Evaluating Tuđman’s Foreign Policy - (Un)successful Protection of National Interest; From Defender to Despot

This is the Published version of the following publication


The publisher’s official version can be found at http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=212034
Note that access to this version may require subscription.

Downloaded from VU Research Repository https://vuir.vu.edu.au/41760/
Evaluating Tuđman's Foreign Policy
(Un)successful Protection of National Interest; From Defender to Despot
Bojana Klepač Pogrmilović*

Summary

The majority of Croatian foreign policy creators and certain scholars evaluate Croatian foreign policy as very successful, especially when compared to domestic policy. Furthermore, the first Croatian president Franjo Tuđman – the main creator of Croatian foreign policy during the 1991-2000 period – is often invoked as a supreme defender of Croatian national interests. This article challenges such positions by setting up a normative framework, which states that Croatian national interest was (is) to become a functional Europeanized parliamentary democracy, based on values, norms and principles formulated in acquis communautaire. Through simplified normativism, the article evaluates four main points: “respect for sovereignty”, “peace”, “market economy” and “rule of law” in which the Croatian foreign policy, whose main creator was Franjo Tuđman, largely contributed to the alienation of Croatia from its vital national interest. The final part of the article evaluates Tuđman’s thought that focuses mainly on the position of small peoples within multinational entities, democracy, Croatia and the EU etc. One of the main reasons of a failed democratic transition is found in Tuđman’s perception that Croatia became a democratic state just by formally adopting a democratic Constitution.

Key words: Franjo Tuđman, national interests, Croatian foreign policy, Europeanization, (de)Tuđmanization

Introduction

On the “historical day for Croatia”, when its “return to Europe” was finally about to happen, there were “two Croats”. One celebrating the “new” Croatia, and the other

* Bojana Klepač Pogrmilović is a doctoral candidate in doctoral study programme of Political Science at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

1 The majority of the material quoted in this article was in the Croatian language. It is not official, but author’s translations. Note: the term narod (and its derivatives like narodni) that is often translated as “nation” is translated in this text as “peoples” and term “nation” is a translation of Croatian word nacija.
The first celebration, attended by 15,000 people, among them high Croatian and European officials, began with the Croatian national anthem and exactly at midnight, on the 1st of July, the EU anthem was performed. The other celebration, attended by 50,000 people and a few Croatian officials and war generals began with Franjo Tuđman's speech about those who are “against Croatian freedom and independence” and who “align themselves with all adversaries of Croatian independence and sell themselves for Judas’ thirty pieces of silver”. More than a decade after his death, the first president of the independent Croatian state, Franjo Tuđman, is still omnipresent in Croatian politics. His thoughts are quoted, his figure invoked whenever patriotism is at stake. Tuđmanization is often perceived as a desirable course towards which Croatia (Croatian politics) should strive and he is perceived (often by both the left wing and the right wing politicians) as a supreme defender of Croatian national interests or, to quote the current president of HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) Tomislav Karamarko, as “the greatest Croat of the 20th century”. Therefore, to illuminate one part of his work and rule, this article proposes a normative evaluation of Croatian foreign policy (CFP) during Franjo Tuđman’s rule, from 1991 to 2000. The main argument primarily attacks the position that Croatian foreign policy was very successful and that Franjo Tuđman was the protector of Croatian national interests. The argument is different from the perception and the arguments presented by certain scholars and the majority of Croatian foreign policy creators who perceive Croatian foreign policy as very successful, especially when referring to domestic policy, which was “less successful”.

2 Marko Perković Thompson (1966, Čavoglave) is a famous Croatian singer, known for patriotic and nationalistic songs, sometimes characterized as pro-Ustaša. He is often described as controversial, because some members of his audience frequently appear in his concerts with Ustaša insignia and some of the songs he performed glorify the Ustaša regime. Thompson had a concert in Split on the same day (July 30, 2013) as the (central) “Celebration of Croatia’s Accession to the European Union” in Zagreb.

3 Franjo Tuđman’s well-known speech, given at Pleso Airport in Zagreb, right after his return from the United States where he received medical care, on November 23, 1996: “We shall not allow the remains of the Yugo-Communist nor the Yugo-Serbian system, the situation we found in Croatia at the time of establishing Croatian freedom and democracy. We shall not allow them to put it all into question. We shall not allow these Yugo-Communist remains, or those political dilettantes, headless muddle-heads who don’t see what really goes on in Croatia today and in the world with all sorts of regional plans... We shall not allow those who align themselves with the black devil himself against Croatian freedom and independence, not only with the black, but also with green and yellow devils... We shall not allow those who align themselves with adversaries of Croatian independence, not only align, but offer themselves, not only offer, but sell themselves for Judas’ thirty pieces of silver... And they align themselves with everybody, from the fundamentalist extremists to all sorts of false prophets, pseudo-democratic bluffers who preach to us today grand ideas about human rights and the freedom of media” (translated from Croatian by Nebojša Blanuša).

4 Croatian Democratic Union (Croatian: Hrvatska demokratska zajednica – HDZ) is a Christian democratic, conservative and the main centre-right, oppositional political party in Croatia that was founded in 1989 by Franjo Tuđman.
The article aims to show how foreign policy – whose main creator was Franjo Tudman – contributed to domestic policy in alienating Croatia from its main national interest, which is to become a functional Europeanized parliamentary democracy, based on values, norms and principles formulated in *acquis communautaire*. The article consists of three parts. The first part sets up a normative framework, defines the Croatian national interest and introduces the leading figure – the president Franjo Tudman. The second part of the article presents a successful side of Croatian foreign policy and afterwards evaluates its unsuccessfulness. Through the four main points – “respect for sovereignty”, “peace”, “market economy” and “rule of law” – the article shows that Croatian foreign policy was successful in achieving only a few goals, but in fact was not clever nor successful when it came to accomplishing the above specified normative (national) interest. The third part of the article deals with Franjo Tudman’s thought and attempts to get behind his policy and see how he, who is often invoked as a supreme protector of Croatian national interests, became its despot. His thought greatly contributed to his policy-making and it is hence very important to illuminate Tudman’s positions towards the EU, multinational entities, integrations, democracy, Croatia within the EU etc., in order to observe how it influenced the alienation of Croatia from its national interest. One of the reasons why true democratic transition of Croatia has failed can be seen in Tudman’s perception that Croatia became a real parliamentary democracy just by adopting a democratic Constitution.

### Setting up a Normative Framework

Realist school of international relations emphasizes the role of national interests in the creation of foreign policy. Tudman perceived himself as a scientist – a historian on the one hand, to whom rational scepticism and relativism are inherent, and a statesman on the other, characterized by political optimism and pragmatism (see Tudman, 2009:115). His close co-workers mostly perceived him as a “realist politician” (see Nobilo, 2000 and Rudolf, 1999). Evaluating his scientific and political work, he would in many aspects largely fit somewhere within the framework of normative political realism, whose imperative states that “each state should promote its own national interest and interests of other states, only if they comply with its own national interest” (Jolić, 2011:48). Vukadinović writes that national interests are “whatever wants to be achieved or preserved in relation to other states”. In theory, national interests are often defined as constant foreign policy lines that are above internal policy agreements or disagreements (Vukadinović, 2009:155). A frequently quoted definition accused of tautology and poor analytical contribution states that “national interest is whatever decision makers say it is” (Furniss and Snyder in: Jolić, 2011:46). On the other hand, Jović states that “countries' foreign policy is subject to change, as all other public policies, and therefore doesn’t need to be mystified with
'national interests’ phrase” (Jović, 2011:24). This article does not attempt to challenge various definitions of national interests, nor to further mystify “national interests”, because this concept is already, at least in Croatia, “mystified” by the public, abused by politicians and insufficiently discussed by scientists. Therefore the article proposes a normative national interests framework fully in line with national interest(s) proclaimed by the Croatian main decision maker. On several occasions, Franjo Tuđman emphasised that the “inclusion in Europe and Europeanization of Croatia” are in Croatia’s best interest. “Along with internal democratic transition all the necessary steps need to be taken into account for including Croatia in the European Community as soon as possible” (Sabor.hr, 1990). Through the eyes of the majority of Croatian foreign policy creators of Tuđman’s era and certain authors, most of the foreign policy goals were achieved, Croatian national interests were secured and Croatian foreign policy was “very, very successful” (except when it came to the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina). However, if it is observed through another normative lens, Croatian foreign policy becomes much less clever and successful and it did not serve national interest(s) that well.

National interest of Franjo Tuđman was basically ethnical interest of the Croats: divide Bosnia and achieve Great Croatia, clean Croatia from the Serbs, create a ‘small power’ in the Balkans that will play the role of policeman in the region, build authoritarian and autarchic state which will develop its own democratic model that will in reality be a nationalistic dictatorship. Furthermore, impose that model on Europe and force it to accept Croatia as such, without real interaction with the democratic and cultural values of contemporary Europe (Grubiša, 2001).

If one defines Tuđman’s national interest as Grubiša did, then Tuđman’s policy, both domestic and foreign, was a complete failure – neither clever nor successful and it failed to serve national interests as well. However, the article will not employ Grubiša’s definition, but will focus on the normative criticism of Croatian foreign policy. As stated before, the set normative framework is established around the claim that the national interest of the Croatian state is to become a functional, Europeanized parliamentary system.

---

5 The article especially challenges prof. Dejan Jović’s thesis of a “very, very successful foreign policy in the last 20+ years... Taking into account what domestic policy was like, foreign policy was saving and palliated”. Although such claims can be defended, especially when taking into account that the main goals were achieved (see chapter (Specious) Success of Croatian Foreign Policy), if observing the CFP through a different – “normative lens” – success becomes seriously disputable.

6 For this purpose I will not enter into an extensive scientific debate on the meaning of Europeanization, but will rather adopt a definition of Europeanization as “accepting liberal, enlightened and democratic values in the political culture of Central European and East European peoples” (Prpić, 2004:46). Furthermore, I will agree that in the case of Croatia we can employ “retrospective Europeanization” that can be explained through these three steps:
1) rejecting the communist system of government,
2) enabling the penetration of European institutions into the national systems of government,
democracy based on *acquis communautaire*. Before further evaluation, it is important to observe the argument that the “foreign policy is a reflection of internal processes, restrictions and fears of the political elite or its courage and determination”. Throughout the article emphasis is put on foreign policy and its effect on national interest(s). However, a distinction line between foreign and domestic policy is sometimes very thin. “Searching those accused of war crimes by the Hague Tribunal, judicial reform in order to make Croatian courts more effective, caring for the freedom of the media, are equally foreign policy issues as well as issues used in the internal political struggles” (Jakovina, 2010:84). Therefore, domestic and foreign policy will sometimes overlap. Article will not extensively elaborate the policy of the international community towards Croatia during the 1990s. It will require an entirely new detailed research. The focus is mainly put on Croatian (foreign) policy, irrespective of the sometimes “shameful” policy led by some “foreign forces”.

**Franjo Tuđman – A Symbol of Croatia (Croatian Policy) and a Supreme Defender of Croatian National Interests**

The article focuses on (the work of) Franjo Tuđman since he is considered to be the main Croatian (foreign) policy creator – both from his own and from a domestic and often external point of view. “Tuđman saw himself as the personification of Croatian unity” and Croats saw him as “the father of the nation” (Bellamy, 2003:67). Even though formally, foreign policy is “led by the head of state, the government and parliament (FP committe) within the countries’ constitutional framework”, young Croatian state had a different experience (Nick, 1997:56). The instrumentalization of political functions was present so “the president can decide everything by himself” (Blanuša, 2011:52). Mate Granić states that “Tuđman had complete control over the Ministry of Defence, Foreign Affairs and the police, as well as the intelligence, sometimes even controlling the work of the Ministry of Finance”. Furthermore, when Tuđman appointed Granić as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he said: “Don’t forget that I am, according to the Constitution, the only head of state and in regard to any problem, you have to come to me.”

---

7 Great Britain, France and Russia were usually mentioned and perceived as “pro-Serbian enemies” (see Tomac, 2012 and Rudolf, 1999).

8 This can clearly be observed through Tuđman’s rhetoric, because he often referred to himself as the “highest representative of the Croatian people”, “statesman”, “sovereign”, “president of all Croats” etc. “He prefers to call himself the Head of State more than simply the President”. Therefore, any “attempt to endanger the Head of State is an attempt to decapitate Croatia” (see Uzelac, 2013).

9 Mate Granić (Baška Voda, 1947) was the Vice President of the Croatian Government (1991-1993) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1993-2000).
foreign policy is not a governmental issue” (Granić, 2005:47-49). Interestingly, even more than a decade after his death, the rhetoric that identifies Tuđman with Croatia and Croatian patriotism remains. Or, in the words of Tomislav Karamarko, “de-Tuđmanization means de-Croatization of HDZ and the Croatian society” (Jutarnji list, 2013). Zdravko Tomac10 states that “Tuđmanism means gathering of patriotic forces and finding a place for action of different political options and different people that are connected by patriotism” (Tomac, 2012:352). Abuse and mystification of the “national interests” concept is partially related to the political discourse of the 1990s, especially Tuđman’s rhetoric. In Croatia’s daily politics Tuđman is often invoked as a supreme protector of Croatian national interests (see Tomac, 2012:347).11 Davorin Rudolf12 states how Tuđman was a statesman who often irritated other politicians, mainly because “he wouldn’t give Croatia for anything. It can be observed through his talks with Kinkel or Albright; fathers flew because he was always firmly defending Croatian national interests” (HRT, 2010). Interestingly, when commenting on Tuđman-Izetbegović Agreement, Rudolf states how “it was a mistake, harmful for Croatian national interests. Negotiators were superficial and politicians who made the decisions weren’t patriotic enough” (Slobodna Dalmacija, 2012). Suddenly the chief negotiator and the main politician became less patriotic. After 2000 things changed and the “once beloved and respected president Franjo Tuđman was being presented as a product and a representative of Balkan mentality. Such a turn changed the political climate in the country because it meant the ending of the identification of Croatia and Tuđman and the identification of Croatia with Tuđman” (Zambelli, 2010:56). However, as stated above, in the year when Croatia entered the EU, Tuđman was again perceived as a simbol of “Croatization”, patriotism and defence of Croatian national interests, because “to re-Tuđmanize the Croatian state and HDZ is the biggest accomplishment, not just for HDZ, but also for Croatia and Croatian national interests in general” (Tomac, 2012:350).

10 Zdravko Tomac (Garčin, 1937) was, as a member of SDP (Social Democratic Party of Croatia, former League of Communists of Croatia), the Vice President of the Government (1991-1992) and a member of Croatian Parliament (1993-2003).

11 Surprisingly, a similar claim was recently (September, 2012) indirectly underpinned when Croatian Prime Minister, the president of SDP (Social Democratic Party of Croatia), Zoran Milanović defended Tuđman’s policy in 1999 – the Agreement with Alija Izetbegović. When HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) accused Milanović to be a trader of Croatian national interests because he was giving away a small part of Croatia’s territory to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milanović invoked “Tuđman’s will” claiming that “he (Tuđman, A/N) knew for sure what Croatia was”. Usually, if Tuđman’s role of a supreme “Croatian national interest defender” is questioned (mostly by the so called “left intellectuals”), such individuals immediately become discredited by attributes such as Yugonostalgic, communist, Serbian, Yugo-communist, Serbo-communist and all sorts of similar derogatory names.

12 Davorin Rudolf (Omiš, 1934) was the Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs from May 3 until July 31, 1991. Later on he became the ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia to the UN. He is a member of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts.
(Specious) Success of Croatian Foreign Policy

It would be unfair, inaccurate and one-sided to declare Croatian foreign policy (and policy makers) completely unsuccessful. From (not just) a normative point of view, Croatian foreign policy was, when observing the achievement of stated goals, successful and clever. These aims were considered to be of great national interest and were successfully achieved. Rudolf claims that the Croatian “goal was to proclaim and preserve the independent democratic Croatian state” (Rudolf, 1999:376). After the Croatian state was established it was especially important to achieve international recognition. However, it is hard to measure to what extent international recognition was connected with skilled diplomacy and clever moves of the Croatian foreign policy actors. Mario Nobilo, for example, mentions “Serbian aggression” as an external factor that “speeded up recognition”. Interestingly, Tuđman admits that very often “the old glory of Tito” was responsible for the success in the achievement of international recognition. “Wherever we representatives of Croatia show up in Asia, Africa, they ask for Tito. When we say Tito was a Croat, it makes it easier for them to support us as Independent Croatia” (Predsjednik.hr, 1996). After signing the Dayton Agreement, Tuđman announced that the “great and holy aim of the Croatian people was the attainment of total sovereignty over its entire, internationally recognised territory” (Bellamy, 2003:72). Croatia is an internationally recognized, independent state that managed to reintegrate its territory peacefully. “With skilled diplomacy and policy, this time using international factors, on January 15, 1998 Croatia recovered Croatian Podunavlje” (Rudolf, 1999:392). Gračić openly claims how Tuđman should get the most credit for that. Furthermore, it is important to note that, for example, successful “play” on the quasi-acceptance of the Z4 plan is also considered to be Tuđman’s clever and farsighted move. The perception in Croatia, especially after the war, was that “Tuđman would not only protect Croatia from the Serbian threat; he would also stand up to the ‘Great Powers’ who threatened Croatia’s national interests” (Razsa, Lindstrom, 2004:643). Throughout his speeches

13 Even though it will not be debated in the article, because it mainly observes CFP from Croatian independence onwards, it is interesting to observe Vesna Pusić’s opinion on independence that is completely opposite from what the other foreign policy actors claim(ed). Pusić states how “Croatia became independent from Yugoslavia in June 1991 more as a result of being pushed than because of any plan”, which undermines the attributed role of crucial political actors in the achievement of Croatian independence (Pusić, 1998:111).

14 Mario Nobilo (Korčula, 1952) was Franjo Tuđman’s spokesman in 1990, and from 1991-1992 his foreign policy adviser. Furthermore, he was the Vice President of the Croatian Council of European Movement and the Europe House in Zagreb (1990-1992) and the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations (1992-1997).

15 Reintegration is considered to be primarily an “internal policy goal, however, it has important foreign policy dimensions”, as stated by Rudolf, “because it can’t be achieved without an active foreign policy” (Jović, 2011:10).
and interviews Tuđman strongly fought against EU’s “regional approach” in the name of the protection of national interests.\(^{16}\) He was strongly convinced that “foreign forces” (from all over the EU and the world) were trying to push Croatia back to the Balkans and create a new Yugoslavia, and he greatly opposed the Western Balkan concept. Eventually, the regional approach was slowly abolished and Croatia has entered the EU independently from other “Western Balkan” countries. Furthermore, during Tuđman's era Croatia became member of the UN and member of the Council of Europe, which is also considered to be a great foreign policy success. Therefore, in some aspects, foreign policy moved Croatia towards Europeanized parliamentary democracy. However, Croatian policy was often, with a little help from foreign policy, moving the country away from that goal. The next chapter will show the four most critical steps that largely contributed to the alienation of Croatia from the process of becoming a functional democracy.

The defeat of Croatian Foreign Policy

This chapter will evaluate major mistakes of Croatian foreign policy and its main creator, presented in four main points – respecting sovereignty, peace, free and fair trade and the rule of law. Ivo Banac stated: “If there was no Tuđman, I am sure that Croatia would already be in the EU.” (Jutarnji list, 2007) Furthermore, unlike the often-quoted thesis on “Croatia's rush to join the EU”, some other scholars claim that Croatia is entering the EU too late (Despot, Reljić, 2011:1). “Croatia is going to enter the EU too late. It is like you are coming to a party at 3 am when all the guests are leaving” (Niall Ferguson for Tportal.hr, 2011). Branimir Lokin claims that the economic benefit for Croatia will be poor to none, because Croatia is “entering the EU a little bit too late” (Novi list, 2011). Or, in other words, “the only real problem with Croatian membership in the EU is the fact that we are not there yet” (Jakovina, 2010:91). Even though Banac is “sure”, it is very difficult to prove actual causality and claim that “Brussels” would have acted differently if Tuđman's foreign (and domestic) policy was different and that Croatia would have already been an EU member state. Also, it is a rather demanding task to determine what “too late” really means. Many scholars argue that Brussels does not actually act upon the fulfilment of the membership criteria, but it rather acts on pure political decision/will. However, what could be argued is the fact that because of Tuđman's “un-clever” policy (both domestic and foreign), Croatia did not become a Europeanized parliamentary democracy. As stated by Grubiša, “Croatia is the only country among all the countries in transition where process of retrospective Europeanization lasted too

\(^{16}\) Ivo Sanader also firmly emphasized the importance of an individual approach and not a regional one, when it comes to Croatia’s accession to the EU (see Sanader, 1999).
long” (Grubiša, 2012:31). One could immediately employ the “war argument”, which is fully legitimate and quite correct. “Croatia is the only post-communist country in which the process of democratic transition coincided with the process of creating a state by means of war” (Kasapović, 1996:84). In other words, “the fact that it (Croatia, A/N) went through a serious conflict has made its democratization and Europeanization much more difficult” (Jović, 2011:37). However, “Croatia is also the only one among all the countries in transition that has rejected professional help offered by the European Community in designing its legislation” (Grubiša, 2012:32). Banac states how Croatia “was facing the post-war blues”, both on the international level, by isolation, and the domestic level, because Croatian “economy was nearly shuttered by deindustrialization, which was not caused by war but by Tuđman’s policies” (Banac, 2009:468). One clear example of his harmful behaviour for the national interests was refusing CEFTA membership for Croatia, because of his paranoid fear of a new Yugoslavia and a “regional approach”. In 1995 the Croatian Institute for International Relations published a Strategy – the effects of joining CEFTA on the Croatian economy – which presented a conclusion that Croatia should be involved in the “international European space of free trade, because every delay opens up new negative effects” (Vuković, Vizjak 2001:120). Therefore, some “un-clever” aspects of Tuđman’s domestic and foreign policy contributed to the slow Europeanization and to the “de-Europeanization”.17 Tuđman was constantly arguing and proving Croatia’s historical position in Europe, its “return to Europe”, its Middle-European heritage far away from the Balkans. However, it was his “policy that ultimately distanced Croatia from Europe and placed it firmly back in the ‘Balkans’, in a political sense”, which was harmful for Croatian national interest(s) (Jović, 2006:93). Attempt to build internally and present externally Croatia as a Europeanized parliamentary democracy has failed. Nobilo states how lesser diplomatic mistakes were made before the Homeland war, however “Croatia did not use its winner status, because after 1995, there was a decline of its international reputation and those years were lost” (Camo.ch, Lopandic). Violation of human and minority rights, freedom of the press and unfair elections happening in the domestic political arena were not directly foreign policy’s fault. However, all those events had a large impact on the demolition of Croatia’s image in the international political surroundings. Due to the fact that they fall primarily under the domestic policy domain, those cases will not be evaluated. Foreign policy (also) played a great role in “Croatia’s fall from grace, from the euphoric declarations of returning to Europe in the early 1990s to the lamentations by the late 1990s of being relegated to the status of a small, marginal, autocratic state” (Razsa, Lindstrom, 2004:637). Following paragraphs will present four points, evalu-
ting the role of foreign policy in Croatia’s alienation from becoming a “Europeanized parliamentary democracy”.

1. Respecting Sovereignty – “Once upon a time in the East”

“I said: Either this kind of Bosnia that will also ensure the interests of Croatian peoples or – division! I also said: one part to Serbia, one part to Croatia, and there can remain a small Muslim state in the middle – that historical small country of Bosnia that would not have the possibility to have ambitions to create some kind of a great Islamic state in Europe” (Novi list, 2005). As shown in this Tudman’s statement from September 17, 1991, the biggest black stains on Croatian foreign policy are related to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The “division of Bosnia”, “aggression on Bosnia” and Dayton agreement were probably the most harmful for Croatia (Croatian national interests). Bosnia is a “focal point” where foreign policy played a great role in the alienation of Croatia from its normative interest. Ivo Banac states how “Tuđman was really responsible for the division of Bosnia. He was always pledging for what was a nonsense that harmed all peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia as well” (24 sata, 2011). Vukadinović states how “Croatia was the only country that has rejected the membership in the Council of Europe mainly because of the “behaviour regarding the Bosnia and

---

18 Even though it could be challenged, I consider the policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina to be a foreign policy, because Bosnia was a sovereign state from October 1990.

19 Detailed transcripts that witness Franjo Tuđman’s division of Bosnia are published in 2005; two volumes in more than 1000 pages. The original title of the book, “Stenogrami Franje Tuđmana o podjeli Bosne i Hercegovine”, published by Feral Tribune (Split, Croatia) and Dani (Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina)

20 Along with the “division of Bosnia” comes a thesis on the Croatian “aggression on Bosnia”. In 2011, the Hague prosecution stated that there was in fact “a joint criminal enterprise” led by Franjo Tuđman, whose goal was “to create an ethnically clean Greater Croatia with the persecution of Bosniaks and non-Croatian citizens from those parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina that were supposed to unite with Croatia”. A recent verdict (May 2013) found all the six accused political/military officials from Herzegovina guilty and stated that Franjo Tuđman participated in this “joint criminal enterprise”.

21 If observed through the “normative lens”, peace would be the highest value, so therefore the Dayton Agreement will not be disputed as harmful for national interest(s). However, according to some FP creators, we could dare to argue that for a large majority of Croats, in Croatia and Bosnia, Dayton was highly unjust and harmful for the Croatian national interests. Mate Granić claims pressure on Tuđman was so high the he could not avoid such a solution. “The most important thing was that the war was over and peaceful integration of Podunavlje was ensured” (Granić, 2005:134). However, political and public discourse often emphasizes how “the aggressor was rewarded with 49 per cent of Bosnian territory” (Slavko Perović, Ivan Supek etc.). The Dayton compromise stopped the war, but also made Milošević look like a more skillful negotiator than Tudman. Zdravko Tomac states that immediately after Dayton was signed he criticized it in the media claiming it was “harmful for Croatian interests”. “While the church bells on St. Mark’s church rang and Mate Granić spoke in Parliament about Bosanska Posavina, people shouted from the streets: “Betrayal! Betrayal!” (Tomac, 2012:323).
The “Herzegovina problem” (Vukadinović, 1996:160). Or to put it differently, “Tuđman’s stance on the Bosnian question caused Croatia to be frequently rebuked by the international society. At best, Tuđman was clumsy in his dealings with the Bosnian question” (Bellamy, 2003:72). In his memoirs, Nobilo plainly stated his disagreements and criticism towards Tuđman’s politics in Bosnia. Nobilo wrote how Tuđman openly presented the issues such as the “division of Bosnia”, “just borders” etc. to some of the highest European officials. In 1991, at a meeting with the special French delegate Jacques Bolt Tuđman said: “Crisis cannot be solved without the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Nobilo, 2000:538). Granić does not exculpate Tuđman, but rather distributes the guilt. He states how it would be highly unjust to blame only Tuđman for the division of Bosnia because the international community played a great role in this policy. “Until the Washington Agreement was signed, the country was divided by everyone” (Granić, 2005:82). Balancing on the edge of international sanctions was a direct consequence of Tuđman’s policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even though the formal sanctions were avoided, informal ones were present. “As soon as it became obvious that Tuđman’s regime got into open games with Milošević on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a ‘Russian winter’ followed for Croats and Croatia in the European and the German media. A lot of time will need to pass for a picture of ‘another Croatia’ to be established in the consciousness of a regular western reader or viewer” (Lasić, 2011:51). Dušan Bilandžić22 claims that Tuđman told him, “Once we divide Bosnia, Sloba and I will be allies” (Nacional, 2012). Furthermore, Milan Kučan23 stated that, primarily, “it was a war against Bosnia and Herzegovina. Later on it gained certain characteristics of an ethnical conflict, but in fact it was a war against Bosnia and Herzegovina, based on an unrealised agreement between Milošević and Tuđman on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Seebiz.eu, 2012). Even though Hrvoje Šarinić – Tuđman’s main negotiator with Milošević – did not explicitly write anything about the division of Bosnia, his testimony on that matter in The Hague was interesting because “in the name of national interests” he could not testify on that subject (Nacional, 2004).24 The testimony of Paddy Ashdown at the Hague Tribunal was well remembered among the Croatian public. Ashdown was astonished by how indiscreet Tuđman was when dividing Bosnia “on the back of the menu”. He claims Tuđman drew the map and said that Bosnia will be “carved up between Serbia and Croatia and would simply disappear” (Youtube, 2010).

22 Dušan Bilandžić (Maljkovo, 1924) is a Croatian historian, politician and a member of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, who was Tuđman’s representative in Belgrade after 1991.
23 Milan Kučan (Križevci, 1941) was the first president of the Republic of Slovenia (1991-2002).
24 It is interesting to observe what Šarinić states about Tuđman’s position towards Bosnia: “Tuđman did not believe in the integrity of Bosnia. As a historian, he believed Bosnia is a historical absurd. However, as a realistic politician, he changed his position, adopted it to reality, recognized Bosnia and sent an ambassador to Sarajevo” (Šarinić, 1999: 85).
The Hague’s prosecutor Kenneth Scott, who supported the thesis of “rewriting Bosnia and Herzegovina”, underpinned these claims. He used many testimonies by “Croatian, Bosnian and foreign representatives and transcripts from the President’s Office. Witnesses showed that Tuđman was obsessed with the idea of the renewal of Banovina.25 In his memoirs Tomislav Jakić states that he will never forget Tuđman’s comment on the silhouette of Croatia’s map: “Look at the shape of this plumelet! Isn’t it obvious that something is missing?” (Jakić, 2010:224).

With no attempt to revile the “historical truth” on the “division of Bosnia” after what has been stated, Tuđman’s policy towards Bosnia was neither clever nor successful and harmed Croatian national interests. The epilogue to this chapter and the introduction to the next are presented in the explanation of the recent ICTY ruling, in the case of six wartime Bosnian-Croatian leaders, which states that Franjo Tuđman “participated in the joint criminal enterprise and took part in the decision of changing the ethnic make-up of Herzeg-Bosnia”.

2. Peace – “Dr Tuđman or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the War”

In this chapter, I will not elaborate whether the war could have been avoided and will not enter a debate with the thesis of Josip Boljkovac26 that “Croatia deliberately caused the war” because it would require new, extensive research (Slobodna Dalmacija, 2009). However, through the evaluation of “maintaining peace” as one of the highest values that was and still is fundamental for founding and preserving the EU, I will observe how “peace” was sometimes unfortunately only a declarative priority of Croatian (foreign) policy. Although Rudolf, in his memoirs War we didn’t want elaborates in detail how Croatian politicians were formally and informally against the war, Croatia was not always leading a “just” and “defensive” war in which it was “impossible to commit war crimes” (Tportal.hr, 2011).27 Tomislav Jakić, for example, states that “Živorad Kovačević wrote how the Americans were warning the leaders of Croatia and Slovenia not to go the way they intended, because there would be war, however, the answer was: We don’t care!” (Jakić, 2010:125). Furthermore, on the readiness to use all the “means of war”, Kasapović wrote: “Even though Croatia led a defensive war, the ruling party did not hesitate to use war in politics. War actions were sometimes used as a dynami-

25 “Scott underpinned this by quoting statements of the former Croatian Prime Minister Josip Manolić, the former American Ambassador in Croatia Peter Galbraith and also the book of the former Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mate Granić” (see HRSvijet.net, 2011).

26 Josip Boljkovac (Vukova Gorica, 1920) was the first Minister of Internal Affairs in the Government of Croatia.

zing factor for the inner political life of the country” (Kasapović, 1996:86). Richard Hoolbrooke stated how he and Peter Galbraith told Tuđman that there was “no excuse for the brutal treatment of Serbs that followed most Croatian military successes... I told Tuđman that the current Croatian behaviour might be viewed as a milder form of ethnic cleansing. Tuđman reacted strongly but did not quite deny it; if our information was correct, he said, he would put an immediate stop to it” (Holbrooke, 1998:166). However, ten months after this meeting, on July 22, 1996, Feral Tribune reported that “942 elderly citizens of Serbian nationality who stayed in their homes in the Krajina region were killed since September 1995, i.e. since all military actions in Krajina were stopped” (Uzelac, 1997). Lalović wrote how Croatian policy was “permanently looming danger of war, in the sense of the constant ideological production of enemies (both external and internal), inciting the nationally aware masses to a holy war as the ultimate confrontation with Evil” (Lalović, 2000:49). Great consequences of the “enemy production” policy were best visible on the economic front.

### 3. Free & Fair Trade – “Back to the Past”

Foreign policy has helped domestic “nationalistic capitalism” to drag Croatia further from becoming a functional market economy based on free and fair trade. Tuđman and HDZ were the creators of “nationalist capitalism” whose characteristics Blanuša describes as “frequent use of inner and outer enemies, nationalism and tolerance of neo-Ustašism, arbitrary and autocratic rule of the President, as well as the creation of parallel public authorities, the tycoonization of the economy, clientelism, the abuse of the secret services, the attempt to control the media and the long-lasting isolationism in the international politics” (Blanuša, 2011:55). Economical isolationism was present throughout the early 1990s when Croatia “aborted economic cooperation with certain economies that seemed to us unworthy of trade” (Jakovina, 2010:87). Even though the evaluation of criminal “conversion and privatization”, “200 rich families plan”, “the tycoonization of the economy” etc. will not be elaborated because they are primarily in the domain of domestic policy, as previously shown in the example of the refusal to join the CEFTA, foreign policy was (as well as domestic) unsuccessful in bringing Croatia closer to its normative interest. This was mostly the regional approach’s fault.

Any expert on the European methods of action will immediately object that the regional co-operation is condictio sine qua non for cooperation with Europe, but after this war, in these communities, all regional connections have a completely different significance. In any suggestions aimed at regional co-operation, connection or grouping, Croatian foreign policy reads primarily a danger of eventual reconstruction of a new Yugoslavia, or a group resembling it. Even quite harmless, very theoretical ideas on a certain Euroslavia, or a Federation of Adriatic States, have been received extremely negatively in Croatia. This
is aimed at making clear that after recently obtained independence, and one paid for dearly, there is no external force that could make Croatian policy accept any new ties, even if evident economic benefits were apparent (Vukadinović, 1996:162).

Paranoid fear of the renewal of Yugoslavia led Croatia “back into the Balkans” and stopped it from achieving certain economic benefits. “It was nearly impossible to turn on the television or radio, or to open a newspaper in Croatia in 1997 without learning about the danger of a world conspiracy aimed at forcing Croatia back into the Balkans” (Razsa, Lindstrom, 2004:18). Tuđman was, especially after 1995, convinced that “Europe tries in all areas to include Croatia in an ex-Yugoslav, Balkan, south-eastern European regional space” (Tuđman, 2009:166). The most common example of such “fear” is the famous speech from the beginning of this article, popularly known as “Black, Yellow and Green Devils”, where he accused some internal enemies of the Croatian state who compromised Croatian independence and sold themselves to foreign (Jewish) capital – “Judas’ thirty pieces of silver”. In 1997, fear culminated and got its legal shape. It entered the Croatian Constitution in the form of Article 135, which states that “it is prohibited to initiate any process of association of the Republic of Croatia with other states, if such an association led or could lead to the restoration of Yugoslav state community or any new Balkan state union in any form”. Therefore, Tuđman’s policy (domestic and foreign) did not use “internal and external circumstances for greater integration in the international community and economic development” (Turek, 2001:186). Although Croatia became a member of the UN and eventually a member of the Council of Europe, Tuđman did not use those memberships for bringing Croatia closer to becoming a functional free market economy. He rather “observed the UN membership more as a status symbol, a final confirmation of sovereignty and less as a mechanism of integrating Croatia in modern global currents” (Nobilo, 2000:267). Significantly, most of the crucial foreign policy goals in the economic and political integration were achieved (immediately) after Tuđman died.

4. The Rule of Law – “The (Un)usual Suspects”

The issues related to the rule of law and Croatia’s alienation from it through the catastrophic judicial reform, Tuđman’s breach of the Croatian Constitution etc. will not be

---

28 Translation by Dejan Jović, original text of the Article 135: “Zabranjuje se pokretanje postupka udruživanja RH u saveze s drugim državama, u kojem bi udruživanje dovelo, ili moglo dovesti do obnavljanja jugoslavenskog državnog zajedništva, odnosno nekog balkanskog državnog saveza u bilo kojem obliku”.

29 Croatia became a member of WTO and the Partnership for Peace in 2000. Negotiations for the Agreement on Stabilization and Accession opened in November 2000 at the Zagreb summit. At the end of 2002, the agreement for accession in CEFTA was signed.
elaborated because they (mainly) fall under the domestic policy domain. However, the rule of law was successfully obstructed on a foreign policy level on the example of (non) cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. Although on November 5, 1991 the Croatian Government initiated the formation of such a court, after realizing it was possible that some (high) Croatian officials could end up there, the obstruction started. In the words of Carla Del Ponte, “Instead of trying to reveal crimes and extradite offenders to the Court, as they have promised, three years before my arrival (1996, A/N), Tudman and other Croatian officials initiated and organized a secret obstruction of the (Hague) Tribunal’s work” (Del Ponte, Sudetic, 2008:241). Nobilo also openly spoke about such obstruction, claiming that the crucial issue in the Zagreb-Hague cooperation was the fact that Zagreb “didn’t want to enable insight into the documents that incriminate all persons who committed crimes, regardless of their origin, justifying such behaviour for safety reasons” (Nobilo, 2000:384). To conclude, in 1999 Tuđman said: “Not one Croatian general should go to the Hague, not as a witness, nor as a defendant” (Novi list, 2005).

**Behind the Policy – Tuđman’s Thought**

To sum up the arguments, the final chapter will focus on Franjo Tuđman’s thought and perception in order to offer a better understanding of his (un)successful policy-making that arises from his primarily nationalistic discourse. This chapter aims to reveal Tuđman’s position towards the EU and Croatia’s position in relation to the EU (and small peoples within multinational entities in general) on the one hand and one of the reasons why Croatia did not become a functional democracy on the other. “One of the main goals of Croatian foreign policy is the inclusion in the European integrations and the middle European civilizational and economic space”. On several occasions throughout the period of his rule, Tuđman emphasized that some of the main goals of Croatian foreign policy were the Europeanization and membership in the EU and NATO “as soon as possible”. For Tuđman, “Croats are – following their historical traditions consistently – among the most sincere advocates of the peaceful European integration of sovereign peoples” (Tuđman, 2009:195-202). However, regardless of these claims, Tuđman was often being described as a “Eurosceptic”, “anti-European nationalist”, “hostile towards Europe”, “Europhobic”, “suspicious towards liberal European ideas”. Apparently, Tuđman, as a historian, did not put much hope in this “Project”, but was more

---

30 Jović, on the other hand, states that the Croatian accession to the EU or the harmonization of policies with the EU was not a priority of the Croatian policy, until Tuđman’s death (see Jović, 2011:12).

31 These quotations are taken from two of Tuđman’s speeches: from April 21, 1997 in the Hungarian Parliament in Budapest (title: Croatian People Have Always Strived to Accomplish their Own Independent and Sovereign State) and from October 11, 1997 in the Council of Europe, Strasbourg (title: Croatia Has Always Been a Middle-European Country).
of a political “realist” who believed that national states are and will be the key players in the international arena (see Jović, 2011, Rudolf, 1999, Nobilo, 2000). His views were easily underpinned with the EU “being too passive in preventing the worst consequences of the war, being morally deficient and completely insensitive to the suffering of other Europeans or for remaining interested for too long in preserving the status quo, i.e. Yugoslavia” (Jović, 2011:39). However, his political behaviour and thoughts about the EU were modified according to the political circumstances, so accusing him of being Europhobic and hostile towards the EU and its very idea would be one-sided and unfair. In 1968, Tudman wrote that the only path Europe can take is to “neutralize and self-organize by uniting in the Union of European States in order to become an independent factor in world’s relations. This is a historical task of the whole world and the old Europe” (Tudman, 2009:41). Furthermore, there was one permanent, unchangeable “leading thought” that remained present throughout his ruling days – returning Croatia to its natural home, away from the Balkans, especially from Serbia. He was a strong advocate of the Croatian return “from the dark of one-party totalitarianism to the middle European and European civilization circle”; as opposed to the east European, orthodox civilization circle (Tudman, 2009:114).32 Croatia, with its “history, culture, geographic position, economy and mentality” has always belonged to this circle and a renewal of Croatian statehood needs to be based “on the principals of market economy, human rights, multi-party democracy, social partnership and European communion” (ibid. 115). For Tudman, it is “inappropriate to say that Croatia needs to be brought closer to Europe”, because it is already part of the western European civilization and Croatia has contributed significantly to its development and defence (ibid. 201).33 Integration is possible only and exclusively “with the countries from Western and Central Europe”, because this is where Croatia belongs “by nature of its civilization and culture” (ibid. 202).34 This is the key to the understanding of his thought, strongly influenced by Samuel Huntington, about the Croatian position within Europe and multinational and supranational entities. Tudman thought that any form of political-cultural association of nationally shaped subjects that come from different civilizations eventually contributes to destabilization. He did not believe globalization and integration would bring the world to the “failure of the classical nation-state” (Castels, 2003:334). On the contrary, he thought it lead to a more “nationalized individualization” (Tudman, 2009:221). His ideas were close to those which implying that “multi-national entities can, on the one hand, be a great support to a more globalized, closer world that can weaken nation-states, but on the other, it can stimulate – in a new way – ethnical and

32 October 20, 1990, a letter to the participants of the “Ost-West Symposium” in Vienna
33 25th November 1990, a thank you note for the honorary doctorate in the campus Lugano, Switzerland.
34 11th October 1997 in the Council of Europe, Strasbourg (title: Croatia has always been a Middle-European country).
cultural groups to demand their own local and regional autonomy” (Held, 1995:152). Tudman was deeply concerned about the interests, fate and position of small peoples. He believed that the Croatian people have always strived towards an independent and sovereign state. “Croatian national being had a consciousness about its national uniqueness and about the permanent values of its political and cultural heritage – from medieval rulers to its ingenious giants that contributed greatly to the European and global civilization”. That consciousness was not changed even by the “great”, “supranational ideas of Pan-Slavism, Austro-Slavism, Yugoslavism, liberalism, pacifism, socialism or communism (Tuđman, 2009:191). For Tudman, any form of democratic universalisms is a “utopian illusion”, because those “greatest ideas” are hidden in the imperialistic, hegemonic theory. According to this interpretation, historical experiences showed that all great ideas, such as “socialist internationalism or universal integralism, the so called free democracy” are always used as an instrument of the ruling peoples against subordinated and small peoples (Tuđman, 1996:50). He believed that history showed how small peoples in Europe were often denationalized and assimilated, because their national identity was constantly jeopardized by the “universal or quasi supranational monarchies and the imperialism of great peoples”. Those great peoples used contemporary ideas such as “catholic universalism, enlightenment cosmopolitanism, civil democratic civilization to Nazi-Fascism and socialism to achieve domination over small peoples” (Tuđman, 1996:9).

There are forces which, in the name of ‘great ideas’ such as international order, internationalism and peace, serve the imperialistic hegemony of the great states and deny the right of all peoples to self-determination and freedom. Only pluralism provides assumptions for survival and coexistence in the nuclear age. From that cognition arises the conclusion of the necessity of recognition and national sovereignty to all non-independent and therefore dissatisfied peoples, as an assumption for harmonious social development of each nation and for voluntary integration in the spirit of the needs in contemporary European and global community (Tuđman, 1996:266-267).

For Tudman, associations and integrations in a larger, supranational union can be done only by free and equal-righted peoples that belong to the same civilization. Therefore, he was not a priori against European project, multinational entities or a Croatian membership in the EU, but was, in his own opinion, “critical towards Europe”, because “he didn't want Croatia to kneel before such a Europe”. “In all types of integration it is necessary to preserve the interests of the nation-state and subjectivity” (Tuđman, 2009:170).

35 April 21st 1997 in the Hungarian Parliament in Budapest (title: Croatian people have always strived to accomplish its own independent and sovereign state).
36 May 26, 1996, Zagreb, the closing words at the Second Assembly of the Presidential Council (title: We Must Lead a Policy with Which We Will Not Put Croatian Sovereignty to Risk).
Beside these proclaimed goals of Europeanization and the inclusion of Croatia within the EU, he emphasised that the “internal democratic transition” is crucial for further development. In order to understand Tudman’s inability to really turn Croatia into a Europeanized parliamentary democracy, as he wished and proclaimed, it is necessary to further analyse his thought. One of the main problems is his understanding of democracy and democratic transition. In October 1990, he believed that Croatia and Slovenia are “real democratic states” (Tuđman, 2009:112). Much the same, he believed that Croatia already is, by its historical contribution, a Western European country and does not need to be closer to Europe when it is already deeply there. Only by the fact that Croatia had its first multi-party elections and it formally adopted a democratic Constitution, for Tuđman, it became a democracy. Transition from a totalitarian, one-party system to a democratic multi-party system was enough to achieve Croatian national statehood fundamentally. In his speech in the Croatian Parliament, from May 30, 1990, Tudman clearly stated the difference between a parliamentary democracy (which Croatia “now” became) and a one-party system, which belongs to the past. Tuđman was often irritated by the “inappropriate” thesis about the immaturity of Croatian democracy posed by some EU officials.37 One can conclude that for Tuđman Croatia, while in Yugoslavia, (of course) was not a democracy, but before it became part of Yugoslavia, it was. Tuđman found the “maturity” of Croatian democracy in famous historical figures and the fact that Croatian philosophers, poets, artists and scientists were famous and influential “from Budapest through Florence to Paris” on the one hand and in Croatian “defence of Europe from the Ottoman overrun” on the other (Tuđman, 2009:166).38 He strongly believed that some international factors kept repeating irrational requests for the “improvement of democratic freedoms and freedom of the press in Croatia for no reason at all”, even though he, for example, invalidated the results of the 1995 elections in Zagreb, because he did not like the outcome or tried to ban the radio that criticized him (Tuđman, 2009:211).39 In the words of Ivica Račan during the “Zagreb crisis”: “It is easy to be a democrat when you win, you should be

37 Tuđman was especially annoyed by the regular European criticism of the insufficient minority rights in Croatia. “Ignorance of the real historical circumstances is present in the non-diplomatic behaviour of some European representatives when they lecture us about democracy and relations towards minorities. For example, from countries such as Sweden and Denmark, who forget how they dealt with their mutual issues before they went through the process of Scandinavization. Or in some other European countries that teach us lessons on how to treat minorities they forget that democratic France did not even recognize the existence of minorities. They recommend us to take back all the Serbs that escaped from Croatia, and they could not solve such problems between Czech Republic and Germany” (Tuđman, 2009:184).

38 May 25 and 26, 1996, Zagreb, introduction to the Second Assembly of the Presidential Council (title: International Factors Were against Establishing the Independent Croatia).

one when you lose” (*Aimpress*, 1995). Therefore, his concept of democracy and what a democratic state should represent was focused on pure form – adopting a democratic Constitution – and the historical contribution of Croatian rulers, scientists, artists, soldiers etc., without evaluating or considering the substance of democracy. That is one of the reasons why Tuđman could not contribute to bringing Croatia closer to becoming a functional democratic state.

**Conclusion**

Croatian foreign policy was, according to the majority of its creators and scholars, very successful. Main foreign policy goals during Tuđman’s era, such as international recognition and territorial integration, were successfully achieved. Furthermore, Croatia became a full member of the UN and the Council of Europe. Franjo Tuđman – the main foreign policy creator – was, and still is, invoked as the supreme defender of Croatian national interests. However, such success had limited scope. Its success was evaluated through normative framework, which states that Croatian national interest is to become a functional Europeanized parliamentary democracy. Through four main points the article shows how Croatian foreign policy contributed to the domestic policy in alienating Croatia away from becoming a functional and Europeanized democracy. The first point is related to the intrusion of Croatian foreign policy in the sovereignty of another state, especially analysing Tuđman’s behaviour in the Bosnian issue. The second point evaluates foreign policy’s contribution to the “war behaviour” instead of accepting peace as a fundamental and founding principle of the EU. The third point evaluates the harmful manners that prevented Croatia from becoming a functional market economy based on free and fair trade. The last point shows how foreign policy was involved in the obstruction of the rule of law by not cooperating with the Hague Tribunal. Therefore, foreign policy played a significant role in the failed transformation of Croatia in the process of becoming a functional and Europeanized parliamentary democracy. The unsuccessful (foreign) policy by Franjo Tuđman led him from a “defender” to a “despot” of Croatian national interest(s). One of the reasons why Franjo Tuđman failed to bring Croatia closer to its goal lies in his overall thought and perception of democracy. For Tuđman, the acceptance of the democratic constitution was enough for Croatia to become a democratic state. Unfortunately, the heritage of Tuđman’s thought and political behaviour has not vanished from Croatian politics.

40 Ivica Račan (Ebersbach, 1944 – Zagreb, 2007) was a Croatian politician, the president of SDP from 1989 to 2007 (former League of Communists of Croatia that rebranded itself in 1990 into the Party of Democratic Reform and in 1993 became the Social Democratic Party) and Croatian Prime Minister from 2000 to 2003. He gave this statement at a TV show that was shot at the Kerempuh Theatre when he spoke about the elections in Zagreb, strongly applauded by the audience.
In the year when Croatia became a member state of the EU, several media outlets already made the direct comparison between Franjo Tuđman and the current Croatian Prime Minister Zoran Milanović and their (political) behaviour.\textsuperscript{41} On the other hand, the successor of Tuđman’s thought (regarding democracy, Croatian membership in the EU etc.) is Tomislav Karamarko. This main invocator of Tuđmanization in today’s Croatia, noticed that “it is absurd” how on the day of celebrating Croatian accession to the EU “nobody mentioned Tuđman”. “Tuđman was dreaming about Europe, while heads and hearts of many others were in Belgrade” (Večernji list, 2013). At the 24th anniversary of the Programmatic Principles of HDZ, Karamarko emphasized that in Franjo Tuđman’s time some new historical values occurred. “Croatian Berlin wall was demolished and Croatia became a country of parliamentary democracy” (HDZusa.com, 2013). Furthermore, according to Karamarko, “not only did the greatest Croat of the 20th century create the Croatian state but he also demolished the Croatian Berlin wall – by inducting democracy – a transition from a totalitarian system to a democracy” (Dnevnik.hr, 2013). These examples show how Tuđman’s pure formalistic approach towards democracy and the heritage of his political behaviour are still present. Regardless of the Croatian membership in the EU, the undemocratic substance of Croatian “democracy” remained. Even though progress towards a Europeanized functional democracy has been made, Croatia is still far away from it, and Tuđman’s rule has contributed significantly to this delay.

REFERENCES


\textsuperscript{41} In some media titles like: “Incompetent Milanović is behaving like Tudman during the Zagreb crisis, Croatia will become isolated again” (see Index.hr, 2013) and “Will Milanović be like Tuđman?” (see Novi list, 2013) occurred. Furthermore, Milanović’s former coalition partner Ivan Jakovčić accused him of behaving towards Istria like Franjo Tuđman behaved during the 1990s (see Hrvatska riječ, 2012).
Despot, Andrea and Reljić, Dušan (2011). Croatia’s rush to join the EU. SWP Comments, 14: 1-4


HRT production 2010. Predsjednik Franjo Tuđman, stvaranje hrvatske države. statement by Davorin Rudolf. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3o7su8BfM24 Date of access: 04.01.2013


Jakić, Tomislav (2010). Nisam zavijao s vukovima; Sjećanja otrgnuta zaboravu. Plejada. Zagreb

Jakovina, Tvrtko (2010). Hrvatska vanjska politika, Što smo bili, što jesmo, što želimo i što možemo biti?, in Budak, N. and Katunarić, V. (eds.): Hrvatski nacionalni identi-
Evaluating Tuđman’s Foreign Policy
Bojana Klepač Pogrmilović


Jutarnji list. 5.1.2007. Interview with Ivo Banac. Tuđman nije bio diktator, ali ni demokrat! Available at: http://www.jutarnji.hr/banac--tudman-nije-bio-diktator--ali-ni-demokrat/168865/ Date of access: 14.01.2013

Jutarnji list. 9.2.2013. Ljevičari su napali ne samo Crkvu nego i našu djecu, Predsjednik HDZ-a Karamarko na skupu u Zagrebu. Available at: http://www.jutarnji.hr/template/article/article-print.jsp?id=1084132 Date of access: 27.09.2013


Novi list. 17.7.2011. Interview with Branimir Lokin: Hrvatska će biti teren na kojem će EU graditi svoje vikendice. Available at: http://www.novilist.hr/Vijesti/Gospodarstvo/Hrvatska-ce-bititeren-na-kojem-ce-EU-izgraditi-svoje-vikendice Date of access: 04.01.2013


Ponte, Carla Del and Sudetic, Chuck (2008). Gospoda tužiteljica; suočavanje s najtežim ratnim zločinima i kulturom nekažnjivosti. Profil. Zagreb


Razsa, Maple and Lindstrom, Nicole (2004). Balkan is beautiful: Balkanism in the political Discourse of Tudman’s Croatia. East European Politics & Societies, (18), 4: 628-650


Slobodna Dalmacija. 16.09.2012. Rudolf: Ugovor Tuđman-Izetbegović sklopljen je na štetu Hrvatske, vlada to mora reći građanima! Available at: http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/Hrvatska/tabid/66/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/187611/Default.aspx Date of access: 03.04.2013

Evaluating Tuđman's Foreign Policy
Bojana Klepač Pogrmilović


Evaluacija Tuđmanove vanjske politike
(Ne)uspješna zaštita nacionalnog interesa; od branitelja do despota

Sažetak

Ključne riječi: Franjo Tuđman, nacionalni interesi, hrvatska vanjska politika, europeizacija, (de)tuđmanizacija
Evaluating Tuđman's Foreign Policy
Bojana Klepač Pogrmilović