A state-feedback Nash equilibrium for the general Target–Attacker–Defender differential game of degree in arbitrary dimensions
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Mammadov, K 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1001-1128, Lim, CC ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2463-9760 and Shi, Peng ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8218-586X
(2022)
A state-feedback Nash equilibrium for the general Target–Attacker–Defender differential game of degree in arbitrary dimensions.
International Journal of Control, 95 (1).
pp. 93-103.
ISSN 0020-7179
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| Item type | Article |
| URI | https://vuir.vu.edu.au/id/eprint/43586 |
| DOI | 10.1080/00207179.2020.1779958 |
| Official URL | https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00207... |
| Subjects | Current > FOR (2020) Classification > 4007 Control engineering, mechatronics and robotics Current > FOR (2020) Classification > 4901 Applied mathematics Current > Division/Research > Institute for Sustainable Industries and Liveable Cities |
| Keywords | TAD differential game, pursuit evader game, optimal state-feedback strategies, Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations |
| Citations in Scopus | 3 - View on Scopus |
| Download/View statistics | View download statistics for this item |
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