle of this nation. And then they will ask me to explain about the war if I mention I am maubere. If they asked me can you tell me the history of the war? I myself did not participate in it. How can I tell the story of the war? So for me personally, this is not really our identity, depends on the context in terms of our identity. I myself do not find it so.

[EB]: One last question about *maubere* which do you identify mostly with at the national level. As *maubere* or as Timoroan at the national?

[FG5]: For me first the term maubere according to our history was used during the Portuguese times to describe people who walked barefoot, without clothes and with torn clothes. This word identified him: barefoot, torn clothes and black. These were the Timoroan and they really walked with bare feet. But now I don't know. Now the context is different from before. A maubere walking barefoot and with torn clothes is called crazy. If we try to define the word maubere, for our grandparents it was different. For us to say maubere is different, we dress well, and we eat well so I don't know who is a maubere.

[FG5]: In regards to the question asked before if I am asked if maubere identity is Timoroan; if they asked me are you maubere or Timoroan I would answer I am Timoroan. I don't need to say I am maubere to be a Timoroan.

The extract above is revealing of the attitudes of young Timoroan to the concept of *maubere* as a contemporary identity marker. The first observation is that there is a degree of ambivalence in terms of young Timoroan being able to use the term to self-identity as

maubere and to describe a Timoroan in a contemporary context. There is an acknowledgement of the role of the term *maubere* as a political identity and as a symbol of the struggle and resistance against the Indonesian occupation after 1975. Nevertheless the term *maubere* is still associated with being FRETILIN and with fighting in the mountains against the Indonesian armed forces. As young Timoroan these respondents have some knowledge of the history of the term *maubere* and its significance during the period of the struggle and what it meant to their 'grandparents'. Nevertheless post-independence, using the word *maubere* as an identity marker still carries with it connotations of being part of FRETILIN and fighting during the struggle and of being a veteran. In this regards, young Timoroan struggle to self-identity with the notion of being *maubere* because they were too young to have actively participated in the struggle and to be able to tell 'stories about the war'.

Who is a *maubere* seems to be a term young Timoroan are struggling with in contemporary times, also because as noted above by the respondents, the image of a *maubere* in contemporary times seems to be associated more in terms of representing someone who is destitute or marginalized or 'crazy'. This is contrary to the 1975 ideological notion of a *maubere* as a Timoroan oppressed under a traditional and colonial class system. And for young Dili educated Timoroan, their self-image is already different. Nevertheless when asked if they were Timoroan (as will be discussed in Chapter 6) no such hesitation exists.

5.5 National Identity and Gender in Timor-Leste

This research project looked and analysed the context of the Timoroan in his or her national identity without making a gender (woman-man, feminine-masculine) distinction between the Timoroan-male and the Timoroan-female and his or her perspectives on national identity in Timor-Leste. In an attempt to make this study as gender balanced; an attempt was made to interview as many female as male Timoroan respondents and to give equal response time in particular during the focus group interviews. In the end slightly more male respondents were interviewed than female respondents but this was mostly circumstantial.

As someone who is from a fairly gender-neutral Timoroan family and works in a newspaper in Timor-Leste with a well-defined gender policy and who helped develop the gender policy; I am particularly aware of gender realities in the country from a male-person perspective. When discussing gender, in that gender refers to both males and females, the discussion is directed immediately to issues affecting women. Even though I have an

understanding and appreciation of the reality faced by Timoroan women in what concerns gender issues, in particular violence towards Timoroan women and unequal access to education for example, I cannot make claims about the specific feelings of Timoroan women in Timor-Leste given I am not a Timoroan woman.

Nevertheless a general scan of the literature on gender, in particular the situation for women in Timor-Leste, reflects the negative experiences of Timoroan women in regards to gender inequality contemporarily. Member of Parliament and war veteran Maria Paixao and former president of the Women in Parliament Group (Grupu Mulher Parlamentar Timor-Leste/GMPTL), in 2009 stated that it is 'Patriarchal systems and male-biased traditional power structures within our society that impede women's leadership and equal participation in decision-making' (Niner, 2011, p. 418). Thus, according to the senior women's' representative and a leader in Timor-Leste, women face many challenges including those that prevent equal participation of women in decision making and women suffer violence by men. Statistics[32] of cases of abuse and violence towards women are high and highlight the importance of greater gender equality awareness raising and institutional and structural change to ensure greater gender equality in Timor-Leste.

The only question this research asked that could elicit any type of response useful for gender analysis at the national or supra-level was whether the respondents felt in terms of their national identity if there were some Timoroan or who are more, or less, Timoroan than others. The question was asked neutrally without any particular reference to gender identification so as not to elicit or guide respondents towards a possible type of answer. None of the female respondents in their answers reflected that being a Timoroan-woman made them feel less Timoroan. Conversely none of the male respondents felt being a Timoroan-man made them feel more or less of a Timoroan at the national level.

The standard answer from all the respondents, female and male, was that at the national identity level, there was no difference between Timoroan. The two extracts of answers below from female respondents ***R13 [JB]*** and ***R6 [FD]*** illustrate the types of answers given to the question.

[32] Statistics were purposefully left out because even though there is statistical data available on the prevalence of gender based violence in Timor-Leste, presenting such data here would require a longer explanation and analysis of the data within a Timorese cultural and social context. This is not the context of this research project even though there is a need to look at statistical data in context in Timor-Leste. This could be the topic of future research.

[EB]: But all Timoroan when we talk about Timor Oan national identity are really the same, or are some Timoroan more Timor than other Timor Oan or are all Timor Oan the same, as national identity, speaking about national identity?

[JB]: I feel born in Timor the identity is the same, despite showing off but you are still Timor. We can say this because we are of the same generation, born the same, each the same. Often I say like this, you can show off as much as you like but you are still Ema Timor. You can change your hair from curly to straight but you are still Timor all the same.

[FD]: I feel all Timor Oan are the same, because we are all together as Timor Oan.

Perhaps if a specific question had been asked about how respondents feel about national identity as a female or as a male it would have generated more specific answers. I acknowledge though this is one of the limitations of this study.

In many respects both historical and contemporary accounts illustrate Timoroan women as strong and resilient and who have always had an active participatory role in society and politics. Timoroan women organized into a political movement emerged at the same time as the first East Timorese political movements emerged after a group of Timoroan student activists returned to Timor-Leste in the 1970s from Portugal and Mozambique. The OPMT (Organização Popular da Mulher Timorense/Popular Organisation of Timorese Women), representing Timoroan women organised into a political movement and as the women's branch of political party FRETILIN was established on 28 August1975. Rosa 'Muki' Bonaparte was a member of FRETILIN's Central Committee and Secretary General of OPMT in her famous speech, described the objectives of OPMT. Her vision for OPMT was to enable women to take part in the FRETILIN revolution and to triumph which would then lead to the liberation of the Timor woman whom for her was a victim of double exploitation. The Timor woman was both a victim of traditional conceptions and of colonial conceptions. For Bonaparte, her ultimate aim was to make the Timor woman an active participant of political life so that as political actors women could then liberate themselves from their inferior status in both traditional and colonial society. Her means was the revolution being led by FRETILIN to create a new society. The creation of OPMT had two objectives; 'First to participate directly in the struggle against colonialism and second to fight in every way the violent discrimination that Timorese women have suffered in colonial society' (Bonaparte, 1975, p. 7).

Bonaparte was highly educated and part of the group of few Timorese who had a chance to study outside of Timor in the 1960s. Together with two other women, Maria do Ceu and Guilhermina de Araujo, upon their return to Timor in the 1970s, brought with them

political and feminist ideas and applied them to the Timorese context. With other Timorese women including Maia Reis, Aicha Bassarawan, Dulce da Cruz and Isabel Lobato they founded OPMT, FRETILIN's women's wing. It was unfortunate that less than six months later, the Indonesian invasion took place and Timorese men, women and children were killed indiscriminately including Isabel Lobato, Rosa 'Muki' Bonaparte and many other OPMT members. It was after the invasion that OPMT penetrated into the countryside as part of the resistance movement (Cristalis & Scott, 2005, p. 28).

It is well documented that Timoroan women played an active role during the resistance period from 1974-1999 from being part of the establishment of the first political parties, to establishing women's political movements and civil society organizations, to being directly engaged in armed combat, to undertaking espionage on the Indonesian regime, to acting as couriers of information and letters, to providing food and medicines to guerrilla fighters and tending to their wounds, sheltering combatants, and to actively speaking in international forums on the plight of Timor-Leste. These are just some of the instrumental roles played by women during the 24 years of resistance to the Indonesian occupation both within and outside Timor-Leste.

When addressing the role of women during the struggle for independence three particular publications are poignant because they contain the firsthand accounts and stories as told by Timoroan women, some of high profile and some others less known. All these testimonies more so than documenting the particular roles of women in the struggle, highlight the important role of women in Timorese society in particular in terms of resisting foreign occupation since Portuguese times until contemporary times.

The first such publication is *Written with Blood*, published by the Office for the Promotion of Equality in the then Prime Minister's Office of Timor-Leste (OPE, 2002). Another book is *Step by Step: Women of East Timor, Stories of Resistance and Survival* (Conway, 2010) documenting the stories of 14 Timoroan women activists, some of whom have held Ministerial roles in the Timorese government but all of whom are still prominent women's rights activists. The third publication is entitled *Secrecy: The Key to Independence* (Abrantes & Sequeira, 2012). This publication is important because as the title suggests, the work of these women was secret, with secrecy and imagination, being the crux of this thesis and the undertone of Timoroan resistance to foreign occupation.

> On principle, I never expose my identity to other people or use my title. It is better that I have no title than to lose my country and it is better that I have no name than to have no title at all. A title is not for me to be famous, but I want

> this country to have the title of independent Timor-Leste, to never have another country rule over us. I thought about this when I was young. It was the fundamental principle for me and my heart.
>
> 'Verónica das Dores' (Maria Ximenes Guterres)
> (Abrantes & Sequeira, 2012, p. 55)

After 1999, and since Timor-Leste gained independence in 2002, the rights of Timoroan women were enshrined in the Constitution, in Article 17 whereby on equality between women and men: *Women and men shall have the same rights and duties in all areas of family, political, economic, social and cultural life* (GoTL, 2002).

In 2003 Timor-Leste ratified the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The Law Against Domestic Violence was passed by the Timor-Leste Parliament in 2010 making domestic violence a public crime rather than a private or family crime. The 2004 Law on the Elections of the Suku Chiefs and the Local Suku Councils provided for quotas at the Sub-National level in that both men and women without discrimination may participate as candidates and be elected local Suku Chiefs and members of the Suku Council that is composed by the Suku Chief, the Chiefs of all villages in the suku, 2 women representatives, 2 youth (1 female and 1 male) representatives, and 1 elder. Changes to the 2006 Law on the Elections of the National Parliament, amended in 2011, in Article 13(3), on electoral lists, provided for a quota system in which 1 out of every group of 3 candidates must be a woman. After the 2012 National Parliament Election, 25 out of the 65 Members of Parliament are women, a ratio of 38.46% female to 61.54% male.

In 2007, after the election, the Office for the Promotion of Equality was transformed into a Secretariat of State for the Promotion of Equality. After the 2012 Election, the composition of the Fifth Constitutional Government included 2 female Ministers, 4 female Vice Ministers, and 4 female Secretaries of State responsible for a range of portfolios: finance, health, social solidarity, education, parliamentary affairs, and private sector promotion, promotion of equality, and arts and culture.

Thus in terms of the legal and policy framework it is more favourable than not (despite much more being needed) to there being greater gender equality in Timor-Leste. In many other respects there is greater gender sensitivity in the country. Equality and a strong women's participatory approach are strong and important features of the gender narratives in Timor-Leste and have influenced how Timoroan men and women perceive gender issues.

Even in regards to a national vision, the national Strategic Development Plan (SDP) 2011-2030 makes it a vision, thus the intention of the State of Timor-Leste that by 2030 the

country will be a gender-fair society where human dignity and women's rights are valued, protected and promoted by its laws and culture (GoTL, 2011, p. 50).

Thus if the above outline of the legal and policy framework should ensure greater gender equality in Timor-Leste, statistics show violence and inequality against women, in particular poor rural women, are still prevalent in Timorese society. For Helen Hill (2012) this can partly be explained by the fact that even though in Timor-Leste women (in particular middle-class urban women) have experienced a higher degree of success in attaining their strategic needs including education, access to livelihoods and own income and a voice in politics that empowers them to change their circumstances vis-a-vis the men; on the other hand most Timorese women (especially poor rural women and including also other women living in more urban settings) have attained very few of their practical needs in the first instance; such as access to nutritious food, clothing, housing, access to medical services and basic education; and still lag behind as well vis-a-vis their more urban counterparts in being successful at attaining their strategic needs.

It is notable the SPD mentions Timor-Leste aims to be a gender-fair society by its laws and also by its culture. It is in regards to indigenous culture that the gender discourse takes an ideological turn and where points of contention emerge. Olandina Caeiro, a prominent Timoroan activist has been quoted as saying "I like my culture, but some things have to change" in the context of the traditional roles of Timoroan women (Cristalis & Scott, 2005). But which cultural 'things' exactly have to change?

For Anzaldúa (2007, pp. 38-39), dominant paradigms, predefined concepts that exist as unquestionable, unchallengeable, are transmitted to women through the culture. In her experience culture is made by those in power, men, and women transmit them. Nevertheless, the narrative of the sisterhood and the shared global oppression of women (Weedon, 1999, p. 159) need to be threaded sensitively to avoid over-generalisations that can be damaging to Timoroan indigenous culture and that can exacerbate or even create new polarities between the sexes and their views on gender.

Violence against women takes place and gender inequality exists in Timor-Leste, this is an assertion that can be safely generalised and contextualised to represent the experience of other women everywhere else in the world. Nevertheless, Niner (2011) correctly asserts that academics and more generally must be clearer about the role and status of women in Timor-Leste. Also how power and income was and is maintained by traditional relations or customary practices; and how this has or can be diminished or strengthened. And that this knowledge must include the negative effects of colonialism and occupation in the roles

occupied by women in Timoroan society. If evidence shows that in the nineteenth century, a significant proportion of *reinos* (traditional kingdoms) in Timor-Leste were ruled by a *liu-rai feto* (queen) (Kammen, 2012, pp. 149-173), does it then follow that Timoroan women have traditionally held greater power than thus far presumed? Determining through research how women were able to attain and maintain such power, but also how they came to lose is important. The results of such research can perhaps assist in making gender and power relations more equal in contemporary Timor-Leste.

Timoroan women need to develop an even greater political and social voice in contemporary Timorese society. Some key examples of Timoroan women views on gender and women's issues in Timor-Leste exist such as the works of Milena Pires, a Timoroan activist and gender expert who is part of CEDAW (Committee for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women) in New York and the work of Laura Abrantes, a Timoroan woman activist.

The gender narrative and discourse in Timor-Leste is actively developing but necessitates greater academic research in particular by Timoroan-woman researchers who can present viewpoints and analysis on the issue that may lead to changes to particular aspect of traditional culture that impede greater gender equality in Timor-Leste. Timoroan-women have tended to participate in women's and gender research in Timor-Leste as interviewees and respondents rather than researchers and analysts themselves leaving mostly the analysis and conclusions to be done by non-Timoroan women which can partially explain why much of the gender narrative in Timor-Leste has been universalised rather than taking in a more local context.

In contemporary times, the revolution Rosa 'Muki' Bonaparte dreamt that would make the Timoroan women a political actor is now a reality, what is needed now is for the Timoroan woman to develop a stronger political voice with which to voice what changes are needed that will lead to a more equalitarian modern Timorese society. Perhaps Timoroan women need to be reminded and invoke the spirit of Bonaparte to guide them in this second part of the unfinished struggle for the Timoroan woman.

From my perspective as a male Timoroan the influential and strategic early work of Timoroan women such as Rosa 'Muki' Bonaparte has greatly influenced the attitude of Timoroan men, in particular in political leaders but more generally as well, towards contemporary narratives and views of Timor-Leste as a gender fairer society, whether this is the actual reality for all women and men or not.

Further Remarks

This chapter attempted to discuss the concept of the socialisation process in the context of the Timoroan reality and worldview. The Timoroan as a collective-people have their own way of learning and teaching and ways of passing down of norms and behaviours that allow them to operate in society.

Despite close to 500 year of foreign occupation these indigenous systems of learning and socialisation happened concurrently and clandestinely to counter the systems of learning and teaching imposed on the Timoroan.

What is and comes naturally to the Timoroan but is still largely unknown or perhaps is left unacknowledged is that for almost half a millennium the Timoroan had to self-preserve through the learning and socialising of culture to mean a whole way of life, and protect indigenous culture from colonialism and forced integrationism.

At which point must stock be taken of what is being tried and achieved or not in contemporary times in Timor-Leste? Or will existing narratives about Timor-Leste continue to perpetuate old practices named differently and enveloped in good intentions i.e. civilisation-for-trade in 1512 and aid-for-trade in 2014 because the new nation-state is still highly dependent on donor funds and development aid.

What this chapter attempted to do was to highlight the importance of considering and appreciating the local Timoroan context before teaching the Timoroan new approaches and often introduce one-size fits all solutions on to how the Timoroan should develop their own society.

This chapter also attempted to bring a common-sense approach to the notion of national identity in the Timoroan context. Everyone has an identity or identities, individual, collective, social, national, international and globalized. In this age of technological wonder National identity is more about the politics of identity and the attribution of political recognition than the notion of identity itself. Thus Timoroan national identity is ultimately about political recognition and not just an ideological recognition. In contemporary times, there is now a Timoroan who is a transnational traveller and who can cross borders as a Timoroan rather than having to use a Portuguese, Indonesian or Australian passport to get places other than his or her own. Nevertheless if one can easily understand there is a political Timoroan does one really know and understand the person who is the holder of that same passport? Removed from his or her context the Timoroan will have to adapt to the new context, but within his or her own context, the adaption has to be reversed and this can only

be achieve through a greater understanding of the Timoroan and of Timor-Leste from an indigenous perspective. Nevertheless this has largely not been done because the Timoroan was appropriated, re-named and re-classified in attempts to mould the Timoroan and the environment (cultural, social and political) to the image of the foreign force.

If there is lesson to be learnt here is that these attempts are futile and in the case of Timor-Leste failed to do so even if imaginatively those who attempted this actually thought this is what they did. Nevertheless upon realizing the Timoroan rejects that influence, both consciously and subconsciously, these powers think the Timoroan as ungrateful or unappreciative of its colonial and occupation legacy, as if these were driven by development and equality and fairness towards the Timoroan in the first instance rather than greed and exploitation and servitude.

Chapter 6: Timoroan National Identity

Notions of Timoroan self; Timoroan identity, Timoroan social identity, and Timoroan national identity are not easily discernible from one another in the context of the Timorese society and culture. This is partly because this area of psychology, social psychology, sociology, anthropology and communications has only been limitedly researched, and where it has been researched mostly western centred knowledge has been employed to try and analyse these key concepts.

As mentioned, this research study does not purport to be a comprehensive handbook on these issues, merely a glimpse into a whole area of research that is still being undertaken. Nevertheless this academic glimpse represents a good start and a road map that points and alerts future researchers to look at the experience of the Timoroan through their lived experiences and their particular worldviews rather that imposing preconceived notions, thus running the risk of further diluting and damaging original indigenous knowledge.

One apparent and common-sense but substantiated view of this study highlights the crucial and fundamental feature of Timorese belief that the Timoroan have to feel themselves as having an unique Timoroan identity (person, social and national). In the more than 100 respondents of this qualitative study, not a single respondent displayed any uncertainty, ambiguity or doubt about being Timoroan. The notion of being an *indigenous* Timoroan was never in question by the respondents; even for those respondents having only one Timoroan parent, or having lived outside Timor-Leste for any period of time, as international students on scholarships or even as Diaspora Timoroan.

When asked how respondents would describe themselves to someone that did not know them and how they would describe themselves first; the standard answer was: “Hau Timor oan” (I am Timorese).

This section deals with the fundamentals of the question of Timoroan Identity (person identity) and Timoroan National Identity (national, social and group identity). Even though there have been some studies on Timorese Identity and Timorese National Identity (Leach, Scambary, Clarke, Feeny, & Wallace, 2013) these have tended to be quantitative where the researchers did not have ample opportunity to ask follow up questions and where respondents did not have much of an opportunity either to represent and contest or debate their answers or to go in-depth into their feelings and views of the topic.

Perhaps the nature of previous research also represents the difficulty in researching in Timor-Leste in language and within culture given the lack of bi-lingual researchers who can

more substantially explore key themes and having to rely on limited language ability of both researchers and of any translators employed. These studies have also had the tendency to use as a basis methodologies of research of national identity in western societies that tends to prefer to regard national identity more in terms of its civic duty and self-individual perspective. Even though the results of such studies are valid and contribute to an expansion of the initial understanding of the Identity/National Identity of the Timoroan; this present study's major contribution is that it enables the respondents to elaborate on what they mean when they say "Hau Timor Oan" and to speak in language and in cultural context and about their particular worldviews of the topic at hand.

This good start is the result of a research study that started formally in 2008 at the academic level but has been a constant companion of the researcher when asking and working through the key issues being researched: Where and how does a Timoroan learns to be a Timoroan? What is the role of culture in the construction of the Timoroan identity (person and social)? Why are Timoroan so attached to culture, lisan and the uma lulik? What are the National Symbols that represent all Timoroan? How do the Timoroan view religion in contemporary Timor-Leste? What has been the impact of history in the shaping and construction of the Timoroan? What is the language situation for the Timoroan in Timor-Leste?

Answers to these questions will be considered in the sections that follow in this chapter based on responses and data collected through this research project.

6.1 'Hau Timoroan'

The poignant feature of the Timoroan Identity is the emphatic belief the Timoroan has in asserting his or her national identity. The Timoroan is a confident collective of individuals who do not hesitate to claim and assert their collective national identity as Timoroan.

A poignant feature of the statement ***'Hau Timoroan' 'Hau Ema Timor' 'Hau Timor Oan' 'Hau Timor'*** is that it leaves little room for misinterpretation of meaning and intent. There is no doubt in the mind of a Timoroan when he or she says "Hau Timoroan." In essence it is constructed as meaning belonging to the collective group that identifies itself as Timoroan.

Leach (2012) is correct when he notes that the main concern of the international community and the Timorese government has been on building the Timorese State post-conflict while the broader processes of nation building, including identity formation and

national integration, have been relatively neglected. This was evidenced from the results of this qualitative study, in that none of the respondents interviewed saw the Timorese State and its instruments (national education and State systems including State media) as having a major impact or role in the way the Timoroan learn about what it means to be Timoroan.

Timoroan national identity refers to the national identity of all Timorese and from the onset it must be noted that national identity narratives cannot be seen as narratives of who is more or less Timoroan, or whether an *indigenous* Timoroan is more or less than a Timoroan of acquired nationality.

Even though there are assertions that the 2006 political military-security crisis made it clear that Timor-Leste's national identity is weakened by such instances; these types of assertions deserve more careful consideration. The 2006 political-military crisis, like other crisis that have taken place in Timor-Leste since 1512 and during colonial times and through Indonesian times, including recent internal conflicts post-independence, has a profound impact on the psyche of the Timoroan but this impact has not weakened Timoroan national identity. The narrative has not been about who is more or less Timoroan, it may be about who participated more or less during the resistance or who has more access and opportunities, and about politics or justice.

Instances like the 2006 political military-security crisis and conflict made the Timoroan feel ***'less proud'*** in their national identity without necessarily chipping away at it because there are other historical and cultural and philosophical instances that counter-balance and neutralize such feelings and that make the Timoroan feel '***very proud'*** of having a Timoroan national identity.

All the respondents of this study responded to feeling *very pr*oud about being Timoroan, which validates Leach's (2012) finding among the attitudes of university students to national identity. The extract bellow builds on his finding and provides explanation as to why the Timoroan are very proud of being Timoroan but also notes when the Timoroan feel *less proud*.

The fact Timor-Leste is independent and was able through resistance and defiance attain its sovereignty and independence and its place among other nations in the world arena is the key reason why the respondents are *very proud* to be Timoroan. Other reasons include Timoroan having their own indigenous culture and languages and Timor-Leste having natural resources.

On the other hand, political and ethnic tensions and conflict among the Timoroan are the biggest source of feelings of being *less proud* of being Timoroan as seen from the extract of answers provided by the respondents of Focus Group 2 ***[FG2]***.

[EB]: Ok are you all proud of being Timoroan? Do you all fee pride in being Timoroan?

[FG2]: Yes because now we have a Nation.

[EB]: What makes you feel proud or are you proud every day or are there occasions that make you feel this way?

[FG2]: For me I feel proud as Timoroan because Timor-Leste is a small nation but it can be independent as a small nation that has its own culture and its own tradition.

[EB]: How about you what makes you feel proud to be Timoroan?

[FG2]: I am proud because Timor achieved independence as a nation and is able to stand in the Asian region. Also now many of its people have gone abroad to Indonesia, Ireland, England, in Korea, as Timoroan they go to other nations.

[EB]: So are there events or moments that take place that make you feel less proud to be Timor and what are those?

[FG2]: For me personally I don't feel proud when there is violence because during Indonesian times we were still afraid but now everyone wants to stand up, everyone wants to show off strength, and I don't like it when this leads to violence.

[FG2]: For me I don't feel proud when foreigners come and meet the Timoroan and find out we are hard-headed or we are violent people. This makes me not be proud.

[FG2]: For me I don't feel proud when problems continue to take place and the leaders continue to through words like the crisis that just took place that made many Timoroan continue to die.

Thus violence, conflict and the perception that the Timoroan are violence-prone can be interpreted as suggesting the Timoroan are divided which goes against the self-identified view the Timoroan have of themselves as being part of the collective, and this is a collective that is as much national as it is regional and local.

A common misunderstanding when referring to the Timoroan is that with it comes preconceived notions of individualism that are reflected in the studies about identity in the western tradition. As discussed earlier, the self in indigenous societies and non-Western cultures, including in Timor-Leste, tends to be contextual and culture-based and it is defined in terms of the self in relation others such as family and community whereby a person learns to harmonise the self with the collective rather than to be autonomous or independent (Shweder, 1991).

This is an important consideration because 'Hau' in the Timorese cultural context does not simply mean 'I'. The 'I' is constructed as meaning all that which constitutes a collective-Timoroan as a cultural and ethnic being.

For instance when ***R16 [MX]*** was asked about what he felt was more important, to think of himself as being Timoroan or himself as a worker or man or from Baucau in relation to others his answer was Timoroan is always first.

> [MX] I believe the most important is that I am Timoroan. First Timoroan; afterwards as a Timoroan I feel and I explain that I am from such and such area. I was born in Timor, I am Timoroan; only then I belong to a District. I am from the District of Baucau.
>
> About our personal self. We also need to know our status: from outside or married. I am married. I married someone. In terms of religion I am Catholic. As a Timoroan I also have evidence of my identity, through the civil registry. I think this is what is important.

This feeling was expressed generally by all the respondents of this study. What emerged strongest was the Timoroan allegiance to Timor as a whole primarily and then to each of their own districts as part of the whole secondarily.

A Timoroan is born a Timoroan first in the self-collective rather than in the self-individual sense of the term. The terms Timor Oan in the full expansion of their meaning literally mean Son or Daughter of Timor (Oan=son or daughter; Timor=the island). This is an important concept because contrary to western and other contemporary societies, the majority of Timoroan are not encouraged to develop individualistic traits. The Timoroan are from birth, even before conception, born with a self-collective ego-identity and as part of a collective community of descent; the collective identity of being a son or daughter of Timor, that geographical land mass, or island all the Timoroan call home.

The reason why it is mentioned the Timoroan are even before conception constructed as Timoroan can be reflective of the customary practice of the *barlake* that has been alluded to before. The barlake, or traditional marriage, represents not a union between woman-man who will then go on to have a child, but through the *barlake*, a traditional union is forged between two extended families, thus the offspring can be said to belong to the community represented by the families rather than just the biological parents.

This study only refers to the half island that in contemporary times corresponds to the sovereign nation occupying the central and eastern half of the island, Timor-Leste, so the findings of this study can only be generalised to represent the notions of national identity of those who live in it and not across the border in Indonesian West Timor.

When the respondents were asked how they answer when they are asked to describe themselves, this elicited two types of reactions and answers: (1) the first answer or reaction was a very confident one "Hau Timoroan" (I am Timorese) without making reference or distinction to where in Timor they are from; and (2) the second reaction was the answer depends on who asks the question which in itself elicits two very different types of answers too. If asked by someone who is an obvious *Mala'e* (foreigner or someone who does not belong or is not recognisable to be part of the immediately known inner-group), the first and definite answer is 'Hau Timoroan' or 'Hau Ema Timor' or 'Hau Timor' or 'Hau Timor Oan'; all of these variation are used to describe the same attachment to country. If they are asked by another Timoroan, someone who is immediately identifiable as part of the in-group of Timoroan, the answer then is rather localised and not national, for instance 'Hau hosi Baucau' (I am from Baucau) replaces 'Hau Timoroan', because being Timoroan is already implied or a given.

[NS]: I believe that if I were for example in Dili and my friends asked where I was from and if I said I am Timor Oan, another question would immediately follow because they are also Timoroan. What they wanted to know specifically was that I was a Timor Oan from where, so I would have to explain…

One important feature of this answer of respondent ***R2 [NS]*** needs to be considered here because at the localised level, the answer is no longer 'Hau Baucau Oan' (I am a son or daughter of Baucau) but 'Hau hosi Baucau' (I am from Baucau), when Tetum language is used. In local languages it may be different.

Likewise if the person in question is from Baucau and the question is being asked in Baucau Sub-District for instance and the person is not originally from Baucau he or she will then reply 'Hau hosi Venilale' (I am from Venilale).

If the question is asked in Venilale the answer will be ***'Hau hosi [village name]'***.

If the question is asked then at the village or 'suku' level, the answer is then 'Hau hosi Venilale' (I am from Venilale) because once it gets to the village or 'suku' level the question ceases to make sense unless the person being asked the question is not originally from the area or not easily identifiable to the clan he or she belongs to so the identity moves up the scale to the national. Or depending on who is asking the question the answer might elicit a fuller explanation as exemplified below.

[EB]: Today I noted you all come from different places. Do you feel you are individuals, do you feel you are from Baucau first or Timor Oan first? Or Timor Oan first and then from Baucau? Or are you from Liquisa or Same, which is first, which is most important. It is more important for people to know you are from Timor or more important for people to know you are from Baucau and then Timoroan?

[FG1]: Timor Oan.

[FG1]: For me when we are all here, inside Timor, I would say I am from Liquisa, when I go abroad, we can say we are Timor Oan.

[EB]: Why would you say you are first from Liquisa?

[FG1]: Because we are inside the country; the majority, only if with Mala'e would we need to ask. If Timorese meeting one another I would only ask from where, I am from Baucau. If the two of us where to meet in Indonesia or Australia and I asked where are you from he or she would say I am from Timor.

[EB]: Do you all agree with this or do you have other opinions?

[FG1]: And also, we say like our colleagues, from one village to another village, from a sub-district we will move to the District, to the Nation. For example like us from the District of Same. We say we are from Same first, people will have first their village, then from the aldeia to the suku, for example Aldeia Fatwa, to Suku Fatugahi, Sub-District of Fatu-Berlihu, then from the sub-district [to the District of] Manufahi.

In the Timor context, as discussed previously, a Timoroan is born first and then later in the lifecycle, and most likely during or after young adulthood, may develop self-individualistic characteristics but these are almost always subservient to the self-collective, which helps explain why familial relations have such an influential role in the way professional and social activities are conducted in Timor-Leste.

The above discussion offers but a snapshot of the types of issues that will be considered here and that start to paint a clearer worldview of the Timoroan that has thus far been considered only in a limited manner by the studies that have been done on Timoroan national identity. This section of the thesis will look at particular answers given by the respondents of this study to questions and follow-up questions about Timoroan identity within the national identity context in Timor-Leste.

In previous chapters and sections of the thesis the circumstances, historical and theoretical, were reviewed and now this section will use answers given during the research process in assisting to answer fundamental questions about Timoroan national identity.

The contribution of this study nonetheless is to an enrichment of the knowledge about who are the Timoroan and where do the Timoroan learn to become within the context of Timorese society. Further psychological, psychosocial, anthropological, ethnographic and historical research needs to be done in this regard but this is a good starting point given that not many such studies exist at this point attempting to understand how the Timoroan arises to

the consciousness of being Timoroan, of forming or identifying as Timoroan and how belonging to that group is based on the 'felt' closeness uniting all the Timoroan belonging to Timor-Leste.

The discussion of the more psychological dimension (Guibernau, 2013) of Timoroan Identity (Person and National) will be done with a particular focus on the learning and socialisation processes reviewed in the previous chapter necessary for identity formation.

Given that the Timoroan have a very confident sense of national identity ***'Hau Timoroan'*** a follow-up question was about where they get such confidence or validation that allows them to express themselves with such certainty. All the respondents of this project were asked several questions about what made them sure they are Timoroan or how did they know they are Timoroan.

The types of answers given are exemplified by an extract from the interview with ***R5 [CM]*** offered below:

> [CM]: I know that I am Timoroan because first I was born in Timor.
>
> I was born in Timor; I became an adult in Timor; my mother and father are Timoroan; I use Timor languages. Now the culture that I know is Timor culture, this is what I spoke about today. The Timorese culture ties us together so when people see me they know I am Timoroan.
>
> I am now in Timor so Timor culture ties me and makes me visible.

The responses varied but from all the responses given a common pattern of responses emerged that allows us to understand better how the Timoroan views him or herself. Thus the Timoroan feels, is and knows first and foremost he or she is a Timoroan. In this section of the thesis, only the more psychological aspects of the Timoroan (to 'feel', and learn to be) will be discussed.

6.2 To Feel 'Hatene nia A'an ka Senti nia A'an nudar' Timoroan

To ***'Hatene nia A'an'*** or ***'Senti nia A'an nudar Timoroan'***, that is, to believe and feel as a Timoroan is the most important aspect of a Timoroan according to the respondents of this research project.

This finding is in-keeping with the findings of a study conducted during a longitudinal research project conducted in 2002, 2007 and 2010 by Leach (2012) on East Timorese

tertiary students and their attitudes to national identity and nation building. Leach found that ***To Feel East Timorese*** was consistently ***very important*** to being Timoroan, coming only second ***To Be Born in East Timor***, and followed by ***Speak Tetum*** to being Timoroan.

The findings of this section not only validate Leach's findings but also help to explain why *To Feel Timoroan* and *To Be Born* in Timor-Leste and *To Speak Tetum* are so important for being able to self-identify as Timoroan.

According to Gellner (1997), there are two basic characteristics to the term nationalism***:*** culture and organisation, nevertheless the author makes clear it is his position that culture and organisation are universal and perennial whilst States and nationalisms are modern concepts. The modernist school of nationalist theory conceives of nationalism as essentially modern. On the other, as seen previously ethno-nationalism authors prefer to not perceive the modern nation removed from its ethnic origins.

This research project is not about Timoroan nationalism as a modern concept, this study is about Timoroan culture and organization in a more perennial perspective; even though the findings and results of this study advance the understanding of the concept in contemporary Timor-Leste.

Even though being born in Timor-Leste is important to being Timoroan, the self-identification and self-classification of being Timoroan is the most important factor of the Timoroan national identity. Being Timoroan is a self-reflective as well as a self-in-relation-to-the-other way of being. To illustrate this point, what follows is an extract from an answer given by ***R3 [AS]:***

[EB]: So as a Timoroan, because people know you, is it important or not for a Timoroan to be born in Timor?

[AS]: I think it is a must but more importantly he or she must self-acknowledge as a Timoroan because he or she can be born anywhere, that is not important. What is important is that I AM Timoroan.

For ***R3 [AS]*** being born in Timor is important, 'a must', for a Timoroan but more importantly the Timoroan must recognize and acknowledge that he or she is a Timoroan. This is an important notion because being Timoroan is first a self-reflective belief that is not contested until the Timoroan starts to doubt this. Because one feels Timoroan then one is Timoroan. It is only when the Timoroan doubts his or her national identity that it then escalates to an issue that can only be resolved by formal documentation.

One anecdotal example of such a circumstance concerns the identity of an African national very likely from the African community of Indonesia. In 1999 this individual

somehow, by luck or circumstance, made his way to Timor-Leste and assumed a Timoroan identity, claiming he was from Bobonaro District (Western-Central Border District). He was of African appearance but spoke Tetum and Bahasa Indonesia fluently. For many years claims abounded about his true Timoroan identity. Nevertheless for years he did not flinch in his conviction he was a Timoroan from Bobonaro District, claiming even being a relative of a senior Timoroan minister. He also had documentation that proved he was Timoroan.

The salient aspect of this case was that this individual 'felt' and made other Timoroan 'feel' he was Timoroan. He knew and could speak in language and culture, contributed towards the development of Timor-Leste by establishing an anti-corruption Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), and in the end even married a Timoroan and had children who are now indigenous Timoroan. Eventually he was arrested and jailed for forging his Timoroan documents because in actual fact he was not Timoroan by blood. For more than ten years though, everyone assumed and did not contest he was Timoroan, albeit from African extraction. After all he could have perhaps been a descendent from the African community who settled in Timor-Leste, in Bobonaro District and in the Capital Dili, during Portuguese times and married into the Timoroan community.

For the respondents, being born in Timor is important but not necessary to one feeling one is Timoroan nevertheless the knowledge that one is Timoroan is almost like an Identity Card and much more important than having formal documents that prove so.

For ***R7 [FS]*** it is of major importance and consequence that a Timoroan acknowledges he or she is a Timoroan. He goes as far as saying it is the duty of the Timoroan to claim to be so and not to be ashamed.

> [FS]: …what is important is that he or she acknowledges as being Timoroan. He or she is not ashamed of claiming he or she is Timoroan. We hear some, whose parents are from Timor who deny and say they are no longer Timoroan. I don't appreciate this.

Thus, for the Timoroan the allegiance to Timor, even before it was declared a modern-contemporary nation-state, may have always supersedes any other kind of regional or personal or local allegiance.

For some respondents such as ***R13 [JB]*** in the extract below her identity as Timoroan is not only a matter of nationalistic sentiment or loyalty but she reflected what most Timoroan consciously and subconsciously did for over half a millennia of foreign occupation.

The Timoroan utilized their national identity as Timoroan as a shield against the other occupying and subversive national identities, that of being Portuguese and Indonesian.

A struggle against such national identities could not be made by utilising local identities, it had to be done with strength of numbers, so compliantly and conceptually or at least imaginatively the Timoroan united around a common identity to ensure they endured and survived thus ensuring their self-determination.

> People have considerable capacity for self-determination, and the operation of will – that capacity to choose behaviours based on inner desires and perceptions – is the basis of self-determination…People have substantial latitude to determine their own existence, yet this latitude exists within the context of various confines.
>
> (Deci, 1980, p. 5)

The above definition of self-determination is relevant at this point because from the time the Timoroan felt their existence was threatened they willed themselves to exist as a people. This could have occurred quite suddenly for some of the more affected Timor kingdoms or more gradually during the close to 500 years of Portuguese colonial occupation, and as the colonial administration transitioned from trading along the coastal areas to more direct inland administrative intervention, but more definitely during the 24 years of Indonesian occupation.

At some defining point, be it *en masse* or gradually the kingdoms that composed Timor Island society were united in the operation of their will and chose a particular behaviour, that of being Timoroan that was based on their common desire and perception to ensure they could keep on going with their own existence.

The quote above also notes that people have substantial latitude to determine their own existence. Thus in this instance the people of the Timor Island had enough latitude to determine their own existence and the confines within which they operated; the confines of Portuguese colonialism and of Indonesian annexation. Both options of confinement would not allow the Ema (people) of Timor to exist as they were and had been which required them to sacrifice what was most sacred to them. Their will to survive despite living as colonised and invaded people united them and may explain why the Timoroan are so ardent in their self-collective assertion to will themselves as Timoroan.

In western academia Will Theory has been theorised since the 1890s but will is important because in and through willing an outcome is imagined and what follows are

movements or actions of the organism that bring about (or at least aim to bring about) the outcome (Deci, 1980).

Thus the will of the Timoroan must have to been to will themselves not-as-Portuguese and not-as-Indonesian, and in doing so the will of the different peoples in Timor became the will of the Timoroan, and actions were taken, consciously by the majority, that brought about, albeit almost 500 years later, the desired outcome of being able to exist as people from the Timor Island, under the national identity umbrella of being Timoroan, a people of different cultures and languages united and self-determined.

It is with this context then that one can comprehend such statements as that of ***R13 [JB]*** when she says that her Timoroan national identity allows her to live and protects her as a human being. And because Timor culture is still oral this sentiment has been socialised from *inan-aman sira* (mother-father and others) in the *uma laran* (inside the home) from generation to generation. Among cultural knowledge and oral history what was socialised and that had the most enduring effect on the psyche of the peoples of Timor was the will to become and be recognized as Timoroan.

[EB]: Do you have any last thoughts on the topic of national identity Juvita?

[JB]: For me, lastly, what I have I cannot throw away. This is my identity: it allows me to live; it protects me.

My last thought is this; I am proud because of my own identity. It allowed me to be born; it gave me a land to live on; to have a livelihood. It gives me an identity that protects me as a human being.

A logical question that followed such assertions of being Timoroan were always to ask what made them sure of being Timoroan to try and determined where and/or from whom the respondents received such national identity reassurance.

As the extract below demonstrates the typical answer for all respondents were immediately to state they were Timoroan because they were born in Timor (in the geographical sense of the word referring to the Island of Timor).

For some respondents such as ***R4 [BD]*** it was poignant for her to point out she is not even of mixed heritage and to claim her *originality.* The fact she is an *original* from Timor (born in Timor, of Timoroan parents and not of mixed heritage gives her no doubt she is Timoroan and enables her to confidently convey this existential denomination of self-collective feeling.

[EB]: You are Timoroan; what makes you sure that you are Timoroan?

[BD]: I am Timoroan; born in Timor. My mother-father are Timoroan, they are not mixed. I am originally Timor and I don't feel any different. I don't have any doubts.

The notion of originality and of being indigenous was reflected by most of the respondents of this study thus the Timoroan can be said to be an ethnic community of descent. What defines the confidence of the Timoroan as such is their ability to claim original belonging to place, not just an attachment to place, but a birth-right claim to place.

The extract below from ***R6 [FD]*** is reflective and telling of this notion. For her, she believes she is Timoroan because her blood comes from her mother-father who are also Timoroan. Her devotion to being Timoroan was so great that she challenged the researcher and defiantly asked for a DNA test because in her mind the results of the blood test would confirm beyond doubt she is a Timoroan and nothing else.

[EB]: Earlier you spoke about being Timoroan; and you referred to yourself as a Timoroan. You know yourself as Timoroan. My question then is what makes you believe or be sure that you are Timoroan?

[FD]: Because, I believe I am Timoroan because my blood is from Timoroan. My mother and my father are Timoroan. If you were to test my blood, my blood would not be from any other than from Timoroan.

It might seem repetitive to bring up extracts of answers given by the respondents, nevertheless this is important because each response not only validates what other respondents claim of their experiences with the topic but also add key information that assists in the elaboration and de-construction of the concept of Timoroan national identity.

The extract from the answer given by ***R11 [JA]*** is illustrative of what must have been to grow up under Indonesian occupation, which is the experience of most of the respondents of this research project except for five respondents who could still remember life during Portuguese times.

For him there was an initial period of confusion growing up during Indonesian times, because what he was being told or socialised by the Indonesian administration contradicted what he had learnt from his *inan-aman sira* (mother-father and others), in his particular case his grandparents. When confronted with conflicting versions and conflicting processes of socialisation of what was to be Timoroan, he went back to what he trusted, knew and develop from childbirth. Thus his natural loyalty and trust were with his immediate extended family and he developed markers for what is and who represents Timoroan. His particular markers

were colour and immediate identification with others like him, oral history, taught by his grandparents and place of birth. These markers because they were socialised in the *uma laran* (inside the home) were beyond the realm of the influence of the socialisation process of the Indonesian administration, done through the formal education system and the mass media.

[EB]: Now we will speak about you as a Timoran and how do you know you are a Timoroan?

[JA]: About me knowing I am from Timor, before during Indonesia, if we look at Indonesians when they came here we already said we were from Timor. I was a bit confused back then. If we analyse Timor during Indonesian times, when they came in we said we were Timor but the Indonesians occupied us. So we matured politically, our leaders found ways so we could be independent and scream Timor.

I believe being Timor is like this. I know Timor(ese) from their colour, I know what is our colour; what is the Mala'es'; so our difference is that our colour is not the same. The colour of the Mala'e is not the same as ours. Timor is part of history told by our grandparents[33]. When our grandparents were born perhaps there was already a Timor. Maybe they created it, so us as grandchildren[34] we were born hearing Timor, so we are Timoroan.

The point of the failed attempt of the Indonesian administration to socialise the Timoroan to become Indonesian is best illustrated by the shared experience of ***R12 [JM]*** who was raised in the context of a mixed marriage between his biological Timoroan mother and his Indonesian stepfather.

Validating what all other respondents of this study noted, the fact his biological mother-father were Timoroan, and the fact he self-identified with his inner-group of Timoroan, caused him to develop a solid sense of attachment to the self-collective Timoroan.

Without detailing the kind of relationship he has or had with his stepfather, whether it was positive or negative, there was some degree of distrust as he points out, in that in front of him he would not claim his Timoroan identity out of some fear but possibly because he was Indonesian. Thus his self-validation as Timoroan came from the knowledge he had of mother-father who were indigenous Timoroan and from his group of friends who taught his how to *halo tuir identidade Timoroan nian* (to conduct himself according to the Timoroan identity).

[EB]: Ok, so before Joao you grew up during Indonesian times. How did you during Indonesian times, how did you continue to uphold Timoroan identity, how did you learn to be Timoroan during the Indonesian times?

[33] Grandparents here means ancestors not just grandmother and grandfather.
[34] Grandchildren here means generations that followed rather and grandchildren.

[JM]: The problem was that during Indonesian time my mother re-married an Ema Indonesia. Sometimes I would not say I was a Timoroan because I was afraid; because my stepfather was Ema Indonesia. But for me I believed because my father was Timoroan so I was also a Timoroan and my identity was Timoroan. From this point onwards I started hanging out with friends and be part of the clandestine. I felt myself to be a Timoroan. We conducted ourselves according to the Timoroan identity.

The two extracts that follow refer to answers about the same question posed to try and understand how a Timoroan asserts such confidence in his or her national identity. The responses within the group-setting did not vary from one-on-one responses. This particular respondents' answer encapsulates quite well the feelings described around the group and generally: he feels he is Timoroan when thinking of himself; he is attached to land, in general terms as distinct from his attachment to his place of birth, he loves his culture, he role-performs as other Timoroan do, he refuses to have any other national identity, and he behaves as a Timoroan.

Focus-Groups are very interesting because it is within this context that one can see the self-collective speak. In the presence of others, there is a genuine consensus, and it is hard to note anyone who disagrees with what someone in the collective says, rather knowledge and opinion is built, assertions are made and respected by the group and new knowledge is always added rather than existing knowledge being questioned or refuted.

[EB]: Ok now we will talk about feeling you are Timoroan. All of you identified yourselves as Timoroan. How do you all know you are Timoroan? What makes you believe you are Timoroan?

[FG3]: One thing that makes me believe I am Timoroan is that my self-characteristics make me believe I am a Timoroan. I love my land, my culture, and do as what the Timoroan do, that demonstrates I am Timoroan. I don't want to be anyone else. And I carry myself as a Timoroan.

A final point will be made in this section of the thesis of the Timoroan being a community of descent. It is obvious from the responses given by the respondents of this study that the Timoroan assert their national identity with particular reference to their ethnicity.

Previous extracts of responses refer to the notion of having Timoroan ancestry as being paramount to feelings of being Timoroan. The extract that follows is quite extensive but it is very relevant to be discussed here because it reflects the way the Timoroan thinks of his or her national identity. It is important to note that the respondents of this study did not have any preparatory time or the ability to study the questions that were asked in order to provide responses. For all the respondents, and as far as I could pre-determine prior to the

interviews, it was the first time they had been asked questions around their feelings and of being and having Timoroan national identity.

This respondent from Focus Group 4 ***[FG4]*** enumerated quickly and succinctly and articulated his views on the topic in a very mature manner. The respondent was male, a student, originally from a rural area, a Mambae speaker, and in his early twenties.

The question he reflected on was about national identity and how the group is certain they are Timoroan. The question was framed as follows as being about considering the topic of national identity that is shared by many Timoroan who have different backgrounds i.e. from Lospalos, Ermera, and Bobonaro. They were also asked to think of themselves as being Timoroan who grew up in Dili, the capital, thus geographically removed from their original place of birth.

This particular respondent enumerated his views on what and why he self-reflected and self-classified as Timoroan:

(1) He knows he was born of Timoroan inan-aman (mother-father) and know of his place of birth;
(2) He knows he is from a District and that he speaks the maternal or local language Mambae and that this is one of the languages of the Timoroan;
(3) He knows he is a citizen;
(4) His parents live in a rural area;
(5) He know his 'stories' as told by his grandparents;
(6) His family was part of the independence movement;
(7) He is aware despite the Timoroan speaking different maternal languages, the Timoroan also speak Tetum (and some have Tetum as a maternal language) which is a language that unifies the Timoroan;
(8) His race, the Timoroan race is different to other races;
(9) He understands of culture at a supra level, and claims all the cultures in Timor are the same, generally speaking.

[EB]: I would like to speak about the topic of national identity; especially about how we are all Timoroan. Even though we might all have different backgrounds; I would like to know how you all feel you are Timoroan even though you have your own experiences from Lospalos, Ermera, and Bobonaro. You are all growing up in Dili from different backgrounds. But at one level you are all Timoroan. This is why I want to ask all of your opinions about this. Ok how do you all know you are Timoroan. What makes you sure you are Timoroan?

[FG4]: Ok I believe what makes me; first I look at my ascendency. My father is Timoroan, then my mother is also Timoroan. I am proud of this because this makes me Timoroan

Second I also have my own district, I believe I know my maternal language Mambae, I feel this so I am part of the Timoroan.

Third as a citizen I live in the same country as my mother and my father, we live in the same land, so from this I feel I am Timoroan.

Then another one is that I know my official language Tetum that I believe is the official language because it makes us all feel Timoroan because I believe only in Timor I speak it.

Another is through history. If we look at history I feel I am Timoroan because my grandparents and uncles were involved in the process of independence. This makes me feel Timoroan with my other peers because of the resistance we now have a nation and state and even though we speak different maternal languages but we have our own official language, our language Tetum that unifies us all as equals as Timoroan.

Then another we also look at our own race. Our race also makes us Timor, we have our own race, different from others for example Indonesia, we are alike races but we are also not the same as them. This makes me feel more like my peers the Timoroan.

Then another one is culture because even though we are from this District or that District; our own culture is similar and even though the explanations have differences; in general terms they have many similarities and are like one another.

The section above discussed in some length the notion of the Timoroan as a feeling, knowing, and being able to assert his or her National Timoroan Identity and how this supra or national identity supersedes all other types of social identities the Timoroan have.

The extracts above also plays an important role is the rationalisation of the Timoroan from the viewpoint of the respondents of this research study. This was important because our understanding of who and what the Timoroan and national identity is de-constructed by the respondents themselves.

The next section of the thesis will address another key element of the Timoroan national identity and its close connection to culture and the role it plays in binding the Timoroan to the Timor-Leste Nation and unto themselves and to one another.

6.3 Kultura Kesi Ita / Culture Binds Us

Culture is often referred as being perennial and universal and can be said to represent and constitute a system of values, beliefs, customs, conventions, habits, languages, practices and particular worldviews that help to justify, sustain and transmit a particular way of life to a group(s) of individuals.

The Cultural Timoroan in this context then refers to Guibernau's (2013) Cultural Dimension to national identity and the way in which the values, beliefs, customs, conventions, habits, languages and practices of the Timoroan are transmitted to the new Timoroan who receive the culture of Timor-Leste.

1. The Timoroan Identity (self, identity, social identity and national identity) is based on Ethnicity (Mother-Father and the shedding of blood - ***Inan-Aman and Ran Fakar***) and cultural obligation (***Kultura Kesi Ita***) rather than civic duty.
2. Ethnicity allegiance is not a point of contest for the self-identification of a Timoroan.

The respondents of this research project use the Indonesian term *Adat* interchangeably with the Tetum term Lisan or the Portuguese term Cultura/Tradição/História (written phonetically Kultura/Tradisaun/Historia) to loosely translate in English the term culture but to mean the ways in which life is organized and remembered and behaviour is dictated in more customary traditional Timorese society.

The State does not yet play a particularly defining role in the definition of a national culture to inform national identity; even though *lisan* and state-based governance are navigated simultaneously by the Timoroan on a daily basis (Cummings, 2012). It is then unsurprising that all the respondents of this research study validated the importance of culture and knowing Timoroan culture and equate this knowledge to truly being Timoroan.

The importance of the *Adat* was also noted in Leach's (2012) research project conducted on the attitudes of Timoroan university students to national identity undertaken in 2010:

> ***Importance of adat***
> A new question, first posed in the 2010 survey, asked students how important 'to respect tradition and adat' was to being 'truly East Timorese'. Despite the evident importance of Catholicism to perceptions of national identity, it is revealing that 'respect for tradition and adat' exceeded this indicator by some 15% as a 'very important' attribute of being 'truly East Timorese' (93.5%). That this finding reflects the perceptions of one of the most educated, urbanized and 'modern' segments of East Timorese society amply demonstrates the on-going strength of traditional conceptions of political community and identity in Timor-Leste.
>
> (Leach, 2012, p. 240)

The findings of this study help answer Leach's finding as to why the Timoroan (93.5 per cent of his respondents) believe culture and traditions are very important to being truly Timoroan. Nevertheless the narrative of being Timoroan is not just about knowing culture

and tradition, rather the salient feature of the responses was the cognitive understanding that culture plays such a defining role in the binding (*Kultura Kesi Ita)* of the Timoroan to place and country and also to one another and plays an integral role in the definition of the Timoroan national identity.

Previously, rather than opting to provide a lengthy definition of the concept of culture, it was preferred to go with a broader definition of the term offered by Raymond Williams:

> Where *culture* meant a state or habit of the mind, or the body of intellectual and moral activities, it means now, also, a whole way of life.
>
> (Williams, 1990, p. xviii)

The respondents of this study noted that they turn to *Kultura Timor* (Timor Culture) to learn about themselves, where they come from, as a people-collective and to learn the customs and traditions. This is very important especially given the past history and experience of Timor-Leste and of the Timoroan with colonialism and illegal annexation that impinged on the Timoroan the forced learning and indoctrination of foreign cultures.

First the Timoroan were forced to assume the identity of Ema Portugal (Portuguese) and then to be Ema Indonesia (Indonesians). Nevertheless rather than just assimilating the foreign cultures, the Timoroan ensured they learnt about Timoroan identity by preserving their oral culture or lisan, history and traditions and efficiently used these to build a sense of nationalism that helped them sustain themselves with an original sense of self-collective for close to 500 years.

[EB]: About culture and stories, it is important or not for a Timor Oan to know about his or her culture?

[AS]: I believe it is important because from our history and culture we know where we are from. Us Timor are from where, our habits and traditions. Culture shows me I am Timor Oan and with history bind us all.

From the respondents as well, culture is not something that can be learnt from the formal education system at schools. In this regard, culture is shared among the Timoroan and it is through that sharing and communion of traditional oral knowledge, the Timoroan both educate and socialise themselves, as well as others, about the importance of knowing and living as Timoroan.

The use of the terms sharing rather than teaching of Timoroan Culture is deliberate here. Mentioning culture is taught would entail the teacher must possess an intimate and

detailed knowledge of culture, which is not the case for most Timorese. The teaching of culture rests with the authority of the few, the *Lian Nain*, or Keepers of the Ceremonies or Rituals, who are entrusted as the cultural custodians of the many cultures that compose the Timoroan Culture and cosmos.

In many respects this lack of ability to teach culture at an in-depth and authoritative level then makes it easier for all the Timoroan to relate to one another. As the respondents also noted, generally the different cultures of Timor-Leste are very similar, it is only at the detailed and in-depth level that language and rituals will vary but this knowledge is mostly the domain of and privy to the Lian Nain, who are shrouded by mythology and metaphorical language that keeps and safeguards this knowledge from most Timoroan but most importantly from the mala'e or foreigners. Thus, in this regard, even though all Timoroan have a high regard for their *Kultura*, the majority of the Timoroan will not possess much more than the knowledge that is important for them to be able to function within society and that binds the Timoroan to Timor-Leste.

In this regard and in general terms, Timoroan Culture is also collective, and in a sense a collective ignorance of the in-depth details of culture is bound by the deep belief and knowledge of the important role culture plays in keeping the Timoroan aware of him or herself.

In this regard, it is natural then that culture cannot be taught by the formal education system because that in-depth cultural knowledge is not of and for the public domain, it is kept safe in rituals and mythologies and in the *lulik*[35].

Most Timoroan know, respect, fear and do not question the *Lulik* and as Trinidade (2011) noted in his reflections as a Timoroan on the Lulik:

> Each one of us is perhaps already familiar with *Lulik* terms such as, *uma*[36] *Lulik, rai Lulik, bee Lulik, fatin Lulik, foho Lulik, Nai Lulik, Amo Lulik,* etc. When Timorese hear the word *'Lulik*', it immediately puts them in place for a moment, they pay full attention, they pay full respect, they are afraid, and it makes them obey without hesitation.

Thus, the in-depth knowledge of Culture is Lulik. For instance the original name given to the Island contemporarily known as Timor and its origins thus far remains unknown.

[35] Lulik- sacred, forbidden, holy. For an interpretative description of the *lulik* refer to the work of Timoroan thinker and philosopher Josh Trinidade in: *http://karaudikur.blogspot.com.au/2012/04/lulik-core-of-timorese-values.html*

[36] Uma-house; rai-land; bee-water; fatin-place; foho-mountain; Nai-Higher Being; Amo-Priest.

Was the name fabricated by the Portuguese as referred to previously, or could its origins come from the Malayo Timur, meaning east, for the island which is furthermost to the east of the archipelago?

It could be the original name of the island is Lulik, and so Lulik that it is known only by a handful of *Lia Nains* who will never disclose that knowledge to the rest of the Timoroan. One of the respondents of this study claimed he knew about this most revered secret but preferred not to share it because it was Lulik, and as a Timoroan researcher I instinctively respected that Lulik knowledge and did not probe any further because if that knowledge is Lulik then it is not for me to know it but it is for me to respect it in my ignorance.

Trying to probe the concept of how culture binds the Timoroan also resulted in plain and general statements that *it just does* because the Timoroan environment is infused with culture and as such it plays a significant role in creating a state or habit of the mind in the Timoroan.

[EB]: Where do you learn the high value of culture? Where do you learn it? In schools or at university or how do you get to have such a high regard for Culture?

[AN]: The value of culture can be seen as education but it is not taught through Education. We just feel it and sometimes this is a just a feeling because for example our culture binds us like this. It makes us respect one another, bow down to each other. So this is our cultural value and it influences to follow the culture that is ours.

[EB]: How does culture bind you because culture is not a person it is not a thing that can bind you. Where do you learn it?

[AN]: Like I said before; we learn first this: first from our environment isn't that so because culture is born in the environment. Everything and everyone lives surrounded by the environment, so culture is infused in it. That which binds us comes from the environment.

Thus a Timoroan is conditioned or socialised or is awakened by his or her environment to act as a Timoroan, and is bound by duty to Culture to respect it and follow it in a devoted manner. This devotion is as much for culture as it is also to the Timoroan ancestors. Culture allows the Timoroan to be in constant communion with the bealan[37] sira, or the ancestors. Culture is interpreted by the *Lian-Nain sira* but it originates from the *bealan sira*, the ancestors, who have transmitted the culture orally across the generations, thus keeping it alive.

[37] Bealan - ancestors

The Timoroan has a strong sense of cultural duty to transmit not so much its content, but more the respect and belief culture is what keeps the Timoroan safe and protected and ultimately defines his or her destiny.

Most respondents reflected on this and acknowledged the need to defend the Timoroan culture.

[EB]: Let's talk now a little about history and culture; how important is it for Timoroan to know about history and culture?

[FD]: I believe it is important for if we did not have our culture we would just be lost. If we were not to follow it, for me as a Timoroan, my culture is my culture and my most sacred and this is very important for me.

So in this regard Culture is sacred or *lulik* and it not only protects the Timoroan but also guides them towards their destiny in communion as Timoroan with their present towards their future and in concert with their past through the *bealan* or the ancestors. By honouring and respecting culture in the present time the Timoroan acknowledges the ancestors as the holders of that collective knowledge that is safeguarded through the generations and passed from mother-father to child and then from that child as a mother or father to their children and henceforth.

[EB]: Who teaches you this?

[MC]: Lisan[38] (Culture) are our traditions that come from our ancestors to our mother-father and down to us that way and we must continue this. Our ancestors created it back then.

[EB]: From mother-father but what did they use to teach culture?

[MC]: Culture is used to teach us. Culture accompanies each generation. From culture we know one another, we respect one another, and we support one another. From our own culture we can all gather together.

[EB]: You mentioned culture gathers together people, how?

[MC]: People are gathered through culture so they can know one another because they all come back from that culture. So even though someone may have gone far away, he or she must go back to culture to know each other well.

[38] Lisan – loosely translates to mean culture. The terms lisan can also translate as customs, but it is used interchangeably with the Portuguese word Kultura that has been borrowed and incorporated into the Tetum vernacular.

The following responses given during a focus group discussion are pertinent also to this discussion about Timoroan Culture because the respondents were able to reflect on an issue that affects many Timoroan in contemporary times, in that in the capital Dili, many Timoroan congregate to study or to seek opportunities of employment and as expected this has caused some friction and departure for some with the old customs and habits.

In this instance one of the respondents was able to note this reality that some Timoroan choose to break away from culture in the Capital Dili and assume a much more relaxed and individualistic approach to being Timoroan given that Dili offers some respite from the obligations and duty to culture that are still very prevalent in the regional areas of Timor-Leste. But 'personally' for the respondent and despite knowing some Timoroan depart from the cultural fold, the Timoroan respects and follows what is his or hers, that is, Timoroan culture and always goes back to the place of origin where the sacred house is. A discussion about the sacred house and its relevance to the Timoroan will be discussed in the following sections of this thesis.

As mentioned earlier as well, the majority of Timoroan will admit and acknowledge to knowing culture but as this respondent demonstrates, this cultural knowledge is not detailed and the equivalent to the knowledge of a Lia-Nain.

For Timoroan also, it is not necessary for them to attend traditional rituals and follow them as one would as a religious person, for example a Catholic goes to Church every Sunday. There are particular times when the Timoroan is likely to attend, such as illustrated below, during the changing of the roof of a Uma Lulik, that only takes place every four to five years, but other traditional ceremonies such as the *tur* (sit) during *barlake* proceedings (when two families get together and speak about the union of two of their own), also serve an important role in maintaining the cultural bonds that unite the clan.

[EB]: About Culture; is it important or not for a Timoroan to know about the Sacred (Lulik), the Culture, the Customs?

[FG1]: For me personally and sincerely I must know because this is my culture. But it also depends on the individual, some have just recently come to Dili and they already claim they don't have culture, depends on the person. But for me personally it is not a choice of wanting or not but I must because this is also part of my identity, this is my culture, I come from this, this is what is mine.

[EB]: Do you all believe you know your own customs?

[FG1]: Yes, but we don't know it in detail like the Lia-Nain but we know it.

[EB]: And every year do you follow the sacred or the rituals?
[FG1]: Yes, we go every time but to the sacred houses only when it is time, or to change the roof, or to follow

some rituals.

But most of the time now in Timor we follow the barlake more than the other traditions of before. Sometimes for example, every three years or four years we have to renovate the sacred house so we only do this every four or five years. More often we follow the barlake and that can take place many times in one year.

In the above reflection, it is notable also that one of the respondents of this focus group highlighted that there is some degree of individual power to choose whether to follow culture or not. Nevertheless that understanding of personal choice is quickly countered by a very personally assertion of cultural adherence not being a matter of personal choice.

The above is interesting; in particular in the contemporary context where Timor-Leste has become much more open to external influences and where direct threats to the old ways are not easily discernible. More and more the Timoroan are being drawn into the globalized context where individual choice is paramount as opposed to cultural collective obligation and being influenced by global culture.

The following extracts from the interviews conducted and respondent's views on the concept of culture for the Timoroan are illustrative of this reality. Nevertheless, it is plainly obvious that to the Timoroan, culture is still as relevant and as strong to contemporary Timoroan, who grew up after Timor-Leste's independence as it was for their predecessors who had to endure and survive through Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation.

It is salient to mention that 15 years have passed since the 1999 Popular Referendum that liberated Timor-Leste from Indonesia. Contemporarily, younger generations of Timoroan, give equal importance, if not at times more by expressing stronger nationalistic fervour, to the way in which they relate to culture. This is noted mostly in reference to the particular aspects of culture that are being commented on here such as respecting culture, the role of the Sacred Houses, reverence of the ancestors, languages, symbols and even animistic belief vis-à-vis religious beliefs.

[EB]: My last question is about the Sacred (lulik). You spoke about the traditional and the sacred, but your generation is, not the new generation, but the one after the old generation, you are based in Dili and grew up in Dili, and getting your education in Dili, do you still hold true traditional and the sacred things? Or not? And how do you do this in Dili, or do you have to travel all the time to the mountains?

[FG4]: No, it is not a case of to respect the sacred we have to go to our sacred houses. If it is during all souls' day our mum usually cooks rice and kills a chicken and puts it aside for our ancestor's after preparing a meal for them. We light candles and this is like respecting the sacred. So wherever we are, this is our history and we take these steps so that in future our children will continue these traditions so we never stray and it is always by our side.

[EB]: OK how about the other colleagues, what do you think?

[FG4]: Yes this sacred is like so, the same goes for naming. Soon after birth and if for example a baby boy named Bernardo, he cries all the time so we will mention the name of the ancestors, like for example a grandfathers name, for example Grandfather Kaibeia and if he goes quiet then he will be known by that non-Christian name. Another point, like today the colleagues said, when we are holding an event we always place aside a portion for the ancestors. During all the events we sit with the entire family, but we talk first to the ancestors so when we do something they will always accompany us so that our endeavours are always a success.

[EB]: So in Dili do your parents hold these beliefs in Dili as well?

[FG4]: Yes they will practice. But maybe I am a bit different from my colleagues because my parents still live in the mountains so they still practice this culture. So if there is a funeral or a fetosan-umane ceremony we always go, we go and get involved. So we cannot avoid it because it is part of our lives and we live in its midst. So our mothers, when we go, for example in the area of Waioli, it is a rural area and we keep doing this even though we are here, we came to Dili only to get an education but when we go back we get right into it.

Interestingly younger generations of Timoroan are fully conscious of their place in Timorese society and the different roles being performed and also the expected roles they are likely to play in order to preserve 'original' culture.

Whether the Timoroan are Dili-based or rural-based seems to matter little to the way in which they perceive their connection and affiliation to their cultural practice and obligations. In this regard the influence of the *inan-aman sira* (parents and others) is paramount to this socialisation of the role newer generations of Timoroan must play in order to be able to learn and preserve but also promote Timoroan culture and in particular the role they will play in passing on culture to their descendants.

Even though most of the respondents of this research project were Dili based, as one of the respondents of Focus Group 5 ***[FG5]*** noted, they are fully aware that Dili is a place where they can get an education and possibly a future job, but their immediate allegiance and cultural genesis will always be in the foho (mountains) where their family, immediate such as *inan-aman sira* (parents and others) or ancestral *vizavo sira* (great-grandparents and others) are from.

[EB]: Let's talk about the next topic, when you think of yourself as Timoroan, is it important or not to know about culture, traditions and the sacred?

[FG5]: Yes it is important.

[EB]: Even though all of you grew up in Dili, do you still hold on to culture, and how do you do it?

[FG5]: Yes we still hold, because it started already with our ancestors.

[EB]: But that is long past.

[FG5]: Yes it is past. But it still brings advantages. But culture also has many disadvantages. We come here to become academics and learn many things that are our culture, and it is best we serve our own culture and improve its reputation. We should respect our friends in the mountains, but we give $100 to attend school but this does not mean that we have to abandon our culture and our identity for our life. For me our customs and our culture is part of life. So we must live with our customs. Perhaps we sit with you brothers and maybe you think this is mythology, but for us this is what we believe in.

When reflecting about culture most Timoroan do not refer to modern or contemporary notions of culture. When reflecting on culture the Timoroan will instinctively and immediately think of ancestral or *bealan or viza avo sira* culture, the type of culture that is perennial and that has been handed down from generation to generation and to which they relate, believe in and respect and also fear.

The role of the *inan-aman sira* (parents and others) in this process is always referred to. Parents and other nurturers or carers serve as mediators to new generations of Timoroan into culture. They take them to the different cultural ceremonies held within the collective family nucleus and are key in introducing them to the other members of the clan and the extended family thus binding them to the communion of Timoroan that share the same culture and relate to one another through an awareness of being part of and by the practicing of that culture.

[EB]: How does it hold on to you in Dili (sacred houses or the sacred things)?

[FG5]: For example when we are in Dili if there is a lia (traditional request), a death or if our people have a lia of sorts we will sit together and support one another during the death rituals.

[EB]: You said before from Dili you go to the Districts, why?

[FG5]: Because even though I live in Dili, my strongest culture and that of my family is in Bobonaro. So I must follow it, sometimes I and my mother-father and others attend the rituals, but if there is a gathering to talk about the fetosan-umane together we will always participate.

[FG5]: On our part, in our culture, it requires us to respect one another, for example culture makes us come together as family and we know who is our kin, a brother, an uncle, a grandparent, and why if in Dili before, before coming to Dili where my mother-father and my grandparents come from in the mountains and the culture we come from, so this is passed down to one another and it binds us together and we cannot leave each other, this is why without these roots we cannot live, this is what ensures we go on.

[EB]: I don't really understand roots?

[FG5]: The roots mean that before they were shown to me, my mother-father and ancestors already lives this culture. They already believed in this before Catholic religion entered. So often they believe this above all else. So from this, people will be baptised, and go to church but before church there is culture, so over there, the

sacred house always mention the name of its children and descendants, this is our way of life. If we don't follow this and do not believe our culture or deny it, they will call us back (hamulak[39]), so if today we are here and we have lunch but we are still not content, this is because of this.

In this section a discussion was elaborated of how Timoroan culture binds the Timoroan to land and people. This binding can be said to be done via cultural *abut* (roots). These cultural roots are the invisible threads that bind the Timoroan to culture and demand attention and allegiance. And these cultural roots are flexible and extend from the rural areas to the Capital Dili where most of the respondents of this research project are based. These cultural roots bring, draw and pull Timoroan back to their original culture but are also used, for instance in the capital Dili, to unite the members of the same clan so they do not forget where they came from and who their ancestors are.

These roots that be summoned through the *hamulak*, or calling out to the spirits, be it in order to silence a child that is troubled and cries constantly or to offer protection and confidence in success in the day-to-day life activities.

[EB]: How do you today recognise better Timoroan?

[FG6]: I think for us to make our identity stronger we need to fight cultural invasion so that other cultures do not influence our original culture because our culture was ordered already by our ancestors. This was not just made up by us yesterday or the day before but it was passed down through our memory from generation to generation.

This is why our culture is so strong because we need to fight cultural invasion, for example from Australia, Portugal. We must not be influenced by other people's culture.

I have a cultural identity so during a cultural event why should I wear others clothes, rather than promoting my own culture.

The above extract is poignant because it expresses clearly how young Timoroan perceive of their own culture vis-à-vis what they call the culture of the foreigner (*ema mala'e nian*) and the impact and threat it poses to their original culture. Given the Timoroan are so influenced and socialised by their *inan-aman sira* (parents and others), a reason for this confident assertion of culture may be because the parents of the Timoroan interviewed here, and some of the Timoroan interviewed here themselves, will have experienced having their culture threatened and denigrated. So this attitude towards culture may be a mere reflection of

[39] Hamulak – traditional summoning, it can be from a living person or from the ancestral spirits. It represents a power that affects the living and the dead and it calls for attention or a particular course of action to be taken.

their *inan-aman sira* (parents and others) fear that a new foreign culture will try to subjugate once again the 'original' primordial and perennial Timoroan culture.

In this regard then any attempt at introducing new culture or perceived new culture will in the first instance be regarded as a potential threat to the original Timoroan culture that was able to survive and self-preserve during the last 500 years of foreign occupation of Timor-Leste.

[EB]: How do you all know you are Timor Oan?

[FG4]: I believe that I know because from little until today, even before I was baptised and after baptism we still continue to go to the sacred house.

[FG4]: When we are little, for us from the District of Lospalos, when a baby is born we will all gather together and if he is a boy our male grandparents and the fathers' family and uncles will come and put a male tais and this shows he is a grandchild of ours from our Uma Lulik named Maleki. So this is Maleki's son. We will all then sit together and call all the family and we will eat together and will give the baby a naran gentio (traditional name) so they can go and place it inside the sacred house. This shows that we are really Timoroan because each one will be part of the culture, and then we will speak the language from each of our districts. We speak many languages.

[FG4]: Ok for me I think my two friends spoke about their experience so I will speak about mine that sometimes is similar. For example names like Mausoco, Buisoco, these are original names. We can know one another through our names; this is a real Timoroan, Buisoco, Mausoco, and Builoi. We can show other nations like Indonesia, like the Mohammed's. Sometimes by name alone we know oh this is the name of a Timoroan.

[EB]: But how do know that you are Timoroan?

[FG4]: Sometimes I look at the name and also the race, and I look at the culture. We can say this is Fetosan-Umane[40], it is not difficult and not that different, because generally there is always Fetosan Umane. Then there is also culture, sometimes some sacred houses are short, some are long, even though they look different if we look at the details but in general if we analyse the fetosan-umane it is the same. Then we look at another part, the name. If the name is Buisoko Mausoco, this allows us to know that friend there is Timoroan.

[FG4]: Thank you, what my friends today spoke about sometime can also help me explain what I see because what is my national identity? I am Timoroan. As an individual I am like this, I as an Timoroan Oan like today my friends said: my mother-father are Timoroan, I was born in Timor, my father was also born in Timor and told me that my identity and part of it is this. Second when I grew up, like my friends said before about Lospalos, ours is different like so; when a baby is born his or her eyes must be washed and we use malus[41] water and coins. This shows the identity of the Timoroan. The mala'e would not wash the eyes like this, only the Timoroan washes the eyes like this. This shows that I am Timor with my eyes washed, my identity is not Ema Mala'e but my identity is Timoroan…and on another part like my friends spoke today about culture. Culture I believe comes from our great-grandparents; they already determined that this is the identity of the Timoroan, our culture, from our way of cultural dress, always talking about fetosan-umane. These things demonstrate that our identity is Timoroan.

[40] Fetosan-Umane: tradition of the women's family and the male's family during the barlake and how this allows a woman to be removed from her sacred house networks to become part of the man's uma lulik networks. A removal though does not mean the severance of the ties but it authorizes the man to take her to establish a new family or *uma-kain*.
[41] Malus: known in English as the Betel or Areca.

Thus culture is defined by the Timoroan in general terms only as the above extract illustrates. Rituals are known and talked about in general terms but talking about them serves an important role nonetheless in binding the Timoroan to culture. The in-depth knowledge of culture is not part of the public domain, rather it is role-specific and the responsibility of the *Lia-Nain* (keepers of the ceremonies and rituals).

Nonetheless this does not entail the Timoroan are passive users of culture, on the contrary the Timoroan are duty bound to safeguard it and pass on to younger Timoroan the knowledge that being Timoroan is knowing about Timoroan culture and respect it and practice it. What is passed on is not so much the content of culture, say like for example a historian might do in teaching about the past events and people, but culture is seen as the cement that binds the Timoroan to the nation and to people, whom may have different regional cultures but who in general terms practice and acknowledge a similar and accepted national Timoroan culture.

Thus in this section, culture was discussed at length and the concept of culture as a binding factor of Timorese reality and way of life and of the Timoroan to each other and to place. Also discussed was the important role the *inan-aman sira* (parents and others) play in this process. The notion of *abut* (cultural roots) was also discussed.

In the reflections of the respondents noted above, often in their narrative the Uma Lulik or Uma Lisan or Uma Adat emerged as a central feature of the cultural process of socialisation of the Timoroan.

6.4 Lisan and the Uma Lulik / Cultural Beliefs and the Sacred Houses

In the preceding section it was discussed that [42]*Adat* or *Lisan* or *Kultura* (Culture) is used to *kesi* (bind) the Timoroan. This section will now discuss in particular the origins of the roots that bind the Timoroan; the source of the Lisan or culture from which it emanates and permeates Timorese society and so greatly influences and manages the Timoroan social relations – *The Uma Lulik (Sacred House)*.

The Uma Lulik' functions as described by a respondent from Suai in a study conducted by Castro and Trinidade (2007):

[42] Adat is the Indonesian word for Culture that has been adopted into the Tetum vernacular. The Tetum world that mostly closely translates as Culture is Lisan. Nevertheless Lisan can mean culture as well as stories and history as well as traditional norms and customs.

> '*Uma Lulik's* function for the Timorese is the root (base) of life itself. […] Secondly, *Uma Lulik* strengthens and creates strong unity amongst people, village, sub-district and even at district level by binding relationships between the *Umas*'.

Uma in Tetum means House[43] and it is both a structural physical construction and a metaphysical articulation of Timoroan culture. As McWilliam (2010) noted, the Timoroan notion of the 'house' is simultaneously a social construction and a ritualised focus for the articulation of social relations and exchange among 'house' members and it possesses the double image of the house as a physical focus for the ritual enactment of social relations; and as a metaphor for the articulation of sociality is a pervasive Timorese cultural value.

To a Timoroan the *Uma/Uma-Kain* is a living entity that is often referred to as being *moris* (alive). Even though the work of authors such as Clamagirand (1975), Traube (1986), and McWilliam (2010) shed light on the importance of the Uma Lulik, to the social ordering of the Timorese society, these works tend to focus more on the particular role or centrality of the *Uma Lulik* rather than looking at the bigger picture of associations between Uma and the inter-relationship between the Uma Lulik and all the Uma connected to it, not just in its immediate vicinity but also across vast distances between the rural areas and for instance the capital Dili, in actual fact across the whole territory, and even in Diaspora communities in Portugal, Indonesia and Australia.

In the preceding section the notion of *abut* (roots) was introduced. The *abut*, in Timorese metaphorical rationalisation refers to be the interconnectedness of every Timoroan through *lisan* or culture and traditions and rituals as the life for the Timoroan, and its direct connection to the Sacred Houses or Uma Lulik.

The authors mentioned above are correct in their descriptions of the Uma Lulik as physical repositories for heirlooms, or lulik objects, and that Uma Luliks reflect key modes of social orientation and affiliation by which social relations are generated, mediated and reproduced (McWilliam, 2010).

> The learning of socio-political systems begins in the house, and it is fundamental to understanding the structure of identity and the ethno-symbolic Timorese nation. The house is a physical space from which man builds his

[43] Uma not to be confused with Uma-Kain that can be translated into English to mean Home or Household. Um-Hela is also used to refer to a house that Timoroan inhabit.

> family, social and cultural life. It therefore represents the memory of the ancestors and has important symbolic value.
>
> (Paulino, 2012, p. 92)

The Uma Luliks are central and serve a crucial role in organizing Timoroan society but they are more than mere repositories around which Timorese social life and organization revolves. The Uma Lulik are at the pinnacle but of extreme importance also are all the other Uma inhabited by members of the same clan as means for the transmission of culture, that is, a way of life or Timoroan life itself.

Nevertheless one key aspect that needs to be further considered and researched are the invisible threads, the *abut*, that unite and trace Timoroan to Timoroan, through the Uma Luliks, to the Uma-Lisan and the Uma-Kain/Uma.

One common feature of most Timoroan Uma is the centrality of the *Oratório*[44]. In the oratorio one is bound to find all types of religious artefacts but also sasan lulik (sacred things) such as *bua malus, bote, masin-lulik, lilin*, but more contemporarily the photographs of the ancestors.

An important connection must be made here between these modern time photographs and other object belonging to the ancestors such as the *hena-metan* (black cloth) and also the heirlooms inside the sacred houses given that both have similar if not the same *lulik* (animistic–sacred) significance and function, that is, to preserve the living memory and wisdom and history of the ancestors. More so than remembering the dead (Grenfell, 2012), the Timoroan live in complete communion with the ancestors, and in a sense, even though physically the ancestors are no longer present, their *klamar* (soul or spiritual essence) never ceases to be part of the clan to which they belong to and remain so as long as they are part of the collective memory of those belonging to the clan.

Photographs and other particular objects in a contemporary Timoroan Uma have almost equal *lulik* significance and relevance as the heirlooms in the original Uma Lulik. The heirlooms in the sacred houses tell the stories of the ancestors; it keeps them alive in the collective memory of their descendants. Since time immemorial the Timoroan have kept the

[44] Oratório – The oratório was introduced by Portuguese Catholicism and it constitutes a designated space (usually a corner) inside the house where prayer is conducted and in the Timor context it contains both Catholic religious statues of saints, and crosses, and rosaries as it contains sasan lulik (other sacred things) such as malus tahan (betel nut leaves), luhu (baskets). Some families will call it Oratorio, some Timoroan may not have a name or a place for it, rather just revering a space inside their house were sacred and lulik objects are placed.

ancestors in their lives and Uma through these heirlooms. Through each of the heirlooms a Lia Nain will be able to invoke the memory of the ancestor to whom the object belonged to.

There may be a practical and historical reason for the above mentioned. As the Timoroan became more mobile within Timor-Leste during the almost 500 years of Portuguese colonisation, the Timoroan started carrying with them certain heirlooms that ensured they remained connected to the original Uma Lulik. This was likely done for safekeeping because they may have feared the original sacred house would be ransacked or destroyed. This was also done as a matter of cultural self-preservation given during Portuguese times is was common for the Portuguese rulers to depose those Liu Rai (traditional kings) who opposed them and promote new Liu Rai who were loyal to the colonial intent.

Also during Indonesian times from 1975 until 1999 where the Timoroan and their cultural heritage once again came under threat due to Indonesian *trasmigrasi* (resettlement) programs of rural populations and also the destruction of many Uma Luliks in particular during the 1999 post-Referendum ballot by the military and militia groups as Indonesia's forces pulled out from the country.

Thus in the midst of such cultural adversity perhaps the Uma Lulik has had to be adapted and be culturally reconceptualised and become as mobile as the people that it represents and unites.

Luckily since 1999, local groups and communities have taken upon themselves the task of finally rebuilding their Uma Luliks which may reinstate its physical importance and centrality to community life in particular in the rural areas, although the cultural implications to future generations of Timoroan still remains to be investigated. But so far, in this snapshot offered by this research project, it seems a re-birth of traditional cultural life is in the process of remerging in contemporary Timorese society.

The extracts of the respondents interviews offered below will shed some light on the topics raised previously. The need to reinstate original culture was offered in the reflections of one of the respondents ***R4 [BD]*** from Viqueque District, in particular the need to reclaim the true identity of the Timoroan.

[BD]: I believe identity because you asked about identity as a citizen, private or family. I believe identity is important, but more important is the national one. We look now even though we just got independence, there has been much cultural assimilation, many have emerged, and is less, so how can we elevate our true identity again.

Because in Timor there isn't one culture only. Culture from the 13 districts is different, in Viqueque is not the same, in Lospalos is not the same, so Timor Identity needs a re-birth because there has been much cultural assimilation, for example Portugal came with its own culture, so which one will we choose as identity, which one is right. For me personally, I believe that it is best that we live and promote our own culture, or that is indigenous to Timor.

[EB]: Today you reflected about our own identity, what do you think has been lacking after independence?

[BD]: For my own area, in particular for my own suku, for our own Sacred House, there are many problems there. I can tell you that just recently some of our family members have started fixing our own sacred house.

Because that is where our ancestors got and took one another. But we don't know about our own Sacred House. Our generation doesn't really know it anymore. Which is our grandfather, like who was the mother of our grandfather, we don't know for sure.

My family has started now to think how to rebuild this knowledge, fix our Sacred House. Some in my family have started looking for information and research where our ancestors came from.

We believe we need to fix it again, live with it. I believe this is missing and how can we can give it a rebirth.

The Timoroan is all too aware of the impact of foreign cultures on the Timoroan culture. And this impact, since Portuguese times through Indonesian times, left a clear indentation in the minds of the Timoroan and in the indigenous cultures of Timor-Leste.

Some respondents reflected that there is need to resist a new cultural invasion. The above quoted respondent calls for going back to the indigenous cultures of Timor. One salient feature from her perspective and what her family is doing is that they are researching and sifting through culture to try and identity who their ancestors are. Another initiative is the rebuilding of their Uma Lulik which seems to have been destroyed during the Indonesian occupation.

Once an Uma Lulik is destroyed, it can cause the disappearance of not only heirlooms and sacred relics but it will cause the likely displacement of the key person, the Lian-Nain, who is the traditional oral keeper of the history, stories and culture attached to the sacred house and its contents.

Even if the contents are salvaged and taken and placed elsewhere, it is often not possible for the people networks attached to the sacred house to travel with the relics, in particular if the relics are brought to the capital Dili. As it was in this instance, the people networks remained (and in some instances perished) in a remote village, in Watukarbau, Viqueque District that is isolated and not within easy access.

If already everyday Timoroan do not possess an in-depth knowledge of their own culture, then when the above scenario takes place that general knowledge remains even more

general and the substance is possibly lost or displaced, and in some instances perhaps even both forever.

In other instances when the displacement of the Uma Lulik was done in Portuguese times along lines of loyalty and subservience to the Portuguese crown there are cases nowadays where disputes within families have emerged as to whom is the rightful claimant to the position of Liu Rai and keeper of the original Sacred House. Possibly the most insidious and serious impact occurred after the occupation of Timor-Leste by Indonesian forces in 1975.

One respondent also from Viqueque ***R17 [MV]*** reflecting on the question of where he learnt about traditional culture noted that most of his learning took place only after independence in 1999 given that in his area after 1975, the Indonesian armed forces bombed the sacred houses and burnt them to the ground. Only after independence in 2000 did his community started fixing the Sacred House and traditions started being passed down. Notwithstanding some 24 years had already past meaning much oral cultural knowledge was likely lost.

[EB]: Where did you learn about the sacred or about the rituals?

[MV]: After 1999 and since the independence. We heard stories from our mother and others that in 1975 when the Indonesian invasion started, the Indonesians threw bombs inside the Sacred Houses and fire destroyed them. Only recently and since independence from 2001 we started again. Yes, we have just started fixing.

As was discussed previously the Uma Luliks are not just a repository of heirlooms or sacred relics. The Sacred Houses have multiple purposes including being repositories of traditional sacred items belonging to the ancestors; they are also living entities inhabited by the Lulik. Another function played by the Sacred House is that it gathers in communion as one, all those people that belong to the house.

The extract below from respondent ***R12 [JM]*** illustrates the crucial role the Sacred House he belongs to plays in ensuring his children, born and raised in Dili, are brought into his, as father, collective cultural fold. When asked how he teaches his children about the *adat* he described a process that is common to most Timoroan: (1) it starts with the inan-aman sira (mother-father and others) explaining to the children that he or she belongs to more than just the immediate extended family; (2) it consists of mother-father and others in the home telling stories of origin; (3) it also consists of father (in this case) taking his children to the original

sacred house so the children know this is their sacred house too; (4) it consists of ensuring the children attend and respect lia, the traditional rituals and ceremonies; (5) it consists of father demonstrating and performing or being part of rituals; (6) it consists of answering questions about culture when the children ask questions; (7) and it consists of reassuring the children they will one day understand what it is all about, when they grow up.

[EB]: And in terms of the sacred do you teach them?

[JM]: Yes I always teach them about this: you fathers people live in that house; I usually tell them and sometimes I take them to Zumalae to show them where the sacred house is, how to participate in traditional ceremonies. They observe the family sitting together; I place the mat (biti) and chewing places. They always talk and ask dad what is this and I say this is our culture. So this when you are older you will know what this is.

The above extract is poignant in the way the respondent started his answer …*your fathers people live in that house*. He was referring to the Uma Lulik and by saying his father's people live in it can be constructed as meaning a group of living people inhabit the house; which is not the case because Uma Luliks are not inhabited spaces, at least not by the living. These spaces are inhabited by the *bealan* (ancestral) spirits who are metaphorically alive and play a defining role in the day-to-day community life. Thus already he is socialising the Uma Lulik as a space of and for the living *bealans* and this socialisation starts even before a child is cognitively able to navigate such thought processes.

There is a common misconception that just because a Timoroan is born or grows up or works and lives in Dili or even overseas that the bond or abut between the Timoroan and his or her sacred house and community is somewhat broken or diminished but as noted below this is not so. The Timoroan are bound by duty to their community of origin regardless of where they end up living.

[EB]: What is your experience in Lahane (in Dili), do you still practice over there these or not?

[FG4]: Sometimes only during the days of the souls. Then during some festivities like my colleague today said we put a plate of rice and wine or beer on the table and then we call the ancestors. We still continue to do this.

[FG4]: We are a bit different because my father brought my grandfather and them to Dili and brought his mother also to Dili but our sacred house is still in the mountains. But our sacred relics we keep them inside our house. So our house has become like a sacred house where my father and the family gathers. All types of activities we just do them here at home only when we have to take my deceased grandfathers' pillow, that's when we go. But to kill buffalo, pigs and goats we kill them there. Only at our house when male-house from the sacred house calls then we go. But to do simple rituals we just do them at home. Before my grandfather passed away he delegated the responsibility to my father to sit on the house and look after my younger

siblings living all around Dili. So the sacred house there also has sacred heirlooms, and we only use the sacred things that we have in our house.

The extract above is very instructive and poignant about the Uma Luliks. The question was asked within a Focus Group to a respondent who was born and lived his whole life in Lahane, a village in the District Capital of Dili. This respondent tells his family story and how his extended family already has been living in Dili for two generations.

His family, including his grandparents and uncles all moved to Dili some time ago, quite possibly during Indonesian times and under what circumstances it was not disclosed. The move must have been so radical that despite the sacred house being in the mountains, they carried with them some of their sacred relics.

By virtue of keeping the sacred relics in their new home, and possibly because the distance to the original sacred house was too great and possibly dangerous during Indonesian times, they imbued the new house with the same cultural authority as a sacred house, thus referring to what was described previously about each house where the Timoroan lives as an extension of the original sacred house, where minor rituals are still held.

6.5 National Symbols and National Identity

The use and promotion of national symbols is another marker of national identity. Baron (1997) and Hobsbawm (1992) note the construction of national identity depends also and appears in the use of public symbols incorporated into daily life.

In Timor-Leste the salience of national symbols has never been explored in depth or through an open public debate that sought to delve into the matter to try and determine which symbols the Timoroan see as important aspects of their national identity. For the most part these, have been decided by those in power in 2002 with little regard to the reports and results of consultation processes conducted at the time.

For the purposes of this study, anthropologist Raymond Firth's (1973) consideration of the symbol in relation to its action-setting from an instrumental point of view will be used. The author considers a symbol as a device for the enabling of abstractions with some end in view, that is, a symbol has instrumental value. Firth looks at symbols as instruments of expression, of communication, of knowledge and of control.

For the author, the instrumental nature of a symbol as a means of expression is that these can evoke powerful emotions of identification with a group and be used for group

action. Such symbols include the flag, the national anthem, and national dress. Symbols are also instruments of communication in that they store and transfer meaning, and can give a common reference point for a variety of ideas. Symbols are also instruments of knowledge. Finally symbols can also be instruments of control because they hold power and can be a powerful means of affecting someone else's behaviour (Firth, 1973).

In the case of Timor-Leste, the State decided the nation would have, according to the 2002 Constitution, Article 14, the Flag, the National Emblem and the National Anthem, as the National Symbols for Timor-Leste[45] (below). In 2007, Law No.2/2007 was approved, relating to the national symbols and the norms governing their display, use and performance (RDTL, 2007).

The National Flag

The National Emblem

The National Anthem 'Patria' (Portuguese)

Pátria, Pátria!
Timor-Leste, nossa Nação
Glória ao Povo e aos Heróis,
Da nossa libertação.
Vencemos o colonialismo,
Gritamos, abaixo o imperialismo,
Terra livre, Povo livre,
Não, não, não à exploração.
Avante unidos,
Firmes e decididos,
Na luta contra o imperialismo,
O inimigo dos Povos,
Até à vitória final,
Pelo Caminho da Revolução.
Pátria, Pátria!
Timor-Leste, nossa Nação,
Glória ao Povo e aos Heróis,
Da nossa libertação.

The National Anthem 'Patria' (English)

Motherland, Motherland!
Timor-Leste, our Nation,
Glory to the People and to the Heroes,
Of our liberation.
We defeated colonialism,
We shout: down with imperialism!
Free land, free People,
No, no, no to exploitation.
United we move,
Firm and resolved,
In the struggle against imperialism,
The enemy of the Peoples,
Until final victory,
On the path of the Revolution.
Motherland, Motherland!
Timor-Leste, our Nation,
Glory to the People and the Heroes,
Of our liberation.

Figure 16: The National Symbols of Timor-Leste.

[45] For a description of the meanings of the National Symbols of Timor-Leste visit: http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=34&lang=en

According also to Schatz and Lavine (2007) in their review of the literature on National Symbolism, it is widely recognised national symbols are a potent source of political power and influence. National symbols are also capable of rallying support for state interests because these often evoke emotional expressions of identification with and allegiance to the national as well as of self-sacrifice.

One can generalise then the intention of the State of Timor-Leste by selecting the flag, the National Emblem and the National Anthem was to rally support of the Timoroan for state interests. Socialisation plays a big role in the elevation of these symbols to national prominence and so these can evoke emotional expressions of national identification, allegiance to the national purposes and self-sacrifice if and when needed.

And the socialisation processes involved here are usually done through routine ritualistic ceremonial activities such as for example the raising of the flag at State buildings and institutions or the lowering of the flag ceremony at 5.00 p.m. every day in front of the new Defence Building in the busiest street in the capital Dili that stops traffic and pedestrians in their tracks in both directions for the duration of the ceremony; or the singing of the national anthem at the beginning of important ceremonies; or the use of the national emblem in State stationary and in uniforms, and so forth.

The socialisation process of the National Symbols is also conducted through the national curriculum where students are required to learn the meaning of the flag and the national emblem and to sing the words of the national anthem.

> National symbols promote national identification in several ways. First, by signifying the group, such symbols render the individual's identity as a national member highly salient. Second, because a symbol is a tangible representation of the group, it provides the individual with a manifest object of identification. Group symbols thus direct the identification process and accentuate reflexive awareness of group identity.
>
> (Schatz & Lavine, 2007, p. 332)

Thus this research study, aware of the instrumentality of national symbols in the construction of national identity asked the respondents their views about which symbols represent them as Timoroan at the supra or national level. The question about which are the symbols for Timor-Leste was constructed to be very neutral in that it did not offer any clues to the National Symbols identified by the State in Article 14.

Given this research project seeks to examine Timoroan national identity, it was important to ask respondents questions about which symbols the Timoroan see as important

so the answers could be contrasted to the symbols the Timorese State sees as important to the Timorese nation.

The table below registers all nationally symbolic representations mentioned by the respondents of this study.

Buat Tradisional (Traditional Things)	Buat Tradisional: Tais, Mortel, Surik, Kultura, Kaibau, Kakaulun, Keke, Manufulun, Kini-Kini, Mosa-mosa, Lensu, Hena Mutin, Ro, Belak, Karau Metan nia Dikur, Lafatik, Biti, Hadak, Hatais, Dansa Kultural, Babadok, Selenda, Sasuku
Traditional House	Uma Adat/Uma Lisan/Uma Lulik
Languages	Lian Tetum, Dialeto, Lian Ofisial
Flag	Bendera/Bandeira
Sacred Animal Crocodile	Lafaek
Other RDTL Symbols (National Anthem, Emblem)	Hinu Nasional, Impela
Traditional Produce (Coffee, Corn, Teak Wood)	Kafe, Hahan Batar, Ai-Moruk, Ai-Tahan, Ai-kulit Aikameli
Landmarks (Ramelau Mountain, Los Palos Traditional House, Maubisi and Baucau Historical Hotels	Foho Ramelau, Uma Adat Lospalos, Pouzada Maubisi no Baucau
Other (Map, Laws, National History)	Mapa, Lei, Historia Nacional

Table 2: National symbols mentioned by the respondents in order of salience.

The table above summarises the types of symbols mentioned by the respondents of this study when asked about which symbols best represented all the Timoroan. The majority of respondents highlighted *buat tradisional* (traditional things) and the Uma Lisan (traditional house) as the top answers for what represents their Timoroan national identity.

This is telling of the type of *national identification* primarily felt by the Timoroan. Thus the primary top three markers of Timoroan National symbolic Identity can be lumped as representative of culture represented by the *buat tradisional* (traditional things) but also the traditional architecture of the Uma Lisan and to include also Tetum and the other indigenous languages. This then helps to validate the preceding discussions about self-identification, culture and the sacred houses as markers of Timoroan national identity and the subsequent discussion on indigenous languages. Thus the Timoroan looks first and foremost at cultural and ethno-symbolism to self-identify and self-classify as Timoroan.

The most poignant reference to the Uma Lisan identified was an abstract or metaphorical one, and not necessarily the Uma Adat Los Palos (traditional house of Los Palos) that was used by the Indonesian regime during the time of the occupation to represent

the *Timor Timur* as the 27th Province of the Republic of Indonesia. There was a cautious and deliberate acknowledgement that each area has its own specific Uma Lisan that is distinguishable through its architectural and stylistic difference.

After Culture, the Timor-Leste flag was highlighted as a National Symbol, which in the context of national identity is not surprising, given that the flag is a key symbol of in group-categorization. The flag itself communicates 'groupness' (Schatz & Lavine, 2007), that is, the flag communicates belonging to the in-group of the Timoroan.

The next symbol expressed by the respondents of this research is the Lafaek (crocodile), which is also an allusion to cultural knowledge and the myths of creation of the island of Timor that has been popularised to characterise the Timoroan as the Children of the Crocodile.

In regards to other National Symbols despite being mentioned, out of 62 respondents only three gave some symbolic importance to the other Constitutional National Symbol, the National Anthem and only one respondent mentioned the National Emblem. And even these references to the other National State Symbols were made more as an afterthought than as a primary consideration and only after being probed further to see if they could include the national symbols in their references to symbols that truly represent the Timoroan. Further probing also resulted in respondents mentioning other symbols such as Mountain Ramelau, the Pouzadas in Maubisse and Baucau, the Map, the Laws and National History.

What the vast majority respondents identified as national symbols are then related to their own sense of indigenous or original culture, or *saida mak ita nian* (what belongs to us) and this is poignant because for the Timoroan the first visualisation of the symbols that represent them are immediately cultural rather than state-constructed. Furthermore it is perhaps quite simple to note why the national anthem does not feature highly in the symbolic representation of a Timoraon. It was written in Portuguese and the only translation available is in English. The National Anthem does not 'exist' in Tetum so for the Timoroan, at least for the majority of non-Portuguese speakers, it is not relevant. In terms of the National Emblem, the meanings contained in it are too many to be easily deciphered and these meaning even though available through the Timor-Leste website portal, have not yet been adequately socialised thus whilst relevant, most people still remain unsure of their symbolic meanings.

6.6 Religion, Lisan and National Identity

When discussing the issue of religion in Timor-Leste one can easily assume that because the Timoroan are in their vast majority Catholic and also because of the central role played by the Timorese Catholic Church in sustaining the identity struggle of the Timoroan during the 24 years of struggle against the Indonesian occupation from 1999 to 1975; that being Catholic affects Timoroan attitudes towards national identity.

The Catholic Church and the history of the Portuguese colonialism and presence in the Timor Island and Eastern Indonesia (in particular in Solor and Flores) are closely bound up. Its presence in particular through the Jesuits (and Dominican) missionaries work was felt across all aspects of life: political and military, and in particular its involvement in education, through the setup of schools, seminaries, monasteries, in the dissemination of secular knowledge, and even in introduction of new agricultural techniques (Carey, 1999).

According to Dunn (1993), the modern period of the Catholic Church's development in Timor-Leste only began after 1912 (after the pacification wars reviewed earlier in Chapter 4).

The Diocese of Dili was established as a separate diocese in September 1940. Following World War II and prior to the Indonesian invasion in 1975, it deepened its links within the local Timoroan structures and people and became the principal vehicle for the spread of the Lusophone culture in Timor-Leste. It also developed considerable influence over the local animist Timoroan populations (Carey, 1999) with more than 80 mission posts in the three parishes of Timor-Leste (Dunn, 1993).

Conversion rates from animism to Catholicism were low for most of the Portuguese presence in Timor-Leste. In 1952 in Timor-Leste, there were only 28 priests and some 60,000 Timorese Christians. This number increased substantially with the increase of Catholic priests in the territory to 44 by 1974. From 1952 conversion rates averaged around 10,000 new conversions yearly. By 1973 there were 196,570 Catholics out of a total population of 659,102 inhabitants according to Church estimates. By the early 1970s Timor-Leste had virtually become a Catholic State despite baptized Timorese Christians still being in the minority. Catholicism was the religion of the Timorese elites and of the educated (Dunn, 1993). Nevertheless the language of the liturgy remained predominately Latin and Portuguese by 1975 and according to Carey (1999) the Church continued to be a rather foreign institution for the majority of the Timorese.

It is with the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste and from1975 that the Catholic Church's role and influence takes on a new direction, reinvents and positions itself as the Timorese People's Church. With the changes of regime in Portugal after 1974, and the emergence of Timorese political parties and in the advent of the Indonesian invasion in 1975, the Portuguese colonial administration withdrew from Timor-Leste. Many of the Portuguese clergy also left which contributed to the Timorisation of the Church in Timor-Leste starting under the leadership of Timoroan Apostolic Administrator Bishop Martinho da Costa Lopes (MCgregor, Skeaff, & Bevan, 2012).

It is also within the period of 1975-1999 that the majority of conversions of the Timoroan to Catholicism take place, partly due to the active role of a Timorised Church in the struggle and its role among the population but also as a show of identity defiance against the Indonesianisation of Timor-Leste.

The Church in Timor-Leste, in particular the Timoroan priests, nuns and other clergy played key roles in the resistance in providing spiritual guidance, shelter and relief to the population and to the clandestine networks. It also disseminated information about the atrocities taking place during the Indonesian occupation. Bishop Belo, whom succeeded Bishop Lopes as the Apostolic Administrator, is known for his activism during this time but such activism resulted in two assassination attempts, one in 1989 and another in 1991 (Lundry, 2002).

In his book *The Road to Freedom* Bishop Belo speaks to the type of theology he practiced during his time as Apostolic Administrator of the Church in Timor-Leste:

> In the same was, as some of my countrymen would say, 'the people is FRETILIN and FRETILIN is the people'. I would dare say, 'the people is the Church and the Church is the people.' It was this conviction that urged me to practice a theology that is contextual, liberating, and characteristically Timorese. This theology guided my pastoral view of the Church in Timor from 1983 to 2001.
>
> Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, SDB (2001, pp. 10-12)

Under Indonesian Law, all citizens must belong to at least one of the five officially recognised religions: Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, Catholicism or Islam (Lundry, 2002), thus the Timoroan, over the 24 years of Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste and wanting to become as different as possible from the occupier, turned and converted *en masse* to Catholicism.

It is within this context of the importance and position of the Catholic Church in Timor-Leste as the Church of the People and Catholicism as a polar identity to that of the Indonesians during the struggle for liberation that assumptions are made that Timorese Catholicism is a defining marker of Timoroan national identity.

According to the 2010 Timor-Leste Census, 97% of the Timoroan are Catholic, 2 % are Protestant/Evangelical, 1 % are Muslim; and less than 1% is belong to other religious denominations including Buddhist and Hindu (GoTL, 2010).

In Leach's (2012) longitudinal quantitative research project on East Timorese tertiary students attitudes to national identity, the author noted 'being Catholic' was rated as 'very important' to being 'truly' East Timorese for his respondents. This is an interesting finding that perhaps demonstrates attitudes towards religion are not as uniform or as clear cut as might be expected.

The sample of answers by the respondents of this qualitative research study seems to indicate either the point made above that attitudes towards religion in Timor-Leste are not uniform or demonstrate a shift in attitude and that despite the Timoroan still acknowledging a firm commitment and importance to being Catholic, being Catholic *la importante* (is not important) to a Timoroan being 'truly' Timoroan.

[AS]: Now for me as Timoroan, even though in Timor the majority belongs to the Catholic religion, for me if someone says he is Timor and must be Catholic I say that is not important. He or she can have whatever religion.

[BD]: True, even though he or she is Islam or Buddha or Protestant. That is not important.

[CM]: I believe to become Catholic that is not Timor's identity because religion is not Timor's Identity but in reality 99,9 % of Timor are Catholic but it is not required that someone that comes here needs to become a Catholic to become Ema Timor, it is not about coming here with a religious identity. I believe when people come and to become truly Ema Timor Oan we are talking about the law that says in order to apply for an Electoral Card, to get married with an Ema Timor Oan man or woman, he or she can acquire a Timor identity, it is not because of religion.

[FG3]: I feel if someone is a Protestant, an Islam, Hindu, Buda, Catholic, we are all Timoroan and all the same even though of different religions but people are Timoroan all the same.

The extracts of responses quoted above represent the views of respondents of different ages. Respondent ***R3 [AS], R4 [BD], R5 [CM]*** are in their 30s while the respondents from Focus Group 3 ***[FG3]*** are in their late teens and early 20s. In fact none of the respondents asked the same question felt that not being Catholic equated to not being 'truly' Timoroan.

This attitude towards religious plurality and tolerance seems to indicate a general acceptance of the general provisions of the Constitution – ***Section 12*** (State and Religious Denominations), ***Section 16*** (Universality and Equality), ***Section 25*** (State of Exception) and ***Section 45*** (Freedom of Conscience, Religion and Worship) in particular.

The extract of the responses by respondent ***R6 [MX]*** indicated the Timoroan is fully aware of the legal protection guaranteeing religious freedom and tolerance in Timor-Leste.

[EB]: So can an Ema Timor also have other religions, do you feel religion defines or not an Ema Timor Oan?

[MX]: Religion does not define Ema Timor Oan because the law also says that in Timor people are free to choose their own religion. This is why it does not define that must belong to a religion to have the right to get citizenship.

This level of awareness is more than just mere acceptance or tolerance of religious diversity in shaping attitudes towards national identity. The vast majority of Catholic Timoroan will undoubtedly attest to how important being Catholic is to them but at the supra or National level, there is an overwhelming recognition that non-Catholic Timoroan are as much Timoroan as all other Timoroan. The responses below from Focus Group 1 ***[FG1]*** are illustrative of this reality.

[EB]: About Catholic Religion, it is important or not for a Timoroan to be Catholic?

[FG1]: It is also important but in our lives now, many people have different ideologies. Some are Protestant and their father and mother are Ema Timor. We recognise him or her as Ema Timor even though he or she does not belong to the Catholic religion. But we know the majority in Timor is Catholic.

[FG1]: But for me I always look at the law and it opens the way for people to decide this. Catholic is important but depends, everyone has rights and the constitution opens the way so that he or she can decide what religion to follow.

[FG1]: Yes if we look at times past, the Timorese did not have faith. We believed in our *adat* (traditions) but after Portuguese occupation we started following Catholicism and be baptised and developed our faith. Even without religion the Timoroan already believed in its *adat* and was still Timoroan.

The extract above is poignant as well because the respondents from ***FG1*** were able to reflect on what the Indonesians, and to a lesser extend the Portuguese, failed to realise in that at its core, Timoroan society has always been and remained fixed in their own animistic *Adat* or *Lisan* belief system with other religious denominations, including Catholicism, co-existing alongside the *lulik* belief system in a non-competitive and non-threatening manner.

In fact some of the respondents from ***FG1*** go as far as articulate that Catholicism, Religion and Faith are concepts introduced by the Portuguese and that before such a time the Timoroan already existed as Timoroan with its own belief system based on the *Adat* or *Lisan* (traditional belief system).

Likewise for the respondents of Focus Group 2 ***[FG2]*** when asked about the value of *Adat* as identity marker for the Timoroan vis-à-vis religion.

[EB]: Like Adat, in terms of religious value in relation to Timoroan Identity, is it important or not?

[FG2]: It is important, what we call religion we only received it now because our grandparents and before them they believed not in religion, no, they believed in the trees and rocks. Only recently after the Portuguese came in and brought religion and entered Timor-Leste, they explained the practice of religion. Only after that we started being baptised and follow religious rules. But before, our grandparents (ancestors) before religion came in they believed in rocks and trees and that is why they held on to this belief until now. I am not saying we should have more faith in *Adat* than on religion, no. These two walk together because now our culture and religion are in the constitution so we keep valorising.

In Section 7.3 it was noted that according to the findings of Leach (2012) quantitative research project, 93.5 per cent of his respondents believe culture and tradition or Adat/Lisan are very important to being truly Timoroan.

What then the extract above from responses given by ***FG2*** and below from ***FG3*** points out is the open acknowledgement of the narrative of Adat/Lisan on par with religious naratives that may represent a re-emergence or at least more open recognition in contemporary times of traditional culture as synonymous of primordial and perennial religious belief. Nevertheless this narrative is done with a high degree of ambivalence in that most Timoroan will still struggle to openly articulate how they view and feel about belief in the Adat vis-à-vis Religious faith.

[EB]: Is this possible as Catholics? What do you think about this? For you is there an impact or not? Can we have faith as Catholics and belief in the Adat in Timor. How can these two walk together or do you believe there is a difference between the two?

[FG3]: I feel to leave one behind is a dilemma. Like we cannot leave Catholic religion behind because that is our faith, then Adat also this is what we live with so to we cannot also just leave it. So I feel these two must walk together, but one cannot be above the other.

This respondent from Focus Group 3 ***[FG3]*** expressed a high degree of ambivalence, not to be taken for confusion, in regards to the Adat-Catholic religion dyadic. If on the one

hand like the other 97% of Timoroan he is an ardent Catholic, by the same token he is equally as animist. The fact he was able to articulate that both Adat and Catholicism are on equal terms in his conceptualisations of religion is poignant and paves the way for future research in this area.

6.7 Languages and National Identity

Section 13
(Official languages and national languages)

1. Tetum and Portuguese shall be the official languages in the Democratic Republic of East Timor.
2. Tetum and the other national languages shall be valued and developed by the State.

RDTL Constitution (2002)

Despite most Timoroan being at least bi-lingual sharing a multilingual ecology, in Timor-Leste discussing languages in the context of language policy in what concerns national identity issues is a contentious and sensitive affair.

The Timor Island is multilingual with the majority of the languages spoken in the island found in the eastern part of the island, in what constitutes the contemporary nation-state of Timor-Leste. According to the Population and Housing Census of Timor-Leste, 2010, there are 32 local languages (to include dialects) spoken across Timor-Leste compared to only three in Indonesian West Timor (see *Figure 11: Ethno linguistic Map*).

The fact Timor-Leste is multilingual and all the language groups have been thus far able to coexist is not that surprising. In fact and historically the coexistence of peoples of different languages and cultures is normal. It is less common for countries inhabited exclusively by people of a single uniform language and culture (Hobsbawm E. J., 1995).

The point of contention with the language debate in Timor-Leste does not relate to the diversity of local languages, in fact all the respondents of this qualitative research project claimed having some knowledge of a local language as being important, but not preclusive, to the self-identification and collective-acceptance of having Timoroan national identity.

The point of contention in Timor-Leste in what regards languages arises when dealing with the issue of the precedence that non-Indigenous languages (Portuguese, English and Indonesian) have over the lingua-franca, Tetum, and over the other indigenous local

languages. And issues of language are very sensitive given their connection to personal and national/ethnic identity (Majhanovich, 2009).

Language narratives in Timor-Leste are sensitive and complex in great part due to language planning. For Hajek (2000), language planning in the historical context of Timor-Leste have been seen as playing an important role in a broader strategy of social and political transformation of the Timoroan society and can be divided into three major phases: phase 1 during the Portuguese Era (1500s-1975); phase 2 Indonesianisation as Paramount (1975-1999); and phase 3 the Post-Referendum East Timor (30 August 1999 onwards).

During Phase 1, conscious language planning on the part of the Portuguese, even though for the most part of the 500 years of Portuguese colonial presence this was not evidenced, did not take place until 1950s through more concerted efforts on the part of the colonial administrator to through education both secular and religious to 'civilise' the Timoroan under the *Portugal Una* (One Portugal) so the Timoroan became real Portuguese citizens with full civil rights. Nevertheless even as late as the 1970s the Portuguese relied on a limited number of Timoroan educated and fluent in Portuguese to deal with local administrative and military affairs and mediate between the 0.2 percent of the Portuguese temporary residents in Timor-Leste out of a population of some 600,000 Timoroan (Hajek, 2000).

For authors such as Kerry Taylor-Leech (2008) there is currently a *language situation* in Timor-Leste that is the legacy of two particular periods in which Portuguese and Indonesian languages were the instruments of Portugal's colonialism and Indonesia's occupation. The author goes on to point out that despite being different the language policies of the Portuguese and the Indonesian were similar as part of a strategy(-ies) of social and cultural assimilation.

It is well documented both the colonial and occupation regimes forced the use of Portuguese and Indonesian languages through their formal education systems whereby both languages during each regime's occupation of the country were taught by total immersion in a system of teaching methods that promoted the learning of the occupying languages to the exclusion of Tetum and other local languages. As part of this formal education system, Tetum and the other local languages were kept as oral languages and out of the classrooms, administration and media settings. This was true both throughout Portuguese colonialism until 1975 and during the Indonesian occupation until 1999.

It was not until the Indonesian regime banned the use of the Portuguese language in Timor-Leste in the 1980s, in the hopes this would elevate Indonesian's position in relation to

all other languages that Tetum gained formal momentum and transitioned from the realm of the indigenous oral language tradition to being used more actively in written form. It is also around this time that Portuguese assumed an even greater symbolic role as an important marker for the Timoroan of cultural difference and defiance to the Indonesian regime.

It was the group of 'civilised' Timoroan alluded to previously, Portuguese speaking and influential that played a defining role in leading the struggle against Indonesian occupation. For Hajek (2000) this represents Phase 2; those same educated Timoroan made Portuguese the language of the resistance and were able with the Church of Timor-Leste to elevate Tetum as an important symbol of Timorese national identity.

These same leaders upon assuming legitimate power after the 1999-referendum and subsequent independence in 2002, with the establishment of the first Constitutional Government of Timor-Leste, enshrined both languages, Tetum and Portuguese, as the co-official languages. English and Bahasa Indonesia became working languages and finally they gave official recognition to the local languages. This represents Phase 3 of the historical language planning context of Timor-Leste (Hajek, 2000).

As was also noted by Taylor-Leech (2008) in her study on *Language and Identity in East Timor*, all of the respondents of this research study have a highly developed awareness about the language issues discussed during the interviews and displayed strong views and assertiveness about where they stand on languages issues dominating the different narratives of the *language situation* in Timor-Leste.

Even though a clear picture, that is a statistical picture, of the language situation in Timor-Leste is not easily accessible, an indication of where Timor-Leste is today in terms of its language ecology is illustrated by the 2010 Population and Housing Census.

The information of the 2010 Census is difficult to read and correlate to the topic of the language ecology in the country but out of a total population 1,066,409; by citizenship 1,055,426 are Timorese (Timoroan) and 10,983 are Foreigners (Mala'e). Of this population, 316,086 are Urban and 750,323 Rural. Of these, 41.4% are Children (0–14 years); 53.9% are economically productive population (15 – 64 years); and 4.7 per cent are elderly population (65+ years).

According to the table below, extracted from the 2010 Census, Volume 3 (Tables 8.1 and 8.2) a picture starts to form in relation to the language ability (Speak, Read and Write) of literacy of the Timoroan 5 years and over with the official languages and with the working languages.

Sexes	Total	Urban	Rural	Sexes	Total	Urban	Rural
Speak, Read and Write in **Tetum**				Do Not Speak, Read and Write in **Tetum**			
Both Sexes	481,576	206,214	275,362	**Both Sexes**	114,999	9,828	105,171
Male	259,016	110,335	148,681	**Male**	51,708	4,767	46,941
Female	222,560	95,879	126,681	**Female**	63,291	5,061	58,230
Speak, Read and Write in **Portuguese**				Do not Speak, Read and Write in **Portuguese**			
Both Sexes	212,753	99,928	112,825	**Both Sexes**	446,105	79,146	366,959
Male	118,523	54,801	63,722	**Male**	211,555	38,674	172,881
Female	94,230	45,127	49,103	**Female**	234,550	40,472	194,078
Speak, Read and Write in **Indonesian**				Do not Speak, Read and Write in **Indonesian**			
Both Sexes	324,732	170,632	154,100	**Both Sexes**	401,937	54,519	347,418
Male	178,059	92,320	85,739	**Male**	188,491	25,966	162,525
Female	146,673	78,312	68,361	**Female**	213,446	28,553	184,893
Speak, Read and Write in **English**				Do not Speak, Read and Write in **English**			
Both Sexes	103,678	66,017	37,661	**Both Sexes**	618,202	121,093	497,109
Male	59,373	37,675	21,698	**Male**	303,837	60,265	243,572
Female	44,305	28,342	15,963	**Female**	314,365	60,828	253,537

Table 3: Language ability (Speak, Read and Write) of literacy of Timoroan 5 years and over, Census 2010, Timor-Leste.

Thus in terms of language literacy of the Timoroan, Tetum is the language that is spoken, read and written the most, followed by Indonesia, then Portuguese and lastly English.

Another salient finding of the Census 2010, concerns the Adult literacy rate (see table below) or the percentage of Timoroan 15 years and over who are literate in the official languages and in the working languages. According to the table, 56.1 % of the Timoroan are literate in Tetum; 25.2 % are literate in Portuguese; 45.3 % are literate in Bahasa Indonesia; and 14.6 % are literate in English.

17. Adult literacy rate: The percentage of persons 15 and over who are literate (can speak, read and write) in Tetun, Portuguese, Bahasa Indonesia and English Language

Sexes	Total	URBAN	RURAL
Speak, read, and write in Tetun			
Both Sexes	56.1	80.9	44.6
Male	61.3	83.4	50.3
Female	50.9	78.0	39.1
Speak, read, and write in Portuguese			
Both Sexes	25.2	40.1	18.3
Male	29.0	42.8	22.1
Female	21.4	37.0	14.6
Speak, read, and write in Bahasa Indonesia			
Both Sexes	45.3	74.1	31.8
Male	50.0	77.2	36.5
Female	40.5	70.6	27.3
Speak, read, and write in English			
Both Sexes	14.6	24.7	7.6
Male	17.0	32.8	9.1
Female	12.3	26.2	6.2

Table 4: Timoroan Adult Literacy Rate (15 years and over), Census 2010, Timor-Leste.

As an example of the language ecology and diversity in Timor-Leste one can take as a sample the capital Dili with a total Population of 141,783 in private households, 6 years and older, whom according to mother tongue, that is, defined in the glossary of the census as the language usually spoken in the individual's home in his or her early childhood; the Timoroan living in the capital Dili speak 30 out of 32 indigenous languages listed.

What this section on Languages aims to do is present a realistic viewpoint of the respondents of this study about the process of development of a language policy for Timor-Leste. In so far as appropriate to do so, another aim of this section on languages is to both allow the Timoroan to present their own personal opinions about languages in the country and also to be able to contest and talk back to the *language situation* imposed on them by the Timorese State.

The findings and analysis in the following sections will expand on the work on languages already conducted in Timor-Leste by Hajek (2000), Taylor-Leech (2008), and Leach (2012). Importantly also the findings of this research project help to put in context the findings by these authors in what concerns Timoroan national identity.

6.7.1 Local Languages

The analysis of languages in this thesis will begin by reflecting on the perceptions and considerations of the respondents of this study towards the status of local languages in relation to the Timoroan national identity narratives being discussed.

Local languages are still predominantly in the oral tradition domain in Timor-Leste. Despite some attempts and initiatives to publish literature in the local languages of Timor-Leste this does not seem to be part of a concerted National Language Policy by the Government of Timor-Leste; at least not yet. Rather it is the initiative of interested individuals and academic institutions, even though the Constitution of Timor-Leste, in Article 13, Section 2, clearly makes it the intention of the State to value and develop other national or maternal languages.

Nevertheless just because local languages do not seem to be a high priority of the language policy agenda of the State of Timor-Leste this does not translate to apathy on the part of the Timoroan in what regards the types of discourses and narratives surrounding the *language situation* in the country.

As noted above, even in the capital Dili with some 141,783 residents, according to the 2010 Census (GoTL, 2010) 30 out of 32 local indigenous languages are still spoken by

Timoroan 6 years and older. With the largest number of speakers speaking Tetum Prasa (80,237), Mambai (6,670), Makasae (4,162), Resuk (1963), Raklngu (1,768), Rahesuk (1,585), Tetum-Terik (1,036), Kemak (934), Fataluku (849), Bunak (839), followed by the other indigenous languages, with the lowest number of speakers speaking Adabe (9), and with no speakers in Dili of only 2 indigenous languages, Idalaka and Kawaimina.

The term *local languages* is used here deliberately rather using the term *national languages* as prescribed in the Constitution of Timor-Leste because local language or *lia lokal* was the term used by most of the respondents of this study to refer to the language they are likely to speak at home other than the official languages (Tetum and Portuguese) and the working languages (English and Indonesian).

Local language or *lia lokal* is also used to describe the indigenous languages of Timor-Leste. This differentiation is important because some small pockets of Timoroan also speak other foreign languages such as Hakka or Mandarin or Arabic reflecting the history of trade, colonialism, transmigration, and international development in the country. Of the community groups that established in Timor, the most dominant during the colonial times were the Chinese community followed by the Arab community (Hajek, 2000) (Hill, 2002).

In the previous section on National Symbols a short extract of one of the respondents answer illustrates the place of languages (national and local), in the psyche and cosmos of the Timoroan. When the respondents were asked what they believe are the national symbols that represent all the Timoroan, a standard answer by respondents included Tetum and also the other local languages of Timor as being nationally symbolic.

> [AN]: The Timor symbols are the Sacred House, the flag, the Tetum Language and the other dialects.

The above extract is important for two key reasons. First it is plain that to the Timoroan the national language Tetum and the local languages and dialects have a high symbolic status associated with self-identification as Timoroan (national identity). Second, it highlights the importance of Tetum as a National Language in relation to the local languages. Tetum as a national language and as a symbol of Timoroan national identity takes an obvious precedence over the local languages.

This notion was also highlighted by most of the respondents of this study. The extracts below demonstrate a sample of the types of answer given by the respondents about

the high importance given to local languages in relation to the self-identification as Timoroan.

Thus knowing a local language is not preclusive to being and having a Timoroan national identity. The real linguistic marker of the Timoroan national identity is in actual fact the Tetum language. This is an important notion because since 1999, the impetus has been on promoting the usage of Portuguese (the other official language of Timor-Leste) while Tetum language development has been left stagnant for the most part; this despite a National Linguistics Institute (INL) being established for this purpose. The one key achievement of INL since its inception seems to have been the standardisation of the Tetum language orthography following the Banati System, developed by INL approved by government Decree Law in April 2004. Despite this, the implementation of the standardisation of the Tetum according to the Banati System has not been successful and Tetum as a written language is still largely written phonetically.

The above illustration serves to demonstrate how despite the importance of Tetum as a language that unites all Timoroan, the State still has not taken this as an opportunity to strengthen it, rather opting for investing resources into the institutionalising of the colonial language, now co-official language Portuguese.

This language policy has now become polemic and remains a sensitive issue that is often politicised across many segments of the society, in particular for the youth educated still under the Indonesian regime or the young university educated professionals who would much rather have Tetum as the dominant formal language out of the two official languages.

[EB]: And how about other languages?

[AS]: I think the most important is Tetum because Tetum allows us all to communicate. It is not as if we must know more specially Makasae.

[BD]: I feel it is important because we cannot limit people's languages. Because I come from this so he or she must continue using his or her own language despite studying at University, or wanting to learn English. But his or her culture, his local language from his or her place cannot forget.

[CM]: I think all our/these languages are important because this is our language-wealth, we can say we have many languages. This is our wealth, because in some countries they only speak one language.

[JB]: Yes this is important because these are our languages. Ours but not only Tetum, but like living languages like Makasae, like Waimoae, like Manbae, like Bunak, like Kemak, like Fataluku. Languages are very important because they show our identity, we are Timor.

[TC]: I feel these languages like Waimua, Fataluku Makasae, I feel these are side languages; like in order to enter a suku for example my suku is Makasae to enter it and speak to the elders and if they don't speak Tetum we can use it, but I think it is best if we use Tetum language.

[FG1]: Yes from my part, when speaking about Tetum and also speaking our languages, these are all important because all these languages demonstrate identity. If we talk about the Tetum Language it is like a citizen we promote out national identity; but if we speak about dialects we promote our own culture.

Several themes for discussion emerge from the sample of answers and other answers provided by the respondents of this research project.

The notion of local language as part of that which is true or indigenous to the Timoroan and representative of Timoroan identity came across often in the reflections by the respondents. The Timoroan are confident in their knowledge of what is originally theirs and know how to not only point this out but discern it from what they believe is not indigenous and thus not of the Timoroan. The knowledge of indigenous languages, as part of traditional culture, also has a binding effect on the Timoroan so much so that *he or she must continue using his or her own language.*

Nevertheless this self-acquiescence of self-local language does not seem to be detrimental to the existence of Tetum as a National Language or even to the many other living local languages in Timor-Leste. Rather surprising is the notion that local languages seem to take on a supportive role to the National language Tetum. This in turn can be seen as reflective of the nature of Tetum in allowing all Timoroan to be able to communicate with one another whilst at the same not threatening the existence of local languages. The Tetum language does not sacrifice the local languages, it in fact allows these to flourish and continue on as living languages.

In what regards local languages, many Timoroan, especially those who grew up in the rural areas in the country claim to be fluent in more than at least one local language.

It was also poignant one respondent reflecting on the notion that the local languages are *living* languages and almost imbuing language with a personality that they see as reflective of the true character of Timoroan local identity, that is once again, not an individual identity, even at the local level, but a collective identity.

This local language versatility was noted by Linguistics and Timor languages expert John Hajek (2000) in that for instance it is frequent, villagers to speak the language(s) of neighbouring villages. Expanding on this, not just of neighbouring villages but rather this language versatility can also be reflective of the composition of the extended family. It is common for a Timoroan from ethnically mixed families to speak the language of both parents, for instance one of the respondents ***R27 [SC]*** from Bobonaro District (Western

District), speaks Bunak from his mother's side, as well as Makasa'e from his father's side who is from Baucau District (Eastern District).

This natural ability to be multilingual and linguistic versatility and ease also translates into an appreciation of the fact the Timoroan is multilingual and that multilingualism is part of the natural wealth of the Nation (language-wealth/rikusoin–lingua) and how this also makes the Timoroan different from others in particular the Portuguese that only have one Official Language and do not have other local languages. In this regard the Timoroan is appreciative and has high regard of the fact he or she has valid language richness.

For instance in one of the focus groups the respondents were asked if they spoke any other local languages and the respondents were quick to identity those local languages they spoke.

[EB]: Do you all speak your maternal language?

[FG2]: We speak Brother; Fataluku, Naueti, Bunak, Galolen, Waimua, Makasae.

Thus for Focus Group Two ***[FG2]*** above, in particular because the question was asked, the respondents were able to attest to speaking to variable degrees of fluency in at least five languages. This group was composed of university students who still watch Indonesian television, speak the language socially, had done some primary education schooling in Bahasa Indonesia, and then transitioned to undertaking the remainder of their high school education and university studies in Portuguese, who now study English at the National University. These six Timoroan can claim they speak Indonesian, Portuguese and English, and also Tetum, plus additionally at least one local language at home and with their friends.

Reflecting on the issue of local languages the respondents of Focus Group Five ***[FG5]*** (extract below) were able to note that by speaking their local language(s) they were preserving their local identity. As mentioned, the duty to uphold, practice and promote Timoroan culture is paramount to *feelings* of and *being* Timoroan and having a Timoroan national identity. This duty to culture is not only to national culture but also local culture and local identity.

[EB]: OK we will speak about the Timor Oan context about language in Timor. Is it important or not for a Timoroan to know his or her maternal language, like Bunak or Kemak or Mambae or Makasae, is this important as a Timoroan? Is it important to know maternal language, or the local language? Or it is not important? Knowing Tetum is good enough. As Timoroan is this important or not?

[FG5]: This is important. This is like our, a local identity, we also come from a local identity, he or she needs to know. Sometimes for example I come to Dili and I only speak Tetum; I return there I don't speak Mambae, people will give me grief. Sometimes we ourselves have ideas that are not good that do not give valour to these types of our identity. Sometimes in the middle of many people if we speak like this, we will feel ashamed. They will speak in general only 'yes we know you are Dili oan (son or daughter of), you grew up here but you went there and we don't know what happened' this shames us even though we may have high qualifications but we are ashamed.

Just as in section 6.2 it is imperative for a Timoroan to self-identity as Timoroan and feel Timoroan to be recognised as such, in the line of cultural reasoning, it is also imperative for a Timoroan who can speak but more importantly grew up speaking and is known to speak a local language to never forget or deny this linguistic ability. Whilst the Timoroan will understand and socially accept a Timoroan who has obviously never had any contact with a local language and cannot speak it for any one of a myriad of reasons. The Timoroan may have been born in the capital Dili and only speaks Tetum at home or the Timoroan may have been born or grown up in Diaspora and does not speak his or her local language. The same attitude cannot be said about someone who willingly forgets or denies speaking a local language. This is particularly so when that language ability is in the immediate public social and family domain of that person. Many of the respondents of this study, including the one whose extract is above, claim to have heard stories or knowing someone who has moved to the capital Dili to study and even gone overseas recently after independence and who upon returning to his or her original place of departure claims not knowing how to speak local language or chooses only to speak in the official language Tetum. This according to the respondents of this study will elicit an openly negative response from the collective. The collective will quite openly denounce and shame these kinds of cultural affront and behaviour. As noted by the respondent above the denouncement will likely be made publicly and purposefully to shame the *cultural perpetrator*, regardless of social standing or qualifications.

According to Tantam (1990) shame limits the actions an individual is likely to choose and can lead to loss of identity dignity which then can jeopardized his or her place in society. Overt and intentional, yet non-aggressive, shaming, such as the type described above and also noted by other respondents of this research project is a cultural practice that has a limiting outcome in type of actions a Timoroan is likely to continue displaying, in this particular case, in the self-refusal to speak local language after a period of absence from the nucleus of the in-group he or she belongs to, in the instance above, after attaining a degree in the Capital Dili.

The extract above is illustrative because shaming actions are taken by the collective publicly and overtly that makes the *cultural culprit* feel guilt and shame.

For the author of the Reintegrative Shaming Theory, John Braithwaite (1997) guilt is only made possible by cultural processes of shaming. For him also 'Shaming means all social processes of expressing disapproval which have the intention or effect of invoking remorse in the person being shamed and/or condemnation by others who become aware of the shaming. Shaming sets out to moralize.'

Nevertheless for the author, shaming sets out to moralize but also has a reintegrative ability in that reintegrative shaming is followed by efforts to reintegrate the culprit back into the community or the collective. According to Braithwaite (1997) and referring to the example illustrated previously, shaming labels the Timoroan's act as evil whilst striving to preserve his or her identity as essentially good and still part of the collective cultural fold or in-group.

Thus in this context the shaming is done to encourage the Timoroan to return back to what is his or hers, in that this process of cultural moralization is designed to ensure the Timoroan never forget where he or she comes from in the context of the National and his or her position in the geographical cosmos of Timoroan society.

This process of shaming may serve to partially explain why Fataluku speakers, located in the eastern tip of island are often describe as not being able of mastering the official language Tetum in their region.

[EB] Why do you over there[46] don't really speak Tetum?

[FG6]: Because there are many sensitivities and negatives. Example over there inside a family if they are educated to speak Tetum ok this is possible, but over there the majority over there does not educate their children to speak and study in Tetum. Theirs [education] comes from speaking Fataluku. When some friends want to speak Tetum to one another they say they are showing off, so they are considered not as friends and from a different district. Then we can say this is sensitive to each other.

As the respondent above notes in his reflections after being asked why in Los Palos the Timoroan do not speak in Tetum, and even though he did not identify the reason why Tetum is not spoken, he was able to shed light on why perhaps they also seem to resist in

[46] *Over there* in this context means in the District of Lauten in the areas where Fataluku Language is spoken predominantly and where it is claimed there are fewer Tetum Language speakers. The other regional area where this is said to occur as well is in the District-Enclave of Oe-cusse in particular in the more remote rural areas.

taking up Tetum as a day-to-day spoken language in the area. It seems in Los Palos then shaming is used as a social process of expressing disapproval in regards to Tetum usage in the area. Even if the person speaks Tetum, an even greater offence locally is the non-use of Fataluku as the language of communication between people from the same ethnic fold. And failure to do so, as also pointed out by Tantam (1990) can jeopardize his or her place in society; *you are Dili oan* (son or daughter of Dili) or *showing off* therefore no longer a friend and no longer from the same district. On the other hand, acceptance of this culturally moralising process reintegrates the person.

The above discussion is important to place local languages in the linguistic ecology of Timoroan society. Contemporary debates about the *language situation* in Timor-Leste tend to be more focused around the two Official Languages (Tetum and Portuguese) and the Working Languages (English and Indonesian) whilst the local languages and its richness and diversity have been de-prioritized within the languages narrative, at least, within the senior leadership of the country.

The sections that follow will analyse the responses of the respondents of this research study in relation to the official and working languages as prescribed in Section 13 of the Constitution of Timor-Leste.

6.7.2 Tetum

This section on Tetum language will evaluate the responses elicited from the respondents of this research study in terms of where they position the language in relation to their self-identification as Timoroan. It will also analyse where respondents locate Tetum in the total spectrum or ecology of languages spoken in Timor-Leste, both indigenous and introduced during the close to 500 years of Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation.

This section will reflect the views of the respondents much more so than attempt to be a critically reflective and in-depth discussion of Tetum as a language and in relation to the language policy in the country. Nevertheless this section necessitates some brief words on the type of Tetum that is discussed here. A distinction needs to be made between Tetum-Terik and Tetum-Praça[47].

According to Fox (2003), there are several distinct forms of Tetum nonetheless for the sake of the purposes of this section, the Timoroan has grown up knowing how to make the

[47] Tetum: Also spelt Tetun and also referred to as Tetum-Praça, Tetum Prasa, or Tetum Dili.

linguistic distinction between what is termed Tetum Terik (or classic Tetum) and Tetum (or Tetum Prasa).

Tetum Terik is seen as the original, thus classic form of the Tetum language as part of the language ecology of Indigenous languages in Timor-Leste and is considered a local language or a language spoken in the *foho* (mountains or rural areas). Tetum Terik (albeit with different variants) is traditionally spoken in three key districts in Timor-Leste, Covalima (West), Manatuto (Centre) and Viqueque (East); as well as in areas across the border into West Timor.

A simplified version of Tetum-Terik that came to be known as Tetum Prasa and is referred to contemporarily simply as Tetum, was introduced during the Portuguese colonial times by the Catholic Church and also by the Colonial administration after it relocated its capital from Lifau in the enclave district of Oe-cusse to Dili, in 1769. According to Hajek (2000) the Portuguese helped to expand the scope and domains of Tetum use and did not discourage its use as a *lingua franca*.

Given the origins of Tetum as the lingua franca of Timor-Leste are still obscure, there may has been a very obvious and logical use for the diluted version of Tetum-Terik as the *lingua franca.* As mentioned above, Tetum-Terik crosses and covers vast geographical areas of the Island of Timor from parts in West Timor into Timor-Leste, in the western district of Covalima, in the central District of Manatuto, through to the Eastern District of Viqueque. Even though Mambai is the most spoken local language (Fox, 2003), territorially it only occupies the districts of central Timor-Leste. Tetum-Terik speakers may have been found all over the island as part of extended families of Timoroan, so in this regard it made sense to use a simplified version of Tetum-Terik that would be easily assimilated by this ethno-linguistic group and promote it as the language of communication among the different ethno linguistic groups in Timor-Leste, and that could be easily learnt too by the Portuguese missionaries as part of the informal administration of the colony.

Thus Tetum as a lingua franca was allowed by the Portuguese until the end of its presence in the island in 1975. As such it was able to flourish but was kept mainly as an oral language as part of the indigenous language ecology of Timor-Leste.

The Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste from 1975-1999 marks a period of intensification for the Timoroan in the assertion of its identity(-ies) against a much more perverse and pervasive imposed one, that of the Indonesian national identity, that for Goebel (2010):

> ...part of the process of building the nation we now know as Indonesia was the development, standardisation, and prescription of Indonesian as the language of education, government, service encounters above the market level, the media, and just as importantly as the language of communication among the 400 or so ethnic groups of Indonesia who did not share the same first language.

Thus in Timor-Leste, Indonesian language planning and policy, came to the fore as part of the rapid Indonesianisation – cultural, political and linguistic – a paramount of the Indonesian's government national project for Timor-Leste as its 27th Province; and as noted by Hajek (2000, p. 405):

> There was no interest in maintaining the local linguistic ecology as the Indonesian authorities found it in 1975. Instead, some languages (Portuguese and Chinese) were to be removed from their niches in the ecology, the rest were to be ignored, and a new language (Indonesian) was to be introduced as quickly and as thoroughly as possible.

So much so that by 1980-1981 Portuguese was replaced as the language of instruction, administration, the media and the Catholic Church to precipitate the adoption of Bahasa Indonesia as the *lingua franca* of Timor-Leste in the context of Indonesian *Penbangunan Nasional* (National Development).

On the one hand this approach was tremendously successful in that it brought Timor-Leste as the 27th province of Indonesia in-line with all the other provinces that spoken Bahasa Indonesia as the *lingua franca.* By the 1990s more than 60 percent (Hajek, 2000) of Timoroan were literate in Bahasa Indonesia.

Nevertheless the Indonesian language policy was fundamentally flawed as much as the Portuguese colonial language policy had been before it. It underestimated the strength of the local languages in maintaining local identity intact and also it undervalued the important role of Tetum as the language of communication and promotion of national identity for the Timoroan by the time of the Indonesian invasion in 1975. Indonesia's treatment of Tetum as merely a local language caused it to fail to realize the Timoroan started to use Tetum to maintain their national identity in direct contravention to the Indonesian national identity.

It is in this context that the success in the elevation of Tetum to a full liturgical language from 1981 and in other domains, including as the lingua franca of the resistance during the 24 years of Indonesian occupation needs to be taken into account. It was not simply the Church but the Timoroan-collective who foremost elevated Tetum as a symbol of

national identity, the same way the Timoroan elevated Portuguese as the language of the resistance more as a matter of strategic diplomacy than identity or nostalgic acculturation.

In what concerns languages (official, working and local) the Timoroan, in particular those researched here, are very pragmatic about their *language situation*.

As seen in the previous section on local languages, the Timoroan is very aware of the language diversity and ecology within which he or she co-exists. In this sense it makes sense to the Timoroan to be quick to note, when asked about the relevance and importance of Tetum language to the Timoroan, its key role as an instrument of unification for all Timoroan. As the extracts below illustrate, Tetum is seen by the Timoroan as a unifying factor in the context of Timorese nationalism and ethnic diversity. In his and her rationalisation about the unifying ability of the Tetum language, the Timoroan is also aware of the way in which the Timoroan are divided if they were only to speak their own local language. This is an important consideration because it demonstrates the Timoroan is very conscious of his or her place in the National context of Timor-Leste.

Likewise, just as aware as the Timoroan is about the placing order of languages in Timor-Leste so is the Timoroan aware of those languages that are indigenous to the country and those that are not, in particular when referring to Portuguese the co-official language of the Timorese State.

The extract below whereby the respondent makes a rather political statement that is reflective of the way in which Portuguese and Tetum languages are thought of in Timor-Leste, is quite poignant because in making such a statement the respondent, and most *jerasaun foun* (new generation) of young Timoroan, wipes away close to 500 years of Portuguese colonial history in the country. His statement also reveals the fact the Timoroan is for the most part ignorant he or she actually speaks more Portuguese than he or she is likely to appreciate. That the majority of Timoroan quite possibly is unaware that approximately 40 per cent of the Tetum-Praça is Portuguese (Berlie, 2008), is poignant and unfortunately this was not a question of this research study.

Only a handful of respondents actually pointed out Portuguese is used to strengthen Tetum as a language in need of development, but no one actually pointed out the percentage is a significant 40 percent. Although the fact Tetum also borrows from other language namely Indonesian and English may also justify this point.

[AN]: I can consider Tetum is a way to unify everyone to enter national life and nationalism. If we speak about the language context then we have to make language selection because Timor has many dialects. About

dialects someone comes from Makasae, Tokodede, so we start splitting ourselves. Then we come up with ideas that are not the same and against nationalism, I think this can be done through language as well. Tetum can make the Timoroan united, gather the Timoroan together so they become only one.

[NC]: Because I think before Portugal coming in we already spoke Tetum and the other languages. Portugal entered and it [Portuguese language] too, so the language that can represent Timor is Tetum.

For the Timoroan, Tetum not only unifies in the abstract or imaginary sense of nationalistic attitude but it also has a very practical utility to it, in that, it assists the Timoroan, in his or her regional mobility to be able to communicate across different cultures and break local or regional isolation.

In such a confined geographical dimensionality where some 32 different languages are spoken, the Timoroan historically would not have to travel very far to test his or her linguistic ability, and even though he or she may have been able to speak one or two other local languages of neighbouring villages, one can easily assume the introduction of Tetum as the *Língua Franca* of Timor-Leste by the Portuguese may have not been resisted against because it will have enabled the Timoroan to mobilize greater distances and even expand family networks and relationships.

[FG3]: This is very important because language is like sound that we use to communicate with other people. If you come from Baucau, and you come to Dili and you don't know Tetum then all the same, this is like you live alone. This way someone get close to you and speak with you to do something. I feel it is important.

Thus given these realities one would assume it is rather problematic for the Timoroan who are said or claimed as not speaking Tetum. In recent years, or in the years of development intervention since 1999, it has become part of the development narrative the *situation* of those Timoroan who reportedly do not speak Tetum, namely in some parts of the eastern-most District of Lauten, and in the more remote areas of the enclave District of Oe-cusse. Even though it is quite possible that some Timoroan who have not left their own immediate area and do not have the need to speak Tetum may in fact not speak it, it is also very unlikely that these Timoroan will not have someone in the extended family who does not speak Tetum to act as language interpreter should the need arise.

This is where the point about western rationalisation is most salient. The Timoroan are collective in their behaviour and in the way they experience and express life, thus only when a person who may not have a need to speak Tetum is spoken to as an individual will this language inability become a salient issue. If speaking to a Timoroan in his or her

collective context, one can safely assume language would no longer be a barrier. And perhaps this is more likely to be the reality introduced into the narrative around non-Tetum speakers rather than an inability to speak Tetum per say, even though in an individual dimension this is correct, but in the collective sense of Timoroan worldview Tetum is spoken by everyone.

Therefore if one analyses the Census 2010 for Timor-Leste (Table 2.3) the District of Lauten has a total population of 44,359 inhabitants 6 years and older. Out of these inhabitants 27,721 speak Fataluku, 10,057 speak Makassae, 5,559 speak Makalero, 406 speak Tetum Prasa, and only 279 speak Tetum as their mother tongue (language spoken at home).

These figures are revealing because in the District of Lauten there is already a substantial language diversity in that despite a bit over half of the inhabitants speaking Fataluku as a mother tongue, almost one third speaks Makassae and the rest of the inhabitants speak a range of other languages.

Another important finding of the 2010 Census (Table 2.4) is that out of a total population of 44,359 inhabitants 6 years and over, some 27,928 have capability in Tetum as an official language. This represents more than half of the population can speak Tetum. If we consider the collective nature of Timorese society then, the point illustrated above, it is more than likely that there will be opportunities for a Tetum speaker to always being present to act as an language interpreter when someone does not speak Tetum, so in this regards, learning or knowing to speak Tetum at an individual level is not necessary because someone in the collective is more like than not to speak it.

A similar situation emerges in the enclave district of Oe-cusse, out of a total population of 46,234 inhabitants 6 years and over, more than half 27,613 speak Baikenu and 17,348 speak Atoni as their mother tongue. Nevertheless some 21,001 inhabitants, close to half the population, have the capability to speak Tetum as an official language.

So for the following respondent ***R4 [BD]*** not speaking Tetum is problematic, not in the linguistic sense but more because being labelled as not speaking Tetum lowers his or her status as part of the Timoroan collective. But even in such instances, so as long as the Timoroan carries him or herself as a Timoroan, this situation is corrected. And carrying oneself as Timoroan invariably entails learning or developing some language ability in speaking, or at least communicate (even if through someone else) in Tetum, and once more this may help explain why even those who are claimed (rather than claim for themselves) not to speak Tetum have actually been socialised to express their inability to speak in Tetum, in Tetum.

For respondent ***R4 [BD]***, from Watukarbau Sub-District, in Viqueque District, in the South Eastern region of the country, and from a very remote *suku* that is largely inaccessible during the rainy season, finds it difficult to grasp with the notion there are Timoroan who have been born and grew up in Timor and who claim inability to communicate in Tetum.

For her also, in the narrative of official languages importance, she claims Tetum as the language she lives with and a language that she firmly believes should dominate over the other official language Portuguese. The respondent's answers are also reflective of the finding by Leach (2012) that consistently from 2002 until 2010 more than 80 per cent of the respondents of his longitudinal study though it very important to be able to speak Tetum to being 'truly' Timoroan.

[EB]: Speaking Tetum despite living in Timor; but if someone says he or she is Timoroan and does not speak Tetum; how about this?

[BD]: I feel this is also a problem because he or she is degrading him or herself because he or she does not know Tetum.

This is also a problem but it is more important that he or she carries him or herself as Timoroan.

But hearing about not knowing how to speak, for me this does not happen. Because I was born with Tetum so I must promote my Tetum, even though Portuguese has been introduced. This language is not to force us to forget our own languages but this language is forcing us to learn their culture and their sacred. I feel it is best to use my Tetum.

Thus for respondent ***R5 [CM]*** below everyone speaks Tetum because Tetum is *our identity as Timor* unless the Timoroan in question comes from another country (in the context of acquired citizenship) in which case it may prove problematic in this instance to this individual who may share Timorese citizenship but may not necessary be co-opted as an Timoroan.

[CM]: I see everyone speaking Tetum, but Tetum is the official language, the only Timor language official, but to speak Tetum, it depends if someone comes from another country and wants to learn Tetum, and has problems, but Tetum is like our own Identity of Timor.

For the respondents of this research study, Tetum is the everyday living language thus it is paramount for a Timoroan to be able to speak Tetum.

[FD]: Can with Tetum or like our language that we speak every day. It is important for us to know our language. We cannot say my own language Tetum I don't know, like speaking another language.

For one respondent in particular ***R14 [LC]*** below, who ironically is from Suku Mehara, in Los Palos Subdistrict, Lauten District, from an area claimed as having difficulties speaking Tetum, he was out of over 100 respondents the one who expressed the greatest degree of displeasure when asked about Tetum and the inability of a Timoroan not to speak it. For him, Tetum is the language of the Timoroan, the everyday language, the language that every Timoroan must know *atu saida-saida*[48]. Thus the inability to speak Tetum in the day to day context signifies an inability to be Timoroan. If Tetum is the Timoroan's language then the Timoroan must know how to speak it.

[LC]: Tetum is our language. We need to know this language so that daily we can do whatever. Tetum language, if we don't know it we are not Timoroan. What is the point if you don't know your own language? We must know our language.

It is in this context that respondent ***R7 [FS]*** terms the ability to speak Tetum as the basic or minimum standard for a Timoroan to be able to self-identity as Timoroan in the national identity narrative. Tetum language ability is the minimum standard rather than the local language, with the local language being an added characteristic rather than a defining characteristic of a Timoroan.

[FS]: Whether it is important or not for Timor I think this is the basic standard for a Timor citizen, must know how to speak Tetum. This is the minimum and then even better if he or she is from Baucau must speak Makasae, from Lospalos speaks Fataluku, like me I come from Maubisse I must speak Mambae, and some Kemak, at least must speak a little.

A discussion with the respondents about Tetum languages as the co-official language could not have been made without direct confrontation and reference to its counterpart, the Portuguese language. The Timoroan accepts Tetum as an official language because it promotes their national or collective identity, as separate to their local identity that is expressed through the local languages.

[48] Atu Saida-Saida=literally translated as To What-What, in context it signifies to do what needs to be done; in this case speaking Tetum every day to perform everyday tasks.

In relation to Portuguese though, there is an obvious hostility towards the fact Portuguese is now a co-official language with the Tetum language. This hostility does not signify the Timoroan does not accept Portuguese as an official language but the Timoroan is very hostile in having to accept Portuguese *on par* with Tetum language as a language that defines the identity of the Timoroan.

Like the extract below from Focus Group 1 ***[FG1]*** illustrates, there is a general acceptance of Portuguese as an official language but as Timoroan, the language does not seem to have enough weight in the identity construction of the Timoroan in what concerns the respondents of this present study. In the following section a more constructive analysis of Portuguese language will be undertaken.

[FG1]: Yes on my part I am the same, about speaking Tetum and also our languages, this is also important speaking all languages, this shows identity. If we speak about Tetum this is like a citizen we promote our national identity, but we speak about dialects, we promote our own culture.

[FG1]: Yes for me personally this is important, Portuguese is the official language but as a Timoroan I was not born in Portugal, and I don't know how to speak it, I know Tetum and this means I am really a citizen of Timor, but I don't need the Portuguese language so I become a citizen of Timor.

The extract below of the answers given by the respondents of Focus Group 2 ***[FG2]*** also offers another dimensionality to the relevance of Tetum as a national identity marker for the Timoroan. For this group the Tetum language serves another Timoroan identity validation purpose in that it allows the Timoroan to self-identity as such in relation to who is not Timoroan. By claiming to speak Tetum the Timoroan can also claim his right as a citizen of the world and thus justifies and validates his existence as Ema (People). After all as the respondent notes how can a Timoroan claim and demonstrate evidence of being from Timor-Leste if he or she does not speak Tetum, and because in this instance speaking a local language does not serve to validate the Timoroan in a global, world of nations, context.

[EB]: Today we spoke about culture and speaking about language is it important or not for the Timoroan to know how to speak Tetum first, and then the maternal language?

[FG2]: Important and why do I say it is important, for example we say we meet foreign friends and they ask about you, where are you from, I come from this country, I am citizen of this place, you acknowledge you are from here. What will we show as evidence that you are from this country? For example if he or she does not know his or her own language how will people believe you are a citizen. So for me it is important for example he or she says he or she is Timor, then must know Tetum, that's the least he or she must know, to speak Tetum, to say I speak Tetum. In terms of maternal languages this depends if he or she wants to study his or her maternal language, we take the example of people [Timoroan] who live in other people's nation.

[FG2]: Likewise for me because in the Constitution it says the official languages are Portuguese and Tetum, so I feel even though I still don't know Portuguese we need to hold on to these two languages because we can use Tetum as the official language to communicate inside the country, outside we cannot use it we use Portuguese language. When we travel abroad it is not as if we are going to use our official language Tetum, I believe we must [know Portuguese] even though we don't know it but as I said it is written in the law so we need to promote it.

The above point is crucial for the Timoroan and it relates back to an earlier point made about self-preservation. Buried in the psyche of the Timoroan is the ingrained value that unless the Timoroan holds on to traditional and original culture and behaviour it will be the existence of the Timoroan that will be under serious threat.

Thus even though the Timoroan is gradually acquiescent of the fact Portuguese is a co-official language in the Constitution of the nation, and sees greater importance in having to promote it as well, instinctively and as a matter of cultural self-preservation, he or she is also deeply distrustful of the impact Portuguese may have on the existence of the Timoroan as Ema (people) if Tetum is not promoted above Portuguese. As the extract below illustrates in the mind of the Timoroan is the constant concern that if Portuguese becomes the *lingua franca* of Timor-Leste and the language of communication among Timoroan, it may spell the demise of Tetum language because locally people will still be able to operate in local language but at the national level the Timoroan will no longer need to operate in Tetum because Portuguese will have replaced it.

This could even be then the un-verbalised and un-socialised intention of the existing language policy in Timor-Leste, the subtext that has not yet matured in the minds of policy makers, that is, to in the long term do away with the *lingua franca,* Tetum Praça, that already borrows approximately 40 per cent of its vocabulary from the Portuguese language. If the State is able to remove the 60 percent of the remaining Tetum words it will make the Timoroan take on Portuguese as the lingua franca for the country, bringing the nation into line and communion with the Portuguese speaking nations, without sacrificing the local languages. In essence doing away with Tetum Prasa as a language that was devised and imagined by the colonial mind in the first instance and replace it with modern standardised Portuguese that according to international rankings is the 8th most spoken language with approximately 260 million speakers worldwide. Portuguese is officially spoken in Portugal, Brazil, Mozambique, Angola, Guiné-Bissau, Macau, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Principe and in Timor-Leste.

Although highly speculative the above rationalisation may well be what is intended by the Timorese State, unfortunately perhaps this policy intention falls short because it fails to realize the complexity of the Timoroan context and it is finding resistance because it is being imposed on rather than culturally and sensitively socialised in the collective psyche of the Timoroan.

Due to the fact the Timoroan perceives the demise of Tetum Praça as a threat to the Timoroan own identity self-preservation and existence, there is an instinctual and natural repulsion against the idea that is assertively reflected in the answers given by the majority of respondents of this study and as is noted in the extract below from focus group 5 ***[FG5]***.

[FG5]: This is important for us to know Tetum because this is what is important, because in the law it is written. There are articles that say we already have official languages Portuguese and Tetum. It is more important that we learn Tetum, because this is our nation, example when the few of us sit together Brother, I speak Tetum Terik, he or she speaks Fataluku, we won't understand one another. So Tetum is needed, because it is important so we can communicate with one another, because it is the language that supports Timor-Leste so we can communicate with one another.

[FG5]: But Brother if we don't speak Teum, if this generation changes, our language is Portuguese, our Tetum identity will be lost, what will become of Timor, our identity will have disappeared.

If the Timoroan perceives Tetum as having the ability to allow the Timoroan to live in communion with one another, the absence of Tetum will then be naturally perceived as an opportunity for an ethnically tolerant society to break down which may lead to further conflict and tensions which is the source of great anxiety, or feeling ***less proud*** in being Timoroan.

[FG6]: Ok Timor Nationality to a point we are all Timorense, but I believe in one thing about language, for example even though we come from different Districts, and we turn up at the capital city where the majority of us speaks Tetum. Only this makes me aware what we are all Timoroan, even though we are from different districts, we have different dialects, but when we are in one place and we all speak Tetum this demonstrates we are all Timoroan.

Thus from the extract above from Focus Group 6 ***[FG6]*** it can be deduced the Tetum language allows the Timoroan once removed from his or her local context to think of him or herself as having an imagined communion with other Timoroan sharing the same cultural and geographical half-island that makes up the nation of Timor-Leste.

Speaking, promoting and protecting the Tetum language then allows not only for self-identification but also self-classification as Timoroan among the collective national body of people that live within the confines of the Timor-Leste nation and globally in the context of Timor-Leste as part of a world of nations. It provides continuity of the Timoroan but also differentiation from those who are not Timoroan.

6.7.3 Portuguese

This section pertaining to the *language situation* in Timor-Leste will deal with the non-indigenous co-official language of Timor-Leste, Portuguese. In the 2002 Constitution, in Article 13, Section 1, Tetum and Portuguese are constitutionally recognized as the two official languages for the country. The Constitution goes even further to set the context within which the Portuguese language will operate. In Article 8, Section 3 stipulates Timor-Leste shall maintain privileged ties with the countries whose official language is Portuguese (Portugal, Brazil, Mozambique, Angola, Guiné-Bissau, Cape Verde, and São Tomé and Principe).

Before such a move, there was inter-generation outcry in Timor-Leste by different sectors of the Timoroan society whereby, the older generations of Timoroan saw no issue with Portuguese becoming an official language, the middle generations of Timoroan aggressively opposed such a decision, and the younger generations of Timoroan more passively witnessed the debates raging around them and over the past decade have learnt to accept and live with the *language situation*.

The reasons why the Timor-Leste State and leadership decided to adopt Portuguese, the colonial language, as its co-official language are many; from historical, to self-preservation, to functional and pragmatic, and developmentally strategic.

This section on the Portuguese language will mainly deal with the responses given by the respondents of this study and as such only reflect the views of Timoroan belonging to the middle-aged generation category, that is, those Timoroan who were born in the final part of the Indonesian occupation but whom completed their senior secondary education during independent times. These answers also reflect attitudes at the end of more than 10 years of Portuguese language presence in the country as a co-official language.

The languages per say are not a contentious subject for the Timoroan, and none of the respondents seems to have a major issue with the Portuguese Language or English and Indonesian Languages for that matter. It is only when the language debate shifts from a

linguistic ability narrative to an identity marker narrative that it becomes a sensitive and divisive issue, not just for the younger generation of nationalists but also for senior leaders of the new Timorese State, such as the current President of the National Parliament of Timor-Leste, Fernando 'Lassama' de Araújo, whom in an interview in 2002 clearly expressed his sentiment about Portuguese language and heritage in Timor-Leste:

> East Timor's identity is not Portuguese. It's Tetum. It's Mambai…it's Makasae…I think Portuguese language is the same as Bahasa Indonesia – the colonialist language. If you want to use Portuguese, it's OK, but you cannot say that this is our East Timorese identity. We have our identity. We don't have to qualify it…I don't want to use this language that's just spoken by the elite, or by one group. It's a kind of alienation.
>
> (Leach, 2003, pp. 141-142)

This sentiment has been echoed a decade later by the respondents of this research study. The Timoroan are 'OK' with Portuguese, and English and Indonesian languages. It is only when asked whether Portuguese language represents the Timoroan at an identity level that the narrative is lost and turns nationalist and aggressive and that Portuguese is ***La Importante*** (***Not Important***).

The types of responses gathered in this research project differ somewhat from the types of responses registered by Leach (2012) in that consistently the respondents of his longitudinal study registered the ability to speak Portuguese as ***very important*** (rather than ***Fairly Important*** or ***Not Very Important*** or ***Not At All Important***) to being Timoroan. Although Leach (2003, 2008, 2012) made the point that *'ability to speak Portuguese'* was the most controversial of all the indicators (even after it increased sharply beyond the initial 2002 survey).

Perhaps this discrepancy can be explained by three factors: (1) his study may have been reflecting more on the experience of the students that participated in his research project from the National University mandated with the promotion of Portuguese language in Timor-Leste (even though the author also surveyed students from UNPAZ, DIT and UNDIL universities); (2) the question may have been perceived by the respondents as not pertaining to them being Timoroan from an identity perspective; and (3) a qualitative study differs from a quantitative study precisely because the researcher and the respondents are able to and have more opportunity to speak and contest the topic being explored.

The extract below reflecting the sentiments of Focus Group 1 ***[FG1]*** speaks to the above points. For the six respondents, personally they believe Portuguese language is

important and they acknowledge and are acquiescent (more so than accept) of the fact Portuguese is an official language of Timor-Leste.

Nonetheless for them, their language heritage is Tetum, not Portuguese because *Hau la moris iha Portugal* (I was not born in Portugal). So for them, Portuguese language clearly represents the language of the non-Timoroan and it is the identity of those born in Portugal. For them it is Tetum language that defines them as Timoroan and their citizenship, so much so that Portuguese language proficiency for them is not an identity marker when claiming Timoroan status.

If in the early years of Portuguese as a co-official language there were heated debates at all levels it seems in more recent years there has been a shift towards accepting Portuguese Language as a fait accompli, *hakarak ka lakohi*[49], a done-deal, given Portuguese laws are written in Portuguese, many more leadership (not just the older generation) are speaking Portuguese, administrative forms are written in Portuguese, and many younger Timoroan are completing their 12 years of basic and secondary education in Portuguese and moving on to tertiary education in Portuguese.

Nonetheless, what is also telling is that the resurgence of a Portuguese language presence in the Timoroan cosmos has not caused an identity dent in the solid identity armour of the Tetum Language. In actual fact, if anything Portuguese has re-assumed its historical place in Timoroan history and narratives and re-emerged once again as the language of the new bureaucratic and administrative Timoroan elites or professionalising class.

Portuguese language is fast becoming the language of those whose professional ambition is to work in Timorese Public Service or who have high political aspirations as Members of the National Parliament or as Members of the Executive Government, including also other Government institutions such as the National Police Force PNTL and to a lesser extent the Armed Forces F-FDTL.

[FG1]: Yes for me personally this is important, Portuguese is the official language but as an Timoroan I was not born in Portugal, and I don't know how to speak it, I know Tetum and this means I am really a citizen of Timor, but I don't need the Portuguese language so I become a citizen of Timor.

[FG1]: I feel Portuguese is also very important for all administrative [purposes] in Timor, not Portuguese is more used than Tetum. As students whether we want it or not *(hakarak ka la kohi)* we must know Portuguese, we have to communicate, to work, must know, but this does not mean it is compulsory that everyone knows

[49] Hakarak ka lakohi=a common popular expression used in situations when things are beyond one's control or influence. The closest translation in English is *a done deal*. In Timor-Leste *hakarak ka lakohi* is used in particular when one is required to take a certain action willingly or unwillingly.

Portuguese. Important we must know Tetum, citizens want to know Tetum, but for students whether they want or not Portuguese must learn because administratively we use more Portuguese than Tetum.

When language then becomes a criteria for exclusion, social or professional, then anti-language sentiment will emerge strongly, and not just in relation to Portuguese, but also English language as well as an important working language within the not-for-profit and international development sector.

So whilst Portuguese has greater administrative presence and fluency in it is required only by a minority of Timoroan to be able to be part of this bureaucratic class; it will leave all those who cannot speak it bitter and disappointed at missing out at an opportunity of secure employment due to poor language ability rather than other meritorious capacity.

For the respondent below ***R14 [LC]*** this is obviously an issue in that he has noted the inability of speaking the colonial language Portuguese or the working language English, both non-indigenous languages, has had a negative impact in his professional life.

[LC]: As Timoroan I don't agree because this is not our language. Our language is Tetum, so if I were a politician I would not accept because it is not our language. Our official language is Tetum. They did this so much so that we go apply for something and the criterion is English, Portuguese, so I need to apply these two languages that I don't know. I don't work anymore because I don't know these two languages, but I only now Tetum. The big wigs say it is the official language; they can because before they studied Portuguese so they know Portuguese but for us who have been educated from Indonesia we don't know it. So like Portuguese language I don't agree, I agree with Tetum.

Thus whilst during the Indonesia occupation Portuguese language became the language of the resistance, in contemporary times Portuguese has, possibly due to poor language policy formulation and implementation, reverted to being seen as a neo-colonial language, spoken by the new modern elites to the exclusion of those Timoroan who do not have a likely chance to learn it to a point where they can access the upper levels of the Timorese administrative and executive classes.

Thus over the past decade of independence rather than Portuguese assuming and enabling a more equalitarian Timoroan society, it has been used to create divisions among the Timoroan among linguistic lines, going against what is natural for the Timoroan in terms of maintaining a good balance in the multilingual ecology of Timoroan society; where linguistic diversity is acceptable at the local level but at the national level it is only acceptable the language that unites the Timoroan and that is the Tetum language.

As discussed in the previous section, the language that unites all Timoroan is the Tetum Language but unfortunately in contemporary language narratives it sits in direct opposition but also threatened by the efforts of the Timorese State to re-establish Portuguese in Timor-Leste. Due to a poor education system and the inability of institutions such as National Linguistics Institute (INL) to develop Tetum as a written language in tandem with efforts to re-establish Portuguese in Timor-Leste, this State initiative is being done at the expense of Tetum language, which will be strongly resisted against. And this linguistic conflict for official language status prominence will not abate without serious debate and strategic socialisation.

In fact in the mind of the Timoroan, as illustrated in the answer provided by one respondent below of focus group 5 ***[FG5]*** there is a serious fear of Tetum being replaced by Portuguese and this causing the loss of the Timoroan Tetum identity.

[FG5]: But Brother if we don't speak Tetum, if this generation changes, our language is Portuguese, our Tetum identity will be lost, what will become of Timor, our identity will have disappeared.

The respondents of this study were asked not only what they thought about Portuguese language as a Constitutional co-official language, to which most were mostly not oppose, but what they thought about Portuguese language as Timoroan.

Like political leader 'Lassama', the Timoroan of this research study is convinced Portuguese does not represent the cultural Timoroan and is seen as part of a foreign culture, a foreign language, that despite having its advantages such as supporting the development of Tetum as an official language and enabling the Timoroan's participation in international forums such as the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), does not have a space in the Timoroan local and national identity linguistic ecology.

[EB]: About Portuguese language, according to your personal opinion not your opinion as a citizen, because Portuguese is in the Constitution, but according to your opinion as Timoroan, do you feel it represents the Timoroan or not?

[AN]: I think for me Portuguese language does not represent Timoroan as culture because this is a culture of foreigners. If we talk about the language context because language is heritage is it not, so we can use the language because this is not in the cultural context, it is not Timor culture. Speaking about politics we can consider Portuguese as a constitutional language that can be official but it is not a cultural language.

[EB]: But you grew up in Indonesian times, it Portuguese relevant to you or not? Is it important to you or not; to you as Timor Oan or is it an obligation?

[AN]: For us on the one hand it is also important because it strengthens the languages we have like Tetum because Tetum is a difficult language so with Portuguese, and through this language can strengthen it and can capacitate us as students so we are able to write.

[NS]: I think it is relevant and has a big advantage if for example like we knew to use the Portuguese language this means we can increase our communication. If we only know Tetum then for sure our knowledge can only circulate inside our country. Portuguese gives a big advantage and can take us to enter in the CPLP nations, this is a big advantage and we need it to get in. Then we get in we can try other things in there. With experience or other things, Portuguese language is a way in, so that we can enter and get political opportunities that are relevant, so I think it is still relevant.

For the Timoroan, Portuguese is not his or her identity. As the extract below from respondent ***R5 [CM]*** illustrates, Portuguese is seen as a language that entered the Timoroan linguistic ecology but does not represent *Ita nia identidade rasik* (our own identity), rather it is a language introduced over time and that has become an official language, but it is not a language the Timoroan are born or self-identify with.

[CM]: I see clearly that Portuguese is not our Identity. Because Portuguese is a language that is not our identity but someone else's that was allowed to develop in our country. In order for it to become our language, I feel Portuguese language is not our language. From our origins it was not part of our own identity, but at some point in time it was determined it would also be like our Timor's official language.

For some of the respondents of this study in actual fact Portuguese sits lowest in the order of language priorities in Timor-Leste.

[EB]: Can you prioritise the four languages?

[AS]: At this point I think Tetum, English, Indonesian, Portuguese.

The extract of the answer above reflect mostly the attitudes of the 30 something Timoroan interviewed here and who will have had very little contact with Portuguese during their formative years and even in the post-independence period and whom have a strong command of Bahasa Indonesia. Nevertheless this generation is more pragmatic than recent studies have constructed them to be, with some respondents able to imagine a future scenario where the Portuguese language might be relevant for future generations of Timoroan. This is likely to be so as more Timoroan become fluent in Portuguese, but for the moment, the Timoroan is born in local and Tetum national languages so for them in the context of

Timoroan national identity, Tetum is paramount and Portuguese 'OK' but not relevant as a national identity marker.

[BD]: I feel it is important because in Timor we don't just have one language right? Tetum, English and others. But I think this generation, maybe in ten more years, they will know Portuguese language.

[EB]: But for Sister Bendita's generation? Do you feel Portuguese is important for us all as Timor or not?

[BD]: But hearing about not knowing how to speak, for me this does not happen. Because I was born with Tetum so I must promote my Tetum, even though Portuguese has been introduced. This language is not to force us to forget our own languages but this language is forcing us to learn their culture and their sacred. I feel it is best to use my Tetum.

Part of this linguistic pragmatism and for this generation of Timoroan, as the response of respondent ***R3 [FS]*** illustrates, despite an initial total rejection there is now also an acceptance of the Portuguese language in Timor-Leste, albeit in a supportive role to the Tetum language as an official language and until Tetum can assume its full role as an official language, as both a full oral and written language.

[FS]: Before first when we were told to use Portuguese language I was one of them who was against it, but in political times our leaders or whatever use Portuguese so I think using it compulsorily I don't want to but to use as other normal languages I accept. I feel we can develop our own language Tetum so that a Nation has its own language. It is not that I don't like, I support the use of Portuguese, but not forever, like in future when Tetum is developed we must use it.

Another major challenge in the re-introduction of the Portuguese language in Timor-Leste over the past decade has also been the way in which this process took and has been taking place. The re-introduction of the Portuguese language into the language ecology of Timor-Leste was made politically and by Portuguese educated Timoroan political elites who returned to power post-1999. These Timoroan returned to Timor-Leste brandishing and promoting Portuguese cultural values and Portuguese language as markers of Timoroan national identity and in the process alienated the vast majority of Timoroan who grew up during Indonesian times and had little contact with Portuguese, thus creating a friction between the State and its constituency.

This generation of Timoroan continues not to agree with the choice of Portuguese as an official language because just as socialisation of the Timoroan takes place at the family and peer level, most Timoroan like them do not speak Portuguese, only a minority of

Timoroan speaks Portuguese, the older Timoroan or the Timoroan leadership who either fought the war against Indonesia in the mountains of Timor-Leste until 1999 or lived in exile in Mozambique, Portugal and Australia.

And this generation of Timoroan such as respondent ***R20 [ZH]*** continues to be confused with the choice, because if in a Democracy, the people decide, then why was it that when asked which language they preferred between English and Portuguese they all chose English yet rather than respecting the wishes of the majority a political decision was made to implement the wishes of the few Portuguese speaking Timoroan.

[ZH]: Personally I don't agree because previously I still remember people distributed a small survey. They told us to fill it about what was our language. We were in Senior High school and everyone chose English. We did not choose Portuguese. How was it that all of a sudden they came up with Portuguese? Why don't I agree because Portuguese is spoken by the majority of the old people, but the youth doesn't really know Portuguese. Only a minority knows Portuguese.

This was possibly strategic on the part of the Timoroan leadership, not to put the choice of languages to popular choice because they must have realized they would lose, so the adoption of Portuguese as an official language was passed, despite the initial intention being it would be the only official language for Timor-Leste, in the end the leadership compromised and made Tetum the official language also.

Had it come down to a personal choice, even more than a decade after independence in 2002, it is likely the Timoroan would still choose Tetum as their preferred official language. And even though for the Timoroan fluency in the Tetum language is compulsory to being Timoroan, on the other hand fluency in Portuguese remains not a marker for national Timoroan identity.

[FG2]: It is important because we believe in the constitution that states it is the official language. I think about Portuguese language, because in our Constitution also says it is the official language it is then important for the Timoroan to know Portuguese, and also for me I would choose Tetum because Tetum is also an official language. As Timor I prefer Tetum.

[FG2]: For me Brother, Portuguese language I cannot say it is very important or not important at all. It is important because it is in RDTL's Constitution. If I had to pick, I would pick Tetum because Tetum is the language of the Timoroan, it is a good language so best I promote my own language Tetum, then we can do whatever with the Portuguese language.

[FG2]: I think Portuguese is also important for us because this is written in our laws so we must know because when we travel to other nations and peoples ask us what if your official language, we have two official languages Portuguese and Tetum, can you speak both or not, for sure some will say Tetum some won't know Portuguese because some grew up in Indonesian times so they learn Bahasa Indonesia not Portuguese.

Because we can say that Portuguese is somewhat difficult, but even though it is difficult we must learn it. Like it is not compulsory but we must be willing to learn it, even though our own language is Tetum, but we must know the two official languages. We must learn them both.

What then if Portuguese was not in the Timor-Leste Constitution as an official language? For the respondents of this study, if Portuguese was not in the Constitution it would be completely wiped out of the language ecology in Timor-Leste. Perhaps it would suffer the same fate as other non-indigenous languages such as Hakka, or Arabic, and only exist in the families of Portuguese descent and in specific social circles. As the extract below illustrates for the respondents of focus group two ***[FG2]*** had the Portuguese language not been in the constitution, it would have become ***La Importante*** (***Not Important***) to younger generations of Timoroan. Perhaps it would have some relevance as a working language but it would not be important as an official language.

[EB]: If Portuguese was not in the Constitution, what would you think about that?

[FG2]: When not in the Constitution for me personally it would not be important because Portuguese when spoken is only mostly with the CPLP nations. I prefer English because we go to whichever nation and we can speak it. If Portuguese was not in the Constitution, for me this is not important.

[EB]: What do you all think?

[FG2]: For me listening about languages if it wasn't in the Constitution it would still be important as a working language. When we travel we can communicate, but from all languages the most important is Tetum language and we must promote it.

The contemporary Timoroan is much more aware of his or her place not only in the Timoroan context but also as part of larger communities and of the context of the internationalisation of Timor-Leste and also the increased mobility of the Timoroan as a global citizen.

As a contemporary Timoroan, and as the extract below from the responses from Focus Group Three ***[FG3]*** illustrate, the Timoroan is aware he or she does not live in isolation in a modern day Timor-Leste and that there are others present in their midst who speak other languages including Portuguese. The Timoroan is also aware, unlike most of its colonial history and during Indonesian occupation; the Timoroan is finally able to move freely not only within his or her country but will also travel regularly internationally to other nations. Thus in this regard the Timoroan is conscious of the need to know international languages, Portuguese and other languages, to be able to communicate with non-Timoroan. In this

regard then Portuguese is seen more as an international language rather than a national or local language.

[FG3]: I feel about languages whatever language is important for the Timoroan because now in Timor not only Timorese who live here and we won't, are not restricted to just being in Timor we will travel out to other nations. And also people from other nations also travel here. It is very important for us to know Portuguese and other languages so we can communicate with other languages and so we can communicate well.

Another important factor that is being felt by younger Timoroan is, despite thinking Portuguese is important, he or she is let down by the fact learning the Portuguese language is not as easy as picking up one of the local oral languages of Timor-Leste. Thus trying to re-establish Portuguese in Timor-Leste when the language is technically difficult to learn and where there are serious limitations in its teaching is also having a serious and negative impact on this process, as the extract below from a discussion with Focus Group Five ***[FG5]*** illustrates.

Thus Portuguese language is important for the younger respondents of this study but difficult and despite learning it at school from basic through to secondary education it is still difficult for them to understand it; notwithstanding the difficulty of the language but also the inability of Timoroan teachers of Portuguese to master the language to be able to teach it to Timoroan students.

This has an obvious psychological impact on the Timoroan students who, are challenged not by the willingness to learn it but by the inability of the system to do a good job of teaching it and making it available for learning. Thus students have to revert back to Tetum and even be pushed to learn other languages namely Bahasa Indonesia or English that are more accessible to learn in their more immediate non-formal education sector.

[EB]: But do you feel Portuguese is relevant for us or not? For you as the generation of Portuguese that completed with it; your Senior Secondary education?

[FG5]: Portuguese is important but it is difficult to understand there, even though we learn it at school in Portuguese from basic to secondary but it is very difficult to understand it because the teachers speak to us in Tetum; how will we practice there? Yes but we cannot speak because the teacher teach it, they teach Portuguese but still use Tetum to speak, so how can we understand it there?

[FG5]: I think it is best to make it disappear and for us to push Tetum forward. I think rather than using Portuguese why not using Indonesian. Our generation also many almost 75 percent use Indonesian language.

The difficulty with the Portuguese language has transitioned from the basic and secondary education level to the tertiary level in particular if students are not able to get into the National University (Universidade Nacional Timor Lorosa'e) UNTL and undertake their tertiary studies at the other private universities in Timor-Leste where classes are still being held in Indonesian as the language of instruction.

[FG5]: I see we are already complicated. Almost students from 75 many [studied] in Indonesia, those who just finished in 2011 are also many, like this, over there we go to them and them speak Bahasa Indonesia well, for example we can facilitate, we might have had our whole school education and course in Portuguese but when we reach university they teach using Bahasa Indonesia. I think people will struggle, some children cannot adapt because from Portuguese they face Lecturers that don't teach in Portuguese, they are Indonesians. So for me to just make Portuguese disappear, this is not possible because the last students studying in Bahasa Indonesia [basic and secondary education] was in 2010. From 2011 onwards it was all in Portuguese. This is the language of colonialism, this is not right; I think it is more important use Tetum to develop our nation. Portuguese as a subject that comes from other nation's brought in and we used it to help us so we could stand on our own, because so we can connect with other nations we also need to do this in language, so going forward best using Tetum to advance us forward.

Thus structural and the poor implementation of a language policy in Timor-Leste are in actual fact strengthening the position of the Tetum language in the language ecology.

Portuguese is not widely used by the Timoroan outside the formal school environment and the high level of government and national Parliament except by a very small number of Timoroan, so in this regards the opportunities for the young Timoroan to practice speaking Portuguese is very limited unless, as per the extract below, they happen to meet a foreigner or a relative who speaks Portuguese so they can practice, but in the day-to-day interactions in the family they speak their local language.

[EB]: Everyday do you all use Portuguese language or not? In your environment?

[FG6]: If we meet a foreign colleague who speaks Portuguese then we will communicate with him or her in Portuguese.

[EB]: In your family environment what do you speak?

[FG6]: In my family many relatives come from Portugal so I take the opportunity to practice with them. Daily we speak in dialect, for example Makasae, Midiki, so every day we speak to one another with these languages.

The language situation in Timor-Leste is still very complex and does not seem to show any signs of improving, in particular in what regards the position of Portuguese as a co-official language for the country.

The section that follows will look at the working languages of Timor-Leste, English and Bahasa Indonesia and their place in the language ecology for the Timoroan respondents of this study.

6.7.4 English and Bahasa Indonesia

In terms of the Constitutional working languages, English and Bahasa Indonesia, for the Timoroan there is little resistance to their presence, learning and usage of these languages in the Timor-Leste language ecology.

In regards to the English language and as the extract below illustrates, for the respondents of Focus Group Six ***[FG6]*** English is simpler to learn than the official language Portuguese. English also seems easier to practice in their own environment as opposed to Portuguese which they claim not using for communication in their daily environment making it more difficult to learn.

> [FG6]: For me I fell Portuguese and English, these two languages are both good, the difference is that the English language, when we study English it is more familiar for us, but Portuguese language we don't deny because Portuguese is our official language but we don't really communicate in it in our environment so in the end if it is difficult for us to study.

In relation to Bahasa Indonesia, English is the preferred language. The respondent below ***R1 [AN]*** is aware of the practicality of speaking English as an international language and that it allows for greater mobility than the other languages. This is somewhat interesting because despite possibly being more fluent in Bahasa Indonesia, this respondent still sees English as more valuable. This could possibly be because as a National University Student he would have come across or knows someone who was able to get a highly coveted opportunity to study with full a scholarship in the United States, or in Australia, or in New Zealand or even in the Philippines. These programs are widely marketed at the National University.

In terms of Bahasa Indonesia, like most respondents, they are still fluent and influenced by it, and even though they may have a socialised affinity to it given the penetrative effect it had during the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste, it has never been part of the national identity discourse and narratives post-referendum 1999 and post-independence in 2002.

Despite there being a speaking affinity with Indonesian in the early days of post-independence this narrative can be seen more as a counter argument to the elevation of Portuguese to co-official language status and feelings of disappointment on the part of a large section of Timoroan educated during the 24 years of Indonesian occupation and also by them feeling excluded from the process of nation building due to lack of literacy, for no fault of their own, with the Portuguese language.

Bahasa Indonesia is still part and parcel of the Timoroan language ecology and it shows no signs of abating, in fact according to the 2010 Census, after more than 10 years since independence 45.3 percent of the population of Timoroan still speaks, reads and writes in Bahasa Indonesia. The percentage is likely to be higher when looking at speaking Bahasa Indonesia alone.

[EB]: So in terms of Malay Language what do you think? What do you think of the English language?

[AN]: OK about Bahasa Melayu, Indonesian language, and English language, I think English is more important. We can travel anywhere and use English why, because English in an international language. I think this is important.

EB]: Malay we Timor still use Malay or Bahasa Indonesian?

[AN]: Yes, we still need it as students because many still study in Indonesian and then we are neighbours with the Indonesian nation so we need to learn it; but more the most important one is English language.

Nonetheless respondent ***R1 [AN]*** also sees the value in the Timoroan knowing Bahasa Indonesia because it opens further opportunities of study in Indonesia and because it is important to speak the language of our neighbouring nations. The extract below of the interview with respondent ***R11 [JA]*** is reflective of the reality on the ground of the attitudes of the Timoroan towards Portuguese and English language learning.

[JA]: People do not want to undertake the [Portuguese] course, just recently, last month, only the teachers attended the course. When an English course was open many youth, and even young children flocked to attend the course. If we analyse this, that even the children attended [English course], even their older brothers attended, when they offered the course. The Portuguese one not many people attended, only teachers and old people. The unemployed did not attend it, it was like for the teachers only.

When given a choice between attending an English or a Portuguese language course, as in the example above, that took place in Gleno, in Ermera District, between the two courses, young people including children and even the unemployed have a preference

towards attending English Language Courses. In the same example, the Portuguese language course only manages to attract teachers, who compulsorily have to teach in Portuguese, or those employed in the public service, whose administrative language is Portuguese, and older Timoroan, who very likely had some formal education contact in Portuguese and wish to attend the course for purely nostalgic reasons.

The Timoroan as a pragmatic person has come to realize that English is a more functional and global language than Portuguese. Also as the extract below illustrates the linguistic reality in Timor-Leste is that even though Portuguese is an official language in Timor-Leste, English is spoken widely, and possibly apart from the formal education sector, there is greater contact with it than with Portuguese.

> [FG1]: For me teacher, in relation to the sciences that we learn in the world, we need English because many of the terms are not used well in Portuguese.
>
> [FG1]: I also prefer English because I can use it anywhere, whilst Portuguese I can only use it in some places because for the majority, and even though we use the Portuguese language, we see that the English language dominates inside our country.

All languages are important for the Timoroan as such the language ecology of Timor-Leste is relatively safe going into the future. As all the respondents of this study demonstrate there is a high level of awareness and high degree of value and pride in the fact the Timoroan speak many languages. The respondents of this study have been able to note a practical value for language in allowing them to communicate locally, nationally and internationally. They also see the identity value of language in helping the Timoroan self-identity at the national level in his or her communion with all other Timoroan and that allows him or her to be different from others in regards to the indigenous languages spoken in Timor-Leste. Finally the Timoroan also sees the multilingual ecology of Timor-Leste as a natural wealth of the country worth protecting and promoting.

Further Remarks

This chapter is important because it offers a rare glimpse into the particular way(s) the Timoroan views his or her world from a Timoroan context. Realistically this chapter cannot be generalised to represent the views of all Timoroan because within Timor-Leste there are

many local identities attached to the ethnicity of the different cultures that compose the Timoroan cosmos.

Nonetheless, perhaps a product of its colonial and occupation history and Timoroan-as-one ingenuity, there is also a supra Timoroan that remains united to the nation-state and that is confident and able to self-assert as such.

Chapter 7: In Closing

This thesis does not really necessitate much in terms of a conclusion because of the way in which the thesis is structured and written. Nevertheless this thesis needs to be closed and that is what the last pages of this thesis are, a closing section more so than the conclusion. This last chapter represents the closing of this research project but also what is hoped will be the inspiration for future research work that can be done by other Timoroan researchers wanting to write about themselves according to their own interpretations and perspectives that may be similar or totally different but that nonetheless represent the views and the voice of the Timoroan.

Timor-Leste is a society in transition and the Timoroan in addition to being citizens of Timor-Leste they are also global citizens, and as such, Timoroan Identity(-ies) are more dynamic and fluid which will require the Timoroan to work through these issues creatively. For instance almost 1,000 Timoroan have returned after spending more than five years away studying in Cuba to become doctors and other medical professionals (Leach, 2008). They now speak Tetum and borrow from the Spanish vocabulary; their views of life and social ordering have been influenced already. Now these individuals are based in Timor-Leste and located across most sukus in the country, where they yield substantial authority. These lived experiences of the new generations of Timoroan represent the need to consider national identity as something that is not static and that is quite adaptive to the particular experiences of the nation-building process that will continue into the future and that have been occurring after Timor-Leste became-nation in 1999.

It is hoped that this research project will also assist non-Timoroan researchers and academics in their ongoing understanding of Timor-Leste and of the Timoroan and that it is useful for those wanting to go and research, work and live in Timor-Leste.

In this closing section I thus return to the research questions that assisted me as a researcher to navigate the topics and areas of enquiry explored throughout this thesis.

What role do the narratives of Timor-Leste play in formulating and providing Timor-Leste (the nation) with a distinctive Timoroan (national identity)?

The narratives of Timor and the Timoroan have always been tainted; this is obvious in particular when looking at the way in which the history of Timor has been written and the

way it has been socialised by and through those responsible for writing it. The History of Timor-Leste is yet to be written by the Timoroan themselves and my ardent desire is that when that happens our history will be written and told, from our particular perspectives and worldviews, and that it serves our interests and our particular truths. Let Timor-Leste's history benefit the Timoroan.

Narratives about Timor-Leste have also always been about power and in particular about those who held power over Timor-Leste – the power to subjugate, to manipulate, to punish, even to kill, and to re-construct. The Timoroan have always been part of the narrative in reference to the *mala'e* and objectified by that same *mala'e*.

These narratives have constructed the reality of Timor-Leste and of the Timoroan on paper that has been reproduced through text to represent the truth; therefore it is accepted.

On the other hand the indigenous narratives of the Timoroan and his or her truth has been kept oral, secretive, hidden, self-preserved in memory, in language, in *lisan* and in *lulik*. It is shared and transmitted principally *iha uma laran* (inside the house) through oral language and it is accepted, respected and revered.

It was neither the Europeans nor the Indonesian that created Timor. On the other hand it was the Timoroan that created Timor as a nation without a State until 1999 but since then the Timoroan have been building their nation-state.

Nevertheless the narratives of colonialism, occupation, and reconstruction of Timor-Leste have shaped the type of Nation-State Timor-Leste is in the process of becoming and shaped in fundamental ways the type of contemporary Timoroan that exists today in Timor-Leste.

The history of Timor-Leste was written, co-opted and claimed by external peoples in attempts to justify their presence in Timor-Leste and to try and claim the Timoroan as its product; and perhaps even to try and find atonement for all the many dark episodes of their history in Timor.

The Timoroan on the other hand are not the mere product of others and were not created simply due to the presence of the *mala'e* in Timor-Leste. The Timoroan were not shaped either, rather they adapted, and did what had to be done to self-preserve, to survive, to persist and emerge in the end but at the start of the 21st Century with a distinctive Timoroan national identity and as a sovereign Nation-State.

Nonetheless what still remains are the legacies of history and of the narratives that still permeate the conceptualisations of what Timor-Leste is and who the Timoroan are. Two narratives have emerged and are converging at the end of close 500 years of foreign presence

in the country; the narrative of the foreigner in the open and the narrative of the Timoroan in the clandestine.

The narrative of the *mala'e* is still the dominant one, as it has always been, thus it necessitates an ideological examination, which is what this thesis represents. This thesis does not purport to be the defining examination but it is nonetheless an analysis of hopefully many other examinations that will be launched by other academic Timoroan in future. I don't accept Timor-Leste and the Timoroan as a mere product of the narratives of the past. The Timoroan are and always were put simply the Timoroan. The Timoroan fought both physical and ideological wars and paid in blood and sacrifice over the past 500 years and still emerged victor and no one has the right to claim this heritage, except the Timoroan themselves.

This is the narrative going forward as Timor-Leste established itself as a Nation-State in a globalised context and as it finds its way in a world of other nation-states. Perhaps other nations and peoples who have similar experiences to that of Timor-Leste and the Timoroan can use this experience and find solutions moving forward, that is, nations that exist without a State but are fuelled by the aspiration and will of the people to self-determination. Perhaps the history of Timor-Leste from the perspective of the Timoroan may serve them as a positive lesson in their quest for independence.

How does the Timoroan learn to be and from whom?

The Timoroan learns to be from other Timoroan and within his or her own indigenous cultural context. This is done from *inan-aman sira* (mother-father and others) who belong to the self-collective sphere represented by the kin and the social networks that make-up Timorese society. This socialisation is also done primarily *iha uma laran* (within the house to represent the family context). At present the Timoroan is not yet learning to be from the formal education system nor through other State sponsored institutions such as the State-run media. This is partiallty because of a deep distrust in the formal education system because of how it was used during colonial Portuguese times and also during the Indonesian occupation to socialise the Timoroan to assume a false national identity. It is also due to the deficiencies experienced by the formal education sector which are developmental issues and challenges that Timor-Leste faces and is still likely to face in the medium to long term. But as the education system develops it can be expected that much more socialising is done through the formal education system and validated and substantiated by the national media.

Nevertheless with the knowledge that the Timoroan are learning to be at this present time, mainly within the family and within traditional cultural context, innovative strategies ought to be developed that strengthen this key agent of socialisation and that ensure a smoother transition into the other key agents of socialisation as these become more adept at taking on this key role.

How might we best understand the emotional, cultural, religious, symbolic and linguistic markers and processes 'constructing' Timoroan National Identity in contemporary Timor-Leste?

This answer is best answered by using the findings of this research project on a living Timoroan subject. After asking more than 100 Timoroan respondents how they know there are Timoroan, I turned the question back to myself as a Timoroan.

How do you know you are Timoroan?

- ✓ I self-identify as Timoroan.
- ✓ I speak Tetum.
- ✓ I was born in Timor-Leste.
- ✓ Both my parents were born in Timor-Leste and are Timoroan.
- ✓ My ancestors are Timoroan.
- ✓ My umbilical cord was cut, blood was shed in the *rai* (land) and it was buried under a coconut tree in front of the house where I was born.
- ✓ I was raised in Timoroan cultural context.
- ✓ My Mothers and her 12 sibbloings is the Uma-Lulik of Tiarlelo, in Atsabe.
- ✓ My Mother's kin begin in Tiarlelo in Atsabe but expand through a woven system of Uma networks and *barlake* alliances from West to East of Timor-Leste.
- ✓ We are and speak Kemak.
- ✓ I follow the *lia* of my collective and I respect and fear the *lulik*.
- ✓ My family living in Dili meets under the mango tree at my grandmother's house to discuss *lia.*
- ✓ I am Catholic and I am Animist and to me both represent a connection to *Maromak* (God).

- ✓ My Mother is Virginia Gonçalves de Araújo Braz, her father is Vital de Araújo, his father is *Nai Buti*, his father is *Nai Koli*, his father is *Tata Kei Bau*, and the names of those before him are known by our *Lia Nain*. Her mother is Teresa Gonçalves de Araújo and her own *abut* (family roots), including a Chinese grandmother who married into the family.
- ✓ My father is António da Graça Braz's. I don't know his Uma-Lulik but I know it exists. I know who his mother is, Maria dos Santos Braz, but not her *be-alan* (ancestors). My father's father was killed during Second World War, his body buried in Watu-Karbau, in Viqueque, in a common grave. My father and his siblings were separated from my indigenous grandmother after my grandfather's (a Portuguese soldier) death to be raised at the Soibada College, in Soibada, in Manatuto District, by nuns. They never saw her again and only vaguely know where she was buried after her death. But it weighs heavy on us, the descendants, to try to find the bones and reconstitute the memories, reconnect to those family *abut* and trace back her links to the *Uma Lulik*. We have regular family discussions about the need to do this or *halo tuir* and we fear the *be-alan* will haunt us until we are successful in reconnecting.
- ✓ I left Timor at 6 days old and grew up in Diaspora during the war but I was an activist and travelled back to Timor-Leste after independence in 1999 and reconnected with the collective and self-classified within the system or norms and behaviours that allow me to operate as a member of Timoroan society.
- ✓ I have documents that prove I am Timoroan (in case someone else doubts my Timoroan identity) but this has never happened, on the contrary I have never needed to prove I am Timoroan.

  > [FS]: I acknowledge Brother, you were born in 1975 and you went overseas immediately but over there you found ways to learn Tetum and you returned; this I value highly.

- ✓ I am accepted and validated by other Timoroan as Timoroan.

Hau Timoroan. I am Timoroan.

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Appendices

Appendix 1 - Interview guide (English/Tetum)

Appendix 2 - Human Research Ethics Information Sheet (Tetum) (English)

Appendix 3 - Human Research Ethics Consent Form (Tetum) (English)

Appendix 1 - Interview guide (English/Tetum)

National Identity Interview Guide / Mata dalan ba Intrevista kona ba Identidade Nasional

Questions for respondents/Perguntas ba respondentes

1. When we think of ourselves, which way would you describe yourself?
Wanhira ita hanoin kona ba ita nia a'an rasik, halo nusa ita bo'ot deskreve (menggambarkan) ita nia a'an rasik?

How would you describe yourself (prioritize):

- I am [current occupation] (including being a homemaker)
- I am East Timorese
- I am a male/I am a female
- I am [age]
- I am Catholic/respondent's religion
- I belong to [political party/group/movement]
- I am [marital status]
- I am Lorosa'e/Loromonu/firaku/kaladi
- Other (register answer)

Halo nusa ita bo'ot deskreve (menggambarkan) ita nia a'an rasik (tuir prioridade as liu):

- Hau [servisu/pozisaun] (tama mos dona-de-casa/ibu rumah tanda)
- Hau Timor Oan
- Hau mane/Hau feto
- Hau tinan [tinan]
- Hau ema Katoliku
- Hau pertense ba [partidu politiku/movimentu/grupu]
- Hau Lorosa'e/Loromonu/firaku/kaladi
- Seluk (saida?)

2. How close do you feel to your town/part of the country?
Ita bo'ot senti besik nusa be ita bo'ot nia hela fatin/aread iha rai laran?

3. How relevant is it for you to be recognized as being part of that specific town/area/region?
Ita bo'ot senti said kona ba ema hatene kata ita bo'ot hosi parte/area ne'e?

4. Do you relate more to that part of the Timor-Leste or to the entire country/nation of Timor-Leste?
Ita bo'to senti nusa, katak, halo parte area ida ne'e ka halo parte Timor-Leste, ida ne'ebe importante liu?

5. How important to being truly East Timorese is it to be (questions below) and why?
Atu katakteriza hanesan Timor Oan importante nusa tuir kriteria tuir mai no tansa?

    1. To have been born in Timor-Leste?
    Moris iha Timor-Leste?

    2. To have lived in Timor-Leste for most of one's life but be born elsewhere?
    Hela iha Timor-Leste tempu naruk maibe moris iha rai seluk?

3. To feel East Timorese?
Atu senti an nudar ema Timor?

4. To feel East Timorese despite being born outside Timor-Leste out of Timorese parents?
Senti an nudar Timor Oan maibe moris iha rai seluk, no inan-aman ema Timor?

5. To feel East Timorese despite being born outside Timor-Leste of at least one Timorese parents?
Senti an nudar Timor Oan maibe moris iha rai seluk, maibe inan ka aman deit mak ema Timor?

6. To feel East Timorese despite not having Timorese parents (if that even possible)?
Senti an nudar Timor Oan maibe inan-aman la los ema Timor (ida ne'e bele ka lai)?

7. To be Catholic?
Ho relijiaun Katoliko?

8. Not to be Catholic i.e. having a non-Catholic religion (Muslim, Protestant, other)?
La os Katoliko maibe iha relijiaun seluk (Muslim, ka Protestan, seluk)?

9. To be able to speak Tetum?
Bele koalia Tetum?

10. To be able to speak any other Timorese language (specify which language)?
Bele koalia lia seluk Timor?

11. To be able to spreak the other official language Portuguese?
Bele koalia lian ofisial Portugues?

12. To have some Timorese ancestry?
Atu iha keterunan Timor nian?

13. To have participated in the resistance?
Tanba partisipa iha resistensia?

14. To have been in Timor during the Indonesian occupation?
Hela iha Timor durante tempo Indonesia?

15. To know about East Timorese history and culture?
Hatene kona ba Timor nia istoria no kultura?

6. Do you define yourself as an East Timorese?
Ita bo'ot defini an hanesan ema Timor?

7. What makes you sure you are East Timorese?
Halo nusa ita bo'ot hatene ho kepastihan/serteza katak ita bo'ot ema Timor?

8. If you hold any other nationality, other than East Timorese, which one do you feel are more, less, equally, of? Why?
Karik iha nasionalidae seluk mos, la os Timor deit, ita bo'ot senti liu ida ne'ebe? Tansa?

9. How proud are you of being East Timorese?
    1. Very proud
    2. Somewhat proud
    3. Not very proud
    4. Not proud at all
    5. I am not East Timorese
    6. Can't choose
    7. Why to any of the above answer?

Ita bo'ot senti orgulyu nudar ema Timor?
1. Hau senti orgulyu los
2. Hau senti orgulyu
3. Hau la dun senti orgulyu
4. Hau la senti orgulyu liu
5. Hau la os ema Timor
6. Hau la dun hatene
7. Tan sa?

10. When do you feel the most proud of being East Timorese?
Wainhira mak ita bo'ot senti orgulyu liu hanesan ema Timor Oan ida?

11. What are the things, occasions, circumstances, experiences that make you proud to be East Timorese?
Saida, eventu saida, ka situasaun said mak halo ita bo'ot senti orgulyu nuda ema Timor ida?

12. When do you feel the least proud of being East Timorese?
Wainhira mak ita bo'ot senti la dun orgulyu nudar ema Timor ida?

13. Describe an East Timorese person the way you would describe to someone who does not know anything about Timor-Leste and its people.
Deskreve/menggambarkan ema Timor ida hanesan ita bo'ot koalia ho ema ida nebe la hatene liu kona ba Timor no nia ema.

14. Describe what it is for you to be East Timorese
Deskreve/menggambarkan ema Timor ne'e mak signifika said ba ita bo'ot?

15. Describe what it is for you to feel East Timorese?
Deskreve/menggambarkan halo nusa ita bo'ot senti nudar ema Timor ida?

16. What are the things you do that make you feel East Timorese?
Saida mak ita bo'ot halo nebe halo ita bo'ot sent nudar ema Timor?

17. What are the things people around you do that are not East Timorese?
Saida mak ema balo halo nebe la tuir buat nebe Timor, ka ema Timor halo?

18. Where do you get validation that you are East Timorese?
Ita bo'ot simu komprensaun ka konyesimentu katak ita bo'ot ema Timor hosi nebe/se?

19. Is being Timorese about having documentation that proves you are East Timorese? Why and explain.
Karik ita iha dokumentasaun nebe dehan katak ita Timor, ida ne'e prova katak ita bo'ot Timor Oan duni? Tan sa no esplika.

20. Is being Timorese about feeling East Timorese regardless of having paperwork that proves it? Explain.
Karik ema Timor kona ba senti kata ita bo'ot ema Timor maske surat ofisial la iha atu prova ida ne'e? Esplika.

21. What are East Timorese symbols?
Timor nia simbolos mak saida?
22. What are the things/elements that make you the same as any other East Timorese?
Saida/elementu saida maka halo ita bo'ot Timor hanesan Timor oan seluk?

23. Would be able to recognize a fellow East Timorese in a crowd of mixed-raced people? How? What characteristics, qualities would allow you to recognize another East Timorese?
Bele ka la'e ita bo'ot konyese se mak Timor iha grupu ida ho ema kahur malu ema hosi rai oin-oin deit? Karakteristikas saida ka kualidades said make bele halo ita bo'ot rekonyese ema Timor iha grupu ne'e?

24. Are all East Timorese the same when it comes to being East Timorese?
Wanhira ita koalia kona ba ema Timor, ema Timor hanesan hotu ka la'e?

25. Are some East Timorese more East Timorese then others? How and please explain the meaning of your answer?
Iha Timor Oan nebe Timor Oan liu ke Timor Oan seluk kona ba sira nia identidade? Halo nusa no esplika resposta.

26. If you could choose to live anywhere else where would that be? And why?
Karik bele hela iha rai seluk nebe no tansa?

27. Where do you learn to be East Timorese?
Ita bo'ot aprend jeitu Timor iha nebe?

28. Growing up how did you find or see references to what it is to be East Timorese?
Durante ita nia moris, iha nebe ita bo'ot hetan ka hare referensias kona ba Ema Timor no nia jeito?

29. How is being East Timorese communicated to you?
Halo nusa mak ita bo'ot hetan informasaun kona ba saida mak Timor Oan?

30. When you watch television do you see any references to what it is to be East Timorese?
Wainhira ita bo'ot hare televizaun ita bo'ot hare referensias kona ba jeito ema Timor?

31. When you listen to the radio do you hear any references to what it is to be East Timorese?
Wainhira ita bo'ot rona radio ita bo'ot hare referensias kona ba jeito ema Timor?

32. When you read the newspapers do you read or see any references to what it is to be East Timorese?
Wainhira ita bo'ot rona radio ita bo'ot hare referensias kona ba jeito ema Timor?

33. When you watch television, listen to the radio, or read the newspaper, what are the things being communicated that make you feel East Timorese?
Wainhira ita bo'ot hare televizaun, rona radio, no/ka le jornal, buat komunika hosi media tolu ne'e, said mak halo ita bo't senti nudar ema Timor?

Appendix 2 - Human Research Ethics Information Sheet (Tetum)

FORMULARIU KONSENTIMENTU

INFORMASAUN BA PARTISIPANTES:
Ami hakarak konvida ita bo'ot atu partisipa iha estudu ida nebe sei fo kontribuisaun a'as kona ba aumenta matenek kona ba topiku harii nasaun no identidade nasional iha Timor-Leste no papel nebe media halao iha prosesu ne'e. Projektu ne'e sei ezamina esperiensia Timor-Leste nudar nasaun foun ida kona ba prosesu komplexu kona ba halo nusa sei harii nasaun foun ne'e, tama mos, knar atu harii sidadaun foun iha nasaun foun ne'e.

SERTIFIKASAUN HOSI PARTISIPANTE:

Hau,
Hosi

Hau sertifika katak hau tinan 18 ba leten no katak hau voluntariu no hatan atu partisipa iha estudu tuir mai ne'e:

Identidades frajil: inentidade nasional no media iha Timor-Leste, halao iha Universidade Victoria liu hosi:

Emanuel Antonio Braz, estudante PhD, nebe hola parte iha estudu PhD iha Universidade Victoria, ho supervizaun hosi Dr Russell Wright, Investigador Prinsipal, hosi Eskols Siensias Sosiais, Universidade Victoria.

Hau sertifika katak objektivus estudu ne'e, hamutuk ho riskus no guarantias balun kona ba prosesu tuir mai ne'e nebe halao durante estudu ne'e, esplika ba hau liu hosi:

Emanuel Antonio Braz, Estudante PhD

No katak hau konkorda atu partisipa iha estudu ne'e nebe sei iha metodu tuir mai ne'e:

Intrevistas,
no/ka
Diskusaun liu hosi Grupu

Hau sertifika katak hau iha oportunidade atu hetan respostas bah au nia perguntas no hau komprende katak hau bele para hau nia partisipasaun iha estudu ne'e wainhira hau hakarak no katak ida ne'e sei la iha impaktu buat ida ba hau.

Hau hetan informasaun katak informasaun nebe hau sei fo sai sei rai tuir maneira konfidensial no katak hau sei bele hili atu:

1. Hau nia naran uza iha projektu ida ne'e Yes [ ] No [ ]
2. Uza naran falsu Yes [ ] No [ ]
3. Intrevista ne'e bele grava ka video Yes [ ] No [ ]
4. Hau hatan atu publika parte ka tomak gravasaun ida ne'e Yes [ ] No [ ]

Asinatura:

Data:

Perguntas ruma kona ba ita bo'ot nia partisipasaun iha projektu ida ne'e bele kontaktu direktamente ho Investigador Prinsipal, Dr. Russell Wright, (+613) 9370-3389, ka liu hosi email: Russell.Wright@vu.edu.au

Karik iha tan perguntas ka preokupasaun seluk kona ba maneira estudu ne'e halao bele kontaktu Secretary, Victoria University Human Research Ethics Committee, Victoria University, PO Box 14428, Melbourne, VIC, 8001 phone (03) 9919 4781.

Appendix 2 - Human Research Ethics Information Sheet (English)

CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS INVOLVED IN RESEARCH

INFORMATION TO PARTICIPANTS:
We would like to invite you to be a part of a study into the national exercise that is to create the new citizenry of a new nation and the role the media plays in this regard. This project will do this in relation to the experience of Timor-Leste as one of the world's *newest* nations. It is the intention of this research project to contribute to an expansion of the body of knowledge of the topic of nation-making and national identity.

CERTIFICATION BY SUBJECT
I, _____
of _____

certify that I am at least 20 years old and that I am voluntarily giving my consent to participate in the study:

Ema Timor: Communicating National Identity in Timor-Leste being conducted at Victoria University by:
Dr. Less Terry.
I certify that the objectives of the study, together with any risks and safeguards associated with the procedures listed hereunder to be carried out in the research, have been fully explained to me by:

Emanuel Antonio Braz
and that I freely consent to participation involving the use on me of these procedures:

- In-depth interview; and/or
- Survey questionnaire;

I certify that I have had the opportunity to have any questions answered and that I understand that I can withdraw from this study at any time and that this withdrawal will not jeopardise me in any way.

I have been informed that the information I provide will be kept confidential and that I can choose to:

My name being used in this research:	Yes [ ] No [ ]
Use a false name:	Yes [ ] No [ ]
The interview being recorded or videotaped	Yes [ ] No [ ]
I agree to the interview being published in part or whole	Yes [ ] No [ ]

Signed:

Witness other than the researcher:

Date:

Any queries about your participation in this project may be directed to the researcher Dr. Less Terry, +61 3 9485285. If you have any queries or complaints about the way you have been treated, you may contact the Secretary, Victoria University Human Research Ethics Committee, Victoria University, PO Box 14428, Melbourne, VIC, 8001 phone (03) 9919 4781.

Appendix 3 - Human Research Ethics Consent Form (Tetum)

INFORMASAUN BA PARTISIPANTES NEBE INVOLVE IHA PESKIZA

Konvite atu partisipa

Ita bo'ot hetan konvite atu partisipa iha projektu peskiza ho naran *Identidades frajil: identidade nasional no media iha Timor-Leste.*

Porjektu ida ne'e halao hosi estudante perskizador, Emanuel Antonio Braz, no halo parte iha estudu ida ba PhD hosi Universidade Victoria, ho supervizaun hosi Dr Russell Wright, Investigador Prinsipal, hosi Eskola Siensias Sosial, Universidade Victoria.

Esplikasaun kona ba Projektu ne'e

Projektu ne'e sei aumenta matenek kona ba topiku formasaun nasaun no identidade nasional iha Timor-Leste no papel media masse iha Timor-Leste (Radio no Televizaun Nasional, jornais, no radios komunidade) iha prosesu ida ne'e. Projektu ne'e sei ezamina esperiensia Timor-Leste nia hanesan nasaun foun ida no prosesu komplexu kona ba formasaun nasaun, tama mos, servisu atu harii sidadaun foun iha Timor-Leste.

Objektivus espesifikus kona ba peskiza ida ne'e mak:

- Ezamina natureza formasaun identidade nasional iha kontextu narrativu jeral kona ba nasaun iha Timor-Leste;
- Ezamina paper media atu harii identidade politika Timorense;
- Identifika maneiras nebe grupus kultural barak no aktores sosial negoseia iha tranzisaun ba nasaun idependente;
- Analiza papel aktivistas sira iha konstrusaun identidade nasional no nasaun.

Saida maka hau tenki halao?

Hau hakarak intrevista iha bo'ot lui hosi prosesu rua tuir mai ne'e:

(1) Intrevista ita bo'ot atu koalia kona ba isu Identidade Nasional Timorense no media massa hamutuk ho hau hanesan peskizador liu hosi intrevista ida

- Intrevistas sei lori besik 45 minutus to'o oras ida
- Intrevistas sei grava, transkreve, no tuir mai traduz ba Ingles
- Konteudu intrevista sei analiza no data sei hetan kona ba tokipu Identidade Nasional no media massa

(2) Hau sei konvida mos atu partisipa iha disukusaun grupu atu koalia kona ba isu Identidade Nasional Timorense iha kontextu kolektivu

- Fokus Grupu ne'e sei halao ho tempu 60-90 minutus
- Diskusaun iha grupu bele video (karik bele), ka grava, atu bele hetan transkrisaun no traduz ba Ingles

- Konteudu diskusaun grupu sei hetan analiza no sei hetan data kona ba topiku Identidade Nasional no media massa

Saida maka hau sei hetan ho hau nia partisipasaun?

Partisipasaun iha estudu ne'e voluntariu. Wainhira partisipa iha intrevista ka diskusaun grupu ita bo'ot sei bele tulun hau atu komprende liu tan kona ba formasaun identidade nasional iha Timor-Leste no paper media massa iha prosesu ne'e. Ita bo'ot mos sei hetan oportunidade atu halo kontribuisaun bo'ot ida ba peskiza iha area Identidade Nasional no said mak signifika identifika nudar ema Timor ohin loron no iha nasaun independente Timor-Leste. Ita bo'ot nia partisipasaun mos sei aumenta matenek kona halo nusa identidade mosu iha nasaun sira ho historia hanesan Timor-Leste. Kopia final tese ida ne'e sei arkivu iha Universidade Nasional Timor-Leste no instituisoens edukasaun seluk iha Australia atu bele fahe matenek foun nebe hetan hosi peskiza ne'e.

Halo nusa mak informasaun hau fo sei uza?

Informasaun ne'e sei hetan sei uza deit atu bele hetan matenek diak liu tan kona ba isu Identidade Nasional iha Timor-Leste no paper media massa iha prosesu ne'e. Lia-fuan balun bele uza ba prosesu perkiza no mos sei bele uza iha publikasoens nebe sei hetan liu hosi projektu ne'e. Publikasoens mak hanesan CD/DVD ho textu, imajens, no audio, iha artigus akademiku, ka iha jornal nebe aprezenta iha konferensias akademikas.

Riskus saida maka iha wainhira hau partisipa iha projektu ida ne'e?

La os intensaun projektu ida ne'e atu tau ita bo'ot iha risku ruma no hau sei respeitu ita bo'ot nia privasidade. Ita bo'ot nia partisipasaun voluntariu no kita bo'ot bele para wainhira/karik hakarak. Karik hau nia perguntas ka topikus halo ita bo'ot senti diskonfortu ita bo'ot bele husu hau atu muda perguntas, ka para intrevista no hahu fali wainhira iha bo'ot pronto, ka bele husu hau atu para kompletu intrevista ne'e.

Karik ita bo'ot partisipa iha diskusaun grupu hau sei fo hatene katak iha tan riskus potensial wainhira partisipa iha diskusaun grupu. Durante diskusaun grupu anonimatu sei lakon no mos sei hamenus konfidensialidade tanba presenza ema seluk iha diskusaun laran. Partisipantes sei hetan informasaun molok diskusaun grupu katak komentariu ne'ebe halo no rejista sei rai nudar konfidensial iha publikasoens tuir mai. Respondentes mos sei hetan informasaun katak tanba natureza diskusaun grupu, no maske komentariu konfidensial, katak buat hotu ne'ebe hatete sei la konfidensial no anonimu ba respondentes sira seluk ne'ebe sei partisipa iha diskusaun grupu hanesan. Maske ida ne'e hau sei husu ba respondentes hotu atu la bele fahe komentariu no informasaun ne'ebe kolegas diskusaun halo ne'ebe la apropriadu ba dominiu publiku.

Karik respondente ida ne'ene partisipa iha intrevistas ka diskusaun grupu senti stress ka deskonfortu, hau sei sujere atu nia ba hasoru ho konselleirus professional hosi ONG nasional PRADET ka servisus apoio konsel ne'ebe bele hetan gratis liu hosi ospital nasional iha Dili.

Halo nusa maka projektu ne'e sei halao?

Hau sei konvida ita bo'ot atu koalia kona ba isu Identidade Nasional Timorense ho hau nudar peskizador liu hosi intrevista nebe sei dura 45 minutus – oras ida. Intrevista ne'e sei grava ho ita bo'ot nia permisaun, sei transkreve, no sei traduz. Konteudu intrevistas sei analiza no data sei hetan kona ba topiku Indendade Nasional.

No mos/ka hau sei konvida ita bo'ot atu partisipa iha diskusaun grupu kona ba isu Identidade Nasional Timorense. Sesaun ida ne'e sei halao ba 60-90 minutus. Diskusaun grupu bele video, ka grava ho ita bo'ot nia permisaun, atu bele hetan transkrisaun, no atu traduz ba Ingles. Konteudu intrevistas sei analiza no sei hetan data kona ba topiku Identidade Nasional.

Sei mak sei halao estudu ida ne'e?

Peskiza ne'e sei halao hosi Dr Les Terry hanesan Investigador Prinsipal no nia kontaktu mak (+613) 94825285 ka liu hosi email: les.terry@vu.edu.au

No hosi Emanuel Braz, Estudante PhD, no nia kontaktu mak (+613) 97045693 ka (+670 7332375) ka liu hosi email: emanuel.braz@live.vu.edu.au

Karik iha tan perguntas ka preokupasaun seluk kona ba maneira estudu ne'e halao bele kontaktu Secretary, Victoria University Human Research Ethics Committee, Victoria University, PO Box 14428, Melbourne, VIC, 8001 phone (03) 9919 4781.

Appendix 3 - Human Research Ethics Consent Form (English)

INFORMATION TO PARTICIPANTS INVOLVED IN RESEARCH

You are invited to participate

You are invited to participate in a research project entitled *Fragile identities: national identity and the media in Timor-Leste.*

This project is being conducted by a student researcher, Emanuel Antonio Braz, Associate Investigator, as part of a PhD study at Victoria University under the supervision of Dr Russell Wright, Principal Investigator, from the School of Social Sciences, Victoria University.

Project explanation

This research project will increase the body of knowledge on the topic of nation-making and national identity within Timor-Leste and the role of the mass media in this process. The project will examine the experience of Timor-Leste as one of the world's *newest* nations and the complex process of national formation, including, in particular, the task of creating a new citizenry in a new nation.

The specific aims of the research are to:

- Examine the nature of national-identity formation within the broader narratives of the nation within Timor-Leste;
- Examine the role the media plays in crafting a distinctly East Timorese political identity;
- Identify the ways in which diverse cultural groups and social actors are negotiating the transition to independent nationhood;
- Analyze the role played by activists in the construction of national identity and nationhood.

What will I be asked to do?

I would like to interview you through one or both of the following ways:

(1)

- I will invite you to discuss the issue of East Timorese National Identity and the mass media with me as the researcher through an in-depth face-to-face interview
- The interview will take approximately 45 minutes to one hour of your time
- The interview will be recorded, transcribed, and later translated to English

- The content of the interview will also be analyzed and data will be generated on the topic of National Identity and the mass media

(2)

- I will invite you to participate in a focus group discussion to discuss the issue of East Timorese National Identity and the mass media in a collective context
- The focus group interactions will take approximately 60 – 90 minutes
- The focus group interactions may be video-taped (if consented), or recorded, so they can be later transcribed, and translated to English
- The content of the focus group interactions will also be analyzed and data will be generated on the topic of National Identity and the mass media

What will I gain from participating?

Your participation in this study is voluntary. By participating in an interview and/or in a focus group discussion you will be able to help me understand how national identity if being formulated in Timor-Leste and the role the mass media plays in this regard. You will also have the opportunity to make an important contribution to research into the area of National Identity and what it means to be East Timorese today and in an independent Timor-Leste. Your participation will also increase the body of knowledge on how national identity emerges in national with a similar historical background as Timor-Leste. A copy of the final thesis will be place at the National University of Timor-Leste and with key educational institutions in Australia to ensure ready access to the research information.

How will the information I give be used?

Information you share will be used only for the purposed of developing a better understanding of the issue of National Identity in Timor-Leste and the role of the mass media. Some of your words may be used to research purposes and possibly in publications produced from this project. Potential publications include books, and may also include CD/DVD containing text, images and audio files, in academic articles, and in papers presented to academic conferences.

What are the potential risks of participating in this project?

It is not the intention of this research project to cause you any harm and it will respect your privacy. Your participation is of course voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time. If any of my questions or topics begin to upset or cause you any discomfort you can either ask me to change the subject, to halt the interview and recommence when you are ready, or to stop completely.

How will this project be conducted?

You will be invited to discuss the issue of East Timorese National Identity with me as the researcher through an in-depth interview that should take approximately 45 minutes to one hour of your time. This interview will be recorded with your permission, transcribed, and

translated. The content of the interview will also be analyzed and data will be generated on the topic of National Identity.

And/or you will be invited to participate in a focus group discussion to discuss the issue of East Timorese National Identity in a group setting. These sessions will take approximately 60 – 90 minutes. The focus group interactions may be video-taped, or recorded with permission only, and will be transcribed, and translated to English. The content of the interview will also be analyzed and data will be generated on the topic of National Identity.

Who is conducting the study?

This research is being conducted by Dr Russell Wright as the Principal Investigator and he can be contacted on (+613) 9370-3389 or via email: Russell.Wright@vu.edu.au

And by Emanuel Braz, Associate Investigator, and he can be contacted on (+613) 97045693 or via email: emanuel.braz@live.vu.edu.au

Any queries about your participation in this project may be directed to the Principal Investigator listed above.
If you have any queries or complaints about the way you have been treated, you may contact the Secretary, Victoria University Human Research Ethics Committee, Victoria University, PO Box 14428, Melbourne, VIC, 8001 phone (03) 9919 4781.