Submission to 'Creeping Acquisitions' Consultation Paper

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Burns, Alex (2008) Submission to 'Creeping Acquisitions' Consultation Paper. Discussion Paper. Australian Government, The Treasury, Canberra.

Abstract

This submission responds to the Australian Treasury's consultation paper Creeping Acquisitions on the notification requirements for mergers and acquisitions (M&A), notably where 'creeping acquisitions' may occur. The response discusses why policymakers need to distinguish between mergers and acquisitions; and how regulators can keep pace with M&A developments in economics, finance, taxation and risk management. It contends that Section 50 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cwlth) may not capture the complexity of markets, and that M&A practitioners will structure deals to avoid or minimise the 'aggregation model' and 'substantial market power model'. Thus, the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC) and the Australian Competition Tribunal have had limited success due to M&A practitioner stratagems. The submission suggests that: (1) other parties in the M&A ecosystem could be involved to encourage timely information revelation in markets, (2)notification requirements be developed for specific risks and scenarios; and (3) the analytical foundations of the 'With or Without' test be strengthened to anticipate market distortions such as asset bubbles, market failures and systemic risk that require regulatory supervision and intervention.

Item type Monograph (Discussion Paper)
URI https://vuir.vu.edu.au/id/eprint/1978
Official URL http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1422/PDF/Burn...
Subjects Historical > RFCD Classification > 340000 Economics
Historical > RFCD Classification > 360000 Policy and Political Science
Keywords creeping acquisitions, M&A, mergers and acquisitions, with or without test, Australian Treasury, Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, competition dynamics, notification requirements, Trade Practices Act, Section 50, aggregation model, substantial market power model, information revelation, Australian Competition Tribunal, regulatory supervision, regulatory intervention, M&A practitioners, knowledge base
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