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Rescripting Creativity after Automation: Situating the Simulacrum to interpret the Queerness of Computational Creativity.

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Abstract: This paper examines how automation in the ever-changing technological landscape is increasing integrated into, and has become a significant presence in, our personal lives. How we behave, contribute, explore, interact and communicate within and across automated digital platforms, has salience for understanding and questioning the ways that dominant discourses in the contemporary construction and enactment of subjectivity, creativity and agency are being modulated by the machine. As a result, we provide a contemplation of automation and its effect on creativity, as a contemporary expression of dis/locations, the simulacrum, performative work and a toxic digital presence in socio-cultural-technical spaces.

Keywords: automation, creativity, simulacrum, technology, post qualitative

Introduction

Human life - that appeared to him the one thing worth investigating. Compared to it there was nothing else of any value. It was true that as one watched life in its curious crucible of pain and pleasure, one could not wear over one's face a mask of glass, nor keep the sulphurous fumes from troubling the brain, and making the imagination turbid with monstrous fancies and misshapen dreams. There were poisons so subtle that to know their properties one had to sicken of them. There were maladies so strange that one had to pass through them if one sought to understand their nature.

(Wilde, 1993: 55)

Some months ago, whilst travelling on the train, one of the authors, VICARS witnessed a young boy attempting to teach his grandmother the intricacies of his Gameboy. After about ten minutes the child in exasperation remarked to his ageing relative “*That it is really easy ... all you have to do is....*” and there then followed a comprehensive catalogue of instructions. Vicars watched as the child laboured to initiate his elderly relative in the rudiments of the game and couldn’t help but smile when after about ten minutes of trying to work out how to play with it, the Gameboy was put to one side in irritation and from a bag was pulled a book. The way in which we negotiate creativity and automation is not ‘*really easy..*’ Although automation is well embedded in education and society at large, any thought that ‘*all we have to do is*’ translates into a need to pass through strange creative maladies, just in order to understand them. Attempting to understand creativity after automation, is worth investigating through theory so as to interpret our creative futures.

Elizabeth Adams St Pierre (2021) advises researchers to be led by theory, allowing it to complicate their inquiry. Moving in and out of knowing and unknowing, and between theory and practice, has underpinned our understanding of situated knowledges in their incompleteness and impartiality. It is in how they are ‘able to join with one another, to see together without claiming to be another’ (Haraway, 2020: 586), that shapes our discomfort with negotiating the ever-changing technological landscape. Situated knowledge making does not depend on the ‘logic of discovery’ but on the power charged social relation[ships] of conversation’ (Haraway, 2020: 593). With all the trickiness and unsettling that occurs with negotiating boundaries in a shifting and changing world in real time, automated by datafied histories, there is a need to reconsider how creativity is being modulated in an age of automation. We ask various questions, such as how does automation modulate, shape and develop established forms of creativity and self-expression and what is the role of the internet as an on-going creative construction? In this paper we narrate automation as a series of speculative gestures between body, knowledge and place. As we consider the diffractive relations of subjectivity and agency in this age of automation, we attend to specific material entanglements to reconsider automation as a series of attunements where creativity is increasingly being situated and performed.

Priyadharshini (2022: 14) has called for a questioning ‘afresh [of] what constitutes the ‘human’ or the ‘social’ ... [and how we should be asking] fundamental, challenging questions about how we conceptualise the world.’ What does it mean to be human in a digital world? How does automation shape established forms of creativity and self-expression? To go beyond the trite

notion of hegemonic method, Steinberg in Walker (2015) has urged us to ‘interrogate our own practices of engagement’ if our work is to result in ‘learning that leads to knowing, which in turn leads to sustainable ways of being in the world’ (p. v). Hence this paper, aims to draw together a series of attunements from the threads of our consumption of the automated contemporary creative. We endeavour to explore socio-cultural-technical spaces and question notions of identity, power and social/well-being when data and analytics, are part of human imagination, artistry and vision.

Thinking with Theory about our attunements to computational creativity

The ubiquity of automated digital technologies has become an intrinsic component of our everyday lived experiences. Whilst immersed in a new and partially automated reality, we see us increasingly consuming mixed realities, that burgeon with augmentation and virtual spaces in which we (re)construct and (re)construe our quotidian existence (Arantes, 2022). While negotiating intangible geographies of the Internet of Things (IoT) and the apparent Metaverse, we suggest that our evolution has not yet wired us for creative automation. Creative automation includes actions such as automated vision, where machine learning, deep learning, and artificial intelligence use digital twins to approximate how people may behave, act or react in a given circumstance. Such automation is part of our personal lives, and sees us engrossed and encased in automated graphic production, deep fakes and creative representation that entangles our lived experiences with others data.

In our entanglements with the more-than-human (Haraway, 2020: 37-38) we suggest that there is a lack of ontological transparency, social identity and agency. Instead, we have become transformed by the underlying values and attitudes of automation, platformization, personalization and the increasing presence of data pools, and digital infrastructures. Van Dijck (2021) quoting Poell et al., notes how ‘platformization pertains to “the interpenetration of the digital infrastructures, economic processes, and governmental frameworks of platforms in different economic sectors and spheres of life” (Poell et al, 2019: 6). Traversing the problematics of platformization, understanding creativity and automation now involves negotiating an understanding of situatedness and embodiment in various forms of computer informed creativity.

Colton and Wiggins’ (2012: 12) definition of Computational Creativity is ‘The philosophy, science and engineering of computational systems which, by taking on particular responsibilities,

exhibit behaviours that unbiased observers would deem to be creative'. Computational creativity is how the interaction of almost every one of our human experiences, feels in some way, has been mediated through and by the digital. Whether as a result of the technological digital turn, the impacts and implications of big data, the Internet of Things, analytics or mixed reality; we as humans live within a knowledge apparatus that is tempered and benchmarked according to increasing automated forms of digital data. Ricourte (2019: 350) expands on this, to suggest that,

‘Big data form[s] the epistemological ground of our historical moment. We live under a new regime of knowledge production in which data processing through advanced statistics and prediction models informs decisions, actions, and relations.’

As an expression of epistemic disobedience, we refocus the assumption that data reflects reality, and narrate automation as a series of speculative gestures between body, knowledge and place, to think with theory (St Pierre, 2021).

We *take-on* and Queer(y) the sacred textualities of platformization, and automation in relation to computational creativity. Instead of viewing one platform as more legitimate than the other, we propose that we should reconsider them all as a piece of the same jigsaw puzzle, like a patchwork quilt that at the centre has the automated reproduction of norms in social depiction. Norms, we argue that are not passive descriptors of conduct that lie idly waiting to be used. They are instead, managers of conduct which ‘command, oblige, recommend [and] guide’ not only ourselves, but others as well (Korsgaard, 1992: 22).

Thinking about the notion of norms in relation to platforms, and automated forms of computational creativity has, to some extent, involved us in decolonising acts. It encourages us to begin by asking critical questions in relation to prevailing knowledge practices around the emergent social, anthropological and technological phenomena made real as a result of the ubiquity of automated forms of creativity on the platforms we consume. Platforms increasingly automated, such as the image generating platform Lensa.ai and text generating platform ChatGPT. The simultaneous interaction and erasure of almost every one of our unique, not digitally mediated human experiences on these platforms can, we suggest, be found in the operationalisation of computational creativity.

To operationalise computational creativity, we consider the diffractive relations of subjectivity and agency in this age of automation. We attend to specific material entanglements to

rescripting creativity after automation and reconsider automation as a series of attunements. Attunements where creativity is increasingly being situated and performed algorithmically.

An attunement in this paper, is a physical, cognitive and emotional sensing of digital others. It is knowing their way of being, their rhythm, and their affect in association to our experience by being human in a digital world. It is being empathetic to the ways computational creativity automates and creates socio-cultural-technological experiences that carry with them, an unbroken feeling of connectedness, and as such provides a reciprocal affect that brings about a resonating response through automation.

There are several ways that individuals and societies can work to rescript creativity after automation. Whether we encourage critical thinking and media literacy, by teaching people to develop a more nuanced understanding of creativity and its relationship to automation, or via a culture of collaboration and co-creation. Rather than seeing automation as a threat to creativity, we need to consider attunements of computational creativity as a tool for collaboration and co-creation. This can help people feel more connected to the creative process and empowered to contribute their own ideas. Whether automation can promote diverse perspectives and voices, is yet to be shown as automation can sometimes perpetuate existing power dynamics and amplify dominant narratives. By promoting diverse perspectives and voices through these attunements, we can philosophise how a wider range of ideas and experiences can come to be represented and valued. Rather than being passive consumers of automated content we can actively engage with automation on our own terms.

What follows is discussion around four attunements of computational creativity, presented here firstly as ‘Dis/locations’ that consider creative forms of fantasy on platforms, followed by our second attunement, ‘You Make Me Feel (Mighty Real)’ which draws on the theory behind the simulacrum to explore how subjectivity has become increasingly mediated through computational creative mythologies on platforms. Thirdly, we discuss ‘To Tweet or not to Tweet: Axiological In/Action’ to explore every day communication as performative work, and finally we conclude with our fourth attunement, ‘Reflections: in the spaces of dis/appearance’ that consider the ways computational creativity could be a toxic digital presence on platforms in the future.

Dis/locations: rescripting creativity after automation

Creativity is increasingly being situated and performed, digitised and automated, as an expression of multiple realities that entangles our imagination of what it means to be human in a digital world. If we think with Lawlor, (1991:37) who has written of the concept of ‘Dreaming’ in Australian Aboriginal folklore as the ‘expresses[ion of] the timeless concept of moving to reality which in itself is an act of creation.’ Some Dreamings tell of creators disappearing, although they continue to live in places that mortals cannot see or, they have become natural forces such as wind or rain. As we reflect on the implications of the pervasive presence of platforms such as Twitter, Instagram, TikTok, Facebook and so on, the social, cultural and textual functions of automation and computational creativity, we understand that we have given rise to how populist thought has become automated force, and how we cannot see digitized forms of self-representation. Dreaming can explain how reality came to be, and can be considered the reports about algorithms and data, that inform computational creativity.

We could also think with Appadurai (1996), who has suggested how creativity is associated with fantasy as a social practice. It is through the imagination that ‘individuals...have found the space to refigure their social lives, live out proscribed emotional states and sensations’ (5). Here, computational creativity, we suggest can be thought about as dis/locations associated with fantasies and imaginaries. Actions, and feelings that can result in an epistemic shudder. It could be argued that automation and platforms are representational signifiers of the defamiliarizing potential of Queer orientations. Orientations that can disrupt normative ideologies by representing ‘alternative times, spaces, and directions for additional and different orientations and reading practices’ (Potter, 2022: 9). (Appadurai, 1996:31) has suggested that the work done by our imagination, is ‘central to all forms of agency’ and that ‘[a]udiences are...more likely to construct imagined worlds that are chimeral, aesthetic, particularly if assessed by the criteria of some other perspective, some other imagined world’ (35). This way of thinking, sees us fantasizing about what happens when creativity is automated? Not concerned with the mathematical formulae of automation, the creative expression of oneself becomes rescripted or woven together with the outcomes of computational creativity.

To explain, let’s consider the avatar creation tool Lensa.ai (<https://prisma-ai.com/lensa>). Users upload 10-20 selfies, which creates avatars, which appear to have been created by a digital artist. See below, Figure 1. The creative voicing of ‘I’ has been rescripted. Freeman (2015: 51) notes, from ‘childhood we are steadily made to erase ... in order that we can successfully carry on

with various tasks upon which the social order depends.’ Here, Lensa is learning from creative works, without their permission. Where, music is sampled but protected under copyright, Lensa is erasing the original form of creativity and arguably automating the creative industry, by removing the artist from the art. The creativity in the fantastical image, is then shaped according to the user’s creative participation in how they use and share the avatars, that hide and submerge their original set of selfies. Both the artist, and the user become overlaid and obscured.

Figure 1 Lensa images of original photo (first) and three generated images



Images by Janine Arantes. Figure 1 is Arantes work using <https://prisma-ai.com/lensa>

Vicars & Neal (2019) have suggested how social order can be understood in a student’s sense of who they are based on their creative participation in online classes, and the way they fantasise their behaviour virtually. By locating the emergence of digital practices as being never unitary, linear or purely cognitive, we understand creative participation, as part of the social practice of computational creativity. Fraser (1999: 109) draws on spatial and temporal metaphors to Queerly interrogate and understand the construction of identities as a thinking and feeling relation with self and others socially. Epistemically, a queer interrogation of such metaphors can tell us something of the processes involved in being, becoming and belonging to/within/as part of computational creativity and the human social. Located or dislocated within dreams, we can think about Hélène Cixous, in *Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing* who notes,

If I could, I would be [was] jealous of dreams: they are [were] mightier than we are [I was], greater in weakness and in strength. In dreams we become [I became] magic, which is why if I could be jealous of my dreams – and I sometimes am – I would be.

Computational creativity, when tied to social order and the human social, evokes fantasy, dreams and a sense of magic that provides us with the ‘capacity to realize the (as yet) inexistent’ (Bröckling, 2006: 514). Just as Lensa automates sets of images according to fantastical themes,

and categories, including Queer, it lends itself to encourage us to share a spatial and temporal metaphor of ourselves. This leads us to think of what determines the influence of new technologies and digital literacies, when it is tied to a digitally informed fantasy of social order and the human social, and ask what is the role of the on-going dis/locations in the construction of reality through computational creativity?

Social media provides a space to share a spatial and temporal metaphor of ourselves, and makes meaning in the computational forms of creativity we experience. Tiggemann & Anderberg (2020) have suggested that social media is not real, rather it is fantastical and argue that (in relation to social media and body image) social comparison targets largely peers, and a quest for self-evaluation in that users actively seek out those with similarities, rather than dissimilarities. We can see this educational settings, where Teacher Influencers upload content to social media, to maximise attraction to their content (Arantes and Buchanan, 2022). Effectively normalising social surveillance, their creative participation on social media, can simultaneously erase and promote intersubjectivity, which in turn puts 'self realization before recognition of the other and individual cognition before mutual meaning' (Von Wright, 2013: 159).

As we are learning to grapple with understanding the ways in which meaning is made in computational creativity in educational settings and society at large, we see the familiar become strange, and the demarcation between reality and dreams come to a standstill. Bhandari and Bimo (2022) in their discussion of a reorientation of the real and the imaginary propose that self-representation, and its dis/location can be understood as a genre rather than a discrete set of practices. Genre in this case refers to something multidimensional and intertextual, something which can be understood as a *tacit agreement* between producers and audiences. Are we agreeing to something or approving computational creativity without actually saying so? Does automation and the power that platforms have make 'real' content within the genre of self-representation community, experience, interior worlds and emotion? However, no one work is necessarily bound to contain all the elements associated with this genre. Shifting our understandings away from indexicality in this manner brings (again) an epistemic shudder to the social, context-dependent, and mediated qualities of self-representation.

Constantly being rescripted, this epistemic shudder induced by the dis/locations of automated creative instruction and participation requires, in part our reorientation to the genre of

computational creativity. Computational creativity affords ‘intersubjective spaces of cultural translation’, and places ‘where one can find an overlay of codes, a multiplicity of culturally inscribed subject positions, a displacement of normative reference codes, and a polyvalent assemblage of new cultural meanings’ (McLaren, 1994: 65). In this school of thought, platforms are ultimately projects or an individual or collaborative initiative that is deliberately planned to achieve a particular aim. In Figure 1 above, the bottom right image was the reproduction of the original photo through a Queered lens. Each time selfies were uploaded, the automated avatars produced by Lensa became less and less fantastical. Until the lens, including the Queer lens avatars were almost mirror images of the selfies. Such projects, in terms of self-representation are managing sociality and negotiating self-expression through a critical deconstruction that connects to a postdigital positionality which focuses on actions not actors (Britzman, 1995). We begin to situate computational creativity as a disruptive epistemology.

As a Queer orientation computational creativity in and of the postdigital world is ‘situated in space’ in which ‘the body is the *site*, or place where the ‘*truth*’ of identity is revealed’ (Fraser, 1999: 109). There is a need to *critique* how identity pursues acts of critical deconstruction, and how this contests the very objects of inquiry under investigation (Arantes & Vicars, 2023). It is a disruptive orientation practice that productively transgresses the divisions between Affect , orthodoxies of knowing and discursive activity that focuses critical attention on the ways in which the regime of the normative habitually constructs and naturalises everyday practices of life (Vicars, 2005). In sum, the platform vernaculars associated with computational creativity will continue to shoot out disruptive rhizomes that embrace the provisional so that they become rooted in embodied experiences to inform, propel and fashion creative cultural capital.

Situating the Simulacrum: You Make Me Feel (Mighty Real)

Behind the story I tell is the one I don’t. Behind the story you hear is the one I wish I could make you hear. (Allison, 1996: 39)

In Bodies that Matter, Butler (1993) has asserted how, as subjects we are produced time and time again. Butler theorised it is through the process of reiteration and repetition of the conventions of everyday life that we come to enact our identities and discursively construct ourselves. She suggests that the construction of identity ‘not only takes place in time, but is itself a temporal process’ (Butler, 1993:10). Butler has also argued in *Excitable Speech* (1997) how the ‘improper’

use of the performative by those who are not permitted to have a voice can be employed to deconstruct ‘prevailing forms of authority and the exclusions by which they proceed’ (Butler, 1997: 158). Thinking with Butler, helps us to curate an understanding of the agentic properties and reciprocal dynamic between the individual and collective interactions. Just as automation, benchmarks averages in large datasets to predict an understand of potential future behaviors.

Ahmed (2006:2) ‘emphasizes the importance of repeated and habitual actions in shaping bodies and worlds’ and, it is the capacity to identify repetition that allows automated decisions possible. As such, the extent to which computational creativity is embedded within wider sociological relations of power is to think with, and through the contingencies of our automated experiences. We can therefore consider how subjectivity can be read as ‘a space of betweenness, that requires special tools to hold open’ (Secor & Linz, 2017: 568).

If, as we suggest, that subjectivity has become increasingly mediated through computational creative mythologies, we must also consider, how automation as a temporal process, is reiteratively reconstructing social identities and realities associated with performative work. To explain, we think about the performativity of working in public and out loud on video sharing platform TikTok (TikTok.com). Such performance, is made possible through the ‘reiteration of a set of norms or regulatory schemas’ (Butler, 1993: 14). The materiality of the postdigital representation of the body on TikTok, is framed and formed epistemologically as a way of knowing, rather than something to be known (Kopelson, 2002). In regard to the postmodern digital context of unprecedented digital freedoms on TikTok (and other social media), there are new rules and new responsibilities that have become the default setting. Bakhtins (1981: 276) provides guidance to understand how the ‘[t]he living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular historical moment in a socially specific environment, cannot fail to brush up against thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by socio-ideological consciousness around the given object of an utterance.’ Each video, becomes readily seen and fed into the automated processes to further engage, and entangle the human and digital. With the TikTok further seen on automated Google searches, we can think with Gee (2008: 1) who reiterates, ‘social relations, cultural models, power and politics, perspectives on experience, values and attitudes, as well as things and places in the world’ shape the new rules and responsibilities that automation brings. The human who created the original video, made to feel ‘mighty real’ through the public scrutiny and comments, based on others values and attitudes.

It is not only TikTok that is performative in its rescripting of creative content produced by humans. The emergence of platforms, such as ChatGPT (<https://chat.openai.com/chat>) has seen human creativity and performance further erased, with each iteration of writing being more associated with Baudrillard’s simulacra. ChatGPT is capable of answering questions via an automated natural language model, that computationally creates admissions to mistakes, challenges incorrect premises, and provide detailed responses to questions. See Figure 2 below. Jabotinsky and Sarel (2022), ask whether we may soon find ourselves co-authoring with an AI. Will students in schools use ChatGPT as a *quasi-co-author*, which Jabotinsky and Sarel (2022: 9) note that this raises ‘the question of how one can delegate to the AI while still being considered an author.’ We may suggest then, that education today is arguably a simulacra, as tools such as ChatGPT rescript creativity in teaching and learning through such interactions in a conversational manner.

Thinking with Baudrillard (1983) reveal how our on line creative practices produce subjects into categories that reiteratively construct social identities and realities. The ubiquity of digital technologies has become an intrinsic component of our everyday lived experiences, and digital realities (re)construct and (re)construe our quotidian existence (Arantes, 2022).

Computational creativity can be thought of as an ongoing intertextual event in which our interactions are only an image or representation of someone or something. How do we apply




Figure 2 ChatGPT responses to author generated questions

academic integrity principles to writing produced through ChatGPT, when educational policy often refers to the notion of personhood? In Figure 2, have we simply reconstructed an interpretation of data, without meaning? Is it how we share and how we use the test, that is now what is defined as ‘creativity’? It has been argued that we are now situated in a new cognition where there is ‘not purely ‘social’ phenomena’ as all human activity involves some degree of technical integration. The ‘reconstruction of experience, (is often) a simulacrum (and) its repetition (is an interpretation) (of) something more real’ (Baudrillard, 1983: 111).

Is computational creativity, an empty referent? Baudrillard (1981) articulated the concepts of *Simulacra and Simulation* to suggest that contemporary life and its meaning has been fabricated from, and are constituted out of symbols and signs. Just as automation categorises historical data to make prediction about future events, their repeated significations and symbolism become an empty silence devoid of any real meaning. In regard to the postmodern digital context of computational creativity, the situated and temporal dynamics of identity and subjectivity are now made material in the virtual re-storying of lives with computational creativity as the enactment of subjectivity as narratives of social action. This implies how computational creativity has become implicated not only in the retelling of the story via automation, but also in the construction of the story of the storying.

Computational creativity has become about being immersed in dialogic, repetitive exchanges between the self and a logic of automated practice. It is in the ritualistic digital activities of everyday life that we glimpse the performativity of re/interpretation as a new materiality. Ellison (1952: 3) in his book *Invisible Man* asserts to the power of being seen:

I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me. Like the bodiless heads you see sometimes in circus sideshows, it is as though I have been surrounded by mirrors of hard, distorting glass. When they approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves or figments of their imagination, indeed, everything and anything except me.

Realness then in computational creativity, has a reliance on the wider contexts, social structures and social relations. Bateson (1978: 244) articulates the assumptions surrounding creativity and automation when he remarks, ‘you are partly blown by the winds of reality and partly an artist creating a composite out of the inner and outer events.’ As such, computational creativity in many ways is most notably visible around the discursive practices of popular culture. If mass media can

fracture the limitations of the local, by bringing into the individual lives, events and experiences that have the potential to induce alternative imaginings, then creative developments in technologies have an effect of circulating reconstructions that contest dominant constructions of normativity. Becoming attentive to what lies beneath and beyond the surface of the posted selfie image, the random meme, the types of Gifs used, and the images on Instagram, Twitter or Facebook can assist us to rethink the implications between becoming, imagination and everyday presence and absence. As computational creativity resituates the boundaries between what is real and unreal in terms of temporality ‘Affiliative solidarity is formed... through the ambivalent articulations of the realm of the aesthetic, the fantasmatic.... the body political’ (Bhabba 1994: 230).

We now turn our focus on the computational creativity of the platform, *Twitter* as the embodiment of discursive practices which both describe and produce the operations of power scripted through the performative/enacted self. We endeavour to Queerly fold in the erasure of language as creative resist-stances in prevailing knowledge practices. Critically reflecting on and examining the underlying values and attitudes and purpose of computational creativity enables a reconsideration of positionality vis-à-vis the represented ‘norm’. We now tentatively articulate how we have become subjectified to the doxa of interconnected digital identities guided by techno-scientific rationalities.

To Tweet or not to Tweet: Axiological In/Action

Yet still the emotion that beckons me on is the pursuit of an ideal self- of a self that is at least worthy of approving recognition. (James, 1890)

Responses to texts unavoidably occur in time and in certain kinds of spaces and are shaped by the normative discourses of practice that sanction how affect, pleasure, power and identities are experienced. Computational creativity brings into critical proximity the valuable idea that people, objects and ideas can create connections and produce new frameworks for and of social examination. The transformative value in this context involves recognising that ‘meanings’ can be conveyed performatively through communicative devices other than formally reasoned argument, e.g. via sound and visual images. Alexander (2014: 1169) notes that the performative

...is a product of critical discernment that cannot be separated from the producer, the mode of production, the method of knowing, and its role as a collective story; displaying an individual’s story by narrativizing the experiences of the social category to which the

individual belongs. Each story pivots on the construct of bodies yearning on the borders of becoming.

Computational creativity in every day communication is a social process in which the axiology of performative work is to engage the arena of problematisation with/in the protean quality of situatedness. The analysis of automation can, we suggest, be employed to productively trace how particular claims of self can be read as socio-political acts and are a 'strategic method to stir up or reinforce narrative constructions of the world. As critical interruptions of situated realities computational creativity can reveal the particularities, the contexts, the contingencies of the economies of our knowledge making. It has been suggested that 'The fictional or imaginary are...considered parasitic on the real world...' (Rosenblatt, 1978: 33). but according to (Vygotsky, 1978: 92), the realm of the imagination, is linked to the calling forth of 'utopian constructions' and none more so than on the platform vernacular provided by Twitter in which 'Individuals inherit a particular space within an interlocking set of social relationships; lacking that space, they are nobody, or at best a stranger or an outcast' (MacIntyre, 1981: 32).

It has been proposed that discourses be thought of as 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak (Foucault, 1972: 149), and if identity can be thought of as an ongoing intertextual event and interactions with texts are part of the process of practicing a social identity, then any analysis of how to conceptualise computational creativity on Twitter is to think how the platform vernacular situates gossip as a form of speech activity that creatively operates to redefine our social relationships. For example, Twitter Bots have been shown to help fuel political feuds via automated social media accounts. Creating a narrative that spreads and embed misinformation networks, falsehoods are fanned by further sharing and partisan disagreement.

Gumperz (1982) considers a speech activity as being concerned with '...a set of social relationships enacted about a set of schema in relation to some communicative goal' and proposes that speech activities '...imply certain expectancies about thematic progression, turn taking, rules, a form and outcome of the interaction as well as constraints on context (Gumperz, 1982: 166). Gossip is often constructed as an inauthentic discourse that merely repeats what is heard without critically examining the grounds or validity of the subject matter in question. However, Turner (1994), has identified gossip as one of the most common means for transmitting information that

is often excluded from more official channels of communication. Mere 'idle talk' could be thought of as a repetition of the conventional and an unscrutinized acceptance of the interpretations of the community in which it is found but gossip has additionally been acknowledged as important in establishing and maintaining social relations and norms within a group (Blum Kulka 2000;). Leach (1997), has noted that:

...gossip inhabits the borderlands of socially sanctioned oral discourse, it expresses the minutiae of relations that create the texture of life, the small "truths" like the "small" talk that infuse the *details of living* with meaning.

(Leach, 1997: 313)

Gossiping enacted as a type of dialogic interaction on Twitter has facilitated significant self-disclosure and at the time of its emergence Tweeting was an expression of a the will to power through which humans started to interpret and interact with the world. If the 'Will to Power, (Nietzsche, 1968). ' is a placing of perspectives as an activity of self-overcoming, then what is 'real' could be said to reside in the value we give to ourselves and to our interpretations. Deleuze & Guattari (1987) have argued in *Anti-Oedipus* that the interior is political and that the connection between word and action and wish and action are one. Twitter as a force of Computational creativity has meant recognizing how cultural communities connect in space and utilize cultural resources opportunities for:

... providing new ways of contesting traditional family and kinship structures of reorganizing national and transnational communities based not on origin, filiation, and genetics but on destination, affiliation, and the assumption of a common set of social practices or political commitments. (Eng, 2003: 4)

Reflections: in the spaces of dis/appearance

It has been argued that social media users leave a digital footprint that can guide the monitoring of virtual exchanges and provide ideal data for analysis (Muhammad et al., 2018). Computational creativity is used to designate not merely something to which one belongs but something that one possesses. As such it can designate boundaries to what we consider to be intrinsic and extrinsic dimension to agentic online cultural participation . In the cited examples using ChatGPT and Lensa, it is not without reason that the creation of computational texts unavoidably occur in time

and spaces and are shaped by discourses of practice that sanction how affect, pleasure, power and identities are experienced. Computational creativity brings into critical proximity the valuable idea that people, objects and ideas can create connections and produce new frameworks for and of social examination. The transformative value in this context involves recognising that ‘meanings’ are conveyed performatively through communicative devices via sound and visual images. Alexander (2014: 1169) notes that the performative

...is a product of critical discernment that cannot be separated from the producer, the mode of production, the method of knowing, and its role as a collective story; displaying an individual’s story by narrativizing the experiences of the social category to which the individual belongs. Each story pivots on the construct of bodies yearning on the borders of becoming.

Where the back end of intrinsic algorithms that underpin automation, computational creativity presents an interesting dimension about whether we are the main agency for differentiation about creativity being situated or performed.

In conclusion, this paper highlights the increasing presence of automation in our personal lives and we have sought to explore how automation modulates established forms of self-expression . The role of the internet in creative construction of identities, its relationships to agency and its potential for a toxic presence has through a consideration of the diffractive relations between subjectivity and agency in the age of automation examined the material entanglements and dis/locations that influence creativity in the contemporary world. As automation has become a significant presence in our personal lives and has an impact on the way we behave, contribute, explore, interact, and communicate within and across digital platforms, we have come to realise its impact on the dominant discourses that shape the ways in which automation modulates and develops established forms of creativity and self-expression and entangles the role of the internet as a constantly evolving space for creativity. By considering these entanglements we have reflected on the ways in which creativity is being performed and situated and have presented a contemplation of the effects of automation on creativity, including its role in dis/locations, performative work, and its potential as a the simulacrum in socio-cultural-technical spaces.

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