“Fatal Collision at Ballarat” – Masculinity at the Eureka Stockade

Juliana Byers

Master of Research

Institute for Sustainable Industries and Liveable Cities, Victoria University

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Research.

January 2025

Abstract

On 3 December 1854, just after four o'clock in the morning, 300 soldiers from the 12th and 40th Regiments attacked 150 armed miners from Ballarat, who had entrenched themselves behind a recently built stockade on the Eureka gold lead. Within twenty minutes the military had triumphed, the stockade was aflame and more than 120 men had been taken prisoner; 13 would later stand trial for high treason. This short but bloody skirmish has since become a defining moment in Victoria's national mythology, yet there is one group of men who were there that have rarely been considered in any detail. The soldiers who stormed the barricade have been made into the villains of the Eureka story: at best they are unintelligent men serving at the behest of tyrants, while at worst they are "beasts" who committed "inhuman brutalities" upon innocent men, women and children.[1] This research argues that neither interpretation is accurate, and that the soldiers of Eureka were – like the stockaders and diggers themselves – ordinary men who found themselves in an extraordinary situation. Using the soldiers killed at Eureka as a case study, this work examines the ideas of manhood which influenced their lives and the society they lived in, and how two ultimately incompatible masculinities – British militarism and Australian colonialism – clashed on the goldfields of Ballarat, with disastrous results.

[1] Peter Lalor, "To the Colonists of Victoria," *Argus*, Melbourne, VIC, 10 Apr 1855, p.7.

Student Declaration

"I, Juliana Byers, declare that the Master of Research thesis entitled "Fatal Collision at Ballarat – Masculinity at the Eureka Stockade" is no more than 50,000 words in length including quotes and exclusive of tables, figures, appendices, bibliography, references and footnotes. This thesis contains no material that has been submitted previously, in whole or in part, for the award of any other academic degree or diploma. Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own work. I have conducted my research in alignment with the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research and Victoria University's Higher Degree by Research Policy and Procedures.

Signature Date: 15 Jan 2025



Dedicated to the memories of Felix Boyle, John Hall, Michael Roney, Joseph Wall, William Webb and Henry Wise.

May they rest in peace.

Acknowledgements

Having read many a thesis while preparing to write mine, I was struck by the number of people who put their time and energy into bringing the author's ideas to life. Like all of these researchers, I too have been blessed with the support of many and I'm honoured to acknowledge them here.

First, more thanks that I can possibly express to my supervisors, Prof. Dianne Hall and Dr. Chris McConville, who were willing to share their invaluable knowledge and experience with me as I recreated the lives of the Eureka Six. Without their willingness to support me, these men would still be nothing more than names on a pair of concrete slabs in Ballarat Old Cemetery. Thanks are also owed to Dr. Sarah Mokrzycki, a treasured mentor, friend and study-buddy who was never too busy to hear about my latest dive into 1854.

I must also acknowledge here Dr. Sue Dodd, Prof. Rob Pascoe and Assoc. Prof. Matthew Klugman, who took valuable time out of their teaching and research schedules to provide me with invaluable feedback at the beginning and end of this project. Thanks also to my classmates and tutors from Victoria University in 2023/2024, who suffered through every presentation and were never too busy to provide much-needed critiques.

The staff at the many archives and libraries who have unselfishly shared their knowledge with me and patiently answered my emails as I hunted down documents, records and diaries. A very special mention here to the wonderful librarians at the State Library of Victoria and the Mitchell Library in New South Wales, who were most generous guides to me during my research.

Like anyone else who embarks on such a project, I am especially indebted to my family, in particular my biggest cheerleaders Mum, Dad and Kassie, who have been there for every celebration and commiseration on this incredible journey. Thanks also to my grandfather, Brian Byers, who kindly gave permission for me to use information from my great-grandfather's journal and the family archive, which would have otherwise remained inaccessible.

Finally, thanks are due to the many, many researchers of Eureka, past and present, without whose published works I could never have embarked on my own project.

Table of Contents

Abstract 1
Student Declaration 2
Dedication 3
Acknowledgements 4
Table of Contents 5
List of Figures 6
List of Abbreviations 7
Introduction: The Soldiers' Eureka 8
Chapter 1: All the Queen's Men 23
- 1.1: Wall and Wise: Class, Conservatism and Englishness 26
- 1.2: Boyle and Hall: Irishmen or British Soldiers? 33
- 1.3: Roney and Webb: Youth and the Desire for Manhood 42

Chapter 2: Man the Barricades! 51
- 2.1. The Diggers of 1854 52
- 2.2. Wait For the Sound of the Bugle 56
- 2.3. Ballarat On This Sabbath Morn 61

Chapter 3: A Public Calamity 67
- Ideal vs. Reality: Military Funerals in the British Empire 71
- Burying the Eureka Six 75
- Time Heals All Wounds? 84

Conclusion: The Wrong Men? 87
Appendices 95
- Appendix 1: Short Biographies of the Eureka Six 96
- Appendix 2: Jack Byers and Golden Roberts 100

Bibliography 102
- Primary Sources 103
- Secondary Sources 106
- Visual Sources 112

List of Figures

Figure 1. *Zealous Gold* Diggers by S.T. Gill 14
Figure 2. *The Eureka Hotel Riot* by Charles Doudiet 57
Figure 3. *Photograph of the Soldiers Enclosure 1* by author........ 68
Figure 4. *Photograph of the Soldiers Enclosure 2* by author........ 69
Figure 5. *Photograph of the Diggers Memorial* by author 70

List of Abbreviations

Archives and Institutions

AJCP – Australian Joint Copying Project

BDM – Office of Births, Deaths and Marriages

ML – Mitchell Library (State Library of New South Wales)

NLA – National Library of Australia

NLI – National Library of Ireland

PROV – Public Records Office of Victoria

SLV – State Library of Victoria

TNA – The National Archives, UK

Military Terminology

DOW – Died Of Wounds

KIA – Killed In Action

NCO – Non-Commissioned Officer

Introduction

The Soldiers' Eureka

On 3 December 1854, a short but bloody clash in Ballarat between 150 armed gold miners, known as 'diggers' in the Australian parlance, and approximately 300 British soldiers from the 12th and 40th Regiments of Foot took place. Behind a barricade on the Eureka lead, the diggers had raised a flag depicting the Southern Cross and sworn an oath beneath it "to defend [their] rights and liberties."[2] They formed companies, elected a commander-in-chief, drilled with weapons, and made flowery speeches where they openly discussed attacking Government Camp – the administrative enclave in Ballarat. Along with the civil and military authorities who called the Camp home, the rank-and-file of the army and police also lived there, and they took the threat to their lives seriously. On 2 December 1854 the diggers built a fortified barricade, which would go down in history as the Eureka Stockade. It stood for less than twenty-four hours before it was stormed and burned by the military. Those inside were unprepared for a fight with professional soldiers, and within twenty minutes they had either fled, been captured, or were lying dead. Among those killed and wounded were not only those who had taken up arms, but an unknown number of civilians who been caught in the crossfire, at least one police officer, and sixteen soldiers.

This is the standard story of Eureka, and the perspective of those men behind the barricade remains the default for most discussions around this event. In this thesis, these men will be referred to as stockaders, to differentiate them from the mostly law-abiding diggers, storekeepers and other civilians who did not actively participate at Eureka, but were broadly supportive of the stockaders aims. The stockaders were a radical minority among the many political movements which swept the Ballarat diggings in 1854, and the initial causes which brought them together enjoyed wide community support. Abolishing the licence fee, unlocking the lands, and manhood suffrage were issues which were dear to the hearts of the vast majority of the population, but most of the diggers and civilians drew the line at taking up arms against the government, and constitutional agitation was the preferred method of making change.[3] Another reason diggers and stockaders are differentiated in this thesis is that the stockaders formed a combatant force. By taking up arms and building a defensive fortification, they put themselves outside the legal and constitutional protections afforded to them as British subjects.[4] They behaved like an insurgent army and were treated as such by the authorities.

Those authorities have typically been cast as villains in the Eureka story, especially the police. At the time of Eureka, Victoria Police had only existed as an organisation for two years (although there had been police in Victoria prior to this), and it was under-staffed, under-funded and many police were inexperienced.[5] Most were former convicts, who had been hired in desperation due to labour shortages brought on by the gold rushes in both

[2] Peter Lalor, "To the Colonists of Victoria," *Argus*, Melbourne, VIC, 10 April 1855, p.7.
[3] Geoffrey Serle, *The Golden Age: A History of the Colony of Victoria, 1851-1861, (*3rd ed. Carlton, Vic: Melbourne University Press), 1977, p.171.
[4] D.L. Keir & F.H. Lawson, *Cases in Constitutional* Law, (London, UK; Oxford Clarendon Press), 1928, pp.360 – 361.
[5] Robert Haldane, *The People's Force: A History of the Victoria Police,* (3rd ed. Carlton, VIC: Melbourne University Press, 2017), pp. 18-19.

Victoria and New South Wales. Corruption was rife among them, especially on the goldfields, and they were seen by the population as little more than a protection racket.[6] In Ballarat, they were under the command of Gold Commissioner Sir Robert Rede, another highly unpopular authority figure, who held enormous power. As Gold Commissioner, Rede was responsible for the smooth running of the goldfields, which covered everything from reducing crime, to adjudicating claim disputes, and ensuring essential administration was completed and reports sent promptly to Melbourne.[7] Stockader Raffaello Carboni disparagingly referred to him as "King Rede" in his 1855 book and there was some truth to it.[8] He was the ultimate authority in Ballarat, and despite recognising that many of the diggers' (and later stockaders') grievances were legitimate, especially regarding the licence, he believed unwaveringly in the need to uphold the law, no matter how unpopular it was.[9] He also made no effort to rein in his police, which further damaged his standing among the Ballarat population. Despite his nearly unlimited authority, it was not Rede who eventually ordered or coordinated the attack on the stockade. By the time the barricade went up, responsibility for restoring order in Ballarat had moved from civilian to military jurisdiction, and the police did not participate at Eureka until the army had breached the barricade.

At the Eureka Stockade, the British Army operated as the Public Order Response Team of 1854, although they were an entirely separate entity to the police. Specialist police units did not exist at this time, so when a civilian protest movement became too large, too violent, or too radical for regular police to manage, the military would assume responsibility for dispersing and/or arresting protestors.[10] Unlike modern militaries, the British Army of 1854 was highly politicised, controlled by an officer class who were less committed to efficient warfare than they were to maintaining their own power and privilege. The long shadow of the Duke of Wellington hung over the British Army in 1854, and the officer class refused any hint of modernisation and continued to look *back* to an idealised version of their success at Waterloo in 1815.[11] The army's disastrous performance in the Crimean War (1854) brought the backwards view of the commanders into sharp focus among the public, but it would not be until the Cardwell reforms of 1870 that the British Army was forced to take real steps towards becoming an efficient, modern fighting force.[12] The soldiers who fought at Eureka were seen as the servants of the ruling elite, and public antipathy towards the regular men was high, not just in Ballarat but across the British Empire in general.[13] Soldiers were seen as a necessary evil in the nineteenth century; they were very much needed to maintain the power and glory of Empire, but were perceived as immoral, violent drunkards who needed to be

---

[6] Haldane, *The People's Force*, pp. 21-22.
[7] Geoffrey Serle. *The Golden Age: A History of the Colony of Victoria, 1851-1861,* (3rd ed, Carlton, VIC: Melbourne University Press, 1977), pp. 43, 69.
[8] Raffaello Carboni, *The Eureka Stockade: The Consequence of Some Pirates Wanting on Quarter-Deck a Rebellion,* (Melbourne, VIC: J.P. Atkinson, 1855), p. 53.
[9] Carboni, *The Eureka Stockade*, pp. 55-56.
[10] Keir & Lawson, *Cases in Constitutional* Law, pp. 360-361.
[11] Gregory Blake, *To Pierce the Tyrant's Heart: A Military History of the Battle for the Eureka Stockade: 3 December 1854.* Australian Army History Collection, (Loftus, N.S.W: Australian Military History Publications [in association with the Australian Army History Unit], 2009), p. 63.
[12] Albert Tucker, "Army and Society in England 1870-1900: A Reassessment of the Cardwell Reforms," *Journal of British Studies* 2, no. 2 (1963), pp. 110-141; Martin Samuels, "'Moral Factors' in British Military Thought and Doctrine, 1856–1899," *War in History* 29, no. 2 (2022), pp. 341-63.
[13] Scott Myerly, ""The Eye Must Entrap the Mind": Army Spectacle and Paradigm in Nineteenth-Century Britain," *Journal of Social History* (1992), pp. 105-131.

kept away from good, upright British citizens.[14] In peacetime, a standing army was considered an unnecessary expense and a potential danger to the public, however the thin red line would be venerated in wartime.[15] The soldiers who fought at Eureka were part of a subculture who were reviled by the people they served, except when those same people felt they were needed.

This meant that, when the soldiers attacked the Eureka Stockade in the early hours of the morning, the stockaders not only lost the battle, but suffered a cultural humiliation. The stockaders perceived themselves as law-abiding men who had been *forced* to take up arms due to the corruption and incompetence of the authorities. It was their duty *as men* to fight "to defend [their] rights and liberties," but in the immediate aftermath it was the military who triumphed, leaving the stockaders not only defeated, but emasculated.[16] They had nailed their manhood to the mast, along with the famous Southern Cross flag, and the soldiers successfully tore down both. In doing so, the military elevated their own sense of manhood, which was rough, violent, and centred around power and control, above the ideals which informed masculinity among the stockaders. How these conflicting ideas about manhood contributed to the violence at Eureka will be the primary focus of this thesis. Examining the role played by masculinity on both sides of the stockade will allow for a deeper understanding of why events unfolded the way they did. The military's response to the agitation that led to the erection of the stockade, and their actions at the stockade itself, will also be examined through this lens. How was their manhood affected by the stockaders "parading the diggings in every direction, many of them in sight of [Government Camp] robbing stores, collecting arms and forcing people to join their ranks?"[17] At the time this was happening, the soldiers had been confined to Government Camp for their own safety, and shots were being fired at their sentries. The sentries had orders to fire back, but what did the ordinary men make of being forced to stand-by?[18] Were men not supposed to respond when offered such a provocative challenge? And what was it about the ideals of manhood the stockaders held dear that led them to making such a challenge, one they knew would lead to a trial of arms with professional soldiers? The stockaders, especially those from British and Irish backgrounds, would have been familiar with the way the army was used to supress civilian protest, and that the British military had a record of doing so with little regard for anyone who might be caught in the crossfire.

While this thesis will focus on how masculinity influenced Eureka, and argues that ideas of manhood prominently informed the behaviour of men on both sides, masculinity was not the *only* matter being fought over. The unfair licence tax, police corruption, the lack of franchise and the inability to buy land, along with the growing feeling that the colony was getting rich of their labour without giving them anything in return, were also pressing issues the stockaders felt compelled to take up arms over.[19] In these matters, the majority of Ballarat agreed with their stance, if not their methods. Whether Eureka was truly a proto-

[14] Blake, *To Pierce the Tyrant's Heart*, p. 69.
[15] Myerly, "The Eye Must Entrap the Mind."
[16] Carboni, *The Eureka Stockade*, p. 50.
[17] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat." *Argus*, 18 December 1854, p. 6.
[18] Clare Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka,* (Melbourne, VIC: The Text Publishing Company, 2013), p. 292.
[19] Record of meeting between Lieutenant-Governor Hotham and a deputation from the diggers, led by J. B. Humffrays and George Black, 27 November 1854, VPRS, 1095/P unit 3, bundle 1, no. 16.

independence movement is a controversial subject which will not be addressed in this thesis, except to say that there was a small minority of (predominately Irish) stockaders who nurtured this dream.[20] This work does take the position that, among the legitimate grievances expressed by the stockaders, Eureka was also an ideological conflict for these men. Their manhood had been challenged, and they felt compelled to respond. For the rank-and-file of the military, the ideologies the stockaders attached to their barricade were irrelevant. The military's goal was simple: dismantle the stockade, disperse the stockaders, and return to Government Camp with as few causalities of their own as possible. At least one officer up at the Camp, Captain Charles Pasley – Royal Engineers and aide-de-camp to Captain John Thomas – believed it was essential to crush the stockaders, lest their democratic ideas spread throughout the entire colony.[21] It is difficult to say with certainty how widely his views were shared by his fellow military officers. Captain Thomas, the overall commander of the attack, did not leave any personal records and did not make his feelings known in the reports that he sent to the Major General and the Governor about the affair. Records of the thoughts about the stockade from the other ten commissioned officers present in Ballarat on 3 December 1854 have either been lost or never existed.[22]

However, simply because Eureka was not ideological to the soldiers, does not mean their actions and decisions at Eureka did not reflect their masculinity. To explore how military ideas of manhood differed from those of the stockaders, this thesis will use the six men killed at or as a result of the action at Eureka as a case study group. For ease of reference, they will be referred to as 'the Eureka Six' although they were not connected except through their military service and the cause of their deaths. They offer an insight into how the social change which was sweeping the colonies collided with the conservative mindset of the institution they served. Chapter One will offer biographical details of these men, while also examining what it meant to be a man in the nineteenth-century colonial British Army. Like British society at the time, the army was strictly divided by class and what was masculine in an officer would be seen as pretentious (or even effeminate) in a regular soldier, while an officer who behaved like the rank-and-file would be viewed as crude and unmanly, for example. These class differences will be explored in depth in Chapter 1.1 through the lives of Captain Henry Wise and Private Joseph Wall. Behaviour alone did not define masculinity, however, and it was also underpinned by the ideas of racial superiority popular in Britian at the time. How race contributed to military masculinity will be covered in Chapter 1.2, by examining the lives of two Irish soldiers: Privates Felix Boyle and John Hall. Finally, while all boys would grow into adulthood, their growth into *manhood* was not assured, and they needed to be carefully nurtured if they were to become men. Chapter 1.3 will show at how this thinking applied to boys in the army by looking at the lives of Privates Michael Roney and William Webb, two of the youngest Eureka causalities. The life of John Egan, the teenage drummer of the 12th Regiment, will also form part of this discussion; Egan did not die at Eureka, although it was assumed for many years that he had. His experience provides valuable insight into the lives of boys who grew up in uniform.

[20] Henry Nicholls, "Reminiscences of the Eureka Stockade," *Centennial Magazine*, May, 1890, pp. 746 - 50.
[21] Charles Pasley, "Letters of Charles Pasley [manuscript]," 27 June 1855, SLV, MS, Box 94/4, n.p.
[22] Aside from Captains Thomas and Pasley, the commissioned officers present in Ballarat on 3 December 1854 were Captains Wise and White, and Lieutenants Broadhurst, Gardyne, Hall, Hegarty and Richards, from the 40th Regiment, and Captains Atkinson, Littlehales and Queade from the 12th Regiment.

Chapter Two will consider the other side of the masculinity coin: the diggers, and how some became stockaders. Britain and the colonies were undergoing tremendous change in the mid-nineteenth century, and the goldfields of Australia provided fertile ground for new ideas. Chapter 2.1 will consider how the diggers and stockaders perceived their masculinity, while 2.2 will demonstrate the importance of *action* in ideological masculinity. This was in conflict with more practical military ideas about the need to win, rather than move, and led to the stockaders underestimating the ability of the regiments present at Ballarat. Chapter 2.3 will examine the consequences of this underestimation at the Eureka Stockade, and how it not only caused the deaths of the Eureka Six, but those of an unknown number of stockaders and civilians. The social impact of Eureka will also be looked at in this section, including how the stockaders were able to bolster their manhood through defeat. This idea was unthinkable to the military, whose manhood was predicated on *winning* fights; for the diggers and stockaders, *honour* was the most important concept.

The final chapter will focus on the aftermath of Eureka, and how the men of each side presented themselves. Chapter 3.1 will examine how celebration and commiseration existed side-by-side among both the stockaders and the soldiers, and what effect masculinity had on their behaviour once the stockade was gone. Chapter 3.2 focuses on the funerals of the Eureka Six, and how the factors discussed in Chapter 1, that is class, race and age, followed these men to their graves. There will also be discussion about the purpose of a military funeral and how the pomp and ceremony served to reinforce the masculine stereotypes treasured by the British Army. Chapter 3.3 closes the main work by considering the position of the soldiers over the past 170 years of Eureka commemoration. Are they men in their own story, or have they been cast as supporting characters whose role is to build the manhood of others? Eureka was not a single-issue protest, but rather a melting pot of grievances, in which a sense of wounded manhood loomed large. The fatal collision on that Sunday morning was not merely one of physical violence, but of two incompatible masculinities coming together with disastrous results.

***

Prior to 2014, gender was not part of the mainstream discourse around Eureka, although the role of women on the goldfields had been examined, most notably by Dorothy Wickham in *Women of the Diggings: Ballarat 1854* (2009).Clare Wright's book *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka* brought the women of Ballarat in 1854 to the masses. It not only considered individual women and their contributions to Ballarat and the Eureka Stockade, but how femininity influenced the radical politics which were sweeping the goldfields. This thesis is focused on the masculine ideology present at Eureka, and how the military responded to it, but also taps into the gendered undercurrents identified by Wright, and how these ideas and stereotypes were built into – or rejected – by Ballarat society. While some of the digging portion of the population was transient, permanent (European) settlement in Ballarat began as the alluvial gold disappeared and deep shaft mining became a necessity between 1852 and 1853. Not only diggers, but the services needed to support them began putting down roots in a canvas city, and the first wooden house was built in 1852 on the site of Barthrop Real Estate

in Lydiard Street.[23] Ballarat was not quite a blank slate when it came to ideas on how a society should function, including the roles women and men should assume, but the majority of the population had come to Australia seeking to escape from the constraints of Europe. While they did not want to emulate the countries they had left behind, old ideas and entrenched prejudices made their mark on the goldfields, and wider Victorian society However, there were opportunities, especially for women, to embrace roles they could never have held in Britain, and some became primary bread winners for husbands who had no luck on the diggings.[24] Women also participated in the work of gold mining (as demonstrated in the image below), and several were politically active, either alongside their men or of their own accord.[25]

Fig. 1: Zealous Gold Diggers, Castlemaine 1852 *by S.T. Gill. The watercolour shows gold digging as a family affair, with a nursing mother assisting her husband and sons.*

It is worth mentioning here that 45% of the population in Ballarat in 1854 were women and children, giving lie to the popular fancy that the diggings were "womanless fields."[26] Women were an intrinsic part of life on the diggings, and while not all of them would have been married or met the Victorian ideal of respectability, men were not hard-up for female companionship, whether they were seeking long-term commitment or a night's enjoyment. Some of these women and children lived with their husbands in Government Camp, but the majority would have been from the diggings, as there were restrictions placed on marriage among regular soldiers, and none of the military officers present in Ballarat in 1854 was wed.[27] The military did not keep records of regular soldiers' wives and children, and only one

---

[23] Barthrop Real Estate, "The First House in Ballarat," last modified 2016, https://www.bartrop.com.au/about, accessed 30 November 2024.
[24] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka*. p.105.
[25] S.T. Gill. *Zealous Gold Diggers, Castlemaine 1852,* 1857, watercolour on paper, SLV, PCLTFBOX GILL GOLDFIELDS 2.
[26] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka*, p. 104.
[27] Richard Holmes, *Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket* (London, UK: WW Norton & Company, 2002), pp. 294-297.

military wife is known to have been in Ballarat, although there undoubtedly were others. Some of the high-ranking police and government officials were also married, but in Government Camp, men far outnumbered women. This was also true on the diggings themselves, although to a lesser extent, as the majority of women and children in Ballarat settled among the gold-diggers, seeking husbands, work, or starting small businesses. Given women and children made up almost half the population, it would be foolish to think they did not influence diggings' society.

Yet gender stereotypes persisted. The Ballarat Reform League – the constitutional organisation which preceded the stockader movement – would not admit women and refused to demand universal suffrage.[28] As Wright notes, this showed that, despite the forward-thinking notions of the diggers and stockaders on the subject of manhood, their concept of gender roles aligned with the status quo. Masculinity involved not only fighting for one's rights, but also protecting the weak and less able. Women and children were the obvious candidates for the role of the protected, regardless of their own capability or intelligence. Nineteenth-century thinking was binary: men and women were opposite, therefore traits which were desirable in men and women were also opposite, as were their designated roles in society. A woman who demonstrated she could function on her own in society was a threat not only to a man, but to the collective idea of manhood. A man could not be a man if the women around him were not appropriately feminine. This binary was even more pronounced in the army, where wives were as tightly controlled as their soldier husbands, and were expected to conform to femininity even in the most trying circumstances.

But even in a time of strict gender roles, masculinity and femininity were not the exclusive domain of either sex. As British historian John Tosh argues, masculinity and femininity are simply two sides of the same coin, and the history of masculinity is not the history of *men*.[29] It is, Tosh states, a history of behaviours which shift and change depending on time, place and society.[30] While this work will focus on the Eureka Six and their male colleagues in the army, as well as the primarily male stockaders, it would be impossible to conduct any research into masculinity without considering how it interacted with femininity. These concepts were not fixed, even in the highly structured nineteenth century, and civilian and military ideas about what constituted proper manhood were frequently in conflict. Sometimes these ideas were directly opposed to each other, while at other times the foundations remained the same, but the execution was fundamentally different. Both the soldiers and stockaders at Eureka, for example, placed a high value on being able to fight for what they believed in, but how such a fight should be fought was a point of difference.

Among both military and civilian populations, masculinity in Britain followed rigid class divides, but these were less defined in Victoria and especially among gold diggers. This is not to say class did not exist among the diggers, but they were opposed to importing "the old European style of Master and Servant," unless they were to be the masters.[31] Administrators living on the diggings, such as the Gold Commissioner, high-ranking police, military officers and magistrates, wanted to retain the class structure which kept them comfortably on top, but

---

[28] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka*, pp. 259-261.
[29] John Tosh, "What Should Historians Do with Masculinity? Reflections on Nineteenth-Century Britain," *History Workshop*, no. 38 (1994), pp. 179-202.
[30] Tosh, "What Should Historians Do with Masculinity?"
[31] Serle, *The Golden Age,* p. 407

this system was rapidly becoming an anachronism among the diggers.[32] Their new brand of colonial masculinity favoured hard work, individual spirit, and a loose meritocracy. Such ideas would have been greeted with alarm by the military establishment had they taken root among regular soldiers, who were expected to conform absolutely and lived under an unbending hierarchy. For the civilian population, especially those who later joined the stockaders, they confused conformity in the regular soldiers for emasculation and underestimated the army to their cost. Independence was not a desirable trait among regular soldiers, and too much of it was even frowned upon in officers, whose first loyalty was expected to be to the crown and the empire.[33] As commented on once again by Tosh, masculinity was inexorably bound up with loyalty, but who one was loyal to influenced how a man was perceived by others.[34] Among soldiers, loyalty to their officers and the crown was lauded as honourable, while among the diggers, being there for their mates was seen as the epitome of manly behaviour. Soldiers too valued standing by their friends and colleagues in uniform, and the surest way to anger a military man was to kill or injure one of his own. Because soldiers depended heavily on each other in combat they formed tight bonds, and avenging a fallen comrade was not only common but encouraged by the British Army at this time.

The works of Tosh and Wright have informed the exploration of gender in this thesis, while understanding soldiers and soldiering on the Victoria goldfields of the nineteenth century required digging deeper into the literature surrounding Eureka. While there are countless books about the Victorian gold rush, and dozens more which consider Eureka, there are very few about the soldiers at Eureka, or even their role on the goldfields generally. Gregory Blake's monograph *To Pierce the Tyrant's Heart* is one of the few available studies which provides a detailed examination of the military's role at the stockade. By centring the soldiers within the work, Blake provides a balanced evaluation of their actions based on how they perceived Eureka. He argues that the twenty-minute skirmish at the stockade was both a legal and reasonable use of military force, and this thesis takes the same approach.[35] Another work used to help inform the lives of the soldiers is *Soldiers Bleed Too*, a short creative non-fiction book by Neil Smith. Smith uses the diary of Corporal John Neill (held privately) to write an impressionistic account of Eureka from Neill's point of view. While it is not an academic source, Smith has published the muster rolls of the 12th and 40th Regiments within the book, and also provides a breakdown of how many soldiers were at the stockade, the number left behind to guard Government Camp, and where each group was positioned. When cross-checked with the primary sources, such as the original muster rolls, maps presented at state trials and recollections of former soldiers and stockaders, it is a valuable and accessible resource. Richard Holmes' *Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of the Horse and Musket* provided important information about the British Army as an institution in the nineteenth century, and what soldiering involved for the men who enlisted in its ranks. It does not specifically discuss either gender or the British Army in Australia, but provides a valuable overview nonetheless into the kind of man who joined the army, and what being a redcoat meant to him, his fellows, and his society. Further information about the role of soldiers in

---

[32] Serle, *The Golden Age*, p. 296.
[33] John Tosh, "'A Fresh Access of Dignity': Masculinity and Imperial Commitment in Britain, 1815–1914," *University of North London* (2004), pp. 120.
[34] Tosh, "'A Fresh Access of Dignity'"
[35] Blake, *To Pierce the Tyrant's Heart.* pp. 220 – 221.

the Australian colonies has come from Peter Stanley's *The Remote Garrison*, which includes information specifically on the 12th and 40th Regiments, and their contribution at Eureka.

Other secondary sources have been used extensively to consider not just the lives of the soldiers, but how the lives of all those living in Ballarat were affected by the social changes that came before and after Eureka. These include Geoffrey Serele's *The Golden Age* and Weston Bate's *Lucky City*, which provide insight into every aspect of goldfields life, from digging to the rise of the regional cities some of the old goldfields towns became. *A History of Ballarat* by William Withers, while dated at the time of writing this thesis, also provided valuable insight into nineteenth-century Ballarat. None of these works touch on gender directly, but offer a foundation to understand Ballarat as a place where people lived and put down roots and also the cultural influences surrounding Eureka. All three contain sections or whole chapters on Eureka itself, although consider the event from the perspective of the diggers or stockaders. These perspectives are valuable for considering the motives and ideas of the men who stayed to defend the stockade. John Moloney's *Eureka*, which argues that Eureka was "Australia's first and only armed rebellion for democratic rights" further assisted in considering the motives of the diggers/stockaders (Moloney does not differentiate between these groups).[36]

To understand the importance of manhood to each group on the diggings, one only has to look at the wealth of primary source material produced by the diggers, stockaders, soldiers and administrators in and around Eureka. Peter Lalor's open letter *To the colonists!* and Raffaello Carboni's colourful book *The Eureka Stockade: The Consequence of Some Pirates Wanting on Quarter-Deck a Rebellion* are two of the most well-known sources which present the stockaders' viewpoint. Neither Lalor nor Carboni can be considered an objective source, but the same is true for most of those present at Eureka who later produced written records. Lalor's words are often given particular weight due to his position as the stockaders' Commander-in-Chief. His letter brims with righteousness and aggrieved manhood, and he makes several direct references to masculinity, but it is a political manifesto rather than an attempt to produce an account of the stockade.[37] With the help of his friends, Lalor had escaped the stockade in the final moments of the battle and had been spirited away to Geelong, where he was cared for by his fiancée after having his arm amputated.[38] He had been planning on standing for election since his arrival in Victoria in 1852, and Eureka became the origin story which propelled him into Parliament in 1855.[39] In a letter to his fiancée, written just days before the stockade, Lalor declared that he would be "unworthy of being called a man" if he did not take a stand.[40] Carboni's book is also a frequently used source in the majority of works which consider Eureka, and he too makes multiple references to the stockaders' sense of wounded pride and the need to defend their manhood.[41] Carboni also provides a very detailed description of the events which took place at Eureka, although his account must be treated with caution, as Carboni was not at the stockade on 3 December

---

[36] John Moloney, *Eureka(* 2nd ed, Carlton, VIC: Melbourne University Press), 2001, back cover.
[37] Lalor, "To the Colonists of Victoria, *Argus*, 10 April 1855"
[38] Peter Lalor, *Letter to Richard Lalor,* 1855, SLV, MS BOX 3/6.
[39] William Craig, *My Adventures on the Australian Goldfields* (Invercargill, NZ: Cassell, 1903), p. 251.
[40] Clive Turnbull, *Australian Lives*, (Melbourne, VIC; F.W. Cheshire, 1965), p. 61.
[41] Carboni, *The Eureka Stockade,* pp. 12, 48, 59, 84, 88, 98.

1854. In fact, his behaviour during this event was the very opposite of masculine for its time: he was discovered by a group of soldiers in the aftermath of the battle, sheltering in the brick chimney of his tent.[42] He was never derided as a coward during his lifetime, although he freely used this insult against others, especially American stockader James McGill and the German Frederick Vern, who he felt had behaved dishonourably. Both Lalor and Carboni hated the soldiers, police and government authorities in 1854/55, and their writings reflect this prejudice.

Another important source from the diggers and stockaders is John Lynch's memoir *The Story of the Eureka Stockade.* Lynch was one of the stockaders' Captains, that is men who were chosen to lead the various divisions within the stockade. Lynch led a group of pikemen, but also spent some time with an American contingent, who called themselves the California Independent Rifle Brigade.[43] Lynch presents a slightly more balanced view of Eureka than Lalor or Carboni; he published his memoirs forty years after the stockade, by which time he had no political position to defend. Whether this makes his work more or less reliable is a point of contention, and by 1894 (the year his memoirs were published) Lynch had held several positions of influence in the Ballarat area. He had worked as a surveyor to help lay out the town of Smythesdale, where he later settled with his family, had served as both a local councillor and mayor of Smythesdale on multiple occasions. He had also been an instructor of mathematics at the Ballarat School of Mines, and was one of the few Eureka veterans still living.[44] Lynch's work provides a brief but clear overview of the stockaders' views and their justification for Eureka. This section especially is valuable, because these justifications can be compared to those offered by the military and government forces for their actions, leading to a better understanding of the actions taken by both sides. In an interesting aside, Lynch was the father of the famous 'Colonel' Arthur Lynch, who – after travelling widely, publishing prolifically, and becoming fluent in French and German – went to South Africa in 1901 to set up an Irish brigade to fight against the British in the Boer War.[45] His exploits demonstrate that the Lynch family, much like the Lalors, were heavily involved not just in colonial politics, but in nationalist movements around the globe too, especially in Ireland. On the military side, there is also a trove of primary source documents, many of them consisting of official reports and correspondence between high-ranking military officers and government officials. Captain Thomas's report to Major General Sir Robert Nickle provides a clear and concise record of not only Eureka itself, but the preceding events from the perspective of the military. What the diggers and stockaders saw as a noble stand for their rights, Thomas perceived as a threat to himself, his men, their families, the civil authorities at Government Camp, the civilians of Ballarat for whom he was responsible, and to the safety and security of the colony in general.[46] With 170 years of hindsight it is easy to see that his concerns that the colony as a whole was at risk were seriously misplaced. The few stockaders who dreamed of independence never had enough public support to make those hopes a reality, and they were a minority in the movement to begin with. However, they were a loud minority and Thomas – a

[42] Carboni, *The Eureka Stockade,* pp. 71- 73.
[43] John Lynch, *The Story of the Eureka Stockade* (Melbourne, VIC: The Australian Catholic Truth Society, 1894), pp. 27- 33.
[44] "Death of Mr. Jon Lynch, J.P.," *The Grenville Standard*, Linton, VIC, 24 March 1906, p. 1.
[45] Geoffrey Serle, 'Lynch, Arthur Alfred (1861–1934),' *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, (National Centre of Biography, Australian National University: Canberra, ACT), https://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/lynch-arthur-alfred-7270/text12599, published first in hardcopy 1986, accessed 8 January 2025.
[46] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat," *Argus*, 18 December 1854, p. 6.

product of Eton and Sandhurst who had dedicated his life to serving the British Empire – was not able to distinguish this aspect of the movement from the ideas which enjoyed more popular support, such as the abolition of the licence fee. Unfortunately, Thomas never kept a diary or wrote memoirs that we know of, and the few personal views he expressed come from the military reports he wrote, which tend to present a broad perspective, rather than an individual one. Thomas never mentioned manhood in any of his reports, but other sources indicate that masculinity was on the minds of the soldiers as they watched the stockaders from their vantage point in Government Camp.

One such source is the letters of Captain Charles Pasley, an officer of the Royal Engineers and nominated member of the Victorian Legislative Council. Despite having no combat experience, Pasley was appointed second-in-command when he arrived in Ballarat of his own volition in 1854 and made his feelings known in his regular letters to his father. Pasley was a great believer in the status quo, not least because he personally benefitted from it, and shared the fears of Thomas and the civil authorities that a revolution was in the making.[47] Where he differs from Thomas is that Pasley felt it was the military's job to punish the stockaders, where Thomas believed his role was to restore order and maintain the peace. Pasley's view was more in line with the civil authorities' position, including that of the Governor Sir Charles Hotham, and Pasley made explicit mention of manhood in his correspondence. Pasley also provides a good example of how masculinity in this period could be gained through power and control, but that it was also incredibly fragile. Pasley was an excellent military engineer and had brought the poorly managed Public Works Department under control *and* under budget when he'd arrived from England in 1853, but he was also acutely aware that he was a soldier who had never been to war.[48] The situation at Eureka gave him a chance to not only protect the systems which supported him, but also to prove he was an able and capable officer: a man worthy of his uniform.

Pasley's personal circumstances mean his words should be treated with as much caution as those of Lalor or Carboni. The government could do no wrong in Pasley's eyes and the fault for the issues at hand lay with the diggers and stockaders. However, not every soldier was as black and white about Eureka. Corporal John Neill of the 40th Regiment was one of the few regular soldiers who kept a diary. While the diary itself is not publicly available, it has been used in other works such as *Soldiers Bleed Too* and *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka*. Later in his life, Neill also wrote frequent letters to the editors of the Ballarat, Creswick and Buninyong newspapers. An 1870 letter he wrote to an unnamed newspaper was reprinted in *The World's News* for the 75th Anniversary of the Eureka Stockade.[49] Neill observed that "both sides had right and justice with them" at the stockade: the diggers were being mistreated, but once they took up arms the administration had to act.[50] Those parts of Neill's diary which have been published have also provided a tantalising glimpse of what life was like for married fathers in the colonial British Army. In the civilian world, being a husband and father was seen as the pinnacle of masculine achievement, whereas the army actively

[47] Charles Pasley, "Letters of Charles Pasley [manuscript], n.p..

[48] Ronald McNicoll, "Charles Pasley (1824 - 1890)," *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, (National Centre of Biography, Australian National University: Canberra, ACT), https://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/pasley-charles-4370, published first in hardcopy 1974, accessed 5 December 2024.

[49] John Neill in J. Abbot, "The Military Point of View," *The World's News*, Sydney, N.S.W, 1930, pp. 9, 35.

[50] Neill, "The Military Point of View."

discouraged marriage and placed restrictions on how many regular men could have wives.[51] Neill's experience caring for his family while also managing his responsibilities as a non-commissioned officer provides important insight into how civilian and military ideas could both come into conflict *and* exist in relative harmony.

Other diaries used within this research include those written by Samuel Huyghue, a Canadian clerk at Government Camp, and digger Charles Evans, who wrote under the pseudonym Samuel Lazarus. Like Pasley, Huyghue was an establishment man who benefitted from the status quo, although he recognised the diggers had legitimate grievances. As a civilian contractor working for the army, he did not participate in the fight at the stockade, although he lived in Government Camp and was deeply affected by the lead-up to, and aftermath of, Eureka.[52] Evans provides perhaps the most objective first-hand account of both the Eureka Stockade and life on the Ballarat goldfields. He was not a stockader, but supported removing the licence fee, unlocking the land to allow for farming, and holding police accountable for corrupt behaviour.[53] He was highly critical of the violent action taken by the stockaders, but equally scathing of what he felt was a serious over-reaction by the military.[54] A final diary which has informed this work and is worth mentioning is one belonging to John "Jack" Byers of the 12th Regiment. Byers (the fifth-great-grandfather of the author) enlisted in the 12th Regiment just months before it sailed to Victoria, and was nineteen when he fought at Eureka.[55] He kept a diary while in the army, parts of which have been included in the author's family archives. Sadly, Byers did not write much about Eureka and was a very inconsistent diarist, but the recollections which have been preserved allow for the lives of the regular men Byers served alongside to be considered in more detail – especially those who, like him, hailed from Ireland.

Ultimately, this thesis aims to not only uncover how masculinity contributed to the violence at the Eureka Stockade, but to tell the story of the men in uniform who stormed it that morning. Their voices and experiences are as valuable to history as those of the stockaders, and many of the soldiers carried the scars of Eureka with them for the rest of their lives. The surviving military men buried friends, colleagues and respected leaders, and some undoubtedly suffered from trauma that was not recognised at the time. As for the Eureka Six themselves, once those who had known them died or left the area, they were generally forgotten. The monuments bearing their names were left to the ravages of time, and their sacrifice ignored as anti-British sentiment began to colour the perception of Australia's pre-Federation history. Since the 150th anniversary of Eureka there has been a more concerted effort to include the story of the soldiers; this has proved controversial, but most aspects of Eureka are. This research was not undertaken with the aim of silencing these controversies but to add to the history of Eureka. There is no denying that the stockaders were generally brave and passionate men, but so too were the soldiers who formed up to defend the civilian population of Ballarat from the stockaders' increasing violence. They faced down a heavily

---

[51] Derek Oddy, "Gone for a Soldier: The Anatomy of a Nineteenth-Century Army Family," *Journal of Family History* 25, no. 1 (2000), p. 39- 53.
[52] Samuel Huyghue, "The Ballarat Riots, 1854 [manuscript]," ML, A 1789, n.p.
[53] Charles Evans, "Diary [manuscript]," SLV, MS, BOX 1777/4, n.p.
[54] Evans, "Diary [manuscript]," n.p.
[55] John Byers in William Byers, "Byers Family History [manuscript]," in the author's possession, n.p.

armed force determined to kill them and triumphed. The six men who will be examined in detail in the following chapter paid for this victory with their lives.

1. All the Queen’s Men

Masculinity in the British Army at Ballarat

This chapter will outline what masculinity meant to the men who made up the fighting force on the British Army, both officers and regular soldiers. Using the Eureka Six as a case-study, the exploration of masculinity in this section will focus on how manhood interacted with militarism across three specific areas: class, race and age. This work does not claim that these were the only factors which influenced masculinity in the army in the nineteenth century, simply that they are the focus of this particular study. With the exception of soldiers’ sons who were born into regiments and usually followed their fathers into uniform, most soldiers had experienced civilian life, meaning they were socialised as men according to civilian morals and values.[1] These were very different to military ideas around manhood, partly due to the hard nature of soldiering, but also due to the strict regulation military men (and their families) lived under. Because the men of the army had previously been civilians, military masculinity was influenced by the ideas society already held about men and manhood, but the British Army in the nineteenth century was a sub-culture in of itself.[2] This not only affected the way soldiers lived and worked, but also how they measured their intrinsic worth as men.

All working men and women were controlled by their employer in the nineteenth century, but in the military this was taken to extremes. Every aspect of a soldier’s life, and the lives of his family if he was married with children, were subject to army discipline.[3] For this reason, soldiers were sometimes derided by the civilian population as “slaves in red coats,” an idea that was insulting to any civilian British man, as the concept of freedom was intrinsic to their developing national identity.[4] Freedom was a loose term in the nineteenth century, with various meaning to different groups within the British Empire. Among the diggers and stockaders in Ballarat, it meant certain inalienable rights that they, as British subjects, held, which the government could not infringe upon.[5] For the soldiers in Ballarat, they too were free British subjects, but the mechanisms of freedom which the diggers and later stockaders were fighting for, such as franchise and property ownership, were out of reach for them. Undoubtedly there were men within the ranks who were political, but civic freedom was not how a regular soldier measured his manhood in 1854. This was a civilian concept, that did not translate to the realities of military life. What military masculinity was, and what it meant to the soldiers of Eureka, will be explored further in this chapter.

However, before examining the lives and deaths of the Eureka Six, and what insights they can provide into nineteenth-century masculinity, it is worth briefly outlining the state of the British Army at this time. Britan was at war with Russia in 1854, and this conflict, the Crimean War, exposed the many flaws and shortcoming of the British military, especially

---

[1] Derek Oddy, "Gone for a Soldier: The Anatomy of a Nineteenth-Century Army Family," *Journal of Family History* 25, no. 1 (2000), pp. 39-53.
[2] Gregory Blake, *To Pierce the Tyrant's Heart: A Military History of the Battle for the Eureka Stockade: 3 December 1854,* Australian Army History Collection (Loftus, N.S.W: Australian Military History Publications [in association with the Australian Army History Unit], 2009), pp. 63, 79.
[3] Oddy, "Gone for a Soldier.”
[4] Scott Myerley, ""The Eye Must Entrap the Mind": Army Spectacle and Paradigm in Nineteenth-Century Britain." *Journal of Social History* (1992), pp. 105-31.
[5] Ballarat Reform League, *Ballarat Reform League Charter,* Ballarat, VIC: Ballarat Reform League, 1854, https://victoriancollections.net.au/stories/eureka-stories/ballarat-reform-league-charter.

when compared to the armies of its continental European neighbours.[6] The British Army had stood still in almost every aspect, from tactics to weaponry, since the victory over Napolean at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, and it showed at Crimea.[7] The famous Cardwell reforms, which would forcibly modernise the army, were still fifteen years away, although the issues that led to future legislation were already well-known and reform was in the wind. In Britain, the military top brass forcibly resisted any change which threatened their privileged positions, but did grudgingly accept small reforms as social conditions demanded it. For example, as recruitment began to slow during the Crimean War, the army announced it would increase the enlistment bonus from 1s. per man to £1 per man.[8] Recruitment jumped so high that within six months, the army had restricted payment of the bounty to those men who joined regiments which were deployed to Crimea. William Webb, the youngest of the Eureka Six, joined the army around the time the bounty was introduced and this may have influenced his decision to enlist. £1 was roughly equivalent to a month's wages for an agricultural labourer like Webb, and it was from the labouring classes, both urban and rural, that the bulk of regular soldiers hailed.[9]

For these mostly young, working-class men, the army offered an escape from the grinding monotony of agricultural or factory labour in Britain, as well as the promise of food, shelter, clothing and regular wages. These things were not guaranteed to labourers in other employment, and despite the harsh realities of army life being well known, these drawcards were enough to entice all sorts of men (not just labourers) to don a uniform.[10] In addition to army life being infamously hard, soldiers lived lives of extreme boredom, and were crammed into overcrowded and unsanitary barracks, where the only breaks in the monotony came from the bottle or the brothel.[11] They were subject to extreme punishments, such as flogging and branding, for even minor offences, and were perceived – by both their officers and the British public – as semi-human, stupid, and inherently violent.[12] Their days followed the same rigid routine, with little time for a soldier to indulge his individual interests and attempts by the rank-and-file to better themselves through what little education was available were restricted by an uneasy officer class.[13] Soldiers' wages were infamously meagre; in theory a regular soldier earned 1s. per day, plus an extra 1d. for 'beer money' but in reality the men never saw that much money.[14] Soldiers' wages were stopped (i.e. reduced) to pay for rations and for the maintenance of their kit and uniforms. Rations alone cost approximately 4d. per day, a quarter of a regular man's pay, and a soldier's wages were stopped entirely if he had to attend the regimental hospital due to being sick or wounded.[15] This was believed by civilian

---

[6] Olive Anderson, "Early Experiences of Manpower Problems in an Industrial Society at War: Great Britain, 1854-56," *Political Science Quarterly* 82, no. 4 (1967), pp. 526-45.
[7] Albert Tucker, "Army and Society in England 1870-1900: A Reassessment of the Cardwell Reforms," *Journal of British Studies* 2, no. 2 (1963), pp. 110-41.
[8] Anderson, "Early Experiences of Manpower Problems in an Industrial Society at War."
[9] Arthur Bowley, *Wages in the United Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1900), p. 34.
[10] Oddy, "Gone for a Soldier"
[11] E. Smith, "Educating the Soldier in the Nineteenth Century (Continued)," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 66, no. 265 (1988), pp. 35-45.
[12] Myerly, ""The Eye Must Entrap the Mind"
[13] T. Bowyer-Bower, "Some Early Educational Influences in the British Army," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 33, no. 133 (1955), pp. 5-12; Tucker. "Army and Society in England 1870-1900"
[14] Blake, *To Pierce the Tyrant's Heart,* pp. 64 – 65.
[15] Henry Mayhew, *London Labour and the London Poor* (London, England: 1862), pp. 233-235.

observers to be a good thing, as it prevented "malingering and idleness" among uniformed men, but stoppages were one of the first things to go when reforms were introduced in 1870.[16]

For soldiers in the colonies, life generally followed the same regimented pattern as in Britain, however colonial life offered some freedoms for regular men, especially in Victoria. Because the colony was still in its infancy, the social and physical structures which governed life in Britain either did not exist yet, or were being implemented with changes to better suit the needs of the colonists.[17] The social order was also more relaxed in Victoria, as there was no established aristocracy in the colony. Class existed, and the army remained as strictly hierarchical as ever, but there were more opportunities for regular men to advance in the colonies than in Britain. This was not unique to Victoria, but was a phenomenon which was generally restricted to the colonies. While the army *was* a deeply conservative organisation, controlled by an officer class highly resistant to change, colonial troops who often lived closer to the civilian population than in Britain were not immune to the new ideas which took hold in their places of deployment. Officers in Britain expected blind obedience from the rank-and-file, but to be effective as a fighting force in the colonies men and officers had to work together and this required trust and open communication.

This situation came about because the high-ranking established officers who controlled the military did not regularly take colonial postings.[18] Some were too elderly or unwell to handle the sea crossing, while others felt a stint in the colonies, especially in fledgling colonies like Victoria, was beneath them. This meant that younger officers, sometimes just months (or even weeks!) out of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst with little to no experience, often took these deployments.[19] This is in direct contrast to the soldiers they commanded, who were often long-term military men with a wealth of colonial experience, especially those who had clawed their way up the ranks to become non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Their knowledge was invaluable, and their newly commissioned officers relied heavily on them once they reached the colonies. Colonial officers also learned quickly that their birth did not make them naturally suited for command, and the experience of working with the regular men and NCOs often benefitted their careers. Captain Thomas is an almost textbook example; he spent more than half his career in the colonies and the experience he gained there saw him retire in 1881 as a Major General without *ever* having purchased a commission.[20] Henry Wise, the only officer to die at Eureka, was sent to Victoria almost immediately after graduating as an Ensign from Sandhurst and was placed in command of a force of military pensioners at Ballarat in 1852.[21] While he earned this first commission, he later purchased further commissions, becoming a Lieutenant, then a Captain, and was moved to Geelong, before he was recalled to Ballarat with his men.[22] He arrived on 28 November 1854 and is

[16] Mayhew, *London Labour and the London Poor,* pp. 233-235.
[17] Geoffrey Serle, *The Golden Age: A History of the Colony of Victoria, 1851-1861,* (3rd ed. Carlton, VIC: Melbourne University Press, 1977), pp. 235 – 237.
[18] Oddy, "Gone for a Soldier."
[19] Oddy, "Gone for a Soldier."
[20] TNA, *WO 76 - War Office: Records of Officers' Services*, Kew, UK, *WO 76/515.*
[21] H.E.C Stapylton, *Eton School Lists 1791-1850*, (London, England: E P Williams, 1863); TNA, *WO 76 - War Office: Records of Officers' Services*, Kew, UK, *WO 76/179.*
[22] TNA, *WO 76 - War Office: Records of Officers' Services*, *WO 76/179.*

still there today, buried in the Soldier's Enclosure at Old Ballarat Cemetery.

1.1. Wall & Wise: Class, Conservatism & *Englishness*

Captain Henry Christopher Wise V, to give him his full name, is arguably the best known of the Eureka Six. Such is his fame that he even appears in promotional material for the Eureka Centre, where he faces off with Peter Lalor in a brochure, on a tea-towel, and within a set a commemorative badges.[23] While this rather exciting scene – of the rebel leader and the gallant officer engaging in a fight to the death – makes for a wonderful story, Wise and Lalor never met each other, and certainly *not* at the stockade. This is not the only romanticised fiction Wise has starred in over the past 170 years either. He has been portrayed as everything from a dashing, Bingley-esque figure, to an aristocratic sadist who was prepared to stop democracy in its tracks at all costs. In reality, there is not enough surviving material to make a definitive statement about his character, and most of what does exist was written by newspaper correspondents after his death. What is clear from the surviving sources is that Wise was well-liked and respected by both the military *and* the civilian communities at Ballarat.[24] While in Britain soldiers were relatively separate from civilians, this was not the case in Victoria, and even less so in Ballarat. Many soldiers formed close relationships in the community they lived alongside. As will be discussed later, a number of soldiers and stockaders who faced off at the stockade knew each other personally, which must have been an uncomfortable experience to say the least.

Wise himself probably did not know any of the stockaders well, if at all. He would have socialised with the respectable citizens of Ballarat: business owners, hoteliers, other officers, members of the judiciary, and civilian officials. However, the turnout at his funeral demonstrated that he was respected by the general population, as well as those in whose circles he moved. This is in contrast with Joseph Wall, a fellow Englishman from the 40th Regiment, who also died of wounds sustained at Eureka. Nationality and cause of death were all these two men had in common: Wall was a labourer from Somerset, while Wise was the eldest son of an influential MP, and heir to an estate and its accompanying fortune. This wide difference in social status has also affected the records both men left behind. Wise's life can be traced with relative ease through the archives, but Wall's common name and surname make it difficult to find any definitive trace of him outside the muster rolls of the 40th Regiment. Despite this, it is possible to place both men into their historical context, and use their lives to examine the role class distinctions, and the British class-system, played in the perception of masculinity in the colonial army.

Aspects of class structure had been part of the fabric of Australian society since the arrival of the First Fleet, and by 1854 the colonists had created their own class and social hierarchies.[25] They were less restrictive than in Britain, as those who arrived in the Port Phillip District and later the colony of Victoria were coming to start a new life for themselves. They did not want to be subject to the same prejudices they had left behind in Europe, especially those who were political or economic refugees.[26] The new society they were creating had more of an

---

[23] Eureka Centre, *Visitor's Guide* (Ballarat, VIC: B. Sanders, 2020), centre spread.
[24] "Ballaarat," *Argus*, Melbourne, VIC, 26 December 1854, p. 5.
[25] Serle, *The Golden Age*, pp. 40-41.
[26] Serle, *The Golden Age,* pp. 41-42.

effect on the rank-and-file of the army than their officers, although, as already discussed, inexperienced officers relied on their men, which softened the power dynamics at play. Henry Wise was the archetype of a colonial officer: young and well-educated, but relatively inexperienced, with no more than a theoretical understanding of how to lead men in battle. It would appear though that Wise was an attentive student and was prepared to learn from his more experienced men. He honed his skills during an early posting to Ballarat in 1852, and when he returned in 1854 he had become a competent leader.

Had he not fallen at Eureka, there was every chance he would have had a successful military career, before returning to Warwickshire and settling down to father Henry Christopher Wise VI. Despite being an officer, Wise's primary duty as the eldest son was to carry on the family line, and previous research suggested he was taking this responsibility seriously. For many years it was believed Wise was married to a woman named Jane Disbrowe, who is remembered in the local parish at Leek Woolton.[27] Described on her memorial as "the widow of Henry Christopher Wise Esq.", Disbrowe was born in Derbyshire in 1828, and died in Leek Woolton in 1908.[28] There is no record of her accompanying then-Ensign Wise to Australia in 1852, nor any mention of her in Ballarat, Geelong or Melbourne in the two years Wise was posted in those areas. The newspapers reported Wise's death and funeral in great detail, but did not note her presence at either his deathbed or in the funeral procession.[29] Had she been in Victoria, she would have been called to his side when he was wounded, and would later have attended her husband's funeral. The army did not keep individual records of military wives but officer's wives were listed on their husband's army records. One would have expected to find Disbrowe listed here, but the space on Henry Wise's personnel file where a wife's name would be was blank and he was listed as 'Unmarried' in 1854.[30] While regular men were subject to marriage restrictions and sometimes had to hide the existence of their spouse, officers such as Wise could marry who and when they chose. Either the regimental clerk had been incompetent, or Wise had never been married; but who, then, was the mysterious Jane?

Uncovering a marriage record eventually led to the answer. Jane Disbrowe had married Henry Christopher Wise IV, the *father* of Captain Wise, in 1863, after the death of Wise IV's first wife, Harriett (nee Skipwith).[31] The modern confusion over which Henry Wise she had married most likely comes from the fact that Captain Wise and his father had the same name, and the position of her memorial at Leek Woolton, which is next to one erected to the memory of Captain Wise. Disbrowe and Wise were a similar age too, meaning that when Wise IV married her, she was young enough to be his daughter. While such an age gap might be seen as cause for concern today, it was not uncommon in high society marriages in the nineteenth century.[32] It was also reasonable to assume that a man of Captain Wise's age and

---

[27] Justin Corfield, Dorothy Wickham, and Clare Gervasoni, *The Eureka Encyclopaedia* (Ballarat, VIC: Ballarat Heritage Services, 2004), p. 549.
[28] Warwickshire County Record Office, Warwickshire Anglican Registers; Roll: Engl 09000/102; Document Reference: DR 38.
[29] "Ballarat," *Age*, Melbourne, VIC, 27 December 1854, p. 4.
[30] TNA, *WO 76 - War Office: Records of Officers' Services*, Kew, UK, *WO 76/179.*
[31] FreeBMD, *England & Wales, Civil Registration Marriage Index, 1837-1915* [database online]; "Marriage in High Life," *Birmingham Gazette*, 4 June 1863, p. 5.
[32] Bart Van de Putte, Frans Van Poppel, Sofie Vanassche, Maria Sanchez, Svetlana Jidkova, Mieke Eeckhaut, Michel Oris, Koen Matthjis, "The Rise of Age Homogamy in 19th Century Western Europe," *Journal of Marriage and Family* 71 (December 2009), pp. 1234-1253.

status *would* be married, as marriage was an integral pillar of masculine identity across all classes. There is a lot of modern interest in the Victorian-era idea that all women strove to be wives and mothers, but a similar pressure was applied to men to be husbands and fathers. The nuclear family was central to the Victorian social code, and to be the provider and protector for one's wife and children was considered the height of respectability. Many men married later in life to ensure they had to economic means to support a family.[33] As an heir and a commissioned officer, Captain Wise would have been a *very* eligible bachelor. He died aged twenty-six, which was older than the mean age of marriage for men in 1854, and whatever his personal desires may have been, he would have been aware of the social expectation that he would eventually settle down and take a wife.[34]

So too would Wall have been conscious of how men were defined by marriage, although as a regular soldier he was not as easily able to meet this social standard. The British Army in the nineteenth century only allowed six out of every hundred rank-and-file men to marry, as it was believed that wives and families would be a distraction.[35] The punishments for being caught marrying without permission were very severe and affected not only the soldier, but his wife and children as well. Because of this, regular men like Wall had to find other ways to express their manhood. One of these was sex, something that has been associated with soldiering since time immemorial. Sexual activity outside marriage was officially frowned upon (and in some cases banned) in both Britain and the colonies, but prostitution was wide-spread and came in many forms.[36] The army's official position was that it did not encourage soldiers to use prostitutes, yet officers willingly turned a blind eye to the large number of sex workers who plied their trade around barracks.[37] Action was only taken to curb paid sexual liaisons when rates of syphilis of other sexually transmitted diseases became unacceptably high, and women were always blamed for its spread.[38] Exact statistics on sexually transmitted diseases among soldiers in the nineteenth century are difficult to come by and the sources vary, but it is generally accepted that roughly twenty-five percent of any regiment would be infected with syphilis at any one time.[39] It can be reasonably assumed that this was the same for the men of the 12th and 40th in Ballarat.

While there has not been a large-scale study on prostitution in Ballarat in the 1850s, Clare Wright considers the subject in Chapter Eight of *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka*.[40] She demonstrates that there was a thriving red-light district in Ballarat, which was frequently patronised by officials in Government Camp, including military officers.[41] It was also frequented by regular soldiers; they did not leave records of their attendance, but this was the

---

[33] Van de Putte, et. al. "The Rise of Age Homogamy in 19th Century Western Europe."
[34] Rose Mintzer-Sweeney, "British marriage, zoomed out," *Datawrapper* (Berlin, Germany: 15 June 2023), https://blog.datawrapper.de/historical-marriage-age-britain/, accessed 24 December 2024.
[35] Richard Holmes, *Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket* (London, UK: WW Norton & Company, 2002), pp. 294- 297.
[36] Hallie Rubenhold, *The Five: The Untold Lives of the Women Killed by Jack the Ripper* (London, UK: Doubleday, 2019), p. 14.
[37] Douglas Peers, "Privates Off Parade: Regimenting Sexuality in the Nineteenth-Century Indian Empire," *The International History Review* 20, no. 4 (1998), pp. 823-854.
[38] Douglas Peers, "Soldiers, Surgeons and the Campaigns to Combat Sexually Transmitted Diseases in Colonial India, 1805–1860," *Medical History* 42, no. 2 (1998), pp. 137-160.
[39] Peers, "Soldiers, Surgeons and the Campaigns to Combat Sexually Transmitted Diseases in Colonial India, 1805–1860."
[40] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka,* pp. 192-196.
[41] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka,* pp. 195- 196.

norm across the British Empire.[42] Brown Hill, identified by Wright as being one of the more notorious red light districts in Ballarat, was geographically close to the military enclave of Government Camp, which was roughly within the modern suburb of Soldiers Hill. The location alone suggests the brothels within this area would have been staffed by women prepared to service soldiers, despite the risk of violence and infection.[43] Whether Wall (or Wise, for that matter) personally patronised prostitutes is unknown, but sexual prowess was an acceptable measure of manhood among military men unable to marry *and* officers who chose not to.[44] While sex and marriage were relatively stable measures of manhood across class, there were other behaviours and ideologies around masculinity which were generally restricted to one class or another. Regular men like Wall were supposed to look up to officers like Wise as role models of how to behave, yet the behaviour expected of each group was entirely different. The life of a wealthy gentleman officer like Wise could not have made more of a contrast with that of a regular soldier like Wall.

Wall joined the army when he was around eighteen years old in 1852 and served with the 40th in Ireland and Australia, but little else is known about him beyond these scant, biographical details.[45] Information about his family circumstances, such as whether his parents were alive, if he had any siblings, or even if he was legally or illegally married, has been lost to time, but some reasonable speculation can be made. Families tended to be large in the nineteenth century, both due to a lack of contraception and religious opposition to the little that was available, so Wall was probably not an only child. His family may have been as large as that of Henry Wise, who was the eldest of eight, although if Wall had siblings, it is likely that they were not all living at the time he enlisted. Infant mortality in England between 1840 – 1850 was approximately twenty-five per cent, and even the wealthy were not immune.[46] Wise's youngest sister, for example, died in 1845, shortly after her third birthday.[47]

A further gap in Wall's life story is precisely what he did before joining the army, and whether he had any education. He had undoubtedly been working for some years prior to enlisting, as childhood was a luxury reserved for the wealthy in the nineteenth century, but the generic descriptor labourer is all that appears on the muster roll.[48] The three major industries which employed the working class in Somerset during the nineteenth century were agriculture (especially tenant farming), fishing, and coal mining, with the latter two considered skilled occupations.[49] Had Wall been a fisherman or a miner, the muster roll probably would have reflected this, and the fact that he is described as having been a labourer suggests that he was an agricultural worker. As for whether he had any education, there is not enough evidence to make any firm conclusions. Literacy rates within the army were

---

[42] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka,* pp. 195-196.
[43] Peers, "Soldiers, Surgeons and the Campaigns to Combat Sexually Transmitted Diseases in Colonial India, 1805–1860."
[44] Peers, "Privates Off Parade"
[45] Neil Smith, *Soldiers Bleed Too: The Redcoats at the Eureka Stockade 1854* (Gardenvale, VIC: Mostly Unsung Military History Research and Publications, 2004), p. 59.
[46] Aaron O'Neill, *Child mortality rate (under five years old) in the United Kingdom from 1800 to 2020* (London, UK: Statista, 2024), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1041714/united-kingdom-all-time-child-mortality-rate/, accessed 22 March 2024.
[47] FreeBMD, *England & Wales, Civil Registration Death Index, 1837-1915* [database online].
[48] Smith, *Soldiers Bleed Too,* p. 59.
[49] Samuel Tymms, *The Family Topographer: Being a Compendious Account of the Counties of England,* vol. 2 (London, UK: J.B. Nichols & Son, 1832), pp. 206- 208, 214- 215.

abysmally low in the 1850s, despite the introduction of regimental schools earlier in the century, but were higher among the civilian population.[50]

The wide gulf of money and class between these two men meant that masculinity – outside areas of sex and marriage – looked very different to each of them. It was so different, in fact, that they may have viewed each other as effeminate. Like many social ideas, the definition of manhood was changing in the nineteenth century. The term masculinity was not widely used at this time, but every man was acutely aware of the concept, and the changes occurring were seen as a threat to the aristocracy in particular.[51] Traditionally, masculinity had been linked with martial values, such as courage, valour and chivalry, which were traits associated exclusively with the upper classes. It was believed these attributes were innate and inherited from martial ancestors, meaning that the lower classes (who inevitably did the actual fighting when conflict occurred) could not possess them.[52] This rather twisted thinking could only last as long as war remained a dominant cultural force, such as during the Napoleonic campaigns. The decades of peace that followed Napoleon's defeat had exposed the cracks in this aristocratic masculine façade. Industrialisation had created the image of a man as a provider, rather than a warrior, and this new masculinity threatened to emasculate the leisurely aristocracy.[53] In response to this ideological threat from the labouring classes, the upper echelons of society transferred their long-held martial ideas about masculinity from the battlefield to the sporting field.[54]

This process was only just beginning in the 1850s, and it would be at least another decade before the idea that sport was preparation for war really caught on among the British aristocracy.[55] In 1854, standard rules for popular games were either relatively new or had not been codified yet, but they were already views as appropriate domains in which a man could prove his worth, even in circumstances were women participated.[56] In Victoria, and other Australian colonies, sport and games were also used to prove masculinity, but had to be adapted for the environment. Men of all creeds and classes enjoyed shooting their way through flocks of native birds and massacring Australia's unique wildlife, both for sport and to add some variety to the dinner plate.[57] The pubs and hotels being built often included bowling alleys – the infamous Eureka Hotel had one attached – and the old standbys of cards, story-telling and music were always available. None of these activities were strictly the domain of the men in Ballarat, but they were coded as masculine, especially when they

---

[50] E. Smith, "Educating the Soldier in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 65, no. 264 (1987), pp. 200-07.
[51] John Tosh, "What Should Historians Do with Masculinity? Reflections on Nineteenth-Century Britain," *History Workshop*, no. 38 (1994), pp. 179-202.
[52] Leonore Davidoff, "Class and Gender in Victorian England: The Diaries of Arthur J. Munby and Hannah Cullwick," *Feminist Studies* 5, no. 1 (1979), pp. 87-141.
[53] Martin Francis, "The Domestication of the Male? Recent Research on Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century British Masculinity," *The Historical Journal* 45, no. 3 (2002), pp. 637-52.
[54] Sathnam Sanghera, *Empireland: How Imperialism Has Shaped Modern Britain* [audiobook] (London, UK: Viking, 2021), chapter 10, n.p; Howard, Alexandra, "For the Good of Empire: Masculine Sporting Culture and Britain's Imperial Enterprise." *Academia* (Ontario, Canda, 2024): pp. 1-22.
[55] Brian Stoddart, "Sport, Cultural Imperialism, and Colonial Response in the British Empire." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 30, no. 4 (1988): pp. 649–73.
[56] Jennifer Hargreaves, "'Playing like Gentlemen While Behaving like Ladies': Contradictory Features of the Formative Years of Women's Sport." *The International Journal of the History of Sport* no. 2 (1985): pp. 40–52.
[57] Serle, *The Golden Age,* pp. 135-137.

occurred in the public sphere. Sometimes, however, the distinction between sport, entertainment and outright violence was not always clear.

For example, a claim dispute between diggers (i.e. an argument over who had the right to dig a particular area of ground) might be settled with their fists.[58] For the diggers involved, this was a very serious business, but such fights often attracted spectators, who behaved as if they were at a boxing match.[59] These fights could be inconclusive, and it was much more common for diggers to protect their claims with firearms, some of which would later be used at the stockade, or call on the Gold Commissioner to arbitrate the dispute.[60] While fist fights over claims may not have been as frequent as the popular history of Ballarat suggests, they undoubtedly happened and soldiers would have been among the spectators at these, for lack of a better term, events. Friendly fights were also staged in Ballarat and other goldfields, and soldiers would have been among both the spectators *and* participants in these contests, away from the gaze of their officers.[61] Fist fights of any kind were forbidden under military code, but boxing was popular among the working classes and was the ultimate masculine sport. It embodied physical strength and toughness, which were manly and desirable traits, and intensely physical games were a way for a man to prove his resilience.[62]

Regular soldiers such as Wall would have internalised these ideas around physicality and manhood, and came from a culture which was steadily rejecting the long-held social convention that they were lesser men because they worked for a living.[63] Masculinity which prioritised physicality was also more easily transferable to the military, where soldiers needed to be both physically and mentally capable, and prepared to act violently if/when the need arose. Whatever the aristocracy may have believed, war was less like the codified games they were developing than it was a bare-knuckle boxing match behind a pub on a Saturday night. The aim was not to honourably defeat the opposing team, but to beat an opponent into submission at all costs. This posed a problem for gentlemen officers like Wise, who could not be expected to simply bash-and-whack their way to victory. While they did not have to be violently physical, this was the role of the regular men, they *did* have to succeed and be able to present that success (to the public, at least) in a way which upheld the masculine values of their class, such as chivalry and honour.[64] Captain Thomas, the commanding officer at Eureka, provides an example of this delicate balance in action.

On the Saturday afternoon before Eureka, Thomas and his soldiers watched as "strong parties of insurgents [paraded about] the diggings in every direction, robbing stores, collecting arms and forcing people to join their ranks," yet despite the open lawlessness, Thomas did not order an attack.[65] This is significant as by 2 December 1854 Thomas was solely responsible for the restoration of law and order in Ballarat, and had both a legal and moral duty to protect the civilian targets of the stockaders' violence. In his report to the Major-General, which Thomas knew would be passed onto the Governor, and probably published in the press, he

[58] Serle, *The Golden Age*, p. 349.
[59] Serle, *The Golden Age*, p. 135.
[60] Serle, *The Golden Age*, pp. 69, 350.
[61] Serle, *The Golden Age*, pp. 135, 348.
[62] John Tosh, "'A Fresh Access of Dignity': Masculinity and Imperial Commitment in Britain, 1815–1914." *University of North London* (2004), pp. 1- 20.
[63] Davidoff, "Class and Gender in Victorian England"
[64] Linda Colley, *Britons,* (London, England: Yale University Press, 2005), pp. 147-148.
[65] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat." *Argus*, 18 December 1854, p. 6.

claimed that he had not acted earlier because the stockaders "were not collected in any one spot."[66] Attacking them at this time would have required Thomas to split his forces and would have left Government Camp undefended, but these practical considerations were not the only thing which stayed Thomas' hand. His political masters wanted a glorious victory, whereas he wanted a definitive one.[67] A definitive victory was a necessity in the circumstances, because from that success Thomas could create the glorious triumph Sir Charles Hotham and the Victorian parliament wanted. Based on his military career both before and after Eureka, it is unlikely that Thomas was swayed by political considerations during any action itself, but was savvy enough to present his victories as triumphs of British and military manhood in the aftermath.

Winning was also important for regular soldiers on both a practical and ideological level. Soldiers on the victorious side were more likely to survive, although causalities were inevitable, and victory also reinforced their superiority. Unlike their officers, the regular soldiers did not need to win in a particular fashion, they simply needed to beat the stockaders. Their violent behaviour in the aftermath was an expression of the dominance of their more physical masculinity over the ideological masculinity of the stockaders. The ability to win a fight was the foundation of military masculinity, but *how* the fight should be won, even how it should be *fought*, was influenced by class factors.[68] Ultimately, once a soldier of any rank was in a fight for his life, his actions were dictated by necessity, but once the fight was *over*, cultural attitudes reasserted themselves among both groups. For the officers at Eureka, such as Henry Wise and Captain Thomas, there was a need to adhere to the moral values and rules that defined their class, as doing so reinforced their superiority. Their working-class counterparts on the other hand, men such as Joseph Wall, did not need to prove they were superior to the defeated stockaders. They had won the fight, and therefore, by definition, were better men than their vanquished enemies.

Whatever their colleagues were doing in the aftermath of Eureka, neither Wall nor Wise participated. Wall had been mortally wounded by a pike in the moments before the stockade fell and died while being transported back to Government Camp. Wise was semi-conscious from blood loss after being shot through both legs, but he survived this initial wound. Two weeks later an infection – probably from this injury, although it may have also come from another gunshot wound he had received earlier at the stockade – killed him. Although *they* lost, being on the winning side ensured that Wall and Wise died as honourable men in the eyes of their comrades. The same holds true for the four other soldiers killed at or as a result of Eureka, yet class was not the only aspect of masculinity which expressed itself differently within the military. Wise and Wall, along with their 12th Regiment colleague William Webb were Englishmen, while the rest of the Eureka Six were Irish. The traditional narrative would suggest that English soldiers held themselves above their Irish counterparts, but was this true? Racial hierarchies were bread and butter in the British Empire, but what did that mean for soldiers from the British Isles themselves, and how did this affect their perception of themselves and their comrades as men?

---

[66] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat." *Argus*, 18 December 1854.

[67] Commissioner Robert Rede to Colonial Secretary Foster, 27 November 1854, PROV, VPRS 1189/P Unit 92/J55/14458.

[68] Colley, *Britons,* p. 302.

1.2. Brien, Boyle & Hall: Irishmen or British Soldiers?

One aspect of Eureka that has received considerable attention over the past 170 years is the number of Irish who were heavily involved in the movement. The stockaders' Commander-in-Chief, Peter Lalor, was from a very prominent, political family in Queens County; Timothy Hayes, the Chairman of Ballarat Reform League, had immigrated from Kilkenny with his family; and there was a small, but vocal group of Irish revolutionaries within the barricade, who were lost in the pipe-dream of creating an independent Victorian republic.[69] The Irish connection to Eureka was cemented by the password the stockaders used to enter and exit the barricade: Vinegar Hill.[70] To Lalor and the small core of revolutionaries, this password, which commemorated two uprisings against the British in Ireland and Australia, was deeply inspiring. For the stockaders from outside Ireland, along with those Irishmen who were *not* interested in revolution, it felt exclusive and insulting.[71] William Craig, a Scotsman, believed it was the reason so many stockaders left the enclosure in the hours before the attack, while Raffello Carboni, an Italian, professed himself "disgusted" with the password.[72] A year later, he claimed had believed it was a bad omen for their movement, as both the Irish and Australian 'Vinegar Hills' had ended in crushing defeats.[73]

Less has been said about the Irish on the *other side* of the barricade. A number of the soldiers who stormed the stockade were Irish and had to face off against their countrymen once they were inside. Jack Byers mentioned this in his diary, noting that he had recognised the accents of a group of stockaders he heard calling out to each other as he climbed over the barricade.[74] He was not only able to pick them out as Irishmen, but identified that they were from the same area of Dublin he hailed from.[75] Byers did not record his feelings about this, but given the level of violence he witnessed and participated in, it is striking that he thought to record this small detail. Perhaps the idea of his own countrymen trying to kill him was more unnerving than his dry recollection suggests. Byers was not the only soldier who noticed and commented on the Irish element within the stockade either. John Neill, another Irishman and a Corporal in the 40th Regiment, made a similar observation in his own diary.[76] Neill was standing close to his friend John Byrne, a fellow soldier, when Byrne was shot in the leg by the stockaders (he survived his injury), but Neill recognised the shooters as Irishmen he knew from the diggings.[77]

While Byers and Neill have provided written evidence that the Irishmen on both sides of the stockade knew they were fighting each other, they would not have been the only ones to notice. The soldiers were an integral part of the Ballarat community, something which will be explored further in Chapter 2, and the Irish among them probably socialised with the Irish on the diggings. People tend to gravitate towards their own when they are in an unfamiliar place,

---

[69] Susan Ryan, "Activism and Reform, Eureka and Human Rights," Friends of Ireland Society, https://humanrights.gov.au/about/news/speeches/activism-and-reform-eureka-and-human-rights2012, accessed 19 October 2023.
[70] William Craig, *My Adventures on the Australian Goldfields* (Invercargil, NZ: Cassell, 1903), p. 270.
[71] Craig, *My Adventures on the Australian Goldfields,* p. 270.
[72] Craig, *My Adventures on the Australian Goldfields*, p. 270; Carboni, *The Eureka Stockade*, p. 66.
[73] Carboni, *The Eureka Stockade*, p. 66.
[74] Jack Byers in William Byers, "Byers Family History [manuscript]," in author's possession, n.p.
[75] Byers, "Byers Family History [manuscript], n.p."
[76] Smith, *Soldiers Bleed Too,* p. 11.
[77] Smith, *Soldiers Bleed Too,* p. 11.

and the soldiers were not confined to Government Camp until a few days before Eureka, when it would have been dangerous for them to leave.[78] The Irishmen of the 40th Regiment, who had been in Ballarat since early 1852, had opportunities to form close relationships with their fellows on the diggings. Given the majority of civilian and military Irishmen in Ballarat were Catholics, and there was only one Catholic Church in Ballarat at the time, both groups would have regularly rubbed shoulders there. This frequent contact would have exposed both civilians and soldiers to different ideas about manhood. But even within the army, Irish soldiers contended with conflicting narratives around masculinity, as British and Irish ideas about manhood were very distinct. The lives of Felix Boyle and John Hall, Irishmen who fell attacking the stockade, will be used as case studies in this section, to examine how (and if) a sense of Irishness effected notions of military masculinity among Irish soldiers at Eureka.

In 1854, Ireland as a whole was part of the United Kingdom, although many Irish felt separate from the British.[79] This feeling of separation was heightened by the economic aftershocks of the famine, still being felt by the predominantly working-class and agrarian Irish.[80] Ireland was still a primarily agricultural economy in the nineteenth century, and lagged far behind its British neighbour in terms of industrialisation.[81] During and after the famine years, many of the Irish landlords switched their estates from crops to livestock. This was more lucrative, as more land could be farmed for less cost, and fewer workers needed to be employed.[82] For the primarily unskilled and illiterate rural population this was a disaster, as those who had survived the famine years saw the only work they knew vanish before their eyes. Some attempted to find work in the larger metropolises of Cork City, Dublin and Belfast, but industry had not yet reached a level where there was high demand for unskilled labourers, so many chose instead to emigrate. When the news that gold had been discovered in the Australian colonies in 1851 reached Ireland, many took advantage of government sponsored immigration programs to secure relatively cheap passage for themselves and their families.[83]

It is also important to note at this time that the concept of nationality as a whole was only just beginning to evolve in the mid-nineteenth century. It was still more common for people to identify by the town or county they were from, rather than the country. For example, Byers referred to himself and the stockaders he heard shouting as Dubliners, rather than Irishmen, while two reluctant stockaders described themselves as Surrymen, not Englishmen.[84] This was also true among those populations from outside of Britain. The large number of Americans present on the goldfields identified themselves by state, especially the Californians, rather than country. In the latter instance, the terms Californian and American were synonymous among the non-American population, but the Americans themselves

---

[78] Blake, *To Pierce the Tyrant's* Heart, p. 59.
[79] Dennis Grube, *At the Margins of Victorian Britian: Politics, Immorality and Britishness in the Nineteenth Century*, (London, England: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), p. 18.
[80] O'Rourke, Kevin, "The Economic Impact of the Famine in the Short and Long Run," *The American Economic Review* 84, no. 2 (1994), pp. 309-13.
[81] Cormac O'Grada, "Did Ireland 'Under'-Industrialise," *Irish Economic and Social History* 37, no. 1 (2010), pp. 117- 123.
[82] O'Grada, "Did Ireland 'Under'-Industrialise."
[83] Serle, *The Golden Age,* p. 694.
[84] Byers, "Byers Family History [manuscript]," n.p; Henry Nicholls, "Reminiscences of the Eureka Stockade," *The Centennial Magazine*, May 1890, pp. 746- 750.

recognised the distinction.[85] Speaking in board terms, though, it is true to say that many of the participants on both sides of the barricade were Irish.[86] Given that Irishmen usually joined the army for the same reasons they emigrated– poverty, unemployment, and a lack of opportunities at home – it is not surprising that they appeared in significant numbers at Eureka. Those who had chosen to emigrate found themselves face-to-face with those who had chosen to serve, and popular history would suggest that the former group looked down on the latter, believing they had betrayed their country by donning "the red livery of shame."[87] While the small group of radicals within the stockade may have felt this way, most of the Irishmen behind the barricade were not nationalists and it is impossible to know what they thought of their uniformed countrymen up in Government Camp.

Among the soldiers at Eureka, a large number, and perhaps even the majority, would have been Irish. While the English urban poor had outstripped the rural Irish by 1846 as the main source of recruits to the rank-and-file, Ireland remained a steady source of manpower for the British Army until the establishment of the Irish Free State.[88] This was partly because the prospects for young Irishmen, especially from rural and regional areas, were so poor that joining the army was both appealing and sensible, but also because they were *encouraged* to enlist. The British Establishment, especially those who were responsible for filling the ranks of the army, believed that the Irish were a particularly martial race, *and* that Irishmen were natural soldiers.[89] One way the British encouraged enlistment among the Irish was by making frequent concessions to allow the practice of Catholicism among the rank-and-file, although the army was generally apathetic to the spiritual needs of all soldiers, regardless of the denomination or religion.[90] It was believed that concessions to Catholics would reduce desertion and encourage more men to enlist, although this tolerance did not always extend to actual availability of priests.[91] In the aftermath of Eureka, Father Patrick Smythe, the local Catholic priest, arrived to give Last Rites to the dying among his congregation, which included soldiers, stockaders, police and civilians. He prioritised attending the soldiers, but was ordered to leave the area and, when he refused, was marched out of the stockade at gunpoint.[92]

The lack of spiritual support was something capitalised on by the nationalists in their attempts to prevent Irishmen from enlisting, although they too believed Irishmen were martially inclined. In 1842, Thomas Davis, a nationalist and member of the political group Young Ireland, remarked that "the Irish are a military people – strong, nimble and hardy, fond of adventure, irascible, brotherly and generous – they have all the qualities that tempt men to war and make them fine soldiers."[93] Professional Irish soldiers were not usually interested in Irish nationalism, but nationalist activists were greatly interested in them. Both radical and

---

[85] Blake, *To Pierce the Tyrant's Heart,* p. 32.
[86] Serle, *The Golden Age*, pp. 338- 339.
[87] Terence Denman, "'The Red Livery of Shame': The Campaign against Army Recruitment in Ireland, 1899-1914," *Irish Historical Studies* 29, no. 114 (1994), pp. 208-33.
[88] Denman, "'The Red Livery of Shame'"
[89] Peter Karsten, "Irish Soldiers in the British Army, 1792-1922: Suborned or Subordinate?" *Journal of Social History* 17, no. 1 (1983), pp. 31-64.
[90] Keith Edghill, "Dangerous Doctrines! The Battle for Anglican Supremacy in the British Army, 1810-1865," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 80, no. 321 (2002), pp. 36-57.
[91] Edghill, "Dangerous Doctrines!"
[92] Dorothy Wickham, *Deaths at Eureka.* (Ballarat, VIC: D. Wickham, 1996), p. 29.
[93] Denman, "'The Red Livery of Shame'"

peaceful nationalists encouraged young men to stay out of the British Army, but when this failed they used it to their advantage.[94] For the more radical groups, such as Young Ireland, the rank-and-file Irish represented a ready-trained fighting force if they could recruit them, but also provided fodder for their publications.[95] Young Ireland frequently drew attention to the poor spiritual conditions in the army, which affected all rank-and-file men, but suggested that Catholic soldiers were treated with particular distain. In reality, the lack of spiritual support for soldiers was an ongoing problem in the British Army, whatever a man's faith, denomination or rank: there simply were not enough chaplains to minister to all the men, especially following a conflict.[96]

At the opposite end of the nationalist spectrum from Young Ireland was Daniel O'Connell, The Liberator. He was not only much beloved in Ireland, but among the Irish diaspora across the British Empire and beyond. In 1891, almost 45 years after his death, a statue of him was erected by public subscription outside St. Patrick's Cathedral in Melbourne.[97] Like the nationalists, O'Connell was opposed to Irishmen joining the British Army and tried to discourage recruitment, but saw enlistment as symptomatic of the wider issues affecting Irish Catholics at the time. The solution, in his mind, was not to try and funnel the young men into the paramilitaries of the radicals, but to address the poverty which usually drove them into the army in the first place.[98] O'Connell "never blamed, but rather praised the heroism of Irish soldiers in the British Army" and viewed them as victims of the systems he devoted his life to dismantling.[99] For both the radical and constitutional nationalist movements, their advice against recruitment was aimed at those who *might* join the army, rather than those already serving. In the mid-nineteenth century they avoided alienating their countrymen in uniform, although later in the century, as elements of the nationalist movement became more radical, Irishmen in uniform became targets and were thought of as traitors.

But how did the Irish in uniform, such as Boyle and Hall, see themselves? According to Peter Karsten, the Irishman who joined the British Army "was usually Catholic, poor, sometimes of an adventurous or bellicose sort, apolitical and saw himself as a soldier by occupation."[100] Karsten also points out that Irishmen who enlisted did not feel they were enlisting in the *British* Army, but simply *the* army: their army.[101] While neither of the Irishmen in this section matches this description exactly, aspects of their lives align with it. Both were from working class backgrounds, and based on his surname, Boyle was probably a Catholic, although a baptism record has proved elusive. Hall was more likely to be a Protestant, again based on his surname, but, as with his Catholic countryman, a baptism record was not able to be located. Both men also had relatively common names, which made tracing their lives outside the muster rolls a challenge, but they had been serving long enough to suggest they felt they were career soldiers. This was especially true for Boyle, who had served for twenty years in the 10th Regiment, and then enlisted in the 12th three years after being discharged. Given they left

[94] Denman, "'The Red Livery of Shame'"
[95] Denman, "'The Red Livery of Shame'"
[96] Edghill, "Dangerous Doctrines!"
[97] "Unveiling of the O'Connell Statue," *Argus*, 1 June 1891, p. 7.
[98] Denman, "'The Red Livery of Shame'"
[99] Denman, "'The Red Livery of Shame'"
[100] Karsten, "Irish Soldiers in the British Army, 1792-1922"
[101] Karsten, "Irish Soldiers in the British Army, 1792-1922"

no written records behind, it is impossible to say whether they were loud and adventurous, or if poverty drove them into the ranks.

Given the overall view, from both the British and Irish, that Irishmen as a group were especially martial, it would logically follow that the Irish must have been viewed as particularly masculine. This was true to a certain degree, however there were important qualifiers. While legally British, and part of the United Kingdom, the Irish were also a colonised people and were subjected to prejudice and othering by their colonial masters.[102] In this context their masculinity was fragile, and unless they put their energies towards supporting the Empire, they were always in danger of being cast as a lesser type of man. While Victorian thinking around the masculine and feminine was binary at this time, it was understood that there were grades (for lack of a better term) of men who were not feminine, but nor were they truly masculine.[103] Men who could not meet the appropriate standard needed to be controlled by those who could, and subordinating inferior men was a central tenant of British masculinity well into the twentieth century.[104] In the army, authority over subordinates was literal and, as discussed in the previous section, the officer class was structured to ensure that only men from the high echelons of society could access command. This meant that those men, like the Irish, who were believed to exhibit a lower grade of manhood would always be under the watchful eye of not only a man of higher class, but of higher manhood as well.

This gendered lens was further complicated by class expectations, as discussed in the previous section. Different classes were expected to behave in different ways and exhibit their manhood differently. The rank-and-file were expected to be particularly aggressive, while officers were more restrained, and so needed to be on hand to control their men. Adding the cultural (and rather prejudiced) understanding of Irishness to this mix created the idea that Irish soldiers were *particularly* aggressive, almost to the point of being savage.[105] During a violent engagement such as at Eureka, aggression and savagery against enemies, prisoners and civilians was encouraged by the military, *but* too much aggression was seen as unmanly. A truly martial soldier from the rank-and-file would cease this behaviour when ordered by his officers, although he might need some encouragement to do so. Captain Charles Pasley drew his pistol and threatened to kill a group of soldiers who were themselves threatening to kill prisoners in the aftermath of Eureka, but this was not seen as unusual or concerning.[106] It was also believed that Irishmen were more naturally aggressive than Englishmen, so officers might need to be more violent with them to regain order following a fight.

Overall, the ideas about Irish military masculinity in the nineteenth century were vaguely paradoxical. In peacetime, their manhood among their comrades was measured by their ability to be quiet, loyal and obedient, while in wartime they were expected to be both the most able warriors *and* exhibit almost beast-like savagery. But savagery was not an acceptable form of manly behaviour, so they needed Englishmen to keep them in line and ensure they did not cause too much harm while their blood was up. This was an undoubtedly

[102] Grube, *At the Margins of Victorian Britian*, pp. 11-12.
[103] Tosh, "What Should Historians Do with Masculinity?"
[104] Tosh, "What Should Historians Do with Masculinity?"
[105] Karsten, "Irish Soldiers in the British Army, 1792-1922"
[106] Charles Pasley, "Letters of Charles Pasley, [manuscript]," SLV, MS BOX 94/4, n.p.

prejudiced understanding and it reduced Irishmen as a group to a monolith, which they were not, and their behaviours, temperaments and beliefs were as varied as those of any other nationality. However, much like the ideas of masculinity among classes, masculinity among nationalities was associated with certain behaviours. The overarching trait that made a man *truly* masculine both within and outside the army was loyalty to Britain and the Empire. When the Irish put their supposed exceptional martial abilities towards this end, they were men, but when they put it to Irish nationalist or anti-British purposes, they might still be men, but were certainly not manly.

Boyle probably had the most experience of this strange double-standard, having served in the army the longest of any of the Eureka Six. His sense of Irishness would have been interwoven with his experiences of being among the ruling race during his twenty years living in India; returning to a second-class existence as an Irish Catholic in Belfast in 1850 would have been a rude shock! Catholics were othered in Ireland, but in parts of the Empire where the British created hierarchies based on skin colour, the Irish were absorbed into the Empire's colonial framework. Within the British Empire, even the most uncivilised white man, wherever he was from, was better than the best black or brown imperial subject.[107] The diary of Robert McNally, an Irish soldier who served in Van Dieman's Land in 1823, illustrates this. He wrote about the unprovoked and brutal murder of an Indigenous Tasmanian woman and her child by white settlers with indifference, noting that "the blacks were usually killed" by the Europeans.[108] His tone changed dramatically, however, when he recounted the punishment he witnessed of two Irish convicts. The two men had been working in a chain-gang and were building a road, when the third man they were attached to collapsed and died.[109] They had tried to provide assistance and comfort to their fellow as he died, and the way the three men were attached meant no one could get up until a blacksmith struck the chains off the dead man. Despite this, the pair were flogged for "stopping work" and McNally felt the whole episode was grossly unjust and barbaric.[110]

McNally was right about the injustice of the convicts' punishment, but his sense of an Irishman's place compared to an Indigenous person is telling. He did not like the way the woman and her baby were killed, but felt it was less problematic than the violent beating of two men, both of whom survived their ordeal. Boyle probably held similar attitudes about his place in the world in India, which would have been difficult to reconcile with his effective demotion to second-class Irish Catholic civilian when he returned to Belfast. Military service, even in the rank-and-file, gave a man a sense of purpose and experienced veterans like Boyle were held in high regard by both their officers and their peers.[111] When Boyle was discharged (probably due to illness or injury, as he received a small pension) all this status disappeared, which would have been a hard pill to swallow. It is also possible that he struggled to transition from military life, which was almost all he had ever known, to civilian life –

---

[107] Santham Sanghera, *Empireland: How Imperialism Has Shaped Modern Britain* [audiobook], chapter nine, n.p.

[108] Robert McNally, "Main Pages from Diary of Private Robert McNally, 40th Regiment of Foot, 26 September 1828 – 26 November 1833 [manuscript]," NLI, MS 13,265/1, n.p.

[109] McNally. "Main Pages from Diary of Private Robert McNally," [manuscript], n.p..

[110] McNally. "Main Pages from Diary of Private Robert McNally," [manuscript], n.p.

[111] Oddy, "Gone for a Soldier."

something which still affects modern veterans today. If this was the case, it may have been what influenced his decision to rejoin the army three years later.

It was a fateful decision for the thirty-one-year-old. On 3 December, as he was storming the stockade with his fellows, he was shot through the nose by a stockader. The bullet exited through his jaw, blowing it off and leaving him critically wounded.[112] After the fight, John Neill saw Boyle, unable to speak because of his injury, gesturing to his friends to bring him water.[113] Despite the seriousness of his wounds, Boyle was not initially listed as mortally wounded and it is unknown if the surgeon at Government Camp attempted to reattach his jaw.[114] If he did, his efforts to save Boyle's life were in vain. On 10 January 1855, Felix Boyle died of his wounds in the hospital at Government Camp, and was buried the next day.[115] Presumably he received the same funeral honours afforded to his comrades, although there is no mention of his burial in the newspapers, and his death was not certified until six months later.[116] He was both the oldest of the Eureka Six and the last of them to die, two distinctions he would probably have rather not had. The question of whether he would have considered himself an Irishman is one which will always be shrouded in mystery, and it is just as likely as not that he felt more Anglo-Indian than Irish. He left Ireland when he was between ten and twelve and did not return for twenty years, then left once more, this time forever, after just three years. It is possible that he did not have many strong connections to Ireland, or he may have simply felt more comfortable in the army than in civilian employment. Sadly, he never wrote any reflections on the subject that would provide a definitive answer, if he was able to write at all.

His fellow Irishman, John Hall, probably felt closer to his country than Boyle. Hall had lived in Limerick before he enlisted, and joined the army when he was twenty-nine.[117] Very little is known about him beyond the basic facts recorded in the muster roll and his eventual death as a result of Eureka. Hall joined the 12th Regiment in 1853 and was a labourer before this, although what kind of work he did is unknown.[118] He had been with the regiment for just thirteen months when he was wounded at the Eureka Stockade, and he died of his injuries on the last day of December 1854. The nature of his wounds is not recorded, although he was probably shot. Gunshot wounds accounted for the majority of injuries among the soldiers at the stockade, and the other five men who made up the Eureka Six were all shot at least once.[119] Hall has no death certificate, but his name appears on the regimental headstone in the Soldiers' Enclosure at Ballarat Old Cemetery and in the sexton's book at Ballarat Old Cemetery, while the muster roll gives clear evidence of his death.[120]

Records were not always as clear as this in the nineteenth century, and this has led to confusion when trying to identify individuals. In 2004, Neil Smith published copies of the muster rolls of the 12th and 40th Regiments which suggested that an Irish soldier named Denis

---

[112] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat," *Argus, 18 December 1854.*
[113] Smith, *Soldiers Bleed Too,* p. 21.
[114] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat," *Argus, 18 December 1854.*
[115] BDM, Death Certificate of Felix Boyle, No. 3264, 1855.
[116] Death Certificate of Felix Boyle.
[117] Smith, *Soldiers Bleed Too,* pp. 36, 48.
[118] Smith, *Soldiers Bleed Too,* pp. 36, 48.
[119] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat," *Argus, 18 December 1854*.
[120] Dorothy Wickham, "Ethersay's Book, Ballarat Old Cemetery, INDEX G –H [photograph]," 2002, https://www.eurekapedia.org/File:DCP_2614.JPG, accessed 20 December 2023.

Brien, 40th Regiment, had died of a gunshot wound at Eureka.[121] This was repeated in 2009 by Gregory Blake, but no soldier named Denis Brien (or any variation of the name) appeared on the 40th's regimental gravestone, nor in the sexton's book, and there was no death certificate on the page where the other military victims of Eureka were listed.[122] Blake suggested that Brien was simply missed in the initial, hastily compiled casualty report by the regiment surgeon, and also noted that there was anecdotal evidence that the regimental clerks were not as rigorous as they should have been in maintaining their records.[123] However, this did not explain why Brien was not named on the 40th's gravestone, or why he did not appear in the sexton's book. An answer was provided by a record on the Victorian Death Index, which led to a death certificate for 'Dennis Brian,' a Private in the 40th Regiment who died on 3 December 1854.[124] Despite the different spelling, this is certainly the man who is also recorded as Denis Brien: he was born in the same year, in the same place, and died on the same date at the same age, and no further variants of the name appear on the muster rolls of the 40th Regiment after 1854. However, this man did not die at Eureka, but instead died of pleurisy in Melbourne on the same day his comrades were storming the stockade.[125] The date of his death is likely what led to the assumption he was killed at Eureka. Mention of him is made in this thesis as he has been listed among the Eureka dead since 2004, and in 2022 his name was added to a plaque on the Pathway of Remembrance in the Eureka Stockade Memorial Park.

Because records were not exact in the nineteenth century, situations where people become associated with events they were not a part of are not uncommon. For the same reason, people's names can completely disappear from the record, especially following a violent event like Eureka. Because of the nature of the goldfields themselves, not everyone who was killed had family nearby to claim their body, and not all the bodies were identifiable. The unidentified dead were taken to Government Camp, and those bodies which were not claimed by friends and family were buried in an unmarked grave in Ballarat Old Cemetery.[126] Their names have undoubtedly been lost forever. Another aspect of Eureka which has been lost, or perhaps is simply not talked about, is the presence of very young men, young enough to be considered children in some cases, who fought there. The presence of families and civilian children, including infants, within the stockade *is* well known, and the army's complete disregard for civilians generally in the stockade itself is often cited as proof they were particularly vicious.[127] Yet, the experience of young people on the *other side* is very rarely given attention. While the names of the final two soldiers of the Eureka Six, Michael Rooney and William Webb – along with that of their surviving comrade John Egan – have not been forgotten, their youth, and the circumstances which found uncomfortably young men in the army in the first place, very rarely form part of the Eureka story.

[121] Smith, *Soldiers Bleed Too,* p. 48.
[122] Smith, *Soldiers Bleed Too*, p. 48.
[123] Blake, *To Pierce the Tyrant's Heart,* p. 195.
[124] BDM, Death Certificate of Dennis Brian, No. 2841, 1854.
[125] Death Certificate of Dennis Brian.
[126] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat," *Argus, 18 December 1854*.
[127] Blake, *To Pierce the Tyrant's Heart,* pp. 179- 181.

1.3. Roney & Webb: Youth & The Desire for Manhood

The first soldier (and possibly the first *person*) to die at the Eureka Stockade was twenty-one-year-old Michael Roney, a Private in the 40th Regiment. As he approached the stockade in formation with his colleagues, a bullet came flying out of the pre-dawn darkness and struck him squarely in the head; he was killed instantly.[128] John Lynch recalled that the shot which felled the young soldier "was taken for a declaration of war" by his colleagues, and was immediately answered by a "fusillade of musketry" from the men of the 12th and 40th Regiments.[129] While Lynch was writing forty years after Eureka, his description of the rection to Roney's killing was entirely consistent with the actions of the British Army in similar circumstances at the time. Once the soldiers had been seen, and had confirmation they were within range of the stockaders' guns, they would have returned fire. However, military considerations would not have been the only thing driving the soldiers who had seen Roney fall. Despite his youth, Roney was not new to soldiering, and had been with the 40th Regiment since he was twelve. Many of them soldiers present would have watched him grow up, and some would have felt paternal towards the younger man. These men would have taken his death *very* personally.

This section will examine how the presence of boys and young men in the British Army informed ideas about masculinity within the ranks, through the lives of Roney and his nineteen-year-old colleague from the 12th Regiment, William Webb. The attitudes of adult soldiers towards their young comrades will also form part of this analysis, and the reaction of the men of the 12th Regiment to the dangerous wounding of their drummer, fifteen-year-old John Egan, will be considered. While the use of children in frontline combat roles is considered a war crime today, it was common across nineteenth-century armies in Britain and continental Europe. In Britain, boys routinely joined the army around the age of twelve, and started their military careers as drummers.[130] Within this section, the term drummer will be used to describe those soldiers, usually young boys, who acted as either drummers *or* buglers for the British Army in the nineteenth century.[4] Both instruments were used in the field in 1854, and the man or boy who played them was always called a drummer, even if he only used a bugle.[131]

Like their adult counterparts, most boys joined the army in an attempt to escape from grinding poverty, and drumming was a lucrative occupation in the military. Because they were classified as specialists, drummers earned an extra 1¾d. per day, on top of their regular 1s. daily pay, which would have been attractive to both the boys and their families.[132] Most working-class children of this period would enter some type of paid employment around the time they turned twelve, and a career in the army had the added attraction of guaranteed food, shelter, clothing and medical care, even if the wages were generally lower than in civilian employment.[133] Another attraction of army service for the families of young boys was that,

---

[128] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat," *Argus, 18 December 1854*; Blake, *To Pierce the Tyrant's Heart*, p. 130.

[129] John Lynch, *The Story of the Eureka Stockade.* (Melbourne, VIC: The Australian Catholic Truth Society, 1894), p. 27 – 33; "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat," *Argus, 18 December 1854*.

[130] Oddy, "Gone for a Soldier."

[131] James Tanner, *Instruments of Battle: The Fighting Drummers & Buglers of the British Army from the Late 17th Century to the Present Day* (Oxford, UK: Casemate Publishers, 2017), pp. ii – iii.

[132] Oddy, "Gone for a Soldier."

[133] Marnie Hay, "Centuries of Irish Childhoods," *Irish Economic and Social History* 47, no. 1 (2020), pp. 3-9.

once their son was on the books, they no longer needed to support him. This did not mean that these boys were not loved by their parents, but at a time when families could be quite large and resources were less readily available, having fewer mouths to feed was always desirable. For Michael Roney, who enlisted in 1845, this may have been a particularly important consideration.

Roney was born in 1833 in Clonallon, County Down, a small, coastal village in the north of Ireland, and was baptised on 26 September the same year.[134] The two major industries in Clonallon at the time were oyster fishing and farming, and *Griffiths Valuation* from 1863 shows that multiple Roneys (spelt Rooney in the valuation survey) held tenancies in the Clonallon area.[135] One of these families was likely to have been that of Michael Roney, even though he was dead by the time the valuation survey was conducted. The size of his family is unknown, but it is unlikely he was an only child and the year of his enlistment is the same year that the Great Famine first reached Irish shores.[136] According to *The Atlas of the Great Irish Famine 1845 – 52*, Roney's community was heavily dependent on the potato in 1845, and suffered most heavily during that first year.[137] Given his family was facing lean times and Roney was old enough to work, joining the army was a sensible decision. Interestingly, Clonallon and other coastal areas in County Down managed to avoid the worst of the famine when the potato blight returned in 1846. The people not only had access to seafood, but many tenant farmers had enough money to diversify their crops, reducing their reliance on the potato.[138] However, conditions were still grim, and some ten per cent of the population in County Down either died or emigrated between 1845 – 1851.[139] This was low compared to more inland regions, especially in the south, but it would be wrong to say the Roneys and their community were unaffected by the Famine.

Roney would not have been alone in joining the army to either escape the famine or ease the pressure on his family. Whether he went to Belfast specifically to enlist, or simply to look for work will never be known, but this pattern of internal migration was common, especially as Ireland began to industrialise.[140] Internal migration was also a factor in William Webb's enlistment, although for different reasons than Roney. Webb was eighteen when he joined the 12th Regiment and, despite being the youngest of the Eureka Six, he never served as a drummer. According to the muster roll, Webb was born in Hertfordshire around 1835, although there are no birth or baptism records to confirm this, and much of his life before he came to Victoria is a mystery.[141] Reasonable speculations can be made based on where Webb came from and the limited information in his army record. He had probably been a farm labourer before he joined the army as Hertfordshire, despite its relative proximity to London, was a rural area in the 1850s, and the main industry was agriculture. As mentioned earlier in

---

[134] NLI, *Irish Catholic Parish Registers*, Microfilm Number: *05497/06,* Dublin, Ireland.
[135] *General Valuation of Ireland*, National Archives, Dublin and Public Record Office, Belfast; Samuel Lewis, *A Topographical Dictionary of Ireland: Comprising the Several Counties, Cities, Boroughs, Corporate, Market, and Post Towns, Parishes, and Villages, with Historical and Statistical Descriptions* (Baltimore, MD: Genealogical Pub. Co., 1984), p. 348.
[136] Christine Kinealy, "The Irish Famine 1845 – 52," *North Irish Roots* 2, no. 5 (1990), p. 158-61.
[137] William Smythe, John Crowley and Mike Murphy [eds], *Atlas of the Great Irish Famine 1845 – 52* (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2012), pp. 418- 419.
[138] Smythe, Crowley and Murphy, *Atlas of the Great Irish Famine 1845 – 52,* p. 329.
[139] Smythe, Crowley and Murphy. *Atlas of the Great Irish Famine 1845 – 52*, p. 425.
[140] O'Garda, "Did Ireland 'Under-'Industrialise?"
[141] Smith, *Soldiers Bleed Too,* p. 47.

this chapter, Webb probably came to London with the intention of joining the army to receive the £1 Line Bounty.[142]

The difference in their ages at enlistment would have affected the way Roney and Webb perceived their masculinity. Roney would have measured himself less against the civilian ideals of the time than Webb, as the former had been part of military society for much longer. While soldiers were not segregated from the civilian population, especially in the colonies, the military did have its own distinct culture and the boys who joined as drummers were steeped in it from a young age. As discussed in Chapter 1.1, marriage was viewed as the pinnacle of civilian masculine achievement, but because soldiers could not usually marry, military masculinity placed a higher value on (heterosexual) sex than it did on monogamy.[143] The more sexual partners a soldier had (or claimed to have had), the more masculine he was. Peers argues that, in the eyes of their single colleagues, those men who were married were believed to have been domesticated, sometimes even emasculated, by their wives.[144]

Being married did not stop a man from joining his friends at the brothel, pub or park – popular places where soldiers looking for a short- or long-term companion could find willing women – but the rates of venereal disease among married men in the army were lower than those of their single colleagues.[145] This would suggest they were not regularly seeking sexual company outside their marriage beds, and perhaps the responsibility of taking care of a wife and children, along with the requirements of army service, meant married soldiers' masculinity aligned closer to civilian, rather than military ideas. It is not known how many military wives were at Government Camp on the morning of Eureka, as the British Army did not keep records of soldiers' wives. The one wife who is known to have been there was Ellen Neill, the wife of Corporal John Neill, as she is mentioned in his diary.[146] They also had a baby daughter with them, Fanny, which meant Corporal Neill himself had reached the heights of civilian manhood, yet would have been viewed as less manly among some of his military colleagues.

When Roney enlisted, ideas around marriage and relationships would have been far from his mind. At twelve he would have been more focused on finding time to play, probably with other drummers in the regiment his own age, or with the children of his adult colleagues. How much time he would have had to do so is unknown, as drummers were an essential part of the military apparatus, even in peacetime, and the importance of play for children's development was not yet understood in the Victorian era. However, as he matured within the military, particularly once he reached puberty and began to experience sexual interest, Roney too would have had to find ways to deal with the restrictions and ideologies which swirled around him. Despite the rules around marriage, and their attempts to replace it with sex, many soldiers *did* want to marry, which shows how deeply entrenched this ideal was within British culture.[147] Roney may have dreamed of a wife, but he was unmarried when he was killed at the stockade. Despite this, like most young soldiers of his era, Roney probably did not die a

[142] Anderson, "Early Experiences of Manpower Problems in an Industrial Society at War."
[143] Peers, "Privates Off Parade."
[144] Peers, "Privates Off Parade."
[145] Peers, "Soldiers, Surgeons and the Campaigns to Combat Sexually Transmitted Diseases in Colonial India, 1805–1860."
[146] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka,* pp. 240- 241.
[147] Oddy, "Gone for a Soldier."

virgin. It is likely that he had already had his first sexual encounter – probably before he left Ireland – in the vicinity of the barracks where he lived, although whether it was with a sex worker or a romantic partner is unknown.

Like many children in the mid-nineteenth century, Roney would have been familiar with both sex and nudity. At a time when families usually lived in single rooms or small tenements, "little about the human condition could be concealed" and privacy was non-existent.[148] Conditions in army barracks were very similar, and the regular men would have provided their young drummers with plenty of further exposure to all things sexual, often in crude or violent ways.[149] Sexual and sexist jokes, rough language and descriptions or depictions of sex acts would have been common, as would a certain amount of bragging and boasting among the men about their real or imagined sexual prowess. It was not only the rank-and-file themselves who held these ideas, but their officers too viewed the regular men's supposably voracious sexual appetites as direct proof of their manliness.[150]

For example, in 1899 an elderly Indian woman named Mah Goon was gang raped by British soldiers outside an army barracks in Rangoon (now Yangon in Burma, but then part of British India).[151] As Peers describes, despite the violence of the attack and the fact that it had occurred in front of witnesses, the British Army felt the men responsible had done nothing out of the ordinary and ignored it. In their opinion, rape was simply another form of manly behaviour, and as long as it was not perpetrated against respectable, European women, it was permitted. While this incident happened fifty years later and half a world away from Eureka, there are hints that the women within the stockade suffered similar fates.[152] Rape and sexual violence are weapons which have been deployed by armies the world over, and while none of the documents describing the soldiers' treatment of women at the stockade use the word rape it certainly happened. Euphemisms such as "excesses" and "inhuman brutalities" were employed instead, while Charles Evans documented an incident in which a woman was "pushed around roughly" by a group of three soldiers.[153] Was this a gang rape? Possibly. Evans recalled that the men were stopped by an officer who threatened to shoot them and they let the woman go, but there were not enough officers at Eureka to stop each episode of violence, nor was there any will to do so. Much like the case of Mah Goon half a century later, the army's position was that the soldiers who attacked the women at Eureka had done nothing wrong, and that their behaviour was perfectly ordinary and acceptable.

The boys growing up immersed in this permissive culture would have internalised the general disregard for women, and as he approached his late teens, Roney probably joined in the sexual bragging and rodomontade in the barracks. Violence against women in all its forms was so common in the British Army that even the wives and daughters of soldiers were frequently subject to it. Clare Wright has identified an episode which illustrates this where Catherine McLister, the daughter of a soldier who became the wife of a police officer,

[148] Hallie Rubenhold, *The Five: The Untold Lives of the Women Killed by Jack the Ripper* (London, UK: Doubleday, 2019), p. 19.
[149] Peers, "Privates Off Parade."
[150] Peers, "Soldiers, Surgeons and the Campaigns to Combat Sexually Transmitted Diseases in Colonial India, 1805–1860."
[151] Peers, "Privates Off Parade."
[152] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka,* pp. 300- 302.
[153] Peter Lalor, "To the Colonists of Victoria," *Argus*, 10 April 1855, p. 7; Charles Evans, "Diary [manuscript]," SLV, MS, BOX 1777/4, n.p.

claimed her husband's commander, Captain Evans, had exposed himself to her.[154] McLister took the unusual step of bringing charges and testifying, but her case was dismissed by a board of inquiry because they felt that, had such a thing occurred, McLister would have made a fuss at the time and told someone about it. As Wright notes, in McLister's testimony she spelled out for the board that Evans frequently asked her to perform mending jobs for him (it was expected that wives of soldiers and police officers would attend to these tasks for other men their husbands worked for) and had "joked" with her.[155] McLister had "tartly answered" these supposed jokes, which suggests they were sexual or otherwise inappropriate, and such crude humour would not have been new for a woman who had grown up surrounded by soldiers. Being flashed by Evans was probably also not the first time McLister had been indecently assaulted in this way, which may have accounted for her calm disgust.[156]

All this serves to illustrate just how entrenched both sex and sexism were in military culture, and this would have affected the boys who grew up in the army. While the incident described by Wright occurred among police, there is no reason to believe such things were uncommon in military barracks. The importance of sex to military masculinity may have driven inexperienced boys to approach their older colleagues for advice on the subject. A boy would usually be expected to go to his father to have these discussions, and not before he was preparing to marry. In the army, where the focus on was one a man's ability to have regular sex and boast about it, boys probably sought the guidance of their adult colleagues from a much younger age, and their discussions were probably far more explicit than those in civilian homes. Participating in this kind of sexualised joshing would have also been a way for young men to integrate themselves with other soldiers. It offered a crude way to bond, especially for young men coming from civilian life who had not had a sexual experience. Listening in on these conversations would either allow them to lie (virginity was suspect among men, especially in the army, and could lead to accusations of homosexuality), or give them a sense of who to ask for advice on finding a willing partner.[157]

Like Roney, Webb undoubtedly joined the army having cheek-by-jowl with his family, which was probably large, and he would have known what married men and women did. Unlike Roney, it may have taken him longer to shed the civilian values around masculine sexuality and adopt the army's rougher ideas. Despite the modern perception that marriage occurred young in the nineteenth century, this was not always the case. Men in Hertfordshire married at the average age of twenty-seven in 1851, and Webb was just eighteen when he left home, so could have been a decade away from seeking a bride.[158] Whether he had ever had any kind of sexual experience is unknown, but it would not have been uncommon for a farm labourer to have explored and experimented with local girls, and despite children's proximity to sex in the home, it is debatable whether the majority of them understood until later that intercourse could lead to pregnancy. When Jack Byers joined the army aged nineteen, he claimed to be unmarried and childless, but in fact he had a wife and a four-year-old son.[159] Four years

---

[154] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka,* pp. 244- 246.
[155] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka,* p. 245.
[156] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka,* p. 245.
[157] Peers, "Privates Off Parade."
[158] University of Cambridge, "Age at Marriage, Males," *Populations Past – Atlas of Victorian and Edwardian Population,* https://www.populationspast.org/m_smam/1851/#9/51.8799/-0.5452/bartholomew, accessed 13 November 2024.
[159] Byers, "Byers Family History [manuscript], n.p."

earlier, Byers had testified under oath in a Dublin court that he had "had carnal relations" with his girlfriend, but said he did not know how she became pregnant.[160] He may have been lying to try and prevent the judge ordering him to marry her (as happened), or he may truly have been ignorant. Simply because children and young people saw sex regularly did not mean they understood its consequences. Boys in the regiments probably had a better knowledge of the potential outcomes of sex than their civilian counterparts, although the army feared venereal disease far more than pregnancy among the sex partners of its men.[161]

While sex was an important measure of masculinity for all military men, there was another milestone, specific to the drummer's life, which signalled the end of boyhood. Around the age of eighteen, most drummers had their instruments replaced with a weapon, and they went on the books as regular soldiers.[162] Eighteen was not an official cutoff, and the age a drummer took up a musket really depended on the needs of his regiment. The 40th Regiment's drummer at Eureka, Henry Cotter, was twenty-five years old and had been in that role since he joined the regiment aged sixteen.[163] Because they were essential to the organisation of the regiment and communicated orders to the men in battle, being a drummer was an inherently dangerous occupation. Drummers were on the frontline, close to the officers who were giving the orders, and they relied on their armed colleagues to protect them. This point is once again illustrated by Cotter, who was shot in the side at Eureka while standing close to Sergeant Edward Harris, a non-commissioned officer who led one of the many charges over the stockade walls.[164] The need to be protected was associated with femininity in the Victorian era, which clashed with a drummer's experiences within the hypermasculine culture of the army. He was a soldier, but one who had no outward proof of his manliness. Having a weapon remedied this deficiency and was the final break between being a boy and a man in the military. While it did not guarantee his survival on the battlefield, it gave him a fighting chance.

However, the battlefield was not the only place an unarmed drummer was in danger. On 28 November 1854, roughly a week before Eureka and prior to the building of the famous stockade, one hundred men from the 12th Regiment arrived in Ballarat, accompanied by their drummer: John "Johnny" Egan. Egan was fifteen and had been with the 12th for a year; he was an Irishman, but had enlisted in England and, like Roney and Webb, he was destined to have a short life.[165] It was after dark when the 12th reached the diggings and their commanding officer, Captain Atkinson, who had never been to Ballarat, did not know the way to Government Camp. As a result, the regiment became lost, and strayed off the road onto the Eureka lead.[166] Tensions were already high in Ballarat and this lead was home to most of the men who would later make up the more radical stockaders, including Peter Lalor. The situation was made even more dangerous as, apart from a small screening force marching alongside the baggage train, most of the soldiers were unarmed and still mounted on carts, so could not manoeuvre quickly. A large group of diggers, erroneously believing that the 12th

---

[160] Byers, "Byers Family History [manuscript], n.p."
[161] Peers, "Soldiers, Surgeons and the Campaigns to Combat Sexually Transmitted Diseases in Colonial India, 1805–1860."
[162] Oddy, "Gone for a Soldier."
[163] Smith, *Soldiers Bleed Too,* p. 50.
[164] Carboni, *The Eureka Stockade,* p. 71; "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat," *Argus*, 18 December 1854.
[165] Smith, *Soldiers Bleed Too,* p. 33.
[166] Evans, "Diary [manuscript]," n.p

had brought artillery, attacked the regiment and a skirmish ensued. No one is known to have been killed, although several soldiers were wounded and the 12th's baggage train was looted.[167] Several stolen muskets were found days later in the stockade, unused and stored on racks.[168] In the chaos and confusion, the few soldiers who were armed began to shoot into the night in an attempt to defend themselves, although it is unknown if any diggers or bystanders were hit.

During this skirmish Egan was shot in the thigh and rushed up to Government Camp in a critical condition.[169] For many years afterwards a gravestone to Egan's memory stood in the Soldiers' Enclosure at the Ballarat Old Cemetery, and it was widely believed he had died from the injury he'd received during the skirmish.[170] It was not until 1996 that historian Dorothy Wickham proved conclusively that Egan had *not* died in Ballarat at all, although details of his fate following his recovery at the time were scarce.[171] The answer to this mystery was later provided by the 12th Regiment's muster rolls, and published by Neil Smith in 2004. Egan had gone on to serve for another six years with the 12th, before he died of a heart attack while convalescing at a regimental hospital in Sydney in 1860, aged just twenty-two.[172] He was buried in Paddington Cemetery, presumably with full military honours, where he rests to this day. Where the rumour that Egan had been killed began is unknown; the men of the 12th would have known he had not died, even if in the confusion of the skirmish there had been concerns for his safety. It is likely it came from second-hand accounts outside the military, with the news of the attack on the 12th being passed around from one excited digger to another, each time with added embellishment.

The 40th, along with a contingent of mounted police, had to go down onto the diggings to rescue their beleaguered colleagues, and when they got the 12th back up to Government Camp, Egan was in a bad way. Samuel Huyghue wrote in his diary that "several men rushed into the hospital" carrying Egan, who was unconscious.[173] The injury to his thigh kept him hospitalised for twenty-one days, and while it did not directly kill him, may very well have contributed to his death six years later. Following his death in 1860 an autopsy was performed (why is unclear from the records) and it was revealed that Egan had a heart condition which pre-dated his enlistment.[174] He had bled profusely when he was shot at Ballarat and this may have exacerbated whatever cardiac disease he already had. However, he was still alive – albeit in hospital – when his comrades stormed the stockade, but there was more than one man from the 12th who had taken his wounding very personally. After the stockade had fallen, a group of men from the 12th wanted to summarily execute a group of captured stockaders, who they claimed were responsible for shooting Egan.[175] An officer was able to stop them, and it is unlikely these men had been able to positively identify the captured stockaders as Egan's shooters; the prisoners were simply scapegoats for the soldiers' rage.

---

[167] Evans, "Diary [manuscript]," n.p.
[168] Blake, *To Pierce the Tyrant's Heart*, pp. 174- 175.
[169] Samuel Huyghue, "The Ballarat Riots, 1854 [manuscript]," ML, A 1789, n.p..
[170] John Molony, *Eureka,* (2nd ed. Carlton, VIC: Melbourne University Press, 2001), p. xii.
[171] Wickham, *Deaths at Eureka*, p. 12.
[172] Smith, *Soldiers Bleed Too,* p. 33.
[173] Huyghue, "The Ballarat Riots [manuscript]," n.p.
[174] Smith, *Soldiers Bleed Too*, p. 33.
[175] Smith, *Soldiers Bleed* Too, p. 15.

While he was not one of the Eureka Six, Egan's severe wounding and the way his adult colleagues reacted to it clearly demonstrate the distinction between boy and man in the army. Even in a military context, where death was a distinct possibility, a boy was to be protected. He was not to be coddled, but taken care of, and those providing that care appear to have taken this responsibility very seriously. This shows an inversion between civilian and military ideas about masculinity and manhood. Taking care of children, even boys, was not men's work in the civilian world, with the exception being in the sphere of education. However, even those men who were teachers or tutors were only responsible for the education and discipline of the boys in their charge; the work of caring for them – both physically and emotionally – still fell to women.[176] In the army, while the young drummers would have had women they could go to (usually the wives of their colleagues) while in barracks, there were less of them in the field. In these circumstances, all aspects of a boy's care fell to the men he was with. While aspects of this caring relationship would have been feminised among civilian men, it was masculinised among the military when directed towards a drummer. Ensuring a drummer grew up into a soldier was part of the work done by the regular men, and was the basis for attachments which could last well into adulthood.

While much can be gleaned about the relationship between men and boys in the army through the attack on the 12th, it was significant in its time for another reason. Prior to 28 November there had been some ad hoc violence between gold miners and *police*, but confrontations between the diggers and the soldiers had been rare. The laws which caused much of the resentment on the goldfields were enforced by police, not the military, whose main work in Ballarat was escorting gold back to Melbourne and ensuring the security of Government Camp. When Hotham had sent soldiers to the goldfields, he had also hoped they would act as a deterrent to any serious violence. Soldiers were used this way in Britain too, and while the diggers may not have liked their presence, they viewed them as a more legitimate expression of British authority than the police. The attack on the 12th was the first time the diggers (and later stockaders) violently and directly confronted the military. It was not an organised attack, but it was relatively successful from the diggers' perspective and may have given them a false sense of their own ability. The men of the 12th Regiment – lost, confused, unarmed and unable to see their attackers in the dark – did not make for very dangerous adversaries, even against an unorganised group of looters.

But who were these men who took up arms against the Queen and her uniformed servants? How did they go from general discontent and monster meetings, to massed attacks on the military and building a stockade that would go down in history? Much like the soldiers they later faced off with at the barricades, the stockaders too were men, and they interpreted the actions of authorities as a series of constant threats to their manhood.[177] In amongst the legitimate grievances they had regarding over-policing, corruption, the exorbitant licence fee, and their inability to purchase land or vote in elections was a deep sense that they were being emasculated. Cut off from the regular measures of manhood, including home, family and steady wages, they created new ways to measure their masculinity and sought to prove themselves by demonstrating their martial prowess. The clash of masculinities between the

[176] Nancy Bush, "The Student and His Professor: Colonial Times to Twentieth Century," *The Journal of Higher Education* 40, no. 8 (1969), pp. 593-609.
[177] Carboni, *The Eureka Stockade*, p. 48.

authorities and the stockaders at Eureka was as serious as the clash of arms, as the following chapter will demonstrate.

2. Man the Barricades!

Diggers, Men & Stockaders on the Ballarat Goldfields

"I have been able to bring about…order, without which it would be folly to face the pending struggle like men."

-Peter Lalor, 30 November 1854[1]

What did it mean to be a man in Ballarat in 1854? Answering this question requires close examination of the men – military and civilian – who were there, their perceptions of each other, as well as the cultural context in which these opinions were formed. The first chapter has sought to examine military masculinity and what it meant to the soldiers, while this chapter will consider what manhood meant to those inside the barricade. This chapter will also consider the events which led to violence at Eureka, and how they were affected by perceptions of masculinity among the diggers and future stockaders. By 30 November, violence in Ballarat was inevitable because nobody was prepared to back down from their respective positions. Retreating, as it were, would have been the ultimate emasculation. The government was determined to enforce the law, no matter how deeply unpopular it was, and the stockaders were equally determined to resist, even at the cost of their own lives. Ideas such as duty and loyalty rubbed up against independence and honour, which clashed with logistical realities such as the availability of weapons, organisational structure and chain-of-command. It would be wrong to say that manhood alone drove the stockaders to build their barricade and take on the military, but it was a factor in how they chose to fight, and in how they prepared for the inevitable violence. With 170 years of hindsight, it is easy to pick out the pattern of events which led to Eureka and to claim that it could have been stopped. Theoretically it could have been, but examination of the counter-factual is pointless. No one wanted to stop, so it became a matter of who was going to act first. Both sides had pressing reasons to move forward, although it is not a surprise that it was the army who dealt the first (and ultimately fatal) blow at Eureka. Each side felt threatened by the other, but it was the military who were ready for an immediate attack and had the means to carry it out.

There were a multitude of issues which doomed the stockaders, but the most prominent was their lack of organisation and training. When the military attacked on 3 December 1854, the stockaders' command structure was still being organised, and there was no agreed plan of attack or defence. They were heavily armed, but did not have enough long guns to counter the muskets and bayonets of the military. Pistols were prominent among the stockaders, most famously the Americans, and a German blacksmith named John Hafele fashioned pikes to "fix red-toads and blue pissants" as he colourfully described the soldiers and police.[2] Carboni was dismissive of the pikes and declared that he did not think they would "stick an opossum" but a pikeman successfully killed Private Joseph Wall, so they must have worked at least once.[3] There is also evidence that the stockaders did not know how to use the few long guns they did have, or did not want to, because a large cache of arms and ammunition was

[1] Raffaello Carboni, *The Eureka Stockade: The Consequence of Some Pirates Wanting on Quarter-Deck a Rebellion* (Melbourne, VIC: J.P. Atkinson, 1855), p. 48.
[2] Carboni, *The Eureka Stockade*, p.51.
[3] Carboni, *The Eureka Stockade*, p.51.

discovered in aftermath of the battle.[4] This included the muskets stolen from the 12th Regiment on 28 November. In comparison, the army was organised, and each man knew how to perform his role efficiently. The soldiers had practiced the drills they would employ at the stockade hundreds of times in their careers, and whether they were regular men armed with muskets, or officers with pistols and swords, they were familiar with their weapons. There was a clear chain of command, from Captain Thomas down to the NCOs, and an orchestrated plan of attack. The military also had a clearly laid out plan for the defence of Government Camp, just in case the stockaders attempted to storm their position.

Whether the stockaders could have arranged themselves into something resembling an army is a great unknown, but this was the order Lalor talked about when he gave his speech on the last day of November 1854. It was a false sense of order though: the stockaders were fiercely independent men who did not intend, for a moment, to be commanded by anyone. However, it is telling that those who arranged the stockade believed that the best way to prove their manhood in the situation was to form an army. Even among those who had come to the colony seeking to create a new kind of social structure, which included new ideas about manhood, the link between masculinity and martial valour was not easily severed. But being a man was not as simple as being able to pick a fight, and while some actions were seen as more manly than others if it came to blows, the stockaders were not out to prove they were better combatants. They believed they were reclaiming liberties and rights which were inherently theirs, which the government had taken away from them without their consent. They were proud men, free men, *independent* men, who felt not just oppressed by unfair laws, but emasculated by them. Eureka was not just a reaction against corrupt governance, but a stand for masculine honour. By aligning their cause with their manhood, the stockaders instigated an ideological confrontation they had not intended to have: a fatal collision of masculinities.

2.1 The Diggers of 1854

This first section will examine the association of masculinity with action, and how these ideas shaped the diggers' and stockaders' perception of the military's ability. To be a man in this period, one had to be prepared to get up and *do* something to achieve his goals. Doing nothing, or being perceived to do nothing, was not manly. The Victorians in general had fixed views about laziness and the ability of people to 'pull themselves up by their bootstraps' if they only tried hard enough. People were not supposed to rise too high, and social climbing was frowned upon, but a man's circumstances were his own to make. This attitude came into sharp focus on the Victorian goldfields, where any man, no matter his social class, had the potential to strike it rich with nothing more than luck and some very hard labour. Such ideas led to changes in the social fabric, which had already been pulled in many directions by the European Revolutions of 1848, the Great Famine in Ireland, and the Chartist Movement in England. Things which would have been frowned upon in Europe became, if not acceptable, then nearly impossible to police in a society which was rapidly coming to value independent action over community cohesion. For example, so many men left their wives and families to

[4] Gregory Blake, *To Pierce the Tyrant's Heart: A Military History of the Battle for the Eureka Stockade: 3 December 1854.* Australian Army History Collection (Loftus, N.S.W: Australian Military History Publications [in association with the Australian Army History Unit], 2009), pp. 174-175.

head for the goldfields, that a new term was coined to describe the women left behind: grass widows.[5] It was not only the term that was new, but the way such women were treated by society. In Britain and Ireland, an abandoned wife was assumed to be morally culpable for her husband's leaving her, and could be socially shunned if her family was not prepared to take her back in. In Victoria, grass widows were seen as victims of capricious and flighty husbands, and were spared the stigma usually attached to an abandoned woman.[6]

This is just one example of the new ideas which were sweeping through the colony, many of them rooted in individualism. Women too were part of this movement; the grass widows were not helpless damsels in distress, but made the best of their circumstances. They banded together for companionship, mutual protection, and to help care for each other and their children. To the interest of social commentators, they became very adept at what were considered masculine tasks, such as chopping wood and shooting parrots for dinner; some became so self-sufficient, that their men were not always welcome if they returned.[7] The desire for independence and individualism among the colonists rubbed up against the government's desire for conformity and a British-based system of social control. There was even a short-lived attempt in New South Wales to introduce hereditary peerages in Australia, and establish a colonial House of Lords.[8] The idea was so unpopular that the New South Wales parliament never made any further attempts to pass the bill, although those bitter about losing the chance to be peers in their new land refused to let it die quietly.[9] The Victorian legislature wisely decided against attempting to follow suit, although the appointees of the Legislative Council were deeply uneasy about the democratic ideas sweeping the colony.[10]

Those who made up the colonial gentry did not come from the highest echelons of British society, but they were elite enough to have benefitted from the mostly inflexible class hierarchies which dominated nearly all aspects of British life.[11] In the colonies, they often rose higher than they could have done in Britain, and were determined to protect their newfound social status, which often also came with increased wealth. However, conservative ideas and reactionary policies were not the exclusive domain of the colonial administration or those whose wealth and class depended on the status quo. The diggers were quite as protective of their way of life, even if the ideologies they attached to it were the polar opposite of those beloved by high-status colonials. They cherished their sense of independence, which they linked to their ability to work, provide and possibly better themselves through the sweat off their brow alone. As one witness at the Commission of Enquiry following Eureka declared "there is one law of our being that is in all men naturally, that is the love of independence."[12] This cherished idea was under threat in 1854, not just from overbearing government policies, but from the realities of deep shaft gold mining.

By 1854, all the accessible alluvial (i.e. surface) gold in Ballarat was gone. The only way to strike it rich was to sink shafts down to the Ordovician layer, and find the gold left by the

---

[5] Clare Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka* (Melbourne, VIC: The Text Publishing Company, 2013), p. 30.
[6] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka, p.* 77; Geoffrey Serle, *The Golden Age: A History of the Colony of Victoria, 1851-1861.* (3rd ed. Carlton, VIC: Melbourne University Press, 1977), pp. 51-52.
[7] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka*, pp. 30, 102.
[8] "The Constitution of New South Wales," *The Sydney Morning Herald* (Sydney, NSW), 16 Aug 1853, pp. 4- 5.
[9] "Legislative Council," *The Sydney Morning Herald* (Sydney, NSW), 17 Aug 1853, pp. 4- 5.
[10] Charles Pasley, "Letters of Charles Pasley [manuscript], SLV, MS BOX 94/4, n.p..
[11] Serle, *The Golden Age*, pp. 129- 130.
[12] Serle, *The Golden Age*, p. 407.

ancient streams which had flowed through the area 440 million years ago.[13] To reach it, shafts between 140 – 190ft deep had to be sunk into the earth; this posed serious challenges, the least of which was there might not be gold at the bottom.[14] The sides had to be shored up with timber slabs, to reduce the ever-present risk of collapse, and because all the work happened below the water table, flooding was a constant problem.[15] Water needed to be bailed out twenty-four hours a day, or the whole shaft would quickly fill up and become nothing more than a rancid pond. Undermining a neighbour's claim, accidently or otherwise, was another problem associated with deep shaft mining, and could lead to violent disputes, especially if gold was found.[16] Breathable air was also in short supply at those depths, so a wind sail had to be rigged at the top the shaft to provide ventilation, and manned twenty-four hours a day, as digging did not stop overnight.

Deep shaft mining could not be done by one man alone, so cooperatives were formed. These consisted of at least six men, although there were some groups which comprised fifty or more.[17] Working in a cooperative did not threaten a digger's independence, and strong relationships were often formed among the men in the group. If gold was found, each man would get a share, and not every member would be a digger. Some men took on traditionally feminine roles, such as cooking or housekeeping (perhaps better described as tent-keeping), while others dug. In some groups this work would be the job of a specific man, while others shared these tasks around.[18] Storekeepers, including women, would join a cooperative and provide capital or supplies on credit, or sometimes both, and share in the rewards if gold was found.[19] Deep shaft mining was expensive, and it could take six months or more to reach the Ordovician layer, so having financial backing was a necessity. Whether the diggers found gold or not, they had to eat, purchase canvas for tents, buy mining tools, and pay the hated licence fee. Under these circumstances, it was not surprising that anti-government feeling ran high, but the diggers saw a much larger problem looming on the horizon: the arrival of the mining companies. By 1854, large corporations were moving in, employing diggers as wage labourers and, in the minds of some, forcibly instating "the old European system of Master and Servant."[20] Those who worked for wages in the corporations were seen as lesser men than those diggers working for themselves in cooperatives. They had given up on the "freedom and independence in the golden lands of Australia" and were treated with scorn.[21]

It was not only the imposition of the companies which made the diggers of 1854 uneasy, but the introduction of new technology. Their independence, which was a fundamental part of their manhood, was tied to them doing the labour *by hand* for their own benefit. This attitude was seen as so unusual that it was remarked upon by the Commission of Inquiry in 1855.[22] In 1853, for example, an enterprising digger in Ballarat began using a steam-powered pump. This machine, which ended the need for a shaft to be constantly bailed out by hand, was so

---

[13] Victorian Government, "Gold," *Resources Victoria*, https://resources.vic.gov.au/geology-exploration/minerals/metals/gold accessed 3 October 2024.
[14] "Ballarat," *Age*, Melbourne, VIC: 27 Dec 1854, p. 4.
[15] Serle, *The Golden Age*, pp. 143 – 145.
[16] Serle, *The Golden Age,* pp. 147 – 149
[17] Serle, *The Golden Age,* pp. 404 – 406.
[18] Serle, *The Golden Age,* p. 126.
[19] Serle, *The Golden Age,* pp. 349- 340.
[20] Serle, *The Golden Age,* p. 407.
[21] Serle, *The Golden Age,* p. 407.
[22] Serle, *The Golden Age,* p. 408.

unpopular that the owner had to threaten to shoot the first man who went near it to prevent it being smashed![23] The issue was not the technology itself, but what it represented. Pumps and other machines made digging easier, but were expensive and usually required outside investment. The encroachment of capitalist interests greatly upset the digging community, despite the fact that many of them worked in cooperatives financed under very similar arrangements.[24] It was not the type of work which was done which was important, but who it was being done for and *how* it was being undertaken. Real men on the goldfields worked with their hands for their own reward; they did not take wages from capitalists or use fancy machinery.

These attitudes about manhood and work were also apparent in the perception among the diggers of those in Government Camp. Regular police and soldiers were not seen as lazy, but as corrupt and mindless respectively.[25] Soldiers in particular, while not as heartily disliked as the police, were assumed to be less intelligent than civilian men.[26] A soldier's life was one of strict discipline and absolute obedience, in which individuality was frowned upon and conformity expected from every man at all times. Soldiers wore the same uniform, ate the same food, practiced the same drills and manoeuvres, and their days followed the same rigid pattern no matter where they were.[27] This monotony was not dissimilar to gold mining, although the diggers saw their labour through the lens of personal achievement, where a soldier was perceived to be participating in military routine because he was too stupid to do anything else. He was better, however, than his indolent officers and the high-ranking civilian officials, who lounged about in their gold and silver lace doing nothing – at least, according to the diggers.[28] In reality, there was so much work to be done by the administration in Ballarat it is a wonder they had time to get on the wrong side of the population!

Much of this dislike was due to incompetence and corruption by the authorities, along with the overzealous enforcement of badly thought-out policies.[29] However, for the diggers working hard on their goldfields, there was also a sense that the officers lording it over them had done nothing to *earn* their authority. Among a people who felt so strongly about their independence, this was an intolerable concept. Combined with the perception that the authorities were "generally young, shallow-brained fellows" who had never done a day's hard work in their lives, this led the diggers to see the authorities as lesser men than they were.[30] If manhood was defined by the ability to work for oneself, or as part of a collective with one's mates, with success or failure dictated by nothing more than hard work, then the authorities at Government Camp were certainly *not* men, nor were those who obeyed their commands. Both civilian and military masculinity on the goldfields was linked to a man's ability to perform his work. Gold digging and soldiering were inherently different, but both professions required physical strength, discipline and patience, and the men relied on those around them

[23] Serle, *The Golden Age*, p. 408.
[24] Serle, *The Golden Age*, pp. 339 – 340.
[25] Robert Haldane, *The People's Force: A History of the Victoria Police.* (3rd ed. Carlton, VIC: Melbourne University Press, 2017) p. 42.
[26] E. Smith, "Educating the Soldier in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 65, no. 264 (1987), pp. 200-207.
[27] Blake, *To Pierce the Tyrant's* Heart, p. 65.
[28] Untitled editorial, *Ballarat Times,* 21 October 1854, page number illegible.
[29] Haldane, *The People's Force,* pp. 42, 44.
[30] Lawrence Sharkey, *Australia Marches On,* (Sydney, NSW: New South Wales Legal Rights Committee, 1946), p. 282.

to do their work well. Ultimately, however, all the ideas came back to *doing*. Not acting was not an option for men, so when a group of soldiers stood by and watched the Eureka Hotel go up in flames in October 1854, the diggers present dismissed them as impotent; they could not have been more wrong.

2.2 "Wait for the Sound of the Bugle"

While civilian masculinity on the goldfields prioritised movement and action, the military at Eureka saw value in waiting for the right moment, something which will be discussed in this section. The military clashed with the diggers, including future stockaders, for the first time on 28 November, as discussed in the previous chapter, but there had been a near miss at the Eureka Hotel on 17 October 1854. During this riot, when the hotel was burned to the ground by an angry mob, a small contingent of the 40th Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Broadhurst, were sent down to support the police and try and disperse the crowd.[31] In his short memoir, Raffaello Carboni claimed the 40th drew their swords when they arrived and surrounded the hotel in an attempt to protect it.[32] Such a provocative action would have enraged the hot, drunk, angry crowd, but there are no reports of any violence between the military and the gathered diggers. No men from the 40th were hospitalised on their return to Government Camp either, nor are there any reports of deaths or injuries among the diggers who were at the hotel. Other contemporary accounts, including the painting below by eyewitness Charles Doudiet, make no mention of the army engaging in this show of force, and regular men in 1854 were not issued with swords. The only soldier armed with a sword at the Eureka Hotel was Broadhurst, as swords were part of an officer's kit.

[31] "Ballaarat," *Argus*, 23 October 1854, p. 5.
[32] Carboni, *The Eureka Stockade*, p. 22.

Fig. 2: Charles Doudiet, The Eureka Hotel Riot, *watercolour on paper, 1854.*

As mentioned in the introduction, Carboni personally hated the soldiers for their successful attack on the stockade, which he characterised as "a foul deed worthy of the devil."[33] It is not surprising, therefore, that he exaggerated the military's level of aggression towards the diggers. While the violent interaction he described at the Eureka Hotel did not occur, the *potential* for serious violence between the diggers and the military had been very real. The *Argus* estimated that the crowd had numbered at least 5000, and Broadhurst only had eighty men under his command.[34] He would have been conscious that he was both dangerously outnumbered, and in a volatile situation. The mob who burned the hotel were not merely an angry crowd, but, as explained by Clare Wright, were engaging in a ritual act of public reprisal.[35] The couple who owned the hotel, James and Catherine Bentley, had been implicated in the murder of James "Scotty" Scobie, but had been acquitted at an inquest led by a magistrate who was also James Bentley's business partner. The crowd which burned the building down had gathered not just in rage at the injustice, but to punish the Bentleys, *and* the government that the diggers felt (rightly or wrongly) were supporting them.[36] Soldiers were visible symbols of state authority, and their mere presence at large gatherings could cause disquiet. Had the diggers chosen to turn on the military and enact further ritual punishment, it would have been a bloodbath.

What thoughts played through Lieutenant Broadhurst's mind as he assessed the situation are unknown, as are the exact instructions he received from his commanding officers. The civil authorities wanted military support for the police, but by the time the 40th Regiment arrived, the police had fallen back, and the hotel was ablaze. Some mounted troopers were still present but "did not take any vigorous measures to deter the people," and once the hotel was properly alight, saving it was impossible.[37] According to diarists Charles Evans and Samuel Huyghue, the day was hot and breezy – perfect conditions for a fire – and the Eureka Hotel was made of wood and full of alcohol.[38] In the circumstances, Broadhurst did the only thing he could do without provoking violence and putting himself or his men at risk: nothing. Both Evans and Huyghue, along with the correspondent from the *Argus*, said the soldiers formed up near the hotel (each man has them in slightly different positions) where they stood waiting for further orders.[39] They remained there until the roof caught fire, at which point Broadhurst ordered his men to return to Government Camp. The roof collapsed while they were still in sight of the building, and the angry crowd did nothing worse than jeer at them as they retreated.[40]

Carboni claimed this was an ignominious defeat for the government forces, a view echoed by Henry Seekamp, the editor of the *Ballarat Times*. Huyghue, a clerk who worked for the military and lived in Government Camp, recalled that the civilian authorities – especially

---

[33] Carboni, *The Eureka Stockade,* p.74.
[34] "Ballaarat," *Argus*, 23 October 1854.
[35] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka,* pp. 224-226.
[36] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka,* p. 224.
[37] Untitled editorial, *Ballarat Times*, 21 October 1854..
[38] Samuel Huyghue, "The Ballarat Riots, 1854 [manuscript]," ML, A 1789; Charles Evans, "Diary [manuscript]," SLV, MS Box 1777/4.
[39] Huyghue, "The Ballarat Riots" [manuscript], n.p; Evans, "Diary" [manuscript], n.p.; "Ballaarat," *Argus*, 23 October 1854.
[40] "Ballaarat," *Argus*, 23 October 1854.

Commissioner Rede – were embarrassed, but the burning of the Eureka Hotel does not appear to have affected the military in the same way. This is not surprising, as the protection of private property and the maintenance of public order were matters under *civil* jurisdiction. Civilian authorities could request military assistance, and in cases of severe unrest the military were legally obliged to intervene to keep the peace, but the military ultimately bore no responsibility for the outcome of the Eureka Hotel Riot.[41] However, the burning of the hotel did mark an important turning point in relations between the military and civilian population in Ballarat. It was the first time soldiers came up against anti-government aggression, and their response had been to do nothing. Doing nothing in any circumstance, but especially circumstances where a threat was present, was seen as unmanly among the civilian population. The lack of action by the military was interpreted by the diggers as a sign they were impotent in the face of massed aggression. The attack on the 12th Regiment just over a month later reinforced this view, and ultimately led to much greater violence at the Eureka Stockade.

This was a serious miscalculation by the diggers and stockaders, but an understandable one. They conflated action with ability, and inaction with its opposite, with little room for context or nuance. Broadhurst and his men did nothing at Eureka because there was nothing they could do; acting would have been suicidally stupid. Neither he nor his men were incapable, they simply chose to observe in this instance. This is fairly standard even for armies today, and soldiers spend a lot more time waiting – for orders, for transport, for something to happen – than actually *doing* anything. Action is not always the best course, and trained soldiers will assess a situation rather than rush headlong into it. This also happened at Eureka, when Thomas ordered his men to "wait for the sound of the bugle" before firing, after they were spotted by the stockaders.[42] While there were some notably foolish officers in the nineteenth century who sought glory at the cost of their men's lives, none of them were present in Ballarat in 1854. The songs and poems about the glorious fallen at Eureka are about the stockaders for this very reason: they rushed in with stars in their eyes, while the soldiers waited for the opportune moment. Even while they wait, however, soldiers are always ready to act should it be required. This was another miscalculation by the diggers, who assumed that a state of inaction would take time to remedy.

This was demonstrated by their characterisation of the attack on the 12th Regiment. Henry Seekamp, the editor of the *Ballarat Times*, presented this incident as a complete rout of the soldiers by the diggers, and claimed that the commanding officer, Captain Richard Atkinson, had fled "as fast as possible" when the diggers attacked and "left his men to do the best they could in his absence."[43] Seekamp went on to say that the men's best had been woefully inadequate and the soldiers had broken ranks and scattered in the face of the attack.[44] Order had only been restored when a contingent of men from the 40th Regiment, accompanied by mounted police, had arrived to rescue their colleagues. Once again, the perception among the diggers who *read* about the attack or heard of it later was that the soldiers were inactive, and therefore incapable. It also suggested that Atkinson was a coward, the very antithesis of

[41] D. Keir & F. Lawson, *Cases in Constitutional Law* (London, UK: Oxford Claredon Press, 1928), pp. 360-361.
[42] William Withers, *The History of Ballarat: From the First Pastoral Settlement to the Present Time* (Carlton, VIC: Queensberry Hill Press, 1980), p. 124.
[43] Henry Seekamp, Untitled editorial, *Ballarat Times*, 3 December 1854, page number illegible.
[44] Seekamp, Untitled editorial, *Ballarat Times*, 3 December 1854.

masculinity, who had been scared off by a group of diggers. Seekamp claimed they had rushed him yelling “Joe!” – the pejorative term for any authority figure on the goldfields – after he had haughtily refused to have any “communication with rebels.”[45]

Yet, there is little evidence to support Seekamp’s version of events, despite it being repeated almost verbatim for the past 170 years. The attack on the 12th was covered by the other newspapers which had correspondents in Ballarat, but none of them mention the flight of Captain Atkinson.[46] Diarist Charles Evans was an eyewitness to the attack and also makes no mention an officer abandoning his men.[47] Such an event would have been unprecedented, so would have drawn the attention of those who saw it. Atkinson’s military record both before and after Eureka also suggests he was not a man prone to running away. Like his 40th Regiment counterpart Captain Thomas, Atkinson had won promotions on merit after graduating from Sandhurst, and was later promoted to Major while fighting in Aotearoa New Zealand.[48] There is no evidence that his alleged poor behaviour was remarked upon when the 12th finally reached Government Camp either. Fleeing under fire amounted to desertion in 1854, which was a very serious offence for any personnel, let alone a commissioned officer, to commit. Atkinson would have faced severe consequences had he behaved in the way Seekamp suggested.

In fact, Atkinson was given extra responsibilities shortly after he arrived, and was left in command of Government Camp the morning of Eureka.[49] This is very significant; in giving Atkinson this responsibility, Thomas designated him as his chosen successor. Had anything happened to Thomas at Eureka, Atkinson would have taken over as the commanding officer at Government Camp until the arrival of Major General Sir Robert Nickle on 5 December. Captain Charles Pasley, Royal Engineers, was Thomas’ second-in-command during the attack at Eureka, and a member of his war council, but Pasley was an inexperienced combatant with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo – he was a member of the Legislative Council. Atkinson, on the other hand, was an experienced officer who had seen action in Mauritius during the British invasion of French East Africa. Thomas’s decision to leave Atkinson in command at Government Camp speaks volumes for the esteem he held for his 12th Regiment counterpart. The safety of the administrative enclave was the primary reason for the military’s presence in Ballarat, and Thomas would not have entrusted it to a man who had demonstrated he could not be relied upon to hold his ground while under attack.

Seekamp’s other claim, that when Atkinson fled his men scattered in terror, also does not hold up to close scrutiny. Atkinson and a small group of soldiers became *separated* from the regiment after they came under attack from the diggers.[50] They did not run away, and the vast majority of the 12th held their ground and were able to organise a defence of their supply wagons, although not before the diggers had managed to start looting them.[51] How many

---

[45] "Ballarat," *Geelong Advertiser and Intelligencer*, 2 December 1854, p. 4.
[46] The *Geelong Advertiser* and the *Argus* were two. These newspapers were sympathetic to the diggers/stockaders, and the *Argus* had published anti-military articles before. Had Atkinson fled, both papers would have reported it.
[47] Evans, “Diary [manuscript],” n.p.
[48] Neil Smith, *Soldiers Bleed Too: The Redcoats at the Eureka Stockade 1854* (Gardenvale, VIC: Mostly Unsung Military History Research and Publications, 2004), p. 26.
[49] Blake, *To Pierce the Tyrant's Heart,* p. 110.
[50] "Ballarat," *Geelong Advertiser and Intelligencer*.
[51] "Ballarat," *Geelong Advertiser and Intelligencer*.

guns the diggers took from the 12th is unknown, but it was not enough to prevent the regiment arming themselves and fighting back against their attackers. Every man from the regiment who was present at Eureka three nights later was also armed, indicating that the baggage train was defended and the diggers were not able to make off with a large number of guns.[52] Further evidence suggesting that someone was organising a defence is that a bugle was heard by a number of witnesses during the skirmish; a drummer would not sound his bugle without orders from an officer.[53] All of this indicates that when the 40th arrived to assist their fellows, the 12th were not in retreat, but were holding their ground. Those men who had become separated from the regiment were quickly found by police and soldiers, assisted by local diggers (the majority had not participated in the attack), and the regiment arrived at Government Camp.

The actions of the 12th Regiment under attack demonstrate the ability of the average British soldier in 1854. That the regiment was able to dismount, arm themselves, protect their baggage train, and hold their ground in the dark, on unfamiliar territory, should have given the diggers and future stockaders pause. That it did not cannot be attributed entirely to Seekamp's fiction, but he certainly contributed to the belief sweeping the physical force movement in Ballarat that the diggers were better men in every way than the soldiers. By default, this meant they would succeed if it came to violence. Given the backgrounds of many stockaders, the great majority of them should have known better, especially the revolutionary Irish and survivors of the 1848 revolutions For the soldiers, ideological and administrative concerns were secondary – there was a growing sense among the men that their community was turning on them.

2.3 "Ballarat on this Sabbath Morning"

"Could the government have but seen the awful sight presented at Ballarat on this Sabbath morning – the women in tears, mourning over dead relations, and the blood bespattered countenances of many men in the diggers' camp."[54]

- The *Melbourne Herald, 5 December 1854.*

The final section of Chapter Two will look at the collision of the conflicting masculinities at the Eureka Stockade itself, and what it meant for the Eureka Six. The men of the 12th Regiment, including Felix Boyle, Johan Hall and William Webb, would not have been surprised that a violent confrontation occurred so quickly after they arrived, given their first introduction to Ballarat was being attacked on the Eureka lead. Because none of these three left records, there is no evidence of what role they played in the skirmish, although it is certain they were not among the dozen men seriously injured. All those men were still in hospital when the attack on the stockade occurred. Their impression of Ballarat would have been that the community was hostile, whereas for the men of the 40th, some of whom had been rotating in and out of Ballart for almost two years, the prevailing attitude was one of confusion.[55] John Neill, a long-term member of the 40th Regiment who had been among the

---

[52] Evans, "Diary [manuscript]," n.p.
[53] Evans, "Diary [manuscript]," n.p.; "Ballarat," *Geelong Advertiser and Intelligencer*, 2 December 1854.
[54] "Ballarat," *Melbourne Morning Herald*, 5 December 1854, p. 4.
[55] Smith, *Soldiers Bleed Too,* p. 11.

first deployed to Ballarat after he had disembarked the *Vulcan* in 1852, saw men he knew and had socialised with inside the stockade![56] Undoubtedly, the stockaders had a similar experience when their barricade was stormed on 3 December 1854: the men attacking them were men they had drank with, gone to church with, and who had escorted their hard-won riches to Melbourne. The shock would have been heightened by the fact that it was a Sunday. Among the primarily Christian population on the Eureka lead, the Sabbath was strictly observed, and only essential work was carried out.[57] The government too showed respect for the Christian holy day, and Commissioner Rede had never ordered a licence hunt, or done anything to harass the diggers, on a Sunday.[58] The army, less constrained by social and religious conventions, saw no reason to consider the Sabbath as a factor in their planning.[59]

This again demonstrates just how much the stockaders underestimated the military. So caught up were they in their own views of how the coming fight would be fought, that they failed to see the forest for the trees. They also had no concept of just how violent they appeared to the professional soldiers watching them from Government Camp. While the view is obstructed today by buildings erected later in the nineteenth century, in 1854 there was a clear line of sight from Government Camp (roughly the site of modern-day Camp, Mair and Lydiard Streets) to the Eureka Stockade, and also to the diggers' preferred gathering ground of Bakery Hill. The soldiers had seen every major episode in the lead-up to Eureka, from the first time the Southern Cross flag was raised, to the moment the first planks of wood were laid down to build the famous barricade.[60] Spies within the movement reported back to the senior military commanders that the stockaders were planning to attack Government Camp, putting not only the soldiers themselves at risk, but their families too.[61] The stockaders may have presented themselves as oppressed men fighting desperately for their rights, but to the soldiers, they looked very much like a rebel army.

Posturing violently is one thing, but the diggers and stockaders had presented the military with ample evidence that they would act on their violent impulses. Two days after the attack on the 12th Regiment, the diggers once again clashed violently with the military, in an event which became known as the Gravel Pits Riot. It was sparked by a monster meeting on 29 November, where the diggers resolved not to take out any more licences *and* declared they would resist any attempt by the government to enforce the licence law.[62] They lit a large bonfire and the image of hundreds or even thousands of diggers lining up to gleefully burn their licences in a massive show of defiance became one of the standout moments of Eureka. However, census records and government revenue reports suggest it was really only a very small number of licences which were burned. The (white) male population of Ballarat in November 1854 was 24,600, and they were accompanied by 4000 women and 4410 children; from this group, only £96,000 had been collected in licence revenue for the year, which

[56] Smith, *Soldiers Bleed Too*, p. 11.
[57] "Ballaarat," *Argus*, 16 November 1854, p. 6.
[58] Charles Hotham to Earl Grey, 'Reporting Official Visit to the Goldfields of Victoria,' 18 September 1854, Dispatch No 112, PROV 1085/P, Unit 8.
[59] Keith Edghill, "Dangerous Doctrines! The Battle for Anglican Supremacy in the British Army, 1810-1865." *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 80, no. 321 (2002), pp. 36-57.
[60] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat," *Argus*, 18 December 1854, p. 6.
[61] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat," *Argus*, 18 December 1854.
[62] Carboni, *The Eureka Stockade*, pp. 39- 40.

averages out to each adult man paying just over £3 per year into the Government's coffers.[63] A licence to dig for one month cost 30s, the equivalent of £1, 10s, while a storekeepers' licence cost £10 every three months.[64] These figures make it very clear that only a tiny portion of diggers and storekeepers were paying the licence fee at all, and attendance at the meeting on 29 November was put at around 15,000, roughly half the population![65] There simply would not have been enough people with a licence to burn for the claims that thousands participated in this act of civil disobedience to be true.

That said, some licences *were* burned and the civil authorities decided that a show of force was needed to put the diggers in their place.[66] The day after this meeting, on 30 November 1854, Commissioner Robert Rede ordered a licence hunt to take place on an area of the diggings known as the Gravel Pits, which was close to Government Camp.[67] This was a foolish decision, as he knew about the meeting the day before and also knew that a significant number of diggers were habitually unlicensed. These diggers took a calculated risk that they would not be caught, given the number of unlicensed miners compared to police on the goldfields. When police arrived they were immediately met by a mob and violence quickly ensued; the police were attacked with rocks, bottles, lumps of quartz and firearms, while those diggers without arms resorted to throwing mud and rubbish, of which there was plenty.[68] Unable to withstand the violent assault, Rede read the Riot Act, and the 40th Regiment was summoned to clear the area. This had the desired effect; when the soldiers arrived and "dropped to their knee and presented guns at us and told the crowd to disperse…my word did they disperse!"[69] A licence hunt was then conducted and eight men were arrested for riotous behaviour.[70] However, it is the interaction between the military and the diggers which is of interest in this episode. If the skirmish on 28 November had given the diggers the idea that they were capable of going toe-to-toe with trained soldiers, what happened on the Gravel Pits clearly demonstrated the opposite was true.The issue that stopped the diggers cold when confronted with armed military might on 30 November was the same one which ultimately led to the stockaders' defeat. As discussed earlier in this chapter, they were not an organised force. Armies – professional or insurgent – cannot operate effectively if there is no chain of command, or if those men on the ground are disinclined to follow orders given by officers, and instead act independently. Such a group is not an army, but rather a heavily armed crowd. Such crowds can still be dangerous, but if they decide to meet an organised army on its own terms, they very rarely prevail. When presented with the full, organised might of the British Army on 30 November, the diggers scattered, but the stockaders would later use the incident to their advantage. They adopted a tone of righteous indignation that their government had set soldiers on them, and declared

---

[63] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka*, p. 277; Eureka Centre & Ballarat Fine Art Gallery, *Eureka Education,* (Ballarat, VIC: 2020), p. 59.

[64] Dorothy Wickham, *Women of the Diggings, Ballarat 1854* (Ballarat, VIC: BHS Publishing, 2009), p. 49; Serle, *The Golden Age*, pp. 188, 220.

[65] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka*, p. 277. Author's Note: Some women held miners' and/or storekeeper's licences, but it is impossible to distinguish the female licensees from their male counterparts for these calculations.

[66] "Serious Outbreak at Ballarat," *Argus*, Melbourne, VIC, 2 December 1854, p. 5.

[67] Serle, *The Golden Age*, pp. 312 – 313; Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of* Eureka, pp. 277- 278.

[68] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of* Eureka, pp. 277- 278.

[69] Elizabeth Rowlands in Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka*, p. 278.

[70] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of* Eureka, p. 278.

they needed a place from which they could defend themselves, should it happen again.[71] The participants ignored the fact that they had been actively rioting, and had violently attacked police and the gold commissioner before the soldiers arrived to restore order. The Gravel Pits Riot was interpreted by the authorities as a declaration of war by the diggers. The erection of the stockade two days later, accompanied by the behaviour of the stockaders towards the civilian population of Ballarat, only served to reinforce this belief.

Although what happened next is well-known, as this thesis is about *soldiers* at Eureka, it will be told from the military perspective. As already mentioned, the soldiers and their officers up in Government Camp could see everything the stockaders were doing; things escalated on 1 December when the diggers began firing on the sentries posted around Government Camp.[72] The sentries returned fire and this pattern continued until the erection of the stockade on 2 December.[73] By this stage, conditions in Government Camp had become grim. After the licence hunt of 30 November, it had been decided it was too dangerous for the inhabitants of the camp to leave its confines. Sentries were posted twenty-four hours a day, with orders to shoot on sight anyone who was not authorised to enter, as the authorities feared the stockaders may have spies within the camp.[74] In this instance the authorities over-estimated the stockaders' ability to manage a military operation, and under-estimated their distaste for spies. It is unclear whether the stockaders did try and put any of their people in Government Camp, although the high treason trials revealed their utter contempt for espionage, so it is unlikely. However, they were aware that the authorities had some of their men within the stockade – the stockaders simply did not know who they were.[75] Two would later be revealed at the high treason trials in 1855: police officers Henry Goodenough and Andrew Peters were in the stockade disguised as a digger and storekeeper respectively.[76] Carboni vilified them in the aftermath, furious at what he saw as duplicity and cowardice, although as the *Argus* pointed out on reflection in 1899 "the business of a spy, although a detestable one in popular fancy, was a task that demanded nerve."[77] There would have been other government spies within the stockade; Goodenough and Peters were identified because they were called to give testimony at the trials, not due to any recklessness on their part.

The presence of spies within the stockade is important for understanding the decisions made by Captain Thomas and his council of war in the hours leading up to the attack. Due to their own concerns about stockader spies within their camp, Thomas's war council consisted only of himself, Captain Pasley and Commissioner Rede, and no information was communicated to other officers until the order to form up was given.[78] Rede and Pasley, both men who benefitted from the status quo, wanted a hard and definitive strike which would entirely crush the movement, but did not have any authority to make that decision.[79] Captain Thomas alone had the power to call an attack; he, too, wanted a definitive strike, but wanted to ensure the

---

[71] Carboni, *The Eureka Stockade*, pp. 57- 58.
[72] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat," *Argus*, 18 December 1854.
[73] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat," *Argus*, 18 December 1854.
[74] William Westgarth, *Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Condition of the Goldfields of Victoria,* (Melbourne, VIC: Victorian Government, 1855), p. 310.
[75] Carboni, *The Eureka Stockade*, p. 54.
[76] Queen v. Joseph, 1855, n.p.
[77] "Gold Seekers of the Fifties," *Argus,* Melbourne, VIC, 1899, p. 4.
[78] Pasley, "Letters of Charles Pasley [manuscript]," n.p
[79] Westgarth, *Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Condition of the Goldfields of Victoria,* p. 310.

advantages lay with him and his men before he moved, to reduce the risk of defeat and ensure the security of Government Camp could be maintained.[80] As night fell and he could no longer clearly see the stockade, he relied on the reports of his agents within the barricade to tell him what was happening. This is how he learned that the stockaders had begun to drift away from the barricade, that a large contingent of heavily armed Americans had left, and that the odds, which had previously been 3:1 against him, had shifted to 3:1 in his favour.[81] Thomas wrote in his report after the stockade that he was also aware that the stockaders were planning a meeting on Sunday afternoon to elect a new executive, and he wanted to strike before that meeting occurred.[82] This information too would have come from agents or informants he had on the diggings, and his reasoning for moving to prevent this gathering was his concern that a new executive might be even more radical than the current one.[83] Thomas wanted to fight the devil he knew, rather than risk taking on a new entity.

Lalor, Carboni, Lynch and a number of surviving stockaders suggested the use of spies by the government and the military was dishonourable, cowardly and *unmanly*, as was their early morning surprise attack.[84] It was *sneaky* and an affront to the sense of manhood the diggers and stockaders had cultivated, as taking advantage of someone suggested weakness. For the military, taking every possible advantage was their bread and butter, and attacking the stockade from the rear, in the early morning darkness, was a sound tactical decision. Thomas had previously fought entrenched insurgents in India and seen the carnage a full-frontal attack could wreak on an army if the enemy was prepared for them.[85] Furthermore, the military saw this as a pre-emptive attack on an offensive enemy. The stockaders had been proclaiming loudly that they were ready to attack Government Camp, and a party of two hundred heavily armed Americans had left to ambush military reinforcements coming up the road from Melbourne.[86] Information had also come through that the structure (despite later claims to the contrary) was well-built and solid; it was too high for a horseman to jump and infantry would have to climb over to reach the men inside. Rifle ports had been built into the side of the barricade, to allow the stockaders to fire on advancing soldiers without being fired upon themselves, and no one was allowed in or out without a password. It was also being manned by armed sentries, which further enforced for the military that the stockaders were an insurgent force and needed to be dealt with as such.

And where were the Eureka Six as the march to the stockade was being prepared? Captain Wise had been assigned command of eighty-seven men drawn from the 12th and the 40th Regiments, and the exact positions of the others are not known. They would have been part of the hundred and fifty or so infantry who formed up under Wise and an officer from the 12th Regiment, Captain Quede. They were supported by thirty calvary under Lieutenant Hall (12th Regiment, no relation to John Hall) and ninety-one mounted and foot police. Roney marched

---

[80] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat," *Argus*, 18 December 1854.
[81] "Gold Seekers of the Fifties," *Argus*.
[82] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat," *Argus*, 18 December 1854.
[83] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat," *Argus*, 18 December 1854.
[84] Peter Lalor, "To the Colonists of Victoria," *Argus*, 10 April 1855, p. 7; John Lynch, *The Story of the Eureka Stockade.* (Melbourne, VIC: The Australian Catholic Truth Society, 1894), pp. 27- 33; Carboni, *The Eureka Stockade*, pp. 86- 87.
[85] Raymond Symthies, *Historical Records of the 40th (2nd Somersetshire) Regiment, Now 1st Battalion of the Prince of Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire Regiment) from It's Formation, in 1717, to 1893* (Devonport, UK: Bremner Printing Works, 1894), p. 328.
[86] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat," *Argus*, 18 December 1854.

out of Government Camp with less than an hour to live, while his comrade Wall had just two hours remaining to him. Roney was dead before the barricade was breached, and while Wall saw the stockade taken, he did not make it back to Government Camp. The pair of them were buried at three o'clock in the afternoon of 3 December 1854. Wise was shot twice while climbing the stockade: once in the thigh, and then through both knees. He was dragged back from the barricade by two of his own men, and was in a critical condition by the time he reached the hospital after the stockade was taken. For two weeks it appeared he would recover, but he died on 22 December 1854 and his funeral brought Ballarat to a halt. Webb was shot through the back and arm as he entered the stockade and went down partially paralysed; his wound was mortal, and he spent his last two days in the rough hospital at Government Camp. Where and when Hall was shot is unknown, but he clung to life until the last day of 1854, leaving Boyle as the last of the Eureka Six. Boyle had been shot through the nose and jaw after he had entered the stockade and finally died on 10 January 1855.

But even in death there was a need among their comrades to ensure their fallen went to their graves as men. Pomp and circumstance were essential parts of military life, and the treasured ceremonies were as much about projecting an aura of masculine power as they were about the soldiers who participated. However, a military funeral also had to take into account to conditions on the ground and the risks involved to the living. The funerals of the Eureka Six illustrate how the army managed when practical and traditional considerations collided, but also provide further evidence of just how important these men were in their community. They were not only mourned by their fellow soldiers, but by the civilian population of Ballarat as well.

3. A Public Calamity

Death and Manhood After Eureka

"The other day I was at the old cemetery of Ballarat, looking at the graves of dead friends of early days, with such thoughts and recollections of a dozen or so of years ago as the occasion might warrant. I had not visited the place for some years, and could not leave without visiting two enclosures. What I saw there I will tell you."

- D.D.W., Letter to the Editor, 1867[1]

In the aftermath of Eureka, the cemetery where D.D.W. went to visit the graves of his deceased friends thirteen years later would be the preferred place of remembrance for old soldiers, stockaders and the community alike.[2] This chapter will explore how memory, both in the immediate aftermath of the stockade and in the years following, was influenced by masculinity, in both civilian and military contexts. The burials of the Eureka Six demonstrate how the military's rigid ideas of manhood followed soldiers to their graves, along with the unbending dictates of the class system that valued the lives of officers over the regular men. Race and youth were less prevalent in the military funeral, although the lack of spiritual support discussed in Chapter Two meant that at least one Catholic soldier among the Eureka

[1] D.D.W, "Those Who Fell at Eureka," *Argus*, Melbourne, VIC, 23 February 1867, p. 1.
[2] Clare Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka.* (Melbourne, VIC: The Text Publishing Company, 2013), pp. 322, 328.

Six was most likely buried in a Protestant service. The army did not go out of its way to deny Catholic soldiers Catholic burials, but as will be discussed below, they prioritised Protestant rites regardless of the class, race or age of the soldier or soldiers in question. The symbolism and rituals present at the funerals of the Eureka Six will be examined to consider how they relate to manhood, and the role of memory in creating honourable and dishonourable men at Eureka will be touched in the final section of this chapter.

The cemetery where much of this remembering occurred is today known as the Old Ballarat Cemetery, and D.D.W would no doubt be appalled to know it still has a rather neglected air in 2024. Many of the old graves, some of them dating back to the 1840s, have cracked, fallen down, or have simply become illegible due to the ravages of the elements. The information centre in the gatehouse is in dire need of an update and lichen grows merrily across the monuments erected by grief-stricken families to loved ones now long forgotten. The Eureka Six are among those whose names are slowly being erased by both time and lichen. Although, compared to some of the other memorials at the cemetery, the final resting place of “the British soldiers…who fell dead or fatally wounded at the Eureka Stockade, in brave devotion to their duty” is quite pleasant.[3] A sprawling tree growing near the entrance to the enclosure provides a sense of privacy and encourages reflection, while a small gravel path leads to an obelisk, which stands like a sentinel in the middle of the space. Two memorials remembering three children who died of disease while living with their parents in Government Camp between 1855 – 1857 stand at the rear of the enclosure and to the right of the obelisk respectively. The graves of the soldiers are on the left of the central monument, slightly shaded by the tree.

While their resting place is relatively well maintained, the soldiers’ gravestones are, like many others, in desperate need of repair. The memorial to the men of the 40th Regiment is cracked and the names are nearly illegible beneath an ever-thickening layer of grime, while the headstone for the men of the 12th is not much better. The concrete plinths of both monuments are beginning to sink and lean towards each other, while the roots of the tree they are resting under are starting to push up underneath their graves. The Union Jack, which used to fly above the memorial, had been absent for more than a year at the time of writing and there has been no word from Ballarat Cemeteries about when, or if, it will ever be replaced. In 1867, D.D.W. was one of many citizens in Ballarat complaining about the appalling state of the cemetery, and especially the “patchy, weedy and neglected” state of the enclosures in memory of the soldiers and diggers.[4] Today, 157 years after D.D.W. and others demanded action be taken to restore the enclosures (and the cemetery itself), they are clearly in need of some more TLC.

[3] “Inscription on the soldiers’ monument at Ballarat Old Cemetery,” Ballarat, VIC, 1879.
[4] D.D.W, "Those Who Fell at Eureka," *Argus*, 23 February 1867.

Fig. 3: "The Soldiers' Enclosure." Photo by the author, September 2023.

Fig. 4: "The Soldiers' Memorial and Graves". Photo by the author, September 2023.

The second enclosure, that of the diggers, is less impressive than that of the soldiers. Near the front of the cemetery, surrounded by a now very rusty iron fence, another obelisk – made of dark granite with a draped urn on top – names twenty stockaders who were killed at Eureka. The names are those which appeared in a letter written by stockade leader Peter Lalor to the *Argus* in April 1855, although Lalor's recall was hardly perfect.[5] The true number of stockaders killed at Eureka would have been closer to thirty than twenty, and included women as well as men.[6] By relying on Lalor's list, the sculptor also failed to include the names of any civilians who were killed that morning. The number of civilians killed at Eureka was far more than ever conceded by either side and, sadly, many of their names will never be known. Like the memorial to the soldiers, the diggers' memorial has clearly seen better days. The "bas-relief representing Victoria weeping" has all but vanished under 170 years of grime, and the enclosure itself is often full of litter.[7] Like the Union Jack at the soldiers' enclosure, the Southern Cross which once flew over the diggers' memorial is absent and the whole space could best be described as *tired*.

Fig. 5: The Digger's Memorial. Photo by the author, May 2024.

[5] Peter Lalor, "To the Colonists of Victoria," *Argus*, Melbourne, VIC, 10 April 1855, p. 7.
[6] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka,* pp. 13-14.
[7] D.D.W, "Those Who Fell at Eureka," *Argus*, 23 February 1867.

This is a great shame, as these memorials are the last remaining physical link to the soldiers and stockaders who fought and died at Eureka. This chapter will examine the funerals of the soldiers buried and remembered in their enclosure. These ceremonies will be used as case studies to demonstrate the connection the soldiers, especially the men of the 40th Regiment, had to the local community. As already discussed previously in this thesis, the men of the 40th had been rotating in and out of Ballarat for two years and they formed relationships among the civilian population during this time.[8] The first soldiers to be buried, Roney and Wall, were both from the 40th Regiment and their funeral took place just hours after the burial of seven stockaders (or civilians, the records are unclear).[9] The stockaders' funeral party was several hundred strong and had to pass Government Camp to reach the cemetery, and there was serious concern that violence would break out.[10] However, the mourners and the inhabitants of Government Camp more or less ignored each other and the sight of coffins on carts rumbling up to the cemetery became an awfully familiar sight over the next few weeks.[11] The Camp itself remained under arms until the arrival of Major General Sir Robert Nickle and eight hundred reinforcements on 5 December 1854, as the authorities had no way of knowing if any of the surviving stockaders were capable of regrouping.

Hours after the stockader/civilian funeral, roughly a hundred men from the 40th Regiment, accompanied by Captain Pasley from the Royal Engineers as their acting commander, marched out in time behind the cart carrying the bodies of their fallen comrades. It was the first of five military funerals that occurred over the next six weeks, and the surviving soldiers were not the only attendees. Pasley wrote that "a large number of persons" from the Ballarat community attended the funeral, and not as passive observers.[12] Pasley recalled that, following the service, the civilian attendees volunteered to stay behind and fill the soldiers' grave.[13] That members of the community attended the funerals of three soldiers who had, mere hours beforehand, been shooting at their men and threatening women and children speaks volumes. The same pattern would be repeated over the next month or so, as those soldiers unlucky enough to die lingering deaths slowly succumbed to their wounds. That the relatively small, grief-stricken community of Ballarat came together not only for the funerals of their own, but for those of the soldiers demonstrates how much they valued these men. More than that, it indicates the soldiers were not just known, but *liked* – they had *friends* among the civilians on the goldfield, and perhaps even a few who loved them, either romantically or platonically. As D.D.W. recalled in 1867, and as was proven by communal outpouring of grief in 1854, the fallen military men "were heartily mourned" by Ballarat and their deaths were considered nothing less than "a public calamity."[14]

---

[8] Raymond Smithies, *Historical Records of the 40th (2nd Somersetshire) Regiment, Now 1st Battalion of the Prince of Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire Regiment) from It's Formation, in 1717, to 1893* (Devonport, UK: Bremner Printing Works, 1894), p. 346.
[9] Peter Sutters, "Eureka's Deadly Results" in Dorothy Wickham, *Deaths at Eureka.* (Ballarat, VIC: D. Wickham, 1996), p. 35.
[10] Sutters "Eureka's Deadly Results," p. 35.
[11] Samuel Huyghue, "The Ballarat Riots, 1854 [manuscript]," ML, A 1789, n.p.
[12] Charles Pasley, "No. 2 Camp Ballarat," *Age*, Melbourne, VIC, 8 January 1855, p. 3.
[13] Pasley, "No. 2 Camp Ballarat," *Age*, 8 January 1855.
[14] D.D.W, "Those Who Fell at Eureka," *Argus*, 23 February 1867.

3.1. Ideals vs. Reality: Military Funerals in the British Empire

The only detailed account in existence of any of the military funerals which took place after Eureka is that of Captain Wise, who was buried on 21 December 1854. Despite this, it is possible to reconstruct what the funerals of the Eureka Six *might* have looked like, by examining how other military funerals were conducted at the time. Comparisons of funerals which took place in war and peace can help further flesh out the likely scenario in 1854, and demonstrate the traditions which may have accompanied the soldiers to their graves. These traditions were not only extremely important to the military establishment, but reinforced their ideas around what kind of men soldiers were. Further information can also be found in the reports which emerged later, following the death of an officer from illness at Ballarat, as well as from letters between interested parties, and official correspondence between the authorities. Before examining these ideas, it is worth touching briefly on the purpose of a military funeral, and how the attitudes around burying military personnel have evolved over time.

Military funerals have always occupied an unusual place in remembrance culture. Soldiers' work is inherently dangerous and has always been so, with the military still being one of the few workplaces where the risk of death and/or serious injury to employees is acceptable. Despite this, the death of a soldier in combat in the twenty-first century is presented as a national tragedy, and their funeral is almost as grand as that of any past or present monarch. TV cameras jostle to get to the most heart wrenching shot of the flag-draped coffin, and politicians make grand speeches about honour, service and sacrifice. Funerals, which "should be reserved for friends, family and brothers-in-arms" are crowded with dignitaries, who shamelessly take up space at services for men and women they have never met, forcing grieving loved ones to the back.[15] In the words of one Australian veteran, we have a "culture of over-blowing the loss of life on the battlefield."[16] It has not always been so, however, and the idea that the loss of soldiers during war is a particularly awful tragedy can be traced back to the calamitous losses in the first world war.[17] During the nineteenth century, when the Eureka Six were buried, military funerals were less a solemn reflection of sacrifice than a form of public entertainment, at least in peacetime.[18] They were highly regimented occasions and the parade-like ceremony was often reported in some detail by the newspapers of the day. The funerals of two soldiers who died in England around the same time as the Eureka Six fell in Australia, gives a sense of just *how* spectacular the ideal military funeral was supposed to be.

In 1853, in Yorkshire, the funeral of Captain Graves attracted tens of thousands of mourners. Just a few years later, in Ipswich in 1858, Sergeant Larter died after a long fight with an unspecified illness, and was accompanied to his grave by thousands. Given the time they died, the details of their funerals suggest the kind of ceremony the military would have wanted to provide for Roney and Wall, and that they would have been planning (within the

---

[15] Chris Masters, *No Front Line: Australia's Special Forces at War in Afghanistan* (Sydney, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2017), p. 636.
[16] Masters, *No Front Line: Australia's Special Forces at War in Afghanistan,* p. 636.
[17] Manfred Hettling and Tino Scholtz, "Bereavement and Mourning," *1914/1918 Online,* https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/bereavement_and_mourning, accessed 3 September 2024.
[18] Scott Myerly, ""The Eye Must Entrap the Mind": Army Spectacle and Paradigm in Nineteenth-Century Britain," *Journal of Social History* (1992): pp. 105-31.

boundaries of operational necessity) for Boyle and Webb, who were both languishing, mortally wounded, up in Government Camp. An important difference is that Graves and Larter died in England, in peacetime, where the Eureka Six died following a short but bloody military engagement in the colonies. Soldiers who died at home, rather than at war, were afforded far more elaborate funerals than their comrades who were killed in action or died of wounds. This was not because soldiers who died in combat were less valuable, but because operational and security requirements restricted the ability to hold a grand, public funeral for the deceased. However, as many aspects as possible of the traditional military funeral would be present, except in times of extreme duress.

Military funerals in the nineteenth century were usually attended by thousands. People would line the streets to watch the procession go by, while those who could afford it rented carriages (or brought their own) and made a long cavalcade behind the regiment. Regardless of the dead man's rank or his personal relationships, all the soldiers in his regiment, including his officers, would be required to escort him to his final resting place. The soldiers would wear their full, ceremonial uniforms, and the regimental band would play a death march as the procession made its way to the cemetery – *Dead March in Saul* was played at both Graves and Larter's funerals, and appears to have been popular at military funerals in the 1850s.[19] Under ideal circumstances, the deceased's coffin would be drawn to their graveside on a gun carriage, but this wasn't always done. Larter was taken to the cemetery by this traditional conveyance, while Graves was carried to his graveside in a civilian hearse.[20] Whether this difference can be explained by the fact that Larter died while still a serving soldier, whereas Graves had retired, is difficult to say with certainty.

Upon arrival at the burial ground, the regiment would form a guard of honour for the coffin and would remain in position until the last of the mourning coaches had entered the cemetery. The regiment would then form up and six of the dead man's comrades would act as pallbearers.[21] The graveside service would be conducted by the regimental chaplain, if one was available, or a local minister. This caused problems for some soldiers, as regimental chaplains were almost always Anglicans until the twentieth century, and most of the regular men (the front-line troops who had a higher risk of death) were Irish Catholics. A soldier was supposed to be buried by a minister of his own faith or denomination, but this did not always happen in practice.[22] The graveside service would be conducted according to the faith of the *minister* presiding, and then the dead man's coffin would be lowered into his grave. Officers, like Graves, were buried with their sword and helmet, which would be placed on the coffin just before it was lowered, and the coffins themselves were often draped.[23] Graves' was shrouded by "a velvet pall," while Sergeant Larter's was covered by the Union Jack.[24]

Traditionally, three volleys would be fired by a specially chosen firing party as the coffin was being lowered, but the size of this party could vary dramatically depending on the rank of the

[19] "Funeral of the Late Capt. Graves," *Yorkshire Herald and the York Herald*, 11 June 1853, p. 6.
[20] "Funeral of the Late Capt. Graves," *Yorkshire Herald and the York Herald*, 11 June 1853; "Military Funeral," *Ipswich Journal*. Suffolk, UK, 30 October 1858, p. 2.
[21] "Funeral of the Late Capt. Graves," *Yorkshire Herald and the York Herald*.
[22] Keith Edghill, "Dangerous Doctrines! The Battle for Anglican Supremacy in the British Army, 1810-1865," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 80, no. 321 (2002), pp. 36-57.
[23] "Funeral of the Late Capt. Graves," *Yorkshire Herald and the York Herald*, 11 June 1853.
[24] "Funeral of the Late Capt. Graves," *Yorkshire Herald and the York Herald*, 11 June 1853.

deceased: Graves' firing party consisted of 100 men, while Larter's was made up of 24.[25] Attendance also varied; the deceased's regiment were obliged to attend, as mentioned above, but civilians were also regular attendees. Between 10,000 – 15,000 people attended Captain Graves' funeral, while 5,000 people were present at Sergeant Larter's.[26] Such numbers would be unheard of except at a state funeral today, but 5,000 appears to have been standard for the time as it is not commented on further by the newspaper. Attendance at Graves' funeral was unusually large, something noted in the reports. A police guard had to be put at the cemetery gates to prevent extra attendees from entering, and it appears that the only people who attended the burial itself were soldiers and militiamen Graves had served with or commanded.[27]

However, much as the army may have desired to provide this kind of service for all its fallen, it was not always possible or practical. While the British Empire had not yet reached its zenith in 1854, it was already the largest empire in the world and looking to grow. While some colonies, mainly those populated by white and/or British settlers, enjoyed a measure of independence, much of the empire was governed by repressive British or British-backed regimes. The preferred security force of such regimes was the British Army, and soldiers were sent all over the world to deal with "unrest" which threatened the Empire's iron grip on colonies such as India, Jamacia and, despite its majority white population, Victoria in 1854. This meant that many soldiers died far from home and their funerals were generally far removed from the glittering shows afforded to Graves and Larter. Most of these deaths were from natural causes – such as tropical diseases that English or Irish soldiers had no resistance to, or from sexually transmitted infections, which killed a great number of nineteenth-century military men (not to mention their sex partners) – but plenty of soldiers also died in colonial conflict. Depending on the severity of the action, the pomp and grandeur of the military funeral was often discarded in the aftermath of these conflicts, as the need to maintain security was paramount.

The letters of John "Golden" Roberts, from the 18th Regiment of Foot, illustrate the stark differences between the regular military funeral (Graves and Larter) and those which were performed in times of extreme duress. Roberts (the three-times great-grandfather of the author), served during the Land Wars in Aotearoa New Zealand between 1861 – 1863. More specifically, he served during what became known as the First Taranaki War and he wrote home to his wife about two military funerals he witnessed there. They offer a glimpse at how nineteenth-century military funerals were conducted when soldiers died overseas during active conflict. In the first instance, during a battle at Puketakauere, 30 British soldiers were killed and 34 were wounded when they attempted to storm a Māori pā (fort).[28] The British were routed in this instance and retreated in disorder, leaving their dead and wounded where they lay.[29] The second incident recorded is of a hasty funeral, which occurred after a group of officers went out under a white flag at an unnamed pā to parley with the Māori chiefs during

[25] "Funeral of the Late Capt. Graves," *Yorkshire Herald and the York Herald*, 11 June 1853.
[26] "Funeral of the Late Capt. Graves," *Yorkshire Herald and the York Herald*, 11 June 1853; "Military Funeral," *Ipswich Journal*, 30 October 1858.
[27] "Funeral of the Late Capt. Graves," *The Yorkshire Herald and the York Herald*, 11 June 1853.
[28] William Byers, "Byers Family History" [manuscript], in author's possession, n.p.; New Zealand History, "Puketakauere," Ministry for Culture and Heritage, https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/taranaki-wars/puketakauere, accessed 18 February 2024.
[29] Byers, "Byers Family History" [manuscript], n.p.

a lull in the fighting. This resulted in a brief ceasefire, during which time both sides were able to collect the dead and wounded. The dead soldiers were buried with "little ceremony" inside the fortified British encampment: the commanding officer conducted the service and a dumb volley was fired over a hastily dug mass grave.[30] Once it had been filled in, fighting resumed.

These instances demonstrate that necessity will always trump occasion, especially in combat. Burying the dead and even caring for the wounded was secondary to protecting the survivors who were able to fight another day. However, leaving the dead unburied or burying them in a hasty ceremony broke several cultural taboos of the time. For example, Roberts was quite convinced that his comrades buried hastily at the pā would not get to heaven, because of the manner in which they'd been buried.[31] As much as the ideal military funeral was supposed to be an awe-inspiring show, it also tapped into many of the cultural ideas the Victorians had about death, mourning and funerary customs.[32] Even during times of necessity, abandoning these customs was troubling for soldiers (and probably their officers too) and would not have been done lightly. But how do these deaths and funerals link to Eureka? They occurred seven years after the stockade, in another British colony, during a very different conflict, but they provide evidence that military funerals were not standard. The situation on the ground had to be taken into account when burying men following conflict, whether at a pā or the Eureka Stockade.

While the conflict was over by the time the first military funeral took place following Eureka, Ballarat was not entirely secure from a military perspective. The stockaders had been driven off, killed or captured, and the stockade destroyed, but it was impossible to assess the survivors' capability to regroup and strike back. With this in mind, Captain John Thomas, 40th Regiment, the commanding officer at Ballarat, had to keep his men ready to repel a potential counter attack; he was also aware that a large group of armed stockaders had left the enclosure in the night and were still unaccounted for.[33] There were also 125 prisoners currently in custody that needed to be guarded, and the population of Ballarat were shocked and traumatised by the morning's events: many civilians had lost homes, what little personal property they had, and some had also lost loved ones.[34] In such circumstances, tensions between the military, the surviving stockaders and the civilian population would have been at an all-time high, and the traditional, glittering funeral parade would have been impractical and potentially dangerous. The need to maintain security, then, had to be balanced with the need to bury the dead respectfully and with the honours they deserved.

---

[30] Byers, "Byers Family History" [manuscript], n.p.

[31] Byers, "Byers Family History" [manuscript], n.p.

[32] Cornelia Pearsell, "Burying the Duke: Victorian Mourning and the Funeral of the Duke of Wellington," *Victorian Literature and Culture* 27, no. 2 (1999): pp. 365-393; Thomas Laqueur, "Bodies, Death, and Pauper Funerals," *Representations*, no. 1 (1983): p. 109-31; James Walvin, "Dust to Dust: Celebrations of Death in Victorian England," *Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques* 9, no. 3 (1982): pp. 353-371.

[33] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat," *Argus*, 18 December 1854, p. 6; Charles Pasley, "Report to Colonial Secretary Foster," *Age*, , 8 January 1855, p. 3.

[34] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat," *Argus*, 18 December 1854; Gregory Blake, *To Pierce the Tyrant's Heart: A Military History of the Battle for the Eureka Stockade: 3 December 1854,* Australian Army History Collection (Loftus, N.S.W: Australian Military History Publications [in association with the Australian Army History Unit], 2009), p. 190.

3.2. Burying the Eureka Six

As mentioned above, the first military funeral following Eureka was the burial of Privates Michael Roney and Joseph Wall, from the 40th Regiment. According to Samuel Huyghue, the clerk at Government Camp, both soldiers were buried with full military honours, but he does not give any further details.[35] The only other report of the funeral comes in a few lines from Pasley, who mentioned the funeral in both his official correspondence and in personal letters to his father, however he gave little detail in either.[36] Despite this, reasonable conclusions can be drawn about various aspects of the funeral, both from the records of Pasley and Huyghue, and other available sources. According to Pasley, by the time the funeral took place "the vigilance of the garrison [had] not been relaxed" due to fears of a counter-attack.[37] Pasley and the other officers had no way of knowing at the time that a successful counter-attack would have been impossible. Those stockaders not wounded or in prison had no way to regroup, the civilian population in Ballarat had no appetite for further bloodshed, and the heavily armed Americans who had left Eureka to waylay any reinforcements had disbanded.[38]

But if the garrison was kept at readiness, this would mean fewer soldiers could have attended the funeral of Roney and Wall. When Graves and Larter were buried in peacetime, their entire regiments marched behind their coffins, but Pasley's report strongly suggests that this did not happen on the afternoon of 3 December. However, there is nothing to suggest that these first three fallen were buried in a hasty ceremony reminiscent of the one Roberts witnessed in Aotearoa New Zealand, entirely devoid of military flair. A large number of civilians "gathered to witness" the funeral, which indicates that there was a level of show and ceremony they were attracted to. It is also likely that some of the attendees had personally known the three deceased, perhaps had even been friends with one or more of them, and had come to say a final farewell. Because the funeral was not widely reported it is impossible to know exactly how many civilians attended, but the number of *soldiers* present can be reasonably assumed.[39]

According to an analysis done by Neil Smith in 2004, there were a total of 546 soldiers from the 12th and 40th Regiments present in Ballarat on 3 December 1854.[40] Of this total, 366 were from the 40th, and 180 were from the 12th. Using this analysis, a rough estimate of how many men might have attended this first funeral can be made. The men of the 12th Regiment can be excluded immediately, as military funerals were only attended by soldiers from the same regiment as the deceased. As for the men of the 40th, it is most likely that only those who had participated in the attack on the stockade would have been present at the funeral. Those who had remained behind to guard Government Camp that morning would have performed this same role again in the afternoon. According to Smith, this leaves 114 men of the 40th who *could* have attended the funeral; with the exception of those in hospital, most of them

---

[35] Huyghue, "The Ballarat Riots" [manuscript], n.p.; Charles Evans, "Diary" [manuscript] SLV, MS BOX 1777/4, n.p.

[36] Pasley, "Report to Colonial Secretery Foster," *Age*, 8 January 1855; Charles Pasley, "Letters of Charles Pasley," [manuscript], SLV, MS BOX 94/4, n.p.

[37] Pasley, "Report to Colonial Secretary Foster," *Age*, 8 January 1855.

[38] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka,* pp. 203, 206- 209.

[39] "Disturbances at Ballarat," *Age* 8 Jan 1855

[40] Neil Smith, *Soldiers Bleed Too: The Redcoats at the Eureka Stockade 1854* (Gardenvale, VIC: Mostly Unsung Military History Research and Publications, 2004), p. 61.

probably did.[41] A party of just over 100 soldiers would be large enough to repel an attempted attack, but not so big that their absence would have left Government Camp dangerously lacking in troops. This party would also be large enough for *some* of the treasured customs of a military funeral to be enacted, although there is very little direct evidence about what these might have been, so some speculation is necessary.

One thing that can be said with certainty is that Roney and Wall were not conveyed to the cemetery by gun carriage, as was the traditional practice. There was no artillery in Ballarat on 3 December, so no gun carriages were available. However, any wheeled vehicle would do in times of duress and carts and wagons were ubiquitous on the goldfields in 1854. Three carts had been requisitioned to bring the dead and wounded back to Government Camp following the fall of the stockade, and one of these vehicles was retained for the funeral.[42] Unlike a gun carriage, a cart could easily carry two bodies, even if they were in coffins, although this is another mystery of the funeral. Were Roney and Wall buried in coffins, or were their bodies simply shrouded and then interred? Huyghue saw the bodies in the cart when they arrived back at Government Camp and described them lying with their arms crossed over their chests, “their showy uniforms a mockery” in death.[43] This indicates they were not in closed coffins or shrouded at the time, but it is inconceivable that they were buried this way.

While soldiers were sometimes buried without a coffin or shroud in wartime, there was an interlude of several hours between when the men died and when they were buried, during which time coffins could have been made. This was the case with the stockaders/civilians buried earlier in the day; despite the suddenness of their deaths, each of these men had his own coffin.[44] Huyghue, who also witnessed this burial, noted that the coffins were “rough” and had been “made hurriedly,” which is evidence that there were craftsmen on the diggings with the skills necessary to quickly put together a large number of coffins.[45] This would suggest that Roney and Wall also each had a coffin, although to date there have been no archaeological excavations of the soldiers’ enclosure at Ballarat Old Cemetery that would confirm this. Traditionally, a soldier’s coffin would be made from English hardwood – both Graves and Larter were buried in oak coffins – but such timber was not readily available in Victoria in 1854.[46] Instead, local timber would have been used; most likely eucalyptus, which was also used to make the stockaders’ coffins.[47]

Another uncertainty is who conducted the funeral service. The 40th *did* have a regimental chaplain, but he is only mentioned in the records from 21 December 1854 onwards. If he was not present on 3 December, then the service would have been conducted by a civilian minister. The denomination of the service is an easier question to answer: it was certainly Protestant, despite Roney being Catholic.[48] The only Catholic priest in Ballarat, Father

[41] Author’s Note: The numbers would have actually been slightly less, as they do not take into account the casualties following Eureka.
[42] Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka,* p. 207.
[43] Huyghue, “The Ballarat Riots” [manuscript], n.p; Evans, “Diary,” [manuscript], n.p; Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka,* p. 207.
[44] Sutters, “Eureka’s Deadly Results,” p. 34.
[45] Sutters, “Eureka’s Deadly Results,” p. 34.
[46] “Funeral of the Late Capt. Graves," *Yorkshire Herald and the York Herald*; “Military Funeral,” *Ipswich Journal*.
[47] Sutters, “Eureka’s Deadly Results,” p. 34.
[48] NLI, *Irish Catholic Parish Registers*, Microfilm Number: Microfilm 05497/06, Dublin, Ireland: 22 Sep 1833.

Patrick Smyth, was officiating at another funeral at the time Roney and Wall were buried, and it is unknown if the army even so much as approached him about burying their men.[49] He knew quite a few of the soldiers in Ballarat, as many of them worshipped at his church, and he was furious in the aftermath of the stockade that he was prevented from giving Last Rites to the dying.[50] However, excluding him from the service may not have been a deliberate snub by the army. There was no way to store bodies for extended periods in 1854, so the men would need to be buried before decomposition set in. Waiting for Father Smyth to be available may not have been possible. Given Wall was English, and presumably Protestant, the army was not breaking any of its own rules either. In the event of a mass burial of soldiers of mixed denominations, the army stipulated that Protestant funeral rites were to be privileged over Catholic ones.[51]

The next piece to consider in reconstructing the funeral is the procession itself. Assuming it was around 100 men strong, the group would have had to keep to the roads. It would have been impossible for a procession of that size, accompanied by any number of civilians, and two bodies in a cart, to make reasonable progress through the diggings. Huyghue recalled seeing the bodies of Roney and Wall at or near the hospital shortly after the stockade, and the only hospital in Ballarat at the time was on the corner of Sturt and Lydiard Streets, at the site of the modern Post Office Gallery.[52] The hospital was not in the military enclave of Government Camp, but nearer the police section, but it is reasonable to assume that the funeral party formed up there. The most logical route to the cemetery from there is to continue up Lydiard Street North (towards what is now Ballarat Station), turn left into Mair Street, and then right onto the Midland Highway/Creswick Road, which at the time was called the Geelong-Ballarat Road. Lydiard and Mair Streets had been laid out by 1854, although they were little more than wide, dirt tracks, and the Geelong-Ballarat Road was not much better, despite being one of the main arterial roads in the district.[53] The soldiers would have marched behind the cart with arms reversed; there are no records which specify this, but marching with reversed arms was standard at a miliary funeral.

In a traditional funeral parade, the soldiers in attendance would wear ceremonial uniforms, but it is unclear whether this happened in Ballarat. Private Patrick Lynott, when giving evidence at the high treason trial of John Joseph in 1855, described in detail the "easy" uniform he and his fellow soldiers wore during the battle itself, but there is no word on whether these were the only uniforms they had at Ballarat.[54] Given the 40th Regiment had been in Victoria for two years, and had arrived expecting a long deployment, it is likely they had both their combat and formal uniforms with them. Both uniforms are described thus by Gregory Blake:

> *"In 1854 infantry soldiers were issued with a uniform which consisted of a long-tailed red woollen coat, dark blue trousers, black leather shoes and a stiff black leather shako* [a type of headwear]. *Sometimes…the long-tailed coat was*

[49] Dorothy Wickham, *Deaths at Eureka*, (Ballarat, VIC: D. Wickham, 1996), pp. 29- 30.
[50] Patrick Smyth, "Letters of William Henry Archer [correspondence]," NLA, MS BOX 264/19.
[51] Edghill, "Dangerous Doctrines!"
[52] Peter Butters, "From Humble Beginnings," *Ballarat Courier*, accessed online 5 November 2012, n.p.
[53] Jolyon Attwooll, "The Latest Chapter in Creswick Road, the Gateway to Ballarat," *Ballarat Courier*, accessed online 9 March 2020, n.p.
[54] Queen v. Joseph, 1855, n.p..

replaced by a shorter red shell jacket and the uncomfortable shako swapped for a much more comfortable fatigue cap. This happened at Eureka…Prior to 1854 the normal leather equipment of a soldier consisted of two white leather belts worn from each shoulder across the chest. One carried a…cartridge box, and a bayonet…hung from the other. In 1854 waist-belts, to which were fitted a bayonet frog [a cloth or leather scabbard] *and a small pouch for percussion caps were introduced. Waist belts may have arrived in Australia in time for Eureka, and if so would have been worn, as they were more practical and comfortable than the traditional cross-belts."*[55]

The long-tailed coat with cross-belts was the more formal uniform. It would have been worn by the soldiers attending the funeral if they had it with them, although it would have been deeply uncomfortable in the Australian summer. In an ideal military funeral, the deceased would be dressed in their ceremonial uniform prior to burial, but this is unlikely to have happened at Ballarat. While there would have been time to dress the three men, there was no undertaker working in the area, and the mechanics of decomposition would have worked against dressing the bodies. When Huyghue saw the three men after the battle, he noted that their uniforms were bloody, indicating they were wearing the clothes they died in, and that their arms had been crossed over their chests in preparation for burial. Roney and Wall were killed at around four o'clock in the morning, but were not buried until about three o'clock that afternoon.[56] By that stage, rigor mortis would have set in, and it would have been impossible to dress the men without breaking their arms.[57] Therefore it is much more likely they were buried in their combat uniforms.

The last piece in this historical puzzle is the preparation of the grave itself. The three men were buried in what is today known as the *Old* Ballarat Cemetery, but in 1854 it was little more than a piece of flat, open ground on the very edge of town.[58] It was unfenced and had not been officially gazetted, although a self-appointed sexton had been conducting burials there for a fee since at least 1848.[59] The names of five of the Eureka Six appear in his book, indicating that he received payment from the army for their burial; Hall is not mentioned in this record, although why is unclear.[60] While it was the sexton's job to prepare the grave, the actual work of digging may have been done by others; the mass gave for the unclaimed stockaders and civilians killed at Eureka was prepared by two government contractors, and the army may have come to a similar arrangement.[61] The pit itself would have been anywhere from six to twelve feet (1.8 – 3.6m) deep, and all 100-or so soldiers and the civilians accompanying the procession could have comfortably gathered around it.[62] When the ceremony was over, three volleys would have been fired as the coffins were lowered. Again,

[55] Blake, *To Pierce the Tyrant's Heart,* p. 70.
[56] Huyghue, "The Ballarat Riots" [manuscript], n.p; Evans, "Diary" [manuscript], n.p.
[57] Rohini Radhakrishnan, *What are the stages of Rigor Mortis?* https://www.medicinenet.com/what_are_the_stages_of_rigor_mortis/article.htm, accessed 26 February 2024.
[58] Goldfields Guide, "Ballarat Old Cemetery." https://www.goldfieldsguide.com.au/explore-location/613/ballaarat-old-cemetery/, accessed 17 January 2024.
[59] Goldfields Guide, "Ballarat Old Cemetery."
[60] Dorothy Wickham, "Photograph of James Ethersay's Book, Entries 422 – 465," https://www.eurekapedia.org/images/b/be/DCP_2784.JPG, https://www.eurekapedia.org/images/8/85/DCP_2785.JPG, accessed 21 January 2024.
[61] Sutters, "Eureka's Deadly Results," p. 35.
[62] Goldfields Guide, "Ballarat Old Cemetery."

the records are silent on whether this occurred, but it was standard practice and there was no reason to omit it or fire a ‘dumb volley’ at Ballarat.

In the aftermath of a funeral, it would be the duty of the sexton to fill the grave, but this task was instead performed by civilian volunteers. Pasley was approached by them as the military was preparing to depart and gratefully accepted their offer.[63] There is no record of who these people were or why they offered their labour for free, but it is likely for the same reasons that some of them attended the funeral. Among the gathered mourners would have been people who knew the deceased: people who worshiped with them, drank with them, gambled with them, saw them in the stores and around the goldfields, and perhaps they even attended social gatherings with them. Some of these people would have had no more than a passing acquaintance with the two soldiers, while others would have been friends, and there may have even been romantic or sexual partners among the mourners. Whatever the type of relationship, losing a person in circumstances as violent as Eureka was traumatic, and those civilians who filled the grave may have been taking the opportunity to say a final goodbye to their friends.

* * *

After this first funeral, there were four more military burials following the Eureka Stockade. The next occurred two days later, on 5 December 1854, and was for William Webb, 12th Regiment. Webb, the youngest of the Eureka Six, had poignantly only been in Victoria a month before he died. As mentioned in Chapter One, very little is known about Webb and even his funeral is shrouded in mystery: it is not mentioned in the newspapers or government reports, nor described in any diaries bar one. It would have differed in several important ways to that of Roney and Wall, although some of the details were similar or almost identical. The first and most obvious difference is that Webb was buried alone, rather than with a group, and was the first of his regiment to die following Eureka. He was also the first to be conveyed to his final resting place on a gun carriage, as he was buried *after* the reinforcements from Melbourne had arrived.[64] Eight hundred infantry and cavalry, led by Major General Sir Robert Nickle, Commander-in-Chief of the British Colonial Forces, arrived in Ballarat around three o’clock in the afternoon on 5 December, and their baggage train included four artillery pieces; the carriage from one was used for Webb’s funeral. Jack Byers recalled walking behind a gun carriage carrying “poor Billy’s coffin” to the cemetery that afternoon.[65]

Given the reinforcements from Melbourne had arrived, Webb’s funeral parade would not have needed to be scaled back to keep the garrison at readiness. All 180 men from the 12th Regiment already in Ballarat, including his officers, would have attended, as well as any men from that regiment who had arrived with Nickle in the afternoon. There is no record of whether there was a regimental chaplain attached to the 12th, but if there was, he would have conducted Webb’s funeral. If the 12th did not have a chaplain, then the chaplain from the 40th Regiment may have stepped in (if he was present), otherwise the service would have been performed by a civilian minister. As with Roney and Wall, there is no record of which option was taken by the army. There would have been no religious controversy either, as Webb, an Englishman, was likely to have been a Protestant. The same rituals that were carried out on

[63] Pasley, "Report to Colonial Secretary Foster," *Age,* 8 January 1855
[64] Byers, “Byers Family History” [manuscript], n.p.
[65] Byers, “Byers Family History” [manuscript], n.p.

the afternoon of the 3rd would have been done for Webb – the guard of honour, his comrades marching with arms reversed, and the three volleys over his grave – and his name also appears in the sexton's book at Old Ballarat Cemetery.[66] He was *not* buried in the same grave as the men from the 40th, but in a separate grave next to them, which would have been paid for by the 12th Regiment, just as the 40th had paid for the grave of their men.

As for civilian attendance at his funeral, there almost certainly would have been people who were attracted to the military spectacle and show, although there may not have been as many civilian mourners as for the first two men. Roney and Wall had been part of the 40th Regiment, and both of them had rotated in and out of Ballarat since arriving in Victoria in 1852. These frequent rotations would have given them time to form relationships with the community, which was later reflected at their funerals. Webb had only arrived in Ballarat a week before Eureka, and his single interaction with the Ballarat community had been negative. He had been with his regiment when they arrived on the goldfields on 28 November 1854 and were attacked by the diggers.[67] Once he and the rest of the 12th arrived at Government Camp, they did not leave it again until they stormed the stockade. He would have had no community relationships, and no one outside his regiment would have known him well.

This may account for why his funeral was not reported locally. Nobody in Ballarat knew him, and his funeral would have been a curiosity *at best*. Because Ballarat was secure at the time Webb was buried, with the garrison numbering around fifteen hundred men and in possession of artillery, the army afforded Webb more pomp and ceremony than they had been able to give his comrades, but it was a show, rather than an opportunity for anyone outside the regiment to mourn.[68] As argued by Scott Myerley in his article *The Eye Must Entrap The Mind*, it was the *spectacle* of the military funeral which was important, not who was being remembered.[69] The British Army wanted to *show* how powerful it was, and part of this show involved using its fallen to display its masculine credentials: the gun carriage, the reversed arms, the regiment in formation and the volley over the grave were all symbols of not only the army itself, but the men who made it up. The funeral was the quintessential show of masculine strength and power, even if it was for a man who was almost unknown outside his regiment.

A final difference between the funeral of Webb and that of Roney and Wall is that it is likely Webb was dressed in his formal uniform when he went to the grave. Webb was shot through the back and arm at the stockade, so his jacket, shirt and collar would have been removed, perhaps even cut off him, when he was in hospital so he could be treated. What he was given (if anything) to either warm him or numb his pain while he was dying is impossible to know, but he would have been dressed sometime between dying and being placed in his coffin. Given he did not have to be buried as hastily as Roney and Wall, and because his combat uniform had most likely been destroyed in the course of his treatment, he would have been dressed ceremonially for his funeral.

---

[66] Wickham, "Photograph of James Ethersay's Book, Entries 422- 465."
[67] Evans, "Diary [manuscript], n.p.
[68] Huyghue, "The Ballarat Riots" [manuscript], n.p.
[69] Myerly, ""The Eye Must Entrap the Mind."

After Webb was buried, it was expected that the next man to die would be Felix Boyle, 12th Regiment, who had been shot in the face at the stockade. Boyle was now the only mortally wounded man left in the hospital, and it seemed that those men who had been 'dangerously wounded', including Henry Wise, who had been shot through both legs, were recovering.[70] Then, very abruptly on or around 19 December 1854, Wise took a turn for the worse and two days later he was dead.[71] The exact cause is not recorded, but it is likely he contracted an infection. He was the fourth soldier to die as a result of Eureka and the only officer. His social station was such that, unlike the previous two funerals, there are multiple, detailed accounts of how Wise was buried, who attended and what the procession looked like. Some reports are so specific, they even include what the officers who attended to mourn were wearing![72] This attention to detail provides clear evidence of the class hierarchy at work in the colony, but also of the high regard Captain Wise was held in among the Ballarat community. Wise was "universally esteemed" and would have been a familiar face to many of the residents, given he had been there the longest of any of the soldiers.[73]

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that his funeral was so incredibly well attended: "nearly all the military force [in Ballarat], the Camp authorities, a number of police, and a numerous party of residents" were present. Another newspaper put the count of military and police attendees at four hundred and two hundred respectively and made much of Wise's fellow officers "wearing crepe."[74] Crepe clothing, when dyed black, was traditionally worn when in mourning during the nineteenth century, although it would have been unusual for men to wear a full suit of crepe.[75] While the newspaper does not say so, it is likely that the officers were in reality only wearing black crepe armbands, along with their ceremonial uniforms. The combination of the black armband on a red jacket with gold lace and buttons would have been very striking, which may explain why it was mentioned in the newspaper articles. The large size of the procession, which may have been up to one thousand strong, including civilians, drew the attention of the media in a way that the previous, smaller procession had not. Wise was buried in the same grave as Roney and Wall and his funeral was conducted by the 40th's regimental chaplain.[76]

There were other differences too, the biggest being the state of Ballarat at the time Wise was buried. The situation on the ground had been tense and uneasy when Roney, Wall and Webb were buried, and their funerals had needed to account for that. By the time Wise was buried, three weeks after the stockade, Ballarat was almost back to a peacetime footing, although here were still around fifteen hundred soldiers present in the district.[77] This meant that Wise's funeral probably had many of the elements seen in the funeral of Captain Graves in England in 1853, and would have been closer to the ideal than those which had already occurred. According to a report in the *Argus*, Wise had given instructions in his final days on how he wished his funeral to be carried out and requested that Governor Sir Charles Hotham be

---

[70] "Ballaarat," *Argus*, 26 December 1854, p. 5.
[71] "Ballaarat," *Argus*, 26 December 1854.
[72] "Ballarat," *Age*, 27 December 1854, p. 4.
[73] "Ballaarat," *Argus*, 26 December 1854
[74] "Ballarat," *Age,* 27 December 1854
[75] Sonia Bedikian, "The Death of Mourning: From Victorian Crepe to the Little Black Dress," *OMEGA-Journal of Death and Dying* 57, no. 1 (2008): pp. 35-52.
[76] "Ballaarat," *Argus*, 26 December 1854.
[77] "Ballarat," *Age*, 27 December 1854.

consulted as to his final resting place.[78] Socially, Wise's funeral had much more of a reported effect on Ballarat itself than those of any of his fellows: all flags were ordered to fly at half-mast, shops were closed (either out of respect or so their proprietors could attend the funeral) and even the committee of inquiry, which was examining unrest on the goldfields and the causes of the Eureka Stockade, did not sit that day, and the commissioners attended the funeral.[79]

Significantly, the tone of the newspapers changed around the time Wise was buried. Where earlier reports in newspapers such as the *Argus* and the *Geelong Advertiser* had used highly emotive words such as "massacre" or "barbaric" to describe the military action at the stockade, the language softened significantly when Wise was put in the ground. The military were no longer "inhuman" or "monstrous" but instead "devoted to their duty" and the stockaders went from being "martyred heroes" to "misguided men."[80] A humanisation of all participants occurred, and for a brief moment all the combatants were men in the public mind: no monsters, no rebels, no sadists or dangerous foreigners. Wise's death shocked not only Ballarat, but much of the wider Victorian community as well. Suddenly, it was not just nameless privates and stockaders being buried in mass graves, mourned only by their friends, but a young, well-known, well-liked officer, with strong ties to the community. Wise's death also came at a time when Ballarat was beginning to count the cost of passionate rhetoric, compared to more peaceful means of agitating for change. As the *Argus* put it, Wise's death provoked "the bitterest regret that life should have been so sacrificed, and the colony and the world should have been in so sad a manner deprived of [a man] in the pride and promise of [his] youth."[81] At twenty-six, Wise was actually one of the oldest of the Eureka Six, and was not the last man (soldier or civilian) to be buried as a result of Eureka.

There were two more funerals after Wise's, both for men from the 12th Regiment: John Hall, thirty, died on 31 December 1854; and Felix Boyle, thirty-two, finally expired from his mortal wound on 10 January 1855.[82] There are absolutely no details in any of the newspapers about their funerals, and the only mention of their deaths comes from the sexton's book, the muster rolls and, in the case of Boyle, his death certificate. Both men were buried on the days they died respectively and were interred in the same grave as William Webb. Their funerals were individual burials and would have followed the patterns observed in the previous funerals for the regular men. Boyle's coffin had probably already been prepared for him, given he had been dying for over a month, and Hall's was probably made shortly before or after his death, depending on how soon his wounds turned mortal. Whether the remains were conveyed by gun carriage or taken on carts to the cemetery is harder to be certain about. Sir Robert Nickle and a large portion of the reinforcements had returned to Melbourne before Hall and Boyle died, and there is no record of the artillery he had brought up with him being left in Ballarat, but nor is there any proof they returned to Melbourne either. Either scenario is as likely as the other; if a gun carriage was available, it would have been used, if not, a cart would have done just as well.

[78] "Ballaarat," *Argus*, 26 December 1854.
[79] "Ballaarat," *Argus*, 26 December 1854.
[80] "Ballaarat," *Argus*, 26 December 1854; "Disturbances at Ballarat," *Age,* 8 January 1855.
[81] "Ballaarat," *Argus*, 26 December 1854
[82] Smith, *Soldiers Bleed Too,* p. 36; BDM, Death Certificate of Felix Boyle. No. 3264, 1855.

There was at least one more military funeral after the final volley had been fired over Boyle's grave, although the soldier in question was not killed at Eureka. Captain George Littlehales, 12th Regiment, died on 12 February 1855, and was buried in the same grave as Boyle, Hall and Webb.[83] Littlehales died of dysentery and colonial fever and is mentioned here because his name appears on the 12th's regimental gravestone.[84] Because he did not die as a result of the Eureka Stockade (it is unknown if he was even present, the records are unclear) he is not included in this study. It is also worth noting that more soldiers may have died at Eureka than were recorded. While conspiracies of this nature have flourished over the years, if the military death toll was higher, the mistakes were likely to have been from sloppy record keeping, rather than an active cover-up. Not all of the wounded soldiers could be treated in Government Camp's rudimentary hospital; several were taken by cart to Geelong and others were moved to the nearby hospital of Red Hill.[85] Had any of them died there, they would have been buried locally and may have been missed in the confusion following the stockade. There also would have been men, like John Egan, who suffered wounds at or around Eureka that later contributed to their deaths. This study has deliberately focused on the six soldiers *confirmed* to have been killed at or as a result of the Eureka Stockade, as to attempt to definitively prove which men did or did not die there is beyond the scope of this thesis.

3.3. Time Heals All Wounds?

By the time Felix Boyle was buried, things had settled down in Ballarat. Much of the community focus had shifted to the impending trials of the thirteen men charged with high treason in the aftermath of the stockade. After juries refused to convict, the government bowed to public opinion and a general amnesty was announced, allowing those stockaders who had escaped capture, including Peter Lalor, to come out of hiding. In the years that followed, many of most violent and active of the stockaders distanced themselves from the movement, which came to be seen as an embarrassment.[86] As Ballarat grew from a muddy patchwork of mineshafts into a thriving, bustling regional city, interest in formal remembrance of the stockade waned. By 1858, Ballarat saw itself as a jewel in the mighty imperial crown, and wanted to be associated with wealth and progress, not a burst of violence which had had more than a whiff of rebellion about it. That year, less than ten people attended the memorial in what is now the grounds of the Eureka Centre to remember the fallen, and those participants still in the area had, for the most part, moved on with their lives.[87] Soldiers from the 40th Regiment remained stationed in Ballarat and across all the Victorian goldfields until the regiment departed Victoria for good in 1870.[88] That year, all British regiments across the colonies returned home, or were sent elsewhere in the Empire, and each colony established its own military; these would be amalgamated following Federation in 1901 to become the Australian Commonwealth Force, the earliest ancestor of the modern Australian Defence Force.

---

83 "Ballarat," *Argus*, 19 February 1855, p. 6.
84 "Ballarat," *Argus*, 19 February 1855.
85 Blake, *To Pierce the Tyrant's Heart*, pp. 197- 198.
86 Anne Beggs-Sunter, "Remembering Eureka," *Journal of Australian Studies* 25, no. 70 (2001), p. 49-56.
87 Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka,* pp. 327328.
88 Raymond Symthies, *Historical Records of the 40th (2nd Somersetshire) Regiment, Now 1st Battalion of the Prince of Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire Regiment) from It's Formation, in 1717, to 1893* (Devonport, UK: Bremner Printing Works, 1894), p. 412.

The Eureka Six remained in their graves. The 12th was never redeployed to Ballarat after Eureka, and there was sporadic effort by the 40th to maintain both regimental graves, but tending to the dead was never a priority. The soldiers stationed in Ballarat post-1854 were rotated between goldfields postings, the barracks in Spencer Street, and St. Kilda Road, and other duties such as guarding public buildings and providing labour for construction projects.[89] There was a detachment of the 40th in Ballarat until 1870, but not all of the men who rotated through the area had been at Eureka or been close to the fallen, so interest in tending their graves depended strongly on who was present. Even when Eureka veterans did find themselves back in their old stomping ground, their lives were so tightly controlled that they could not simply walk down to the cemetery and pay their respects to their fallen friends whenever they felt like it. For several years after the 40th Regiment left forever in 1870, John Neill, a former corporal who had settled in Creswick, was given the position of honorary caretaker of the Soldiers' Enclosure; when he died in 1895, care of the area fell to the Ballarat Cemeteries Trust.[90] The upkeep of the enclosure, and the rest of the cemetery, has remained their responsibility ever since.

For the survivors of Eureka, the cemetery was the preferred place of remembrance. Even as public interest waned, it was not uncommon to see old diggers – as they were referred to, whether they had been diggers or not – heading to the cemetery on 3 December every year to pay their respects to their fallen mates.[91] However, as those who had been at the stockade began dying, and other groups began to co-opt the imagery and story surrounding the violence, the survivors began to be "exhibited almost as historic relics" and the events of 1854 became secondary to the stories which had grown up around them.[92] The memories of the soldiers constantly took a back seat to those of the stockaders. Surviving members of the 12th and 40th Regiments who had settled in Ballarat were never actively excluded from the commemorative ceremonies, but their experience at Eureka was described as no more than an expression of their 'devotion to duty.'[93] That they had put their lives on the line to protect their community from what had evolved into an extremely violent movement was never acknowledged. Their role continued to shrink as the decades wore on, and they began to be cast as villains, as if the Eureka Stockade had been as simple as a superhero comic. During a re-enactment to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the battle on 3 December 1954, cadets from the Royal Australian Air Force radio school who were playing the soldiers were jeered at and booed by the watching crowd as they stormed a replica stockade with smoke bombs and wooden bayonets.[94] It was not all doom and gloom for the soldiers' memories that year, however. The Suffolk and South Lancashire Regiments in England, formally the 12th and the 40th, sent cablegrams remembering the dead and £5 to purchase wreaths to lay at the memorial.[95]

This may all seem very far removed from the theme of masculinity, but memory plays an important part in deciding who was an honourable man in history. As discussed in Chapter One, victory was an important measure of manhood when matters escalated to a physical

---

[89] Symthies, *Historical Records of the 40th (2nd Somersetshire) Regiment*, p. 469.
[90] John Neill, "The Soldiers' Graves," *The Ballarat Courier*, 29 August 1872, p. 4.
[91] Beggs-Sunter, "Remembering Eureka."
[92] Beggs-Sunter, "Remembering Eureka."
[93] "The Eureka Stockade," *Leader*, Melbourne, VIC, 10 December 1954, p. 20.
[94] "Troopers Hissed by Crowd in Battle Tableau," *Argus*, 6 December 1954, p. 9.
[95] "British Recall Eureka," *Argus*, Melbourne, VIC, 3 December 1954, p. 7.

conflict. While the military won the initial victory and achieved their aims by dismantling the stockade and neutralising the stockaders, the final victory was certainly had by the stockaders themselves. Within a year, the things their movement had initially been founded on – manhood suffrage, the ability to buy land, a restructuring of administration on the goldfields, and the abolition of the license fee – came to pass. They were permitted to participate in civil processes, own land and support their families in ways which did not rely solely on a lucky strike. These were important markers of socially acceptable, civilian masculinity, and as the former stockaders were also those who controlled how Eureka was remembered, especially in the years immediately following the stockade.[96] The respectable notions of masculinity the former diggers and stockaders adopted as they moved on with their lives was better understood by the majority of Victorians than the much rougher ideas that continued to form the basis of military manhood for many years to come.[97] It would be wrong to say that masculinity formed an obvious part of how Eureka was remembered, but gender was a powerful undercurrent in Victorian society.[98] As the memories of the stockade, and the events which followed and preceded it, were remoulded, re-examined and recycled by each successive generation, it was much easier to cast the stockaders as honourable men because they embodied values better understood by the general population.[99]

On 3 December 1854, two diametrically opposed masculinities collided: the ideological manhood of the stockaders and the physical ability of the soldiers. The stockaders left records of their ideas, their hopes and their ambitions, so they became relatable as time moved further and further away from them. The soldiers won the fight, but left behind fewer records so their story was not as readily available. It had to be searched for, uncovered, and teased out, while the words of the stockaders boomed out from books, pamphlets and speeches, which were later adapted into movies, television shows, novels and podcasts. As was demonstrated at the stockade, however, ideology does not win fights, and a physical opponent may not be an ideological opponent. The rank-and-file at Eureka had much more in common with the stockaders than they did with the Establishment, but their job was to protect the community. They succeeded in keeping Ballarat safe and they deserve credit for it. The Eureka Six and their comrades were not mindless government drones, they were *men*, but unlike the stockaders they did not feel the need to prove it. For them it was a fact: their uniforms, their profession and their ability demonstrated their manhood, and the funerals the army conducted for them cemented their status. But as time moved on, and the colony of Victoria crafted its own identity, victory and physicality were no longer enough on their own to demonstrate manhood, and the soldiers of Eureka were relegated to the background of an event in which they had played a starring role.

---

[96] Beggs-Sunter, "Remembering Eureka."
[97] Michèle Cohen, "“Manners” Make the Man: Politeness, Chivalry, and the Construction of Masculinity, 1750–1830." *Journal of British Studies* 44, no. 2 (2005), pp. 312-29; Leonor Davidoff, "Class and Gender in Victorian England: The Diaries of Arthur J. Munby and Hannah Cullwick." *Feminist Studies* 5, no. 1 (1979), pp. 87-141.
[98] John Tosh, "What Should Historians Do with Masculinity? Reflections on Nineteenth-Century Britain." *History Workshop*, no. 38 (1994), pp. 179-202.
[99] Clare Wright, "Forgetting to Remember: Time to Be Brave." *Griffith REVIEW*, no. 48 (2015), pp. 149-57.

Conclusion

The Wrong Men?

Masculinity may not have been at the forefront of the minds of the men, both within and outside the stockade, who assembled there on 3 December 1854. However, none of them could escape the gendered world they were a part of. If they were fish, gender was the water they swum through, a way to understand the world and their place in it. While this study has used masculinity as the lens through which to examine the events of Eureka, and especially to consider the role played by the military by using the Eureka Six as a case study, it does not claim gender was the only factor that led to the violence at the stockade. It was one of many complex social and political ideas and circumstances that came together on the goldfields with disastrous results. As an institution, the British Army could not back down from a challenge posed by a restless community, as the only frame of reference they had was that such communities were rebellious and a threat to the Empire they had sworn to protect. The politically minded stockaders saw the heavy-handed and often corrupt application of law and order as a threat to their treasured status as free subjects of the British Empire, and when they perceived that constitutional means had failed, they chose to rise up in violence.

Among the many factors they used to justify their stand was the perceived insult to their manhood. Prominent stockaders Lalor and Carboni made direct reference to being emasculated or needing to stand up as men in their later writings, despite their own decidedly unmasculine behaviour at the stockade.[1] The military did not refer directly to masculinity in their reports after the event, or when reflecting on their perception of the violence they had participated in, but soldiering itself was an expression of manhood. It was very different kind of manhood than that understood by the stockaders, but one which the men in uniform needed to protect. It would have been highly embarrassing if the military had been forced to retreat at the stockade, and would have called into question their prowess as truly masculine men. While gender is, and always has been, a social construction, it is part of the human condition and a powerful behavioural motivator.[2] This was even more prevalent in the nineteenth century, when behaviour that was not seen as aligned with a person's gender was viewed with suspicion, and could have serious consequences.[3] Yet, for all its rigidity, what constituted masculine and feminine behaviour was also affected by a range of social factors, and differed from one group to another. Manly behaviour that was lauded by civilians was not always seen as truly masculine by soldiers and vice versa.

One aspect of masculinity that both the soldiers and stockaders agreed on was that a man needed to be able to fight for his principals, and a man who refused was a coward. How this fight occurred was the primary break between civilian and military masculinities, and it was demonstrated poignantly at Eureka. The stockaders wanted a glorious stand, where the soldiers wanted a tactical victory. For all their passionate rhetoric, few of the stockaders were

---

[1] Peter Lalor, "To the Colonists of Victoria," *Argus*, Melbourne, VIC, 10 April 1855, p.7; Raffaello Carboni. *The Eureka Stockade: The Consequence of Some Pirates Wanting on Quarter-Deck a Rebellion.* (Melbourne, VIC: J.P. Atkinson, 1855), pp. 48, 50, 102.

[2] Terry Kupers, "Toxic Masculinity as a Barrier to Mental Health Treatment in Prison," *Journal of Clinical Psychology* 61, no. 6 (2005), pp. 713-24.

[3] Michèle Cohen, "“Manners” Make the Man: Politeness, Chivalry, and the Construction of Masculinity, 1750–1830," *Journal of British Studies* 44, no. 2 (2005), pp. 312-329.

prepared to die for their cause when presented with the muskets and bayonets of the military. While the soldiers remained *outside* the stockade, the stockaders maintained the illusion that they could hold their ground. Once the barricade was breached, and Eureka turned into a bloody, hand-to-hand melee, it is hardly a surprise that a large number of them broke and ran. While the masculine rhetoric of their day would dismiss this as cowardice – and, indeed, some of the stockaders who later wrote memoirs did just that – it was something far more primitive than an abandonment of gendered ideas that drove their flight. They wanted to survive, which is human nature; they were not trained to fight as a coordinated force, nor to hold their ground in the face of an attack.

However, they were creating a new masculinity, one which was not as tied to the old-world structures as that of the military. The diggers and stockaders were building a manhood that celebrated the ability to undertake hard, physical work, applauded the conviction required to stand with one's mates, encouraged independence and venerated personal success.[4] The military too valued standing with their comrades and formed tight bonds with the men they fought beside, and soldiers were no strangers to hard work, but their manhood was rougher. It was tied to their employment, their smart scarlet jackets identified them as men, and they proved it among their fellows with crude humour, sexual conquest (including perpetrating sexual assault) and their willingness to use violence.[5] This final point was a requirement of their jobs, but it spilled over into their personal lives too and they were perceived by the public as being especially prone to brawls and fist fights.[6] But even within the military ranks there were differences in how men should behave, as demonstrated by the Eureka Six. Class, race and age all influenced how masculine a man was seen to be by those above and below him in the military hierarchy.

Captain Wise and his fellows were not violently physical men, as such behaviour was unbecoming for gentlemen officers. It was their job to control the unrestrained violence expected of the regular men once the hand-to-hand fighting started.[7] The Irishmen within the British Army's ranks were thought to be simultaneously martial and well suited to soldiering, while also being naturally savage. They were legally British, yet othered within the Empire, and soldiering offered a community outside the agrarian life many of them had come from.[8] In the army, their Irishness did not make them criminal or dangerous, but powerful… admittedly, only as long as there was a suitably English or Anglo-Irish officer looking over their shoulder to control them. Boys who joined the army young, such as Michael Roney, were steeped in military culture from early childhood. However, even the army understood that a boy needed to be nurtured into a man, and drummers were taken under the wings of

[4] Geoffrey Serle, *The Golden Age: A History of the Colony of Victoria, 1851-1861,* (3rd ed. Carlton, Vic: Melbourne University Press, 1977), p. 407.
[5] Douglas Peers, "Privates Off Parade: Regimenting Sexuality in the Nineteenth-Century Indian Empire." *The International History Review* 20, no. 4 (1998), p. 823-854.
[6] Scott Myerly, ""The Eye Must Entrap the Mind": Army Spectacle and Paradigm in Nineteenth-Century Britain." *Journal of Social History* (1992), 105-131.
[7] Gregory Blake, *To Pierce the Tyrant's Heart: A Military History of the Battle for the Eureka Stockade: 3 December 1854.* Australian Army History Collection. Loftus, N.S.W: Australian Military History Publications [in association with the Australian Army History Unit], 2009, pp. 61-63.
[8] Dennis Grube, *At the Margins of Victorian Britian: Politics, Immorality and Britishness in the Nineteenth Century.* London, England: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013, pp. 9-10; Terence Denman, "'The Red Livery of Shame': The Campaign against Army Recruitment in Ireland, 1899-1914." *Irish Historical Studies* 29, no. 114 (1994), pp. 208-233.

their colleagues. Ad demonstrated by the reaction of the 12th Regiment to the dangerous wounding of John Egan, these relationships could be protective and veer into the paternal, even as a boy approached manhood. Aged fifteen when he was shot, Egan was certainly no child by the standards of his time. Any soldier, past or present, will aid a wounded comrade, regardless of their age, but the men of the 12th showed a special regard for Egan, indicating he had not quite outgrown boyhood, and the accompanying need to be protected, in their eyes.

The reaction to Egan's wounding among the diggers and future stockaders shows they also saw the distinction between boyhood and manhood as important. When it was falsely rumoured that the young drummer had been killed in the night-time skirmish on the Eureka lead, it was the community of Ballarat who paid for a grave marker, which stood for many years in the soldiers' enclosure at the cemetery.[9] Killing a man in a fight was a reasonable use of force, something that any man could be expected to do, but killing a *boy* was not only socially unacceptable, it was not honourable. Killing or harming someone who was weaker than oneself was not something men of honour did, and the diggers and stockaders certainly thought of themselves as men of honour. This sense of honour carried over into how they presumed the fight at the stockade would play out, as they wrongly thought the British Army would wait for a more worthy opponent before striking. For soldiers, honour came in the victories they won, and was an idea reserved for officers, rather than regular men. Engaging with the stockaders when they were outnumbered and unprepared was not honourable by civilian standards, however, it was good tactics. In the aftermath, Captain Thomas was able to focus on those aspects which appealed to the likes of Sir Charles Hotham and the ruling elite of Victoria, presenting them with a victory that they felt was morally acceptable.[10] The divide between military and civilian perceptions would later allow Peter Lalor to publicly upbraid Thomas as a liar and a dishonourable soldier.[11] The Establishment's view could not have made more of a contrast with Lalor's: Thomas was promoted on the back of his success at Eureka and went on to have a glittering military career.

The focus on behaving honourably and presenting themselves as wronged men forced to resort to violence also shines through in the attitudes of the stockaders towards any kind of intelligence gathering. Honourable men did not slink around eavesdropping and then run off to share everything they heard with a paymaster. For the military, the use of spies had no bearing on their manhood whatsoever, as sending agents into an enemy camp to ascertain their movements was a practical decision that increased their chance of victory. The trial of arms the stockaders envisioned at Eureka was one in which bravery and conviction would be enough of a foundation for success. There is no denying they were brave, and they were also aware of their deficiencies, especially in the areas of arms and discipline, compared to the professional soldiers of the British Army. But their perception of themselves as better men than the soldiers led to them prioritising the ideological aspects of their movement, rather than considering the consequences if they were caught unawares by the military. Captain Thomas and Commissioner Rede suspected there were stockader spies within the Camp (they were mistaken, but it was a reasonable assumption to make), and held their war council in the strictest secrecy as a result. Even fellow officers from the 12th and 40th Regiments were not

[9] Dorothy Wickham, *Deaths at Eureka* (Ballarat, VIC: D. Wickham, 1996), p. 12.
[10] "Council Paper: Disturbances Ballaarat." *Argus*, 18 Dec 1854, p. 6.
[11] Lalor, "To the Colonists of Victoria, 10 April 1855."

informed an attack was imminent until they were ordered to form up their men and proceed to the Eureka lead. The behaviour of the stockaders on Saturday night – leaving the stockade, going to bed, and sending away two-hundred of their best men – shows this secrecy paid off. They did not know an attack was in the wind, and better intelligence would have given them more time to organise and prepare themselves. However, it would have been unthinkable within the masculine ideology they had built for them to do such a thing, even if it was to their own detriment.

As for the soldiers, including the Eureka Six, as much as their masculinity was affected by by class, race, age and the other factors discussed within this work, culturally they did not need to prove they were men. When they formed up with their uniformed colleagues on what for some was their last morning alive, were not concerned about whether or not they were manly enough to win the fight. Their manhood was intrinsic, and would only be called into question if they *lost* a battle. Because the stockaders' masculinity was ideological, it was more malleable, and as a distinct sense of Victorian (and later Australian) manhood was developed, the measure of a man rested more on whether he was *willing* to fight for his beliefs, rather than the *outcome* of a physical fight. In the months and years that followed the stockaders defeat they presented themselves as doomed underdogs, who had nevertheless been determined to make a stand for their rights. They downplayed the violence of their movement and exaggerated the military response their actions provoked. They rewrote what it meant to be a man, so that even in defeat they were heralded as beacons of masculinity. They would no doubt be thrilled to know that, 170 years after their futile stand, Victoria is still talking about them.

The soldiers of Eureka receive considerably less attention. They have been victims of creeping anti-British sentiment that has stripped them of their identities. The diggers and stockaders were as British as the soldiers, and despite Clara Seekamp's impassioned editorial asking "Who is a foreigner?" in 1855, very few on the diggings would have embraced the idea that they were 'Australians. As demonstrated, soldiers' identities were as complex as those of civilian men; despite the popular stereotype, nineteenth-century infantry were not uniquely brutish, stupid or sadistic. The men who became the Eureka Six, and each of his colleagues, had joined the army for varied reasons, but all did so knowing there was a possibility they would be called upon to put their lives on the line. It is a small comfort that the men who did lose their lives did so defending a community they knew and had connection to. The Eureka Six were not fighting for Commissioner Rede, or Sir Charles Hotham, or Britain, or even the Empire. They were not the attack dogs of tyranny, nor were they butchers, devils or "red-coated rats."[12] They were men, and more than that they were professional soldiers who gave their lives to defend a community being terrorised by a small group of radical insurgents. Given Australia's recent involvement in overseas conflicts in similar circumstances, it is disappointing that the memories of the Eureka Six, and their comrades, have not been treated with more respect.

[12] Clare Wright, *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka* (Melbourne, VIC: The Text Publishing Company, 2013), p. 319.

Appendices

Appendix 1

Short Biographies of the Eureka Six

Boyle, Felix

Date of Birth: c. 1820

Place of Birth: Ireland

Regiment at Eureka: 12th Regiment

Date of Death: 10 January 1855

Place of Death: Ballarat, Victoria, Australia

Cause of Death: DOW, complications from gunshot wound to the face.

Age at Death: Thirty-two years (32yrs)

Alternate Names: N/A

Biography: Felix Boyle was a career soldier and carpenter from the north of Ireland, but exactly where he was born is unknown. He enlisted in the 10th Regiment of Foot when he was between ten and twelve years old and served in India for twenty years, before being pensioned out in 1850. He worked as a carpenter in Belfast until 1853, when he re-enlisted with the 12th Regiment. He was wounded at the Eureka Stockade, when a musket ball hit his nose and exited through his mouth, causing the lower part of his jaw to detach from his face. He was not originally assessed as mortally wounded, but later died of complications from this injury. He lived for four weeks after the stockade, and has the dubious double honour of being both the oldest of the Eureka Six, and the last to die of his wounds. He is buried in the Soldiers' Enclosure of the Old Ballarat Cemetery with Hall, Webb and Captain George Littlehales (the latter was not a victim of Eureka).

Hall, John

Date of Birth: c. 1824

Place of Birth: Limerick, Ireland

Regiment at Eureka: 12th Regiment

Date of Death: 31 December 1854

Place of Death: Ballarat, Victoria, Australia

Cause of Death: DOW, complications from (gunshot?) wound to unspecified area.

Age at Death: Thirty years (30yrs)

Alternate Names: Joseph Hall

Biography: John (sometimes recorded as Joseph) Hall was most likely born in Limerick, and joined the army in October 1853. Little else is known about him, except that he

died from wounds received at Eureka on the last day of December 1854. The nature of his injury was unspecified, but it was probably the result of a gunshot. He died almost four weeks after Eureka, suggesting his ultimate cause of death was complications or an infection, rather than the wound itself. He is buried in the Soldiers' Enclosure of the Old Ballarat Cemetery with Boyle, Webb and Captain George Littlehales (the latter was not a victim of Eureka).

Roney, Michael

Date of Birth: c. 1833

Place of Birth: Clonallon, County Down, Ireland

Regiment at Eureka: 40th Regiment

Date of Death: 3 December 1854

Place of Death: Ballarat, Victoria, Australia

Cause of Death: KIA, gunshot wound to the head.

Age at Death: Twenty-one years (21yrs)

Alternate Names: Michael Rooney

Biography: Michael Roney was the son of Arthur and Elizabeth Roney and was baptised on the 26th of September 1833 in Clonallon, Ireland. He joined the army in Belfast when he was twelve years old as a drummer. He arrived in Victoria in 1852 and was posted to both Melbourne and Ballarat during his two years in the colony. In 1853, while in Melbourne, he was court-martialled for being drunk and disorderly, and was fined 12*d*. He may have been the first casualty at the stockade, and was the first of the military to be killed there. He is buried in the Soldiers' Enclosure of the Old Ballarat Cemetery with Wall and Wise.

Wall, Joseph

Date of Birth: c. 1834

Place of Birth: Somerset, England

Regiment at Eureka: 40th Regiment

Date of Death: 3 December 1854

Place of Death: Ballarat, Victoria, Australia

Cause of Death: DOW, disembowelled by a pike.

Age at Death: Twenty years (20yrs)

Alternate Names: N/A

Biography: Very little information survives about Joseph Wall's life before he joined the army, apart from the fact that he was born around 1834 in Somerset. He joined the 40th

Regiment in 1852 and sailed with them to Victoria soon afterwards. He is the only known person to have been killed by a pike at Eureka. He was stabbed in the abdomen in the closing moments before the stockade fell to the military, and died while being taken back to Government Camp for treatment. He is buried in the Soldiers' Enclosure of the Old Ballarat Cemetery with Roney and Wise.

Webb, William

Date of Birth: c. 1835

Place of Birth: Hertfordshire, England

Regiment at Eureka: 12th Regiment

Date of Death: 5 December 1854

Place of Death: Ballarat, Victoria, Australia

Cause of Death: DOW, complications from gunshot wounds to the back and arm.

Age at Death: Nineteen years (19yrs)

Alternate Names: N/A

Biography: William Webb was the youngest of the Eureka Six; he died at just nineteen years of age, exactly one month and two days after he arrived in Victoria. He was born in Hertfordshire and joined the army in 1853, shortly before the 12th was sent to reinforce the 40th in Victoria. He was shot through the back and arm after entering the stockade and was assessed as mortally wounded when he was brought to the hospital at Government Camp. He died two days later, and was the first of the Eureka Six to be conveyed to the cemetery by gun carriage. He is buried in the Soldiers' Enclosure of the Old Ballarat Cemetery with Boyle, Hall and Captain George Littlehales (the latter was not a victim of Eureka).

Wise, Henry

Date of Birth: 12 April 1829

Place of Birth: Rome, Italy

Date of Death: 22 December 1854

Place of Death: Ballarat, Victoria, Australia

Cause of Death: DOW, complications from gunshot wounds to the legs.

Age at Death: Twenty-six years (26yrs)

Alternate Names: N/A

Biography: Henry Christopher Wise V was the eldest of eight living children of Henry Christopher Wise IV and his first wife, Harriet Skipwith. He attended Eton and Sandhurst,

where he graduated top of his class and earned his first commission as an ensign (1846). He later purchased commissions as a Lieutenant (1849), then a Captain (1853). He had previously commanded a force of military pensioners in Ballarat in 1852, before being posted to Geelong later that year. He returned with a detachment of the 40th Regiment in November 1854. His death from complications related to the gunshot wounds he received at Eureka, or possibly in the aftermath of a presumed amputation, elicited public mourning in Ballarat, and his funeral was widely attended. He is buried in the Soldiers' Enclosure of the Old Ballarat Cemetery with Roney and Wall. He remains the best-known of the Eureka Six.

Appendix 2

Jack Byers and Golden Roberts

Author's Note: John "Jack" Byers and John "Golden" Roberts, whose recollections and diaries were used to inform parts of this work, were my ancestors. Despite being a similar age and having much in common, neither man ever met, although they were distantly related by marriage: Roberts' daughter, Florence, married Byers' grandson, John, in 1908. Their son, William "Bill" Byers, was my great-grandfather – I knew him as Bebe. He preserved their diaries within his own journals, which were then passed onto my grandfather, Brian Byers. In early 2023 I obtained a copy of the journal from my grandfather. The original journal has since been donated to the Cobh Heritage Centre in Ireland, where it is available for researchers to view.

John "Jack" Byers, 12th Regiment

Very little is known about Jack Byers. He was born c.1834 and in his diary said he was from Dublin, Ireland, although no birth or baptism record for him exists in the family archives. The information my family has about him comes from stories and recollections recorded by his great-grandson (my great-grandfather) between 1965 – 1995, and those parts of his diary which have survived. Byers joined the 12th Regiment in 1854, shortly before the regiment set sail for Victoria. On the muster roll he claimed to be unmarried and childless, when in fact he had a wife and a four-year-old son (also John Byers) in Dublin. Why he chose to leave his family is unclear and he makes no record or mention of them anywhere in his diary, but perhaps he was simply too young for the dual responsibilities of marriage and parenthood. Byers was only sixteen when his son was born, and it is not clear if he ever saw him again after he left Ireland and joined the army. Byers fought with the 12th Regiment at Eureka on 3 December 1854, and attended the funeral of William Webb two days later. Presumably he was also present for the funerals of Felix Boyle and John Hall, although he does not mention either. On the 23 August 1855 he deserted while still in Ballarat and after that he disappears from the records, including those held privately by my family. How his diary came to be in our family archive is not recorded, although for William Byers to have had access to it in 1965 suggests strongly that Jack Byers returned to Ireland at some point after deserting from the army and reconnected with his family. Where and when he died, along with the location of his grave (if one exists), is unknown.

"Golden" Roberts, 18th Regiment

Golden Roberts is far less mysterious than Jack was. He was born in Tipperary, Ireland in 1839, and married local woman Elizabeth Mullens in 1859. Roberts joined the 18th Regiment of Foot in 1860 and the family moved to Cork, where their first child was born, and then to Aotearoa New Zealand, where Roberts fought in the Land Wars (formerly known as the Māori Wars). Their next three children, all daughters, were born in Aotearoa New Zealand and in 1866 Roberts was given a tract of land in Taranaki, in recognition of his services to the crown. In 1868 an earthquake struck the area, and Elizabeth Roberts joined several other army wives in petitioning the commanding officer to send their husbands back to Ireland. The Roberts family settled in Dublin and stayed there for the rest of their lives, having seven further children over the next sixteen years. In total, Golden and Elizabeth Roberts had eleven

children, although four of them died before their fifth birthdays. My great-great grandmother, Florence Roberts, was their youngest child.

William Byers makes no mention in his journal of whether he copied Roberts' experiences from a diary or letters, or if he was recording things Florence had been told by other members of Roberts' family. Roberts himself did not live to meet his grandson-in-law, and died in Dublin in 1909, at the age of 70. He was buried in a family plot with his children. He was joined there in 1915 and 1916 by two of his unmarried daughters, and finally his wife in 1920. Interestingly, it is thanks to Golden's service in Aotearoa New Zealand that my extended family eventually settled there.

Florence Roberts married John Alfred Byers (the grandson of Jack Byers) in 1908, and their eldest son, William, was my great-grandfather. J.A. Byers was killed in action in 1917, and Florence remarried in 1921 to William McCabe. According to her son, Florence was frightened of the violence that was engulfing Dublin and McCabe suggested they immigrate to Australia. Florence was still in contact with family who had returned to Aotearoa New Zealand and insisted on moving there instead. The farm in Taranaki was no longer there (it is unclear whether the Roberts family sold it after the earthquake or if it was simply abandoned), so they settled in Wellington. William Byers was still living in Wellington when I was born there in 1993.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Manuscripts/Unpublished Sources

Byers Family Archive

Byers, William. “Byers Family History.”

National Library of Australia

Smyth, Patrick. “Letter to William Henry Archer.” MS BOX 264/19.

National Library of Ireland

McNally, Robert. “Main Pages from Diary of Private Robert McNally, 40th Regiment of Foot, 1828 [Sept. 26] - 1833 Nov. 26.” MS BOX 13,265/1.

Mitchell Library

Huyghue, Samuel. “The Ballarat Riots, 1854.” Call Number A 1789.

State Library of Victoria

Evans, Charles. “Diary of Charles Evans, 1853 September 24 -1855 January 21.” MS Box 3994/1-4.

Pasley, Charles. “Letters of Charles Pasley.” MS BOX 94/4.

Printed/Published Sources

Government Documents

Britian

“Birth Certificate of Henry Wise.” Select Births and Baptisms, 1806-1900, Italy. Ancestry.com [database online].

Further Papers Relevant to the Recent Discovery of Gold in Australia. London, UK: House of Commons. 1853.

Stapylton, H.E.C. *Eton School Lists 1791-1850*. London, UK: E P Williams, 1863.

Ireland

“Baptism Record of Michael Roney.” Catholic Parish Registers, 1655-1915. Microfilm 05497/06. NLI.

Victoria

Ballarat Reform League. “The Charter of the Ballarat Reform League.” 1854. https://ballaratreformleague.org.au/brl-charter/.

Westgrath, William. *Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Condition of the Goldfields of Victoria*. 1855.

Victorian Supreme Court

Queen v. Joseph. 1855.

Victorian Office of Births, Deaths and Marriages

“Death Certificate of Dennis Brian.” No. 2841. 1854.

“Death Certificate of Felix Boyle.” No. 3264. 1855.

“Death Certificate of Michael Roney.” No. 3261. 1855.

“Death Certificate of William Webb.” No. 3265. 1855.

“Death Certificate of Henry Wise.” No. 3260 1855.

British Army Records

Australian Joint Copying Project (at the National Library of Australia)

War Office Series 12 – Muster Roll of the 40th Regiment of Foot (2nd Somersetshire) 1854 – 1855. Reel No: 3777.

War Office Series 12 – Muster Roll of the 12th Regiment of Foot (Suffolk) 1854 – 1855. Reel No: 3714-3715.

The National Archives, UK

War Office Series 76 – Records of Officers’ Services.

War Office Series 86 – Judge Advocate General's Office: District Courts Martial Registers, Home and Abroad (1852-1855).

Books

Anon. *Social Life and Manners in Australia: Being the Notes of Eight Years' Experience.* London, UK: Longman, Green, Longman and Roberts. 1861.

Carboni, Raffello. *The Eureka Stockade: The Consequence of Some Pirates Wanting on Quarter-Deck a Rebellion.* Melbourne, VIC: J.P. Atkinson. 1855.

Craig, William. *My Adventures on the Australian Goldfields.* Invercargill, NZ: Cassell. 1903.

Earp, George. *The Gold Colonies of Australia, Their History and Progress, with Ample Details of the Gold Mines, How to Get to Them and Every Advice to Emigrants* London, UK: George Routledge & Co. 1852.

Garryowen. *The Chronicles of Early Melbourne, 1835 - 1852, Historical, Anecdotal & Personal.* Vol. 2. Melbourne, VIC: Fergusson and Mitchell. 1888

Howitt, William. *Land, Labour, and Gold, or Two Years in Victoria with Visits to Sydney and Van Diemen's Land* London, UK: Longman, Green, Brown and Longman. 1855.

Lewis, Samuel. *A Topographical Dictionary of Ireland: Comprising the Several Counties, Cities, Boroughs, Corporate, Market, and Post Towns, Parishes, and Villages, with Historical and Statistical Descriptions.* Baltimore, MD: Genealogical Pub. Co. 1984.

Lynch, John. *The Story of the Eureka Stockade.* Melbourne, VIC: The Australian Catholic Truth Society. 1894.

Stoney, Henry. *Victoria: With a Description of Its Principal Cities, Melbourne and Geelong, and Remarks on the Present State of the Colony; Including an Account of the Ballaarat Disturbances and of the Death of Captain Wise, 40th Regiment.* London, UK: Smith & Elder. 1856.

Symthies, Raymond. *Historical Records of the 40th (2nd Somersetshire) Regiment, Now 1st Battalion of the Prince of Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire Regiment) from It's Formation, in 1717, to 1893.* Devonport, UK: Bremner Printing Works. 1894.

Tymms, Samuel. *The Family Topographer: Being a Compendious Account of the Counties of England.* Vol. 2, London, UK: J.B. Nichols & Son, 1832.

Newspapers

Age (Melbourne)

Argus (Melbourne)

Ballarat Courier

Ballarat Times

Birmingham Gazette

Edinburgh Gazette

Freeman's Journal (Sydney)

Geelong Advertiser

Grenville Standard

Guardian (London)

Ipswich Journal

Journal (Newcastle Upon Tyne)

Leader (Melbourne)

Morning Chronicle (London)

Sydney Morning Herald

Yorkshire Herald and the York Herald

World's News (Sydney)

Periodicals

Bastin, John. "Eureka—an Eye-Witness Account." *The Australian Quarterly*. 1956. 76-83.

Nicholls, Henry. "Reminiscences of the Eureka Stockade." *The Centennial Magazine*. 1890. 746 - 50.

Secondary Sources

Government Documents

Britian

Ministry of Defence. *UK Armed Forces Biannual Diversity Statistics 1 April 2022*. London, UK: Ministry of Defence. 2022.

United Nations

Committee on the Rights of the Child. *Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britian and Northern Ireland*. United Nations. 2016.

Books

Bate, Weston. *Lucky City: The First Generation at Ballarat: 1851 – 1901.* Melbourne: VIC: Melbourne University Press. 1978.

Blake, Gregory. *To Pierce the Tyrant's Heart: A Military History of the Battle for the Eureka Stockade: 3 December 1854.* Australian Army History Collection. Loftus, N.S.W: Australian Military History Publications [in association with the Australian Army History Unit]. 2009.

Bowley, Arthur. *Wages in the United Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 1900.

Clark, Anna. *Making Australian History.* Sydney, NSW: Vintage Books. 2022.

Colley, Linda. *Britons.* London, England: Yale University Press, 2005.

Connell, Raewyn. *Masculinities.* 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2005.

Corfield, Justin, Wickham, Dorothy, and Gervasoni, Clare. *The Eureka Encyclopaedia.* Ballarat, VIC: Ballarat Heritage Services. 2004.

Dudink, Stefan, Hagemann, Karen and Tosh, John. *Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History.* London, UK: Manchester University Press. 2004.

Grube, Dennis. *At the Margins of Victorian Britian: Politics, Immorality and Britishness in the Nineteenth Century.* London, England: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.

English, Otto. *Fake History: Ten Great Lies and How They Shaped the World.* London, UK: Welbeck. 2021.

Haldane, Robert. *The People's Force: A History of the Victoria Police.* 3rd ed. Carlton, VIC: Melbourne University Press. 2017.

Hill, David. *Gold: The Fever That Forever Changed Australia.* North Sydney, N.S.W: William Heinemann. 2010.

Holmes, Richard. *Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket.* London, UK: WW Norton & Company. 2002.

Kipling, Rudyard. *Department Ditties, Barrack Room Ballads and Other Verses.* New York, NY: United States Book Company. 1890.

MacFarlane, Ian. *Eureka: From the Official Records.* Melbourne, VIC: PROV. 1995.

Masters, Chris. *No Front Line: Australia's Special Forces at War in Afghanistan.* Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin. 2017.

Molony, John. *Eureka.* 2nd ed. Carlton, VIC: Melbourne University Press. 2001.

Nelson, Claudia. "Growing Up: Childhood." In *A Companion to Victorian Literature and Culture*. 2017.

Rubenhold, Hallie. *The Five: The Untold Lives of the Women Killed by Jack the Ripper.* London, UK: Doubleday. 2019.

Sanghera, Sathnam. *Empireland: How Imperialism Has Shaped Modern Britain* [audiobook]. London, UK: Viking. 2021.

Sanghera, Sathnam. *Empireworld: How British Imperialism Has Shaped the Globe* [audiobook]. London, UK: Viking. 2024.

Serle, Geoffrey. *The Golden Age: A History of the Colony of Victoria, 1851-1861.* 3rd ed. Carlton, VIC: Melbourne University Press. 1977.

Smith, Neil. *Soldiers Bleed Too: The Redcoats at the Eureka Stockade 1854.* Gardenvale, VIC: Mostly Unsung Military History Research and Publications. 2004.

Smythe, William, Crowley, John and Murphy, Mike (eds). *Atlas of the Great Irish Famine 1845 - 52.* New York, NY: New York University Press. 2012.Tanner, James. *Instruments of Battle: The Fighting Drummers & Buglers of the British Army from the Late 17th Century to the Present Day.* Oxford, UK: Casemate Publishers. 2017.

Tosh, John. "The History of Masculinity: An Outdated Concept?" in *What Is Masculinity? Historical Dynamics from Antiquity to the Contemporary World*, edited by John H. Arnold and Sean Brady. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. 2011.

Wickham, Dorothy. *Deaths at Eureka.* Ballarat, VIC: D. Wickham. 1996.

Wickham, Dorothy. *Women of the Diggings, Ballarat 1854.* Ballarat, VIC: BHS Publishing. 2009.

Withers, William. *The History of Ballarat: From the First Pastoral Settlement to the Present Time.* Carlton, VIC: Queensberry Hill Press. 1980.

Wright, Clare. *The Forgotten Rebels of Eureka.* Melbourne, Victoria: The Text Publishing Company. 2013.

Journal Articles

Allanby, Matthew. "Who 'Owns' the Eureka Flag?" *Agora* 57, no. 3 (2022): 6-10.

Amies, Marion. "Amelia Carey White - Her Book, Her Life: Victoria, October 1852 to November 1859." *Victorian Historical Journal* 89, no. 2 (2018): 325-46.

Anderson, Olive. "Early Experiences of Manpower Problems in an Industrial Society at War: Great Britain, 1854-56." *Political Science Quarterly* 82, no. 4 (1967): 526-45.

Bate, Weston. "Perceptions of Eureka." [In English]. *Victorian Historical Journal* 75, no. 2 (2004): 133-44.

Bayly, C. "Ireland, India and the Empire: 1780-1914." *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 10 (2000): 377-97.

Bedikian, Sonia. "The Death of Mourning: From Victorian Crepe to the Little Black Dress." *OMEGA-Journal of Death and Dying* 57, no. 1 (2008): 35-52.

Beggs-Sunter, Anne. "Remembering Eureka." *Journal of Australian studies* 25, no. 70 (2001): 49-56.

Beggs-Sunter, Anne. "Contested Memories of Eureka: Museum Interpretations of the Eureka Stockade." *Labour History*, no. 85 (2003): 29-45.

Beggs-Sunter, Anne. "Eureka: Gathering "the Oppressed of All Nations." *Journal of Australian Colonial History* 10, no. 1 (2008): 15-34.

Bittles, A. and Smith, M. "Religious Differentials in Post-famine Marriage Patterns, Northern Ireland, 1840-1915. I. Demographic and Isonomy Analysis." *Human Biology* 66, no. 1 (1994): 59-76.

Blanco, Richard L. "The Attempted Control of Venereal Disease in the Army of Mid-Victorian England." *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 45, no. 184 (1967): 234-41.

Bowyer-Bower, TA. "Some Early Educational Influences in the British Army." *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 33, no. 133 (1955): 5-12.

Bush, Nancy. "The Student and His Professor: Colonial Times to Twentieth Century." *The Journal of Higher Education* 40, no. 8 (1969/11/01 1969): 593-609.

Cesur, Resul, Freidman, Travis and Sabia, Joseph. "War, Traumatic Health Shocks, and Religiosity." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 179 (2020/11/01/ 2020): 475-502.

Cohen, Michèle. "“Manners” Make the Man: Politeness, Chivalry, and the Construction of Masculinity, 1750–1830." *Journal of British Studies* 44, no. 2 (2005): 312-29.

Colley, Linda. "Britishness and Otherness: An Argument." *Journal of British Studies* 31, no. 4 (1992): 309-29.

Van de Putte, Bart, et. al. "The Rise of Age Homogamy in 19th Century Western Europe." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 71 (December 2009): 1234 - 53.

Connell, RW and Messerschmidt, James. "Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept." *Gender & society* 19, no. 6 (2005): 829-59.

Davidoff, Leonore. "Class and Gender in Victorian England: The Diaries of Arthur J. Munby and Hannah Cullwick." *Feminist Studies* 5, no. 1 (1979): 87-141.

Denman, Terence. "'The Red Livery of Shame': The Campaign against Army Recruitment in Ireland, 1899-1914." *Irish Historical Studies* 29, no. 114 (1994): 208-33.

Dinwiddy, John Rowland. "The Early Nineteenth-Century Campaign against Flogging in the Army." *The English Historical Review* 97, no. 383 (1982): 308-31.

Edghill, Keith. "Dangerous Doctrines! The Battle for Anglican Supremacy in the British Army, 1810-1865." *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 80, no. 321 (2002): 36-57.

Francis, Martin. "The Domestication of the Male? Recent Research on Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century British Masculinity." *The Historical Journal* 45, no. 3 (2002): 637-52.

Gilbert, Arthur. "Buggery and the British Navy, 1700-1861." *Journal of Social History* 10, no. 1 (1976): 72-98.

Hadamitzky, Christiane. "Public Vs. Private Honour." *helden. heroes. héros.* 2 (2016): 63 - 68.

Hargreaves, Jennifer. "‘Playing like Gentlemen While Behaving like Ladies’: Contradictory Features of the Formative Years of Women’s Sport.” *The International Journal of the History of Sport* no. 2 (1985): 40–52.

Harvey, A. "Prosecutions for Sodomy in England at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century." *The Historical Journal* 21, no. 4 (1978): 939-48.

Hay, Marnie. "Centuries of Irish Childhoods." *Irish Economic and Social History* 47, no. 1 (2020/12/01 2020): 3-9.

Howard, Alexandra. "For the Good of Empire: Masculine Sporting Culture and Britain's Imperial Enterprise." *Academia* (2024): 1 – 22.

Ireland, John. "Eureka: Politics or Self Defence." [In English]. Journal Article. *Victorian Historical Journal* 68, no. 1 (1997): 29-36.

Johnson, Paul. "Disgraceful Conduct: Parliamentary Regulation of Homosexuality in the British Army, 1829-1992." *British Journal for Military History* 8, no. 3 (2022): 79-107.

Karsten, Peter. "Irish Soldiers in the British Army, 1792-1922: Suborned or Subordinate?". *Journal of Social History* 17, no. 1 (1983): 31-64.

Kinealy, Christine. "The Irish Famine 1845 - 52." *North Irish Roots* 2, no. 5 (1990): 158-61.

Kupers, Terry. "Toxic Masculinity as a Barrier to Mental Health Treatment in Prison." *Journal of Clinical Psychology* 61, no. 6 (2005): 713-24.

Laqueur, Thomas. "Bodies, Death, and Pauper Funerals." *Representations*, no. 1 (1983): 109-31.

Myerly, Scott. ""The Eye Must Entrap the Mind": Army Spectacle and Paradigm in Nineteenth-Century Britain." *Journal of Social History* (1992): 105-31.

Normington-Rawling, J. "Before Eureka." *Labour History*, no. 4 (1963): 11-18.

O'Grada, Cormac. "Did Ireland 'under'-Industrialise." *Irish Economic and Social History* 37, no. 1 (2010): 117-23.

O'Rourke, Kevin. "The Economic Impact of the Famine in the Short and Long Run." *The American Economic Review* 84, no. 2 (1994), 309-13.

O'Malley, Patrick. "Irish Whiteness and the Nineteenth-Century Construction of Race." *Victorian Literature and Culture* 51, no. 2 (2023): 167-98.Oddy, Derek. "Gone for a Soldier: The Anatomy of a Nineteenth-Century Army Family." Article. *Journal of Family History* 25, no. 1 (2000): 39-53.

Parham, Don. "Riot or Revolution: Getting the Full Story of the Eureka Stockade." Journal Article. *Quadrant* 51, no. 1–2 (2007): 42-47.

Pearsall, Cornelia. "Burying the Duke: Victorian Mourning and the Funeral of the Duke of Wellington." *Victorian Literature and Culture* 27, no. 2 (1999): 365-93.

Peers, Douglas. "Privates Off Parade: Regimenting Sexuality in the Nineteenth-Century Indian Empire." *The International History Review* 20, no. 4 (1998): 823-54.

Peers, Douglas. "Soldiers, Surgeons and the Campaigns to Combat Sexually Transmitted Diseases in Colonial India, 1805–1860." *Medical History* 42, no. 2 (1998): 137-60.

Quirk, Kate. "The Colonial Goldfields: Visions and Revisions." *Australasian Historical Archaeology* 26 (2008): 13-20.

Samuels, Martin. "'Moral Factors' in British Military Thought and Doctrine, 1856–1899." Article. *War in History* 29, no. 2 (2022): 341-63.

Sherwood, Marika. "White Myths, Black Omissions: The Historical Origins of Racism in Britain." *International Journal of Historical Teaching, Learning and Research* 3, no. 1 (2003): 45-54.

Shuttleworth, Sally. "Victorian Childhood." *Journal of Victorian Culture* 9, no. 1 (2004): 107-13.

Smith, E. "Educating the Soldier in the Nineteenth Century." *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 65, no. 264 (1987): 200-07.

Smith, E. "Educating the Soldier in the Nineteenth Century (Continued)." *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 66, no. 265 (1988): 35-45.

Stoddart, Brian. “Sport, Cultural Imperialism, and Colonial Response in the British Empire.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 30, no. 4 (1988): 649–73.

Teffeteller, Gordon. "Wellington and Sir Rowland Hill." *The International History Review* 11, no. 1 (1989): 68-75.

Tosh, John. "What Should Historians Do with Masculinity? Reflections on Nineteenth-Century Britain." *History Workshop*, no. 38 (1994): 179-202.

Tosh, John. "‘A Fresh Access of Dignity’: Masculinity and Imperial Commitment in Britain, 1815–1914." *University of North London* (2004): 1-20.

Tucker, Albert. "Army and Society in England 1870-1900: A Reassessment of the Cardwell Reforms." *Journal of British Studies* 2, no. 2 (1963): 110-41.

Walvin, James. "Dust to Dust: Celebrations of Death in Victorian England." *Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques* 9, no. 3 (1982): 353-71.

Wright, Clare. "Forgetting to Remember: Time to Be Brave." *Griffith REVIEW*, no. 48 (2015): 149-57.

Wrigley, E Anthony. "Reconsidering the Industrial Revolution: England and Wales." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 49, no. 1 (2018): 9-42.

Conference Papers

Frost, Warwick. "Refighting the Eureka Stockade: Managing and Marketing the Heritage of a Dissonant Battlefield." CAUTHE Conference. Sydney, NSW: Monash University. 2007.

Thesis

Linch, Kevin. "The Recruitment of the British Army 1807-1815." University of Leeds. 2001.

Newspapers

Age (Melbourne)

Ballarat Courier

Periodicals

Edwards, Park. "Digger Revolt Down Under." *Military History*, December 2000.

Jr., John Osborn. "Death Penalty for Desertion." *Military Heritage*, April 2007.

Blogs

Anderson, Margaret and Wilcox, Ann. "Children at Work." *Old Treasury Building*. 27 July 2024. https://www.oldtreasurybuilding.org.au/lost-jobs/children-at-work.

Bvance, Samantha. "Victorian Mourning & Funerary Practices." *Victorian Monsters*. 9 Jan 2015. https://victorianmonsters.wordpress.com/victorian-funerary-practices/.

Webpages

"Activism and Reform, Eureka and Human Rights." Eureka and Human Rights Friends of Ireland Society. Updated 3 December 2012. Accessed 19 October 2023. https://humanrights.gov.au/about/news/speeches/activism-and-reform-eureka-and-human-rights2012.

"Child Recruitment and Use." United Nations, Updated 2024, accessed 22 Jan, 2024, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/six-grave-violations/child-soldiers/.

"Purchase of Officers' Commissions in the British Army, The." 2005, accessed 6 March 2024, https://web.archive.org/web/20160520024659/http://www.colonialwargaming.co.uk/Miscellany/Army/Commissions.htm.

"Royal Lincolnshire Regiment, The." Accessed 6 Sep 2024. https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/royal-lincolnshire-regiment.

"Gold." Victorian Government. Accessed 3 October 2024. https://resources.vic.gov.au/geology-exploration/minerals/metals/gold.

Visual Sources

Artwork

Doudiet, Charles. “The Eureka Hotel Riot.” Watercolour on paper. 1854. Ballarat Fine Art Gallery.

Gill, S. T. “Zealous Gold Diggers, Castlemaine 1852.” Watercolour and pencil on paper. 1857. SLV. Accession No: H141536.

Photographs

Byers, Juliana. “The Soldiers' Enclosure.” September 2023. Ballarat Old Cemetery, Victoria.

Byers Juliana. “The Soldier’s Memorial and Graves.” September 2023. Ballarat Old Cemetery, Victoria.

Byers, Juliana. “The Diggers’ Memorial.” May 2024. Ballarat Old Cemetery, Victoria.

Wickham, Dorothy. "James Ethersay's Book, Entries 422 – 465." Eurekapedia. https://www.eurekapedia.org/images/b/be/DCP_2784.JPG, https://www.eurekapedia.org/images/8/85/DCP_2785.JPG. Ballarat, Victoria.